

BRISTOL **SHORTS** RESEARCH

LANDE: THE CALAIS 'JUNGLE' AND BEYOND

DAN HICKS AND SARAH MALLET



DAN HICKS
AND SARAH MALLET

LANDE: THE CALAIS 'JUNGLE' AND BEYOND



First published in Great Britain in 2019 by

Bristol University Press
University of Bristol
1-9 Old Park Hill
Bristol
BS2 8BB
UK
t: +44 (0)117 954 5940
www.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk

North America office:
Bristol University Press
c/o The University of Chicago Press
1427 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637, USA
t: +1 773 702 7700
f: +1 773 702 9756
sales@press.uchicago.edu
www.press.uchicago.edu

© Dan Hicks and Sarah Mallet 2019

The digital PDF version of this title is available Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 license (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>) which permits adaptation, alteration, reproduction and distribution for non-commercial use, without further permission provided the original work is attributed. The derivative works do not need to be licensed on the same terms.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested.

ISBN 978-1-5292-0787-3 (paperback)
ISBN 978-1-5292-0618-0 (hardback)
ISBN 978-1-5292-0621-0 (ePub)
ISBN 978-1-5292-0622-7 (Mobi)
ISBN 978-1-5292-0619-7 (OA PDF)

The right of Dan Hicks and Sarah Mallet to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press.

Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher.

The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the authors and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication.

Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality.

Cover design by blu inc, Bristol


Front cover: 'The Hopeland', copyright Majid Adin 2019

Photographs courtesy of Caroline Gregory, included with permission

Printed and bound in Great Britain by CMP, Poole

Bristol University Press uses environmentally responsible print partners





The Hopeland (Majid Adin 2019)

**For Jan-Georg Deutsch (1956–2016),
colleague and friend at St Cross College**

Contents

Preface	vi
1 Introduction: borderline archaeology	1
2 Environmental hostility	23
3 Temporal violence	47
4 Visual politics	67
5 Giving time	93
Notes	115
References	121
Index	139

Preface

This book looks at La Lande – the site of the ‘Jungle’ at Calais during the years 2015 to 2016 – through the lens of Contemporary Archaeology. Such an approach draws on the distinctive focus on material culture, the built environment, and landscapes and ecologies, that emerge through the application of approaches from anthropological archaeology to the most recent past and the undocumented present. This exercise in Contemporary Archaeology aims to expand the field of material culture studies (Hicks, 2010) through a foregrounding of place, time, transformation, visibility, (post)colonial legacies, and intervention, and also to open new dialogues with the anthropological museum as a political space. The book is a companion volume to an exhibit, also titled *Lande: The Calais ‘Jungle’ and beyond*, displayed at the Pitt Rivers Museum during 2019. Taken together, the book and the exhibit aim to raise cross-disciplinary questions around the material, environmental, temporal and visual dimensions of La Lande as a place of dehumanising borderwork, governance and violence on the one hand, and on the other as a ‘space of appearance’ and protest, and as a site for comparison. In this respect, they also represent a contribution to the prospect of a Visual Archaeology, and towards the possibilities of Activist Archaeologies that engage with a wider cross-cultural moment of *visual politics*. We introduce the idea of *giving time* as one way of conceptualising the work of archaeologists in the contemporary world that takes inspiration from the many grassroots movements around Calais. We also introduce the idea of *militarist colonialism* as a key part of the ongoing human and material legacies encountered at La Lande.

The cover image of this book, also reproduced as the frontispiece, is a photo-illustration by Majid Adin titled ‘The

PREFACE

Hopeland' (2019), made through the act of returning to La Lande. Caroline Gregory's photographs accompany our text. They were taken during the two years that she volunteered at the 'Jungle' in 2015–16, and also form one part of the Pitt Rivers exhibit. Caroline Gregory is a journalist and aid worker who continues to highlight the plight of those stuck on the border. Her photographs were taken with the express intent to document and report what was going on in the camp, the small moments of life and joy and the repression and horror alike. The process of selecting these photos for the book, out of an archive of 30,000, was difficult, emotional and fraught with impossible questions, not least about whether or not faces should be shown. Ethical questions surrounding identifying refugees clash with concerns about not dehumanising the situation for observers. These pictures are not dated or captioned since, as Caroline explained in a message to us:

'lots of them don't gain any relevance from their dates, but rather show "how things were", the daily experience and everyday visuals and so on. It wasn't a period of constant happenings; most of it became some kind of normal life for those there and I think it's important to show that and not make it sound like every day was a drama or every day had a lot of significance. This was especially true for refugees – as volunteers we were constantly a bit "on edge" and playing catch-up, but for them, boredom and a sort of routine was the norm. What these photos bear witness to is both extraordinary and painfully ordinary: flowers in front of a house, a man making chips, young men playing football. This kind of visual activism, documenting ordinary life in an extraordinary landscape, could only be achieved by long-term immersion, and it is what makes them so powerful. The media response, much like the academic field of Refugee Studies, is overdetermined by 'emergency', but only by taking our time and looking

beyond the urgency can we really understand La Lande in all its contradictions.'

Our thanks are due to Caroline, and also to Majid Adin, Shaista Aziz, Babak Inaloo, Nour Munawar, Noah Salibo, Suzanne Partridge and Wshear Wali, with whom we have worked on the *Lande* exhibit at the Pitt Rivers Museum. Thanks also to the Architectures of Displacement project team, Mark Breeze, Rachael Kiddey and Tom Scott-Smith, out of which this book and exhibit developed. Thanks also to all those who have inspired, informed and supported the book and museum exhibit, whether by simply speaking with us about Calais or through major contributions to shaping the work, including Maddy Allen, Maximilian Basta, Carine Bazin, Sophie Besse, Daniel Castro Garcia, Dan Court, Thom Davies, Marike Dee, Manon de Thoury, Nick Ellwood, Anna Feigenbaum, Alice Freeman, Louise Fowler, Cannelle Gueguen-Teil, Anne Gourouben, Grainne Hassett, Liam Healy, Maria Hagan, Cyrille Hanappe, Bradley Hallier-Smith, Tom Hatton, Margaret Horner, Olivier Kugler, Shakir Javed, Ben Jennings, Diego Jenowein, Maya Konforti, Cyrus Manhoubian, Katherine Mann, Jenny Mellings, Gideon Mendel, Oli Mould, Rosanna O'Keefe, Jason Parkinson, Rob Pinney, Julien Pitinome, Alison Raimes, Ania Ready, Alan Schaller, Rosanna Sheehan, Harley Weir, Blue Weiss, Henk Wildschutt, everyone at Counterpoint Arts, everyone at Common Ground Oxford, everyone at Help Refugees, and the staff and volunteers of the Pitt Rivers Museum. The shortcomings of the book are, of course, ours alone.

Sarah: I would also like to thank 'Les Marcheurs' on the Marche Solidaire between Ventimiglia and London in 2018. I only walked a little bit of it, but those conversations we had under the crazy hot sun of northern France were both inspiring and challenging. Similarly, I would like to thank everyone at the Warehouse in Calais: all the staff and volunteers working for

PREFACE

Help Refugees, L'Auberge des Migrants, Utopia 56, Refugee Info Bus, Refugee Community Kitchen, Refugee Youth Service, Refugee Women and Children's Centre and School Bus project. Thanks also to Toby Martin.

Dan: I would like to thank Oscar Aldred, Mary Beaudry, Ed Bispham, Felicity Bodenstein, Victor Buchli, Mats Burström, Sam Derbyshire, Caitlin DeSilvey, James Dixon, Paul Dresch, Emma Dwyer, Danielle Gilbert, Chris Gosden, Martin Hall, Tim Ingold, Rosemary Joyce, Frédéric Keck, Kristian Kristiansen, Pierre Lemonnier, Mark Leone, Gavin Lucas, Laura McAtackney, James McDougall, Randy McGuire, Lesley McFadyen, Janet Miller, Wayne Modest, Chris Morton, Gabe Moshenska, Morten Nielsen, Hilary Orange, Zuzanna Olszewska, Sefryn Penrose, Angela Piccini, Criraj Rassool, Mike Rowlands, Nathan Schlanger, John Schofield, Kelvin Smith, Olivia Smith, Carole Souter, Jonas Tinius, Laura Van Broekhoven, Margareta von Oswald, Richard Wentworth, William Whyte, Laurie Wilkie, and Tom Yarrow for conversations over the years that have contributed in different ways to the approach taken in the current book. I also benefitted from the constantly stimulating intellectual environment of the Musée du quai Branly–Jacques Chirac during my Visiting Professorship there in the academic year 2017–18, during which much of this research was undertaken, and I am grateful to all my friends and colleagues in Paris for stimulating conversations around this topic and beyond. Thanks are also due to audiences at the universities of UCL, York, Nanterre, and Pantheon-Sorbonne for their comments and feedback on presentations on this work at various points in its gestation during 2017 and 2018.

This research was supported by grants from the Economic and Social Research Council (ES/P005004/1), the Arts and Humanities Research Council, the John Fell OUP Fund, TORCH, the Henry Moore Foundation, and ICOM UK,

to whom thanks are due. We are also thankful to the editorial team at Bristol University Press for their ethos, professionalism and hard work in turning this project from a proposal into a book, and also to our colleagues and friends at St Cross College, Oxford. Finally, we thank each other.

Our royalties from this book will be donated to L'Auberge des Migrants who have provided vital aid to displaced people in Calais since 2008. If after reading this book you would like to donate to them yourself, please visit www.laubergedesmigrants.fr

*Dan Hicks and Sarah Mallet,
Pitt Rivers Museum,
10 January 2019*

Introduction: borderline archaeology



“We have fulfilled our mission; the humanitarian dismantling operation is over,” announced Fabienne Buccio, Préfète of Pas-de-Calais, on Thursday 27 October 2016.¹ Her words described the completion of an episode, a supposed end to the ‘Jungle’. But in reality this speech marked the end of neither the ‘Jungles’ of Calais nor the ongoing experience of displaced people in Hauts-de-France of cycles of building, dismantling, counter-building and demolitions.

This book reconstructs and revisits some of what emerged at the place that was known, for a year and a half between March 2015 and October 2016, as the *Camp de la Lande*. This was

the controversial and euphemistic name used by the French authorities for the site of the 'Jungle', as it existed as a 'tolerated' encampment on the eastern borders of Calais, less than half a kilometre from the Port of Calais and adjacent to the Rocade Est ring road (N216) that takes lorries and cars to the Ferry Terminal. The French term '*lande*' means 'heath' or 'moor', and it refers here to a marginal physical geography of sandy outlands, flats and dunes. In contrast, the term '*Jungle de Calais*' has been used to describe many different larger and smaller encampments in the Calais area since around the turn of the millennium, although is now most associated with La Lande, and as a word it has further dehumanised those living on European soil in extreme conditions of precarity. The coinage 'Jungle' appears to derive from the Pashto word '*dzjangal*', meaning a forest or wooded area, and French anthropologist Michel Agier has suggested that its use began in the 1970s in Pakistan to refer to Afghan refugee camp there, 'before being picked up and spread by Afghans themselves to name their places of refuge on the roadsides of their exile, and then to become a generic term for precarious migrant settlements' (Agier, 2016a: 56, our translation). It is also, as Thomas Müller and Uwe Schlüper have observed (2018: 7), part of a racist taunt by the French hard right and even by the police: '*Get back to your jungle!*'

Considering La Lande's position in the regulatory environment of urban land zoning deepens the sense of it as a dehumanising space, where at its peak more than 10,000 displaced people lived. La Lande was a former landfill site next to the former Jules Ferry Sports Centre, overlooked by the Graftech chemical plant and the highway. The site falls within an area designated as contaminated with dangerous industrial substances under the Seveso III European Union (EU) Directive, repurposed as a nature reserve – a Natura 2000 Habitat. These bureaucratic geographies hint at how the tents and shelters erected in 2015 and 2016 represented, as one activist-scholar group has expressed it, 'foundations built among capitalist ruins' (DUF, 2018: 3). The

INTRODUCTION: BORDERLINE ARCHAEOLOGY

nature of those ruins, and the ongoing processes of ruination, will become clearer as we trace some of the many historical, geopolitical and social dimensions of the transformation of this large open site of sandy wasteland on the industrial eastern edge of town, a state-owned former rubbish dump lying between the road and the sea, into an ultra-militarised landscape of encampments, barriers, violent conflict and the regime of ‘deterrence’. But since La Lande was just the largest and most famous Calais ‘Jungle’ among so many other ‘Jungles’, long-standing features of the Calais landscape in the form of squats and tents and shelters erected at the margins and interstices of the city both before 2015–16 and after, a necessary first step is to gain a better sense of the ongoing ‘Jungle’ landscapes of displaced people in Hauts-de-France.

★



The 'Jungle' landscapes of Calais began to emerge in the 1990s through three intersecting processes of infrastructure, law, and military conflict. First, the Channel Tunnel opened on 6 May 1994. Excavated 20.7 miles through the solid white chalk that connects Dover and Calais, the Chunnel brought with it – under the Channel Tunnel (International Arrangements) Order 1993, and in accordance with the 1986 Treaty of Canterbury and the 1991 Sangatte Protocol – new border control arrangements that were relocated from English ports. These involved 'juxtaposed' immigration and customs controls at the entry to the Channel Tunnel at Coquelles in Calais, creating an offshore outpost of the UK national border. Second, in March 1995 the Schengen Area was implemented, removing official border crossings across an area of Europe that subsequently grew from five EU member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands) to 26 (including four – Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland – that are not EU member states) – outside of which the UK has remained throughout. Calais thus became the UK's border not simply with France but with a much wider swathe of Europe across which border controls had been abolished. Third, refugees from the Kosovo War began to arrive in Calais in 1998, en route to claiming asylum in the UK, and were prevented under the new border arrangements from legally crossing the Channel. Through this, and the subsequent displacement of people following the new conflicts in the Middle East after 9/11, the dual role of Calais as the UK's outsourced border and as the 'final frontier of Schengen' (CFDA, 2008) led to the incremental blocking of 'third-country' subjects from entering the UK (Bhatia, 2018: 184). These displaced people are unable to make asylum claims to the UK without finding a route for an irregular crossing to British soil.

In a recent book Michel Agier and his co-authors have described the ensuing sequence of *La Jungle de Calais* (Agier *et al.*, 2018: Chapter 1). An early milestone was the opening of an accommodation facility for displaced people at the Sangatte

hangar by the French Red Cross in April 1999, which was then closed and demolished in December 2002 following sustained pressure from the UK government under Tony Blair, in the context of the growing politicisation of the so-called ‘asylum crisis’ (Blunkett, 2002). As Agier *et al.* (2018) document, a range of subsequent temporary informal ‘Jungles’ formed around Calais after the Le Touquet Protocol of 2003: in fields, woods, parks and carparks, on verges and in empty buildings. That Protocol extended the UK’s ability to undertake immigration checks in France from the Eurotunnel to include juxtaposed controls for ships departing from the ports of Dunkirk and Calais (Bolt, 2018: 29). A shifting number of displaced people – ebbing and flowing between 1,000 and 2,500 at any one time – lived in Pas-de-Calais at various squats and ‘Jungle’ encampment sites after the closure of Sangatte – at Bois Dubrelle, Tioxide Plant, Paul Devot Hangar, Leader Price, Galou, and other locations. Beyond Calais, further small camps emerged and were removed in parallel coastal landscapes at Dunkirk, Grand-Synthe, Dieppe, Ouisteham, Cherbourg and Roscoff, as well as in the north of Paris near the Stalingrad Metro (Agier *et al.*, 2018: Chapter 1).

The ongoing sequence of small squats, encampments and evictions was punctuated by a seven-year cycle of very high-profile demolition efforts, running from 2002 to 2009 to 2016 (Corporate Watch, 2018: 129). ‘CALAIS JUNGLE CLEARED,’ announced the front page of *The Times* reporting the major clearances in September 2009 of what had come to be known as ‘the New Jungle’ – a scattering of smaller encampments and squats of disused industrial buildings. Opening the paper, the story began with a quotation from a 16-year-old Afghan youth: “There will be other Jungles. There are plenty of forests around here.”²

Such other ‘Jungles’ did indeed emerge and retract, through the diverse actions of British and French authorities, displaced people, and a growing population of volunteers and activists. In 2013–14, more sustainable solutions were provided through the

work of Calais Migrant Solidarity and other non-governmental organisations, including the first dedicated house for women and children at Boulevard Victor Hugo (Corporate Watch, 2018: 128). But ongoing clearances continued (Ibrahim and Howarth, 2018: 118), and from early 2015 a municipal policy in Calais involved clearing the multiple squats and camps around the city while ‘tolerating’ a camp at the site of La Lande, where the creation of the Jules Ferry day centre was made possible through co-financed European Commission ‘emergency funding’ grants of €3.8 million in 2014 and €5.2 million in 2015, including funds for the transportation of people from Calais to other locations in France (Corporate Watch, 2018: 137).

★



The ‘tolerated’ encampment at La Lande grew incrementally from February 2015 onwards and as its built environment grew and became ever more complex, so too did the media coverage,

political rhetoric, physical securitisation and ultimately the scale of two major demolition events. In January 2016 a securitised zone consisting of some 130 converted white shipping containers was installed to provide the CAP (Centre d'Accueil Provisoire) container camp – a camp within a camp, with supervisors, fences, turnstiles, and entrance controls by palm identification (Agier, 2016a: 59). Notice was served for the demolition of the southern half of La Lande, and the bulldozing and clearances took place in late February 2016. The northern section of the site continued to grow during 2016, until the northern section was also cleared in late October 2016 and the residents were transported to centres across France (Müller and Schlüper, 2018).

The high-profile clearances of December 2002 and December 2009 prefigured those of February and November 2016 in terms of political rhetoric on both sides of the Channel, from President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2009 to Prime Minister David Cameron in 2016. “The aim is to create here in Britain a really hostile environment”, Theresa May, then the UK Home Secretary, said in 2012,³ and the Immigration Acts 2014 and 2016 were designed to make it easier to deport people from the UK. Meanwhile under the ‘hostile environment’ policy of the UK government from 2010 much effort was also poured into the policy of ‘*deterrence*’ in Calais – through which a hostile regime was actively created in order to deter displaced people from seeking to cross irregularly to make legal claims for asylum in Britain.

Serial announcements committed hundreds of millions of pounds, amounting to at least £315 million between 2010 and 2016, invested by the UK under the terms of the Le Touquet Protocol in a range of aspects of border security to ‘stop and deter illegal migration’ at Calais.⁴ Each new expenditure sought “to strengthen security to deter migrants from trying to enter Britain”, as David Cameron put it.⁵ On 18 January 2018, the Sandhurst Treaty, signed by Theresa May and Emmanuel Macron (UK Prime Minister’s Office, 2018), committed the UK to a

further investment of £44.5 million in border controls at Calais.⁶ New physical port security infrastructure has included vehicle-scanning equipment and thermo-detection cameras, extending customs offices and control areas, secure freight-queuing arrangements, additional freight search teams and dogs, drones and video surveillance, funding for deportation flights, various forms of improved tunnel security, and hundreds of extra police from both the UK and France (Border Force, 2014; Corporate Watch, 2018: 137). A police barrier previously used for the 2012 London Olympics and the 2014 NATO summit in Wales was relocated to the lorry terminal at Coquelles and still stands – despite being blown over by winds in December 2014.⁷ From early 2015 a series of multi-million-pound contracts followed, awarded for the construction of the £2.3 million concrete ‘great wall of Calais’ and a series of further fences at increasing scales. Some areas around the Channel Tunnel entrance at Calais were even flooded to reinforce these barriers.⁸ Major funded increases in security personnel have been largely focused on the French *Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité* (CRS) riot police, armed with teargas, batons and rubber bullets, but also include deployments of the *Police nationale*, *Brigade anticriminalité*, *Police de l’air* and *Police aux frontières* – ‘a thousand police and gendarmes day and night’.⁹ France became, in the words of the *Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme* (CNCDDH) in July 2014, ‘the “police arm” of British migration policy’. “Our main border control with continental Europe effectively operates now at Calais, not Dover,” chimed UK Prime Minister David Cameron on 10 November 2015.¹⁰ These major investments have been nowhere clearer than in the juxtaposition of a proliferation of solid fences and walls across Calais and the new large scale of demolitions and violence seen at La Lande during October 2016 and since.

★



“The humanitarian dismantling operation is over.” On 10 October 2016, just 17 days before the demolition, the French president François Hollande announced that La Lande would close before the winter, with its 9,000 inhabitants relocated around the country.¹¹ What was the sequence of landscape change – physical, human, bureaucratic, political – that led up to and reaches beyond the Préfète’s announcement?

The hostile environment policy, Theresa May explained in a statement to the House of Commons on 14 July 2015, is driven by the idea that “we must break the link between people making the treacherous journey across the Mediterranean and achieving settlement in Europe”.¹² In this respect it continued the rhetoric begun, in the aftermath of 9/11, by a previous Home Secretary, David Blunkett, in 2002. Humanitarian reasons given publicly for the removals – based on what the French Prime Minister Manuel Valls called the “wretched conditions” suffered by displaced people – contrast with the ongoing, worsening situation in Pas-de-Calais, in a strange conflation of

humanitarianism and violent clearance that reveals what Miriam Ticktin describes as 'the dual logic of protection and surveillance' (Ticktin, 2016: 29). In October 2016, in an uncanny echo at the UK national border of more distant destructions – conflict, civil war, forced conscription and humanitarian violence in Darfur, Eritrea and Afghanistan from which many then present had fled – some 2,000 adults and children left the 'Jungle' before the demolition to hide elsewhere in northern France to avoid being taken to other regions (Refugee Rights Europe, 2017a: 4). As Leonie Ansems de Vries and Marta Melander (2016) put it in the aftermath of the destruction, this act 'did nothing other than displace the already-displaced, pushing them one step closer to exhaustion', across the landscape of many other, smaller informal camps across northern France (cf. Refugee Rights Europe, 2016b). In the aftermath Steve Symonds, Director of Amnesty UK's Refugee and Migrant Rights programme, reported how disagreements between British and French authorities over responsibilities meant that the "two governments have once more effectively abandoned these children in conditions which obviously put their safety and welfare at risk".¹³

★



The ongoing landscape of the Calais ‘Jungles’ is a place of juxtaposition: steel constructions and human demolitions, displaced people and Auguste Rodin’s bronze statue *Les Bourgeois de Calais*, French and British border regimes, Border Force and Police aux frontières, customs officers and grassroots aid volunteers, the border of the British nation state and the border of the European Schengen zone. At this place co-produced through juxtapositions, this book adds another layer by beginning a dialogue with the anthropological project of Michel Agier (Agier *et al.*, 2018): not with the aim of critique, but of juxtaposition of a British Contemporary Archaeology with a French ‘tournant contemporain de l’anthropologie’ (‘contemporary turn for anthropology’) (Agier, 2013a). We share with Agier an interest in how ‘emplacement’ relates to ‘displacement’ in refugee landscapes (Agier, 2002a: 364), and a deep scepticism around the complicity of humanitarianism in the ideology of western militarism (de Lauri, 2019). But our focus is on the potential of Contemporary Archaeology not

to engage in a 'cosmopolitan' sociology of interaction (Agier *et al.*, 2018), but to push at the limits of an anthropology of infrastructure towards new dimensions of the cosmopolitical – environmental, temporal, visual.

That word, 'Lande', underlines our methodological focus on La Lande as a landscape and environment – an ecology of hostility and of resistance to violence. It encompasses the enduring co-productions of displaced people, volunteers, British, Belgian and French activists, security services, smugglers and traffickers, and others. The ongoing politics, in other words, of what Doreen Massey called 'coformation', plus indications of a new chapter in 'the conflictual and often perilous throwntogetherness of nonhuman and human' (Massey, 2005: 147, 160). What in practice might such an approach involve? Where Agier (2016, 23) seeks to perform an 'epistemological decentring', the decentring performed here is ontological, topographical, durational, and material. Michel Agier has studied the 'Jungle' as a refugee camp; we approach La Lande as not a camp but as the UK's national border with Schengen. Agier envisions the 'Jungle' as an urban form, an event, 'an extended case study' (Agier *et al.*, 2018); we understand La Lande as a (post)colonial monument, a duration, an assemblage. We affirm the importance of Agier's descriptions of how people managed to live at La Lande with the ephemeral, in a shifting landscape of precarity opposed by hospitality – building restaurants, shops, places for Muslim and Catholic worship, a school and French-language training, a kindergarten, a library, a theatre, and even a nightclub. There is no doubt that 'migrants invented for themselves the hospitable city in France that the government denied them' (Agier, 2016a: 59, our translation). As Audrey Coguiec and David Suber have pointed out, displaced people undoubtedly experienced a unique kind of agency to shape the built and social environment of La Lande (Coguiec and Suber, 2017), and La Lande was doubtless an event for those who lived through it– an *événement* even, for volunteers 'a transformative

experience, a moment of biographical rupture comparable to May 1968' (Agier *et al.*, 2018: 115), and 'a moment in the life stories' of all those who lived there (Godin *et al.*, 2017: 3; Squire, 2017). Mark Doidge and Elisa Sandri (2019) have written eloquently about the significance of friendship among Calais volunteers in creating community. And as Oli Mould has observed, La Lande's collaborative and collective building represented a kind of 'Lefebvrian autogestion' (Mould, 2018: 403). It is doubtless possible to envision La Lande as a place to 'reflect on what fascinates us in the camp form' (Agier, 2016a: 57, our translation; cf. Agier 2014), a place of 'self-organised refuge' (Agier 2008), and even, as Cyrille Hanappe suggests, a kind of prototype of a 'new kind of world city', since 'the most rapidly developing urban model is that of the precarious city and nearly a third of the world's population will live in such neighbourhoods by 2030' (Hanappe, 2015).

