

War and Peace in the Western Political Imagination

From Classical Antiquity to
the Age of Reason

Roger B. Manning

War and Peace in the Western Political Imagination

Also Available from Bloomsbury

The Roman Army, David Breeze

Marius, Federico Santangelo

War: A Short History, Jeremy Black

War and Peace (Problems in Theology), edited by Jeff Astley,

David Brown, and Ann Loades

War and Peace in the Western Political Imagination

From Classical Antiquity to the Age of Reason

Roger B. Manning

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC
LONDON • NEW YORK • OXFORD • NEW DELHI • SYDNEY

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK
1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA

BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo
are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

First published 2016
Paperback edition first published 2017

Copyright © Roger B. Manning, 2016

Roger B. Manning has asserted his right under the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work.

This work is published open access subject to a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 licence (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0, [https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/)). You may re-use, distribute, and
reproduce this work in any medium for non-commercial purposes, provided you
give attribution to the copyright holder and the publisher and provide a link to the
Creative Commons licence.

Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for,
any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given
in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher
regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased
to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN: HB: 978-1-47425-870-8
PB: 978-1-47425-869-2
ePDF: 978-1-47425-872-2
eBook: 978-1-47425-871-5

Typeset by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk

To find out more about our authors and books visit
www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

*Dedicated to the memory of my grandmother
Margaret Compton Manning*

Contents

Preface	ix
Introduction	x
1 The Legacy of Classical Antiquity	1
The Greek martial ethos	2
Alexander the Great and empire-building	13
Stoicism and Greek concepts of peace	18
The Roman military machine	24
Roman concepts of peace	31
Early Christian pacifism	38
Stoicism and constraints on war	40
2 War and Peace in the Medieval World	45
The Augustinian earthly city	46
Barbarians, war, and violence	54
Christianity and Germanic society	57
The Carolingian Empire and feudalism	63
Chivalry and warfare	67
Medieval just-war theories	74
The Peace and Truce of God	80
The papacy and the crusades	82
War and diplomacy in the Byzantine Empire	88
The Hundred Years War and papal diplomacy	94
Emergence of a peace ethic	97
3 Holy Wars, Crusades, and Religious Wars	105
Holy war in the Bible	106
The concepts of holy war	109
Islamic holy war	113
Crusades against the Saracens	119
The Turkish holy war against Christendom	126

Crusades against Christians	133
Wars of the Reformation	142
French religious wars	155
Thirty Years War	166
British and Irish civil wars	170
4 Humanism and Neo-Stoicism	181
The Renaissance and the study of war and peace	182
The Machiavellians and the martial ethos	183
Erasmianism and irenic culture	189
The Salamancan School and just-war theory	194
Utopianism	197
Neo-Stoicism	199
Secular explanations of war and peace	209
5 The Search for a Science of Peace	215
Gentili and Grotius: Natural law and constraints on war	216
Classical republicans and martialism	225
Hobbes's fear of civil strife	234
The science of politics	237
Political psychology: The science of peace and absolutism	243
Inventing peace	248
6 Conclusion	271
Appendix: Changing Meanings of the "Sinews of War"	285
Glossary	289
Notes	293
Bibliography	347
Index	359

Preface

A person incurs many debts of gratitude in undertaking a new research project and writing a book crossing several academic disciplines and covering two thousand years of history. The research for this undertaking was carried out in the British Library, the Huntington Library, the Cleveland Public Library, and the Law School and University Libraries of Cleveland State University. I wish to thank the librarians of those worthy institutions for many kindnesses beyond the bounds of duty.

My friend and colleague Samuel Clark was especially helpful and read several versions of the entire manuscript of this book. The anonymous readers of the Bloomsbury Academic Press offered much encouragement and many helpful suggestions. The editorial staff of the academic division of Bloomsbury Publishing have been especially helpful, and I particularly wish to thank Alice Wright, Anna MacDiarmid, Chloë Shuttlewood, and Lucy Carroll.

As always, my greatest debt of gratitude is owed to my wife Anne Brown Manning, who has encouraged me to engage in scholarship and provided me with the leisure to do so for the past fifty-five years.

Cleveland, OH
July 2015

Introduction

For empire and greatness, it importeth most that a nation do profess arms as their principal honour, study and occupation.

“Of the Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates,” in
The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. Basil Montagu, 3 vols.,
(Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan, 1857), I: 38

He who desires peace should diligently train his soldiers; he who hopes for favourable issues should fight by art and not by chance.

John of Salisbury, Bishop of Chartres, *The Statesman’s
Book of John of Salisbury . . . Policratus*, trans.
John Dickenson (New York: Knopf, 1927), vi. 19 (p. 240)

For much of human history, a martial ethos has dominated the thinking and actions of the rulers and aristocratic classes of city-states, empires, theocracies, feudal monarchies, dynastic states, and nation-states. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this was reinforced by a more explicit rhetoric of war, which in some totalitarian and militaristic societies, gave rise to a cult of war. In liberal democracies, war has come to be considered pathological since the time of the First World War. Following the devastation of the Second World War (or the last part of the “Second Thirty Years War” as Sir Michael Howard called it), a rhetoric of peace became more fashionable. There have always been advocates of peace, going back to antiquity, but it has always been more difficult to imagine universal peace because of a paucity of historical examples.¹

Until the end of the eighteenth century and beyond, war was a way of life. From the time of the rise of sovereign states, the basic cause of wars was the competition for power and the survival of sovereign entities. In early modern Europe, war was regarded as something that happened between states, and consequently, may be viewed as an adjunct of the sovereign-state system. Diplomacy was employed not as a way of preserving peace, but as a means of

securing a strategic advantage prior to the next war or as a means of negotiating an advantageous peace treaty after a war. This makes it difficult to distinguish times of peace from times of war.²

It is necessary to begin this study of the concepts of war and peace in the Western world with an examination of these topics in classical antiquity and the Middle Ages in order to observe how they were transmitted to early modern Europe. This is because the Greek myth of martial glory continued to exert an influence on the psychology of war and the culture of valor in the formative period of the modern state and society. These classical values were passed on through the intervening periods by the code of chivalry and its literary expressions as well as by the various chivalric and crusading orders. They survive in modern armies in the form of battle decorations and ribbons—even for those desk-bound warriors who have rarely, if ever, experienced combat.³

The mythology of war as a source of honor and a test of manly courage no longer finds wide acceptance. Most nation-states now belong to the United Nations and other international organizations that seek to resolve interstate disputes, end civil wars, contain terrorism, avoid genocides, administer humanitarian aid, and promote democratic government. These international bodies have enjoyed a certain degree of success, but are less effective in resolving disputes among great powers where the national interests of those great powers usually predominate. These national interests are driven by regional geopolitics, the search for sources of energy and raw materials, and the need to export in order to maintain full employment and avoid domestic unrest. Plans to reduce conflict and promote international peace often run up against networks of interests consisting of defense industries, intelligence agencies, military establishments, and legislators wishing to promote and protect business and employment in those industries and on those military bases within their constituencies. Such persons find universal peace hard to imagine. The Cold War may have ended, but new pretexts for military adventures and defense spending continue to present themselves. While the rationale for going to war has changed, and the lethality of warfare has lessened since the middle of the twentieth century, it cannot be demonstrated that the frequency of war has diminished.⁴

The Quaker mathematician Lewis F. Richardson undertook a complicated survey of what he called “deadly quarrels” covering the period between 1820

and 1952. These included the two World Wars, other interstate wars, civil wars, rebellions, slave revolts, and various military campaigns, which were arranged into six categories based on the magnitude of casualties.⁵ Including each of the two World Wars as single entities, the total number of wars and other deadly conflicts during this period totals 315. The manuscript of this book remained unpublished at the time of Richardson's death, and it was subsequently edited and published by Quincy Wright and C.C. Lienau. The editors emphasize that the list is incomplete, and could be made complete only if a team of investigators could be gathered together to examine the records of each and every country.⁶

In most of the ages of humankind, war was always the main topic of historical writing and the language of politics—at least, among the chroniclers of the ancient, medieval, and early modern worlds, and was always a favorite topic of poets and dramatists as well. Peace was a weaker concept than war. War was “a more theatrical feature of human life.” Peace was static and indistinct. Sculptors and painters often depicted rulers decked in the laurels of victory, if not clad in battle armor and equipped with swords and batons. Machiavelli recognized that war was transforming politics in the Renaissance, and any topic that did not concern the ability to make war, win honor, and enhance the reputation of the prince was of secondary importance. As Samuel Pufendorf said: “Peace and war . . . comprehend all . . . the conduct of life.” Particular wars and battles are something that we are all familiar with to a degree, but war itself is a phenomenon that is more difficult to explain. Moreover, it is not only true that open and declared wars take up much of recorded history, but also that the intervals of what is called peace, when actual fighting subsided, were characterized by latent hostility and preparations for the next war.⁷ The belief that war is the stuff of history dates back to the Greeks. François Rabelais repeats the proverb *bellum omnium pater est* (“war is the begetter of all things”) from Lucian of Samosata (c. 180–c. 120 BCE), a skillful Hellenistic-Syrian satirist, who was making the point that young and inexperienced historians of his age thought that history consisted entirely of wars and battles. Rabelais, living in an age of religious warfare, used the same adage to lament that he lived in an age of iron characterized by pervasive warfare that threatened to destroy civilized life.⁸

War has pervaded historical writing because of its frequency. A number of social scientists have attempted to measure the frequency of human conflict,

although it is no easy task classifying the types of conflict and defining the criteria for doing so. War has always been used in a calculated and rational manner as an instrument of international relations. Michael Mann estimates that, from ancient times to the present day, the average state in the Western world has fought with other states roughly half of the time. Periods of peace occur because armies become exhausted and money runs out, and time is needed to prepare for the next war. To show that medieval and modern states were largely concerned with raising armies and making war, Mann studied the finances of English and British governments between 1130 and 1815. He found that during this period, between 75 and 95 percent of all revenues raised were spent on making war. He adds that the English and British examples do not differ significantly from those of other European states during the same period, and these estimates also would have been true of ancient empires and political societies such as classical Greece, ancient Rome, and imperial China. Mann also says that since this pattern was established so early, capitalism could have had little influence on the close link between state formation and war-making.⁹ By the end of the sixteenth century, dynastic and religious conflicts, which frequently took the form of siege craft and trench warfare, had led to prolonged conflicts that were to characterize the seventeenth century. The age of the professional soldier and standing armies, when combined with technological innovations in gunnery, fortifications and tactics, favored the defensive over the offensive, and resulted in long, indecisive, and brutally destructive wars. Sir Michael Howard observed: "It was a period in which warfare seemed to escape from rational control; to cease indeed to be 'war' in the sense of politically motivated use of force by generally recognized authorities, and to degenerate instead into universal, anarchic and self-perpetuating violence."¹⁰

To provide more precise specific examples, between the years 1585 and 1702, there were only three years when a war was not being fought somewhere in mainland Europe. In Eastern Europe, conflict among Sweden, Poland, and Russia occurred four out of every five years; the major powers of Western Europe, Spain, France, and the Dutch Republic, were at war two-thirds of the time. The Three Kingdoms of the British Isles were engaged in interstate and civil conflict during forty-nine of those 117 years.¹¹ There were, of course, years in which a number of wars were going on at the same time, including both domestic and international conflicts. Evan Luard calculates that there were a

total of 229 wars on the European mainland between 1400 and 1559—a period of 159 years—which averages out to 1.4 wars per year. France alone was involved in international wars for seventy-eight of these years, and in civil and religious wars for twenty-six years. During the same period, England fought wars for a total of sixty-nine years; the Habsburg Empire, for 114 years; the Turks were also at war for 114 of those 159 years, and Poland-Lithuania were at war seventy-nine years. These calculations do not include peasant uprisings, feuds, or raids. During the period of religious warfare, 1559–1648, there were 112 wars within a period of eighty-nine years. A war was going on every year, and sometimes two or three. The most destructive of all European wars, the Thirty Years War (1618–48), according to Quincy Wright, “consisted of 13 distinct but overlapping wars, involving over 30 bilateral wars.” For example, the Thirty Years War subsumed the latter part of the Eighty Years War (1568–1648), also known as the Dutch War of Independence, in which the Dutch gained their freedom from Habsburg Spain, but which also drew in France, the three British and Irish kingdoms as well as mercenaries and volunteers from all over Europe.¹² Micheal Clodfelter’s statistical summary of warfare in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries attempts to break down these wars by types of conflict, and shed some light on the changing nature of warfare in the early modern period. In the sixteenth century, interstate conflicts constituted thirty-one or 56 percent of the wars; religious wars, thirteen or 24 percent; civil wars and rebellions, eight or 15 percent; and colonial wars, three conflicts or 5 percent, totaling fifty-five large-scale violent conflicts. In the seventeenth century, there were thirty-three interstate wars, or 41 percent of the total; the eleven civil wars accounted for 14 percent of the total, there were twenty-four rebellions (30 percent) and two religious wars (not quite 2 percent), while colonial wars increased to eleven (or 14 percent), making a total of eighty-one violent conflicts for European states and their colonial possessions.¹³

Certain wars appear to form clusters. Philip Bobbitt uses the term “epochal war” to describe a long series of conflicts separated by “periods of apparent peace” interspersed with peace treaties and involving differing states, but which actually constitute one long conflict. Earlier examples of epochal wars include the Peloponnesian War, the Punic Wars, the Hundred Years War, and the Thirty Years War. In the twentieth century, Bobbitt argues that the conflict that began in 1914 ended only in 1990 with the conclusion of the Cold War. This most

recent epochal war was fought over one basic question: What would be the nature of the nation-state?¹⁴

Michael Mann argues that militarism (or more properly, bellicosity) is the result of historical development rather than being inherent in human nature. Although most primitive societies engaged in war, not all did; it was a matter of choice. Of those tribes that did engage in violent conflict, such warfare was sometimes ritualized to reduce fatalities. Compared to the kind of warfare waged by supposedly more civilized peoples, such rituals of bellicosity seem tame in comparison, and were primarily athletic and recreational in nature, according to Mann. This ritualized warfare dispelled boredom, released tension, and provided entertaining stories to tell around the campfire. But in tribal societies where the numbers were small, such as the North American Indians, who lived barely above the subsistence level, just a few deaths could be disastrous. Consequently, these groups needed to capture members of rival tribes or communities to supplement their labor force. But, such practices, together with the injured feelings of rival tribes, would inevitably invite retaliation. Nevertheless, participation in combat allowed the warrior to enhance his reputation and social status, and helped to perpetuate the myth that warriors were useful to the community¹⁵

Azar Gat, in his interdisciplinary study of the phenomenon of war, argues that people's frequent resort to war is the result of human evolution, and does not differ from the deadly competition to be found in other species such as chimpanzees. People, or subhuman species, can choose to cooperate or compete for food, sexual mates, and other resources that often are scarce, depending on the strategies they select. Violent conflicts were endemic among hunter-gatherers; the death toll among adult males by violence seems to have been as high as 25 percent. A number of anthropologists have discovered that homicide rates are many times higher in hunter-gatherer and pastoral societies—what are called nonstate societies—than they are in state or political societies. Murder is a more common occurrence even in the relatively more pacific of these nonstate societies than in those that have come to be governed by the rule of law. Even under autocratic or colonial rule, the evidence suggests that life was more peaceful than in nonstate societies. Thus, Thomas Hobbes was mostly correct in saying that life was less violent in a political society that was governed by a leviathan than in a state of nature. However, Lawrence

Keeley argues that Hobbes's view of the original state of nature as brutal, violent, and miserable is based on the myth of progress. When the development of agriculture permitted the emergence of larger political communities, war became more organized. Also, as societies became more specialized in economic terms, a smaller portion of the population participated in war. As in more recent times, so in antiquity, the need to make war on a larger scale seems to have driven the state-building process. Once one tribal society proceeded in this direction, it compelled neighboring groups to do the same in order to defend themselves.¹⁶ For the Roman military writer Vegetius, the act of building fortified walls around a city was a basic and symbolic part of the establishment of the city-state; he imagined that this had to come before Rome could conquer the world. The need to build such fortifications as the city walls of Rome or the Great Wall of China is indicative of a state of mind regarding one's neighbors.¹⁷

In his most recent book, Robert Muchembled argues that a "culture of war" has existed in the Western World since before recorded history, and led to a disposition to violence that Western military adventurers spread to various parts of the non-Western world during the crusades and the Age of Discovery and Colonization. But Muchembled's argument that the European culture of war was more disposed to violent conflict than the non-Western parts of the world that European colonial powers came in contact with during the early modern period is not borne out by Steven Pinker's statistical comparison of the percentage of deaths in warfare in nonstate and state societies, which is based on percentages of the population killed rather than raw total numbers. In terms of percentages, wars were many times more lethal in hunter-gatherer or tribal societies than in more recent state societies, including the wars and genocides of the twentieth century.¹⁸

One of the reasons for the decline in mortality rates resulting from interpersonal and tribal violence was that larger and somewhat more civilized states suppressed aristocratic feuding, banditry, and private attempts to secure justice and revenge, establishing a state monopoly on the use of violence. A more rational and civilized concept of justice slowly emerged that was incompatible with private vengeance. Also, those warlike instincts needed to be redirected into the prosecution of interstate wars. Violence was thus legitimized in the service of the sovereign state for military ends, but the

brutality of soldiers also fell on noncombatants who happened to get in the way of these larger-scale and more lethal wars of the early modern period.¹⁹

The degree to which prehistoric people's predilection for hunting disposed them to make war remains controversial. Hunting, that is, the pursuit of wild beasts such as deer and boar, was very much a part of the martial culture of the ancient world. Indeed, Plato regarded warfare as a species of hunting. Rabelais believed that hunting was war on a smaller scale. Xenophon said, according to Rabelais, that all good war leaders came out of the hunting field. Some Renaissance scholars and political theorists, such as Alberico Gentili and Joseph Scaliger, believed that the first war was occasioned by a hunt led by Ascanius, son of Aeneas, who killed a stag in territory belonging to the ancient Latins.²⁰ Plato stated that field sports should be directed toward cultivating those qualities most esteemed in a soldier. Hunting prepares the hunter not just for the successful pursuit of four-legged beasts, but also for the most "noteworthy" quarry in warfare—namely humans. Aristotle echoes Plato in saying that hunting was a preparation for war insofar as it prepares soldiers to hunt those barbarians who were "intended by nature to be governed," but stubbornly refused to submit to Greek rule. Aristotle further insisted that it was morally just to make slaves of barbarians (but not Greeks), who were taken prisoners of war, because they were designated by nature for subjugation.²¹ Xenophon particularly recommended hunting because "it promotes good health [and] . . . and trains men for war." When the Persian King Cyrus went hunting, as he frequently did, he took half of his garrison with him and used public funds to do so. Besides acquiring physical endurance and becoming used to living under conditions of physical discomfort, Cyrus's soldiers learned to scout the terrain in order to gain an advantage over an adversary and developed habits of alertness. Above all, they learned that virtue can be achieved only by hard work.²² The practice of taking an army hunting as a tactical exercise in preparation for war and to procure fresh meat as a reward for the soldiers continued in the Byzantine Empire as long as it lasted, and is discussed in the Emperor Maurice's *Strategikon*.²³

In the middle of the twentieth century, a number of anthropologists argued that before the invention of agriculture hunting was the behavior that turned apes or man-apes into humans. Hunting dominated the activities of early humans. From the time of the earliest Greek philosophers down to modern

anthropologists, it has been generally agreed that hunting and war are closely related—indeed, that hunting is a substitute for and preparation for war—but involved less danger than war. This is known in anthropological circles as the “hunting hypothesis.” With a considerable amount of moral disapprobation, some anthropologists saw the origin of war in the delight that early humans took in hunting and killing and eating their prey. Through evolution, war came to dominate human history because males found pleasure in this activity. It may have been the revulsion against the destructiveness of the two World Wars that led some anthropologists to conclude that men made war on other men because of human instinct. However, as the fossil remains of early hominids subsequently were unearthed in East Africa, it became apparent that early humans were not as dependent on hunting for alimentation as was previously supposed. Moreover, humans were hunted as much as they themselves hunted. More recently, Bernard Chapais has argued that early hominids took up the use of weapons to curtail the power of dominant males to monopolize sexual contact with females. The resulting monogamy led to a more egalitarian society characterized by intergroup marriage that characterizes hunter-gatherer societies. This supposedly lowered the amount of intergroup violence, and inaugurated more peaceful societies based on the tribe that were noteworthy for the exchange of women between male kinship groups. Rivalries and violent proclivities were then directed against other tribes.²⁴

Many of the anthropologists and archaeologists who believe that primitive societies before contact with civilized societies were peaceably inclined tend to ignore the archaeological evidence of burials with weapons, armor, and chariots as well the existence of fortifications. They also assume that the accepted causes of war, such as population movements and expansion, or the envy of new weapons and other commodities, or depopulation resulting from the spread of epidemic diseases were peculiar only to civilized societies. Such believers in Rousseau’s concept of the “noble savage” assert that the violence and bloodshed of warfare resulted from contact with civilized political societies. Those who argue that a primitive peace had formerly prevailed assume that war was ritualistic and occurred rarely in prestate societies. The fact is that almost all prestate societies engaged in war; totally pacific societies, it turns out, were extremely rare. The moralists who drew overarching conclusions from so little evidence had to admit that perhaps humankind

hunted and made war because of mere perversity, not because of an evil instinct inherent in human nature. In any case, it would appear that some anthropologists engage in myth-making almost as much as poets.²⁵

While most political societies in the Western world have tried to eliminate private war and civil conflicts, it has been argued that one of the most striking features of the Western way of war is its lethality. According to Victor Davis Hanson, what distinguishes the Western method of waging war, from the time of the Greeks down to the present day, is the tendency of Western powers to mercilessly slaughter their opponents in battle. This is why the bloodiest wars have usually been civil wars and interstate conflicts among and between Greeks, Romans, and Europeans; non-Western armies also suffered disproportionately when engaged in warfare with Western powers. It is not that non-Western armies and their leaders were not themselves brutal; rather, Western armies tended to be better disciplined and more effective—especially when fighting on foot in tight formations as heavy infantrymen, as exemplified by the Greek hoplites and Roman legionaries. Military discipline and technological superiority help to explain the lethality of Western warfare, but other considerations must be given weight, such as an amoral concept of military necessity, the frequent use of citizen armies that are ideologically motivated, and a large degree of rationalism, cultural dynamism, and adaptability that were lacking in non-Western armies.²⁶

Throughout much of Western history, when kings and emperors were expected to be warriors, the mortality rate among rulers was high. Half of the kings of Israel died on the battlefield, or more usually, at the hands of rebels. At least half of the Julio-Claudian emperors were murdered. Assassination and military mutinies determined the Roman imperial succession. During the period of the Severans and their successors from 192 to 284 CE, of the thirty-seven rulers who claimed the imperial title, twenty-four were assassinated, six died on the battlefield, and only four died natural deaths. Among the Anglo-Saxon kings of Northumbria, similar rates of death in battle may be discerned, while of the Viking kings of Norway, only a third died on their thrones—the remainder being murdered or banished.²⁷

We lack precise numbers for those who served in the rank and file or for civilian populations before the early modern period. But there are good reasons for thinking that warfare grew more destructive in terms of casualties during

the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The proportion of killed to wounded seems to have increased as fewer prisoners were taken because of the massacres that accompanied an increase in the proportion of religious and civil conflicts. The Thirty Years War may have caused as many as eight million deaths—representing perhaps a third of the population of Germany. The religious and civil wars and attendant plagues and famines during the second half of the sixteenth century in northern France generally reduced the population by 20 percent, and in parts of the Pays Nantais, by as much as 26 percent.²⁸

Organized religion has done little to prevent war or to lessen its brutality. A certain ambiguity has always characterized Christianity. It began as a nonviolent and pacifist religious culture, but later came to treat heretics and nonbelievers with great severity, while at the same time, advocating peaceful relations among Christians. Like Islam, Christianity preached holy war against infidels, while advocating brotherhood among believers. Christian writers frequently employed martial metaphors in the pursuit of peace. As David Martin says: “Christianity captured the language of war for the purpose of peace. But no victory of that kind is fully secure.” Because Christian teaching concerning war was ambiguous, Sir Michael Howard says that Christianity was able to become “one of the great warrior religions of mankind.” Nor should we forget that the Hebrew Bible also provided the justification for undertaking holy war, crusades, and other forms of religious warfare that continue to the present.²⁹

Christian thinkers were certainly influenced by the classical Roman belief that peace can only be achieved through war and victory. The myth that the only way to preserve peace is to prepare for war is a very old and durable one, and certainly dates back as far as Cicero. John of Salisbury, Bishop of Chartres (d. 1180), who was considered by some to be the most learned classical writer of the Middle Ages, insisted that those who desired peace should be prepared to go to war to preserve it. A man who did not believe in leaving any task undone, he advocated his own canonization before leaving this world. Michael Howard quoted Sir Basil Liddell Hart as saying: “If you want peace, understand war.” In other words, the pacifist who wants peace, but neglects to study the nature and causes of war, is intellectually slovenly. William Penn thought that most rulers sought to impose their wills through war rather than peaceful diplomacy. He remembered that Oliver Cromwell had employed the old Latin

tag *pax quaeritur bello* (“peace is the end of war”) as his motto. Penn thought that justice provided a better path to peace than war.³⁰

The purpose of this book is to examine how the legacy of classical antiquity influenced philosophers, theologians, political theorists, humanist scholars, and educated members of governing elites and military aristocracies with regard to the phenomenon of war, its general causes, and intellectual and cultural consequences, and how these attitudes of classical Greek and Roman writers were transmitted through late antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance to thinkers at the beginning of the Age of Reason. Ideas concerning war were complex and highly developed in all periods of Western history, while concepts of peace remained underdeveloped and limited in terms of time, place, and people. Even the Utopian commonwealths of the humanists could be imagined only on a small scale and were situated on the periphery of the known world. The concept of universal peace had not yet appeared on the historical horizon.

From the dawn of recorded history, martial cultures have predominated, and in archaic and classical Greece and during the Roman Republic, were closely linked with concepts of citizenship and civic participation; irenic concepts were associated with cults and civic nonparticipation. In the early Middle Ages, pacifism was often associated with heretical sects or cloistered monastic communities that practiced asceticism and had withdrawn from the world. The code of chivalry, which became an integral part of aristocratic values in the medieval world, was pervaded by habits of violent conflict, and notions of honor and glory that drew on the warrior ethos of both the antique world and the Germanic peoples who menaced the Roman provinces on the frontiers of empire. Although these chivalric values were at odds with Christian belief and worked against peace, the latter was not an option as the Western Roman Empire disintegrated and was overwhelmed by Germanic and Turco-Mongolic incursions or Arab conquests.

The Eastern, or Byzantine Empire, although prepared to defend itself against similar incursions, fought only defensive wars, and was prepared to pursue diplomacy or even pay tribute to avoid the devastation of war. Such tactics were incomprehensible to the Franks or Western crusaders who thought them cowardly and effeminate. The lands of the Latin Christian West had become

increasingly isolated from the Byzantine heirs of Rome, and when they re-established contact with Byzantium during the Wars of the Crusades, the Latin crusaders showed themselves impervious to the political wisdom and peaceful habits of the Byzantines. For their part, the Byzantine Greeks rejected the concept of holy war espoused by their Latin Christian and Muslim neighbors; when they were compelled to go to war, it could be declared only by the emperor and not by any caliph or pope.

At the beginning of the Renaissance, a more complete recovery of the writings of classical antiquity necessarily reinforced the martial ethos inherited from the chivalric culture of the Middle Ages because classical Greek and Roman historians had put war at the center of their of their historical discourse. Nor was this incompatible with the crusading mentality that medieval popes and prelates had fashioned out of the warrior culture of the Franks and other Germanic peoples to serve their own political and religious policies when dealing with the Byzantine and Muslim worlds. The religious wars of the period of the Protestant and Catholic Reformations produced political theorists who wished to limit the viciousness of that kind of conflict and to diminish the destructiveness of war by making it serve purely political ends. This necessitated secularizing political theory, and this approach can be detected in Machiavelli and the classical republicans as well as in the Neo-Stoics who admired Machiavelli's analytical approach to war and politics, but wished to impose some moral constraints on how and why wars were fought.

There had always existed a peace ethic, but pacifists had been notably deficient in producing practical plans for bringing about universal peace in this world. From the time of the ancient Greek Stoics to the monastic houses of the Middle Ages to the Utopian communities of more recent times, pacifists have usually sought peace by withdrawing from political participation, practicing asceticism as hermits, or retreating to the seclusion of remote rural, desert, or mountain cloistered communities. Moreover, the quest for peace in this world by some Christian sects and communities have also been associated with the taint of heresy. The pacifism of Erasmian Christian humanism did not wholly escape the accusation of heresy, and Erasmus was forced to back down from some of his pacifist pronouncements after many of his writings were condemned by ecclesiastical authorities. While it is conceivable that the

Christian humanist reforms of the educational curriculum might have lessened the warlike proclivities of the military aristocracy, Erasmus and his followers never provided satisfactory guidance for how a political community could pursue a policy of peace and also be ready to respond to an unprovoked attack and conduct a defensive war without being accustomed to the exercise of arms. Nor is there any good reason for believing that Erasmian pacifism accomplished anything to deter war or impose constraints on how wars were fought.

The Stoic revival, or Neo-Stoicism, also grew out of Christian humanism, and was, at the same time, a reaction against the Wars of Religion. Since it condemned the brutalities and excesses of the wars of that period without denigrating soldiers, it garnered the attention of many military men—both Catholic and Protestant—who would have been repelled by the Erasmian peace ethic that placed no value on the valor of military men. As such, Neo-Stoicism probably contributed more to practical and actual constraints on how wars were fought and what constituted a just war than any influence exerted by Erasmus and his followers. Although some Neo-Stoic thinkers such as Montaigne sought to withdraw from the chaos and violence that afflicted their worlds, early modern Neo-Stoicism had a strong appeal to those who pursued active political and military careers. It particularly promoted the development of professionalism in the standing armies that were associated with the emergence of the early modern sovereign state. The Neo-Stoics, with their emphasis on obedience to established churches, also encouraged political stability, but not always religious toleration.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Erasmus's pacifist writings, which appeared in Latin, reached a smaller audience than did the vast outpouring of military treatises and memoirs, vernacular translations of Tacitus, and other classical historians who made war their main theme, and the many plays and epic poems that celebrated the deeds of the great heroes of the past. While Christian humanists may have rejected St. Augustine of Hippo's view of war as punishment for man's sins, many of the Protestant Reformers continued to insist that this explanation remained true and that war was inevitable, and indeed, could serve Divine ends. The Bible—especially the Hebrew Bible or Old Testament—and classical authors continued to exert a powerful influence on how war and peace were regarded in the early modern world that seemed to defy rational and secular analysis.

Since the time of the crusades, probably nothing did more to retard the existence of a peace ethic than the bitterness engendered by the Wars of Religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Many Protestant divines preached that wars against papists would always be justified as were those against Turks and Moors. Catholic prelates, clerics, and theologians replied in kind.³¹ The ancient Roman assertion that it was justified to go to war with barbarians in order to bring the benefits of civilization to them was revived to sanction the conquest, subjection, and conversion of the indigenous peoples of the Indies. Skeptics and rationalists could well ask if this was not hypocritical and inconsistent with the peaceful message of the New Testament. Military commanders saw such objections as incipient mutiny and reminded their subordinates of their duty to obey the prince and his lawfully appointed subordinate officers. Whether a war was just or not was presumably beyond the understanding of the common soldier. It was also frequently argued that foreign wars were always a good remedy for avoiding civil wars and feuds at home, and were necessary to keep potential soldiers used to the exercise of arms, and thus, deter foreign invasions. It was also thought to be socially useful to read the authors of classical antiquity and the Renaissance scholars who made such writings more accessible to those nobles and gentlemen who still felt the need to seek actual experience of battle in every generation in order to validate their honor.

By the beginning of the seventeenth century, a number of political theorists had wearied of the religious and dynastic wars, and were determined to snatch the study of war and peace out of the hands of clerics, divines, and swordsmen, and lay the foundations for a secular, scientific, and rational political theory of human nature and violent conflict. Hugo Grotius sought to impose legal constraints on the doctrine of just war and how wars were fought so as to prevent harm to the property and persons of noncombatants, and thereby, to establish a body of international law. This he sought to base on natural law, which he insisted was discoverable by acquiring an extensive knowledge of the works of history, philosophy, and poetry drawn from the past—especially the world of ancient Greece and Rome. The principles of natural law were something that was shared with other sovereign states—even actual and potential enemies—and could constitute a foundation for international law.

Thomas Hobbes also used natural law as a basis for moral philosophy. He insisted that in their escape from the state of nature, people sought peace, and

where they faltered in this quest for peace, it was attributable not to evil intentions and a desire for war, but rather to an ignorance of what constituted the principles of moral philosophy. Contentious religious diversity both undermined loyalty to the sovereign and his royal dynasty, and cut across national loyalties, thus serving as an incitement to both civil war and interstate war. The solution to this problem was to strictly regulate all preaching and to simplify religious beliefs almost to the point of promoting an established church with deistic beliefs (or atheism as his numerous clerical opponents preferred to call it). For Hobbes, political stability was always preferable to religious and intellectual freedom. Hobbes's quest for peace in an age of perpetual war led him to devise a science of politics characterized by a rational and empirical intellectual discipline that sought to explain the origins of human conflict. Casting aside the traditions and theories of many classical philosophers, Hobbes began his inquiry by constructing a model of how men lived in a state of nature before they entered into political societies in order to end the climate of war and secure peace. He believed that absolute monarchy was the best guarantee of stability and concord, yet he also understood that sovereigns were subject to the same frailties as other men, and that dynastic rivalries and jealousies often led to conflict. He understood the need for some sort of international law and government to rein in their ambitions. Hobbes may have been too much of a realist to imagine universal peace in an age of iron, but he did as much to advance the cause of peace as anyone living in the Age of Reason.

The Legacy of Classical Antiquity

Saevit toto Mars impius orbe (“The merciless war-god rages throughout the world”).

Virgil [Publius Vergilius Maro], *Bucolica et Georgica*,
ed. T.E. Page (London: Macmillan, 1931), I: 511, (p. 41)

*A Latian use there was, which Alban towns
Kept ever sacred, and Imperial Rome
Keeps now; whene'er they summon Mars to strife
Twain Gates of War there were, so named from dread
Of awful Mars, revered and holy fear,
Barred by a hundred bolts' eternal iron;
And Janus there the threshold constant guards.
Here when the Fathers' sentence is for war,
The Consul, in Quirinus¹ gown, and cinct
In Gabine wise,² unbars the door himself,
Himself calls battles forth, then all the rest
Call, and the trumpets blow with harsh assent.*

The Aeneid of Virgil, trans. Charles J. Bilson, 2 vols.
(London: Arnold, 1906), vol. ii: bk. vii, lines 601–15

The Temple of Janus, mentioned in the first and seventh books of *The Aeneid*, originally consisted of two gates connected by two walls open to the sky and containing a statue of the god Janus. It was located in the Forum in front of the Curia. When Roman armies went to war, they marched through this enclosure in a kind of ceremony of purification.³ Victorious armies returning from battle again marched through this triumphal arch, apparently because

Roman soldiers felt the need to be purified from the taint of bloodshed after battles. When the Gates of War, as the gates of the Temple of Janus were called, were closed in time of peace—and this happened rarely in the history of Rome—it was hoped that they would imprison the devils of war. The gates of the Temple of Janus thus functioned as an *index pacis bellique*, that is, an “indicator of peace and war.”⁴

Warfare was pervasive in the ancient world, as an examination of the histories of ancient Greece and Rome and the other political societies they came in contact with will demonstrate. Even brief periods of tranquility reveal an undeclared state of war; peace was more apparent than real, and a concept of peace revealed itself slowly and incompletely. It was and remains difficult to imagine peace in a world overtaken by war. We are the heirs of this legacy of martialism that stretches back to classical antiquity, and this has been passed on to us in the Western Tradition. Part of the reason for this disposition to bellicosity is that the writing of history since the time of Homer has been, to a large degree, concerned with war. It is also more difficult to imagine peace than to describe warfare because the latter is an activity commonly recorded in history, while the former is “a state or condition” more slowly achieved by law and the weight of moral reasoning. Moreover, philosophers, theologians, lawyers, and politicians spend more time discussing when war is justified than how permanent peace might be achieved. And, over the centuries, the reading public has shown a distinct preference for reading about heroes rather than moral philosophers.⁵

The Greek martial ethos

In the archaic period of Greek history, violent conflict was endemic and wars occurred frequently. Giambattista Vico tells us that during this time, when men were “superstitious and fierce,” and before they made good use of the faculty of reason, they equated divine justice with force and revenge. It was divine justice that they sought in order to settle their quarrels by fighting duels. When they began entering into political societies and establishing laws, duels were forbidden. After they had established monarchies and city-states, they continued to view the declaration of public war as an invocation of divine

justice. War was a part of the life of the citizen of the *polis* or city-state, and citizens were expected to fight in these wars as long as they were physically able. Their athletics, moreover, were directed toward maintaining physical fitness for war. Most of our knowledge of early Greek warfare of the Bronze Age comes from the epic poems of Homer. Homer's narrative focuses on the deeds of heroic individuals who strut across the stage of history and vaunt their glorious deeds. In battle, they run ahead of their comrades and seek out warriors of great repute among the enemy in order to engage them in individual combat. All of this has been arranged by gods and goddesses such as Athena who choose to bestow honor and glory on their favored heroes. The victor in the battle believes that he has gained glory if the person whom he has killed is of high repute—even if the manner in which he kills him is less than heroic.⁶

The accounts of battles and warfare, in general, in ancient times are difficult for the modern reader to understand because these tales are fabulous and cannot be taken at face value. There exists a language of arms that we find difficult to penetrate. The historical reliability of ancient Greek literature is called into question by the fact that descriptions of battle and martial culture are often “stylized literary constructs.” One of the functions of martial poetry and narrative in ancient Greece was to reinforce the existing social structure. The sixteenth-century French humanist and historian Jean Bodin points out that it is difficult to get an accurate picture of the wars that the Greeks fought among themselves or with others because they tended to heap glory on themselves, whereas an outsider such as Alexander the Great (a Macedonian as the Greeks would have insisted) thought that what the Greeks regarded as a great war looked to him like “a war of mice and frogs.” Bodin adds that the Greeks tended to magnify their own victories with little regard for the achievements of others. He also cites Thucydides, Plutarch, and Diodorus Siculus who condemned Herodotus for inventing speeches and putting them in the mouths of heroes and narrators to please readers who preferred eloquence to truth.⁷

In examining the literature of classical Greece, Simon Hornblower finds that although Greek writers generally profess a dislike of war as unnatural, they are fascinated by it and write extensively about it, which can lead one to believe that war was both more frequent and played a more significant role in ancient Greek culture than was actually the case. While it is true that c. 490–338 BCE, the Athenians were at war something like two out of every

three years, Athens was not typical of all Greek city-states. Other Greek polities did sometimes settle their disputes by arbitration.⁸ Even if war was not as pervasive in the Hellenic world as used to be thought, it still is arguable that the Greeks did not require much of a pretext to go to war. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine a state of peace in ancient Greece because of the perpetual conflict between the Greek city-states. In early Greece and Rome, as in most tribes and nonstate societies, anyone who was a foreigner, that is, a person different in language, culture, and customs from themselves, was considered to be an enemy. Although the Greeks may not have regarded war as the most desirable way to settle disputes, they often resorted to violence and revenge rather than diplomacy in order to resolve their conflicts with those whom they regarded as hostile. One of the main reasons that violence was endemic in the ancient world was that the violence of daily life and the weapons employed in street fighting carried over into war.⁹ Levels of violence were high and exceeded what was proportionate to the ends to be achieved. Besides fighting among themselves, the Greeks were even more likely to become involved in wars with Asian races, such as the Persians or lesser peoples such as the Macedonians whom they regarded as barbarians. Nor were their methods of war always constrained by rules. Even fellow Hellenes were sometimes massacred as prisoners of war.¹⁰

Greek philosophers made a distinction between civil war (*stasis*) and war (*polemos*). War was at the heart of Greek culture and gave the Greeks a sense of identity. Civil war, on the other hand, led to annihilation. War in the Greek world was a kind of athletic competition, fought according to rules that assumed the prior existence of law. The existence of law, in turn, assumed that there was an agreed way of seeking vengeance within an agonistic or competitive society. Greeks such as Heraclitus thought that competition within an agonistic society was far better than living in a primitive state of nature where every person was at war with everyone else—as Thomas Hobbes later imagined it. To put it another way, asymmetrical warfare was carried on without constraint, and describes the violent conflict engaged in by primitive tribes that were not civilized enough to form themselves into state or political societies. The Greeks believed in fighting wars according to the rules—although their conflicts could be brutal and quite lethal. And, as in all wars, there were Greeks who sometimes broke those rules.¹¹

Greek poets and historians made war the central topic of their writings, but other than attributing these wars to the intervention of the gods, they had little to say about the causes of war in terms of human actions. In heroic ages, such as those that Homer wrote about, war was regarded as a natural part of life, and could be justified by the acquisition of territory, trade, or slaves. In this regard, the Greeks differed little from the so-called barbarians for whom they had only contempt.¹² Homer stresses that the gods approve of war, and sometimes allowed mortal heroes the opportunity to participate in their wars and win personal glory, or at other times, they sanction wars to punish mortals if they believe that they have been insulted. Thus, war also functioned as a divination or legal trial to reveal the will of the gods. Although the Greeks possessed sufficient moral sensibilities to recognize that war was an evil, they still enjoyed the violent conflict. Achilles chose the life of a warrior knowing that it would shorten his life span, while Odysseus preferred war to cultivating his fields. The Spartans thought that living on booty seized in battle afforded both sustenance and glory, while the fruits of laboring in their fields afforded only sustenance. Also, as Herodotus observed, both Greeks and barbarians believed that shopkeepers and those who worked with their hands should be assigned a lower social status than those who devoted themselves to war. The intellectual recognition that peace was better than war might exist, but the fact remains that one comes across few pacifists in Greek literature and history.¹³

Belief in the divine inspiration of the gods played an important role in ancient Greek warfare. The Spartans, for example, were notably religious. They refused to come to the aid of the Athenians against the Persians at the Battle of Marathon in 490 BCE until they had performed the customary religious rituals and sought divine blessings. They variously worshiped Artemis, Hera, Demeter, and Pan, who, the Spartans thought, gave them the courage to go forward.¹⁴ When the Greeks went to war, they sacrificed to all of their gods, but different Greek cities regarded different gods as their patron deities. They had ambivalent feelings about these gods such as Athena, goddess and protector of Athens, and Ares, god of war:

Pallas Athena, the city's protector, I shall begin singing:
Dreadful is she, her concern is with Ares, polemics and war work,
Sacking of cities concern her and bellicose shouting and battles.

Yet it is she that protects all the populace going and coming.
Hail to you, goddess, please grant me good luck and felicitous fortune.¹⁵

The Greeks might pray to the gods to help conquer cowardice and to achieve victory, but even as early as the time of Homer, Ares was regarded as despicable—the personification of bloodlust. Although the Homeric poems and other literary expressions of archaic and classical Greece were largely concerned with describing war, it does not follow that the Homeric poets glorified war. They regarded war as abnormal and peace as something to be highly valued.¹⁶

Thucydides provided a more secular and rational explanation of the causes of war. In defending the domination of their empire, he has the Athenian delegates at Melos in 431 BCE tell the Spartans that it has always been the rule that the stronger should rule the weaker:

Of the gods we think according to the common opinion; and of men that for certain by necessity of nature they will everywhere reign over such as they be too strong for. Neither did we make this law nor are we the first that use it. . . ; but as we found it, and shall leave it to posterity for ever, so shall we use it, knowing that you likewise, and others that should have the same power which we have, would do the same.¹⁷

In bellicose societies, competition for honor and military glory is intense because that is usually the path to political prestige. Such societies will find frequent pretexts for going to war.¹⁸ Greek writers sought to justify wars in moralistic terms. However, Thucydides admitted that wars were usually fought over “three of the greatest things, honour, fear¹⁹ and profit.” In the archaic and classical periods the Greek aristocracies were driven to acquire more honor and more wealth, which necessitated a resort to war because aristocratic honor would diminish without displays of martial ardor. In the archaic period, this meant that men of repute never traveled abroad without a sword, and needed to be prepared to fight in the streets as well as on the field of battle. Because they fought only to garner fame and glory, their methods of warfare were little influenced by a concern for tactics or military organization.²⁰ As interpersonal violence declined during the classical period, more participation in battle was expected.²¹ The cost of weapons tended to reinforce the aristocratic monopoly on making war, and it was considered dangerous to arm the peasantry.²² The

armies of the Greek city-states remained small when they fought one another—typically between 6,000 and 8,000 men. When they faced a common enemy, such as Philip of Macedon at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BCE, they might field as many as 35,000 men. The Greek armies were small because the agricultural economies of the various city-states could not support larger armies, and the hoplite phalanxes were made up entirely of aristocratic warriors who furnished their own armor and weapons, and depended on the labor of others. Also, the privilege of fighting in the armies of the Greek city-states of the archaic and early classical periods had to be confined to those who could control the other social orders.²³ Aristotle thought that wars were related to the amount of wealth that the citizens of a neighboring city-state possessed. The envy of the wealth of an adjoining city-state could invite attack. For this reason it was desirable that men be taught not to covet and possess excessive wealth, but at the same time, it was well that citizens should possess sufficient wealth to arm and sustain themselves for the defense of their city-states. Plato and Aristotle both agreed that wars rose from greed for luxuries, not a struggle for necessities. Consequently, Greek society was always unstable because the aristocratic classes were always competing for wealth and honor.²⁴

The expansion of Athens was curbed by the Peloponnesian War, but civil war among the Greek city-states remained an intractable problem, and the Persians kept Sparta from being overwhelmed in order to sow discord among the Greeks. The Persian Wars, as described by Herodotus, emphasized to the Greeks the difference between them and the barbarians, as they called the rest of humanity. Although Herodotus might admire the Persians for their courage, the Greeks viewed barbarians as lacking both rational and moral faculties, and worthy only to be slaves. In response to the continuing Persian threat, a number of Greek cities, led or compelled by Athens, formed the Delian League to ward off the enemy. This defensive alliance came to resemble nothing so much as an Athenian empire, and caused much resentment among other Greek city-states. Athens claimed that the Delian League was defensive, but it was seen as aggressive and overbearing by other Greeks. In a debate at Sparta in 432 BCE, on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, an Athenian ambassador insisted

We have done nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary to human nature in accepting an empire when it was offered to us and then refusing to give it up. . . . And we are not the first to act in this way. Far from it. It has always

been a rule that the weak should be subject to the strong; and besides, we consider that we are worthy of our power.²⁵

Plato concluded that it was “the folly of mankind” that led men into war, and in a well governed state the magistrates had a duty to ensure that the citizens trained regularly in preparation for war during the brief periods of tranquility. The state was organized for war, and even during these periods of apparent peace, there actually existed an undeclared state of war against all other city-states. Hence, the citizens needed to exercise arms at least one day a month in all weathers, and they were to be accompanied into the field by their women and children. They were also to be encouraged to organize sporting contests and combats that simulated real warfare, and these should be accompanied by panegyrics on martial prowess and rewarded with prizes or reprimanded with censures for those who failed.²⁶ The ancient Greeks are the source of the belief that military service was a moral duty of the citizen, which in modern times has become closely linked to nationalism. Except in Sparta and among its allies, the concept of democratic participation was as strong as the martial ethos. But it remained true that war was always imminent. Thucydides observed that the Peace of Nicias of 421 BCE could hardly constitute a state of peace after twenty-seven years of war—especially considering that the Spartans continued to block the Athenians’ access to the sea and their overseas empire by occupying the port of Piraeus, and neither side honored the terms of the treaty.²⁷

The Persian and Peloponnesian Wars were quite unlike earlier Greek wars because they ushered in more intensive conflict and necessitated changes in how the Greeks fought their wars. Herodotus depicted the outcome of the Persian Wars as a victory of democratic institutions over Persian despotism. In actual fact, the methods of warfare of the Greeks, such as the use of the heavy-infantry phalanx, resembled those of other Mediterranean peoples. It was in the Lyric Age (especially the eighth to the fifth centuries BCE) that the solid phalanxes of disciplined hoplite warriors emerged in Greece. They were small farmers and craftsmen of means, but substantial enough to furnish their own weapons and armor. The risks they took as a warrior class conferred sufficient status on them to claim rights of citizenship, including participation in decisions concerning going to war. Sparta was a typical hoplite power at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, and adhered closely to the traditional

rules of hoplite fighting. Their soldiers had been bred to strict rules of discipline since childhood. Indeed, Sparta's defensive walls were ordered demolished by Lycurgus because they were incompatible with Sparta's martial culture in which Spartans were expected to stand their ground and defend their city. However, the evolution of the phalanx came to require more discipline than the Athenians and other Greeks were used to, and increasingly led to the use of mercenary soldiers. Athens abandoned the single-battle concept of hoplite warfare, and thought that as an imperial and naval power, it could wear down the Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies in a more drawn-out war. Athens had become a very bellicose political society in the fifth century BCE, and this was accompanied by a more democratic form of government in which its citizens were easily swayed by the rhetoric of leaders such as Pericles. However, the Spartans adapted to the Athenian methods of fighting on the seas better than was anticipated, and with Persian assistance, won a naval war against the Athenians, whose reserves of manpower had been depleted by a visitation of the plague.²⁸

Warfare in the writings of Herodotus had been concerned with the epic—how destiny moves individuals across the stage of history in their quest for glory. The individual rather than the political community or society is the subject of history, and the individual sometimes helps shape the unfolding of events through the intervention of the gods. It was for this reason that the epic was concerned mostly with recording the individual deeds of those warriors who most distinguished themselves in battle. Whether the battle was won or lost or military and political goals achieved did not signify. But Thucydides was more interested in war as a collective action in which effective leadership and discipline were especially important. For Thucydides, heroism was a reflection of corporate rather than individual endeavor, but most generals were more concerned to garner individual glory. Because he did not emphasize the heroic deeds of individuals, the Greeks did not find Thucydides enjoyable to read. Moreover, he did not write in verse. Because the Peloponnesian War was a civil war between Greeks, his readers did not find it as glorious as the wars against the Persians and the barbarians, and Thucydides failed to pay attention to the role of the gods.²⁹

Thucydides, who served as an Athenian general, began his *History of the Peloponnesian War* at the beginning of the war because he thought that the

conflict between Athens and Sparta would be especially memorable. He was afforded the leisure to continue gathering sources and composing his text after the Athenians removed him from command and exiled him following his loss of the Battle of Thrace. He thought that wars were caused by chance, but that the overheated rhetoric of political leaders and envoys made the Peloponnesian War inevitable. In speeches that Thucydides composed as summaries of the Spartan and Athenian positions, he distinguishes between the pretexts given in public for resorting to war, such as the breaking of peace treaties, and the real motives that he discusses retrospectively. The actual motive was Spartan fear of the growth of Athenian power, but the Spartans could hardly admit that they harbored fear in their breasts.³⁰

Polybius, like Herodotus and Thucydides, thought that war dominated international relations. Wars came about because of rational decisions made by political leaders based on expected gains balanced against possible losses. He discerned another kind of warfare caused by emotional reactions, such as shame and revenge, rather than rational calculation. Writing for an aristocratic audience, Polybius also spoke of a third kind of warfare—that undertaken to preserve honor. Polybius, whose political pragmatism and moral values have been compared to those of Niccolò Machiavelli, approved of the first and third justifications of war, but not the second: “No man of sound mind goes to war merely for the sake of crushing an adversary.” Polybius did not deny that war was a terrible thing, but he insisted that peace was to be sought only if it was consistent with honor and justice, which presupposes a war leading to victory. Polybius attributed the eventual Roman victory over Carthage, despite fighting at a disadvantage, to Roman “nobility of spirit.” Even utter defeat was preferable to a peace without honor. Polybius insisted that only someone who had been a soldier and had risked his life in personal combat was competent to write about war. Polybius had done so at the gates of Carthage during the Second Punic War when he had served as a military advisor to Scipio Aemilianus (Scipio the Younger).³¹ As a Greek of the Achaean League, a group of Peloponnesian states opposed to Spartan hegemony, Polybius viewed the Hellenistic world as chaotic because the various states that succeeded Alexander the Great’s empire possessed no set of moral standards nor a body of international law to govern relations with one another. Although the rulers of these Greek and Hellenistic states did engage in negotiations, disputes were almost invariably settled by

war. Polybius understood that the strong would always prevail. Taken as a political prisoner to Rome, Polybius came to believe that Roman power was exercised with greater restraint than was the case with Sparta or Macedon, and that political alignment with Rome made sense and allowed the Hellenistic Greek communities some room for negotiation.³²

Whether men fought wars because of instinct or mere perversity, it certainly can be argued that the Greeks were preoccupied with war. Plato's *Republic* uses the word *polemos* ("war") and its cognates "nearly ten dozen times." Other words relating to war, such as *battle*, *courage*, *manliness* or *cowardice* also occur frequently in Plato's text, but the word *peace* occurs no more than a dozen times, and is sometimes employed in a disparaging context, or to refer to inner peace, or to the kind of peace that comes when old age obliterates sexual desire. War is a fact of political life; peace is for contemplation. Government by oligarchy necessarily brings factionalism, while democracy is never free from contention, and tyranny is even more chaotic.³³ In the hoplite warfare in which swordsmen on foot fought in phalanxes, courage was considered more important than skill at arms. Such soldiers were drawn from among the citizens of the Greek *polis*, or city-states, who furnished their own weapons. As such, they were associated with government by oligarchy. The resources of these political communities, and the need to bring in the harvest before the beginning of the campaigning season had tended to make warfare a seasonal activity in the Archaic and early Classical periods. Plato, however, believed that war was an art and required full-time training, and for this reason, he does not discuss militias or citizen-armies. Thus, the army that he recommends is a professional standing army, and the main reason for the existence of the city-state is to support such an army. The warriors must be heavily armed, and therefore, dangerous, but their education and training should not attempt to make such warlike and spirited men less warlike and more pacific. Rather, the city-state needed a well-developed system of justice to restrain and discipline them. The pastimes that Plato recommends for training this warrior class, not surprisingly, are those in which warrior aristocracies have always delighted: hunting, horse racing, athletic contests, and dancing. Plato recommended that they be billeted in austere barracks in a fortified camp that was situated so that it could be easily defended. The soldiers should take their meals in common and make music that was appropriately martial. It is interesting that Plato does not

exclude the possibility of enlisting females since some women are well suited by nature for making war. Indeed, whole families might comprise the military band and follow their husbands and fathers into battle. In this way, the apprenticeship in arms could begin at an early age.³⁴

Hoplite warfare developed over a long period of time in archaic and classical Greece. First came the armor and the weapons: these included a bronze helmet, breastplate, and greaves (or leg shields), together with a wooden shield, a short iron-tipped spear and a short sword for stabbing. The warriors had to be farmers of some substance, who could afford to provide their own weapons. The tactics came later, and three years of intensive training gave the hoplites an iron discipline, a powerful cohesiveness and comradery that made them especially effective in face-to-face combat. The hoplite heavy infantry could advance swiftly on the battlefield, and alarmed the Persians. These qualities also promoted loyalty to the *polis* and fused the obligation of military service with civic participation. However, this hoplite civic spirit disintegrated when hoplites began serving as mercenaries in the fourth century BCE.³⁵

In late archaic and early classical Greece, these phalanxes of hoplites, or armored heavy infantry of aristocratic status, fought shoulder to shoulder in tight formation, which might be eight or more ranks deep. The hoplite phalanx moved as one body, and in the first phase of battle pushed against the enemy phalanx. Lack of space meant that skill at arms did not signify until the formation broke ranks. The hoplites fought only with short swords and thrusting spears, and scorned the use of projectile weapons, which were only used by light troops of lesser social standing who were no part of the hoplite formation. The pitched battle did not commence until the location and time of meeting were agreed on, and sacrifices to Ares and the other gods of war were offered. The battle did not cease until the losing side ceded victory by sending a herald to ask for permission to recover their dead.³⁶

Hoplite methods of fighting in phalanxes constituted a stylized and formal kind of warfare. Much of our knowledge of it comes from the epics of early Greek writers. The concept of agonistic warfare is a modern interpretation of hoplite styles of battle denoting a military struggle fought according to rules and constraints analogous to those governing athletic contests. While archaic and classical cultures certainly did employ athletic endeavors to prepare for war, there is limited evidence that the Greeks followed rules of fair play in

warfare or that they regarded their enemies—whether Greek, Persian, or barbarian—as worthy opponents. Hoplite ideals of warfare, insofar as they ever existed, went into decline when generals resorted to stratagems and deception. Some of these, such as the fortification of cities and the use of siege engines of a primitive sort to besiege fortified places, date back to the Trojan wars; others, such as the use of light troops, cavalry, projectile weapons, and naval warfare, certainly were in use by the time of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars when the hoplite ideals of the archaic period were in decline. Political and military objectives became more important than the demonstration of valor or the validation of honor by individual warriors. Military commanders resorted more frequently to stratagems such as ambushes and surprise attacks, and pitched battles grew more infrequent.³⁷

The hoplite mode of warfare was devoid of strategy, and one conflict usually resolved the issue only for that short summer campaigning season. Hoplite tactics and limited warfare declined during the Peloponnesian War as a consequence of the spread of democracy in Athens, the use of naval warfare and the rise of the Athenian empire. When Athens was besieged by Sparta and the Peloponnesian League, the Athenians retreated behind their extensive fortifications; they could fight over a longer season and could draw food, supplies, and wealth from their overseas colonies. In effect, Athens under Pericles had invented a concept of grand strategy that allowed Athenians to fight a long war against the Peloponnesian League because of their abundant manpower and other resources. The Peloponnesian War was a long, drawn-out affair that was indecisive, resulted in unforeseen consequences such as the Plague, the breakdown of accepted conventions of war, and the use of mercenary soldiers. Athens lost the war, but its democratic institutions gave it an internal cohesion that allowed it to survive as a city-state despite the disintegration of its empire.³⁸

Alexander the Great and empire-building

Despite the attempts at empire-building by the Athenians, the Greeks of the classical period lacked the logistical and tactical abilities to unite themselves into one political unit. They were incapable of, and probably could not have

afforded the expense of keeping a permanent military force standing for any period of time. The very localized political loyalties of the classical Greek world did not facilitate the emergence of larger political societies, such as the empire that later appeared under the leadership of Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander the Great. The individualistic approach to war and the adulation for heroes of the Greeks of the archaic and classical ages got in the way of fighting wars for political and military ends. Political unity came only at the beginning of the imperial or Hellenistic period when these defects were remedied by a permanent military force that incorporated innovations such as better weapons, a siege force, heavy cavalry capable of dealing with the Persian light cavalry, and a well drilled infantry with tactical skills superior to the traditional Greek forces and that was capable of meeting the Persians on an equal footing and sustaining the effort for a long period of time. The most important feature of the Macedonian army under Philip and Alexander was its logistical ability to operate over considerable distances without being heavily dependent on slow wheeled transport.³⁹

Alexander gave detailed attention to the provisioning of his army as he crossed Asia into India and back. He did not depend on wheeled transport, and the use of pack animals was limited by the fact that in crossing barren and sparsely inhabited expanses they would have consumed more than they could carry. To overcome these supply problems, Alexander, who had always given much thought to logistical strategies, arranged to have provisions gathered at the destinations of his march in advance of his arrival. This required a sophisticated intelligence system. He supplied his troops by sea when possible, and took into consideration factors such as weather and local harvest dates in areas to be conquered. He broke down his forces into smaller units so as not to put too much pressure on the consumption of available supplies, and sometimes, resorted to forced marches. The number of servants and family members accompanying his expeditions was always strictly regulated. In order to accomplish his logistical goals, Alexander had to devise a new type of military organization that carried with it a light baggage train, moved quickly, and was highly motivated. This terrified his enemies. Reading Xenophon's *Anabasis* (or *The March Up Country*) is thought to have led Alexander's father Philip to believe that a well disciplined Greek army with a minimal baggage train could defeat a Persian army many times larger.⁴⁰

The Assyrian, Egyptian, and Persian empires had all developed armies that were more technologically advanced in terms of weapons, strategy, and logistics, but it was the Greeks who contributed the enduring concept that being a warrior was a source of individual glory. To wield the sword, to display courage in the face of death, and to undergo the hardships associated with campaigning was thought to be an ennobling experience according to the Homeric sagas. During the transition from the archaic to the classical period, these values came to dominate the culture of the Greek world, and to represent the heroic ideals to which all politically active citizens of the Hellenic age aspired. The foundations of this admiration for the heroic individual were reinforced by the pantheon of gods found in Greek religious mythology and the rationalism of Greek philosophy and science. Greek philosophy of the Hellenic and Hellenistic periods would endure over the centuries and continue to function as a guide to masculine conduct down to modern times.⁴¹

During the Persian Wars, the Greeks regarded the Persians as an inferior people, a corrupt race who accepted political subjugation to an oriental despot and fought from a safer distance with projectile weapons such as bows and arrows, instead of engaging in face-to-face combat with short swords, thrusting spears, and shields as the Greek hoplites did. They were cast in the role of being an effeminate, Asian people, as contrasted with the masculine and brave Greeks. The Romans would later depict the Carthaginians in the same vein—as a feminine, oriental people who had migrated west from Phoenicia. The Western style of martial symbolism and propaganda thereafter frequently attempted to demonize the enemy.⁴² The problem with that kind of reasoning is that it is difficult to garner honor and glory on the battlefield if one's enemy is an inferior and unworthy opponent. Another problem is that when the Greeks fought the Persian armies, they were often fighting their fellow countrymen since the Persian Great Kings, as they were called, employed numerous Greek mercenary soldiers. Also, the presence of Greeks in the cities of Asia Minor and the use of Greek mercenaries made the frequent rebellions of the Greek inhabitants of those cities which were located in Persian satrapies look like Greek civil wars.⁴³

Philip II of Macedon arrived on the scene after the Greeks and the Persians had exhausted themselves in the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars. The Greeks despised the Macedonians as barbarians despite the fact that the Macedonians

were linguistically and culturally similar. However, Macedon was a dynastic monarchy, whereas the Greek city-states shared the political values of self-governance and reverence for the law. In 359 BCE, Philip and the Macedonian army defeated the Greeks, led by Athens and Thebes, at Chaeronea. At the urging of Isocrates, the Athenian orator who admired and trusted Philip and hoped that he could bring peace and unity to the Greeks by making war on the Persians, the Macedonian king crossed the Hellespont in 336 BCE to rid Asia Minor of the Persians and to free the Greek cities there from Persian rule. Philip was assassinated shortly thereafter, and was succeeded by his son Alexander III, whom we know as Alexander the Great.⁴⁴

When Alexander the Great crossed into Asia Minor to make war on the Persians, he attempted to unite the Greek people by proclaiming that he was avenging the atrocities and other injuries committed by Xerxes and other Persians against the Greeks and the insults hurled at their gods. He did this by drawing on the cultural heritage of the Greeks as contained in such works as *The Iliad*. This first necessitated defeating the superior forces of the Persian army, and then attempting to conciliate the Persian nobility. When Alexander conquered Asia Minor, he encountered many cities where Greeks had long lived. The campaigns of Alexander, like the earlier Persian Wars, were viewed by Hellenistic Greeks as a continuation of the mythical Trojan Wars—a repetition of the *anabasis*, or “march eastwards from the sea.” This expansionism grew out of the cultural gulf between East and West. In more recent times, these Greek communities in Asia Minor had come to be ruled as Persian satrapies. Alexander told the Greeks that they had been liberated from Persian tyranny, but in actuality, he merely replaced the Persian *satraps*, or provincial governors, with Macedonian soldiers. And because he claimed to be the heir of the Persian Achaemenid Dynasty, he continued to levy the same taxes as the Persian rulers. Military functions took precedence over civic governance for fear that the Persians would attempt to reconquer Asia Minor. Very little had changed for the descendants of the original Greek colonists. After he had won over members of the Persian nobility and peace settled on Asia Minor, Alexander also appointed some of them as governors.⁴⁵

One way that Alexander conciliated the Persian nobility was by adopting the wife and daughter of the Persian Great King Darius instead of ransoming or enslaving them as was the usual practice. Darius was also offered peace if he

would accept Alexander as his suzerain. Darius refused, and the Macedonian army had to defeat another large Persian army. The Persian cities, as they surrendered, were remodeled as Greek city-states. Only the Persian capital, Persepolis, was ravaged and looted, and this was done to prevent a mutiny among Alexander's troops, who had previously been denied booty in order to win over the conquered Persians. Alexander also destroyed Xerxes's palace. After that, he moved further east through Bactria (Afghanistan), marrying the daughters of Persian rulers to solidify his claims to Persian sovereignty and to fuse the Greek and Persian peoples. He took more brides from among the daughters of Bactrian chiefs to buy peace on his way to India.⁴⁶

In Plutarch's account of Alexander, he enjoyed the reputation of being the founder of more than seventy cities, which were supposed to have brought civilizing influences to barbarian peoples. The reality is that Alexander needed to establish fortified bases in the conquered territories that could be garrisoned by his own soldiers. His practice of settling immigrants from Greece in these new towns frequently aroused the violent resistance of the local populace, and these revolts were brutally suppressed. He often named these new cities after himself or his son, who was also named Alexander. The most famous of the new cities was, of course, Alexandria in Egypt, which was the only one of Alexander's cities that was not heavily garrisoned—perhaps because a large number of Greeks had settled there.⁴⁷

After he claimed the Persian throne and ruled Persian subjects, Alexander began gradually to introduce the dress and protocol of the Persian court, hoping to reach a compromise acceptable to his Persian and Macedonian subjects. Besides affecting Persian court dress, Alexander, as Great King of Persia, tried to alter court rituals when he met together with Greeks, Macedonians, and Persians. He sought to persuade the former two groups to accept a modified version of the Persian obeisance when greeting him, but to those in the Greek-speaking world, *proskynesis*, or "prostration," was performed only when worshipping the gods, which would have implied that Alexander was a god (he was, in fact, deified after his death). Gradually, a cult was built around Alexander, from being a kind of god among men to proclaiming himself as descended from the gods. Alexander even claimed to be the son of Zeus. His attempt to introduce Persian court ritual alienated many of his followers, and prompted a number of assassination plots against him.⁴⁸

Alexander's success in conquering Greece, the Persian Empire, parts of Bactria, and India—uniting for a time parts of Europe and Asia—made him the very model of an empire-builder to succeeding generations. His successes drew admiration and imitation on the part of Julius Caesar, Pompey, and Marc Anthony—not forgetting later empire-builders such as Napoleon. While these would-be conquerors of a universal empire forgot that Alexander's empire split into a number of feuding Hellenistic kingdoms following his death, we have to grant that Alexander, despite his paranoia and insatiable ambition, did actually help to promote cosmopolitanism among his subjects. The building of bridges between cultures became characteristic of the Hellenistic and Roman worlds despite many instances of internal political squabbles.⁴⁹

Stoicism and Greek concepts of peace

Greek culture of the archaic and classical periods, at least among the aristocratic classes, was formed by the need to make war or prepare for the next war. Greek towns were built on promontories and surrounded by walls to facilitate defense. The Homeric poems, which were compilations of heroic sagas written or composed by bards of earlier generations, reflect the background of ever present violence and war. Archaic Greek warfare often led to the annihilation of the enemy warriors and the destruction of their cities. While the heroes or aristocratic warriors of the Homeric poems pursued glory, we occasionally learn something of the feelings of ordinary soldiers drawn from among peasant farmers, who thought that war was the greatest of calamities. Even the greatest of ancient Greek martial epics does not ignore the blessings of peace that are forfeited by the pursuit of martial glory. In his close scrutiny of the very detailed scenes described as being displayed on the shield of Achilles in *The Iliad*, Oliver Taplin says that the similes that these scenes evoke force us to “think about war and see it in relation to peace.” Only then can we fathom “the price of war and heroic glory.” Also, the warriors of *The Odyssey* are not usually given to the bragging that characterizes the heroes of the earlier Homeric tales, and were less likely to exult on slaying an enemy and were disposed to show mercy. Warring armies began the practice of agreeing to a truce to give each side the opportunity to bury the dead. Gradually, the Greeks began to see the

need to agree on rules for the conduct of war. These constraints on how wars were fought supposedly derived from the influence of the gods of Mt. Olympus, who, though they sometimes influenced the outcome of Greek wars, did not really approve of war—with the notable exception of Ares.⁵⁰

Plato believed that while people in prepolitical conditions were gripped by fear, this did not mean that they were savages. People were eager to associate with other people, and were willing to share their meager resources of food, although they still had much to learn about how to live in peace and harmony. They had acquired a primitive body of cultural and moral values from their gods and they were more trusting of one another and more inclined to live peaceably than after their descendants had formed city-states and entered into so-called civilized society.⁵¹ While Plato accepted the idea that a well governed city must be prepared to fight wars to defend itself, he insists that the question of whether to wage war can never be considered apart from the principles of justice. The state should be primarily concerned with peace, and a good ruler should be able to avoid war. However, in his last work, *The Laws*, Plato concedes that the view of Kleinias and his fellow Cretans that an undeclared state of war existed among all states was not easily dismissed. But Plato still thought that peace was preferable to war, and it was to be hoped that people would display good will toward one another regardless of civic allegiance.⁵²

Greek mythology maintained the idea that a Golden Age had once reigned. The poetic depiction of myths of golden ages in a number of ancient religious cultures expressed collective hopes for peace in the future. When the Persians burst on the Hellenic world and the internecine wars between Athens and Sparta grew more destructive, other voices began to protest the martial ethos and bellicosity of the rulers of the Greek city-states as depicted in Homer's epic poetry. Pindar of Thebes, the great lyric poet who lived during the Persian Wars, wrote that "War is sweet to those who have no experience of it, but the experienced man trembles exceedingly at heart on its approach."⁵³ Even as early as the eighth century BCE, the didactic poet Hesiod expressed the feelings of ordinary men and lamented that he had been born in an age of iron and recounted the peace that had characterized the Golden Age, or as Hesiod had put it, the golden race of men who had lived in the Age of Cronus. Hesiod propagated the myth of men who had once lived like gods in a pastoral paradise where they enjoyed peace and happiness, but were later replaced by an iron

race with a proclivity to wage war. The principal cause of war, Hesiod thought, was lack of justice. He singled out those gods and goddesses who sowed the seeds of war, but also praised Zeus as the fount of justice as well as his children such as Eirene, the goddess of peace.⁵⁴

The poetical metaphors of the gold, silver, bronze, and iron races of humankind were devised by Hesiod. Other ancient civilizations had similar accounts of a mythical golden age. Subsequently, the Latin poet Ovid, in his *Metamorphoses*, reworked the golden-age myth and depicted an iron age where men no longer enjoyed the fruits of the earth in common, but divided the earth into property worked by iron ploughs and fought over by weapons of iron. In the poetical explanations of the end of this halcyon age, classical Greek and Roman writers all agreed that the Golden Age of peace broke down when people ceased to live on a vegetarian diet; they began to hunt and kill animals, to eat flesh and to take delight in the cruelty of blood sports. From ancient times until the disappearance of horsed cavalry, hunting, that is, the pursuit of deer, boar, and similar beasts on horseback was regarded as a rehearsal for or a simulation of war. The Ovidian age of iron is the Golden Age turned upside down. Although the Ovidian age of iron derives its name from the ferrous metals used to forge weapons and ploughs, the real source of contention was the competitive acquisition of wealth. Ovid does not suggest the possibility of a return to a Golden Age, so presumably the age of iron is the last stage of history. Men began to look for powerful leaders—usually kings—to lead and protect them and to build fortified cities. As we can discern in the writings of many classical poets and historians, concepts of honor and the pursuit of martial glory also led to armed conflicts.⁵⁵

In the archaic period of Greek history, the word *eirene* originally meant the opposite of war, or the abundance that people enjoyed when they ploughed their own lands and tended their own flocks. Peace did not come to those who traveled abroad or traded with foreign parts. Peace could be enjoyed only by those who were satisfied with the simple life. Not until the fourth century BCE did the word *peace* take on the meaning of a negotiated treaty that ended a war. The Peace of Antalcidas (386 BCE), signed by the Spartans and the Persians, bound the signatories not to reopen the conflict and established the legal concept of a “common peace” between the Greek cities and Persia. This established the precedent for negotiated peace treaties in modern international law. Under the

influence of Greek religion, peace also came to signify that tranquility of mind that comes from the favor of the gods and leading a just life.⁵⁶

Isocrates (436–338 BCE), who is generally considered a Sophist, lived a very long life and had witnessed the Peloponnesian War. In 357 BCE, he and his fellow citizens were gathered in the Athenian assembly to discuss the question of war and peace with regard to the rebelliousness of some of the allies of Athens, who had come to resent the domineering leadership of the Athenians. Isocrates advocated a policy of peace, not only toward the disgruntled Athenian allies, but also in her relations with all of the Greek city-states, just as they had signed peace treaties with Sparta and Persia. Isocrates condemned the imperialistic expansion that earlier had led to the Peloponnesian War. He thought the possession of a navy displayed excessive bellicosity toward the neighbors of Athens, and was incompatible with democratic government, as was the employment of mercenary soldiers—especially since these were things that Athens could ill afford.⁵⁷

Another philosopher who was skeptical concerning the fruits of war was Cineas (fl. third century BCE), who was a companion and royal servant of King Pyrrhus of Epirus on the northwestern border of Greece. Pyrrhus, attacking with elephants, had succeeded in defeating a Roman army at Heraclea in southern Italy in 280 BCE, and imagined that he could go on from there to build an empire in Italy and Sicily. Cineas pointed out to his master that he already possessed great wealth, and suggested that the cost of victory could well exceed what he might gain. Following a very costly victory at Asculum in Apulia in 279 BCE, Pyrrhus exclaimed: “If we are victorious in one more battle with the Romans, we shall be utterly ruined.” Hence, the expression “pyrrhic victory!”⁵⁸

As a consequence of the Peloponnesian War, the Greeks became disillusioned with the *polis* as a model political society because it had come to be viewed as promoting fragmentation and conflict. The Sophists, in particular, began to put forward the idea of human equality—even, possibly, between so-called barbarians and Greeks. Such ideas would eventually lead to the concept of cosmopolitanism and the spread of Greek culture. The person most instrumental in the diffusion of Greek cultural values was the soldier and conqueror Alexander the Great, a pupil of Aristotle. He was hardly a man of peace, but his actions did lead to the creation of the Hellenistic world that resulted in a degree of peace between Greeks and non-Greeks within an

enlarged sphere of Greek culture and language. Stoicism, in particular, was the moral philosophy that helped Greeks to deal with the collapse of the city-states following the Peloponnesian War and to learn to accept the equality between Greek and barbarian and to live in the cosmopolitan world of the Hellenistic monarchies. Stoicism attributes causation solely to providence or fate, but Stoics insist that people still have choices to make, and were morally responsible for such actions despite the influence of fate. Stoics insist that virtue is sufficient for happiness, but distrust emotions. Virtue consisted of the ability to put things to correct use. Humans are rational beings, and this means living in accordance with nature. Stoics rejected all sufferings and calamities as external to themselves in order to cultivate internal peace. The overriding characteristic of Stoicism is that it places a heavy emphasis on ethics. Of all ancient philosophies, it had the most influence on modern European cultures.⁵⁹

The philosopher who is generally regarded as the founder of Stoicism was Zeno of Citium (322—264 BCE); the influence of his ideas lasted several centuries and spread throughout the Greek and Latin worlds. Although only fragments of Zeno's writings survive, we know that he advocated one universal state, and it seems reasonable to infer that the purpose of this was universal peace. In this cosmopolitan and ecumenical society, all would accept one divine being and adhere to a moral code in an atmosphere of brotherly love and a recognition of the common relationship of all humanity. Many of the writings of other Stoics before the Roman period also failed to survive, but we learn from the writings of later authors that Chrysippus of Cyprus (c. 280–c. 208 BCE) was also a major source of Stoic thought, and that these earlier Stoics abhorred violence and war. Later writers, such as Diogenes, Cicero, and Seneca, all held the moral principles of Chrysippus in the highest regard. That war existed in the world these earlier Stoics attributed to the fall from grace in Hesiod's Golden Age, and the remedy for the violence that afterward afflicted mankind was a universal monarchy, such as the empire of Alexander or the Roman state that Stoics hoped would eventually bring a return of peace.⁶⁰

The Greek philosopher Epicurius (342?–270 BCE) advocated withdrawing from worldly affairs to seek peace of mind and intellectual pleasure. If duties were imposed on a person, they should be performed, but ambition or advancement of a person's career were always to be avoided. Epicureans were individualists who thumbed their nose at convention. They were lovers of

peace who believed that enthusiasm often led to fighting wars in order to achieve glory, and was therefore to be shunned. They felt benevolence toward all humankind, but had no interest in cosmopolitanism, and wished merely to be spectators. The foremost teacher of Roman Epicureanism was Lucretius (c. 94–55 BCE), who advocated a more active engagement in the life of the world. He believed that war and superstition must be eliminated if society were to evolve to a higher form, and in his *De rerum naturae*, he called on the goddess Venus to persuade Mars to put “the savage works of war to sleep.” Another Epicurean was the Syrian Lucian of Samosata (c. 120–180 CE) who believed that war was a great imposture that was exploited by morally obtuse politicians.⁶¹

One noteworthy thinker who stood outside the mainstream of Greek philosophy was Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 540–c. 475 BCE). He criticized Homer for wishing that conflict might vanish from the affairs of gods and men because he thought that conflict between opposites was the creative force of nature. Indeed, Heraclitus viewed war, as personified by King Polemos, as superior to Zeus and all the other Greek gods. Warfare was pervasive among humankind just as there was strife in nature. There was no such thing as good and bad strife. Justice was merely a seasonal cycle of the two. King Polemos was the father of all, and the father of history.⁶²

The teachings of the orator Dio Chrysostom (c. 40–115 CE) give a good idea of the thrust of Stoicism during the period when the Greeks lived under the Roman Empire. Dio was well acquainted with historical tendencies toward factionalism among the Greeks of the archaic and classical periods. He believed that concord within individual communities should be valued more highly than the abstract concept of universal peace. Factionalism leading to civil war should be more feared than war between states. Concord begins in the family and household, and spreads to the local community, and then governs the relations between cities. Thus, the road to peace began with persuading the Greeks to live in concord.⁶³

Epictetus (c. 55–135 CE), another Greek, was the slave of a high-ranking official at the court of the Emperor Nero whose master allowed him to study philosophy. He eventually became a free man. He observed that although the Roman state was able to provide freedom from external violence during the time of the *Pax Romana*, it could not furnish the kind of internal peace and

freedom from personal suffering caused by illness, jealousy, emotional turmoil, or personal tribulations. A man could achieve a large degree of inner peace by cultivating the values of Stoic philosophy, but that could be achieved only through the use of reason, which was a gift of God. After the Emperor Domitian banished philosophers from Rome in 89 CE, Epictetus sought refuge in Nicopolis, where he taught philosophy until his death in about 135.⁶⁴

The Roman military machine

Roman military organization was an adaptation of the Greek hoplite phalanx. Unlike the phalanx, the Roman legion had a more hierarchical command structure, and could be broken down into a number of smaller and more maneuverable tactical units. Like the hoplite phalanxes, the Romans did not leave the battlefield until they had obtained a decisive victory, and they were prepared to fight until they had won. The soldiers of the Roman legions were armed with only short swords and javelins. The rear ranks were also equipped with thrusting spears. In the earlier days of the Roman armies, which were made up of citizens and small farmers, they neglected the use of the light infantry and cavalry that Alexander the Great had employed, but they learned the value of more flexible tactics when they ran up against the brilliant Carthaginian general Hannibal.⁶⁵

The Roman Republic was a state organized for and devoted to making war, and had no parallel until the rise of the early modern state. Roman society has been described as a military machine. Because the Roman army was so well drilled, it did not need brilliant generals. Those who commanded and led the Roman armies possessed no special qualifications or training, and were drawn from senatorial and equestrian families. This does not mean that they were devoid of military knowledge and experience because military service went hand-in-hand with their duties as civil magistrates throughout their careers. In the senatorial oligarchy of the Roman Republic, admission to that elite came through a long military apprenticeship and service, and the duties of the magistrates were essentially military. Because of the wealth and glory that military command could provide, there was competition for the higher military offices that were the reward of extensive campaigning.⁶⁶

In the time of the republic, the decision to go to war was made by aristocratic members of the Roman Senate. The senators shared a common martial culture, and understood that warfare and expansion of empire could bring them wealth, honor, and access to the highest political and military offices. The small farmers of the republican period, who were subject to service in the army, would in theory also have had a voice in such matters as members of the Popular Assembly, but they could easily be persuaded to follow the senatorial lead by a successful military commander, to whom he would promise booty, land and slaves—not forgetting the prospect of adventure and glory. Following the military reforms of 107 BCE instituted by Gaius Marius, a hard-bitten professional soldier who had little use for aristocrats, the Roman legions became a standing army that relied less and less on the traditional Roman citizen-soldier. In the late Roman Republic, the decision to go to war became concentrated in the hands of a few ambitious men such as Marcus Crassus and Julius Caesar. Both the Roman Senate and the Popular Assembly lost influence, and Caesar's political base came to be located in an army made up of long-service veterans. Gradually, military recruiting spread beyond Italy to the less romanized provinces of the empire. Such men were at first enlisted as auxiliaries, and later, as regulars. Caesar's heir Octavian Augustus was able to concentrate decisions concerning war and peace in his own hands, although he sometimes consulted a council for the sake of form. Augustus's motives for going to war are not easy to discern, but the probable explanation is that he needed to enhance his reputation as a military leader with some notable successes so that he would appear to be a worthy successor to Julius Caesar, although he possessed no great qualifications to lead armies. The Roman language of arms emphasized and exaggerated the deeds of heroes in order to reinforce their command of military forces and the right to govern. It was commonly assumed that military success would lead to political success. Also, since Augustus was in possession of an army of 300,000 men, stationed mostly in the frontier provinces, he needed to keep them busy and away from Rome. The policy of pacifying the outlying provinces ended up expanding the boundaries of the empire.⁶⁷

The expansion of Rome was a driving force under the republic, and this was a deliberate policy of the senate whenever circumstances permitted and profit beckoned. However, the empire was not necessarily construed as a territorial

entity over which Rome claimed authority, but also included client states where the Romans wielded power. As Rome annexed neighboring cities on the Italian peninsula, it demanded military service, whereas the Athenians had been content to demand tribute. Moreover, the military service was to be rendered every year during the campaigning season. It took time to formally incorporate all these client states into the administrative and military system of the empire, but before the process of annexation was completed, the Romans thought of themselves as the rulers of the world. That the Romans did not possess a coherent plan of imperial expansion does not gainsay the fact that they felt a strong compulsion to do so. The Greek writer Onasander believed that Roman expansion was advanced by the ambition of generals rather than by fortune, but Polybius appears to have been the only ancient historian who had a clear picture of what the Romans were doing.⁶⁸ Under the influence of Stoicism, Polybius believed that the political unity created by the expansion of the Roman Empire must lead to universal unity that would bring peace and an end to conflict.⁶⁹

The perpetual wars of the Roman Republic required military mobilization on a scale that matches or exceeds the total war of the early twentieth century. Roman law of the regal period was heroic in nature, and was derived from the assumption, based on the rights of conquest that “the strong and the weak were different in kind.” Consequently, the plebs were originally regarded as being no better than slaves. This understanding of the heroic law had been accepted from the founding of Rome until the enactment of the Petelian Law, contained in the Twelve Tables (451 BCE), which finally freed the plebeians from their base status by recognizing their marriages as legal. This change in social status was earned by the plebs fighting in the Roman wars and demonstrating heroic virtue. In the second century BCE, some 10 percent of the free Roman males were conscripted for service in the Roman armies. This made it difficult for small-holders to retain their holdings, which fell into the hands of the aristocracy. The labor force of these *latifundia*, as the huge aristocratic estates were called, was supplied by slaves captured in the wars of imperial conquest. When the legionaries were discharged from military service, they expected to be compensated with lands. The failure of the senatorial aristocracy to meet these expectations caused soldiers to look to their generals for rewards, and thus, diminished their loyalty to the Roman state. The support that the

generals increasingly received from their soldiers magnified the political ambitions of military commanders such as Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar. Augustus smoothed the transition from city-state to universal world-state or empire by ensuring the loyalty of the many soldiers discharged following the civil wars of the late Republic. He provided grants of land—paying for some from his own personal wealth and for others by expropriating the lands of small-holders to make way for the discharged veterans. This may have angered the small farmers, but it pacified the former soldiers who were armed and could have made trouble. Subsequently, the Roman army became a smaller, but well disciplined professional force. Julius Caesar had doubled the pay of the army, and substantial bonuses were paid to the soldiers upon their discharge. Conscription was ended by Tiberius, and this helped to diminish the discontent of the small Roman farmers.⁷⁰

Virgil was an admirer of Julius Caesar, but not necessarily of Augustus. He may have borne a grudge against Augustus, because Augustus's land commissioners appear to have expropriated part of the family farm near Cremona where he grew up, in order to settle discharged soldiers on it. At the end of book I of the *Georgics*, Virgil sees the bucolic life of the small Roman farmer being turned upside down by pervasive war—both internal and on the frontiers—during the civil conflicts that occurred at the end of the Republic, and he hopes that Augustus can bring peace to Rome. He imagined the wars causing the fields to fill with weeds, blood to ooze from wells, wolves howling in the cities, and ploughs and sickles being beaten into swords and spears. He could not conceive of how the husbandman could survive this upheaval.⁷¹

While Augustus had gone to war to acquire glory and to increase his popularity, it appears that some of the later Roman emperors had sought to maintain peace in order to deny military glory to generals whom they feared might become rivals. Or, if war could not be avoided, they might assume personal command in the field. This was risky if the emperor had no military experience, as was the case for some two centuries of those emperors who followed Tiberius. An emperor who went to the frontiers to play general always needed to be wary of what went on behind his back in Rome.⁷²

In the popular imagination, the age of Augustus and the expansion of the Roman Empire were believed to have inaugurated a new age of peace symbolized by the closing of the Gates of War in the Temple of Janus and a

return of the Golden Age as described by the poet Hesiod. Virgil hoped that this might be true:

Then wars shall cease, and the rude age grow mild.
 Quirinus and his brother,⁷³ white-stolled Faith,
 And Vesta shall give laws, War's iron gates
 Stand closed. Within, upon her savage arms,
 Inhuman Rage will sit, by thousand links
 Of brass chained back, and snarl with bloody fangs.⁷⁴

The policies of Augustus ended the civil strife that had characterized the late Roman Republic and achieved internal peace. Edward Gibbon makes the point that the *Pax Romana* meant that the army was stationed on the frontiers of empire, and that obedience to the laws and payment of taxes on the part of Roman citizens was so habitual that the assistance of the army was rarely required, in contrast to the more frequent turbulence and popular discontent in the monarchies of Asia. And as so-called barbarians and other non-Romans became assimilated and were granted the rights of citizenship, they also acquired the habit of obedience to the magistrates. Even though the number of slaves in the time of Claudius probably equaled the number of free inhabitants in the empire, their servitude was not always perpetual; they were sometimes freed, and their descendants had an even better chance of manumission and citizenship.⁷⁵ The expansion of the Roman Empire also came to mean that men could travel the length and breadth of the Roman world and not fear brigands or pirates provided they accepted Roman law and authority. However, this internal peace and the expansion of empire rested on force. The costs of operating the Roman state after the accession of Augustus were largely based on maintaining an army of some 300,000 men for the next three centuries. The size of this army was fairly constant, as was the cost of running the Roman state, because the cost of maintaining Roman rule was almost entirely accounted for by military expenditure. Rome was always at war, unlike its medieval and early modern successor states, which were at war only about half the time. Thus, despite the internal peace of the *Pax Romana*, Rome was perhaps the most bellicose state that ever existed in the Western world.⁷⁶

The Romans were less interested in philosophical speculation than the Greeks. For them, war revealed a divine judgment. The strong Roman belief in the necessity of providing a justification for going to war grew out of Roman

religion and a legalistic frame of mind. The *fetiales*, the college of priest-heralds, regulated interstate or foreign relations; they consulted with the sybils and priestesses, and conducted the sacrifices and other religious ceremonies prior to going to war as well as making the formal declaration of war. This practice was peculiar not only to Rome, but also to the other Italian states that Rome conquered or otherwise absorbed. The Romans attributed their success in the many wars of expansion to their scrupulous observance of the religious and legal niceties, but as Roman expansion continued they developed considerable legal and rhetorical expertise in justifying their many wars. It was from these ceremonies and practices that the concepts of *ius in bello* (“rights in war”) and *ius ad bellam* (“right to make war”) derived, which formed the basis of subsequent attempts to construct a code of constraints on the conduct of war, and eventually, helped to provide a foundation for international law in the modern period. Only the state could declare war, and Onasander thought that the commander who explained the reasonable and just causes of a war to his soldiers did much to enhance the morale and courage of his men when facing the enemy.⁷⁷ The Roman definition of an enemy was based on the distinction between who had a right to declare and wage war, and who did not. An enemy in a war declared by a lawful ruler possessed a right to certain considerations; a brigand, a pirate, or a rebel had no such rights.⁷⁸

Cicero, who once called himself a man of peace despite the fact that he had served in the Roman army in order to qualify for the office of consul, said that the use of violence was harmful to justice and law in a constitutional state. Nonetheless, he believed that the Roman Republic had rendered a service to Rome’s Latin neighbors and that the peace settlements concluding those wars demonstrated clemency. All that changed as the wars of expansion continued following the Punic Wars against Carthage. Cicero advocated political solutions over the use of military force, and believed that war should be undertaken only when there was no other way to secure peace. He thought that political decisions often required more courage than wielding the sword on the field of battle. The goal of those who are entrusted with governing the state should be “peace with honour.” This is what makes them fit to govern, and for this reason they were honored as aristocrats (*optimates*) because it is assumed that they would not conclude a peace devoid of honor. “Peace with honor” in this context meant concord, or domestic peace within the Roman state. Since the

Romans ruled most of the known world, their concept of peace did not really extend beyond the frontiers of the Roman Empire. If war were to be declared, Cicero would insist on a proper observance of the accepted rules of war; hostilities were to be formally declared by priestly heralds with no preemptive attacks, and the enemy was to be treated as a worthy opponent.⁷⁹ It has been asserted that Cicero was not consistent in urging ethical constraints on how wars were fought by citing the maxim *inter arma enim silent leges* (“the laws are silent during wartime”). However, this is often taken out of context. Cicero actually uttered this maxim as a lawyer while defending a man in a murder trial, and it should be classified as a rhetorical flourish such as attorneys have been known to employ on such occasions. Cicero spoke these words, when the Roman Republic was dissolving into chaos characterized by conflict between armed mobs. It does not refer to the conduct of war against external enemies.⁸⁰

The Emperor Augustus maintained that his pacification of the Germanic tribes north of the Alps was a just war, but then the ruling classes of Greece and Rome had always believed that the conquest of so-called barbarians was justified. Most Roman commentators, including Tacitus, assumed that the acquisition of military glory, the defense of military honor and the suppression of mutinies and revolts provided adequate justification for undertaking war against barbarians without any discussion of the morality of these issues. Although he might recognize good moral qualities in the Germanic tribes and perceive the tactical advantage of sometimes pursuing diplomacy instead of warfare, Tacitus could still be quite bellicose in advocating the expansion of empire.⁸¹

Partly as a consequence of the longevity of Rome as a political society and her success in defeating rival powers, and partly as an attempt to warn off rivals in the latter days of the Roman Empire, Roman writers propagated the myth of the Roman martial ability to achieve perpetual victory. This was a message that legates always carried to barbarian courts and camps to emphasize Roman legitimacy of rule, their martial prowess, and their great good fortune. The title *imperator*, which later came to signify the ruler of a universal empire, began as a military title given to a commander after he had won a great victory. Thus, from the beginning, the title *imperator* drew on a culture of victory that was acted out in triumphal processions, personified by deities, commemorated on coins and statuary, and in athletic games. These triumphal ceremonies

continued under the Byzantine Empire, and the propaganda must have been quite effective because the enemies of Rome more than half believed in the “eternal victory” supposedly enjoyed by Roman military forces.⁸²

Roman concepts of peace

One of the legacies of the classical world is the belief that a secure peace can be obtained only through war. Thucydides insisted that “war gives peace its security, but one is still not safe from danger if, for the sake of quiet, one refuses to fight.”⁸³ Cicero, who was educated in the Greek classics, said: “If we wish to enjoy peace, we must wage war. If we fail to wage war, peace we shall never enjoy.”⁸⁴ Polybius thought “that war is a terrible thing . . . but it is not so terrible that we should submit to anything to avoid it.”⁸⁵ This advice was passed on to the medieval world by Vegetius, the Roman military writer: “He who desires peace, let him prepare for war.”⁸⁶ The Romans were also believers in the cyclical view of history, that is, that periods of war alternated with times of peace. When Scipio Aemelianus gazed on the destruction of Carthage, Polybius records, he wept for the fate of his enemies, and reflected that all great empires, cities, and nations must inevitably suffer the same fate—even Rome—for no human society can endure forever.⁸⁷ The Romans believed that war and peace alternated as cause and effect. The civil wars broke out because of the extravagance that followed in the wake of earlier wars. The luxury and prosperity of the later Roman Republic and Empire, and the enervating effects of peace effeminized its citizens and made them the prey of barbarian invaders.⁸⁸ Tacitus states that Roman legions posted to Armenia to fight the Parthians had grown lax, and had neglected the exercise of arms because of a lack of exposure to war. Peace could cause an army to deteriorate rapidly.⁸⁹

The Roman concept of peace was fragmented. One way of looking at this is to remember that during the regal and republican periods of history there was no god or goddess who personified peace. While it is true that Saturn was said to have established the Golden Age, a time of perfect peace and harmony, and that no war could be declared during the festival of Saturnalia, the Golden Age was no more. Peace was an abstract and alien concept that was imported into Rome and personified as a goddess.⁹⁰ At the same time, there were several

deities who personified war, such as Mars and Minerva. Diana was the goddess of the hunt, which was understood to be closely related to war.

