Imagining Europe: Memory, Visions, and Counter–Narratives

Edited by Lars Klein and Martin Tamcke

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Imagining Europe

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Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Martin Tamcke, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen;
Dr. Janny de Jong, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen;
Dr. Lars Klein, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen;
Dr. Margriet van der Waal, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

Editors of Volume 2

Dr. Lars Klein, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen;
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Martin Tamcke, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen

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Preface

In the course of the so-called 'economic and financial crisis' from 2008 onwards, there has been a fierce debate about the role and purpose of the European Union. It was led in politics and the media just as in academia. The economic usefulness of the Euro has been discussed, and the political implications of a fostered European unification. Most often, the state of Europeanization has been presented as being without alternatives: no Europe without Greece; no Euro without Greece; no way back to the nation state in its old form. As a result, the debate on Europe was largely narrowed down to the very questions of the immediate crisis, namely economics and finance. Only a few voices held that the crisis in fact was one of politics, not of economics. And only late did politicians mention again that Europe is more than the EU. Alternative views of Europe, however, were scarce and often presented full of consequences. It thus came without much surprise that the lacking imaginative power of politicians as well as intellectuals was criticized.

The idea for this volume sprang from that situation. We have invited scholars from various disciplines to present us with ways of imagining Europe that go beyond the rather limited view of EU institutions. How was, how is Europe imagined? Which memories are evoked, which visions explicated? Which counter-narratives to prominent discourses are there?

The contributors come from a range of disciplines, from English Literature, History, Political Science, Sociology and Theology. Most of the contributions to this volume were first presented as a lecture in the Erasmus Mundus Programme "Euroculture – Society, Politics and Culture in a Global Context" at Georg-August-Universität Göttingen and revised for publication.

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Lars Klein and Martin Tamcke

Serbian Church and Europe
on the Threshold of the Third Millennium[*]

Vladimir Cvetković

1   Definitions

The shape that the history of relations between the Serbian Church and Europe will have depends directly on the definition of these two terms. If these terms are broadly defined, then one may speak of more than a millennium long history relationship, which passed various historical phases. In broad terms the 'Serbian church' designates a church of Orthodox rite to which belongs Serbian Slav population; which has been established in the ninth century by the Greek missionaries Cyril and Methodius and which belonged to the Byzantine political and cultural sphere of influence.[1] In opposition to the Byzantine cultural model stays another cultural model, created through "the confluence of Germanic traditions and Christian-Latin culture", a model by which is usually from eighth century onward Europe identified.[2] The things become more complicated if one understands the Serbian Church as an independent or autocephalous ecclesial organization, established by the medieval Serbian nobleman and monk Sava Nemanjić in 1219, and which included most of Serbian population.[3] In this case, the long standing divisions Latin/Greek or Europe/Byzantium become precarious, because although it cherished both Latin and Greek Christianity, the Serbian Church attempted to build its own spiritual tradition and organization, often encouraging Serbian rulers to campaign against Byzantium in alliance with Western European Catholic kingdoms

[1] A.P. Vlasto, *The Entry of the Slavs into Christendom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 207-208.

[2] Norman F. Cantor, *Civilization of the Middle Ages* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 185.

[3] Vladimir Cvetković, 'Serbian Tradition', in: Augustine Casiday (ed.*), The Orthodox Christian World* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 130-140: 131-132.

despite belonging to the Byzantine cultural model and despite celebrating in Orthodox rite.

Used in a narrower sense, the aforementioned terms may acquire different meanings: the Serbian Church may be identified with the institutional framework of the Patriarchate of Belgrade or the Serbian Orthodox Church, which is its official name,[4] while Europe might be used in a geopolitical sense and refer exclusively to the European Union. However, I will avoid the institutional context of both the Serbian Church and the EU. Instead, when I refer to the Serbian Church I have in mind in particular the attitudes of those thinkers who shaped the main tenants of the Serbian Orthodox thought, in the course of the twentieth century. I will refer to Europe not in its physical sense as geographic entity, but I will identify it with those European authors, who constructed European values and later contrasted them to the Balkans or the Orthodox Christianity of the Balkans. The definitions of Serbian Church and Europe in broader and narrower sense are useful for understanding the complex perception of Serbia and Serbian Church by European scholars, journalists or politicians, as well as for understanding the perception of Europe by Serbian churchmen and I will occasionally refer to them. My aim however, is not to argue whether the representation of Europe or Serbian Church are accurate or not, but to investigate the ways in which they were discursively constructed.

2   The Balkans – Colonialism, Post-colonialism, Neocolonialism

Inspired by the fact that in an audience such as this, most of the listeners are of non-European origins, coming from countries that might have experienced some sort of European dominance at some point during their history, I have decided to approach my topic through the lenses of postcolonial theory. First, I would like to clarify my choice. Although the idea of applying postcolonial theory to the Balkans may seem controversial, since the Balkans do not represent distant and overseas colonies, but are situated in the heart of the European continent, the recent studies of Maria Todorova,[5] Vesna Goldsworthy,[6] Milica Bakić-Hayden[7] and Zoran Milutinović[8] demonstrate that this perspective has been most fruitfully adopted for discussing the cultural legacy of centuries long efforts of various imperial powers to dominate the Balkans. In the period from the end of eighteenth century until today there have been four foreign powers physically present in the western Bal-

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[4] Cvetković, 'Serbian Tradition', 136.

[5] Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

[6] Vesna Goldsforty, *Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998).

[7] Milica Bakić-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalism: The Case of Former Yugoslavia", *Slavic Review* 54/4 (1995), 917-931.

[8] Zoran Milutinović, *Getting Over Europe: The Construction of Europe in Serbian Culture* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011).

kans: Ottoman, Austrian (latter Austro-Hungarian), Venetian (latter Italian) and French. Germany, Russia, Britain and more recently USA have also attempted to impose their interests to the region either by political and economical means or by military presence.

As the term "colonialism" is not meant to cover all national oppressions, and thus is not applicable to the period before the European colonial Empires,[9] the five centuries of Ottoman domination of the Balkans, despite having an enormous impact in shaping the identity of the Post-Ottoman Balkans, are not in our focus. Some scholars justify the application of postcolonial theory, because it offers a unique set of intellectual resources for understanding certain processes in the Balkans and the reaction to the Western influences,[10] but they are reluctant to apply the term colonialism or post-colonialism in the strict sense of the words. On the other side, there are scholars, like Vesna Goldsworthy, who think that terms such as 'colonialism', 'post-colonialism' and 'neocolonialism' acquire their true meanings only in the context of the nowadays Balkans, which has remained for Europe 'the repository for all kinds of unacceptable, and often racist feelings, which could no longer be expressed in relation to the Third World'.[11] She substantiates her stance referring to two recent examples: one of the British journalist Michael Nicholson, who in a book about Sarajevo entitled *Natasha's Story*, published in 1997 wrote: "The ferocity of the Balkan peoples has at times been so primitive that anthropologists have likened them to the Amazon's Yanamamö, one of the world's most savage and primitive tribes."[12] The second example is that of a UN representative in Kosovo who described to *The Guardian* that governing Kosovo is like "dressing a child: you give it the trousers of economy, the shirt of education, the jacket of democracy, etc. And all the while, the child wants to run out and play outside in its underpants. If we let it, it could hurt itself"[13]. By these two examples Goldsworthy actually points to two main features of the European perception of the Balkans, the primitivism and barbarity of its people, that points to their "not yet European" state or the state in which "Europe has already been",[14] and a permanent need of Europe or the West to supervise the Balkans and to deal with the "ancient hatred" of their people.

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[9] Aijaz Ahmad, 'The Politics of Literary Postcoloniality', *Race and Class* 36/3 (1995), 9.

[10] George Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolaou (eds.), *Orthodox Constructions of the West* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 21.

[11] Albena Vacheva, Interview with Vesna Goldsworthy 'Not quite European... Scrutinizing the Balkan's neo-colonialism' from 9 July 2004, http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-07-09-vacheva-en.html (accessed 28 November 2014).

[12] Michael Nicholson, *Natasha's Story* (London: Macmillan, 1993), 19.

[13] Jon Henley, 'Kosovo 1999', *The Guardian*, Thursday 29 May 2003, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/may/29/balkans.foreignpolicy (accessed 28 November 2014)

[14] Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania,* 202-212.

3   Orthodoxy and Orientalism: The Orthodox Church in the eyes of Europeans

When it comes to the European or Western depiction of the Orthodox Church of the Balkans, Christopher Johnson lists four different roles that Eastern Christianity plays for the western Christians: 1) historical root and background of Western Christianity, 2) tool for unity between Protestants and Catholics, 3) link for missionaries to non-Christian Orient, and 4) justification for Western intervention.[15] The historical primitivism of the Orthodox in comparison with the Western Christianity and the justification of the Western intervention are identical to Goldsworthy's analysis of the Western perception of the Balkans. Johnson offers a long list of examples that point to the primitive status of the Orthodox Church in the eyes of the western clergyman, including Adolf Harnack's and Arthur Stanley's descriptions of the Orthodox Church as being in a state of "petrifaction, barrenness, and barbarism"[16] or as expressing "the simplicity of barbarism, not the freedom of civilization."[17]

The perception of the other usually includes self-perception. As Milutinović points out, by identifying the European identity with "Christianity", "Civilization", and from nineteen century with the "West", Western European authors and, in this case theologians, indicated tacit or explicit political and cultural aims.[18] By comparing the progressive and innovative character of their own churches with the ancient customs of the Orthodox Church, the Westerners become convinced not only of the primitivism and backwardness of the Orthodox people, but also of the superiority of their own religious practice. This feeling of superiority inspired them to set their political and cultural aims, which pertain in the Johnson's classification to the second and the third role that the Eastern Christianity played for western Christians, namely to be a tool for Western Christian Unity, as well as a link for their missionaries to the non-Christian Orient.[19] By way of comparison with their Eastern Christian counterparts, the Western Roman-Catholic and Protestant churches realize that they share more common values among themselves that may be preserved by common action. In modern terms this kind of Western mobilization for the preservation of the common values is evident in the tweet of the Swedish foreign affairs minister Carl Bildt, who wrote that the orthodox conservative

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[15] Christopher D. L. Johnson, '"He Has Made the Dry Bones Live": Orientalism's Attempted Resuscitation of Eastern Christianity', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 82/3 (2014), 811–840: 829.

[16] Adolf Harnack, *History of Dogma*, vol. IV, trans. Neil Buchanan (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Company, 1989), 235.

[17] Arthur P. Stanley, *Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church* (London: J.M. Dent & Co., ²1907) (1st edition 1861), 76.

[18] Milutinović, *Getting Over Europe*, 18.