But let us be cautious of jumping towards such abstractions without interrogating the idea of the 'cosmopolitan' and multicultural character of the 'Jungle' (Agier, 2016a: 60), or without taking stock at Calais of the co-productions of displaced people, volunteers, activists, and a diversity of governmental actors, and the vagaries, necessities and contingencies of irregular travel and regimes of asylum, in a form of what Chris Rumford (2008) has called *bordenwork*. Our focus is on looking at the material traces of a human landscape from the near-present, understanding La Lande as a cosmopolitical border settlement more than a new cosmopolitan urban form. Cosmopolitics in this sense involves not just the politics of a connected and unequal world, but also the mobilisation of the cultural and natural environments, the landscape and the earth itself, towards inequality: a politics of natures as well as just cultures. Borderline archaeology indeed.

★



In strictly archaeological terms, any reduction of La Lande to the category of the refugee camp, as a particular and predetermined settlement type, risks erasing its comparative status as the long-term emergence of the human experience of the UK's border with continental Europe. An alternative is to understand the form of the place and the contingencies and improvisations of that form as building, so to speak, a cross-temporal seriation rather than a mere typology, and to ask: How did this 20-month artefact operate as a building block, laid down and partially removed, in the ongoing border situation at Calais? Certain kinds of border phenomena emerge at the juxtaposition of different worlds, as Karl Polanyi (1963) famously described through his idea of the 'port of trade' in economic anthropology. By treating La Lande not as a finished form but a comparative space, these juxtapositions proliferate: between colonial pasts and the (post) colonial present, between shelter and dispossession, between the Global North and the Global South, and even, as we shall argue in Chapter Five, between Old and New Worlds.

The 'Jungle' has a history that is hard to discern from media reports, one that stretches far before 2015. There are many untold histories of immigration to Europe from the Middle East and Africa. As Daniel Trilling shows us, these include long-term changes in controls on movement, from slavery to serfdom, poor laws, and vagrancy acts (Trilling, 2018: vii). La Lande holds a unique place in the long-term histories of controls of undocumented migration, as they developed from the 1920s, of racialised discourses around refugees in Europe (Ahonen, 2018), and of histories of humanitarianism (Barnett, 2011). In each case legacies of what we might term, for want of a better term, the *militarist colonialism* of British informal empire in the Middle East and Africa from late 19th century (Nesiah, 2004) into more recent and ongoing conflicts, are entangled with ideas of 'humanitarian militarism' and 'humanitarian war', as they developed from the Kosovo War onwards. The Calais 'Jungles', from Sangatte to La Lande, are key sites at which 'the birth of the humanitarian border' (Walters, 2011) has been imagined, where humanitarianism is not just present at the border but serves actively to mask violence. Becoming complicit with policing (Pallister-Wilkins, 2017) global humanitarianism is gradually militarised (McCormack and Gilbert, 2018), and the 'humanitarianisation' of border enforcement through the 'safety/security nexus' (Williams, 2016) takes hold.

Thus, a historical perspective to La Lande is necessary but insufficient. An anthropological perspective interrogates the present status of humanity in 'humanitarianism', and the conception of humanness and personhood in Refugee Studies. Here, we join with Agier in resisting the definition of La Lande as a humanitarian problem, since humanitarianism at the border involves both care and control: 'a functional solidarity between the humanitarian world (the hand that heals) and the police and military ordering of the world as a whole (the hand that strikes)' (Agier, 2008: 4, our translation; cf. Agier, 2003; Agier and Bouchet-Sangier, 2004). We also agree with

those scholars, practitioners and activists who have argued that 'the actions proposed by humanitarianism generally focus on survival, not transformation' (Feldman, 2009: 37), and thus tend towards reproducing and naturalising inequalities, promoting a militarised account of humanity that excludes some people from it in order to care for them (Belloni, 2007; Zehfuss, 2012). But the logic of an anthropological archaeology of the near present means that we must attend to the intimate entanglements of humans, and thus the treatment of humans, with objects, time, environments and visibility in order to reorient our vision of humanitarianism at La Lande, and contribute to the pressing task in the anthropology of humanitarianism of 'thinking beyond moral positioning, while remaining committed to ethics and politics' (Ticktin, 2014: 284). Sidestepping, for the moment, current dominant academic tropes of the nonhuman, the posthuman, the 'Anthropocene', and so on, let us at this point make the question clear: What resources from within the disciplines of Archaeology and Anthropology can help us to find more human ways to conceptualise and to resist dehumanisation – those processes by which, as Giorgio Agamben (1998) explains, humans can come to be categorised as 'homo sacer', outside the law? These two 19th-century disciplines were complicit through western colonialism in the origins of global war, and were central tools in constructing, by the enactment of alterity, the fake intellectual case for today's transhemispheric inequalities. To collide them into an archaeology of the near-present is to proceed as if anthropology were no longer just about worldviews, or mentalities, or modalities, but also about some of its older preoccupations: technologies, objects, the material inequalities across our common humanity, and knowledge made through new descriptions of the world (rather than apt illustrations retrofitted as case studies). Our interest is in how archaeology can reassert some kind of decentred anthropocentrism, by which we mean a humanistic re-centring that accommodates the centrality of things, places and processes to humanity. And a commitment

to the anthropology of ourselves as an unfinished project that must be reimagined in the face of new forms – environmental (Chapter 2), temporal (Chapter 3) and visual (Chapter 4) – of old inhumanities.

★



Part of what archaeology brings to the anthropological study of the near-present is a distinctive sense of interventionist or transformational practice that weaves together the anthropological sense of participant observation with the archaeological sense of discovery and making the undocumented visible. Contemporary Archaeology finds itself closer to the kind of practice-based research that is conducted in film-making or theatre, where the status of writing is less a question of ‘writing about’ than it is one of ‘writing from’ (Pitches *et al.*, 2009: 151). In the case of the present text our practice has involved gathering together a collective of co-curators, refugees and other displaced people,

artists, activists, academic-activists, volunteers and others to make a temporary exhibit of a loaned collection of material, visual and digital culture at the Pitt Rivers Museum for a period of time during 2019. From artefacts, maps and works on paper to photographs, these are things that a diversity of people have made or kept from Calais, traces that survive or have been created, sometimes for the purposes of documentation and memory, and sometimes with other motivations. We are writing four months before the exhibit will be installed, and of course the reader may well not have seen the exhibit or attended the events programme, and so the relationship of this book to that wider project is intentionally ambivalent. We are writing not to represent the view of others but as two archaeologists – one British and one French – in the spirit of that distinctive kind of hesitation, of stopping and thinking, which comes with the archaeo-curatorial notion of gathering together of memories of the most recent past in material, visual and digital form. Through that hesitation we want to consider the politics of what endures and what can be seen at this double border – UK and Europe, ferry port and rail tunnel, the white cliffs of Calais, archaeology and anthropology, past and present, western and non-western. We want to put duration into operation to document and think through displacement across borders beyond the familiar themes of mobility and control, globalisation or the nation state.

In other words, we see this book as part of a body of work that includes the exhibit to be read with that display – part of that visual act. As a kind of partial return to La Lande, the text offers none of the fixity of a catalogue, but instead bears witness to the contradiction – an endless guerrilla siege – that is being conducted in the name of deterrence on French soil by the British state against displaced people who wish to claim asylum. Archaeology is often assumed to be largely focused on the study of prehistory – those times and places without written records, for which the only evidence of human life comes in the form of material traces of artefacts, the built environment

and cultural landscapes. But literacy, where it exists, only ever creates documentation that is partial, in both senses of the term: neither total nor impartial. The archaeological study of the undocumented past has thus developed as a field of enquiry that reaches from the Bronze Age cultures of Egypt and Mesopotamia to historic and prehistoric cultures around the world, and across the Iron Age, Roman, medieval and post-medieval worlds of Europe. This is an archaeology of Europe's undocumented present.

Such an archaeology need not involve excavation (although it could) but performs the sustained disclosure of unspoken material coordinates and dimensions of social life. In this view, Contemporary Archaeology begins with the commitment that the more carefully we attend to objects, buildings and landscapes, the more human our account of the world may become. The aim is not to use material culture as an alternative source of evidence to write the history of the recent past. Here, Contemporary Archaeology is a form of disclosure and La Lande is not its case study but a place built for comparison onto which we map this intervention.





In what follows, we take stock of borderlines and juxtapositions under three themes. First is *environmental hostility*, through which we present a new account of the infrastructures and cosmopolitics of La Lande as an ongoing site of ‘borderwork’ that seeks to reduce humans through material environments of ongoing loss (Chapter Two). Second is *temporal violence*, which we identify in the conjuncture of past and present through which impermanence becomes a form of governance, in the politics of timelessness at borders and in anthropology itself, and in the status of Calais as an unfinished (post)colonial landscape (Chapter Three). Third is *visual politics*, through which Museum Anthropology and Contemporary Archaeology are reimagined as a kind of Visual Archaeology in the context of an emergent politics of documentation and the counter-politics of witnessing, folding together both the role of the museum exhibit at the Pitt Rivers with the status of La Lande itself as a site of resistance, a ‘space of appearance’, and thus a perspective for comparison (Chapter Four). A conclusion (Chapter Five) considers the

prospects for such comparisons between borderwork in Calais and the America of Trump and MAGA, through the idea of *giving time* as a way of carrying out a Contemporary Archaeology of the undocumented present.

We begin, however, with pushing the idea of cosmopolitics beyond any ethnoarchaeological sense of the present as an analogy for understanding the past to its reverse: the application of the materially- and environmentally-focused nature of archaeological thinking about the human past to the near-present.



Environmental hostility



‘When I think of the term “hostile environment”, it conjures up notions of a war zone, of environmental degradation or an inhospitable climatic event, perhaps an earthquake – something stark and unpleasant, like a scene from a World War I killing field. I do not think – or, I should say, I had not previously thought – of it as something to do with my own country.’ (Lord Bassam of Brighton, House of Lords, 12 June 2018)¹

“*The humanitarian dismantling operation is over.*” More than two years on from the demolitions a wooden path leads across the former site of La Lande, which is undergoing a process described by an official sign at the site as one of ‘renaturalization’ (DUF, 2018: 13) – reimagined, with no hint of irony, as a coastal reserve for migratory birds. The Hauts-de-France coastline is filled with the stubborn remnants of changing border regimes, and the path leads to the remains of the Batterie Oldenburg, a Kriegsmarine artillery battery constructed by the German military in 1942–44, housing two 8-inch cross-channel coastal guns of the so-called ‘Hellfire Corner’ of the Dover Straits. The battery was part of the *Atlantikwall* – a line of defences envisioned by the Nazi leadership as running along the entire coastline from Norway to Spain. Around Calais this barrier comprised not only forts, batteries, bunkers and walls topped with barbed wire but also stakes and ramps fitted with mines, steel and concrete anti-tank obstacles, and a wider landscape of air bases, radar positions and naval forces (Kaufmann *et al.*, 2012). The absences of the empty landscape of La Lande, months after the remains of the camp were so effectively churned by the toothed buckets of mechanical excavators within the buried remains of landfill, represent the inverse of the steel and concrete remnants usually studied by conflict archaeologists. As the UK’s national border at Calais is built, rebuilt and reinforced through walls and fences, it is also increasingly constructed through such absences and loss.

Wall-building in the city and ferry port of Calais continues to expand. The hundreds of millions of pounds invested by the British government in border measures at Calais, described above, have seen the urban landscape disfigured by a growing labyrinth of steel and concrete walls and fences. The direction from which invasion might come is reversed: these are not fortifications against seaborne military invasion from the waters of Thames, Dover or Wight, but against displaced people who have travelled from beyond the Brandt Line. Calais is just one location among many around the world at which a global

process of wall construction by western governments against the movement of people from the Global South is underway. The dozens of current and proposed construction projects for national border barriers range from the Mexican–US border to the borders between Norway and Russia, India and Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Turkey and Syria. The Calais fences also echo the so-called ‘peace walls’ of Northern Ireland, which contemporary archaeologist Laura McAtackney has studied in detail (McAtackney, 2011, 2018). Archaeologically, this global wall-building moment is unprecedented: whether in Texas, Norway, Israel or India, the change isn’t just a question of scale, but of the increased militarisation of national borders that exclude, and in doing so create human populations that are categorised as ‘illegal’. It would be impossible now to mistake the 1990s debordering of the EU through Schengen and the building of the Channel Tunnel as indications of a post-Cold War world as a global borderless space.

Where the Schengen Area meets the fences of Calais, anthropological ‘border theory’ or ‘border studies’ (Wilson and Donnan, 2012: 2; cf. Donnan and Wilson, 2010) encounters a landscape of experiments in borderwork being conducted by the British and French governments under the Le Touquet Treaty. This place is already a case study for the British government. The UK’s border in Calais has been ‘an intra-European laboratory for an EU external border regime’ (Müller and Schlüper, 2018: 17) – a site of experimentation, an extended case study so to speak, created in an ongoing effort by European nations towards outsourcing migration control to third countries as ‘buffer zones’ (Amnesty International, 2014: 13), frontier experimentations with tactics and technologies reminiscent of those during the Troubles on the UK’s other (post)colonial border in Northern Ireland, which included the invention of the rubber bullet. This laboratory landscape is a site of experimentation with the decentring of borderwork, through which the abstractions of the nation state have come to require not just the physical

infrastructure of walls but also human and material landscapes extending beyond the barrier itself, and absences and destructions as much as physical presences. Can our methodology do more than simply reproduce the state's vision of La Lande as case study, and excavate its critical role as a contested space in the emergent geopolitical regime of environmental hostility?

★



Anthropologists Dimitris Dalakoglou and Penny Harvey have demonstrated how much is to be gained by following through the implications of Susan Leigh Star's call, two decades ago now, for an 'ethnography of infrastructure' that encompasses questions of 'ecology' rather than just stuff (Star, 1999; Dalakoglou, 2010; Dalakoglou and Harvey, 2012; Harvey, 2015). An archaeology of 'borderwork' at Calais borrows from these scholars' deep scepticism towards any anthropology of infrastructure that relies upon a firm distinction between the material and the human.

To operate between the two extremes of humanism and brute materiality – between the nomadic subject, continually driven from the smallest of durations, and the vision of permanence conjured through the concrete, steel and razor wire – is for the researcher to do more than employ a particular theoretical conceit or methodological device; it is a necessary conceptual and practical response to new techniques for the objectification of displaced people. New technologies of decentred borderwork require us to commence an ecological archaeology of the near present rather than resorting to the old model of a situational anthropology (*pace* Agier, 2016: 40). This new borderwork has temporal dimensions, as we shall explore in Chapter Three; before that, it is the environmental and geographical dimensions that must concern us.

What does this decentered borderwork look like? The enactment of the UK border at Calais does not stop with the concrete, steel and razor wire of the physical barrier itself. The ongoing proliferation of physical borders is accompanied by the emerging tendency for borders to take on a range of different forms and even locations (Jones, 2012). It is now twenty years since Étienne Balibar, speaking two years before 9/11, observed the beginning of a new tendency towards borders being geographically distributed. ‘No longer simply located at the edges of territories,’ she wrote, ‘they are distributed all over the place, wherever the movement of information, people and things takes place, where it is controlled, for example in cosmopolitan cities’ (Balibar, 2001 [1999]: 15, our translation).

The Calais borderwork reaches far beyond the city’s fences or even detention centres on UK soil, and begins even closer to ‘home’. A radical decentering of the UK national border through the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016 (Yuval-Davis *et al.*, 2018) has led to new geographies of ID checks by employers, schools, universities, landlords and the NHS, as well as immigration raids, rough sleeper round-ups, and deportations – new kinds of border that seem unterritorial because they create ecologies of precarity.

It also reaches beyond the limits of any apparent situational limits of physical infrastructure to include an expanding range of border materialities, not just documentation like passports and ID cards but a host of other objects, from luggage and vehicles to electronic devices like laptops (Burrell, 2008) and smartphones (Gillespie *et al.*, 2018).

★



How was La Lande an articulation of the ideology of the hostile environment? To answer this question, we need to dig deeper into how we define the 'humanity' in humanitarianism, interrogating the anthropocentric tendencies of contemporary anthropology. Archaeology brings an expanded view of human life, which includes among other things the environmental, understanding material culture and the built environment as forms of humanity rather than just technologies for social life or utilitarian cultural property. This leads the archaeologist

beyond any view of objects or architecture as simply tools that alternately constrain the agency of the weak and extend the power of the strong – but that kind of relatively utilitarian view of the material world has been peculiarly influential in Refugee Studies, mainly through the institutional analyses of Michel Foucault. The archaeologist radically broadens the account of human life that informs Foucault’s account of ‘biopolitics’. Foucault described a transformation that took place during the 19th century, through which the sovereign’s power to ‘take life or let live’ came to be joined by the emergent power of the state to ‘make live and let die’; it was ‘the emergence of something that is no longer an anatomo–politics of the human body, but ... a “biopolitics” of the human race’ (Foucault, 1997: 243). The potential of a Foucauldian biopolitical approach, especially as it was developed by Giorgio Agamben through his accounts of ‘bare life’ (Agamben, 1998), has been explored in many different ways in Refugee Studies – from the medical provisioning of refugee camps to the border technologies of identity documentation.

Achille Mbembe’s 2003 paper ‘Necropolitics’ has provided a powerful corrective to the Eurocentrism of Foucault’s account of biopolitics, and the general absence of the contexts of ongoing legacies of empire from the uses of Agamben’s account of ‘bare life’ in African Studies, Refugee Studies, and beyond. Crucially, Mbembe underlines the role of colonial histories and their ongoing after-effects, and in doing so he expands the persistent Foucauldian focus on the living body. It is thus, in Mbembe’s view, the use of the bulldozer for the continual destruction of the lived environment, as much as the fighter jet used for precision strikes targeting individuals, that Mbembe (2003: 29) identifies as central to the practice of neocolonialism in Palestine – an ‘infrastructural warfare’. We learn from Mbembe that necropolitical conditions can be made through attacks upon the nonhuman environment as well as just the human body.



The hostile environment created by the British and French authorities at Calais is precisely concerned with this form of necropolitics. It experiments with new regimes of violence and destruction directed against possessions and shelters as well as against bodies, against the full range of distributed and extrasomatic personhood of displaced people in Calais, putting material culture, the built environment and the wider landscape into operation as weapons against the weak.

After October 2016 a sudden normalisation of a new scale of *operations d'évacuation* came about (Corporate Watch, 2017). Let us skip forward two years to the winter of 2018–19, and listen to the testimony of Fahad, living in the woods south of rue des Oyats, Calais:

‘The police come in the night-time. Maybe 2 o’clock they come and we have three people in our tent. They rip the tent and spray inside. That time we didn’t sleep all night

because our whole body was feeling crushed. They cut the tent with blades.’ (in Dutton, 2018)

The destruction of encampments is far from over. In March 2017, in the House of Commons, the UK’s Minister of State for Immigration responded to the Tory MP for Dover urging him “to do all he can to make sure that a new ‘Jungle’ does not form at Calais this year” by stating that:

‘The site of the former Calais camp remains clear and there is ongoing work, supported by UK funding, permanently to remove all former camp infrastructure and accommodation and to restore the site to its natural state. That work will help to prevent any re-establishment of squats or camps in the area.’²

But as Baroness Sheehan put it in the House of Lords the following November, “as in the townships in South Africa, homes may be destroyed but people do not vanish in a puff of smoke – they return”.³ An ongoing, continual and very expensive effort towards the destruction of encampments implements a strategy best described, in the words of the Défenseur des droits, Jacques Toubin, as one of ‘invisibilisation’.⁴ The cycles of demolition and building in Pas-de-Calais are intensifying. On 26 October 2018, the two-year anniversary of the demolition of the Calais ‘Jungle’, a large-scale eviction of 1,700 people from a camp near Grande-Synthe was carried out. Some seven hundred had returned within a week. Refugee Info Bus, a volunteer-led charity formed in 2016 at Calais, have noted how, ‘Time and time again, strategies implemented by the French state have failed to ensure that people have appropriate access to accommodation, food, water, healthcare and legal information’:

Reports from an eviction in September 2018 saw buses driving families around Northern France for hours without food or water, before dumping them at the side of the road in soaking wet weather without access to shelter. This unending stalemate leaves everyone involved trapped in a cyclical nightmare of destitution and fear. This needs to stop. With a drastic drop in temperatures as we hurtle towards winter, these continuing evictions, systemic destruction of belongings and confiscation of tents and sleeping bags is leaving a large number of displaced people sleeping rough on the streets with no form of shelter. (Refugee Info Bus, 2018a)

In November 2018 the charity recorded 17 evictions of small temporary camps within a 14-day period at Calais, with some locations subject to evictions twice per week:

There is no option to get on a bus to accommodation centres or hotels. People are moved on with no place to go, occasionally detained but released hours later, and have their shelter and belongings removed. (Refugee Info Bus, 2018a)

This ongoing *Chasse à l'Homme* ('hunt for humans') is an 'absurd game of cat and mouse' (Murphy, 2018), a regime of normalised police brutality and intimidation that constitutes an innovative, dangerous and little understood form of peacetime militarised violence. There is far more than just the surveillance carried out by cameras, dogs, drones, heat and CO₂ sensors to detect people in vehicles, and the vast mix of security guards and riot police (Corporate Watch, 2018: 130). Journeys filled with conflict, physical danger and health risks from start to finish arrive at an extreme situation at Calais, where practices of assault, bodily harm, negligence, poisoning with gas, endangerment, despoliation, harassment and psychological violence have

become ‘an integral part of border management’ (Calais Migrant Solidarity, 2015a, 2015b; cf. Bouhenia *et al.*, 2017; Müller and Schlüper, 2018: 31). The cycle of ‘cleansing’ migrant camps, ongoing since the demolition of Sangatte (Cohen, 2004), is now continual.

Controls on building first enforced during 2016 at La Lande – when the bringing of ‘durable’ building materials such as brick, concrete, cinder blocks or large wooden materials being onto the site was outlawed (Mould, 2018: 399) – now operate through continual dispossessions and destructions. Meanwhile reports of police brutality range from constant chasing, the routine daily use of tear gas and pepper spray, and systematic harassment through ID checks and arrests, to detentions in cells without access to a toilet, humiliating physical searches, routinised and indiscriminate beatings, slashing tents, shelters and bedding with blades, spraying blankets with pepper spray, the burning of property in fires, and the sustained confiscation and theft of property – even baby food and milk. From November 2016 to November 2017, 91.8% (and 93.6% of minors) had experienced police violence, up from 75.9% during the existence of La Lande. Violence became part of the militarised environment of deterrence:

‘I can’t sleep because of the police. I can’t continue walking by the road. When I’m walking by road they come with spray, kicking and this is no good, this is very bad. I came for human rights. And please, in France people, and from government and the Calais police, please do something for the people because I am living a very bad life here. I’m living in Jungle but I can’t sleep at night time because every day and all the night I’m scared about the police.’ (Testimony of an Afghan man, November 2017, Refugee Info Bus, 2018b: 24)

'Tactics of exhaustion', designed to weaken the chances of people successfully crossing the Channel at night time, include the sustained use of sleep deprivation, the use of tear gas in the face or on sleeping people, or kicking them awake. The practice of taking of one shoe from refugees – a strange modern refraction of the anti-personnel weapon of the caltrop – is combined with the destruction of mobile phones with batons or by stamping on them, baton strikes on the top of the legs to break items in trouser pockets (Gentleman, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2017; Refugee Rights Europe, 2017b: 18; Corporate Watch, 2018: 130; Refugee Info Bus, 2018b: 22).

There is no protection against the constant risk of secondary violence from people other than the police. Vigilante activities and attacks and abductions by fascists have been reported, raising concerns over the overlap between police and hard right activists committing violent acts (Gardenier, 2018: 89; Müller and Schlüper, 2018: 30). It would take another book to understand how the personal ideologies of the French *forces de l'ordre* and military are so often aligned with the extreme right, but there is much anecdotal evidence, including the controversy over the arrest of General Christian Piquemal, former Commander of the French Foreign Legion, in Calais on the day of a Pegida-organised anti-migrant rally on 6 February 2016.⁵

Around the roads there is a constant physical danger from cars and lorries, whether spitting, glass bottles and other items thrown from moving vehicles, or the constant possibility of being run over by accident or on purpose (Refugee Rights Europe, 2017b). Further violence from which all displaced people, but especially unaccompanied minors, are at risk include human trafficking, sexual exploitation and modern slavery (Beddoe, 2017). Violence also derives from arguments and ethnic tensions among displaced people, and conflict with traffickers. In this environment of continual danger, intimidation and fear the bodies of the displaced people come to bear the physical marks of violence: cuts, chemical burns, rashes, bruises, broken

ENVIRONMENTAL HOSTILITY

bones, chipped teeth, bites from police dogs, eyesight problems, permanent damage such as lost eyes.