Another way of looking at the slow development of the Roman concept of peace is to examine the changing meanings of the word *pax*. According to the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*,⁹¹ *pax* originally meant a pact between individuals, or a blessing conferring freedom from divine anger. It could also mean the opposite of war, as applied to the relations between two political entities or two gods. The olive branch, now regarded as a universal symbol of peace, originally signified no more than a pact between Venus and Neptune. *Pax* took on the meaning of a broad concept or policy only in the time of Augustus with the *Pax Romana*, a state of tranquility within those parts of the empire that had been pacified. This broader notion of peace did not exist except with reference to the Roman Empire. The personification of peace as the goddess Pax also appears to date only from the time of Augustus. It is important to note that the classical Roman concept of peace assumed that peace must be preceded by a total victory imposed by the victors, which assumes the existence of war. The goddess Pax was associated with the end of the civil wars and the expansion of empire. Augustus had derived the concept of peace from the Greek goddess Eirene, who had been known to the Greeks since the time of Hesiod. Although the Greeks had fought their wars ferociously, they, and the other city-states of the ancient Greek world, had generally restored peace through negotiated peace treaties rather than demanding total victory. A Roman peace treaty was imposed on enemies after a crushing victory and was never negotiated. Thus, a Roman treaty differed from those agreements employed in the Greek world, where the theory was that both parties to the treaty had identical rights and there was some room for negotiation. Roman coins often depict Pax linked to the goddess Victoria, with the latter wielding a sword and shield and displaying war trophies. This reinforced the idea that peace was something to be imposed, hence the motto *Mars pacifer*, which emphasized that victory and peace imposed through war achieved unity and agreement. The views of peace expressed by Roman poets do not differ significantly from the values expressed by the legends and mottos on Roman coins.⁹² A more limited notion of peace can be found in the cult of the goddess Concordia, which may have originated in the fourth century BCE as a symbol of social reconciliation between patrician and plebeian factions, but became prominent only in the time of

Julius Caesar when it was associated with the suppression of military mutinies. Thus, Concordia came to personify civil harmony, but had no relation to external political entities.⁹³

From the time of King Tarquin in the regal period, the Romans had always demanded the *deditio* or unconditional surrender from their enemies. Polybius thought that the Roman methods of warfare were more brutal than those to be found in the armies of the Hellenistic kingdoms. The Romans appear to have used very severe methods against non-Italian peoples. For example, it was their policy to employ terror against the Germanic peoples who lived north of the Alps in order to discourage future rebellions. Captives who did not immediately surrender when called on to do so were either slaughtered or enslaved. The execution of the leaders of such rebellious tribes was part of the rituals of a military triumph of a commander on his return to Rome. Livy, in his history of Rome, *From the Founding of the City*, makes a distinction between surrender to the power of Rome, which left the defeated forces in an uncertain state, and surrender to the good faith of Rome, which assured clemency.⁹⁴ The Roman style of besieging towns was more usually based on terror. For example, they might display the heads of captured enemy leaders on spears, or catapult them into the public spaces of the besieged town. The Greek philosopher Onasander, in his treatise on generalship, advised Roman commanders preparing to besiege towns to promise good treatment to the defenders in order to persuade them to surrender without a siege. In practice, Roman commanders expected besieged towns to take the initiative in this matter. Julius Caesar cultivated a reputation for clemency when he believed that it was to his advantage, but he could also be quite ruthless. However, most Roman commanders observed the convention that cities were sacked only after capture, but not after surrender.⁹⁵

Rome was a militaristic society animated by a martial culture. Because the Romans took pride in their past military successes, war was never unpopular. Besides, it brought Roman citizens tangible benefits such as new lands to cultivate and slaves to do the labor. Livy thought that since the Romans had a past that was distinguished by military glory, it was not unreasonable for them to think that they were descended from Mars. Livy also said that the Romans believed that Mars was the father of Romulus, the founder of the city of Rome, and was their father also. For this reason, they thought that they were destined to rule the world. This message was, according to myth, conveyed to a mortal

Roman after Romulus had become a god, and he also told the Romans to cultivate skill at arms in preparation for this great task.⁹⁶ Roman military leaders who undertook ambitious schemes of territorial expansion also turned to foreign gods to act as patrons for their conquests. Sulla had enlisted the Cappodocian goddess Ma in his adventures, and linked her to Bellona. Caesar claimed Venus as the ancestor of his dynasty. He also revived half-forgotten cults and religious titles and offices to support his political ambitions. Augustus employed the Greek god Apollo as a god of victory, and adopted Mars Ultor, “the avenger of Caesar’s murder” as a dynastic deity.⁹⁷

This may help to explain why the Roman pantheon contained such a large collection of war gods, but no peace god until the time of Augustus. Mars was foremost of the Roman war deities, a majestic figure who was second in importance only to Jupiter. He was the husband of Bellona and a lover of Venus. Only Venus was thought to be able to restrain Mars since when war raged he ruled. His epithet, *Mars Ultor*, means “Mars the Avenger,” and he was usually depicted naked with a helmet and a shield. Although he was the equivalent in Roman mythology of the Greek Ares, he was held in higher esteem, whereas Ares was little more than the personification of bloodlust. Another Roman God, Quirinus, together with Jupiter and Mars, belonged to the trio of Roman war deities known as the Capitoline Triad, and he was third in importance behind Jupiter and Mars. Quirinus had probably been a Sabine god, and was usually portrayed as a bearded man in religious and military garb.⁹⁸

The Romans pantheon of war deities also included goddesses. Minerva was the virgin goddess of warriors and arms. The worship of this goddess was inherited from the Etruscans, who in turn, had derived her from the Greek Athena. Like Pallas Athena, Minerva was usually represented wearing a helmet and bearing arms. She was particularly associated with heroic endeavors and cunning stratagems. Bellona was another ancient war goddess. She appears to have been an Etruscan deity, older than Mars, to whom she was married. Later, she becomes a minor deity, and is represented wearing a helmet and a breastplate and bearing a spear and a torch. Meetings of the Roman Senate having to do with military matters were held in the Temple of Bellona. The Roman goddess Victoria (or Victory) dates from the third century BCE when expansion of the empire increasingly absorbed the energies of the rulers of

Rome. She was the Roman equivalent of the Greek Nike, but unlike Nike, Victoria was a major deity with many temples erected in her honor. Roman generals held ceremonies and triumphs to give thanks for her favors. Statues of Victoria were adorned with wings, and she was usually depicted bearing the trophies of battle that were so dear to the hearts of Roman military men. The Roman religious calendar also featured festivals that were specifically military in nature, such as the *Equiria* in the spring, when cavalry mounts were exercised, and the *Armilustrum* in October, when the blessing of arms took place.⁹⁹

Augustus maintained that he was restoring the Roman Republic when he came to power at the end of the civil wars. This was, of course, part of a propaganda program that also included the proclamation of the *Pax Romana*. When Augustus returned to the city of Rome in 13 BCE after three years of campaigning in Gaul and Spain, he entered the city by night without a formal military triumph in order to present the appearance of modesty. He also refused the offer to erect an altar in his honor in the senate, but he did consent to have one built in the Campus Martius, the military training ground beside the River Tiber, known as the *Ara Pacis Augustae*. Augustus knew better than to be too greedy for honors, and besides, he had already allowed an altar to be installed in the senate, dedicated to Victoria after his return from the defeat of Anthony and Cleopatra in 29 BCE. He also built an important temple in the Forum Augustum in 2 BCE where captured enemy standards were placed. The new Forum Augustum was intended to celebrate Augustus and his family among the founders of Rome, and to link his dynasty with military glory.¹⁰⁰

Like many thinkers of the Hellenistic world, the Romans had a cosmopolitan notion of human society that extended beyond their empire, but writers such as Cicero placed limits on sociability, and distinguished between fellow countrymen and strangers and between relatives and friends.

In the whole moral sphere . . . there is nothing more glorious nor of wider range than the solidarity of mankind, that species of alliance and partnership of interests [*utilitates*] and that actual affection which exists between man and man, which coming into existence immediately upon our birth, owing to the fact that children are loved by their parents and the family as a whole is bound together by ties of marriage and parenthood, gradually spreads its influence beyond the home, first by blood relationships, then

by connections through marriage, later by friendships, afterwards by the bounds of neighbourhood, then fellow-citizens and political allies and friends, and lastly by embracing the whole human race.¹⁰¹

Cicero also made a further distinction within Roman society between those who were educated and cultivated, and lived within a social framework of family life and affection, and those more lawless elements who tilled the fields and lived in “sylvan retreats.” The latter did not bother much with marriage rituals and would have had trouble identifying their own children.¹⁰²

Marcus Terrentius Varro (116–27 BCE), a Stoic who is sometimes classified as a Platonist, wrote a treatise entitled *Logistoricus de pace*, which condemned war because Varro insisted that humans must remember that they belonged to a larger community comprehending all humankind as well as their own kinship group. We do not know the precise contents of this essay because Varro unfortunately chose the wrong side in the civil war between the armies of Caesar and Pompey, and his library was destroyed when his villa was sacked. However, Caesar pardoned him and he spent the rest of his long life engaged in scholarship and writing.¹⁰³ Epictetus (55–135 CE) also maintained that all men owe an allegiance to this universal city, which is the brotherhood of man, because all are sons of God (i.e., Zeus). This could be taken as an argument for universal peace. But, at the same time, Stoics were bound to accept the course of human events as the unfolding of God’s will, which made it difficult to deny the historical fact that humans devoted much of their time to fighting wars.¹⁰⁴

This survey of the literary and iconographic evidence for the origin of the concept of peace in the Roman world suggests that peace was not a condition characterized by an absence of war, but a consequence of war, won on the battlefield.¹⁰⁵ Thus, we must look elsewhere for a more fully developed concept of peace. Classical and Hellenistic Greece offers more fertile ground for exploration. In classical Greece, the concept of a just war evolved as an attempt to seek justice and to restore peace. Because peace was that which was sought, wars could not be conducted in such a way as to make the restoration of peace impossible. The concept of a just war, therefore, incorporated the idea of constraints on the way war was waged. Because the Greek city-states were all roughly equal in size, arbitration was possible and did occur. But the Romans, because of their size relative to other states and the magnitude of their pride, did not submit to mediation. Although the Hellenes engaged in perpetual

warfare with one another, they did make a distinction between fighting with other Greeks within a code of restraint, but this code of conduct did not apply to warfare with barbarians. However, the subsequent conquests by Alexander the Great spread a cosmopolitanism that enlarged the concept of what constituted the civilized world. Thus, people could be Greek in terms of culture if not ethnicity, and only those outside the Hellenistic world would be considered barbarians. Another test of what constituted civility was the degree to which people behaved rationally. This broadening concept of cosmopolitanism, combined with Greek Stoicism, would eventually furnish a concept of peace that embraced all humankind.¹⁰⁶ The Romans were influenced by this Greek idea of cosmopolitanism, but the more immediate influence was to persuade the Romans that wars needed justification, and since the Romans were devoted to war and had a genius for propaganda, they became very good at justifying them. Although the concept of a just war was based on a wide degree of ethical agreement, a just war could also be based on little more than a desire for vindication or revenge.¹⁰⁷

The concept of the *Pax Romana* was an ideological or cultural derivative of Roman expansion and part of a wider pattern of violence and war. The Roman conquerors believed themselves to be more humane and civilized than the barbarians who lived outside the boundaries of the empire. The Roman wars of expansion carried across several centuries, but the fighting tended to be confined to the frontiers of empire, and therefore, there was a large degree of peace within the older parts of the empire. But this peace could be maintained only by the exercise of imperium or armed power to suppress revolts, mutinies, and banditry within the empire and to repulse those barbarian hordes who attempted to penetrate the empire which necessitated extensive garrisons on the frontiers.¹⁰⁸ This is not to say that the Roman people were not glad of a measure of peace, because there must have existed a weariness with war. But it helps to put the *Pax Romana* into perspective to remember the famous passage from *The Agricola* of Tacitus where, on the eve of battle with the Romans, Calgacus, the Caledonian chieftain, a man “of outstanding valor and nobility,” was supposed to have addressed his warriors and warned them that their freedom was threatened by the most insatiable conquerors in the world: “To robbery, butchery and rapine, they [the Romans] give the lying name of ‘government’; they create a desolation and call it a peace.”¹⁰⁹

As the Roman Empire reached its fullest extent, the Roman governing classes, although steeped in Stoic philosophy, failed to deal with the problem that war, employed as an instrument of imperial expansion, still disturbed the peace. We must remember that Stoic philosophers remained skeptical concerning how far people could achieve peace in this world. Although the Roman state was able to provide considerable freedom from external violence during the time of the *Pax Romana*, Epictetus reminded his readers that it could not furnish the kind of internal peace and freedom from personal suffering caused by illness, jealousy, emotional turmoil, or personal tribulations. An individual could achieve a degree of inner peace by cultivating the values of Stoic philosophy, but this was available only to a few through the use of reason, which was a gift of God.¹¹⁰ That war could not be totally eliminated, Stoic thinkers such as Seneca (c. 4–65 CE) attributed to humankind's corrupt and vicious nature. "If mortals always practice eternal hatred, and if the rage which has arisen never leaves their minds; if the fortunate hold to their arms and the unhappy prepare for war, wars will leave nothing. To desire to restore peace is expedient for the victor and necessary for the vanquished." In effect, he said that Rome's cultural attitudes condemned individual murders done in private, but praised conquering heroes for the mass slaughter of whole peoples. These praiseworthy Stoic sentiments, which embodied cosmopolitanism and brotherly love, found little application in the real world of governing an empire. As Gerardo Zampaglione observes, Seneca's dichotomy between Stoic cosmopolitanism and the raw Roman political world anticipates St. Augustine's distinction between the City of God and the City of Man.¹¹¹

Early Christian pacifism

Whether the *Pax Romana* was good or bad depended on who you were and where you lived. Origen, one of the Greek fathers of the Christian Church, insisted that the expansion of the Roman Empire and the *Pax Romana* facilitated the spread of Christianity, which would have been slower and more difficult had there been many states as was the case during the Hellenic and Hellenistic periods.¹¹² Indeed, the belief that the *Pax Romana* was the work of Divine Providence was widespread among Christian thinkers even though the

first three centuries of the Christian era were, for them, a time of persecution.¹¹³ From the apostolic age to the time of Constantine, most Christians were men of peace. This was not because the New Testament disallowed participation in warfare or forbade Christians to be soldiers, but because early Christianity imposed a new and higher code of values on its adherents that was profoundly different from classical Greek and Roman or Hebrew attitudes toward war.¹¹⁴ Despite the vagueness of the New Testament concerning Christian values regarding war, the early Fathers of the Church were more explicit in their condemnation of military service. Tertullian held that a Christian could not become a professional soldier because warfare was not a proper profession for a Christian. Moreover, a Christian who became a soldier in the Roman army would have to swear oaths to two masters, and the need to travel to far corners of the empire would be inconsistent with Christian family life. Before Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire, soldiers might well be ordered to participate in the persecution and execution of Christians. Furthermore, Roman soldiers were expected to make sacrifices to gods who were associated with warfare, and to decorate themselves with laurel and myrtle crowns associated with those deities.¹¹⁵

Strictness of observance of these teachings varied from one Christian community to another, but there appear to have been few Christians who actually served as Roman soldiers before the end of the third century. The way to peace was no longer victory at the end of a war with barbarians, but rather the Christian path to peace became meekness and an expression of fellowship with the gentiles. Yet, in the final analysis, the pacifism of the New Testament urged on individual Christians a submissive spirit, not a plan for world peace.¹¹⁶

Pacifism in its purest form, that is, an absolute prohibition against participation in war, was an important teaching only in the early period of the Christian Church, when hope for an early second coming of Christ remained strong. By the time that Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire in the fourth century, the barbarian invasions posed a threat that could not be ignored, and henceforth, pacifism remained an ideal only among the clergy. The Christian Church reworked the Roman doctrine of the just war, and attempted to direct martial ardor against heathens, infidels, and heretics.¹¹⁷

Perhaps the most important influence on Latin Christian views concerning war and peace, as passed down through the medieval world, was provided by a

Roman who became a Christian only as an adult. This was St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo in North Africa. Augustine's ideas were derived, in part, from the Old Testament and from the Roman legal concept of a just war. Hebrew culture was deeply religious, and peace was regarded as a gift of God, so this left no room for a secular concept of peace. People could only trust in God for peace; it could not come about through the endeavors of humans. Thus, St. Augustine taught that wars were sometimes sent by God to punish wickedness and sin. This, of course, provides the basis for a providential explanation of history, which leaves no room for secondary or human causation. According to St. Augustine, true peace can only exist based on justice and a balance of rights and duties among men and between men and God. Mere tranquility does not constitute peace. A war that aims at peace by seeking to restore this combination of justice and rights is to be regarded as a just war.¹¹⁸

Stoicism and constraints on war

The main source of pacifist thought in classical antiquity was Greek and Roman Stoicism, the latter deriving from the former. The meaning of the word *pax* came to mean freedom from "turbulence of mind." The spread of Stoicism introduced concepts of tolerance and tranquility of mind. The Stoics believed that the Time of Cronus (later called the Golden Age by the Latin poets) as described by Hesiod in his *Works and Days* was historical and not mythical. This Golden Age was a time that was free of war and misfortune, a time of abundance when there was no need for private property or slavery. While the Stoics did not think that the Golden Age could ever be recovered, their belief in it did afford a moral standard by which to judge whether a war was undertaken for just causes. Wars might be waged for defense, and vengeance might be exacted only in accordance with justice and humanity. While the original form of Stoicism tended to be detached and reclusive, the Stoics of the Hellenistic world encouraged public service and constancy in the face of vicissitudes. They also were advocates of cosmopolitanism, which led them to a belief in the brotherhood of man and the natural equality of all men. Thus, Stoicism contained a number of beliefs that anticipated the message of Christianity. The defeated enemy must be granted clemency unless the soldiers

had been bloodthirsty and barbaric in their methods of warfare. Essentially, Stoicism urged constraints on warfare; it did not propose to abolish it.¹¹⁹

Some Stoics went further in their views of war and peace; they believed that the universe was a rational system and that war was irrational. The Greek Stoic philosophers living under the Roman Empire in the time of Augustus had no experience of war, and could anticipate no need to fight a war in the future. They regarded soldiers, who were no longer citizen-soldiers, but rather mercenaries, as socially debased. These Greek Stoics went so far as to condemn war, even when fought for liberty or self-defense.¹²⁰ A number of Roman Stoics also rejected the concept of just wars, and especially condemned generals who were driven by lust for martial glory. Pliny the Elder thought that of all animals only humans were disposed to perpetual war, and therefore, inferior to the most frightening wild beasts.¹²¹ The Roman grammarian and lexicographer Festus speculated that the Latin word *bellum* (“war”) was derived from the Latin *belua* (“large beast or brute”).¹²²

Perhaps the most well known exponent of Stoic thought was Cicero, a Hellenized Roman, who gathered his ideas on these matters in his *De officiis* (*On Duties*). Cicero, who called himself a man of peace (despite the fact that he had to serve in the army to qualify for the office of consul), argued that the use of violence was harmful to justice and law in a constitutional state.¹²³ He believed that rational and civilized people should be able to settle their disputes by peaceable discussion; it was the way of beasts and brutes to resort to force. The only justification for going to war was when discussion failed; wars should be resorted to only to preserve peace.¹²⁴ He advocated political solutions over the exercise of military power. Cicero further believed that political decisions often required more courage than wielding the sword on the field of battle, and that war should be undertaken only when there was no other way to secure peace. But, at the same time, he never doubted that the gods favored the expansion of the Roman Empire.¹²⁵

Stoicism, in its various guises, was widely accepted by the Greco-Roman educated classes, but it remained a personal philosophy rather than forming the basis for a political philosophy. However, it did introduce an ethical concern with the practical problems of governance and duty that placed some constraints on how wars were fought, and the Romans came to display a degree of willingness to grant clemency to those who surrendered without putting the Roman armies

to too much trouble. Beginning in the Renaissance, the legacies of Stoicism and early Christianity would provide a foundation on which Erasmus and his circle of Christian humanists could build a more uncompromising concept of pacifism.

The Greeks were a wonderfully imaginative people, possessed of great intellectual gifts. But they could not imagine a world in the near future in which peace reigned. Their poets believed that a golden time of peace had existed in the Age of Cronus, but that was in the distant past. The Greeks of the late archaic and classical periods were aware that they lived in an iron age of pervasive warfare. Unless they wished to appear cowardly and devoid of honor, they needed to be prepared, as a duty of citizenship, to be ready to carry arms into battle and know how to wield them. While they invested little thought concerning why wars occurred so frequently, it cannot be said that they lacked explanations for the causes of war: habits of violence and an acquired taste for flesh learned from hunting characterized the end of the Golden Age; mischief sown by the gods, a lack of justice and fear of enemies, the jealousy and ambition of kings and the inflammatory rhetoric of demagogues stirred up conflict. The Greeks invested far more thought in how to fight wars and win glory than they ever did in imagining a world without war. They never ceased to relish tales of heroes, displays of courage, and skill at arms. The decline of interpersonal violence that characterized the archaic period may have only increased the conflict between the city-states and great empires of the classical and Hellenistic periods. The periods of time between declared wars and hard-fought battles may have appeared tranquil by contrast, but they actually constituted a climate of undeclared war.

The Roman state in the republican period was primarily organized for making war, and many centuries later, would provide a model for the early modern fiscal-military state. The hierarchical command structure and the superb discipline of Roman armies would also furnish a model for the standing armies that emerged in the late-sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe. The senators and citizens of Rome expected to serve in the army, and they grew used to the idea that they must never leave the battlefield until they had obtained a decisive victory. The senatorial and equestrian families also understood that the pursuit of public careers necessarily involved both military

and civil duties, and that a good military reputation was necessary for a successful political career. The demand for larger armies kept in the field for longer periods of time and in the more distant outposts of empire led to a decline in the use of citizen-soldiers. Roman armies became more professionalized and increasingly recruited soldiers beyond Rome, and later, outside of Italy. Consequently, the Roman Empire became more cosmopolitan as the boundaries of the civilized world were extended. The Roman concept of peace was at first limited, and was always preceded by a crushing victory and unconditional surrender. This concept of peace, which originally meant a pact limited in scope, time, and place, gradually took on a wider meaning as a consequence of contact with the Greek world. Even in time of war constraints came to be placed on methods of fighting, and Roman commanders sometimes showed mercy to the defenders and inhabitants of fortified towns that surrendered instead of resisting. However, James Turner Johnson believes that classical antiquity contributed little to legal restraints on how wars were fought and Christianity had little more to add. Both Roman and Christian thinkers insisted on the need to fight just wars for the right intentions. The Romans did not believe in using more force to accomplish their military goals than was necessary, not for moral reasons, but in order to conserve military resources. Violence was merely a tool to accomplish a military goal.¹²⁶

Roman imperial expansion was undoubtedly accompanied by war and crushing defeats, but despite frequent barbarian and Persian incursions and outbreaks of civil war, the extension of Roman authority and law brought a previously unknown degree of security to a wider world. Whereas the Carthaginian Empire depended on the institution of slavery, the Roman Empire came to be held together by the concept of citizenship. Moreover, this Roman concept of citizenship was the most cosmopolitan that the ancient world had seen.¹²⁷ As Bryan Ward-Perkins points out, for five centuries between 67 BCE, when Pompey the Great at the head of a Roman fleet cleared the last pirates from the Mediterranean, until the fifth century CE, when the Vandals crossed into North Africa, mariners and merchants could travel the seas in safety. And, unlike the medieval and early modern world, Roman cities in the interior provinces could be built without walled fortifications.¹²⁸ Tacitus may have been critical of the moral shortcomings of Rome under the emperors, but he never questioned the justness of Roman expansion because the rule of law

and a settled way of life were preferable to the disordered mode of existence that characterized the Germanic and Turco-Mongolic tribes beyond the boundaries of the Roman Empire. Tacitus admired certain moral qualities that he perceived among the Germanic peoples, but their violent and marauding ways together with the arbitrary government of their kings and chieftains provided a horrifying contrast to the civilizing influences of the *Pax Romana*. Tacitus wrote a kind of didactic history in which he was capable of praising the good qualities of Rome's enemies in order to underline the defects of his own society, but he never doubted that Rome's contributions to civilization outweighed its defects. Prophetically, he predicted that the abandonment of the Roman provinces and the collapse of Roman imperial authority would bring war and misery.¹²⁹

As the eastern Roman Empire became more Christianized, a philosophical revival of pagan Hellenism occurred that strengthened the tradition of classical learning and philosophy, and sometimes led to a dialogue with Christian thinkers that ensured that the teachings of the Greek philosophers would survive into the High Middle Ages. Christian thinkers showed that they were quite prepared to absorb the philosophical teachings of classical civilization. In this way, the heritage of the Roman Empire was saved from destruction even as its military defenses collapsed.¹³⁰

War and Peace in the Medieval World

The peace which is peculiar to ourselves we enjoy now with God by faith, and shall hereafter enjoy eternally with him by sight. But the peace which we enjoy in this life, whether common to all or peculiar to ourselves, is rather the solace of our misery than the positive enjoyment of felicity.

St. Augustine of Hippo, *The City of God*, in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, ed. Philip Schaff, 14 vols. (New York: Christian Literature Co., 1886), vol. II, bk. xix, ch. 27

St. Augustine says that the hopes of pagan philosophers, such as Marcus Terentius Varro, that peace could be achieved in this world were an idle dream. Thus, Augustine reminded his audience that the peace Christ promised was to be enjoyed only in the next world and only by those who had been saved. As for this world, the earthly city was in a perpetual state of decay. The view that warfare pervaded human activity persisted at least until the High Middle Ages. John of Salisbury said that periods of apparent peace may occur, but human strife and violence will always result in more war.¹ The people of the ancient world understood well what war was, but they had only a limited concept of peace as our age imagines it. The word peace meant different things to different people in the ancient world. Among the Greeks, it was simply the absence of war, usually accompanied by abundance. The earliest meaning of the Latin word *pax* was a pact by which all signatories agreed not to fight. But, for early Christians, peace was a positive and dynamic force, woven into the fabric of their religion, which signified not only abstention from war, but also an avoidance of all contention and bloodshed, together with a positive injunction to love and forgive all.² However, human frailty being what it is, the pacifism of early Christians was less easily achieved in practice.

The Augustinian earthly city

The severely ascetic Tertullian, who adhered to the Montanist party and was regarded by more orthodox Christians as a heretic, insisted that while war had been permitted in the Old Testament, Christ had taken away the sword in the New Dispensation. Tertullian taught that merely to wear the garb of a soldier—even that of the rank and file and even if the soldier was not required to make sacrifices to pagan gods—was incompatible with a Christian way of life, because a good Christian could not serve two masters. Not only were Christians forbidden to fight in wars, they were also prohibited from bringing lawsuits.³ Religion had played an important role in the life of Roman soldiers. As recruits, Roman soldiers had to swear loyalty to both the emperor and the gods, and to participate in religious rites and make sacrifices to the gods on a regular basis. These religious observances were supervised by their officers. This sacralization of army life was an important part of Roman military discipline. From the time of Constantine, these pagan religious rites were modified and adapted to Christian practice.⁴ Although the first three centuries of the Christian era have been regarded as the most pacifistic in the history of Christianity, in fact, there is to be discerned a militancy that had a sharp cutting edge. Some early Christian theologians tended to demonize non-Christians, such as pagans and Jews and even other Christians, whom they regarded as heretical. Martyrdom was eagerly sought out as spiritual combat, and the language of Christian devotion in St. Paul's Epistles is sometimes pervaded with martial metaphors.⁵ Debates among Christian theologians were often acrimonious and polarized Christian communities. When Christianity became the state religion and the political culture was de-secularized, this led to intolerance and violent persecution.⁶

Pacifist sentiments were unevenly distributed among early Christians in the Roman world. Such beliefs seem to have been more prevalent in the Greek-speaking parts of the Eastern Empire; in the older parts of the Western Empire, most Christians had also come to prefer more peaceful ways; but in those frontier provinces of the Western Empire where Germanic and Magyar invasions were a constant danger, Christians recognized the need for the protection provided by the Roman legions. It was among Armenians in the East that the first notable group of Christian soldiers was recruited in about 173 CE to serve in the "Thundering Legion." Since Roman soldiers were also

assigned to other duties, such as service in the constabulary and fire-fighting units, some Christian thinkers began to make a distinction between service in the Roman army and participation in war.⁷ The accession of the Emperor Constantine ended both the persecution of Christians and the brief period of Christian pacifism. The new emperor was viewed as the anointed of the Lord after he displayed the Christian cross on his banners and won the battle of Milvian Bridge in 312 CE, ending a period of civil war and disputed imperial succession. The Christian concept that earthly rulers governed by the grace of God would have been familiar to earlier pagan emperors. Yet, Constantine was not immediately converted to Christianity after his famous victory; he participated in a pagan military triumph on his return to Rome, and he remained a catechumen and put off baptism until the last moment of his life. Constantine saw no reason not to allow his subjects to erect a temple in his honor, although he believed that it was inappropriate for them to offer sacrifices to him. He also embodied the restoration of Roman values after a period dominated by half-Germanic emperors. Whether Constantine's victory brought a Christian defeat of paganism or a triumph of Roman military values is less clear. Christians were now obliged to take up the full responsibilities of Roman citizenship. Within a century, only Christians were allowed to serve in the Roman army, and even clergy were known to wield weapons against invading hordes.⁸

The theological controversies of the early fourth century CE confused and dismayed the Emperor Constantine. He was inclined to be tolerant toward pagans because he hoped to reconcile Christians and pagans and persuade them at least to share a common monotheism. The officials of the Roman Empire retained a strong belief in hierarchical order and consensus in political matters and did not understand why theologians could not also work toward that end. Constantine promoted the Council of Nicaea in 325 to reconcile these divergent views; while most bishops signed the Nicene decrees and creed, some zealots preferred doctrinal purity to Christian unity. Later Roman emperors were no more successful than Constantine in promoting concord and unity within the Christian Church, and they often had to resort to coercion in a vain attempt to maintain peace.⁹

The decision by Constantine's nephew, the Emperor Julian, called the Apostate, to return to paganism appears to have provoked much disorder

within the Roman Empire. Anti-Christian riots were particularly severe at Alexandria in 362 CE, and were made worse by the provocations of the Arian Bishop George, who not only promoted discord within the Christian community, but also incited his followers to destroy pagan temples. A crowd fell on Bishop George and beat him to death. Although the late-classical historian Ammianus Marcellinus was himself a pagan, he disapproved of those who promoted strife between pagans and Christians, and advocated toleration of all religions as a matter of principle. The Emperor Julian was also a tolerant man, but he had to warn Christian bishops that their theological disputes were disturbing public order and preventing both Christians and pagans from worshiping in peace. "Experience had taught him [Julian] that no wild beasts are such dangerous enemies to men as Christians are to one another." In the days when new popes were elected by acclamation of the people of the city of Rome, proceedings could be quite violent. Ammianus tells us that in 363–364 CE, the election of a new pope in the Basilica of Sicinius resulted in rioting that left 127 people dead, and the authorities restored order only with great difficulty.¹⁰

Another symbolic blow to the concept of the *Pax Romana* came with the destruction of the *ara pacis*. This altar, dedicated to peace and abundance, which Augustus had erected on the Campus Martius, traditionally a field dedicated to the exercise of arms, seems to have been dismantled when the Emperor Theodosius suppressed pagan cults in 391–392. Flooding and encroachment had also contributed to its reduced visibility, but there can be no doubt that prelates such as St. Ambrose wished to make the point that peace came only from Christ, not Roman emperors. The idea that the emperor could provide peace and abundance in this world was superseded by the promise of peace in the next world for those who were saved.¹¹

It is perhaps understandable that Christians who professed their beliefs with such fervor and often displayed the enthusiasm of recent converts, might resort to violence. But what were the reasoned views of the early Fathers of the Church? John Helgeland insists that it is difficult to discern a coherent doctrine of pacifism among the early Church Fathers. Their objections to Christians serving as soldiers in the Roman army were largely limited to the pagan religious observances that might accompany the discharge of military duties. At the same time, it seems that Christians were very loyal to the Roman Empire

and accepted the need for an army to protect the borders of the empire. The early Church Fathers might have expressed an aversion to war and a condemnation of murder, but that does not mean that they did not recognize the necessity of self-defense.¹²

It was St. Augustine who shaped the discussions concerning war and peace in late antiquity and in the medieval West. He was already steeped in the classics of the Greco-Roman world before he became a Christian. His great task was to reconcile Roman legal thinking with the knowledge derived from the Hebrew Old Testament and the evangelical message of the New Testament. The Old Testament was filled with examples of wars undertaken by God's command to punish and correct the wicked; war was morally justified under certain circumstances, which provided justification for the Roman concept of a just war. The New Testament did not specifically condemn war, but rather provided a guide to personal conduct that made it difficult to envision a Christian living the life of a soldier. This was an idea that St. Augustine was not comfortable with, since the pacifism associated with the Manichean beliefs that he had repudiated when he became a Christian did not accord well with his belief that war was a consequence of original sin. Augustine's one concession to what remained of early Christian pacifism was that a Christian could not kill in self-defense because that would be inconsistent with the Christian love of one's neighbor. Only rulers and magistrates possessed the authority to declare war.¹³

Because the people of the Roman Empire had largely converted to Christianity toward the end of the fourth century, Augustine's views concerning war had changed. While an espousal of nonviolence had been morally appropriate for the early Christian era, Augustine became convinced that the use of force had become acceptable for advancing and defending the Christian religion. But Augustine became disillusioned with this concept in later years, and this was reflected in his *City of God*, which is dominated by the theme of war. He had come to apprehend that the Roman Empire was fighting a losing battle against imminent political collapse, and that this was leading to a "Hell on earth." In such a situation, a morally wise man would be bound by duty to fight to preserve what remained of political society. This was the basis of Augustine's doctrine of "just war." He thought that war was the price one had to pay for peace, and even the most just of rulers could not avoid engaging in

war since his more turbulent neighbors would force it on him. This was because the basic cause of war was wickedness.¹⁴

St. Augustine expanded on Cicero's concept of just war as compensation for lost territory or goods, which led to the status quo ante bellum. The Augustinian doctrine of just war went beyond mere compensation and sought punishment, not just for injuries done to a people or a nation, but also for violating the moral order. Thus, the Augustinian just-war doctrine got into the business of punishing sin as well as crime. Moreover, it did not distinguish between offensive and defensive wars, it was total and unlimited in scope, and the enemy, including noncombatants as well as soldiers, could be punished without regard to individual culpability.¹⁵

St. Augustine had originally believed that no one should be coerced into accepting Christianity or Christian unity. But his experience with the Donatist heresy changed his mind. Finding instances of compulsion in both the Old and the New Testaments, such as the conversion of St. Paul, St. Augustine concluded that compulsion and free will were not mutually exclusive concepts. When heretical groups refused to accept ecclesiastical discipline peacefully, he asserted that the imperial authorities had a duty to enforce discipline on dissident Christian groups, although the use of violence should be tempered so as to punish and not destroy those who disturbed the peace and unity of the Christian Church. However, it was not easy to enforce conformity on Christians, whether orthodox or heterodox, who were steeped in the religious culture of martyrdom. We might ask how this differed from the earlier persecutions of Christians by the imperial authorities in pagan times. St. Augustine would have answered that the application of physical coercion by imperial authorities in Christian times was a kind of paternal discipline and was done for the right motives.¹⁶ Physical coercion of evil doers could provide a degree of peace for those who were law-abiding:

Surely, it is not without purpose that we have the institution of the power of kings, the death penalty of the judge, the barbed hooks of the executioner, the weapons of the soldier, the right of punishment of the overlord, even the severity of the good father. All of these things have their methods, their causes, their reasons, their practical benefits. While these are feared, the wicked are kept within bounds, and the good live more peacefully among the wicked.¹⁷

Thus, the possibility of war among Christians was recognized by St. Augustine when he endorsed the necessity of punishment of heretical Christians by the secular authorities (in this case, the Roman state). Augustine did not regard this as civil war, but rather a manifestation of the continual conflict between the City of God and the City of Man. Augustine based his argument on a study of Exodus 32, where God commanded Moses to order the sons of Levi to slay those who worshiped the golden calf. St. Augustine called this perpetual struggle a holy war. This doctrine of Augustine was subsequently cited by Hildebrand, later Pope Gregory VII, to justify the extension of the crusading wars from infidels only to those who were heretical, schismatic, or excommunicated. But, whereas St. Augustine had restricted the authority for declaring such a war to temporal rulers, Pope Gregory VII claimed the authority for proclaiming a holy war for the papacy.¹⁸

St. Augustine assumed that living as he did in the earthly city, man's life would always be plagued by discord, and out of discord, war inevitably arose. Lasting and universal peace could only be found in Heaven, and would only be available to those who were saved. The best that could be achieved in this imperfect world was to attempt to limit such conflict to just wars fought within certain ethical boundaries. If this could be achieved, humankind might, from time to time, experience concord as well as discord. Wars would be fought to secure peace, but since peace is such a fragile thing in this anarchical world, moments of peace could only be temporary. Just wars come at a heavy price and were immensely destructive, because the legacy of just wars was generations of bitterness and the possibility of more wars.¹⁹ Thus, St. Augustine rejected the pacifism and antimilitarism of the earlier Church Fathers. The doctrine that some wars were commanded by God, which runs throughout the Old Testament, was reasserted, and the teachings of Christ, which took the sword of vengeance out of the hands of Christians, were seemingly laid aside.

St. Augustine conceded that "peace is the instinctive aim of all creatures, and even the ultimate purpose of war," but then he qualified this statement by adding that everyone desires a peace that is to his own advantage. Even when men strove for peace, it remained a contested concept. In this world, after the Fall of Man, all creatures, human and animal, wanted peace, but only for their own convenience and dominion, which was an unstable foundation for peace. If conflict occurs on an almost daily basis in families, households, and

friendships, is it any wonder that political society is so frequently disturbed by insurrections and civil wars?²⁰ “Peace is a doubtful good, because we do not know the heart of our friend, and though we did know it today, we would be ignorant of what it might be tomorrow.”²¹ St. Augustine insisted that the proper moral view is that an unjust peace is no peace at all: “It comes to this then; a man who has learnt to prefer right to wrong, and the rightly ordered to the perverted, sees that the peace of the unjust, compared to the peace of the just, is not worthy of the name of peace.”²² St. Augustine’s teachings brought the classical Roman concept of a just war into the corpus of Christian thought. This concept of just war derived from Roman law and Stoic philosophy. While some Christians thought the concept of just war departed from Christian teaching, the related concept of holy war could be derived from the Scriptures.²³

The sixteenth-century French humanist and historian Jean Bodin thought that for St. Augustine to assert that this world will always be devoid of real peace was philosophically incorrect because that implied that God could not alter the course of events in the world that he governed. However, Augustine, mindful of the doctrine of human free will, had anticipated that objection. Those who ponder these matters are seemingly forced to believe either that Divine Providence does not reach to these outer limits of things or that surely all evils are committed by the will of God. Both horns of this dilemma are impious, but particularly the latter. For although it is unsound and perilous to the soul to hold that anything is beyond God’s control, yet even among men, no one is blamed for what he could not do or prevent. The imputing of negligence is indeed more pardonable than the charge of ill-will or cruelty. Reason therefore not unmindful of piety is in a manner forced to hold that the things of this earth cannot be governed by powers divine or that they are neglected and unnoticed, rather than hold they are all governed in such wise that all complaining about God is inoffensive and blameless.²⁴

Following the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West, Christian thinkers had little choice but to accept the legacy of classical antiquity as it applied to warfare and statecraft. Although St. Augustine had demonstrated in the *City of God* that the Roman Empire was tainted, it was all that remained to protect Christians against barbarian invaders. What was to be learned from the New Testament was neither coherent nor helpful in defending Christian society, while examples derived from the Old Testament depicted Jews going to war in

response to direct commands from God to exterminate heathens living in the Promised Land. The political and military theories of the Greeks and Romans offered not only more practical examples of how to deal with troublesome neighbors, but also the example of a degree of ethical restraint in warfare—even though both Greece and Rome were bellicose societies. The doctrine of the just war enjoyed continued support from the leaders of the Church as the early Middle Ages saw continued onslaughts of pagan hordes in northern and central Europe and Muslims bent on conquest and *jihād* from the south.²⁵

Other Fathers of the Church also recognized the need to accept the Roman concept of just war, and to work with the Roman authorities to protect Christianity from internal and external enemies. St. Ambrose, bishop of Milan, who was the first of the Fathers to urge this cooperation, taught that prudence, fortitude, and justice were all closely related to the desire for self-preservation. The courage to protect the weak and to defend one's home and country against bandits or barbarians was suffused with justice. However, fortitude should always be combined with prudence. St. Ambrose reminded his audience that David never engaged in war unless compelled to do so, he always prayed for guidance before battle and he always offered thanks to God when he won a victory, such as when he slew Goliath.²⁶

St. Augustine wrote his *City of God* following Alaric's sack of Rome in 410. But he was careful to point out that the civil wars between Sulla and Marius were cruel far beyond anything perpetrated by the invasions of the Goths or Gauls.²⁷ The Germanic and Turco-Mongolic invasions disrupted the unity of Rome not only by their violent eruption into the empire, but also by their own lack of political unity and stability as well as by their diverse religious views. Some of these invaders remained pagans, and those who had accepted Christianity were likely to be heretical. The Latin Church began to assume some of the temporal functions of the former rulers as the Western Empire disintegrated, but the chaos of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages delayed and hindered the process of assimilation and civilization. These invasions also destroyed what was left of a peace ethic and weakened the concept of a just war. The precept that only a legitimate ruler could declare war made no sense when tribes and kinship groups replaced city-states and empires. Ultimately, the emergence of Christendom as a moral and religious entity would help to tame the bellicosity of tribal chieftains and warriors, or at least, turn their

aggression outward. With the emergence of feudal monarchies, bishops and abbots as feudal lords could be drawn into feuding and warfare, and their armed followers sometimes included secular and even monastic clergy. But the Church as an institution never approved of this kind of clerical behavior.²⁸

Before he became bishop of Milan, St. Ambrose had been a Roman official from a senatorial family, and he derived his moral justification for Christian participation in just wars from Ciceronian Stoicism. However, he continued to reiterate that the Church had abhorred bloodshed from the earliest part of the Christian era. Clerics could not hold an office that would require them to pronounce a sentence that prescribed mutilation or death, nor were they permitted to bear arms in time of war, although they could accompany armies into the field as chaplains. Those persons who served as soldiers after receiving baptism could not thereafter be ordained as priests.²⁹

Barbarians, war, and violence

The Roman Empire was quite unprepared for the barbarian invasions that occurred after 260 and the accompanying instability. The Mediterranean littoral had not seen war for many generations, and the imperial government was in the hands of an aristocracy that had grown accustomed to peace over a long period. By contrast, the periphery of empire was governed and defended by professional soldiers who had to deal with military emergencies at a moment's notice. Germanic, Turco-Mongolic, and Persian peoples made repeated incursions. Here, "it was plain," as Peter Brown observes, that "peace was a momentary lull in the laws of nature." The interior of the Roman Empire was one of the few places in history where a great state had attempted to establish a zone of peace where civilians ruled instead of soldiers.³⁰

What Christians living within the Roman Empire of late antiquity could observe of the Germanic and Turco-Mongolic peoples who came out of the Steppes of Central Asia and who penetrated the frontiers seemed to bear out what St. Augustine said about the earthly city. Azar Gat argues that the so-called "Dark Ages," or the early medieval period, was characterized by a "collapse of civilization" because the peoples who overran the Roman Empire in the West were so primitive that they were like the Iron-Age peoples who had

preceded classical antiquity. Tribal warfare, as found, for example, among the Celts and the Germans of northern Europe, was characterized by endemic violence, but little in the way of organized war. Hunter-gatherers often raided the resources of agriculturalists, and the prizes sought were usually cattle, women and children, or sometimes crops. Adult male prisoners were rarely allowed to live. Because of high mortality rates among males, tribal societies had difficulty replenishing themselves; children were needed to provide replacement warriors, and women were needed to perform labor since many of the men would have been warriors. By contrast, Roman attitudes toward prisoners of war were quite unusual, because they absorbed almost all captives into Roman society—even if some were enslaved. In the long run, Roman willingness to take in foreign populations and Romanize them undoubtedly contributed to the greater demographic resources that they could draw on when raising armies.³¹

Although some Germanic peoples were primarily agriculturalists, in other tribes, almost every boy was expected to become a warrior, and every adult male as a warrior was expected to follow his tribal chief during the campaigning season. There was little difference between warriors and noncombatants, and civil and military leadership were fused into one. No concept of just war, such as had been developed in the Roman world was to be found in Germanic society because every warrior decided for himself whether or not to take up arms, but those who followed peaceful pursuits were looked down on. The Germanic tribes were therefore largely devoted to warfare and worshiped gods in the form of animals such as bears and bulls. Their kings had a divine mission to lead their warriors into battle. Unlike the Roman legions, these Germanic warriors moved about with their whole families. Because most of the Germanic and Turco-Mongolic peoples were semi-nomadic and refused to fight pitched battles, preferring raiding and other more mobile tactics, the Romans found it difficult to engage and defeat them using Roman methods of warfare. Moreover, the costs of sustaining an army to fight the tribal peoples along extensive frontiers and to contain their incursions raised taxes to such a level that the empire in the West could not survive.³²

Peter Heather has argued that the Roman Empire in the West was not brought down by social and moral collapse, but as a consequence of penetration and conquest by Turco-Mongolic peoples. Even in the late fourth century CE,

the Roman army still maintained dominance on all its European frontiers. It was the Persian frontier that posed the greater danger, not the northern frontier. Along the Rhine-Danube border, the Germanic hosts had coalesced into client kingdoms, and the Romans frequently made alliances with them and recruited German auxiliaries into the Roman army. In the fourth and fifth centuries, Rome still maintained control over this situation, but the recruitment into the army of non-Roman elements, whose loyalty and reliability were questionable, made it difficult to respond to the greater threat posed by Sasanian Persia. The depredations and conquests in the late fourth century by the Huns, who came out of the Steppes of Asia, forced very large groups of Germanic refugees to throng the Danube frontier, asking for refuge within the empire. Because so many troops had to be deployed to deal with the Persians, insufficient legions remained on the Danube frontier to control the new immigrants as they settled in Roman territory. The Goths went on the rampage in the Danube and Balkan regions, and found willing allies among the Huns and Alans. The victory of the Goths at the Battle of Adrianople in 378 allowed them to range more widely as they pillaged the Balkans. But the Goths were not yet ready to overwhelm the empire because they lacked the manpower resources and military technology to successfully lay siege to fortified cities, and could not feed their hordes, which included women and children, solely by pillaging. For the moment, they lacked the economic base to continue fighting.³³

The situation was quite different a century later when the barbarian presence within the empire had grown larger and Roman economic and military sources had diminished. With the removal of the last emperor in the West in 476, Roman political culture, characterized by an imperial court and a bureaucracy that made decisions for the whole empire and deployed the army for its protection, disappeared within a few years. Earlier, in the western part of the empire, the senatorial class had withdrawn to their private estates, where they continued for some time to live a life devoted to Latin literature and pagan rituals. In 260, they were excluded from military command in favor of professional soldiers of humble birth. The Emperor Constantine had come from this latter background. The senators were untouched by Constantine's conversion, but most of his courtiers were Christians. Although the senators were made welcome at Constantine's court, most of those in the West became more rusticated. Loyalty to the emperor remained strong in the East, but grew

weak in the West. The West remained economically backward, but the Eastern Empire with its numerous towns and a more developed economy prospered and could afford to pay the increasingly higher taxes needed to maintain the Roman army and bureaucracy. While the senatorial aristocrats in the West eventually became Christianized, they made no effort to come to terms with the Germanic newcomers who eventually replaced them in positions of power.³⁴ Provincial Roman cultures survived in a few places, such as southern Gaul, for some time thereafter, but Roman landowners became a distinctly less privileged class as tribal kings and their followers established themselves during the invasions of 376 and 405/6, which brought substantial migrations of Germanic and Turco-Mongolic warriors and their families. These widely dispersed incursions of Germanic tribes had been accompanied by the expansion of the Huns in the Central Steppes of Asia, and the hordes that overran the Roman Empire contained both Germanic and non-Germanic groups such as the Iranian-speaking Alans and the Huns. Under Attila, the Hunnic conquest had for a brief moment lent a degree of unity to the Western Empire, but following the death of Attila in 453, the Western Empire continued to disintegrate, and after 476, imperial authority was replaced by a number of smaller Germanic and Hunnic kingdoms. In this new world, advancement in a person's career depended on following the king as a warrior rather than the extended and expensive education in classical Latin and Greek that had been required for a career in the Roman bureaucracy. While some degree of literacy among elites persisted, clearly the level of education had declined.³⁵

Christianity and Germanic society

The small degree of unity and concord that fragmented Germanic societies possessed came from the conversion of these small kingdoms to Christianity by missionaries sent north by the popes in Rome. In this way, the Germanic peoples were incorporated into Christendom. The laws and institutions of the medieval Church owed much to Imperial Rome, and the clergy and scholars of that institution had access to and preserved much of the learning of classical Rome. One of the most important legacies of the ancient world was the concept of a universal world-state and the *Pax Romana* that had prevailed within that

empire. Given the chaotic circumstances of late antiquity and the early medieval period, the task of recovering this legacy was very difficult.

One of the most important approaches to peace in the early medieval world was monasticism. Ultimately, it had much to contribute, but in the short run, it did nothing to promote an engagement with public affairs in the Ciceronian tradition. The monastic approach to peace was ascetic, that is, it was based on an inner tranquility that necessitated a retreat from the world. This withdrawal from public life in an age of turmoil and political disintegration tended to weaken the classical Roman concept of concord in political society. Since the time of the Emperor Constantine's acceptance of Christianity, the Roman emperors and their Byzantine, Merovingian, and Carolingian successors had hoped that Christian influence and the cooperation of the clergy, with their resources of learning and literacy, would assist in governing the empire and maintaining unity and peace. But, instead, the monks chose to go into seclusion in the desert or the mountains and away from the cities. This monastic seclusion was reinforced by the severely ascetic belief of some of the Fathers of the Church, such as St. Ambrose and St. Jerome, that the peace of God and the false peace of this world would never coincide, and the former could be approached only through contemplation, poverty, and chastity.³⁶

Arnaldo Momigliano says that Christianity unintentionally proved to be a disruptive force after the Roman Empire was weakened by severe economic decline. Wealth was diverted to ecclesiastical building projects and religious charities, and prelates came to wield a rival authority that could not but undermine secular authority. Hermits and the first monks were rebellious and disruptive influences before monastic rules were drawn up by St. Basil in the East and St. Benedict in the West. Monasticism, as we have seen, proved to be a subversive force by causing monks to withdraw from the duties of citizenship. Among the reasons why there was more stability and cohesion in the Eastern Empire was that the Greek Fathers of the Church, such as St. John Chrysostom, were more supportive of imperial government than St. Augustine and his disciples in the West, who strongly criticized the Roman political apparatus. The loyalty of the Byzantine clerics and divines stood in contrast to the unwillingness of their counterparts in the West, who were more conciliatory toward the Germanic invaders than toward Roman pagans. But, most of all, the Church as an institution simply replaced the Roman Empire in the West.³⁷

At the same time, it must be said that it was the Christian Church that effected a synthesis of Latin and Germanic cultures by undertaking the conversion of the rural population and by preserving something of the Roman administrative and juridical systems. The Germanic peoples had never sought to destroy Roman culture, and they became willing partners in this synthesis even as their incursions destroyed Roman imperial unity. Slavery had been the economic foundation of the Roman Empire, but Western monasticism, with its emphasis on asceticism, intellectual endeavor, and manual labor for all members of the monastic community, pointed in a different direction, and gave dignity to manual labor. It also opened up the possibility of technological improvements, which made the increasingly scarce resources of labor more efficient and productive.³⁸

Although the monks were supposed to lead cloistered lives, Pope St. Gregory the Great, the last of the Latin Fathers of the Church, called on a group of Benedictine monks to cross the Alps in 597 and convert the peoples of Britain and northern Europe. The conversion of the Germanic peoples was largely carried out by monastic missionaries, leading to the unity and consolidation of what we call Christendom.³⁹ This was not easily accomplished. The Franks had a well defined warrior class that spent the campaigning season pursuing feuds between families. When they came under the influence of Gallo-Roman bishops, such as St. Gregory of Tours, St. Hilary, and St. Martin, these prelates, so far from disapproving of their bellistic predilections, merely encouraged the Frankish warriors to go after their heretic or heathen neighbors, such as the Alans, Visigoths, and Frisians. The Venerable Bede likewise recognized the need for a warrior class among the Anglo-Saxons because they still faced the enmity of pagan neighbors, and wars of defense against them were morally justifiable. However, there were also wars of aggression against neighbors that lacked such moral justification. But ecclesiastical authorities could not be too strict in their reprimands of these warrior-kings as long as they protected their subjects from pagan incursions and assisted the work of Christian missionaries. In any case, the pagan Germanic peoples had believed that war necessitated cooperation between pagan gods and warriors, and this was a cultural disposition that Christian bishops and missionaries found easier to adapt to than to eradicate. The ideal Christian warrior-king, whose actions were regarded as just and merciful, and who led his people in a Christian and

patriotic war to contain the heathen Danish invaders of eastern England, was Alfred the Great.⁴⁰

Anglo-Saxon kings, such as Alfred the Great, Aethelred II “the ill-advised,” and Edwin of Northumbria, attempted to make peace with the Danish invaders in Anglo-Saxon England, although only Alfred enjoyed much success. The first two kings resorted to paying tribute, but discovered that the Danes and other Vikings had little to gain from a peace treaty as long as they lived by raiding. Only if they could be turned into settled territorial rulers with something to lose as well as to gain from the bargain could they then be expected to honor the terms of a treaty. Like the original meaning of the word *pax*, the concept of peace, as it was understood by the Vikings, was something quite limited in terms of time, place, and people.⁴¹

It was usual for early medieval rulers to claim that their governance would bring peace to their subjects. This was a customary way of asserting the legitimacy of their rule and their determination to preserve social order. It was also a way of maintaining continuity with the *Pax Romana* of the earlier Western Roman Empire. The wisdom of Solomon as a judge and peacemaker was also invoked by many medieval rulers, but the reality was otherwise. War remained endemic in the early medieval world, and the panegyrics and prayers of court poets and clerics offered but a weak bulwark against the incursions of Vikings, Muslims, Slavs, and Magyars in the West during this period. Although Christ was recognized as the Prince of Peace, it was unclear how far the example of Christ as a bringer of peace was applicable to the temporal government of this world. The political theorists of early medieval Europe found that the image of Solomon provided more concrete examples of how a peaceful king in this world should rule. Solomon’s name, in Hebrew, meant “peacemaker,” and he was also understood to prefigure the coming of Christ. He embodied justice and wisdom, ruled over a united Israel, and built the Temple. Despite a few character flaws, King Solomon was considered an exemplary monarch—especially when contrasted with King Saul or the pharaohs. The great Frankish rulers, such as Charlemagne, and the Anglo-Saxon kings, such as Alfred the Great, all regarded King Solomon as an exemplar.⁴²

While the Germanic peoples often settled their quarrels by fighting, there were also peaceful ways of resolving their differences. Two important parts of

any process of peace-making in early medieval Europe were oath-swearing and the exchange of hostages. These customs held true throughout Europe from the Danube Basin to the Atlantic. It was understood that divine sanctions and the threat of death stood behind these exchanges of oaths and hostages. Marriage alliances were also an important means of preserving or securing peace, but they were more commonly employed to reinforce peace with neighboring tribes and kingdoms rather than to bring an end to hostilities. More usually, they were instruments to preserve peace between two political entities that shared common cultures, such as between Viking and Anglo-Saxon kings, but this did not occur until the latter began to regard the former as equals rather than marauders. Marriage alliances were also linked to concepts of peace because the very notion of peace in the medieval imagination grew out of kinship. In early Iceland, which was converted to Christianity in about 1000 CE, until about 1260, there was no state capable of enforcing judgments, but there was a highly developed system of laws and courts. Enforcement of the courts' judgments was in the hands of the aggrieved party. Anthropologists tell us that all cultures develop the means of resolving disputes and imposing concord, but Christianity was remarkable for defining the clergy as a group that could assist in the resolution of conflicts. This was not so apparent in the early medieval world where members of the clergy might still retain relationships with chieftains and warriors who were parties to a feud. However, despite these tainted kinships many of them did actively seek to heal conflicts. They possessed rhetorical resources for encouraging forgiveness, or at least, accepting compensation without forfeiting honor by drawing on biblical literature and parables. If any of the recalcitrant parties refused to accept arbitration, then they could be threatened with ecclesiastical penalties and eternal hellfire.⁴³

For the Venerable Bede, Edwin of Northumbria was a model king who pursued a policy of peace by suppressing violence within his kingdom and who pursued "legitimate" violence against the external enemies of the kingdom. Kings who refused to wield the sword for these ends and did not conform to this model of kingship were not worthy to wear their crowns and endangered the lives of others. One of the principal meanings of peace in the early medieval period was internal order—the freedom to travel the king's highway without fear of molestation. In this sense, peace meant no more than enforcement of

public order and security of travel. It was a rare commodity in Christian Europe, although Bede asserts that a lone woman with a child could travel safely during the reign of Edwin, the first Christian king of a united Northumbria in the early seventh century. Peace also generally prevailed in privileged places such as the households of kings, religious sanctuaries, and monasteries—but rarely on the king’s highway except in Edwin’s Northumbria.⁴⁴

Alfred, the ninth-century King of Wessex, is the only monarch in English history called “the Great.” He earned this reputation by defending his subjects by the sword against Viking marauders, and also by his endeavors to secure a peace settlement with the Danes that was embodied in a formal treaty. In this effort he employed the usual early medieval diplomatic tools for obtaining peace, that is, exchanging hostages, swearing of oaths, and paying tribute. A man of scholarly tastes himself, he also sought the help of the church and employed scholars to translate writings from the Roman past and excerpts from the Bible that encouraged the cultivation of habits of peace. In the Alfredian translation of Boethius’s *Consolation of Philosophy*, he emphasized that strong and wise kingship was a guarantee of peace when done in concert with the Christian Church. Later generations likened him to King Solomon in his wisdom and love of peace.⁴⁵

Although a longing for peace did exist in the tribal cultures of northern Europe before the coming of Christianity, the Nordic and Germanic notions of peace seem to have assumed that periods of peace would always be short and fleeting.⁴⁶ Early Christian Ireland, however, affords an example of a native peace ethic that was more carefully thought out. As early as the seventh century, this concept of peace was identified by the *Audacht Morainn* (*The Testament of Moran*) with good kingship. The just ruler not only sought to secure peace and tranquility within his household and during all hostings and assemblies, he also protected his subjects from hostile neighboring tribes and kings. Moreover, he accepted that he had a duty to relieve the distress of his subjects following natural disasters such as storms and plagues. While it was recognized that a just ruler would sometimes have to employ violence in order to preserve the peace and keep external enemies at bay, he was admonished to keep bloodshed at a minimum. Other Irish writings of this period also reveal a determination to reshape notions of kingship in accordance with Christian morality and to devalue martial culture.⁴⁷

Concepts of peace were limited in the early medieval world, and their existence was more usually to be found in the imagination rather than in reality. They were usually embodied in literary epics, poems, and sermons. A ruler would be regarded as a peaceful king if he could unite the adherents of his hall or kingdom in the face of external enemies. To have attempted to pursue a larger policy of peace against the many and dangerous external enemies would have been foolish. The many external threats present in early medieval Europe placed limits on the pursuit of peace by rulers. Yet, some progress was made toward building a peace ethic, however primitive it may seem to us.

Germanic concepts of warfare were influenced by customary rules for pursuing a feud, which was a quarrel between kinship groups. One of its most striking features was the idea that quarrels could be settled by a monetary composition as an alternative to bloodshed. Some of the Germanic tribes were not particularly warlike, and Wulfila, one of the leaders in Visigothic Spain, refused to permit the Book of Kings from the Old Testament to be translated into the Goth language because he thought that it was an inflammatory incitement to war. The Lombards in Italy were distinctly more warlike, while the Anglo-Saxons were more peaceably inclined—especially within a kinship group or neighborhood.⁴⁸

The Carolingian Empire and feudalism

The assimilation of the Germanic peoples into the Christian world led to a reorientation of views on war. In Germanic society, war was a kind of moral action, and was more admired than peace. Because the early Christian values of love and concord were little esteemed by Germanic warriors and because the Church needed the protection and assistance of the Germanic rulers and their warriors, the prelates and clergy of the Catholic Church had to accommodate the martial values of Germanic culture and society.⁴⁹

The Carolingian Empire represented an attempt to revive the Roman Empire in the West under the tutelage of the Church. It brought a degree of political and military unity to most of the former provinces of the Western Roman Empire minus Moorish Spain, North Africa, and Britain. It also

incorporated Catalonia, Lombard Italy, Saxony, and Friesland. The imperial title was bestowed on Charles the Great, or Charlemagne, by Pope Leo III in Rome on Christmas Day 800. Although Charlemagne sought to revive the Roman administrative system, what he actually got was an embryonic form of feudalism because his companions, known as counts, were given land in exchange for military and judicial service. The Germanic peoples were ignorant of the Roman concept of *res publica*. Their society was bound together by ties of personal loyalty. Charlemagne also did his best to revive learning and literacy, and to convert the pagan peoples beyond the frontiers.⁵⁰

Feudal society was characterized by vassalage, a bond of loyalty between a *vassus*, or warrior companion, and his lord; vassalage predated the Carolingian Empire and originated in the followers of the Germanic tribal chiefs. A similar system, called *companionage*, was also found in Celtic societies. Although the status of vassalage was originally servile, it gradually took on an honorable distinction. From the time of Charles Martel, the grandfather of Charlemagne, these bands of warriors coalesced under their chiefs for the purpose of establishing peace and order among Christians under the leadership of the Carolingian dynasty. Each chieftain or lord was bound to furnish a band of warriors for the king when called on to do so, and the bond between the lord and his *vassi*, or warrior followers, was supposed to last a lifetime. In return, the king was supposed to bestow gifts on his *vassi*, including grants of land. Charlemagne was generous in the distribution of largesse to his followers, and in doing so, he fulfilled the most kingly characteristic of rule in Germanic society. The gold that he distributed came from military campaigns that were usually justified by the forced conversion of heathens, but which, in reality, were thinly disguised expeditions to gather loot.⁵¹

Peace was very hard to come by because friendship in premodern societies did not exist outside of kinship. Blood relationships were very old and certainly predated feudalism. Kinship, along with vassalage, became one of the two foundations of the feudal system. Feudal lords, of course, could usually count on *vassi* or liegemen, but it was generally assumed that an ordinary knight had no friends except kinsmen by blood or by marriage. Quite simply put, there was no neutrality. In feuds or trials by compurgation or by combat, kinsmen were the only ones that a knight could rely on for support. This also seems to have been true of lesser folk. Following Roman legal principles, only kings

were supposed to declare war. All other forms of violence were viewed as being akin to banditry. During one ten-year period, armies in the Frankish kingdoms were involved in various wars, raids, rebellions, mutinies, civil strife, and other instances of large-scale violence on thirty-seven different occasions.⁵²

In the last days of the Carolingian Empire, the perpetual state of war, including military expeditions on the frontiers as well as internal conflict, caused warriors or vassals to look for protective relationships with lesser lords rather than with the Frankish kings. The latter were left without the military resources they needed to protect the Church and their subjects, and their authority became increasingly meaningless. There were many indications of the decline of Carolingian power in the last years of Charlemagne's life. Two of his sons predeceased him, and his surviving son Louis the Pious lacked ability as a military leader. Frankish expansion came to an end in Italy and Spain, and the threat of a Danish invasion remained great. The poor suffered from economic distress; warfare continued on the frontiers. There was discord and rebellion among Charlemagne's *vassi*, who refused to render military service—possibly caused by the failure of Charlemagne's successors to provide booty and other rewards through wars of expansion. A general war-weariness existed; many wished for a ruler of more peaceful disposition, which they found in Charlemagne's surviving son Louis the Pious. In his last years, Charles the Great increasingly turned to asceticism, and in the final disposition of his wealth, gave most of it to the Church, leaving his heir destitute. The nobility also suffered a decline in wealth. The combination of weak leadership and economic decline brought an end to Charlemagne's great project. Anarchy and disintegration followed before a new social and political system emerged.⁵³

The period of peace established by the Frankish empire of Charlemagne was short-lived. Louis the Pious, a man of peaceful temperament, had assumed that the barbarian raids that had troubled the Carolingian Empire were at an end. However, the invasions of Arabs, Magyars, and Scandinavians resumed, and the fortifications that had been dismantled had to be rebuilt. Even in the heart of the Frankish lands, neither cities nor rural communities were entirely safe. The raids depopulated a number of villages and monasteries, but the monastic chroniclers may have exaggerated the damage done. Since the Vikings usually penetrated the interior by rowing up the rivers, they diminished commerce just as the flight from the villages diminished agricultural production, while the

disruption of monastic life led to declining levels of literacy and scholarship. Gradually, the Franks learned to build better defenses, and the Norsemen, once they had settled in Normandy, seem to have driven back the Vikings who continued to raid along the northern coast. Because defense against the barbarian and Saracen raids became the highest priority, much time and effort was invested in fortifying towns and monasteries, and building castles. Since the castles were in the hands of the feudal nobility rather than being under royal control, royal authority was thereby weakened. Very few of the Christian kings of this period were able to organize resistance, and the castles of the feudal nobility served as bases from which they could pursue feuds or pillage the peasantry rather than fighting the external enemies.⁵⁴

As a consequence of a quarrel among Charlemagne's three grandsons, the Emperor Lothaire, Louis the German, and Charles the Bald, the empire was divided into three parts, Lotharingia, Saxony and Bavaria, and Neustria, by the Treaty of Verdun of 843, which effectively recognized the end of the Carolingian Empire. The treaty failed to bring peace because Louis and Charles both wanted access to the Rhineland and failed to observe the terms of the treaty, which in any case, did not correspond to ethnic and racial boundaries. Hence, the new political units lacked coherence, and military leadership was divided. In Charles the Bald's new kingdom of Francia and Neustria, his subjects included Franks, Bretons, Gauls, Aquitanians (who were descended from the Romans), Basque-speaking Gascons, Goths, and Spaniards. Charlemagne's attempt to revive the Roman Empire in the West and to impose unity on the lands that he ruled had failed because he never succeeded in curtailing ethnic particularism nor curbing his own desire to bestow a throne on each of his heirs. Moreover, areas such as Bavaria, Lombardy, and Aquitaine remained autonomous regions within the empire, while Gascony and Brittany were never incorporated within the Carolingian Empire. Although the King of Neustria and Francia appointed royal officials to keep the peace and administer the law, collect taxes, and render military service, by the end of the 880s, this system had ceased to function, and this part of Charlemagne's empire had disintegrated. That Charles the Bald pursued military adventures elsewhere did nothing to restore unity.⁵⁵

The feudal political units that succeeded the Roman and Carolingian empires were at first exceedingly numerous and too weak to maintain peace

and stability. Feudal rulers might hold a variety of titles—sometimes vested in one person—including emperor or king, prince, duke, prince-bishop, or count, and so on. These feudal lords could claim only a limited allegiance from *vassi* or fiefholders, who lived on grants of land held of their lords. These fiefholders were drawn from an emerging knightly class. Originally a household retainer, the knight's status grew with the spread of the culture of chivalry and the holding of feudal fiefs. Fiefholders owed a limited amount of military assistance to their lords as specified in the feudal contract. Some fiefholders possessed tenants of their own, an arrangement called subinfeudation. Some fiefholders also had landless knights in their households. Since they possessed fortified castles, they were in a position to engage in private warfare on their own. Many *vassi* owed allegiance to more than one feudal lord, and the uncertainty concerning which lord they would follow in a conflict only exacerbated instability. This was largely true of the feudal societies of mainland Europe because the Norman variety of feudalism, imposed on England as a consequence of the Conquest, did not allow subinfeudation. All fiefholders of the Anglo-Norman kingdom were tenants-in-chief of the crown. Since the hierarchy in feudal society was military in nature, and was distinct from manorial or urban society, there existed a wide gulf between feudal rulers and ordinary people.⁵⁶

Chivalry and warfare

Peace was not thought to be a natural state of affairs in the Middle Ages. Chivalry, the knightly code of behavior with its emphasis on performing acts of valor on the battlefield, ensured that peace was unlikely to be achieved in Europe or its borderlands. Before the advent of chivalry in the Frankish lands and the use of mounted knights on the battlefield, warfare in Northern Europe often involved great hostings of warriors. The Vikings were particularly given to quick raids for booty and ransom of hostages. However, the building of strong castles and the use of heavy war horses and expensive armor made warfare more static and limited. At the same time, the mentality of the knightly class caused war to become a constant activity, even if it was fought on a more limited scale. Those who were defeated in battle were more likely to be taken

prisoner and held for ransom because the victorious knights saw that there was profit to be made in such trade. And, unlike most earlier conflicts, knights were now fighting Christians who shared a common chivalric culture.⁵⁷

The medieval knight was essentially a warrior who insisted on his right to dispense violence whenever his sense of honor was offended. Despite the propaganda contained in chivalric literature concerning the protection afforded to widows, orphans, and others incapable of defending themselves, they were the main cause of the violence that created widows and orphans, and generally disturbed the peace. In short, many knights differed little from common brigands and were responsible for much of the violence that was endemic in medieval society. Monastic chroniclers—such as Orderic of Vitalis, a twelfth-century English monk in the Norman monastery of Saint-Evroul, and Suger, abbot of Saint-Denis near Paris—praised the efforts of monarchs, such as William I and Henry I of England, who endeavored to bring such “proud and turbulent men” to justice and restore a measure of peace. When William Rufus, son of the Conqueror and later King William II, was campaigning in Maine in 1098, he released some prisoners on parole. Some of his followers protested his leniency. William explained that knights could be trusted to keep their word in such matters or their reputations would forever be blackened. Orderic commented that a concept of *notitia contubernii*, or “a fellowship in arms,” had emerged whereby prisoners were now captured instead of being slain, although they were not freed without being ransomed. This was a practice that had emerged in France and was called by Gerald of Wales *Gallica militia*, a new rule of chivalry sometimes practiced in France. This chivalric behavior was generally extended to aristocratic combatants, but ordinary soldiers sometimes benefitted. Yet, it remains generally true that during the High Middle Ages, the violence generated by knights probably posed a greater threat to public order than crime or popular rebellion.⁵⁸ Orderic, in his *Ecclesiastical History*, was a severe critic of brutal and ill-disciplined knights and a defender of Henry I’s efforts to curb the depredations in Henry’s Duchy of Normandy. When some rebel knights allied themselves with Angevin invaders in an attack on monastic lands and tenants in 1136, Orderic contrasted their acts of brigandage, spoliation, and sacrilege with the tight discipline that Roman commanders had maintained over their cohorts. Clearly, Henry I had great difficulty in persuading the knights within his lands

to be guided by the rules of warfare of the new chivalry. Orderic may have drawn on the *De re militari* of Vegetius for his knowledge of Roman discipline.⁵⁹

Nobility was thought to derive from prowess; honor came from the demonstration of prowess generation after generation, and it could only be retained by wielding the sword in battle. The continuing demonstration of prowess was the principal characteristic of chivalry. Those who had earned the noble status that derived from prowess were privileged to dispense violence as their sense of honor dictated. Both chivalric literature and eyewitness accounts of battles tell us that knights found the slaughter and mayhem of hand-to-hand combat exhilarating. It conferred identity. Jean de Bueil, viscount of Carenton and count of Sancerre, who assisted Joan of Arc at the Siege of Orleans, proclaimed that war was a “joyous thing” because it allowed a knight to perform brave deeds, acquire honor and glory, and enhance his reputation.⁶⁰ The display of rage in battle was more highly admired than the exercise of restraint. Needless to say, it made it more difficult for commanders to impose discipline and to persuade knights to focus on carrying out battle orders and securing military objectives rather than seeking personal encounters and hand-to-hand fighting. In both chivalric romances and eyewitness accounts of battle, knights display a love of tournaments and actual warfare that strikes modern sensibilities as distinctly blood-thirsty. A knight believed that he could not be respected “until he has taken and given many blows.” We must remember that the chivalric values of the medieval warrior held that prowess was diminished by peace, and his income was lessened by the lack of opportunity to win booty and collect ransom. The distinction between public war (*bellum*) and private war (*duellum*) is a modern one; the only difference between actual war and the tournament in medieval times was that the property of noncombatants was not destroyed or stolen in the latter form of combat. While the lances used in tournaments had blunt rather than sharp points, mock combat was still a dangerous sport, and participants could and did suffer fatal accidents. No one doubted that tournaments were a simulation of or a rehearsal for war.⁶¹

Knights looked forward to war not only as an opportunity to display prowess, but also because of the prospect of garnering booty and ransom. They understood that war brought widespread destruction to the persons and property of noncombatants; this was regarded as natural and not a cause for

regret. But, then, chivalry had nothing to do with ordinary people. Armies had usually lived off of the land since ancient times, and to leave the lands and properties of the subjects and peasants of one's enemy untouched was to afford that enemy an advantage in the struggle. Naturally, slash-and-burn tactics would also provoke an enemy to do the like by way of revenge. This bears eloquent witness to the values of the code of chivalry, which never really extended beyond the small world of knights. Chivalric culture was also full of contradictions. While there is evidence that it did place constraints on the conduct of war among Christian knights, there are also many instances of sheer brutality in the treatment of enemies on the battlefield, including both prisoners of war and noncombatants. When warriors and soldiers were captured on the battlefield, usually only those nobles who could afford to pay ransom were spared and taken captive. For others whom the mounted knight encountered on campaign, there was only violence and destruction. Persons of humble birth received little or no consideration; this sometimes included well born ladies.⁶²

According to the author of *L'Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal*, the first thing that knights must concern themselves with when wielding the sword was preserving their reputation. Then, they must be attentive to defending themselves, their families, and friends. Glory would also accrue to those who defended their homeland. In last place, they should also remember their duty to preserve the peace of the Church. Honor and reputation were always foremost in the mind of the medieval knight, and this is revealed alike by poetic romances, songs, and narrative memoirs—whether biographical or autobiographical. Such a knight was known as a *prudhomme*, or a man of prowess.⁶³

Some thirteenth-century sources such as the *Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal* suggest that the advent of chivalric culture brought some restraint to warfare. However, the wars between the kings of England and France over the Angevin territories in France were particularly lengthy and nasty because the Capetian monarchs and their knights saw the struggle as a defense of the patria. The Battle of Bouvines in 1214 was a hard-fought engagement in which the French exacted a heavy toll on the invaders and were little interested in taking prisoners. Abbot Suger of Saint-Denis went so far as to suggest that the foreign invaders should be treated like Saracens, and their bodies left unburied for the beasts of prey to feed on. The chivalric culture that the Normans

introduced into England in 1066 mandated the humane treatment of prisoners of war of noble status while condoning the harsh treatment of prisoners of low status. Duke William of Normandy knew how to be ruthless when enemies or subjects broke faith with him, but when he invaded England in 1066, he went out of his way to follow the accepted rules of warfare under the code of chivalry and to show mercy to the Anglo-Saxons. When his soldiers destroyed property or took booty without permission, William made restitution. William I had sought the assistance of Pope Alexander II in legitimizing his conquest of Anglo-Saxon England in exchange for assisting papal reforms. A group of Norman bishops had already drawn up a penitential ordinance reaffirming church teaching that soldiers who had killed in battle or during the suppression of a domestic rebellion had committed “grave sin” and needed to perform lengthy public penance. This also assisted the Conqueror’s efforts to impose stricter discipline on his army. Bishop Ermenfrid of Sion was sent to England as a papal legate, and confirmed this document, although William himself was exempted from the obligation to perform such penance. The pope also granted William the right to nominate prelates within his kingdom.⁶⁴

Whether the pre-conquest Anglo-Saxons possessed rules of war is uncertain. They fought mostly defensive wars to ward off foreign invaders, but we know that on one occasion, following the Battle of Stamford Bridge in 1066, the Norwegian invaders, led by Harald Hardrada, were put to the sword following their defeat. When the Normans overcame King Harold Godwinson’s exhausted Anglo-Saxon army at Hastings a short time later, the margin of victory was so narrow that the Normans decided that they could not spare the lives of the defeated Anglo-Saxons if they were to complete the conquest of England. The Battle of Hastings was an exceptionally bloody affair, and William did not feel that it was appropriate to spare the Anglo-Saxon warriors. Later, William the Conqueror did show clemency to rebels when, by English custom, he could have exacted harsher penalties. Normandy and England after the Conquest were more chivalrous societies than Anglo-Saxon England, where rebels were commonly put to death. William’s usual practice was to exile such persons and confiscate their estates, but to spare life and limb. However, persons of lower status could expect severe punishments from their Norman rulers.⁶⁵

As Anglo-Norman power extended into the Celtic borderlands of the British Isles, a great disparity between the conduct and methods of warfare

could be observed in the Norman and Celtic camps. King Edward I was a rather poor model of chivalry, and he and the Anglo-Normans did not extend the chivalric courtesies to Welsh and Irish prisoners of war because Edward regarded them as rebels, and in Celtic warrior society, methods of warfare were more brutal and it was still the practice to slay all prisoners and take their heads. Also, the Norman commanders believed that severity would deter future revolts, raids, and acts of terrorism; they could also claim that they were merely paying back the Welsh and the Irish in kind. Yet, there were occasional exceptions to this brutality. Following a skirmish between English and Irish warriors at Bagenbun Creek in Waterford in 1170, the English took seventy prisoners. One of the English knights insisted that the prisoners should be killed because foreign countries were never conquered by clemency. However, another English knight, Raymond le Gros, argued that the prisoners should be spared because “they are no longer our enemies; they are human beings.” In the event, the majority of the English knights prevailed and the prisoners were put to death. Gerald of Wales, while admitting that it was common practice for the Welsh and the Irish to kill prisoners, insisted that the Celts were defending their homelands, and that the Anglo-Normans were excessively brutal and could have set a better example. It has been suggested that one of the reasons that the Celts slaughtered prisoners of war instead of ransoming them was because they lacked a monetary economy. Chivalric culture and knighthood hardly existed in Wales, and the Welsh practiced guerilla warfare. They could capture castles by surprise attacks, but they lacked the expertise and equipment for sieges. The Irish also engaged in guerilla warfare that mostly took the form of cattle raids on the herds of other tribal chieftains. The Scots were more adept in their methods of warfare, and could fight pitched battles and counter English heavy cavalry charges.⁶⁶

The reduction of private war in medieval Europe was a joint effort of the Church and the new feudal monarchies. As the recently Christianized Germanic tribes were absorbed into the feudal kingdoms of the medieval Latin West, they brought with them “a cult of war and belligerence,” which was at the core of the code of chivalry. Knights bred in this chivalric culture were encouraged to seek adventure and single combat, and later, to joust in tournaments. The bellicosity of feudal warriors was also directed against external enemies, and received the sanction of the clergy as just-war. The opportunities for

adventure and combat in the First Crusade not only helped to rid Western Europe of these disruptive individuals, but also bestowed on them the status of Christian warriors. Indeed, the encouragement of the Church made chivalry into a kind of order or estate that placed the knight who went forth to protect the holy places on the same hierarchical level with the priesthood.⁶⁷

In the High Middle Ages, monarchs—especially those of England and France—sought to gain control over warlike manifestations of violence and to enforce a royal peace. How far this was successful remains a matter for scholarly debate. However, chivalric culture maintained the belief that a knight committed no offense against his suzerain if he killed an opponent in seeking revenge for offending his knightly honor—provided that he followed all of the proper forms prescribed by the rules of knightly combat. Although the chivalric code sanctioned individual combat between two knights to settle points of honor, it was incompatible with the rules governing blood feuds, where tactics and practices such as ambush, mutilation, or the slaying of prisoners were usual. This knightly prowess was considered a private right that did not concern the king. In chivalric literature, kings were inclined to answer that an offended knight had a right to exact revenge, but only after the matter had been decided by the king could a judicial combat be allowed. The kings of England and France claimed regality with the right to dispense justice at all levels of society, including jurisdiction over chivalric disputes. They justified this as necessary to permit “the peaceful practice of Christianity.” Thus, the values of chivalry and the interests of royal government were quite different.⁶⁸

Other than the Angevin-Capetian Wars, the conflicts of the eleventh and twelfth centuries mostly consisted of violent quarrels among lords and vassals. As the feudal monarchs extended their jurisdictions they attempted to gain a monopoly on violence within their kingdoms, but this necessarily meant persuading the perpetrators of violence to take their fighting elsewhere. Whereas the Church sought to impose peace by sending warriors as crusaders against the Saracens, feudal monarchs, once they had imposed a degree of peace on their own kingdoms, were also able to send larger armies to fight rival Christian kings. In the intervals of peace, such as occurred from time to time during the Hundred Years War, a problem presented itself concerning soldiers who were thrown out of employment in France and roamed the countryside in search of adventure and booty. These bands of unemployed soldiers sometimes

challenged royal armies or found themselves engaged in secondary wars with peasants. In 1346, Edward III of England dealt with the problem by sending the Black Prince to Spain to help Peter the Cruel of Castile counter an attempt by his half-brother to divert the royal succession and seize the crown. Both of the opposing armies were composed of veterans of the wars in France. Thus, a measure of peace could be brought to France by mounting a war in Spain. Just-war theories could also be turned against the Church, as in the conflict between King Philip the Fair of France and Pope Boniface VIII.⁶⁹

Another solution to the problem of bringing internal peace to countries plagued by roving bands of soldiers was suggested by Philippe de Mezières, an official in the service of the King of Cyprus, who was known for promoting a greater awareness of the ideals of chivalry and the duties of knights. He proposed taking knights and their men-at-arms into royal armies for permanent service. Those who proved to be good soldiers could be retained, while those who were interested only in looting could be discharged. Honoré Bonet (or Bouvet), a Benedictine monk, and Christine de Pisan, a French poet, redefined *chivalry* in terms of service to the commonwealth; both, along with the English cleric John of Salisbury, advocated imposing on royal armies the kind of discipline practiced by the Romans and set forth in *De re militari* by Vegetius, who was widely read during the Middle Ages.⁷⁰

Honoré Bonet summed up the duties that knights and other soldiers owed to their feudal lords. When a *vassus* swore loyalty to his lord, being a king, duke, or count, he was obliged never to do anything that might hurt the interests of his lord. However, the *vassus* was not obliged to fight for his lord, even in a just cause, unless his lord paid him wages. But, if the king or lord lacked the means to do so, the *vassus* must assist him—especially in a defensive war.

Medieval just-war theories

The laws of war during the Roman Empire required justification for every war, but it was agreed that wars in defense of imperial borders or the pacification of non-Roman peoples living on or beyond the frontiers were always a just cause. To these just causes of war, the Christian successors of the Roman Empire in the Middle Ages added the defense of Christendom against pagans, a category

that included Vikings, Magyars, Muslims, and others who invaded Christian territory or the Holy Land.⁷¹ Thus, the Church continued to preserve something of the just-war theory inherited from Roman law and the teachings of St. Augustine and the Church Fathers.