[19] Johnson, 'He Has Made the Dry Bones Live', 830-1.

ideas (of Vladimir Putin) feature anti-Western and anti-decadent character,[20] and as such they are an immediate threat to Europe and the West.[21]

Similarly to the Balkans that evoke the metaphor of a bridge between the West and the East,[22] the role of Eastern Christianity is to serve as a bridge for Western Christians to access to the non-Christian Orient for the purpose of proselytizing.[23] This is possible only because Eastern Christianity has something in common with both the West and the Orient, and the conversion of Eastern Christians to a Western form of Christianity may serve as prelude for evangelization and further conversion of the non-Christian Orient.[24] One may also argue that the geostrategic planning of proselytism of the Western Christians in the past is the germ of modern-day western military interventions. As Orthodox Christianity of the Balkans served as a medium for reaching the non-Christian Orient, the Western 'humanitarian interventions' in the Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993-1995 and Yugoslavia 1999) served as model for the future military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya.[25] Finally, the justification of the intervention of the Western Christians is based on deeply humanitarian grounds, because the Eastern Christians could be saved, which means civilized, westernized and Europeanized by the West, in spite of being "held back by their Oriental nature and their oppressive Oriental environment."[26] One may recall similar explanations in modern media and scholarship. Thus, the British journalist Simon Winchester draws parallels between the geology and mentality of the Balkans, claiming that the geological fracture of two mountain chains, the Balkan Mountains and the Dinaric Alps, became a template for the fractured behavior of those who would later live upon it.[27] Slavoj Žižek pointed out to a similar treatment of the Greek people in the recent German media. When the Greek accusation of the neoliberal technocracy imposed by Brussels could not be ignored anymore, the German media replaced the story of irresponsible, lazy, free-spending, tax-dodging Greeks with assertions that one cannot

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[20] Carl Bildt, "Perhaps @McFaul underestimating force of Putin's new anti-Western and anti-decadent line. Building on deeply conservative orthodox ideas.", 24 March 2014, 5:10 AM, Tweet, https://twitter.com/carlbildt/status/448069450437513216 (accessed 13 July 2015).

[21] The Russian news agency Rex reported that "Carl Bildt thinks that the Eastern Orthodoxy is main threat to western civilization", which the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs deemed as misinterpretation.

[22] Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, 14.

[23] Stanley, *Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church*, 93.

[24] Johnson, 'He Has Made the Dry Bones Live', 831.

[25] David N. Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009), 1-2. Similarly to Gibbs, but from a completely different perspective, Marlene Spoerri argues, in her recent book *Engineering Revolution*, that a successful overthrowing of Slobodan Milošević from power in Serbia through democratic 'regime change' engineered and financially backed by US and other Western powers was a preparation to similar 'colour' revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Cf. Marlene Spoerri, *Engineering Revolution. The Paradox of Democracy Promotion in Serbia* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 172.

[26] Johnson, 'He Has Made the Dry Bones Live', 832.

[27] Simon Winchester, *The Fracture Zone: A Return to the Balkans* (London: Viking, 1999), 26.

blame them, because they are victims of their own nature.[28] Similarly to Yugoslavia, which was the main testing grounds for a model of 'humanitarian intervention', Greece is, according to Žižek, the main testing grounds for a new socioeconomic model of depoliticised technocracy in which bankers and other experts are allowed to demolish democracy. Hayden White unmasks the humanitarian intervention of the West, Europe and the United States claiming that they served only to their economic motivations, which are proclaimed as the global moral model, "the last best hope for mankind", and the very summit of human community.[29] Thus, the "salvation" of the Balkan Orthodox Christians by the Western counterparts whether by means of proselytism and conversion, military conquest or economically impoverishment always served to a politic and economic agenda of the West and Europe.

4   The Serbian Church in the European focus

While in the West it has been extensively written on the Orthodox Church in general, or on the Greek and Russian Church in particular, the Serbian Church came into focus of the Western scholarship relatively late. I would limit myself at the scholarly findings of the German scholarship, which has exhibited especially in the last quarter of century a vivid interest in the Serbian Church.

The doctoral thesis of Thomas Bremer, *Ekklesiale Struktur und Ekklesiologie in der Serbischen Orthodoxen Kirche im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,* published in 1992, constitutes a first assessment of the recent history of the Serbian Church outside the Orthodox world. The main thesis of Bremer's study is that despite the merits of three generations of twentieth century Serbian theologians in rooting the theology of the Serbian Church in the Bible and patristic tradition, the recent theology and ecclesiology represent a step backwards in relation to the ecclesiology of the Metropolitanate of Karlovci, because there the participation of laypeople in Church governance played an important role.[30] Although Bremer argues that a particular church tradition should not be evaluated on the basis of a theological and spiritual heritage foreign to it,[31] he does exactly this by adopting the participation of the laypeople in the leadership of the Church as criterion for evaluation. While this aspect might be highly valued in other Christian traditions, such as Protestant, being the legacy of a secular democratic society, it is, however, alien to the Orthodox tradition.

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[28] Slavoj Žižek, 'Save Us From the Saviours', *London Review of Books* 34/11, 7 June 2012, 13, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n11/slavoj-zizek/save-us-from-the-saviours (accessed 30 November 2014).

[29] Hayden White, The Discourse of Europe and the Search for European Identity', in: Bo Stråth: *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2000), 67–86: 67.

[30] Thomas Bremer, *Ekklesiale Struktur und Ekklesiologie* (Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1992), 252.

[31] Bremer, *Ekklesiale Struktur und Ekklesiologie*, 250.

If one applies Johnson's fourfold classification on Bremer's study, his evaluation may be subsumed under the first role that Orthodoxy plays for the Western Christians or Europeans: in comparison with previous ecclesial forms, in which the Serbian Church was more willing to include the legacies of democracy in its ecclesiology, the contemporary ecclesiology of Serbian Church based exclusively on the conciliar tradition of the Orthodox East is retrograde. Read through the prism of the West-East binary oppositions Bremer's assessment may also suggests that the theology and ecclesial organization under the colonial rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire bore better fruits than in the newly founded Kingdom of Yugoslavia.[32]

Bremer's dissertation was followed by further, more historical, studies on Justin Popović, mainly focused on the context of Serbian nationalism. The most illustrious example is that of Klaus Buchenau, who is the author of the most comprehensive studies of the Serbian church in the context of Serbian nationalism and anti-western attitudes. From the perspective of postcolonial theory nationalism should not be considered in its usual sense as building personal identity on belongingness to one nation, and against other nations, but rather as denial of the allegedly subaltern, stateless nations to submit themselves voluntarily to the imperial *Kulturträger* protection.[33] The tendency to interpret theology and ecclesiology of the Serbian church in the context of Serbian nationalism and its anti-western orientation has originated from attempts to understand the Yugoslav wars (1991-1999) in a broader historical setting. By exploring both the church-state and inter-churches relations in his book *Orthodoxie und Katholizismus in Jugoslawien 1945-1991: ein serbisch-kroatischer Vergleich* (2004), Buchenau envisaged possible reasons for the breakdown of Yugoslavia. He argues that due to some internal antagonisms in the churches-state relations and due to Tito's refusal to implement democratic liberalism in the Yugoslav society of the sixties, Yugoslavia was doomed to fall apart.[34] Buchenau states also that the national mobilization and false evangelization of the Serbian Church, especially connected with the campaign over Kosovo during the eighties bear the responsibility for the turmoil, which happened later.[35]

In his second book *Auf russischen Spuren: orthodoxe Antiwestler in Serbien, 1850-1945*, Buchenau attempts to demonstrate that the Serbian Orthodox anti-westernism has its origins in the Russian critique of Europe and the West.[36] The main thesis of Buchenau's book is based upon the conclusion of his previous studies: by adopting the Russian ideas about the West as the 'other', and thus the gained status of a Russian cultural colony, Serbian people proved their need for

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[32] Bremer, *Ekklesiale Struktur und Ekklesiologie*, 9.

[33] Mykola Riabchuk, *Vid Malorosji do Ukrajni* (Kyiv: Kritika, 2000), 14.

[34] Klaus Buchenau, *Orthodoxie und Katholizismus in Jugoslawien 1945-1991. Ein serbisch-kroatischer Vergleich* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004), 449.

[35] Buchenau, *Orthodoxie und Katholizismus in Jugoslawien 1945-1991*, 379-391.

[36] Klaus Buchenau, *Auf russischen Spuren. Orthodoxe Antiwestler in Serbien, 1850-1945* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2011).

Kulturträger protection.

Finally, in the recent article 'Anti-Europeanism in the Balkans, Anti-Americanism in Latin America: a Comparison', Buchenau, in the fashion of right-wing historians, argues in favor of North America's and Europe's leading role in developing modernity, enterprise, democracy, human rights, individualism as 'global' values, and explores the denial of this role in the Latin America and the Balkans. The comparison has actually another purpose and this is to show that while the Catholic and Protestant mentalities of the two Americas are not so incompatible, the 'othering potential' between Orthodoxy and the West is much higher, due to the dominant and stable anti-European discourses of Balkans' Orthodox theological elites.[37] One of the main conclusions of Buchenau's recent article is that the Eastern Christianity may serve as a tool for Western Christian unity, specifically for the unity between North-American Protestants and South-American Catholics.

The recent German scholarship with a focus the Balkans and the Serbian Church represents certain variations of the four aforementioned roles that Eastern Christianity plays for the West from early nineteenth century onwards.

5   The Serbian Church – The First World War and the Interwar period

There is unanimous consensus among scholars that the works of two Serbian theologians, the bishop Nikolaj Velimirović (1881-1956) and the priestmonk Justin Popović (1894-1979) particularly represent the spiritual and intellectual directions of the Serbian Church during the First World War and the Interwar period. Velimirović spent the decade preceding the First World War as a student in Switzerland, Germany and England. He obtained two doctorates in Bern, one in theology (1908) and another in history (1910) and allegedly an additional one in Geneva on the philosophy of George Berkeley.[38] In similar vein to third-world scholars, who by attending the first-world academic institutions either adopted or challenged the attitudes that Western scholarship held toward their countries,[39] Velimirović intended to improve the perception of his religion and history of his fatherland in European scholarship. In his article in the Anglican *Guardian* from 1909, Velimirović argued against the widespread attitude among Anglican divines that the gulf between the Christian West and East is unbridgeable without doctrinal consensus.[40] He pointed out that if each side makes a first step out of love, they would

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[37] Klaus Buchenau, 'Anti-Europeanism in the Balkans, Anti-Americanism in Latin America: a Comparison', *Religion, State & Society* 40/3-4 (2012), 379-94: 390.

[38] Jovan Byford, *Denial and Repression of Antisemitism. Post-Communist Remembrance of the Serbian Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2008), 20-21.

[39] Ailaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (London: Verso ³2000), 40-1. Arif Dirlik, 'The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism', *Critical Inquiry* 20 (1994), 328-9.

[40] Nicholas Velimirović, 'Problems of Reunion with the East', *The Guardian (Anglican newspaper)*,

discover that this deep chasm is in fact a firm ground. He also argued in favor of another kind of unity, which secures the unity of Europe, the unity among Slavic nations. Velimirović attempted to give to the originally Russian Slavophile idea of unity among the Slavs, that became the political program of the Slavonic people in the Austro-Hungarian Empire,[41] a deeper religious meaning. Thus, the Slavs as the youngest European race should play a messianic role in saving Europe, not by instituting a Slavonic Empire, but by embodying the All-Man (Serbian „Свечовек") as opposed to Nietzsche's Übermensch.[42] During the WWI the Serbian Government sent Velimirović to the UK and the USA to promote the Serbian cause. In a lecture delivered in Canterbury Cathedral in 1915 he praised the British Empire because of its democracy and foundation based on the Christian philosophy of democratic equality and brotherhood. He urged Britain to protect Serbia and other oppressed European nations from German dominion by spreading democracy and Christian values.[43] Faced with the catastrophic consequences of the WWI, Velimirović's enthusiasm for the European Christian brotherhood completely vanished. In his lecture given in 1920 at London's Kings College, he states that Europe has abandoned Christianity as the centre of its civilization and that it is doomed to decay unless she returns to its centre.[44] Velimirović spent the interwar period as bishop of Ochrid (nowadays in Republic of Macedonia). Deeply disappointed with the secularization of Europe, he turned his reflections toward the East, seeing in the spiritually rich India the future of world Christianity.[45] However, in the advent to the WWII, Velimirović attempted to avoid the East-West division by proposing the simple religiosity of Serbian peasants as a model that is beyond East and West.[46] The WWII further convinced him that Europe is sick unto death. By the end of the war, while still being a German prisoner in the concentration camp of Dachau and experiencing death around him, Velimirović writes:

"All of Europe smells of death. European universities preach death. European writers describe death. European scientists immortalize death. European politicians work for death in youth's soul. European imperialist disseminate death the world over. European revolutionaries carry the banner of death. Modern Europe is synonym for death".[47]

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17 February 1909.