There have been hundreds of deaths.

★



The landscape is not just a container or stage for this regime of abjection. The material world – objects, buildings, landscape – is actively involved in ‘environmental hostility’. Military-grade fences are weapons against civilians like batons, tear gas, pepper spray and rubber bullets. The border regime inflicts the harsh materiality of The Game, as the practice of seeking the luck or ‘good chance’ of an irregular crossing of the Channel is called – with tool bags of bolt cutters and padlocks to both open and seal a lorry passed from hand to hand, by placing obstacles or even setting fires in the road to stop vehicles, and through the dangerous economy of the traffickers.

The public health risks both at La Lande and after are part of this ecology as well. The unsafe landscape of asbestos and chemical residues has at several points also been characterised by the continual risk of fire from unsafe encampments. Alongside the cold, the rain, the heat, there are factors like the illegal out-of-date tear gas and the purposeful spraying of chemical agents into drinking water. At La Lande, fieldwork undertaken by Surindar Dhesi, Arshad Isakjee and Thom Davies in 2015 identified that adults and children were exposed to a wide range of environmental health risks. These included unsafe levels of bacteria in food and drink, the inability to wash clothes and bedding leading to scabies, bedbugs and lice, and inappropriate living conditions leading to exposure to heat, damp and cold and high levels of communicable disease. There was also evidence of piped water with faecal contamination, water stored in chemical containers, extremely high levels of airborne particulates from campfires burning many inappropriate materials, and the ubiquitous presence of a variety of pathogenic bacteria causing widespread vomiting and diarrhoea, respiratory problems, debilitating skin diseases. These were compounded by ongoing physical risks from unsafe, poorly lit living environment, uncontrolled fire, and violence from other camp residents and the authorities (Dhesi *et al.*, 2015, 2018).

Many of these public health problems persist for displaced people today at Calais, and different factors in this hostile environment intersect with each other. A lack of sanitation, for example, brings an inability to wash pepper spray from the skin. In July 2017 the Conseil d'État ruled that the French state was obliged to provide adequate water points and sanitation facilities, including showers and toilets, and that its failure to do so had exposed displaced people 'to inhuman or degrading treatment'.⁶ The continuing failure to fulfil these obligations, making available only ten taps and ten portable lavatories to a displaced population of perhaps seven hundred, was condemned by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of

Human Rights in October 2017, and has been the continued focus of campaigning by grassroots charities in Calais.⁷ And within this nexus of border governance, even the withholding of safety and an insouciant indifference to suffering can play a part, representing a kind of necropolitical ‘violent abandonment’ or ‘violent inaction’ (Davies and Isakjee, 2015; Davies *et al.*, 2017). Even the ‘toleration’ of La Lande on its toxic site, claimed by the Préfecture as a policy adopted for the sake of improved living conditions, can represent a form of hostility – an observation of wider significance in how we frame and understand humanitarianism and inaction as methodologies and rhetorics of border governance.

And the effects of sleeping rough for an extended period of time – in the marshes, on the sand, in the forest, in ditches, in fields – are not just physical but also psychological, especially with sleep deprivation. Mental health problems documented at La Lande included depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress, caused by a mixture of the deadlocks, precarities and abuses of Calais and the conflict and violence many had experienced in their home countries and on the journey, which had taken many through Libya.⁸

Even supposedly humanitarian assistance has contributed to this hostile environment, for example with the experimental introduction of white shipping containers at La Lande through which, as Miriam Ticktin has observed, a specific kind of ‘containment’ engendered a particular ‘politics of humanity’:

Because they inherit the materiality of shipping containers in their basic form, the refugees housed in containers must be thought about in relation to the effects they were originally designed to contain. They are lined up in identical rows, crammed together as tightly as possible, in ways that repeat the arrangement of goods in containers. In this sense, the humanitarian camps at the edge of Europe do not simply enact a racialized politics of citizenship, deciding

who can enter and belong to Europe; they embody a politics of humanity, which works by constantly reordering the boundaries of the human. (Ticktin, 2016: 32)

Disruptions to the work of volunteers seeking to distribute food, clothing and shelter continue to be routine at Calais. Tight controls on times for the distribution of food are enforced, and limited to a designated fenced-off distribution area, where the giving of food and clothing once per day for 60 or 90 minutes is closely monitored – organised in a fenced area that ‘resembles a cage’ (Neuman and Torre, 2017). Incidents of officers knocking food out of volunteers’ hands if times are breached are accompanied by widespread practices of fining for the most minor infractions, including parking tickets, low tyre pressure, dirt on mirrors, insufficient windscreen fluid – and even citations for littering infractions for food dropped by refugees when sent away by the police. Harassment of volunteers themselves includes regular body searches and ‘pat-downs’, ID checks, tailing, filming and so on (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Help Refugees, 2018) – adding to the many material dimensions of hostility.

★



Two alternative accounts of the cosmopolitics of the hostile environment at Calais might be developed. On the one hand, we could follow Michel Agier in seeing the ‘Jungle’ as a camp, describing ‘the Calais event’ in terms of ‘extraterritoriality’, ‘exception’ and ‘exclusion’ (Agier *et al.* 2018: 135–7), building a self-reflexive and ‘situational’ analysis on the old functionalist model of the Manchester School and the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute. We might call this ‘contemporary anthropology’, which Agier defines as:

the trace of what is happening in the moment and situation of the investigation, and therefore its presence reflected in the anthropologist’s text. The trace of movement, change, the first breath of the future. (Agier, 2013a: 85, our translation)

Even if ‘ethnography is the material of the contemporary in anthropological knowledge’ (Agier, 2013a: 85; see also Agier,

2008), which we doubt is the whole story, then let us assert that Contemporary Archaeology is the *discovery and transformation of anthropological knowledge of the near present*. Rather than reducing the 'Jungle' to a situation and a moment in time for urban anthropology, we understand La Lande as an ongoing environment and an assemblage. As we have seen, for Agier the 'Jungle' is an 'extended case study' (Agier *et al.*, 2018: 10), and in this 'rehabilitation' of the Max Gluckman's old anthropological project, a mode of analysis is employed that renders the wider environments, times, and visibility of La Lande inaccessible (Agier, 2016b: 22; cf. Ardener, 1971: 465). The choice here is between two alternative visions of contemporary anthropology: situational interactionism and the assertion of cosmopolitanism on the one hand, or a cosmopolitics that takes environments, time and transformation seriously. The former approach reduces the 'Jungle' to a camp and to a case study, just as the British state has itself sought to – along with the narratives of 'crisis', 'emergency', 'exception', and so on. The latter seeks to take stock of what Nigel Thrift has called the 'knowingness' of the neoliberal state (Thrift, 2005), which pre-empts sociological categories like 'the camp'. Because the geographies of border governance at Calais are already situated, dispersed and decentred by the state, a focus solely on the 'Jungle' as a refugee camp risks reproducing the state's erasure of people distributed beyond it – mistaking the 'Jungle' for an event rather than an ongoing process across place and time, and limiting resistance to the new borderwork.

★

ENVIRONMENTAL HOSTILITY



For the reasons set out above, we want to approach the unceasing series of micro-deterritorialisations, displacements and dispossessions at La Lande and beyond, which keep displaced people in a continually shifting state of sleeplessness, homelessness and dispossession, in ontological rather than situational terms. A sense of landscape, ecology, the built environment, material and visual culture, is central to our anthropological view of humanity here. Agier's appropriation of the idea of 'cosmopolitics' (Agier, 2013b; Agier et al., 2018) is based on his critique of the so-called 'ontological turn', which he claims 'reactivates and perpetuates the agenda of cultural relativism founded on the principle of a table of cultural identities, drawn up in order to interpret and compare them' (Agier, 2016b: 23). This confusion leads to his mistaken critique of 'the oxymoron of an anthropology that is both post-human and non-human':

With the anthropos discarded, shared humanity as the founding principle of anthropology is thrown into question and authors of these ontologies introduce themselves, without any theoretical or methodological precautions. (Agier, 2016b: 31)

Agier seeks to re-activate situational analysis to define the 'the cosmopolitan condition' and to critique that most modish of ideas – that of different modes of existence. But if the state is ahead of the situational game, as we have suggested, then Agier's contemporary anthropology finds itself in the predicament described more than a decade ago by Mike Savage and Roger Burrows as 'the coming crisis of empirical sociology' (Savage and Burrows, 2007). State borderwork is creating different worlds, written into an environment where the border is naturalised offshore through a coastal landscape, where the human subject is othered through ecologies of infrastructural practice that range far beyond the body creating a cosmopolitics of distributed personhood. And so what is needed is an approach to humanity, and thus to humanitarianism, that accommodates the nonhuman and the environmental. Without, that is, reducing humanity further through a 'posthuman' approach – a literature which often finds itself so close to the aim and the logic of the inhumanity of the hostile environment, as a form of governmentality that seeks to prevent displaced people from forming communities of solidarity (Tazzioli, 2017).

★

ENVIRONMENTAL HOSTILITY



The UK national border at Calais is a device for classification and comparison, producing difference in opposition to cosmopolitanism. In this regard, we suggest, it holds much in common with the historic and ongoing structures of anthropology as a discipline. The border's purpose is 'to try to separate the wanted from the unwanted, the imagined barbarians from the civilised, the global rich from the global poor' (van Houtum, 2012: 405) – an impulse it shares with the anthropological museum. Is Agier's 'situational' conception of reflexivity fit for the urgent task of understanding these connections, which are historical links to the European colonial project, and to the beginning of modern ideologies of 'race'? Or could another model for reflexivity be found within the spaces of anti-racist resistance created at La Lande itself? To what extent was La Lande an attempt to fight this wild, ultraviolent experimentation in border governance made by the British and the French at Calais (as if all the mutual horrors and hatreds enacted over the centuries between these two European

countries and against the non-European world were the prime mover for these steel fences, police vans and tear gas grenade launchers) on its own terms? To 'fight magic with magic', as anthropologist Mick Taussig has described the parallel challenge in the United States, in the face of our present global phase of dehumanisation, in the face of 'disembodiment, meaning bodies torn from themselves, from each other, and the body of the world', there is no option other than to 'match the object of study', to build 'an anthropology of the impending catastrophe that learns from anthropology no less than from history, so as to change both'.⁹ 'To stay,' as Donna Haraway (2016) has it, 'with the trouble'.

As Natasha King puts it, 'The border regime is *productive*. It produces human illegality' (2016: 2). A primary task must then be not to *re*-produce the structures through which the border is already being governed – first among which, perhaps, is the building of typologies of difference. An archaeological sense of seriation – how typologies evolve – may offer one alternative. It is through bureaucracy and ultraviolence that the border documents and classifies, and thus produces different categories of people as if they were a variety of forms to be fixed and listed. Anthropology was founded on classification and colonialism, and so it must be with extreme scepticism that we consider one major strand in current Refugee Studies thinking about infrastructure – the impulse to build typologies of buildings and shelters in refugee camps, in the name of architectural design, or improving living conditions (e.g. Bully, 2017; UNHCR, 2018). The very name 'Jungle' is a category rather than toponym (Müller and Schlüper, 2018: 6). And this is part of how it dehumanises, by reducing the particularity of any place of encampment, and thus effacing the ongoing counter-performances in the form of grassroots humanitarianism, protest and hope against borderwork, securitisation and 'deterrence'. An awareness of the risks of a typological approach (of uncritically typologising that which typologises) might emerge from archaeology's unearthing

of ongoing transformation rather than designed intentionality. The risk of a focus on design – for instance to innovate, to improve shelter or other forms of humanitarianism – is that it masks what Ticktin calls the ‘technopolitics’ of refugee shelter, which she shows is bound up with a long-term ‘ontological politics’ of racialisation (2016: 29, 32).

The cosmo/technopolitics described by Ticktin is also used by the UK and French governments themselves through the hostile environment policy. Part of that, as we have seen, includes spaces beyond the physical border itself – including spaces of ongoing precarity and violence as technologies of objectification of others. As Oli Mould has observed, insofar as La Lande was urban, it was not purely utopian in design; it was also a *de facto* slum of London (Mould, 2017). It was a site of ongoing experimentation both in the management of camp form by the authorities, for example with the container camp (Mould, 2018: 402) and the ongoing environment of deterrence described above, but also in modes of protest and resistance by displaced people, activists and volunteers. What volunteers and activists made in building against the border at La Lande – the crucial work of architectural projects like Calais Builds (Chapter Four below) and grassroots infrastructure groups like Acted, A Home for Winter, Calais Woodyard, Caravans for Calais and Beyond, Jungle Canopy, and Utopia 54 – comprised not design solutions but human and material acts of dissent. Utopian action at La Lande came in the form of protest against borderwork more convincingly than it did through new forms of urbanism. There is surely little hope, no prototype for sustainably living together, to be discovered among the extreme deprivations of this poisoned landscape. It was, let us underline, a place where 10,000 young people (overwhelmingly men) lived, including perhaps 1,300–1,500 unaccompanied children in inhumane and degrading living conditions, with an absence of opportunities for regular education or work, ongoing risks to their mental health, physical violence, coercion to engage in criminality,

sexual violence and even the risk of being trafficked, pimped and subjected to forms of debt bondage (UNICEF, 2016; Refugee Rights Europe, 2016a: 8), only to be processed through state accommodation centres, relocated to more than 200 temporary migrant centres called Centres d'Accueil et d'Orientation (CAOs) all over France.

The border operates to 'mark the points at which materiality and immateriality become indistinguishable' (Demetriou and Dimova, 2019: 13). What cosmopolitics means in a regime of deterrence is not the cosmopolitanism evoked by Agier, but interventions in the landscape in order to naturalise inequality and to weaponise a place, against which resistance must be on the same terms: endurance against precarity. The question of the pace as well as place of violence – the timeless limbo and 'slow violence' of the 'Jungle' as chronotype – is a central factor (cf. Davies, 2018; Nixon, 2011). That is to say, another major part of how environmental hostility achieved this is not geographical but temporal – and it is this to which we now turn.

Temporal violence



“The humanitarian dismantling operation is over.” The slow violence of words again. Let us step back from the sheer staginess of the destruction of October 2016 as an iconic event and media spectacle, and follow Leonie Ansems de Vries in seeing the ‘no man’s land’ of La Lande as, throughout its existence, a precarious space for the performance of ‘transience and persistence’ (Ansems de Vries, 2016). Its condition of being ‘forever temporary’ as each cycle of building and destruction plays out (Reinisch, 2015) leads us to study La Lande as the UK national border with Schengen, rather than as a camp, an event, a localised situation for reflexive fieldwork with cosmopolitan subjects.

In Calais, the cosmopolitics reaches from space into time, in the ongoing strategy of an erasure of the human through the performance of permanence afforded to the nonhuman in the form of durable materials of concrete, steel, and a seemingly endless supply of tear gas: the performance of humanity reduced to impermanent alterity.

The border is temporal as well as spatial. There is doubtless a potential for an important institutional history of the camp, from British plantations in the Caribbean to British concentration camps in South Africa, reaching back perhaps even to the Roman military technology used in Gaul itself, re-emerging with the labour camps – such as that which existed, in this palimpsest landscape, in 1942 for Belgian Jews at the site of the 1999 Sangatte container camp (Bernardot, 2008: 111). Marc Bernardot (2008) is persuasive in his call for a 'sociohistory' of camps in France, from the First World War to the present day, a cross-temporal approach that doubtless would reveal such continuities in the physical use of buildings or places with a truly shocking regularity.

But the most recent chapter in any such history would be not just a function of any long-term French 'national history of internment' (Bernardot, 2008: 110), or accidents of co-location, but a kind of structural technology of occlusion, through which the image and performance of the camp is deployed to mask, to soften, to distract from, and to naturalise the new hostility of the leading experimental zone for the new phenomena of border technologies against the Global South. Calais is thus less a glimpse of some future urban form than it is 'a testing ground for border security and technology' (Corporate Watch, 2018: 125), from which that naturalising name, *La Lande*, sought to distract.

Through a trick with time, the presentation of the border as a camp distracts from the growing endurance of containment through narratives and experiences of emergency and precarity, enacted through the collision of human suffering with concrete and steel. As an academic field, Refugee Studies

TEMPORAL VIOLENCE

continues often to frame its field sites through the ideologies of emergency and humanitarian militarism because its definitions of fieldwork and humanity still rely on the timeless and patriarchal accounts of sites, framings and humanity of an older functionalist anthropology. The motivations for and modalities of an anthropology of displaced people requires some critical examination in this light. In this chapter we want to suggest that the old anthropological technique of temporal violence, as a device for othering, is re-emerging in the borderwork of Calais. But we want to question how anthropological thinking about ‘cosmopolitics’ maps on to borderwork as well, before returning in the final two chapters to the potential of an anthropological account of the cosmopolitical, as infrastructural and ecological rather than ‘cosmopolitan’.

★



How to begin to describe the *temporal violence* of La Lande? One helpful place to start is Joel Robbins' important account of the shift in the locations and subject matters of anthropology following the discipline's internal (post)colonial critiques and attempts to abandon ongoing racist narratives of progress and temporal otherness. Expanding on Michel-Rolph Trouillot's account of anthropology's 'savage slot', Robbins (2013) has suggested that the 'suffering slot' – places of pain, suffering, oppression or violence – has come to displace this as the central location for anthropological fieldwork and thinking, in 'a turn from a concern with anthropological difference to a focus on universal suffering' (Ticktin, 2014: 274; cf. Trouillot 2003).

Experiences of the environmental hostility in the previous chapter above clearly share some primary characteristics with what Robbins describes as 'suffering'. In extending the questions of hostility and militarism from material and ecological perspectives towards the question of time, let us begin with that felicitous notion from the Annalists – their sense of *l'histoire environnementale* which constitutes the *longue durée*, a notion that they deployed to critique *l'histoire événementielle* as short-term, or journalistic, or superficial. With a nod to Braudel, let us suggest that at Calais, the term 'Jungle' has represented a *chronotype* – a linguistic trick through which this place can shift location and be repeatedly destroyed and announced to have been destroyed but still remains somehow present, timeless, ephemeral – a permanent emergency, an ideology that co-opts the language and practices of humanitarianism for the sake of borderwork.

The long term takes the form, the Annalists showed us, of environmental history. But even impermanence can generate a kind of environmental history. There is a complication, since part of what persists over this nascent longer-term history of environment is a history of the ultra-short-term, through which impermanence constitutes not just abandonment, decay or ruination, but both a condition and a technology of 'material precarity' (Mould, 2018). The temporary becomes a

space for politics, a time destroyed so quickly that it is perhaps even shorter than the *événement*. Recall how the times of sleep deprivation mean that ‘sleep has become a political matter in Calais’ (Hagen, 2018). This is a cosmopolitics of differential access to time, a mode of existence that produces difference through the withholding of duration. Like myths and music in the account of Lévi-Strauss, the bulldozers of La Lande were ‘machines for the deletion of time’¹ (cf. Hicks, 2019a, 2019b).

This temporal *legerdemain* is very familiar to anthropologists since our discipline can take much of the dishonour for inventing it, during the early modern days of merchant ethnography, and then profiting from it as the museums filled up with supposed timeless and universal artworks during the years of informal empire. This politics of time is what Johannes Fabian, in his classic text *Time and the Other* (1983), described, that is, how anthropology created the geotemporal illusion that the further the traveller ventured from Paris or London, the further back in time he went: until, in Tasmania or South Africa (or, for Charles Darwin, Tierra del Fuego), he witnessed the human conditions, supposedly ‘archaic’ or ‘fossilised’ or ‘degenerate’, of the Stone Age. In these ways, anthropology misrepresented Indigenous people deeply affected by historical processes as ‘pristine’ ethnographic situations, or survivals. They came to use the idea of the ethnographic present as a given moment of universal time, masking the way in which it was a frame in which people might be frozen, through the constant deferrals of salvage. Here, survival of a different kind was at stake, one compressed into the much shorter timescale of human loss and trauma, calibrated by the human lifespan. Time, Fabian suggested, became a more powerful means of creating ‘the other’ than space. Western ‘civilisation’ grew in two directions at once, enacting the idea of progress in tandem with its reverse – creating present pasts that justified its own degenerate savagery beyond the bounds of Europe. From the last quarter of the 19th century – perhaps specifically from 1884, a year which marked

both the Berlin Conference and the foundation of the Pitt Rivers Museum – the border and the museum were the two central devices in fabricating the time-geographies of informal empire – forged through ideologies of 'race' and the practice of destroying and stealing the possessions and settlements of others. Today, at both the museum and the border, time is a (post)colonial weapon.

In the Calais landscape these ongoing (post)colonial survivals are experienced vividly by displaced people through the strange epoch into which they are forced: a technological Mesolithic, where, apart from the smartphone, there is no modern technology of shelter, of transport, of lighting, heating, or community based on sedentism, but instead just walking and running, constant mobility, long journeys measured through time passed.

'I was surprised that I saw no houses, no electricity, there were just shelters. I arrived knowing no one, with no connections, to see a place that belonged to the European Middle Ages.' (Muhammad from Syria, in Godin *et al.*, 2017: 113)

The questioning in newspapers and on social media of the authenticity of displaced people at Calais through images of them with smartphones recalled a thousand racist anthropological tropes (O'Malley, 2015). At the Calais 'Jungles', impermanence is a form of governance, an artificial limbo of timelessness that is just as significant as statelessness. The experience of displacement here is a condition of waiting, of unsafe boredom, of the banal everyday experience of wasting time that is collapsed into immobile transit, vividly captured in the static white shipping containers through which, as Miriam Ticktin has observed, displaced people were 'rendered immobile by containers designed to travel' (Ticktin, 2016: 31). Part of the logic of how this impermanence is achieved temporally is through the

state's biopolitical appropriation of the humanitarian trope of 'emergency', as it has developed from 20th-century world wars as a focus on saving human life (Barnett, 2011).

★



But the problem of border time cannot be recalibrated through Fabian's solution, simply by asserting the 'coevalness' of a common humanity. Inequality of any kind is more than a social construction to be relativised and demonstrated to be a falsehood, as if the 'zero time fictions' of anthropology's problematic 'ethnographic present' (Vansina, 1970: 165), which re-emerge and harden in the idea of a 'contemporary turn for anthropology' (Agier 2013a), could be simply generalised – opened up to all. This is the same instinct that leads to a collapsing of humanitarian aid into 'development' aid, reproducing the attendant linear, Eurocentric, and discriminatory temporal narratives (Atlani-Duault and Dozon, 2011).

The heterotopias of bottlenecks and chokepoints across the (post)colonial Calais landscape collapse temporal scales into each other (cf. Tazzioli, 2014). But how has the UK national border at Calais come, in the performative guise of the camp, to operate with the timelessness of anthropology? No border is built to be temporary, of course (van Houtum, 2010): the border claims duration for the province of the nonhuman alone through the banal technologies of (post)colonial bureaucracy, paperwork and waiting (Refugee Info Bus, 2018b: 17). The primary message of the border to the traveller is that it can classify them because it will outlast them. Across Calais, exhaustion plays out as a combination of repeated forced displacements, push-backs and the stretched temporality of years of uncertainty which is not resolved after being granted official protection (Ansems de Vries and Welander, 2016). From this holding zone, *The Game* looks like not just crossing La Manche but a kind of time-travel. The state of suspension is generalised from document-checking, border examinations, surveillance and anxiety in the passport queue, and forms, applications and hearings, across the landscape as waiting becomes the only possible act of dwelling. The presence of this archaic mode of existence (which is a mode of *survival*), enacted through bureaucracy and violence, means that we must think through the status of La Lande as a (post) colonial landscape.

★



Where to start with the idea that the white cliffs of Calais might have any relevant connection to the history and legacies of empire? In answering this question, let us follow Ann Laura Stoler in using the term ‘(post)colonial’ to underline the enduring legacies of European colonialism rather than relegating them to history (Stoler, 2016), and thus to understand the colonial past as an anthropological as well as purely a historical question. How far back do these ongoing legacies stretch? Calais has experienced centuries of conflict and peace and ongoing human movement during the post-medieval and modern periods, culminating in its importance in the border regime after the First World War and its almost total destruction in the 1940 Siege of Calais, a few days before the Battle of Dunkirk. But the medieval landscape archaeology of Calais may prove important not to neglect. The town was founded in 1165 by Matthew of Alsace, count of Boulogne, fortified in the 13th century and then taken by the English after the Battle of Crécy in 1346. Jean Froissart’s *Chroniques* recorded that Edward III

issued proclamations that English immigrants would have 'liberties, privilege and immunities so that with their families and goods they may be able to remain and live there safely' while French inhabitants were expelled (Rose, 2008: 23–4). However, while the exile of the 'great burghers and their wives' is fairly well documented, by Froissart in particular, it is much more difficult to assess what happened to ordinary people; as Susan Rose puts it in her account of Calais as *An English town in France*, these people probably 'melted in the general body of anonymous poor folk in Northern France' (Rose, 2008: 25). Calais remained a possession under the Treaty of Brétigny long into the 16th century, until its loss after the Siege of Calais of 1558. Calais was thus an English town for more than half of the first four centuries of its existence, with Members representing the constituency of the Pale of Calais in the English Parliament. With the accession of Queen Elizabeth in 1558, and the Treaty of Troyes of 1564, French ownership of Calais was recognised with the payment of 120,000 crowns.