Gratian of Bologna, or Franciscus Gratianus, an Italian cleric, reformulated the principles of just war around 1148. There had been earlier collections of canon-law legislation and opinions of the Fathers of the Church, but Gratian's *Concordia discordantium canonum* (*Concord of Discordant Canons*), also known as the *Decretals*, was the first that was systematically organized. It became a basic reference for medieval canon lawyers and theologians concerned about ethics. Gratian reiterated the Augustinian doctrine that war, conducted in a spirit of Christian charity and love of one's neighbor, was useful for persuading the sinner to give up his sinful ways. Consequently, service as a soldier was not "inherently sinful." Insofar as they fought injustice and punished sinners, they acted as ministers of God. The same was true concerning corporal punishment, mutilation, or execution of thieves, bandits, and pirates. One can see that Gratian did not distinguish between sin and crime or between war and the administration of justice. Overriding all of this was the admonition that the object of war was a return to peace, and once victory had been achieved, the soldier or magistrate should be merciful to captives. At the same time, soldiers who fought only for pay or booty were explicitly condemned.⁷²

Although Gratian is concerned with the question whether a Christian may participate in war, only part of his ideas derive from St. Augustine and the Fathers of the Church; other concepts, such as the need for a formal declaration of war by a ruler or a magistrate, originated with Cicero and Roman law, and were transmitted through the writings of St. Isidore of Seville, an early medieval Spanish prelate and doctor of the Western Church. Gratian cites St. Augustine to the effect that wars of defense are allowable against enemies of the Church in order to avenge an injury by those enemies. To these criteria for a just war, St. Thomas Aquinas later added another criterion—that the war so declared be fought for the right intention, that is, to punish the transgressor and restore peace. We should note that no justification was provided for fighting wars to preserve the state since this particular abstract concept, of the political community having an existence apart from the person of the king, although known to the Romans, was not revived again until the sixteenth century.⁷³

The Roman emperors had claimed to be lords of the world. The Carolingian emperors were content to claim the title “lord of Europe,” but when Gratian’s successors, the Decretalists, began to codify canon law in the twelfth century, they asserted the idea that there was only one emperor of the world, and he could not be an infidel, but rather, had to be a Christian. This authority had been bestowed on the Roman emperors of the Christian era after the time of Constantine by the popes because, as vicars of Christ, they had a world-wide dominion over the souls of men. This would later give them authority to proclaim the crusades and to divide parts of the New World among the Spanish and Portuguese. Supposedly, the popes could also authorize the conquest of non-Christian peoples, not because they were nonbelievers, but because they had violated the laws of nature by unnatural acts, such as sodomy and cannibalism.⁷⁴

John of Legnana (1320–83), professor of canon and civil law at the Studium in Bologna and vicar general to Pope Gregory XI, was the first jurist to address the whole corpus of rights and duties as they pertain to rulers who engage in war. His efforts were also the first by a layman to base the primary justifications for engaging in war on natural law rather than the law of nations, although he does not completely cast aside the justification for war based on divine law. He was not much interested in the moral philosophy of war, or more concretely, constraints on how war was conducted. He allows that the pope may proclaim a crusade against the infidel Saracen to recover the Holy Land, and he may also declare war against an emperor or a prince if he is heretical, schismatical, or if he usurped “the rights and liberties of churches.”⁷⁵

Concerning the origins and causes of wars, Honoré Bonet or Bouvet believed that war originated in Heaven when God drove out the bad angels led by Lucifer. If war originated in Heaven, one should not be surprised to find it in this world. Armed conflict also arose out of the contrariness of human nature. Battle was viewed as an appeal to the judgment of God. War was reasonable and compatible with natural law and man-made law. Nor could it be contrary to divine law, since there were occasions in the Old Testament when God commanded his chosen people to wage war. The evil that is occasioned by the prosecution of war derives from the misconduct of combatants who try to make war serve their own ends of revenge, looting, and rapine, rather than securing justice. War must always be proportionate to the

offense offered. Because God uses soldiers as martial instruments to punish sin does not mean that He loves soldiers.⁷⁶

Most of those who lived in the medieval European world assumed that God intervened directly in battles and rewarded one side with victory and punished the other side with defeat. Unless the apologists of the losing side could plausibly explain how this happened, their rulers risked forfeiting claims to legitimacy. This providential explanation of the outcome of battle was attributed to an epistle supposedly written by St. Augustine known as the *Gravi pugna*, which asserted that God awards victory to the army whose cause is just. Only a minority of clerics, such as Philippe de Vilette, abbot of Saint-Denis, recognized that God might, for his own good reasons, award victory to the wicked. Or, as the Venerable Bede suggested, this might happen because Christian peoples had grown morally lax and God needed to punish them.⁷⁷

The belief, still widely accepted as late as the fourteenth century, that war served no useful purpose except to punish man for his sins, was challenged by the revival of interest in Vegetius, who held that war was a means of bringing about peace. His *De re militari* was read, paraphrased, cited, and translated from the Carolingian era into the early modern period. Vegetius, thought to have been a Christian who had lived in the fourth century CE, had much to say about the practical aspects of making war to restore justice, order, and peace. He emphasized that war should be fought for a clear political purpose. War must be carefully planned and quickly fought with as little waste of resources as possible. It was to be judged only by the achievement of a successful victory, and not by the heroic deeds of individuals. Good leadership and experience were important for success, and the implication was that such qualities were not always to be found in the well born. Moreover, because war should only be waged for the common good, there was an obligation of citizenship that required that all citizens should undergo military training in order to help defend the political community rather than employing mercenaries.⁷⁸

Influenced as he was by Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas believed that peace was the natural condition of mankind, and thus, he rejected St. Augustine's argument that there existed a perpetual conflict between the City of God and the City of Man. Nor did he accept the idea that warfare was inevitable between Christians and infidels. Although all humans bore the burden of original sin, this did not completely obliterate people's natural inclination to peace, nor did

it make war necessary and inevitable. St. Thomas did not care for the motivation of the crusades, nor did he think that the divine command to slay idol-worshippers in Exodus 32 offered a precedent for Christians to follow, although he allowed, like St. Augustine, that heretics could be persecuted.⁷⁹

Aquinas did follow St. Augustine in arguing that the purpose of war was to secure peace, and to restore political and social harmony. He laid down the conditions that were necessary for securing these ends: in order to be considered just, a war must be declared and the army summoned by the authority of a ruler rather than a private individual; there must be a just cause for declaring the war; and the belligerents must intend either to seek “some good” or avoid an evil.⁸⁰ Just as kings and magistrates have the authority to wield the sword of justice to punish criminals or internal enemies of the state, so also they have recourse to wield the sword of war against external enemies. The power to dispense justice and the power to make war go together.⁸¹

Thus, the medieval teachers of law, known as legists, agreed that war was lawful, and justification for war could be derived both from divine authority and natural reason. The concept of just war, from the time of its Aristotelian origins, had remained very flexible. War could not be an end in itself, but a just war could be undertaken not only to secure or restore peace, but also to acquire glory, or to enslave and govern barbarians or non-Greeks, who, because of their inferior status, deserved to be subdued. To this, the Romans added the legal concept of redressing an injustice by war. This could include the recovery of goods or territory, the defense of the state, or the vindication of honor. The Germanic kingdoms, which succeeded the Western Roman Empire, preserved the study of Roman law, a belief in the right of self-defense, constraints on how war was to be waged, together with a recognition of the need to restrain interpersonal violence and feuding. Although warfare was prevalent in medieval Europe, in general, warriors accepted the limitations on war imposed by the Church.⁸²

By the end of the thirteenth century, we can discern four types of war. There was the Roman style of conflict in which the hostile parties usually fought to the death and took only a few prisoners, who could be slain or enslaved, but could not claim the privilege of ransom. The crusades against the Saracens would be an example of this category. The second category comprised public war between Christian princes, in which spoil could be taken and noble

prisoners ransomed. Feudal warfare, the third type of war, was considered to be *guerre couvert*, or covered war, in which the combatants, by custom, could kill or wound, but not burn or pillage. The fourth category was the state of truce, in which war was merely suspended, but not ended. When we look beneath the surface of warfare in the medieval world, the situation could be complicated. Maurice Keen gives the example of a ten-year period during the Hundred Years War. Besides the war between the two kings of France and England, which involved two different conflicts—one in Provence and another concerning the succession to the crown of Castile—the king of France was also at war with the king of Navarre; the rival houses of Blois and Montfort were at war with one another in Brittany; and elsewhere, the counts of Foix and Armagnac were engaged in another struggle. At the same time, *routiers*, or free mercenary companies, were pillaging the countryside. In such a state of affairs the distinction between public and private warfare seems meaningless.⁸³

From the High Middle Ages until the sixteenth century, there existed side-by-side two distinct just-war theories: the first was the *jus ad bellum*, a religious doctrine that derived both from theology and canon law, and which concerned the right to make war; and the *jus in bello*, which was a secular but ethically sanctioned set of rules concerning what was allowable in methods of fighting. In the medieval and Renaissance periods, custom required that princes not resort to war without justification, but princes and states found that just causes were not difficult to discover—no matter how transparently false they were. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that just-war doctrines failed to deter war.⁸⁴ The concept of just war was also validated by chivalric culture, which praised and romanticized the noble warrior fighting in the service of the Church and the prince, and also acting as the protector of the meek and the poor. The values of chivalry were also celebrated by the creation of highly select orders of chivalry, such as the English Order of the Garter, or in Burgundy, the Knights of the Golden Fleece.⁸⁵

Works of chivalric literature, such as the *Morted' Arthur*, sometimes displayed the same aversion toward periods of peace that we find in the writers of classical antiquity because it was widely believed that peace depleted the martial ardor and skill at arms of the warrior. On hearing the news that war with the Romans would resume, King Arthur and his court are depicted as

rejoicing that they would once again have the opportunity to perform feats of arms, for they believed that they had languished in inglorious peace for too long.⁸⁶ English writers of the fourteenth century had experience of war throughout their lifetimes, and they did not particularly long for war, but they did fear that peace would lead to effeminacy and a decay of martial prowess. Certainly, a theme running throughout many chivalric romances is that war directed against the sultan and the Saracens was always just.⁸⁷

The Peace and Truce of God

The early Middle Ages in the West saw instability and widespread violence. Toward the end of this period, following the disintegration of the Carolingian Empire, several peace movements originated in France and spread from there into Germany. One was the Cluniac Revival, a monastic movement that emphasized a more strict observance of the Benedictine Rule and which originated at the monastery of Cluny in Burgundy. The Cluniac movement achieved widespread influence because the abbots and priors of Cluniac houses stood outside of the feudal hierarchy, and Cluny was subject to the authority only of the popes. Indeed, four abbots of Cluny became popes, and their influence contributed to a revival of papal power, which had been weakened in the previous years. The other two movements were led by the French bishops. The first was the Peace of God, which emerged after about 975 CE, and was aimed at limiting the depredations of troublesome warriors on church buildings and the clergy as well as protecting pilgrims, merchants, peasants, and shepherds. The Truce of God, another peace movement, dating from the early eleventh century, was also led by the French bishops and sought to prohibit conflict among Christians during certain holy days and seasons of the ecclesiastical calendar. These movements attempted to achieve complete internal peace within Christendom and reached a peak in 1095 when Pope Urban II, a former abbot of Cluny, proclaimed a holy war against the Saracens at the Council of Clermont. Neither of these peace movements attempted to abolish war, but only to impose constraints on feuding, and some of the lesser forms of conflict and violence, and to allow war to be declared only by the proper authorities. The limitations on the methods of warfare were not

observed by the crusaders in their wars against the Saracens and Turks, and their religious fanaticism and spoliations shocked the Byzantine Greeks who had long fought with their Muslim neighbors without displaying such excesses. Moreover, the pacifism of the regular clergy was repudiated by the emergence of military monastic orders such as the Knights Templar.⁸⁸

The Church did sometimes sanction peace movements, such as the Peace and Truce of God, but this particular movement enjoyed only limited success because it failed to secure sufficient support from the secular authorities, and the Church had no effective way of enforcing such a policy. The feudal nobility continued to carry on private wars and to pursue vendettas. The church could only resort to excommunicating particularly notorious offenders, but such spiritual penalties were widely ignored—especially since bishops often excommunicated people indiscriminately for trivial matters such as property disputes with their neighbors.⁸⁹

The same peace movement also attempted for a time to ban certain weapons, such as crossbows and long bows, which were proscribed by the Council of the Lateran in 1139. However, some theologians thought that it was justified to use such weapons against infidels, pagans, and heretics. The later introduction of gunpowder weapons does not seem to have provoked the same degree of condemnation by Church authorities. The prejudice against missile weapons appears to have arisen more from chivalric values than from motives of Christian charity, and should probably be attributed to a dislike of the kind of mercenary soldier who employed projectile weapons. It is also interesting that the clergy did not object to blessing swords, lances, and military banners.⁹⁰

Truces were frequently resorted to in medieval warfare. Although acts of violence ceased during the truce, there still existed a climate or condition of warfare because it was understood that hostilities would eventually resume. Little wonder, for violence was very much a part of daily life in the medieval world. Apart from the frequent wars, most ordinary people carried staves when they traveled as well as knives for eating. By all accounts, these were frequently employed as weapons in quarrels. In societies where feuding was common, such as medieval England, feuds were rarely solitary affairs as they might be in the later Italian style of dueling in the period of the Renaissance. In medieval England, feuds were often carried on with the assistance of friends and kinsmen (usually the same individuals), and typically took the form of an assault on a

fortified house rather than an individual ambush on the highway. The injury inflicted on one person was understood to affect the larger kinship group. The more organized form that vengeance took made it difficult to secure lasting peace. The assumption persisted into early modern England that a person needed friends to survive in a hostile world because the state was too weak to protect the individual. It was also assumed that those who were not friends must be enemies since there could be no neutrality. This assumption reached back to ancient Rome, when Publilius Syrus, a freed slave, said that a person should “treat your friend as if he might become an enemy.” Because the people who inhabited such societies had a highly developed sense of shame, the dispensing of justice and attempts at reconciliation had to be staged with much theatricality. Wrongdoers had to be humbled as well punished before a large audience. However, public executions and corporal punishments did little to deter crime and probably set a bad example for the resolution of conflicts. Most people equated justice with vengeance. Yet, it has been observed that in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the English were more receptive to royal attempts to suppress violence than the French, who held on to concepts of private warfare and the judicial combat. Subsequently, both realms seemed to have suffered from an increase in violent protest and crime as a consequence of the Hundred Years War. Feuding was, and remains, characteristic of societies with weak or nonexistent governments. The monarchs of this period understood that peace began with the suppression of violence and the enforcement of public order through the exercise of royal justice, and many of their subjects came to share this view. Like the maintenance of domestic public order, peace-making between states was never easy.⁹¹

The papacy and the crusades

The desire to divert Christian warriors away from feuds and wars with other Christians and to bring peace to the Latin West was at least as important to Pope Urban II as protecting the Eastern Church and securing the Holy Places against the Saracens by proclaiming the First or Jerusalem Crusade. This was why the pope, a Cluniac monk, had proclaimed the Peace of God at the same time that he promised forgiveness of sins to the crusaders. Urban was following

the example of an earlier pope, Leo IV (847–55). After Saracen marauders had sacked Rome and desecrated St. Peter's Basilica in 846, Pope Leo urged the Franks to drive them out of Italy with the promise that those who died doing so would find their way to a heavenly reward. In effect, this was an early attempt to define a war fought against Muslim infidels in defense of the Holy Faith as a holy war and to promise forgiveness of sins and immediate salvation. That the pope had the authority to issue such a proclamation is questionable, and it certainly did not define new doctrine. Nevertheless, subsequent popes would repeat this exhortation and promise.⁹² Subsequently, Pope John VIII (878–79) granted an indulgence to those who undertook to fight pagans and infidels, and fell on the field of battle. Such soldiers would obtain remission of their sins and immediately enter into "eternal life." Effectively, the bull subsequently published by Pope Urban was a proclamation of holy war. This sacralization of combat against the Saracens was accompanied by the ritual blessing of the crusaders' armies, their weapons, and banners. John of Salisbury believed that just as the secular prince possessed the temporal sword, the pope and bishops also possessed a spiritual sword that was to be wielded in cooperation with the secular authorities, but always in conformity with God's will. Preachers such as the Benedictine monk Gerald d'Avranches helped to legitimize warfare at the time of the First Crusade and to popularize the so-called "warrior-saints," such as Saints George, Mercurius, and Demetrius, who had been Christian soldiers in the Roman army and martyrs, and who might intervene in the battles fought by the crusaders to ensure Christian victory.⁹³

The crusading concept derived from the earlier practice of undertaking pilgrimages to the Holy Land or other sacred places for the purpose of doing penance or advancing one's spiritual growth. Pilgrims enjoyed a special protected status in Roman canon law, wore distinctive insignia, and were supposed to be afforded hospitality in monasteries. The proclamation of the First Crusade combined the pilgrim's vow to undertake a pilgrimage to the Holy Land with fighting a holy war; the crusader also undertook to fight for the stated objectives of the holy war, and was promised remission of punishment for past sins. The older view that the violence of war involved "grave sin" and necessitated public penance following absolution gave way to the practice of private penance in the Age of the Crusades. In the Christian lands that he passed through on the way to the Holy Land or in undertaking to recover

lands lost to conquest by the Saracens, the crusader was to enjoy the special status of a pilgrim.⁹⁴

Those who took part in the First Crusade consisted of a mix of volunteer crusaders and paid mercenaries, but we must be wary of making too fine a distinction between the two. Both were recruited with the promise of pay from the Byzantine emperor and indulgences from the pope. This was a formula for rewards that had worked for Pope Leo X in the earlier crusade against the Normans in Sicily and in the Roman Schism of the 1060s that resulted in the conflict between pope and anti-pope. Furthermore, those popes who preceded Urban II had also designated those conflicts as holy wars. Thus, we should not be surprised to see that both altruism and self-interest were incorporated into the Wars of the Crusades.⁹⁵

Christians in the Latin West had reason to fear the political and military power of the Muslims. The Muslims had conquered the formerly Christian lands of Asia Minor, North Africa, and much of the Levant; they dominated most of the Iberian Peninsula and threatened the kingdom of the Franks before Charles Martel turned them back at the Battle of Tours in 732. Muslim pirates had ruled the western Mediterranean, kidnapped travelers, and sacked the towns of the littoral while building fortified strongholds in Italy and southern France. Although individual Christian kings put up a brave defense from Leon and Navarre, Western Christendom lacked the organization and military might of the Byzantine Empire, which for long had held off Muslim expansion. The papacy blessed the individual knights who began to come from all over Western Christendom to do battle with the Saracens, and gradually such military expeditions acquired the status of a holy war. Thus, by the late eleventh century, the era of the crusades had begun, and this military effort acquired a degree of unity under the leadership of the papacy.⁹⁶

The proclamation of a holy war against the Saracens went well beyond the more limited aims of a just war. The popes of this period seemed little concerned with limitations on how these wars were fought or the ultimate ends of these crusading expeditions. Moreover, it was an inconsistent policy to proclaim holy war abroad, while attempting to maintain the ideal of religious peace at home. The popes broke this truce themselves when they encouraged crusades against heretics and excommunicated persons in the West such as the Cathars, and became involved in factionalism when the Great Schism of the

Avignon papacy divided the allegiances of faithful Christians, or when they failed to remain impartial during the Hundred Years War between England and France.⁹⁷ The practitioners of just war in classical antiquity had sought to avoid displeasing their pagan gods, and thus, the Greek and Roman wars were not devoid of a religious sanction, but the medieval crusades embodied a degree of militancy that owed more to the Hebrew modes of warfare found in the Old Testament.⁹⁸

Pope Gregory VII taught that the feudal aristocracy, from knights to kings, had a duty to serve the interests of the Church and fight its wars. This meant not just wielding the sword against heathens and infidels, but also serving the interests of the see of St. Peter in its struggles with the Emperor Henry IV, or whomsoever opposed the interests of the papacy. Again, this necessarily brought Christians into conflict with other Christians. This was part of the so-called Investiture Controversy, which was, at bottom, basically a struggle over wealth and power, or whether the pope could appoint clerics to episcopal sees on the basis of talent and ability, or whether the emperor could use such offices to buy the support of aristocratic families. Gregory VII also claimed the power to remove temporal rulers, and he had excommunicated the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV in an attempt to depose him. He had also threatened King Philip I of France with the same penalty, and warned him that he would place France under the interdict if the king did not behave himself. This would have forbidden the ministrations of the sacraments to the king's subjects in an attempt to raise a rebellion against him, which probably would have provoked a civil war. In short, Pope Gregory VII came to look on the feudal nobility as *vassi* of the papacy, and in return for fighting his battles, Gregory promised them remission of the punishment due to their sins.⁹⁹

Whether knightly aristocrats were suitable instruments for the exercise of papal power is open to question. Before the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, theologians had difficulty seeing how a knightly career could be compatible with following the path to salvation. The code of chivalry had taken over pagan and barbarian attitudes regarding dueling, feuding, warfare, and courtly love that were difficult to reconcile with Christian morality. So evil and violent were some of these values that a knight could achieve salvation only by abandoning knighthood for the monastic life, so it was thought. The papal proclamation of the Wars of the Crusades, however, not only made the

profession of arms respectable, but conferred on knighthood the status of an order comparable to the priesthood or the monastic life. Jean de Bueil, in his *Le Jouvencel* (c. 1481), asserted that the knight who fights for a good and just cause is as blessed in the sight of God as a monk who follows the contemplative life. The profession of arms now became a path to salvation sanctioned by the Church.¹⁰⁰ The shared martial and religious experience of the First Crusade became a justification for subsequent crusades, and was readily adaptable to the martial ethos of the Germanic peoples. At the same time, because books of chivalry advanced other goals, such as the pursuit of honor, glory, and adventure, it became harder to recruit knights to participate in the wars against the Saracens when they could win honor, glory, and profit closer to home.¹⁰¹

One of the foremost advocates of Gregory VII's holy war against infidels, heretics, and other enemies of the Church was St. Bernard, the founder and first abbot of the Cistercian monastery of Clairvaux. Although he agreed that clerics could not bear weapons, he made an exception for the military monastic order known as the Knights Templar. Bernard believed that monastic peace was purely ascetic and consisted of an inner peace that was obtained by withdrawing from the world and taking the vows of poverty and chastity. The secular clergy lived in and had a duty to promote peace in this world, although St. Bernard did not believe that the peace of the kingdom of Christ could ever be achieved in this life.¹⁰² St. Bernard was most insistent that Christian rulers were never to enter into alliance with Muslims until their political power and religion were first destroyed. He did not believe that non-Christians should be killed unless they molested Christians, but he added that where the two lived in close proximity, Muslims were likely to display aggression toward Christians. As for those who took up the crusader's white cross, Bernard proclaimed that "the Christian glories in the death of the non-Christian, because Christ is glorified."¹⁰³

There were both clerics and laymen who questioned the papal policy of holy war. Whereas the proponents of the papalist position, that is, the assertion of the temporal as well as spiritual supremacy of the pope, taught that *concordia*, or peace in this world, came from God and flowed down through the spiritual hierarchy, Marsilius of Padua's use of the term *pax*, or peace, in the title of his treatise, *Defensor Pacis*, meant "civil peace or tranquility," and referred to a state

that functioned properly and smoothly; it had nothing to do with peace between states. Marsilius also makes an oblique reference to Italy, which had possessed unity when it was part of the Roman Empire, but now was disturbed by the Bishop of Rome, as Marsilius always calls the pope. Marsilius had been rector of the University of Paris, usually a bastion of theological orthodoxy, but after the papal condemnation of his *Defensor Pacis* in 1326, he was forced to flee and continued to be widely regarded as a heretic. Besides its attack on papal power and the mischief that it caused, the *Defensor Pacis* is noteworthy for its secular approach to the origins of the state and its sources of authority. Marsilius insists that the state is purely a product of human reason invented to wield coercive power to resolve conflicts, and its authority derived from the consent of the people. The state was not a moral entity dedicated to cultivating virtue; it was simply an instrument for dispensing justice by arbitrating disputes between individuals and groups. The ecclesiastical hierarchy had no business interfering in the government of the secular state because the people's will is the supreme authority. The role of priests is simply to provide moral guidance; they do not possess coercive authority, which belongs exclusively to secular rulers. Marsilius carries this a step further and insists that in matters of church-state relations, the temporal ruler is supreme.¹⁰⁴

Another critic of the exercise of temporal powers by the popes was the poet Dante, born a generation before Marsilius. Being an Italian and well steeped in classical literature, Dante was always an admirer of universal monarchy modeled on the Roman Empire. This form of government reflected the unity of God, and was conducive to peace and harmony; it found its best approximation in the Holy Roman Empire. The existence of two or more monarchs, who did not recognize one another's authority would necessarily make the settlement of disputes very difficult, if not impossible. This universal monarch must be someone "who brings out the best of others" by his example rather than his words. This method of government would allow each citizen to seek his or her own best interests and would make governing by force unnecessary. The political society that Dante believed would result would display the virtues of peace, order, and justice. Its model in classical antiquity was St. Augustine's earthly city rather than the heavenly city because Dante clearly preferred the dominant influence in the world to be the emperor rather than the pope. Dante had personal reasons for disliking papal power since

Pope Boniface VIII had meddled in the politics of Dante's native city of Florence and caused Dante to be driven into exile.¹⁰⁵

The papal policy of sending bellicose rulers and knights to fight the Saracens in the Levant may have brought a degree of peace to the Latin West. But once the popes got in the habit of thinking that these knights and crusaders were their *vassi*, and could be sent to make holy war against other Christians, whose orthodoxy was suspect, or believing that they could intervene in the politics of Italian towns or the affairs of the Holy Roman Emperor, they promoted new divisions within Christendom. This was especially true in their relations with the Byzantine emperors and the prelates of the Greek Orthodox Church, who did not accept the papal concept of holy war.

War and diplomacy in the Byzantine Empire

One of the objectives of the crusaders was to bring much-needed assistance to the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine, or Eastern Roman Empire, with its capital at Constantinople, did not possess a strong martial culture as did the Western Roman Empire and its medieval successors. The Eastern Father of the Church, St. Basil the Great, condemned warfare in the strongest of terms. While he admitted that a soldier must obey orders, St. Basil declared that anyone who slew another in battle must abstain from receiving communion for three years. To be a warrior did not confer status or earn glory as it did in the West. As the heir to a strong legal tradition, the Byzantine Empire continued to apply the Roman concept of just war to defend its territories or to reconquer lost lands. What particularly distinguished Byzantine rulers and generals from their Roman predecessors, however, was their consistent attempt to employ diplomacy to avoid war wherever possible, and to marshal legal arguments for declaring war when bloodshed could not be avoided. If war could be avoided, the Byzantine emperors were even prepared to pay tribute to their enemies. The practice of paying tribute money to their Persian, Arab, and tribal neighbors avoided some of the devastation of war. The Byzantines also sought to reduce conflict with tribal groups, such as the Serbs and Bulgars, by attempting to Christianize them. Their efforts to convert such ethnic groups were often successful, but this did not always put an end to hostilities. When

the Bulgars continued to be troublesome, Byzantine diplomats persuaded the Magyars to attack the Bulgars from the rear. The Frankish crusaders regarded these practices as mere cowardice.¹⁰⁶

The Byzantine Empire claimed to be a continuation of the Roman Empire in the East, and its rulers called themselves “emperors of the Romans.” The Emperor Justinian, mindful of the unity that once existed throughout the whole empire, undertook to reconquer the most important of the lost western provinces by driving the Visigoths, Ostrogoths, and Vandals out of Spain, Italy, and North Africa. This proved to be a heavy drain on Byzantine resources. When the Muslim expansion of the eighth century deprived Byzantium of these territories together with the important resources of men and treasure in Anatolia, the Byzantine Empire was thereafter reduced to little more than one of a number of successor states of the former Roman Empire. This great loss was brought about not only by civil war and political instability; the enslavement of free peasants in Anatolia had undercut the economic prosperity and tax base of the Byzantine Empire, and this also contributed to military collapse. Unreliable mercenary soldiers had replaced native Anatolian soldiers in the Byzantine army. Moreover, the intolerance of the Byzantine Church led to persecution of Armenian, Egyptian, and Syrian Christians for their resistance to Greek Orthodox beliefs. It increased the hatred between Armenians and Greeks, and made dissident ethnic and religious groups willing to consider alliances with the Turkmens, who already served as mercenary troops within the empire. Both Christians and Jews who lived in the parts of the Byzantine Empire that were conquered by the Muslims were content to live under their conquerors because the Muslim discrimination against Jews and heterodox Christians was less onerous and the taxes were lighter than living under the Byzantines. Moreover, they were also exempted from military service. To the west, the Normans of Sicily and southern Italy also wished to acquire Byzantine territory and were better organized than the Turks. As Greek authority disintegrated in Anatolia, Turks, Persians, and Arabs migrated into the region, and Muslims were successful in converting most of the native population, who also became Turkified. Those Christians who held out against the process of Islamization were increasingly isolated from other Christians.¹⁰⁷

In matters of secular government, Byzantium was one of the more peace-loving states of the ancient and medieval worlds, but surrounded as they were

on all sides by hostile tribes and powers, the Byzantines had no illusions about the need to resort to war to achieve peace and promote stability. While Byzantium was frequently at war with its belligerent neighbors, the Byzantine emperors expressed a desire for peace for their subjects and insisted that they wished for peaceful relations with the Turks, Arabs, and other powers. At the same time, the emperors, as the successors of the ancient Greek and Roman states that had preceded Byzantium, did not let their enemies forget that they were not afraid of war, and were prepared to wage war. Such ideas reflected the Byzantine Christian heritage; they thought that wars were caused by the devil and were contrary to man's peaceful nature. Consequently, the only just wars were defensive wars. By contrast, the Western European concept of just war also encompassed wars fought to avenge injustices. Some of the neighbors of Byzantium, such as the Arabs, Turks, and the crusaders, had a concept of holy war to defend and expand their religious societies. These holy wars were proclaimed by religious authorities such as the caliph of Baghdad and the pope of Rome; by contrast, the wars fought by Byzantium were declared by the emperor, a temporal ruler. Despite the danger presented by Islamic expansion and *jihād*, the Byzantine Christians never espoused the concept of holy war against the Saracens. The Byzantines had a secular concept of just war, and insisted that they fought only in self-defense, for recovery of territory forcefully and wrongfully taken, and because treaties had been broken by other powers. The object of their wars, so Anna Comnena, the daughter of the Emperor Alexius I, insisted in her *Alexiad*, was always the restoration of peace. This included the recovery of territory that had belonged to the Byzantine Empire in about 1100 CE; Anna did not contemplate the reconstitution of the Roman Empire as it had existed at its greatest extent. The moral foundation of Anna's ideas about just war derived from her knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy, Roman jurisprudence, and the ideas of St. Augustine. In other words, she had a good understanding of the criteria for determining when war was justified in both the ancient and medieval worlds of thought.¹⁰⁸

The Byzantines viewed the Turks as barbarians rather than as Muslim infidels. Warfare between the two was endemic, but the Byzantines, who knew their Muslim neighbors better than the Frankish crusaders or the popes, did not fear being overwhelmed by the Arabs and the Turks the way the Latin

Christians did. Except in times of crisis, the leaders of the caliphate and the Byzantine Empire did not try to forcibly convert one another's subjects, and they were more tolerant than was the case in the Latin West. The Byzantines believed that God would ultimately allow them to triumph over their enemies, but understanding that their enemies surrounded them and had the advantages of geography, greater manpower and greater resources, they could never hope for more than to employ clever stratagems, catch their enemies off guard, and win small victories. They also had to learn to accept something less than the total and crushing victory that the traditional Roman martial ethos had once demanded in the days of the republic and early empire. They must sometimes be prepared to negotiate the terms of peace in order to end a war. Hence, the Byzantines came to value diplomatic skills as much as military expertise. Consequently, avoiding battle was frequently part of the Byzantine strategy. Constantly beset by enemies, the Byzantine emperors could lead their soldiers into war or speak the language of diplomacy. They knew how to employ the rhetoric of war, but adhered to the moral assumption that peace was always preferable. Anna Comnena thought that unnecessary bellicosity or provoking the enemy was quite simply a display of bad military leadership. War was regrettable, but it was also part of everyday life.¹⁰⁹

When the Frankish crusaders arrived at the court of the Emperor Alexius I, Anna Comnena says that they did not need a pretext for engaging in duels or war. One of the Franks boasted to the emperor of how he used to go out and wait at a certain crossroads near his dwelling to which quarrelsome knights customarily resorted and anxiously awaited an antagonist with whom he might engage in single combat, but none ever showed up because of his reputation for bravery and skill at arms. The emperor thought it well to send this Frankish knight off to help recover the Holy Places as quickly as possible.¹¹⁰

Before the rise of Renaissance sovereign states, for as long as Latin Christians thought of themselves as belonging to a single Christian commonwealth, the practice of diplomacy hardly existed in the West, and was probably incomprehensible to the warrior mentality. Frankish knights lacked understanding and appreciation of the Byzantine practice of exchanging ambassadors with their enemies among the Turks and Arabs. This had long been a Byzantine practice, by which they gathered intelligence, exchanged

prisoners, and sometimes avoided war. To Latin crusaders, this furnished proof that the Byzantines were treacherous, duplicitous, and effeminate. They made unreliable allies, and these stereotypical views of the Byzantine rulers helped to justify the sacking and conquest of Constantinople and the establishment of the Latin Empire there. All of this poisoned relations between Latin and Orthodox Christians, and helped to perpetuate the schism between the two churches.¹¹¹

As members of loosely organized military expeditions, the crusaders were volunteers who tended to be contentious, self-willed individuals who were not very amenable to military discipline. Those knights who participated in the Fourth Crusade (1202–4), which was preached by Pope Innocent III, had taken a pilgrim's vow to make their way to Jerusalem to secure the Holy Places. They had a falling-out when the Venetians, on whom they were dependent for transport by sea, attempted to persuade them to attack the Dalmatian city of Zara—then in Hungarian hands—to satisfy their unpaid debts. A dissident minority of the crusaders felt bound to fight the Saracens rather than fellow Christians. Yet another crisis occurred when Alexios Angelos, the pretender to the Byzantine throne, sought to persuade them to descend on Constantinople and help him seize the throne and depose the usurping Alexios III, who had deposed and blinded the previous emperor, Isaac II. Again, the crusaders would be fighting fellow Christians, although some of the Latin prelates insisted that the current regime in Constantinople was schismatic and offensive to the papacy, and the installation of Alexios would reunite the Latin and Greek Orthodox Churches. This the crusaders found more persuasive. They helped Alexios Angelos depose Alexios III, and the former became Alexios IV, but when he was unable to pay the expenses of the crusaders, he himself was deposed and murdered. His successor, Alexios V, ordered the crusaders to depart and menaced them; so with the blessing of the Latin bishops, the crusaders attacked and looted Constantinople for five days. Then they crowned Baldwin, count of Flanders as the new Byzantine emperor, and installed a Latin Catholic as patriarch of Constantinople.¹¹²

That the efforts of the Frankish crusaders to recover the Holy Places and protect Eastern Christianity against the Saracens proved to be so very destructive should cause little surprise; political thought and practice in the Latin West remained primitive compared to that of the Byzantines, and the

crusader armies were ill disciplined. War was one of the main functions of the medieval state in the West, and images of kings who pursued peace are few in number in the medieval world. This is reflected in the martial ethos of those warriors who came to be known as knights. *Miles*, the medieval Latin term for knight, first appeared in about 970 in France to describe a mounted warrior of superior social status, and became widely used within the next sixty years to describe a coherent group associated with certain aristocratic families. The emergence of this knightly class also coincided with the decline of the Carolingian monarchy and the need to provide protection for the poor and the innocent. Because knights did not always live up to these ideals, many churchmen continued to distrust them until the papacy employed them in the crusades and made knighthood respectable.¹¹³ Combat offered the only way to test the mettle of a knight, and chivalric culture made no distinction between *bellum*, or public war, and *duellum*, or private combat. Besides spilling much blood, this constant effusion of chivalric belligerence could be sustained only by a tremendous expenditure of wealth and human energy. The Church had coopted the culture of chivalry and the concept of knighthood, and had sought to direct this bellicosity outward during the crusades, but the knightly class did not become less ferocious. This chivalric culture or warrior ethos was partly inherited from classical antiquity, but had been reinvigorated by the development of new cavalry tactics based on the introduction of the stirrup, which allowed the mounted warrior to wield his weapons more effectively from the saddle. Of course, not all knights took up the vocation of crusading in distant lands, and the concentration of martial energy in royal armies presented a strong temptation to use such forces against other Christian princes. As these medieval monarchies developed, the wars among the Christian kings of Europe became more extensive.¹¹⁴ Clearly, the themes of chivalric literature were not consistent with maintaining the Peace and Truce of God in the West. Such writings often placed considerable emphasis on the maintenance of honor or the need to go to the aid of *vassi*, lords, and allies in pursuit of feuds, or fighting for suzerains in the numerous wars between Christian kings. Thus, participation in crusades in the Holy Land would have to compete with these other activities, which in any case, were not consistent with maintaining the Peace and Truce of God in the West. This merely confirmed the belief that peace would never last very long in this world.¹¹⁵

The Hundred Years War and papal diplomacy

The so-called Hundred Years War actually lasted 116 years and consisted of a series of wars. The cause of the conflict was that the kings of England had possessed lands in France ever since the Norman Conquest, and were, for that reason, technically *vassi* of the kings of France for those possessions. However, King Philip VI of France considered Edward III to be a disloyal *vassus* and attempted to confiscate the latter's French possessions in 1337. Although this was a conflict between two sovereigns and should be considered an interstate war, it also contained elements of feudal and dynastic conflict and provoked violent popular protests.¹¹⁶

There were inherent contradictions in the nature of these late medieval monarchies of France and England. One of the main duties of the monarch was to preserve the king's peace, and that helped to define both medieval kingship and the early modern state. A king's subjects looked to him for peace and protection. Peace with political entities that were not part of the king's realm could be established only by formal agreements between parties whose status, from a modern point of view, had yet to be established, just as the distinction between private combat and public war began to emerge slowly in the early modern period, and was accepted even more slowly by members of the aristocracy, who were more concerned with honor than legal distinctions. In the early modern period, as the sovereign state established itself more completely, the language and practice of diplomacy also developed slowly—partly because the phenomenon was so new that statesmen lacked a vocabulary for foreign relations, international relations, and diplomatic practice. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the task of making peace between England and France was largely undertaken by the papacy, which could draw on the resources of clerical scholars who staffed the papal secretariat. During part of this time the popes were resident in Avignon—a period known as the Great Schism—and their influence was diminished. In the task of making peace between England and France, the popes failed, but their efforts are worth discussing.¹¹⁷

One of the problems that hindered negotiations for peace between England and France during the Hundred Years War was that England's embryonic diplomatic service was more advanced than that of France. The English

recognized early on the need to maintain an archive of treaties and correspondence, and to have diplomats who were experienced and possessed a knowledge of canon and civil law. When envoys of Henry V of England entered into negotiations in 1418 with the French, they discovered that the latter were unfamiliar with the earlier Treaty of Brétigny of 1360 and possessed only a vague knowledge of the geography of their own country. Gradually, it came to be realized that, although diplomatic missions needed to be led by persons of high noble status, their staffs had to include clerks who had studied civil and canon law at a university. The French government was much slower to develop an archive with easily retrievable information at this time, and French diplomats had to rely on polemical tracts and propaganda for summaries of the king's negotiating points. In any case, diplomacy during the late medieval period was viewed as a legitimate weapon of war; if conditions for concluding an alliance, a peace, or a truce were refused, this provided a legitimate reason for proceeding to a resumption of hostilities.¹¹⁸

Like the Romans, most of the French kings believed that rulers could not achieve peace if they did not make war. But, by the fifteenth century, many people in France thought otherwise. Bishop Jean Juvénal des Ursins, who was a pacifist, thought that the French people were quite tired of perpetual wars, and "would have accepted a Saracen as king if only he had given them peace." Charles V, "the wise," was at least one monarch who thought that the king of France should, with divine assistance, work for peace. The Jacquerie of 1358 was essentially a protest against the exactions levied on the peasantry to pay for the war with the king of England. From their point of view, it was never very clear who the enemy was. The term might include the English, the mercenary soldiers employed by the king of France, or the French nobility, who engaged in feuds and private warfare among themselves. While the concept of peace was certainly admirable, among the problems encountered when agreeing to a peace was how to restrain unemployed soldiers. War often provided a cover for bands of criminals, who in peacetime, devoted themselves entirely to robbing and pillaging. Travel on the highways in France during the Hundred Years War could be more dangerous during the time of a truce than when war was actually being waged.¹¹⁹ Yet, there remained many reasons why peace between England and France was desirable. The Hundred Years War contributed to perpetuating the Great Schism between the Roman and the

Avignonese lines of popes. The peasant revolts in both England and France were popular reactions to devastation and high taxes brought on by war; the English Parliament wished to see the war ended; and Christendom was under siege by the Ottoman Turks. Many English subjects thought that their Plantagenet rulers were more interested in their French possessions and neglected their duties in their English kingdom, but the Plantagenets persisted in laying claim to their possessions in Gascony.¹²⁰

The people of the medieval world often looked to the papacy to promote peace within Christendom. This was not easy during the Great Schism when there were two lines of popes, one living in Rome and the other living in Avignon, a papal enclave in the Rhone Valley. Although the papal enclave at Avignon was technically not part of the kingdom of France, the Avignonese popes were usually French born, and it was difficult for the rulers of England not to view them as puppets of the king of France. For that reason, the English usually looked on the Italian popes as the true successors of St. Peter. Nevertheless, Avignonese popes, such as Innocent VI and Clement VI, did actively promote peace between the kings of England and France during the Hundred Years War. Clement VI, when he tried to bring Edward III of England and Philip VI of France to agreement, was well informed concerning who the important decision-makers and advisers to the kings of England were among the members of the royal family, the royal council, the English nobility, and the Corporation of the City of London, and he bombarded them all with letters in an attempt to bring the war between the two kings to a final conclusion. It was not easy for late-medieval monarchs to accept papal arbitration because concepts of royal sovereignty were already well developed, and these kings did not want to be regarded as papal *vassi*. In 1356, Hélie de Talleyrand, Cardinal of Périgord, dean of the College of Cardinals and diplomatic representative of Pope Innocent VI at Avignon, attempted to secure a truce between King John II of France and Edward, Prince of Wales, the “Black Prince.” The forces of both sides were drawn up for battle at Poitiers, and both were, at first, agreeable. The cardinal repeatedly crossed between the two battle lines trying to reach an agreement, but found the king of France unwilling to compromise unless the English surrendered without fighting and allowed the French to take as prisoners and hold for ransom four out of every five English knights—some 100 in all. The English

understandably refused, and the battle went forward. The English won, and King John II himself was taken prisoner.¹²¹

The former French crusader, Philippe de Mézière, who, after his return from the Holy Land, had entered the service of King Charles V of France, and subsequently, that of his heir, Charles VI, did much to promote crusading efforts and to send assistance to the Byzantines and the other Christians of the East. He remained convinced that the Hundred Years War between England and France must first be concluded in order to end the scandal of the Great Schism and restore unity to the Latin Church; only then could substantial Western military assistance be directed to the fight against the Turks. Only in the latter part of his life, after he had joined the religious order of the Celestines, when Mézière and his disciples acted as diplomatic intermediaries between Charles VI of France and Richard II of England, did his idealism find acceptance in both realms. One of his followers, Robert the Hermit, also a former crusader, was dispatched to Rome and Avignon in an attempt to persuade the two popes to resign and end the schism, and also to Richard II at Eltham Palace to plead for peace between England and France.¹²²

The French ultimately prevailed in these conflicts, but the Hundred Years War left a legacy of hatred and bitterness between England and France. The various peace treaties of Brétigny (1360) and Troyes (1420) that punctuated the various phases of this long conflict settled very little and contributed to a resumption of the fighting. After 1453, when the king of England lost English Gascony, France increasingly became an absolute monarchy, while England traveled down the road to civil war. It was now very clear that the papacy's influence in arbitrating peace had declined. Thereafter, the most fruitful ideas on how to achieve peace in this world tended to come from the lesser clergy or from laymen.

Emergence of a peace ethic

Late-medieval critics of the martial ethos pointed out the limitations of chivalric culture. Honoré Bonet condemned acts of individual bravado undertaken without the permission of the knight's commander. He reprimanded those who acted out of anger, vainglory, and undue concern for

personal honor, and reminded knightly warriors that they were always to submit to the discipline of their commanders. As royal armies came into existence, the emphasis on discipline tended to run counter to the anarchic individualism of chivalric culture because such individuals did not usually think in terms of duty or the good of the commonwealth. Bonet particularly condemned looting and pillage, and reminded knights of their obligation not to prey on poor laborers, widows, and the poor, or to wantonly lay waste to dwellings and churches. Bonet recognized that the law of arms, although never codified like canon and civil law, did usually restrain how knightly warriors treated their enemies. But there were limitations on how far the law of arms applied to prisoners of war. Such courtesies applied only to knights and members of the nobility and not to members of the commonalty or non-Christians, so members of the aristocratic warrior class were always careful never to surrender to those who were not bound by the same rules.¹²³ Honoré Bonet insisted that there was no law that allowed Christian princes to make war on the Saracens because they were infidels, nor did scripture permit the use of force to convert nonbelievers or to take their possessions. But Bonet did maintain that the Holy Land had become the lawful possession of Christians because that was where the passion of Christ had occurred, and consequently, the Saracens had seized it wrongfully.¹²⁴

The English poet and gentleman, John Gower, condemned the clergy in general and the popes in particular for stirring up wars. In his *Vox clamantis*, Gower accused the pope of disturbing Christian concord by siding with the French in the Hundred Years War. Many of the clergy not only fanned the flames of war, but also actually bore arms against other Christians instead of tending to the cure of souls. In his *Confessio amantis*, in which Gower poses a question about the morality of the crusades, the priestly confessor answers that it is permissible to preach the faith to non-Christians and to suffer martyrdom, but not to slay non-Christians in a holy war. That was not how the Apostles had spread the Christian faith.¹²⁵ Gower was certainly no pacifist and believed in the concept of just war, but he also became a critic of decaying chivalric culture during the Hundred Years War because he thought knights were not adhering to their code to protect widows and orphans, to defend the Church, and fight for the common good. They were a violent and disputatious lot, and went to war out of pride or the pursuit of booty. Just as often, they failed to fight in wars

when duty compelled them to do so, stayed at home, and violated their oaths by oppressing the poor. As the Hundred Years War dragged on, Gower ceased to believe in the justness of Edward III's claims in France, and he thought that many who participated in that conflict had dishonored the profession of arms.¹²⁶

Disapproval of the way that wars were fought, and indeed, of the very concept of armed conflict, was not limited to the monastic clergy. For example, John Wyclif, a secular priest and theologian, quoted the words of Christ from the New Testament to show that differences should be settled by peaceful means and the exercise of patience. John Bromyard, a fourteenth-century Dominican friar, said that both Holy Scripture and history demonstrated that wise rulers who contemplated going to war, should fast, pray, and examine their consciences before deciding to unfurl their banners in declaration of war, and should always heed good counsel. Pacifist concepts were espoused mostly by individuals and a few religious communities. Such persons usually refused to be drawn into war even in defense of their possessions and property. One of the reasons that St. Francis of Assisi (1182–1226) insisted on complete poverty for his mendicant friars was that he viewed the possession of goods and treasure as a source of war and conflict among men. St. Francis longed for a restoration of the Golden Age, a concept derived from the Book of Genesis as well as pagan philosophers such as Hesiod, Ovid, and Lucretius. Declarations of pacifism by lay confraternities, such as the Penitents in Italian cities or the Beguines in Flanders, could not count on papal support. Pope Nicholas IV declared that they ought to be prepared to defend their own religious communities or the towns in which they dwelled. Although they were technically laymen, the members of these confraternities claimed clerical status in their refusal to bear arms, and they were offended by insensitivity to their principles on the part of ecclesiastical authorities. The civic authorities also treated them as laymen and showed little respect for their intransigence in the face of marauding armies or rioting townsmen. Moreover, these lay confraternities were often regarded as being tainted by heresy. The belief that an ideology of pacifism could change the world is a modern phenomenon, which was first enunciated by Erasmus and his circle of Christian humanists. Even then, their influence was quite limited. In the medieval and early modern periods, the expression of pacifist sentiments continued to be associated with

heresy. The medieval Church was more concerned with defining when war was justified or bestowing blessings on crusades and crusaders than with restraining warfare. The Church was more usually to be found in a militant posture than in a passive stance.¹²⁷

Religious communities officially designated as heretical were often pacifist. In southern France, the Cathars, or Cathari, whose progenitors were thought to be disillusioned crusaders who had picked up their ideas from an obscure sect in Bulgaria on their return from the Holy Land, but probably had originated in Western Europe, rejected war except in self-defense. The Waldensians, who originated in thirteenth-century Burgundy and Piedmont, claimed exemption from military service. Like the Montanists, their second-century predecessors of Asia Minor and North Africa, the Waldensians wished to withdraw from secular society, which they particularly associated with cities; they sought refuge in a rural hinterland in order to live a more simple life. In a number of ways, pacifistic movements such as Waldensianism, which had been founded by Peter Waldo, a wealthy merchant who had once lived in Lyons, paralleled monasticism; but whereas the monastic orders never posed a challenge to ecclesiastical authority and enjoyed the approbation of the Church, the Waldensians constituted a radical religious sect that challenged papal authority, or more specifically, what they called "Constantinianism," the papal claim to wield the temporal sword and to employ force to correct errant temporal rulers, heretics and infidels. The Waldensians at first tried to remain within the church structure, but after their excommunication in 1184, they sought refuge in the Alpine valleys of Lombardy. The Hussites of Bohemia also had a pacifist wing led by Peter Chelciky, who argued that the pacifism of the early Christians had been repudiated after the Emperor Constantine promoted a union of the Roman state and the Christian Church. Chelciky thought that the state existed only to correct sinners, and that good Christians should hold neither military nor civil office. Eventually, the bellicose wing of the Hussites prevailed, and the Bohemian peasants made war against the Holy Roman Empire.¹²⁸

In the latter part of the fourteenth century, the wars in France were going badly for the English, and this probably helped to stimulate a reevaluation of accepted attitudes toward war and peace. Preachers were quite sure that the cause of these misfortunes was an abundance of the sins of lechery and luxury

among the aristocracy. Thomas Walsingham, a monk at St. Albans Abbey, in his *Chronicon Angliae*, was especially critical of John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster and King Edward III in his declining days. The chroniclers and political commentators of this period always perceived a link between morals and political events, and their audience would have recognized the parallels with biblical passages. A prophecy, probably by John Erghome, asserted that the king's association with his mistress, Alice Perrers, had effeminated him, and he had lost his zest for war.¹²⁹

John Wyclif's efforts to build a "peace ethic" mark a distinct break with medieval clerical thinking about war and peace. He rejected much of the teaching of St. Augustine about the inevitability of war and sought inspiration in the early Christian teachings which predated the Emperor Constantine. Wyclif also refused to accept the concepts of just war and holy war as proclaimed by the papacy, and he accused the pope, at that time residing in Avignon, and the bishops of sowing discord and fomenting war among Christian princes in order to enhance papal power.¹³⁰ That Wyclif stood outside the mainstream of medieval theological and political thought concerning the exercise of civil authority can be seen in his assertion that the origins of civil dominion were to be found in human sinfulness, and the very exercise of such authority unavoidably involved the bearer of the swords of justice and war in the commission of sin. Wars could be fought only for motives of Christian charity and not for temporal gain, although Wyclif does allow for the invasion of the lands of non-Christians in order to convert them to the true religion or to punish them for inflicting injuries on Christians. Wyclif does not accept the examples from the Old Testament of the Hebrews making war against other peoples by divine command because God no longer issued such commands, and Christians were instead to follow Christ's example of humility and charity.¹³¹

John Gower also became disposed to a policy of peace because he had ceased to believe in the concept of just war when two Christian kings prolonged the war between England and France—the conflict that we know as the Hundred Years War. Gower, who had enjoyed the patronage of Richard II, was at first inclined to excuse the king's misrule because of his youth and lack of experience, but when Richard continued to place his confidence in supporters who pursued their own selfish and destructive interests, Gower began to

despair in Richard's will to accept reforms, and transferred his allegiance to Henry of Bolingbroke, earl of Derby, who succeeded as Henry IV in 1399.¹³² Gower viewed Henry IV as a divinely ordained bringer of peace both at home and abroad. He wrote *In Praise of Peace* and other works to support Henry's candidacy for the throne during the parliamentary proceedings that led to the bestowal of the crown on him. In his poetry, Gower told the new Lancastrian king that although monarchs had a legal and moral right to declare war as long as their objective was the ultimate restoration of peace, it was better to avoid war between Christian kingdoms in the first place because "peace is best, above all earthly things."¹³³ Ironically, one of the reasons why Richard II had been overthrown was because members of the aristocracy believed that he intended to conclude peace with the king of France. Aristocrats such as Thomas, Duke of Gloucester, led an anti-French and pro-war faction because his followers had profited from the war, and they believed that Richard did not project the image of a warrior-king and indulged himself only in pleasure.¹³⁴ Gower continued to admire Henry IV, but the new king's ability to maintain peace in his kingdom and lordships was weakened by his usurpation of the throne—despite the support of most of his subjects. He faced rebellions and civil disturbances in England and Wales as well as conflicts with Scotland and France. Sixty years later, during the reign of Henry IV's weak and inept grandson, Henry VI, Richard, Duke of York, attempted to advance his claim to the throne before Parliament by reminding his audience that the Lancastrians were a usurping dynasty. A few months later, York was killed at the Battle of Wakefield, which was part of the first of the three conflicts that made up the Wars of the Roses.¹³⁵

Despite the official propaganda about the blessings of Tudor rule and the fictions introduced by Shakespeare in his cycle of history plays, which depicted the Wars of the Roses as one continuous war instead of three separate and somewhat shorter conflicts, the baronial and dynastic wars of the late fifteenth century were not nearly as bloody as is generally supposed. The French historian Philippe de Commines thought that English commanders and soldiers showed more restraint than was the case in mainland European wars, and avoided killing prisoners or plundering the countryside because they cared about public opinion. Despite the dynastic conflicts of the fifteenth century, it was probably a more peaceful time in which to live than the sixteenth century

with its religious conflicts and persecutions and economic upheavals. Indeed, John Gillingham believes that “England in the fifteenth century was the most peaceful country in Europe.” It was not heavily taxed, and unlike many states of mainland Europe, it was not burdened with a standing army and did not need to spend the huge sums expended elsewhere on municipal fortifications. Also, England was not as militarized as comparable states, and it was backward in military technology, and remained so until the sixteenth century.¹³⁶

Among early Christians, a full acceptance of the peace ethic seems to have been limited to groups whose orthodoxy was open to question. Within the Roman world of late antiquity, pacifism was more widespread among Greek-speaking Christians than in the Latin West, and hardly existed at all in the outposts of empire. As long as Christians pursued proselytizing activities, debated abstruse theological doctrines or enthusiastically sought martyrdom, there always existed the possibility of conflict. Christian theology bred dissent and heresy from the beginning, and ecclesiastical politics has never been a game for the faint of heart. Paganism disappeared slowly, and while many pagans were tolerant of other beliefs, Christians grew increasingly intolerant of the old beliefs. Once Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire, Christians were obliged to take up the duties of citizenship which could include military service.

There was more than one theological school of thought in the early Christian Church, but it was the Augustinian tradition that remained dominant through much of the medieval period. St. Augustine of Hippo associated pacifism with the heretical sect that he had broken with when he converted, and he never did succeed in reconciling pacifistic inclinations with his belief that God used war to punish man’s sins. Moreover, as a practical matter, he could see no other way of suppressing heretical groups and repulsing barbarian incursions, which raised the possibility of war among Christians as well as between Christians and non-Christians. A just war was to be preferred to an unjust peace. As the boundaries of empire retreated in late antiquity, the problem of defending Christendom fell into the laps of the ecclesiastical authorities, and in the absence of city-states and emperors in the former Roman Empire in the West, the clergy had to provide a lead in fending off the enemies of the Church, maintaining a degree of stability and furnishing an example of constancy.

Insofar as a peace ethic survived in late antiquity and the early Middle Ages, it was to be found in monasticism. But monasticism was a severely ascetic movement that sought refuge in that inner peace that was consequent on withdrawal from the world. However, the monastic movement took a different direction when the Papacy called on a group of Benedictine monks to undertake the conversion, or reconversion, of Britain and northern Europe. This effort did ultimately bring a degree of peace to Western Europe by incorporating those Germanic kingdoms and tribes into the larger entity of Christendom. The acceptance of Christianity was perhaps less than complete because the warrior culture of the Germanic peoples could only be contained and not eliminated. Rather, their bellicosity was directed outward against heathens, heretics, and infidels. This led to the papal proclamation of the Wars of the Crusades, which sought to recover the Holy Land and drive the Moors out of the Iberian Peninsula. A by-product of the effort to tame the martial tendencies of the warrior class was the emergence of a chivalric culture, which imposed some constraints on how wars were fought and how prisoners and noncombatants were treated, but which at the same time, perpetuated a martial ethos.

The Augustinian view that war was intended as a divine punishment for man's sins was challenged by St. Thomas Aquinas, who believed that peace was the natural condition of mankind—including both Christians and non-Christians alike. There also occurred a revival of interest in Vegetius's *De re militarii*, which held that war, quickly and efficiently executed, could secure peace. This required a clear focus on military and political objectives, and undermined the view that wars provided the opportunity to validate honor and win glory for aristocratic warriors. This perhaps contributed little toward the establishment of a peace ethic, but it did reinforce the idea that wars needed a moral and legal justification that should be based on natural law. This approach to the concept of just war necessitated the study of both Roman and canon law in order to maintain constraints on how wars were fought. However, princes seldom failed to present compelling arguments for the justness of the many wars that they fought. Despite the many writers who sought to establish a peace ethic, at the end of the Middle Ages, there still remained a strong aversion to prolonged periods of peace, and the prejudice persisted that peace bred effeminacy and made it more difficult to find valiant soldiers.

Holy Wars, Crusades, and Religious Wars

Then standing inside the gate of the camp, he said: If any man be on the Lord's side let him join with me. And all the sons of Levi gathered themselves together unto him.

And he said to them: Thus saith the Lord God of Israel: Put every man his sword upon his thigh: go, and return from gate to gate through the midst of the camp, and let every man kill his brother, friend and neighbour.

And the sons of Levi did according to the words of Moses, and there were slain that day about three and twenty thousand men.

Exodus 32:26–8

And the Lord said to the servant: Go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled.

Gospel of St. Luke, 14:23

When the sacred months are passed, kill the idolaters wherever you find them, and lie in wait for them in every place of ambush; but if they repent, pray regularly, and give the alms tax, then let them go their way, for God is forgiving, merciful.

Koran, sura, [chap.] 9:5

Scriptural religions, in varying degrees, are necessarily dogmatic. Believers are bound to accept certain beliefs. The Israelites were told by Moses that they were not to tolerate idolatry; those who sinned against this commandment were to be slain—even if the offender was one's own brother or friend. The verse from St. Luke in the New Testament was sometimes used from the time of St. Augustine of Hippo to justify coercion—even holy war—against heterodoxy, which led to wars against infidels or other Christians.¹ The

quotation from the Koran, from one of the “sword verses,” places an obligation on the true believer to wage *jihād*, or holy war, against idolaters and nonbelievers, but urges mercy and restraint toward those who convert and toleration for Jews, Christians, and those “people of the book” who humbly submit themselves to Islamic authority and pay tribute.² However, scriptural justifications and the injunctions of religious leaders alone are not sufficient to explain the many holy wars and religious conflicts that have occurred in the past; traditions of tribal warfare, ethnic rivalries, the pursuit of honor and glory, dynastic ambition, greed, and expansionism must also be taken into account. In addition, Christian and Muslim religious leaders of holy wars simply could not imagine a concept of peace extending beyond a temporary truce.

Holy war in the Bible

All of the empires, kingdoms, and states of the Mediterranean world and the ancient Near East possessed gods of war, which rulers always invoked before going into battle. It was believed that these gods and goddesses would intervene in battle, favoring those deemed worthy and striking down those deemed unworthy. Homer’s *Iliad* (iv. 128) states that Athena deflected an arrow aimed at King Menelaus during a battle. Although religion was always a part of war in the ancient world, such wars were fought for what we would call political reasons, but religious ideas contributed much to official propaganda. These wars may be regarded as holy wars because their rulers had special access to the gods of war, which lesser folk lacked, and they justified these wars on the basis of divine commands. Holy wars were characteristic of scriptural religions, and the concept obliged believers to fight.³

The Old Testament or Hebrew Bible is filled with hundreds of stories of unspeakable violence. However, it must be said many of these stories cannot be verified by archaeological research or the historical records of contemporaneous civilizations. These tales are drawn from the literature of pastoral societies, and are allegorical and filled with ambiguities and hyperbole. Insofar as a message can be deciphered from the biblical text, it is that God was displeased with his chosen people—not for particular transgressions, but because of their general infidelity. The main message seems to be that murder and violence are the

greatest and most widespread of human sins. Because of the original sin of disobedience of Adam and Eve, God hid his face from their descendants, and they became subject to death by violence. War and violence are therefore the consequence of sin. This is the explanation that many theologians and biblical scholars have given us, although it offers small comfort to the devout. While much of the Old Testament is poetic myth and is hardly an accurate representation of the history of the Israelites and their antecedents, we must remember that these myths did much to shape the religious and national identity of the Jewish people.⁴ Also, more literal readings of these biblical tales provided justification for the prophet Muhammad and Christian leaders, such as the popes and the Protestant reformers, to proclaim their crusades or holy wars and wars of religion.

In the Jewish Bible, holy war involved a struggle between the believers and the nonbelievers in which the faithful triumphed through divine intervention and assistance. The glory gained thereby belonged to God. This distinguished the war-making of the Israelites from the wars of other Near-Eastern rulers who used religious propaganda, but claimed the glory for themselves. In nomadic societies, all able-bodied men were warriors and were expected to fight under the leadership of their tribal leaders, as was the case with the Israelites before they came into the Promised Land. During the time that they wandered in the desert, the whole of the Israelites constituted a military expedition and camp. They were summoned to war by the blast of the trumpet, and intimidation was sometimes used to compel attendance. The weapons they bore usually included no more than a sword and a sling. Lances and shields were carried only by their leaders, and they went into battle without helmets or armor. Their tactics included raids and ambushes; because they had no staying power, they avoided pitched battles and sieges. Armored chariots filled them with terror. Considering the risks of fighting with such an undisciplined and poorly trained force, their leaders preferred smaller groups and sent home those who were apprehensive or faint of heart. Small forces and surprise, combined with stratagems such as making a great deal of noise, often worked against their enemies. Some battles were settled by single combat between two champions.⁵

War was a common occurrence among the early Israelites, but not all the wars mentioned in the Jewish Bible were holy wars fought against idolaters.

Some were wars of territorial conquest, and some were wars of defense. The war narratives of the Old Testament tend to be stylized, and the ancient Hebrews were confident that Yahweh aided them in battle. The wars by which the Israelites took possession of the Promised Land were wars of conquest. The Israelites were convinced that they were participating in a divine activity under the leadership of Yahweh. Thus, Yahweh's armies consisted of both earthly and heavenly hosts. The holy war took on a sacral quality and necessarily involved the ministrations of priests in purifying the camp and the warriors, and also undertaking preparations for carrying the Ark of the Covenant before the people into battle. The details concerning the deployment of the astral armies tend to be vague, but a great psychological advantage was gained over the enemy when they discovered that there were visitations of plague and pestilence in their camp, while the camp of the Israelites was spared. As long as the Israelites trusted in Yahweh, victory was assured, but that did not mean that the Hebrew warriors were spared heavy fighting. The action of battle was chaotic, but the Israelites knew that they fought to preserve order. When victory was achieved, the Israelites were reminded that the spoils of war, both prisoners and booty, were reserved for Yahweh.⁶

In the early parts of the Jewish Bible, those who worshiped idols or were rebellious were punished by God directly by famine, plague, serpents, earthquake, and fire (Numbers 11:1, 11:4–34, 16:5–6). But in Exodus 32:26–28, God ordered the sons of Levi to take their swords and go throughout the camp and slay those who practiced idolatry. On this occasion, God used human agency to punish the wicked, and this is taken to be an example of divinely sanctioned holy war. In the Book of the Prophecy of Ezechiel, Yahweh is imagined as a warrior marching across the land to seek vengeance against nonbelievers who had invaded the territories where the Israelites had lived in peace. In this terrible struggle, Yahweh vanquished Prince Gog of the land of Magog and all the forces of evil so that all would acknowledge His power and glory.⁷

The evidence concerning when the Israelites conquered the Promised Land presents problems. There is an alternative explanation to the Book of Exodus and its narration of the Hebrew people under Moses returning from Egypt to the Promised Land and effecting a divinely sanctioned conquest. According to this hypothesis, the chosen people never were in Egypt, but were a rural population of pastoralists who lived at a higher elevation than the cities where

the Amalkalites and Canaanites lived. They had recently converted to Yahwism and rebelled against the local city-states subject to the hegemony of the Pharaohs, whose governance they found unbearable. Although the various biblical narratives agree that the people of Israel came from somewhere else and possessed the Land of the Canaanites by conquest, a small number of biblical scholars assert that the Israelites had always lived in the land that came to be known as Israel, and they see the conquest of Canaan as a peaceful penetration of a thinly populated land. Thus, they deny that the ancient Hebrews ever practiced holy war.⁸

The early Hebrew laws of war are set out in the Book of Deuteronomy: When the Hebrews approached an enemy camp, they were to offer them peace. If the enemy accepted the offer of peace, all of them were to be enslaved and forced to labor. If the offer of peace was rejected, then war was to be waged. If Yahweh bestowed victory, then all males were to be put to the sword, but the women, small children and cattle were to be spared and appropriated. The warriors who willingly surrendered were to be allowed to live, but as slaves. The purpose was to utterly destroy the enemy host and community, but interestingly, fruit trees that still bore fruit were to be spared. The object of destroying the warriors and community of the people of Canaan was to prevent them from contaminating the Israelites with their idolatry.⁹

According to the Hebrew Bible, the Israelites undertook holy war by God's commandment; they were associated with God in the struggle, and fought alongside the hosts of warrior angels in a cosmic battle. They were to destroy the persons and property of the enemy. But such tactics were to be limited by a sense of proportion. Even in divinely sanctioned holy wars, as described in Joshua 11 and Deuteronomy 20:19–20, there were limits placed on the destructiveness of warfare, and the holy warriors needed to carefully distinguish between those among the enemy who had actually taken up arms and those who were noncombatants.¹⁰

The concepts of holy war

Many—probably most—present-day Jews do not believe that holy war was practiced by the ancient Israelites, and we do have to admit that in

most accounts of the wars fought by the Israelites, the nature of that warfare was largely defensive. However, these Old Testament biblical passages were certainly among the sources that later proponents of holy war such as St. Augustine of Hippo and Muhammad drew on. The early Christians, although they knew what profane war was, would have failed to recognize the concept of holy war as it emerged during the medieval period among Christian crusaders and Muslim jihadists. Perhaps the earliest Christian understanding of holy war was that described in the Book of Revelation (otherwise known as the Apocalypse of St. John the Evangelist). The end of time would be characterized by a holy war in which supernatural agents rather than mortal men would wield the sword and bring plague, fire, and brimstone to punish the wicked. There would be an internecine war in which fiends and beasts would slay a large part of humankind. The prophecies contained in the Book of Revelation predicted the overthrow of pagan Rome, but Christians were to take no part in this strife. The proper role of believers was to offer no resistance.¹¹

The early Christians did not believe that they could serve as soldiers. The Christian clergy abhorred all bloodshed as sinful; and later, after Christians actually began serving in the armies of Rome, they believed that soldiers, even fighting in a just war and obeying legitimate commands and having killed infidels in battle, still needed to perform penance. The Christian clergy in both the Latin West and the Greek East continued to adhere to this early pacifist tradition for nearly a millennium. Yet, Christianity was ambivalent about war in the early centuries. While Tertullian represented a completely pacifist position, it must be remembered that Christianity spread during the expansion of a militarist empire, and could hardly remain uninfluenced by the Roman world. Gradually, Christian thinkers after the time of the Emperor Constantine became aware of the holy war tradition as recorded in the Book of Joshua. St. Ambrose, a former Roman official, accepted the Roman arguments for fighting defensive wars, and St. Augustine drew on Stoic philosophy and Roman law as well as the Old Testament tradition of holy war. Although St. Augustine was not an advocate of the concept of holy war, it has to be said that later writers could find an abundance of ideas in his writings, which taken out of context, could justify the crusades, or also assert that war and conflict were characteristic of human society. St. Augustine's views on just war were

particularly influential in shaping medieval attitudes toward war. Such ideas were also acceptable to the Germanic warrior elites who saw warfare as their *raison d'être*, while the Byzantine East viewed war as a social duty.¹²

Christians served in the Roman army from the fourth century onward, but the leaders of the Church did not consider waging war in the name of Christianity before the ninth century. St. Augustine and Pope Gregory I (p. 590–604) could envision two kinds of holy war: an internal war fought against heretics to preserve the pure beliefs of the Christian Church, and an external war to spread Christianity by force. However, heresy was not a serious problem in late antiquity and the early Middle Ages, and the Church was usually able to Christianize the Germanic tribes by peaceful missionary activities alone. There were, of course, pagan peoples further to the east who might have offered the opportunity for a war of forced conversion, but as Carl Erdmann points out, the warrior had first to be persuaded that the main motive for fighting such wars was to convert heathens and infidels. The Germanic kingdoms of this period were not yet prepared to accept such an ideology, and most of the clergy were unwilling to condone such violence toward even pagan infidels except in self-defense. The ideal *milites Christi*, or soldiers of Christ, were still understood to be those who fought spiritual battles in monasteries. The weapons of profane war were forbidden to them.¹³

The Christian concept of holy war emerged in the ninth century, when all of Europe was beset by invaders and immersed in war. The British Isles, northern France and Moorish Spain were subjected to continuing raids by Norsemen, who established a permanent settlement in Normandy in 911. Arabs from North Africa raided the Italian peninsula and southern France, and established colonies in Sicily and Provence. The Magyars—sometimes mistaken for Turks—also raided as far west as France, but mostly troubled the Danube Basin and the Adriatic. It was the Muslim Arabs—the Saracens—whom the clerical and monastic chroniclers regarded as especially cruel and devastating. The popes could not forget that the Arabs had attacked Rome in 846 and 875, and had dared to enter, loot, and deface St. Peter's Basilica itself. The papal proclamation of holy war against the Saracens grew out of a genuine threat to Rome, the Italian peninsula, and the islands. This proclamation of holy war broke with a centuries-old policy of avoiding bloodshed in Christ's name. Although Charlemagne sent into Spain an expedition that skirmished with the

Moors, his concept of holy war was limited to fighting the Saxons, which nicely coincided with his dynastic ambitions.¹⁴

In the medieval world, war was viewed as an instrument of Divine Providence and a manifestation of God's justice. But some conflicts were thought to be more closely aligned with divine purpose, and were specifically designated by religious authorities as holy wars; they were directed against enemies who were thought to be in league with the devil. Those who volunteered for these sanctified wars were called crusaders, and were granted special benefits such as indulgences or privileged entry into Paradise. Among historians of Europe, the crusades and the Wars of Religion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are the leading examples of holy wars, but the concept had been employed among the ancient Israelites and continued to be used in the Islamic world.¹⁵

The Byzantine acceptance of the concept of holy war was slow and reluctant because the Orthodox Church had taught that killing for religious beliefs was a sinful act. But, from the time of the first contact with Islam, those who defended the imperial frontiers against the Muslims believed that their struggle represented the defense of Christendom. The Byzantine army considered the Muslims to be blasphemers against Christ, and they believed that the Blessed Virgin guided them in battle. The Byzantines were also aware of the precedents of holy war in the Old Testament. After the Persians captured Jerusalem in 614, it was difficult for the Byzantine soldiers not to view the recovery of Jerusalem and its relics, such as the Holy Cross, as a struggle that was divinely blessed. Beginning in the tenth century, the Byzantine rulers attempted to persuade the Orthodox clergy to accept the doctrine of holy war and to recognize that killing the infidel was not sinful. Generally speaking, the religious leaders and crusaders of the Latin West were disappointed in the response of the Greek Orthodox Church in failing to view the fight against Islamic expansion as a holy war. The Byzantine resistance to Muslim conquests, however, was not totally devoid of religious sanction. The Greek Church did view the military victories of the Byzantine emperors against barbarian peoples as a gift of God because of the justness of the Byzantine cause in the eyes of God.¹⁶

The Muslim tradition of holy war was not very different from that of the Jewish Bible or the religious motivations of the medieval Christian crusaders and the teachings of many of the Protestant and Catholic divines and soldiers

during the Wars of Religion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Muhammad commanded that holy war was to be waged against nonbelievers: "When you meet the unbelievers, smite their necks, then when you have made wide slaughter among them, tie fast their bonds; then set them free, either by grace or ransom, till the war lays down its loads." Mercy could be shown after complete victory over unbelievers, and the people of the book had submitted themselves to Islamic authority.¹⁷ This element of triumphalism bears comparison to Roman rituals associated with celebration of military victories.

Islamic holy war

The first Muslims were Arabs who lived in a political void where there was no authority to restrain conflict except that of the tribe. Consequently, various levels of violence were pervasive. This violence mostly took the form of raiding the herds of other tribes and securing possession of wells and grazing grounds. The only restraint on this conflict over very limited resources was the *lex talionis*, the threat of retaliation in kind. As revealed in contemporaneous Arab poetry, this tribal society was pervaded by a warrior ethos emphasizing revenge and honor that was not very different from that found in the classical civilizations of Greece and Rome, and the feudal society of medieval Europe. The virtues that were most admired were loyalty, generosity (which extended only as far as the enhancement of reputation), and martial prowess. This pre-Islamic martial ethos continued after the time of the Prophet, although it was combined with Islamic piety. Islamic religious culture was quite open to pre-Islamic and non-Islamic influences, such as those of ancient Persia and India in matters of weapons, strategy, tactics, and more generally, how to conduct warfare. The Koran states that "men are the enemies of each other." Because of these warlike propensities, Ibn Khaldun, the fourteenth-century philosopher and historian, thought that men needed to be restrained by some force that would keep them from attacking one another. He also thought that secular war was evil, and good Muslims should undertake war only for religious purposes. Among other foreign influences on Islamic thought about war and violence was the apocalyptic literature of Jewish and Christian scriptures from whence the Prophet derived the notion of *Jihād* or holy war.¹⁸

Muslims were empire builders from the time that Muhammad began to preach that he was the messenger of God sent into the world to convert all humanity. Islam spread rapidly because it filled a void on the Arabian Peninsula beyond the reach of rulers and states, and Mecca and Medina sat astride trade routes leading to more established political societies in the Byzantine and Persian empires as well as in India and Southeast Asia. Christianity had grown slowly in the already well established political society of Rome. Moreover, Christians had always recognized the political obligations that they owed Caesar. Islamic society, however, combined religious and political functions in one entity, and developed pronounced expansionist tendencies from the beginning. Muslims were not as driven by a desire to convert others as were Christians, but they did mean to require everyone to submit to Islamic authority. They aspired to universal peace within the *dar el-islam* or “Islamic world,” but beyond this was the *dar al-harb*, the “world of war” where strife always prevailed. With those who refused to accept Islamic authority, there could never be peace, and the Islamic empire expanded more rapidly than had the Roman Empire.¹⁹ Islamic legal theory, however, was more insistent about total conquest. It maintained that war had always existed and would always continue between Islam and non-Islamic societies until the Islamic world had conquered the non-Islamic world and all non-Muslims had converted or submitted. Meanwhile, until this permanent state of peace was achieved, Muslim rulers were not allowed to make peace treaties that would exceed ten years. The Islamic law of peace was never regarded as anything but a temporary measure to be employed when holy war between the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds was temporarily in abeyance. However, in later periods Islamic societies sometimes found more permanent peaceful relations were desirable.²⁰

The long conflict between Islam and Christendom had its origins in the rivalry between Byzantium and Persia, both of which sought to expand their influence in the Near East—especially in Arabia. The Byzantines and the Persians had each hoped to gain control of Mecca and other commercial centers near the Red Sea coast of Arabia leading to the Mediterranean. Following the decline of Persian power in the seventh century, some of the Arab supporters of Persian influence turned to Muhammad and became Muslims. His influence was originally exerted among the merchants of Mecca, but later spread to the desert tribes from whom the merchants had sprung in

earlier generations. These bedouins, who were divided into tribes, had been in the habit of raiding one another's encampments because they never produced enough food to feed themselves. Muhammad's message was at first met with resistance and accompanied by strife among the tribes of the Medina oases. In conflicts with members of his own tribe, who refused to accept his religious message, Muhammad and his followers became convinced that God and his angels, dressed in white turbans, fought on their side. Muhammad insisted that all Muslims regard one another as brothers, but they were to fight all others until they acknowledge that "there is no god but Allah."²¹

Once one had uttered these words, he immediately became a Muslim and was admitted to the *umma*, the indissoluble and universal Muslim community. To this brotherhood he owed loyalty and he could not leave it without committing the capital offense of apostasy, and as the Prophet himself insisted, he also became obliged to pay the *zakāt*, or religious tax, to this community. Following the death of Muhammad in 632 CE, some of the more outlying Arab tribes believed that his demise ended the treaties that obliged them to pay the *zakāt*, but Abu Bakr, Muhammad's father-in-law and the first caliph, undertook the War of Apostasy against them to compel the payment of those taxes. Although the indissoluble character of the *umma* was viewed as a means of creating peace within the Muslim community, its focus was on Arab loyalty. It was this concept that brought the Islamic community into seemingly endless conflict with Christianity. Christians and Jews living within the Muslim world were always obliged to submit to Islamic authority. While recognized as people of the Book, they were compelled to pay the *jizsa*, the poll tax or tribute imposed on them, as a sign of their humiliation and submission. These taxes were levied by command of the Prophet himself, and as the messenger of God, his commands were absolute and not to be disputed. In the time of Muhammad, the Prophet was the leader of an integrated religious and political society, and subsequently, the caliphs also exercised this authority. Although the Byzantine emperors and the medieval papacy had aspired to such authority, the world that followed the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West came to be characterized by a distinction between temporal and ecclesiastical authority that worked against the emergence of theocracies.²²

Muhammad waged war against the polytheistic nonbelievers of Mecca, but he sometimes also made war against Jews and Christians even though he

acknowledged that they were “people of the Book”; in Byzantine Syria, war was waged against Christians and Jews “until they paid tribute or utterly submitted.” (This was done with the nice distinction that it was “mere war” and not holy war that was being visited on these Byzantine communities.) Mostly, however, the Islamic community of the Arabian Peninsula made holy war on neighboring states to impose Islamic authority. It was not originally the intention to compel conversion, but rather to persuade Jews, Christians, and pagans to accept Muslim teachings of their own free will. Indeed, in the early years of Muslim expansion, the costs of military conquest were paid by the taxes on non-Muslims, so it was not fiscally desirable to convert the whole non-Muslim population unless they could assist as soldiers or serve in some other useful capacity. During the first two centuries of Muslim expansion, nonbelievers remained a majority of the population. Moreover, the first converts to Islam were regarded as inferior in status to Arabs and could retain title to their property only if confirmed by treaty.²³

Muslim holy war began in the last days of the Prophet Muhammad, when he called on the major rulers of the time to acknowledge his message; he then dispatched military expeditions to the frontiers of the Byzantine Empire. Muhammad’s successor Abu Bakr, the first caliph or leader of the political-religious community of Islam, continued this military pressure on the Byzantine Empire. Before the second caliph ‘Umar ibn Abd al-Khatteb died in 644, all of Arabia had been conquered as well as Egypt and Persia. The reasons why such large conquests were made so quickly were much the same as historians have used to explain the decline of earlier great empires such as those of Rome and Persia—barbarian incursions, incessant wars, plague, agricultural decline, diminished population and resources, and shrinking urban settlements. The people who lived in these newly conquered areas sometimes found the caliph’s regime easier to accept because the tax burden, although discriminatory, was usually lighter than under Byzantine rule, and Christian heterodox minorities were not persecuted as much as they had been under the Greek Orthodox Church.²⁴

The original meaning of *jihād*, as pronounced by the prophet Muhammad, was a personal moral endeavor to carry out the will of God and a struggle against nonbelievers who interfered with the dissemination of the Prophet’s message or persecuted his followers. The secondary meaning of *jihād*, or “the

greater holy war,” consisted of the internal struggle to purge one’s soul of impurities. Some jurists thought that this “greater” expression of *jihād* was the true path to martyrdom, but most Islamic scholars argued that internal and external *jihād* were inseparable. From the time of the battle for the wells at Badr, near Medina, Muslims came to believe that when they fought holy war against infidels, they were the winners whether they actually achieved victory over the enemy or died in battle. In the latter instance, they became martyrs and entered Paradise. Muhammad’s preaching aroused a great deal of turmoil in Mecca, and after he had fled that city to seek safety with his kinsmen in Medina, the concept of *jihād* took on a more emphatically military meaning. While Muhammad thought that killing was a terrible thing, he believed that persecution of believers was worse, and therefore, a war against nonbelievers and persecutors became a sacred duty for his followers. *Jihād* was considered to be a just war, carrying with it the sanction of Allah and requiring a formal declaration of war. It was also considered to be a permanently declared war. Indeed, following the example of the prophets of the Hebrew Bible, Muhammad insisted that God sometimes sent heavenly hosts dressed in white turbans to assist his followers in the holy war against nonbelievers. When the aggressors and nonbelievers had submitted and accepted God, then mercy could be shown. The survival of the Islamic community in the early days depended on the ability of Muslims to remain in a military posture, and those who were unwilling to fight were assigned an inferior status.²⁵

It was the opinion of jurists that the principal collective obligation of the *umma*, or Islamic community, was to exalt the word of God as laid down by the Prophet, and to preserve the unity of the *umma*. This seemingly involved the caliph or *imam*, as the ruler of the Islamic religious state, in the duty of making perpetual holy war against nonbelievers until they submitted. This notion of Islamic unity and perpetual *jihād*, as Fred Donner says, could “logically lead to empire building.”²⁶ However, the term *jihād* includes rhetoric as well as Islamic legal doctrine. Islamic scholars recognized a difference between holy war and the usual sort of war that had occurred throughout human history, which was often caused by the ambitions of rulers or a desire to despoil neighboring states. The latter were unjust and unlawful. However, wars fought against those Muslims who attempted to secede, rebel, or promote civil war were both just and holy wars. As the Muslim world became more

stable and peaceful, the practice of *jihād* was largely confined to the borders with the Byzantine Empire. The decline of Byzantine power in the western Mediterranean opened up Italy and the Iberian Peninsula to Muslim attacks from North Africa. These attacks were notable because the Muslim warriors in this region were experts in sea warfare, unlike the desert Arabs who knew only cavalry warfare. The terrible sack of Rome came in 846, and the attacks on the Italian peninsula continued for the next century. The ninth and tenth centuries saw the Moorish invasion of Spain and an attempt to penetrate the kingdom of the Franks. The Muslim warriors who fought in these border clashes with the Byzantine Empire and Latin Christendom believed that they were *mujahidin*, or fighters of holy war, while those who died in these struggles were regarded as martyrs. Like the scholar-soldier, Asad ibn al-Furat, vizier to the Aghlabid rulers of Kairouan in Tunisia, who launched the invasion of Byzantine Sicily in 827, many of the *mujahidin* were non-Arabs from other parts of the Islamic world, such as Khurasan in the Steppes to the east of modern Turkey. These Turkish tribesmen played an increasingly important role in the military service of the caliphates. Concentrations of such Turkish warriors in Asia Minor led to the emergence of the Seljuk Empire.²⁷

After the remarkable expansion of the seventh century led to the establishment of the great Muslim empires, the concept of holy war became somewhat inconvenient to the ‘Umayyad caliphs and other Muslim rulers, who became more concerned with maintaining political stability. Instead of continuing to pursue military expansion, holy wars of defense seemed to make more sense. Some of the Islamic rulers failed to heed the opinions of the Islamic jurists and even entered into treaties with the rulers of nonbelievers and engaged in trade with their neighbors, including the Byzantine Empire—although these arrangements were always thought by Muslims to be temporary. When the ‘Umayyad caliphs completed their conquest of the Persian Empire at the end of the seventh century, they began developing sea power in order to extend their conquest to the European shores of Byzantium.²⁸

The armies of the early ‘Umayyad period under the caliphs of Damascus resembled the hostings of barbarians. Military leaders were selected from among tribal aristocracies because of their ability to gather warriors, who would be loyal to the regime of the caliphs, but there was no structure of command. Discipline and loyalty to the caliphs was enforced by a kind of

primitive military police. At the end of this period, the 'Umayyad armies began to show signs of professional training, such as the construction of well-planned rectangular camps with earthen and stone ramparts, watch towers, the digging of trenches, the use of caltrops as well as the deployment of kneeling spearmen to repel cavalry charges. They began to develop sounder tactics and to understand the value of good defense, and came to appreciate the interdependence of cavalry and infantry in battle.²⁹ However, they failed to develop the naval resources to challenge the Byzantine Empire on the European side of the Bosphorus.

When the 'Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad came to power in the later eighth century following the failed 'Umayyad attempts to take Constantinople, the expansion of the Islamic state was limited to warfare on the frontiers of the Byzantine Empire. Border raiding was confined to the summer, and this was sometimes little more than a seasonal ritual that provided an outlet for those who wished to participate in holy war. At other times, the campaigns were more extensive. This level of warfare was sufficient to maintain the reputation of the caliphs, provide opportunities for booty, and also served the function of providing opportunities for military training. Despite the provision for medical care, the volunteers, who came from many ethnic groups, often paid a heavy toll in battle casualties and deaths from disease.³⁰

Crusades against the Saracens

The concept of holy war as practiced by both the Muslims (or Saracens, as they were called in the Latin West) and the Franks (as the Muslims called the crusaders) left little room for constraints on how wars were fought. The Greeks, the Romans, the Arabs, and the Syrians had all thought of one another as "barbarians," which simply means that they regarded one another's culture as strange and alien. The Latin crusaders thought of themselves as the heirs of the ancient Greeks, Alexander the Great, imperial Rome, and Judas Maccabeus, the latter of whom had come to represent the ideal Christian knight. The crusaders did not observe any rules of war in their dealings with Muslims. The Muslims would spare Christians from death or slavery only if they converted to Islam, and the Frankish crusaders would spare only those Muslims who

became Christians. Both sides would also grant mercy to those who were wealthy enough to pay a ransom.³¹

The Arabs called the crusaders “Franks” because there was no Arabic word for crusader at that time. Strictly speaking, the war against the Franks was not the *jihād* to expand the boundaries of the *dar el-islam* at the expense of nonbelievers that Muslim jurists had in mind. Rather, as fought by Nur al-Din and Saladin, this war had the more limited goal of defending the unity and territorial integrity of the Islamic community. This view allowed Saladin to conclude a negotiated peace with the Franks. Saladin was aware that since he was not the caliph, he lacked the authority to declare and wage *jihād* against Christians. Islam was politically fragmented during the Wars of the Crusades, so the wars that individual Muslim rulers, such as Saladin, fought were something less than holy wars, although they did not hesitate to use the concept of *jihād* as a propaganda tool. However, the actual prosecution of the war was in the hands of professional soldiers, not fanatical amateurs. This helps us to understand how Muslim rulers and military commanders could agree to temporary truces. Sometimes these truces actually led to proposals for marriage between Muslims and Christians, but the Christian clergy would always frustrate such alliances. Clearly, the leaders of both camps saw room for diplomatic maneuvers to end hostilities, and were willing to permit pilgrimages and encourage commerce. At the same time, frequent violations of treaty terms were always at hand to provide the pretext for a renewal of fighting. Muslim scholars and military leaders also used Friday prayer services to whip up enthusiasm for the declaration of *jihād*. This not only had the effect of furnishing wider popular support for the war effort against the crusaders, but it also made life more difficult for Arab Christians (or polytheists as they were sometimes called because of their belief in the Trinity), and Christian churches were often seized as a consequence.³²

The periods of peace that interspersed the Wars of the Crusades were difficult to arrange because the Muslim and Latin Christian worlds had different concepts of peace. Peace was an ideal in both religious cultures. In Islam, it could result only from victory that brought justice, but war had to come first. In the Latin Christian view, as exemplified by the teachings of St. Augustine, universal and permanent peace must first be preceded by the end of the world and the day of last judgment. Both Muslims and Christians aimed

at the destruction of one another by *jihād* and crusade. Muslim legal scholars could conceive of peace among Muslims, but with nonbelievers, peace could be purchased only through conversion or paying tribute. In other words, holy war must continue to the end of time. However, *jihād* was a collective obligation; it did not bind each individual Muslim, and later Islamic scholars such as Ibn Rushd (Averroes) did allow for truces under compelling circumstances. Both Muslim imams and Catholic popes and prelates generally thought that truces and treaties with one another were evil—even when they were dictated by political circumstances—and could only be temporary.³³

Non-Muslims tended to associate Muhammad's teachings with private vengeance and political assassinations to a greater degree than the Prophet intended. The duty of Muslims to engage in *jihād* seemed to the Latin West to be the worst sort of aggression. They did not understand that, for the Muslim, holy war also implied an inner moral struggle. Despite the horror expressed concerning one another's concepts of holy war, it is worth comparing Muslim and Christian concepts of holy war because the two reveal certain similarities. Islamic jurists taught that *jihād* could be waged against bad Muslims and rebels as well as nonbelievers. Many Catholics also believed that holy war could be waged against Christian heretics and rulers who disagreed with papal policy.³⁴ With the rise of the feudal monarchies, Catholic theologians came to accept that war could be a way of maintaining peace and dispensing justice. But there remained from an earlier age an abhorrence of bloodshed and killing—even in a just war—as penitentials, or manuals prescribing penance for certain sins, indicated. Bishop Burchard of Worms insisted that soldiers needed to perform penance if they had killed someone in battle. Burchard did admit that the performance of penance and fighting the heathen could be combined, but the shedding of blood still required penance. This moral stricture seems to have been widespread in local church law, yet it did not derive from any church council or papal decree. The Gregorian reforms were hostile to the idea of performing penance in a just war that enjoyed papal or episcopal approbation, because no guilt attached to such actions provided they were performed for the right motive and not to seek glory or acquire booty.³⁵

The crusade was a species of holy war that was recognized in civil and canon law by the special status granted to individuals and expeditions by papal bull. It was a sanctification of war that combined the elements of just-war theory

with penance and pilgrimage. The crusader was granted a plenary indulgence, or full remission of all sins, for his participation or death in battle. The visible symbol of this special status was the white cross that the crusader wore. The crusades also represented an attempt to bring about peace among Christians by ending private feuding and war among Christian princes. Another function of crusading bulls issued by the papacy was to allow crusading expeditions to solicit contributions from both clergy and laity. Originally intended to liberate the Holy Land from the Saracens, the crusading concept was later applied to military expeditions sent to Syria and Morocco, against pagans in Prussia, Lithuania, and Finland, and also against heretical and schismatic Christians in the Byzantine Empire and southern France. The papacy also practiced a kind of economic warfare against its enemies and imposed sanctions that prohibited trading with Saracens, Moors, Mamluks in Egypt, and pagans in the Baltic region. The crusades led to a mentality in which the interests of the Catholic faith and the institutional Church were to be defended against heretics and schismatics or those who did not immediately submit to papal directives. This reinforced the concept of crusades against other Christians.³⁶

The crusades were also penitential pilgrimages, comparable to the inner struggle of the Islamic *jihād*, which were meant to purge sinfulness on the part of the knights, clerics, and lay folk. It was public penance performed with all of the attributes of theater, and foremost among these histrionic displays was the emphasis on unrestrained violence. The apologists for the Wars of the Crusades employed the holy war rhetoric of the Old Testament to justify their assault on the Saracens by likening themselves to the Israelites entering the Promised Land and slaying the Canaanites, but at the same insisting that their motives were purer than the Hebrews because they were recovering the Holy Places and relics for the glory of God rather than merely acquiring territory. The historical record of the exploits of the crusaders and pilgrims was set down largely by monks who emphasized that the Wars of the Crusades were conflicts between good and evil. Those who died in these wars were martyrs for the faith, and this was part of the effort to justify the conflict as a holy war.³⁷ Susanna Throop argues that the motivations of the Latin crusaders extended beyond the more familiar concepts of pilgrimage, penitence, just war, and holy war to a more fundamental urge to seek vengeance. This was not a secular idea that originated in a primitive lay society characterized by acts of

violence and feuding; it derived from the concept of an act sanctioned by divine and moral authority that combined judicial punishment with vengeance, and as such, was commended by religious writers such as St. Bernard of Clairvaux, Peter the Venerable, and others who represented vengeance as “almost a Christian virtue.” Such sentiments were not characteristic of all the clergy, and many continued to urge that justice and vengeance be tempered with mercy.³⁸

The prelates and clerics who accompanied the crusaders became militarized—especially those from the German-speaking lands. No fewer than twelve archbishops and bishops accompanied the Emperor Henry VI on his crusade of 1195–96. These prelates did not shy away from wielding the sword, and often led their *vassi* into battle. The Third Crusade of 1187–92 had included abbots as well as bishops who won their share of military glory. The popes were tolerant of such clerical bellicosity. The priests who accompanied the crusades made themselves available on the battlefield to hearten the warriors by their preaching. That the crusades were both holy wars and holy pilgrimages can be seen in the large numbers of humble folk—women, children, and the elderly—who accompanied most of the crusades. The crusaders were admonished to protect and feed these pilgrims, but some of them were abandoned on the long journey to the Levant because of sickness and inadequate provisions.³⁹

The regular clergy played a significant role in preaching the crusades. Some of the monks belonged to military orders that fought in the wars. Among the early purposes of the mendicant Franciscan and Dominican friars was the charge to undertake missionary work among the Muslims. St. Francis of Assisi actually went to Egypt in 1219 in an attempt to convert Sultan al-Kâmil. The sultan received St. Francis courteously and listened to what he had to say before allowing him to return under safe conduct. Another band of Franciscans went to Morocco to preach conversion, but insulted Islam and brought about their own martyrdom. This was not the only instance of Catholic clergy in Muslim lands verbally abusing Muhammad and Islam, and inciting violent retribution.⁴⁰

It must have appeared to many Muslims that the crusaders and their clerical supporters had designs on more than the Christian holy places in Palestine. One Muslim ruler and soldier who was aware of how vulnerable the fragmented polity of Islam was to the crusaders was the Kurdish sultan of Fatimid Egypt,

Saladin. He believed that he would need to conquer Syria in order to unite the Islamic community before attempting to recover the lands occupied by the Christian crusaders. This task he began by laying siege to Kerak, or Krak les Chevaliers, the great crusader castle in Syria. His first siege in 1153 was repelled, but he returned four years later after Reginald of Châtillon violated the terms of a truce between Saladin and Baldwin IV, King of Jerusalem, by attacking a caravan carrying Saladin's sister. Baldwin sought to compel Reginald to make amends, but the latter refused to do so. This gave Saladin the excuse to resume the war, and he gathered his forces to meet the crusader army near the village of Hettin on July 3, 1187. The Frankish crusaders were routed in perhaps the most important encounter of the Wars of the Crusades—a battle that continues to hold great significance for present-day Muslims. Reginald was executed by Saladin himself, two hundred Knights Templar and Hospitallers were massacred, and the rank and file of the crusader army were sold into slavery. It was only a matter of time before Jerusalem fell. The Christian governor of the city decided to strike a bargain with Saladin. If Saladin would allow the Christians to pay a ransom to be spared, he would yield. If not, he would put to the sword all of the Muslims of the city. Saladin agreed, and the Syrian Christians were allowed to keep their holy places. Saladin had a reputation for chivalry and was tolerant of Jews and Christians within limits, but at the same time, was determined to destroy the power of the Frankish crusaders.⁴¹

Another example of a Christian crusader who was prepared to negotiate with Muslim rulers and commanders was the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II. Frederick had been educated in Sicily where he had been personally acquainted with Muslims, and he spoke Arabic himself. He also employed at his court the astrologer and scholar Michael Scot, who had been one of the translators of Aristotle from Arabic texts at the cathedral school of Toledo in Spain. When Frederick went to the Holy Land to lead the Fifth Crusade, he carried with him the assumption that much wisdom and knowledge could be acquired by contact with the Arab world. Frederick had looked forward to leading a bloodless crusade in which he hoped to negotiate a truce with the Saracens. When Frederick reached Acre in 1228, he entered into talks with the Sultan al-Malik of Egypt, who was of the same mind. The sultan actually offered Frederick and the Christians access to Jerusalem, which no longer possessed any strategic value since the razing of its walls, but Pope Gregory IX

and the papal legate on the crusading expedition objected to a truce and excommunicated Henry, while Muslims took to the streets in the cities of the Levant to voice their outrage at the idea of a compromise with the Franks after being incited by their muezzins. Among the crusaders, the Knights Templar plotted his assassination. There was little popular support for diplomatic efforts at peace-making on either side.⁴²

As far as Latin Christendom was concerned, the most obtrusive presence of Muslims was to be found in the Iberian Peninsula. The Moors, as the Muslim Berbers of North Africa were called, had invaded Iberia in 711 under the leadership of the Arab general Târiq ibn Ziyâd and destroyed the short-lived kingdom of the Visigoths. There was little resistance to the Moorish occupation of Visigothic Spain, which encompassed some four-fifths of the peninsula by 720, because the new regime proved to be tolerant of Christians and Jews. Although the *reconquista* was not officially designated a crusade until 1212 by a papal bull of Innocent III, clearly the idea of a holy war or crusade sanctioned by ecclesiastical authorities with the usual grant of indulgences first emerged in eighth-century Iberia. The *reconquista*, or Christian reconquest of Spain, continued until 1492, when the kingdom of Granada, the last Moorish stronghold in Spain, fell to the armies of Ferdinand and Isabella. In the interim, for seven centuries, al-Andalus, or Andalusia, had been part of the *dar el-islam*, and Christian warriors from the northern part of Spain, the kingdom of Asturias, fought their version of a holy war to drive the Moors from Spain. The *reconquista* and the *conquista*, the Spanish conquest of the New World, signaled a revival of the crusades called for by the pope after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. The *reconquista* provided an excuse for the king of Castile to tax his subjects and an opportunity for glory and booty for *hidalgos* as well as ordinary Castilians to migrate to the rich lands of southern Spain. The initial policy of tolerating Muslims in the newly conquered territories was subsequently abrogated. When the monks of Cluny in Burgundy took control of the pilgrims' route from France to Santiago de Compostela, Spain became a place that attracted pilgrims as well as crusaders from all over Western Europe.⁴³

The Spanish and Portuguese holy war against the Moors carried over into North Africa, and later provided the driving spirit for the founding of overseas colonial empires. Following the end of the Portuguese War of Independence, the younger Portuguese noblemen and knights were looking for other frontiers

where they could seek honor and wealth in battle. Prince Henry's military expedition to seize the Moroccan port of Ceuta in 1415 provided an opportunity for military adventure in a crusade against the Muslims comparable to the opportunities afforded Castilian knights on the frontier with the Muslim kingdom of Granada. Prince Henry pressed his case for invading Ceuta with his father the king. Although King John appeared to hesitate to grant permission until he could assure himself that an invasion of Morocco constituted a just war, in actuality, the Portuguese kings had always accepted the papalist argument that any war against Muslims, pagans, or infidels could always be considered a just war. Despite their protestations of crusading zeal, the Portuguese conquerors were more intent on plundering Ceuta's merchants, both Muslim and Christian. Prince Henry and his followers were also aware that this foothold in Africa opened up the prospect of exploiting the Atlantic coast of Africa for colonization and trade.⁴⁴

Prince Henry was the son of King John I of Portugal and Philippa of Lancaster, and his descent from the English royal house of Lancaster made him aware that he was the heir of a notable chivalric tradition. He saw himself as dedicated to the tradition of crusading against the Moors. During his boyhood, the new Portuguese nobility, created after the old Portuguese nobility had sided with the Castilian invaders in Portugal's War of Independence from Spain, were dedicated to the proposition that war brought honor and profit; Henry's enthusiasm for exploration and trade as a source of wealth came later. His projects for the exploration of Guinea showed a rational mind at work: Henry was well educated and quite capable of planning such an expedition in detail; his approach to crusading, on the other hand, was emotional and less rational. As a crusader, Prince Henry kept the new Portuguese nobility busy fighting Moors or engaging in chivalric displays. He was quite aware of the maxim that the honor of a family could be maintained only by demonstrating prowess on the battlefield in each generation.⁴⁵

The Turkish holy war against Christendom

As the jihadist spirit waned among the Arabs and the Moors, another ethnic group emerged from out of the Steppes of Central Asia to lead the Islamic holy

war. These were the Turks, and their ambitions would extend to converting all Christians and conquering Europe as far west as the Atlantic. This change in the leadership of the Islamic world extended over several centuries and began when the 'Abbasid dynasty of caliphs succeeded the 'Umayyids in the middle of the eighth century. The new rulers of the Islamic world came to power with Persian assistance, and established a more centralized and absolute monarchy, as contrasted with the network of tribal alliances that characterized the government of the 'Umayyids. The 'Abbasid caliphs and their ministers were frequently men of humble birth and were often non-Arabs. The caliphate was moved from Damascus to Baghdad in the eighth century. The soldiers who were quartered in the military camp at Baghdad came from Kurasan on the northeast frontier, a region that had been part of the Sasanian Persian Empire. They were drawn into the city's factions, and civil war followed. The need to find a more loyal army caused the caliphs to recruit another military force that was increasingly drawn from the nomadic Turkish-speaking tribes of Iranian Transoxiana who originally came from the Steppes. The court and the army camp moved northward to Samarra on the River Tigris to get away from the factionalism of Baghdad. The Turks, who were skilled cavalrymen, constituted an elite group and lived in their own quarters. Eventually, they came to dominate the caliph's government. From that point on, Turkish became the language of the army and the caliph's court in the eastern half of the Islamic world. The Arabs who remained in the caliph's army played a diminishing role and mostly served as foot soldiers.⁴⁶

The nomadic Turks who constituted the elite troops at Samarra were used to spending as much time in the saddle as on foot. Although some of them were recruited as Mamluks, or slave soldiers, the Turks were brave and formidable fighters who came to enjoy free status and to regard themselves as superior to the caliph's other troops. They introduced new tactics and were skilled horse-archers. At first they had no particular loyalty to the predominantly Arab state of the caliphs and were not enthusiastic practitioners of holy war. They were recent converts to Islam, and what they sought was booty.⁴⁷

The migration of the Seljuk Turks from Transoxiana into the Near East in the eleventh century led to the conquest of Persia and the caliphate of Baghdad. The Seljuk Turks then turned their eyes toward the Byzantine territories in Anatolia, and after the defeat of the Byzantine forces at Manzikert (1071), they

colonized Anatolia to the point where Turks and Muslims became the dominant ethnic and religious group. The Turks were originally nomadic pastoralists, but thereafter, they gradually established themselves in the agricultural villages of eastern Anatolia. In the time of the Seljuk dynasty, from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, Persian culture was dominant in the court and cities of the Turkish Empire. The frontiers, however, were settled by many Turcoman dervishes, who had migrated from the Steppes more recently. These semi-nomadic frontier peoples were adherents of a mystical sect and were regarded as heretical by orthodox Muslims. They were especially devoted to continuous holy war and the conversion of Christians on the other side of the frontier. In the thirteenth century, the Seljuk Turks were overrun by the Mongols, and they became the vassals of the Mongol khan. The Mongols displaced many of the Turks of eastern Anatolia, and the latter were forced westward. This migration ended Byzantine rule in western Anatolia. Thereafter, the ruling class, formerly Persian-speaking under the Seljuks, became Turkish and Muslim. By the end of the thirteenth century, the Ottoman dynasty had replaced the Seljuks.⁴⁸

The original concept of *jihād* as expounded by Muhammad and the Islamic jurists was to expand the Islamic community in all directions in order to spread the message of the prophet. During the Wars of the Crusades, this came to include defending the Islamic community against the incursions of the Frankish crusaders in Palestine and the Levant. With the rise of the Turkoman principalities in the thirteenth century—most notably the Ottomans—a new form of holy war emerged in the *ghazâ*, which focused on the efforts of the *ghazis*, or Islamic warriors, in conquering the Christian West, including the Byzantine Empire. This strategy involved the conquest of Byzantine Anatolia and Constantinople and the Balkans, gaining control of the Mediterranean and its commerce as well as the former territories of the western part of the Roman Empire. Thus, the ambition of the Turkish sultans extended to claiming the caliphate, a title assumed by Murad I in the latter part of the fourteenth century, which gave the sultans the authority to wage holy war against the Christians and other infidels, as well as the Roman imperial title formerly borne by the Byzantine emperors prior to the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and by the emperors of Rome prior to the founding of Constantinople. The rise of the Ottoman Turks also changed the orientation of the Christian

crusading movement because from the crusaders' point of view these wars ceased to be an attempt to reconquer Palestine and convert by the sword, and instead, became a desperate attempt to defend Europe from Turkish expansion. The sultan's exclusive claim to the caliphate also involved the Ottoman Turks in eliminating rival sultans and caliphs in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria. The proclamation of *ghazâ*, or holy war, by the Ottoman Turkish sultans implied that they were the successors of all caliphs and *imams* going back to the Prophet himself.⁴⁹