[41] Diana Mishkova, 'In Quest of Balkan Occidentalism', *Tokovi istorije* 1-2 (2006), 29-62: 38-40.

[42] Cf. Nikolaj Velimirović, *Nietzche and Dostoyevsky* (1911), *Sermons under the Mount* (1912), *Words on the All-Man* (1920), *Prayers by the Lake* (1922) (All in Serbian).

[43] Nicholas Velimirovic, *Serbia in Light and Darkness* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1916), 8-9.

[44] Nicholai Velimirović, *The Spiritual Rebirth of Europe* (London: The Faith Press, 1920), 20.

[45] Cf. Nikolaj Velimirović, *Indian Letters* (Belgrade: Evro, 2000) (in Serbian).

[46] *Above East and West*, in: in: Episkop Nikolaj Velimirović, *Sabrana dela (Collected Works)*, vol. 5 (Düsseldorf: Himmalsthür, 1977) (in Serbian).

[47] *Words to the Serbian People Through the Dungeon Window* in: Velimirović, *Sabrana dela*, vol. 13 (Düsseldorf: Himmalsthür, 1983), 331-332 (in Serbian). The English translation in: Milutinović, *Getting Over Europe*, 148.

After the war, instead of returning to the communist Yugoslavia, Velimirović chose to go to the USA, where he lived until his death in 1956. He visited Europe just once, being briefly in London, but he never again wrote of Europe. Due to Christian determination and democracy, two values that Velimirović highly esteemed, America became for him the land of hope, and the new light to the world. Velimirović changed his opinions on numerous occasions, adopting vigorously certain ideas and abandoning them abruptly. However, the constant of his philosophical program was a combination of Christianity, which permeates every aspect of social and political life and democracy, and he linked both these ideals to Europe.

Velimirović's disciple Justin Popović, although adhering to his teacher's ideas, took different views on numerous points. In comparison with Velimirović's ecumenical leanings, in his Oxford BLitt thesis (then the highest supervised degree issued by Oxford University) on Dostoyevsky (1919), Popović was very critical of the Papal and protestant role in turning Christianity into humanism in Europe, but also of Christian socialism,[48] which was then very popular among Anglican divines. In fashion of the European intellectuals of interwar period, who maintained that Europe is sick and that it needs treatment, Popović proposes his diagnosis and prescribes therapy. The main causes of the illness of Europe are: humanism, rationalism and individualism. Drawing on Slavophile ideas Popović proposes: Theohumanism or the process of human perfecting in the God-man Jesus Christ as the cure for western humanism, which proclaims the human being as the supreme value; the integral knowledge as a process of acquiring knowledge by means of faith and love is opposed to the rule of reason; finally, the ecclesial catholicity (*sabornost*) is, in his view, the only remedy for individualism.[49] Although Popović adopted the criticism of Western ideas from the Slavophile movement, he applied them not in a politico-ideological, but rather in an ecclesial context. He also disagreed with Velimirović regarding the implementation of these ideas, that is not by means of messianic Slavonic race or simple religiosity of peasants, but rather by a return to the ascetical tradition of the Desert Fathers. In his works on Macarius of Egypt (his doctoral thesis from Athens 1926) and Isaac the Syrian (1927), Popović offers the desert, here a synonym for ascetic feat as a solution to the problems of twentieth century European man. At the same time similar ideas, which proposed the ascetical practice of the Christian East to spiritually devastated Europe, circulated among Catholic theologians Henri De Lubac, Jacques Maritain, and Jean Daniélou. In the book '*Svetosavlje* (Saint-Savaism) as the Philosophy of Life" (1953) compiled of his interwar writings on the Serbian medieval saint Sava Nemanjić,

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[48] "Religion and Philosophy of F.M. Dostoyevsky", *Hrišćanski Život (Christian life)* 4 (April 1923), 168-180, (in Serbian).

[49] Vladimir Cvetković, 'Abba Justin Popović, un théologien de synthèse', *Istina* 65/1 (2011), 47-62: 48.

Popović develops *Svetosavlje* as a *tertium quid* metaphor meant to transcend East and West narratives, in both ecclesial and political sense. At the end of WWII, the Yugoslav Communist authorities banned Popović to return to his previous professorial post at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Belgrade, and confined him to the Monastery of Chelie in Western Serbia, where he remained until the end of his life. Europe completely disappeared from Popović's focus in this period. However he continued with similar severity to condemn Yugoslav Communists for adopting atheistic humanism, rationalism and not individualism but collectivism as main social values. Popović deeply inspired the next generation of Serbian theologians, who to great extent shaped contemporary views of Serbian Church on Europe.

6   Justinovci – Communist Era and Post-Yugoslav period

Four Popović's disciples, Amfilohije Radović, Atanasije Jevtić, Artemije Radosavljević and Irinej Bulović, usually referred as Justinovci (meaning 'of Justin') have had a similar intellectual development. All four are theologians and monks, later bishops of the Serbian Church. All four obtained their doctorates from Athens, and as postgraduate or postdoctoral students frequented West European Universities, usually Rome and Paris. As students in Athens during seventies of the last century they took an active role in the so-called Palamite renaissance, a theological movement that reacted against the western theological influence on Orthodox theology by returning to authentic Orthodox sources of earlier times.[50] Their doctoral theses are fine examples of political theology, being equally critical of the Western theological stances and of the previous Orthodox tradition because of its theological hybridity. While living in Greece and other European democratic countries, they accustomed themselves with the values of democracy. Upon their return to Yugoslavia at the beginning of the eighties, they embarked on a critique of the Communist regime adhering to democratic values, and as professors of the Faculty of Theology in Belgrade they took active roles in numerous dissident forums. In April 1982, after the Serbian Patriarchal Monastery of Peć in Kosovo was set on fire, as a part of larger group of priests they appealed to the Federal authorities to protect the Serbian people and churches in the Albanian dominated province.[51] When at the beginning of the nineties Yugoslavia slipped into the war, all four were already appointed bishops. Despite their nationalist inclinations, they did not find anything in common with the policy of the Serbian president Slobodan Milošević, whom they considered not only a disguised communist technocrat, but

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[50] Vasilios N. Makrides & Dirk Uffelman, 'Studying Eastern Orthodox Anti-Westernism: The Need for a Comparative Research Agenda', in Jonathan Sutton &William Peter van Den Bercken, *Orthodox Christianity and Contemporary Europe* (Leuven: Peeters, 2003), 87-120:116-117.

[51] 'Appeal for Protection of Serbian People and its Holy Shrines in Kosovo' *Pravoslavlje (Orthodoxy)*, May 15, 1982. (in Serbian).

also exceedingly dangerous for Serbian national interests.[52] The topic of Europe, which was previously out of their scholarly or political interest, came to be developed during nineties particularly due to the increasing appropriation of Western values by their congregations and due to the involvement of Western diplomacy in the Yugoslav crisis. Thus, although supporting the opposition of Serbia in the struggle for democratic values, Amfilohije Radović, the Metropolitan of Montenegro condemned the West for its preoccupation with material values, for its expansionist impulse, and totalitarianism.[53] As the Bishop of Herzegovina (in Bosnia) Atanasije Jevtić was involved in talks with numerous negotiators from the European Community, including the meeting in early 1992 with Lord Peter Carrington. Jevtić's general impression from these meetings at the dawn of the crisis is that Europeans, backed by Americans attempted to impose their control on the region, without observing the interests of local people. Further confrontation of Bosnian Serbs with Bosnian Muslims and Croats led to NATO air strikes against Serbs, which led to a large number of negative depictions of Europe in Jevtić's sermons and public addresses. In 1996 he claimed that: "the real war and the false peace [in Bosnia] are the result of the policy of the UN, the European Community, the Security Council and the European Parliament",[54] repeating once more the thesis that the Orthodox Balkan is Europe before "Europe" and civilisation before "civilisation", because it bears and guards the Jerusalem-Mediterranean Europeanness.[55]

As the bishop of Kosovo since 1991, Artemije Radosavljević, severely criticized Milošević's policy in this province, for its lack of democratic legitimacy. Deeply believing that the problem of Kosovo could be solved through the process of democratization, he urged the western Governments not to employ force in Kosovo, because that would strengthen Milošević's regime and further radicalize militant Albanian groups such as the Kosovo Liberation Army.[56] In spite of his appeal, NATO bombarded Kosovo and Serbia. After the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army, including the Serbian administration from Kosovo, Radosavljević as the only representative of the Serbian people continued his efforts for establishing a democratic and multiethnic Kosovo. Since 1999 he pledged UN representatives in Kosovo to make conditions for the return of the Serbian people displaced from

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[52] Atanasije Jevtić, Interview to independent television station Studio B, 12 March 1992.

[53] Amfilohije Radović, Opening Address at the Conference on the Future of Montenegro Held on the 18 December 1991 in Podgorica. The English translation in: Ivan Čolović, *The Politics of Symbol in Serbia: Essays in Political Anthropology* (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2002), 40.

[54] Atanasije Jevtić, 'A Worst Than Any Other War', in: *The Lamb of God and the Beast from the Abyss: Philosophy of War,* Collected Papers from the Second Theological-philosophical Symposium Held During The Days of Saints Cyril and Methodius, Edited by: Radoš M. Mladenović & Hierodeacon Jovan (Ćulibrk) (Cetinje: Svetigora - Publishing house of Metropolitate of Montenegro and Littoral, 1996). (in Serbian).

[55] Radović, in: Čolović, *The Politics of Symbol in Serbia,* 40.

[56] Bishop Artemije, 'The Letter to the Presidents, Governments and Parliaments of the United States of America and Western States', *Sveti Knez Lazar* (*Saint Prince Lazar*) 26 (April 1999), 5-8: 7.

Kosovo, for legal trials of crimes against Serbs, and for the restoration of destroyed Serbian cemeteries and churches.[57] However, the fact that just in three years of UN, NATO and EU presence in Kosovo, 260 000 Serbs were exiled, 2000 Serbs killed and the same number kidnapped, 36000 Serbian houses were destroyed and 70000 were taken from exiled Serbs, and 150 monasteries and churches were destroyed,[58] disillusioned not just Radosavljević, but many Serbian people that the mandate of NATO and EU missions in Kosovo is to secure safety. The majority of the Serbian people consider the US and EU's backing of Kosovo's independence, which has been unilaterally proclaimed in 2008, as a clear violation of the international law. In spite of the official Serbian policy, whose strategic goal is accession into the EU, the reception of Europe in the Serbian Church is usually determined by the role she played in Kosovo and in the NATO bombardment.