Let us reimagine the loss of Calais as a key moment in the nascent Elizabethan imperial geographies. The waters of the Channel might appear today to be a 'natural' border between France and England, but this is an artefact of 1563–4, the very time of the first expeditions to the Americas by John Hawkins, often considered England's first slave trader. And so Calais represents, among so many other things, England's last overseas possession on the European mainland (with small aftershocks in the temporary possession of nearby Le Havre in 1562–3, and also Dunkirk between its capture from Spain in 1658 and its sale back to France in 1662)² and its last pre-colonial overseas possession, the withdrawal from which was a key moment in the emergence of the new oceanic geographies of empire. At Calais, withdrawal from any territorial possession on the European mainland laid the foundations for the transition from English exploration to overseas settlement, for the Acts of Union in 1707, and thus for the British Empire.

The question of (post)colonial legacies is even clearer in the more immediate life histories of those displaced people who have found themselves living in the Calais 'Jungles'. As we have seen, Michel Agier and others have made much of the cosmopolitan character of displaced people at Calais, but the quantitative human geographies reveal a more specific geographical sequence. In her ground-breaking work *Asylum After Empire* Lucy Mayblin (2017) makes a simple but radical observation: most asylum seekers in Britain come from regions that were formerly part of the British empire. More specifically, at Calais these former regions overwhelmingly comprise just four states: Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan, and Eritrea (with some smaller but significant numbers of Somalians). Official government figures, published in November 2017 for the transfer of children from Calais in November 2016, list 227 from Afghanistan, 211 from Sudan, 208 from Eritrea (a total of 646), with a further 89 from Ethiopia, from a total of 769.³ This is in keeping with the description of nationalities at the many informal camps described in the report of the Coopération Française pour le Droit de l'Asile, *La loi des 'Jungles'* in 2008: 'Eritreans, Afghans, Iraqis, Sudanese and Iranians' (CFDA, 2008: 24). More recent census data also shows that between two thirds and four fifths of the overall population at the Calais 'Jungles' have come from five countries: Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea and, to a lesser degree, Somalia (Refugee Rights Europe, 2016a: 9, 2016c: 9, 2016d: 10). Higher numbers of Iranians may have arrived during 2018, following the emergence of a new irregular route with the introduction of visa-free travel for Iranians to Serbia from August 2017, but the scale of this is at present based only on anecdotal reports.⁴

★



It is perhaps uncontroversial to understand the current conflicts in Darfur and Afghanistan, and the military conscription regimes in Eritrea from which so many flee, in (post)colonial terms. It is a further step to recognise human displacement from these regions to Europe in the same long-term temporal frame: a history of changing definitions of 'enemy aliens', and of the alternative fates of British subjects within what became the Commonwealth, and British protected persons in those parts of the world that were subject to the informal forms of empire that emerged with the Scramble for Africa and in the Middle East from the 1880s. Four of the five main countries that have been represented by nationals at Calais were former Protectorates or Protected States of the British Empire – Afghanistan (Emirate of Afghanistan, 1879–1919), Sudan and South Sudan (Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 1899–1956) and Somalia (British Somaliland 1884–1960). And in the case of Eritrea, after half a century of Italian rule there was a significant period of British Military

Administration after the Battle of Keren in 1941 until 1952, before independence in 1958 (Balfour-Paul, 1999).

(Post)colonial narratives of the British are often focused on the earlier colonies of the Caribbean and India, or on Australia, the Pacific, and West and South Africa. We imagine the British Empire in terms of ‘possessions’ – dominions and colonies – and in doing so we erase how, later in its history, other arrangements developed in parts of empire that did not involve formal annexation: protectorates, condominiums, mandates and other administrations that created dependent territories or royal or crown colonies rather than British Overseas Territories, and thus excluded their citizens from the benefits of Commonwealth membership after independence, despite the central role of the British Empire in the formation of these states. The trajectories of those states that were not part of the Commonwealth (formed by the Balfour Declaration of 1926, and then the London Declaration of 1949) involved a range of different ideologies of place, ‘race’ and personhood – and enforced migration. The dominance of the model of ‘settler colonialism’ has led to a neglect of the very different conditions of extractive, bureaucratic, informal or, what we are here referring to as the *militarist colonialism* of the British informal empire in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa past and present, from the 1880s to modern conflicts, which are still played out in the Wars in Afghanistan (2001–present), Syria (2011–present) and Iraq (1991, 1998, 2003–9, 2014–present) – and, above all, in Palestine.

★



As Patrick Wolfe (2016) showed in the case of settler colonialism, so too for what we are calling ‘militarist colonialism’: each brought particular ideologies of landscape, property, time and ‘race’, some of which are refracted through Calais today. The basic geographical connection is made by the British and French governments:

Repeated attempts to subvert the border control between France and Britain are an acute symptom of a problem that starts in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, and is exploited by smugglers who take migrants’ money and risk their lives, in particular in the Mediterranean. (Joint UK/France ministerial declaration, 20 August 2015)⁵

But what are the temporal connections through which we might stretch a Braudelian understanding of environmental history from shores of the Mediterranean to La Lande, at this intersection between France and Britain, two former colonial powers, and in

the process restore the centrality of empire to modern European history, as many have done for the early modern period? It is the border regime, rather than the performance of the camp, that is the primary artefact of enduring empire here. The UK's *Windrush* scandal in 2018 has made that clear: a moment of visibility in the (post)colonial border regime of the UK, in which the politics of documentation (an important theme, to which we shall return in Chapter Four) and the horror of illegal deportations for British people born in Commonwealth countries has rightly raised an international outcry. But while the Calais situation and the supposed 'migration crisis' has continued in Britain's national dialogue at the same time, the very different fates of those living through the legacies, scars and debts of the different and more recent forms of militarist colonialism remain virtually unmentioned. Here, we take a lead from Thom Davies and Arshad Isakjee in their call for 'excavating the ideological and material linkages that tie colonial histories with contemporary border governance', which they see as 'key to understanding Europe's shifting constellation of camps, and the racial politics that underpins them' (Davies and Isakjee, 2019).

★




Part of what is recovered through such excavations is a broader temporal perspective on the ongoing debate about the reasons displaced people at Calais risk their lives to cross the Channel and claim asylum in the UK. The balance-sheet approach to this debate, as framed by the British media, polarises and weighs up the so-called ‘push factor’ of fleeing ongoing conflict emphasised by the Left against the supposed ‘pull’ of benefits imagined by the Right. A more complex picture is suggested by primary research in 2016 by Refugee Rights Europe (2016d: 14–15) concluded that three main factors stated by refugees are language skills, family members and perceptions of education opportunities (especially among Eritreans). But in a longer-term perspective than such accounts of motive and agency can reveal through structured interviews and focus groups, the (post)colonial logics of displacement may be significant too. Those fleeing the Taliban or Janjaweed or the forced labour inflicted by the Eritrean state on its citizens do so under (post) colonial conditions – harsh examples of what Ann Laura

Stoler describes as the ‘duress’ of ‘imperial durabilities’ and ‘ruination’ (Stoler, 2008, 2016) that accompany colonialism and decolonisation as ongoing processes in the present. One part of the fragments, structures and modes of existence that endure across time in these regions is the imperial enactment of Britain as a just and good place. Talal Asad has shown how, as a colonial power, the British actively associated themselves with the image of secular humanitarianism – without it being clear that their actions aimed not just to humanise the world but included ‘the desire to create new human subjects’ (Asad, 2003: 110). We might detect the ongoing dominant influence of settler colonialism upon anthropology in the framing in contemporary Refugee Studies of settlement through the image of the camp. At Calais this impulse has served to erase the status of La Lande as part of a border created through the ongoing influences of another, *militarist*, form of British colonialism – through the foregrounding of its status as a camp, and thus as a nonplace rather than a key site of (post)colonial subjugation as the technology of the border uses new parahuman criteria to define others as illegal. La Lande was a human landscape that made visible the ongoing mortal risks being taken for asylum in Britain by moderates, Christians, Muslims and others, especially those from communities, political groups and families most at risk from former associations under new regimes and fundamentalisms, from these specific (post)colonial legacies. To map this landscape, to understand it, requires a geo-temporal rather than a purely situational account of La Lande.

The border, like the anthropological museum, is an engine for the production of alterity; both are devices for the classification of some humans as out of time as well as out of place.





We learn from Michel-Rolph Trouillot (2003) that time of the ‘savage slot’ was that of archaism, the fantasy of pristine survivals from past stages of the human and the myth of progress; what then is the time of what Joel Robbins (2013) calls the ‘suffering slot’; what are its myths? Those times and myths must surely those of impermanence and ‘crisis’.

At Calais the militarised border reduces displaced people to emergency cases in a humanitarian camp. The short-term fix is an ideology in which some parts of academic Refugee Studies are surely complicit, especially in a ‘challenge-led’ UK government funding environment. (Post)colonial debts, obligations and cases for restitution are reduced through the narrative of urgency. The material culture of aid and emergency shelter are made with built-in impermanence, an ephemeral functionalism. There is a ‘temporal politics’ in play like that described by Gisa Weszkalnys (2014) in situations of anticipation fixed into a permanent impermanence. Two unanswered questions: What does this violent presentism share with the history of contemporaneity in

anthropology? What does it share with what the world systems theorists used to call ‘underdevelopment’ as a technique of oppression?

The general failure of Refugee Studies to engage with history (Marfleet, 2007; Chatty, 2017) matters most in its failure to engage with the (post)colonial (Mayblin, 2017: 3), and thus with the idea of the contemporary. One thing to which Contemporary Archaeology may be particularly attuned is the weaponisation of contemporaneity; top of the list on that score when encountering Refugee Studies is the euphemism coined there, one which matches the violence of the anthropological idea of the ‘ethnographic present’ – ‘the emergency’ (cf. Turner 2015).

Just as the emergence of the suffering slot was a response to decolonisation, so the very status of the ideology of the ‘emergency’ is a persistence of ongoing (post)colonial knowledge structures. At the sharp end of this body of thinking, the ‘violence of humanitarianism’ operates in the camp through an ‘antipolitics of care’, where preserving biological life serves to bolster and maintain inequality (Ticktin, 2011). The ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005) is normalised by the state, extended through time, generalised so that even to talk in those terms, in the terms of crisis or emergency, is to contribute to the temporal mystifications of ‘disaster’ and the militarised othering of borderwork (cf. Fassin and Pandolfi, 2013). Through uses of the idea of human survival, humanitarian accounts of ‘bare life’ thus not only obscure how some lives are more likely to be subject to this categorisation because of ongoing (post)colonial processes (Tagma, 2009) but also contribute to the elision of abjection with ‘still life’, fixed in time and space.

Against those slippages towards humanitarian militarism, let us try in the next Chapter to use the possibilities of Contemporary Archaeology to address questions of resistance, of protest, of endurance, of survival, of ‘appearance’, of documentation, and of *visual politics*.

Visual politics



“The humanitarian dismantling operation is over.” Let us consider the October 2016 demolition as an act of occlusion and silencing. Imagine La Lande as a political gesture of witnessing. Not just a place and a time but also a form of knowledge of the production

of inequality and difference. A place and time at which physical erasure was akin to the redaction of a document. Where a demolition buried utopian resistance against borderwork, could excavation ever match up to this gesture? The hope must be that Agamben's (2005) account of the state of exception managed (as so often with Foucauldian studies) to overdetermine the power of the state at the expense of diminishing or erasing traces, places, ongoing processes and potential actions of contestation and resistance (McGee and Pelham, 2018: 24–8). In the possibility that resistance might take the form of making something that leaves a trace that endures for a while and can be seen, and so can bear witness against the bulldozer and the tear gas, a potential space for an archaeology of the near present opens up. But let's be clear at the outset: this would involve a method that shares so much history with borderwork and nationalism itself that its use is limited the technical possibility of making visible what is being hidden. At its best, putting back, for a time, a space for dialogue, a time for the work of memory. Such memory work is surely the most powerful means of creating a warning for the future.

In this chapter we want to explore a further juxtaposition: that of an emergent political phase in the border regime based on new forms of bureaucracy and documentation, and a parallel phenomenon of the political action taken through the means of the iconographic, the forensic, and even the straightforwardly descriptive. We have suggested that representations of the 'Jungle' have masked the Calais borderwork behind the image of the camp and the ideology of the impermanent. Here, we want to explore how collaborative grassroots movements at La Lande co-produced an unofficial monumental critique of the emergent new forms of borderwork at Calais. We focus on, and align ourselves in solidarity with, this 'volunteer humanitarianism' as a self-conscious, collective, improvised and radical 'challenge to the humanitarian machine' (Sandri, 2018: 77), as against the humanitarian militarism that served to mask the ongoing

experiments in borderwork behind emergency measures, and the false image of a supposedly unpredictable ‘refugee crisis’.

Let us focus on those elements of La Lande that constituted a co-produced built environment that sought to make visible, ameliorate and protest inhuman conditions, against the material dimensions of precarity, violence, abjection, dispossession and timelessness of borderwork. Forms of building this place included not just architecture but also the giving of hospitality and the giving of time. The co-production of infrastructure is the most obvious form of this process. It involved a diverse range of community buildings, designed, improvised and constructed from wood, tarpaulin and other materials to hand – some even prefabricated and assembled on site (Mould, 2018: 400–2). Deliveries of timber, clout nails, plastic sheeting, nails, screws and hinges, along with hammers, saws, staple guns and cordless drills (O’Boyle, 2016: 31, 38) continued despite growing controls on building materials from the Préfecture. This architectural work operated at a different pace, and at different scales of budget and forms of organisation, from the ongoing processes of border construction through the hundreds of millions of pounds worth of contracts awarded to contractors engaged by the British and French governments. Grassroots building at La Lande thus became a sort of counter-territorialisation; it produced a settlement against a border of fences, roads, police officers and the Channel itself, and in doing so represented an act of repurposing the monumental, a re-classification of the border as a place of temporary endurances of wood and canvas and human bodies, steel, concrete and rubber (cf. Balibar, 2009).

Yet more was produced through the hospitality, the care and the infrastructural support given by volunteer groups to displaced people – from advice and support services to aid, art, education, food, infrastructure, medicine, phone charging and phone credit, and therapy and health – as well as a wide range of online community groups. Through these efforts and many more – like services for translation,¹ for internet access, and even

for sport – La Lande became a space of resistance against the border regime. The practices of care were both human-centred and materially focused in building safety and dignity, with advice, information, support, translation, and the creation of spaces for women and young children alongside the distribution of food, shoes, shelter, clothing, sleeping bags, blankets, firewood, and sanitary and medical supplies. Here were architectures of dignity and care – toothbrushes for example, and the ongoing needs of warm meals, clothing, phone recharging, firewood, wi-fi.

Natasha King asks the central question for these times of global wall-building: '*How do we refuse borders?*' (King, 2016: 4). One answer came from the grassroots humanitarianism of La Lande: *through the giving of time* the impermanences of borderwork were counterbalanced, made visible, and protested. La Lande became a utopian slot as much as a suffering slot.





The giving of time – let us adopt this phrase to describe how the improvised grassroots responses at La Lande resisted the instrumentalist, militarist humanitarianism that obscured long-term inequalities behind the immediate sufferings of ‘emergency’ and ‘crisis’. Giving time took the form not just of volunteers spending time to restore dignity and to offer therapy (Burck and Hughes, 2017), but also the visible provisioning of things that lasted in the face of dispossession. This included infrastructures like sanitation, drainage and electricity, as well as buildings, artefacts, performances and artworks. In some cases there was a transnational geography to these acts of resistance, as for

example, in the practice of repurposing tear gas canisters cut into pots for planting by children, which is a form known from Palestinian protest. Art was ever present, with many charities and individuals working at La Lande to help and support displaced people through painting, music or theatre.

If the making of artwork produced counter-materials against the border, then the building of structures was even more directly a form of resistance against routinised destructions (Mould, 2018: 405). As the immobilisation of displaced people served to reduce their ability to protest (Rigby and Schlembach, 2013), the landscape of La Lande became a space of protest in its own right. And since October 2016 each temporary 'Jungle', before it is destroyed, has to some extent come to represent a 'performance' of safety that cites and recreates what was offered at a different scale by La Lande (Hagen, 2018). This forms part of long-term practices of resistance that stretch back before the creation of Calais Migrant Solidarity activist collective at the end of the Calais No Borders protest camp in 2009 (English, 2017) and forward past the L'Auberge des Migrants *Marche Citoyenne pour l'Accueil des Refugies* from the Franco-Italian border at Ventimiglia to London via Calais in 2018. Just as irregular travel is a necessary geography for those wishing to seek asylum in the UK, so these temporary permanences represented material forms of irregular time.

★



These material acts of giving time contrast with the changing post(colonial) border materialities against which they resisted. Patrick Wolfe (2016) described how the alternative forms of settler colonialism and extractive colonialism fed into very different racial ideologies of otherness: the former writing identity into landscape and place, and the latter, especially in the context of the displacements of transatlantic slavery, on the skin. The ongoing (post)colonial legacies of British militarised colonialism in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East have produced a border regime at Calais that is increasingly characterised by techniques for the governance and racialisation of displaced people that are based neither on place nor the body, but on a new ultra-bureaucracy as the generator of otherness. This includes the documentation of the geocorporeal: name and date and place of birth name carried in the pocket in the form of an ID card; biopolitics of the body at one remove, refracted through biometrical records and screens, photographs of the face, fingerprints, scans of bodies and eyes, alongside X-rays

of lorries to look for human life – the ‘body as a passport’ (van Houtum, 2010: 288). The dispossession traced above in the form of statelessness, impermanence, timelessness are refractions of a broader status of being ‘without’ that can begin with slippages of language around the lack of papers (*sans-papiers*) towards definitions of being without humanity. The logic of racialisation increasingly unfolded through documentation in the daily experience of displaced people living in Calais in what has been called by some an ‘Apartheid policy’, where Natacha Bouchart (as Mayor of Calais since 2008) has overseen measures to introduce ‘access cards’, obtainable with ID and proof of address, in order to prevent displaced people from ‘using football pitches, swimming pools, the library, and other facilities in the town’ (Calais Migrant Solidarity, 2015c). Meanwhile, a regular feature of the systematic harassment by the CRS in Calais with ID checks has been the removal of officers’ identification badges and the denial of any ability to document violence or breaches of the law on the part of the authorities, for example through photography (Refugee Info Bus, 2018b: 7), even to the extent of the seizure of mobile phones to examine or delete films made of police behaviour (Human Rights Watch, 2017). The prevention of such documentation goes hand in hand with destructions, confiscations and dispossessions, as highlighted by the account of the testimony of a 14-year-old from Afghanistan at rue des Verrotières, 11 April 2018:

‘He just come back from the police station/deport centre and was coming back to his tent to take his items at the beginning of the clearance at Rue des Verrotières ... A CRS officer told him to go quickly and the officer kicked him. He was videoing the situation and the officer took his phone and broke it. His tent, sleeping bag, charger and bag were all taken.’ (in Refugee Info Bus, 2018b: 23)

At the same time, for displaced people at Calais disposing of papers and cards can also represent a strategy of resistance. In this context, the blurring of a face in a photograph online may sometimes even serve to increase the humanity of a political image. A new kind of politics of documentation is emerging in the borderwork of Calais, through which material evidence is both a technique of racialisation and violence, but can also constitute a means for opening up a space where the politics of memory, action and resistance can be seen. This was something also revealed in the 2018 Windrush scandal, in which banal and bureaucratic processes – listing, documentation, concerns that might appear merely descriptive, archaeological even – became recognisably political. The criminal conviction in of human rights activist Loan Torondel, following his being charged with defamation after tweeting a photograph in January 2018 of policemen removing a blanket from a displaced person at Calais², clearly indicates the ongoing emerging visual nature of political conflict, and the power of making undocumented processes visible around the ‘Jungles’ (Amnesty International, 2018).

★



Contemporary Archaeology is concerned with the undocumented present: quotidian traces that are forms of memory in that they are a means for knowing everyday prehistories, unwritten contemporary experiences that are undocumented, unacknowledged, and yet far from unimportant. It seeks to articulate these unspoken moments through more-than-human recollections, to offer a duration to ideas, knowledge, beliefs and modes of existence that have the momentariness that is possessed by words spoken rather than words written; to create appearances and visibilities for the living outdoor world that reimagines the interior of a museum cabinet as unfixed, full of

change; to make the time to reflect, to hesitate and to think, and to make the space to document through intervention and transformation rather than just collecting. This is how the archaeologist can seek to give time, in a manner analogous to how grassroots volunteers continue to give their time in Calais. We are trying to learn from this in how we create the Lande exhibit at the Pitt Rivers.

Visual Archaeology calibrates impermanence through a documentation of change that is not representational but recursive, in that it involves some form of return (Hicks, 2013, 2016a, 2019a, 2019b). Its photographs are not stills and its artefacts are not just remnants but ongoing acts of witnessing (Hicks, 2019a). Its materials are collaborative transformations. Its conception of place is as a palimpsest not an instantaneity. We see this clearly in documenting what was kept, and what is being loaned to us for a temporary further display, from La Lande, understanding this landscape not just as a refugee camp but as a monumental border protest, a *counter-image* or *Gegenbild* – vernacular, experimental and improvised practices of counter-witnessing, ‘an emblem for mass suffering of refugees’ (Hurley, 2016: 1).

There are many important examples of counter-witnessing the borderwork of Calais at La Lande, many of which are included in the Pitt Rivers Museum exhibit in 2019. A few examples will show the range and significance of this work. In winter 2015–16, civic forensics project Riot ID used physical analysis of the remains of conflict with the CRS to show from discarded containers that tear gas was out of date and included an illegal chemical agent (Feigenbaum and Raoul, 2016). In July 2016, the Humans of Calais project at King’s College, London (Singh *et al.*, 2016) sought to document La Lande through the eyes of its residents – ‘migration from the perspective of migrants’. Similar participatory photographic projects that distributed disposable cameras were organised by photographer Séverine Sajous’ Jungleye Postcards project (Jungleye, 2017) and by artist

Gideon Mendel. Mendel's 'visual activism' led him to make large collections of clothing, tear gas canisters, toothbrushes, burnt furniture, children's toys and other items, and exhibit them in a show titled *Dzhangal* at Autograph BPG in East London in February 2017, as a 'counter-aesthetics' of the experience of displaced people (Malaquais, 2017). Architect Grainne Hassett's Calais Builds project undertook crucial infrastructure work at La Lande, while also making architectural and landscape maps in order 'to generate political documents using architectural methodology' (IMMA, 2017). The DUF (Design Unlikely Futures) project worked to add La Lande to Google Maps, to archive Google Street View images from within La Lande, and to document shelter forms through architectural 'cut outs' (DUF, 2017). Photographer Henk Wildschut, meanwhile, returned periodically to repeat photographs at precise spots to create his trans-temporal *Ville de Calais* series, which began in 2006 in the woodlands along rue des Garennes and continued after the demolition of La Lande a decade later (Wildschut, 2018). The sheer amount of material that survives from Calais, its ephemerality both in material and digital form, and its political significance, are among the themes of the Pitt Rivers exhibit.

The visibility of the landscape of La Lande online, in mainstream media and in social media groups (Ibrahim and Howarth, 2016), contrasted with how the cycles of forced sedentism and forced mobility are played now out as cycles of visibility and hiding. Artistic and architectural interventions echoed a process going on in the landscape itself, as this community of practice and border protest, moving through co-productions beyond the binarisms created in this techno-environmental zone, generated a visible monument to the ongoing experience of displaced people at the UK border. La Lande became something close to what Judith Butler has called a 'sphere of appearance' of collective performativity (Butler, 2016: 58; Koegler, 2017: 9).