The primary source of the sultan's authority was his military leadership. During the fourteenth century, the Ottoman military force had changed from a group of raiders (the original meaning of *ghazi* was raider) to a disciplined army capable of mounting sieges and engaging in pitched battles. The two most important branches of the Ottoman army were the cavalry, the members of which held a *timar*, a kind of feudal fief, which freed the cavalryman from dependence on pillaging in exchange for military service when called on, and the Janissaries, a skillful body of guards with a strong esprit de corps. These two groups were the basis of the Ottoman standing army. Because they served on a contractual basis, the sultan could raise a predictable number of soldiers every year. The corps of Janissaries (which means "new army" in Turkish) was the first standing army in Europe. They were the enslaved children of non-Muslims who were acculturated and enrolled in the Ottoman army as a distinct corps paid by the treasury and served directly under the command of the sultan. The Ottoman army also began using gunpowder weapons during the fourteenth century. The Ottoman artillery was manned by mercenary soldiers, and constituted the first standing corps armed with cannons in Europe. These Ottoman units were a highly disciplined force in contrast to the crusader and other Western armies in which mounted knights and other members of elite cavalry corps showed an obsessive concern with individual honor that frustrated the attempts of their commanders to maintain cohesiveness when engaging the more tactically innovative Turkish light horse, who easily picked off knights who broke formation to engage in single combat. The sultan's army achieved a notable victory when it defeated the French crusaders at the Battle of Nicopolis in 1396.⁵⁰

Since the Ottoman Empire was essentially a military organization, the sultan's command of an effective and well disciplined army afforded him a

distinct advantage, and enabled him to hold together a conglomeration of diverse nationalities and religions. Islam was, of course, the official religion, although Christians and Jews sometimes held minor offices. To Machiavelli, the sultan appeared to be an absolute monarch by virtue of his political and military leadership, but in fact, there were a number of limitations on his power. He could not alter Islamic law, which was immutable; the strength of custom was such that his law-making powers were quite limited. As long as the sultans led their armies in the field, their military power was extensive, but maintaining discipline among the corps of Janissaries, the sultan's household infantry, could be a problem because they mutinied frequently when their demands for rewards or booty were not met. Also, the very complexity of Ottoman government gave viziers, court officials, and bureaucrats some degree of influence—especially after the sultan ceased to attend meetings of the imperial council in the mid-fifteenth century. And, of course, the tendency to solve the question of succession among the sultans' many sons by fratricide was bound to introduce a certain degree of instability. A sultan with a strong personality, however, could prevail in the face of these limitations on his power.⁵¹

When the Ottomans under Sultan Mehmet II were making preparations to invest Constantinople, the Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI sent an urgent plea to Pope Nicholas V asking for help in defending the Byzantine capital. The pope did supply some aid to the Knights of Rhodes, Cyprus, and the kingdom of Hungary, but he refused assistance to the Byzantines unless the Orthodox Church entered into union with Rome. Nicholas V, it would seem, had intended to help the Greeks, but he had used the issue of schism as a bargaining chip; he was quite shocked when Constantinople fell to the Turks, and his reputation suffered much as a consequence. He issued a crusading bull when he realized that the sultan had designs on Italy. However, at that time, the rulers of Renaissance Europe were too divided and absorbed in their own problems to undertake a war against the Grand Turk.⁵² Also, the Turkish massacre of Christian prisoners of war following the Battle of Nicopolis in 1396 had shaped Western views of Turkish cruelty and discouraged many would-be crusaders for years to come.⁵³

Following the successful Ottoman siege of Constantinople in 1453, commentators in the Latin Christian West were unable to recognize and appreciate Turkish military prowess, organization, and discipline because the

Turks were infidels. The humanist Aeneas Sylvius Piccolimi, the future Pope Pius II, who lamented the death of Greek letters, asserted that the Turks were effeminate and lacking in martial prowess. Many Christians who believed that Divine Providence was the first and only source of causation in history, thought that the Turks had been sent by God as punishment for the sins of Christians; they could undo this calamity only by repenting and mounting a strong defense of their faith and the integrity of Christendom. At the end of his life, Pius II sought to lead a crusade against the Turks in 1463, but he died before it could be brought to fruition.⁵⁴

Having conquered Constantinople, Mehmet II saw himself as the greatest Islamic ruler since the first four caliphs, the successor of the Roman emperors, and the upholder of the Roman, Islamic and Turkish claims to universal sovereignty. Selim I (1512–20) also claimed to be the protector of the Jews and the Greek and Armenian churches, and appointed the patriarchs of those churches. With the incorporation of the Arab lands into the Ottoman Empire, Selim also became the protector of the pilgrim routes to Mecca and Medina and of all Muslims. As *gazi* sultans, they were devoted to making continuous holy war, and such a policy also had the benefit of providing wealth for the Ottoman treasury.⁵⁵

The expansionism of the Ottoman Turks led to a revival of the crusading ethos in Western and Central Europe. The grand master of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem warned that Mehmet II intended to conquer all of Europe. The Venetians were especially alarmed by this news because of their trading interests and ports in the eastern Mediterranean, and they begged the pope and other Western rulers for assistance. Pope Nicholas V, regretting his miscalculation concerning the threat that the Turks had posed to Constantinople, hoped to bring about peace in Europe so as to gather forces to repel the expected Turkish advance. Other prelates and clerics also came forward to preach another crusade and to remind their audience of Turkish cruelty. When an appropriate response failed to materialize in the Latin West, a number of bishops lamented the lives of soldiers wasted in civil conflicts, such as the Wars of the Roses, when they could have been fighting the Turks. As we shall see, there were other crusading efforts in the late medieval period in the Baltic Sea area, the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean islands, and the Iberian Peninsula, but without the formidable Turkish threat, there probably

would not have been such an emphasis in the Latin West on the continuing importance of religious war. With the exception of Portugal and the Balkans, other late medieval crusades in the Baltic and Spain were subsiding.⁵⁶

The most notable attempt to halt the westward advance of the Ottoman Turks in the Balkans was the Crusade of Varna, which involved several battles fought in 1443–45.⁵⁷ The politics behind the various military and naval campaigns that constituted this crusade were more complicated than the religious conflicts between the Muslims and the Latin and Orthodox churches. The Genoese were allies of the Ottomans, as was the Christian ruler of Athens. The enemies of the Ottoman sultan comprised not only the Byzantines, the Venetians, and the Hungarians, but also the Muslims of Karaman in southern Anatolia, where the Mongol ruler Timur had earlier restored the khanate in opposition to the Ottomans. The involvement of the Genoese and the Venetians, often inveterate enemies, together with the Burgundians, provided a naval dimension to these struggles. The main battle of the crusade was fought between the Ottoman and Hungarian armies on November 10, 1444, at Varna on the Bulgarian coast of the Black Sea. At first, it appeared that the Hungarians would prevail because of the devastation wrought by their artillery on the Turkish army under the command of Murad II, but Vladislav III, king of Hungary and Poland, foolishly charged ahead of the ranks of his army and was killed by the sultan's Janissaries. This decided the battle, and the failure of the Crusade of Varna delivered the predominantly Orthodox Balkan Peninsula into the hands of the Ottoman Muslims rather than the Catholics. With allies as disparate as Hungary and the khanate of Karaman, it is little wonder that the opponents of Sultan Murad II failed to coordinate their military efforts. The collapse of the Hungarian Army at Varna and the quarrels between Venice and the papacy made it impossible to continue the crusade. There were a few more skirmishes as the ships of the Burgundians resorted to piracy in the Bosphorus and the Black Sea.⁵⁸

From their victory at Varna, the Ottoman Turks had turned their attention to capturing Constantinople, the great center of Eastern Christianity. They then besieged Rhodes and advanced up the Danube Valley, capturing Belgrade in 1521 and defeating the Hungarians at Mohacs in 1526. Not until after 1683, when the Siege of Vienna was lifted, did the Turkish threat begin to subside. The fall of Constantinople was a great loss to the world of humanist learning; it also raised the possibility of the eradication of Christianity. That was why the

papacy responded with a crusade to defend Christendom and to reinforce its defenses in borderlands such as Hungary, Transylvania, Cyprus, Malta, Rhodes, and the outposts of the Venetian Empire along the Adriatic. In order to encourage soldiers to volunteer for this crusade, every effort was made to demonize the Turks and depict them as barbarians, like their alleged ancestors the Scythians. Others called on Biblical prophecies that identified the Turks with Gog and Magog of the apocalyptical Last Battle.⁵⁹

Fernand Braudel considered it significant that Christendom should have built formidable defenses mounted with heavy ordnance against Islamic expansion along its eastern frontier in Austria, Hungary, and the islands in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean seas that were held by the Venetians and the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, while the Turks, who built no such defensive line, gloried in wars of aggression against the Christian West and pursued those holy wars to the gates of Vienna. Braudel thinks that one of the motives of the Turks, besides their endless pursuit of holy war, was that the Turks needed to acquire knowledge of Western military technology such as improved gunpowder weapons and naval shipbuilding from the Christians to employ against their Persian enemies to the east. The Christian powers, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, the Poles, the Venetians, and their allies continued to defend the frontier against the Turks until the latter were beaten back from Vienna and were driven out of Hungary in the seventeenth century. The Western determination to mount offensive crusading wars against the Turkish Empire, however, ended in the wake of the defeat of the Turkish naval fleet at the Battle of Lepanto of 1572, which was not as great a victory for the Christian powers as it is sometimes represented. Following Lepanto and the Turkish conquest of the Venetian outpost on the island of Cyprus in 1570–71, the Turkish advance was slowed and they entered a period of decline and retreat from their earlier conquests in Europe. Thereafter, the war in the Mediterranean continued at the level of piracy and brigandage.⁶⁰

Crusades against Christians

Crusading had begun as an ideology based on the determination of the papacy and other Latin Christian powers, the Byzantine emperors, and their Orthodox

allies to halt Muslim expansion as well as to recover the holy places of Jerusalem. Muslims remained the chief enemy, but in later crusades, other enemies of the Church or papacy were also pursued, such as Christian heretics, schismatics, and pagans. Pope Gregory IX had established the Roman Inquisition in 1231 to conduct inquiries concerning heresy and to try individual heretics, but it was not capable of dealing with heresy on such a large scale. For this reason, crusades against heretical Christian sects were proclaimed under papal authority, but required the participation of Christian kings and knights, whose cooperation could be procured only if these military campaigns also served their secular interests. Expansionism and dynastic ambitions were always an integral part of the holy wars of both Christendom and Islam.⁶¹

Honorius II was the first pope to declare a holy war against a Christian ruler, Roger, the Norman Count of Sicily, whom the pope labeled “a semi-pagan tyrant.” Roger had supported the anti-pope Anacletus, and employed Muslim courtiers and soldiers. Honorius promised the Normans of Apulia, who undertook to fight Count Roger full forgiveness of their sins if they died in battle; those who fought and survived were allowed a half remission of their sins. The papal crusade against Count Roger resulted in a victory for Pope Innocent II, who had succeeded Honorius. This first holy war against Christians followed the model of the First Crusade, which had been proclaimed by Pope Urban II at Clermont in 1095. One of the precedents for employing holy war against other Christians was the Peace and Truce of God movement, which was directed at violent and lawless bands within Christendom. A number of bishops had organized groups of the faithful in the eleventh century to compel lawless individuals and gangs to behave themselves, and they administered oaths to these prototype parish constables to enforce the peace. Such peace militias, organized by parishes, with the priests bearing banners before them, were sent against robber-barons such as Thomas of Marle, who had terrorized a whole province from his castle of Crécy-sur-Serre in northern France. Before assaulting Crécy, the parishioners were absolved of their sins, and told that their penance was to lay siege to the castle. In southern France, a region much troubled by *routiers*, or roving bands of mercenary soldiers, and a region where the king of France’s authority and reach were less sure, peace edicts were also used to raise peace militias by various prelates. The use of such peace militias,

the members of which were promised indulgences, was also a precedent for the later crusade against the Cathars or Albigensians, and there was some popular confusion of the *routiers* with the Albigensians.⁶²

In 1208, Pope Innocent III attempted to stop the spread of the Cathar heresy in Languedoc by preaching and by appeal to King Philip Augustus, but the French monarch was more interested in fighting wars with other Christian kings. The pope then decided to appeal to Christian knights from other parts of France to launch a holy war or crusade against the Cathars by promising that such a crusade would make participants instruments in God's work by granting them absolution of sins. Those who died in such an undertaking would be regarded as martyrs just like those who had participated in the crusades to recover the Holy Land. The papal blessing on wars directed against fellow Christians was supported by a radical reorientation of Christian thinking in the eleventh century that made it acceptable to employ violence in carrying out God's work when peaceful means had failed. Not all theologians and canonists supported this granting of indulgences and absolution of sins to crusaders, and Sigebert of Gembloux wondered where the popes got this authority to wage war—especially against Christians. Pope Leo IX had actually declared war against the Normans in Sicily by claiming that they were worse than pagans. Such holy wars proclaimed and waged by the papacy might have gained more support if they had been more successful; their usual lack of success raised the question whether God had actually authorized these wars.⁶³

The war against the Cathars, also known as the Albigensian Crusade or the Occitan War, was viewed as a war fought to protect the Church from heretics or internal enemies, and thus, was construed as a just war. This argument was, however, rejected by many of the leaders and inhabitants of Languedoc, such as Raimon-Roger, Count of Foix. In the event, the knightly code of chivalry as well as Christian ethics, provided few, if any, of the customary constraints of how the Occitan War was fought, or indeed, any of the informal rules of war observed in the conflicts between Christians and Muslims. By any measure, the Albigensian Crusade was an exceptionally brutal war in which prisoners, civilian and military, men, women, and children, were mutilated and massacred in the cause of eliminating heresy. Such atrocities were not committed only for religious reasons, however; also involved were rivalries based on conflicting feudal jurisdictions and allegiances.⁶⁴

It is now generally accepted among medievalists that combat between mounted knights on the battlefield was rare during the Middle Ages, while sieges of strongly fortified towns and castles as well as raiding were more usual. The nobility of southwestern France raided one another frequently before the beginning of the Albigensian Crusade. The crusaders, on the other hand, demonstrated a willingness to engage in devastating and costly siege warfare. Although the crusader armies in the Languedoc region always included some knights who served their feudal lords, most of the soldiers fought for pay. These included many *routiers* who were mercenaries who lacked political allegiances and who were feared because of their utterly ruthless methods of war. If captured as prisoners in the Occitan War, they were often massacred.⁶⁵

Holy war against Christian heretics had thus become an instrument of papal policy. The *militia Christi*, the knights of Christ, were originally conceived of as a purely spiritual force, devoted to prayer and ascetic practices. Pope Gregory VII (the former Hildebrand) began to put a more military construction on the term and began to conceive of the knights of Christ going out into the world and engaging in actual combat on behalf of the Church and the patrimony of St. Peter. He inaugurated the practice of appealing to temporal monarchs and knights to wield the sword on behalf of the papal states. Thus, pious devotion was interwoven with the feudal obligation to render military service as a papal vassal. Pope Gregory was moving in the direction of holy war as an instrument of papal policy against those temporal rulers such as the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV, who had incurred papal displeasure and was excommunicated. One of the most ardent defenders of the Gregorian doctrine of war against heretics, Bonizo of Sutri, stated that it was the duty of all Christians to fight heretics by means appropriate to their status: priests by spiritual means, and knights with weapons of war. Moreover, Christians should fight heretics more fiercely than pagans or unbelievers.⁶⁶

While many of the supporters of Pope Gregory VII and his predecessor Pope Leo IX, who had proclaimed holy war against the Normans in Sicily, held that the use of violence and war in defense of the faith was laudable, there were papal advisors, such as Peter Damian, Cardinal Bishop of Ostia, who were opposed to using force against heretics. Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury, was also opposed to the papal proclamation of the crusade because he thought that all war was profane and immoral. But those who supported the concept of

holy war could draw on the example of the military heroes of the Old Testament, such as Joshua, David, and Judas Maccabeus, and the mythical or actual warrior saints such as Sebastian, Maurice, George, Denis, Theodore, and James (the Spanish Santiago), whose patronage and protection were widely believed to bring victory in battle.⁶⁷

In the twelfth century, the papal concept of holy war was also extended to northern Europe. The Northern Crusades, which were at first directed against pagans in the Baltic Sea region, were recognized as holy wars by papal bulls issued between 1147 and 1505. The Danes and the Swedes, later joined by the Teutonic Knights, attempted to pacify and Christianize the Prussians, the Lithuanians, the Latvians, and other peoples called Balts, who had been in this region since before Roman times. This lent legitimacy to a war of territorial conquest by drawing on crusader and chivalric traditions, and this helped to attract contributions and volunteers from a wide area of Central and Western Europe. In their continuing quest for territory and trade, the Teutonic Knights did not hesitate to go up against nations with older Christian traditions such as Poland.⁶⁸

The Slavs, or Wends, as the Germans called them, were more recent arrivals than the Balts. The Baltic Slavs were quite militarized because, as they moved into the Baltic region in the ninth and tenth centuries, they had to be able to defend themselves against the Vikings and the Germans. They had a warrior class, supported by peasants, and they quickly learned how to build fortifications and to fight on the sea as well as land. They lived in fortified village communities clustered along rivers and estuaries. The dense forests and impenetrable bogs made settlement on land away from the rivers and estuaries difficult. The Baltic Slavs were slow to accept Christianity, and clung to their pagan holy places long after their nominal conversion, but so did the inhabitants of Denmark and Sweden. Even after the ruling classes had accepted Christianity, the rural areas saw continued resistance to Christian belief. Of all the various Baltic peoples, the Lithuanians put up the most cohesive struggle against the aggressions of their Christian neighbors because they had a line of princes that provided strong leadership. The tendency of the Balts and the Slavs to fortify their communities, and to fight back and to resist Christianity provided a challenge to crusaders from Germany and the West.⁶⁹

The first of the Northern Crusades was the Wendish Crusade of 1147. This supposed holy war in the lands along the frontier to the east of Hamburg and

the Elbe River began when the land-grabbing Saxons overran the lands of the Wends. The Saxon warriors and their chiefs had lived as raiders and mercenaries, and were hardly more civilized than the Wendish chiefs whom they displaced. The crusading phase began when a bishopric was established at Lübeck, and priests were called in to convert and tame the supposedly more savage Slavs. German invaders of Slavic lands had previously been content to levy tribute money, but the Slavic peasants were now rounded up and forced to live in fortified stockades dominated by wooden blockhouses, where they could be exploited more effectively. The Wendish Crusade of 1147 involved both the Saxons and their Danish allies, and was recognized in a bull issued by Pope Eugenius III. Paying tribute to the Germans was no longer sufficient; Slavs were now compelled to convert to Christianity or die. However, in all subsequent Northern Crusades, conversion remained subordinate to the acquisition of land and collecting tribute. This became a cause of contention between the Saxon nobles and the numerous bishops from other German cities who also participated in the Wendish Crusade.⁷⁰

The Teutonic Knights were the most successful of all the major monastic military orders of crusaders. Like the Knights Templar and the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, they began their operations in the crusades to recover the Holy Land. After their expulsion by the Turks, the Teutonic Knights transferred their operations to the Baltic, where they combined fighting pagan Prussians and Lithuanians with the opening of the Baltic hinterland to trade and the exploitation of raw materials. In the process, the Teutonic Knights built an extensive territorial state, ruled as an *Ordenstaat*,⁷¹ and were able to recruit many members of the lesser nobility of Germany, who were eager to acquire land. In 1309, the order established their headquarters at Marienburg, just as the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, also expelled from the Holy Land by the Turks, had moved to Rhodes. They justified their acquisitions of territory by the need to extirpate paganism in Prussia and Livonia, quite ignoring the fact that some of the lands that they grabbed belonged to Christian Poles and Livonians. Prussia was extensively resettled by immigrant Germans. Livonia and Poland then served as bases from which to conquer pagan Lithuania. The Lithuanians tried to head off conquest by the Teutonic Order by opening negotiations directly with both the papacy and the Russian Orthodox Church concerning their possible conversion to Christianity. This was only a ploy, and

the conquest of the Lithuanians, a martial people, involved a long and bitterly fought war during the fourteenth century in the most difficult of terrain. These *Reisen*, or summer and winter campaigns of the Teutonic Knights, which were undertaken against the heathen Lithuanians, were particularly popular with noblemen and knights from England and France, and gave them something to do during the intervals of peace in the Hundred Years War. Prussia acquired the reputation as a place where one could gain unique expertise in the exercise of arms.⁷²

The Teutonic Knights continued to insist that their efforts to conquer and convert the pagan Lithuanians in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries constituted a holy war. This argument, however, was undercut when the Lithuanians became Christians. In 1386, Jadwiga of Poland married Jogaila of Lithuania just after the latter had been baptized a Christian and accepted the new name of Wladyslaw. Since the territories of the two greatest enemies of the Teutonic Knights' *Ordenstaat* had been united and the Lithuanians were nominally Christians, the Teutonic Order no longer possessed a justification for launching crusades. Internal strife in Lithuania made it difficult for the Lithuanians to take the field against the Teutonic Knights. Many among the Teutonic Knights and their supporters remained unpersuaded that the Lithuanians had sincerely accepted Christianity, and more military campaigns were sent against the Lithuanians, who had territorial ambitions of their own. They and the Poles sometimes called on the Russians and the Muslim Tartars for military assistance. The Teutonic Knights suffered a major defeat at the Battle of Tannenberg in 1410. Although the Teutonic Knights survived, the order had lost its crusading appeal and fewer Westerners volunteered for their *Reisen*. Moreover, when these issues were debated at the Council of Constance in 1415, it was charged against the Teutonic Knights that they were more interested in territorial aggrandizement than converting the pagans of the territories that they had conquered. Clearly, the Baltic Crusades were no longer regarded as holy wars, since the *Reisen* were now directed against Christians. For a time, the Teutonic Knights attempted to maintain their status as crusaders by fighting the Hussites and defending part of Transylvania against the Ottoman Turks. When volunteers ceased to come from the West, the order began hiring mercenaries, who proved difficult to manage, while their own subjects became unhappy with the governance of the Knights, and they faced

the continuing enmity of the Poles, and later, the Russians. The knights gradually began to abandon their monastic rules and to secularize themselves, a process that was completed at the time of the Lutheran Reformation when the grand master of the Teutonic Knights, the Margrave Albert of Brandenburg-Anspach, transformed the *Ordenstaat* into a dynastic secular state in 1525. The Teutonic Knights lost governance and Prussia became a duchy.⁷³

Some of those who attacked the sacred violence of crusades and holy wars as proclaimed by the papacy were members of heretical sects. The Hussite heresy in Bohemia posed a particularly severe threat to orthodoxy and Christian unity because it was fed by Czech nationalist feelings. The papacy was unable to deal effectively with the Hussites through the Inquisition because the Great Schism and the corrupt practices of the papal court had diminished the reputation of the Church and the authority of the popes. The Hussite movement was strengthened by the support of the Bohemian nobility, the intellectual coherence of its beliefs, which derived from the teachings of the English heresiarch John Wyclif, and the hatred of the Germans on the faculty of the University of Prague. The leader of this Czech reform movement was John Hus (c. 1369–1415).⁷⁴ Hus was a vigorous and prolific preacher who reached a large audience because his sermons were delivered in Czech. Whereas the Wycliffite heresy in England was largely suppressed, the Hussite heresy was more difficult to deal with because King Wencelas IV manipulated the movement to pursue his anti-Habsburg agenda. Those clerics who were sent by the Roman pontiff to preach against the Hussite movement were ignored, and the archbishop of Prague, having failed to enforce obedience to Rome, resigned. Hus's attempt to defend his views at the Council of Constance led to his condemnation and execution as a heretic in 1415. This only served to make Hus a martyr and to strengthen popular support for his teachings. The resulting conflict led to two civil wars in 1424 and 1434. The inability to control the Hussite Revolt moved Pope Martin V to proclaim a crusade, which was led in 1420 by the emperor-elect, Sigismund of Hungary, and a number of German princes and prince-bishops. The crusade was defeated by the Hussite armies, as was a second crusade in 1421 and a third in 1422.⁷⁵

The Hussite reform movement consisted of many factions, ranging from conservative reformers, who were found among the Bohemian and Moravian nobility and the faculty of the University of Prague, to social radicals who

wished to turn the world upside down. The latter included Taborites, so called after the town of Tabor, where many of them had migrated to share their unorthodox and revolutionary ideas, which struck terror in the hearts of ecclesiastical and temporal rulers throughout much of central and Western Europe. So great was the fear of the Taborites and other Bohemian radicals that there was perhaps more enthusiasm for crusades sent against them than those launched against the Turks. For their part, the Taborites put forward the brilliant and capable leader of the Hussite forces, John Žižka. Žižka's leadership of the Hussite armies was characterized by brilliant tactics and strong discipline together with religious zeal. Some of the anti-Hussite crusaders came from as far away as England and Burgundy, and one crusade was led by the English prelate Henry, Cardinal Beaufort. When they were not repelling German, English, and Burgundian crusaders, the Bohemian Hussites fell out among themselves because the nobility feared the radical groups that emerged during the Hussite Reformation such as the Taborites. In retaliation for foreign intervention, some Hussite military forces raided Saxony, Franconia, and the Upper Palatinate in southern Germany. Another crusade, sponsored by the pope and Julian, Cardinal Cesarini, and Albert V, Duke of Moravia, also failed to crush the Hussites. The mounting of crusades against Christian heretics, such as the Hussites and the Waldensians in the Alpine regions of France and Savoy, were failures and both sects survived into the sixteenth century when they merged with the Protestants. At the same time, the papacy and the Habsburgs needed to be wary of the continuing westward advances of the Ottomans.⁷⁶

Generally speaking, the religious wars of Europe were confined to the latter part of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries. However, Bohemia experienced two centuries of confessional conflict that began with the Hussite Revolt and the execution of that precursor of the Reformation, Jan Hus, in 1415. Within four years of Hus's death, Jan Želivský, a priest and follower of Hus, led a crowd to reclaim the church where Želivský had been deprived of his benefice, and expelled the orthodox Catholic priest and congregation. From there, the angry crowd followed him to the New Town Hall to release a number of Hussite prisoners. When the Prague magistrates did not comply, the Hussites threw them from the top of the tower to the pavement below. This anticipated by two hundred years the more famous

defenestration of Prague of 1618, when several Habsburg officials were thrown out of a high window, which was followed by the Thirty Years War. The two centuries between these two defenestrations were filled with half a dozen anti-Hussite crusades and a full-scale revolt during which the Bohemian Hussites elected their own king, George of Poděbrady. This led to conflicts with Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus and with the Catholic Bohemian dynasty, the Jagiellonians. The Habsburgs became kings of Bohemia in 1526 in the person of Ferdinand I, who subsequently tried to reconvert his Czech subjects to Catholicism and who later invited the Jesuits to assist in this endeavor. Confessional clashes between the Hussites, some of whom displayed Lutheran sympathies, and the Catholics continued into the seventeenth century. The defeat of the Hussites and the German Calvinist prince, Frederick V, Elector Palatine, whom they had elected as king of Bohemia, at the Battle of White Mountain outside Prague began the Thirty Years War and the most thorough-going recatholicization undertaken anywhere during the Counter-Reformation.⁷⁷

Wars of the Reformation

Protestant thinkers generally condemned the Wars of the Crusades. Thomas Fuller, in his *History of Holy War* (1639), stated that they were excessively long, cruel, and costly. He had doubts about whether these incursions into the Holy Land could be regarded as just wars, and he suggested that an argument could be made that the Saracens possessed a legitimate title to the lands that they ruled. The only possible argument for calling the crusades a just war was that they were defensive in nature, which Fuller doubted. Sir Walter Raleigh stated that the Muslims had also put forward a similar argument. Both Fuller and Raleigh objected that one of the main goals of the Wars of the Crusades was to convert Muslims to Christianity by the sword, which they regarded as repugnant. Protestants generally saw the concept of holy war in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as an attempt by the papacy to undermine the power of princes.⁷⁸

It is no longer thought to be accurate to label the Wars of the Reformation as crusades. The preferred term is religious war. A religious war is a conflict in

which at least one of the belligerents bases its claim to be fighting a just war on religious law or beliefs. The use of the term religious war in early modern Europe was based on a claim to legitimacy, not on actual motivation, which was likely to be much more complicated and difficult to discern—especially considering that there were something like 250 wars in Europe between the late fifteenth century and the end of the eighteenth century, with at least 500 distinct belligerent parties participating. The term religious war seems to be more applicable to those wars fought after the middle of the sixteenth century.⁷⁹

Despite the wide influence that Martin Luther had on the settlement of religion and the emergence of more assertive secular governments in the Holy Roman Empire and Scandinavia, it cannot be said that he was a systematic thinker or that he was possessed of political imagination. His passions too often got the better of him and caused him to overreact—however sincere his desire for reform. He was notably consistent on one doctrine: that it was the duty of all Christians to obey constituted authority and never to resist it. Although true Christians did not need to be restrained and punished by the sword, Luther maintained that there were few true Christians in the world. The true Christian, however, submitted himself to the secular power and performed duties required by the prince because the sword was needed to preserve peace in the world and to restrain the wicked. Princes and magistrates were needed to maintain order, and only when peace and order reign could the word of God be preached and spread. In his pamphlet *Concerning Secular Authority* (1523), Luther stated that while the ruler also possessed the authority to reform the Church, he could not compel men to accept specific beliefs that were not sanctioned by Scripture or to worship in a certain way contrary to the same.⁸⁰

In his *To the Christian Ruling Class of the German Nation* (1520), Luther rejected the traditional Catholic teaching that secular rulers have no jurisdiction over the Church or that only the pope could summon a church council and that the pope possessed authority to depose princes. Luther also denied that there was any distinction between clergy and laymen because baptism consecrates all Christians and makes them all priests. Bishops and priests can baptize and consecrate only because the whole Christian congregation has delegated to them that sacerdotal authority that belongs to

all Christians. Princes and magistrates were ordained by God “to punish evil-doers and to protect the law-abiding,” and this authority to correct extended over the clergy as well as the laity, and could be exercised without hindrance from popes, bishops, and priests. This gave the princes the authority, from God, to reform all things pertaining to religion as long as they abided by sacred Scripture. Luther believed that those portions of canon law that decreed otherwise were devised by the “archdevil himself.” Luther was too naive to see that the princes would not always act in the best interests of the Christian community. Accepting Luther’s invitation to reform the churches within their jurisdictions, the German princes established Erastian churches. Although Luther thought that princes were often fools, he recognized his dependence on them when the Peasants’ Revolt broke out in May 1525. Luther actually witnessed some of the violence on a journey through Thuringia, and he subsequently wrote a ferocious pamphlet entitled *Against the Robbing and Murderous Hordes of Peasants* (1525), in which he urged the princes to crush the rebellion with whatever means were necessary.⁸¹

Theological and political discourse in sixteenth-century Europe had moved beyond the confines of the academic world, and became abusive and incendiary. In Germany during the early stages of the Reformation, there had been attempts to keep the debate within an academic setting and in Latin. But the Protestant and Catholic reformers, even if they came from an academic background, could not resist the temptation of playing to a popular audience by way of sermons preached and books published in the vernacular—the latter of which took advantage of the printing press and lower costs of production. Like medieval popes and inquisitors, they staged book burnings to catch the attention of the public. The debate grew especially acrimonious in France where royal authority was weakened in the second half of the sixteenth century, and as Andrew Pettegree says, the Protestants “encouraged disobedience and disorder within families” and opened divisions within French society that led to religious and civil war. The Catholic polemicists, for their part, depicted heresy as such a monstrous thing that popular outrage and violence led almost inevitably to such events as the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in Paris.⁸²

Considering what had happened in Bohemia during the Hussite disturbances of the fifteenth century, it is small wonder that the Lutheran Reformation unleashed forces of social and economic unrest. Religious protests provided a

degree of ideological unity to disparate social and economic grievances that troubled the feudal and seigneurial societies of the German states as well as those lands within and bordering Habsburg Austria, the Holy Roman Empire, and the Swiss Confederation. Rural and urban communities both suffered from population pressure and inflation, and wages and rents had not adjusted to these changed economic conditions. The imperial knights, or the lesser nobility of the empire, were losing power and influence to the territorial princes and the imperial free cities, and their lawless and undisciplined habits did not accord well with the new political and military order. Many served as mercenary soldiers to eke out a living, while others lived as robber barons. The problem was especially acute in southwestern Germany where Franz von Sickingen led the Knights Revolt of 1522–23. Their armed protest failed, and when they retreated to their castles for a last stand, their outmoded defensive walls were easily demolished by artillery.⁸³

The peasants' situation was even more desperate. Increasing population had made their labor less valuable than it had been in the fifteenth century when the workforce was still contracting following the fearful mortality that resulted from the Bubonic Plague. They faced the threat of enserfment and greater demands on their labor, higher rents, and seigneurial dues, together with a diminishment of rights of common in pastures and woodlands. As so many of their ancestors had done before them in the medieval period, they vented their rage against these injustices by banding together in localized peasant revolts. In the period 1513–17, larger peasant leagues began to emerge in southwestern Germany and Switzerland such as the German one employing the *Bundschuh*, or laced peasant's boot, as a symbol of unity in protest against seigneurial exactions. In 1525, the Swabian peasants joined in a league and put forth their "Twelve Articles" protesting such matters as excessive rents and dues, game laws, loss of rights of common, and payments of church tithes, which revealed more explicitly the influence of religious reforming movements. The most serious combination of peasant social and economic unrest, together with religious protest, erupted under the leadership of Thomas Münzer of Zwickau, who preached social revolution and hatred of both Catholics and Lutherans, and became the leader of the peasants' army in 1525. He was executed after the Battle of Frankenhausen when the peasant army was defeated. Following the brutal suppression of the participants in this uprising, Luther regretted

some of the harsh words he had written earlier, when he had urged the German princes to put down the peasants' revolt.⁸⁴

Pope Leo X was so distracted by the threat of renewed Turkish expansion into Europe under the leadership of Suleiman the Magnificent that he overlooked the danger to Christian unity posed by Martin Luther. Unlike earlier challenges to Catholic orthodoxy, the Lutheran Reformation spread rapidly by means of inexpensive printed books and pamphlets, and German princes who wished to challenge imperial authority also took advantage of the need of both papal and imperial authorities to worry about the Turks who had pushed their way as far as Belgrade in 1521 and were laying siege to Vienna in 1529. Thus, the Turks and the Lutherans were unwitting partners in diminishing papal power and allowing Protestantism to expand. For their part, Luther and his followers were little interested in joining a crusade against the Ottoman Turks that would be proclaimed under papal authority and led by a Catholic prince.⁸⁵

The Holy Roman Emperor Charles V was a steadfast enemy of Lutheranism and an upholder of Catholic orthodoxy, but the necessity of diverting his attention to the *comuneros* rebellion of 1520–21 in Spain, the wars with Turkey and France, and the arduous task of governing a vast and incoherent dynastic empire prevented him from dealing more effectively with the spread of Lutheranism and the recalcitrance of the many German territorial princes within the Holy Roman Empire who chose to become Lutheran. The Lutheran states had trouble reading the emperor's intentions, and in 1531, formed a defensive alliance called the Schmalkald League, which was intended to prevent the enforcement of the Edict of Worms that aimed at stopping the spread of Lutheran ideas. The resolve of the Lutheran states and cities was stiffened when they learned of the formation in 1533 of the Halle League, made up of Catholic states and towns. There were also other distractions. Religious warfare had already shattered the peace in Switzerland, and the advance of the Turks on Vienna compelled Charles V to agree to a truce in Germany. Because of numerous delays and attempts to work out a compromise, war did not actually break out between the Schmalkald League and the Catholic and imperial forces until 1546, and by 1547, the emperor had defeated the Lutheran states' armies. By this time, of course, Luther was dead. After a generation of Lutheran evangelization, Catholic unity was destroyed. There was no going back, and both Lutheran and Catholic states were disposed to

accept the status quo, which was embodied in the Religious Peace of Augsburg of 1555. While other European rulers and governments also attempted to impose religious settlements on their territories requiring adherence to a state church and providing punishments for those who did not conform, such as Spain, Portugal, the Italian states, and the British kingdoms, the religious situation in the Holy Roman Empire (including the German lands and much of Hungary), Switzerland, and France was too complex to admit of a similar solution. In general terms, the Peace of Augsburg brought a limited amount of religious toleration to Germany; the treaty specified that only one religion, as authorized by the ruler, could be practiced in each state or city. Anabaptists, Zwinglians, and Calvinists were excluded from the terms of the peace.⁸⁶

But the Treaty of Augsburg did contain some exceptions to the rule of one religion only in one jurisdiction. In a number of German towns, Catholics and Protestants were forced to accept one another as neighbors however much they disliked one another's religion. One such town was Biberach in Upper Swabia, a cloth town, where the Emperor Charles V in 1548, following the Schmalkaldic War, compelled the majority Lutherans to share the one parish church with the minority Catholics. This was one of a number of *Simultankirchen* in Germany. Each held their own liturgies conducted by their own clergy in the church, but by imperial decree, at different specified times. The church interior had a clock that rang out the hours to ensure that the allotted times were precisely observed. The Peace of Augsburg settled this issue permanently, and required the two groups of worshipers to cooperate. Other biconfessional towns included Ulm, Ravensburg, Dinkelsbühl, Donauwörth, Aachen, Augsburg, Colmar, and the Dutch city of Maastricht. Biconfessionalism was also guaranteed in hundreds of urban and rural communities in France by the Edicts of Nantes. In Augsburg, the largest of the biconfessional cities, antagonism between the two religious factions was especially fierce, and they continued to be confrontational well into the eighteenth century in an attempt to maintain their confessional identities; yet, the Lutherans and Catholics obeyed the law and managed to govern the city together because the right of each to hold municipal and guild offices as well as to worship separately was guaranteed by law. The consequence of the Peace of Augsburg was political fragmentation carried to an extreme, but it ended violent religious conflict in the German states for more than half a century.⁸⁷

There were always those who rejected force as a means of maintaining Christian unity. Georg Wetzel was a German priest who followed Luther for nine years before returning to the Catholic Church. He was opposed to religious war because he thought it was incompatible with Christianity, and declared that “it behooves the wise man to try all things rather than weapons.” Wetzel was a Christian humanist and an admirer of Erasmus who devoted his career to attempting to reconcile Lutherans and Catholics. He was very much a Catholic reformer, but in his own way. He sought to strip away the dogmatic and liturgical accretions of the centuries, and return to the simple liturgy of the second century, which would have incorporated sermons based on the Gospels, communion in both kinds, and prayer in the vernacular language—all of which were features that would have appealed to Lutherans and other Protestants. Wetzel remained convinced that dialogue could reunite Christians. There were also Protestants, such as Philip Melanchton and Martin Bucer, who were prepared to engage in dialogues or colloquies, such as the one held at Regensburg in 1541 with Cardinal Contarini.⁸⁸

But other voices prevailed. The Lutheran and Zwinglian attacks on Catholic doctrine and worship provoked a Catholic reaction known as the Counter-Reformation or the Catholic Reformation. This movement was based in part on decrees issued by the Council of Trent (1545–63), but it also incorporated older reforming efforts. The Counter-Reformation was spearheaded by the founding of new religious orders such as the Jesuits, the Theatines, and the Capuchins, or reformed Franciscans. Although persuasion may have been the dominant thrust of the Counter-Reformation, force always lurked in the background. The half century of peace that followed the Peace of Augsburg was undermined by the militancy of the Emperor Ferdinand II, who had been taught to hate Protestantism by his Jesuit tutors. Ferdinand’s Jesuit confessor, William Lamormaini, thought that the emperor had a divine mandate to restore Catholicism in Germany and the Habsburg lands. Lamormaini derived this idea from the Old Testament notion of holy war. Ferdinand began to extirpate Protestantism when he was entrusted with the government of the Austrian province of Styria, and next he turned his attention to Bohemia as king of the Bohemians. As ruler of that country, Ferdinand instructed the papal nuncio, Giovanni Caraffa, to close all Protestant schools, purge the University of Prague of all Protestants, and compel townsmen, landowners, and peasants to become

Catholics or suffer fines and imprisonment. Probably a quarter of the landowners and townsmen left Bohemia rather than convert to Catholicism. Ferdinand's views were shared by Maximilian of Bavaria, who was his chief ally at the beginning of the Thirty Years War. One of Ferdinand's most provocative acts was the Edict of Restitution of 1629, which sought to recover all lands of the Catholic Church that had been secularized or had fallen into Protestant hands since 1552.⁸⁹ During the reign of Ferdinand II and continuing through the reign of Charles VI, much of Bohemia, Austria, and the German lands of the Habsburg Empire were reconverted to Catholicism. The methods used were to isolate Protestant communities, to sever their communications with Protestant centers elsewhere, and to prevent stubborn individuals from emigrating, a right guaranteed under the Peace of Westphalia. Protestant congregations were placed under the supervision of Catholic prelates, and individuals were conscripted into military service or forced labor and denied the right to hold public office. Some were sent to regions farther to the east on the Turkish-Hungarian frontier. The Jesuits preached their sermons with soldiers in the background, and the result was often no more than outward conformity.⁹⁰

The impact of the Counter-Reformation was delayed in France by the religious and civil wars and by royal hostility to ultramontane influences, but it flourished in the lands ruled by the Habsburgs, where it was skillfully harnessed to further dynastic ambitions. The Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis of 1559 favored the Habsburgs—especially the Spanish branch: it established Spanish hegemony in Europe, terminated the illusion of papal political power in Italy, and put an end to France's hegemonic ambitions as well its role as an ally in European politics of the Ottoman Turks. The political landscape of Italy had also changed in the years preceding the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. The Spanish Habsburgs had consolidated political control in the Italian peninsula despite French efforts to prevent this. Milan had become a military base to supply the Spanish Army of Flanders by way of the "Spanish Road," an overland supply route between northern Italy and the southern Low Countries. Under Spanish hegemony, the rulers of the Italian states such as Florence constructed very powerful absolutist states with the instruments of finance and military force.⁹¹

War and rebellion dominated the politics of the Spanish Empire. Whereas Charles V, like a medieval king, had led his soldiers into battle, his son Philip II was a monarch who ruled and made war through a bureaucracy. Being

unfamiliar with the unpredictable nature of warfare, he assumed that the end of the wars with France after the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis afforded him the resources to make war on the Ottoman Turks instead of going ahead with plans to seek a truce. Philip did not believe in negotiating with rebels or heretics. He was unable to compromise or negotiate, and was extremely inflexible. This apparently arose out of his fear of appearing weak. This was a dangerous strategy considering the growing strength of Calvinism in France and the Low Countries. His policies for governing his subjects also led to rebellion and civil war. However, as conscientious a monarch as Philip was, his choice of Madrid as his capital city and his preference for employing Castilians as councillors encouraged a growing animosity between Castilians and Aragonese, Catalans, and other subjects who lived in places as separated as Naples, the Low Countries, New Castile, Portugal, and Brazil.⁹²

The political landscape of Italy had also changed in the years preceding the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. Believing that the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis had brought peace to northwestern Europe, Philip II turned his attention to the Mediterranean and the Turkish foes. In planning his strategy, he overestimated Spanish resources for making war on the Turks and exaggerated Turkish decline. When he committed a major part of Spanish fiscal resources to the Mediterranean war effort, he left the Spanish viceroys in the Low Countries with insufficient means to deal with the Dutch Revolt. But he could not ignore the fact that the Turks were on the march, and that Italy and the islands of Malta and Cyprus were the principal barriers against Turkish expansion in the western Mediterranean. The Turkish naval forces had improved their effectiveness, and the Ottoman Turks had forged an alliance with the corsairs of Moorish North Africa. In fact, the Turks possessed enormous resources for making war, and the Islamic threat was heightened by the rebellion in 1568 of the *Moriscos* of Granada, the Moors who had supposedly converted to Christianity, but surreptitiously continued to practice the Muslim religion. Following the suppression of this revolt, the *Moriscos* were expelled from Granada and dispersed throughout Castile. Because of the continuing difficulty in assimilating the *Moriscos*, a quarter of a million of them were expelled from Spain in the reign of Philip III. After the Turks invaded Cyprus, Philip II acceded to Pope Pius V's urgent plea for a crusading war against the Turks, and a Spanish naval fleet, joined by the Venetians and

the Genoese, was launched to make war on the Ottomans. The battle was joined September 16, 1571, at Lepanto in the Gulf of Corinth, and the Turkish navy was defeated.⁹³

The Revolt of the Netherlands grew out of aristocratic and popular discontent with Spanish rule, and a Calvinist opposition to the militantly Catholic practices of the Spanish Habsburgs, which were even more harsh in the Spanish Netherlands than in Spain. Nationalism also played an important role, and led to one of the longest of European conflicts, the Eighty Years War (1568–1648), as the Dutch call their war of independence. The Low Countries were divided by the conflict, and only the northern half gained independence from Spain. The southern half was occupied by the Spanish Army of Flanders, a well-disciplined force with competent leaders, while the configuration of the coast of the Northern Netherlands together with their many waterways and islands allowed the irregular Dutch naval forces, known as the “Sea Beggars,” to hinder the operation of the Spanish land forces in what became known as the Dutch Republic.⁹⁴

When Philip II inherited the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands in 1555 he was determined to crush Protestantism. He began by increasing the number of Catholic bishoprics in the Low Countries from four to eighteen, and he gained papal approval for appointing all of the archbishops and bishops. His revamping of the ecclesiastical government went hand in hand with the integration of the Inquisition into the episcopal administration of the dioceses so as to stop the flow of Protestant ideas, books, and refugees into the Low Countries. Philip’s attempts to confessionalize the Seventeen Provinces violated many local privileges and customs and was at variance with the more tolerant attitudes that characterized Netherlandish culture and society. Politically, it forced a number of burghers and noblemen into opposition. The reaction of popular Protestantism was to challenge the ecclesiastical establishment by delivering public sermons and mounting a wave of iconoclasm beginning in 1566, which destroyed images in hundreds of Catholic churches. After the armed revolt began, the Sea Beggars made it difficult for the Spanish Army of Flanders, under the command of the Duke of Parma, to operate in the maritime provinces such as Holland and Zeeland.⁹⁵

The establishment of the Reformed religion in the Province of Holland owed much to the forceful tactics of the Sea Beggars, who began occupying the

towns after 1571–72. Although the stadholder and leader of the Dutch revolt, William of Orange, worked for a policy of toleration of both Calvinism and Catholicism, the Beggars entered on a campaign of murdering priests—especially friars—and destroying Catholic buildings and images. It is open to question whether the Beggars were convinced Calvinists or merely antireligious. While William of Orange was devoted to promoting religious peace and toleration, he chose to finance the Dutch resistance to the Spanish with treasures plundered from Catholic churches rather than impose an unpopular tax. The Calvinists found that the cause of reform was not easy to carry out because the municipal corporations of Holland, which still included many Catholics, were uncooperative about assigning Catholic parish churches to Reformed congregations. This helps to explain why members of the Reformed religion continued to invade and vandalize Catholic parish churches. The magistrates of Leiden, Gouda, and other towns sought to deal with this popular violence and iconoclasm by closing Catholic churches, which effectively banned the Catholic liturgy. The prohibition against saying mass proved to be permanent, and as a consequence, many Catholic clergy departed. Thereafter, only Calvinist services were performed in public after the States General banned the Catholic mass in 1581 despite the fact that only a minority of the population were of the Reformed persuasion. This remained true as late as 1600. Yet, failure to attend the services of the Reformed Church was an offense, and membership came to be a requirement for holding public office. Whenever Spanish forces captured a town in Holland, Reformed ministers were sometimes executed. Consequently, most people chose to remain uncommitted to either religious faction. In the countryside, support of the Reformed religion was very weak.⁹⁶

As the more stringent members of the Reformed religion migrated from Flanders and Brabant to Holland and the northern provinces to escape Spanish control, they remained a minority because not all of their sympathizers were disposed to accept strict presbyterian discipline. Although they were a minority, they were well organized and attempted to forbid Catholic practices. At the same time, public sentiment was strong that no one should be compelled to accept one particular religion, and Catholics were tolerated as long as they did not worship in public. Above all, the Dutch magistrates wanted to maintain religious peace because discord would weaken resistance to the Spanish. The

Dutch were also well aware of the bloodshed that confessional disputes had brought in France and Germany. In 1578, the Synod of Dordrecht issued its *Supplication*, a document that advocated religious peace as a political solution to the growing discord among the Dutch religious parties and provinces. The *Supplication* was also meant to lend support to William of Orange's campaign for religious concord. Another widely circulated pamphlet, *The Admonition and Advice for the Netherlands*, attributed to the French Huguenot, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, also argued that religious concord must be the foundation of the Dutch Republic if it were to avoid civil war and survive. The persecution of heresy only led to sedition. Christians of different denominations should attempt to convert one another only by preaching, not by force. The Dutch religious compromise partly repudiated the teachings of John Calvin, who never accepted the concept of religious liberty, but it cannot be said to have granted full toleration because religious minorities were not allowed to worship in public.⁹⁷ Patriotic sentiment continued to identify Catholicism with loyalty to the Spanish regime, and the Catholic religion remained illegal and could only be practiced in private. Many Catholics fled south to the Flemish provinces, which remained under Spanish control while the seven northern provinces formed the loose confederation that became the Dutch Republic whose independence was recognized in 1648 at the end of the Eighty Years War. While Calvinism remained the only officially recognized religion, Jewish merchants and artisans fleeing persecution in Spain and Portugal, as well as others seeking an escape from repressive regimes, found a guarded welcome in Dutch cities such as Amsterdam, but this culture of toleration was not recognized by Dutch law.⁹⁸

The Dutch Republic was born of war; the central institutions of the Dutch state were almost entirely military and diplomatic in nature. The Dutch liked to cultivate the myth that they were a peace-loving people, and had no territorial ambitions in Europe nor war heroes. It is true that they were little motivated by honor or military reputation, but they were ruthless enough to pursue their economic ambitions in a number of naval and colonial wars. Their naval and military forces always contained numerous foreign mercenaries until the end of the Republic. The Dutch themselves preferred civilian pursuits—especially those of a mercantile nature, and they had a small demographic base and a relative scarcity of labor. For this reason, foreign volunteers and mercenaries,

especially from England, Scotland, and France, together with many Protestant volunteers from the German territories, made up for the small number of Dutch soldiers in the States' Army as the Dutch land forces were called. Under the leadership of the Stadholder Maurice of Nassau, later styled Prince of Orange, the States' Army became a highly trained and disciplined military organization that drew many gentlemen volunteers from all over central and northwestern Europe who wished to learn the latest methods of warfare that modern military historians associate with the Military Revolution. The Protestant movement in the Dutch half of the Netherlands was less rigidly Calvinist, more humanist, and politically flexible than was the case with the French Huguenots. Nor were all of the provinces of the United Netherlands as Calvinist as was the case with Holland and Zeeland. Catholics remained a strong minority elsewhere. For this reason, the Eighty Years War was less overtly religious than were the French Wars of Religion.⁹⁹

By the end of the sixteenth century Spain, drawing on the bullion that it had plundered in the New World, had built a huge empire, and had become the greatest power in the world, but had exhausted its resources on imperial and military adventures. When Philip III succeeded his father Philip II in 1598, the Spanish thought that their empire was greater than that of Rome and they had prospered thus far because they were, like the ancient Hebrews, a chosen people. They were also familiar with the belief, expounded by Polybius after witnessing the destruction of Carthage, that states are living organisms, and that periods of greatness are usually followed by decline and extinction. This made Philip III and the Spanish ruling class determined to preserve their empire and reputation. It was understood by political philosophers such as Giovanni Botero that preserving a state was more difficult than building an empire. This meant pursuing a foreign and military policy that would secure peace with the Dutch in their long war for independence from Spain without allowing it to appear that the Dutch had humiliated Spain and gained their independence. Likewise, the Spanish Habsburgs wished to secure an honorable peace settlement for their Habsburg cousins in Germany that would appease the Protestant princes and cities, and not drive them to take up arms again. This awareness of Spanish *declinación*, or decline, led to the policy promoted by Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-duke of Olivares, to reform the economy so as to increase revenues, maintain military strength, and preserve the empire. This

so-called *pax hispanica* led Spain to revive the war in the Netherlands at the end of the Twelve Years Truce in 1621, and to intervene in the Rhenish Palatinate and to help the Austrian Habsburgs crush the Bohemian Revolt at the beginning of the Thirty Years War.¹⁰⁰

French religious wars

One of the consequences of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis was that France, having withdrawn from foreign wars, was led into religious and civil wars. The peace settlement came about because Valois France and Habsburg Spain were both on the verge of bankruptcy and feared the spread of heresy and confessional strife within their realms. As a result of Cateau-Cambrésis, England lost Calais, France retained a few former Imperial cities in Lorraine, but was expelled from the Italian peninsula and Corsica. Savoy emerged as a strong state and an ally of Spain. Since the head of the Montmorency family, Anne, Duke of Montmorency and Constable of France, was blamed for France's humiliation as one of the negotiators of the treaty, Charles of Guise, Cardinal of Lorraine, and his brother, Francis, Duke of Guise, did everything they could to destroy their Montmorency rivals. Following the accidental death of King Francis II in a jousting tournament in 1560, royal power fell into the hands of Catherine de Médicis, the Italian queen mother and her four ineffective sons, but was much diminished as the Guises on the one hand and the Montmorencys and the Colignys on the other vied for control of the rival Ultra-Catholic and Huguenot factions. France could no longer afford foreign adventures as the country dissolved in a series of religious and civil wars. This diminished the Habsburg-Valois rivalry during the latter part of the sixteenth century.¹⁰¹

The Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis left impoverished nobles in France, who had previously fought in the Italian wars, without employment. The French crown depended on the support of the French nobility, who had willingly followed monarchs such as Francis I and Henry II when they personally led their soldiers into battle. However, Francis II, only fifteen years of age when he became king in 1559, lacked military experience, and was too young to play the commander. Many of the provincial governors of France were high-ranking nobles, who had fought in Italy or resided at court in the time of Francis I and

Henry II. But after the end of the foreign wars, they lived in the provinces that they governed and commanded large escorts of armed noble clients who followed them about when they traveled through their jurisdictions. This brought about a militarization of French society, which exacerbated the confessional disputes and undermined royal authority. Disaffected nobles who were denied patronage or who were disgusted by the corruption and venality at court and among the higher nobility were often attracted to the Huguenot party.¹⁰²

Protestantism in France first spread among the more humble social orders—especially urban craftsmen. However, in the 1560s, Calvinism made many converts among the nobility, and probably between one-third and one-half of French noble families became Huguenots at one time or another. Because there was so much popular hostility to the meetings and conventicles of the Huguenots, these noblemen, who mostly still regarded themselves as soldiers, took it on themselves to provide armed protection for the meetings, and organized themselves and their retainers into a sort of militia commanded by captains of congregations and colonels of provincial colloquies. Also, as a consequence of the numerous popular tumults of the latter part of the fourteenth century, the nobles had grown wary of arming the people. Thus, Huguenot communities had organized themselves along military lines, and were ready for action when the first of the religious and civil wars broke out in 1562. While the French nobility had been hit hard by the inflation associated with the Price Revolution of the sixteenth century and the lack of opportunity for winning martial glory and booty abroad after the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, the main reason for the recruitment of so many of the French nobility to the Huguenot cause probably had more to do with the influence of the bastard feudal system of patronage and clientage, which compelled many of the lesser noblemen to follow the political leadership of their patrons among the greater nobility.¹⁰³

In the medieval period, the Catholic Church often had a role in peace-making, but confessional divisions had diminished that role, and aristocratic feuding made the bitterness of the French Religious Wars even worse. The role of royal leadership became more important as the process of peace and reconciliation fell to the monarchy. Queen Catherine de Médicis played an important part at court at the beginning of the French Religious Wars, and her

influence on the peace-making process was significant. Although she was a staunch Catholic, her main concern remained the survival of the dynasty, which was represented by her four young sons. For this reason, she urged a compromise with the Huguenots, which resulted in the Edict of January 1562, also known as the Edict of Saint-Germain, which allowed the Huguenots a degree of freedom of worship. The thrust of royal peace-making was political and social unity rather than religious uniformity. However, the Huguenots' *prêches*, or meetings, could not be held publicly within walled towns. Some Huguenots were not content with these concessions since they expected parish churches to be handed over to them. The Catholic leaders were outraged by the arrogance of the Huguenots and began preparing for war. The first major act of violence occurred when the Duke of Guise stopped to hear mass in the town of Vassy. A large crowd of Huguenots had gathered in a nearby barn to attend their meeting. Since Vassy was a walled town, where Reformed worship was by law prohibited, the duke ordered the Huguenots to disperse, but, instead, the Huguenots threw stones at him. Guise's retainers fired into the barn where the Huguenots were meeting and killed 23 and wounded more than 100. When Guise returned to the predominantly Catholic city of Paris after the so-called massacre at Vassy, he was welcomed as a hero, and did his best to appeal for popular support for his cause. Queen Catherine recognized that Guise was a bad influence on her son, King Charles IX, and appealed to Henry, Prince of Condé, to rescue him from Guise's influence, which only worsened the factionalism. Condé refused the opportunity, but the French nobility began choosing sides for the coming conflict. However, Catherine's hand was strengthened in the Royal Council.¹⁰⁴

The teachings of John Calvin were the source of the Reformed religion in France. Calvin was born and educated in France, but had taken up residence in Geneva, in the French-speaking region of Switzerland, which may have limited his direct political influence, but did little to minimize his enormous intellectual influence as contained in the *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (1536), which went through various revised editions and set forth the most systematic exposition of Reformed doctrine. Calvin's teachings concerning the role of Divine Providence are noteworthy for the uncompromising doctrine of predestination that instilled in Calvin's followers a militancy and fatalism that disposed them to believe that they were the agents of God's will on earth. The

Reformed religion was the most international variety of Protestantism, and Calvin's followers were responsible for helping to bring about the Religious Wars in France, the Dutch Revolt against Spain, the Thirty Years War in the Holy Roman Empire, not forgetting the religious and civil wars of the British Isles.¹⁰⁵ Calvin's doctrine of Divine Providence appears to obliterate human free will and to make use of evil agents to perpetrate horrors such as war and all its accompanying calamities to carry out His divine will. This appears to make God the author of all evil deeds, but Calvin made a distinction between what God did and what He permitted. Calvin thought that it was impious to attribute such evil deeds to His divine will.¹⁰⁶

When the Reformed religion began to take hold in France, Calvin was very careful not to become openly involved in the religious and political conflicts because he always emphasized the obligation to obey the civil powers when he wrote to the leaders of Reformed congregations in France. However, it does appear that Calvin had previous knowledge of the Conspiracy of Amboise of 1560 when some of the Huguenot nobility attacked a royal palace in order to free King Henry II from Guise influence. Calvin later privately expressed the opinion that the deaths of Henry II and Francis II were providential acts of deliverance. There were those who urged Calvin to come out openly and support the king of Navarre, whom many Huguenots viewed as a leader, but he had no wish to listen to "the noisy outcries of the multitude." Calvin taught that secular and spiritual government were quite distinct. The purpose of secular government was "to foster and protect the external worship of God" and "to defend pure doctrine." It should also promote civil concord and dispose good Christians to accept a mode of behavior compatible with "civil justice." Like Luther, he thought that while the elect of God might not need these restraints, "the effrontery of the wicked is so great, and their evil-doing so incorrigible, that laws of great severity are scarcely enough to keep them in check."¹⁰⁷

Calvin stated that rulers and magistrates were ministers of God, and subjects had no right to resist them. If a ruler was harsh and evil, then that might simply mean that he had been sent by God to punish the sins of his subjects. But Calvin did allow exceptions to the rule that subjects may not rebel against their princes: Sometimes certain divinely appointed messengers were charged with liberating good people from the rule of tyrants, or magistrates might sometimes act to restrain the evil deeds of tyrants. Although Christians had a general

obligation to obey their rulers, those rulers could also void their authority by stepping outside the bounds of good government. That would allow their subjects to resist them. It would seem that Calvin's political thought always contained ambiguities, which sometimes approached equivocation. Although he feared anarchy, Calvin also opened the door to tyrannicide. Some of Calvin's disciples, such as John Knox, even went so far as to openly advocate tyrannicide. And certainly, the Huguenot nobility had no qualms in resorting to armed rebellion, but they often clothed such resistance as the restoration of good government.¹⁰⁸

Calvin assumed that rulers and their appointed officials possessed authority to seek "public vengeance" on those who seditiously disturbed the peace by rebellion, and they could also use that same authority to punish those who invaded a country without right. It made no difference whether the foreign invaders were kings or "the lowest of the common folk." They were all to be regarded as robbers and punished accordingly. Calvin was especially fearful that countries might be invaded by Anabaptists or other radical sects. He was happy to see the attempt by the popular party of reformers who had attempted by violence to gain control of the municipal government of Schaffhausen, Switzerland, defeated. They had meant to impose a more radical religious settlement, and Calvin attributed their defeat to divine intervention.¹⁰⁹

The Edict of Saint-Germain of 1562 signified a noteworthy departure in royal policy in that it attempted to impose a political solution on the religious conflict of the preceding months, which had seen an attempt by the Guise faction, led by Francis, Duke of Guise, to control the young king, Francis II. This was followed by the Conspiracy of Amboise, by which the Huguenots attempted to seize the person of Francis II, which was thwarted by the Guise followers with much bloodshed. When Francis died in 1560, his younger brother Charles IX, who was three years of age, became king and his mother, Catherine de Médicis, appointed herself regent and drove the Guises out of the court. She subsequently sought to heal the breach by bringing representatives of the two factions together at Poissy in 1561. The Guises had responded to the Edict of Saint-Germain with the massacre at Vassy in March 1562. So began the Wars of Religion. The novelty of the Edict of Saint-Germain was that it broke with the formula of earlier Reformation religious settlements that had insisted that the ruler decided the religion of his or her realm and maintained

absolute religious uniformity. The Edict of Saint-Germain, which was authored by Catherine de Médicis, Michel de l'Hôpital, and Jean de Montlac, asserted the doctrine of tolerance as a means of maintaining political unity. Actually, the toleration granted to the Huguenots was quite limited, and this edict was meant to be only a temporary measure until unity of religious practice could be restored.¹¹⁰

The decision to impose a political solution and grant a degree of toleration to the Huguenots was determined partly by the fact that decisions in the Royal Council were no longer advisory, but were determined by a binding majority vote. These votes were very close, and Catherine de Médicis sought to avoid being identified with only one faction, but rather attempted to keep a dialogue going between members of the council without abandoning the initiative. The increasing importance of securing a majority vote within the Royal Council appears to reflect a growing view that sovereignty did not reside within the king's person, but rather in the concept of a larger sovereign body that incorporated the views and interests of those officials who were the enforcers of royal power, as well as the Parlements and the Estates General, which came to meet more frequently during this period. These ideas anticipated the later monarchomach concept of a mixed monarchy in which the king recognized that his personal power was limited. One adherent of the monarchomach school of thought, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, a Huguenot and a *politique*, went so far as to argue that there was a covenant among God, the king, and his subjects that justified rebellion if the king disobeyed God's commandments.¹¹¹

Even before the Religious Wars began in France, a loosely associated group of *moyenneurs* emerged that wished to pursue reconciliation between the Catholic and Reformed leaders. They included the queen mother, Catherine de Médicis, Michel de l'Hôpital, and a few royal councillors, prelates, and Sorbonne theologians. Their efforts were rooted in the Erasmian program of concord and their goal was a reunion of the different factions—perhaps by means of a church council. L'Hôpital realized that concord and reunion were distant prospects, and accepted the fact that France would, for the time being, have to live with a diversity of religious beliefs and practices, or what we call toleration, as a matter of practical politics. The alternative was religious warfare. Religion, he thought, was “what keeps a subject from obeying his king, and what causes rebellions.”¹¹²

The politiques were mostly a faction of Catholics who broke with the mainstream of Catholicism in France in the early 1570s. Their ranks included a few Protestants such as François de la Noue. Following the failed attempt of a royal army to take La Rochelle by siege from the Huguenot defenders in 1572, they realized that the Royalist forces lacked the resources to defeat the Protestants—especially the Huguenot leagues in the south of France—and came to believe that religious toleration, or the official recognition of two religions, was the only way to achieve peace. Some regarded the politiques as being little better than atheists; many were actually what we would call skeptics and utilitarians. They believed that toleration was the only way to avoid the breakup of the kingdom and achieve peace. Montaigne thought that the Religious Wars not only corrupted public morals, but that the differences between the two religions were exaggerated. Catholics and Huguenots had more in common than was generally admitted. Therefore, religious persecution was futile. At the same time, most politiques believed in a limited monarchy that needed to work with the Estates-General. Many were also drawn to Gallicanism, the belief in an autonomous Catholic Church in France, which would effectively limit papal intervention in French religious politics. In order to resist this papal interference, which was disinclined to accept toleration of heresy, the politiques were later drawn to uphold the concept of absolute monarchy. These were also the views of Henry of Bourbon-Navarre, the future King Henry IV, and the Huguenots who were also increasingly drawn to accept his leadership and the politique position.¹¹³

The Cardinal of Lorraine and the Guises were the leaders of the Ultra-Catholic party in France and did much to fan the flames of animosity by proposing a “Brotherhood of Catholics in France”; they also invited Catholic powers such as Spain and Savoy to intervene in France. The Parlement of Paris organized a militia, but the Holy League (*sainte ligue*) was mostly a provincial movement. Catholic militancy against the Huguenots was first mobilized in 1561 in the southwest of France, and the leadership was provided by the nobility, including some army officers under the command of Blaise de Monluc, with the assistance of local clergy.¹¹⁴ In Bordeaux, lay Catholics resisted attempts by Huguenots to alter the liturgy in a parish church by preaching a sermon along with a baptism, and by attempting to bury their dead in the parish cemetery. After demanding the church keys, Catholic parishioners

stoned the Protestants, and a riot broke out. Subsequently, the president of the Parlement of Bordeaux ordered the arrest of fourteen parishioners. The other parishioners immediately demanded their release. Citizens of Bordeaux and the inhabitants of the suburbs began organizing secret societies to protect the Catholic religion, and a number of members of the Parlement lent their support to those who resisted the Huguenots.¹¹⁵ Similar organizations appeared in Toulouse, where officers and soldiers swore to extirpate Huguenots and formed an association to which royal officials and the Cardinal of Armagnac lent their support. The Parlement of Toulouse authorized a Catholic League in March 1563, which had the power to levy taxes, swear adherents to obey its covenant and orders, and the authority to establish armories in every diocese and civil jurisdiction. Blaise de Monluc was appointed to command the Catholic League Army. Municipal and provincial leagues spread throughout the south, but a strong Catholic League movement did not develop in the north of France before 1568 when the Confraternity of the Holy Spirit was formed under the command of Marshal Saulx Tavannes, one of the procurers of the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre. The local companies of this Catholic League Army, which included many professional soldiers of all ranks, pursued Huguenots from village to village with firebrands, and burnt and demolished the houses and chateaux of Huguenots or anyone who sheltered them. Collectively, the actions of the Catholic militants took on the form of a crusade. The patronage of Catherine de Médicis was sought, and pamphlets began to appear setting forth the historical precedents for punishing heretics to be found in the Albigensian Crusade.¹¹⁶

The French Wars of Religion displayed the characteristics of confessional strife found in other wars of the period of the Reformation, but also retained some of the features of earlier crusades against the heretical Cathars of medieval France. Members of confraternities formed at Dijon and Toulouse during the first of the religious wars wore the white cross of the earlier crusaders when going into battle or defending their cities against the Huguenot enemy, and were granted indulgences by Pope Pius V. The white crusaders' cross was a sign of defiance against Huguenots, who held that symbol in particular horror. These newer confraternities resembled those that had been organized in 1212 at Marseilles by the papal legate for deployment against the Albigensians. The sixteenth-century confraternities frequently grew out of

guilds that had been formed by urban tradesmen, but were often joined by members of the nobility.¹¹⁷

Popular opposition in France to Protestantism often drew on popular religious rituals and organizations. These might imitate Good Friday processions or perhaps the dramaturgy of late-medieval flagellants; participants sometimes carried large crucifixes. Such processions often began at the door of the parish church with the priest carrying the Holy Sacrament. Among the religious organizations that perpetrated violence against Huguenots were lay religious confraternities. Some were newly founded to defend the Catholic faith against Calvinist reform; others were medieval confraternities revived after falling into disuse. These confraternities provided an organized outlet for the violence of the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of 1572 in Paris. Similar incidents on a smaller scale in provincial towns such as Toulouse, Limoges, and Aix-en-Provence were also carried out by confraternities.¹¹⁸

As in German biconfessional cities, the frequent religious processions staged by Parisian Catholics flaunted the images, relics, and other symbols of their faith and enraged Protestants; the latter were derided because of their refusal to participate in these civic and religious spectacles. Catholic processions were frequent in the years during which religious conflict manifested itself. These processions expressed not just religious fervor, but also loyalty to the monarchy and community solidarity. To take part in such processions, as one clerical pamphleteer put it, constituted "a public profession of faith." They were also associated with the veneration of saints, such as Sainte Geneviève, a patron saint of Paris—a practice which especially offended Protestants. The increased frequency of such processions was associated with the diminution of royal power that led to the Religious Wars and the growth of heresy in Paris. Henry II, when he ascended the throne in 1559, ordered a procession specifically directed against heretics in which a number of them were burned at three different locations. Protestants responded with rioting and the smashing of statues in parish churches.¹¹⁹

The Huguenots invited the hostility of Catholics by setting themselves apart, affecting a moral superiority to their neighbors and refusing to participate in popular religious festivities. They also disrupted Catholic services with acts of violence and iconoclasm. Huguenot synods were often inflammatory, and the Wars of Religion had been preceded by Huguenot

revolts in a number of French cities, which also mobilized Catholic opinion against the Calvinists.¹²⁰

The Huguenots also contributed to the Wars of Religion by refusing to abide by the terms of the Peace of Amboise of 1563, which ended the First Civil War. This agreement specified that the royal government would protect and support the Calvinist religion in all towns where it prevailed except Paris; in one town in each jurisdiction, Calvinist preaching was to be allowed, and the royal government was to pay for the upkeep of the Huguenot army. In the countryside, Huguenot lords who were licensed to dispense justice might have preaching within their households. The Peace of Amboise was difficult to enforce because the royal army could not contain the violence; both Catholics and Huguenots were armed, and civil violence continued in many parts of France.¹²¹

As the religious warfare continued, the Huguenots were subjected to a great deal of popular violence. The horror of the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of August 24, 1572, in Paris reverberated through provincial towns. Three thousand Huguenots, including their leader Admiral Coligny, were killed in Paris, and another 10,000 in provincial towns. During the rampages in Orleans, rioters broke into the houses of Huguenots and demanded money, plate, and jewels as ransom to spare their lives. The Protestants were then put to death whether they paid or not. All of this was done in the spirit of carnival. Similar massacres occurred in Bourges, Rouen, Meaux, Angers, Saumur, Lyons, Troyes, Bordeaux, Toulouse, and several other provincial cities following news of the bloody events in Paris. The leadership in these wholesale slaughters was usually popular, but the perpetrators claimed to be acting on the king's orders. This was often the pretext offered for earlier religious riots. In actuality, Charles IX had written to his provincial governors and lieutenants commanding them to prevent the spread of violence in their jurisdictions. There is good evidence, however, that these written instructions countermanded earlier verbal orders uttered by the king. Thus, the king's earlier words, perhaps hasty and ill-considered, may have contributed to the massacres. What can be said for certain is that the king failed to make his intentions absolutely clear. His subjects lost confidence in the Valois dynasty following these events.¹²²

The Huguenots maintained the upper hand from about 1560 until the massacres, when they lost much of their leadership. Thereafter, they went into decline. One of the reasons that the Huguenots never developed much of a

popular following in France was that they distrusted the common people because of the demagoguery of the Catholic League. The word *ligue* in French seems to have acquired a new meaning at this time, if, indeed, it was not a new word. It connoted anarchy. After 1580, the Catholic League became dominant and was sustained by the militancy of Ultra-Catholic ideology. The leadership of the Guises was largely nominal and limited to the national level; at the provincial level, Catholic preachers whipped up fanaticism among the commonalty.¹²³

From the beginning of the outbreak of violence in southern France in 1561, the motivation behind the civil wars involved more than just religious animosity toward the Huguenots. The various provincial Catholic leagues were drawn into the feud between the Guises and the Montmorencys, and became so truculent that they threatened the monarchy itself. The stronger monarchy that had emerged under Francis I and his late-medieval predecessors had weakened noble power and influence. As the manifesto of the Holy League circulated by Henry, Duke of Guise before his assassination in 1588, on the orders of King Henry III, made clear, the Guises and their supporters used the League to preserve and strengthen the powers of the Estates General and the ancient privileges of the nobility by curtailing the Renaissance monarchy.¹²⁴

The Wars of Religion also touched off various local popular riots and rebellions. Although these usually began as protests against heresy, the unrest eventually focused on the high taxes and other exactions caused by the wars, and on the inequities of the tax system, which largely exempted the nobility and the clergy. One symptom of the unease caused by these conflicts was that in provinces such as Dauphiné, many craftsmen and peasants dared not leave their houses unless armed with daggers or swords. In many places, they organized themselves into militias for protection. Both the royal army and the Huguenot forces as well as outlaw soldiers pillaged and terrorized the countryside in the late 1570s, and the commonalty felt that they also needed to be armed. This kind of popular unrest usually began as simple opposition to Protestant heresy mixed with social conflict and popular rebellion, and later developed into ultra-orthodox militancy. In short, the French Wars of Religion, and the widespread social and economic unrest that accompanied those conflicts led to a general arming of the population. Denis Crouzet sees a “triumph of war” taking root in French society and culture.¹²⁵

Altogether, the Catholics and the Huguenots fought eight religious and civil wars. Each conflict had been temporarily ended by a royal edict or peace treaty that granted certain concessions such as a limited right of worship for Protestants in certain places and the right to retain and fortify certain towns (but not including Paris and its suburbs, where popular support for Catholicism remained strong). The religious conflict engendered much bitterness, and each peace settlement sought to consign the memory of each side's grievances to oblivion. However, memories persisted and from these grew the religious identities of each party, thus making it more difficult to return to a state of peace. In the last of the peace settlements, the Edict of Nantes of 1598, the new Bourbon monarch, Henry IV, in effect, created a Huguenot state within a state by allowing the Protestants to retain and garrison some two hundred fortified towns. Just as each of the preceding peace settlements had proved temporary, Henry IV made it clear that the Edict of Nantes was meant to last only eight years until he could consolidate his rule under peaceful conditions. Religious identities had hardened for many Catholics and Huguenots, but the violence that accompanied the Religious Wars also caused many Huguenots to defect from the new religion. Political support for the Ultra-Catholic party also diminished as many moderate Catholics preferred to join the *politique* faction.¹²⁶

Thirty Years War

The process of confessionalization split the medieval Latin church into three confessional churches: the post-Tridentine Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church, and the Reformed or Calvinist Church. It placed an emphasis on religious identity, doctrinal orthodoxy, and observable outward behavior. The clergy underwent professionalization to prepare them for more effective preaching and pastoral work among the laity. This fostered ideologies that were confrontational. The rituals and beliefs of each faith were employed in such ways as to exaggerate the differences in religious identity and contributed much to the outbreak of the Thirty Years War. An increased emphasis on organization and spiritual community led to stricter discipline and conformity among the Calvinists that separated the zealots from those who were not yet

deemed worthy to be full members of that elite spiritual community. Ultimately, the convergence of political interests and confessional solidarity led to the emergence of national identities during the many wars of this period.¹²⁷

The fragile religious peace imposed by the Treaty of Augsburg began to fall apart after 1603 in the biconfessional city of Donauwörth. In that year, on St. Mark's Day, the monks of the Catholic abbey mounted a procession through the mostly Protestant town. In subsequent years, the monks and the Catholic laity were violently confronted by angry Lutheran mobs who attacked their increasingly ostentatious processions. Because the Catholic minority possessed imperial immunity, the Emperor Rudolf II imposed a ban on the city and Maximilian of Bavaria occupied it with an army. Maximilian ordered the city's Lutherans to convert to Catholicism or leave the city. The result was that a number of Protestant territories and cities organized the Protestant Union, and in response, the Catholics also formed an armed league.¹²⁸

Religious conflict remained a part of almost all European wars until the end of the seventeenth century, but dynastic rivalries, competition for colonial empire and trade, and, in some cases, such as the Dutch Republic, Portugal, and the kingdom of Bohemia, an assertion of national identity also contributed to the continuing European conflicts. It was indeed an "age of iron"; standing armies had become the principal instruments of early modern sovereign states, whether they were republics or monarchies; and armies staffed by professional soldiers were dangerous when idle. War had become institutionalized.

The Thirty Years War (1618–48) does not easily fit the pattern of a religious war. While it is true that many of the noblemen who led the Bohemian revolt in Prague in 1618 were Protestants resisting Catholic pressure, they were also defending Bohemian identity and aristocratic power against Austrian Habsburg centralization. They were crushed at the Battle of White Mountain near Prague in 1620, and a more Teutonized nobility began to replace the Bohemian lords. The Calvinist Elector Frederick V of the Palatinate, who had unwisely allowed himself to be talked into becoming King of Bohemia, a title claimed by the Habsburgs, found that his German territories were overrun by the Habsburg army, and Germany was also drawn into the civil and religious conflict. Dynastic ambitions and an urge to grab territory led Christian IV of Denmark into the Thirty Years War on the pretext of helping the Protestants. The conflict expanded as the Dutch war of independence from Spain, known

as the Eighty Years War, became part of the struggle. Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, intervened in the German war after 1631, and campaigned extensively in Germany with armies that included many volunteers from Scotland and England. Many of these volunteers had joined the Swedish and Dutch armies to fight for the Protestant cause, but the motives of the rulers of Spain and France, which were also drawn into the Thirty Years War, were more concerned with dynastic rivalries and the expansion of trade. The Franco-Spanish conflict continued until 1659, after the Peace of Westphalia had ended the main conflict. On its peripheries, this European-wide conflict also spread into Eastern Europe in the war between Russia and Poland.¹²⁹

Because of the continuing threat posed by the Turks, the Habsburg emperors could not neglect the affairs of Bohemia and Hungary. Bohemia on the eve of the Thirty Years War was an economically advanced part of Central Europe. Because so much of Hungary was in the hands of the Turks, Bohemia was vital to the defense of the Habsburg Empire. However, besides being Slavic rather than German, perhaps as many as nine-tenths of the population of Bohemia and Moravia were Hussite or Protestant. They had a strong national identity, and were fiercely antipapal and anticlerical. During the time that Rudolf II (1576–1612) was emperor, he resided mostly in Prague and worked to preserve peace between Protestants and Catholics.¹³⁰ The situation in Hungary was perhaps even more dangerous. Bethlen Gabor, Prince of Transylvania, was the political leader of the Hungarian Protestants, who included Bohemian Brethren, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Hussites. He contested those parts of Hungary not controlled by the Turks in order to protect Protestantism, and at one point, he launched an incursion into Austria. The possibility existed that Bethlen might join the Turks in order to oppose the Habsburg-Jesuit Counter-Reformation, which the Turks encouraged by making Bethlen King of Hungary. Albert von Wallenstein, a Bohemian noble who was at first loyal to the Emperor Ferdinand II and had raised a large mercenary army for the Habsburg cause, was sent into Hungary to attempt to contain Bethlen's forces; Wallenstein later became too independent and ambitious, and was assassinated on the emperor's orders.¹³¹

The Thirty Years War was long viewed as one of the most destructive wars of European history. Earlier estimates of population decline as a consequence of the Thirty Years War stated that Germany, or the Holy Roman Empire, lost

between one-half and two-thirds of its population. More careful recent estimates, although far from precise, put the population loss at between 15 and 20 percent. Post-war demographic growth brought the German population back to its prewar level by 1700. The population losses were mostly caused by malnutrition and epidemic diseases rather than by battle casualties. Although the armies of the time were not very well disciplined, most commanders did make an effort to prevent injury to noncombatants.¹³² The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 repudiated the militancy of the Catholic Reformation. Otherwise, little was achieved toward granting religious toleration that had not been contained in the Peace of Augsburg. The terms of the Peace of Westphalia allowed individual princes and free cities to determine the religion of their subjects or allowed the latter to go somewhere else. It was also symptomatic of the decline of papal and imperial power.¹³³

Europeans now accepted that religious unity could never be restored, and that they must now learn to live with one another. It was also assumed that the Enlightenment that followed brought religious toleration to the European world. Benjamin Kaplan questions this argument and reminds us that more religious conflict followed. Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685 causing perhaps 300,000 Huguenots to flee France; the Duke of Savoy rescinded the edict of toleration that had been granted to the Waldensians. After the last Calvinist Elector Palatine died, his Catholic heir began to reinstate Catholicism in the Rhenish Palatinate and to force Protestants to abandon or share their parish churches. In retaliation, Catholics were persecuted in Prussia and other Protestant states of Germany. Religious civil wars broke out again in Switzerland in 1702. In England, anti-Catholic violence surfaced again in the so-called Popish Plot of 1678, in reaction to the Scots Jacobite invasion of England in 1745, and especially, during the Gordon Riots of 1780, when for two weeks, London was in the hands of a mob protesting Parliament's enactment of the Roman Catholic Relief Act of 1778. Although the philosophes advocated tolerance, most Protestants and Catholics continued to hate one another's beliefs and practices.¹³⁴

However, it can be said that the Peace of Westphalia ended large-scale religious conflicts within the Holy Roman Empire. This came about because of the emergence of a fully developed body of international law that recognized the constituent member-states as equals that were now free of the authority of

the Holy Roman Empire. This, in turn, owed much to the principles laid down in the writings of Vitoria and Grotius, who applied Roman law to new situations, and to the increasing tendency to view politics in secular terms without completely ignoring the legitimate concerns of religion. This transition to an era of many competing sovereign states brandishing their independent status by military and economic means also provided the opportunity for cooperation by more peaceful means. The Peace of the Pyrenees of 1659 likewise signified that France had succeeded Spain as the dominant power in Europe. That France asserted its military power during the reign of Louis XIV is widely recognized, but at the same time, France also exerted its influence by establishing a diplomatic service staffed by professional diplomats who took up permanent residence in all the courts and capitals of Europe. France led in the development of diplomatic practice, which was as important in asserting French influence as its military arm, and became a model for other sovereign powers. Significantly, French also replaced Latin as the diplomatic language at this time.¹³⁵

British and Irish civil wars

The British and Irish civil wars were the last of the European religious wars. There was always the possibility that religious armed conflict, so pervasive in mainland Europe, would spread to the British Isles, but unification of the Three Kingdoms of England, Ireland, and Scotland under the Stuart dynasty and a Protestant king appeared to have lessened that prospect after 1603. This effectively closed off the possibility of intervention by France or Spain in Ireland. Also, by the end of the sixteenth century, the religious wars in the Low Countries had largely run their course. Although the religious conflict reopened on the Continent after 1618, the danger of it spreading to the British Isles had diminished. Both England and Scotland were mostly Protestantized by the beginning of the reign of James VI and I, and Catholicism retained a strong presence only in Ireland. By the 1640s, the Catholic powers of mainland Europe had fallen out with one another, and were too busy struggling for dominance to invade the British Isles. Insofar as religion influenced the English civil wars, the struggle was between two rival varieties of Protestantism.¹³⁶

If England was spared armed religious conflict in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, there were those in the British Isles who were drawn to the religious wars of mainland Europe. Protestant gentlemen volunteers viewed service in the armies of the mainland European Protestant powers as a religious crusade. However, the rank and file who served under them in the English and Scots regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade and the Scots Brigade of the Dutch Republic's army, as well as the armed forces of other Protestant powers, were usually impressed from among masterless men, but Protestant preachers and pamphleteers thought such rogues should not begrudge serving in a just war. Some of the lords, who commanded regiments in the Low Countries wars, recruited tenants by means of a feudal levy. Recruiting masterless men was thought to be a good way of cleansing the streets of London and the countryside of vagrants and criminals. In the last seventeen years of the reign of Elizabeth, an estimated 2 percent of the total population of England and Wales were impressed to serve in the wars in the Netherlands, Ireland, France, and naval expeditions to Spain, Portugal, and the Azores. Because of deaths from battle, disease and malnutrition as well as desertion, few of these men ever returned home. The Privy Council of Scotland followed similar policies of impressment—especially following the end of the Scots civil war in 1573. Probably 10 percent of the male population of Scotland served in various mainland European armies during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries both as impressed soldiers and as mercenaries. The numbers of English and Scots who served in the field forces of the Dutch army during the Eighty Years War varied between one-third and two-thirds of the total.¹³⁷

The civil wars in England were fought between two factions of Protestantism, but an exaggerated fear of popery certainly did help to bring on those civil wars. This largely derived from James VI and I's plans to marry Charles, Prince of Wales to the Spanish Infanta. The scheme was based on a desire to get the Spanish to agree to return the Rhenish Palatinate, which had been conquered by the Austrian Habsburgs following the foolish attempt by James's son-in-law, Frederick, Elector Palatine to become King of Bohemia, which had for some time been part of the Habsburg Empire. These marriage negotiations fell through. Charles was then married to Henrietta Maria, sister of Louis XIII, King of France. It was widely feared that this marriage treaty contained

provisions to suspend enforcement of the recusancy laws penalizing English Catholics. The fear of the potential resurgence of Catholicism reflected a fear of the two greatest Catholic powers in Europe more than the potential for a revival of Catholic religious practice in England. English Catholicism had long since been marginalized.¹³⁸

Fear of popery at home and apprehension of the threat from France and Spain, the major Catholic powers abroad, helped to sow the seeds of division both in London and in the provinces, but the absolutist direction in which Charles I's rule was proceeding also aroused popular fears. The arbitrary governance, levying taxes without parliamentary approval, and the imprisonment of critics of the regime without trial in the common-law courts provided evidence that the king believed that he was above the law and the ancient constitution, and that he acted on that assumption. To these problems was added the intractable task of trying to govern three separate and distinct kingdoms—each with its own constitutional forms and religious preferences. Charles's subjects mostly adhered to the Anglican Church, while the better part of the Scots were Presbyterians and saw little difference between Anglicanism and Catholicism. In Ireland very few people belonged to the Anglican Church of Ireland, and hardly any of its clergy spoke Irish Gaelic.¹³⁹

One of the most important royal prerogatives that King Charles possessed was that of summoning and dissolving Parliaments. When the English constitution functioned in a healthy manner, meetings of Parliament allowed the king to become aware of his subjects' grievances, and king and Parliament worked together enacting statute law and authorizing the levying of taxes. Unfortunately, Charles I did not listen to good advice and thought that he could dispense with Parliament during the period of his personal rule between 1629 and 1640. After 1638, when the Scots moved in the direction of armed rebellion, Charles discovered that he did need Parliament in order to raise and pay for an army to bring the Scots to heel. More than any other country in Europe, except, perhaps, the Netherlands, the English were a well informed and politically aware people. When Charles finally summoned their elected representatives to Westminster in May 1640, he found that the members of Parliament were determined to secure redress of their grievances before they were willing to trust Charles with an army, and England began its descent into civil war.¹⁴⁰

Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, a contemporary observer, a faithful servant of Charles I and a pious Anglican, did not think that religion was the main cause of what he called “the civil war and rebellion.” He stated that “religion was made a cloak to cover the most impious designs” of members of the Long Parliament. Clarendon was also of the opinion that Anglican clergy such as William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, intruded religious matters into the political affairs of the day; he was of the opinion that religion was a matter of private concern. Clarendon’s view was that the war was a conflict between Royalists, who were persons of honor, good lineage, and property, and Parliamentarians, people of mean birth and no reputation, who were jealous of their social superiors. The fear of popery, Clarendon thought, was a mere pretense. In other words, Clarendon’s account of the civil war and rebellion emphasized “class conflict,” as a later generation of historians would have put it.¹⁴¹

Thanks to the breakdown of official censorship during the Interregnum, we have inherited a vast contemporaneous literature in which the religious reasons for justifying the English civil wars from the viewpoint of both parties to the conflict are recorded. It is important to remember that popular political discourse in the British Isles at this time had not yet become fully secularized. Both sides produced numerous arguments to assure their audiences that they were fighting a just and necessary war, sanctioned by the Lord. The Parliamentary army was always well equipped with chaplains and preachers, and the soldiers often went into battle singing hymns. The rhetoric of the two contending armies would have been familiar to those who had fought in the mainland European religious wars, and their justifications for taking up the sword reached back to St. Augustine and drew on the examples of holy war in both the Old and New Testaments. Their religious convictions were sustained by the belief that God was on their side. Religion was still a useful propaganda tool.¹⁴²

In Scotland, a seemingly trivial issue of contention between the crown and the Scots arose from Charles I’s peremptory treatment of the Scots nobility and his attempt to make them abide by the very formal English court rituals. As in England, the religious side of the conflict was also between two incompatible forms of Protestant church government—the Presbyterian Kirk of Scotland and Charles’s attempt to impose on the Kirk an episcopal type of church

government and an Anglican liturgy. When Charles was crowned king of Scotland in Edinburgh, the Scots were horrified by the elaborate rituals and pageantry of the king's coronation ceremony, which the Scots thought was excessively popish and that were conducted by an archbishop and a bishop—officials who had no place in the hierarchy of the Presbyterian Kirk. It was a clear indication that Charles meant to alter the presbyterian government of the Kirk. The following Sunday an Anglican service was conducted in the High Church, formerly the Cathedral of St. Giles. The direction in church polity that Charles was pursuing had become all too obvious, and it was unacceptable to the Scots. It should hardly have caused any surprise that the first of the king's subjects to rebel were the Scots who did so by proclaiming their National Covenant in 1638. The so-called Bishops Wars that followed were the first of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms—the British and Irish civil wars. The ramshackle army that King Charles put together with militia units and tenants of royalist gentry and peers was no match for the Covenanting Army that the Scots assembled from amongst experienced Scots veterans of the Thirty Years War. The need to finance his army led Charles to summon two English Parliaments in 1640, which led to an impasse between the king and his subjects. Thus, began the first of the three English civil wars.¹⁴³

Religion played an even more important role in the Elizabethan Irish wars and the later civil wars of the 1640s, but national identity was also very important. England had never conquered Ireland in medieval times beyond the English Pale, a small group of counties surrounding Dublin. The English regarded the Irish as pagans and barbarians comparable to the Turks, the indigenous peoples of the New World, or even the Scythians. As late as the reign of Elizabeth, the English crown failed to recognize the Irish as subjects with legal rights. They were viewed as rebels and were not accorded the usual treatment allowed to enemy prisoners in the mainland European wars. Consequently, the Irish rebelled frequently during the Elizabethan wars in that unfortunate island. Both sides assumed that the only way of settling their differences was by war.¹⁴⁴

The question of national identity was complicated by the existence in Ireland of several distinct groups. The Old English of the Pale and the littoral settlements of the Province of Munster had lived in Ireland for many generations, and many were descended from the Norman conquerors. They

were disposed to loyalty to the English crown, but since they remained Catholic, they were alienated by the Protestantizing policies of the crown. Many of the mostly Protestant New English had gone to Ireland during the Elizabethan period as soldiers and behaved like Spanish *conquistadores*; they carved out estates by displacing the Gaelic Old Irish who defiantly continued in their attachment to Catholicism. The latter retreated into the bogs and forests and resisted their conquerors by the tactics of guerilla war. Both sides frequently hired redshanks and gallowglasses, who were mercenary warriors brought over from Scotland.¹⁴⁵

The Irish Civil War (1641–53) in its early stage was a contest between the Royalist forces on the one hand and the Scots Covenanters and the new British settlers in Ulster and Munster, who chose to side with the English Parliamentarians in their rebellion against Charles I. Between 1642 and 1649, the situation was complicated by the existence of a third entity, the Catholic Confederation of Kilkenny, which hampered the Irish cause by dividing the Catholic ranks. The Scots Covenanters also maintained a separate army in Ireland, so for a time, there were four distinct armies campaigning in the field.¹⁴⁶

The Protestant faction in the Irish Civil Wars recruited followers by greatly exaggerating reports of a Catholic massacre of Protestants and using the same for purposes of propaganda. Some deaths did occur as the native Irish reclaimed lands from which they had earlier been forcibly ejected. But most of these deaths resulted from hunger and disease. The lords justices of Ireland estimated the number of deaths caused by the so-called massacres at 154,000, but a more accurate figure would be 6,000. The animosity between Protestant and Catholic certainly made the Irish Civil Wars more brutal. Because of the rumors that they heard about the massacres, English Parliamentarians such as Oliver Cromwell and Henry Ireton resolved that revenge must be exacted and the Irish would have to pay in blood for these alleged atrocities. Participants claimed that the cruelties inflicted on combatants and noncombatants alike were worse than those perpetrated by the Turks and Christians during the Wars of the Crusades. The Catholics said that Irish soldiers taken prisoner were immediately put to the sword, and in Britain, Irish soldiers captured there were usually hanged until Prince Rupert of the Rhine, a Royalist commander, threatened retaliation on Parliamentarian prisoners.¹⁴⁷

When Sir Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, became lord deputy of Ireland in 1632, he managed not only to estrange every important group in Ireland, but also to unite them in opposition to his rule. He alienated the Old English by undercutting the power of the Irish Parliament to criticize his policies, by weakening the protections of land ownership that had been granted by King Charles in return for loans to the crown made in 1628, and by reneging on promises made by the king to relax the Irish penal laws against Catholics; he also expropriated the lands of the Old Irish and attacked their religion, their Gaelic language and customs; and he offended the Scots settlers in Ulster by purging their church of Presbyterian practices and ministers, and by imposing fines on the latter when they departed from the conditions of their tenancies.¹⁴⁸

Another Irish group whom Strafford offended were the New English, whose antecedents had come to Ireland in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries to make their fortunes by dispossessing the Old Irish. Looking for ways to make the government of Ireland pay its way, Strafford inaugurated the Connacht Plantation scheme. This would raise money by selling land grants in the west of Ireland, and it also fitted in with the policy of civilizing the Gaelic Irish by moving them to Connacht and making them tenants of the New English. The latter could be expected to support such a policy because they stood to acquire some of the lands from which the Old Irish were being evicted. Strafford meant to squeeze money out of the New English as well by compelling them to return church lands that they had acquired earlier in an irregular manner. He demanded the return of these alienated church lands in order to introduce the Anglicanizing reforms that were sponsored by Archbishop William Laud, his partner in forcing through absolutist policies of Charles I. The New English and the Ulster Scots were much offended because these Laudian reforms had a distinctively popish flavour.¹⁴⁹

The Wars of the Three Kingdoms took a heavy toll—even by comparison to the two World Wars of the early twentieth century. In the latter conflicts, the mortality rate for combatants and noncombatants alike never exceeded 2 percent of the population of Britain. The English civil wars resulted in 75,000 deaths in battle, and probably 105,000 died as a result of disease and accident, which probably represented 3 percent of the total population. Scotland suffered 25,000 battlefield deaths and another 35,000 died due to disease and accident,

which constituted 6 percent of the population.¹⁵⁰ The civil wars in Ireland, between 1641 and 1652, were comparable in their destructiveness to the Thirty Years War, and lasted longer than they did in England and Scotland. The population of approximately two million was reduced by a third, and at least 200,000, and possibly as many as 300,000, people died as a direct result of hostilities. In addition, many were displaced from their lands and died of disease or hunger. Irish soldiers, known as “wild geese,” were dispersed abroad in mainland European armies for generations thereafter. Those Catholic Irish who remained at home were denied the basic rights of subjects of the crown, and were dominated by English and Irish Protestants, whom they regarded as alien conquerors.¹⁵¹

Because of their departure from the methods and rules of war that characterized the civil wars of England and Scotland, the Irish civil wars need to be discussed at some length. After the beginning of the Third Civil War in England, the fighting also resumed in Ireland. The laws of war, which had come to be accepted on the European mainland, had little influence in Ireland where it was usual for victors to slay the defeated when they were taken prisoner. Only the prospect of ransom could bring mercy. When Cromwell took command of the Parliamentary forces in Ireland, he told his officers that God had commanded them to crush the barbarian Irish as the Israelites had slaughtered idolaters in the land of Canaan. In September 1649, Cromwell besieged the well fortified walled town of Drogheda that commanded the mouth of the River Boyne. He first called on the commander of Drogheda to surrender; when the latter refused, Cromwell began a heavy bombardment and finally breached the walls with great loss of life. Cromwell allowed no quarter, and some 3,500 Irish were killed. The following month another massacre of the same magnitude occurred at Wexford, which offered no resistance after a traitor opened the gates. Cromwell’s men slaughtered noncombatants as well as soldiers. This was followed by similar massacres at Carrick, Callan, and Gowran Castle. The Cromwellian conquest of Ireland was consolidated by large-scale confiscations of land. The Catholic proprietors and tenants were driven westward to the barren lands of Connacht. This forced removal was accompanied by much brutality because Cromwell and many of his senior officers believed that the Irish needed to be punished further. Cromwell supposedly remarked that those Irish who had taken part in the

rebellion against the authority of Parliament were to have the choice of going to Hell or Connacht.¹⁵²

Cromwell was able to defeat the Royalist and Catholic Confederation armies in Ireland because of the disunity among these factions. This divisiveness can be traced back to the failure of the Gaelic or Old Irish to reconcile with the Old English of Leinster and Munster—despite the Catholic beliefs that they shared. The Irish civil war was well under way before the Old English lords of Munster joined forces with the Gaelic Irish following the formation of the Catholic Confederation at Kilkenny in 1642. The prospects of the Catholic forces were much improved with the arrival later that year of experienced military commanders such as Owen Roe O'Neill and Thomas Preston, who had served in the Spanish Army of Flanders. O'Neill, in particular, brought with him several hundred experienced officers and noncommissioned officers who introduced their Irish recruits in the Confederation's Ulster army to the latest continental European battlefield tactics, which allowed his army to become a formidable force. Otherwise, the Confederate army remained badly divided because the Old English lords, led by James Butler, earl of Ormond, continued to work for a closer alliance with the Royalists, while the Gaelic Irish sought closer ties with Spain. The dispatch of a papal nuncio, Cardinal Rinuccini, to Kilkenny in 1647 did little to promote unity among the Confederates. Rinuccini took a hard line against the members of the Supreme Council, which had governed the Confederation for the previous five years, and excommunicated those who did not agree with him and sought a compromise peace with the Royalists, which would have ended the Recusancy Laws and discrimination against Catholics in Ireland.¹⁵³

The victors in the Wars of the Three Kingdoms were the English Rump, or purged Parliament and its army, the New Model, a well disciplined force led by Sir Thomas Fairfax and Oliver Cromwell. The people of England and Wales were not as divided by religious or ethnic animosities as were the peoples of Scotland and Ireland. In England there existed wide recognition and acceptance of Parliament as a national institution, and the only real threat to this unity came from the Leveller revolt within the army, which the generals easily suppressed. The civil wars in Ireland and Scotland displayed many of the characteristics of religious conflict, but in England religious sects so proliferated that none could completely dominate the others. As Adam Smith later

explained, this was how religious toleration eventually came about. Cromwell had been the scourge of Irish Catholics and his atrocities cannot be forgotten, but Cromwell always considered Irish Catholicism to be a political religion, and he thought its links to Spanish Catholicism posed a threat to religious liberty for Protestants. Cromwell never believed in full religious toleration, but he was willing to allow more religious freedom than most other English rulers of the seventeenth century. As lord protector of the Commonwealth or English Republic, he allowed Catholics and Anglicans to worship in private without disturbance. Cromwell told Cardinal Mazarin of France that he wanted to grant more liberty of worship to Catholics, but political considerations such as the opposition of Parliament and his council stood in the way. Alexandra Walsham makes the useful distinction between concord and toleration in Anglican thought that continued to cling to the notion of the indivisibility of religious truth. Full toleration of non-Protestants was conceded only very slowly; legal recognition of Catholic worship was not granted by Parliament until 1778, and full civil rights were not restored until 1829.¹⁵⁴

The concept of holy war, in the various guises of the medieval crusade and the Reformation wars of religion, was never fully accepted in the mainstream of Western political theory because the usual legal and moral justification for declaring war was based on the concept of just war. That doctrine had its roots in classical antiquity, and always had its defenders during the medieval period. Except for periods when the papacy or other religious leaders asserted themselves when temporal authority and power were weak, it was usually assumed that only the recognized leader of a political society or a sovereign ruler possessed the right and authority to declare war.¹⁵⁵ The sovereign states that emerged during the Renaissance and early-modern period of European history could not allow contending religious and aristocratic factions to disrupt the peace, as happened in France during the latter part of the sixteenth century. Violent confessional conflict came to be classified as civil war or nonwar, which could not be considered just war.¹⁵⁶ For this reason, most states that aspired to sovereign status pursued Erastian state churches if they were Protestant, or severely limited the authority of the popes and bishops if they remained Catholic, as was the case in Spain and with the Gallican Church in France. The latter monarchies were major powers, and could apply pressure on

the papacy to grant extensive royal control over the Catholic Church within their realms because they wielded military and political power in Italy or were in close proximity to the Italian peninsula. Also, both Spain and France gradually eliminated earlier policies of tolerating religious minorities. Spain had expelled the Jews and *Moriscos* who refused to convert to Catholicism, and Louis XIV revoked the Edicts of Nantes that had allowed the Huguenots to worship in certain designated places.