For the last two decades Serbian people have perceived European economic policy as a promise of their future prosperity. However, the last few years the European economic model is increasingly associated with colonial impoverishment than with prosperity. Amfilohije Radović recently pointed out that the Church could not accept neo-liberal capitalism, which in his Montenegro, as well as in the entire Europe impoverished the majority of people, enriching just a few.[59] He concludes that the ideology of contemporary neo-liberal capitalism is rooted in wolfish self-interest (in connection to the proverb *Homo homini lupus*).[60]

Not only the European economic policy and the policy toward Kosovo, but also the European insistence on the right of sexual minorities is a controversial issue for the Serbian Church. On many occasions the Church leaders gave statements against the organization of Belgrade pride parades. In spite of the statements of Church leaders that routinely condemn homosexuality as a threat to traditional family values, it is difficult to say that intolerance of homosexual rights is widespread in Serbia. The recent statement of Radović regarding LGBT rights was a surprise not only for the liberal audience, but also for Orthodox Christians. Asked by a journalist to comment the recent floods in the Balkans, Radović said: "Have a look at this what is going on. What is the priority in Europe now? It is this unfortunate woman, or better said unfortunate man, I do not know his name, who es-

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[57] Bishop Artemije, The Letter to Bernard Koushner from 26 of October 1999, *Sveti Knez Lazar* 27 (1999), 12-13:13.

[58] Bishop Artemije, 'The Exposition on the Suffering of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija in Paris, June 2003', *Sveti Knez Lazar* 43 (2003), 152-154: 152 and 'The Letter to the Holy Synod of Serbian Orthodox Church', *Sveti Knez Lazar* 46 (2004), 7-21: 9-10.

[59] Amfilohije Radović, 'Reality is Not a Measure', *Radio Television of Serbia (RTS)*, 19 October 2011 (in Serbian), http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/125/Društvo/975626/Amfilohije%3A+Realnost+nije+mera.html (accessed 14 July 2015).

[60] The Christmas Message of Metropolitan Amfilohije 2011/2012 (in Serbian), http://www.svetigora.com/node/9736 (accessed 14 July 2015).

tablishes himself as Jesus."[61] In fashion of ancient Christians, Radović explains that the flood in the Balkans is a sign of punishment or of divine warning to Christians not to transgress by popularizing the pop artist and drag queen Conchita Wurst as a model of tolerance and diversity. Radović also stated that the recent gay pride parade organized in Podgorica, as a sign of Montenegro's respect for the EU gender policy, is Montenegro's enslavement by the anti-Christian Europe. However, there are different views on this point in the Serbian Episcopate. Ignatije Midić, the bishop of Branichevo and professor of dogmatics at the Faculty of Theology in Belgrade, does not derogate homosexual persons, but he equates them with heterosexual ones in some respect, stating that both homosexual and heterosexual people need divine and human love for salvation.[62]

7   Conclusion

The relationship between Europe and the Serbian Church in the last couple of centuries has been shaped by the main historical circumstances of the European continent, such as: the nineteenth century imperial dominance, the WWI, the Yugoslav interwar period of limited democratic prosperity, the WWII and the communist revolution, followed by the communist rule, the collapse of communism, the breakdown of Yugoslavia and the decade of wars, and, finally, the period of the last fifteen years characterized by political and economic turbulences. The nineteenth and early twentieth century European scholarship mostly viewed the Balkans and its Orthodoxy in colonial fashion as a historical primitive form of Western Christianity, suitable as a tool for the unity of Western Christians, whose proselytizing mission should progress over the Orthodox world toward the non-Christian Orient. The recent German scholarship on Serbian Church follows this fashion to some extent. The perspective of the Serbian Church on Europe confirms the European colonial approach to the Balkans. Similarly to third-world scholars, who by attending the first-world academe challenged the Western scholarly perspective toward their countries, a generation of Serbian theologians educated in the Western Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century, like Velimirović and Popović constructed 'Europe' from their national perspective, which opposes the picture of Europe dominant in the Western canonical formation. Since self-fashioning processes always develop by differentiation from an 'other', their construction of the European other also affected their representation of Orthodox identity. Velimirović, and especially Popović considered the Catholic and Protestant Christianity, deemed by western Europeans as progressive and superior

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[61] 'Amfilohije: The Floods are Divine Warning for the Celebration of Conchita Wurst as Jesus and the Gay Parade' *Portal Analitika,* May 18, 2014, (in Serbian).

http://www.portalanalitika.me/drustvo/vijesti/146827-amfilohije-poplave-boja-opomena-zbog-slavljenja-konite-vurst-kao-isusa-i-gej-parade-video (accessed 14 July 2015).

[62] Quoted from Bishop Artemije, *Defense of the Orthodox Confession of Faith from the Heresy of Prof. Dr Ignatije Midić the Bishop of Braničevo* (Beograd: Revnitelj, 2014), vol. 3.27, 169. (in Serbian).

in comparison with Orthodoxy, a departure from the true nature of Christianity. A new generation of Serbian theologians and churchmen educated in the seventies and eighties in Greece and Western Europe continued the work of constructing 'Europe' and 'Europeanness' in opposition to Orthodox identity. The western interventions in the Yugoslav wars during the nineties of the last century just deepened the sense of Europe and the West as hostile other. Whether western interventions in the Balkans took the form of cultural enlightenment, political and military liberation or economic prosperity, it is considered by most of the Serbian churchmen and laypeople now, that they are driven not by Christian altruistic, but by imperialistic motives.

The Conflict of Narratives about the Front Experience in the Weimar Republic.
War Literatures and the Problem of Generations

Hiroaki Murakami

1   Introduction

The front experience of the First World War that enabled the mass murder on an unprecedented scale through modern technologies caused not only the change of international political landscape, but also brought about the collapse of cultural values or norms that had ruled the European society since the 19th century. First of all, in trenches of the Western front, where the "death" became a completely routine event through weapons for mass murder as machine gun, tank, mortar and chemical gas, various values of bourgeoisie developed in the prewar time were eroded before others, and hence the old language-system came to be inadequate in order to express the experiences of war, especially for the soldiers who stemmed from the bourgeois stratum.[1] Letters of front soldiers written to families make us clear how difficult it was for them to put the front experiences into words. For example, a German student who fell on the Western front in July 1918 describes the landscape of battlefield, which was literally "beyond words", as following.

> The eye sees nothing but horrible ruins during the march for days. [...] The Medieval Ages gave the devil a grotesque face. Who can portray the devil? This churned, shattered landscape, dead woods, cross upon cross – All this is *one* trait in the face of devil.[2]

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[1] Modris Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (London: 1990), 199-216; however, in the case of soldiers who stemmed from working class, front experiences were interpreted along with the patterns of prewar period throughout the Great War. Inequalities or un-fairness within the military organizations for example were understood as nothing but an extension of the prewar class-order under soldiers from working class. See: Benjamin Ziemann, Das „Fronterleb-nis" des Ersten Weltkrieges – eine sozialhistorische Zäsur? Deutungen und Wirkungen in Deutsch-land und Frankreich, in *Der Erste Weltkrieg und die europäische Nachkriegsordnung. Sozialer Wandel und Formveränderung der Politik*, ed. Hans Mommsen (Köln: 2000), 43-82, esp. 54-65.

[2] Cit. from the letter of Otto Helmuth Michels (1892-1918) on 1 May, in *Kriegsbriefe gefallener Stu-denten*, ed. Philipp Witkop (München: 1928), 335. [Emphasis in original]

Who can portray the grotesque face of devil? – Though such a question about the "limits of representation" is posed after the experience of the "century of violence" (Hannah Arendt) exclusively in connection with the tragedy of the Holocaust[3], it can be said that the front experience in the First World War raised the same problem seriously for the first time, insofar as it was also a challenge to the traditional narrative of historical events. In other words, the memory of the front experience called legitimacy or validity of cultural norms, which had constituted the old "European identity", thoroughly into question and claimed the need to seek a new form and content of the identity. Nonetheless, when it comes to Germany at least, the traditional way of historiography was not reconsidered fundamentally even by the catastrophe of the Great War[4], so that German historians were not able to acquire the means to express the tragedy of front soldiers as in the case of the Holocaust and therefore had to leave the "true-to-life" narrative of the front experience in hands of poems or literatures.[5]

Moreover in Germany, the defeated nation of the Great War, remembrance of the war was accompanied inevitably with strong political meanings and, for that reason alone, vehement conflicts often arose around its memory in the Weimar Republic. In such social situations of the postwar period, educated front soldiers who had been called up young to the war tried to transfer their own experiences on battlefields to the Weimar society, depending on the form of literature at that.[6]

This chapter aims to trace the change of the "devil's face" portrayed by former young soldiers in order to reveal that the memory of a historical event (in this case: the front experience of the Great War) can be by no means drawn out directly from the event itself, if anything, it is exposed usually to the influence of social, political or economic situations at the moment the event is put into words. In other words, the remembering form of the First World War handed down until today, which is explained for preference as one of the origins of the European identity in

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[3] Saul Friedlander, ed., *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the "Final Solution"* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).

[4] Ernst Schulin, Weltkriegserfahrung und Historikerreaktion, in *Krisenbewußtsein, Katastrophenerfahrungen und Innovationen 1880-1945 (Geschichtsdiskurs, Bd. 4)*, ed. Wolfgang Küttler, Jörn Rüsen and Ernst Schulin (Frankfurt a. M.: 1997), 165-188; however, after the Great War there was a paradigm shift in the German historiography from political to "national" or "populational" history (Volksgeschichte), and the shift flowed later even into the "Generalplan Ost" of the Third Reich. See: Willy Oberkrome, „Historiker im „Dritten Reich". Zum Stellenwert volkshistorischer Ansätze zwischen klassischer Politik- und neuerer Sozialgeschichte," in *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 50. Jg., Heft 2 (1999): 74-98.

[5] Eksteins, *Rites of Spring*, 387-391.

[6] Though mobilized soldiers were constituted obviously not alone of educated bourgeois, but of people from various social strata as handicraftsman, peasants and workers, narratives of war since the French Revolution were yielded by the bourgeoisie which possessed the ability to express its own experiences in spite of their minority position within troops. See: George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 16.

the 20th century, was not able to be ascribed to the war itself; it was, so to speak, an ex post facto construction.

Furthermore, although historians did not pay so much attention so far, this chapter focuses also on a generation conflict about the memory of the Great War emerged in the final years of the Weimar period, because it seems to have served as one of the backgrounds for the above-mentioned change of remembering form; that is to say, the conflict – and not the war itself – can be seen as a crucial turning point that paved the way on which the memory of the Great War has marched through the last century.

2   On the so-called "generational experience" of war

But at first we need to notice some points of the argument in order to clarify the reason why this article concentrates on "narratives" and not on reconstruction of real war experience itself. These points affirm that it would be more constructive to take account of "narrative tones" instead of real experiences of storytellers, if we would try to shed light on the formative phase of a generational consciousness through war experience.