★



A number of wider parallels to this idea of the ‘Jungle’ as ‘a collective *visible* resistance’ (King, 2016: 125, our emphasis) may assist in thinking it through. In Nick Mirzoeff’s account of the ‘politics of appearance’ in the Black Lives Matter movement, Hannah Arendt’s notion of ‘the space of appearance’ (Arendt, 1958: 199–212) is reformulated through a new account of digital photography of police violence and killings, protest and social media from ‘cell-phone videos and photographs, supplemented by machine-generated imagery taken by body cameras, dash cams, and closed-circuit television footage’:

I will call the interface of what was done and what was seen and how it was described as ‘appearance,’ especially as the space of appearance, where you and I can appear to each other and create a politics. What is to appear? It

is first to claim the right to exist, to own one's body, as campaigns from antislavery to reproductive rights have insisted, and are now being taken forward by debates over gender and sexual identity. To appear is to matter, in the sense of Black Lives Matter, to be grievable, to be a person that counts for something. And it is to claim the right to look, in the sense that I see you and you see me, and together we decide what there is to say as a result. It's about seeing what there is to be seen, in defiance of the police who say 'move on, there's nothing to see here,' and then giving the visible a sayable name. People inevitably appear to each other unevenly – the social movement process is about finding ways for people to learn how to treat each other equally in circumstances where they are not equal, whether in material terms, or those of relative privilege. To take the foundational example, the indigenous person in the Americas always knows that the land in which we appear was stolen from them and so the work of creating the space of appearance is always decolonial. (Mirzoeff, 2017: 17–18)

Mirzoeff's focus on visibility has inspired Lesley McFadyen and Dan Hicks' archaeological account of 'the photological', by which they mean a kind of knowledge made possible through the visualism co-produced by Archaeology and Photography (Hicks, 2019a, 2019b; McFadyen and Hicks, 2019). The work of artists engaging with the so-called 'migrant crisis' and with the refugee experience in Palestine is also directly relevant, including the work of the cross-disciplinary team of architects, artists, software developers, investigative journalists, and others who make up the Forensic Architecture research agency at Goldsmiths College, who define their practice as part of an emergent academic field that bears many similarities to Contemporary Archaeology, in that it involves the presentation of physical and digital evidence 'on the threshold of detectability' (Weizman, 2017). Their

Forensic Oceanography strand, including the *Left-to-Die Boat*, addresses the question of deaths of displaced people crossing the Mediterranean.³ Artist Jeremy Deller's 2009 work *It Is What It Is*, in which an exploded car from the war in Iraq was toured across American galleries from New York City to Los Angeles, was an early forerunner of this kind of intersection between art and politics around the idea of visibility. In an important work that has inspired our own approach to repurposing the (post)colonial apparatus of heritage and museums, in 2017 Sandi Hilal and Alessandro Pessi's architectural studio Decolonising Architecture, based in Beit Sahour, Palestine, issued a dossier setting out justifications for the inscription on the World Heritage List of the supposedly impermanent Dheisheh Refugee Camp in Bethlehem – a place which is now more than 70 years old (Petti, 2017). This intervention, expanding what Beverley Butler calls 'archival memory' in Palestine (2008), uses the politics of duration as a form of resistance against displacement. These works also hold much in common with an earlier tradition of activism in Archaeology and Heritage in post-Apartheid South Africa. For example community collecting and excavations at Cape Town's District Six in 1992 led to the display the material remnants, including street signs and domestic objects, being recovered and re-displayed by the same people whose houses were destroyed less than a decade before – an engagement with the 'state of emergency' through collective memory (Rassool 2007). Here, Ciraj Rasool has shown how the museum became 'a verb', 'something ongoing, productive, empowering and engaging' (Rassool, 2014).

And so our interest is less in La Lande as an urban prototype (*pace* Agier *et al.* 2018), prophecy, or site for some tautological 'future heritage' than as a place through which to remember the undocumented human experiences of the near-present, a *lieu de mémoire* for the recent past – remembering the 'Jungles' of the previous two decades, and in doing so remembering the ongoing human legacies of the British empire on French soil.

This kind of memory might re-recreate a site of comparison to critique the racist classificatory work of border regimes, reassembling fragments of La Lande as a place to make visible processes that are now being hidden.

In this respect La Lande is and was a monument: a place built against the border to recall ongoing (post)colonial brutality. And as Lesley McFadyen observes, 'monuments are better understood through the details of their making rather than as an explanation of form' since architecture is a practice before is an object (McFadyen, 2016), and so we think of the splinters and sand under the fingernails, the sheltered bodies, the violence of destruction, and the dispersals as collapsed across time into this place as a monument, now doubly remembered. The pace, so to speak, of the sand and that of the wood and that of the people and that of the steel fencing and that of the fires is layered, so that the monument is in a form of immanence or growth rather than fixity; to make visible the pace of violence. This is Contemporary Archaeology's account of transformation, a counterpoint to Agier's account of a 'contemporary turn for anthropology' (Agier, 2013a).

★



The Pitt Rivers Museum is an unlikely institution through which to develop this work, but bear with us as we explain further some of the rationale. We learn from Sarah Green that the border is a technology of classification (Green, 2005, 2012: 576–8), and so too we affirm is an anthropological museum: a space of containment, of racist ideologies, of the objectification of others, a space where documentation not only describes but enacts dispossession – the museum is, like the border, all of these things. Chiara de Cesari (2017: 21) has gone so far as to suggest that we might see the western museum itself as a ‘border device’, through which European identity can be projected via technologies of making memory through material culture. De Cesari could not be more right in arguing this, we believe; and this book and exhibit seek to push this idea to its limit. Archaeology and anthropology are the epitome, often the caricature, of colonialist forms of knowledge. And yet the anthropological museum today is just as unstable as the border. La Lande was in part a monument built to critique through the built

and lived environments of care and co-production the horrors of British and French borderwork, only to be destroyed and hidden. As the public space of a discipline that works across presence and absence, could the anthropological museum extend its interest in displaced objects to operate as a site for making visible the ongoing situations for displaced people? The predicament of both the border and the museum is a (post)colonial one, and thus one of the ongoing obligations formed through an unfinished imperial past. The anthropological museum is always already, as was La Lande, in part a monument to national shame. That is the point of departure for our Pitt Rivers exhibit.

Some are concerned that the 'museification' of the question of forced migration and human displacement will create a 'temporal fixation' (Hamilakis, 2016: 136). But museums, like borders, like any landscape or assemblage, are, as Doreen Massey (2005) put it, 'stories so far'. Museums are places for rethinking the infrastructures of anthropology itself (Fortun and Fortun, 2015) – a process in which the old technology of the museum may yet find a new role, be repurposed, be reimagined as an unfinished project – while never failing to testify to the horror of its conditions of creation and growth. And like museums, so too borders 'are not always working in the service of the state' (Johnson *et al.*, 2011: 68), as long as they can host acts of protest such as that witnessed at La Lande. We are therefore far more concerned with resisting an academic discourse that fails to use its platform and its past to understand our present, which could only be another violent (post)colonial inaction. We hope that the exhibit – of loans, friendships, loss, protest, objects and reassembled communities of memory – will be a document to be read as a map of an unfinished journey.

Each example of collecting, making, photographing, posting online, drawing, painting, keeping, is to some extent an exercise in redrawing the UK border – each more enduring, in that it is more human, than fences, passports, border security, detention centres, and the rest of the infrastructure of borderwork.

Such counter-mapping takes a non-geometrical form. It is an interventionist cartography of the cosmopolitics of memory. It recalls how for forensics to be possible someone must be to blame. It documents how people sought to redraw contemporary histories to make endurances that now bear witness to the unendurable.

During the 19th century nations were built in part through national museums; today the architecture of the 21st-century nation state is primarily borderwork, and the museum is still with us, with its attendant (post)colonial disciplines of archaeology and anthropology, waiting to be reimaged at a new scale.

The assertion of the physicality of borders – material things like fences or walls that constrain, that categorise, that in the obligatory pun ‘b/order’ (contain and exclude) – takes us only so far. The observation that these things leave traces – like so many chunks of the *Berlinermauer* on bourgeois mantelpieces – is banal. But consider how, in their ground-breaking account of the material politics of borders, Olga Demetriou and Rozita Dimova observe that the materiality of borders ‘as lines on the ground, or on maps, continues to be taken for granted’ (2019: 2). This taking for granted holds back and yet in doing so also creates a space for questioning, their forms, their effects, their logics, and their histories – rather than just their intentions – and thus holds us back from seeing the ‘processual aspect of borders’ in terms of ‘how the relationship between materiality and abstraction is established’ (Demetriou and Dimova, 2019: 2). So too, John Agnew has observed how borders are not simply ‘artefacts on the ground’, but operate as ‘residual phenomena’ that limit not only physical movement but also ‘the exercise of intellect, imagination and political will’ (Agnew, 2008: 175–6). Agnew’s argument can be taken forward in new directions through a combination with anthropological thinking about the material world as dimensions of thought, knowledge and time as much as physicality (Hicks 2010) – and extended, for

the case of residues, to include not just ideas but also memory and the politics of heritage.

★



The afterlives of those things that survive from La Lande that will form part of the Lande exhibit remain uncertain at this point. But these temporary loans from the recent past offer moments to stop and think, quite unlike the 'first draft of history' they create a space for dialogue, a deferral of completeness, a time for hesitation, and thus surprise emerging through a trans-temporal method, for a re-description of modes of existence. There may perhaps be some kind of generation of time or knowledge through a curatorial gesture that is not stopped still by the conservator. No objects are being accessioned, although the potential for, and the politics and desirability of, a longer-term archive will be one topic for debate through the exhibit. Looking

ahead, we are interested in trying to imagine a humanitarianism that places memory and ongoing ‘lessons learnt’ from the recent past at its heart (Taithe and Borton, 2016) – not a historical method but an ephemeral, archival and visual intervention in the anthropological museum, thinking beyond the ‘crisis’. By putting some borrowed nonhuman fragments on display we hope to make some of the dehumanisations of Calais’ borderwork visible, in an exhibit that begins by assembling people through what they have kept (as an act of resistance against impermanence), and in the hope of – through a Visual Politics – reorienting our sense of the human in humanitarianism, as we have begun to in anthropology, in this case by using fragments to underline the ongoing situation for displaced people in Calais (King, 2016: 23).

We are using an expanded archaeological definition of monumentality here. La Lande was a powerful material form of protest in the face of a border regime that uses impermanence, constant deferral, ongoing postponement, as forms of governance – more than it was any kind of camp or urban form:

Monuments, to be monuments, must be more than big memorials. They must possess the qualities of monumentality, the foremost of which is the imaginary. We do not merely see them and remember. We feel them and imagine. (Pauketat, 2014: 442)

To exhibit or even to write about La Lande as a monumental place is not to continue its life but to return to it by effecting its gradual emergence through memory, and thus its transformation (Hicks, 2016a). The western idea of a monument is intimately bound up with the ideology of the nation state, but forms of the monumental are much more diverse, including non-capitalist modes of the production of time. The monumental is not just the memorial – it is more than just a tomb or a grave marker, more than Egyptian pyramids, or Mesoamerican temple complexes, or European megalithic tombs. In the Hauts-de-

France landscape we might imagine a collapsing across time of the coastal enclosure (Iron Age hillfort), the Atlantikwall, Napoleonic Forts, the Tapisserie de Bayeux, the urban forms made by those arriving from a Mediterranean world (Roman Gaul), the Deutsche Kriegsgräberstätte (war cemetery) at La Cambe, the communally built megalithic structures such as passage graves and standing stones along the French coastline to the west.

Archaeological memory is the inverse of nostalgia in that it seeks actively to reshape the past rather than simply to remember it. It effects transformation through description. And so its approach to what Mbembe calls the necropolitical – the control of who lives and who dies in a (post)colonial world – is that of the necrological, a witnessing and documenting life and loss.

The installation at locations across Europe and North America since 2007 by Turkish artist Banu Cennetoğlu of *The List* – an ongoing detailed death roll of the names and ages of those who have lost their lives seeking to enter Europe since 1993, and the circumstances of their deaths, maintained by the Amsterdam-based grassroots organisation UNITED for Intercultural Action – is a powerful reminder of what these theories mean in practice. This necrology, which at 30 September 2018 ran to more than 35,587 people, follows the logic of Mbembe's flip of the Foucauldian idea of the 'biopolitical' control of human lives by opening a space for memory and dialogue about the ongoing conditions of living and dying at the borderlands of Fortress Europe.





“*The humanitarian dismantling operation is over.*” Let us recall some of the deaths in Calais in October 2016. On 9 October an unnamed man from Eritrea was killed and his wife was injured when hit by car on the A16 highway in Calais; ‘it comes before the imminent demolition of a camp known as the Jungle’, reported *The Guardian*; ‘The incident reportedly brings the death toll among refugees and migrants this year in the Calais area to fourteen.’ Five days later, on 14 October 2016, an unnamed displaced person of unknown nationality was hit by freight train while walking along railway tracks. Then on 17 October 2016 a 26-year-old Sudanese man named Mohammad O. Eyman or Omar died after being beaten by a group of people smugglers in the camp at Norrent-Fontes. On 18 October 2016 an unnamed stowaway of unknown nationality suffocated in back of truck travelling from Calais to the UK. These deaths were not unpredictable accidents but human loss in an environment built to kill in the name of ‘deterrence’.⁴

More than twenty years ago Michael Taussig suggested that a central technique of what he called *The magic of the state* is that the military machine takes ownership of the taboos of the treatment of the corpse, taboos that universally separate humans from nonhumans. Its power appears thus to derive not just from a control of how to think about the dead, as world religions might do, but from a control of life itself (Taussig, 1997). The same power surely animates populist fears of displaced people, parochial western insecurities around a Scramble from Africa that frames a support for lashing out through the Calais landscape as a kind of proxy. Is outsourced violence even more attractive if it can be displaced not just across space but also across time and then, through documentation, can present other humans as some species of the undead? The racial ideologies that led to the creation of the border and the museum through the fake science of the Victorian world are very much in the present.

Drowned, stabbed, shot, beaten by fascists, run over, and suicides in Centres d'Accueil that no Durkheimian sociology could ever make sense of. The Muslim section of Calais' Cimetière Nord, where the inhumations of displaced people who have died at Calais are marked with the wooden crosses of pauper's graves, continues to grow (Gentleman, 2017).

There have been more than 200 (two hundred) deaths at the Calais border over the past two decades (Refugee Info Bus, 2018c; cf. Calais Migrant Solidarity, 2011, 2018; Müller and Schlüper, 2018: 34–42). In 2016 it was estimated that half of the deaths that occurred while trying to cross to the UK were of children (UNICEF, 2016: 23).

In the face of such loss, such horror, each object and image that persists – a text message, a drawing, a photograph, an artefact – is a moment of hope that a light might be shone. Our part of that hope is that the new brutal border regime of ultra-documentation might somehow be met on its own terms from the museum and from anthropological archaeology, so that a form of archaeological documentation may contribute towards

some moment of hesitation or reflection, and may thus, through the smallest of acts of solidarity and resistance, go some way to diminishing this ongoing violence, this (post)colonial militarised (anti)humanitarianism, at least on some small or temporary basis (Corporate Watch, 2018: 143). Bearing witness, like Ernst Bloch (1957) finding hope in the moment of ‘not yet’, by treating the near present as if it were the contemporary past.

Giving time



‘The humanitarian dismantling operation is over.’

Just a few days after the clearances of the final northern section of La Lande, as the hundreds of coaches were still completing their task of moving displaced people from Calais to centres across France, on Tuesday 8 November 2016, the day of the national election in the United States, some lines from Félix Guattari’s 1989 book *Les trois ecologies* came to mind. It was in that section where, discussing the limits of the boundaries of

western categories of 'nature' and 'culture', the Guattari draws a comparison between Donald Trump and a species of algae:

More than ever nature cannot be separated from culture. We must learn to think through the interactions between ecosystems, the mechanosphere, and the baseline universes of social and individual life 'transversally'. Just as mutant and monstrous algae invade the Venetian Lagoon, so our television screens are saturated with a population of 'degenerate' images and statements. In the field of social ecology, men like Donald Trump have the freedom to proliferate freely, like another species of algae, taking over entire neighbourhoods of New York, Atlantic City, etc., to 'redevelop' them by raising the rents, thereby driving out tens of thousands of poor families most of whom are condemned to becoming 'homeless', the equivalent of the dead fish of environmental ecology. (Guattari, 1989: 34, our translation)

Three decades on this toxic algae spreads out at a new hemispheric scale across each of Guattari's trio of *Ecologies* – humanity, society, environment. New mobilisation events expand the racial ideologies of the urban clearances of gentrification at a continental scale. 'It's you and your #FuckingWall', as Vicente Fox Quesada, former President of Mexico, put it on 26 January 2017.¹

How to study this new adverse political ecology? And how to resist it? The immediate fears were about how it was starving what lay beneath it of oxygen and light, smothering dead info-zones that misrepresent the world with the spurious bloom of fake news. On 19 November 2016 the *Oxford English dictionary* chose 'post-truth' as its 'Word of the Year'. The *New York Times* maintained a list of 'Trump's outright lies' for more than a year.² On Earth Day 2017, the first anniversary of the Paris Agreement, the March for Science brought more than a million people out

onto the streets of six hundred cities worldwide. A March for Truth followed in June 2017, again seeking to reclaim reality as a means of critique, as if in hope of pulling back the curtain on the conjuring of solid truths from thin air. Some even accused the academic abstractions of epistemological relativism, social constructionism, identity liberalism and so on of mystifications that now find themselves complicit with Trumpian unreality.³ As if we could fight fictions with nothing but facts. As if the task were, in the words of Marshall Berman's famous definition of modernism, for 'men and women to become subjects as well as objects of modernization, to get a grip on the world' (Berman, 1988: 5). But the process of changing the world itself, or at least some western chunk of it, has been under way for a few hundred years in the form of western colonialism. Philippe Pignarre and Isabelle Stengers call it 'capitalist sorcery'; 'if capitalism were to be put in danger by denunciation,' they observe, 'it would have collapsed long ago' (2009: 10).

Those speaking out about climate change come up quickly against not just denial but against those very agencies that can change, are changing the weather. *To resist the changing of fact, rather than mere fiction, we must return to description.*

If the Contemporary Archaeology of this book – environmental, temporal, visual – is an exercise in 'transversal' thinking, then it is not how Félix Guattari imagined it, Rather than 'running perpendicular to the points first perceived' it excavates a new temporal elasticity of environments, images and things as political forms (cf. Dubois, 2016: 164). In paying attention to the prospect of that #FuckingWall, our ability to fight falsehood with fact depends on the degree to which we believe that the political imagination has the ability not just to misinterpret the world, but to enact its nature in new ways. Chandra Mukerji identified this impulse in 17th-century Versailles, where the transformation of nature in the gardens was not just a reflection of, but an integral strategy within, the creation of the territorial state. Such transformations – 'experiments in building and war

that transformed a landmass into a new kind of political resource' – take a different form in France under the new border regimes (Mukerji, 1997: 3).

The #FuckingWall threatens to render the Brandt Line in concrete sheets, steel posts, razor wire and security officers, and thereby to use a weapon forged from \$70 billion dollars⁴ to score the underdevelopment of the Global South into sand, gravel, shale, clay and rock along the Rio Grande and across the Chihuahuan and Sonoran deserts, from San Diego to Brownsville. What branch of naturalism could grasp the virulent, photosynthetic reach of this extended phenotype, which is so much more than the naturalisation of ideology, of inequality, of prejudice, of the failed ideology of 'race' resorting to the reshaping of geography itself? How to provincialise this degenerate Boreal savagery that moves across so many plateaux: human and environmental, real and fake, artefactual and ideological? Let us repeat how it erects not fortifications against hostile armies but environments built against non-state actors of Global South, humans armed just with cell phones, rucksacks, and their own bodies. This conflict about the relative humanity of places and bodies recalls that old Victorian terror of the crowd – and, more precisely, the fear of besiegement through 'reverse colonisation' (Hage, 2016: 39).

At the Santa Ana National Wildlife Refuge in Texas, environmental protests reveal untruths not as a bloom that obscures how the world really is, but an instant patina across how it is being disfigured. What type of sociocultural algology is required to cope with this change in the West's regime of materials, of environment, and of the visual? The production of illegal humanity through 'borderwork' involves a bifurcation of existential modes; a change in *regimes of possibility*. To reveal it we need the inverse of an inventory of untruths. If the ideological has collapsed into the ecological, any purely sociological talk of 'cosmopolitics' misses how those impulses that are changing

the climate can be extended to change human geography in a range of other ways.

By paying attention to this very material world-making, this book represents a kind of afterword or update to Reviel Netz's study of *Barbed Wire* (2004), described by the author as 'an ecology of modernity', where the reader is led through how one technology shifted between different situations, from the cattle ranches of the southern Great Plains in 1874 to the British enclosures of the Boer War, to the concentration camp on the soil of Europe, with victims ranging from herded animals at first and natural environments to human beings. This frontier technology is returning to the Texas border, but with an outcome that remains uncertain apart from our sense of natures transformed in the name of the inhuman. We might sketch a new seriation of dehumanisation by documenting the evolving forms and species of disaster capitalism, the nomenclatures of immigration enforcement, the construction of what is meant to appear to be unmoveable. Lucien Febvre would surely have called it naturalization. These constructions are as much made by sheer neglect or inaction, or silence or erasure – just as with the denial of climate change and the ascription of illegality or nonhumanity to non-western people – as they are through the new scale of monumentality wrought through the infrastructure of borders.

The ecocidal algae that has wrapped itself around the United States reaches out across the Atlantic Ocean, across the Global North. Climate change is surely a tiny chunk of a new ecological (post)colonialism that alters the earth not by default or as an epiphenomenon but through design and violent inaction. If the nonhuman is being transformed in the name of the inhuman, then this means that we are witnesses to alterations not just in the stories that are told but in *modes of existence*. Pushing Guattari's 'transversal' thinking to its limit, our fieldwork might build not taxonomies of organisms or typologies of forms of shelter but seriations of the different (post)colonial worlds that are being

forged; new descriptions of environmental regimes built for the uneven distribution of pasts, presents and futures.

★



This book has offered a small exercise in such seriation at Britain's own #FuckingWall, at Calais, France. In doing so it aims to combine insights around the prospect of a Visual Archaeology (Hicks, 2019a, 2019b) while contributing to the ongoing emergence of Contemporary Archaeology, and thus to take particular inspiration from Shannon Dawdy's 'profane archaeology' of the politics of 'patina' after Hurricane Katrina (2016; Hicks, 2016b), Rachael Kiddey's participatory archaeologies of homelessness (2017; cf. Kiddey, 2019), Laura McAtackney's *Archaeology of the Troubles* in Northern Ireland (2014), and Jason de León's (2015) account of crossings along the US–Mexican border. As de León shows with his account of the 'Prevention through Deterrence' policy and the Migrant Death

Mapping programme, the natural environment itself has been enlisted in channelling people to make a crossing so dangerous that it becomes ‘a killing machine that simultaneously uses and hides behind the viciousness of the Sonoran Desert’ (De Leon, 2015: 3). As with the naturalised violence of the Texas desert, so with the Mediterranean crossing in which some 17,589 people were killed during the years 2014 to 2018.⁵ And so too at the English Channel, where, as we argued above, the naturalisation of the border began in the 1560s, hand in hand the birth of the British Empire. The enrolment of the sea itself in border security entered a new phase with the offshore border arrangements of the Le Touquet Protocol.

This naturalised violence constitutes much more than the familiar claims in the Frankfurt School tradition, that unequal structures of power relations could be hidden or ‘naturalised’ through the built environment (Leone, 1984, Hicks, 2005). It weaponises places and documents in a global project of human classification and containment that bears many of the hallmarks of the warped project of the Victorian ethnographic museums. To resist this process, a reaffirmed commitment to our common humanity is essential (Agier, 2013b), but is not sufficient. Beyond the assertion of cosmopolitanism our challenge is to fight against the classificatory construction of different modes of existence in the present global moment of borderwork on its own terms – through a reimagining of the comparative project of anthropology, repurposing the discipline that has been closest to the ongoing colonial project. Eduardo Viveiros de Castro has described such an anti-imperialist and ecological political action as the definition of (post)colonial anthropology around ‘one cardinal value: working to create the conditions for the conceptual, I mean ontological, self-determination of people’ (de Castro, 2003: 2). A reimagining of the (post)colonial moment as one not of worldviews, but of words, not of the ‘multiculturalism’ of the intellectual crisis of representation but a multinaturalism born of a ‘crisis of nature’, in which resistance,

like knowledge, must not merely take up a position but must build a perspective (de Castro, 2014).

★



La Lande witnessed the building of a counter-perspective, and it is unfinished. As a process rather than a crisis, La Lande witnessed the co-production of this perspective across boundaries in the name of anti-racism and through endurance in the face of impermanence, destruction and violence. Thus, among so many other things, La Lande was a comparative project that resisted the classifications of borderwork.