Increasingly, in the early modern period, political philosophers as well as monarchs rejected religion as a valid reason for going to war. In his *The Law of War and Peace*, published in Latin in 1625, Hugo Grotius argued that relations between states should be grounded in natural law and historical experience. This, of course, embodied the just war tradition, but it also reinforced the growing secularization of political thought. Grotius insisted that the only grounds for a just war were “the defence of persons and property.” He denied that the Church or the Holy Roman emperor had the authority to declare offensive war.¹⁵⁷

Humanism and Neo-Stoicism

No state . . . can support itself without an army.

Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, trans. Ellis Farnsworth
(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965; rpr.
New York: Da Capo, 1990), bk. 1, p. 30

*Rash princes, until such times as they have been well beaten in the wars, will
always have little regard for peace.*

Antonio Guevara, Bishop of Guadix, *The Diall of Princes*, trans.
Thomas North (London: John Waylande, 1557; rpr. Amsterdam:
Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1968), fo. 174v

The Humanist response to the perpetual problems of war and peace divided into the polarities of a martial ethos and an irenic or peace-loving culture. These opposing cultures were linked to an obsession with fame or reputation, honor, and the military legacy of ancient Greece and Rome on the one hand, and on the other, a concern with human dignity, freedom, and a stricter application of Christian morality. Machiavelli and his followers advocated the martial ethos; Erasmus was the most widely read of those who fostered an irenic culture. The latter was also the author of *The Education of a Christian Prince* (1516), which was intended as a manual for the Emperor Charles V. In this work, Erasmus maintained that “A good prince should never go to war unless, after trying all other means, he cannot possibly avoid it. If we were of this mind, there would hardly be a war.”¹ Another school of thought, which combined an admiration for Machiavelli’s analytical approach to political theory with an Erasmian sensitivity to ethical practice, was called

Neo-Stoicism. Michel de Montaigne and Justus Lipsius, the founding fathers of this modern adaptation of the Stoicism of ancient Greece and Rome, while expressing a longing for peace, accepted the reality of war, but sought to impose ethical restraints on how it was declared, waged, and concluded.

The Renaissance and the study of war and peace

Christian humanist, Neo-Stoic, and Protestant thinkers all recognized that discord was a basic part of human existence. Their knowledge of human history, largely derived from the ancients, suggested that war and peace had tended to run in cycles since the dawn of recorded history, but war was the main theme of history. Certainly, many of the earlier Italian humanists saw war as a test of character and an opportunity to win fame and honor. From a theological perspective, war was viewed as a punishment for man's sins. From a more secular and analytical point of view, war arose from man's disposition to violence, just as he was subject to plagues, famines, and other natural disasters that were attributable to forces beyond his control. Some commentators were cynical enough to argue that foreign wars helped to avoid civil wars, kept the population down, and purged the body politic of some of the more undesirable social elements. The Christian humanists launched a general attack on the glorification of war and attempted to demonstrate that human nature could be cured of its supposed disposition to war and violence. Indeed, some Christian humanists went so far as to suggest that communities could be constructed in which it was possible to imagine a world without war. The problem with building utopias, however, was that war-making and the Renaissance state were so bound together that it would be difficult to abolish the one without dismantling the other.²

Many humanists who studied the past tended to idealize Rome during the *Pax Romana* as a kind of golden age following an earlier heroic age that had been characterized by strife. Thus, the myth of a golden age came into existence among early sixteenth-century humanists, who lacked a critical historical understanding of the Roman world. Hence, Erasmus thought that the *Pax Romana* was indeed a time when peace prevailed. Perhaps he did not understand that the Roman peace was not only preceded by strife, but also was

established by wars of conquest and a total and crushing victory.³ Antonio de Guevara believed in the poetic truth of the Golden Age as described by Hesiod and Virgil, and he equated it with the Garden of Eden as described in the Old Testament.⁴ The more that humanists debated the concept of a “golden age,” the more diverse their interpretations and understandings became. One interpretation, derived from Ovid, was that of a primitive pastoral society characterized by “primeval innocence.” This might have been a good refuge for poets, but had a limited application to the modern age. Another, a vision of an idealized future, derived from Virgil, had hoped for an age of gold when peace would be restored to the world by a new Augustus, or perhaps, a child sent from heaven. Christian writers, understandably, interpreted the latter to be the redemptive mission of Christ; courtly poets of the Renaissance shamelessly exploited the secular concept of a golden age to compose panegyrics to describe the alleged virtues of their royal patrons.⁵

A good example of this is provided by the courtly propaganda surrounding Elizabeth I of England. Elizabeth is frequently compared by poets, artists, and theologians to Astraea, patroness of the golden age, that is, the age and empire of Augustus when universal peace supposedly reigned. In Christian times, Astraea was identified with Mary, the Virgin Mother of Christ, and the return of the golden age brought the advent of Christianity. The poets and theologians who were the advocates of an Elizabethan golden age seized on the concept of empire—a sovereignty that united the powers of church and state to effect a reformation leading to pure religion, unity, and justice, when the virgin queen would become the patroness of peace.⁶ What the queen’s subjects actually got was an intolerant, persecuting regime and foreign wars.

The Machiavellians and the martial ethos

Myth-making, however, would carry a Renaissance monarch only so far, and there were those—both inside and outside the sphere of government in England—who sought to remind Elizabeth of the realities of exercising power in a world torn by religious and dynastic warfare. Peter Whitehorne, who translated Machiavelli’s *The Art of War* into English in 1560, told the queen in a dedicatory epistle that the preservation of peace and the uninterrupted

administration of justice depended on the perpetual exercise of arms and preparation for war: "It is impossible for any realm or dominion long to continue in quietness and safeguard where the defence of the sword is not always in readiness..."⁷ Machiavelli's treatise went on to emphasize the intimate relationship between the art of politics and the art of war. Military power was the basic foundation of a civil society in which subjects gave their primary loyalty to their rulers rather than to kinship groups or feudal lords. Machiavelli insisted that the foundations of every state were "good laws and good arms." The latter was the more important: good laws would follow if the state were well armed and defended. "Good arms" meant that a state should depend on a popularly based citizen army and must avoid employing mercenary forces. Machiavelli was consistently emphatic in arguing that a citizen army, or civic militia, would always promote unity and social and political stability.⁸ Machiavelli also viewed a well ordered militia as having an important political function. It would serve as a school of citizenship, promote respect for the laws, and inculcate a common sense of identity. This would erect an obstacle to attempts by ambitious noblemen to seize power, provided that the commanders and officers did not come from the same district in which the members of the militia resided. For these reasons, civic militias were more compatible with republics than monarchies. Machiavelli addressed his writings to the rulers of all states, but he personally preferred a republic with a broad base of popular participation in which the people were subjected to military training and discipline, and which, like Rome, pursued a policy of expansion. It would seem that Machiavelli assigned a higher priority to political stability in a commonwealth than to military success. And, although political stability was highly desirable, Machiavelli believed that popular participation was necessary even if it did lead to a certain amount of popular turbulence.⁹

Like Polybius and Livy, Machiavelli recognized that all human societies are constantly "in a state of flux" and cannot remain the same; a commonwealth that is devoted to preserving tranquility must soon decay. Thus, there was a danger in remaining too long at peace. The only way to avoid idleness, effeminacy, factionalism, and sedition among its citizens was to follow the example of the Roman Republic and employ the militia to pursue a policy of imperial expansion.¹⁰ Machiavelli's advice to princes who wished to remain on their thrones and to those who aspired to become rulers was to devote

themselves exclusively to studying warfare and exercising arms: “A prince . . . should have no other object or thought, nor acquire skill in anything except war, its organization and discipline. The art of war is all that is required of a ruler. . . .”¹¹ Rulers cannot expect their subjects to submit to them and obey them unless they are armed. “A prince who does not understand warfare as well as the other misfortunes which it invites, cannot be respected by his soldiers or place any trust in them.” In preparing for war in peacetime, he should read the histories of great soldiers, hunt regularly, and keep his soldiers well trained and organized. By reading the histories of great men, especially the famous military commanders of antiquity, princes could acquire examples of how they should conduct themselves.¹² Machiavelli records that Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and all great military leaders always marched on foot at the head of their armies and carried their own weapons into battle. Thus, if and when they were killed in battle, they died with their *virtù* intact, and could not be accused of “softness or effeminacy.”¹³

Machiavelli argued that it was necessary for a prince to enjoy a degree of popular support as much as the rulers of a democratic government. It was desirable that the people love their ruler, but in any case, they must fear him. In order to avoid the hatred and contempt of his subjects, the prince needed to enhance his reputation, because reputation was all important in politics. The prince must appear to be virtuous, religious, and clement—even if this required a certain degree of deception and manipulation of public opinion. One of the best ways to build a reputation was by performing great military deeds; another was by providing good laws. A state could not enjoy good laws without the means of enforcing obedience, which presupposed the existence of a military force. Religion was also necessary to sanction obedience and loyalty to the state, as the history of pre-Christian Rome demonstrated. Indeed, religion was a necessary function of the state for that very reason.¹⁴

Most aristocrats in late-fifteenth-century Florence believed that the principal instruments of politics were law, diplomacy, and force, but as a consequence of the helplessness of a divided Italy after it was overrun by the French in 1494, as well as a growing disenchantment with the rule of the Medicis, some of them began to view force as the best way to secure their liberties. Some Italian city-states and principalities had begun to rely for their defense on mercenaries, but humanists, such as Machiavelli and his friend and

close contemporary Francesco Guicciardini, instead advocated citizen armies because that was the way it had been done in the Roman Republic of antiquity. This incorporated the notion that, in a well governed commonwealth, military force should replace diplomatic negotiations in both external and domestic affairs. The Medicis, after their return to power, however, used this concept to overthrow the Florentine Republic and establish a despotism behind the facade of republican institutions. Guicciardini made the observation, based on the Medici despotism that lay behind this facade that “Every government is nothing but violence over subjects, sometimes moderated by a form of honesty.” Guicciardini anticipated Machiavelli in providing a new vocabulary for discussing politics, and emphasized that the political power of all states had its origin in violence. Christian moral principles were, therefore, not relevant to a discussion of politics or its practice.¹⁵

Machiavelli argued that an armed citizenry organized as a civic militia need not pose a threat to the authority of the prince or to political stability, but a mercenary army certainly would. Mercenary soldiers of the Renaissance were notorious for fanning the flames of war in order to keep themselves in employment. So deeply ingrained were their martial inclinations that they could not imagine any other way of earning a living. For this reason, subjects who fought for the glory of the prince were to be preferred to mercenary soldiers who fought to satisfy the ambition of someone else. This insistence that mercenary soldiers were always dangerous was endlessly repeated by the disciples of Machiavelli, and made it difficult for rulers in later times to raise well disciplined standing armies of long-service professional soldiers.¹⁶ A prince who lacked an army of well trained soldiers had only himself to blame for not providing his subjects with the opportunity to exercise arms. Yet, it was better to go to war with inexperienced citizen soldiers than to hire experienced mercenaries. Indeed, a prince who wished to expand his territories should never alter his plans merely in order to avoid war, because postponing a war would always work to his disadvantage.¹⁷

The so-called “free companies” of mercenaries, or *routiers*, had become especially troublesome in the fourteenth century because of the abundant wars of that period. The lack of resources meant that the state armies of the period could not fight continuously, and when knights and soldiers of lesser rank found themselves without employment they devastated the countryside

and extorted tribute from towns. They were particularly troublesome in Italy where they were known as *condottieri*. The military term “company,” to modern readers, can mask the size of such bands. One, known as the “Great Company,” may have numbered as many as 10,000 men. Small wonder that many Italian communes in the wake of the Black Death lacked manpower and financial resources to field citizen armies to resist such adventurers, and chose to pay bribes or tribute to get rid of them. Even when mercenary companies disbanded, they contributed to crime in the countryside, but the soldiers discharged by the military forces of communes were hardly better.¹⁸

At the same time, Maurizio Arfaioi rejects a number of assumptions based on the writings of Guicciardini and Machiavelli; namely, that mercenary companies were inferior to native militias or foreign armies from transalpine Europe in fighting wars in Italy in the early sixteenth century. Actually, the mercenary bands that fought in the Italian wars of that period were experienced in the use of a number of recent military innovations, such as artillery, light cavalry, and highly disciplined infantry formations, and they also had a good knowledge and experience of permanent fortifications as well as field entrenchments. In fact, the wars of the Italian peninsula became “a bloody laboratory of experimentation.” The Italian mercenary bands learned much from the Swiss infantry in regard to how well disciplined companies of pikemen could defeat the heavy cavalry of feudal armies, but only after the use of militia units or bands composed of both militia soldiers and mercenaries had failed. After initially being at a disadvantage, the Italian infantry improved on the Swiss tactical organization composed of a large square of pikemen by integrating *arquebusiers*, or handgunners, into pike formations.¹⁹ While Machiavelli had many followers—especially with regard to the desirability of a civic militia in preference to a mercenary army—there were also those who were repelled by his rejection of both natural and divine law. One was Giovanni Botero, a sometime Jesuit priest who was urged to leave the Jesuit order after giving a sermon questioning the temporal authority of the pope. Botero’s approach to politics was not so different from that of Machiavelli, despite the fact that he was under the influence of the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Botero’s book, *The Reason of State* (1589), dealt with many of the same topics that Machiavelli had discussed—especially those relating to the question of when a prince was justified in going to war. Quite often, Botero’s explanations

concerning which occasions justified declaring war can only be described as expedient. As Professor Quentin Skinner has noted: "Botero is recognizably an inhabitant of Machiavelli's moral universe."²⁰

Like Machiavelli, Botero warns that peace can never be so certain that one can dispense with the military means to defend one's country.²¹ It is only with regard to wars of expansion that Botero parts company with Machiavelli. He states that the right of defensive war is absolute, but an offensive war can only be justified for purposes of defense. Botero, who had experience of the French Wars of Religion, was more sensitive to the issues of religious warfare than Machiavelli when he said that although warfare against infidels was always justified, war against heretical Christians must be a last resort.²² A foreign war, he thought, was a good remedy against popular rebellion and civil war because it keeps the people occupied and dissipates their feelings of hostility toward the aristocracy. The examples of ancient Greece and Rome furnished proof that this was a good policy.²³ Botero also warned that long wars can make warfare a habit because it teaches men that they can acquire what they want by the sword. The conclusion of foreign wars, once the habit of violence is acquired, can lead men who are used only to warfare to turn on their rulers. Botero was, like Machiavelli, an advocate of wide popular participation in government, and he recognized that the prince who employs his own subjects as soldiers did risk danger, but the use of foreign mercenaries could entail even more dangerous consequences because a prince's subjects should never be "beholden" to anyone for defending the state except himself.²⁴

Baldasare Castiglione, although he had been a soldier and thought that military experience was an important part of aristocratic life, believed that the aristocrat, or "courtier," should be known primarily as a man of letters, educated in the classics, who valued moral virtue. It was the duty of a ruler to provide his subjects with laws that would "enable them to live safe and dignified lives in peace and quiet." Castiglione conceded that many states had enjoyed prosperity during time of war, only to fall into decay with prolonged peace. This was because they had not learned how to take advantage of the leisure afforded by peace and to cultivate the necessary moral virtues to enjoy the same. Many rulers had promoted a martial culture that taught their subjects that

their principal aim must be to subjugate their neighbours, and in consequence they incite their people to become bellicose and aggressive. . . . But this was

never feasible, seeing that the process could go on forever, short of the conquest of the whole world, and was in conflict with reason as propounded by natural law, which requires us not to want for others what we should not wish for ourselves. Therefore, rulers should make their people warlike not for lust of conquest, but in order to insure the defence of themselves and their subjects. . . . It is outrageous and deplorable that in war, which is intrinsically evil, men should be valourous and wise, whereas in peace and quiet, which is good, they are so ignorant and inept that they do not know how to enjoy their blessings.²⁵

Antonio de Guevara thought that a prince “which keepeth his commonwealth in peace hath great wrong if he were not of all men beloved. What good can the commonwealth have where there is war and dissension. . . . What availeth a prince to banish all vices . . . otherwise he keepeth it in war.”²⁶ Castiglione’s appreciation of the pursuit of more peaceful pastimes was further explored by the adherents of Christian humanism.

Erasmianism and irenic culture

The European state system in the Renaissance was organized for wielding power and making war. Garrett Mattingly has suggested that Machiavelli, the Florentine humanist, who is almost universally viewed as a cynical realist and who adapted his political philosophy to this state of affairs, was actually something of a disillusioned idealist.²⁷ Erasmian humanism, on the other hand, criticized this political realism and glorification of martial culture by launching a direct attack on crusading, chivalric, and patriotic values. Erasmian humanists hoped to convert princes to more peaceful policies by showing them the usefulness of negotiation and arbitration as an alternative to war, yet Erasmus himself remained suspicious of the deviousness inherent in the diplomatic practice of the period. Treaties between rulers were supposed to prevent wars, but because they were often drawn up with the intent to dissimulate, they often led to wars. Erasmus thought that if rulers were men of good faith there would be no need for treaties. Still, negotiation offered an alternative to war. In order to inculcate more pacific values, Erasmus and his followers proposed to draw up a course of studies emphasizing Christian and

the best of classical ethics based on the New Testament and the works of Roman Stoic authors such as Cicero's *De officiis*. The Ciceronian or Neo-Roman variety of humanism provided the critical tools to question the dedication of the nobility to seeking honor and glory in war rather than pursuing "the arts of peace." It asserted that nobility should be based on virtue rather than lineage. The audience that the Erasmians aimed this curriculum at consisted of merchants whose trade might benefit from peace, and gentlemen who valued the pen more than the sword and who were likely to become magistrates, royal counselors, and servants, and who might help wean monarchs from their bellicose habits.²⁸

Aristotelianism had dominated the scholarship and philosophy of the medieval world—especially the universities—and was the basis of the scholastic philosophy that, under the guidance of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, had provided a rationalist approach to the truths of the Christian religion. From the beginning of the Italian Renaissance, humanist scholars, often working outside of the academic world, began promoting an alternative to scholastic Aristotelianism, which was called Ciceronianism, or more simply, Romanism. These humanists, such as Petrarch, preferred the moral values and rhetorical Latin style that they found in Cicero and Seneca. Later, Christian moralists such as Erasmus discovered a grave fault in Cicero—he had come to be admired by Machiavelli, who made effective use of Cicero's argument that the interests of one's own country were to be preferred above all other considerations.²⁹

Erasmus was an early and severe critic of the martial ethos that had prevailed in Christian society from late antiquity through the Middle Ages when the Church had often stood in need of armed protection. This position was at first emotional rather than intellectual because his pupil, Alexander, son of James IV of Scotland, was killed at the battle of Flodden in 1515. Erasmus called Mars "the stupidest of all gods." War did not confer glory in his opinion; it was irrational, and Erasmus came to detest all professional soldiers. Erasmus condemned war, not because it was incompatible with the Christian religion, but because it was an inhumane activity. The argument that war was unnatural and irrational became one of the foundations of modern pacifism.³⁰

The Christian humanists, such as Erasmus, Sir Thomas More, and John Colet, rejected the argument that war was an instrument of Divine Providence

to punish the sins of man; they insisted that wars occurred because of the actions of men, and sins were “learned in war.” Erasmus said that since more innocent than evil people were hurt by war, the divine use of war to punish sins would be unjust. Further, the Erasmians insisted that peace was possible in a society founded on reason and justice. For that reason, a good Christian prince should be too busy governing and dispensing justice to have time to hunt, make war, dance, or gamble.³¹ If Plato, a pagan, thought that civil war was the worst kind of calamity imaginable, how much more careful should Christians be about shedding Christian blood, said Erasmus, because war among Christians was a kind of civil war. Erasmus also thought that it would be very difficult to justify a war against the Turks unless provoked, because this was contrary to the means by which Christianity was first spread. Since one war tends to lead to another, a good Christian prince should be very circumspect about declaring war. If he does go to war, he should be careful to wage war with as little harm to his own subjects and as little shedding of Christian blood as possible, and to conclude the struggle as soon as possible.³² Although Erasmus was the leading exponent of peace in his time, it needs to be said that he had never taken the trouble to think through the complex subject of why states go to war with one another.³³

Erasmus was most insistent in his condemnation of the just-war doctrine. Princes deceive themselves when they declare that the wars that they are about to undertake are just wars. There was no point in discussing whether a war was just or not since rulers have always found the requisite arguments to assert that their cause was just. Moreover, the problem with allowing the prince to decide whether to wage war was that princes have difficulty distinguishing between their own ambitions and the interests of a commonwealth. Erasmus was also insistent that princes should not consult their lawyers and courtiers on this subject, but rather should listen to their subjects. He did concede that a good prince might be obliged to fight a war for a compelling reason, but it could not be called a just war unless he pursued and exhausted more peaceful solutions.³⁴ Erasmus thought that the true message of the New Testament enjoining Christians to be men of peace had been perverted by the Roman law doctrine of just war and by the rationalism of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. That message of peace had been further diluted by canon lawyers, theologians, and papal practice during late antiquity and the medieval period.³⁵

Erasmus singled out Pope Julius II as a particularly bad example of a pontiff, whose bellicose behavior made him indistinguishable from the worst of the Renaissance Italian princes. It was during Julius's pontificate (1503–13) that the papal states emerged as a sovereign entity as a consequence of his pursuit of war and diplomacy. Erasmus wrote a satirical dialogue in which he compared Pope Julius to Julius Caesar. Although perhaps not as corrupt as some of his predecessors, Julius was a very worldly pope whom Erasmus styled the "warrior-pope." Erasmus depicted Julius II entering cities he had conquered in the manner of Roman military triumphs such as those staged by Scipio Africanus or his alter ego, Julius Caesar.³⁶

Among the adages that Erasmus added to the 1515 edition of the *Adagiorum Chiliades* was *dulce bellum inexpertis*, that is, "war is sweet to those who have not tried it." It was a proverb with many variants and was found in the writings of classical authors from the Greek poet Pindar to the Roman military writer Vegetius. Erasmus lamented that despite the terrible destruction of war, it was entered on lightly:

If there is anything in mortal affairs which should be approached with hesitancy, or rather ought to be avoided in every possible way, guarded against and shunned, that thing is war; there is nothing more wicked, more disastrous, and more widely destructive, more deeply tenacious, more loathsome, in a word more unworthy of man, not to say of a Christian. Yet, strange to say, everywhere at the present time war is being entered upon lightly, for any kind of reason, and waged with cruelty and barbarousness, not only by the heathen but by Christians, not only for lay people, but by priests and bishops, not only by the young and inexperienced, but also by the old who know it well; not so much by the common people and the naturally fickle mob, but rather by princes, whose function should restrain with wisdom and reason the rash impulses of the foolish rabble. Nor are there lacking lawyers and theologians who add fuel to the fire of these misdeeds. . . . And the result of all this is, that war is now such an accepted thing that people are astonished to find anyone who does not like it.

The new 1515 edition of Erasmus's *Adages* seems to have been prompted by the youthful Henry VIII's wars against Scotland and France.³⁷

Until well into the early modern era, the distinction between the nobilities of the sword and the robe (or in the British Isles, between swordsmen and

gownsmen) persisted, and many young noblemen and gentlemen believed that a period of time spent in the army as an officer or a gentleman volunteer constituted an initiation into manhood and a validation of their honorable status.³⁸ Erasmus regarded time spent in military service as time wasted and thought that the effort expended was destructive. He made a particular point of attacking the writers of military memoirs and their accounts of battle as pure fiction because the “hallooing, hurly-burly, noise of guns, trumpets and drums, neighing of horses and shouting of men”:—what modern military historians call the “fog of battle”—produced such noise and confusion that it would have been impossible for any one person to know what was going on everywhere on the battlefield—never mind being able to repeat verbatim speeches made in different places by noble officers and commanders.³⁹

A protégé of Erasmus, the Catalan Juan Luis Vives, carried on Erasmus’s denunciation of martial culture. As a child, Vives saw his father, grandmother, and great-grandfather all executed by the Spanish Inquisition as relapsed *conversos* (or crypto-Jews). His mother died soon after of the Plague, and her body was dug up and also burnt by the Inquisition. Vives left Spain never to return, receiving his education at the University of Paris. He spent the rest of his life in England and at Bruges in the Spanish Netherlands. Like Erasmus and Thomas More, Vives, in his *The Education of a Christian Woman*, directed his literary efforts toward condemning bellicosity as depicted in books of chivalry such as Thomas Mallory’s *Morted’ Arthur*, which these humanists wished to see banished from the lists of recommended reading for aristocratic men and women. Indeed, they wished to purge all works of history and romantic literature that praised despots and conquerors such as Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar. These works were hardly suitable for the education of Christian monarchs and their officials who were supposed to rule with justice. The education of a Christian prince should be aimed at ending the endless wars between Christians. True honor and glory could not be found in the senseless bloodshed of war. Vives also emphasized the idea that civility flourished best in an urban commonwealth in which civic participation in government and the rule of law were to be found.⁴⁰

Éméric Crucé, another disciple of Erasmus, a French monk and the author of *Nouveau Cynée* (1623), also rejected the concept of just war, and proposed an international congress to maintain peace, which would meet at Venice

and include representatives from Muslim as well as Christian countries.⁴¹ He thought that warriors had no place in civilized society because of their arrogance and brutality, which were the causes of all wars. Such men could never settle down to peaceful habits. Like Erasmus, he did not believe in the legal concept of just war. While Crucé did not think that martial men could be entirely banished, he did insist that free trade and the development of agriculture, commerce, and manufacturing could shift the social balance, encourage peaceful occupations, increase wealth, and draw men away from martial pursuits. Those who could not adapt themselves to living in a mercantile world could be recruited into professional armies and sent to the fringes of the civilized world to fight pirates and savages.⁴²

The Salamancan School and just-war theory

Not all humanists followed Erasmus in rejecting all forms of violence. Many clung to the just-war tradition, and while unable to follow the Erasmian peace ethic, they did seek to impose constraints on methods of warfare. Nor should we forget that Machiavelli's jettisoning of ethical standards from political and military discourse also derives from the Italian humanist tradition. Other humanist scholars cited classical authorities to perpetuate or revive a martial ethos for their princely or aristocratic patrons.⁴³

Because Erasmus had mounted a devastating attack on the ancient doctrine of just war, which had been upheld and defended by theologians and canon lawyers for a millennium, his writings caused alarm in those quarters. His *Querela pacis* (*The Complaint of Peace*), published in 1517 while he was living in England, was condemned and seized by the Sorbonne, the theological faculty of the University of Paris. Taken aback that his book was banned in France, Erasmus backed down to a degree in later life, and admitted that armed conflict was not totally prohibited to Christians. Rulers were allowed to wield the sword to protect the commonwealth, but not to pursue their personal ambitions by means of war.⁴⁴

However admirable these sentiments were, the Erasmian peace ethic lacked practical application. The pacifism of Erasmus and the Christian humanists was parochial because it built Utopias within a world that possessed Christian

values and was confined to Western Europe. It failed to anticipate European expansion into the East Indies and the New World, and it could not comprehend or deal with the nature of the early modern state that came into existence for the purpose of making war on a grander scale over a sustained period of time.⁴⁵ Also, many humanists rejected the Roman concept of kinship within human society, and preferred the more narrow Aristotelian belief that the *polis* was the ideal society. At the same time, not a few of them also accepted Aristotle's argument that barbarians and other lesser people were fit to be enslaved because of cultural and moral shortcomings. This was an argument that could be used to justify both the aggressive pursuit of war and the conquest of the native peoples of the New World.⁴⁶

Spain, during its so-called Golden Age, when it was the dominant European power and was in the process of acquiring a vast colonial empire, was hardly in the mood to listen to the Erasmians. Where Erasmus had said that it might be better to accept an unjust peace in preference to a just war, Francisco de Vitoria, a Dominican friar and a philosopher who had studied at the University of Paris and later taught at the University of Salamanca, rejected pacifism and cited St. Augustine to argue that in the earthly city peace is only momentary. Like other Spanish political theorists of the early sixteenth century, his outlook was shaped by the Spanish conquests in the New World. Unlike Erasmus, whose writings he took a part in condemning, Vitoria recognized the need to accommodate the sovereign state and the right of political society to defend itself. Moreover, Vitoria also insisted on the right of a state to wage offensive war, if after a lapse of time, it failed to obtain satisfaction or reparations from an enemy for injuries suffered. Thus, the ethical and legal doctrine of the just war was extended by philosophers such as Vitoria; this was done by reaching back to the Old Testament, rather than grounding their teachings on war solely on the New Testament as Erasmus had done. At the same time, Vitoria was not prepared to allow the prince to declare war without constraints; he rejected differences of religion, princely ambition, and conquest of empire as sufficient causes for waging war. The only morally acceptable reasons for going to war were self-defense, the restoration of peace, and the avenging of injuries. Vitoria also rejected the papal claim that the Indians of the New World might be conquered because they practice cannibalism. It was morally acceptable for any ruler to stop such practices, but

not to acquire territory.⁴⁷ The Italian Protestant, Alberico Gentili, also joined this controversy by arguing that it was just to make war on the Indians because they supposedly practiced sodomy with beasts, which was contrary to natural law. However, he rejected the argument that the conquest of the Indians was justified because they refused to accept the missionaries who came to preach the Gospel.⁴⁸

Vitoria laid down rules for waging war. Only the prince had “the authority to wage war,” but he should first strive to live in peace with his enemy and “above all to avoid all provocations and causes of war.” Assuming that his subjects did not object, the inability to maintain peaceful relations with a potential enemy was grounds for a legitimate war. War should be waged not to destroy the enemy, but to reestablish peace and security. Once victory had been achieved, the victorious prince must act as a judge and not as a prosecutor. “He must give satisfaction to the injured, but without causing the utter ruination of the guilty commonwealth.” However, Vitoria lays down a number of exceptions to this last rule. Sometimes, when fighting the infidel, it becomes necessary to kill all who can bear arms when that enemy refuses to surrender. This cannot be done in wars against fellow Christians because this would provoke endless warfare. Mindful that the Book of Joshua (6:21) records that Saul and the Israelites, by divine command, had killed the children and young women of Amalek, Vitoria rejects so broad a doctrine of holy war even when fighting the Turks. Even though it can be assumed that Turkish male children may grow up to fight Christians, they may not be slain for what they might do in the future. One must presume that all noncombatants are innocent, even though Deuteronomy (20:10–20) allows the killing of all adult males—whether combatants or noncombatants. Vitoria does allow that if it is necessary to besiege and storm a fortification in order to keep the war from spreading or to prevent the enemy from winning, no moral fault is incurred if innocent people die, but “care must be taken to insure that the evil effects of war do not outweigh the possible benefits sought by waging” the war in the first place. Vitoria also specifies the conditions that allow the killing of enemy combatants: The defenders of a city or fortress who have refused to surrender when called on to do so, may be put to the sword following victory, but only after taking “account of the scale of the injury inflicted by the enemy, [and] of our losses and their other crimes . . . without cruelty or inhumanity”; and when the enemy is an

infidel from whom one can never hope for peace; and when prisoners of war turn out to be “deserters and fugitives,” but not otherwise.⁴⁹

Another member of the Salamancan School was Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, a diplomat and a canon of Santiago. His *The Idea of a Politico-Christian Prince* called for the ruler to maintain his reputation by the display of moral virtue and political wisdom. To cultivate that reputation could be more difficult than building a state, and once lost, it could never be regained. Virtue helped to build the support of citizens and subjects, and was a major source of political power and the maintenance of authority. This had more to do with respect than public opinion, but the ruler could not ignore his subjects’ wishes either. While Saavedra did not approve of outright lying by a prince when conducting affairs of state, he believed that a prudent ruler might sometimes need to dissimulate when dealing with foreign princes, his own subjects, or even his own councilors. In this respect, Saavedra was not all that different from Machiavelli. And, like Machiavelli, Saavedra believed that religion, with its assurances of future rewards or punishments, helped to ensure obedience to the prince.⁵⁰

A number of Portuguese Jesuits joined the friars of the Salamancan School in their desire to impose limits on offensive war. Luis Molina wrote that wars for the pursuit of glory and preemptive strikes were not morally permissible. Unlike Gentili, he said that wars cannot be just on both sides, and the aggression in defensive wars must be proportionate to the injury suffered. Warfare against “barbarians” living without lawfully recognized government, in places such as Brazil, was permissible only to protect “innocent victims of their aggression.”⁵¹

Utopianism

A genre of Christian Humanist literature that arose in protest against Machiavellian “reason of state” political theory and its glorification of the martial ethos was Utopianism. Thomas More was the modern inventor of Utopian schemes, which were widely imitated by later writers such as Sir Francis Bacon, in his *New Atlantis*, and Robert Burton.⁵² Most early modern schemes for Utopias offered models for small perfected communities within a larger imperfect world. They were often located on the periphery of the

European world away from the vortex of war. In some of these communities, there was an absence of gold so as not to arouse the envy of bellicose neighbors, yet in none of these ideal societies could their creators imagine a larger world completely purged of war.⁵³

The inhabitants of Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* were not entirely pacifist; they were prepared to fight in self-defense, although they preferred diplomacy or even paying tribute to actual warfare. However, unlike Machiavelli and the classical republicans who insisted on civic militias for military undertakings because they distrusted mercenary soldiers, the Utopians hired mercenaries to fight their wars of self-defense. They also mistrusted mercenaries, but they did not want the Utopians mixed up in the nasty and unprofitable business of war. Sir Thomas More, being a lawyer, was prepared to accept the just-war doctrine, dating back to St. Augustine and Roman law. Erasmus, by contrast, thought that war was so unchristian and destructive that he could not think of any circumstance that justified a declaration of war.⁵⁴

A striking feature of More's *Utopia* is that it was not conceived as a Christian commonwealth. Whereas Sir Francis Bacon imagined that the citizens of *New Atlantis* possessed both the Old and the New Testaments, More chose to withhold Christian revelation from the Utopians, and despite the fact that he dressed them in the garb of Franciscan friars and had them dwell in a community that looked suspiciously medieval, the Utopians lived in accordance with an ethical code that would have been familiar to Plato. The purpose of this was to show that if the Utopians possessed only the four cardinal virtues of classical pagan morality and could live in peace, how much more perfect would be a society possessing the three Christian virtues as well. Thus, More depicted the Utopians, having only reason to guide them, as living to a higher moral standard than the inhabitants of the war-torn Christian Europe of More's time who had the benefit of Divine Revelation.⁵⁵

It is perhaps misleading to think of the inhabitants of More's *Utopia* as living in a perfected society. Whereas the Utopians were highly moral and restrained in their domestic political behavior, their relations with other nations were sometimes devoid of moral restraint. They did not make treaties, they practiced deception, and when they went to war with other peoples, they hired foreign mercenaries to do their fighting. They also attempted to undermine the governments of their enemies by suborning treason and

procuring assassinations. The Utopians also dealt with the problem of surplus population by pursuing aggressive colonial expansion.⁵⁶

With respect to external relations, More's highly principled behavior as a royal servant to Henry VIII was in contrast to that of the Utopians. Most of the rulers of Europe in the early sixteenth century liked to attract humanist scholars to their courts for adornment if not enlightenment. The humanists, in turn, were flattered to be invited, and hoped to exert some influence on these would-be patrons. Christian humanists usually discovered that the princes and aristocracy were eager for a humanist education that would help them adapt to a rapidly changing world, provided it did not interfere with their predilection for hunting and making war. A problem that Sir Thomas More explored in his *Utopia* was whether a Christian humanist should involve himself in the political affairs of a prince if invited to become an adviser. The royal councilors had their own sycophantic culture and inner dynamic, and intellectuals would have to give up their independence of judgment. Erasmus understood that a Christian humanist could not give honest advice on the justness of war to a powerful prince who was determined to go to war.⁵⁷ More thought that Renaissance monarchs were preoccupied with "pursuits of war" in order to add to their kingdoms, rather than providing good government to the territories that they already possessed. His opposition to war was partly motivated by the heavy burden that taxation placed on ordinary people—especially the poorest segment of the population—and by the looting of soldiers. More also believed that the insatiable needs of war corrupt good laws and government.⁵⁸

Neo-Stoicism

At the time of More's death in 1535, it must have appeared that the chances of universal peace were fading. The more practical humanists turned their attention to the task of limiting the scope of war and imposing ethical constraints on how war was waged, employing the examples of Roman Stoicism. Just as classical Stoicism was generated by the conflicts and violence of the Hellenistic world, so also the revival of Stoicism, or Neo-Stoicism, had its origins in the 1570s in the reaction of humanist moral and political

philosophers against the spread of bloodshed resulting from the religious wars in France. Similar disasters plagued Germany, the Low Countries, and the British Isles. One of the earliest exponents of this Neo-Stoicism was Michel de Montaigne, who implicitly rejected the Huguenot theory of resistance to constituted authority and blamed it for the moral, political, and social disintegration that accompanied the French religious and civil wars. These extraordinary times explain his espousal of Neo-Stoicism: "In ordinary and peaceful times, a man prepares himself for common and moderate accidents; but in this confusion, wherein we have been for these thirty years, every Frenchman, be it in general or in particular, doth hourly see himself upon the point of his fortunes overthrown and downfall."⁵⁹ Montaigne withdrew from his judicial offices in the Parlement of Bordeaux and retired to his estate, employing his leisure for scholarship and the writing of his *Essays*. Montaigne's example of stoic endurance and tolerance encouraged Neo-Stoic disciples in France and other countries beset by civil and religious strife.⁶⁰

Montaigne was trained in the law and held offices associated with the nobility of the robe, but he considered himself to be a member of the sword nobility. Despite his peaceful inclination, he believed that the profession of arms was the only source of nobility. He disliked the law, but was vague about the details of his military service. His father had fought in the Italian wars, and kept a journal, which Montaigne read. Montaigne also made a special study of Roman soldiers, such as Scipio Africanus (the "Elder"), the conqueror of Carthage, and Lucullus, a patron of learning, and a friend of scholars and poets. Being surrounded by violence and civil war, it is not surprising that Montaigne's *Essays* are filled with references to and anecdotes about warfare both ancient and modern. As befitted a humanist, he showed a particular interest in the ethics of war.⁶¹

The theme that runs through Neo-Stoic philosophy is the acceptance of the vicissitudes of fortune, and the determination to remain constant and courageous in the face of the miseries that civil war brought. Justus Lipsius defined constancy as "a right and immovable strength of mind, neither lifted up nor pressed down with external and casual accidents." It was characterized by patience and the acceptance of suffering without complaint and it was guided by "right reason." Although he was a steadfast Catholic, Montaigne incurred the official displeasure of the Catholic Church because of his frequent

citation of the goddess Fortuna; other Neo-Stoic thinkers such as Justus Lipsius and Guillaume de Vair, Bishop of Lisieux, invoke Divine Providence as a cause of the conjuncture of disasters associated with the civil conflict that Montaigne, in his humanist-classicist style, assigned to fortune. The constancy that Neo-Stoics advocated required faithfulness to established religion, which in France was Catholicism. Coupled with the maintenance of religious uniformity (although Montaigne was a man of tolerant views), Neo-Stoic thinkers insisted on loyalty and obedience to rulers by law established, whatever their imperfections, and an acceptance of ancient custom. Therefore, political and religious resistance could not be condoned.⁶² Late sixteenth-century Neo-Stoics thought that it was of supreme political importance to preserve the ruler's hold on the state in order to preserve political stability. The advancement of justice was of secondary importance, and unjust things might be done to preserve the state and maintain political order and civil peace.⁶³

Montaigne believed that the French civil wars were more cruel than anything to be found in the ancient world. They were worse than interstate conflicts because they obliged everyone to be a soldier and guard his own house. Montaigne seems to be referring to the fact that most of his neighbors were Protestants, and he felt besieged and had ever to be vigilant: "Civil wars are worse in this respect than other wars, that they make us all sentinels in our own houses." Indeed, Montaigne believed that the age in which he lived was so vicious that it was not sufficient to call it an age of iron. A new and more base metal was called for to describe his times.⁶⁴

The cruelty of the French civil wars was intensified by the widespread aristocratic feuds of the period that increased bloodletting beyond what the political and religious disputes would otherwise have warranted. Stuart Carroll says that this endemic feuding had been inherited from the Burgundian-Armagnac wars of the fifteenth century, was made worse by the Italian fashion for dueling, and resulted in a homicide rate that exceeded anything in present-day society. These violent predilections reached their peak during another period of civil war in France—the *Frondes* in the 1650s. Aristocratic feuding replicated the civil wars on a smaller scale, because dueling in the Italian fashion, with rapiers rather than military swords, required the numerous seconds that Italian dueling protocol called for also to participate in duels rather than to merely witness the contest.⁶⁵ Montaigne's disciple, Guillaume du

Vair, offered the advice that armed noblemen should avoid those occasions and places where insults might be offered of a kind that a man of honor would be obliged to answer with violence.⁶⁶ The chivalric revival of the Renaissance intensified the egotism and martial ethos of the military aristocracy in early modern France. In aristocratic circles, it came to be believed that revenge acquired more legitimacy if it was performed in public. Moreover, judges were prepared to accept the argument that murder and mayhem committed while seeking revenge under the aristocratic code of honor constituted mitigating circumstances. Because the Valois kings of France had succeeded in suppressing most of the larger aristocratic vendettas, feuding, and dueling were largely confined to the lesser ranks of the French aristocracy. However, the religious wars turned these conflicts into blood feuds and thus intensified the enmity.⁶⁷

Montaigne's Neo-Stoic values reflected his desire to develop an ethical system that would urge men to restrain their passions and renounce revenge in order to curb the cruelty of war. Like many Frenchmen, he believed that the religious wars reflected a decline in ethical standards.⁶⁸ He insisted that when punishing an enemy or fighting a war, passion and anger could cloud one's judgment. Furthermore, when engaging an enemy in combat, there was no need to demonize him since he might be an honorable man with admirable virtues.

Philosophy wills that in chastising injuries received we keep anger out of it, not so that the vengeance may be less, but on the contrary so that it may be all the better dealt out and heavier; which purposes, so philosophy thinks, this impetuosity hinders. . . . He who bears himself more moderately toward winning and losing is always self-possessed. The less he becomes excited and impassioned about the game, the more advantageously and surely he plays it.⁶⁹

The distinction between robe and sword in sixteenth-century France has probably been exaggerated, as the career of Montaigne suggests. Montaigne always assumed that he belonged to the sword nobility, and saw no reason why one could not combine the careers of being a soldier and a scholar. He insisted that "the proper, the only, the essential form of nobility in France is the military profession." Judges sometimes interrupted their careers to seek military experience, and some of them pursued feuds and engaged in duels. Yet, despite

his condemnation of civil wars and wars of aggression, Montaigne continued to admire soldiers and the military life.

There is no occupation so pleasant as the military one, an occupation both noble in execution (for the strongest, most generous, and proudest of all virtues is valour) and noble in its cause: there is no more just and universal service than the protection of the peace and the greatness of your country. You enjoy the company of so many noble, young, active men, the regular sight of so many tragic spectacles, the freedom of that artless relationship, a manly and unceremonious way of life, the variety of a thousand diverse actions, the brave harmony of martial music which delights your ears and arouses your soul, the honour of this exercise, even its severity and hardship. . . . To fear the common risks that affect so great a throng, not to dare what so many kinds of souls dare, that is for a heart immeasurably weak and base. . . . Death is more abject, lingering and distressing in bed than battle. . . .⁷⁰

Montaigne was clearly ambivalent about warfare. He condemns wars undertaken for conquest and glory, such as the Spanish acquisition of a colonial empire in the New World, but at the same time, he condemns as cowardly and shameful the failure of the kings of Spain to lead those campaigns in person. He held Henry III of France in contempt for his failure to appear on the battlefield, but admired the warlike qualities of Henry of Navarre (later Henry IV), although he did not trust the latter's motives.⁷¹

Montaigne was a humanist with a strong moral sense, and was clearly influenced by Erasmian pacifism. He agreed that the king's primary duty was to dispense justice and condemned those princes who were driven by ambition to expand their territories. While he had a strong aversion to civil conflicts, he also could not condone the chauvinism of a monarch who sought to quell domestic factionalism or strife by undertaking foreign wars. However, Montaigne realized that the uncompromising pacifism of the early sixteenth-century Erasmians had failed to deter warfare, and thus, he accepted the ancient and pessimistic view of human nature that made war seem inevitable. Consequently, he believed that rulers had a duty to prepare their countries for defensive wars, and should be ready to lead their subjects personally in such endeavors.⁷²

Justus Lipsius, a Flemish classical scholar who changed his religion every time he moved his residence, was a disciple of Montaigne but also an admirer

of Machiavelli. Like Montaigne, he came down on the side of morality in political and military affairs. Drawing on the writings of both Seneca and Tacitus, Lipsius sought to devise a system of politics and ethics that was compatible with Christian morality.⁷³ Beginning in the 1570s, Tacitism became a model of humanistic discourse on politics and replaced the earlier Ciceronian humanism. Although Machiavelli had not acknowledged the influence of Tacitus, Justus Lipsius and Michel de Montaigne found that Tacitus's skeptical way of looking at politics suited the age of the civil wars that characterized France and the Netherlands. Tacitus was a classical writer to whom Lipsius and Montaigne could turn and who also provided the moral dimension that was lacking in Machiavelli. Lipsius and Montaigne are also noted for their fusion of secularized political analysis with Tacitean skepticism, which is one source of what we call Neo-Stoicism. But Lipsius retained a belief in Machiavellian "reason of state" and conceded that in an imperfect world where deception pervaded diplomatic relations, the prince must sometimes "play the fox" in order to protect himself and his realm.⁷⁴ Lipsius may have abhorred war, but he recognized that the prince needed military power to keep order at home and to defend the realm. That power needed to be guided by what he called "military prudence." Machiavelli was the only modern writer whom Lipsius recommended to his readers, and he placed him in his pantheon alongside Plato and Aristotle, but he did insist on a Neo-Stoic code of morality in military matters.⁷⁵

Lipsius inspired scholars throughout early modern Europe to study Roman political and military institutions in order to apply Roman practice to contemporaneous problems. Whereas Machiavelli thought that a state's military forces should rest on a citizen militia, Lipsius favored a standing army composed of long-service professional soldiers recruited from among the state's own citizens. The development of the fiscal resources of the early modern state had progressed far enough to make this possible by the end of the sixteenth century. Indeed, Lipsius made military force the foundation of the early modern absolutist state, and at the same time, argued that military questions could not be divorced from foreign and domestic affairs and fiscal resources. Because his prescriptions for military organization, methods of warfare, and the financial underpinnings of these activities were incorporated into a political theory, Gerhard Oestreich believed that Lipsius was the

“philosophical father of the early modern state.” Lipsius’s call for military reforms was taken up by Maurice of Nassau, stadholder of the United Provinces of the Netherlands and captain-general of the States’ Army, and his Nassau cousins, who turned the Dutch Army into an effective and disciplined force during the Eighty Years War (1568–1648), the Dutch war of independence. Lipsius’s distinctive contribution was to lay out a system of discipline derived from Roman models, and to provide an ethical system based on Roman Stoicism.⁷⁶ Unfortunately, one of the chief lessons that European rulers learned from their study of Roman political and military institutions was that imperial expansion led to greatness. Consequently, their imperial expansion helped to keep alive the fires of religious and dynastic warfare. Lipsius believed that the reason Europe was beset with so many wars and rebellions was because it was divided into small parcels ruled by competing dynasties. He pointed out that the same situation had prevailed on the Western European continent before it was incorporated into the Roman Empire. If Europe could achieve both political and religious unity once again, it could enjoy internal peace and put an end to the Turkish threat. To achieve such unity, of course, would have required a considerable degree of coercion on the part of a powerful state with plentiful resources of money and military power, such as the Roman Empire had possessed. This was a view of history that was consistent with the fashionable Tacitism then current in European intellectual circles. The kingdom of France had also maintained a standing army composed of mercenaries from the late medieval period, but because the kings of France wished to employ only experienced soldiers, they were always looking for pretexts for war to provide their soldiers with battle experience. They forgot the lesson to be learned from Rome, Carthage, and the other empires of the ancient world that mercenary soldiers often turn on their own masters.⁷⁷

Lipsius spent much of his career at the University of Leiden, where his writings were thought to provide a suitable basis for the education of the young Maurice of Nassau, so that he might follow in the footsteps of his father William I (“the Silent”), Prince of Orange, as the military leader of the Dutch war of independence from Spain. Lipsius subsequently returned to Catholicism and the Spanish Netherlands, spending his last years at the University of Louvain. However, he never abandoned his Tacitean belief that courts of princes were corrupt, and war was sometimes preferable to peace

when living under rulers such as the Spanish Habsburgs. The lesson could also be learned from reading Lipsius that honor was something to be acquired on the battlefield, not at court—especially a court that had become effeminated like the English court of King James VI and I. King James hated violence, but for the Stoic, violence was part of the human condition and could not be avoided.⁷⁸

Lipsius hoped for a negotiated peace in the Low Countries war, rather than a victory by either side. He disapproved of the policy followed by Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma, the Spanish military commander, in his attempt to settle the war by conquest and the imposition of religious uniformity. Lipsius had accepted a teaching post at the University of Leiden because William I had declared himself in favor of a degree of religious toleration; Lipsius moved back to Louvain and became a Catholic once again when he perceived that the Spanish government had abandoned Parma's policy of conquest and was open to negotiations. As Lipsius surmised, the Spanish agreed to the Twelve Years' Truce in 1609. Although Lipsius's views on the need for religious uniformity altered according to the circumstances, he remained consistent in arguing that the public observance of religion must always be subordinate to politics. At the same time, he believed that the private observance of religion was a matter of individual choice. These views remind us of why Lipsius was always considered to be a Machiavellian.⁷⁹

Lipsius did adhere to the traditional Roman and medieval criteria for a just war—especially those laid down by St. Thomas Aquinas. Only the prince had the authority to make war, and the only just cause for taking up arms was defense against invasion, but this also included going to the aid of a neighbor or ally who was threatened by tyranny. An enemy's territories might also be invaded to avenge injuries suffered or to recover something wrongfully taken by that enemy, but only after the enemy had been warned and given the opportunity to make restitution. Lipsius also quotes St. Augustine to say that preemptive war may be undertaken against barbarians who are uncivilized heathens—especially if they have previously invaded Christian territory. "Wise men make war that they may have peace. . . ."⁸⁰

One should not enter upon war lightly, Lipsius advised princes, because it was easier to begin a war than to extricate one's kingdom once the war had begun. Moreover, the outcome of a war was always unpredictable, and the

wake of war would leave behind much death and destruction, visited on princes as well as peasants. For this reason, the prince had a Christian obligation to seek good counsel before undertaking a war, and to banish from his court warmongers—those who “are the furies and firebrands of war” and cannot live in peace. Lipsius paraphrased Erasmus: “War is sweet to them that have not had experience thereof.” But then, he cites Caesar Augustus to the effect that while a prince should be peaceful and renounce ambition, he should maintain sufficient military resources to defend his kingdoms.⁸¹

Arguing from the precepts of Homer, Lipsius saw the perfect prince as “a good governor and a worthy warrior,” who was distinguished by courage, military virtue, industry, and military prudence, which meant that he was conversant with the ways of making war and the laws and customs governing the same, and always observed those laws and customs. The prudent prince understood that “all wars are unlawful which are grounded upon no other cause than ambition and covetousness.” Whereas early sixteenth-century Christian humanists had criticized the martial ethos, Lipsius collaborated in the creation of the absolutist states of the seventeenth century, which were certainly not compatible with the values of the Erasmians.⁸² While Lipsius may have longed for peace, and cautioned princes—especially those of smaller states—to avoid war if at all possible by seeking to negotiate a settlement of differences, he spent more time discussing the practical aspects of waging war, such as organization, discipline, strategy, and tactics than he did examining war as a phenomenon. However, he did try to impose a moral dimension on the practical aspects of warfare by discussing the concepts of just war, constraints on war, and how to conclude a war in a manner consistent with justice. In this way, he indirectly contributed to the development of international law in the seventeenth century.⁸³

In his advice to rulers and commanders, observing what he took to be the example of the Roman Republic, Lipsius urged that wars be concluded by an honest peace in which the victors displayed leniency, moderation, and modesty. The losing side should also understand that they had been defeated, but unnecessary destruction of resources, plunder, and spoil were to be avoided. At the same time, he counsels the defeated prince and his subjects to consider well their loss, to accept it, and not to harbor revenge. They should endure their losses with dignity and courage, and be consoled by the knowledge that

reversals of fortune in war and peace often occur. They should learn from their mistakes, and should be prepared to defend themselves more effectively the next time.⁸⁴

In order to find constancy and peace in the midst of war and turmoil, Lipsius insisted that one must abandon belief in chance and fortune and trust to Divine Providence. This was at the heart of Neo-Stoicism.⁸⁵ Thus, unlike the Roman Stoic thinkers such as Seneca, Lipsius also rejected the role of fate, fortune, or destiny, although he sometimes uses the word in a figurative sense, and insisted on the doctrine of Divine Providence in historical causation. In this respect, he differed from Montaigne. However, he was also determined to preserve a role for human free will.⁸⁶ In England, Neo-Stoicism was found in both Protestant and Catholic circles, and derived not only from the influence of Lipsius, but also from the writings, translated into English, of Montaigne, Charron, and Du Vair. Neo-Stoicism, when coupled with the sharp edge of Tacitean inquiry into politics, was particularly influential among the followers of Sir Philip Sidney, Robert Devereux, second Earl of Essex, and in the household of Henry, Prince of Wales.⁸⁷ James VI and I disparaged Neo-Stoic values because he thought that they led men down the path to war, seeking only honor. Yet, he did pay tribute to the constancy and the *invicti animi* (i.e., “the unconquerable spirit”) of the Neo-Stoics.⁸⁸

A perhaps understandable reaction of Neo-Stoic thinkers such as Montaigne to the pervasive warfare of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was to emulate the Stoics of the age of Epicurus and to withdraw from active participation in worldly affairs—to cultivate their gardens in both a figurative and literal sense. The Lipsian method of seeking valid modes of political and moral behavior in an age of perpetual warfare was to employ the tools of scholarship to look for examples from the ancient wisdom of the classical past. As such, it shared much with the broader movement of Erasmian humanism, but Lipsian Neo-Stoicism was intended for those who pursued an active life despite the chaos around them. The Lipsian emphasis on constancy and prudence owed much to the Stoic influence of Seneca, who urged moderation in all things and avoidance of basing one’s thought and behavior on passion. Seneca had taught that the good of the commonwealth must be preferred to what the individual wanted for himself. This was in perfect accord with man’s rational faculties and his sociable inclinations.⁸⁹

Secular explanations of war and peace

The main thrust of Renaissance political thought was to offer secular and rational explanations for the causes of war and peace. There were those in Elizabethan England who did not believe that war was sent as a punishment for sin, but rather could be explained in secular terms, and this view appears to have enjoyed popular support as well. For example, George Gascoigne thought that the main cause of war was “princes’ pride,” which was part of the natural cycle of “war, ruin, poverty, peace, riches, envy, malice and war.” War was part of a self-regulating political system—an explanation that appears to originate with Livy.⁹⁰ Thomas Fenne, on the other hand, rejected this cyclical explanation of war and peace, and insisted that war was caused by the actions of men, and could be prevented by human wisdom.⁹¹ Edmund Spenser was well acquainted with a wide variety of views on war and peace from the classical authors to the Christian Humanists. From St. Augustine, he had learned that wars and conflict sprang from evil and were widespread, and that perfect peace could never be achieved in this life. Yet Spenser continued to believe that peace must be strived for, and he employs combat as a metaphor for moral struggle.⁹² The characters in Shakespeare’s plays sometimes utter antiwar sentiments. This may reflect Shakespeare’s awareness that chivalric culture was in decline, and this posed the danger that such restraints on warfare as granting quarter or the humane treatment of prisoners of war might give way to more barbaric methods.⁹³ In depicting Richard III as a villain, Shakespeare draws on the Senecan concept of Nemesis (personified as the Greek goddess of retribution) and depicts that king as an extremely vengeful person who possessed none of the Stoic virtues. This enhanced Richard’s evil qualities as a villain totally liberated from moral restraint, and thus, empowered his schemes to do evil.⁹⁴ Thomas Nashe thought that the theater could teach important moral lessons to those persons who were inclined to violence and disorder:

There is a certain waste of people for whom there is no use but war. . . . If the affairs of state cannot exhale these corrupt excrements, it is very expedient that they have some light toys to busy their heads withal, cast before them as bones to gnaw upon. . . . [Plays] show the ill success of treason, the fall of hasty climbers, the wretched end of usurpers, the misery of civil dissension, and how just God is evermore in punishing murder.⁹⁵

Wars were begun, said the cleric and scholar Robert Burton, “to make sport for princes, without any just cause”; they arise from vanity, ambition, and the desire for revenge—which were “goodly causes all for plunging the world into an orgy of war and slaughter.” The courtiers and councilors who urge such wars will always be safe at home while soldiers endure the wounds and privations of battle. Burton then reflects on the misguided motives that led men to volunteer to be soldiers, and the ways in which military commanders appeal to their sense of honor and ambition for glory through displays of military dress, martial music, ceremony, and spectacle. He particularly regretted the losses suffered by their wives, families and friends.⁹⁶ Burton expressed his hatred of warfare, and thought that offensive wars were seldom justified. The only just reason for going to war was *ad populi salutem*, that is, “for the safety of the people.” Diplomacy was to be preferred to armed conflict: “Fair means shall first be tried. Peaceful pressure accomplishes more than violence. . . . For strategy can inflict greater blows on the enemy than uncalculating force.”⁹⁷

Much as Burton hated war, he had to admit that a civil society “lies under the protection of warlike virtues, because whensoever there is any suspicion of tumult, all our arts cease.” Indeed, “fighting men are more useful to the state than husbandmen.” Burton concedes the need for standing armies and a “prepared navy”; the necessity of providing for the sinews of war should be recognized by dedicating a portion of the revenues of the commonwealth for supporting such standing forces, anticipating the inevitable costs of war, as well as subsidizing “chaste sports” and exercises that prepare men’s bodies for the physical exertions and hardships of war.⁹⁸

Burton was a Utopian and severely criticized contemporaneous warfare, but he was, like other Neo-Stoics, far from being a pacifist. He believed in just wars—especially those directed against non-Christians who had invaded Christian territories—and he insisted on the necessity of always being prepared for war. Yet, it must be said that he also believed in moderation and restraint in warfare. He praised the Stoic principle that a wise and prudent man will avoid all manner of passions and disturbing thoughts, and subdue them by self-discipline and well guided reading so as to avoid violent actions.⁹⁹

Throughout the Renaissance, there were widely differing views concerning whether war was a natural part of the human condition. The study of history,

whether of the ancient world or the contemporary world of the Renaissance, certainly suggested that war was the main theme of historical writing. It was also the favorite theme of poets and dramatists. Thus, the study of history offered little help in trying to imagine a world in which peace reigned. Some humanists looked to the concept of a golden age for help in constructing a vision of a world without war, or at least a model society on a smaller scale from which violent conflict had been banished. But the humanists of the Renaissance could not agree on whether a golden age had ever existed, where it might have existed, or when. The poets of the ancient world had not been in agreement on this question, and the writers and political propagandists of the Renaissance only confused matters further by inventing panegyrics concerning new golden ages in order to flatter their princely patrons.

Machiavelli and Guicciardini would have none of this myth-making, and they urged princes and their advisors to confront the harsh realities of the European world of the Renaissance, and told them they had no chance to compete, or even survive, unless they constantly prepared for war and saw to it that their subjects did likewise. If a state remained constantly in a posture of military preparedness, and its citizens maintained the exercise of arms, good government would inevitably follow. Although popular participation in the government and defense of the state might occasion some turbulence, Machiavelli and his classical republican followers did not see this as a serious threat to political stability. Depending on an army of mercenaries presented a far greater threat to political stability and liberty.

Machiavelli's thoroughly secular analysis of politics and the art of war brought a new clarity to the study of these subjects, and was widely admired even by those who were troubled by his indifference to both divine and natural law. All humanists, even those of the Erasmian persuasion, were ultimately prepared to admit that all political societies had the right to defend themselves from their enemies, but they were not prepared to accept the disposition of Machiavelli and the classical republicans to expansionism and empire-building.

The Erasmians launched an attack on the political realism and the glorification of martial values that characterized the Machiavellians, and hoped to devise an educational program that would wean the aristocratic classes from such values. Although Erasmus had good reason to distrust the diplomatic practices of the Renaissance, he did very much wish to induce princes to try

negotiation and arbitration to settle differences before resorting to war. To accomplish these ends, the Erasmian humanists had hoped to draw up a whole new curriculum of studies aimed at those aristocrats who were likely to enter the service of rulers that incorporated the best of classical learning and Christian ethics. Such Christian humanist principles hopefully might influence princes to abandon their bad habits and pursuits of war, hunting, gambling, and the like for the more regal duties of governing their kingdoms and dispensing justice. The Erasmian program of reforms meant abandoning much intellectual and cultural baggage from the past: This included the Roman concept of just war, the Augustinian doctrine that wars were sent to punish men for their sins, the belief that war provided a means for validating honor, acquiring glory, and demonstrating prowess and manliness. Ultimately, Erasmian pacifism failed because it lacked a practical program for implementing reforms, it alarmed many theologians sufficiently to cause Erasmus's works to be condemned, while governments of the period simply ignored what he had to say. The rulers of the early modern period remained devoted to war and imperial expansion.

A more practical variety of humanism was Neo-Stoicism, a revival of Roman Stoicism associated with Michel de Montaigne and Justus Lipsius. A former soldier and a lawyer, Montaigne withdrew from high public office, condemned the Huguenot political theories of resistance that he blamed for the outbreak of the French religious and civil wars, and retired to his estate to write about the virtues of tolerance and constancy in troublesome times. He was particularly attentive to the problems of the ethics of warfare. Montaigne's Neo-Stoic philosophy, like that of the Flemish humanist Justus Lipsius, required acceptance of the constituted authority of church and state. Although Montaigne could never condone offensive wars or rebellion against the prince or church, and condemned acts of passion or revenge and feuding, he continued to admire the military life and thought kings must display the appropriate military virtues and appear on the battlefield to lead their armies in person.

Justus Lipsius had a widespread following among military men because he succeeded in combining Machiavelli's political realism concerning the needs of the Renaissance state in a dangerous world with a determination to apply Christian morality to political and military problems. Lipsius urged on his readers a close study of Roman political and military institutions in order to

adapt ancient practice to the contemporaneous questions of how to raise, organize, finance, and discipline standing armies led by a professional officer corps. Lipsius spent much of his academic career in the Dutch Republic where he provided inspiration for Maurice of Nassau's reforms of the Dutch army. Lipsius adhered to the traditional Roman definition of what constitutes a just war, and not trusting the corruption and sycophancy of court life, he wished to see warmongers banished from the prince's council. War must be a last resort after first attempting diplomacy.

Lipsian Neo-Stoicism had adherents among both Protestants and Catholics in mainland Europe and the British Isles. Its values were sufficient to make men perceive war as an evil that was destructive of all the civilized arts. Neo-Stoic values taught men to restrain their passions and thirst for revenge, and thus, furnished a moral underpinning for limitations on the ferocity of warfare. But it did not give them the moral vision to imagine a world without war.

The Search for a Science of Peace

Warfare has no place among the useful arts. Nay, rather it is so horrible that only the utmost necessity, or true affection, can render it honourable.

Hugo Grotius, *The Law of War and Peace: De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres*, trans. Francis W. Kelsey, 2 vols. (Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1913–25), II: xxv. ix. 3 (pp. 585–86)

That is the best government which best provides for war.

Algernon Sidney, *Discourses concerning Government* (London: various booksellers of London and Westminster, 1698), bk. II: 23

The conflict between martial culture and the peace ethic was one of the main themes of humanist thought; in the seventeenth century, these topics were elevated to a more theoretical level of discourse in the writings of Alberico Gentili, Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, and the classical republican followers of Niccolò Machiavelli. Warfare and military preparedness were at the center of Machiavelli's political discourse, and everything else was of secondary importance. In the age of religious wars, Gentili had to flee his native Italy because he had become a Protestant; he subsequently found refuge in Elizabethan England. Grotius, who witnessed much of the Eighty Years War in the Low Countries, also had to deal with the problem of war overwhelming politics.¹ Hobbes lived through both the English civil wars in the 1640s and the Fronde in France in the 1650s. All four political philosophers shared the common experience of being forced into exile or flight by war, political factionalism, or religious persecution. Gentili believed that there were no natural causes that justified going to war because all men have a kinship to one another: "If there seems to be a natural enmity between two peoples, then it is

because they are trained to be enemies of one another. But this is the result of education, which is a second nature.”² Grotius went on to provide a language of natural law that furnished a theory of natural rights and a foundation for international law, which in more recent times, has helped to provide a number of constraints on how wars have been fought as well as a series of rules governing the behavior of sovereign states. Their experience of interstate and civil war gave both Grotius and Hobbes an abiding dislike of violent conflict. Hobbes, who learned to distrust the inflammatory rhetoric of ambitious politicians in democratic governments from his study of Thucydides, preferred to trust the security of the commonwealth to an absolute sovereign. For this reason, he has never been appreciated for his endeavors to promote the scientific study of peace until quite recently. The classical republicans, the principal heirs of Machiavelli in the Atlantic world, continued to insist that citizens of states with popular governments who valued their liberty must be prepared to give their blood to maintain those political traditions.

Gentili and Grotius: Natural law and constraints on war

As we have seen, Justus Lipsius, along with Gentili and Grotius, was one of the founders of international law because he had sought to synthesize Stoic ethics and Christian morality and apply these principles on a case-by-case basis to the same topics that Machiavelli wrote about, thus introducing a moral dimension to political theory that was missing in Machiavelli. Lipsius further applied Dutch social and moral values not only to the task of waging war, but also to an attempt to prevent the blight of war from disrupting the lives of civilians while at the same time protecting trade and the economy. Lipsius’s values were distinct from aristocratic preoccupations with honor, glory, and privileged status. Like Hobbes, he leaned in the direction of absolutism, preferring peace and stability to individual freedom.³

The political philosophers of the seventeenth century recognized that rational and scientific explanations of the causes of war were not to be found in divine commands, Divine Providence or man’s sinful nature. A more fruitful approach could be discerned in the study of what we term political and social structures and in the animosity generated by conflicting religious views.

Algernon Sidney recognized that the function of the feudal nobility had been making war; they were “perpetually in arms” because they placed a high value on valor and were acquisitive.⁴ The Scots political theorist Andrew Fletcher observed that a profound alteration in government had occurred in most European countries in about 1500 whereby kings who possessed greater financial resources began to keep armies standing in peacetime as well as war. The nature of warfare quite altered as missile and gunpowder weapons replaced edged weapons, and the aristocracy gave up martial pursuits and were replaced by professional officer corps. “Thus, the armies which in preceding times had always been composed of such men as these, ceased . . . and the sword fell out of the hands of the barons.” Princes began instead to raise standing armies paid for by levying taxes voted by representative assemblies and levied on “people grown rich by trade, and dispirited for want of military exercise.” War became more pervasive in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries “and grew a constant trade to live by.” The nobility adjusted to the changed conditions by taking up military commissions in the officer corps of these new professional armies.⁵

The Italian jurist Alberico Gentili viewed the laws of war as a subdivision of international law. He was forced to flee his homeland and seek refuge in England because he had converted to Protestantism. In England, he became a protégé of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester and Chancellor of Oxford University, who secured a position teaching Roman law for Gentili in 1580. In 1587, he was appointed Regius Professor of Law on the recommendation of Sir Francis Walsingham. Gentili later attracted the attention of Robert Devereux, second Earl of Essex, who was a member of the Elizabethan war party. Gentili was an admirer of Machiavelli and shared some of the views of classical republicans, but he also became, as we now understand, one of the founders of the corpus of international law. The study of this discipline was based on natural law rather than divine law or theology. The debate that Gentili participated in did not concern whether war was a just instrument of the state, but rather focused on the variety of justifications for war.⁶

Gentili insisted that the laws of war arose from natural law because they concerned the whole human community, and did not derive from the teachings of political or moral philosophers. This was a premise to his argument that defensive war had to do with the duties of citizens and pertained to only one community, whereas a philosophy of war would be the concern of the whole

human community and would comprehend enemies as well. Roman law, as embodied in the Justinian code, Gentili says, citing Jean Bodin, was ignorant of the laws of war. The concept of natural law was, however, known to the ancients, and they assumed that a common understanding of the laws of war could be derived from natural law, which was innate. However, the understanding of natural law varied from one man to another, according to his level of intelligence.⁷

Gentili maintained that war was a legitimate exercise of the power not only to defend one's country, but also to preserve the wider human community. He used this argument to justify the Spanish conquest of much of the New World, citing the unnatural practices of some of the American Indians, such as cannibalism, as violations of natural law. At the same time, Gentili rejected the Aristotelian argument that all barbarians were inferior, and could for that reason, be enslaved. However, because their moral standards diverged so widely from those of the Christian world, he distrusted the Turks, and took note of their barbaric behavior in the way that they waged war and enslaved conquered peoples. For this reason, Gentili believed that Christian monarchs should never enter into treaty relations with the Turks, as the king of France had done.⁸

Gentili excluded many varieties of human conflict and violence from the category of war. War must be public, just, and fought with the usual and customary weapons of war between two sovereign rulers, and it must be officially and publicly declared according to a mutually understood protocol, which included an announcement of intentions, an opportunity to make satisfaction for a stated grievance, and a waiting period. No war should be declared unless the need for such conflict was first demonstrated and arbitration attempted. Arbitration was the only available peaceful means for settling disputes. Moreover, there were many examples in former times of arbitration between sovereigns. Gentili also maintained that war should be waged only against armed combatants; he did not approve of the deliberate devastation of the lands, properties, and houses of noncombatants, or the deliberate destruction of works of art. He urged moderation in war and the avoidance of needless cruelty except against brigands and pirates, who were not protected by the laws of war. Gentili believed that the purpose of every war was to secure peace. Peace was "the orderly settlement of war." Permanent

peace was best procured by ensuring that the terms imposed on the vanquished were just and moderate. The victors were entitled to reparations covering the cost of the war as well as the payment of tribute, but if the peace settlement did not embody justice, then the peace would not be lasting. Gentili quoted Seneca as saying that an unjust war was no better than organized murder. But he reminded his readers that the Romans never recognized rebels, brigands, and pirates, or participants in slave revolts as enemies entitled to be dealt with according to the rules of war. All could be summarily condemned to death. To be a recognized enemy, one had to be part of a sovereign state.⁹

The pursuit of war to seek vengeance was just, Gentili states, because the failure to seek vengeance invited another injury or wrong. The right of a sovereign to seek vengeance rose out of natural law. This was a natural right that had been allowed to individuals before the formation of political societies, but was now exercised by rulers and magistrates on behalf of individual citizens. The human causes of war consisted of violations by a sovereign state of man-made laws. From this perspective, war was simply an instrument for dispensing justice by avenging an injury and punishing a crime. However, Gentili admitted that this view of war was dangerous, and a war for such reasons should not be declared without first attempting arbitration. Preemptive strikes had been a frequent cause of war from antiquity to Gentili's time, and Gentili believed that preemptive strikes could be justified by fear of an injury rather than a real injury. There was no good reason to needlessly expose one's self to danger. This was sometimes used as an argument for making war on the indigenous peoples of the New World.¹⁰ It was possible, thought Gentili, for both parties to a war to have justice on their sides. It did not follow that in a war one side had justice entirely on its side, while the other belligerent was in the wrong. Gentili gave the example of the Jewish conquest of the land of Canaan by divine command, while the Canaanites, being ignorant of the divine command, were fighting a war of self-defense: "if it is doubtful on which side justice is, and each side aims at justice, neither side can be called unjust."¹¹

Gentili was also a strong advocate of religious toleration, and he argued that it was against natural law to force another person to change his religion against his will. Religious freedom should be allowed unless harm was done to the state thereby. He disagreed with Justus Lipsius, who believed that only one religion should be practiced in a state. Contrary to what Lipsius said on the

matter, Gentili claimed that toleration in practice was allowed in the Imperial Free Cities and in the Habsburg lands of the Holy Roman Empire, as well as in the papal states, and it was also the practice of the Turks toward Byzantine Christians and Jews.¹²

Gentili's approach to formulating the rules of warfare and their place in the body of international law bears some resemblance to the Neo-Stoical and Salamancan schools of thought. His firm belief in religious toleration separates him from the Neo-Stoics, who believed in adherence to a state religion as a social glue to hold civil societies together in an age of religious warfare. Whereas members of the Salamancan School, such as Francisco de Vitoria and the Portuguese Jesuit Juan Luis Molina ignored classical authors and employed Thomist criteria to condemn many of the characteristics of modern warfare, such as the conquest of the New World, Gentili used humanist scholarship to approach classical authors in order to devise his rules of war. He also thought that Vitoria, Balthazar Ayala, and other members of the Spanish School did not pay enough attention to concepts of peace, and gave too much attention to matters concerning war. Gentili's English patrons, such as the second Earl of Essex, to whom he dedicated his *De Jure Belli*, drew him into the fringes of the Elizabethan war party, and his admiration for Machiavelli suggests that he displayed some of the characteristics of a classical republican. But he does not fit neatly into any of these categories.¹³

Grotius also drew most of his examples of unjust wars from the ancient world, but in addition, he addressed the contemporaneous problem of religious conflict by denying that the pope's claim to universal jurisdiction was justified by scripture or patristic authority, while at the same time, attacking Protestant claims for going to war based on ancient prophecies or the explicit command of God. Even when just causes for declaring war presented themselves, Grotius's counsel was not to do so rashly.¹⁴ Grotius, in effect, had undermined the legal authority of the Bible and provided a secular explanation for the causes of wars, and thus, had rejected the traditional medieval explanations of when war was justified. Grotius's determination to separate religion from politics and legal discourse represented a significant new direction in political theory. His treatment of war was based on natural law, which was discoverable by reason, and his examples were mostly drawn from classical antiquity. Thus, the rules governing warfare should be knowable to all men and not just Christians.¹⁵

The political theories of both Grotius and Hobbes were based on the assumption that men had once existed in a state of nature, and for mutual self-protection, had made a compact to enter into political society. Sir Robert Filmer, the defender of patriarchalism and royalism, rejected Grotius's concept of a state of nature that existed before men entered into political society. Because all men were descendants of Adam, who was the first patriarch, political society had always existed. Filmer believed that Grotius had a bad influence on political theory because he conflated natural law and the law of nations.¹⁶ Filmer insisted that popular governments must always tend toward war and violence because the opinions of the people will always be so varied, and they lacked the judgment to distinguish between truth and falsehood. Only a king or a dictator could remedy this situation. Thus, popular government must always give rise to more tumults than the most tyrannical of monarchies. Like Grotius, Filmer drew most of his examples from ancient history to support his assertions: "The murders by Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, Domitian, and Commodus put all together cannot match the civil tragedy which was acted in that one sedition between Marius and Sulla. . . . This was the height of Roman liberty—any man might be killed that would. A favour not fit to be granted under a royal government."¹⁷

Whereas Algernon Sidney believed that civil society would dissolve without constant vigilance and military preparedness to defend liberty against tyrants, John Locke maintained that war, however just, was detrimental to civil society because men, when entering political society, gave up the right to make war as individuals. Arbitrary monarchs, by their ambition and aggression, caused the dissolution of political society and brought perpetual disorder. Their subjects thereby gained the right to wield the sword, and rebellion and resistance against the prince thereby became justified.¹⁸ In interstate wars, Locke attempted to impose legitimate limits on the objectives of war: The aggressor could be punished and reparations demanded. This meant that the offending government could be subdued or brought to terms, but the enemy could not be annihilated. The problem in securing a peace settlement was that just as man as an individual living in the state of nature experienced disorder and a lack of security, so also commonwealths experienced the same kind of insecurity because of the absence of a universally recognized body of international law and some universal authority to enforce the same. Consequently, it fell to individual states to be

“both judge and executioner of the law of nature.” Since men tended to be “partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far. . . .”¹⁹

Hugo Grotius was appalled by the lack of restraint in war throughout the Christian world and the “rush to arms” for the slightest of pretexts. He did not believe that Erasmus’s solution of forbidding Christians to take up arms was practical. Rather, Grotius set out to discover “a common law among nations” based on natural law, which would impose restraints on war and which would be understood and accepted by all men, whether civilized, enlightened or barbarian. This would be based on a prodigious knowledge of “philosophers, historians, poets . . . [and] orators.”²⁰ Grotius said that “it should not be supposed that while a war rages all laws are in abeyance.”²¹ Citing numerous Roman precedents, he stated that wars should be conducted with the same scrupulousness as judicial processes. Even though the courts may not be able to operate in wartime, there were laws that govern conduct in war as well as relations among people in time of peace. Wars should be waged only against those who refuse to abide by judicial decisions, and only in accord with recognized laws of war.²²

Grotius’s greatest contribution was to provide a legal and historical foundation for constraints on war. But it must be remembered that others, such as Balthazar Ayala, also made significant contributions to rules limiting the horrors of war. In addition, Grotius was also indebted for many of his ideas to the Spanish school of political theory concerning the origins of international law with regard to natural law and the laws of war.²³ In the seventeenth century, the laws of war also evolved out of the codification of military customs and conventions by professional military officers in the capitulations of besieged fortresses, protocols for the ransom of prisoners of war, articles of war, and codes of military justice that imposed discipline on soldiers with regard to the distribution of lawful booty and the treatment of noncombatants. Among the earliest written instruments were articles of war drawn up by field commanders in the Dutch and Swedish armies in the times of Maurice of Nassau and Gustavus Adolphus. Such instruments were widely copied in the various armies that fought in the British civil wars, but the basic principles would have found approbation among the officers of mainland European armies. Ultimately, such customs and conventions had derived from chivalric culture, aristocratic codes of honor and conduct, and the teachings of the

medieval Catholic Church. In the early eighteenth century, these laws of war, inherited from the professional soldiers of the seventeenth century, were praised by many of the philosophes as evidence of progress and humanitarianism in the conduct of war among European nations.²⁴

Regardless of Grotius's poor opinion of the military profession—he considered mercenary soldiers more abominable than executioners because they kill without cause—the degree of status assigned to professional officers was rarely challenged. Indeed, the Seigneur de Saint Evremond, a French veteran of the Thirty Years War who lived in exile in England during the reign of Charles II, believed that the noble profession of arms made “subjects equal in authority to the sovereign.” The question concerning whether a good Christian could be a soldier resulted in divided opinion within the Catholic Church in France. The Jansenists tended to condemn military life and discouraged careers in the army, but Jesuit chaplains organized confraternities within the army to minister to soldiers who wished to be pious.²⁵

Despite repeated declarations of his aversion to war, Grotius went on to attempt to define when war was justified. Those who hoped for perpetual peace often cited the prophecy of Isaiah, ii. 4, of a time when swords will be beaten into instruments of cultivation, but Grotius insisted that this refers to a time in the future when all men will have become Christians and put aside un-Christian habits. Until that time, the world will continue to experience an age of iron. St. Peter's admonition that “he who smiteth with the sword shall perish with the sword” is not applicable to public war lawfully declared, but only to private war. According to Grotius, Christ did not intend to prevent the Christian from fighting in a lawfully declared, just war when he stated that his kingdom was not of this world (John xviii. 36). A public war was a lawful and formal war waged between two sovereign states. The possession of sovereignty assumes the legal right to declare and wage war. A private war is waged by someone who lacks the authority to wage war, but it is justified to wage private war to avoid an injury where no public tribunals exist.²⁶ Grotius says that war is more than contending by force; it is a condition that persists over time. *Bellum*, or public war, often subsumes *duellum*, or private war, which is more ancient than public war. “War . . . is undertaken in order to secure peace,” but peace can exist only where factionalism and feuding have been suppressed to such an extent that we may speak of a political community as having achieved “union.”²⁷

Grotius reconciled the concept of a just war, lawfully declared, with natural law by arguing that war is not opposed to nature, but is in perfect accord with it, since nature has given every animal strength sufficient for self-defense. Right reason allows the use of force to protect oneself and one's possessions provided the rights of others are not infringed. Reason also dictates that this right to employ force in defense of one's rights should be exercised as a community. Thus, the right to forcibly resist an attacker to avoid an injury is a natural right, but with the establishment of civil society, the individual must yield that right of self-defense to the state, which in exchange for the obligation to protect the individual and his property, seeks to acquire a monopoly on violence, or at least, to limit the resistance that an individual can offer. Otherwise, the state cannot function. However, if a ruler violates the laws or becomes an enemy of his people, then his subjects have the right of forcible resistance, and may even put the tyrannical ruler to death.²⁸

Grotius says that the best of Greek and Roman thinkers insisted that the laws cannot exist without sanctions, and that sometimes nations and rulers need to go to war to secure justice to themselves, but they must also remember that they were part of the human race, and their principles of justice needed to extend beyond their own borders, even to those who were their enemies. It was unwise not to adhere to the rule that concepts of justice needed to be shared in the wider international community because every state will someday stand in need of a defensive alliance or trade agreement in order to survive. To depart from this concept of international law and justice is risky.²⁹ Grotius was very careful to specify the unjust causes of war in order to validate his just-war theories. The main distinction here was between "justifiable and persuasive causes." Following Polybius, he calls the first category "pretexts" because they were the reasons for going to war that were publicly alleged. The "persuasive" causes were the actual reasons for which a state or a sovereign undertook a war. Those who rushed into war without either pretexts or persuasive causes were no better than savages. Those who alleged pretexts for going to war, but had no justifying causes, were regarded by classical Greek and Roman authors as brigands.³⁰

Grotius is sometimes considered an advocate of peace, but in fact, he was something less than a pacifist. First of all, Grotius justified the Dutch rebellion against Spanish rule because he thought that the duke of Alva prosecuted the

war against the Dutch rebels in a manner that violated the king of Spain's oath to uphold the law. Moreover, the Dutch republicanism that Grotius espoused was bellicose and expansionist. During the Eighty Years War, he distanced himself from the party of Oldenbarnevelt, which advocated peace with Spain that subsequently resulted in the Twelve Years Truce of 1609. He opposed this truce because members of his family had an interest in the United East India Company (VOC) and he believed that commercial expansion at the expense of Spain and Portugal was necessary to sustain Dutch republicanism. This was also a motive behind his advocacy of freedom of the seas in his *Mare Liberum*, which advocated the right of trading companies such as the VOC to wage war as if they were sovereign entities.³¹ In England, John Selden, who had at first opposed peace with Spain, changed his opinion on this matter and joined the court faction in supporting a rapprochement with Spain because he came to fear the growing power of the Dutch in both naval and commercial power. This was the occasion of Selden writing his *Mare Clausum* (1636) in answer to Grotius's *Mare Liberum*.³²

Classical republicans and martialism

The classical republicans, especially the seventeenth-century English followers of Machiavelli, were at odds with the Grotian school of thought in their emphasis on a martial ethos. Like their Florentine mentor, the classical republicans saw liberty not as an end in itself, but as a means to a military end by seeking to imitate the military expansion of Rome rather than the stability of Venice. The reception of Machiavellian classical republicanism in England during the period of the English Commonwealth was accompanied by the conquest of Ireland and Scotland, and the defeat of the formidable Dutch navy during the First Anglo-Dutch War. Seventeenth-century England suffered from mostly weak or unstable governments, and consequently, was pervaded by a climate of war even during the periods when actual hostilities had subsided. For that reason, English political theorists such as Bacon, Harrington, Hobbes, Sidney, and Locke devoted much discussion to the subject. Those who inclined toward classical republicanism insisted that war was necessary to defend liberty, while those who sought to explain the endemic nature of

warfare found abundance of sin and political failure a sufficient explanation. That historians and political scientists should associate the martial ethos with classical republicanism is hardly surprising since ancient Greece and the Roman Republic were perpetually at war, and this martial disposition made every citizen a soldier. The cultural antecedents of classical republicanism in the ancient world were self-destructive, and early modern political theorists, such as Machiavelli and Hobbes, sought to impose self-discipline, but war nonetheless remained a preoccupation of classical republican thought in the seventeenth century.³³

One of the very first of the English classical republicans was Sir Francis Bacon, who like Machiavelli, insisted on the importance of a race of valiant men continually exercising arms in order to achieve civic greatness. Contrary to what some writers had maintained since antiquity, Bacon, like Machiavelli and Harrington, adhered to the somewhat old-fashioned view that it was valiant and well disciplined soldiers possessed of a warlike spirit that constituted the *nervi belli*, or “sinews of war,” and not money. As important as riches and trade were to making war, Bacon insisted that one should never lose sight of the fact that poorer nations sometimes made war and achieved civic greatness more readily than those states that had grown wealthy, but had sunk into luxury and effeminacy.³⁴ Even Thomas Hobbes had been more inclined to advocate war in his younger days. He began his career in the household of the Cavendishes, a military family, and he was closely associated with Sir Francis Bacon, who, in 1624, advocated a preemptive war against Spain and who was more “Hobbesian” than Hobbes himself in believing that “humanity is in a condition of public war of every man against every man.”³⁵ Hobbes was also involved in colonizing activities in Virginia and Bermuda during his association with Sir William Cavendish, later Lord Cavendish, who sat on the council of the Virginia Company.³⁶

Algernon Sidney, perhaps the most bellicose of the classical republicans, believed that making war was one of the most important functions of a state, and that a state that did not change and expand must decline and disintegrate. This was based, in part, on the mercantilist assumption that the world contained a fixed amount of resources and competition was absolutely necessary for survival. The principal criterion for judging a government, whether a monarchy or a republic, was how well equipped they were with regard to the competence

of their commanders and the fitness and loyalty of the people who furnished the state's soldiers. The commanders of the armies of popular governments must demonstrate competence and merit, whereas those of monarchies need only be favorites of the king. For this reason, a state should not depend on a single ruler to defend itself, but rather on citizens and magistrates who are trained in arms. Failure to provide for defense in this way should be regarded as a shameful thing.³⁷

James Harrington, like Sidney, drew on Machiavelli's distinction between those republics that were expansionist and sought conquest, such as Rome and ancient Israel; those that were armed only for defense, such as Sparta; and those, such as Venice, that pursued peace and trade as a matter of policy. Sidney believed that all sought the public good. Rome was most successful in terms of its preparedness for war; Venice was the weakest because of its habit of depending on mercenary soldiers. As Jonathan Scott points out: "This unqualified bellicosity is the touchstone of Sidney's political thought."³⁸ Having read what Machiavelli had to say about the various historical examples of republics, Sidney concluded that it was better for a state to be organized for both war and trade. It should be prepared to wage both offensive and defensive war, employing citizens as soldiers. Trade was useful in order to finance war, but it must be assigned a role inferior to making war.³⁹

James Harrington was more interested in peace and stability than Sidney. Based on his study of classical Greek history, Harrington concluded that peace could only be secured by a government that sought a balance between the power of the aristocracy and the commonalty. In this commonwealth there must be liberty and property for the citizen as well as participation in government. Not to establish a government of this sort invited bloodshed.⁴⁰ Harrington strongly disagreed with Machiavelli's assertion that what enabled Rome to expand its empire by military conquest was the arming of the plebeians, and that the cost of such greatness was the continuing problem of popular tumults that the Roman senatorial class had to tolerate. Harrington valued political stability more highly, and he thought that allowing the commonalty such a large share in government led to anarchy. Harrington agreed with Thucydides and Hobbes that the source of popular tumults and foreign wars was political passions and demagoguery, and in his *Oceana*, Harrington devised elaborate safeguards in his ideal commonwealth to defuse such passions by

avoiding inflammatory oratory. Effectively, Harrington abolished freedom of speech and allowed such freedom only to written expression that would be regulated by “moderators.” Harrington derived this “peace of silence” from Hobbes’s translation of Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War* (1629), which condemned political passions leading to unbridled rhetorical excess. During their reigns, James I and Charles I both complained of the inflammatory rhetoric in the English House of Commons. Hobbes had studied the politics of the classical world of Greece and Rome, and had found that they afforded an inappropriate model for seventeenth-century England.⁴¹

Harrington thought that maintaining a large standing militia that required military service was generally the best way to avoid war and secure peace. This standing militia that Harrington envisioned for England, Ireland, and Scotland would consist not of soldiers of fortune, but rather of “citizens at their vocations and trades.” These citizen-soldiers would maintain a constant state of readiness, and would serve in the horse or foot according to their social rank. Although exempt from military service, persons above the age of thirty could volunteer for military service in order to gain honor.⁴²

English writers in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were much concerned about what they perceived to be a decline of the martial ethos. The reception of Tacitism caused them to view this as a problem of luxury causing sloth and a diminishment of manliness. Authors who had received a classical education further saw this as a decline from an earlier golden age.⁴³ Sidney considered the noblemen and gentlemen who dominated the political life of Restoration England to be an “effeminate titular nobility” because they no longer exercised arms, and instead, based their claim to exalted position on “riches and birth.” The implication was that they were less noble than the commoners who had recently taken up arms to defend the English Commonwealth during the Interregnum. For Sidney, the model aristocracy was the Anglo-Saxon nobility that had consisted of the whole of the citizenry because, in Anglo-Saxon England, all free men bore arms and were therefore noble. All others were villeins or slaves. Sidney had trouble accepting that feudalism was long since dead.⁴⁴

Sidney placed little value on peace. “Peace may be good in its season,” but it had no absolute value; it was thought to be worth having only by those nations that did not value courage or justice. Human society was not constituted for

peace: the world “being so far of another temper that no nation can be safe without valour and strength,” which, as the leaders of the Roman Republic understood, could be achieved only by “discipline and exercise [of arms].”⁴⁵ But, following the establishment of the Roman peace, citizens ceased to be employed as soldiers; their courage withered while plebeians were hired as soldiers for pay. They were eventually replaced by barbarians; consequently, Italy lacked men possessing the strength and virtue to defend the homeland. Sidney was both a relativist and a believer in progress. He thought that the early Church Fathers, such as Tertullian, St. Augustine, or St. Ambrose had nothing to say to his generation about the value of peace because the circumstances of political life changed constantly. The early Christians might turn the other cheek or seek martyrdom because they expected that death was imminent; as a persecuted minority, they were not focused on taking up the duties of citizenship or the office of magistrate.⁴⁶ Arguing against Filmer, Sidney insisted that popular tumults, seditions, and wars could find moral justification. God did not intend that men should do wrong, nor did he say that they should suffer wrong, for that would be an injustice, which must be punished, whether in a malignant magistrate or in the violence offered by a foreign enemy. To fail to recognize that war and rebellion are justified in the face of cruel tyranny or gross injustice, where more peaceful methods of persuasion have failed, subverts the basic principles of law and virtue.⁴⁷

The great poet of seventeenth-century England John Milton launched an attack on the remnants of the martial ethos and chivalric culture. His epic poem, *Paradise Lost*, begun in 1650 and published in 1667, was written for Englishmen who had long been subjected to “the odious din of war.”⁴⁸ His audience included not only those who had lived and fought through the three English civil wars, the conquest of Scotland and Ireland, and the First Anglo-Dutch War, but also those whose memories reached back before the Wars of the Three Kingdoms began in 1638. Even before the beginning of these internecine and interstate conflicts, the English people had lived in a climate of war. Not only had Spain attempted to invade England several times after 1588, and actually landed in Ireland, thousands of soldiers from the British Isles had fought in the religious and dynastic wars of mainland Europe for the better part of a century prior to the British civil wars. There had developed in England and among English-speaking readers elsewhere an audience for a vast literature

on every aspect of warfare—manuals on the art of war by classical and modern authors, war memoirs, sermons justifying war, and news books recounting the events in the mainland European wars. And of course, there were the secular works of political theory by Machiavelli and the classical republicans equating military preparedness and the exercise of arms with good citizenship as well as numerous works on medieval chivalry and the chivalric revival celebrating individual acts of valor and feats of arms.⁴⁹

Milton's *Paradise Lost* relies heavily on military metaphors and martial discourse because military books were widely studied by members of the reading public among the country gentry and the citizens and burgesses of towns. There was a widespread belief in the inevitability of war that went beyond its acceptance as part of the human condition and that embraced the belief that honor needed to be validated on the field of battle. Milton was repelled by these values, but he makes use of this widely shared martial ethos to condemn war and to show how it was repugnant to reason, morality, and the teachings of religion. He uses poetic imagination to depict Satan and the fallen angels as possessing martial values and behaving like professional soldiers. Milton's *Paradise Lost* is meant to be a subtle attack on the notion that equates martial endeavors with true nobility and to persuade his reading audience to alter their views. Milton's condemnation of war is an attitude that was largely absent from previous ages, and was exceptional even in the Renaissance.⁵⁰

The presence of Satan and his martial hosts in *Paradise Lost* reminds us that Milton is not offering us a secular explanation of the phenomenon of war. He realized that it was difficult, if not impossible, to provide rational alternatives to the crusading mentality of divines and preachers when so many great thinkers of antiquity and the modern world had failed to come up with an escape from the belief in the inevitability of war. Milton continued to offer a theological explanation for the pervasiveness of war, as exemplified by his explanation of how changes in military technology had made modern warfare more horrible. Milton asserted that gunpowder weapons (especially those called great ordnance in the seventeenth century) were invented by Satan, composed of substances dug deep from within the bowels of the earth, and shot from a distance for the purpose of punishing man for his sins.⁵¹

Samuel Daniel, an Elizabethan predecessor of Milton, had also lamented the baneful effect of missile and gunpowder weapons on warfare. Although

Daniel is said to have had pacifist leanings, his epic poem *The Civil Wars*, which was about the Wars of the Roses, complained that face-to-face combat had grown less frequent, warfare had become shrouded in anonymity, and no one could say who had killed whom or had performed valorous deeds. Ordinary peasants could now kill nobility. Daniel attributed the intensification of wars to the introduction of the new weapons and the invention of printing, which he thought had caused the dissolution of Christendom by introducing “impious contention and proud discontents.” This he blamed on “fierce Nemesis, mother of fate and change, sword-bearer of th’eternal Providence.”⁵²

The political philosophy of the English classical republicans enabled them to justify rebellion against tyrants, and they had no difficulty in identifying the tyrant when explaining the origins of the English civil wars. James Harrington argued that the Tudor and early-Stuart monarchs, by neglecting the nobility and allowing that class to become less powerful both politically and militarily, contributed to a collapse of royal government that caused the civil wars: “wherefore the dissolution of this government caused the war, not the war the dissolution of government.” “Of the king’s [Charles I’s] success with his arms it is not necessary to give any further account, but that they proved as ineffectual as his nobility. But without a nobility or an army . . . there can be no monarchy.”⁵³ This raises the question whether a feudal army led by the nobility, would have been useful in the civil wars or whether a reformed militia could have saved the monarchy. The classical republicans placed more faith in militias than actual historical examples of such forces would warrant. Nor were the king’s armies as badly served as Harrington seems to imply. Officers and other ranks from the British Isles who served in the various armies that fought in the Wars of the Three Kingdoms frequently had already acquired much knowledge and experience in the dynastic and religious wars of mainland Europe.⁵⁴

Perhaps the most radical feature of Harrington’s *Oceana* was its assertion that the bedrock of all government was the exercise of the sword, which allowed the people, through the instrument of the New Model Army, to overthrow the monarchy and nobility. Harrington insisted that the transfer of power was perfectly natural and did not depend on providential intervention. Therefore, it was justified by natural law. The emergence of an army during the time of the English Republic led to increased democratic agitation on the part of junior officers and ordinary soldiers, which despite Harrington’s secularism,

was sometimes justified in terms of a covenant with the Lord God. The exercise of arms by the members of the New Model Army promoted political awareness and activism that gave them the means to achieve their goals.⁵⁵

One of the limitations of the standing militia advocated by Harrington in his *Oceana* was that it was based solely on the tenure of land. Although Harrington had served in an English regiment of the Dutch army, he had no understanding of political societies, such as the Netherlands, which rested largely on trade. Because the Netherlands and Venice preferred to have their citizens contributing to economic productivity by working at their trades, both of these republics employed armies that were largely composed of mercenaries rather than citizen-soldiers.⁵⁶

John Milton employed religious imagery in *Paradise Lost* to launch his attack on the bellicosity found in many of the books read by the gentry and the citizens of early seventeenth-century England, yet his justification of the removal of the king and the establishment of the Commonwealth employs the secular vocabulary of English classical republicans. Milton became the secretary for foreign tongues in the Council of State of the Commonwealth in 1649, which made him, in effect, the chief propagandist of the new republic. Going beyond Protestant theories of resistance, Milton's justification for removing tyrants was grounded in natural reason, and allowed the individual citizen as well as the magistrate to punish tyrants. Thus, Milton rejected the view, dating back to classical antiquity, that the sword of justice belongs exclusively to the magistrate or the prince. Like Grotius, Milton stated that the law of nature granted individuals as well as sovereign rulers and legislatures the right to punish offenses against the law of nature. In effect, Milton is saying that the office of king is elective, and popular assemblies possessed the power to elect them and to remove them.⁵⁷ Moreover, since the power of declaring war was always in the power of Parliament, Milton says that it was unlawful and without precedent for the king to make war on Parliament.⁵⁸

Milton's views on tyrannicide could hardly promote peace or stability. He could see no difference between a foreign tyrant such as the king of Spain, who had attempted to invade England, and a domestic tyrant, such as Charles I, who made war on his own subjects. Milton employed Cicero's characteristically Stoic argument that all participated in the brotherhood of man, and that tyrants, whether foreign or domestic, had cut themselves off from that brotherhood.