First, there was no possibility *ab initio* to check the scenes narrated in the war literatures on the basis of objective materials, because they were almost always confined to individual experiences or impressions on the front. Though a lot of war literatures intended to "describe [the front experience] for readers as it was" or to "bring my impressions [of war] as directly as possible on paper"[7], there was no other criterion to judge the validity of narratives but, as it were, the sense of audience, if it is impossible to check the described scenes objectively as in this case. That is to say, the authenticity of the narrative depended exclusively on whether the audience at that time could accept its "effect of reality" as relevant, namely whether readers would regard the statement of battlefield as "real". Therefore, the criterion to winnow the true from the false in narratives about the front is held rather in the hands of readers than of storytellers. Just as in the case of confession in general, the truth of war narratives cannot be completed until the audience accepts it[8]; and thus, storytellers had to obey the manner of narratives acknowledged as legitimate in the society at that time, even though they intended to picture the "unprecedented" front experience. The portrait of battlefields shown in war litera-

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[7] Ernst Jünger, *In Stahlgewittern. Aus dem Tagebuch eines Stoßtruppführers*, (Berlin: 1922), [first published in 1920], S. V. [Vorwort zur 1. Aufl.].

[8] This argument follows Michel Foucault who characterizes the behavior of confession as a function of the power to produce truth. According to him, the production of truth completes not on the side of person who confesses, but of person who listens the confession. "The person who listens [the confession] will be not simply the lord of forgiveness, the judge who condemns or absolves; he will be the lord of truth." (Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la Sexualité 1. La volonté de savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), 89).

tures was indeed a reflection of such social manners and by no means of "immediate" front experiences per se.

Second, in connection with the first point, the fiction of the "typical" or "standard" front experience was constructed through the war literatures. In fact, the mobilized men to the war had not only to be engaged in a variety of military works, but also experienced the war in infinitely multifarious ways, for example such as in illness, wound, captive and so on.[9] The criterion to decide what must be excluded as "exceptional" or accepted as "typical" from such miscellaneous experiences is *not* what actually happened, but first what people would admit publicly as happened.[10] It can be supposed that the war literatures succeeded in the Weimar period offered more or less exact pictures which were acceptable for people at that time.

Therefore, it can be concluded from these two points that the constructive factor in the phase of shaping the generational consciousness through "common" front experiences is in no case individual experiences *per se*. Rather, a generational consciousness or experience is nothing else than a "typical" and "collective" figure, in other words, a fictional one that is shaped depending exclusively on the established social narrative structure. Therefore, concrete front experiences that individual soldiers confronted respectively have essentially no connection with such a collective figure formed by the narrative structure; more precisely, individual experiences are regulated or permeated always already through existing narratives, but not vice versa.[11]

And finally, it needs to be mentioned as the third point that the very former young soldiers who are classified usually as the so-called "front generation" had belonged also to the same age group as agencies of the youth movement that had

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[9] According to the *Zentralnachweiseamt für Kriegsverluste und Kriegsrgäber* at the end of 1933 the number of confirmed war dead stood at 1,900,876 men from the army, 34,836 from the navy and another, 1,185 who had died in Germany's former colonies. In addition, 4,814,557 German soldiers were reported as having been wounded during the war and 14,673,940 were registered cases of illness among servicemen. Moreover, as many as 80,000 German soldiers were taken prisoner during the war, most of whom returned home between the autumn of 1919 and the summer of 1920 (Richard Bessel, "The 'front generation' and the politics of Weimar Germany", in *Generations in Conflict. Youth revolt and generation formation in Germany 1770-1968,* ed. Mark Roseman, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 124f.).

[10] *Ibid.*, 135.

[11] Hence Joan Scott criticized vehemently the tendency of historians to consider experience as the uncontestable evidence of historical events for its "foundationalism" that reproduces the existing ideological system (Joan W. Scott, "The Evidence of Experience", *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 17 (1991): 773-797). Joanna Bourke, a pioneer of the "history of emotion", claims that the very chaotic events on battlefield must be ordered through the existing narrative structure (for example fantasies produced by films or books) in order to avoid unutterable terrors of death as well as to make the events understandable (Joanna Bourke, "The Killing Frenzy: Wartime Narratives of Enemy Action", in *No Man's Land of Violence. Extreme Wars in the 20th Century*, ed. Alf Lüdtke, Bernd Weisbrod (Göttingen: 2006), 101-125). Of course this argument can be applied to fearful experiences in general. See also: Joanna Bourke, "Fear and Anxiety: Writing about Emotion in Modern History", in *History Workshop Journal*, Vol. 55 (2003): 111-133; Joanna Bourke, *Fear. A Cultural History* (London: 2005).

spread over the whole Germany during the prewar period. It is of course no coincidence that they, who had rose in revolt against the Wilhelmine Germany and developed the myth of youth as the slogan "'The revolt of the young generation' creates the new realm"[12], constructed a generational identity based on the war experience excluding elders. One of the historical reasons why the identity of "front generation" had been created so convincingly, despite the uniformity of front experience was a merely fictional figure as mentioned, is that nothing but the old myth of youth survived continuously with strength also in the postwar society.[13] So we have to pay attention to the tradition of the myth, if we intend to focus on narratives of former young soldiers.

3   From "differentiation" to "equalization" of death

3.1   Death as the "great experience"

Of course the impact of the First World War was not confined only to Germany but extended over the whole Europe, and thus the discourse of "the generation of 1914", on the one hand, had a significant weight also in the other European countries as France or Spain.[14] On the other hand, however, patterns of realizing the discourse were so strictly regulated by the historical context of each country especially all in Germany, because of its deep-rooted tradition of the myth of youth, the words as "generation" or "youth" acquired an eminent signifié in public spheres and political movements more conspicuously than in other countries[15]. Though the German word "youth" [Jugend] had already possessed some religious element during the prewar period (we can see its one example in Walter Benjamin[16]), since 1918 the word began to carry a political connotation in parallel with mythicizing the front experience and the paroles "youthicizing the politics" (Verjugendlichung der Politik) or "politicizing the youth" (Politisierung der Jugend) were clamored extensively as one slogan against the Weimar society in the postwar political culture.[17]

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[12] Jürgen Reulecke, Utopische Erwartungen an die Jugendbewegung 1900-1933, in *Utopie und politische Herrschaft im Europa der Zwischenkriegszeit*, ed. Wolfgang Hartwig (München: 2003), 212.

[13] Mark Roseman, Generationen als „Imagined Communities". Mythen, generationelle Identitäten und Generationenkonflikte in Deutschland vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, in *Generationen. Zur Relevanz eines wissenschaftlichen Grundbegriffs*, ed. Ulrike Jureit, Michael Wildt (Hamburg: 2005), 191f.

[14] Robert Wohl, *The Generation of 1914*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).

[15] Hans Mommsen, Generationskonflikt und Jugendrevolte in der Weimarer Republik, in *Von Weimar nach Auschwitz. Zur Geschichte Deutschlands in der Weltkriegsepoche. Ausgewählte Aufsätze*, ed. Hans Mommsen (Stuttgart: 1999), 58-72.

[16] Walter Benjamin, Die religiöse Stellung der neuen Jugend, in *Die Tat. Sozial-religiöse Monatsschrift für deutsche Kultur*, 6. Jg., (1914/15): 210-212.

[17] Barbara Stambolis, *Mythos Jugend – Leitbild und Krisensymptom. Ein Aspekt der politischen Kultur im 20. Jahrhundert*, (Schwalbach/Ts.: 2003), 11-13.

Although the so-called "discovery of adolescence" in the second half of the 19th century and the development of protection or disciplination of youth through legislation as well as education can be enumerated probably as general historical backgrounds of the myth of youth[18], among others in Germany, the delayed nation, praises of youth had emerged early from cultural critics such as thoughts of Julius Langbehn or Paul de Lagarde and crystallized already in the prewar period to the German youth movement, which reached a climax on the "Hoher Meißner" (1913).[19] This movement aimed to abandon "lethargic customs and laws of an ugly convention", that is, to establish "independence of youth" or "youth culture"[20]; adolescence was not considered as a merely transitional period to adulthood, but rather as a phase of life that possesses its own "beauty" and "worth".[21]

Meanwhile we have to remember that the youth revolt against the Wilhelmine society was permeated by an unshakeable belief in the "Volk" or "Vaterland". It was the reason why the meeting on the Hoher Meißner, where, even if temporarily, various youth organizations at that time had united, had to be arranged just at the opportunity for the 100th anniversary of the "Battle of the Nations" that it had intended to reject "that cheap patriotism, which approaches the heroic actions of the fathers in great words without feeling obligated towards its own actions". However, the self-consciousness as German youth, "who is poised to risk its life for the right of its own Volk" and "also to dedicate its fresh pure blood in battle and peace of workday for the fatherland", seems to have been a sufficient basis for the organizers of the meeting in order to justify their own revolt.[22]

Thus the Great War since 1914 was nothing but an irreplaceable opportunity for German youths to prove their belief in their Volk through "heroic actions". Youth organizations at that time as Wandervogel, Freideutsche Jugend and Deutsche Akademische Freischar were, almost without exception, involved by enthusiasm of the war and therefore they declared to fight "to the last man for protection of our fatherland", laying aside their animosity against the Wilhelmine

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[18] John Gillis, *Youth and History: Tradition and Change in European Age Relations, 1750-Present* (Waltham: Academic Press, 1975), 95-131.

[19] On history of the youth movement, Walter Laqueur, *Young Germany: a History of the German Youth Movement* (New York), 1962.

[20] „Freideutscher Jugendtag 1913. Jahrhundertfeier auf dem Hohen Meißner am 11.-12. Oktober" [Einladungsflugblatt zur „Jahrhundertfeier auf dem Hohen Meißner"], in *Hoher Meißner 1913. Der Erste Freideutsche Jugendtag in Dokumenten, Deutungen und Bildern*, ed. Winfried Mogge and Jürgen Reulecke (Köln: 1988), 68.

[21] According to Gustav Wyneken, an ideologue of the German youth movement, adolescence would be no preparatory phase for adulthood, but the phase that "possesses its own irreplaceable worth, its own beauty and, as a result, the right for its own life, for the possibility to develop its own way." (Gustav Wyneken, *Der Gedankenkreis der Freien Schulgemeinde – Dem Wandervogel gewidmet* (Leipzig: 1913), 10f.).

[22] „Freideutscher Jugendtag 1913", in Mogge, Reulecke, ed., *Hoher Meißner*, 68.

society[23]. Although such an enthusiasm, of course, cooled down rapidly under front soldiers while battles became trench-fighting, the well-known myth of "Langemarck", in which a German "young regiment" broke the front of enemy singing "Deutschland über alles in der Welt" and hence embodied the "ideal of the heroic fighter as well as the spirit of chivalry", was constituted within Germany just at the moment disenchantment began to spread over trenches.[24]

The reason why the myth succeeded was that the topoi of the old ideal as "hero" or "sacrifice" carried by the youth movement in the prewar period survived still within the home society even after its erosion through trench-fighting on the Western front. In fact, the report about the battle of Langemarck, the origin of the myth, was written bearing the atmosphere of home country in mind[25] and, as a result, the representation of "youth in Langemarck" remained a kind of myth, users of which were "content only to activate the old tradition"[26] rather than embodying a new ideal.

Also in war literatures at that time, the figure of such an old ideal hero was reflected exactly. For example, in *The Wanderer between Two Worlds* [*Der Wanderer zwischen beiden Welten*] (1917), which is a well-known representative of war literatures published during the war time with 190,000 copies being allegedly being sold up to 1919, a young soldier takes the role of a charismatic hero who reminds of Nietzsche's Zarathustra or Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, and even the Christ was represented in dependence on the figure of the real person Ernst Wurche (1894-1917).[27] As the author of the book, Walter Flex (1887-1917), is sometimes called "poet of the youth movement"[28], this young hero was a typical figure incarnated by the old ideal of the "Bildungsbürger".