Through its ongoing remnants we can compare political ecologies of borderwork, between what stands at Calais and the prospect of that American #FuckingWall. Let us use what we have reassembled from La Lande to juxtapose these two border controls. On the one hand there are proposed changes to the 14th Amendment on birthright citizenship, and on the other the

removal of *jus soli* in the British Nationality Act 1981. There is Donald Trump's dehumanising language that describes 'illegal immigrants' that 'pour into and infest our country'⁶ and there are UK Prime Minister David Cameron's words during the media circus around La Lande in summer 2015:

'You have got a swarm of people coming across the Mediterranean, seeking a better life, wanting to come to Britain because Britain has got jobs, it's got a growing economy, it's an incredible place to live... But we need to protect our borders by working hand in glove with our neighbours, the French, and that is exactly what we are doing.' (David Cameron, 30 July 2015)⁷

There are campaigns against family separation on the Mexican border and many reports of family border separations at Calais. There is the phasing out of the Obama policy of 'deferred action for childhood arrivals' and there is the October 2018 ruling that the British government acted unlawfully in not giving reasons to children refused entry to Britain from Calais under the Dubs arrangement.⁸ There is the suspension of entry to the United States for citizens of seven countries in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, five of which are former British mandates or protectorates: Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. And there are thousands of Sudanese, Eritreans and Afghans risking their lives to cross the Channel to claim asylum in Britain. There are mass deportations of undocumented immigrants from the US and there was a report, in July 2018, from the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee into the Windrush Scandal that warned that 'the problems which affected the Windrush generation and their children will happen again, for another group of people' (HASC, 2018: 33). There was widespread condemnation of the use of teargas against asylum seekers in the US in November 2018, and there is the routine use of tear gas, pepper spray and rubber bullets by the CRS

in the ways described above for years, funded by the British government. The US was also condemned for incarcerating refugee children in June 2018, just as the French government was adopting one of its most restrictive immigration policies (adopted September 2018) that makes it possible to detain families with children in administrative detention for up to three months. And there is the important documentation of how the Sonoma Desert serves to kill migrants seeking to cross the border, while in winter 2015–16 the bodies of Shadi Omar Kataf and Mouaz Al Balkhi washed up 500 miles apart after they tried to swim the Channel from Calais to Dover (Fjellberg and Christiansen, 2016), and in winter 2018–19 hundreds of displaced Iranians began trying to cross in small boats. This is not an 'extended case study'. With each comparison we see the importance of moving beyond the time-frame created by the language of crisis and emergency, and even the humanitarian language of 'saving' and 'rescuing' at sea, which served only to bring the ideas of rescue and capture, caring and controlling, closer together (Pallister-Wilkins, 2017) – more 'catastrophe' than crisis (Stengers, 2013).

★



Calais continues to be a key (post)colonial site in changing technologies of borderwork and exclusion. At the time of writing (January 2018) the outcome of Brexit is still uncertain. There are reports of dredgers working in Ramsgate, but Calais still handles 17% of all UK trade with the world (Corporate Watch, 2018: 126) and the Channel Tunnel reportedly ‘facilitates 26% of UK–EU trade’.⁹ It is the largest European passenger port, carrying 30 million passengers via Eurostar and ferries in 2017, plus some 3.5 million trucks and 4 million cars and vans. To accommodate the politics of this traffic in people and goods, this re-shaped environment of naturalised borders, we do not need the concept of the ‘Anthropocene’. Our account of cosmopolitics seeks to recentre humanity through a decentering of conventional accounts of the human. We are sceptical of any posthuman impulse towards ‘ghosts and monsters’ – ‘unsettling Anthropos from its presumed centre stage in the Anthropocene by highlighting the webs of histories and bodies from which all life, including human life, emerges’ (Swanson et al., 2017: m3)

– that does not place humanism and humanity at its heart. The academic literature that has emerged under the banner of the 'Anthropocene' is of limited use in studying how the materials, environments, practices and ecologies of humanitarianism have been co-opted by militarist colonialism. The term 'Necrocene' might be closer to what is needed to capture some of how La Lande was a time and place that testifies to new controls over living and dying, new cartographies of discrimination, an ongoing (post)colonial situation not just of 'life among capitalist ruins' (Tsing, 2015) but of ongoing ruination (Stoler, 2008). But any assertion of new temporal ages, whether Anthropocene or Cthulucene (Haraway, 2016), would bring with them a return to the same progressive and linear time philosophies that fuelled the racist ideology of the savage slot.

Instead, let us try to discern and to trace how, at Calais and elsewhere, a militarist (post)colonialism is building new kinds of time-zone – incising lines between futures and pasts, in which alterity is, in the name of 'deterrence', rendered as an everlasting present. The temporal stasis that comes from the physical blockage arising from seeking asylum through irregular passage becomes the abhorrent condition of impermanence as abjection. Time is weaponised, as it was once before through Victorian savagery. But this now operates through the withdrawal of duration and the ongoing (post)colonial process of the imposition of different ages across different hemispheres. In these new geopolitics La Lande juxtaposed the infrastructure of transport and stoppage, and became a site of utopian resistance by starting to build new permanences, and thus new times and places – which will be partially reassembled, with the aim of remembering the near-present, at the Pitt Rivers Museum during 2019.

★



‘It seems that walls have become “racist”’, barked an opinion piece in *The Telegraph* in September 2016.¹⁰ This came the day after Immigration Minister Robert Goodwill had told the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee that, ‘We are going to start building this big, new wall very soon. We’ve done the fence, now we are doing a wall.’ The month after the announcement of this latest Great Wall of Calais (of course since superseded by even greater projects), the October demolition of the northern section of La Lande took place. The next week, the world woke up to the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States.

The return of populist far right movements goes hand in hand with this new borderwork. There is doubtless an ongoing experimentation within ‘the large-scale segregations that are being established on a planetary scale’ (Agier, 2002b: 320). But if anthropology relies upon its old tools of social construction, situational-functionalism or reflexivity, it will adopt the parochial, hyperconstructivist, and ethno-Eurocentric position,

as Michel Agier has, that 'No human has ever been "indigenous" [*autochtonien*]' (Agier, 2013b: 47).

Thus, unlike all identity-based beliefs in the indigeneity [*l'autochtonie*] of humans, ancient or contemporary, as a principle or a universal model of identity and as a natural framework of existence, we must instead admit that every em-placement has been preceded and will be followed by a dis-placement... and so forth. The history of identities is a succession of migrations, accidents and accommodation – and, in the end, an ever-arbitrary relationship between a being in motion and an indefinite place 'on the surface of the earth' at the end of an encounter that can only *a posteriori* be given the air of evidence and primary truth. Yet it is in the name of this primary 'truth' that 'identity essentialism' has imposed itself as the illusion of our time, a fake relief from distress in the face of the rapid changes in the world seen in recent decades, in the face of this major change called globalisation, and which has imposed itself as a reality as the mark of a new modernity after the Cold War, causing this strong widespread sensation of uncertainty about the boundaries of places and people. Nevertheless, *no human has ever been 'indigenous' [autochtonien]*, and all borders have always been unstable. All the histories of settlement studied by ethnologists show this: it is the 'already here' [*déjà là*] who can, when newcomers arrive, transform from a relativist and strategic point of view into an 'always here' [*toujours là*] to those who follow, at the cost of an operation that freezes and essentializes a being in motion, of an operation which today would be called 'freeze frame' and which then fixes the identity of space [*l'espace*] in an arbitrary manner. The invention of origin myths is part of this relative anteriority, but they themselves are not fixed in time. They can go through several versions depending on the moment or

the precise place where they are told, or according to the strategies and conflicts that drive them – until forming what historian and anthropologist Marcel Detienne calls *mythidéologies*. (Agier, 2013b: 47–8; our translation, our emphasis)

Let us assess this position not from the cross-Channel position that led David Cameron, during the Brexit campaign, to warn of the ‘Jungle’ moving to Folkestone because the Le Touquet agreement would break down,¹¹ but from the perspective that we built to compare La Lande with Texas.

To reduce the identities of Indigenous people to essentialism and myth by deploying social constructivism in the name of ‘cosmopolitanism’ is to shine a light on the current status of anthropology in mainstream academic Refugee Studies. Doubtless there is a political urgency for a European anthropology of borders that shows the boundary to be a construction, and thus to fight the far right appropriation of the language of Indigeneity. But understanding Calais as a (post) colonial space should also remind us of the planetary context – the importance of anthropologies around the world accepting that Indigenous is not just a culturally fabricated category or identity ‘choice’, but a set of localised attempts to resist settler colonialism on its own terms. It is against the violence of borderwork, not human dwelling and locality, that anthropology, a discipline with a unique conception of the diversity of human worlds, needs to fight. We must not erase the ongoing traffic between early 20th-century colonial and European racial ideologies and practices. As one of us wrote in the week of the October demolitions at La Lande, ‘Britain has never needed Anthropology more than it does today [as] Anthropology resists the dehumanisation of others by expanding our conception of “the humanities”’ (Hicks, 2016c). Anthropology can not only relativize and historicise borderwork, but can also resist it and Fascist nativism too internationally, without making universal

statements about Indigenous rights far beyond Europe, or erasing the violence of replacement of those already emplaced.¹² Indeed, Indigenous activists and scholars, especially in North America, have led the critiques of changelessness or authenticity, instead foregrounding the ongoing violence of settler colonialism, of which the #FuckingWall is another incarnation.

A comparative view reveals also how effects of Agier's universalism go even further, beyond the consequences for Indigenous people who have suffered at the hands of settler colonialism across the Global South, to also impact at Calais those who continue to suffer that other form of ongoing European colonialism, which we are calling here *militarist colonialism*. To acknowledge Indigeneity as a social scientist is to accept how imperialist ideologies of land and environment can be reclaimed as a form of resistance, as an integral part of human groups. Agier critiques humanitarianism at Calais, but in doing so resurrects an old anthropological conception of personhood where humanity is not bound up with environments and material conditions and time – an approach difficult to disentangle from those prejudices through which displaced people are reduced to just people in the ideology what Agamben (1998) calls 'bare life'.

We share with Agier a concern with how what Aimé Césaire (1955: 88) called '*pseudo-humanisme*' finds its way into humanitarian militarism at places like the 'Jungles'. We see the same diminished humanity in posthuman tendencies in 'dark heritage', 'ruin porn' and the 'archaeographic' – those dehumanising trends that have characterised some the most flaneuristic, scholastic, and voyeuristic accounts of La Lande and other sites of (post)colonial violence, and directly against which this book and exhibit aim to build new forms of Visual Archaeology (cf. McFadyen and Hicks, 2019). In this text we have been advocating for an archaeological anthropology that turns away from any conception of 'posthumanism' and takes seriously the layered environments, times and documents of borderwork at La Lande in order to resist the violence of the

GIVING TIME

border regime on more human terms. To fail to do so would be to extend the dispossession of people that was resisted through the creation of La Lande as place, duration and visual culture.

★



This is part of a much wider and more pressing question for comparative anthropology – one expressed by Marshall Sahlins, in his foreword to the English translation of Philippe Descola’s *Par-delà nature et culture*, which reflected on a time at which ‘many thought anthropology was losing its focus, parallel to the disruptive effects of global capitalism on the cultural integrity of the peoples it traditionally studied’:

As I listened to an anthropological lecture recently on customs officers in Ghana, the thought flashed across my mind that we used to study customs in Ghana. (Sahlins, 2013: xi–xii)

To ask those bigger, comparative questions is to speak up for humanity's different modes of existence, ways of living and thinking, or 'ontologies' to use the jargon, and in doing so to alert ourselves to how global borderwork is seeking to make the lines between such different worlds – but drawn on their own terms – permanent. The present moment is not a *Scramble from Africa* but a *Scramble to Borderwork*. This moment demands a more-than-human analysis of changing western technologies of classification. Britain was never a nation of shopkeepers, but its present challenge is the threat and the prospect of a nation of customs officers, from university lecturers to landlords. We might learn from how La Lande improvised one method for resistance: building a space of comparison, creating things to last from the condition of precarity, and thus making a space of appearance for the means, contingencies and horrors through which the nation state is built and rebuilt – central among which is borderwork as a technology of 'race'. In this book and exhibit, we aim now to bear witness to that space of appearance and comparison, through a form of Visual Archaeology.

★



The cosmopolitics of Calais today are (post)colonial in nature, at a time at which Britain's fantasies about its imperial past are increasingly wild and self-delusional, in plans for Mayflower 2020 and beyond. Today, the environment of 'deterrence' for those humans forced daily to risk their lives to cross from the white cliffs of the Côte d'Opale is more hostile than ever. Anthropology has a key role to play in showing, comparing and thus problematising the place of material, built and natural environments in the production of alterity through national borders (cf. Latour, 2017). As an anti-racist discipline, anthropology has a responsibility to continue to make visible the inhuman treatment of displaced people on European soil and at its walls, what Dimitris Dalakoglou describes as 'the manifestation of Europe's most ugly and discriminatory spatiality – the preservation at all costs of its border security' (2016: 180).

In the 20th century Britain was a key driver of globalisation, and many scholars – from Eric Williams to Edward Said – have shown the importance of the global connections of the British

LANDE: THE CALAIS 'JUNGLE' AND BEYOND

Empire to British history, from the Industrial Revolution to the English country house. In our present (post)colonial moment it is the old technology of the estate wall, now wrought in steel and razor wire, that appears to be emerging as the signature artefact, archaeologically speaking, of the geopolitics of the nation state. If the British withdrawal from Calais, and thus from Europe, in 1564 heralded the beginning of empire, its return to this place in the 21st century bears witness to the ongoing 'ruin(n)ation' wrought by the British Empire through the ideology of the nation state.

★



What will the Pitt Rivers exhibit achieve? A recalibration of border time maybe – one that builds against it, rather reconstructs. Contemporary Archaeology is a method for transformation rather than representation. We certainly hope to create a space of duration that expands the resistance, the making visible of the human conditions of borderwork, that was begun at La Lande. As an exercise in Visual Archaeology, we aim to shine a light on Calais as the key (post)colonial borderzone of Britain, and a place of experimentation in new forms of borderwork in a world of wall-building (McAttackney and McGuire, 2019). In the process, the project has reconnected people, friends, communities and objects. We are aware that ‘the very aspirational quality of the politics of humanity that lends it appeal often immunizes it from critical inquiry’ (Moyn *et al.*, 2010), but we hope to bring an anthropological perspective that embraces the risk, as highlighted by Bernardot (2008: 30), of ‘confusing science and activism’.

La Lande has already produced many hybrid scholarly-activist works written by people who spent time creating this place, many of which are cited here (King, 2016: 3), and there are doubtless more to come. It was a watershed for the politics of visibility. We hope to put the idea of an archaeology of the near past into practice in a manner that ‘gives time’ in the way that the many displaced people, volunteers and activists did at La Lande in 2015 and 2016.

In doing so, the exhibit and this book are about the present and the near future. They recall the ongoing situation at the borders of Britain and Europe – the many ongoing ‘Jungles’, across *environmental hostility*, *temporal violence* and *visual politics*. As we write, today on, 7 January 2019, 26 months on from the demolition of the northern section of the Calais ‘Jungle’, Stella Creasy MP has had to remind the House of Commons what Help Refugees and others have been saying for months: that ‘There are 1,500 people sleeping rough tonight around Dunkirk and Calais, 250 of them children and unaccompanied minors ...

There have been 972 human rights abuses reported in Calais, 244 of them involving police violence ... The French police are pouring bleach into the tents.'¹³

As collaborative endeavours the book and exhibit protest the ongoing failure of the duty of care for those seeking asylum through irregular travel across the UK national border in France. They protest the racist (post)colonial structures of exclusion, segregation and classification that underlie it, and they bear witness to the border as an ongoing (post)colonial technology. They seek to reimagine and repurpose the museum and anthropological archaeology as tools for visual politics. Who knows what the prospects for the humanities and social sciences are, given the contemporary predicament of an undecolonised curriculum where whole sub-disciplines like Classics are grounded in the exclusion of the non-western from the definition of 'civilisation' and the British Museum hardens its parochial, aristocratic position on universality? Could *giving time* be part of anthropology's (post)colonial restitution? At Calais and beyond there can be no more urgent task for Archaeology today than to excavate and advocate for the undocumented present.

Notes

1 Introduction: borderline archaeology

- ¹ ‘Notre mission est remplie, l’opération humanitaire de démantèlement est terminée’, quoted in ‘Démantèlement de la “Jungle” Fabienne Buccio, la préfète du Pas-de-Calais en première ligne’, *La Voix du Nord*, 29 October 2016, www.lavoixdunord.fr/66830/article/2016-10-29/fabienne-buccio-la-prefete-du-pas-de-calais-en-premiere-ligne
- ² ‘Flow of migrants will continue however many tents are torn up’, *The Times*, 22 September 2009.
- ³ ‘Theresa May interview: “We’re going to give illegal migrants a really hostile reception”’, *The Telegraph*, 25 May 2012, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/9291483/Theresa-May-interview-Were-going-to-give-illegal-migrants-a-really-hostile-reception.html
- ⁴ See UK Prime Minister’s Office (2018: 9). For some of the figures and detail see these three Home Office publications from 2015, 2016 and 2017: *Managing migratory flows in Calais: Joint Ministerial Declaration on UK/French co-operation* (20 August 2015). London and Paris: Ministère de l’Intérieur and UK Home Office, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/455162/Joint_declaration_20_August_2015.pdf; Joint statement by the governments of France and the United Kingdom (30 August 2016), www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-by-the-governments-of-france-and-the-united-kingdom; Home Office response to Freedom of Information request, 28 April 2017, Annex A of which gives the figure of £315.9 million, https://fullfact.org/media/uploads/foi_response_41250_-_r.pdf
- ⁵ UK Prime Minister’s statement at the UK–France summit, 3 March 2016, www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-france-summit-3-march-2016
- ⁶ Refugee Council, ‘Refugee Council responds to Sandhurst Treaty’, January 2018, www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/latest/news/5145_refugee_council_reponds_to_sandhurst_treaty. The full text of the Sandhurst Treaty is here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/674885/Treaty_Concerning_the_Reinforcement_Of_Cooperation_For_The_Coordinated_Management_Of_Their_Shared_Border.pdf

⁷ 'Calais migrant fence blown down by wind in French port', BBC News, 27 December 2014, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30613475

⁸ Oliver Gee, 'Eurotunnel floods land in bid to keep refugees out', *The Local*, 13 January 2016. www.thelocal.fr/20160113/eurotunnel-adds-moats-to-keep-refugees-away

⁹ A total of 100 million euros have already been provided by British authorities to reinforce security. Work will be taken forward rapidly on priorities identified in the regular joint UK France security reviews. Moreover, over the last year, the French authorities have been providing 1,000 police and gendarmes day and night to prevent intrusion and protect people and goods around and in the tunnel and port areas. This scheme has just been recently reinforced with 160 additional officers. (Home Office web page announcing the August 2016 Home Office Joint Statement cited in the footnote above, 30 August 2016, see: www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-by-the-governments-of-france-and-the-united-kingdom)

See also 'Médecins sans frontières: "Calais est devenue une cage de zoo"', *Le Monde*, 16 June 2017, www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2017/06/16/medecins-sans-frontieres-calais-est-devenue-une-cage-de-zoo_5145860_3232.html

¹⁰ Prime Minister's speech on Europe at Chatham House, 10 November 2015, www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-on-europe

¹¹ 'Eritrean man dies after Calais road accident involving UK lorry driver', *The Guardian*, 10 October 2016, www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/10/eritrean-man-dies-calais-road-accident-uk-lorry-driver-obstacles-road

¹² Home Secretary, Statement on illegal immigration in Calais, 14 July 2015, www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretary-statement-on-illegal-immigration-in-calais

¹³ 'Squabbling over children in Calais sends an appalling message to the rest of the world', Amnesty International, 2 November 2016, www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/squabbling-over-children-in-calais-sends-an-appalling-message-to-the-rest-of-the-world/

2 Environmental hostility

¹ House of Lords, 'Immigration: Hostile environment', *Hansard* vol. 791 (14 June 2018), <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2018-06-14/debates/4EB5AD24-87B4-43E9-908F-1DE447952889/ImmigrationHostileEnvironment>

² House of Commons, Exchange between Charlie Elphicke (Dover, Con) and James Goodwill. 'Refugee camp: Calais', *Hansard* vol. 622 (6

NOTES

- March 2017). <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2017-03-06/debates/81424AB7-FC0F-4AE8-B1DC-47AD5B853E66/RefugeeCampCalais>
- ³ House of Lords, Lady Sheehan, ‘Calais refugees’, *Hansard* vol. 785 (2 November 2017). <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2017-11-02/debates/12AC247A-E161-494A-9336-4BE334BF0D0D/CalaisRefugees>
- ⁴ On 19 December 2018 *Le Monde* (‘Le Défenseur des droits déplore le “dénouement extrême” des migrants dans les campements’) reported Jacques Toubin as describing: “stratégies de dissuasion et d’invisibilisation sur le territoire national menées par les pouvoirs publics” (“strategies of deterrence and invisibilization on national territory driven by government authorities”), www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2018/12/19/le-defenseur-des-droits-denonce-une-degradation-de-la-situation-des-migrants-dans-les-campements_5399868_3224.html
- ⁵ ‘Calais: trois militants d’extrême droite condamnés à la prison ferme’, *Le Monde*, 14 March 2016, www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2016/03/14/calais-trois-militants-d-extreme-droite-condamnes-a-la-prison-ferme_4882749_1653578.html
- ⁶ Conseil d’État, 31 juillet 2017, Commune de Calais, Ministre d’État, Ministre de l’Intérieur, www.conseil-etat.fr/Decisions-Avis-Publications/Decisions/Selection-des-decisions-faisant-l-objet-d-une-communication-particuliere/Conseil-d-Etat-31-juillet-2017-Commune-de-Calais-Ministre-d-Etat-ministre-de-l-Interieur
- ⁷ ‘France to provide water and open centres for refugees near Calais’, *The Guardian*, 31 July 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/31/france-to-provide-water-and-open-centres-for-refugees-near-calais; ‘France must provide safe drinking water and sanitation for migrants in the “Calais Jungle”, say UN rights experts’, OHCHR 16 October 2017, www.ohchr.org/en/newsevents/pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22240&LangID=E
- ⁸ ‘Migrants à Calais: La majorité des gens en souffrance psychologique’, *Le Monde*, 2 April 2018, www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2018/04/02/migrants-a-calais-la-majorite-des-gens-sont-en-souffrance-psychologique_5279651_3224.html
- ⁹ <https://culanth.org/fieldsights/1046-trump-studies>

3 Temporal violence

- ¹ Pourtant, cet hommage liminaire confine l’existence du problème plutôt qu’il ne le résout. La vraie réponse se trouve, croyons-nous, dans le caractère commun du mythe et de l’œuvre musicale,

- d'être des langages qui transcendent, chacun à sa manière, le plan du langage articulé, tout en requérant comme lui, et à l'opposé de la peinture, une dimension temporelle pour se manifester. Mais cette relation au temps est d'une nature assez particulière: tout se passe comme si la musique et la mythologie n'avaient besoin du temps que pour lui infliger un démenti. L'une et l'autre sont, en effet, des machines à supprimer le temps. (Lévi-Strauss, 1964: 23–24)
- ² The only other potential candidates would be the garrisoned Cautionary Towns of Brill and Flushing (1585–1616).
- ³ 'Transfers of children to the UK from the Calais Operation: November 2017', www.gov.uk/government/publications/transfers-of-children-to-the-uk-from-the-calais-operation-november-2017
- ⁴ See www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-kent-46519306
- ⁵ Joint UK/French ministerial declaration on Calais: An agreement between France and the UK on new measures to help alleviate the migrant situation in Calais (HM Government Policy Paper based on joint declaration signed by Home Secretary Theresa May and French Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/455162/Joint_declaration_20_August_2015.pdf

4 Visual politics

- ¹ The seven main languages of La Lande were Arabic, Amharic, English, Farsi, Kurdish, Pashto and Tigrinya (Refugee Rights Europe, 2016c: 5).
- ² Loan Torondel, '(Policier prenant la couverture d'un migrant) – Mais il fait 2°! – “Peut-être, mais nous sommes la Nation française monsieur”’, 1 January 2018, <https://twitter.com/LoanTorondel/status/947827212153180161>
- ³ Forensic Architecture, *Liquid traces: The left-to-die boat*, 2014, <https://vimeo.com/89790770>
- ⁴ The List. <http://www.list-e.info/>

5 Giving time

- ¹ <https://twitter.com/VicenteFoxQue/status/824685921182347264>
- ² www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/23/opinion/trumps-lies.html
- ³ See Mark Lilla, 'The end of identity liberalism', *New York Times*, 20 November 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-liberalism.html. See also Owen Whooley, 'Are we complicit? Talking social constructionism in the age of Trump', 23 February

NOTES

- 2017, <https://asaskat.com/2017/02/23/are-we-complicit-talking-social-constructionism-in-the-age-of-trump/>
- 4 In April 2017 the *New York Times* suggested that the Mexican Border Wall would cost up to \$70 billion to build and \$150 million per annum to maintain, www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/us/politics/senate-democrats-border-wall-cost-trump.html
- 5 Missing Migrants: Mediterranean Migration Route, <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean> (consulted 6 January 2019).
- 6 <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1009071403918864385>
- 7 <https://twitter.com/refugeecouncil/status/626663835223621632>
- 8 Help Refugees, ‘Government broke the law by not giving reasons for Dubs children rejections, court finds’, 3 October 2018, <https://helprefugees.org/news/dubs-court-case-ruling-home-office-october-2018/>
- 9 www.getlinkgroup.com/uk/the-channel-tunnel/founding-documents/
- 10 Douglas Murray, ‘The Calais wall is nothing like Donald Trump’s – but the Left will say anything to undermine our borders’, *The Telegraph*, 7 September 2016, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/07/the-calais-wall-is-nothing-like-donald-trumps--the-left-just-don/
- 11 ‘Britain “faces influx of 50,000 asylum seekers” if it leaves the European Union’, *The Telegraph*, 8 February 2016, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/12145781/David-Cameron-warns-of-migrant-camps-in-southern-England-if-Brexit-vote.html
- 12 We are grateful to Rosemary Joyce, Georgy Kantor, and other colleagues for discussions on these points.
- 13 House of Commons, Stella Creasy MP, ‘Migrant crossings’, *Hansard* vol. 652 (7 January 2019).