Having, so to speak, placed themselves outside the pale of civilization, a tyrant was no better than “a Turk, a Saracen, a heathen.” Moreover, by abolishing the distinction between resisting a foreign invader and overthrowing a domestic tyrant, Milton eliminated the distinction between external war and civil war because the individual citizen need not wait for the inferior magistrate to take the initiative in resisting a domestic tyrant.⁵⁹

Marchamont Nedham, like his friend Milton, was another propagandist for the Commonwealth government. A journalist who changed sides in the civil conflicts more than once, he was hired to write for the official journal of the Rump Parliament, the *Mercurius Politicus*, whose purpose was to defend Cromwellian policy and to celebrate the military and naval achievements of the English Republic. Nedham also wrote a long pamphlet entitled *The Case of the Commonwealth, Stated*, which was intended to reconcile royalists to the commonwealth. He stated that all governments went through cycles of birth, glory, and death, and ultimately, all perished regardless of merit. All governments, good or bad, rested on “the power of the sword”; this had been “the foundation of all titles of government.” Thus, whether the commonwealth’s acquisition of power from the monarchy was legitimate or not, was a question that was quite irrelevant. Nedham reminded his readers that the English monarchy was historically based on the right of conquest, and thus, was no different from the English Republic.⁶⁰

Algernon Sidney, perhaps the most bellicose of all English classical republicans, thought a rebellion now and then was not a bad thing: “Civil tumults and wars are not the greatest evils that befall nations.” In response to Sir Robert Filmer’s assertion that more men died in civil conflicts under “popular governments than in absolute monarchies,” Sidney replied that it was worse for nations to suffer “misery, weakness and baseness” because they lacked the courage and strength to contend for a better life. Turning Calgacus’s speech as recorded in Tacitus’s *Agricola* upside down, Sidney said that failure to fight for liberty gives “the name of peace to desolation.” No state can be entirely free from civil wars and tumults, but republics were less troubled by such contentions than monarchies because merit will advance men of wisdom and courage to lead the commonwealth.⁶¹ Filmer had asserted that rebellion was a sin comparable to witchcraft. While individual men are obliged to obey the commands of the magistrate, Sidney replied, “The general revolt of a nation

cannot be called a rebellion,” and “rebellion is not always evil.” Whether seditions, popular tumults, and civil wars are just or unjust is to be determined by whether a government works to preserve liberty or not. This principle derives from Grotius’s concept of a just war between states, but Sidney applied the principle to the internal affairs of a state.⁶² There is no government in the world that can provide a guarantee against sedition and civil war. Such popular resistance will always be justified as long as magistrates exceed their authority or powerful people break the laws of the commonwealth. For these reasons, the threat of popular violence is always necessary to preserve republican liberty.⁶³

“Mixed and popular governments,” Sidney thought, also “preserve peace and manage wars better than absolute monarchs.” The latter were dependent on mercenary soldiers who served only for wages and “often betray their masters in distress, and always want the courage and industry which is found in those who fight for their own interests, and are to have a part in victory.” Sidney stated that the examples of ancient Greece and Rome demonstrated the wisdom of having citizens fight wars abroad to preserve liberty at home, but also to teach them by the constant exercise of arms to be valiant. An expansionist policy based on trade was compatible with these goals as long as the wars were fought by citizen-soldiers and not mercenaries.⁶⁴

Hobbes’s fear of civil strife

Whereas Algernon Sidney thought that an occasional foreign or civil war kept the citizens of a commonwealth in a warlike stance and ready to defend republican liberty, Thomas Hobbes labored to discover a science of peace. Hobbes had a particular horror of civil war because he had observed the effects of internal strife both in the British Isles and while residing in France, but he had also learned from Thucydides the lesson that internecine strife was the most usual cause of the demise of city-states. Hobbes further thought that domestic conflict invited foreign aggression. At the conclusion of the English civil wars, Hobbes, like other Englishmen of the time, was disposed to support whatever regime held power because of a desire for peace and a continuing fear that the civil wars would revive. Although he would have preferred a

legitimate royal government, Hobbes was prepared to support the Cromwellian regime, and consequently, returned home from France and swore the Engagement Oath pledging loyalty to the lord protector. His justification for this action may be found in the "Review and Conclusion" of *The Leviathan*, in which he states that a soldier was obliged to adhere to his military oath of loyalty only so long as his army "keeps the field and giveth him means of subsistence." Thereafter, the soldier might swear allegiance to whomever offered him protection.⁶⁵

The causes of interstate and civil wars arose not so much because people desired such conflicts, but because men are "ignorant of the causes of wars and peace," and have neglected to learn their responsibilities for preserving peace by practicing the principles of moral philosophy that derive from natural law. For Hobbes, moral philosophy consisted of a set of "laws of nature," which sought self-preservation and promoted peace. These could be discovered by the use of reason, but Hobbes admitted that they were not universally recognized because "the violence of their passion" and "evil custom" often led men in another direction.⁶⁶

Hobbes thought that the fundamental causes of wars were to be found in the diversity of opinions of individual people rather than the differing interests and policies of states. These threats to peace erupted from the excessive ambitions of individual politicians who risked plunging their countries into factionalism, sedition, and civil war. Such ambitions could spill over into imperial adventures abroad, or tempt hostile foreign states to intervene in a country suffering from weakened government. Although Hobbes was more concerned about the dangers presented by seditions and civil wars, he did have certain assumptions about the causes of interstate wars. These were largely caused by dynastic ambitions and rivalries, and by disagreements about religion. In the latter case, loyalties transcended national identities based on language, culture, and history, and challenged allegiance to a particular royal dynasty in which it was believed that a conflict existed between the obligation to obey divine commands on the one hand, and the duty to remain loyal to one's sovereign on the other. Hobbes thought that the best way to calm religious passions was to suppress all theological beliefs except belief in the divinity of Christ. This rather impractical solution depended on an Erastian church-state relationship in which the clergy of an established church continually reiterated

the necessity of obeying all the laws and commands of a sovereign monarch. A secular state with religious toleration would have been unthinkable for Hobbes, who could not conceive of a legitimate diversity of interests occurring within a stable society.⁶⁷

Hobbes was appalled by the way that differing religious opinions led to civil strife. This confirmed his strong belief in a religion established by law in which preaching was licensed and carefully controlled. Among those whom Hobbes blamed for popular disloyalty to Charles I during the civil wars were the clergy of the Church of England—especially those of the presbyterian party who still generally remained within the Anglican Church before 1640. In their sermons, they pretended “to have a right from God to govern every one in his parish, and their assembly the whole nation.” Hobbes thought that the clergy of the Church of England—both those who taught in and governed the universities as well as the bishops and those who served in the parishes—had arrogated to themselves the power of the Catholic popes and bishops, which the Henrician Reformation had abolished. This power of ecclesiastical government properly belonged to the king, Hobbes insisted, but the clergy had come to claim this divine right for themselves. The clergy pretended to be learned in divinity, which they confounded with religion. Hobbes denied that the Church of England or any established church possessed political authority over a sovereign ruler, but he did concede that the clergy of such a church should be listened to, and that a sovereign might find their pronouncements persuasive.⁶⁸

Hobbes was a philosopher with a European-wide reputation, but he was not appreciated at home where he was unjustly accused of atheism, which in the seventeenth century meant heresy. This was because he ignored the spiritual dimension of religious life and advocated mechanistic philosophy. He was later considered a deist. The latter accusation was perhaps not entirely unfair, since he wished to make ethical behavior and not religious beliefs the test of loyalty to the established church. Hobbes wanted an established religion that de-emphasized individual conscience, took away the church's right to insist on a correct interpretation of the scriptures, abolished clerical power, and merely insisted on moral behavior. Hobbes was not prepared to allow freedom of speech or unregulated preaching because to do so would abandon the power of controlling public discourse, which properly belonged to the sovereign. When men make a covenant by means of civil laws to form a commonwealth,

said Hobbes, they agree to impose on themselves a restraint on speech so as to avoid contention, and this is especially necessary in the matter of religion in which disputes are most likely to occur.⁶⁹

One contradiction in Hobbes that is difficult to explain is his fear that religious controversy might disturb the peace of the commonwealth and infringe on the authority of the sovereign as the head of church and state, while at the same time, he continued to cling to an independence of thought in religious matters that others interpreted as “atheism,” or more properly, heresy. A royalist by preference, for twelve years, Hobbes had lived abroad, mostly in France, where he had a wide circle of admirers. Although his works were banned by both Catholic and Protestant authorities in mainland Europe, they were still possible to obtain in different translations, and they were widely read.⁷⁰

Hobbes blamed both the clergy and members of Parliament for failure to instruct the people of England concerning the obedience that they owed to their king. He believed that it was obedience that held together political societies: “Take away in any kind of state the obedience (and consequently the concord of the people), and they shall not only not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience to do no more than reform the commonwealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it.”⁷¹ The members of Parliament and the relatively small group of electors who possessed the parliamentary franchise refused to recognize the duty that they owed the king to pay taxes to help raise an army for the common defense at the beginning of the civil wars. This failure to recognize and support the king’s authority was widespread, and the voters were inclined to choose members of Parliament who opposed granting taxes to the king.⁷²

The science of politics

In his pursuit of peace, Hobbes had first to construct a science of politics based on natural law and an investigation of the origins of conflict. Hobbes was acquainted with many scientists, and he was conscious that he was working in the midst of a scientific revolution, although his understanding of what constituted science was sometimes imperfect. His own study of natural science

led him to prefer the empirical over the theoretical approach to knowledge, and to emphasize practice. Hobbes associated prudence with the empirical study of accumulated historical examples. This, in turn, would lead one to *sapientia*, a kind of moral and political wisdom, which would confer a knowledge “of what is right and wrong and what is good and hurtful to the being and well being of mankind. . . .” These scientific and rational methods of inquiry would lead one to an infallible knowledge of how political society worked, and would help mankind avoid many of the mistakes of the ancient Greeks and Romans. This brought Hobbes into strong disagreement with Aristotle, who placed theoretical science above moral philosophy and the empirical study of political behavior. Hobbes’s continuing disagreement with Aristotle led him to denounce that philosopher as “the worst teacher that ever was.”⁷³ Hobbes thought that ancient authorities such as Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca had derived their philosophical principles from traditions, customs, and older authorities rather than constructing a more rational and methodical or scientific approach to politics. The uncritical study of Aristotle in the universities had led to the teaching of the rebellious notion “that any lawful sovereign may be resisted under the name tyrant.” Only time and a revision of the university curriculum could overcome such seditious notions, thought Hobbes.⁷⁴

When constructing his science of politics, Hobbes insisted on the need to investigate the origins of political society and how concepts of justice had originated. This required doing a kind of dissection of the body politic in order to discover how it was put together and also analyzing human nature in order to understand the nature of social bonds.⁷⁵ Hobbes says that living in a state of nature, before civil societies were entered into, was like living in a perpetual state of war “of every man against every man.” War consisted not only of battle, but also of living in a climate of war in which other men had a disposition to offer violence. The consequence was a “continual fear and danger of death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”⁷⁶ Thus, Hobbes asserts that the state of nature was characterized by anarchy, and he turns the primitivist Golden Age as described by Hesiod and Ovid (not to mention the Biblical Garden of Eden) upside down and says that it was like living in Hell. Commonwealths, even when they were formally at peace with one another, continued to distrust neighboring states, and felt the need to maintain

armies and defend their borders. Within commonwealths, individual citizens distrusted their neighbors enough to feel the need to bolt their doors and carry weapons when they traveled.⁷⁷

Hobbes believed that people had been given the gift of reason so that they might discern moral and natural law, which he said was the same thing as divine law. The basic principle of natural law is “the pursuit of peace,” which is the essence of divine law.⁷⁸ Men establish commonwealths and agree to place restraints on their individual actions in order to free themselves from “the miserable condition of war.” Hobbes thought that men were so prone to fall into disputes about honor, that it was absolutely necessary for the sovereign power to strictly regulate the laws of honor. The sovereign power must not only jealously guard the right to sit in judgment on disputes that could disrupt the commonwealth, but also maintain armed forces to restrain and control the same, or “he retains the judicature in vain, for want of execution of the laws.”⁷⁹

Hobbes’s views concerning social hierarchy and aristocratic honor changed as his ideas developed. It is only in an earlier work, *The Elements of Law* (written in 1640 and widely circulated, but not fully published until the nineteenth century), that he regards honor in war to be a virtue. In *The Elements of Law*, Hobbes states that in ancient times aristocratic virtue had imposed limits on taking lives and booty among the defeated. This concept of aristocratic honor had been the only motive for constraints on methods of warfare, since in time of war the law was silent, as an old proverb supposedly phrased it. Aristocratic honor depended on the recognition by others of the superiority of aristocracy. This, in turn, rested on the exercise of power and a readiness to employ force against those who were not prepared to be “sociable.” The problem with the concepts of honor, aristocratic pride and magnanimity, which were all linked together, was that they rested on the notion of social superiority. But Hobbes, in his later writings, came to attach great significance to natural equality of status because it was this natural equality among people as they existed in the state of nature that made individuals vulnerable to the aggressions of others and disposed them to constant warfare. This was actually a rhetorical device that expressed Hobbes’s horror of the concept of social equality.⁸⁰ Hobbes rejected the Aristotelian view that there was a natural hierarchy of merit that allowed one to discern the difference between, for example, an aristocrat and a less well born person, or between a free man and a slave. Hobbes insisted that

the sovereign was the source of all honor—not aristocratic descent. It was pride in descent that made aristocratic quarrels so frequent an occasion of violent conflict. Hobbes wished to promote the view that it was a universal consent on the part of everyone to live in peace and acknowledge that it was the authority of the sovereign that held political society together.⁸¹

The thirst for revenge and factionalism presented two threats to the maintenance of peace in a political society. To seek revenge for past injustices is in accord with natural law, provided that one does so with an eye to the future. To seek revenge only for past wrongs without being willing to forgive is mere vainglory and contrary to reason. To hurt another without cause is to risk providing one's enemy with the pretext for war. Insulting words are fighting words that readily lead to violent conflict, because men in a traditional society would rather die than suffer reproach or insult. It is therefore contrary to natural law to offer reproach because it sows discord.⁸² Factionalism, or the defense of particular rather than common interests, can also lead to civil conflict or exposure to foreign wars. Popularity is another kind of faction, and often rises from mischief procured by men "of immoderate private wealth" who pursue their own ends rather than the common good. It is the duty of rulers to break up factions because to allow them to continue is like admitting an enemy within one's defensive walls. Factionalism, fanned by the eloquence of ambitious orators, can also lead to civil wars or worse.⁸³

Hobbes thought that absolute monarchy represented the best means of calming the passions and factionalism that led to violent conflict, yet he was enough of a realist to understand that absolute rulers with no limitations on their power and who were also subject to the same defects as other mortals, made wars seem inevitable.

In all times, kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and [in] the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours, which is a posture of war. . . .

To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent: that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common [i.e., international] power,

there is no law; where no law, no justice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues.

While some might argue that war can unite a political community, Hobbes would reply that with the conclusion of war domestic factions will once again become dominant.⁸⁴

There was always an ambivalence in Hobbes about whether human nature was universally disposed to war. Hobbes did not believe that men were evil by nature; he thought that fear was the basic cause of war. Some men were more aggressive than others, but fear was still the main cause of war, even when they launched preemptive strikes.⁸⁵ Certainly, his study of Thucydides' thoughts, occasioned by his translation of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* (1628), which was Hobbes's first important piece of scholarship, brought out the pessimistic side of Hobbes's ambivalence. Hobbes learned from Thucydides that war, with its attendant problems of compulsory military recruitment, dearth, disease, and mortality, broke down the bonds of human society, creating *stasis*, or civil conflict. The Peloponnesian Wars, Thucydides concluded, were more than merely a civil war of Greek states fighting other Greek states that nearly destroyed the Golden Age of Greece, but at a different level, constituted a war "of every man for himself against everyone else." Thucydides had concluded that war had become a "condition of human nature."⁸⁶

Hobbes's interest in Thucydides may have been prompted, at least in part, by an interest in finding an antidote to Tacitus's insistence on equating the government of kings with tyranny, as well as the recognition that Tacitism, as promoted, for example, by Justus Lipsius and his writings about Tacitus, provided a set of ideas espoused by swordsmen as well as classical republicans. In England, as Hobbes would surely have noticed, the study of Tacitus was associated with the circle of Robert Devereux, second Earl of Essex, who showed a keen interest in the events that had led to the overthrow of Richard II. Essex himself led an abortive rebellion at the end of Elizabeth I's reign because of his discontent with her policies such as peace with Spain. The members of Essex's circle constituted a war party, which believed that peace at home was best procured by continuing the war with Spain.⁸⁷ Hobbes's experience of translating Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* made

him aware not only of the need to pursue peace, but also left him skeptical about aristocratic and democratic participation in government. He believed that the bellicose aspects of classical republicanism would bring only instability and endless civil strife.⁸⁸

Paraphrasing Thucydides, Hobbes states that the main causes of civil war were fear concerning security, a desire for honor and glory as well as profit: “Men compete for honour and dignity . . . hence men experience *resentment* and *envy*, which are sources of sedition and war. . . .”⁸⁹ The vain seeking after rank and precedence was something that Hobbes thought characterized the public assemblies in the ancient world that he associated with aristocracies and democracies; he thought monarchy gave less scope for the expression of such passions. “Man’s tongue is a trumpet to war and sedition; and it is said that *Pericles* once made thunder and lightning in his speeches and threw all *Greece* into confusion.”⁹⁰

Just as Thucydides thought that the overheated rhetoric of demagogues was one of the causes of the Greek civil wars, Hobbes, in his translation of Thucydides, saw a parallel with the confrontational politics and inflammatory speeches of politicians in the Caroline Parliaments of 1625–28, and also saw a reflection of the dangerous influence of classical republicanism. It was difficult to avoid the conclusion that more temperate speech would promote more political stability. Yet, Hobbes noted that any orator who spoke with restraint was thought to be a coward—both in Athens and in Charles I’s Parliaments. Hobbes offered the opinion that there were few wise men in the Caroline Parliaments because wise men knew how to get business done without resorting to eloquence.⁹¹

Turning from Greek to Roman history, Hobbes used the example of Catiline, who had been the instigator of the most serious rebellion during the Roman Republic, as depicted in Sallust, to demonstrate the danger of a demagogue who was possessed of eloquence, but not wisdom. Such rabble-rousers always pose a threat to the peace because they are adept at stirring up the passions of the people. Their arguments are rhetorical rather than logical, and are devoid of wisdom or acquaintance with factual analysis. One cannot be said to be possessed of wisdom unless one understands “the rules of *justice* and *injustice*, *honour* and *dishonour*, *good* and *evil*” together with a knowledge of “what achieves and preserves peace among men and what destroys it; what is *one’s*

own and what is *another's*. . . .” Fake eloquence always makes a good situation seem bad, or a bad situation seem worse. Such orators are skillful in employing eloquence to appeal to the raw emotions of the members of a popular assembly rather than their rational faculties. The purpose of their eloquence is to persuade rather than to teach. Because all political societies are devised by the hand of man, they are impermanent and must inevitably collapse. Thus, they are especially vulnerable to discontented individuals who see the chance to change their circumstances by employing their oratorical abilities to start a rebellion, which often leads to civil war. Since rebel leaders usually possess more eloquence than wisdom, they fail to understand that rebellions rarely succeed.⁹²

Political psychology: The science of peace and absolutism

Thucydides’ use of what modern social scientists call political psychology very much influenced how Hobbes went about writing his *Leviathan*, which sought to examine people’s motives for going to war in universal terms. Hobbes assumed that human nature, in all periods of history and throughout the world, remained the same. In order to achieve peace, one must study war as a phenomenon, but this must also be preceded by an attempt to analyze humans in a state of nature. Here, there existed such a threatening climate of war that people were reluctant to undertake the industrial arts, dared not venture on commerce, did not engage in agriculture, nor undertake the arduous task of cultivating knowledge because the future prospects were so dismal. Men neglected to form social bonds because they lived in fear of death. The similarity of Hobbes’s description of the perpetual climate of war, where one could not imagine a state of peace, was derived from Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War*. By painting such a dark picture of the persistent clouds of war that enveloped men living in a state of nature, Hobbes’s rhetoric aimed at focusing attention on how to seek self-preservation, avoid civil wars and wars between nations, and how to pursue peace. Hobbes saw Thucydides depicting the Athenians as a people of passion perpetually in motion, reckless in their oratory, always ready to go to war, unwilling to allow other people to live in peace, and “fatally self-destructive.”⁹³

Because Hobbes is usually thought to hold the view that mankind is, by nature, involved in a perpetual war in an insecure world in which concepts of morality count for naught and only coercive power commands obedience, he is usually regarded as a realist. In internal politics, his abhorrence of civil conflict is so great that the individual's rights are surrendered to an absolute ruler. Although Hobbes has less to say about this struggle when applied to relations between states, it is widely assumed that he was a realist in this sphere also. Yet, an argument can be made that Hobbes sought to develop a science of peace to pursue this seemingly elusive goal. Hobbes insisted that the prescription was simple: Men need only obey their rulers and the laws granted by them and listen to the judges who interpreted those laws, and they would find themselves on "the highway to peace." But they must not listen to those philosophers who tell them that they may rebel against and overthrow those so-called tyrants who had been set to rule over them.⁹⁴

Hobbes states that it is a fundamental law of nature to work for peace as far as possible. This is based on the premise that a person should avoid anything destructive of his own life, which means that he should avoid becoming involved in conflicts in which he might lose his life. This requires that everyone yield the right to protect himself by force to the state, which then acquires the right to protect everyone collectively. It is only when one has failed to secure peace that one may justly pursue war. Hobbes's interpretation of natural law assumes that men will first attempt to bring about peace within domestic society before pursuing international peace.⁹⁵ While all men seek peace, they do so by different paths because of a diversity of opinions, which can be made manifest by a condition of perpetual warfare, but that does not mean that they are not seeking peace as a future goal. Since it is only reasonable to pursue peace as a future goal, it follows that the path that men should follow in seeking peace is to practice good manners. Good manners, in this sense, refer not to social conventions "or such points of small morals," but to those larger principles of moral philosophy that are based on virtues discoverable in the laws of nature. These include "modesty, equity, trust, humanity, mercy. . . ."⁹⁶

Clearly, Hobbes was not prepared to accept Thucydides' belief in the inevitability of war. He believed that it was possible for a commonwealth to achieve peace through a demonstrated record of having the means to defend itself, and through the discouragement of political ambitions that might lead

to foreign adventures and imperial expansion. Because Hobbes thought that the exercise of liberty in the public sphere had led to intemperate speech and threatening rhetoric, his first step toward establishing a science of peace was to insist that the exercise of liberty in the Greek sense had to be surrendered. Demagogues could not be allowed to use inflammatory rhetoric to urge military adventures, and counselors who advised prudence and restraint should not be called cowards. This, it goes without saying, was a solution that was incompatible with a parliamentary system that allowed room for aristocratic or democratic participation. Absolutism remained the only choice.⁹⁷

The seventeenth century—especially the 1640s and the 1650s—saw numerous aristocratic and popular rebellions in various parts of Europe, and it is not surprising that Hobbes and his contemporary James Harrington were both driven by a desire for peace. Harrington believed that the best path to peace was to have a republic in which the laws were enacted by a popular assembly such as the English Parliament. However, he admits that this form of government is fraught with danger. There was an inherent risk that such a popular assembly would be subject to factionalism and vested interests in both the selection of representatives and in the ways in which legislative business was conducted. The people were often “careless” and “tumultuous”; the clergy were the “declared and inveterate enemies of popular power”; the lawyers pursued their own “private interest point-blank against the public”; men with too much wealth and land tended also to pursue their own interests, while the tendency, on their part, to retain a monarchy was a distraction. Harrington thought that plain gentlemen who did not possess the “great estates of noblemen,” but rather enjoyed “a good honest popular estate” which was heritable, would have no interest in establishing or retaining a monarchy, but would naturally incline toward a commonwealth characterized by popular participation in the civil administration on the part of those who served or had served in the militia. As in the Swiss cantons, electoral rights were conferred only on those who performed military service. Having learned discipline during their military service, the civil officers, serving as sheriffs, magistrates, and elected representatives, would be able to govern and achieve “perfect reformation by degrees and without violence.” Hobbes, of course, had abolished civic participation altogether. Harrington agreed with Hobbes that natural law requires peace, and this, in turn, necessitates obedience to man-made or positive

law. Harrington preserved a ritualized participation in government, which, says Jonathan Scott, was obligatory, but was devoid of any substance or choice.⁹⁸

Hobbes rejected the notion that sovereignty could be divided or limited. In effect, he said, as far as this principle applied to England at the beginning of the civil wars, that sovereignty rested in the king-sole, not the king-in-Parliament. This doctrine assigned to Parliament only an advisory role. Thus, it was the king alone who possessed the authority to declare war and to wield “the sword both of war and justice”. The king-sole possessed the power to make all laws, decide all controversies, and command the militia; his subjects had no right of resistance to these actions. Hobbes also insisted that the king’s subjects could not refuse to pay taxes that the king had levied. This quite explicitly denied the theory of possessive individualism or the absolute and unqualified rights of private property that was coming to be widely accepted in the seventeenth century. Such views about the absolute nature of sovereignty would have found acceptance only among high royalists, but then, Hobbes spent much of his life in the rarefied company of aristocrats.⁹⁹

Subsequently, in his *Leviathan*, Hobbes admitted that the possession of goods and land was a natural right that the subject possessed, but he made it dependent on the exercise of sovereignty by the ruler. The possession of such goods and land was likely to lead to perpetual conflict, and only a strong government in the hands of a sovereign with unlimited power could protect subjects and allow them to enjoy their property rights. Coercive power, without force, cannot uphold sovereignty and protect such natural rights.¹⁰⁰

Another power that pertained to a sovereign ruler was “to be a judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse and what conducing to peace”; it followed that a ruler might suppress those opinions and doctrines that were likely to disrupt peace and concord. Agents of the ruler should be appointed to censor all books before they are published. Hobbes does concede that through unskillful government or the teaching of false doctrine, a truth could disrupt a society and possibly lead to war, but the fault lay with those who governed ineptly or taught false doctrines because they were careless about preserving peace, and consequently, lived in a state of undeclared war.¹⁰¹ Hobbes believed that all civil and moral philosophy before his time inculcated error because all moral opinions and their political implications could be disruptive. His solution to this problem was to confine all political activities to the sphere of

the sovereign, and to limit his subjects' intellectual activities to private life and to teach them not to meddle in the sovereign's affairs. The concept of a legitimate command or a just war derives from the legitimate authority of the ruler. Private men who presume to pass moral judgment on political matters are "aspiring to be kings." A commonwealth could not be expected to remain stable where subjects laid claim to moral judgment in political matters.¹⁰²

Charles II would have agreed with Hobbes about the sovereign power of censorship. The restoration of the monarchy and the re-institution of press censorship made it difficult to discuss the recent civil wars because Charles II was determined to prevent a revival of the bitter controversies that surrounded those conflicts. Royal control of the press was something that he took a personal interest in, and he sometimes read proposed books in manuscript before allowing publication to proceed. He read the manuscript of Hobbes's *Behemoth*, in which Hobbes discussed the origins and causes of the civil wars, and consequently, that book was not published until 1682, after press censorship had broken down during the Exclusion Crisis of 1678–81.¹⁰³ One wonders if Hobbes understood how inflammatory some of his own remarks must have seemed. In his *Behemoth*, he charged that the citizens of London and other centers of trade in England had envied the prosperity of the people in the Netherlands after they had thrown off the rule of the king of Spain, and thought that they might achieve the same commercial prosperity by rebelling against their own sovereign. Since Charles II's government continued to be very dependent on the City of London for loans, banking services, and assistance in collecting the customs and excise duties, the king could hardly have been pleased by Hobbes's analysis.¹⁰⁴ While many Englishmen were troubled by Hobbes's advocacy of political absolutism, the French, following their experience of the Fronde and its myriad attendant blood-feuds, welcomed his political theories justifying absolutism, which were based on and accorded with a French Neo-Stoic tradition dating back to Montaigne.¹⁰⁵

Hobbes was a well read classical scholar, and except for his *Behemoth*, he drew most of his examples used for illustration in his principal works from ancient authors. This led to a pronounced distrust of the ancients. Hobbes thought that exposure to the writings of Greek and Roman authors without "the antidote of solid reason" and the corrections "of discreet masters" instilled in young men in the Three Kingdoms harmful ideas such as love of martial

glory, a disposition to war, a fondness for popular government, and a tendency to view kings as tyrants, which could easily lead to rebellion and civil war. Some of these men found their way into the House of Commons, where they stirred up trouble with their eloquence.¹⁰⁶

The famous deeds and sayings of the Greeks and Romans have been commended to history not by reason, but by their grandeur and often by that very wolf-like element which men deplore in each other; for the stream of history carries down through the centuries the memory of men's varied characters as well as their public actions.¹⁰⁷

In classical Greece, observed Hobbes, aristocratic and democratic factions in neighboring city-states caused discontent within the states that were ruled by kings. So also, the imitation of political principles and practices observed in the Dutch Republic aroused a love of novelty that bred discontent in early Stuart England.

One of the reasons why Hobbes rejected the political philosophy of the ancient Greeks and Romans is that they derived their principles, not from nature, but from customs of their city-states, which had a long history of being unstable and perpetually at war. The turmoil that resulted not only led to civil strife, but also caused their leaders to favor a policy of expansionism that involved citizens in foreign wars and occasioned the exaltation of the exercise of arms and military glory. In short, Hobbes thought, "the learning of the Greek and Latin tongues" produced a legacy in the Western world of "tumults" and "the effusion of much blood." The moral philosophers of the past had been wrong; they had departed from moral law and their teachings had led to a state of perpetual war. They failed to seek out the universal principles of moral law, and instead, merely codified the customs of their society and culture. These are among the reasons that Hobbes cited when he laid part of the blame on the universities for contributing to the outbreak of the civil wars.¹⁰⁸

Inventing peace

Sir Henry Sumner Maine thought that "war appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention." However, the longing for peace and the revulsion against war have a long history. Such attitudes were often expressed

in religious terms—especially in the Middle Ages. The Age of Reason did not invent such attitudes; it merely secularized them. Because the Old Testament legacy of sin was war, St. Augustine of Hippo could imagine peace only in the next life and only for those who would be saved. Those who followed him had such small expectation of longevity that they doubted whether they would live long enough to pursue peace in this world. In our own age, fewer people believe in an afterlife, but the threat of obliteration by nuclear weapons makes the cause of permanent peace seem more urgent.¹⁰⁹

Peace must always be a “contested concept” because every participant in a war will always have different objectives in sight when starting a war or negotiating a peace settlement. A peace that is dictated after a crushing victory can hardly be acceptable to the losing side. The defeated may obtain a release from the hardships and suffering that accompany war, but otherwise will gain little by the peace accord. Victors have been known to impose punitive peace settlements that burden the vanquished with unacceptable forms of government, and which sow the seeds of future conflict unless ameliorated by some strong and impartial form of international government. Unless all parties to a peace settlement participate on equal terms, there can be little prospect for permanent peace.¹¹⁰

Throughout the Middle Ages, learned men—mostly clergy—recognized that war was a legitimate and just activity. Not until the very end of that period did the Erasmian humanists begin to argue that war was not “a significant part of the natural or divine order.” They began to imagine a social and political order from which war had been banished, but they were able to do so only by degrees and on a small scale. Any scheme of universal and permanent peace must necessarily be fragile. It takes generations to build such a political and social order, but as long as sovereign states, which have the recognized power to make war, still exist, such a scheme of universal peace could be destroyed in short order. Peace, as Sir Michael Howard has observed, is an ideology—and a recently invented one at that. It is in the nature of ideologies to simplify the truth. War is also an invention of man, but it is very much older than pacifism, and has long since been institutionalized.¹¹¹

Most of the proposals for universal and perpetual peace in the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment were based on principles laid down in the writings of Grotius and Hobbes. Some of these later political and moral

philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant, were in general agreement with the Hobbesian view of man in the state of nature; others, such as Samuel Pufendorf, rejected those views. This influence can be attributed to Hobbes's tendency to be a more skeptical philosopher than Grotius had been, which enabled him to be a greater advocate of peace than Grotius.¹¹²

Hobbes had allowed that all individuals had a natural right to decide when they needed to defend themselves from grave danger, but he insisted that, at some point, they must surrender that independent judgment and agree on a common means of defense. When Hobbes discussed the turmoil and violence that was found in the state of nature, he stated that he was thinking more of interstate relations than the relationship between individuals. Just as individuals did well to surrender their natural right of self-defense to a sovereign ruler or a leviathan, Hobbes also thought that since sovereign rulers were always contemplating war with one another, even during those times when they were not actually engaged in hostilities, it made sense for those rulers of sovereign states to submit to the authority of a single sovereign ruler.¹¹³

The Enlightenment presented a much more serious challenge to church and state than did the Reformation. While the Protestant Reformation caused a division in Christendom, none of its confessional positions challenged the basic tenets of Christianity, nor were the assumptions of monarchy, aristocracy, and the sources of religious authority questioned (except, perhaps, papal authority). What was called "Cartesianism" appeared in the middle of the seventeenth century and introduced rationalism and secularism, which challenged the fundamentals of all revealed religions, the authority of the Bible, Aristotelianism in philosophy, the accepted principles of politics and the assumptions about nature and the universe. It ushered in mechanistic principles of science and repudiated divine causation.¹¹⁴

Benedict Spinoza is regarded by some as the thinker who did the most to undermine the philosophical basis of revealed religion, traditional ways of thinking, morality, and political authority based on divine right. He is often compared to Hobbes in his attack on the old intellectual order, but Hobbes insisted that Spinoza was much more radical than he. Spinoza was an atheist and a materialist who not only rejected Divine Providence, but could see no external creator beyond a mechanical universe. He was expelled by his own synagogue when he was only twenty-three years of age. Hobbes, by contrast,

remained more conservative in his political views, insisting on the need for a strong ruler to preserve the political and social order as well as a state church to regulate moral behavior, even if his own personal religious opinions were less than orthodox.¹¹⁵ Spinoza's philosophical writings, to a considerable extent, are commentaries on the moral and political philosophy of Hobbes—especially as they were applicable to the Dutch Republic. Unlike Hobbes, who believed that outward conformity to a church by law established was necessary for a stable political society, Spinoza was an advocate of religious toleration. He could see that the policy of religious uniformity had failed in England, and he favored the practice of toleration that had attracted Iberian Jews, among whom were numbered his ancestors, to the Netherlands. Subsequently, the political influence of the Calvinists largely undid the policy of toleration in Holland and other of the provinces of the Netherlands.¹¹⁶

Spinoza thought that men as individuals are prone to anger and envy to a high degree, and are therefore natural enemies of one another: "For he is my greatest enemy whom I need most to fear, and against whom I have most need to guard myself." Once man realizes that there is anarchy in the state of nature, he seeks to cling to others and form a society for protection, and thus, to preserve peace. Spinoza has effectively reformulated Hobbes's question: How can a state be constructed that will provide men with the maximum peace? Peace is not the mere absence of war, nor can it exist merely through apathy; it must be based on a concept of what is good for the commonwealth. A political society whose subjects are constrained from civil wars or rebellions may be free of war to a degree, but they do not enjoy peace. Peace is best secured where a number of commonwealths enter into peace treaties with one another—the more which do so the more likely they are to observe the conditions necessary for peace: "concerning peace it can decide nothing, save with the concurrence of another commonwealth's will. Whence it follows that the laws of war regard every commonwealth by itself, but the laws of peace regard not one, but at least two commonwealths, which are therefor called the contracting powers."¹¹⁷

The main purpose of the state was to provide peace and security for its citizens. This was best achieved by promoting harmony, and the ideal form of government for accomplishing this was a democratic republic. By contrast, a political society that fails to provide harmony—where crime and internal disorder prevail—differs little from living in the original state of nature. The

form of government most likely to give rise to internal disorder and to engage in war was a monarchy. The only way to ensure that a monarchy would avoid these evils was to oblige the monarch to consult a large council of citizens elected not for life, but for specified and limited terms of office. A strong state requires the participation of its citizens; a political society whose citizens are apathetic resembles nothing so much as a “desert.” This would minimize the dangerous influence of the courtier interest, which has always tended to erode royal power and enhance aristocratic interests—especially when the king was a child or otherwise impaired. The greatest danger to peace and the public good occurs where kings possess complete control of an army made up of foreign mercenaries or professional soldiers. Indeed, employing mercenaries or professional soldiers was to lay “the foundations of eternal war.” The way to prevent this was to have a citizen army whose officers and commanders were not paid salaries, but served out of a sense of duty. Clearly, Spinoza had little respect for the kind of monarchy found in early modern Europe.¹¹⁸

In Spinoza’s opinion, a stable state was one that was just powerful enough to preserve its own possessions without coveting those of another state. Such a state will do “its utmost to avoid war and maintain peace.” Spinoza reveals Machiavelli’s influence here when he insists that his model commonwealth would be sufficiently strong so that no other state would desire to attack it, but not so strong that other powers would fear it. Spinoza’s model commonwealth closely resembled the Dutch Republic, which he thought had a bias toward peace. The reason that Spinoza believed that rulers and magistrates had a strong obligation to avoid war and protect trade is not difficult to ascertain. His family’s mercantile business had been ruined by losses and debts resulting from their ships and cargoes being seized by the Barbary pirates and by English warships during the Anglo-Dutch Wars. Although he was a republican in his political thought, he was no friend of Oliver Cromwell or the English republicans.¹¹⁹ Spinoza anticipated the problem of vested military and defense-related interests, which make it difficult to avoid military adventures and remain at peace. In his model commonwealth, Spinoza specified that the salaries of his “senators” should be derived from import-export duties on the assumption that foreign wars always disrupt trade. Additionally, he specified that members of the legislature could not hold positions of command, or indeed, perform any military duties, and could not look forward to sharing in

the spoils of war. Thus, Spinoza hoped that legislators would have more to gain from peace than war, and would never attempt to prolong a war. He thought that wars should only be waged to secure peace, and when an enemy city was captured it should not be retained and garrisoned. But if an enemy city once captured refused to accept the terms of peace offered and was thought to pose a future threat, it should be destroyed and its inhabitants moved elsewhere.¹²⁰

In contrast to Spinoza, the North-German philosopher Samuel Pufendorf rejected Hobbes's view of the state of nature as utter savagery; he believed that the natural order could be better characterized by peace, in which individuals, under the guidance of God, sought to build a better society. Pufendorf, like a number of North-German men of learning, was in the employ of the Swedes, and distrusted the belligerent and expansionist views that characterized the writings of many English and Dutch thinkers. Pufendorf saw the German attempt to build a more peaceful order following the end of the Thirty Years War as a refutation of what Hobbes had said about man in a state of nature and an affirmation of the concept of sociability. Pufendorf thought that the Treaty of Westphalia's recognition of religious diversity was a good solution to the problem of irreconcilable religious differences and was an important characteristic of that peace settlement. Pufendorf also rejected Hobbes's insistence on the need for an absolute leviathan to maintain order. The German Empire, Pufendorf believed, was not a sovereign entity, but a mixture of different forms of government that was something less than a sovereign government.¹²¹

Pufendorf also sought to reduce the occasions that led to war. In this case, he was undoubtedly thinking of the third parties that had intervened in the Thirty Years War and the numerous colonial wars of conquest. He rejected Grotius's notion that a state had a natural right to punish any other state for actions contrary to natural law, and he also insisted that punishment could not be visited on individuals who were not subjects (with certain exceptions such as pirates and bandits). What Pufendorf had in mind here was to argue that European conquerors and colonizers could not expropriate the lands of indigenous peoples in the New World simply because they engaged in barbarous and unnatural acts, such as human sacrifice and cannibalism. Pufendorf also stated that a third party could not intervene in a war that did not directly affect its own interests as a neighboring state. Otherwise, wars

would multiply. He also condemned preemptive strikes against a possible enemy, although a state could go to the assistance of a third country to which it was bound by treaty.¹²²

Earlier in the seventeenth century, Henry IV's minister, the Duke of Sully, had put forward his "Grand Design" for peace, which was based on accepting the religious and political status quo of the European states, except for partially dismantling the Holy Roman Empire. Territories would be taken away from the Austrian Habsburgs in order to entice the other states of Europe to join this scheme. The Habsburgs would be removed from Central Europe and confined to their Spanish dominions. These European states would then form a league to drive the Turks out of Europe. All of this, of course, necessitated making war on the Hapsburgs before taking on the Turks. If the czar of Russia, whom Sully thought of as the khan of the Scythians, did not agree to this plan, he would be confined to Asia like the Turkish sultan. Sully's "Grand Design" would have led to a European government with a composite army. Sully does not seem to have understood that his grandiose plans would have sown the seeds of revanchism among the Austrians and all the other losers, and probably would have encouraged the growth of Prussian expansion and militarism. Sully's method of bringing peace to Europe was simply another crude version of the Roman practice of first securing a total and crushing victory and then dictating a peace settlement.¹²³

François de Callières, an envoy of Louis XIV who signed the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697, offers a complete contrast to Sully's clumsiness. Callières thought that every Christian prince had a moral obligation not to pursue war until he had made a serious attempt to settle differences with other states by peaceful means. He believed that France's lack of a system for training diplomats contrasted unfavorably with that provided for military officers. Diplomatic assignments were often given to men of little education and knowledge who had never before been out of the country. They were hardly better than the heralds of medieval times, who were sent to deliver specific messages, rather than having permanent diplomatic missions abroad, which negotiated on a continuing basis and kept their princes and governments well informed about events before they developed into crises. Callières thought that good diplomatic practice in France began only with the ministry of Cardinal Richelieu in the reign of Louis XIII. The transition from *ad hoc* to permanent diplomatic

representation abroad had been necessitated by the decline of papal power and the emergence of sovereign states and shifting diplomatic alliances. The new diplomacy spread from Renaissance Italy to Northern Europe. Hugo Grotius, the most eminent jurist of the early seventeenth century, also served in a diplomatic capacity representing the Dutch Republic in England, and later, spent ten years as the Swedish ambassador to France. He looked on these roles as a painful experience, and did not believe that permanent diplomatic missions were desirable.¹²⁴

William Penn, the Quaker founder of the colony of Pennsylvania, also put forward a plan for the international government of European affairs. Penn wrote his essay because he was distressed by the “bloody tragedies” of the Nine Years War (1688–97). He feared that men could not “know the comforts of peace, but by smart and penance of the vices of war.” Penn proposed that the sovereign princes of Europe agree to meet every year or so in a diet or parliament to take up weighty matters and disputes that could not be resolved by embassies. These disputes would be dealt with by discussion in order to preserve peace. The states that refused to participate would be compelled to submit to arbitration by the other participating powers. Allowing a ruler to act as his own judge in a dispute was to be avoided at all costs. The weight to be assigned to the votes of large and small countries was to be determined by an estimate of the number of persons and the gross wealth of each country based on the revenue of that country. To avoid arguments about precedence in this European parliament, the chamber in which the body was to meet should be round in shape with many doors for entrance and exit. The presiding officer could be chosen “by turns.” Decisions would be made only by a majority of three-quarters of the members. The language of debate should be French or Latin, the language of men of quality in the first instance, or of civil lawyers in the second.¹²⁵

William Penn assumed that his proposal to establish a European parliament to preserve the peace would be met with a number of objections. One was that a prolonged peace would engender effeminacy; another was that there would “be a great want of employment for younger brothers of families; and that the poor must either turn soldiers or thieves.” His reply was that, instead, society would have trade and employment for everyone. The philosophers of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment would also note the correlation among

commerce, civil societies, and peace. Penn also argued that if the European powers adopted his proposal for universal peace, the reputation of Christianity in the sight of infidels would greatly increase.¹²⁶

Another plan for universal peace and a proposal for a European union came from Charles Castel de Saint-Pierre, a French cleric. Saint-Pierre was a perpetual student, who has been called the patriarch of the philosophes and an early exponent of utilitarianism. He was secretary to Cardinal de Polignac, one of the French emissaries who negotiated the Peace of Utrecht of 1713, which ended the War of Spanish Succession. He had lived in the Netherlands for more than a year, and his contact with Dutch intellectuals influenced his own political and economic ideas. Saint-Pierre had not heard of Emeric Crucé's *Nouveau Cynée*, which anticipated some of his ideas until his friend Gottfried von Leibnitz made him aware of it. However, he had read the work by the Duke of Sully.¹²⁷

Saint-Pierre's plan for perpetual peace proposed a republic consisting of twenty-four Christian states of Europe as defined by the Treaty of Utrecht. Each state would send the same number of delegates to a senate of peace, which would meet on a permanent basis in a neutral city such as Cologne, Geneva, or Utrecht. The presidency of that senate would rotate on a weekly basis. No state could secede from this European union. An army would be raised to protect this European union from Asiatic aggression until a similar Asian union for perpetual peace could be formed. When disagreements occurred among the European states mediation would be obligatory before a court of arbitration, which would hand down a verdict. But that verdict would go into effect only after five years. The long-term goal of Saint-Pierre's scheme for perpetual peace was disarmament, which he assumed would promote greater economic prosperity. Saint-Pierre assumed that the twenty-four states of his republic of peace would retain most of the attributes of sovereignty and continue to negotiate treaties with one another. Implicit in his plan was the assumption that the Austrian Habsburgs' pretensions to universal monarchy would be undercut. Saint-Pierre is generally regarded as a Utopian, but the ministers of the French crown of his day saw him as a "tiresome and disturbing agitator."¹²⁸

After the Thirty Years War, warfare became more limited in nature. Thereafter, the thrust of philosophers such as the Swiss Emmerich de Vattel was to impose constraints on war so that as little damage was done to

noncombatants and their property as possible. Vattel entertained no doubts about the natural right of making war. He thought only a fanatic would take seriously the pacifist message of the Gospels, and allow himself “to be massacred and plundered, rather than oppose force to violence.” The right to make war belonged only to “nations” and could be employed to remedy an injustice, but only as a last resort. A just war must be publicly declared, the grievances had to be specified, and the designated enemy must be given time to reply with a proposed remedy. A defensive war, however, required no formal declaration. The only just reasons for going to war were to prevent or avenge an injury by an aggressor. Vattel did say that a preemptive strike against a neighboring state could also be justified when that state prepared for war in time of peace and refused to explain why it was doing so.¹²⁹

While Vattel, like Kant, rejected the concept of an international government possessed of sovereign powers, he did believe that the states of Europe had enough in common to constitute a sort of republic. Modern Europe had a shared political system that was characterized by the exchange of resident ambassadors and a continuing process of negotiating treaties with one another for “the maintenance of order and the preservation of liberty.” The states of Europe were no longer constantly at war with one another, but had achieved a degree of peace by means of what was called “the balance of power.” Although the alliances in this system were constantly shifting, this did achieve a greater degree of peace than had prevailed a century earlier.¹³⁰

Immanuel Kant was the first major philosopher to imagine a world free of war. From the time of the first Classical Greek philosophers, the great thinkers of the Western world had believed that war was a permanent and even dominant feature of human life. Most thinkers, although they might deplore war as evil, also viewed war as the usual path to peace. Kant was a Pietist, a Protestant sect that emphasized ethics and avoided theological dogmatism. He lived much of his life in Königsberg, East Prussia, and taught at the university there. He must have had a puckish sense of humor since he tells us that he got the idea for the title of his treatise on pacifism, *Perpetual Peace* (1795), from a Dutch innkeeper’s sign, which depicted a graveyard. The point was that most philosophers—and rulers—assumed that war was the main theme of history because it had dominated relations between states since antiquity, and lasting peace was to be found only in the next world.¹³¹

Kant regarded war as a great evil and denied that it was a legitimate way to settle disputes. At the same time, he was not a pacifist, and insisted that in the long history of mankind, warfare often contributed to human progress. It had driven men to form political societies for protection, and to settle uninhabited parts of the earth. The fear of future wars had caused people to think about humanitarian values, to devise technological and scientific innovations, and generally, to pursue learning. Kant argued that war was generally “a deeply concealed, perhaps intentional attempt of the most supreme wisdom, if not to establish then at least to prepare lawfulness along with the freedom of states and thereby the unity of a morally grounded system of states.” Fear of what the future might bring drives people toward progress, and hopefully, that will eventually lead to some universal scheme for preserving peace on a universal scale. All of the previous peace treaties had been mere truces. Kant looked forward to the future establishment of a kind of “representative republic,” but he doubted that any of the monarchs or diplomats of his time had anything to contribute to such an idea. Kant does not precisely state what such an international organization for preserving peace would have looked like, but the model that he often employed was based on the leagues of Greek city-states, such as the Delian League.¹³²

We hear an echo of Hobbes when Kant says that nature, by instilling in people an unsociableness that leads to wars interspersed with undeclared states of war and “unremitting military preparations,” drives them by their suffering to abandon the savage state in which they exist to seek peace and security by renouncing the state of nature and uniting together to form an international federation. Human beings are violent and will fight among themselves until an “external coercive” power intervenes. A state of undeclared war was the more natural condition of mankind than peace, and it was necessary to establish a state of peace by mutual formal agreements. Otherwise, people will always regard their neighbors as enemies. In other words, they must form a civil society and agree to submit to arbitration by competent judicial authority. The establishment of a declared state of peace can occur only between two or more states that are characterized by civil societies.¹³³

In a state of nature, sovereign states are permitted to make war on one another because there is no international legal tribunal to which they can apply for justice. In such a lawless state, sovereign entities are also free to make

preemptive strikes on a neighbor that engages in military preparations or is pursuing territorial expansion in order to be more powerful. The existence of such an expansionist state justifies other states attempting to maintain a balance of power in order to thwart such expansion. This constitutes a condition of perpetual war, whether declared or not. Even if there are no declared hostilities, such a situation is completely devoid of justice and should be abandoned. Such states are bound to enter into a federation dedicated to mutual self-protection. In his desire to promote peace, Kant believed that the sovereign state had to be preserved; the international federation that he envisioned could not be one where sovereign rights were given up.¹³⁴

Kant condemned actions that might possibly cause wars together with actions, which, undertaken during a war, might make it difficult to secure a peace settlement. He disapproved of promoting treason or rebellion within a belligerent country. He viewed assassinations and the dispatching of spies as inimical to the restoration of peace. He could not conceive of a punitive war since no international government, authority, or tribunal existed to render a judicial decision warranting punishment of a sovereign state. Although there might be occasions when one power would be justified in intervening in a civil war, such interference was best avoided until the conflict reached a critical stage. It was better to allow an independent people the opportunity to settle their own affairs. Otherwise, it “would render the autonomy of all states insecure.”¹³⁵

Kant believed that the “spirit of commerce” suppressed the desire to make war, and would urge nations to make peace with one another. This urge was based on self-interest and not morality. The appearance of the commercial instinct derived from the “power of money” and was an important step in the formation of a civil society. Before any system of international security among sovereign states could be established, these states must display the characteristics of a civil society. This means that each state that aspires to the status of a civil society must possess a republican constitution. This cannot be a democracy, where all citizens possess the sovereign right to make decisions, which necessarily results in a despotism, nor can it be an absolute monarchy where one person makes all the decisions. Rather, it must be a political society where all agree to abide by the rule of law and where there is a separation of the executive power from the power to legislate, and the exercise of this legislative power is based on a system of representation.¹³⁶

Kant urged that states possessed of a “civil constitution,” that is, states characterized by a civil society living under the rule of law, should form themselves into a “league of nations” with the intention of abolishing war. Such a federation could not be called a state or a union since Kant did not contemplate these states giving up their sovereignty. What he did envision them giving up was the right to make war. Having entered into such a league, they would submit their disputes to an international tribunal to be adjudicated according to the body of international law. Kant imagined this “league of nations” gradually expanding membership as more nations decided to give up war and settle their disputes by arbitration. While an international federation of states dedicated to preserving the peace was the best solution, Kant thought that the existence of many sovereign states was preferable to a “universal monarchy” because such a large and monolithic state would degenerate into a despotism. He apparently did not envision this “league of nations” extending beyond Europe.¹³⁷

Kant’s *Perpetual Peace*, published in 1795, was one of the last works of the Enlightenment. The philosophers of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, by developing theories of war, helped to place constraints on how wars were fought, and thereby, helped to lay the theoretical foundation for theories on how to achieve peace. At the same time, as constraints became codified in the rules of war, they also helped prevent interstate war from degenerating into something resembling warfare between prestate tribes.¹³⁸

The concept of a civil society owed but little to the world of classical antiquity, thought Adam Ferguson, a Presbyterian minister, sometime chaplain to the Black Watch Regiment, and subsequently, professor of moral philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. Modern civil societies could find nothing to admire in the methods of war practiced by ancient Greece and Rome, he insisted. The theme that Ferguson explores in his treatise *The History of Progress and the Termination of the Roman Republic* is that republican institutions could not work in a sprawling and expansionist state, and would result in the dominance of the of the military over civilian authorities. By contrast, the armies of the eighteenth century accepted constraints on their methods of war, and were lenient toward defeated enemies. They valued this compassion for their defeated enemies more than martial prowess. Ferguson believed that the laws of war of his time imposed constraints on how wars were conducted, and

reflected the humane values of civil society. This was an idea that Ferguson probably got from Montesquieu.¹³⁹

The concept of a civil society was thus a modern invention, although it had derived some of its elements from the ancient world. Ferguson praised the ancient Roman legacy of civil law, but he thought that the excesses of democracy in the Roman Republic had led to despotism. The decade of the 1760s were years of crisis, he said, because Britain during that period resembled the Athenian Empire and the late Roman Republic. Large-scale demobilizations during that period led to social unrest and popular tumults that could have resulted in either militarism or egalitarianism. But the government of Great Britain, he thought, had “carried the authority and government of law to the point of perfection, which they had never before attained in the history of mankind.” The rights of the people were preserved in the laws, and no despotism on the part of government officials was allowed to interfere with the proceedings of the courts. In short, this was a mixed constitution where the “vigour and jealousy of a free people” guarded against the arbitrary acts of the crown and the nobility, and protected the “safety of the person and the tenure of property” far better than any other political society on the past. But the danger remained that too much democracy could destroy a political system such as that found in Great Britain. And that is why Ferguson wasted little sympathy on the American attempt to secure independence.¹⁴⁰

Adam Smith, Ferguson’s contemporary who held the chair of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow, identified religious toleration as another important characteristic of a civil society. He believed that state churches that possessed a monopoly of religion were employed by political leaders to support their own party and often promoted violent factionalism. But if there were many religious sects—preferably two or three hundred—the clergy and adherents of those sects would learn to tolerate one another, and would be no position “to disturb the public tranquility.”¹⁴¹

Yet, both Ferguson and Adam Smith recognized that the degree of civility that Britain had achieved by the last quarter of the eighteenth century came with risks. One of the dangers of a civil society was its reliance on standing armies consisting of professional, long-service soldiers because this inhibited the martial spirit of citizens, and made them vulnerable to a government

backed by physical force. In Part V of his *History of Civil Society*, entitled “Of the Decline of Nations,” Ferguson says:

The boasted refinements, then, of the polished age, are not divested of danger. They open a door, perhaps, to disaster, as wide and accessible as any they have shut. If they build walls and ramparts, they enervate the minds of those who are placed to defend them; if they form disciplined armies, they reduce the military spirit of entire nations; and by placing the sword where they have given a distaste to civil establishments, they prepare for mankind the government of force.¹⁴²

Both Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith agreed that a well established commercial culture was an important characteristic of a civil society, but it also carried risks. In barbarian or prestate societies, the principal activity was making war, and this preoccupation favored the rise of successful military leaders, and usually led to monarchical government. As a political society becomes more commercialized and the subdivision of labor more specialized, citizens have less time to spare from their occupations. They become more reluctant to exercise arms in a militia, and thus, become less warlike. Commercial nations become, at the same time, more wealthy and offer the temptation to armed neighbors to invade their countries. At the point where enforcing military obligations becomes less feasible, states usually constitute standing armies in which being a soldier becomes a full-time trade requiring that they spend all their time in military training. Adam Smith was of the opinion that states that depend on militias for defense risk conquest by other powers. However, standing armies can also pose a danger unless they are well disciplined and their loyalty to the government guaranteed.¹⁴³

Adam Smith thought that the martial ethos among the Athenians first began to wane when commerce with the Greek colonies and other states became important on the eve of the Peloponnesian Wars. Previously, the usual way to acquire riches had been by the spoils of war, and citizens were glad of such opportunities. Commerce gave, then, a chance to acquire wealth and luxuries and raise themselves to equality with the nobles. Smith thought that it was at the Battle of Platea in 479 BCE that Athenian soldiers were first paid out of the public treasury; he argues that this signifies a decline of the heroic spirit and civic participation among Athenian citizens. In fact, mercenaries had been employed at least three centuries earlier in the Greek world and among its

neighbors. But they came to be remunerated with money only in about the fifth century BCE when coinage came into general use in the Greek world. Before that, mercenaries were recompensed in other ways.¹⁴⁴ The belief that the development of commercial society caused citizens to become more concerned with private business and less devoted to the public good was widespread in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹⁴⁵

Commercial societies often generated a taste for luxury and consumption. This disposition was usually shared by the rulers and the aristocracy, who became disinclined to save money in peacetime. But, in time of war, governments were obliged to borrow great sums of money to expand their military and naval forces and to equip and provision the same. Merchants and manufacturers were inclined to lend money to these governments to fund the public debt in political societies where the citizens had confidence in the equitable administration of justice and the guaranty of property rights. The existence of a permanently funded public debt could, of course, make it easier for states to go to war. The availability of such large amounts of capital was thus diverted from mercantile investment, and could make wars last longer than was needful.¹⁴⁶

Great Britain's manufactures and commerce had allowed that country to carry on wars in distant parts of the world. Britain did not depend primarily on the export of gold or the expenditure of much of the money in circulation, but derived its wealth from the export of commodities and the profits derived from the transportation of commodities—especially goods of finer quality. Thus, Britain in the eighteenth century was able to carry on wars without interruption, whereas earlier rulers often had to interrupt their wars when the money ran out.¹⁴⁷

Immanuel Kant noticed that the existence of a permanently funded public debt allowed European countries to engage in increasingly expensive and more frequent wars. This, of course, entailed spending a larger amount of the government's revenues on standing armies. Kant believed that the very existence of standing armies was itself a provocation to neighboring states. He disapproved of the employment of mercenary soldiers, and continued to believe that a voluntary militia was all that was permissible to deter foreign aggression. Kant also believed that commercial nations, such as Great Britain, which sold government bonds to build up their financial resources to wage

war, represented as great a threat to peace as the maintenance of standing armies. The existence of credit systems such as this represented a major obstacle to the establishment of perpetual peace, and other states were justified in forming alliances against such governments.¹⁴⁸

Emmerich de Vattel (1714–67), however, recognized the need to maintain a standing military force if a neighboring prince also did so, but at the same time, he lamented that this was a financial burden to any state. He thought it desirable that every treaty of peace should specify “that belligerent powers should disarm on both sides” and “disband their troops.” He reveals his classical republican sentiments when he notes that England, unlike most mainland European states, was not obliged to support a large standing army, which he considered to be “an instrument of despotism.” And, being Swiss by birth, he was eager to proclaim the unique position of his native land, ringed as it was by natural fortifications.

Happy Switzerland! if continuing carefully to exercise her militia, she keeps herself in a condition to repel any foreign armies, without feeding a host of idle soldiers who might crush the liberties of the people, and even bid defiance to the lawful authority of the sovereign. Of this Roman legions furnish a signal instance. The happy method of a free republic—the custom of training up all her citizens to the art of war—renders the state respectable abroad, and saves it from pernicious defect at home. It would have been everywhere imitated, had the public good been everywhere the only object in view.¹⁴⁹

Vattel anticipated the *levée en masse* by which the enormous armies of the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon would be raised, but he preferred the citizens’ militias to standing armies. While Vattel thought that it was preferable to call on volunteers to serve, and assumed that those “who are incapable of handling arms or supporting the fatigues of war” would be exempted, he was not prepared to say that natural law allowed an exemption to the clergy because of the strictures of canon law. He was prepared, however, to allow exemptions from military service to those clergy who performed useful religious services. But this latter category specifically excluded monks and friars.¹⁵⁰ The growth of religious toleration was sometimes accompanied by the appearance of anticlericalism, which could work against the civilizing process.

A number of leading French philosophes had concluded by the middle of the eighteenth century that the European monarchies of that era were obstacles to peace. Montesquieu believed that “the spirit of monarchy is war and expansion; the spirit of republics is peace and moderation.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau thought that wars would not end until all monarchies were abolished—although he understood that this could not be achieved without spilling much blood. Rousseau had a project for writing a grand treatise on political science that would replace Montesquieu’s *Spirit of the Laws*, but it never came to fruition. He had hoped to lay out a form of government that would ensure that the law would always prevail over the mind of man.¹⁵¹

Rousseau was a severe, although not intellectually rigorous, critic of Hobbes. He agreed that man in a state of nature was ruled by his passions rather than reason, but he rejected the Hobbesian view that primitive man lived in a perpetual state of conflict. Only hunger could drive him to violence. Man’s naturally peaceful nature was corrupted by civil society as he adopted concepts and institutions such as marriage, property, and social stratification that rested on man-made laws rather than natural law. Men became warlike only after they formed political societies, and a martial disposition was acquired only through habit and experience. In the state of nature, relations between man and man were not stable enough to constitute either a state of war or a state of peace. Quarrels among individuals came and went quickly, so personal relations did not constitute a basis for war. War became possible only when societies were formed and concepts of property were institutionalized. Man became a soldier only after he had become a citizen. War is a relationship among states, not individual persons. Thus, the age of the “noble savage” gave way to endemic warfare.¹⁵²

Rousseau rejected the assertion by Hobbes that humans lived in an undeclared state of war. Rousseau believed that Hobbes confused individuals, as they supposedly lived in a state of nature (which Hobbes had never actually observed), with individuals as they actually existed in society. Rousseau believed that man was naturally inclined to peace, but the laws, as made and administered by princes to dispense justice, were merely a cover for imposing the prince’s will by force. As for the so-called “rights of nations,” because international law lacked sanctions, it was weaker than the law of nature. Political society represented “an artificial concord” imposed on people to make

them fight the ruler's wars. When the first such political society was formed, others were bound to follow. The larger that political societies grew, the more likely they were to expand outward and make war. The state is an artificial creation that continues to grow, and as it feels strong or weak in comparison to other states that surround it, it tends to absorb neighboring, and especially, weaker states to strengthen its own political stability. The bigger it grows, the more dangerous its quarrels with its neighbors become. It is in the nature of well organized political societies always to be active, and the interaction among such great societies tends to produce war and mutual self-destruction.¹⁵³

As for peace, Rousseau stated that it was a much broader concept than war since it encompassed meanings such as concord, unity, benevolence, and mutual affection together with a desire to preserve God's creation of humanity, but it was easily disturbed and damaged in ways that fall short of open warfare. For example, the object of a declared war might be to force the enemy to accept a peace treaty that imposed even greater harm than was done by war.¹⁵⁴

An important milestone in the search for a science of peace was Hugo Grotius's attempt to explain the causes of war in purely secular terms. This had the effect of playing down the differences between the Catholic and Protestant camps during the age of religious wars. In his attempt to ascertain the criteria governing a just war and the methods that might or might not be employed in conducting such a war, Grotius provided a rational mode of inquiry that might be used by the non-Christian as well as the Christian world. This was to become the basis of international law. The realization of a more developed system of international law lay in the distant future; Grotius's more immediate contribution was to cite Roman historical precedents and to provide a foundation in natural and civil law for constraints on war, which pacifist idealists sometimes forget represents a praiseworthy intermediate stage in the ultimate goal of universal peace. One must first determine which actions in war are unjust before one can declare what constitutes a just war. And it is well that the international community reach agreement concerning what is lawful in war before moving on to the next step of determining how to achieve and preserve peace in future.

The message of Machiavelli, Algernon Sidney, and the English classical republicans that liberty must be contended for, suited the temper of many

merchants and military men in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when it was combined with a disposition to expand trade and engage in empire-building. Since making war was seen to be the principal function of the state, classical republicans such as Sidney looked for competence in their military and naval commanders. However, contrary to the doctrines of the classical republicans, this goal could not be achieved through the sporadic exercises of an amateur militia, but rather required a disciplined long-service soldiery and a professional officer corps which offered careers of merit. This did not accord well with the appointment and promotion of court favorites or the martial aspirations of the aristocracy. The professionalization of the Royal Navy was achieved in the late seventeenth century in England, but the same process in the army took much longer. Although it is difficult to gauge how completely the governing classes were persuaded by the intellectual currents associated with classical republicanism, the acceptance of the idea that military preparedness, empire-building and the expansion of trade at the expense of the Dutch, the French, and the Spanish were desirable objectives helped to propel the British kingdoms and the English colonies into wars with France and its allies that lasted from 1689 to 1815, and raised Britain from the status of a third-rate power in a backwater of Europe to that of a global great power.

James Harrington was also a classical republican, but he was closer to Hobbes in his desire to maintain peace and stability. Both men had been alarmed by those passages in Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, which identified democracy and demagoguery as the principal causes of internecine strife. Harrington and Hobbes attempted to avoid civil war by prescribing governments that imposed varying degrees of censorship and absolutism. Algernon Sidney was remarkably unsympathetic to this peace ethic, and insisted on the need to constantly train for war. Indeed, he welcomed the occasional war or rebellion because of fear that the nation would become effeminate and devoid of valor without the experience of armed conflict from time to time. Moreover, Sidney did not doubt that moral justification could be found for sustaining this martial ethos. The values of this bellistic culture were reiterated in a great outpouring of books on the art of war together with sermons urging a holy war against the enemies of the Protestant cause, whether Catholic or Muslim. It was this audience that John Milton had in mind when he composed his *Paradise Lost*. Milton understood that such an audience was

so conditioned to the idea that war was a consequence of sin that it would do no good to offer a secular explanation for the phenomenon of war. Milton meant to condemn this disposition to war, but he had to do it in terms that were readily comprehended. Yet, his condemnation of royal tyranny and his justification of the right of a people to rebel and choose their own leaders did little to promote the cause of peace.

Thomas Hobbes's words to the effect that in a state of nature men were perpetually at war with one another, and consequently, "the life of man [was] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short," are frequently torn out of context and misunderstood. Hobbes insisted that the causes of this seemingly perpetual conflict rose not so much from a widespread delight in war, but rather from an ignorance of the origins of war and peace, and the failure to study those principles of moral philosophy and the laws of nature discoverable by all men which could promote peace. In other words, Hobbes insisted that the difficulty in imagining peace in this world was caused by intellectual slovenliness. This remains as true today as it was in the age of Hobbes.

In his search for a science of peace, Hobbes looked about for the causes of bellicosity and the ignorance of those principles of moral philosophy that might promote peace, and he placed the blame on several categories of people: there were the clergy of different religious persuasions who exceeded their clerical authority and promoted a diversity of religious opinion; he castigated the philosophers and authors of classical antiquity who inculcated martial values and false principles of moral philosophy together with those modern scholars and authors who continued to reiterate those values—especially those who failed to teach obedience to royal government and thought that every king was a tyrant to be overthrown; and he singled out for special disapprobation those demagogues described by Thucydides whose rhetorical excesses often helped to precipitate conflict.

Anticipating the philosophes and scholars of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, Hobbes wished to completely revise the curricula of schools and universities. He intended to construct a new science of humankind, and like the deists, wanted to emphasize ethics and de-emphasize theology. But, in the interests of promoting peace, he parted company with the mainstream of political philosophy in the English-speaking world by seeking to increase royal power and to reinforce the monopoly of the established religion. Although in

his own career he deviated from many of these restraints, he could not imagine a stable political society in which there existed unrestricted intellectual inquiry, religious toleration, free speech, and popular, or even aristocratic, participation in government. Yet, we must remember that few people did more to promote rational and scientific inquiry into the topics of war and peace than Hobbes, and he certainly must be numbered among the founding fathers of political science and political psychology.

The political and moral philosophers who followed Grotius and Hobbes in the next century or so were able to envision supra-national bodies that would urge sovereign states to settle their differences by submitting them to tribunals that would render decisions based on the developing body of international law. International law was useful for imposing constraints on how wars were fought. Wars grew less frequent, but expanded in scale and length as governments increased their financial resources through improved methods of funding their public debts by issuing bonds. Consequently, wars lengthened and spread over larger geographical areas. Indeed, some of the wars of the second half of the eighteenth century were global in scale. Perhaps, only Immanuel Kant could imagine a world completely free of war, but he was unable to draw up a more specific map of how to reach that destination. It could hardly be reached without limiting the power of sovereign governments to some degree.

Probably, the best way of bringing about peace, and one over which governments had but limited control, was through the development of commerce within their societies and also with other nations. There was general agreement that the spread of commercial culture led to the decline of bellicose cultures that had been inherited from classical antiquity and the medieval world and the emergence of civil societies that were characterized by the rule of law. The more that governments were subjected to constitutional limitations and characterized by civil societies, the more they would be drawn together in peaceful commercial relations. This might be followed by international cooperation to limit wars, and possibly, abolish war altogether and settle all disputes by arbitration. Unfortunately, the growth of commerce can also lead to international and colonial competition, and does not invariably guarantee peaceful relations. Moreover, the profits of commerce, when appropriated by government in the form of taxes and investments in the public debt often continued to be spent largely on weapons and armies, which necessarily pose a risk to peace.

Conclusion

*For mankind, o'er wearied with a life
Fostered by force, was ailing from its feuds;
And so the sooner of its own free will
Yielded to laws and strictest codes.*

Titus Lucretius Caro, *Of the Nature of Things*, trans. William Ellery Leonard (London: Dent, 1921), bk. V (p. 232)

War pervaded classical antiquity and is a legacy of the ancient world. It was what poets, dramatists and historians wrote about more than any other topic, and tales of heroism and martial glory were what their audience wanted to hear. Contemplation of a world free of conflict, both civil and interstate, required poetic imagination, but poets such as Hesiod, Ovid, or the prophets who wrote the Hebrew Bible, could imagine peace only in the very distant past, perhaps in the distant future or in the next world, but not in the world in which they actually lived. In the Greek world, the obligation to bear arms came to be viewed as one of the duties of citizenship, and since the Greek city-states were highly competitive and jealous of one another and went to war frequently, it was necessary for citizens to exercise arms on a regular basis. This bellicosity also shaped their athletic games, and their gods smiled on such endeavors when they were not fighting among themselves. If the gods fought among themselves and encouraged those mortals whom they favored to do the same, it was difficult to have anything but brief periods of peace among mortals.

The Greeks frequently had to repel invasions by their Asian neighbors, and their earlier philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, taught them to think of non-Greek peoples as barbarians fit to be conquered and enslaved. The conquests of Alexander the Great enlarged the Greek world and promoted the idea of cosmopolitanism. This brought a degree of peace within the Hellenistic world, but at the same time, encouraged aggression and expansion on the frontiers of empire. Another reason for going to war frequently in the archaic, classical, and Hellenistic periods, and later in Roman times, was that

the honor and glory won on the battlefield conferred prestige and could advance one's political career. The belief that the individual warrior won glory on the battlefield was peculiar to the Greeks, and, apparently, was not found in the martial cultures of other Near-Eastern empires. This was to be an enduring concept and persisted in Western cultures into medieval and early modern times; it predisposed aristocratic warriors to engage in individual combats as well as to seek honor and glory on the field of battle. The belief that their enemies were inferior peoples sometimes led them to demonize such peoples—a tendency that persists into the present, and that tempts soldiers to commit acts of atrocity or causes their commanders to be disinclined to end wars by negotiated treaties.

The Roman state in the days of the Republic was a political society organized for constant war and expansion, and became the model for the fiscal-military state of the early modern period. The Roman army during the republican period had demanded military service of all citizens, but in the transition to the empire became an organization made up of long-service professional soldiers. The activities of this army consumed most of the taxes raised by the Roman state. The link between citizenship and military service anticipated the militant nationalism of the French Revolution, and the scale of the mobilization of manpower for military service was at times greater than that of Western states during the age of total war in the early twentieth century. Although the *Pax Romana* of Augustus brought peace to the interior of the empire for several centuries, the fact remains that Rome was a bellicose state by any comparison. The concept of peace in Roman thought was limited, developed slowly, and in any case, was imported from the Greek world. It does not appear before the time of Augustus. While Roman intellectuals were influenced by Greek Stoicism, and sometimes condemned war in general terms, it is difficult to demonstrate that such sentiments had any influence on how the empire was governed. Seneca concluded that man's corrupt nature made war inevitable. The Romans were fastidious about providing legal justifications for making war, but cared little about eliminating it.

The Romans were slow to develop a concept of peace, and their political imagination did not carry them very far in that direction. For the Romans, peace came only after a crushing victory and a dictated peace. The Gates of War were seldom shut in the Temple of Janus, and peace was never durable.

The Greeks were more imaginative. It was they who first engaged in the negotiation of peace treaties between equals, thus establishing an important precedent for the emergence of international law in the early modern period. The Athenian Sophist philosopher Isocrates, who witnessed the disintegration caused by the Peloponnesian War, came to advocate peace among the Greek city-states; he questioned Athenian expansion and condemned possession of and employment of mercenary soldiers and naval forces as bellicose and provocative. The Sophists also argued for the principle of human equality—not only among the Greek city-states, but between Greeks and their Asian neighbors.

The Stoics, with their imperturbability and their emphasis on ethical behavior, also expressed an abhorrence of war and a longing for peace. They promoted cosmopolitanism, which they believed could best be realized in a universal monarchy or state. Stoicism, while it had considerable influence on such major Roman thinkers as Cicero, remained a personal philosophy. Its most important contribution is that it caused both the Greeks and the Romans to see the wisdom of imposing constraints on how wars were fought, and a thousand years later, it influenced Erasmian and Neo-Stoic thought during the Renaissance.

Stoicism insisted on a moral standard by which wars could be judged just or unjust. Stoicism also endorsed cosmopolitanism, which promoted the concept of the brotherhood of man and a belief in a natural equality among men, and thus, anticipated some of the tenets of Christianity. Its most enduring idea is the belief that war should be subjected to constraints on how it was fought. Individual Stoic philosophers went further in advocating the abolition of war as irrational, but again, these ideas remained a personal philosophy rather than being integrated into a more widely accepted political philosophy. Stoicism underwent a revival during the Renaissance, and as Neo-Stoicism, did much to introduce an ethical dimension to how wars were fought. It also had some influence on the Erasmian pacifism of the Christian humanists. However, the Greeks and the Romans, the intellectual leaders of the world of classical antiquity, devoted more thought to how to win glory and sustain honor than they ever did to attempting to imagine a world in which peace prevailed. The Roman state was organized for making war, and that was the model to which the emerging sovereign states gave priority during the Renaissance and early modern period when they turned their attention to making their armies more effective.

In late antiquity, after the time of Constantine, the emergence of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire seems to have bred public disorder and contempt for non-Christians, whether pagans or Jews. Despite the early Christian aversion to war, the Augustinian doctrine that war is a consequence of man's sinfulness and that peace was to be found only in the next world cast a shadow over the Middle Ages. Pacifism came to be associated with heretical sects. Augustine and his followers devoted their efforts to laying out a sweeping doctrine of just war, which included making war on heterodox Christians. The bitterness that such crusades engendered could last for generations, and made it difficult ever to achieve peace. Although it was universally assumed that the end of war was peace, everyone wanted peace on his own terms, so peace always remained a contested concept. The concept of just war, which derived from classical antiquity, was a meager inheritance for the Christian world, but it did offer more constraints on how wars were fought than the concept of holy war derived from the Old Testament. The classical doctrine of just war taught that only a legitimate temporal ruler could declare a just war, but this made no sense when the political authority of the Western Roman Empire disintegrated during the Germanic and Turco-Mongolic invasions, and the collapse of imperial authority provided the opportunity for the popes of the Latin Church to assume the power to declare war and proclaim the Crusades.

The decentralized system of feudalism, which emerged toward the end of the early Middle Ages, also proved an ineffective means of preserving peace. The knightly code of chivalry, with its need to continually display martial prowess, worked against peace between kingdoms and within lordships. Chivalric values, with their emphasis on the acquisition of individual honor and glory undermined attempts to impose discipline and to focus on political and military aims in war. Such undisciplined displays of histrionics could only diminish opportunities to secure peace. The medieval knight was devoted to war because the quickest way to enrich himself was by winning ransom and booty. Although the code of chivalry imposed constraints upon methods of war between knights, medieval war remained brutal for lesser persons. The Church decided that the best way to suppress conflict between feudal monarchs as well as feuding and private combat was to send these troublesome knights against the Saracens and infidels and to confer upon them the status of crusaders. But as feudal monarchs gradually gained a monopoly on violence within their

realms, they built up armies with which they could fight one another to further their dynastic ambitions. Thus, another solution to restraining knightly violence was for monarchs to take such knights into royal armies for permanent military service. The *Decretals* of Gratian served to rehabilitate the soldier by making him a warrior in the service of God since he punished sin and crime in the administration of justice. All of this was based on the assumption that the object of war was peace, although the individual knight did not necessarily have this in mind. There were times when medieval writers clearly suffered from war weariness, but they often feared peace more since it was generally believed that extended peace would lead to effeminacy and the decay of military prowess.

The concept of holy war derives from the Hebrew Bible or Old Testament. Modern Jews generally reject the idea that the ancient Israelites ever engaged in anything other than defensive war in territories that they had always occupied. Nevertheless, St. Augustine and the Prophet Muhammad claimed to have discovered the concept in various passages of the Hebrew Bible. The early Christians before the time of Augustine would not have understood the concept of holy war since they were pacifists and could not comprehend the concept of holy war except as described in the Book of Revelation, which foretold a battle between angels and demons in which they would have no part. Nor would Roman political theory have allowed a war that was not declared by those possessing political authority in the Roman state. The Christian concept of holy war did not emerge fully developed until the ninth century CE, a period of political weakness when the Western Roman Empire was no more than a distant memory, and all parts of that former empire were beset by barbarian invaders or Muslim conquerors. The Muslim tradition of holy war also derived from the Hebrew Bible, and was intended to destroy idolaters or compel them to convert to Islam, but the main driving force of Islam was expansionism. The Islamic tradition never recognized a distinction between religious and secular authority. By contrast, the concept of holy war was never fully accepted in the Byzantine or Eastern Roman Empire, where imperial authority remained much stronger. In the long run, the Western distinction between spiritual and temporal authority, inherited from the Roman political tradition, did not provide fertile ground for the growth of theocracy.

In both theory and practice, holy war was the most vicious kind of armed conflict, because, unlike war in late antiquity and later in early modern Europe,

there were no constraints on how armies treated their enemies and prisoners. However, not all of the wars that the Saracens and the Franks or crusaders fought with one another were full-scale holy wars, and sometimes rulers such as Saladin, Sultan of Egypt, or the Emperor Frederick II were prepared to negotiate truces, but the clergy of the two opposing faiths usually did their best to sabotage such efforts. Generally, both Muslim jihadists and Christian crusaders aimed at destroying one another. Both also pursued wars against heretical elements within the Christian and Islamic worlds. Muslims could imagine peace only within the Islamic world, and Christians thought that permanent peace could be attained only in the next world. Both Christians and Muslims thought that those who died in these holy wars were martyrs to their faith.

When the Ottoman Turks came to dominate the Near-Eastern Islamic world in the thirteenth century, the focus of Muslim holy war shifted from conquest in all directions to a strategy of expanding westward into Europe as far as the Atlantic Ocean. The Ottoman sultans also claimed the caliphate and attempted to subdue their Arab co-religionists. The Ottoman army became professionalized and highly effective, and it continued to expand westward into Europe, conquering the Byzantine Empire and advancing up the Danube Basin until it was stopped at the gates of Vienna in the late seventeenth century. The Turkish threat helped to keep alive the crusading spirit and gave longevity to the idea of holy war in the West. That the later crusades were not pure holy wars can be seen in the alliance of the Genoese with the Ottomans at the Crusade of Varna.

The crusading ideology grew out of the determination to halt the expansion of Islam and to recover the holy places of Jerusalem. Holy war had become an instrument of papal policy while the temporal rulers of Western Europe remained weak. These motives remained at the heart of the movement, but crusading wars were also directed against heretics within Christendom, and against enemies of the papacy and pagans in the Baltic Sea region. In order to secure the cooperation of secular rulers and members of the feudal nobility, the crusades against Christians also had to serve the needs of secular rulers and their dynastic interests. The Teutonic Knights continued their crusades against the Lithuanians even after the latter were converted to Christianity. When it was objected that the holy war of the Teutonic Knights was nothing but a pretense, the Knights launched campaigns against the heretical Hussites in Bohemia and

fought the Turks in Transylvania. The Hussite heresy, which fed on Czech nationalism and was effectively led by John Hus, with military leadership from Jan Žižka, proved to be the most difficult of all medieval heretical movements to deal with. Four separate crusades were sent against the Hussites, but the latter endured and retaliated by raiding several German states. The holy wars against the Hussites and the Waldensians were failures, and these groups survived into the sixteenth century when they merged with Protestantism.

The holy wars and crusades of the medieval period bequeathed an unfortunate legacy to Reformation and early modern Europe since religious motives, in part, provided a pretext for the numerous wars of that period. Although political and dynastic ambitions also contributed to the wars of the Reformation, the popular exhortations of religious leaders in both the Protestant and Catholic camps stirred up violence in the religious and civil wars that followed. Popular religious discontent helped to unleash peasant rebellions and other social and economic protests based on grievances that had accumulated under the seignorial and manorial regimes in the latter part of the Middle Ages.

Unemployed soldiers always posed a threat to good order—especially in the case of France after that country withdrew from foreign wars for the half century following the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis of 1559. The many French noblemen and their followers who had fought in the Italian wars returned home, and their presence in the provinces brought about a militarization of provincial French society that undermined royal authority, and made the confessional disputes of the French religious and civil wars more deadly. The provincial governors and their armed retinues sometimes attempted to uphold royal jurisdiction and the Catholic faith, but many disaffected noblemen who failed to secure patronage found an outlet and a refuge in the Huguenot party. These swordsmen took it on themselves to organize militias to protect the meetings of Huguenot congregations. Both Ultra-Catholic and Huguenot noblemen found extensive popular support, and the descent into civil war inevitably followed. The Catholics formed the Holy League; various local armed confraternities were revived or newly organized, and their pursuit of war against the Huguenots not only displayed many of the characteristics of the religious strife seen in other wars of religion, but also reminded some observers of the medieval crusades against the Albigensians. For their part, the Huguenots invited popular hostility by their refusal to abide by the earlier

royal grants of limited toleration as contained in the Peace of Amboise of 1563. Thirty-four more years of religious and civil strife ensued, but the Huguenots did not gain any greater degree of religious toleration than had been conceded by the Peace of Amboise.

That the nature of religious war was changing is exemplified by the Wars of the Three Kingdoms. The Irish civil wars bore all the characteristics of religious conflict between Catholic and Protestant, but the civil wars in England and Scotland were both fought between different factions of Protestantism, although the exaggerated fear of popery played a role in fomenting these conflicts. Like the wars of the Reformation of mainland Europe, popular involvement was informed by the many books and pamphlets that poured forth from the printing press, and large segments of the English people displayed a remarkable awareness of the political issues—especially after the breakdown of official censorship. But popular political discourse had not yet become completely secularized, and religious propaganda still played a significant role in stirring up animosity.

The civil wars of Ireland were indeed religious conflicts, but they were also something more. Several distinct ethnic and religious groups had never been fully assimilated by the middle years of the seventeenth century. The Old Irish clung to their Gaelic language and customs—especially in Ulster—and their Norman and English conquerors had never accorded them the status and rights of subjects. The Old English of Munster and the English Pale had remained loyal to Catholicism, but the Old Irish were reluctant to trust them because the former chose the Royalist cause while the Gaelic Irish formed themselves into the Catholic Confederation of Kilkenny. As the more recent conquerors, the New English and the Ulster Scots were distrusted and hated by both the Old Irish and the Old English. The people of Ireland had never forged a common identity. Clearly, there were numerous political considerations that exacerbated the Irish conflict, but the use of religious propaganda—especially concerning the alleged massacre of Protestants—was even more exaggerated in Ireland than was the case in England and Scotland. This contributed to horrific atrocities that were worse than anything in the mainland European conflicts. The constraints on war, found in the mainland European wars, and to some extent in the civil wars of England, were absent in the Irish wars.