The death of the hero Wurche who "seemed to deserve all brilliance and all salvation of German future from the spirit of Wandervogel" and "embodied this spirit purely and brightly"[29] meant the confirmation of truth which the youth movement had claimed since the turn of the century. In fact, as he met the corps

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[23] Quoted in Winfried Mogge, Wandervogel, Freideutsche Jugend und Bünde. Zum Jugendbild der bürgerlichen Jugendbewegung, in *»Mit uns zieht die neue Zeit«. Der Mythos Jugend*, ed. Thomas Koebner, Rolf-Peter Janz and Frank Trommler (Frankfurt a. M.: 1985), 183f.

[24] On the myth of "youth of Langemarck", see: Uwe-K. Ketelsen, „Die Jugend von Langemarck". Ein poetisch-politisches Motiv der Zwischenkriegszeit, in ibid., 68-98; Bernd Hüppauf, "Langemarck, Verdun and the Myth of a *New Man* in Germany after the First World War", *War and Society*, Vol. 6, No. 2, (1988): 70-103, cit. from p. 70; It is George L. Mosse who saw, paradoxically at a glance, the rapid retreat of enthusiasm under soldiers as a background for the constitution of the myth. (Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, 73).

[25] Hüppauf, *Langemarck*, 74.

[26] Cit. from Ketelsen, *Die Jugend von Langemarck*, 77.

[27] On metaphors of Nietzsche's Zarathustra or Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, see: Walter Flex, *Der Wanderer zwischen beiden Welten. Ein Kriegserlebnis*, (München: 1918), 6f. [first published in 1917]

[28] Justus H. Ulbricht, Der Mythos vom Heldentod. Entstehung und Wirkungen von Walter Flex' „Der Wanderer zwischen beiden Welten", in *Jahrbuch des Archivs der deutschen Jugendbewegung*, 16 (1986/87): 111-156, here, p. 111; Flex himself, however, didn't participate in youth movement.

[29] Flex, *Der Wanderer zwischen beiden Welten*, 13.

of Wurche, Flex perceived on the dead's soldier peaceful face a mark of "great soul", which only selected persons would be able to carry.

> And I knelt before him, looked again and again into the ceremonially silent peace of his proud young face, and was ashamed of my own confusion of mind. [...] Death is the greatest experience of noble souls. [...] If they are speaking to God, they are no longer speaking to men.[30]

Death as the "greatest experience" which was allowed only "noble souls" who are able to speak with God. Such a "selectedness of fallen soldiers"[31], that is, the element of "differentiation" or "cult" of death was intertwined with the old myth of youth in the Flex' text. "Remain pure and become mature (rein bleiben und reif werden) – this is the most beautiful and most difficult art of life."[32] The person who said so was nobody but Wurche, who practiced this way of life himself through his own death in battle and acquired the "ceremonially silent peace". For him, only "action" and "death" were the very moments to "mature [youth] and to keep young".[33]

The reason why *The Wanderer between Two Worlds*, which repeated in this manner the old myth of youth just as it had been, was perceived by readers at that time as "authentic, or indeed the document of their own experiences", was that, "besides his own experiences, stocks of (un-) consciousness, so literary motives, all kinds of ideological germs [Ideologeme] and religious meaning patterns became to the material of the author"[34], in short, the traditional values survived still in the home society were reflected clearly in his text. In other words, the "classical ideal" of Bildungsbürgertum like "a free development of personality", an ideal which was "derived from 'Bildung' and thus the independent ability to judge", survived persistently within the bourgeois publicity of the home country throughout the Great War. Such traditional ideals began to indicate the symptoms of oscillation at last, when the German society confronted a situation of crisis, in which political violence of a scale unknown in history raged on public streets.[35]

3.2   Narrative of "horrible death"

And just at this time, tones of "war narratives" were changed. We can see an exemplary case of the change in the controversial work *Storm of Steel* [*In Stahlgewittern*] (1920) of Ernst Jünger (1895-1998) who is sometimes called "Martin Luther of war

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[30] Ibid., 84f.
[31] Ulbricht, Der Mythos vom Heldentod, 152.
[32] Flex, *Der Wanderer zwischen beiden Welten*, 41.
[33] Ibid., 103.
[34] Ulbricht, *Der Mythos vom Heldentod*, 147f.
[35] Dirk Schumann, Einheitssehnsucht und Gewaltakzeptanz. Politische Grundpositionen des deutschen Bürgertums nach 1918 (mit vergleichenden Überlegungen zu den britischen *middle classes*), in *Der Erste Weltkrieg und die europäische Nachkriegsordnung*, ed. Mommsen, 83-105, cit. from p. 100.

literature".[36] Although the thought of this author influenced the German intellectual world tremendously, he is today overwhelmingly regarded as a precursor of the National Socialism from various perspectives.[37] But it is not our theme to analyze his thought again in connection with the Nazis, rather needs to bracket such a perspective off in order to reveal features of his war narrative along with the historical situation at the beginning of the Weimar Republic.

The narrative of Jünger was no more "differentiation" of death as Flex used. But rather, in *Storm of Steel* he used a variety of "horrible" deaths, which had nothing to do with the "ceremonially silent peace". There were corpses for example, that looked like "rotten flesh [of which] gleams like a fish greenish whitely from torn uniform", or that exposed an "empty eye socket as well as a little bunch of hair on black-brown skull" and they were "frozen in ominous dance of death". Moreover, there were also battles without a face-to-face confrontation with the enemy, or a landscape in which "thirteen soldiers became victims" through a shrapnel flying suddenly through the air. In confrontation with such "destructive effects of material battle" operated by modern technologies, front soldiers "had to adapt themselves to the totally new form of war" and, as a result, even death of comrades was sometimes quantified. "Of fourteen men who had made sortie with me, only four came back." This is the narrative tone about the battle which "depressed" Jünger.[38]

In this narrative there is no space for an heroic personality who, like Wurche, can change a stone "into a crystal in his hands"[39] with intelligence or charisma, nor for independent actions which tempt into death. It is solely an accident to spell the difference between life and death, and thus the death swoops down total equally on all humans, regardless whether they are soldiers or "an 8-year-old girl who looked for trashes in crater".[40] In the very storm of artillery shells this "equalization" of death, which does not choose its target, can be realized completely.

You cower alone in your foxhole and feel to be exposed to a relentless, blind will of destruction. You forebode with horror that your total intelligence, your abilities, your mental and physical advantages become to inconsequential, absurd thing. Yet, while you think

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[36] Bernd A. Rusinek, Krieg als Sehnsucht. Militärischer Stil und „junge Generation" in der Weimarer Republik, in *Generationalität und Lebensgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke (München: 2003), 139.

[37] Whereas Jeffrey Herf, as well known, argued Jünger's thought under the concept of "reactionary modernism" and named it "magical realism" (Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) [repr. ed.], 70-108); Bernd Weisbrod connected Jünger's asthetics of violence with the "violence culture" in Weimar Republic, a provenance of which was the "myth of violence" in George Sorel (Bernd Weisbrod, Kriegerische Gewalt und männlicher Fundamentalismus. Ernst Jüngers Beitrag zur Konservativen Revolution, in *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 49. Jg. (1998): 544-560).

[38] Jünger, *In Stahlgewittern*, 16, 20, 3, 80, 154.

[39] Flex, *Der Wanderer zwischen beiden Welten*, 10.

[40] Jünger, *In Stahlgewittern*, 62.

of such a thing, the steel log might have already lined up for whizzing drive in order to shatter you to formless pieces.[41]

Such a change of the narrative cannot be understood until we pay attention to the time when the book *Storm of Steel* was published, that is, to the social situation of the early Weimar Republic during which the German bourgeois publicly confronted. Just at that time an unknown circumstance in German history of the so-called "culture of violence" (Gewaltkultur) appeared, in which the political violence on public streets developed in a massive scale under the very nose of the German citizens.

Since the November Revolution in 1918 the German state lost its monopolistic military force and thus was coerced to enter into "mariage de convenance" (Norbert Elias) with the military authority which wished to suppress the communist revolutions. Moreover, because the so-called "Freikorps" of right wing increased its activities under the support of the Entente powers, the Weimar Republic was confronted from its beginning with the reversal phenomenon of history, in which legitimate violence of the state weakened and private armies or illegitimate violence revived. Although it was already known under social democrats since the prewar period to utilize the public sphere like streets in order to express their own political creeds, the bourgeois citizens turned out to public streets for the first time during the revolutionary turmoil and hence innumerable conflicts between bourgeois and the mass of workers occurred in various towns of Germany.[42]

Not only violence of radicals with clearly political meanings like the assassinations of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg or of Martin Erzberger and Emil Rathenau frequently happened before people's faces, but rather bloody disturbances between security powers or Freikorps and the mass of workers, which developed gradually without intentions. For example, in the enormous scale collision on the march of 1920, following the Kapp Putsch, 27 soldiers died and more than 100 citizens lost their life in Halle alone during "the armed conflict between military and workers which reminds war." In addition, citizens also were involved frequently in the conflict between military force and workers like the case of a woman who was killed by unauthorized shootings of a hasty soldier when she stood by a cash desk, or of another old woman who lost her life by wild shoots of an armed car, and further a matron of orphanage who was shot on the way to church with children.[43]

Because death became a constant threat and penetrated into everyday life of citizens through such political violence on the streets, traditionally cultivated values

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[41] Ibid., 136.

[42] Dirk Schumann, *Politische Gewalt in der Weimarer Republik 1918-1933. Kampf um die Straße und Furcht vor dem Bürgerkrieg* (Essen: 2001), esp. 33, 51f.

[43] Ibid., 89-92.

and norms of the German bourgeois publicity were gradually eroded and soon "the new horizon of values which enabled to break away from Weimar and formed the violent dominance of the National Socialists", in short, "the new paradigm of violence" was established[44]. Jünger's above observed narrative of "equalization of death" was woven amidst the very process in which this kind of violence culture came into existence.

On the one hand, his war narrative, especially about the autonomization of modern technology and alienation of human being, indicated the continuity with romantic cultural critics since the 19th century and in his later works the discourse also appeared which overlapped with the "myth of violence" of George Sorel.[45] On the other hand, however, the reason why such discourses condensed with war narrative into one literary work not during the war, but in the early phase of Weimar, is most probably that another narrative was required because of social situations like turbulences of street violence and oscillation of old cultural values caused by the former, rather than Jünger's personal attempt to "protect war experiences against the spirit of postwar time"[46].

Nevertheless, the traditional norms since the prewar period were not yet completely overthrown at that time. Also, in the above-mentioned conflict on the march of 1920, both bourgeois and workers called each other's victims "the fallen", and newspapers of bourgeois side praised them publicly as "heroes" who fulfilled their own "duty" in order to "maintain peace and public order"[47]. Accordingly, the narrative in *Storm of Steel* barely left space for confirming the heroism in form of "duty and honor", on the basis of which front soldiers stay on battlefields and continue to fight even in storm of shells.[48] The challenge to this heroism of front

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[44] Bernd Weisbrod, Gewalt in der Politik. Zur politischen Kultur in Deutschland zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen, in *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 43. Jg., (1992): 392.