References

- Agamben, G. (1998) *Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life* (trans. D. Heller-Roazen), Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Agamben, G. (2005) *State of exception* (trans. K. Attell), Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Agier, M. (2002a) 'Still stuck between war and city: A response to Bauman and Malkki', *Ethnography*, 3(3): 361–6.
- Agier, M. (2002b) 'Between war and city Towards an urban anthropology of refugee camps', *Ethnography*, 3(3): 317–41.
- Agier, M. (2003) 'La main gauche de l'Empire: Ordre et désordres de l'humanitaire', *Multitudes*, 11: 67–77.
- Agier, M. (2008) *Gérer les indésirables: Des camps de réfugiés au gouvernement humanitaire*, Paris: Flammarion.
- Agier M. (2012) 'Penser le sujet, observer la frontière: Le décentrement de l'anthropologie', *L'Homme*, 202–3: 51–75.
- Agier, M. (2013a) 'Le tournant contemporain de l'anthropologie: Comprendre, encore, le monde qui nous entoure', *Socio*, 1: 77–93.
- Agier, M. (2013b) *La condition cosmopolite: L'anthropologie à l'épreuve du piège identitaire*, Paris: Éditions La Découverte.
- Agier M. (ed.) (2014) *Un monde de camps*, Paris, La Découverte.
- Agier, M. (2016a) 'Nouvelles réflexions sur le lieu des Sans-État: Calais, son camp, ses migrants', *Multitudes*, 64(3): 53–61.
- Agier, M. (2016b) 'Epistemological decentring: At the root of a contemporary and situational anthropology', *Anthropological Theory*, 16(1): 22–47.
- Agier, M. and F. Bouchet-Sangier (2004) 'Humanitarian spaces: Spaces of exception', in F. Weissman (ed.) *In the shadow of 'just wars': Violence, politics, and humanitarian action*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Agier, M., Y. Bouagga, M. Galisson, C. Hanappe, M. Pette and P. Wannesson (2018) *La Jungle de Calais*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

- Agnew, J. (2008) 'Borders on the mind: Re-framing border thinking', *Ethics & Global Politics*, 1(4): 175–91.
- Ahonen, P. (2018) 'Europe and refugees: 1938 and 2015–16', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 52(2–3): 135–48.
- Amnesty International (2014) *The human cost of Fortress Europe: Human rights violations against migrants and refugees at Europe's borders*, London: Amnesty International.
- Amnesty International (2018) 'France: Criminal conviction for a tweet will have chilling effect on migrant rights defenders', 25 September, www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/france-criminal-conviction-for-a-tweet-will-have-chilling-effect-on-migrant-rights-defenders/
- Ansems de Vries, L. (2016) 'The transience and persistence of the "jungle" at Calais', *Open Democracy*, 27 February, www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/leonie-ansems-de-vries/transience-and-persistence-of-jungle-in-calais
- Ansems de Vries, L. and M. Welander (2016) 'Calais demolition: "mission accomplished", the politics of exhaustion and continued struggles for mobility', *Open Democracy*, 25 November, www.opendemocracy.net/mediterranean-journeys-in-hope/leonie-ansems-de-vries-marta-welander/calais-demolition-mission-accom
- Ardener, E. (1971) 'The new anthropology and its critics', *Man*, 6(3): 449–67.
- Arendt, H. (1958) *The human condition* (second edition), Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Asad T. (2003) *Formations of the secular*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Atlani-Duault, L. and J.-P. Dozon (2011) 'Colonisation, développement, aide humanitaire: Pour une anthropologie de l'aide internationale', *Ethnologie française*, 41(3): 393–403.
- Balfour-Paul, G. (1999) 'Britain's informal empire in the Middle East', in J.M. Brown and W.M. Roger Lewis (eds) *Oxford history of the British Empire: The twentieth century*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 490–514.

REFERENCES

- Balibar, É. (2001 [1999]) 'Ouverture: Aux frontières de l'Europe', in *Nous, citoyens d'Europe? Les frontières, l'État, le peuple*, Paris: La Découverte, pp. 15–26.
- Balibar, É. (2009) 'Europe as borderland', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 27(2): 190–215.
- Barnett, M. (2011) *Empire of humanity: A history of humanitarianism*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Beddoe, C. (2017) 'Nobody deserves to live this way!' *An independent inquiry into the situation of separated and unaccompanied minors in parts of Europe*, London: Human Trafficking Foundation, www.antislaverycommissioner.co.uk/media/1262/nobody-deserves-to-live-this-way.pdf
- Belloni, R. (2007) 'The trouble with humanitarianism', *Review of International Studies*, 33: 451–74.
- Berman, M. (1988) 'The broad and open way: Preface to the Penguin edition', *All that is solid melts into air: The experience of modernity*, London: Penguin, pp. 5–12.
- Bernardot, M. (2008) *Camps d'étrangers*, Bellecombe-en-Bauges: Editions du Croquant.
- Bhatia, M. (2018) 'Social death: The (white) racial framing of the Calais "jungle" and "illegal" migrants in the British tabloids and right-wing press', in M. Bhatia, S. Poynting and W. Tufail (eds) *Media, crime and racism*, London: Palgrave, pp. 181–212.
- Bloch, E. (1959) *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Blunkett, D. (2002) 'I'll fight to have Sangatte closed for good', *Daily Mail*, 16 May (32948), p. 4.
- Bolt, D. (2018) *An inspection of Border Force operations at south coast seaports, January–May 2018*, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office (Report of the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/755272/ICIBI_An_inspection_of_South_Coast_Ports.pdf

- Border Force (2014) *Partner bulletin: Essential information for Border Force's partners, September 2014*, London: Border Force, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/359914/BFpartnerBulletinSep14.pdf
- Bouhenia, M., J. Ben Farhat, M.E. Coldiron, S. Abdallah, D. Visentin, M. Neuman *et al.* (2017) 'Quantitative survey on health and violence endured by refugees during their journey and in Calais, France', *International Health*, 9: 335–42.
- Bully, É. (2017) 'Habiter la jungle de Calais', *Métropolitiques*, 20 October, www.metropolitiques.eu/Habiter-la-jungle-de-Calais.html
- Burck, C. and G. Hughes (2017) 'Challenges and impossibilities of "standing alongside" in an intolerable context: Learning from refugees and volunteers in the Calais camp', *Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry*, 23(2): 223–37.
- Burrell, K. (2008) 'Materialising the border: Spaces of mobility and material culture in migration from post-socialist Poland', *Mobilities*, 3(3): 353–73.
- Butler, B. (2008) 'Othering the archive. From exile to inclusion and heritage dignity: The case of the Palestinian archival memory', *Archival Science*, 9(1–2): 57–69.
- Butler, J. (2016) *Notes toward a performative theory of assembly*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Byrne, D. (2016) 'The need for a transnational approach to the material heritage of migration: The China–Australia corridor', *Journal of Social Archaeology*, 16(3): 261–85.
- Calais Migrant Solidarity (2011) *Calais: This border kills. Documented police violence June 2009–June 2011*, Calais: Calais Migrant Solidarity, <https://nobordertestblog.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/english-dossier.pdf>
- Calais Migrant Solidarity (2015a) *Calais Novembre 2011–Avril 2014. Chronologie non exhaustive des contrôles d'identité, interpellations, intimidations, fermetures de squats, etc, subis par les exilé-e-s*, Calais: Calais Migrant Solidarity, <https://calaismigrantsolidarity.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/chronologie-calais-2-ans-aprc3a8s.pdf>

REFERENCES

- Calais Migrant Solidarity (2015b) *Calais deux ans après: Harcèlement policier discriminations nouvelle saisine du défenseur des droits*, Calais: Calais Migrant Solidarity, <https://calaismigrantsolidarity.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/synthc3a8se-calais-2-ans-aprc3a8s.pdf>
- Calais Migrant Solidarity (2015c) ‘Segregation in the swimming pool’, 20 November, <https://calaismigrantsolidarity.wordpress.com/2015/11/20/segregation-in-the-swimming-pool/>
- Calais Migrant Solidarity (2018) ‘Deaths at the Calais border’, <https://calaismigrantsolidarity.wordpress.com/deaths-at-the-calais-border/>
- Césaire, A. (1955) *Discours sur le colonialisme*, Paris: Éditions Présence Africaine.
- CFDA (2008) *La loi des ‘jungles’: La situation des exiles sur le littoral de la Manche et de la Mer du Nord*, Paris: Coordination Française pour le Droit de’Asile, www.lacimade.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/hc_cfda_rapport2008-exiles-manche-nord.pdf
- Chatty, D. (2017) *Syria: The making and unmaking of a refuge state*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Coguiac, A. and D. Suber (2017) ‘Agency encamped: The case of Calais’Jungle inhabitants’, *Refugee Review*, 3, <https://espminetwork.com/refugee-review-volume-3/>
- Cohen, N. (2004) ‘The Sangatte legacy’, *The Guardian*, 13 June, <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2004/jun/13/asylum.comment>
- Corporate Watch (2017) ‘The hostile environment: Turning the UK into a nation of border cops’, <https://corporatewatch.org/the-hostile-environment-turning-the-uk-into-a-nation-of-border-cops-2/>
- Corporate Watch (2018) *The UK border regime: A critical guide*, London: Freedom Press.
- Dalakoglou, D. (2010) ‘The road: An ethnography of the Albanian–Greek cross-border motorway’, *American Ethnologist*, 37(1): 132–49.
- Dalakoglou, D. (2016) ‘Europe’s last frontier: The spatialities of the refugee crisis’, *City*, 20(2): 180–5.

- Dalakoglou, D. and P. Harvey (2012) 'Roads and anthropology: Ethnographic perspectives on space, time and (im)mobility', *Mobilities*, 7(4): 459–65.
- Davies, T. (2018) 'Toxic space and time: Slow violence, necropolitics, and petrochemical pollution', *Annals of the American Association of Geographers*, 108(6): 1537–53.
- Davies, T. and A. Isakjee (2015) 'Geography, migration and abandonment in the Calais refugee camp', *Political Geography*, 49(5): 93–5.
- Davies, T. and A. Isakjee (2019) 'Ruins of empire: Refugees, race and the postcolonial geographies of European migrant camps', *Geoforum*.
- Davies, T., A. Isakjee and S. Dhesi (2019) 'Violent Inaction: The Necropolitical Experience of Refugees in Europe', *Antipode*, 49(5): 1263–84.
- Dawdy, S.L. (2016) *Patina: A profane archaeology*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- de Castro, E.V. (2003) *And: After-dinner speech given at Anthropology and Science, the fifth Decennial Conference of the Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth*, Manchester: University of Manchester.
- de Castro, E.V. (2014) *Cannibal metaphysics: For a post-structural anthropology* (trans. P. Skafish), Minneapolis: Univocal.
- de Cesari, C. (2017) 'Museums of Europe: Tangles of memory, borders, and race', *Museum Anthropology*, 40: 18–35.
- de Lauri, A. (2019) 'Humanitarian militarism and the production of humanity', *Social Anthropology*.
- de Léon, J. (2015) *The land of open graves: Living and dying on the migrant trail*, Oakland, CA: University of California Press.
- Demetriou, O. and R. Dimova (2019) 'Introduction: Theorising material and non-material mediations on the border', in O. Demetriou and R. Dimova (eds) *The political materialities of borders: New theoretical directions*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 1–15.

REFERENCES

- Dhesi, S., A. Isakjee and T. Davies (2015) *An environmental health assessment of the new migrant camp in Calais*, Birmingham: University of Birmingham Press.
- Dhesi, S., A. Isakjee and T. Davies (2018) 'Public health in the Calais refugee camp: Environment, health and exclusion', *Critical Public Health*, 28(2): 140–52.
- Doidge, M. and E. Sandri (2019) "'Friends that last a lifetime": The importance of emotions amongst volunteers working with refugees in Calais', *British Journal of Sociology*.
- Donnan, H. and T.M. Wilson (eds) (2010) *Borderlands: Ethnographic approaches to security, power, and identity*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Dubois, P. (2016) 'Trace-image to fiction-image: The unfolding of theories of photography from the '80s to the Present', *October*, 158: 155–66.
- DUF (2017) Calais street-view', <http://duf.space/street-view.php>
- DUF (2018) 'The site of the former Jungle, Calais', *DUF (Design Unlikely Futures) Zine*, 10 (September).
- Dutton, J. (2018) 'For refugees in Calais, police brutality is a daily occurrence', *The Independent*, 10 December, www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/refugees-calais-jungle-camp-french-police-brutality-a8674596.html
- English, C. (2017) 'Security is no accident: Considering safe(r) spaces in the transnational migrant solidarity camps of Calais', in G. Brown, A. Feigenbaum, F. Frenzel and P. McCurdy (eds) *Protest camps in international context: Spaces, infrastructures and media of resistance*, Bristol: Policy Press, pp. 353–70.
- Fabian, J. (1983) *Time and the other: How anthropology makes its object*, New York, NY: Colombia University Press.
- Fassin, D. and M. Pandolfi (2013) 'Introduction: Military and humanitarian government in the age of intervention', in D. Fassin and M. Pandolfi (eds) *Contemporary states of emergency: The politics of military and humanitarian interventions*, London: Zone, pp. 9–26.

- Feigenbaum, A. and V. Raoul (2016) 'Dangerous weaponry used on refugees with no legal status in Calais', *New Internationalist*, 29 January, <https://newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2016/01/29/dangerous-weaponry-used-on-refugees-in-calais>
- Feldman, I. (2009) 'Gaza's humanitarianism problem', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 38(3): 22–37.
- Fjellberg, A. and T.W. Christiansen (2016) 'The Wetsuitman', *Dagbladet*, <https://www.dagbladet.no/spesial/vatdraktmysteriet/eng/>
- Fortun, K. and M. Fortun (2015) 'An infrastructural moment in the human sciences', *Cultural Anthropology*, 30(3): 359–67.
- Foucault, M. (1997) *Il faut défendre la société: cours au Collège de France 1976*, Paris: Seuil.
- Gardenier, M. (2018) 'Sauvons Calais, a nationalist vigilante group', *Sociology and Anthropology*, 6(1): 86–93.
- Gentleman, A. (2017) 'Teargas, cold, no toilets: Plight of refugees in Calais revealed', *The Guardian*, 10 August, www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/aug/10/teargas-cold-no-toilets-plight-of-refugees-back-in-calais-revealed
- Gillespie, M., S. Osseiran and M. Cheesman (2018) 'Syrian refugees and the digital passage to Europe: Smartphone infrastructures and affordances', *Social Media + Society*, January–March: 1–12.
- Godin, M., K. Møller Hansen, A. Lounasmaa, C. Squire and T. Zaman (eds) (2017) *Voices from the 'Jungle': Stories from the Calais refugee camp*, London: Pluto Press.
- Green, S.F. (2005) *Notes from the Balkans: Locating marginality and ambiguity on the Greek–Albanian Border*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Green, S. (2012) 'A sense of border', in T.M. Wilson and H. Donnan (eds) *A companion to border studies*, Chichester: Blackwell, pp. 573–92.
- Guattari, F. (1989) *Les trois écologies*, Paris: Éditions Galilée.
- Hage, G. (2016) 'État de siège: A dying domesticating colonialism?', *American Ethnologist*, 43(1): 38–49.

REFERENCES

- Hagen, M. (2018) 'The Jungle "performance": Recreating a refugee camp on the fly', *Refugees Deeply*, 7 September, www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2018/09/07/the-jungle-performance-recreating-a-refugee-camp-on-the-fly
- Hamilakis, Y. (2016) 'Archaeologies of forced and undocumented migration', *Journal of Contemporary Archaeology*, 3(2): 121–39.
- Hanappe, C. (2015) 'Calais: La "jungle", future ville?', *Libération*, 8 September, www.liberation.fr/societe/2015/09/08/calais-la-jungle-future-ville_1378304
- Haraway, D. (2016) *Staying with the trouble: Making kin in the Chthulucene*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Harvey, P. (2015) *Roads: An anthropology of infrastructure and expertise*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- HASC (2018) *The Windrush generation*, London: House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee (Sixth Report of Session 2017–19), <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmhaff/990/990.pdf>
- Help Refugees (2018) *Calais: The police harassment of volunteers: study of 1st November 2017 to 1st July 2018*, Calais: Help Refugees (with L'Auberge des Migrants, Utopia 56 and Refugee Info Bus), <https://helprefugees.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Police-Harrassment-of-Volunteers-in-Calais-1.pdf>
- Hicks, D. (2005) "'Places for thinking" from Annapolis to Bristol: Situations and symmetries in "world historical archaeologies"', *World Archaeology*, 37(3): 373–91.
- Hicks, D. (2010) 'The material-cultural turn: Event and effect', in D. Hicks and M.C. Beaudry (eds) *The Oxford handbook of material culture studies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 25–99.
- Hicks, D. (2013) 'Four-field anthropology: Charter myths and time warps from St Louis to Oxford', *Current Anthropology*, 54(6): 753–63.
- Hicks, D. (2016a) 'The temporality of the landscape revisited', *Norwegian Archaeological Review*, 49(1): 5–39.
- Hicks, D. (2016b) 'Review of Shannon Lee Dawdy, *Patina*', *Sculpture Journal*, 25(3): 448–9.

- Hicks, D. (2016c) 'Here's why you should care about the scrapping of A level anthropology', *The Conversation*, 1 November, <http://theconversation.com/heres-why-you-should-care-about-the-scrapping-of-a-level-anthropology-67332>
- Hicks, D. (2019a) 'The transformation of Visual Archaeology (Part One)', in L. McFadyen and D. Hicks (eds) *Archaeology and photography*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Hicks, D. (2019b) 'The transformation of Visual Archaeology (Part Two)', in L. McFadyen and D. Hicks (eds) *Archaeology and photography*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Human Rights Watch (2017) "'Like living in hell": Police abuses against child and adult migrants in Calais', www.hrw.org/report/2017/07/26/living-hell/police-abuses-against-child-and-adult-migrants-calais
- Hurley, R. (2016) 'Vandals force volunteer doctors to close clinic in Calais's refugee camp', *British Medical Journal*, 352: i182.
- Ibrahim, Y. and A. Howarth (2016) 'Imaging the jungles of Calais: Media visibility and the refugee camp', *Networking Knowledge*, 9(4): 1–22.
- Ibrahim, Y. and A. Howarth (2018) *Calais and its border politics*, London: Routledge
- IMMA (2017) 'Grainne Hassett: The Calais maps exhibit', Irish Museum of Modern Art, <https://imma.ie/whats-on/grainne-hassett-the-calais-maps/>
- Johnson, C., R. Jones, A. Paasi, L. Amoore, A. Mountz, M. Salter *et al.* (2011) 'Interventions on rethinking "the border" in border studies', *Political Geography*, 30: 61–9.
- Jones, R. (2012) *Border walls: Security and the war on terror in the United States, India and Israel*, London: Zed Books.
- Jungleeye (2017) *Jungleeye*, Calais: Jungleeye Association, https://issuu.com/jungleeye/docs/170731_jungleeye_pr__printing
- Kaufmann, J.E., H.W. Kaufmann, A. Janković and V. Tonič (2012) *The Atlantic Wall: History and guide*, Barnsley: Pen and Sword.
- Kiddey, R. (2017) *Homeless heritage*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

REFERENCES

- Kiddey, R. (2019) 'Reluctant refuge: Taking an archaeological approach to sites of temporary refugee shelter in Athens, Greece', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 32.
- King, N. (2016) *No borders: The politics of immigration control and resistance*, London: Zed Books.
- Koegler, C. (2017) 'Precarious urbanity: 'The Jungle' (Calais) and the politics of performing the urban', *Postcolonial Text*, 12(3/4): 1–15.
- Latour, B. (2017) *Où atterrir? Comment s'orienter en politique*, Paris: La Découverte.
- Leone, M.P. (1984) 'Interpreting ideology in historical archaeology: Using rules of perspective in the William Paca Garden in Annapolis, Maryland', in D. Miller and C. Tilley (eds) *Ideology, power and prehistory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 25–35.
- Lévi-Strauss, C. (1964) *Mythologiques: Le Cru et le Cuit*, Paris: Librairie Plon.
- McAtackney, L. (2011) 'Peace maintenance and political messages: The significance of walls during and after the 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland', *Journal of Social Archaeology*, 11(1): 77–98.
- McAtackney, L. (2014) *An archaeology of the Troubles: The dark heritage of Long Kesh/Maze prison*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McAtackney, L. (2018) 'The many forms and meanings of (peace) walls in contemporary Northern Ireland', *Review of International American Studies*, 11: 39–61.
- McAtackney, L. and R. McGuire (eds) (2019) *A world of walls*, Santa Fe: University of New Mexico Press
- McCormack, K. and E. Gilbert (2018) 'Spaces at the intersections of militarism and humanitarianism', *Critical Military Studies*, 4(2): 97–101.
- McFadyen, L. (2016) 'Immanent architecture', in M. Bille and T. Flohr-Sorensen (eds) *Elements of architecture: Assembling archaeology, atmosphere and the performance of building space*, London: Routledge, pp. 53–62.
- McFadyen, L. and D. Hicks (2019) 'From archaeography to photology', in L. McFadyen and D. Hicks (eds) *Archaeology and photography*, London: Bloomsbury.

- McGee, D. and J. Pelham (2018) 'Politics at play: Locating human rights, refugees and grassroots humanitarianism in the Calais Jungle', *Leisure Studies*, 37(1): 22–35.
- Malaquais, D. (2017) 'Forensics (photography in the face of failure)', in G. Mendel, *Dzhangal*, London: GOST, pp. 73–4.
- Marfleet, P. (2007) 'Refugees and history: Why we must address the past', *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 26(3): 136–48.
- Massey, D. (2005) *For space*, London: Sage.
- Mayblin, L. (2017) *Asylum after empire: Colonial legacies in the politics of asylum seeking*, London: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Mbembe, A. (2003) 'Necropolitics' (trans. L. Meintjes), *Public Culture*, 15(1): 11–40.
- Mirzoeff, N. (2017) *The Appearance of Black Lives matter*, Miami: Name Publications. <https://namepublications.org/item/2017/the-appearance-of-black-lives-matter/>
- Mould, O. (2017) 'The Calais Jungle: A slum of London's making', *City*, 21(3–4): 388–404.
- Mould, O. (2018) 'The not-so-concrete Jungle: Material precarity in the Calais refugee camp', *Cultural Geographies*, 25(3): 393–409.
- Moyn, S., N. Guilhot, N. Bhuta, N. Gilman, J.R. Slaughter and M. Ticktin (2010) 'Statement of the Editorial Collective', *Humanity Journal*, <http://humanityjournal.org/issue-1/statement-of-the-editorial-collective/>
- Mukerji, C. (1997) *Territorial ambitions and the gardens of Versailles*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Müller, T. and U. Schlüper (2018) *Dynamiken der Jungles Calais und das europäisch-britische Grenzregime*, Munich: Bordermonitoring.
- Murphy, F. (2018) 'Refugees and police violence in Calais', *Anthropology News*, 9 May, <https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/AN.722>
- Nesiah, V. (2004) 'From Berlin to Bonn to Baghdad: A space for infinite justice', *Harvard Human Rights Journal*, 17: 75–98.
- Netz, N. (2004) *Barbed wire*, Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.

REFERENCES

- Neuman, M. and C. Torre (2017) 'Médecins Sans Frontières: "Calais has become a cage in a jungle"', www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2017/07/medecins-sans
- Nixon, R. (2011) *Slow violence and the environmentalism of the poor*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- O'Boyle, B. (2016) *Mud, sweat and tear gas: Volunteering in the Calais Jungle*, Wheathampstead: Insight2foresight.
- O'Malley, J. (2015) 'Surprised that Syrian refugees have smartphones?', *The Independent*, 7 September, www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/surprised-that-syrian-refugees-have-smartphones-well-sorry-to-break-this-to-you-but-youre-an-idiot-10489719.html
- Pallister-Wilkins, P. (2017) 'Humanitarian rescue/sovereign capture and the policing of possible responses to violent borders', *Global Policy*, 8(S1): 19–24.
- Pauketat, T.R. (2014) 'From memorials to imaginaries in the monumentality of ancient North America', in J. Osborne (ed.) *Approaching monumentality in archaeology*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press (IEMA Distinguished Monograph Series), pp. 431–45.
- Petti, A. (2017) 'Refugee heritage. Part III, Justification for inscription', *Humanities*, 6(3): 1–11.
- Pignarre, P. and I. Stengers (2009) *La Sorcellerie capitaliste: pratiques de désenvoûtement*, Paris : La Découverte.
- Pitches, J., S. Murray, H. Poynor, L. Worth, D. Richmond and J. Dorey Richmond (2009) 'Performer training: Researching practice in the theatre laboratory', in B. Kershaw (ed.) *Research methods in theatre and performance*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 137–61.
- Polanyi, K. (1963) 'Ports of trade in early societies', *Journal of Economic History*, 23(1): 30–45.
- Rassool, C. (2007) 'Memory and the politics of history in the District Six museum', in N. Murray, N. Shepherd, and M. Hall (eds) *Desire lines: Space, memory and identity in the post-apartheid city*, London: Routledge, pp. 113–28.