While Machiavelli can hardly be considered an advocate of peace, he, like earlier Italian scholars such as Dante and Marsilius of Padua, helped to secularize

political thought. This removed that intellectual discipline from the realm of clerical control, and by writing in the vernacular, admitted laymen to the world of political discourse. In the course of time, this helped to lessen the papal power of declaring holy war, and restored to the sovereign ruler the exclusive authority to declare war. The secular rulers were also quite capable of exploiting religious prejudices to justify their own wars, as happened during the wars of the Reformation, but they also had strictly secular ends in sight, and they tended to depend on a broader and more popular political base when they decided policy or declared war. Imitating the example of the citizen army of the Roman Republic, Machiavelli and the classical republicans advocated civic militias in preference to standing armies composed of mercenaries or long-service professional soldiers. A civic militia, they argued, was more likely to promote political stability than foreign mercenaries, who had an interest in keeping the wars going.

Despite the secularizing influence that the Italian humanists had on political discourse, they did not break with the view, derived both from the ancients and the Augustinians, that war arose from man's disposition to violence—something that man had no control over. Since war was inevitable, a prince must encourage his subjects to exercise arms in preparation for the next conflict. Peace always brought the danger that aristocrats and citizens would lose the martial spirit that was necessary to hold an army together and defend one's country. On the other hand, Castiglione warned his readers that however necessary it was to maintain a political society and its people in a state of readiness for war, a prince neglected his duty if he did not encourage his subjects to take advantage of the leisure afforded by peace to cultivate the moral virtues necessary to enjoy peace and prolong the same.

Erasmus, the prince of Christian humanists, attacked the political realism of Machiavelli and the classical republicans by questioning the crusading, chivalric, and patriotic values on which the martial ethos rested. In the short run, he hoped to promote arbitration as an alternative to war, but he also understood that diplomacy was just another word for dissimulation. Ultimately, he aimed at providing a humanist curriculum based on the moral principles of the New Testament and the Roman Stoic philosophers. His audience was necessarily limited because he wrote and published in Latin, whereas Machiavelli and his followers wrote in the vernacular and were widely translated into other modern languages. Erasmus, unlike the Neo-Stoic philosophers, did not help his cause

by making clear his detestation of professional soldiers. Ultimately, Erasmus's dislike of war was based, not on Christian principles, but on the argument that war was irrational and contrary to natural law. Thus, at the same time, he rejected the argument that war was a providential means of punishing man's sins. He also threw out all of the classical Greek and Roman, Augustinian and Scholastic arguments supporting the doctrine of just war.

Erasmian humanism did not equip humanists for dealing with the dreadful political realities of early modern Europe. Erasmus took no account of the development of the Renaissance sovereign state, which came into being primarily to make war more effectively, and his ideas were unacceptable to the Portuguese and Spanish who were entering an extended period of colonial expansion. However, there were those who attempted to impose theoretical restraints on the conduct of armies in the just-war tradition, such as the political theorists of the Salamancan school who sought to place limits on how non-Christian noncombatants were treated in the Indies and in the continuing war with the Turks. The Salamancan thinkers also rejected differences of religion as a sufficient justification for declaring war.

The reason that Erasmian pacifism did not engage with the political realities of his age was that Erasmus, although he had fled the cloister, retained a monkish disengagement from the problems of politics and war. His bitter denunciations of war and soldiers could hardly commend him to those who had to deal with such realities, but needed moral guidance in doing so. For that reason, Michel de Montaigne, Justus Lipsius and the other Neo-Stoics were better guides in developing an ethics of war in an age of religious and civil conflict that Montaigne thought was worse than anything the ancient world had ever experienced, yet they were able to draw on the ancient Stoic virtues of constancy, courage, and tolerance in facing the changing accidents of war. Montaigne demonstrated that it was possible to be both a soldier and a scholar, to combine a rational analysis of war with a care for ethical restraint on how war was waged. He and Justus Lipsius helped to restore the moral dimension that was missing from Machiavellian political and military analysis and to combine it with a skeptical approach to history that characterized Tacitus. Consequently, they reached a wider audience than Erasmus was able to do. Lipsius was widely read by military reformers, which led to more disciplined standing armies and constraints on war, but at the same time these military

reformers also strengthened the sovereign state, the chief activity of which was making war.

Machiavelli's secular and analytical approach to war and politics was much admired in early modern Europe, but many of those admirers were troubled over the Florentine's omission of the moral dimension and endeavored to supplement his political theory with the study of moral philosophy. Whereas Machiavelli and the classical republicans viewed war as the main function of the state and the best means of preserving republican liberty, the Neo-Stoics such as Lipsius as well as Grotius and Hobbes, were concerned to place constraints on how wars were fought and to incorporate the same in a body of international law, which would be based on natural law rather than divine law or theology. As the European world engaged Asia, Africa, and the New World, the laws of war necessarily concerned the whole human community and not just Christendom. It was assumed that the concept of natural law was comprehensible to non-Western peoples, since it was known to the pre-Christian peoples of classical antiquity.

None of these jurists, such as Gentili and Grotius, could imagine a world without war, but they certainly thought that some wars could be avoided by arbitration and that all wars could be rendered less destructive by the observance of international law and the rules of war. The reason that most jurists and philosophers could not imagine the total abolition of war was that war was accepted as a legitimate means by which a sovereign ruler dispensed justice. Gentili was one of the first jurists to insist on the distinction between public and private war. The former could only be declared by one sovereign ruler against another sovereign by formal declaration, and hostilities could not begin until a waiting period allowed an opportunity for arbitration. Public war could only be fought with customary weapons, and every effort should be made to spare the persons and property of noncombatants. Since securing peace was the object of war, the terms of the peace treaty should treat the vanquished in a just manner that would facilitate a lasting peace.

Grotius was but one of a number of jurists who contributed to the body of international law that established constraints on the conduct of war. Most of these derived from practices that had been embodied in articles of war and codes of military justice that emerged as more disciplined standing armies came into being in the early seventeenth century in Sweden, the Dutch Republic

and the Spanish Army of Flanders, and thereafter, these practices spread through the military forces of mainland Europe and the British Isles. These constraints on how wars were fought also owed something to the medieval code of chivalry and the teachings of the medieval Catholic Church. Despite his aversion to war, Grotius reminds his readers that it is a condition that persists through much of history. Rightly used, it can secure periods of peace, but only the sovereign state has the right to declare and prosecute wars. This is public war, and one of the political community's functions is to suppress private war by securing a monopoly on violence. War is a necessary function of a well governed commonwealth because, as ancient authors insisted, the rule of law cannot be maintained without sanctions. This principle not only applies to domestic matters, but also needs to be extended into the international sphere. Such sanctions depend on the continuing use of war justly declared. Grotius used these arguments to justify the Dutch war of independence from Spain and the right of trading companies such as the Dutch East India Company to assume sovereign rights and to pursue a war of trade and commercial expansion against the Portuguese and Spanish. Thus, much as Grotius abhorred war and soldiers, he helped to provide a framework, based on international law, for its continuance—albeit subject to constraints on its conduct.

If Gentili and Grotius had been careful to insist on a distinction between public and private war, the English classical republicans, such as Milton, Harrington, Sidney, and Locke, effectively eliminated that distinction and furnished arguments and justifications for rebellions against monarchs and the pursuit of civil war. Sidney thought that republican governments preserved domestic peace better than monarchical governments. Thomas Hobbes would have been horrified by this line of reasoning, and more than any other thinker of his age, he worked to develop a science of peace. In addition to the study of history and natural law, Hobbes emphasized the need for people to study moral philosophy to discover and acknowledge their responsibilities for avoiding both civil strife and interstate war. Based on his close study of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Hobbes thought that the causes of interstate wars could be comprehended under the headings of dynastic ambitions and rivalries, differing religious opinions, and the rhetorical excesses of individual politicians. Whereas other thinkers of the Age of Reason were coming to insist that religious toleration could avoid the contention that led to

religious wars, Hobbes could not imagine a stable civil society without an Erastian state church. The main function of an established church was to teach obedience to the sovereign.

Hobbes was a careful student of Greek and Roman classics, but in his attempt to construct a science of politics, he came to reject the authority of classical authors such as Aristotle. Influenced by the Scientific Revolution, he preferred the empirical approach to knowledge over the theoretical method of the Aristoteleans, and he believed that the accumulation of and study of historical examples allowed one to acquire the moral and political wisdom that would enable one to construct a science of politics that was compatible with moral philosophy. This reflected the rationalism and scientific method of inquiry of his age, and a rejection of custom and tradition, which Hobbes maintained had led to political instability in the city-states of the ancient world. From his study of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Hobbes learned to distrust the false eloquence of politicians—devoid as it was of wisdom—which along with ambition and the pursuit of honor as well as greed, was so often the occasion of war. Thucydides also brought out the pessimistic side of Hobbes's nature, while his acquaintance with the classical republicans and the parliamentary demagogues of the war party in precivil war England led him to distrust aristocratic and democratic participation in government, and to put his trust in monarchical absolutism. Although Hobbes posited that in a state of nature there would have existed a continuously threatening climate of war, he also thought that it was a basic law of nature to work for peace, and refused to believe that war was inevitable, as Thucydides had maintained. Unfortunately, Hobbes could not reconcile this with political liberty and the parliamentary system of representation and an aristocratic and democratic voice in law-making. If the sovereign state was to preserve peace, all power must be vested in the king alone and Parliament's role could only be advisory. Any liberties and rights possessed by the subject would derive from or depend on the absolute sovereign.

The jurists and political philosophers who followed Grotius and Hobbes refined some of the ideas of these two very influential thinkers. Kant was able to imagine a world free of war—or at least, the world that he inhabited. He accepted Hobbes's argument that the natural state of man was undeclared war, but he thought that a state of peace could be established if two or more states characterized by civil societies agreed to submit to arbitration by an international

tribunal staffed by competent jurists, but he did not envision them abandoning their sovereign rights and powers. A key idea that Kant put forward was that commerce within political societies and trade among states promoted civil societies characterized by the rule of law, where laws were made by a representative body separate from but working with a sovereign ruler. The best chance to secure international amity would occur when sovereign states with similar civil societies and political constitutions banded together to form a "league of nations." However, Kant could not imagine such an international body extending beyond Europe.

Adam Ferguson thought that the concept of a civil society represented a significant break with classical antiquity because it rejected the methods of war and the martial ethos of the ancient world. The spread of commerce undercut aristocratic attachment to the martial ethos and led to better disciplined armies led by professional officer corps rather than amateur gallants, and also brought constraints on the conduct of war. He attached importance to Kant's belief that civil societies were associated with the rule of law and representative institutions, but he also feared that too much democracy could destroy a nicely balanced regime. Adam Smith thought that religious toleration was also an important characteristic of a civil society and rose from a multiplicity of religious sects in which none could dominate. Yet, both Ferguson and Smith recognized that the spread of commercial culture brought risks. Prosperity invited the envy of powerful neighbors, and commerce often promoted colonial expansion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Citizens in a commercial society were more interested in their private affairs and less concerned with their duties as citizens. Such societies were usually defended by mercenaries or standing armies composed of long-service soldiers, and the commonwealth was vulnerable to political interference by these permanent military forces unless their loyalty to the regime was somehow guaranteed. Kant was also able to see that countries with a well funded public debt were able to carry on wars of aggression and expansion without interruption, and he continued to favor citizen militias over standing armies as a means of defense. Thus, countries with abundant resources, permanent public debts, and standing armies remained a major obstacle to perpetual peace. Political societies with large standing armies and navies were rarely at peace for long.

Appendix

Changing meanings of the “sinews of war”

According to the Roman military writer Vegetius, the term *nervi belli pecunia*, “money, the sinews of war,” was used figuratively by Cicero, and was derived from *nervi*, or animal sinews or tendons, which were employed to make ropes or cables used in constructing catapults, mangonels and other torsion-engines necessary for mounting sieges and defending towns and fortified places against the same. Horsehair and even women’s hair could also be used for making ropes that were especially strong. Vegetius said that in preparing for sieges, cities needed to have a good store of animal tendons.¹

The idea that money is indispensable for war dates back to Thucydides, who said: “War is not so much a matter of armaments as of money which makes armaments effective: particularly is this true in a war fought between a land power and a sea power. So let us first of all see to our finances and, until we have done so, avoid being swept away by the speeches from our allies.”²

Quintus Curtius Rufus, the Roman biographer of Alexander the Great, also maintained that money was the sinews of war.³ Curtius had drawn that conclusion after describing a battle that Antipater the Macedonian chose to fight with the king of Sparta because he had no money to pay his soldiers and feared that they would desert if he did not immediately join battle.

Machiavelli cited many examples of kings and republics with ample financial resources which nevertheless lost wars. Machiavelli insisted that “Gold is not the sinews of war, but good soldiers are. Gold is necessary, but of secondary importance, and good soldiers can get it for themselves [presumably by plunder]. . . .”⁴ Elsewhere, he says: “Men, iron, money and bread be the strength of war, but of these four the first two be most necessary, because men and iron find bread and money, but bread and money find not men and iron”; and “The armour on the backs of citizens or subjects, given by the disposition of order

and law, did never harm, but rather always it doth good and maintaineth the city much longer in surety through the help of this armour than without.”⁵

Giovanni Botero agreed with Machiavelli about the importance of valor, but he also pointed out that valor had to be learned and was not inherent: “Discipline is the nerve of an army. By discipline I mean the art of making a good soldier, and I define a good soldier as one who obeys valiantly. Roman soldiers had to take an oath to their captains to obey to the best of their ability. The first necessity in enforcing discipline is to keep soldiers from whatever fosters corruption and luxury.”⁶ Francesco Guicciardini believed that wars will always be expensive, and attempts at false economy will only hinder the prosecution of the war.

Those who try to be tightfisted while waging war always end by spending more. For nothing requires a more boundless effusion of money than war. The greater the provisions, the quicker the undertaking will be ended. Failure to make such provisions, just to save money, will make the enterprise take longer and, what is more, will result in incomparably greater cost. Accordingly, nothing is more pernicious than waging war by disbursing monies desultorily and without large amounts of cash at hand. For that is not the way to finish a war but to nourish it.⁷

The belief that valiant soldiers constituted the sinews of war became a kind of litmus test among Machiavelli’s disciples in England and the Atlantic world, whom we call classical republicans, such as Robert Devereux, second Earl of Essex, Sir Walter Raleigh, and James Harrington. When Raleigh addressed the question asked by Livy, whether Alexander the Great could have conquered the Romans, he put the question aside by insisting that the Englishman was the best warrior because of his valor (rather than any superiority of weapons, such as the long bow). Despite the fact that most English soldiers of his time were impressed men rather than professionals and were not as well trained as Roman soldiers, Raleigh still thought that they were superior.⁸ Although James Harrington recognized that the Dutch Republic’s war-making capacity rested on trade, he believed that England, being at that time primarily an agrarian society, must depend on citizens and freeholder cultivators of the land for its soldiers. Harrington said that Roman historians recorded that Rome had relied on citizens for its army, and paid for its military operations by conquest, booty, and expansion. Before the rise of the modern military-fiscal state, most armies

were expected to live off of the land when away from their home base. In any case, citizens who were not willing to defend themselves invariably surrendered their political power.⁹

Barnabe Rich accepted Machiavelli's dictum about valor. However, he was also familiar with the Low Countries wars, and knew how much treasure they consumed. He had a most interesting solution for raising money for paying soldiers and other costs incident on keeping an army standing:

Let us fetch our example from the people of the Low Countries, who being generally given to drunkenness, hath an excise imposed both of beer and wine that it well sufficeth to pay all their soldiers during the time of the civil wars.

Now our people of England being generally given to inordinate lawing, if the like imposition might be raised for every writ they should fetch forth, and for every sentence in law that should be pronounced with them both, or against them, no doubt it would maintain a great many soldiers.¹⁰

Justus Lipsius recognized that, in order to make war successfully, a ruler needed good advice, soldiers, weapons, provisions, and supplies, but he could have none of these without money. Thus, fundamentally, money is the sinews of war, because without funding one cannot have the necessities of war. Valor was a quality he mentioned only as an afterthought. Reflecting his knowledge of war as conducted in the Dutch Republic under Maurice of Nassau, a plentiful supply of money was needed to keep an army standing and always ready to engage the enemy. Lipsius also remembered that the Romans maintained magazines well stocked with provisions in anticipation of war. Understanding the distinct advantage that the Dutch had over their Spanish enemies, he also emphasized the importance of maritime commerce and convenient ports for supplying money and mariners for fighting wars both on the sea and the land.¹¹

One could count on Hobbes to succinctly put this whole discussion into perspective, and also to supply the missing moral dimension:

Two things are necessary for the citizens to prosper: *hard work* and *thrift*; a third contributing factor is the *natural* produce of earth and water; and there is also a fourth, *military activity*, which sometimes increases citizens' wealth but more often erodes it. For a commonwealth set on an island in the sea, with only just enough room for habitation, can grow rich by trade and manufacture alone, without sowing and without fishing; but there is no

doubt that if they have territory, the same number can be richer or a larger number can be equally well off. The fourth factor, *military activity*, was once regarded as a gainful occupation under the name of *piracy* or *raiding*. And before the formation of commonwealths, when the human family lived dispersed in families, it was considered just and honourable. For raiding is simply making war with small forces. And great commonwealths, particularly *Rome* and *Athens*, at certain times so enlarged their country from the spoils of war, foreign tribute and the acquisition of territory by arms, that they did not impose taxes on poorer citizens; in fact they actually distributed money and land to individuals. But we should not take enrichment by these means into our calculations. For as a means of gain, military activity is like gambling; in most cases it reduces a person's property; very few succeed.¹²

By the end of the seventeenth century, the controversy concerning whether valiant soldiers or treasure constituted the sinews of war had been laid to rest. Charles Davenant, the political economist and proponent of mercantilism, summed it up thus:

For war is quite changed from what it was in the time of our forefathers; when in a hasty expedition and a pitched field, the matter was decided by courage; but now the whole art of war is in a manner reduced to money; for nowadays that prince who can best find money to feed, clothe and pay his army, not he that has the most valiant troops, is surest of success and conquest.¹³

Glossary

Ares see under Athena.

Arianism widespread early Christian heresy condemned by the Council of Nicea, which taught that Jesus and the Holy Ghost were not co-equal members of the Trinity, but were created by the Father.

Athena: patron of Athens and goddess of wisdom, and the strategic and disciplined side of war, in contrast to her brother Ares, the personification of bloodlust, violence, and the rawer side of war.

Bedouins nomadic desert-dwelling Arabs who lived in tribal societies.

Beguines lay women in the Low Countries who sought to live a religious life without taking vows; many devoted themselves to charitable endeavors. Some became associated with the Third Order of St. Francis, while others became flagellants. Many lived by begging, and some were suspected of heresy.

Cathars also known as Albigensians. Adherents of a heretical sect in Languedoc who allegedly believed in dual deities. The first was an evil deity that had created the physical world, and a second, that represented love and peace and who was purely spiritual. They worshiped only the second god.

Dar al-harb in Islamic terminology: territory of war; inhabited by unbelievers.

Dar el-Islam territory of Islam.

Dervishes Sufi Muslims who pursue an ascetic life.

Donatism doctrines of early Christian heretics who argued that the true church included only those saints who could withstand persecution and excluded relapsed sinners.

Eirene one of the *horae* or Greek goddesses who controlled orderly life; she was the personification of peace.

Equestrian order hereditary aristocratic order in ancient Rome, ranking below patricians; it furnished the mounted troops of the Roman army legions.

Erastianism a political theory that teaches that the secular authority of the sovereign state possesses a superior power over the church in ecclesiastical matters. Wrongly attributed to the Swiss Zwinglian theologian Thomas Erastus; more properly associated with the English divine Richard Hooker. Erastianism was also advocated by Thomas Hobbes.

Fortuna Roman goddess of fate and fortune; her influence could bring good fortune or chaos and disaster. Often involved in hopes of bringing victory in war. For Christians to speak of Fortuna could be construed as a denial of Divine Providence.

Fronde the Fronde consisted of a series of two revolts in France between 1648 and 1653.

The first was led by the Parlement of Paris and consisted largely of legal resistance to increased taxes imposed by the royal government to pay for the continuing war with Spain. The Second Fronde was led by a discontented group of nobles that was trying to stem the tide of royal absolutism, and offered armed resistance to the royal army.

Gownsmen a pen-gentleman; members of court and council whose access to power and influence was gained through scholarly pursuits and legal or fiscal expertise rather than military pursuits. Loosely analogous to the French robe nobility.

Huguenot theory of resistance based on the concept of an elective monarchy and a covenant between God, the king, and the subjects of the king. French Protestant political theorists claimed the right of lesser magistrates to depose and even kill a tyrannical monarch. This assumption was used to justify Huguenot resistance to the king of France in the civil and religious wars following the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre of 1572, and subsequently, influenced arguments for just wars and parliamentary and democratic revolutions.

Investiture Controversy eleventh-century conflict between Pope Gregory VII and the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV concerning appointments of bishops and abbots, who often served as royal officials while holding ecclesiastical benefices.

Jansenism a puritanical movement within the Catholic Church in France and the Low Countries in the seventeenth century, which was based on a close examination of the writings of St. Augustine of Hippo, undertaken by a Flemish prelate, Cornelius Jansen, Bishop of Ypres. Aimed at countering the influence of the Jesuits, it questioned the doctrine of free will and was hostile to royal absolutism in France. Jansenism was condemned by the Papacy in 1653.

Jihād holy war; the normal state of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Jizya poll tax paid to Islamic authorities by unbelievers.

Manicheism a set of religious beliefs widespread in the ancient Near East and Asia that were characterized by belief in a struggle between good and evil. Considered to be a threat to Christianity and other religions, it was widely persecuted.

Maurice, Emperor (Flavius Mauricius Tiberius Augustus (539–602 CE)) Byzantine ruler and successful military commander in wars against the Persians and probable author of the *Strategikon*, a sophisticated military treatise.

Montanism second-century Christian movement, regarded as heretical, which claimed to be possessed of a new divine revelation replacing the apostolic version and which questioned the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity.

Military garden or yard; artillery ground; a training and parade ground for an artillery or municipal militia company; imitative of the Roman *campus martius*. The term artillery in seventeenth-century usage referred to hand-fired missile weapons such as bows and arrows.

- Odysseus** Greek king of Ithaca in Homer's *The Odyssey*.
- Penitents** members of lay confraternities who dressed in robes similar to religious orders of monks and friars, and who performed various charitable works. Following the Black Death, some of them practiced self-flagellation.
- Perseus** mythical Greek warrior and hero who slew Medusa, the only mortal member of the Gorgons; supposed founder of Mycenae.
- Recusants** Catholics who refused to attend the services of the Church of England in obedience to the Recusancy Statutes of 1559. From the Latin *recusare*, to refuse.
- Saracen** a word used by the Greeks and Romans to describe the inhabitants of the deserts of Arabia and Syria. During the Crusades, the term was applied not only to Arabs, but also to any Muslim.
- Satrap** the governor of one of the satrapies, or provinces, of the Persian Empire, or later, the Hellenistic Empire following Alexander's conquest of the former.
- Saturn** Roman god of agriculture and civilization; father of Neptune.
- School of Salamanca** a group of theologians led by Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez who studied natural law and morality to reconcile the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas with the existence of the early modern state.
- Scipio Aemelianus** Scipio the Younger (185–129 BC); Roman consul and commander, who led the siege of Carthage in 146 BC.
- Sibyls** wise women of antiquity who dwelt in temples, shrines, caves, and sacred groves; were thought to be possessed of the gift of prophecy.
- Swordsman** a military man; members of aristocratic families who believed that honor needed to be validated on the battlefield in every generation, and could not be acquired at court. Roughly analogous, but not equivalent, to the French *noblesse d'épée*.
- Vassus**, pl. *vassi* Warrior companions who owed fealty and military service to their lords in the era of feudalism. Preferred to the more recent term vassal.
- Waldensians** twelfth-century sect founded by Peter Waldo, a merchant of Lyons, who practiced poverty and claimed the right to preach the gospel without the approbation of the clergy. Declared heretical by the Catholic Church.
- Zeus** ancient Greek king of the gods.

Notes

Introduction

- 1 Michael Howard, *The Causes of War and Other Essays* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 11–12; Azar Gat, *War in Human Civilization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 663.
- 2 Howard, *Causes of Wars*, 13; Ian Clark, *Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 4–5, 12.
- 3 Richard A. Gabriel, *The Culture of War: Invention and Early Development* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 128.
- 4 See, for example, Melvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Conflicts, 1816–1980* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982).
- 5 Richardson also included a seventh category—domestic homicides—which I have omitted.
- 6 Lewis F. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*, ed. Quincy Wright and C.C. Lienau (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1960), 32–111; Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined* (New York: Viking, 2011), 200–222. John Gittings, *The Glorious Art of Peace from The Iliad to Iraq* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 20–24, argues that there were more numerous and more extended periods of peace, but his argument would be more convincing if he furnished quantitative evidence.
- 7 Jonathan Scott, “The Law of War: Grotius, Sidney, Locke and the Political Theory of Rebellion,” *History of Political Thought* 13, no. 4 (1992), 566–67; Paola Pugliatti, *Shakespeare and the Just War Tradition* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), 103; Fernand Braudel *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Siân Reynolds, 2 vols. (2nd ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1966), ii: 836.
- 8 Edwin M. Duval, *The Design of Rabelais’s Tiers Livre de Pantagruel* (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1999), 19–20. Lucian wrote in Greek. Rabelais was citing the Latin edition of Lucian’s works by Jakob Moltzer *alias* Jacob Mycllus, *Luciani Samosatensis Opera* (Frankfurt, 1538). See also *Ben Jonson and the Lucianic Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 82.
- 9 Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. i: *A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 73–120, 130–31. Peter Brecke, in his online “Conflict Catalog” (Violent Conflicts, 1400 A.D.

- to the Present in Different Regions of the World [Centre for Global Economic History, Utrecht University]) enumerates 3709 international and civil conflicts between 1400 and 2000.
- 10 Michael Howard, *War in European History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), 36–37.
 - 11 Roger B. Manning, *Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1–2 and 2*n*.
 - 12 Evan Luard, *War and International Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 24–25, 35; Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), tables 31–34 (pp. I: 641–43); Roger B. Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army, 1585–1702* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chs. 2–3.
 - 13 Micheal Clodfelter, *War and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1494–2007* (3rd ed.; Jefferson, NC: MacFarland, 2008), 7–69.
 - 14 Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History* (New York: Knopf, 2002), 19–23.
 - 15 Michael Mann, *States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 129–30; Harry Holbert Turney-High, *Primitive War: Its Practice and Concepts*, (2nd ed.; Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1971), 166–67; Gabriel, *Culture of War*, 25.
 - 16 Gat, *War in Human Civilization*, 663–65; Bradley A. Thayer, *Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004), 267–68; Mann, *States, War and Capitalism*, 129–30; id., *Sources of Social Power*, i.48; Lawrence H. Keeley, *War before Civilization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 4–5; Pinker, *Better Angels of Our Nature*, 55–56.
- René Girard, on the other hand, does not believe that primitive societies are more prone to violence than “civilized societies,” nor does he believe that war is more characteristic of one society than another. Primitive societies try to subdue violence by ritualizing it and making it part of their religion by offering sacrifices (René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, trans. Patrick Gregory [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977], 19–20, 249).
- Steven Pinker continues to argue that humankind is born with a disposition to violence, which is bred out of infants by the process of socialization (*Better Angels of Our Nature*, 482–88; id., *The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature* [New York: Viking, 2002]).
- 17 *Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science*, trans. N.P. Milner (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), bk. iv, Preface (p. 113); Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World*, ii: 37.

- 18 Robert Muchembled, *A History of Violence from the Middle Ages to the Present*, trans. Jean Birrell (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 8; Pinker, *Better Angels of Our Nature*, 49, 53 (Tables 2.2 and 2.3); Keeley, *War before Civilization*, 33.
- 19 Gat, *War in Human Civilization*, 665; Wright, *A Study of War*, i: 162–63; Muchembled, *History of Violence*, 162–63; Jonathan Fletcher, *Violence and Civilization: An Introduction to the Work of Norbert Elias* (Cambridge: Polity, 1997), 32.

In the early modern period of history, Charles Tilly, with some slight degree of exaggeration, compares the formation of states and the attempt to secure a monopoly on violence to government-operated protection rackets (Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169, 171.

- 20 *The Laws of Plato*, trans. and ed. Thomas L. Prangle (New York: Basic Books, 1980), VII: 823b–824a (pp. 215–17); François Rabelais, *The Histories of Gargantua and Pantagruel*, trans. and ed. J.M. Cohen (Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1978), bk. V, ch. 14 (p. 632); Alberico Gentili, *De Jure Belli Libri Tres*, vol. 2: The Translation of the Edition of 1612, trans. John C. Rolfe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 94–95.

The actual cause of the war, according to Virgil, arose from the disputed betrothal of Lavinia, daughter of the king of the Latins, whom some had wished to see married to Turnus, king of the Rutuli, a neighboring people in Italy (Virgil, *The Aeneid*, trans. John Dryden [Harvard Classics, no. 13; New York: Bartleby, 2001] [online]), bk. VII, lines 673–776.

- 21 Plato, *The Laws I and VII*, trans. A.E. Taylor, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Bollingen Ser., LXXXI; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 823b–d (p. 1393); Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), I. ii.1420 (pp. 23–29), I. iii.7–8 (p. 37); *Peace and War in Antiquity*, comp. Augustus FitzGerald (London: Scholartis Press, 1931), 29, 94.
- 22 Xenophon, *On Hunting [Cynegeticus]*, trans. A.A. Phillips and W.W. Willcock (Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1999), 12.1–18 (pp. 81–85); id., *Cyropaedia*, trans. Walter Miller, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), I. ii. 9–11 (pp. 17–19), VIII. i. 34–39 (pp. 321–23). See also *The Laws of Plato*, ed. Pangle, V. 763 (pp. 149–50), VII. 823–4 (pp. 215–17); Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De Officiis*, trans. Walter Miller (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), I. xxix (p. 104).
- 23 [Flavius Mauricius Tiberius Augustus,] *Maurice’s Strategikon: A Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy*, trans. George T. Dennis (Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 165; Oliver Lyman Spaulding, *Pen and Sword in Greece and Rome* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1937), 146.

Martin van Creveld notes that many commentators from Plato to Machiavelli and beyond have viewed hunting as the oldest of all sports and a preparation for war. However, Creveld rejects the idea that hunting can be regarded as a wargame in the modern meaning because it was distinguished from war in the sense that it is “an interspecies activity and not an intraspecies one” (*Wargames: From Gladiators to Gigabytes* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013], 9–10).

24 Fletcher, *Violence and Civilization*, 110; Bernard Chapais, *Primeval Kinship: How Pair-Bonding Gave Birth to Human Society* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 117, 232–34; Matt Cartmill, *A View to a Death in the Morning: Hunting and Nature through History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 9–14, 16–26.

25 Keeley, *War before Civilization*, 21–23, 27–28.

Douglas P. Fry challenges the assumption that humans are culturally or instinctively warlike, and examines numerous cases of hunter-gatherer as well as less primitive societies to demonstrate that many such groups have developed methods of conflict resolution that avoid warfare (*The Human Potential for Peace: An Anthropological Challenge to Assumptions about War and Violence* [New York: Oxford University Press, 2006; id., *Beyond War: The Human Potential for Peace* [New York: Oxford University Press, 2007]).

26 Victor Davis Hanson, *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power* (New York: Doubleday, 2001), 5–23.

27 Gat, *War in Human Civilization*, 419–20; Perry Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism* (London: NLB, 1974), 83–84.

28 Clodfelter, *War and Armed Conflicts*, 4–5; Philip Benedict, “Civil War and Natural Disaster in Northern France,” *The European Crisis of the 1590s: Essays in Comparative History*, ed. Peter Clark (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985), 96, 100.

29 Gat, *War in Human Civilization*, 435; David Martin, *Does Christianity Cause War?* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 113; Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience* (London: Temple Smith, 1978), 13.

30 Cicero, *Phillipics*, ed. and trans. D.R. Shackleton Bailey (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), vii. 19 (p. 207); *Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science*, trans. Milner, 62; John of Salisbury, *Policratus: The Statesman’s Book*, ed. Murray K. Markland (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1979), vi. 20 (p. 90); *D.N.B.*, sub John of Salisbury (d. 1180); William Penn, *An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe* (1693–94), rpr. in *Peace Projects of the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Garland, 1972), 3.

- 31 See, for example, William, Cardinal Allen's polemic in *The Execution of Justice in England*, by Sir William Cecil, and *A True, Sincere and Modest Defense of English Catholics*, by William Allen, ed. Robert M. Kingdom (Folger Documents in Tudor and Stuart Civilizations; Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965), 160.

1 The Legacy of Classical Antiquity

- 1 Pertaining to Quirinus, the Roman deification of Romulus, founder of the city of Rome, son of Mars, and like his father, a war god.
- 2 Pertaining to a stone that was especially resistant to fire.
- 3 A later version of the Temple of Janus was located in the Campus Martius, close to the *Ara Martis*, or Altar of Mars.
- 4 John Bridge, "Janus Custos Belli," *The Classical Journal* 23.8 (1928), 610–14; Philip de Souza, "Parta victoriis pax: Roman Emperors as Peacemakers," in *War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval History*, ed. Philip de Souza and John France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 80; Jeri Blair DeBrohun, "The Gates of War (and Peace): Roman Literary Perspectives," in *War and Peace in the Ancient World*, ed. Kurt A. Raaflaub (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 256–58; Paul E.J. Kershaw, *Peaceful Kings: Peace, Power, and the Early Medieval Political Imagination* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 44–45. The ritual of opening and closing the gates of the Temple of Janus originated following the Roman victory in the first Punic War.
- 5 Joycelyne G. Russell, *Peacemaking in the Renaissance* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 9; John Gittings, *The Glorious Art of Peace: From The Iliad to Iraq* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 15–16.
- 6 Giambattista Vico, *The First New Science*, trans. and ed. Leon Pampa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 108–9; J.E. Lendon, *Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 24–25; *The Illiad of Homer*, trans. Richard Lattimore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 1. 206–14 (p. 64); Martin van Creveld, *Wargames: From Gladiators to Gigabytes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 15–17.
- 7 Vico, *The First New Science*, 204–5; Simon Hornblower, "Warfare in Ancient Literature: The Paradox of War," *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare*, ed. Philip Sabin and Hans van Wees, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 40, 50; Jean Bodin, *Method for an Easy Comprehension of History*, trans. Beatrice Reynolds (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945; rpr. 1966), 41–42, 55.

- 8 Hornblower, “Warfare in Ancient Literature,” 22–23, 26–27, 40, 50.
- 9 Robert Knapp, *Invisible Romans* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 33–42, gives a vivid picture of the violence and lawlessness that ordinary and poor Romans faced on a daily basis.
- 10 Hans van Wees, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities* (London: Duckworth, 2004), 3–4; Adam Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (4th ed.; London: T. Caddel, 1773; rpr. London: Gregg, 1969), 33; Brian Campbell, *War and Society in Imperial Rome, 91 BC–AD 284* (London: Routledge, 2002), 45; Ian Clark, *Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 19–20; Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (New York: Penguin, rev. ed., 1972), vii. 29–30 (pp. 495–96); Brian Bosworth, “Massacre in the Peloponnesian War,” *Theatres of Violence: Massacre, Mass Killing and Atrocity throughout History*, ed. Philip G. Dwyer and Lyndall Ryan (New York: Berghahn, 2012), 17–26.
- 11 Christopher Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers: Reflections on the Nature of War from Heraclitus to Heisenberg* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 13–18, 22–23.
- 12 Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), i: 162–63.
- 13 Arnaldo Momigliano, “Some Observations on the Causes of War in Ancient Historiography,” in *Studies in Historiography* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), 120; *The Iliad of Homer*, trans. Lattimore, 1.1–192 (pp. 59–64); Louis Rawlings, *The Ancient Greeks at War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 4–8; Doynce Dawson, *The Origins of Western Warfare* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 52–53; Clark, *Waging War*, 20; *The Landmark Herodotus: The Histories*, trans. A.L. Purvis, ed. R.B. Strassler (New York: Pantheon, 2007), 1.154–57 (pp. 83–84), 2.167 (p. 197).
- 14 W. Kendrick Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, Part III: *Religion* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 1–10; *Landmark Herodotus*, trans. Purvis, ed. Strassler, 9.61–62 (p. 479); also *ibid.*, Cartledge, “The Spartan State in War and Peace,” p. 734.
- 15 *Homeric Hymns*, in *Works of Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns*, trans. and ed. Daryl Hine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), lines 1–5 (p. 173).
- 16 *Iliad of Homer*, trans. Lattimore, 5.889ff (p. 152); Hans van Wees, “War and Peace in Ancient Greece,” in *War, Peace and World Orders in European History* ed. Anja V. Hartmann and Beatrice Heuser (London: Routledge, 2001), 33–47 (at 39).
- 17 Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War: The Complete Hobbes Translation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), V. 105 (p. 368). See also I. 76 (p. 440).
- 18 Dawson, *Origins of Western Warfare*, 16.

- 19 This is sometimes rendered as “self-defense.”
- 20 Richard A. Gabriel, *The Culture of War: Invention and Early Development* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 85.
- 21 Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, 37–42.
- 22 Gabriel, *Culture of War*, 85.
- 23 Antonio Santosuosso, *Soldiers, Citizens and the Symbols of War: From Classical Greece to Republican Rome, 500–167 B.C.* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 8.
- 24 Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), II. iv. 9–12 (pp. 117–19); Thucydides, *History*, trans. Warner, IV.59 (p. 299); van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, 34–36.
- 25 Anthony Pagden, *Worlds at War: The 2,500-Year Struggle between East and West* (New York: Random House, 2008), 41–46; Thucydides, *History*, trans. Warner, I. 76 (p. 80).
- 26 Wallace E. Caldwell, *Hellenic Conceptions of Peace* (New York, 1919; rpr. New York: AMS Press, 1967), 108–39; *The Laws I and VII*, trans. A.E. Taylor, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Bollingen Ser., LXXI; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 625d, 626d (p. 1227), 829a–c (p. 1395), 830a–e (p. 1396).
- 27 Gabriel, *Culture of War*, 100; Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. i: *A History of Power from the Beginnings to A.D. 1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 202; Thucydides, *History*, trans. Warner, V.26 (pp. 363–64).
- 28 John France, *Perilous Glory: The Rise of Western Military Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 42–43, 60; John A. Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2003), 10–11; David M. Pritchard, “The Symbiosis between Democracy and War: the Case of Ancient Athens,” *War, Democracy and Culture in Classical Athens*, ed. D.M. Pritchard (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2009), 5–8; *The Laws of Plato*, trans. and ed. Thomas L. Pangle (New York: Basic Books, 1980), bk. VI, p. 167 (778d–779b); Josiah Ober, “Classical Greek Times,” *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World*, ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Schulman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 18–23.
- 29 Peter R. Pouncey, *The Necessities of War: A Study of Thucydides’ Pessimism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 10–12, 160, n. 3.
- 30 Wallace E. Caldwell, *Hellenic Conceptions of Peace* (New York: rpr. AMS, 1967), 100–101; R. Sealey, “Thucydides, Herodotos, and the Causes of War,” *Classical Quarterly*, new ser., 7 (1957): 8–11; Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Warner, I. 23 (p. 49). See also Rawlings, *Ancient Greeks at War*, 12–13.

- 31 Arthur M. Eckstein, *Moral Vision in The Histories of Polybius* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 13–14, 56–57, 60, 63, 66–70; Kenneth Sacks, *Polybius on the Writing of History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 189.
- 32 Eckstein, *Moral Vision*, 195–234.
- 33 Leon Harold Craig, *The War Lover: A Study of Plato's Republic* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 14–18.
- 34 Lendon, *Soldiers and Ghosts*, 41–42; Craig, *War Lover*, 7–11.
- 35 Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, i: 199–202, 228. For a detailed account of an army of Greek mercenaries in Persia, cf. Xenophon, *The Persian Expedition [Anabasis]*, trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, rpr. 1972).
- 36 Craig, *War Lover*, 41–42.
- 37 John C. Dayton, *The Athletes of War: An Evaluation of the Agonistic Elements in Greek Warfare* (Toronto: Edgar Kent, 2006), 1–5, 60–68, 167–69; van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, 116–17, 131–52; Rawlings, *Ancient Greeks at War*, 134–35; Lendon, *Soldiers and Ghosts*, 88–89, 91–96.
- 38 J. Ober, “The Rules of War in Classical Greece,” *The Athenian Revolution*, ed. J. Ober (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 53–71.
- 39 Gabriel, *Culture of War*, 95–9; Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, i. 202–4.
- 40 Donald W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Persian Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1–3, 9–10, 12–13, 22–25.
- 41 Gabriel, *Culture of War*, 83, 86–87.
- 42 Aeschylus, *Persians*, ed. and trans. Alan H. Sommerstein (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 239–40 (vol. I, p. 41); Santosuosso, *Soldiers, Citizens and the Symbols of War*, 5–6; Pagden, *Worlds at War*, 41–4. Herodotus is more restrained and indirect in his criticism of the Persians than Aeschylus. See, for example, *The History of Herodotus*, trans. George Rawlinson, ed. E.H. Blakeney, 2 vols. (London: Dent, 1940), iii. 80–89 (vol. I: pp. 250–55).
- 43 William H. MacNeill, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community* (New York: Mentor, 1965), 305.
- 44 Pagden, *Worlds at War*, 47–49; Gerardo Zampaglione, *The Idea of Peace in Antiquity*, trans. Richard Dunn (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 109–10.
- 45 Pagden, *Worlds at War*, 49–57; A.B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 229–35; Simon Hornblower, “Greeks and Persians: West against East,” ed. Hartman and Heuser, *War, Peace and World Orders in European History*, 48–61 (at 49–50).
- 46 Pagden, *Worlds at War*, 49–57, 59–60.
- 47 Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 245–49.

- 48 John Maxwell O'Brien, *Alexander the Great: The Invisible Enemy: A Biography* (London: Routledge, 1992), 113, 142–43; Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 147, 193, 199–200, 278–90.
- 49 Pagden, *Worlds at War*, 61–63.
- 50 Zampaglione, *Idea of Peace in Antiquity*, 18–22; Oliver Taplin, “The Shield of Achilles and the ‘Iliad,’” *Greece & Rome*, 2nd ser., 21.1 (1980): 1–21 (at 15).
- 51 *Laws of Plato*, trans. Pangle, bk. III, pp. 60–63, 677e–680c, p. 425.
- 52 Henrik Syse, “Plato: The Necessity of War, the Quest for Peace,” *Journal of Military Ethics* 1. No. 1 (2002), 36–44; *Laws of Plato*, bk. I, p. 7, 628c–e; Iain McDaniel, *Adam Ferguson in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Roman Past and Europe’s Future* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 80–81.
- 53 Pindar, *The Odes and Selected Fragments*, trans. G.S. Conway, ed. Richard Stoneman (London: J.M. Dent, 1997), fragment 110 (p. 377). This, presumably, is the source of the Latin proverb *dulce bellum inexpertis*. Cf. also the speech by Hermocrates of Syracuse at the conference in 424 BCE attempting to mediate the war in Sicily (Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, trans. Warner, v. 59 (p. 299).
- 54 Zampaglione, *Idea of Peace in Antiquity*, 23; Harry Levin, *The Myth of the Golden Age in the Renaissance* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), 10, 14, 19–22; Robert P. Adams, *The Better Part of Valour: More, Erasmus, Colet and Vives on Humanism, War and Peace, 1496–1535* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962), 5–7; *Works and Days* in *Works of Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns*, trans. Daryl Hine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), lines 170–76, 187–90; Robert Nisbet, *History of the Idea of Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 14–15.
- 55 Levin, *Myth of the Golden Age*, 22–23; Arthur O. Lovejoy and George Boas, *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), 43–48, 232–33.
- 56 Zampaglione, *Idea of Peace in Antiquity*, 26–28, 108–9.
- 57 *Isocrates II*, ed. Terry L. Papillon, (“The Oratory of Classical Greece”; Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 136–66, esp. 8, 16, 44, 46, 64.
- 58 *Plutarch’s Lives*, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1959), ix. 385–89, 413–17; Azar Gat, *War in Human Civilization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 438–39.
- 59 Zampaglione, *Idea of Peace in Antiquity*, 112–14; *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, ed. Simon Hornblower and Anthony Spawforth (3rd ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), sub “Stoicism” (p. 1446); Pagden, *Worlds at War*, 119–20.
- 60 Zampaglione, *Idea of Peace in Antiquity*, 112–16, 147–48; Pagden, *Worlds at War*, 119–20; Lucretius [Titus Lucretius Carus], *De rerum natura*, trans. W.H.D. Rouse, ed. Martin Ferguson Smith (2nd rev. ed.; Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), bk. 1. 29–41 (p. 5).

- 61 Zampaglione, *Idea of Peace in Antiquity*, 117–18; Lucian of Samosat, *Lucian*, trans. K. Kilburne, 8 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959 rpr. ed.), vi: 5.
- 62 Zampaglione, *Idea of Peace in Antiquity*, 35; Charles H. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An Edition of the Fragments with Translation and Commentary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), LXXXI–LXXXIII (pp. 66–67).
- 63 Zampaglione, *Idea of Peace in Antiquity*, 164–65.
- 64 Arrian [Flavius Arrianus], *The Discourses of Epictetus*, trans. P.E. Matheson (New York: Heritage Press, 1968), bk. III, ch. 13 (pp. 166–67).
- 65 Dawson, *Origins of Western Warfare*, 111–12.
- 66 *Ibid.*, 111–14; C.M. Gilliver, *The Roman Art of War* (Stroud, Gloucs.: Tempus, 1999), 13.
- 67 Campbell, *War and Society in Imperial Rome*, 2–9, 25; de Souza, “*Parta victoriis pax*,” 76; Giambattista Vico, *The First New Science*, trans. and ed. Leon Pompa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 198.
- 68 William V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327–70 BC* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 105–9; Onasander, *The General*, in *Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander*, trans. The Illinois Greek Club (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), prooemium 7–6 (p. 371).
- 69 Zampaglione, *Idea of Peace in Antiquity*, 142.
- 70 Perry Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism* (London: NLB, 1974), 60–61, 67–68, 70; Vico, *First New Science*, 43, 112–13.
- 71 Virgil, *Georgics*, I. 461–514, in *Virgil’s Works*, ed. J.W. Mackail (New York: Modern Library, 1950), 306–8; L.P. Wilkinson, *The Georgics of Virgil: A Critical Survey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 22–23, 32–35.
- 72 Campbell, *War and Society in Imperial Rome*, 11–12.
- 73 Remus.
- 74 *Aeneid of Virgil*, trans. Bilson, vol. i, bk. I (lines 291–96); see also Zampaglione, *Idea of Peace in Antiquity*, 152.
- 75 Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. Hans-Friedrick Mueller (New York: Modern Library, 2003), vol. I, ch. 2 (On the Internal Prosperity of the Roman Empire in the Age of the Antonines) pp. 30–31.
- 76 Zampaglione, *Idea of Peace in Antiquity*, 134–35, 156; Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, i: 273–74.
- 77 Dawson, *Origins of Western Warfare*, 56, 114–15; Onasander, *The General*, IV. 1–4 (pp. 391–93); Cicero, *De officiis*, trans. Walter Miller (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), I. xi. 34–35 (p. 37); Roland H. Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960), 41.

- 78 The Romans maintained a distinction between *hostis* (“public enemy”) and *inimicus* (“private enemy”). Martin van Creveld, *The Culture of War* (New York: Ballantine, 2008), 131–33.
- 79 Cicero, *De officiis*, trans. Miller, I. xi. 34–35, II. viii, II. viii. 26–29; id., *Pro Sestio*, trans. R. Gardner (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), xlvi.98, lxxv. 137.
- 80 Cicero, “*Pro Milone* [Oration for Titus Annius Milo],” *The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero*, vol. iii, trans. C.D. Yonge (London: Bell & Sons, 1905), ch. iv. 201–6.
- 81 Dawson, *Origins of Western Warfare*, 113; Campbell, *War and Society in Imperial Rome*, 133–34.
- 82 Michael McCormick, *Eternal Victory: Triumphal Rulership in Late Antiquity, Byzantium, and the Early Medieval West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 3–5.
- 83 Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, trans. Warner, I.24 (p. 108).
- 84 Cicero, *Philippics*, ed. and trans. D.R. Shackleton Bailey (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), vii. 19 (p. 207).
- 85 Polybius, *The Histories*, trans. W.R. Paton, 6 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), ii. 375–77.
- 86 *Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science*, trans. N.P. Milner (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), 62.
- 87 Polybius, *The Histories*, trans. Paton, 438–39.
- 88 Lucan [Marcus Annaeus Lucanus], *The Civil War*, Books I–X, trans. J.D. Duff (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957 rpr. ed.), bk. I, p. 15; *Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science*, trans. Milner, p. 26.
- 89 Cornelius Tacitus, *The Annals*, trans. A.J. Woodman (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004), 13.35 (p. 262).
- 90 Arnaldo Momigliano, “How Roman Emperors Became Gods,” *On Pagans, Jews and Christians* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1987), 95.
- 91 Ed. R.G.W. Glare (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), sub “pax.” See also Kurt A. Raaflaub, “Searching for Peace in the Ancient World,” ed. Raaflaub, *War and Peace in the Ancient World*, 12–16, and *Peace and Negotiation: Strategies for Coexistence in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, ed. Diane Wolfthal (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2000), xvi–xvii.
- 92 James Hutton, *Themes of Peace in Renaissance Poetry* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 17, 30–33; Stefan Weinstock, “Pax and the ‘Ara Pacis,’” *Journal of Roman Studies* 50 (1960): 44; Zampaglione, *Idea of Peace in Antiquity*, 133–34; Alberico Gentili, *De Jure Belli Libri Tres*, vol. 2: The Translation of 1612, trans. John C. Rolfe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), bk. III, p. 290.

- 93 Greg Woolf, “Roman Peace,” *War and Society in the Roman World*, ed. John Rich and Graham Shipley (London: Routledge, 1993), 171–94, at 176–77.
- 94 J.W. Rich, “Treaties, Allies and the Roman Conquest of Italy,” in *War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval History*, ed. de Souza and France, 62; Dawson, *Origins of Western Warfare*, 116; Campbell, *War and Society in Imperial Rome*, 23, 70–75; Livy [Titus Livius], *Ab urbe condita*, trans. B.O. Foster, 14 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), I. 38. 1–4 (vol. i: pp. 135–37).
- 95 Gilliver, *Roman Art of War*, 154; *ead.*, “The Roman Army and Morality in War,” *Battle in Antiquity*, ed. Alan B. Lloyd (London: Duckworth, 1996), 220–21, 224.
- 96 Campbell, *War and Society in Imperial Rome*, 12–13; Livy, *Ab urbe condita*, I. xvi. 2–8 (vol. i, pp. 57–59).
- 97 Arnaldo Momigliano, “Roman Religion: The Imperial Period,” *On Pagans, Jews, and Christians* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1987), 179–80.
- 98 Lucretius, [Titus Lucretius Carus], *De rerum natura*, trans. W.H.D. Rouse, ed. Martin Ferguson Smith, (2nd ed.; Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), bk. 1. 29–33, 40–41 (p. 5); Rawlings, *The Ancient Greeks at War*, 177–78; Dawson, *Origins of Western Warfare*, 115; Tertullian [Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus], “The Chaplet, or De Corona,” ch. 12, in *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1986), iii.100–101.
- 99 Tertullian, “The Chaplet, or De Corona,” iii.100–101; Dawson, *Origins of Western Warfare*, 115. Roman soldiers had their own distinctive religious cults in the early empire, including that of the Emperor Augustus, whom they revered as their warlord and deity (Knapp, *Invisible Romans*, 224–26).
- 100 J.W. Rich, “Augustus’s Parthian Honours, the Temple of Mars Ultor and the Arch in the Forum Romanum,” *Papers of the British School at Rome* 66 (1998): 71–128 (at 74–75); Campbell, *War and Society in Imperial Rome*, 122–24.
- 101 Marius Tullius Cicero, *De finibus honorum et malorum*, trans. H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929), v. 65 (pp. 467–69).
- 102 Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 36–39, 54. Professor Tuck suggests that this may have been where Thomas Hobbes got his idea for the original state of nature. This darker view of human nature is associated with Epicureanism, and Hobbes was often accused of being an Epicurean.
- 103 Zampaglione, *Idea of Peace in Antiquity*, trans. R. Dunn, 151–52; T.P. Wiseman, *Remembering the Roman People* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 107–29 (Oxford Scholarship Online).

- 104 Flavius Arrianus, *The Discourses of Epictetus*, trans. P.E. Matheson (New York: Heritage Press, 1968), Introduction, xxviii; ii. 5 (p. 81); iii. 22 (pp. 185, 189).
- 105 J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, “War and Peace in the Earlier Middle Ages,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser., vol. 25 (1975): 157–74 (at 156–57).
- 106 Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace*, 33–35.
- 107 Ibid., 40–41; Wallace-Hadrill, “War and Peace in the Earlier Middle Ages,” 156–57.
- 108 Woolf, “Roman Peace,” 171, 177–78, 180; Campbell, *War and Society in Imperial Rome*, 18.
- 109 Cornelius Tacitus, *The Agricola and the Germania*, trans. H. Mattingly, (rev. ed.; Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1981), ch. 30 (pp. 30–31).
- 110 Arrianus, *Discourses of Epictetus*, trans. Matheson, iii. 13 (pp. 166–67).
- 111 Seneca [Lucius Annaeus Seneca], *Hercules Furens* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), Act II, lines 362–69; Gentili, *De Jure Belli Libri Tres*, bk. III, p. 289; Zampaglione, *Idea of Peace in Antiquity*, trans. R. Dunn, 157–60.
- 112 Origen [Origenes Adamantius], *Origen against Celsus*, in *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1968), bk. ii, ch. 20 (vol. iv: p. 444).
- 113 Momigliano, “The Disadvantages of Monotheism for a Universal State,” *On Pagans, Jews and Christians*, 152–53; Eusebius Pamphili, Bishop of Caesarea, *The Proof of the Gospel: Being the Demonstratio Evangelica of Eusebius of Caesarea*, ed. W.J. Ferrer (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1920), 141.
- 114 Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace*, 53–55.
- 115 Tertullian, “The Chaplet, or De Corona,” in *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, ed. Roberts and Donaldson, ch. 11 (vol. iii: pp. 99–100).
- 116 Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace*, 64, 72–73, 79–81.
- 117 Miriam Eliav-Feldon, “Grand Designs: The Peace Plans of the Late Renaissance,” *Vivarium* 27.1 (1989): 51–76 (at 54–55).
- 118 Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace*, 30–31; R.S. Hartigan, “Saint Augustine on War and Killing: The Problem of the Innocent,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 27.2 (1966): 95–204 (at 199).
- 119 Zampaglione, *Idea of Peace in Antiquity*, 134–35, 156; Dawson, *Origins of Western Warfare*, 52–53, 124–26, 134; Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace*, 20.
- 120 Ibid., 26; Harry Sidebottom, “Philosophers’ Attitudes to Warfare under the Principate,” *War and Society in the Roman World*, ed. John Rich and Graham Shipley (London: Routledge, 1993), 241–64 (at 248, 250).
- 121 Adams, *The Better Part of Valor*, 6–7.
- 122 Sextus Pompeius Festus, *De verborum significatu*. This was cited by the Spanish Christian humanist Juan Luis Vives in his *De concordia et discordia* (1529),

- according to Philip C. Dust, *Three Renaissance Pacifists: Essays in the Theories of Erasmus, More and Vives* (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), 138.
- 123 Cicero, *De legibus*, trans. C.W. Keyes (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), III. xviii. 42 (p. 509).
- 124 Id., *De officiis*, trans. Miller, I. xi. 34–35 (p. 37).
- 125 Ibid., I. xxii. 77–80 (pp. 79–81); Dawson, *Origins of Western Warfare*, 134.
- 126 James Turner Johnson, *The Quest for Peace: Three Moral Traditions in Western Cultural History* (Princeton: NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 68.
- 127 Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, i.254.
- 128 Bryan Ward-Perkins, *The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 133; Christopher Duffy, *Fire and Stone: The Science of Fortress Warfare, 1660–1860* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1975), 19.
- 129 K. Wellesley, “Tacitus as a Military Historian,” in *Tacitus*, ed. T.A. Dorey (New York: Basic Books, 1969), 78–80.
- 130 Peter Brown, *The World of Late Antiquity, AD 150–750* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1971), 82–84.

2 War and Peace in the Medieval World

- 1 St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, *City of God against the Pagans*, trans. and ed. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), bk. xix, chs. 1–4; P.R.L. Brown, “Political Society,” in *Augustine: A Collection of Essays*, ed. R.A. Markus (New York: Anchor, 1972), 311–35 (esp. 323–25); Harold J. Berman, *Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 27; John D. Hosler, *John of Salisbury: Military Authority of the Twelfth-Century Renaissance* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 119.
- 2 Roland H. Bainton, “The Early Church and War,” *Harvard Theological Review* 39. No. 3 (1946): 206–8.
- 3 Tertullian [Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus], “On Idolatry,” ch. 19, in *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1968), iii: 73; Bainton, “Early Church and War,” 197.
- 4 David S. Bachrach, *Religion and the Conduct of War, c. 300–1215* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2003), 7–9.
- 5 For example, Ephesians, 6. 11–17, Douay-Rheims Version; 6. 10–16, Revised Standard Version.
- 6 Michael Gaddis, *There is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ: Religious Violence in the Christian Roman Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 23–25.

- 7 Bainton, “Early Church and War,” 193–94, 198–200.
- 8 Id., *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960), 85–89; Peter Partner, *God of Battles: Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 60–61; Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 263; Arnaldo Momigliano, “How Roman Emperors Became Gods,” *On Pagans, Jews and Christians* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1987), 104.
- 9 Gaddis, *There is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ*, 58–63.
- 10 Ammanianus Marcellinus, *The Later Roman Empire (AD 354–378)*, trans. Walter Hamilton (Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1986), 22.5 (pp. 338–39); 22.11 (pp. 246–47); 27.3 (pp. 335–36).
- 11 Paul J.E. Kershaw, *Peaceful Kings: Peace, Power, and the Early Medieval Political Imagination* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 40–44.
- 12 John Helgeland, “Christians and the Roman Army, A.D., 173–337,” *Church History* 43. No. 2 (1974): 156.
- 13 Frederick H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 16–18, 304–5; R. A. Markus, “Saint Augustine’s Views on ‘Just War,’” *The Church and War*, in *Studies in Church History* 20 (1983): 1–13; Arnaldo Momigliano, “Some Observations on the Causes of War in Ancient Historiography,” *Studies in Historiography* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), 122–23.
- 14 R.A. Markus, “Saint Augustine’s Views on ‘Just War,’” rpr. in *Warfare in the Dark Ages*, ed. John France and Kelly DeVries (Aldershot, Hants.: Ashgate, 2008), 194–207; J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, “War and Peace in the Earlier Middle Ages,” rpr. *ibid.*, 147–64.
- 15 F. Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, 18–21; Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, 264–65.
- 16 Gaddis, *There is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ*, 131–42.
- 17 “The Right of Priestly Intercession: An Exchange of Letters with Macedonius, Vicar of Africa,” *The Political Writings of St. Augustine*, ed. Henry Paolucci and Dino Bigoghiari (Washington: Regnery, rpr. 1996), 255.
- 18 Michael Walzer, “Exodus 32 and the Theory of Holy War: The History of a Citation,” *Harvard Theological Review* 61. No. 1 (1968): 4–5, 8; Joycelyne G. Russell, *Peacemaking and the Renaissance* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 5.
- 19 Kershaw, *Peaceful Kings*, 67; J.A. Fernandez-Santamaria, *The State, War and Peace: Spanish Political Thought in the Renaissance, 1516–1559* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 120–24; St. Augustine, *Concerning the City of God against the Pagans*, trans. Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1972), bk. xix, ch. 7 (p. 861).

- 20 Ibid., bk. xix, ch. 12 (p. 866); Kershaw, *Peaceful Kings*, 68.
- 21 St. Augustine, *The City of God*, trans. Marcus Dodds et al. (New York: Modern Library, 1950), bk. xix, ch. 5, p. 681.
 In 1 Thessalonians 5, St. Paul warned his followers to beware of those who spoke of “peace and security,” because the Second Coming of Christ was imminent, and would come when least expected “as a thief in the night.”
- 22 St. Augustine, *City of God*, trans. Bettenson, bk. xix, ch. 12, (p. 809).
- 23 Partner, *God of Battles*, 61–62.
- 24 Jean Bodin, *Method for the Easy Comprehension of History*, trans. Beatrice Reynolds (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945; rpr. 1966), 305; *Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil: A Translation of St. Augustine’s De Ordine*, ed. Robert P. Russell (New York: Cosmopolitan Science and Art, 1942), 7.
- 25 Doyne Dawson, *The Origins of Western Warfare: Militarism and Morality in the Ancient World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 169–70.
- 26 Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, 263; St. Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, “Of the Duties of the Clergy”, in *A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series*, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1969), bk. 1, ch. 27.129 (vol. x: p. 22).
- 27 St. Augustine, *City of God*, trans. Dodds, bk. iii, chs. 28–30 (pp. 104–7).
- 28 Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace*, 101–5, 109; Bryan Ward-Perkins, *The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 13–24.
- 29 Alfred Vanderpol, *La doctrine scholastique du droit de guerre* (Paris: A. Pedone, 1925), 118–22.
- 30 Peter Brown, *The World of Late Antiquity, AD 150–750* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1971), 22.
- 31 Azar Gat, *War in Human Civilization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 155, 183–85.
- 32 J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, “War and Peace in the Earlier Middle Ages,” rpr. in *Warfare in the Dark Ages*, ed. John France and Kelly DeVries (Aldershot, Hants.: Ashgate, 2008), 149; James Turner Johnson, *The Quest for Peace: Three Moral Traditions in Western Cultural History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 69–71; Partner, *God of Battles*, 63–65; Michael Mann, *States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 53.
- 33 Peter Heather, *The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 15, 71, 98–99, 110, 146, 161, 175–76, 182–84.
- 34 Brown, *World of Late Antiquity*, 24, 41–44, 88–89, 115–16, 124.

- 35 Heather, *Fall of the Roman Empire*, 431–36, 440–41.
- 36 Thomas Rena, “The Idea of Peace in the West, 500–1150,” *Journal of Medieval History* 6 (1980): 145–49.
- 37 Arnaldo Momigliano, “Christianity and the Decline of the Roman Empire,” *The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century*, ed. Arnaldo Momigliano (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 12, 14–15; see also Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. J.B. Bury, 7 vols. (London: Methuen, 1898), iv: 162–63.
- 38 Perry Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism* (London: NLB, 1974), 128–35.
- 39 Rena, “The Idea of Peace in the West, 500–1150,” 145–49.
- 40 J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, “War and Peace in the Earlier Middle Ages,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser., vol. 25 (1975): 163–69.
- 41 Richard Abels, “Paying the Danegeld: Anglo-Saxon Peacemaking with the Vikings,” in *War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval History*, ed. Philip de Souza and John France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 174–77.
- 42 Kershaw, *Peaceful Kings*, 2–3, 8, 55–59.
- 43 *Ibid.*, 19–20, 30; Wallace-Hadrill, “War and Peace in the Earlier Middle Ages,” 149; William Ian Miller, *Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law and Society in Saga Iceland* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 5, 40–41, 267–70.
- 44 Kershaw, *Peaceful Kings*, 31–34, 38.
- 45 *Ibid.*, 252–61.
- 46 Miller, *Bloodtaking and Peacemaking*, 259.
- 47 Kershaw, *Peaceful Kings*, 69–73.
- 48 Wallace-Hadrill, “War and Peace in the earlier Middle Ages,” 159–61.
- 49 Carl Erdmann, *The Origins of the Idea of Crusade*, trans. Marshall W. Baldwin and Walter Goffart (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 19.
- 50 Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism*, 137–38; Susan Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 20.
- 51 Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society*, trans. L.A. Manyan, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), i.155–60; Heinrich Fichtenau, *The Carolingian Empire*, trans. Peter Munz (Toronto: Medieval Academy of America and the University of Toronto Press, 1978), 79.
- 52 Bloch, *Feudal Society*, i: 123–24; Guy Halsall, *Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450–900* (London: Routledge, 2003), 2–3, 15, 17–18, 231–33. On the authority of Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals*, passim, I have avoided using the term *vassal* because it is anachronistic and was introduced into the study of early medieval history by scholars of a much later period.

- 53 Bloch, *Feudal Society*, i: 155–60; Halsall, *Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West*, 37–38; Fichtenau, *Carolingian Empire*, 179–88.
- 54 Bloch, *Feudal Society*, i: 40–42, 55–56; Jean Dunbabin, *France in the Making, 843–1180* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 37–42; Jane Martindale, “The French Aristocracy in the Early Middle Ages: A Reappraisal,” *Past and Present*, no. 75 (1977): 20–21.
- 55 Dunbabin, *France in the Making*, 1–11; Jacques Boussard, *The Civilization of Charlemagne* trans. Frances Partridge (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), 203–15; Martindale, “The French Aristocracy in the Early Middle Ages,” 20–21.
- 56 Michael Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, vol. i: *A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986): 390–92; Elizabeth M. Hallam and Judith Everard, *Capetian France, 987–1328* (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 2001), 128.
- 57 Maurice Keen, *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), 28; Richard W. Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 4; Matthew Strickland, *War and Chivalry: The Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 134–37.
- 58 Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe*, 8, 15–17, 28; John Gillingham, “Conquering Barbarians: War and Chivalry in Twelfth-Century Britain,” *Hastings Society Journal: Studies in Medieval History* 4 (1992), 67–84 (at 77–81).
- 59 Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 13–15. Vegetius’s textbook on military affairs, the *Epitome of Military Science*, had circulated widely in the ninth and tenth centuries. Charlemagne and Alcuin both possessed copies, and apparently, the book was widely read in the Carolingian and Ottonian periods—not only by the higher ranks of soldiers but by the clergy as well. There is also evidence that Vegetius’s *Epitome* was used for training soldiers in their households. But we lack evidence that knowledge of and acceptance of the principles of Roman discipline were widespread in the armies of the ninth and tenth centuries—or even later periods (Cf. Davis S. Bachrach, *Warfare in Tenth-Century Germany* [Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2012], 12–20, 134, 138.)
- 60 Maurice Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 7–8, 13, 56, 81, 98–99; Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence*, 30–32; Jean de Bueil, comte de Sancerre, *La Jouvence*, ed. C. Favre and L. Lecestre (2 vols.; Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1887–89), ii.20–21; see also *The Poems of the Troubadour Bertran de Born*, ed. William D. Paden, Jr., Tilde Sankovitch and Patricia Ståblein (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 338–43.
- 61 Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence*, 61–64, 135–46; Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 113–15.

- 62 Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence*, 176–77; Michael Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 219–22; Martindale, “French Aristocracy in the Early Middle Ages,” 24 and *n.* 78. Richard Kaeuper and others have argued that when the Plantagenet kings replaced the Angevin monarchs, the state based on the rule of law that had been introduced by the latter dynasty degenerated into a state largely devoted to making war. This so-called “war state” allowed responsibility for law enforcement at the local level to fall into the hands of local feudal lords under the system of “bastard feudalism” that corrupted the administration of justice. Gerald Harriss’s view is that a bellicose military policy did not necessarily hamper the administration of justice provided that the monarch was competent. Harriss insists that “war was a normal and integral element in the medieval polity, and to present it as a contrasting and alternative option to state-building is misleading” (G.L. Harriss, “Political Society and the Growth of Government in Late Medieval England,” *Past and Present* no. 138 (1993): 28–29, 32).
- 63 Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 98–99.
- 64 H.E.J. Cowdrey, “Bishop Ermenfrid of Sion and the Penitential Ordinance following the Battle of Hastings,” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 20. no. 2 (1969): 225–42. Burchard of Worms (c. 950–1025), in his *Decretum*, had specified severe penances for homicide and also included certain acts of killing by soldiers in this category (Greta Austin, “Jurisprudence in the Service of Pastoral Care: The Decretum of Burchard of Worms,” *Speculum* 79. no.4 (2004): 929–59.
- 65 Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 1–6, 164–65; John Gillingham, “1066 and the Introduction of Chivalry into England,” *Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy: Essays in Honour of Sir James Holt*, ed. George Garnett and John Hudson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 32–34, 45, 369.
- 66 Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 6, 237–39; Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 307–10; Gillingham, “Conquering the Barbarian: War and Chivalry in Twelfth-Century Britain,” 67–84; Frederick C. Suppe, *Military Institutions in the Welsh Marches: Shropshire, 1066–1300* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 1994), 32–33.
- 67 Maurice Keen, *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), 23; *id.*, “War, Peace and Chivalry,” in *War and Peace in the Middle Ages*, ed. Brian Patrick McGuire (Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels, 1987), 94–95; F. Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, 301.
- 68 Gillingham, “1066 and the Introduction of Chivalry into England,” 33; Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence*, 95–99.
- 69 *Id.*, *War, Justice and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 12; Keen, *Laws of War*, 104; Christopher Allmand, *The Hundred Years War: England and France at War, c. 1300–1450* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 20–21; F. Russell, *Just War*, 301.

- 70 Keen, “War, Peace and Chivalry,” 106–10; John of Salisbury, *Policratus: The Statesman’s Book*, ed. Murray K. Markland (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1979), vi.20 (p. 90); Hosler, *John of Salisbury*, 4–5, 7.
- 71 Robert C. Stacey, “The Age of Chivalry,” *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World*, ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos and Mark R. Shulman (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 27–28.
- 72 F. Russell, *Just War*, 55, 58–63.
- 73 James Turner Johnson, *Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200–1740* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 35–39, 53–54; Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History* (3rd ed.; London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 145.
- 74 Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 58–63.
- 75 Giovanni da Legnano, *Tractatus de bello, de represaliis et de duello*, ed. Thomas Erskine Holland, trans. James Leslie Brierly (Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1917; rpr. New York: Oceana, 1964), bk. iv, pp. 231–35; Paola Pugliatti, *Shakespeare and the Just War Tradition* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), 27–29.
- 76 N.A.R. Wright, “The *Tree of Battles* of Honoré Bouvet and the Laws of War,” in *War, Literature and Politics in the Late Middle Ages*, ed. C.T. Allmand (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 14–15; Honoré Bonet, *Tree of Battles*, ed. G.W. Coopland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1949), 125, 157–58; M.H. Keen, *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), 130.
- 77 Kelly DeVries, “God and Defeat in Medieval Warfare: Some Preliminary Thoughts,” *The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History*, ed. Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 1999), 87–97.
- 78 Allmand, *Hundred Years War*, 37–38, 52, 68, 111, 158–59, 162; Ben Lowe, *Imagining Peace: A History of Early English Pacifist Ideas, 1340–1560* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 52 and *n.*; John of Salisbury, *Policratus*, vi.1 (p. 73).
- 79 Walzer, “Exodus 32 and the Theory of Holy War,” 8–11.
- 80 Aquinas: *Selected Political Writings*, ed. A.P. Entrèves, trans. J.G. Dawson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1948), 159–61.
- 81 St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II. ii, q. 40. 1, quoted in Kaeuper, *War, Justice and Public Order*, 13.
- 82 Keen, *Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages*, 8–9; F. Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, 4–5, 41, 60–61.
- 83 Keen, *Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages*, 101, 104.

- 84 Johnson, *Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War*, 7–8; Theodore Meron, *Bloody Constraint: War and Chivalry in Shakespeare* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 27.
- 85 J. Russell, *Peacemaking in the Renaissance*, 6.
- 86 *Morte Arthure, or the Death of Arthur*, ed. Edmund Brock (Early English Text Society, original series, no. 8; London: Oxford University Press, 1967), lines 249–58; Keen, *War and Peace in the Middle Ages*, 100.
- 87 Karl Heinz Göller, “War and Peace in the Medieval English Romances and Chaucer,” in *War and Peace in the Middle Ages*, ed. McGuire, 130.
- 88 Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, 270–73; Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace*, 110–14; F. Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, 302; H.E.J. Cowdrey, “The Peace and Truce of God in the Eleventh Century,” *Past and Present* no. 46 (1970): 50–57; Meron, *Bloody Constraint*, 17.
- 89 Keith Haines, “Attitudes and Impediments to Pacifism in Medieval Europe,” *Journal of Medieval History* 7 (1981): 376–77.
- 90 Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, 274, 277.
- 91 Keen, *Laws of War in the Middle Ages*, 104; Kaeuper, *War, Justice and Public Order*, 134–39; Paul Hyams, *Rancor and Reconciliation in Medieval England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 4, 12; Keith Thomas, *The Ends of Life: Roads to Fulfilment in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 192; Publilius Syrus, *The Moral Sayings of Publilius Syrus*, ed. D. Lyman (New York: Andrew Graham, 1862), no. 401; Robert Knapp, *Invisible Romans* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 110.
- 92 Robert C. Stacey, “The Age of Chivalry,” *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World*, ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos and Mark R. Schulman (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 27–39 (at 29); Keen, “War, Peace and Chivalry,” 97–98; James A. Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 22; Thomas Asbridge, *The First Crusade: A New History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1–26; Norman Daniel, *The Arabs and Medieval Europe* (London: Longman, 1979), 115.
- 93 Jean Flori, *La guerre sainte: La formation d'idée de croisade dans l'Occident chrétien* (Paris: Aubier, 2001), 48–51, 125; Hosler, *John of Salisbury*, 120; James B. MacGregor, “The Ministry of Gerald d’Avranches: Warrior-Saints and Knightly Piety on the Eve of the First Crusade,” *Journal of Medieval History*, 29.3 (2003), 219–37.
- 94 Daniel, *Arabs and Medieval Europe*, 10–14, 30–31; Cowdrey, “Bishop Ermenfrid and the Penitential Ordinance following the Battle of Hastings,” 225–42.
- 95 Erdmann, *Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, 269–80.
- 96 Steven Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), vol. ii: *The First Crusade*: 88–92.

- 97 F. Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, 2; Keen, “War, Peace and Chivalry,” 97–98.
- 98 Bainton, “Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace,” 44.
- 99 I.S. Robinson, “Gregory VII and the Soldiers of Christ,” *History* 58 (1973), 169–92; Jonathan Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?* (3rd ed.; San Francisco: Ignatius, 2002), 32–33.
- 100 Colin Morris, “*Equestris Ordo*: Chivalry as a Vocation in the Twelfth Century,” *Studies in Church History* 15 (1978); 87–90; Jean de Bueil, *Le Jouvencel*, ed. Favre and Lecestre, ii.20–22; C.T. Allmand, *Society at War: The Experience of England and France during the Hundred Years War* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 27–28.
- 101 E.O. Blake, “The Formation of the ‘Crusade Idea,’” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 21. no.1 (1970): 100.
- 102 F. Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, 36–37, 296; Rena, “Idea of Peace in the West,” 156–58.
- 103 Norman Daniel, *The Arabs and Medieval Europe* (London: Longman, 1979), 256–57.
- 104 Johnson, *Quest for Peace*, 120–23; Marsilius of Padua [Marsilio dei Mainardini], *Defensor Pacis*, trans. and ed. Alan Gewirth (Toronto: Medieval Academy of America; University of Toronto Press, 1980), xix, xxx, xxxviii, liii–lv.
- 105 Dante Alighieri, *Monarchy and Three Political Letters*, ed. David Nicholl (New York: Noonday Press, [1954]), I.vii–viii (pp. 12–13), I.viii (pp. 20–22); Johnson, *Quest for Peace*, 113–18.
- 106 Runciman, *History of the Crusades*, i.83–84; Judith Herrin, *Byzantium: The Surprising Life of a Medieval Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 79; Ward-Perkins, *Fall of Rome*, 61; Michael Whitby, “Byzantine Diplomacy: Good Faith, Trust and Co-operation in International Relations in Late Antiquity,” *War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval History*, ed. de Souza and France, 127–29; Julian Chrysostomides, “Byzantine Concepts of War and Peace,” *War, Peace and World Orders in European History*, ed. Anja V. Hartmann and Beatrice Heuser (London: Routledge, 2001), 91–101 (at 94–95).
- 107 Heather, *Fall of the Roman Empire*, 431; Speros Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Thirteenth through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 70–78, 91, 403–5; Edward Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 205, 208.
- 108 John Haldon, *Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565–1204* (London: LCL Press, 1999), 13, 17–18, 21–23, 29, 31, 35; Thomas F. Madden, *The New Concise History of the Crusades* (rev. ed.; Lanham, MD: Rowman &

- Littlefield, 2005), 5; Angeliki E. Laiou, “On Just War in Byzantium,” *To Hellenikon: Studies in Honor of Speros Vyronis*, ed. John Langdon, 2 vols. (New Rochelle, NY: Caratz, 1993), i: 153–69.
- 109 Runciman, *History of the Crusades*, i.87–88; Haldon, *Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World*, 24–25, 35–37.
- 110 *The Alexiad of the Princess Anna Comnena. Being the History of the Reign of her Father, Alexius I, Emperor of the Romans, 1081–1118 A.D.*, trans. Elizabeth A.S. Davies (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1928; rpr. New York: AMS, 1978), bk. x (p. 264).
- 111 Herrin, *Byzantium*, 261, 267–68; Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1965), 15–19.
- 112 Raymond Schmandt, “The Fourth Crusade and the Just-War Theory,” *Catholic Historical Review* 61 (1975): 191–221; Herrin, *Byzantium*, 262–64.
- 113 Georges Duby, “The Origins of Knighthood,” *The Chivalrous Society*, trans. Cynthia Postan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 159–69.
- 114 Keen, “War, Peace and Chivalry,” 112–13; Kaeuper, *War, Justice and Public Order*, 11–13, 145–46.
- 115 Keen, “War, Peace and Chivalry,” 110, 112–13; Göller, “War and Peace in the Medieval English Romances and Chaucer,” 118.
- 116 Anne Curry, *The Hundred Years War* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993), 1–5.
- 117 Françoise Autrand, “The Peacemakers and the State: Pontifical Diplomacy and the Anglo-French Conflict in the Fourteenth Century,” ed. Philippe Contamine, *War and Competition between States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 249–77.
- 118 Allmand, *Hundred Years War*, 1988), 116–17; Craig Taylor, “War, Propaganda and Diplomacy in Fifteenth-Century France and England,” ed. Christopher Allmand, *War, Government and Power in Late Medieval France* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000), 76–79; C.T. Allmand, *Society at War: The Experience of England and France during the Hundred Years War* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1973), 167.
- 119 Autrand, “Peacemakers and the State,” 249–53; Allmand, *Society at War*, 173–74.
- 120 J.J.N. Palmer, *England, France and Christendom, 1377–99* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972), 13–15.
- 121 Autrand, “Peacemakers and the State,” 2260–64; Curry, *Hundred Years War*, 134–36; Allmand, *Society at War*, 2, 164–65.
- 122 Palmer, *England, France and Christendom*, 186–89; Philippe de Mézière, *Letter to Richard II: A Plea Made in 1395 for Peace between England and France*, ed. and trans. G.W. Coopland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1975), x–xiii, xxv–xxvii, 3–11, 21–4, 53, 63–72.

- 123 Wright, “Honoré Bouvet and the Laws of War,” 18–20; *Tree of Battles*, ed. Coopland, 189; Meron, *Bloody Constraint*, 6.
- 124 *Tree of Battles*, ed. Coopland, 126–27.
- 125 John Barnie, *War in Medieval English Society: Social Values in the Hundred Years War, 1337–99* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), 123–24; Göller, “War and Peace in Middle English Romances and Chaucer,” 113; Peter Heath, “War and Peace in the Works of Erasmus: A Medieval Perspective,” in *The Medieval Military Revolution: State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, ed. Andrew Ayton and J.L. Price (London: Tauris, 1995), 131–40.
- 126 Barnie, *War in Medieval Society*, 122–23, 130–31.
- 127 *Society at War: The Experience of England and France during the Hundred Years War*, ed. C.T. Allmand (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 37–39; Haines, “Pacifism in Medieval Europe”, 369–70, 373–76; Thomas S.R. Boase, *St. Francis of Assisi* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), 38; Roger D. Sorrell, *St. Francis of Assisi and Nature: Tradition and Innovation in Western Christian Attitudes toward the Environment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 53–54.
- 128 Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace*, 115, 118–21; Kaueper, *War, Justice and Public Order*, 338; Johnson, *Quest for Peace*, 73–75, 94–101.
- 129 Barnie, *War in Medieval Society*, 117–20.
- 130 Lowe, *Imagining Peace*, 38–40; John Wyclif, *Of Prelates*, in *The English Works*, ed. F.D. Matthew (Early English Text Society, old ser., no. 74; London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1902), ch. 9, p. 73; Rory Cox, *John Wyclif on War and Peace* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Royal Historical Society, 2014), 63–64.
- 131 L.J. Daly, *The Political Theory of John Wyclif* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1962), 76, 138–41, 150; Cox, *John Wyclif*, 100–103.
- 132 Barnie, *War in Medieval English Society*, 125, 135–37; John H. Fisher, *John Gower: Moral Philosopher and Friend of Chaucer* (New York: New York University Press, 1964), 68, 132–33.
- 133 Fisher, *John Gower*, 68, 132–33; Barnie, *War in Medieval English Society*, 135–37; John Gower, “Unto the Worthy and Noble Henry the Fourth,” *The Complete Works of Geoffrey Chaucer*, ed. Walter W. Skeat (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899), vol. 4, lines 56–76.
- 134 Barnie, *War in English Medieval Society*, 126–28.
- 135 ODNB, sub Henry IV (1366–1413).
- 136 John Gillingham, *The Wars of the Roses: Peace and Conflict in Fifteenth-Century England* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981), 1–6, 11, 15–17, 117–19.

3 Holy Wars, Crusades, and Religious Wars

- 1 Konrad Repgen, “What Is a ‘Religious War?’” ed. F.T. Khouri and T. Scott, *Politics and Society in Reformation Europe: Essays for Sir Geoffrey Elton* (London: Macmillan, 1987), 311.
 The context of the passage from St. Luke suggests that nonbelievers were to be invited to enter the house of the Lord, rather than physically compelled to do so.
- 2 Reuven Firestone, *Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 3, esp. p. 88. In the early days of Islam, the obligation to participate in holy war fell particularly on all Muslims who were physically able to fight; in later periods, the obligation rested generally on the whole Muslim community.
- 3 Peter Partner, *God of Battles: Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), xvi, 1–3.
- 4 Raymund Schwager, S.J., *Must There be Scapegoats? Violence and Redemption in the Bible*, trans. Maria Assad (New York: Crossroad, 2000), 47–53, 69–70; Martin van Creveld, *The Culture of War* (New York: Ballantine, 2008), 190. See also James L. Kugel, *How to Read the Bible: A Guide to Scripture Then and Now* (New York: Free Press, 2007), esp. ch. 1.
- 5 Partner, *God of Battles*, 6; Johannes Pedersen, *Israel: Its Life and Culture*, 4 vols. in 2 (London: Oxford University Press; Copenhagen: Branner og Korch, rpr. 1959), iii.1–2; Roland de Vaux, *Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions*, trans. John McHugh (London: McGraw-Hill, 1961), 214–18.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 247; Gerhard von Rad, *Holy and Ancient Israel*, trans. and ed. M.J. Dawn (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991), 66–73; Patrick D. Miller, *The Divine Warrior in Early Israel* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 156–73.
- 7 Michael Walzer, “Exodus 32 and the Theory of Holy War: The History of a Citation,” *Harvard Theological Review* 61 (1968), 1–14; Norman Cohn, *Cosmos, Chaos and the World to Come: The Ancient Roots of Apocalyptic Faith* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 161–62.
- 8 J. Alberto Soggin, *A History of Israel: From the Beginnings to the Bar Kochba Revolt, A.D. 135*, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1984), 20, 138, 149–50, 154–56, 163–64; Paul D. Hanson, “War, Peace and Justice in Early Israel,” *Biblical Archaeology* 3 (1987), 32–45.
- 9 Pedersen, *Israel*, i.24–25, 27, 31; Deuteronomy, 20:10–14.
- 10 James Turner Johnson, “Historical Roots and Sources of the Just War Tradition in Western Culture,” *Just War and Jihad: Historical Perspectives on War and Peace in*

- Western and Islamic Traditions*, ed. John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991), 7.
- 11 Partner, *God of Battles*, 25–26; Carl Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, trans. Marshall W. Baldwin and Walter Goffart (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 5.
- 12 R.A. Markus, “St. Augustine’s Views on ‘Just War,’” *Warfare in the Dark Ages*, ed. John France and Kelly DeVries (Aldershot, Hants.: Ashgate, 2008), 194–207; Partner, *God of Battles*, 26–30.
- 13 *Ibid.*, xviii; Erdmann, *Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, 10–15.
- 14 Norman Daniel, *The Arabs and Medieval Europe* (London: Longman, 1979), 51, 53–62, 76; Partner, *God of Battles*, xviii.
- 15 Norman Housley, *Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400–1536* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 1–3.
- 16 Partner, *God of Battles*, 69–70; Fred M. Donner, “The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War,” in *Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions*, ed. John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991), 36–38.
- 17 Arthur J. Arberry, *The Koran Interpreted* (New York: Macmillan, 1955), ii.220. See also i.57, 63, 111–12, 114, 116, 203–4, 220, ii.32.
- 18 Donner, “The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War,” 33–36; Michael Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 7–9; Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955; rpr. New York: AMS, 1979), 5, 71–72.
- 19 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 70–73; James Turner Johnson, *The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 66.
- 20 *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybānī’s Siyar*, trans. Majid Khadduri (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), 17; Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, 145.
- 21 *Bell’s Introduction to the Qur’an*, ed. W. Montgomery Watt (rev. ed.; Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970), 2–14; Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 18.
- 22 John Burton, *An Introduction to the Hadith* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 23; Anthony Pagden, *Worlds at War: The 2,500-Year Struggle between East and West* (New York: Random House, 2008), 163–65; Firestone, *Jihād*, 173–74; Johnson, *Holy War Idea*, 62.
- 23 Partner, *God of Battles*, 32–34, 36–41; Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History*, 25–26.

- 24 Hourami, *History of the Arab Peoples*, 22–24.
- 25 Partner, *God of Battles*, 32–34; Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, 56; Arberry, *The Koran Interpreted*, i.53–45; M.J. Akbar, *The Shade of Swords: Jihad and the Conflict between Islam and Christianity* (London: Routledge, 2002), 8–9; Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History*, 12–14, 51, 169–70.
- 26 Anne K.S. Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 65; Donner, “The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War,” 37.
- 27 Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, 65; Partner, *God of Battles*, 46–49, 50–5; Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History*, 2–3, 5–6.
- 28 Partner, *God of Battles*, 46–49; Donner, “Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War,” 51; Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, 65; Johnson, *Holy War Idea*, 67.
- 29 Hugh Kennedy, *The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State* (London: Routledge, 2001), 21–22.
- 30 *Ibid.*, 105–7.
- 31 Daniel, *Arabs and Medieval Europe*, 117, 138–39.
- 32 Johnson, *Holy War Idea*, 149–50; Yehoshua Frankel, “Muslim Responses to the Frankish Dominion in the Near East,” in *The Crusades and the Near East*, ed. Conor Kostick (London: Routledge, 2011), 27–36; Jonathan Riley-Smith, “The Crusading Moment,” ed. Anja V. Hartmann and Beatrice Heuser, *War, Peace and World Orders in European History* (London: Routledge, 2010), 127–40.
- 33 Yvonne Friedman, “Peacemaking: Perceptions and Practices in the Medieval Latin East,” in *The Crusades and the Near East*, ed. Kostick (London: Routledge, 2011), 220–31; Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History*, 49.
- 34 Daniel, *Arabs and Medieval Europe*, 246, 265.
- 35 Ernst-Dieter Hehl, “War, Peace and the Christian Order,” *The New Cambridge Modern History*, ed. D. Luscombe and J. Riley-Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), vol. 4, pt. 1.
- 36 David S. Bachrach, *Religion and the Conduct of War, c. 300–1215* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2003), 108; Norman Housley, *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305–1378* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 1–5.
- 37 *Id.*, *Fighting for the Cross: Crusading to the Holy Land* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 178–79, 181–83, 188–90.
- 38 Susanna A. Throop, *Crusading as an Act of Vengeance, 1095–1216* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 3–8, 12–20, 33–35.
- 39 Housley, *Fighting for the Cross*, 115–18.
- 40 Akbar, *Shade of Swords*, 62–64; John V. Tolan, *Saracens: Islam in Medieval European Imagination* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), chs. 9 and 10.

- 41 Pagden, *Worlds at War*, 236–40.
- 42 Akbar, *Shade of Swords*, 52–55.
- 43 J.H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain, 1469–1716* (New York: St. Martin's, 1964), 20, 33–41; Pagden, *Worlds at War*, 182–88, 219; Daniel, *Arabs and Medieval Europe*, 122; Partner, *God of Battles*, 68–69.
- 44 Peter Russell, *Prince Henry "the Navigator": A Life* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 40–44, 52.
- 45 *Ibid.*, 13–28, 39–40.
- 46 Hourami, *History of the Arab Peoples*, 35–36, 88; Pagden, *Worlds at War*, 194–200; Kennedy, *Armies of the Caliph*, 118–20.
- 47 *Ibid.*, 120–24.
- 48 Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 4–7; Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 105; Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600* (London: Phoenix, 1973), 186–88.
- 49 Johnson, *Holy War Idea*, 154–56; Inalcik, *Ottoman Empire*, 3, 6–7; Thomas F. Madden, *The New Concise History of the Crusades* (rev. ed.; Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 195.
- 50 Imber, *Ottoman Empire*, 120–21, 127, 356–57; Gábor Ágoston, "Ottoman Warfare in Europe, 1453–1826," *European Warfare, 1453–1815*, ed. Jeremy Black (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), 118–44 (at 124–26); Matthew Strickland, *War and Chivalry: The Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy, 1066–1217* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 113–15.
- Although the more conservative Muslim thinkers believed that Islamic armies should not use any weapons that had not existed in the time of the Prophet and received his approval, the Ottoman rulers and military leaders did not hesitate to adopt gunpowder weapons and Western military technology.
- 51 Imber, *Ottoman Empire*, 318–25.
- 52 Robert Schwoebel, *The Shadow of the Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk (1453–1517)* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), 30–35; Colin Imber, *The Crusade of Varna, 1443–45* (Aldershot, Hants.: Ashgate, 2006), 8–9.
- 53 Kelley DeVries, "The Effect of Killing the Christian Prisoners at the Battle of Nicopolis," *Crusaders, Condottieri and Cannon*, ed. Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 157–72.
- 54 Pagden, *Worlds at War*, 268, 272–73; Schwoebel, *Shadow of the Crescent*, 18–19.
- 55 Inalcik, *Ottoman Empire*, 56–57.
- 56 Schwoebel, *Shadow of the Crescent*, 1–5, 10–12; Housley, *Religious Warfare in Europe*, 62–3.

- 57 Varna was the port on the western shore of the Black Sea, where, five centuries later, British troops first landed to begin their entry into the Crimean War.
- 58 Imber, *Crusade of Varna*, 1–5, 15–17; id., *Ottoman Empire*, 26, 257, 269, 275; Housley, *Religious Warfare in Europe*, 62–63.
- 59 Ibid., 131–36.
- 60 Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Siân Reynolds, 2 vols. (2nd ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1966), ii. 842–43, 864–65; Inalcik, *Ottoman Empire*, 41–42; Pagden, *Worlds at War*, 280–82.
- 61 Imber, *Crusade of Varna*, 1. See also Pagden, *Worlds at War*, for modern political uses of the concept of crusading.
- 62 Norman Housley, “Crusades against Christians: Their Origins and Early Development, c. 1000–1216,” ed. Peter Edbury, *Crusade and Settlement* (Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, 1985), 21–23, 25–26.
- 63 Housley, “Crusades against Christians,” 17–19.
- 64 Lawrence W. Marvin, *The Occitan War: A Military and Political History of the Albigensian Crusade, 1209–1218* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 19–22, 36–45.
- 65 Ibid., 12–13, 18–19.
- 66 Erdmann, *Origins of the Idea of Crusade*, 201–9, 227–28, 251–52; Housley, “Crusades against Christians,” 23–24.
- 67 Richard W. Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 64–66; Erdmann, *Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, 269–80.
- 68 Eric Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades: The Baltic and the Catholic Frontier, 1100–1525* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 1–2.
- 69 Ibid., 26–38.
- 70 Ibid., 50–53.
- 71 A state governed by a religious order.
- 72 Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades, 1274–1580: From Lyons to Alcazar* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 204, 322–28, 337–39, 242–43; Christiansen, *Northern Crusades*, 74–88.
- 73 Housley, *Religious Warfare in Europe*, 18, 20, 54–55; id., *Later Crusades*, 351–74, 378–79.
- 74 John Hus furnishes one of the few instances in academic history of a collegiate dean espousing new ideas and leading a revolt.
- 75 Housley, *Later Crusades*, 249–54, 378–79.
- 76 Ibid., 252–59.
- 77 Howard Louthan, *Converting Bohemia: Force and Persuasion in the Catholic Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1–4.

- 78 Glenn Burgess, “Wars of Religion and Royalist Political Thought,” *England’s Wars of Religion Revisited*, ed. Charles W.A. Prior and Glenn Burgess (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 169–92 (at 170–78); Ben Lowe, “Religious Wars and the ‘Common Peace’: Anglican Anti-War Sentiment in Elizabethan England,” *Albion*, 28.3 (1996), 415–35.
- 79 Reppen, “What Is a ‘Religious War’?,” 313–14, 318; Thomas F. Madden, *The New Concise History of the Crusades* (rev. ed.; Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 214.
- 80 J.W. Allen, *A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century* (London: Methuen, rpr. 1961), 15–27; Heiko A. Oberman, *Luther: Man between God and the Devil*, trans. Eileen Walliser-Schwarzbart (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 289; Luther, *On Secular Authority*, in *Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority*, ed. and trans. Harro Höpfl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 13–14.
- 81 *Reformation Writings of Martin Luther*, trans. Bertram Lee Woolf, 2 vols. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1953), I. 110–24; Allen, *History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century*, 17.
- 82 Andrew Pettegree, *The Book in the Renaissance* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 211–13. See also Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, *The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 152–55.
- 83 Lewis W. Spitz, *The Protestant Reformation, 1517–1559* (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 101–3.
- 84 *Ibid.*, 103–7.
- 85 Madden, *New Concise History of the Crusades*, 208–10.
- 86 Spitz, *Protestant Reformation*, 115–17; Elliott, *Imperial Spain*, 148–56; Charles Wilson, *The Transformation of Europe, 1558–1648* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 92; Benjamin J. Kaplan, *Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 150–52.
- 87 *Ibid.*, 198–205, 217–18.
- 88 *Ibid.*, 129–30.
- 89 Robert Birely, *Religion and the Politics of the Counter Reformation: Emperor Ferdinand II, William Lamormaimi, S.J. and the Foundation of Imperial Policy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 4, 7, 31.
- 90 Louthan, *Converting Bohemia*, 317–23.
- 91 Richard Tuck, *Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 32.
- 92 Elliott, *Imperial Spain*, 167, 228, 245–54, 278–80; Geoffrey Parker, *Philip II* (3rd ed.; Chicago: Open Court, 1995), 210.