[45] Rolf Peter Sieferle, *Die Konservative Revolution. Fünf biographische Skizzen* (Frankfurt a. M.: 1995), 139; Weisbrod, *Gewalt in der Politik*, 559.

[46] Hans-Harald Müller, *Der Krieg und die Schriftsteller. Der Kriegsroman der Weimarer Republik* (Stuttgart: 1986), 221.

[47] Schumann, *Politische Gewalt in der Weimarer Republik*, 94f.; but only one year later the newspapers on the side of social democrats as well as of bourgeois considered communists already as a criminal group and called them "vampires of Moscow". For both bourgeois and social democrats at this time it meant a "suicidal sentiment" to spare the life of communists (ibid., 130f.).

[48] Jünger, *In Stahlgewittern*, 137; Jünger's imagination of hero, however, transformed already in *The Struggle as an Internal Event* [*Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis*] (1922) to a figure, "the beast [of which] climbs within battle as an esoteric monster out of the heart of soul", or which knows "the lust of blood" (Ernst Jünger, *Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis* (Berlin: 1922), 7-9). Of course such a figure of front soldiers portrayed by Jünger was merely a "myth" which has nothing to do with reality. There were not only feather merchants but also soldiers who quarreled with officers in order to refuse the commando to go to the Western front. In addition, the so-called "Heimatschuss", the act of self-injury for the purpose of repatriation was favored much under front soldiers (Richard Bessel, "The Great War in German Memory: The Soldiers of the First World War, Demobilization, and Weimar Political Culture", in *German History*, Vol. 6, No. 1, (1988): 20-34, here pp. 24-26, 32).

soldiers itself could not be raised until a young generation without front experiences appeared anew on the public scene.

4   "Home front" awakening

4.1   Conflict with "home"

All Quiet on the Western Front [*Im Westen nichts Neues*] (1929) by Erich Maria Remarque (1898-1970), which is worldwide well-known as the antiwar novel until today, contains a scene as one of its main themes which had appeared scarcely in former war literatures. In this scene, the protagonist Paul Bäumer came back home and is asked by his father to tell about the front.

> He [Paul's father: HM] wants me to tell him about the front; he is curious in a way that I find stupid and distressing; I no longer have any real contact with him. There is nothing he likes more than just hearing about it. I realize he does not know that a man cannot talk of such things; [...][49]

For Paul, who found people in his hometown like his father "stupid" and "distressing" because of their frivolous curiosities for the front experience, the home already became "a foreign world". "I find I do not belong here anymore"[50]. Even though the mother of a fallen comrade, whom Paul had to tell about the death of her son, begged him to tell the truth about her son's dead, her mourning did not touch his heart. "When a man has seen so many dead he cannot understand any longer why there should be so much anguish over a single individual." The days on the battlefield had changed him so thoroughly that he could not even tell his mother, the only one who seemed to understand him, the truth of his experiences, and thus he regretted his return home after tormenting himself: "I ought never to have come on leave."[51]

It is a unique feature of Remarque's narrative compared to former war literatures that such a theme as lack of understanding for front experiences in home country occupies a large part of his work as its keystone. Needless to say, however, we can find at times some of discourses about the incomprehensibility of the front experience before Remarque. Jünger, for example, who was disgusted by superficial recapitulations of the war in postwar society, raised a doubt "Can anyone who has not been in our battle talk about war?"[52] and emphasized the impossibility to transmit the front experience to home country as following:

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[49] Erich Maria Remarque, *Im Westen nichts Neues* (Köln: 2006) [first published in 1929], 117.
[50] Ibid., 119.
[51] Ibid., 127, 114, 129.
[52] Jünger, *Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis*, 15.

Our previous life was merely a fuzzy dream. We lost the connection with it more and more. Even if we sent letters home, we wrote only about popular things or described the superficial face of war, not its heart. A few of us who were clear in their mind knew well that the people in home would never understand them.[53]

Yet such a discourse of "rupture" between front and home remained exceptional in the texts of Flex and Jünger. Both narrators spoke rather willingly either of a "German mother" who accepted bravely even the dead of her son in a rush since "it was his wish" (Flex) or of "three girls in bright apparel who passed holding tennis rackets in their arm and chatting with each other" as a "brilliant farewell to life on leave" (Jünger)[54], and thus excluded from their narratives almost always discords or conflicts with the "home front". Nevertheless, the narrative that speaks garrulously of the conflict between front and home came on the scene so suddenly in Remarque's text, because the so-called "war youth generation" [Kriegsjugendgeneration] (born about in 1900-1910), which had spent its childhood within the home country during the Great War, began to articulate its own voices in the German publicity around the very end of the 1920s.

This baby-boom cohort born at the turn of the next-to-last century began to leave school and to go out into the world during 1920s, but just at that time the German economy underwent the hyperinflation and hence the labor market scaled down extremely. Because the war youth generation, the population scale of which was relatively larger than other former cohorts, had to enter the market in the period of highest inflation, the German labor market experienced a staging oversupply of labors that the proportion of youth among the unemployed population rose rapidly since the early phase of Weimar.[55]

Whereas the age group of men between 14 and 20 in the whole male population, for example, rose from 11.9% (1910) to 12.9% (1925), and between 20 and 25 from 8.7% to 10.1%, the employable population increased in proportion from 18,500,000 (63.3% of the whole population) in 1910 to 22,900,000 (71.1%) in 1925. On the other hand, the number of unemployed between ages 14 and 21 amounted to 270,000 and this corresponded to 17% of the whole group of unemployed in Germany. Though such a crisis was deescalated relatively in the phase of the "Golden Twenties" since the end of hyperinflation (9.5% in 1927), the situation of unemployment among young people continued throughout the Weimar period and was yet spurred by the Great Depression in 1929 (16.3% in 1931 and the number amounted to 700,000).[56]

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[53] Ibid, 42.

[54] Flex, *Der Wanderer zwischen beiden Welten*, 53; Jünger, *In Stahlgewittern*, 65.

[55] Detlev J. K. Peukert, *Die Weimarer Republik. Krisenjahre der Klassischen Moderne* (Frankfurt. a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1987), 20f., 30f., 94-100.

[56] Detlev J. K. Peukert, "The Lost Generation: Youth Unemployment at the End of the Weimar Republic", in *The German Unemployment. Experiences and Consequences of Mass Unemployment from the Weimar Republic to the Third Reich*, ed. Richard Evans and Dick Geary (London/Sydney: 1987), 173-175.

Of course, there were large numbers of dead among the age groups mobilized to the war and the scale of the male population which were between 30 and 35 years old in 1925 (the front generation) reduced to less than half of the same age group in 1910 in spite of an increasing birth rate.[57] In addition, we have to deduct the number of men who became unemployable through war wounds from the employable population. It is, however, probably unreasonable to suppose that entering into labor market would have become easier with such a change of population movement, because – as we can infer from the number that 2,100,000 of soldiers returned home and had been engaged in businesses of war economic sectors already in early 1918 and 2,500,000 in June/July of the same year – workplaces within the home country tended to be occupied by soldiers (and women) even during the war. For example, there was a mining firm, 12,114 among 20,000 employed of which had been mobilized to the war, but 5,477 of them had come back and been engaged again in the former business already at the time of the armistice. Moreover, employees made effort with the government after the armistice to help former soldiers to find workplaces and thus they could find job eventually despite temporary unemployment.[58]

Thus the age cohorts classified to the "war youth generation" had no hope for their own future on account of the German labor market, being extremely scaled down and occupied by former soldiers, so that this age group split into both right and left radicals[59] and became the core of political violence on public streets. On the "March Action" in 1921, for instance, one quarter of masses who revolted against security power stemmed from this generation, and it constituted half of the well-known rioters in Sachsen during the "Golden Twenties". Furthermore, the same cohort amounted in the final years of Weimar after the Great Depression for more than half of the Sturmabteilung (SA) in the NSDAP which propelled the violence on the streets. The political violence centered upon this age group changed gradually its character and soon established a completely new behavioral pattern, that is to say, not to rush into bloody uprisings without intention but to cause systematic and intentional clashes with political enemies.[60]

4.2   Revolt of the "Class of 1902"

Class of 1902 [*Jahrgang 1902*] (1928), the autobiographical novel of Ernst Glaeser (1902-1963), published in the very social situation, was a literary work which creat-

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[57] Peukert, *Die Weimarer Republik*, 91.

[58] Bessel, The Great War in German Memory, 22f., 29-31.

[59] They became main supporters for political radicals as Nazis and communists. In fact, the average age of Nazi-members, for instance, was 29 in 1925 and 35 in 1932 and thus the NSDAP was a remarkably "young party" compared to others. The only party at that time which could compete with it was the KPD (Michael H. Kater, Generationskonflikt als Entwicklungsfaktor in der NS-Bewegung vor 1933, in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 11. Jg., Heft 2, (1985): 230f.).

[60] Schumann, *Politische Gewalt in der Weimarer Republik*, 140, 241, 282, 228f., 244.

ed a social sensation at that time because it was interpreted as the representative voice of the war youth generation, the oldest age cohort of which was born in the very year 1902 and hence 15 or 16 years old when the First World War came to end. Whereas a part of the cohort born in 1901 was still able to be mobilized to the war, the "Class of 1902" was excluded completely – at least officially – from mobilizing, that is to say, it was the age group which had no qualification to take part in memories of the mythicized front experience.[61] Contemporary reviews were generally favorable in regard to the literary significance of the novel which presented such a voice of this age group for the first time; for instance, it was a novel that depicts "the reality" of "our generation of 1902" which "had experienced the enthusiastic dizziness of the outbreak of the war in the sensitive age, and [...] had to meet the collapse of the whole world in the very phase of life in which the delusion of adolescence came to end"; or, a novel that narrates "the extraordinariness of the so-called postwar generation" who "grew up in the war and awaked self-consciousness when the world form of society collapsed", and according to a figurative expression, it was a literary work which "solves again the equation that is simple but proved seldom".[62]

A reason for such favorable reviews is surely nothing else than that the novel with the well-known epigraph "La guerre – ce sont nos parents" (The war – it are our parents) narrated the everyday life of youth in the home country during the war and its awakening of antipathy against fathers who fought on front-lines. As we can see from the fact that contemporary readers gained the consciousness of the "generation of 1902" as "the sacrifice of elderly generations" through this novel[63], it depicts faithfully the feelings of the protagonist who "astonished" the self-assertive "heroic sentiment" of his father on front-line, which claimed that "if our youths do not understand that we wish only their best, if they despise our concern and begin to live following their own mind – then they are not worth risking father's life here abroad for their future..."

This was the voice from the front. This was the voice of those men who were our fathers one time, but now, because they were far from us since years, stood before us as strange one and were awesome, huge, powerful and, with profound shadows, oppressive like a monument. What did they know about us? They knew where we lived, but how we looked and thought, they did not know it anymore.[64]

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[61] Jürgen Reulecke, Das Jahr 1902 und die Ursprünge der Männerbundideologie in Deutschland, in *»Ich möchte einer werden so wie die...« Männerbünde im 20. Jahrhudert*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke (Frankfurt a. M.: 2001), 35f.