- Rassool, C. (2014) 'District Six revisited', Unpublished paper, Department of History and African Programme in Museum and Heritage Studies, University of the Western Cape.
- Refugee Info Bus (2018a) 'Eviction', *Medium*, 21 November, <https://medium.com/thedigitalwarehouse/evictions-ff98e3e9ed9d>
- Refugee Info Bus (2018b) *Police violence in Calais: Abusive and illegal practices by law enforcement officers. Observations and testimonies: 1 November 2017–1 November 2018.*
- Refugee Info Bus (2018c) 'Macron to visit Calais this week', *Medium*, 14 January, <https://medium.com/thedigitalwarehouse/macron-to-visit-calais-this-week-6b462777ebeb>
- Refugee Rights Europe (2016a) *The long wait: Filling data gaps relating to refugees and displaced people in the Calais camp*, London: Refugee Rights Europe.
- Refugee Rights Europe (2016b) *The unknown knowns: Observations from small informal refugee camps in northern France*, London: Refugee Rights Europe.
- Refugee Rights Europe (2016c) *Still waiting: Filling additional information gaps relating to the Calais camp*, London: Refugee Rights Europe.
- Refugee Rights Europe (2016d) *Still here: Exploring further dynamics of the Calais camp*, London: Refugee Rights Europe.
- Refugee Rights Europe (2017a) *Six months on: Filling information gaps relating to children and young adults in northern France following the demolition of the Calais camp*, London: Refugee Rights Europe.
- Refugee Rights Europe (2017b) *Twelve months on: Filling information gaps relating to refugees and displaced people in northern France a year on from the demolition of the Calais camp*, London: Refugee Rights Europe.
- Reinisch, J. (2015) "'Forever temporary": Migrants in Calais, then and now', *Political Quarterly*, 86(4): 515–22.
- Rigby, J. and R. Schlembach (2013) 'Impossible protest: Noborders in Calais', *Citizenship Studies*, 17(2): 157–72.
- Robbins, J. (2013) 'Beyond the suffering subject: Toward an anthropology of the good', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 19(3): 447–62.

REFERENCES

- Rose, S. (2008) *Calais: An English town in France, 1347–1558*, Woodbridge: Boydell Press.
- Rumford, C. (2008) *Citizens and borderwork in contemporary Europe*, London: Routledge.
- Sahlins, M. (2013) 'Foreword', in P. Descola, *Beyond nature and culture* (trans. J. Lloyd), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. xi–xx.
- Sandri, E. (2018) "'Volunteer humanitarianism': Volunteers and humanitarian aid in the Jungle refugee camp of Calais', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 44: 65–80.
- Savage, M. and R. Burrows (2007) 'The coming crisis of empirical sociology', *Sociology*, 41(5): 885–99.
- Singh, I., T. Flores, L. Mohseni and S.S. Hansen (2016) *Humans of Calais: Migration from the perspective of migrants*, London: KCL (Kings College London Migration Research Group), www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/mrg/Humans-of-Calais-report.pdf
- Squire, C. (2017) 'Scattered but hopeful: Stories of life after the Calais "Jungle" refugee camp', *The Conversation*, 9 March, <https://theconversation.com/scattered-but-hopeful-stories-of-life-after-the-calais-jungle-refugee-camp-73009>
- Star, S.L. (1999) 'The ethnography of infrastructure', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 43(3): 377–91.
- Stengers, I. (2013) *Au temps des catastrophes: Résister à la barbarie qui vient*, Paris: La Découverte.
- Stoler, A.L. (2008) 'Imperial debris: Reflection on ruins and ruination', *Cultural Anthropology*, 23: 191–219.
- Stoler, A.L. (2016) *Duress: Imperial durabilities in our times*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Swanson, H., A. Tsing, N. Burbandt and E. Gan (2017) 'Introduction: Bodies tumbled into bodies', in A. Tsing, H. Swanson, E. Gan and N. Burbandt (eds), *Arts of living on a damaged planet*, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, pp. m1–m12.
- Tagma, H.M. (2009) 'Homo sacer vs. Homo soccer mom: Reading Agamben and Foucault in the war on terror', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 34(4): 407–35.

- Taithe, B. and J. Borton (2016) 'History, memory and "lessons learnt" for humanitarian practitioners', *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire*, 23(1–2): 210–24.
- Taussig, M. (1997) *The magic of the state*, New York: Routledge.
- Tazzioli, M. (2014) *Spaces of governmentality*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield International.
- Tazzioli, M. (2017) 'Calais after the jungle: migrant dispersal and the expulsion of humanitarianism', *Open Democracy*, 20 July, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery/martina-tazzioli/calais-after-jungle-migrant-dispersal-and-expulsion-of-humanitarianis>
- Thrift, N.J. (2005) *Knowing capitalism*, London: Sage.
- Ticktin, M. (2011) *Casualties of care: Immigration and the politics of humanitarianism in France*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Ticktin, M. (2014) 'Transnational humanitarianism', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 43: 273–89.
- Ticktin, M. (2016) 'Calais: Containment politics in the "Jungle"', *Funambulist Magazine*, 5 (May–June): 29–33.
- Trilling, D. (2018) *Lights in the distance: Exile and refuge at the borders of Europe*, London: Picador.
- Trouillot, M.-R. (2003) 'Anthropology and the savage slot: The poetics and politics of otherness', in M.-R. Trouillot, *Global Transformations: anthropology and the modern world*, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 7–23.
- Tsing, A. (2015) *The mushroom at the end of the world*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Turner, S. (2015) 'What is a refugee camp? Explorations of the limits and effects of the camp', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 29(2): 139–48.
- UK Prime Minister's Office (2018) '2018 United Kingdom–France Summit Communique', https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/674880/2018_UK-FR_Summit_Communique.pdf
- UNHCR (2018) *Shelter typologies 2018*, London: UN High Commissioner Refugees, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/62289>

REFERENCES

- UNICEF (2016) *Neither safe nor sound: Unaccompanied children on the coastline of the English Channel and the North Sea*, Paris: UN International Children's Emergency Fund France.
- van Houtum, H. (2010) 'Waiting before the law: Kafka on the border', *Social and Legal Studies*, 19(3): 285–98.
- van Houtum, H. (2012) 'Remapping borders', in T.M. Wilson and H. Donnan (eds) *A companion to border studies*, Chichester: Blackwell, pp. 405–18.
- Vansina, J. (1970) 'Cultures through time', in R. Naroll and R. Cohen (eds) *A handbook of method in cultural anthropology*, Garden City, NY: Natural History Press, pp. 165–79.
- Walters, W. (2011) 'Foucault and frontiers: Notes on the birth of the humanitarian border', in U. Bröckling, S. Krasmann and T. Lemke (eds) *Governmentality: Current issues and future challenges*, London: Routledge, pp. 138–64.
- Weizman, E. (2017) *Forensic architecture: Violence on the threshold of detectability*, London: Zone.
- Weszkalnys, G. (2014) 'Anticipating oil: The temporal politics of a disaster yet to come', *Sociological Review*, 62(1): 211–35.
- Wildschut, H. (2018) *Ville de Calais*, Amsterdam: Idea Books.
- Williams, J.M. (2016) 'The safety/security nexus and the humanitarianisation of border enforcement', *Geographical Journal*, 182(1): 27–37.
- Wilson, T.M. and H. Donnan (2012) 'Borders and border studies', in T.M. Wilson and H. Donnan (eds) *A companion to border studies*, Chichester: Blackwell, pp. 1–25.
- Wolfe, P. (2016) *Traces of history: elementary structures of race*, London: Verso.
- Yuval-Davis, N., G. Wemyss and K. Cassidy (2018) 'Everyday bordering, belonging and the reorientation of British immigration legislation', *Sociology*, 52(2): 228–44.
- Zehfuss, M. (2012) 'Contemporary western war and the idea of humanity', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 30: 861–76.

Index

#FuckingWall 94, 95, 96, 100, 108

9/11 4, 9

A

absence 24, 26, 84

Acts of Union 56

Afghanistan 2, 10, 57–8, 59

Agamben, G. 16, 29, 65, 68, 108

Agier, M. 1, 11–13, 15, 39, 41–2, 53, 82, 105–7

Agier, M. *et al.* (2018) 4–5, 13, 39–40

Agnew, J. 85

Annalistes 50

Ansems de Vries, L. 47

Ansems de Vries, L. and Melander, M. 10

anthropological approach

classification 43–4

colonialism and 63, 83, 99

comparative 109

contemporary 39–42, 53, 82

functionalist 49

on Indigeneity 107

and infrastructure 26

and materiality 85, 111

situational 27

and suffering 50

time 65

architectural projects 45

Arendt, H. 79

artworks 71–2

Asad, T. 63

asbestos 36

asylum claims 4–5, 7, 18, 57, 62–3, 101, 104

Atlantikwall, WWII 24

B

Balfour Declaration 59

Balibar, E. 27

Al Balkhi, Mouaz 102

Bassam of Brighton, Lord 23

Batterie Oldenburg, WWII 24

Battle of Crecy 55

Battle of Keren, Eritrea 59

Berlin Conference of 1884–85 52

Berman, M. 95

Bernardot, M. 48, 113

Black Lives Matter 79, 80

Blair T. 5

Bloch, E. 91

Blunkett, D. 9

borders, external 4, 25; *see also* Calais

Bouchart, N. 74

Brandt Line 96

Brexit 103, 107

Brigade anticriminalité 8

British Empire 56–9, 81, 99, 112

British Nationality Act 101

Buccio, F. 1, 9, 24, 47, 67, 89, 93, 115n1

'buffer zones' 25

building controls 33

Butler, B. 81

Butler, J. 78

C

Calais

historical importance 55–6

trade and 103

as UK border 4–5, 8, 24–5, 27, 43

Calais Migrant Solidarity 6, 72

Calais No Borders 72

Cameron, D. 7, 8, 101, 107

camps, historical 48

CAOs *see* Centres d'Accueil et d'Orientation

CAP (Centre d'Accueil Provisoire) 7

LANDE: THE CALAIS 'JUNGLE' AND BEYOND

- Cape Town 81
 capitalism 2, 95, 97, 104, 109
 Cennetoğlu, B., *The List*
 (installation) 88
 Centres d'Accueil et d'Orientalion
 (CAOs) 46, 90
 Césaire, A. 108
 CFDA *see* Coordination Francaise
 pour le Droit de'Asile
 Channel Tunnel
 flooding of 8
 immigration checks and 5
 opening of 4
 trade and 103
 Channel Tunnel (International
 Arrangements) Order 4
 children
 artwork 72
 dangers to 10, 36
 deaths of 90
 and former British empire 57
 incarceration of 102
 numbers of 113
 refusal of entry to Britain 101
 unaccompanied 34, 45
 Cimetière Nord, Calais 90
 clearance of camps 5–11, 30–1, 67–8,
 89, 105, 113
 climate change 95, 97
 CNCDH *see* *Commission nationale*
consultative des droits de l'homme
 Coguic, A. and Suber, D. 12
 colonialism 16, 29, 44, 55, 63, 83,
 95, 99; *see also* British empire;
 extractive colonialism; militarist
 colonialism; (post)colonialism;
 settler colonialism
Commission nationale consultative des
droits de l'homme (CNCDH) 8
 Commonwealth 58, 59, 61
 community 13, 42, 69, 81
 Compagnies Républicaines de
 Sécurité *see* CRS
 confiscation of property 32, 33, 74
 'contemporary anthropology' 39–42
 Coordination Francaise pour le Droit
 de'Asile (CFDA) 57
 Coquelles 4, 8
 Corporate Watch 48
 cosmopolitanism 13, 39–43, 45–51,
 85, 99, 103, 107, 111
counter-image (*Gegenbild*) 77
 counter-witnessing 77
 Creasy, S. 113–14
 CRS (Compagnies Républicaines de
 Sécurité) 8, 74, 77, 101
- ### D
- Dalakoglou, D. and Harvey, P. 26,
 111
 Darfur 10, 58
 Davies, T. and Isakjee, A. 61
 Dawdy, S. 98
 de Castro, E.V. 99
 de Cesari, C. 83
 de Léon, J. 98–9
 death taboos 90
 deaths 35, 81, 88–91, 102
 decolonisation 63, 65, 80
 dehumanisation 2, 16, 44, 87, 97,
 101, 107, 108
 Deller, J., *It Is What It Is* (artwork) 81
 Demetriou, D. and Dimova, R. 46,
 85
 deportation 27, 61, 101
 Descola, P. 109
 Design Unlikely Futures project *see*
 DUF
 destruction of property 26, 29–34
 deterrence 3, 7, 18, 33, 89, 98–9,
 111
 time and 44–6, 104
 Detienne, M. 107
 'development' aid 53
 Dheisheh Refugee Camp,
 Bethlehem 81
 Dhesi, S. *et al.* (2015) 36
 dispossessions 71, 74, 83, 109
 documentation 20, 29, 54, 61, 68,
 73–5, 90, 99
 Doidge, M. and Sandri, E. 13
 DUF (Design Unlikely Futures)
 project 78
 Dunkirk 5, 56

INDEX

E

Edward III, King of England 55–6
 Elizabeth I, Queen of England 56
 English Channel 99
 environmental health risks 36
 environmental history 50, 60
 environmental hostility 23–38; *see also* necropolitics
 Eritrea 10, 57, 58–9, 62
 Ethiopia 57
 ethnography 26, 29, 51, 53, 65, 99
 Eurocentrism 29, 53, 105
 European Union (EU)
 European Commission 6
 Seveso III Directive 2
 Trade and 103
 Eurotunnel *see* Channel Tunnel
 evictions 5, 30–3
 extractive colonialism 73

F

Fabian, J. 51
 fascism 34, 107
 Febvre, L. 97
 Feldman, I. 16
 food distribution 38
 Forensic Architecture research agency,
 Goldsmiths College 80–1
 Foucauldianism 29, 68, 88
 Foucault, M. 29
 Fox Quesada, V. 94
 France
 Conseil d'Etat 36
 joint declaration with UK 60
 police 8
 UK immigration checks 5
 Frankfurt School 99
 French Red Cross 5
 Froissart, J. 55
 functionalism 39, 49, 64

G

The Game 35, 54
The Guardian 89
Gegenbild *see counter-image*
 gentrification 94

globalisation 106, 111
 Gluckman, M. 40
 Godin, M. *et al.* (2017) 52
 Goodwill, R. 31n2, 105
 Google Maps 78
 governance 20, 37, 40, 43, 52, 61,
 73, 87
 Green, S. 83
 Guattari, F. 93–4

H

Hagen, M. 51
 Hamilakis, Y. 84
 Hanappe, C. 13
 Haraway, D. 44
 Hassett, G., Calais Builds project 78
 Hauts-de-France 24
 Hawkins, J. 56
 health, risks to 31, 32, 36–7
 Help Refugees 38, 113
 Hicks, D. 107
 Hilal, S., Decolonising Architecture
 studio 81
 Hollande, F. 9
 Horn of Africa 59, 73
 humanitarianism
 grassroots 44, 70
 ‘humanitarian militarism’ 11,
 15–16, 49, 65, 68, 71, 91, 108
 language of 102
 objects and 87
 secular 63
 ‘volunteer humanitarianism’ 68
 Humans of Calais project, King’s
 College, London 77
 Hurley, R. 77
 Hurricane Katrina 98

I

‘identity essentialism’ 106
 IMMA (Irish Museum of Modern
 Art) 78
 immigration to Europe, historical 15
 impermanence 20, 68, 70, 77, 81,
 87, 104; *see also* time
 Indigenous people 51, 80, 106–8

LANDE: THE CALAIS 'JUNGLE' AND BEYOND

- infrastructure 8, 20, 29, 31, 42, 44,
69–71, 78
'invisibilisation' 31
Iran 57
Iraq 59
Irish Museum of Modern Art *see*
IMMA
- J**
- Johnson, C. *et al.* (2011) 84
Jules Ferry Sports Centre 2, 6
'Jungle,' etymology of 1
juxtaposition 11, 14
- K**
- Kataf, Shadi Omar 102
Kiddey, R. 98
King, N. 44, 70
Kosovo War 15
- L**
- labour camps 48
'lande,' etymology of 1
L'Auberge des Migrants *Marche*
Citoyenne pour l'Accueil des
Refugiés 72
Le Touquet Protocol 5, 7
Le Touquet Treaty 25
Levi-Strauss, C. 51, 117n1
London Declaration 59
- M**
- Macron, E. 7
Manchester School 39
March for Science 94–5
March for Truth 95
Massey, D. 12, 84
Matthew of Alsace 55
May, T. 7, 9
Mayblin, L. 57
Mbembe, A. 29
McAttackney, L. 25, 98
McFadyen, L. 82
McFadyen, L. and Hicks, D. 80
media 6, 47, 52, 62, 78–9, 101
Mendel, G., *Dzhangal* exhibition 78
mental health 34, 37, 51
Mexican Border Wall 25, 94–100,
101, 108, 119n4
Middle East 4, 58, 59, 73
Migrant Death Mapping
programme 98–9
militarisation of border control 3, 16,
25, 32–3, 64–5, 73, 91
militarism 11, 50, 59
'humanitarian militarism' 11,
15–16, 49, 65, 68, 71, 91, 108
militarist colonialism 15, 59–63, 73,
104, 108
Mirzoeff, N. 79
Le Monde 117n4
Mould, O. 13, 45
Moyn, S. *et al.* (2010) 113
Mukerji, C. 95–6
Müller, T and Schlüper, U. 2, 25
Murphy, F. 32
museums 51, 81, 84–5
- N**
- Natura 2000 Habitat 2
naturalisation of violence 99
Netz, R. 97
necropolitics 29–30, 37, 88
neocolonialism 29
'New Jungle' 5
The New York Times 94
Northern Ireland 25
- O**
- Obama, B. 101
'ontological turn' 41
otherness 73–4
- P**
- Palestine 29, 59, 80, 81
Paris Agreement 94
Pauketat, T.R. 87
peak displaced persons 2
Pegida anti-migrant rally 34
Pessi, A., *Decolonising Architecture*
studio 81

INDEX

- physical danger 36
Pignarre, P. and Stengers, I. 95
Piquemal, General C. 34
Pitches, J. *et al.* (2009) 17
Pitt Rivers Museum 18, 20, 52, 77,
78, 83–4, 104
Polanyi, K. 14
Police aux frontières 8
police barriers 8
Police de l'air 8
Police nationale 8
police violence 8, 30–1, 32–5, 74,
79, 114
populism 90, 105
(post)colonialism
documentation and 73
environment and 97–8
museums and 81, 84–5
resistance and 99–100
time 50, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 61–3,
65, 104
'posthuman' approach 42
'post-truth' 94
power relations 29, 51, 68, 99
public health 36
- R**
- racialisation 15, 45, 73–5
racism 2, 50, 52, 82, 104, 105, 114
Rasool, C. 81
Refugee Info Bus 31–2, 33, 74
Refugee Rights Europe 62
Refugee Studies 29, 44, 48–9, 63–5,
107
relocation of refugees 9–10, 46
'renaturalization' 24
resistance
documentation and 75
equality of 46
and experimentation 45
imperialism 108
(post)colonialism 99–100
power and 68
site of 20, 70, 104
time and 81, 87
transnational 71–2
visibility of 79–90
- Rhodes-Livingstone Institute 39
Riot ID, civic forensics project 77
Robbins, J. 50, 64
Rodin, A., *Les Bourgeois de Calais*
(statue) 11
Rose, S. 56
Rumford, C. 13
- S**
- Sahlins, M. 109
Sajous, S., Jungleye Postcards
project 77
Sandhurst Treaty 7–8
Sandri, E. 68
Sangatte container camp 4–5, 33, 48
Sangatte Protocol 4
sanitation provision 36
Santa Ana National Wildlife Refuge,
Texas 96
Sarkozy, N. 7
Savage, M. and Burrows, R. 42
Schengen Area 4, 11, 12, 25, 47
Scramble for Africa 58, 90
settler colonialism 59–60, 63, 73,
107, 108
Sheehan, Baroness 31
shipping containers 7, 37–8, 52
Siege of Calais 1558 56
Siege of Calais 1940 55
situational interactionism 40
sleep deprivation 34, 37, 51
Somalia 57, 58
Sonoran Desert, Texas 96, 99
South Africa 81
South Sudan 57, 58
Star, S. L. 26
Stoler, A. L. 55, 63
Sudan 57, 58
suicide 90
surveillance 10, 32
Swanson, H. *et al.* (2017) 103
Symonds, S. 10
Syria 59
- T**
- 'Tactics of exhaustion' 34
Taussig, M. 44, 90

LANDE: THE CALAIS 'JUNGLE' AND BEYOND

tear gas 8, 34, 36, 44, 48, 77, 101
 technology and decentred
 borderwork 27–8
 technopolitics 45
The Telegraph 105
 Texas 96–7, 99
 Thrift, N. 40
 Ticktin, M. 10, 16, 37–8, 45, 50, 52
 time 47–65
 and deterrence 44–6, 104
 media and 47, 52, 62
 see also impermanence
The Times 5
 'tolerated' encampment 3, 6–7
 Torondel, L. 75
 Toubin, J. 31, 117n4
 Treaty of Brittany 56
 Treaty of Canterbury 4
 Treaty of Troyes 56
 Trilling, D. 15
 Trouillot, M.-R. 50, 64
 Trump, D. 94, 101, 105
 truth 94–8, 106
 Tsing, A. 104

U

UK (United Kingdom)
 'asylum crisis' 5, 31
 Immigration Acts 7, 27
 investment 7–8
 joint declaration with France 60
 trade 103
 see also Windrush scandal
 ultraviolence 43–4
 UNITED for Intercultural Action 88
 United Nations Office of the
 High Commissioner of Human
 Rights 36
 universalism 108
 US (United States)
 birthright citizenship 100
 immigration 101
 Mexican border wall 25, 94–100,
 101, 108, 119n4

V

Valls, M. 9
 van Houtum, H. 43
 Vansina, J. 53
 Versailles, gardens of 95
 vigilante attacks 34
 violence 30, 32–7, 45–6, 90–1, 99,
 107–8; *see also* police violence;
 ultraviolence
 visibility 63, 67–91, 111, 113
 artwork and 71–2
 media and 78–9
 Visual Archaeology 77, 98, 108, 110
 volunteers 12–13, 38, 69, 71

W

walls, construction of
 at Calais 8, 24, 105, 111–13
 Mexican border wall 94–100, 101,
 108, 119n4
 movement from Global South
 and 25
 Walters, W. 15
 water provision 31, 32, 36–7
 Weizman, E. 80
 Wieszkalnys, G. 64
 Wildschut, H., *Ville de Calais*
 (photographic series) 78
 Williams, J.M. 15
 Windrush scandal 61, 75, 101
 Wolfe, P. 60, 73
 World Heritage List 81

"Shocking, stunning, sobering. *Lande* forces us to ask who we are, what we'd do in the shoes of others, and whether we can continue to look away from what Calais has become."

Danny Dorling, University of Oxford

"This deeply informed, richly illustrated and politically engaged book describes border camps as hostile environments in which humans resist impermanence by their relations to objects."

Frédéric Keck, CNRS and Laboratoire d'anthropologie sociale

"An unsettling work of border archaeology that documents how a war of things (tents, shoes, and flowerpots) is really about who gets to be human."

Shannon Lee Dawdy, University of Chicago

How can archaeology help us understand our contemporary world? This ground-breaking book reflects on material, visual and digital culture from the Calais 'Jungle' – the informal camp where, before its destruction in October 2016, more than 10,000 displaced people lived.

Lande: The Calais 'Jungle' and Beyond reassesses how we understand 'crisis', activism, and the infrastructure of national borders in refugee and forced migration studies, foregrounding the politics of environments, time, and the ongoing legacies of empire.

Introducing a major collaborative exhibit at Oxford's Pitt Rivers Museum, the book argues that an anthropological focus on duration, impermanence and traces of the most recent past can re-centre the ongoing human experiences of displacement in Europe today.

Available Open Access under CC-BY-NC licence.

Dan Hicks is Professor of Contemporary Archaeology at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of St Cross College, Oxford.

*Sarah Mallet is Postdoctoral Researcher and TORCH Research Fellow in the School of Archaeology at the University of Oxford, and co-curator for the Pitt Rivers Museum exhibition *Lande: the Calais 'Jungle' and Beyond*.*



@BrisUniPress
www.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk

ISBN 978-1-5292-0618-0



9 781529 206180