- 93 J.H. Elliott, *Europe Divided, 1559–1598* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 26–27, 175–83, 186–94.
- 94 Wilson, *Transformation of Europe*, 142, 146, 148–82; Elliott, *Europe Divided*, 125–27.
- 95 Kaplan, *Divided by Faith*, 107–10.
- 96 Alastair Duke, “Towards a Reformed Polity in Holland, 1572–78,” *Reformation and Revolt in the Low Countries* (London: Hambledon, 1990), 199–226; id., “The Ambivalent Face of Calvinism in the Netherlands, 1561–1618,” *ibid.*, 269–93.
- 97 Martin van Gelderen, *The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, 1555–1590* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 216–22, 267.
- 98 Kaplan, *Divided by Faith*, 107–10.
- 99 J.L. Price, “A State Dedicated to War? The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century,” *The Medieval Military Revolution: State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, ed. Andrew Ayton and J.L. Price (London: Tauris, 1995), 183–200; Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Roger B. Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army, 1585–1702* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 24–61; id., “Prince Maurice’s School of War: British Swordsmen and the Dutch,” *War and Society* 25.1 (2006), 1–19.
- 100 J.H. Elliott, *Spain and its World, 1500–1700: Selected Essays* (London: Yale University Press, 1989), 114–24, 248.
- 101 Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World*, ii.865; J.H. Elliott, *Europe Divided, 1559–1598* (2nd ed.; Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 1–3.
- 102 R.J. Knecht, *The French Wars of Religion, 1559–1598* (3rd ed.; Harlow, Essex: Longman, 2010), 3, 86–88; *Constitutionalism and Resistance in the Sixteenth Century: Three Treatises by Hotman, Beza and Mornay*, ed. Julian H. Franklin (New York: Pegasus, 1969), 16.
- 103 Knecht, *French Wars of Religion*, 14–16; David Potter, *Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c. 1480–1560* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2008), 67, 96–97.
- 104 Penny Roberts, *Peace and Authority during the French Religious Wars. c. 1560–1600* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 7–10; Marvin R. O’Connell, *The Counter-Reformation, 1559–1610* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 135–39; Elliott, *Europe Divided* (1969 ed.), 101.
- 105 Robert M. Kingdom, “International Calvinism and the Thirty Years War,” *1648: War and Peace in Europe*, ed. Klaus Bussmann & Heinz Schilling, 3 vols. (Munich: Bruckmann, 1998), I. 233.
- 106 Jean Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. John T. McNeill & Ford Lewis Battles, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), I. 18. 1.

- 107 *Calvinism in Europe, 1540–1610: A Collection of Documents*, ed. Alastair Duke, Gillian Lewis and Andrew Pettegree (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 58–59, 78–81; *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, in *Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority*, trans. and ed. Höpfl, 49–50.
- 108 Denis Crouzet, “Calvinism and the Uses of the Political and Religious in France, ca. 1560–ca. 1572,” *Reformation, Revolt and Civil War in France and the Netherlands, 1555–1585*, ed. Philip Benedict et al. (Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1999), 101–5.
- 109 Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. McNeill and Battles, IV. 20. 11; *Calvinism in Europe, 1540–1610*, ed. Duke et al., 41–45.
- 110 Denis Crouzet, “A Law of Difference in the History of Difference: The First Edict of Tolerance,” *Religious Difference in France: Past and Present*, ed. Kathleen Perry Long (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2006), 1–18.
- 111 David Potter, *Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c. 1480–1560* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2008), 255–56; Olivier Christin, “From Repression to Pacification: French Royal Policy in the Face of Protestantism,” *Reformation, Revolt and Civil War in France and the Netherlands, 1555–1585*, ed. Benedict et al., 201–14; *Constitutionalism and Resistance in the Sixteenth Century: Three Treatises by Hotman, Beza and Mornay*, ed. and trans. Julian H. Franklin (New York: Pegasus, 1969), 39–41, 142–46.
- 112 Mario Turchetti, “Middle Parties in France during the Wars of Religion,” *Reformation, Revolt and Civil War in France and the Netherlands*, ed. Benedict et al., 168, 170–72; “Introduction,” *Religious Differences in France: Past and Present*, ed. Long, xiii.
- 113 James B. Wood, *The King’s Army: Warfare, Soldiers and Society during the Wars of Religion in France, 1562–1570* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 306; J.W. Allen, *A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century* (London: Methuen, rpr. 1961), 370–76; Michel de Montaigne, *The Complete Essays*, trans. & ed. M.A. Screech (London: Penguin, 2003), I. 23 (pp. 137–80).
- 114 James Westfall Thompson, *The Wars of Religion in France, 1559–1576* (New York: Frederick Ungar, rpr. 1959), 210, 212–16. Monluc was the author of the *Commentaires*, one of the earliest military memoirs, which was widely read by those who wished to learn the art of war. Cf. Roger B. Manning, *Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 36.
- 115 Denis Crouzet, *Les guerriers de Dieu: La violence au temps des troubles de religion (vers 1525–vers 1610)*, 2 vols. (Seysssel: Champ Vallon, 1990), i.378–80.
- 116 Thompson, *Wars of Religion in France*, 212–16; Crouzet, *Guerriers de Dieu*, i.380–2.

- 117 Housley, *Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400–1536*, 195–96; Thompson, *Wars of Religion in France*, 21–17.
- 118 Crouzet, *Guerriers de Dieu*, i.357–61.
- 119 Barbara Diefendorf, *Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 28–29, 38, 40–48.
- 120 Philip Benedict, “The Saint Bartholomew’s Massacre in the Provinces,” *Historical Journal* 21.2 (1978), 218. Compare the Huguenot behavior to Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, vol. i, ch. 15, where Gibbon describes how the refusal of the early Christians to participate in traditional pagan religious festivals exposed them to persecution.
- 121 Thompson, *Wars of Religion in France*, 191, 207, 240.
- 122 Benedict, “Saint Bartholomew’s Massacres in the Provinces,” 205–8, 214, 216–17; Natalie Zemon Davis, “The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-Century France,” *Past and Present* no. 59 (1973), 51–91; Richard S. Dunn, *The Age of the Religious Wars, 1559–1715* (New York: Norton, 1979), 34–36.
- 123 Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie, *Carnival in Romans*, trans. Mary Feeney (New York: Braziller, 1979), xiii–xiv, 35–36, 81.
- 124 Jean Daniel Charron, *The “Wisdom” of Pierre Charron* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, c. 1966), 49; Thompson, *Wars of Religion in France*, 254–61.
- 125 LeRoy Ladurie, *Carnival in Romans*, 57–49, 83, 86–87; Crouzet, *Guerriers de Dieu*, ii.9.
- 126 Barbara B. Diefendorf, “Waging Peace: Memory, Identity and the Edict of Nantes,” *Religious Differences in France: Past and Present*, ed. Long, 19–44.
- 127 Heinz Schilling, “Confessionalization in Europe: Causes and Effects for Church, State, Society and Culture,” *1648: War and Peace in Europe*, ed. Bussman & Schilling, I. 219–28.
- 128 Kaplan, *Divided by Faith*, 73–75.
- 129 M.S. Anderson, *War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618–1789* (Stroud, Gloucs.: Sutton, 1998), 33–36; Richard S. Dunn, *The Age of Religious Wars, 1559–1715* (2nd ed.; New York: W.W. Norton, 1979), 82–92; Elliott, *Europe Divided, 1559–1598*, 107–10.
- 130 Wilson, *Transformation of Europe, 1558–1648*, 252.
- 131 Birely, *Religion and Politics in the Age of the Counterreformation*, 4, 7, 31; Wilson, *Transformation of Europe, 1558–1648*, 252.
- 132 Christopher R. Friedrichs, “The War and German Society,” *The Thirty Years’ War*, ed. Geoffrey Parker (2nd ed.; London: Routledge, 1997), 188–89.
- 133 A.G. Dickens, *The Counter Reformation* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968), 152, 154; Bireley, *Politics and Religion in the Age of the Counterreformation*, 130, 227–28.
- 134 Kaplan, *Divided by Faith*, 336–43, 352–53.

- 135 François de Callières, *The Art of Negotiating with Sovereign Princes* (London: Strahan et al., 1716), in Callières, *The Art of Diplomacy* ed. H.M.A. Keens-Soper and Karl W. Schweizer (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1983), 22–24; Heinz Schilling, “War and Peace at the Emergence of Modernity: Europe between State Belligerence, Religious Wars and the Desire for Peace,” *1648: War and Peace in Europe*, ed. Bussmann & Schilling, I. 20.
- 136 John Morrill, “Renaming England’s Wars of Religion,” *England’s Wars of Religion Revisited*, ed. Charles W.A. Prior and Glenn Burgess (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 307–25; Blair Worden, *The English Civil Wars, 1640–1660* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2009), 3–4. Morrill also insists that the events between 1640 and 1660 in England did not constitute a revolution.
- 137 Manning, *Apprenticeship in Arms*, 44–47, 50–51, 54.
- 138 Austin Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution, 1625–1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 33; Ian Gentles, *The English Revolution and the Wars in the Three Kingdoms, 1638–1652* (Harlow, Essex: Pearson Longman, 2007), 68–72.
- 139 *Ibid.*, 72–75.
- 140 David Scott, *Politics and War in the Three Stuart Kingdoms, 1637–49* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 2–5.
- 141 Trevor Royle, *The British Civil War: The Wars of the Three Kingdoms, 1638–1660* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 806–7; Christopher Hill, “Lord Clarendon and the Puritan Revolution,” in *Puritanism and Revolution: Studies in Interpretation of the English Revolution of the 17th Century* (London: Mercury, 1962), 199, 203.
- 142 Barbara Donagan, *War in England, 1642–1649* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5, 9. However, John Morrill maintains both royalists and parliamentarians used the terms holy war and religious war in a perjorative sense (“Renaming England’s Wars of Religion,” 320).
- 143 Royle, *British Civil War*, 49–83.
- 144 Manning, *Apprenticeship in Arms*, 8–9, 11, 13, 15.
- 145 *Ibid.*, 16–18.
- 146 Jane Ohlmeyer, “The Civil Wars of Ireland,” in *The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, Scotland and Ireland, 1638–1660*, ed. John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 73–74, 77, 79.
- 147 *Ibid.*, 77, 79; James Scott Wheeler, *Cromwell in Ireland* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999), 10.
- 148 Royle, *British Civil War*, 34–36.
- 149 Scott, *Politics and War*, 14.
- 150 Gentles, *English Revolution*, 436–37.
- 151 Wheeler, *Cromwell in Ireland*, 6; Gentles, *English Revolution*, 436–37.

- 152 Charles Carlton, *Going to the Wars: The Experience of the British Civil Wars, 1638–1651* (London: Routledge, 1992), 329–32; Royle, *British Civil War*, 617–18.
- 153 Wheeler, *Cromwell in Ireland*, 3, 13, 15–17; Ohlmeyer, “The Civil Wars in Ireland,” 90–1, 94–5.
- 154 Scott, *Politics and War*, 203–4; Maurice Ashley, *The Greatness of Oliver Cromwell* (New York: Collier, 1962), 360–61; Sir Charles Firth, *Oliver Cromwell and the Rule of the Puritans in England* (London: Oxford University Press, rpr. 1953), 354–55; Barry Coward, *Cromwell* (London: Longman, 1991), 110–11; Alexandra Walsham, *Charitable Hatred: Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500–1700* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 234–35.
- 155 Johnson, *Holy War Idea*, 10–11.
- 156 Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, trans. and ed. G.L. Ulmen (New York: Telos, 2003), 53, 140–41.
- 157 Johnson, *Holy War Idea*, 13–14. Also see below, ch. 5.

4 Humanism and Neo-Stoicism

- 1 Steven Marx, “Shakespeare’s Pacifism,” *Renaissance Quarterly* 45 (1992): 49, 52–53; Desiderius Erasmus, *The Education of a Christian Prince*, trans. Lester K. Born (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), 249.
- 2 J.A. Fernández-Santamaria, *The State, War and Peace: Spanish Political Thought in the Renaissance, 1516–1559* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 120–21; Sir John Hale, “Armies, Navies and the Art of War,” in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, vol. iii: *The Counter-Reformation and the Price Revolution, 1559–1610*, ed. R.B. Wernham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 172; Miriam Eliav-Feldon, “Grand Designs: The Peace Plans of the Late Renaissance,” *Vivarium* 27. no. 1 (1989): 52.
- 3 Robert P. Adams, *The Better Part of Valor: More, Erasmus, Colet and Vives on Humanism, War and Peace, 1496–1535* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962), 7.
- 4 Antonio de Guevara, Bishop of Guadix, *The Diall of Princes*, trans. Thomas North (London: John Waylande, 1557; rpr. Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1968), fo. 43r.
- 5 Henry Kamen, “Golden Age, Iron Age: A Conflict of Concepts in the Renaissance,” *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 4 (1974): 138–40; Harry Levin, *The Myth of the Golden Age in the Renaissance* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), 112.

- 6 Frances A. Yates, *Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), 30–35, 38–40, 59–60, 77.
- 7 Dedicatory Epistle to Elizabeth I, from Peter Whitehorne's translation of 1560, in Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Art of War* (1521), trans. Ellis Farnsworth (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965; rpr. New York: Da Capo, 1990), 233–34.
- 8 Id., *The Prince*, trans. George Bull (Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1961), 77; id., *Art of War*, trans. Farnsworth, xlvii; Doyne Dawson, *The Origins of Western Warfare* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 176–77.
- 9 Machiavelli, *Art of War*, trans. Farnsworth, bk. 1, p. 41; *The Political Works of James Harrington*, ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), Introduction, 16, 18–19.
- 10 Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, ed. Bernard Crick (London: Penguin, 1983), I.6 (pp. 121, 123); J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 305; J.W. Allen, *A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century* (London: Methuen, 1961 rpr. ed.), 455.
- 11 Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. Bull, 87.
- 12 Id., *Art of War*, trans. Farnsworth, xlix n.
- 13 Ibid., bk. 7, p. 211.
- 14 Robert Bireley, *The Counter-Reformation Prince: Anti-Machiavellianism or Catholic Statecraft in Early Modern Europe* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 8–10, 12.
- 15 Felix Gilbert, *Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 128–31, 133–37; Francesco Guicciardini, *Maxims and Reflections of a Renaissance Statesman (Ricordi)*, trans. Mario Domandi (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, rpr. 1970), no. 48 (p. 54); Richard Tuck, *Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 38–39.
- 16 Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, bk. 1, p. 30; Maurice Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), 227; Niccolò Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), I.43 (p. 91). To give but one example, the insistence that mercenary soldiers are always dangerous is reiterated by Sir Walter Raleigh (*History of the World* [1614], ed. C.A. Patrides [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971], V. ii. 3 [pp. 356–60]).
- 17 Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, trans. Mansfield and Tarcov, I. 21 (pp. 54–55); id., *The Prince*, trans. Bull, 40, 43.
- 18 William Caferro, “Slaying the Hydra-headed Beast: Italy and the Companies of Adventurers in the Fourteenth Century,” *Crusaders, Condottieri and Cannon*, ed. Donald J. Kagan and L.J. Andrew Villalon (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 285–304.

- 19 Maurizio Arfaioli, *The Black Bands of Giovanni: Infantry and Diplomacy during the Italian Wars, 1526–1528* (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2005), 3–11.
- 20 Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), i: 249.
- 21 Giovanni Botero, *The Reason of State*, trans. P.J. and D.P. Waley (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956), bk. II, ch. 6 (p. 45).
- 22 *Ibid.*, bk. X, ch. 9 (p. 221).
- 23 *Ibid.*, bk. III, ch. 3 (pp. 76–77), bk. V, ch. 9 (p. 112).
- 24 *Ibid.*, bk. III, ch. 4 (p.79), bk. IX, ch. 2 (p. 171).
- 25 Baldasare Castiglione, Count of Novitara and Bishop of Avila, *The Book of the Courtier*, trans. George Bull (rev. ed.; London: Penguin, 1976), 302–3; see also Peter Burke, *The Fortunes of the Courtier: The European Reception of Castiglione's Cortegiano* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 23, 28–29.
- 26 Guevara, *Diall of Princes*, fo. 173r.
- 27 Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1965), 158.
- 28 Eliav-Feldon, “Grand Designs,” 57–58; Erasmus, *Education of a Christian Prince*, trans. and ed. Born, 238–39; James D. Tracy, *The Politics of Erasmus: A Pacifist Intellectual and His Political Milieu* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 56–57; Glenn Burgess, *British Political Thought, 1500–1660* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 2; Ben Lowe, *Imagining Peace: A History of Early English Pacifist Ideas, 1340–1560* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 153–55.
- 29 Tuck, *Philosophy and Government*. 10–13, 29.
- 30 Sir Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience* (London: Temple Smith, 1978), 13–16.
- 31 Adams, *Better Part of Valor*, 4; Nick de Somogyi, *Shakespeare's Theatre of War* (Aldershot, Hants.: Aldgate, 1998), 21–22; Erasmus, *Education of a Christian Prince*, trans. Born, 246–47.
- 32 *Ibid.*, 236, 249, 251.
- 33 Peter Heath, “War and Peace in the Works of Erasmus: A Medieval Perspective,” *The Medieval Military Revolution: State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, ed. Andrew Ayton and J. L. Price (London: Tauris, 1995), 126.
- 34 *Ibid.*, 127.
- 35 Erasmus, *Education of a Christian Prince*, trans. Born, 251; *The “Adages” of Erasmus: A Study with Translations*, ed. Margaret Mann Phillips (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 331; Fernández-Santamaria, *State, War and Peace*, 137–38; Guevara, *Diall of Princes*, trans. North, fo. 174r; J.H. Hexter, *The*

- Vision of Politics on the Eve of the Reformation: More, Machiavelli and Seyssel* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 88.
- 36 Erasmus, *Julius Excluded from Heaven: A Dialogue*, trans. and ed. Michael J. Heath, *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 27, ed. H.H.T. Levi (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 155–97.
- 37 “Adages” of Erasmus, 308–10, 313n.
Compare also the remarks of the French soldier, Blaise de Monluc, who insisted that the Habsburg-Valois Wars between Charles V and Francis I were the result of their mutual jealousy of one another’s grandeur. *Commentaires*, ed. P. Courteault (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 30–31.
- 38 Roger B. Manning, *Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1–12.
- 39 Erasmus, *Education of a Christian Prince*, trans. Born, 226; id., “The Soldier’s Confession,” in *The Whole Familiar Colloquies*, trans. Nathan Bailey (1733; rpr. Glasgow: Alexander Campbell, 1877), 39.
- 40 Adams, *Better Part of Valor*, 220–25; Juan Luis Vives, *De concordia et discordia* (1526), v: 483, quoted in Philip C. Dust, *Three Renaissance Pacifists: Essays in the Theories of Erasmus, More and Vives* (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), 144.
- 41 The English version is *The New Cyneas of Éméric Crucé*, trans. and ed. Thomas Willing Balch (Philadelphia: Allan, Lane & Scott, 1909); see also Balch, *Éméric Crucé* (Philadelphia: Allan, Lane & Scott, 1899).
- 42 Edmond Silberner, *La guerre dans la pensée économique du XVII au XVIII siècles* (Paris: Librairie du Receil Sirey, 1939), pt. ii, 128–38; Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience*, 19–20.
- 43 Eliav-Feldon, “Grand Designs,” 57.
- 44 Joycelyne G. Russell, *Peacemaking in the Renaissance* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 12.
- 45 Fernández-Santamaria, *The State, War and Peace*, 120.
- 46 Vives, *De concordia et discordia*, v: 483, quoted in Dust, *Three Renaissance Pacifists*, 144; Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 40–41.
- 47 *Ibid.*, 63–69, 73–74, 133–38.
- 48 Gesina van der Molen, *Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law* (2nd ed.; Leyden: Sijtoff, 1968), 130.
- 49 Francisco de Vitoria, “On the Law of War,” in *Political Writings*, trans. and ed. A. Pagden and J. Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 314–16, 319–21, 326–27.
- 50 Bierley, *Counter-Reformation Prince*, 198–203, 223–24, 230–31.

- 51 Tuck, *Rights of War and Peace*, 51–52.
- 52 Skinner, *Modern Political Thought*, i: 246–47.
- 53 Eliav-Feldon, “Grand Designs,” 512.
- 54 “Adages” of Erasmus, ed. Phillips, 112–14; *The Complete Works of St. Thomas More*, vol. iv, ed. Edward Surtz, S.J. and J.H. Hexter (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965), 211.
- 55 R.W. Chambers, *Thomas More* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), 126–29, 362–63.
- 56 J.C. Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society: A Study of English Utopian Writing, 1516–1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 54–55; Burgess, *British Political Thought*, 12–15.
- 57 Hexter, *Vision of Politics on the Eve of the Reformation*, 83–86, 93; Burgess, *British Political Thought*, 6.
- 58 *Complete Works of St. Thomas More*, vol. iv, ed. Surtz and Hexter, 57; J.H. Hexter, *More’s Utopia: The Biography of an Idea* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1952), 144.
- 59 Michel Eyquem de Montaigne, *Essays*, trans. John Florio, 3 vols. (London: Everyman’s Library, 1910; rpr. 1965), iii: 102.
- 60 Skinner, *Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, ii. 276–77; Geoffrey Miles, *Shakespeare and the Constant Romans* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 68.
- 61 James J. Supple, *Arms versus Letters: The Military and Literary Ideals in the “Essais” of Montaigne* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 3–4, 6; Montaigne, *The Complete Essays*, trans. and ed. M.A. Screech (London: Penguin, 2003), ii: 7 (p. 431).
- 62 Miles, *Shakespeare and the Constant Romans*, 71, 75–76; Skinner, *Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, ii. 278–83.
- 63 Tuck, *Philosophy and Government*, 56–58.
- 64 Montaigne, *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, trans. Donald Frame (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958); “Of Cruelty,” ii: 11 (p. 315); “Of Vanity,” iii: 9 (p. 727), p. 241*n*.
- 65 Stuart Carroll, *Blood and Violence in Early Modern France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 258, 260, 264–65.
- 66 Guillaume du Vair, *The Moral Philosophie of the Stoicks*, trans. Thomas James (London: Thomas Man, 1598; rpr. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1951), 124–25.
- 67 Carroll, *Blood and Violence in Early Modern France*, 266–67. For a parallel study of the effect of the chivalric revival on the aristocracies of the British Isles during the same period, see Manning, *Swordsmen*.
- 68 Carroll, *Blood and Violence in Early Modern France*, 279.

- 69 *Complete Essays of Montaigne*, trans. Frame, “Of Husbanding [i.e., Restraining] Your Will,” iii: 10 (pp. 770–71, 774–76).
- 70 Carroll, *Blood and Violence in Early Modern France*, 291–92; *Complete Essays of Montaigne*, trans. Frame, ii: 7 (p. 277); “Of Experience,” iii: 13 (p. 841).
Pierre Charron, Montaigne’s friend and a Catholic priest and theologian, repeated this passage almost word for word in his *Traité de la Sagesse* (1601), but then contrasted it with his own dark view of military life and the consequences of war in a passage whose antiwar rhetoric rivals that of Erasmus in its eloquence. To give but a sample, Charron says that humankind’s proclivity for war “seems to be unnatural and to proceed from an alienation of our sense and understanding; it is a great testimony of our weakness and imperfection, and it is not found in the beasts themselves, in whom the image of nature continueth far more entire” (Pierre Charron, *Of Wisdom*, trans. Samson Lennard [London: Edward Blount and William Ashley, before 1612; rpr. Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1971], 207–8. Compare Ammianus Marcellinus as cited in ch. 2, 9*n*).
- 71 Supple, *Arms versus Letters*, 174.
- 72 *Ibid.*, 167–68.
- 73 J.H.M. Salmon, “Stoicism and the Roman Example: Seneca and Tacitus in Jacobean England,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 50. no. 2 (1989): 202.
- 74 Skinner, *Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, i: 254.
- 75 Tuck, *Philosophy and Government*, 39–42, 45; Bireley, *Counter-Reformation Prince*, 91; Neal Wood, “Introduction,” in Machiavelli, *Art of War*, trans. Farnsworth, xxxvii–xxxviii.
- 76 Adriana McCrea, *Constant Minds: Political Virtue and the Lipsian Paradigm in England, 1584–1650* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 26; Gerhard Oestreich, *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State*, ed. B. Oestreich and H.G. Koenigsberger, trans. D. McLintock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 50, 71, 131.
While the Dutch Army in the time of Maurice, Prince of Orange came the closest to meeting Lipsius’s standards of a long-service professional army that avoided the worst characteristics of a mercenary force, Dutch citizens were, in the time of Maurice, a minority in that force (Roger B. Manning, “Prince Maurice’s School of War: British Swordsmen and the Dutch,” *War and Society* 25. no. 1 (2006): 1–19).
- 77 McCrea, *Constant Minds*, 26; *Complete Works of St. Thomas More*, vol. 4, ed. Surtz and Hexter: 63–65; Tuck, *Philosophy and Government*, 61–63.
- 78 Andrew Shifflett, *Stoicism, Politics and Literature in the Age of Milton: War and Peace Reconciled* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 28–29, 31–32.
- 79 Tuck, *Philosophy and Government*, 47, 59–61.

- 80 Justus Lipsius, *Sixte Bookes of Politickes or Civil Doctrine*, trans. William Jones (London: William Ponsonby, 1594; rpr. Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1970), bk. v, ch. iv (pp. 130–33); Bireley, *Counter-Reformation Prince*, 91–92; Oestreich, *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State*, 51.
- 81 Lipsius, *Politickes*, bk. v, ch. v (pp. 133–35).
- 82 *Ibid.*, bk. v, chs. ii–iii (pp. 117–28); Anthony Grafton, “Portrait of Justus Lipsius,” *American Scholar* 56 (1986–87): 390.
- 83 Halvard Leira, “At the Crossroads: Justus Lipsius and the Early Modern Development of International Law,” *Leiden Journal of International Law* 20 (2007): 79–81.
- 84 Lipsius, *Politickes*, bk. v, chs. xxxviii–xix (pp. 178–83).
- 85 *Id.*, *Two Bookes of Constancie* (1594), trans. Sir John Stradling, ed. Rudolf Kirk (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1939), 72, 71–78, 102, 15–16, 127.
- 86 McCrea, *Constant Minds*, 6–7.
- 87 Salmon, “Stoicism and the Roman Example,” 208.
- 88 *Basilikon Doron*, in *The Political Works of James I* (1616), ed. C.H. McIlvain (rpr. New York: Russell and Russell, 1965), 41–42.
- 89 David Allan, *Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland: Neo-Stoicism, Culture and Ideology in an Age of Crisis, 1540–1690* (East Linton, East Lothian: Tuckwell, 2000), 14–15.
- 90 George Gascoigne, *The Fruites of War*, in *The Poesies of George Gascoigne* (1575), fo. 13, stanza 4, quoted in de Somogyi, *Shakespeare’s Theatre of War*, 20.
- 91 Thomas Fenne, *Fennes Frutes* (London: Richard Oliffe, 1590), fos. 53v–55v, 69r, 78r–v, cited in Ben Lowe, *Imagining Peace: A History of Early English Pacifist Ideas, 1340–1560* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 302n.
- 92 Alastair Fowler, “Spenser and War,” in *War, Literature and the Arts in Sixteenth-Century Europe*, ed. J.R. Mulryne and Margaret Shewring (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 151–52.
- 93 Theodore Meron, *Bloody Constraint: War and Chivalry in Shakespeare* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 22.
- 94 Robert B. Pearce, *Shakespeare’s History Plays: The Family and the State* (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1971), 89–91.
- 95 Thomas Nashe, *Pierce Penilesse his supplication to the devill* (1592), in *Works*, ed. R.B. McKerrow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), i: 213.
- 96 Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), ed. Holbrook Jackson, 3 vols. (London: Dent, 1932), i: 55–62.
- 97 *Ibid.*, i: 106–7.
- 98 *Ibid.*, i: 59, 107.

- 99 Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society* (1981), 102; Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, ed. Floyd Dell and Paul Jordan-Smith (New York: Farrar and Rhinehart, 1927), I: ii 3.1 (p. 218).

5 The Search for a Science of Peace

- 1 Jonathan Scott, "The Law of War: Grotius, Sidney, Locke and the Political Theory of Rebellion," *History of Political Thought* 13. no. 4 (1992): 566.
- 2 Gesina van der Molen, *Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law* (2nd. ed.; Leyden: Sijtoff, 1968), 125.
- 3 Halvard Leira, "At the Crossroads: Justus Lipsius and the Early Modern Development of International Law," *Leiden Journal of International Law* 20 (2007): 66, 68.
- 4 Algernon Sidney, *Discourses concerning Government* (London, 1698; rpr. New York: Arno Press, 1979), III: 28 (pp. 386–87).
- 5 Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, *A Discourse of Government with Relation to Militias* (1698), in *Political Works*, ed. John Robertson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 2–7.
- 6 *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, sub Alberico Gentili (1552–1608); Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17–18.
- 7 Alberico Gentili, *De Jure Belli Libri Tres*, vol. 2: The Translation of the Edition of 1612, trans. John C. Rolfe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), III: 3–4, 11.
- 8 Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, 34–36.
- 9 Gentili, *De Jure Belli Libri Tres*, vol. 2, trans. Rolfe, III: 13–15, 25, 27, 34–36, 131; Van der Molen, *Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law*, 116, 147–50, 152.
- 10 Gentili, *De Jure Belli Libri Tres*, vol. 2, trans. Rolfe, III: 61–66, 83–84; Van der Molen, *Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law*, 129; Tuck, *Rights of War and Peace*, 18.
- 11 Gentili, *De Jure Belli Libri Tres*, vol. 2, trans. Rolfe, III: 31, 36.
- 12 *Ibid.*, III: 38, 44–45; Van der Molen, *Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law*, 123.
- 13 *Oxford DNB*, sub Alberico Gentili; Tuck, *Rights of War and Peace*, 51, 78; Van der Molen, *Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law*, 113–14.
- 14 Hugo Grotius, *The Law of War and Peace: De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres*, trans. Francis W. Kelsey (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), II: xxii, xiv–xv

- (pp. 553–55); Mark Somos, *Secularisation and the Leiden Circle* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 384.
- 15 James Turner Johnson, *Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200–1740* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 209–11; Somos, *Secularisation and the Leiden Circle*, 388–91.
- Giambattista Vico said that Grotius fell into error because he attempted to establish a law of nations that was based on natural law rather than Divine Providence (*The First New Science*, ed. and trans. Leon Pompa [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 14–15).
- 16 Sir Robert Filmer, “Observations upon H. Grotius De Jure Belli et Pacis,” *Patriarcha and Other Political Works*, ed. Peter Laslett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1949), 261.
- 17 Id., *Patriarcha, or the Natural Power of Kings*, in *Political Works*, ed. Laslett, 89–91.
- 18 Scott, “Law of War,” 581–82.
- 19 Richard L. Cox, *Locke on War and Peace* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 164; John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (rev. ed.; New York: Mentor, 1963), II: 125 (p. 396).
- 20 Grotius, *Law of War and Peace*, prolegomena 28–29 (p. 20).
- 21 Cicero’s maxim, *Inter arma enim silent leges* (“The laws fall silent during wartime”), refers to the chaos of civil conflict, and is not applicable to war with external enemies. Moreover, Cicero uttered this maxim as a lawyer defending Titus Annius Milo in a murder trial when the Roman Republic was dissolving into chaos characterized by conflict between armed mobs. It should be regarded as a rhetorical flourish such as trial lawyers are inclined to use from time to time (Marcus Tullius Cicero, *Pro Milone* [“Oration for Titus Annius Milo”, in *The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero*, vol. III, trans. C. D. Yonge (London: Pell & Sons, 1905), ch. IV: 201–6).
- 22 Grotius, *Law of War and Peace*, prolegomena 25–26 (pp. 18–19); Johann R. Sommerville, *Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 42.
- 23 Balthazar Ayala, *Three Books on the Law of War and on Duties Connected with War and Military Discipline*, vol. II, trans. John Pawley Bate (Antwerp, 1597; Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1912); Peter Haggenmacher, “Grotius and Gentili: A Reassessment of Thomas E. Holland’s Inaugural Lecture,” *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, ed. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Robert Adams (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 136–37, 155–57.
- 24 Geoffrey Best, *Humanity in Warfare* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 60–61; Roger B. Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army, 1585–1702* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 59, 205–12; Barbara

- Donagan, “Codes and Conduct in the English Civil War,” *Past and Present* no. 118 (1994): 78–79; ead., “Atrocity, War Crime and Treason in the English Civil War,” *American Historical Review* 104 (1994): 1137–66.
- 25 Grotius, *Law of War and Peace*, II. xxv. ix. 2–3 (p. 586); Jean Chagniot, “The Ethics and Practice of War amongst French Officers during the Seventeenth Century,” *War and Society* 10 (1992): 32–33.
- 26 Grotius, *Law of War and Peace*, I. ii. vii. 1, 17 (pp. 70–71, 81), I. iii. I. 1–2 (pp. 91–92).
- 27 *Ibid.*, I. i, I. ii. 1–2 (pp. 33–34).
- 28 *Ibid.*, I. ii. 4 (p. 52), I. iv. ii. 1 (p. 139).
- 29 *Ibid.*, prolegomena 19–22 (pp. 16–17).
- 30 *Ibid.*, II. xxii. I. 1–2, xxii. ii–iii (pp. 546–48).
- 31 Van der Molen, *Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law*, 124; Richard Tuck, *Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 155, 160–64; id., *Rights of War and Peace*, 78–85.
- 32 *Id.*, *Philosophy and Government*, 211–12.
- 33 Jonathan Scott, “The Peace of Silence: Thucydides and the English Civil War,” *Hobbes and History*, ed. G.A.J. Rogers and Tom Sorell (London: Routledge, 2000), 113–15.
- 34 Sir Francis Bacon, *The Essayes and Counsells, Civill and Morall*, ed. Michael Kieran (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 95; id. “Of the Greatness of the Kingdom of Britain,” in *Works*, ed. James Spedding, R.J. Ellis, and D.D. Heath, 7 vols. (London: Longman, 1857–59; rpr. Stuttgart: Fromann Verlag, 1963), vii: 45–64; Markku Peltonen, *Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Political Thought, 1570–1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 198–204.
- A fuller discussion of the changing meanings of the “sinews of war” may be found in the appendix.
- 35 *Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. Spedding et al., vii: 477–78.
- 36 Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 126–28.
- 37 Jonathan Scott, *Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677–1683* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 236–37; Sidney, *Discourses concerning Government*, II. 23 (pp. 165–66, 168).
- 38 Scott, *Sidney and the Restoration Crisis*, 235–36. See also Niccolò Machiavelli, *Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, English*, trans. J.C. and R. Bondanella (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 37; J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 306.

- 39 Sidney, *Discourses concerning Government*, II: 22 (pp. 161–62).
- 40 James Harrington, *The Commonwealth of Oceana* (1656), in *Political Works*, ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 241.
- 41 Scott, “Peace of Silence,” 128–30.
- 42 James Harrington, *The Art of Lawgiving in Three Books* (1659), in *Political Works*, ed. Pocock, 683, 685.
- 43 Daniel Woolf, *The Social Circulation of the Past: English Historical Culture, 1500–1730* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 64–66. See also Roger B. Manning, *Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 3–50.
- 44 Scott, *Sidney and the Restoration Crisis*, 259; Algernon Sidney, *Court Maxims*, ed. H.W. Blom, E.H. Mulier, and R. Janse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 67; id., *Discourses concerning Government*, III: 30 (p. 395).
- 45 Sidney, *Discourses concerning Government*, II: 15. 3–4 (pp. 124–26); Scott, *Sidney and the Restoration Crisis*, 234.
- 46 Sidney, *Discourses concerning Government*, II: 15. 3 (p. 125), III. 8 (pp. 284–86); Scott, *Sidney and the Restoration Crisis*, 255–56.
- 47 Sidney, *Discourses concerning Government*, II: 24 (pp. 174–75).
- 48 John Milton, *Paradise Lost: A Poem* (London: Peter Parker, 1667; rpr. Menston, Yorks.: Scolar Press, 1972), 6.408.
- 49 James A. Freeman, *Milton and the Martial Muse: Paradise Lost and European Traditions of War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 24–45. The following works will give some idea of how extensive this literature was: H.J. Webb, *Elizabethan Military Science: The Books and the Practice* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965); and Maurice J.D. Cockle, *A Bibliography of English Military Books up to 1642 and Contemporary Foreign Books* (2nd ed.; London: Holland Press, 1957).
- 50 Freeman, *Milton and the Martial Muse*, 4–8, 61–64; Manning, *Swordsmen*, 51–80.
- 51 Freeman, *Milton and the Martial Muse*, 23–24; Milton, *Paradise Lost*, 6.469–634.
- 52 Samuel Daniel, *The Civil Wars*, ed. Lawrence Michel (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1958), bk. VI, stanza 30 (p. 215), stanzas 37–38 (pp. 216–17), stanza 40 (p. 217); D.R. Woolf, “Community, Law and State: Samuel Daniel’s Historical Thought Revisited,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 49. no. 1 (1988): 65; F.J. Levy, *Tudor Historical Thought* (San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1967), 274. Thomas Bastard’s *Chrestoleros: Seven Bookes of Epigrammes* (London: Richard Bradocke, 1598), Epigr. 9 (pp. 58–59), carries much the same message as Samuel Daniel.
- Nemesis* was the Greek personification of retribution.
- 53 Harrington, *Oceana*, ed. Pocock, 198.

- 54 T.R. Kubik, "How Far the Sword? Militia Tactics and Politics in the *Commonwealth of Oceana*," *History of Political Thought* 19. no.1 (1998): 188; Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms*, chs. 1–6, 12.
- 55 *Political Works of James Harrington*, ed. Pocock, Introduction, 25, 41; *Oceana*, 165.
- 56 *Political Works of James Harrington*, ed. Pocock, Introduction, 61.
- 57 John Milton, *Political Writings*, ed. Martin Dzelzainis, trans. Clare Gruzelier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), x–xvii (citing *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* (1650), xvii–xviii, xxv).
- 58 Milton, *A Defence of the People of England* (1658), in *Political Writings*, ed. Dzelzainis, 220–22.
- 59 Id., *Tenure of Kings and Magistrates*, in *Political Writings*, ed. Dzelzainis, xiii–xiv, 18.
- 60 Jonathan Scott, "The Rapture of Motion: James Harrington's Republicanism," in *Political Discourse in Early Modern England*, ed. Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 145; Blair Worden, "Milton's Republicanism and the Tyranny of Heaven," in *Machiavelli and Republicanism*, ed. Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, and Mario Viroli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 226–27; Marchamont Nedham, *The Case of the Commonwealth, Stated*, ed. Philip A. Knachel (1650; rpr. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1969), xxv, 1–14, 21.
- 61 Sidney, *Discourses concerning Government*, II: 24, 26 (pp. 198, 206); Cornelius Tacitus, *The Agricola and the Germania*, trans. H. Mattingly (rev. ed.; Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1981), ch. 30 (pp. 30–31).
- 62 Sidney, *Discourses concerning Government*, III: 36 (p. 413); Scott, *Sidney and the Restoration Crisis*, 238.
- 63 Sidney, *Discourses concerning Government*, II: 24 (p. 172).
- 64 *Ibid.*, II: 21, 22 (pp. 154, 160).
- 65 Donald W. Hanson, "Thomas Hobbes's 'Highway to Peace,'" *International Organization* 38. no. 2 (1984): 335–36; Deborah Baumgold, *Hobbes's Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 128–29; Hedley Bull, "Hobbes and the International Anarchy," *Social Research* 48 (1981): 717–38; Thomas Hobbes. *The Leviathan*, ed. W.G. Pogson-Smith (London: Andrew Croom, 1651; rpr. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 549; Glenn Burgess, *British Political Thought, 1500–1660* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 350.
- 66 Hobbes, *De Corpore*, pt. I, in *Computatio sive Logica/Logic*, trans. Aloysius Martinich, ed. Isabel C. Hungerland and George R. Vick (New York: Abaris, 1981), 185; Richard Tuck, "Hobbes's Moral Philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes*, ed. Tom Sorell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 189–90.
- 67 Hanson, "Thomas Hobbes's 'Highway to Peace,'" 338, 351–52.

- 68 Alan Ryan, “Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes*, ed. Sorell, 234; Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth: The History of the Causes of the Civil Wars of England*, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London: William Crooke, 1682; rpr. New York: Burt Franklin, 1963), pt. I (pp. 5, 9–10, 72–73); Tuck, *Philosophy and Government*, 303, 318.
- 69 Noel Malcolm, “Hobbes and the European Republic of Letters,” in *Aspects of Hobbes*, ed. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 457–58; Patricia Springborg, “Hobbes on Religion,” in *Cambridge Companion to Hobbes*, ed. Sorell, 347–48, 352–53; A.P. Martinich, *Hobbes: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 351–52; Margaret C. Jacob, *The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution* (New York: Knopf, 1988), 80–81.
- 70 Springborg, “Hobbes on Religion,” 369; Malcolm, “Hobbes and the European Republic of Letters,” 457–58, 469–70.
- 71 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Pogson Smith, II: 30 (p. 261).
- 72 Id., *Behemoth*, ed. Molesworth, pt. I (pp. 6–7).
- 73 Sommerville, *Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context*, 29; Ryan, “Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,” 212–14; Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Pogson Smith, I: 5 (p. 38); id., *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*, ed. Ferdinand Tönnies (2nd ed.; London: Cass, 1969), II: 8. 13; Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis*, trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936; rpr. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 34–35.
- 74 Hobbes, *Elements of Law*, ed. Tönnies, II: 8. 13, II: 9. 8.
- 75 Id., *On the Citizen*, ed. and trans. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Preface to Readers, 9 (p. 10).
- 76 Id., *Leviathan*, ed. Pogson Smith, I: 13 (pp. 96–97).
- 77 Id., *On the Citizen*, ed. Tuck and Silverthorne, Preface to the Readers, 9 (pp. 10–11).
- 78 Ibid., IV: 1–3 (pp. 58–59).
- 79 Id., *Leviathan*, ed. Pogson Smith, II: 17, 18 (pp. 128, 139).
- 80 Id., *Elements of Law*, ed. Tönnies, I: 17. 15, I: 19. 2; Strauss, *Political Philosophy of Hobbes*, 49–50, 555–56; Martinich, *Hobbes: A Biography*, 144–45.
- 81 Ryan, “Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,” 216–17.
- 82 Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive: The English Version*, ed. Howard Warrender (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), III: 6–7 (pp. 67–68).
- 83 Id., *Leviathan*, ed. Pogson Smith, II: 17 (p. 128); id., *On the Citizen*, ed. and trans. Tuck and Silverthorne, XIII: 13 (pp. 140–41, 149).
- 84 Id., *Leviathan*, ed. Pogson Smith, I: 13 (p. 98), II: 17 (p. 130).
- 85 Tuck, *Rights of War and Peace*, 130–32.
- 86 Peter R. Pouncey, *The Necessities of War: A Study of Thucydides’ Pessimism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), xii, 43, 143.

- 87 Tuck, *Philosophy and Government*, 46–47, 105–7; Strauss, *Political Philosophy of Hobbes*, 79–82; Manning, *Swordsmen*, 120–21.
- 88 Scott, “Rapture of Motion,” 156, 161–62.
- 89 Hobbes, *On the Citizen*, ed. and trans. Tuck and Silverthorne, V: 5 (p. 71); Gabriella Slomp, “Hobbes, Thucydides and the Three Greatest Things,” *History of Political Thought* 11. no. 4 (1990): 565–67.
- 90 Strauss, *Political Philosophy of Hobbes*, 110–12; Hobbes, *On the Citizen*, ed. and trans. Tuck and Silverthorne, V: 5 (pp. 71–72).
- 91 Jonathan Scott, “The Peace of Silence: Thucydides and the English Civil War,” in *Hobbes and History*, ed. G.A.J. Rogers and Tom Snell (London: Routledge, 2000), 112–36; Thomas Hobbes, “On the Life and History of Thucydides,” *Hobbes’s Thucydides*, ed. Richard Schlatter (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1975), 12–13; id., *Behemoth*, ed. Molesworth, pt. I (p. 49).
- 92 Id., *On the Citizen*, ed. and trans. Tuck and Silverthorne, X: 11 (p. 123), XII: 12 (pp. 139–40); id., *Elements of Law*, ed. Tönnies, II: 8. 13; Martinich, *Hobbes: A Biography*, 159–60.
- 93 Scott, “Peace of Silence,” 122–25; Hanson, “Thomas Hobbes’s ‘Highway to Peace,’” 339–40; Hobbes, *On the Citizen*, ed. and trans. Tuck and Silverthorne, I: 12 (pp. 29–30).
- 94 Hanson, “Thomas Hobbes’s ‘Highway to Peace,’” 329–33; Hobbes, *De Cive*, ed. Warrender, Preface to Reader, 8 (pp. 31–32); Sommerville, *Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context*, 1, 29.
- 95 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Pogson Smith, I. 13, 14 (pp. 98, 100, 117–20); Sommerville, *Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context*, 31, 52; Burgess, *British Political Thought*, 308.
- 96 Hobbes, *De Cive*, ed. Warrender, II: 2 (p. 53); id., *Leviathan*, I: 11 (p. 74).
- 97 Scott, “Peace of Silence,” 118–19, 125; Hanson, “Thomas Hobbes’s Highway to Peace,” 350–51.
- 98 Harrington, *Art of Lawgiving*, in *Political Works*, ed. Pocock, 660–62, 666, 668; Scott, “Rapture of Motion,” 157.
- 99 Hobbes, *Elements of Law*, ed. Tönnies, II: 8. 7–8; Tuck, *Philosophy and Government*, 313–14.
- 100 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Pogson Smith, II: 17 (p. 128), II: 29 (pp. 250–51); Deborah Baumgold, “Subjects and Soldiers: Hobbes on Military Service,” *History of Political Thought* 4. no. 1 (1983): 46.
- 101 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Pogson Smith, II: 18 (pp. 136–37).
- 102 Hanson, “Hobbes’s ‘Highway to Peace,’” 345–46; Hobbes, *On the Citizen*, ed. and trans. Tuck and Silverthorne, XII: 1 (p. 132).

- 103 Philip Hicks, *Neoclassical History and English Culture* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 54–55.
- 104 Hobbes, *Behemoth*, ed. Molesworth, pt. I (p. 6); Michael J. Braddick, *The Nerves of State: Taxation and Financing of the English State, 1558–1714* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 37–41.
- 105 Stuart Carroll, *Blood and Violence in Early Modern France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 311–12.
- 106 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Pogson Smith, II: 29 (p. 252); id., *Behemoth*, ed. Molesworth, pt. I (p. 6).
- 107 Id., *On the Citizen*, ed. and trans. Tuck and Silverthorne, Epistle Dedicatory, 3 (p. 4).
- 108 Id., *Leviathan*, ed. Pogson Smith, II: 21 (pp. 164–66), II: 29 (pp. 251–52); Robert Nisbet, *History of the Idea of Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 131.
- 109 Sir Henry Sumner Maine, *International Law* (London: John Murray, 1888), 8; Martin van Creveld, *The Culture of War* (New York: Ballantine, 2008), 255; Christopher Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers: Reflections on the Nature of War from Heraclitus to Heisenberg* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 125.
- 110 Ibid., 133–36; St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, *The City of God against the Pagans*, ed. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), bk. XIX, ch. 12 (p. 934).
- 111 Sir Michael Howard, *The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and the International Order* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 2, 6; Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers*, 28.
- 112 Tuck, *Philosophy and Government*, 348.
- 113 Ibid., 306–7, 327; id., *Rights of War and Peace*, 140.
- 114 Jonathan I. Israel, *The Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 4.
- 115 Ibid., 159–60.
- 116 Benedict de Spinoza, *The Political Works*, trans. and ed. A.G. Wernham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958; rpr. 1965), Introduction, 1–4.
- 117 Ibid., 22, 275–77, 311; Spinoza, *Tractatus Politicus*, in *Writings on Political Philosophy*, trans. R.H.M. Elwes, ed. A.G.A Boltz (New York: Appleton Century, 1937), 91, 103.
- 118 Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*, 26; Spinoza, *Political Works*, trans. Wernham, 309; id., *Tractatus Politicus*, trans. Elwes, ed. Boltz, 124, 133, 139.
- 119 Id., *Political Works*, trans. Wernham, 339, 361 and *n*; Niccoló Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, trans. Leslie Walker, S.J., ed. Bernard Crick (London: Penguin, 1983), I. 6 (p. 123); Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*, 166–67.
- 120 Spinoza, *Political Works*, trans. Wernham, 393–95; id., *Tractatus Politicus*, ed. Boltz, 125.

- 121 Tuck, *Rights of War and Peace*, 142–43, 150–51; Samuel, Freiherr von Pufendorf, *On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law*, ed. James Tully, trans. Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), xviii, 168; id., *The Political Writings of Samuel Pufendorf*, ed. Craig L. Carr, trans. Michael J. Seidler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 6, 37, 87, 145–47.
- 122 Tuck, *Rights of War and Peace*, 158–62; Pufendorf, *On the Duty of Man and Citizen*, ed. Tully, 119, 159, 170; id., *Political Writings of Samuel Pufendorf*, ed. Carr, 259–60.
- 123 Sully's *Grand Design of Henry IV: From the Memoirs of Maximilien Béthune, duc de Sully (1559–1641)*, intro. David Ogg (Grotius Society Publications, no. 2; London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1921), 10–11, 17–24, 30–33.
- 124 François de Callières, sieur de Rochelay et de Gigny, *The Art of Negotiating with Sovereign Princes* (London: Geo. Strahan et al., 1716), in Callières, *The Art of Diplomacy*, ed. H.M.A. Keens-Soper and Karl W. Schweizer (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1983), 20–22, 65–70; Keens-Soper, “François de Callières and Diplomatic Theory,” *Historical Journal* 16. no. 3 (1973): 485–508.
- 125 William Penn, *An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe* (1693–4), rpr. in *Peace Projects of the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Garland, 1972), 1–2, 6–10.
- 126 *Ibid.*, 12–15.
 Few Quakers were pacifists before 1660. Many had served in the Parliamentary armies, and were much opposed to the Royalists. Most of the radical Quakers were dead by 1670. The Restoration of Charles II forced pacifism and more conservative views on the Quakers in order to survive. William Penn represented this more conservative strain of Quakerism and also came from an aristocratic family (Barry Reay, *The Quakers and the English Revolution* [New York: St. Martin's, 1986], 41, 111, 121).
- 127 Charles Castel de Saint-Pierre, abbé de Tiron, *A Shorter Project for Perpetual Peace* (1738, rpr. in *Peace Projects of the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Garland, 1974)), 1–8, 24–33; Paul Hazard, *The European Mind, 1680–1715* (Cleveland: World, 1963), 435–37.
- 128 Saint-Pierre, *Shorter Project for Perpetual Peace*, 24–33.
- 129 Howard, *The Invention of Peace*, 24–25; Emmerich de Vattel, *The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns*, ed. Béla Karposy and Richard Whatmore (London, 1797; rpr. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2008), III: I. 3 (pp. 469–70), III: iii. 24 (p. 483); III: iii. 50 (p. 499).
- 130 *Id.*, *The Law of Nations, or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns*, trans. Albert de Lapredelle, ed. Charles G.

- Fenwick, vol. III (Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1916), III: iii. 46 (p. 250); Tuck, *Rights of War and Peace*, 192–94.
- 131 Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers*, 28; Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace* (1795), ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), 3.
- 132 Anthony Pagden, *The Enlightenment, and Why It Still Matters* (New York: Random House, 2013), 347–60.
- 133 Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, ed. Beck, 10; id., *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), in *Kant's Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), section 44 (p. 137); “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” (1784), in *Kant's Political Writings*, 47.
- 134 Id., *The Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. Reiss, section 54 (p. 165), section 56 (p. 167). Compare also Charles-Louis Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, ed. and trans. Anne M. Cohler, B.C. Miller, and H.S. Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 2. 10. 1–2 (pp. 138–39)
- 135 Id., *Perpetual Peace*, ed. Beck, 7–8.
- 136 Ibid., 10–15, 32.
- 137 Ibid., 16–20, 31; Tuck, *Rights of War and Peace*, 220.
- 138 Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers*, 183.
- 139 Adam Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (4th ed.; London: T. Caddel, 1773; rpr. London: Gregg, 1969), 333–35; id., *The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic* (Edinburgh, 1783; rpr. New York: Harper, 1844); Iain McDaniel, *Adam Smith in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Roman Past and Europe's Future* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 166–69, 157, 186–89; Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, ed. and trans. Cohler et al., 2. 10. 3 (p. 139).
- 140 Ferguson, *History of Civil Society*, 277–79; McDaniel, *Adam Ferguson in the Scottish Enlightenment*, 40–41, 56, 58, 185.
- 141 Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), ed. Edwin Cannan (New York: Modern Library, 1937), 745–46.
- 142 Ferguson, *History of Civil Society*, 387.
- 143 Ibid., 246–47, 302; Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, 659–60, 667–68.
- 144 Id., *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*, ed. J.C. Boyce (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 150–51; Matthew Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries: From the Late Archaic Period to Alexander* (London: Routledge, 2004), 4–5, 18–21, 82–83.
- 145 See also François, duc de La Rochefoucauld, *Epictus junior, or Maximes of Modern Morality*, trans. J[ohn] D[avies] (London: T. Bassett, 1670), 128–29.
- 146 Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, 861–63, 878.
- 147 Ibid., 409–13.

- 148 Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: ‘This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice’” (1793), in *Kant’s Political Writings*, ed. Reiss, 90–91; id., *Perpetual Peace*, ed. Beck, 5–6.
- 149 Vattel, *Law of Nations*, ed. Kárposy and Whatmore, III: iii. 50 (pp. 499–500).
- 150 Ibid., III: ii. 8 (p. 473).
- 151 Montesquieu, *Spirit of the Laws*, ed. Cohler et al., 9. 2. 2. (p. 132); Christopher Brooke, *Philosophic Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to Rousseau* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 204.
- 152 Lawrence H. Keeley, *War before Civilization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 6–8; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “The State of War,” *The Social Contract and other Political Writings*, trans. and ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 46–7, 166.
- 153 Ibid., 162–65, 167–70.
- 154 Ibid., 171–73.

Appendix

- 1 Vegetius: *Epitome of Military Science*, trans. N.R. Milner (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), iv: 9 (pp. 118–19).
- 2 Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1972), I: 83 (p. 84).
- 3 Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, ed. Bernard Crick, trans. Leslie Walker, S.J. (London: Penguin, 1974), II: 10 (pp. 300–303).
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Id., *The Arte of Warre*, trans. Peter Whitehorne (London, 1560; rpr. London: Peter Nutt, 1905), I. 22, I. 47.
- 6 Giovanni Botero, *The Reason of State*, trans. P.J. and D.P. Whaley (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956), IX.10 (pp. 183–84).
- 7 Francesco Guicciardini, *Maxims and Reflections of a Renaissance Statesman (Ricordi)*, trans. Mario Domandi (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, rpr. 1970), no. 149 (p. 79).
- 8 Sir Walter Raleigh, *The History of the World* (1604), ed. C.A. Patrides (rpr. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1971), V: I. 1 (pp. 325–33).
- 9 James Harrington, *The Art of Lawgiving in Three Books* (1659), in *Political Works*, ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 690; also Introduction, 58–59.
- 10 Barnabe Rich, *A Path-way to Military Practise* (London, 1587), sigs. B3v–B4r.

- 11 Justus Lipsius, *Six Bookes of Politickes or Civil Doctrine*, trans. William Jones (London: William Ponsonby, 1594; rpr. Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1970), V: vi (pp. 735–37). Compare also Don Bernadino de Mendoza, *Theorique and Practice of Warre*, trans. Sir Edward Hoby ([Middelburg: Richard Schilders,] 1597), 8, 23; [Edward Cooke,] *The Prospective Glasse of Warre* (London: Roger Michell, 1628), 1.
- 12 Thomas Hobbes, *On the Citizen*, ed. and trans. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), XIII: 14 (pp. 149–50).
- 13 Charles Davenant, *An Essay upon Ways and Means of Supplying War* (2nd ed.; London: Jacob Thomson, 1695), 26–27.

Bibliography

Primary sources

- The "Adages" of Erasmus: A Study with Translations*, ed. Margaret Mann Phillips. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964.
- The Alexiad of the Princess Anna Comnena. Being the History of the Reign of her Father, Alexias I, Emperor of the Romans, 1081–1118*, trans. Elizabeth A.S. Davies. London: Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner, rpr. 1978.
- The Aeneid of Virgil*, trans. Charles J. Bilson. 2 vols.; London: Arnold, 1906.
- The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1986.
- Aquinas: Selected Political Writings*, ed. A.P. Entrèves, trans. J.G. Dawson. Oxford: Blackwell, 1948.
- Aristotle. *Politics*, trans. H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977.
- Arriannus, Flavius. *The Discourses of Epictetus*, trans. P.E. Matheson. New York: Heritage Press, 1968.
- St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. *City of God against the Pagans*, trans. and ed. R.W. Dyson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Bacon, Sir Francis. *Works*, ed. James Spedding, R.J. Ellis and D.D. Heath. 7 vols.; London: Longman, 1857–59; rpr. Stuttgart: Fromann Verlag, 1963.
- Bodin, Jean. *Method for an Easy Comprehension of History*, trans. Beatrice Reynolds. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.
- Bonet, Honoré. *The Tree of Battles*, trans. and ed. G.W. Coopland. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1949.
- Botero, Giovanni. *The Reason of State*, trans. R.J. and D.P. Woley. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956.
- Bueil, Jean de. *La Jouvencaul*, ed. C. Favre and L. Lecestre. 2 vols.; Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1887–89.
- Burton, Robert. *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, ed. Holbrook Jackson. 3 vols.; London: Brent, 1932.
- Calvinism in Europe, 1540–1610: A Collection of Documents*, ed. Alastair Duke, Gillian Lewis and Andrew Pettegree. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992.

- Cicero. *De officiis*, trans. Walter Mills. Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961.
- The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Bollingen Series, XXXI; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973.
- Collected Works of Erasmus*, various editors. 86 vols.; Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1974–2011.
- The Complete Works of St. Thomas More*, various editors. 21 vols.: New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963–97.
- Erasmus, Desiderius. *The Education of a Christian Prince*, trans. Lester K. Born. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936.
- Ferguson, Adam. *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*. 4th ed.; London: T. Caddell, 1773; rpr. London: Gregg, 1969.
- Filmer, Sir Robert. *Patriarcha and Other Political Works*, ed. Peter Laslett. Oxford: Blackwell, 1949.
- Fletcher of Saltoun, Andrew. *Political Works*, ed. John Robertson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Gentili, Alberico. *De Juri Belli Libri Tres*, vol. 2: The Translation of 1612, trans. John C. Rolfe. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933.
- Grotius, Hugo. *The Law of War and Peace: De Juri Belli ac Libri Tres*, trans. Francis W. Kelsey. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962.
- Guevera, Antonio de. *The Diall of Princes*, trans. Thomas North. London: John Wayland, 1557; Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1968.
- Hobbes, Thomas. *Behemoth: The History of the Causes of the Civil Wars of England*, ed. Sir William Molesworth. London: William Crooke, 1682; rpr. New York: Burt Franklin, 1963.
- . *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*, ed. Ferdinand Tönnies. 2nd ed.; London: Cass, 1969.
- . *The Leviathan*, ed. W.G. Pogson-Smith. London: Andrew Crooke, 1651; rpr. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967.
- . *On the Citizen*, ed. and trans. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- The Iliad of Homer*, trans. Richard Lattimore. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.
- The Islamic Law of Nations; Shaybānī's Siyar*, trans. Majid Khadduri. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966.
- John of Salisbury, Bishop of Chartres. *The Statesman's Book of John of Salisbury . . . Policratus*, trans. John Dickenson. New York: Knopf, 1927.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Perpetual Peace*, ed. Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957.

- Kant's Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
- The Landmark Herodotus: The Histories*, trans. A.L. Purvis, ed. R.B. Strassler. New York: Pantheon, 2007.
- The Laws of Plato*, trans. and ed. Thomas L. Prangle. New York: Basic Books, 1980.
- Lipsius, Justus. *Sixte Bookes of Politickes or Civil Doctrine*, trans. William Jones. London: William Ponsonby, 1594; rpr. Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1970.
- Lucretius. *De rerum naturae*, trans. W.H.D. Rouse, ed. Martin Ferguson Smith. 2nd ed.; Loeb Classical Library: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.
- Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority*, ed. and trans. Harro Höppfl. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Macchiavelli, Niccolò. *The Art of War*, trans. Ellis Farnsworth. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965; rpr. New York: Da Capo, 1990.
- . *Discourses on Livy*, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Turner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- . *The Prince*, trans. George Bull. Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1961.
- Marcellinus, Ammianus. *The Later Roman Empire (AD 354–378)*, trans. Walter Hamilton. Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1986.
- Maurice's Strategikon: A Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy*, trans. George T. Dennis. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984.
- Milton, John. *Political Writings*, ed. Martin Dzelzaines, trans. Clare Gruzelier. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Montaigne, Michel de. *The Complete Essays*, trans. and ed. M.A. Screech. London: Penguin, 2003.
- Montesquieu, Charles-Louis Secondat, baron de. *The Spirit of the Laws*, ed. and trans. Anne Cohler, B.C. Miller and H.S. Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Onasander. *The General*, in *Aneas Tacticus, Asclepiodus, Onasander*, trans. Illinois Greek Club. Loeb Classical Library: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977.
- Peace Projects of the Seventeenth Century*. New York: Garland, 1972.
- The Political Works of John Harrington*, ed. J.G.A. Pocock. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Polybius. *The Histories*, trans. D.E. Shackelton Bailey. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986.
- Pufendorf, Samuel. *On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law*, ed. James Tully, trans. Michael Silverthorne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

- . *The Political Writings of Samuel Pufendorf*, ed. Craig L. Carr, trans. Michael J. Seidler. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Raleigh, Sir Walter. *History of the World*, ed. C.A. Patrides. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *The Social Contract and Other Political Writings*, trans. and ed. Victor Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, ed. Philip Schaff. 14 vols.: New York: Christian Literature Co., 1886.
- Sidney, Algernon. *Discourses concerning Government*. London, 1698; rpr. New York: Arno Press, 1979.
- Smith, Adam. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), ed. Edwin Cannan. New York: Modern Library, 1937.
- Spinoza, Benedict. *Political Works*, trans. and ed. A.G. Wernham. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958; rpr. 1965.
- . *Writings on Political Philosophy*, trans. R.H.M. Elwes, ed. A.G.A. Boltz. New York: Appleton Century, 1937.
- Tacitus, Cornelius. *The Agricola and the Germania*, trans. H. Mattingly. Rev. ed.; Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1981.
- . *The Annals*, trans. A.J. Woodman. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2004.
- Thucydides. *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner. New York: Penguin, 1992.
- Vattel, Emmerich de. *The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nations Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns*, ed. Béla Karposy and Richard Whatmore. London, 1797; rpr. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2008.
- Vegetius. Epitome of Military Science*, trans. N.P. Milner. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993.
- Vico, Giambattista. *The First New Science*, trans. and ed. Leon Pampa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Works of Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns*, trans. and ed. Daryl Hine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

Secondary sources

- Adams, Robert P. *The Better Part of Valour: More, Colet and Vives on Humanism, War and Peace, 1496–1535*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962.
- Akbar, M. J. *The Shade of Swords: Jihad and the Conflict between Islam and Christianity*. London: Routledge, 2002.

- Allen, J.W. *A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century*. London: Methuen, rpr. 1961.
- Allmand, Christopher. *The Hundred Years War: England and France at War, c. 1300–1450*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Anderson, Perry. *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism*. London: NLB, 1974.
- Arberry, Arthur J. *The Koran Interpreted*. New York: Macmillan, 1955.
- Bachrach, David S. *Religion and the Conduct of War, c. 300–1215*. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2003.
- . *Warfare in Tenth-Century Germany*. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 2012.
- Bainton, Roland H. *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace*. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960.
- Barrie, John. *War in Medieval English Society: Social Values in the Hundred Years War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974.
- Berman, Harold J. *Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.
- Bireley, Robert. *Religion and the Politics of the Counterreformation: Emperor Ferdinand II, William Lamormaini, S.J. and the Foundations of Imperial Policy*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981.
- Bloch, Marc. *Feudal Society*, trans. L.A. Manyan. 2 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.
- Bonner, Michael. *Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practices*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.
- Bosworth, A.B. *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Braudel, Fernand. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Siân Reynolds. 2 vols.; New York: Harper and Row, 1966.
- Brown, Peter. *The World of Late Antiquity, AD 150–750*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1971.
- Burgess, Glenn. *British Political Thought, 1500–1660*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Campbell, Brian. *War and Society in Imperial Rome, 91 BC–AD 284*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes*, ed. Tom Sorrell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare*, ed. Philip Sabin and Hans van Wees. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Carroll, Stuart. *Blood and Violence in Early Modern France*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

- The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History*, ed. Donald J. Kagan and L.J. Andrew Villalon. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 1999.
- The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, Scotland and Ireland, 1638–1660*, ed. John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Clark, Ian. *Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Clodfelter, Micheal. *War and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1494–2007*. 3rd ed.; Jefferson, NC: MacFarland, 2008.
- Coker, Christopher. *Barbarous Philosophers: Reflections on the Nature of War from Heraclitus to Heisenberg*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
- Contamine, Philippe. *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. Michael Jones. Oxford: Blackwell, 1984.
- Cox, Rory. *Wyclif on War and Peace*. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Royal Historical Society, 2014.
- Crouzet, Denis. *La guerrieres de Dieu: La violence au temps des troubles de religion (vers 1525–vers 1610)*. 2 vols.; Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 1990.
- Crusade and Settlement*, ed. Peter Edbury. Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, 1985.
- Crusaders, Condottieri and Cannon*, ed. Donald Kagan and L.J. Andrew Villalon. Leiden: Brill, 2003.
- The Crusades and the Near East*, ed. Conor Kostik. London: Routledge, 2011.
- Daniel, Norman. *The Arabs and Medieval Europe*. London: Longman, 1979.
- Davis, J.C. *Utopia and the Ideal Society: A Study of English Utopian Writing, 1516–1700*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Dawson, Doyne. *The Origins of Western Warfare: Militarism and Morality in the Ancient World*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990.
- Dunbabin, Jean. *France in the Making, 843–1180*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Eliav-Feldon, Miriam. “Grand Designs: The Peace Plans of the Late Renaissance.” *Vivarium* 27. no. 1 (1989), 51–76.
- Elliott, J.H. *Europe Divided, 1559–1598*. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.
- . *Imperial Spain, 1469–1710*. New York: St. Martin’s, 1964.
- England’s Wars of Religion Revisited*, ed. Charles W.A. Prior and Glenn Burgess. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011.
- Erdmann, Carl. *The Origins of the Idea of Crusade*, trans. Marshall W. Baldwin and Walter Goffart. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.
- Fernandez-Santamaria, J.A. *The State, War and Peace: Spanish Political Thought in the Renaissance, 1516–1559*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Fichtenau, Heinrich. *The Carolingian Empire*, trans. Peter Munz. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978.

- Firestone, Reuven. *Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Fisher, John H. *John Gower: Moral Philosopher and Friend of Chaucer*. New York: New York University Press, 1964.
- Flori, Jean. *La guerre sainte: La formation d'idée de croisade dans l'Occident chrétien*. Paris: Aubier, 2001.
- France, John. *Perilous Glory: The Rise of Western Military Power*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011.
- Freeman, James A. *Milton and the Martial Muse: Paradise Lost and the European Tradition of War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- Gaddis, Michael. *There is no Crime for Those Who Have Christ: Religious Violence in the Christian Roman Empire*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.
- Gat, Azar. *War in Human Civilization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Gentles, Ian. *The English Revolution and the Wars in the Three Kingdoms, 1638–1652*. Harlow, Essex: Pearson Longman, 2007.
- Gillingham, John. "Conquering the Barbarians: War and Chivalry in Twelfth-Century Britain," *The Haskins Society Journal: Studies in Medieval History* 4 (1992), 67–84.
- . "1066 and the Introduction of Chivalry into England." *Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy: Essays in Honour of Sir James Holt*, ed. George Garnett and John Hudson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- . *War, Justice and Public Order: England and France in the Late Middle Ages*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Gilliver, C.M. *The Roman Art of War*. Stroud, Gloucs.: Tempus, 1999.
- Haldon, John. *Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World*. London: LCL Press, 1999.
- Halsall, Guy. *Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450–900*. London: Routledge, 2003.
- Heather, Peter. *The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Herrin, Judith. *Byzantium: The Surprising Life of a Medieval Empire*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
- Hexter, J.H. *The Vision of Politics on the Eve of the Reformation: More, Machiavelli and Seyssel*. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
- Hosler, John D. *John of Salisbury: Military Authority of the Twelfth-Century Renaissance*. Leiden: Brill, 2013.
- Hourami, Albert. *A History of the Arab Peoples*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.
- Housley, Norman. *Fighting for the Cross: Crusading to the Holy Land*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008.

- . *The Later Crusades, 1274–1580: From Lyons to Alcazar*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- . *Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400–1536*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Howard, Michael. *The Causes of War and Other Essays*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.
- . *The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000.
- . *War and the Liberal Conscience*. London: Temple Smith, 1978.
- . *War in European History*. London: Oxford University Press, 1976.
- Imber, Colin. *The Crusade of Varna, 1443–45*. Aldershot, Hants.: Aldgate, 2006.
- . *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
- Israel, Jonathan. *The Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Johnson, James Turner. *Just War and Jihad: Historical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991.
- . *Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War: Religions and Secular Concepts, 1200–1740*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.
- . *The Quest for Peace: Three Moral Traditions in Western Cultural History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987.
- Kaeuper, Richard. *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Kaplan, Benjamin. *Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.
- Keeley, Lawrence H. *War before Civilization*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Keen, Maurice. *Chivalry*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989.
- . *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965.
- Kennedy, Hugh. *The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State*. London: Routledge, 2001.
- Kershaw, Paul E.J. *Peaceful Kings: Peace, Power, and the Early Political Imagination*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Khadduri, Majid. *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955; rpr. New York: AMS, 1979.
- Knapp, Robert. *Invisible Romans*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011.
- Knecht, R.J. *The French Wars of Religion, 1559–1598*. Harlow, Essex: Longman, 2010.
- Lambton, Anne K.S. *State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Political Theory: The Jurists*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

- The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World*, ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos and Mark R. Shulman. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.
- London, J.E. *Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Antiquity*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965.
- LeRoy Ladurie, Emmanuel. *Carnival in Romans*, trans. Mary Feeney. New York: Braziller, 1979.
- Levin, Harry. *The Myth of the Golden Age in the Renaissance*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969.
- Louthan, Howard. *Converting Bohemia: Force and Persuasion in the Catholic Reformation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Lowe, Ben. *Imagining Peace: A History of Early English Pacifist Ideas, 1340–1560*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.
- Madden, Thomas F. *The New Concise History of the Crusades*. Rev. ed.: Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.
- Mann, Michael. *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. i: *A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- . *States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1988.
- Manning, Roger B. *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army, 1585–1702*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- . *Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Martinich, A.P. *Hobbes: A Biography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Mattingly, Garrett. *Renaissance Diplomacy*. Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1965.
- McCrea, Adrianna. *Constant Minds: Political Virtue and the Lipsian Paradigm in England, 1584–1650*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997.
- McDaniel, Iain. *Adam Ferguson in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Roman Past and Europe's Future*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013.
- Meron, Theodore. *Bloody Constraint: War and Chivalry in Shakespeare*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Miles, Geoffrey. *Shakespeare and the Constant Romans*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Miller, William Ian. *Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law and Society in Saga Iceland*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.
- Momigliano, Arnaldo. *Studies in Historiography*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966.
- Muchembled, Robert. *A History of Violence from the Middle Ages to the Present*, trans. Jean Birrell. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.

- Ostreich, Gerhard. *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State*, ed. B. Ostreich and H.G. Koenigsberger, trans. D. McLintock. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
- Palmer, J.J.N. *England, France and Christendom, 1377–99*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972.
- Partner, Peter. *God of Battles: Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987.
- Pedersen, Johannes. *Israel: Its Life and Culture*. 4 vols. in 2; London: Oxford University Press, 1926–40; rpr. Copenhagen: Branner og Korch, 1959.
- Peltonen, Markku. *Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Political Thought, 1570–1640*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Pinker, Steven. *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined*. New York: Viking, 2011.
- Pocock, J.G.A. *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.
- Pouncey, Peter R. *The Necessities of War: A Study of Thucydides' Pessimism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.
- Prestwich, Michael. *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996.
- Rawlings, Louis. *The Ancient Greeks at War*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007.
- Reformation, Revolt and Civil War in France and the Netherlands*, ed. Philip Benedict. Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1999.
- Religious Differences in France: Past and Present*, ed. Kathleen Perry Long. Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2006.
- Reynolds, Susan. *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Richardson, Lewis F. *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*, ed. Quincy Wright C.C. Lienau. Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1960.
- Riley-Smith, Jonathan. *The Crusades: A History*. 3rd ed.; London: Bloomsbury, 2014.
- . *What Were the Crusades?* 3rd ed.; San Francisco: Ignatius, 2002.
- Royle, Trevor. *The British Civil War: The Wars of the Three Kingdoms*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
- Runciman, Steven. *A History of the Crusades*. 3 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962.
- Russell, Frederick H. *The Just War in the Middle Ages*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- Russell, Joycelyne. *Peacemaking in the Renaissance*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986.

- Schmidtt, Carl. *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, trans. and ed. G.L. Ulman. New York: Telos, 2003.
- Schwobel, Robert. *The Shadow of the Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk*. New York: St. Martin's, 1967.
- Scott, David. *Politics and War in the Three Kingdoms, 1637–1660*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
- Scott, Jonathan. *Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677–1683*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- . “The Law of War: Grotius, Sidney, Locke and the Political Theory of Rebellion.” *History of Political Thought* 13, no. 4 (1992).
- Shifflett, Andrew. *Stoicism, Politics and Literature in the Age of Milton: War and Peace Reconciled*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Skinner, Quentin. *Foundations of Modern Political Thought*. 2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- 1648: War and Peace in Europe*, ed. Klaus Bussmann and Heinz Schilling. 3 vols.; Munich: Bruckmann, 1998.
- Society at War: The Experience of England and France during the Hundred Years War*, ed. C.T. Allmand. New York: Harper and Row, 1973.
- Somagyi, Nick de. *Shakespeare's Theatre of War*. Aldershot, Hants.: Ashgate, 1998.
- Sommerville, Johann R. *Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Context*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.
- Spitz, Lewis W. *The Protestant Reformation, 1517–1559*. New York: Harper and Row, 1985.
- Strickland, Matthew. *War and Chivalry: The Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Strauss, Leo. *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis*, trans. Elsa M. Sinclair. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936; rpr. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.
- Supple, James. *Arms versus Letters: The Military and Literary Ideals in the “Essais” of Montaigne*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.
- Thompson, James Westfall. *The Wars of Religion in France, 1559–1576*. New York: Frederick Ungar, rpr. 1959.
- Tolan, John V. *Saracens: Islam in Medieval European Imagination*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
- Tuck, Richard. *Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- . *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and International Order from Grotius to Kant*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Van Creveld, Martin. *The Culture of War*. New York: Ballantine, 2008.

- . *Wargames: From Gladiators to Gigabytes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Vanderpol, Alfred. *La doctrine scholastique du droit de guerre*. Paris: A. Pedone, 1925.
- Van Wees, Hans. *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities*. London: Duckworth, 2004.
- Wallace-Hadrill, J.M. "War and Peace in the Earlier Middle Ages." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser., 25 (1975): 157–74.
- War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval History*, ed. Philip de Souza and John France. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2008.
- War and Peace in the Ancient World*, ed. Kurt A. Raaflaub. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.
- War and Peace in the Middle Ages*, ed. Brian Patrick McGuire. Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels, 1987.
- Ward-Perkins, Bryan. *The Fall of Rome: and the End of Civilization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Warfare in the Dark Ages*, ed. John France and Kelly DeVries. Aldershot, Hants.: Ashgate, 2008.
- Wheeler, James Scott. *Cromwell in Ireland*. New York: St. Martin's, 1999.
- Wilson, Charles. *The Transformation of Europe, 1558–1648*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.
- Worden, Blair. *The English Civil Wars, 1640–1660*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2009.
- Wright, Quincy. *A Study of War*. 2 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.
- Zampaglione, Gerardo. *The Idea of Peace in Antiquity*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973.

Index

- Abu Bakr 115, 116
Achilles 5
age of iron 20, 201, 223
Alaric 53
Albert, Margrave of Brandenburg-Anspach 140
Alexander II, Pope 71
Alexander III, the Great 3, 13–14, 16–18, 21, 24, 185, 193, 271, 285, 286
Alexius I, Emperor 90, 91
Alexios III, Emperor 92
Alexios IV, Emperor 92
Alexios V, Emperor 92
Alfred the Great, King of the West Saxons, 60, 62
Ambrose, St., Bishop of Milan 53, 54, 55–8, 110, 229
Ammianus Marcellinus 48
Anselm, St., Archbishop of Canterbury 136
Antalcidas, Peace of 20–1
Apollo, god 34
ara pacis 35, 48
Ares, god 5–6, 12, 34
Aristotle xvii, 7, 21, 78, 124, 190, 191, 195, 218, 238, 239, 250, 271, 283
Armilustrum 35
Ascanius, son of Aeneas xvii
Astraea 183
Athena, goddess 3, 5–6, 106
Attila the Hun 57
Augustine, St., Bishop of Hippo xxviii, 38, 40, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 75, 77, 78, 87, 90, 101, 103, 105, 110–11, 173, 198, 206, 209, 212, 229, 249, 274, 275, 279
d'Avranches, Gerald 83
Ayala, Balthazar 220, 222

Bacon, Sir Francis x, 197, 198, 225, 226
Baldwin, Count of Flanders, Byzantine Emperor 92
Baldwin IV, King of Jerusalem 123
Battles
 Asculum in Apulia 21
 Adrianople 56
 Bagentun Creek 72
 Bouvines 70
 Chaeronea 7
 Drogheda 177
 Flodden 196
 Frankenhausen 145
 Lepanto 133, 151
 Marathon 5
 Mohacs 132
 Nicopolis 129
 Siege of Orleans 69
 Stanford Bridge 71
 Tours 84
 Tannenberg 139
 Tours 24
 Varna 132
 White Mountain 142, 167
Beaufort, Henry, Cardinal 141
Bede, the Venerable 59, 61–2, 77
bellicosity xv–xvi, 6
Bellona, goddess 34
Benedict, St. 58
Bernard, St., Abbot of Clairvaux 86, 123
Bethlen Gabor, Prince of Transylvania, King of Hungary 168
Bodin, Jean 3, 52, 218
Boethius 62
Bonet (or Bouvet), Honoré 74, 76–7, 97, 98
Boniface VIII, Pope 74, 88
Botero, Giovanni 187–8, 286
Bromyard, John 99
Bucer, Martin 148
Bueil, Jean de, Viscount of Careton and Count of Sancerre 69, 86
Burchard, Bishop of Worms 121
Burton, Richard 197, 210

- Calgacus 37, 233
 Callières, François de 254
 Calvin, John 153, 157–9
 Campus Martius 35, 48
 Cartesianism 250
 Carthaginians 43
 Castiglione, Baldasare 188–9, 279
 Cateau-Cambrésis, Treaty of 149–59, 155, 156, 277
 Cathars 100, 135, 136, 162, 277
 Catherine de Médicis, Queen Mother of France 155, 157, 160, 162
 Catiline 242
 Cavendish, Sir William, Lord Cavendish 266
 Charlemagne, Emperor 63–6, 111–12
 Charles Martel 64, 84
 Charles V, Emperor 146, 147, 181
 Charles V, King of France 95, 97
 Charles VI, King of France 97
 Charles IX, King of France 157, 159, 164
 Charles the Bald, King of Francia and Neustria 66
 Charles I, Prince of Wales, King of England, Ireland and Scotland 171, 172, 173, 175, 176, 228, 231, 232, 236, 242
 Charles II, King of England, Ireland and Scotland 223, 228, 247
 Charron, Pierre 208
 Chelciky, Peter 100
 Chrysostom, St. John, Patriarch of Constantinople 58
 Chrysippus of Cyprus 22
 Cicero 22, 29, 30, 31, 35, 36, 41, 58, 75, 190, 232, 238, 273, 285
 Cineas 21
 Claudius, Emperor 28
 Clement VI, Pope 76
 Clermont, Council of 80, 134
 Cluniac Revival 80
 Colet, John 190
 Commynes, Philippe de 102
 Comnena, Anna 90, 91
 Concordia, goddess 32
 Condé, Henry, Prince of 157
condottieri 187
 Constantine I, Emperor 39, 46, 47, 56, 58, 100
 Constantine XI, Byzantine Emperor 130
 cosmopolitanism 35
 Crassus, Marcus 25, 27
 Cromwell, Oliver xx–xxi, 175, 177, 179, 252
 Crucé, Eméric 193–4, 256
 Crusades xvi, xxii
 Crusaders xxii, xxiv
 Curtius Rufus, Quintus 285
 Cyrus, King of Persia xvii

 Daniel, Samuel 230–1
 Dante Alighieri 87–8, 278–9
 Darius, King of Persia 16–17
 Davenant, Charles 288
 “deadly quarrels” xi
 Decretalists 75–6
 Devereux, Robert, second Earl of Essex 208, 217, 241, 286
 Diana, goddess 32, 33
 Dio Chrysostom 23
 diplomacy x–xi
 Domitian, Emperor 24, 221
 Dudley, Robert, Earl of Leicester 217
 Duplessis-Mornay, Philippe 153, 160

 Edward I, King of England 72
 Edwin, King of Northumbria 60, 61, 62
 Eirene 20, 32
 Elizabeth I, Queen of England 183, 241
 Epicurus 22–3, 208
 Epictetus 23–4, 36, 38
Equiria 35
 Erasmus xxii–xxiii, 99, 148, 181, 182, 189–95, 203, 207, 208, 211–12, 279–80
 Erghome, John 101
 Ermenfrid, Bishop of Sion 71

 Fenne, Thomas 209
 Ferdinand I, Emperor 142
 Ferdinand II, Emperor 148, 168
 Festus 41
 Ferguson, Adam 260–2, 284
festiales 29
 Filmer, Sir Robert 221, 229, 233
 Fletcher of Saltoun, Andrew 217
 Francis of Assisi, St. 99, 123
 Francis I, King of France 155
 Francis II, King of France 155, 158, 159
 Frederick II, Emperor 124

- Frederick V, Elector Palatine, King of Bohemia 142, 167
Fuller, Thomas 142
- Gaius Marius 25
Gascoigne, George 209
Gentili, Alberico xvii, 196, 197, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 281
George, Arian bishop 48
Gerald of Wales (Giraldus Cambrensis) 68, 72
Gibbon, Edward 28
Golden Age (Age of Cronus) 19–20, 22, 27, 31, 40, 42, 238
Gower, John 98–9, 101
Gratian of Bologna (Franciscus Gratianus) 75–6, 275
Great Schism 24–5, 94, 95–6, 140
Gregory of Tours, St. 59
Gregory I, Pope 111
Gregory VII, Pope (Hildebrand) 51, 59, 75, 78, 136
Gregory IX, Pope 194
Grotius, Hugo xxiv, 180, 215, 216, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 232, 249, 253, 255, 266, 269, 281, 282, 283
Guevara, Antonio, Bishop of Guadix 181, 183, 189
Guicciardini, Francesco 186, 187, 211, 286
Guise, Charles, Cardinal of Lorraine 156, 161, 165
Guise, Francis, duke of Guise 156, 157, 159, 165
Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden 168, 222
Guzmán, Gaspar de, Count-duke of Olivares 156
- Hannibal 24
Harald Hardrada, king of Norway 71–2
Harold Godwinson, King of the English 71
Harrington, James 225, 227, 228, 231–2, 245, 266, 267, 282, 286
Henry I, King of England 68
Henry of Bolingbroke, earl of Derby, King Henry IV of England 102
Henry V, King of England 95
Henry VI, King of England 102
Henry II, King of France 155, 156, 158
Henry III, King of France 165, 203
Henry of Navarre, King Henry IV of France 158, 161, 166, 203, 254
Henry IV, Emperor 85
Henry VI, Emperor 123
Henry “the Navigator”, Prince of Portugal 126
Henry, Prince of Wales 208
Heraclitus of Ephesus 4, 23
Herodotus 5, 7, 9–10
Hesiod 19–29, 22, 28, 32, 99, 183, 238, 271
Hilary, St., Bishop of Poitiers 59
Hobbes, Thomas xv, xxv, 4, 215, 216, 221, 225, 226, 227, 228, 234, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250–1, 258, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 281, 282, 283, 287
Homer 2–3, 5, 6, 18–19, 100, 207
Honorius II, Pope 130
hoplites xix, 6–7, 9, 12–13, 15, 24
hunter-gatherer societies xvi, 54–5
hunting xvii–xviii
Hus, Jan 100, 140, 276
Hussites, 100, 140, 141, 168, 276–7
Hyde, Edward, Earl of Clarendon 173
- Ibn al-Furat, Asad 118
Ibn Khaldun, ‘Abd-al-Rahmān 112
Ibn Rushd, Muhammad ibn-Ahmad (Averroes) 121
imperator 36
Innocent II, Pope 134
Innocent III, Pope 92, 135
Innocent VI, Pope 96
Isidore of Seville, St. 75
Isocrates 21
- James VI & I, King of England, Ireland and Scotland 170, 171, 206, 208
Jansenists 223
Janus, Temple of 1–2, 27, 272
Jerome, St. 58
John VIII, Pope 83
John of Legnana 76
John of Salisbury, Archbishop of Chartres xx, 45, 74, 83
Judas Maccabeus 119, 137
Julian, Emperor 47, 48
Julius Caesar 25, 27, 33, 34, 36, 185, 192, 193, 207

- Julius II, Pope 192
 Justinian, Emperor 89, 218
- Kant, Immanuel 250, 257–60, 263–4, 269, 284
 Knights of Rhodes 170
 Knights of St. John's of Jerusalem 131, 133
 Knights Templar 81, 86, 124–5
 Knights, Teutonic 137, 138, 139, 276–7
 Knox, John 159
- Lamormaini, William, S.J. 148
 Lateran, Council of 81
latifundia 26
 Laud, William, Archbishop of Canterbury 173, 176
 Leo IV, Pope 83
 Leo IX, Pope 135–6, 146
 Leo X, Pope 84
lex talionis 113
 l'Hôpital, Michel de 160
 Lipsius, Justus 182, 201, 203, 204–5, 206–8, 212–13, 216, 219–29, 241, 280, 287
 Livy 33, 184, 209, 286
 Locke, John 221, 225
 Louis the Pious, Emperor 65
 Louis XIII, King of France 171, 254
 Louis XIV, King of France 180
 Lucian of Samosata xii, 23
 Lucretius 23, 99, 271
 Luther, Martin 143–4, 146, 158
- Ma, goddess 34
 Machiavelli, Nicholò xii, xxii, 10, 130, 181, 183–9, 197, 198, 204–5, 211, 215, 216, 217, 220, 225, 226, 227, 230, 252, 266, 278–9, 280, 281, 285, 286
 Maine, Sir Henry Sumner 248
 Manicheanism 49
 Mars, god 23, 32, 34, 190
 Marsilius of Padua 86, 278–9
 martial glory xi
 Martin, St., Bishop of Tours 59
 Maurice, Emperor xvii
 Maurice of Nassau, Stadholder, Prince of Orange 154, 205, 213, 222, 287
 Maximilian I, Elector of Bavaria 167
 Mahmet II, Sultan of Ottoman Turkey 130
 Melanchton, Philip 148
- Mezières, Philippe de 74, 97
 Milton, John 229, 230, 231–3, 267–8, 282
 Minerva, goddess 32, 34
 Molina, Luis 197, 220
 monasticism xxii
 Montaigne, Michel de xxviii, 161, 182, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 208, 212, 247, 280
 Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de La Brede 261, 265
 Monluc, Blaise de 161, 162
 Montluc Jean de 160
 Montmorency, Anne de, Duke of, Constable of France 155
 More, Sir Thomas 190, 193, 197, 198, 199
Morte Arthure 79–80, 193
 Muhammad, Prophet 107, 113, 115, 116, 117, 121, 275
 Münzer, Thomas 145–6
 Murad I, Sultan of Ottoman Turkey and Caliph 128
 Murad II, Sultan of Ottoman Turkey 132
- Nashe, Thomas 209
 Nedham, Marchamont 233
 Neptune, god 32
 Nicaea, Council of 47
 Nicholas IV, Pope 99
 Nicholas V, Pope 130, 131
 Nicias, Peace of 8
 Nike, god 35
 Norman Conquest 67, 68
 Noue, François de la 161
- Octavian Augustus, Emperor 25, 27, 28, 30, 32, 35, 41, 273
 Odysseus 5
 Onasander 26, 29, 33
 Orderic of Vitales 68, 69
 Origen 38
 Ovid 20, 99, 183, 237, 271
- Paul, St. 46, 56
 Pax, goddess 32
 Penn, William xx, 255–6
 Pericles 9, 13
 Philip II, King of Macedon 7, 14–15
 Philip Augustus, King of Francis 135
 Philip the Fair, King of France 74
 Philip VI, King of France 94, 96

- Philip II, King of Spain 149–50, 151, 154
 Philip III, King of Spain 150, 154
 Pindar of Thebes 19, 192
 Pisan, Christine de 74
 Pius II, Pope (Aeneas Sylvius Piccolimi)
 131
 Plato xvii, 8, 11–12, 19, 191, 198, 271
 Pliny the Elder 41
 Plutarch 3
 Polemos, King 23
 Polybius 10–11, 26, 31, 33, 154, 184, 224
 Pompey 43
proskynesis 17
 Pufendorf, Samuel xii, 250, 253–4
 Punic Wars 10, 29
 Pyrrhus, King of Epirus 21
- Quirinus, god 1, 34
- Rabelais, François xii, xvii
 Raleigh, Sir Walter 142, 286
 Rich, Barnabe 287
 Richard II, King of England 97, 101–2,
 241
 Richard III, King of England 207
 Roger, Count of Sicily 134
 Romulus 33
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques xviii, 265–6
rouitiers 134, 136, 186
 Rudolf II, Holy Roman Emperor 167, 168
 Rupert of the Rhine, Prince, English
 Royalist General 175
- Saavedra Fajardo, Diego de 197
 Saint Evremond, Charles, Seigneur de 223
 Saint-Pierre, Charles Castel, Abbé de 256
 Saladin, Yusuf ibn-Ayyûb 120, 123–4, 276
 Scaliger, Joseph xvii
 Scipio Aemilianus (Scipio the Younger) 10,
 31, 192, 200
 Scot, Michael 124
 “Second Thirty Years War” x
 Selden, John 225
 Selim I, Sultan of Ottoman Turkey 131
 Seneca 22, 38, 190, 208, 219, 238
 Shakespeare, William 209
 Sickingen, Franz von 145
 Sidney, Algernon 215, 217, 221, 225, 226–7,
 228–9, 223, 234, 266–7, 282
- Smith, Adam 178–9, 261, 262–3, 284
 Solomon, King of Israel 60, 62
 Spencer, Edmund 209
 Spinoza, Benedict 250–2, 253
 Suger, Abbot of Saint-Denis 68, 71
 Suleiman the Magnificent, Sultan of
 Ottoman Turkey 146
 Sully, Maximilien de Bethune, Duc de 254,
 256
- Taborites 141
 Tacitus, Cornelius 30, 31, 37, 43, 204, 205,
 208, 228, 233
 Tarquin, King 33
 Tertullian 39, 45, 110, 229
 Theodosius, Emperor 48
 Thomas Aquinas, St. 75, 77–8, 104, 187, 190,
 191, 206
 Thucydides 3, 6, 9–10, 216, 227, 228, 241,
 242, 243, 244, 267, 282, 285
 Tiberius, Emperor 27
 Twelve Tables 26
- United East India Company (VOC) 225,
 282
 Urban II, Pope 80, 82, 84, 134
- Vair, Guillaume de, Bishop of Lesieux 201,
 202, 208
 Vandals 43
 Varro, Marcus Terentius 30, 45
 vassalage 64, 67
 Vattel, Emmerich de 256–7, 264
 Vegetius xvi, 31, 69, 77, 104, 192, 385
 Venus, goddess 23, 32, 34
 Verdun, Treaty of 66
 Vico, Giambattista 2
 Victoria, goddess 35–6
 Vilette, Philippe de, Abbot of Saint-Denis
 77
 violence, state monopoly on xvi–xvii
 Virgil 1, 27–8, 183
 Vitoria, Francisco de 195, 196, 228
 Vives, Juan Luis 193
- Waldensians 100, 141
 Walsingham, Sir Francis 217
 Walsingham, Thomas 101
 Wallenstein, Albert von 168

- war, frequency of xii–xv
warrior-kings, mortality rate of xix
Wentworth, Sir Thomas, Earl of Strafford,
 Lord Deputy of Ireland 176
Wetzel, Georg 148
William I, the “Conqueror”, King of
 England 68, 71
William Rufus, William II, King of England
 68
William of Orange (“the Silent”) 152, 205, 206
Wyclif, John 99, 101, 140
Xenophon xvii, 14
Xerxes, King of Persia 16–17
Zeno of Citium 22
Zeus, god 23, 36
Žižka, John 141, 277