[62] Fritz Rosenfeld, Rez. von E. Glaeser „Jahrgang 1902“, in *Die Bücherwarte*, Jg. (1928): 327f.; Heinz Holler, Naturgeschichte einer Generation? Zu Gläsers „Jahrgang 1902“, in *Widerstand*, 4. Jg., (1929): 205; Erich Franzen, Rez. von E. Glaeser: „Jahrgang 1902“, in *Die Literarische Welt*, 4. Jg., No. 42, (1928): 5.

[63] Rosenfeld, Rez. von E. Glaeser „*Jahrgang 1902*“, 327.

[64] Ernst Glaeser, *Jahrgang 1902* (Berlin: 1928), 323.

Needless to say, such discourses of revolt against former front soldiers emerged from the above mentioned social condition of the war youth generation at that time, yet naturally they triggered also backlashes on the side of the front generation as following: "Our enemies stand not only in front of us as hitherto, but also behind us more strongly and dangerous", yet in fact they are "not different from that old people who stand still before us", and "we declare the war" also to this "youth which we experienced as the class of 1902"; the "heroism" latent in the youth of today is the same that "drove once young generations to the war" and thus the youth is by no means a "new youth"; "the postwar generation" is "not burdened with the difficult experiences" as "the war generation" so that it had "neither contemplation nor deepening" and thus its "activism is not ready to sacrifice, rather simply a playful joy at activity [spielerische Tatfreude]", and so on...[65]

In such a vehement generational conflict Remarque wrote *All Quiet on the Western Front*. The above mentioned narrative of the rupture between front and home in his novel cannot be understood without considering the discourse of revolt from the war youth generation and the backlash against it on the side of the front generation. In fact, *All Quiet* was for the front generation by no means an antiwar novel, but "a rehabilitation of our generation" and its success meant "a first comfort of our days". The following words of Ernst Toller (1893-1939) are also nothing but an exultation of the "rehabilitated" front generation. "German infantries lived in the way in trenches; also French and British".[66]

Remarque himself also noticed in the interview with the same age journalist Axel Eggebrecht (1899-1991) that his novel was not "complete" as a war novel and even "I didn't wish at all such completeness" although it required the scenes of battlefields, and talked with the interviewer as following:

E [Eggebrecht: HM] – Then you intended to write no "war book". You say this also in your small foreword. If I understand you exactly, your book does not focus on events of the war so much as on their effect to young people portrayed by your hands, does it?

R [Remarque: HM] – Yes, This is the core of thing. Our generation grew up in a different way from all other generations both before and after us. Their strongest and immediate experience was the war, *no matter whether they accept or negate the war, whether they perceived it nationalistically, pacifistically, adventurously, religiously or stoically.*[67] [Emphasis added by HM]

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[65] Cit. from Hans Thomas [i. e. Hans Zehrer (1899-1966)], Absage an den Jahrgang 1902, in *Die Tat*, 21. Jg., (1929/30): 743, 745, 748; Siegfried Kracauer (1889-1966), Neue Jugend?, in *Neue Rundschau*, Bd. 42, (1931): 138-140; Edgar J. Jung (1894-1934), Die Tragik der Kriegsgeneration, in *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, Jg. 27, (1930): 528.

[66] Axel Eggebrecht (1899-1991), Paul Bäumer, der deutsche Unbekannte Soldat, in *Die Weltbühne*, 25. Jg., (1929): 212f.; Ernst Toller (1893-1939), Rez. von „Im Westen nichts Neues", in *Die Literarische Welt*, 5. Jg., No. 8, (1929): 5.

[67] Axel Eggebrecht, Gespräch mit Remarque, in *Die Literarische Welt*, 5. Jg., No. 24, (1929): 1.

Thus *All Quiet* should not necessarily be read as an antiwar novel both for his generation and for Remarque himself.[68] What Remarque especially hoped was – to cite again from his own words – to write the tale "of a generation who have been destroyed by the war", in other words, to present "the fate of a generation of young men, who at the critical age, when they were just beginning to feel the pulse of life, were set to face with death" and thus "to awaken understanding for a generation that more than all others has found it difficult to make its way back from the four years of death, struggle and terror, to the peaceful fields of work and progress." This is the very reason why Remarque's motive to describe "typical, standard situation, such as constantly recurred" was "not political, neither pacifist nor militarist, in intention".[69]

Here it is not of significance to analyze the political intention of Remarque, much less to check whether he had actually such war experiences as that he described in his own book (his "front experience" was seen suspiciously already among contemporaries[70]). It is more remarkable that Remarque himself emphasized in the interview the authenticity of the war experiences depicted in his novel ("The situations in my book are true and experienced one, they are neither distended nor exaggerated lopsidedly"), and that the same age interviewer Eggebrecht also gave the affirmative reply to it immediately ("Certainly, I know it from my own memories").[71] This means indeed that a "typical" war experience was shared among the front generation through *All Quiet*. As our preceding discussion shows clearly, this fictional "typicality" including the rupture between front and home was nothing else than a kind of protective wall built by the front generation against the younger one who began to talk of the another "typical" war experience on the basis of *Class of 1902* as "the fate of the same age".[72]

5   Conclusion

As we have seen above, the narrative of the Great War during the Weimar period had to change its content – or manner of narrating – whenever new social situations as the political violence on streets or the conflict between the front and war

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[68] Benjamin Ziemann also points out this contemporary reading style of *All Quiet*, although he considers that German nationalist circles criticized the allegedly pacifism in Remarque's novel (Benjamin Ziemann, *Contested Commemorations. Republican War Veterans and Weimar Political Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 250-254). Yet, as we will mention soon, they were not always critical to Remarque.

[69] "The End of War? Correspondence between Erich Maria Remarque and General Sir Ian Hamilton", *Life and Letters*, Vol. 3, No. 18, (1929): 403, 405f., 408, 405.

[70] Remarque who had been called-up in August 1916 and experienced a battle in June 1917 for the first time was hospitalized already from 3 August 1917 to 31 October 1918. That is, there were only about two months between his first experience of battle and hospitalization and was also a witness who claimed – although the truth is unknown – that even Remarque's wound was hurt by himself in order to be sent home (Eksteins, *Rites of Spring*, 372f.).

[71] Eggebrecht, *Gespräch mit Remarque*, 1.

[72] Fritz Dietrich, Rez. von „Jahrgang 1902", in *Die Literatur*, 31. Jg., Heft 3, (1928): 168.

youth generation appeared, and thus any war narrative did not win completely to the end during the Weimar period. For that reason alone we might say that the transvaluation of all values on which the old European identity of the 19th century had relied was fulfilled by no means at one sweep through the experience of the First World War per se, but marched in a zigzag line along the changes of postwar society. The new European identity of the 20th century, one primal origin of which is very often attributed to the "European War", seems to have been shaped in fact through the change or conflict of memories about the war step by step and hence, ex post facto.

Yet such a diachronic flexibility of war narrative is sometimes overlooked among historians so far, except for Benjamin Ziemann who recently shed light on the variety of war commemorations in the Weimar Republic.[73] Rather they seem to indicate the tendency to prefer the war narratives of Flex or Jünger as representative discourses of the Weimar period and to solidify their fluidity retrospectively.[74] Or, the others interpreted the fluidity of narrative as the change of a "poetic matrix" and therefore similarly overlooked social driving forces as its background.[75] Because of the lack of historical insight some explained, the cause of the war boom for example suddenly booms in the final years of the Republic almost only as the product of the *Zeitgeist* as it were, that is to say, the win of "avant-garde", "irony and anxiety" or "perplexed international self-commiseration" and so on.[76]

Although there is of course no reason to doubt the effect of such contemporary atmospheres, we need – given the above discussion – to emphasize more than so far the factor of the generational conflict on memories of the war which arouse at the end of the 1920s as a cause of the boom. In fact, whereas some members of the front generation claimed during the period of relative stability that recollections of past through war novels are "already enough" and required to look "forward", few years later – in the final phase of Weimar – nobody but the members of the generation, for instance the well-known journalist Hans Zehrer (1899-1966) who edited the national journal *Die Tat*, expressed the hope the "great war book" comparable to Remarque who depicted "the great pictures that the war recalls in mind".[77] For members of the front generation who were exposed to attacks of the

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[73] Ziemann, *Contested Commemorations.*

[74] For instance, Jürgen Reulecke argued on the one hand the transfiguration in the representation of soldiers during the First World War, he found on the other a representative figure in the narrative of Jünger and set its continuity until the battle of Stalingrad (Jürgen Reulecke, Vom Kämpfer zum Krieger. Zum Wandel der Ästhetik des Männerbildes während des Ersten Weltkrieges, in *Männerbünde im 20. Jahrhudert*, ed. Jürgen Reulecke, 89-101; Jürgen Reulecke, Neuer Mensch und neue Männlichkeit. Die „junge Generation" im ersten Drittel des 20. Jahrhunderts, in *Jahrbuch des Historischen Kollegs* (2002): 109-138).

[75] Müller, *Der Krieg und die Schriftsteller*, 36-93.

[76] Eksteins, *Rites of Spring*, 391, 397.

[77] Kurt Tucholsky (1890-1935), Vorwärts – !, in *Die Weltbühne*, 22. Jg. (1926): 1-4; Hans Thomas [Hans Zehrer], Wohin rollt die Zeit?, in *Die Tat*, 22. Jg., Heft 2 (1930): 81f.

younger generation, revisiting the Great War meant indeed the most effective way to reaffirm their own identity and hence to reinforce the solidarity as a generation.

It needs to be said, however, that the war youth generation, which constructed its own generational consciousness as "sacrifice of elderly generations", did not refuse the war itself. Rather, the longing for the war existed intensely also in this age group as we can perceive from the fact that German Social Democrats deplored in their party conference of 1931 as following: "No more war! This slogan gives little impact on youth."[78] This longing among young people explains indeed why the war youths sometimes tried to persuade the front generation as the same "human of 20th century" or "young generation" as themselves into cooperating with their own camp.[79] The alliance of these two generations was completed soon in the Nazi state led by Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) and the members of the war youth generation – as its typical representatives we can list the names of Ernst Kaltenbrunner (1903-1946), Reinhard Heydrich (1904-1942) or Adolf Eichmann (1906-1962) – reached the outbreak of the Second World War as substantial supporters of the Third Reich who were active in various spheres of the state or society such as bureaucracy.[80]

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[78] Cit. from Rusinek, *Krieg als Sehnsucht*, 127.

[79] Uttmann von Elterlein (1902-?), Absage an den Jahrgang 1902?, in *Die Tat*, Jg. 22, Heft 3 (1930): 202-206; E. Günther Gründel (1903-?), *Die Sendung der Jungen Generation. Versuch einer umfassenden revolutionären Sinndeutung der Krise* (München: 1932), 60-63, 64f. and passim.

[80] Michael Wildt, *Generation des Unbedingten. Das Führungskorps des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes* (Hamburg: 2003); Ulrich Herbert, *Best. Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft, 1903-1989* (Bonn: 1996).

Orhan Pamuk

Martin Tamcke

1 Introduction

Europe is where I belong, due to the fact that I was born here. To Europe also belongs my native country Germany, which for many centuries has been in an exchange with other European countries. An exchange in which it occasionally was provided with progress and then again was harassed.

But I don't belong to those, whose affiliation to Europe was a result of choice. I was born into it. There are many things that I take for granted, which are not. Important for each learning process from or about Europe is that one awakens and doesn't through nescience forfeit, in a state of dreaming innocence, what distinguishes Europe. We can assume that we are not aware of many things that distinguish Europe and differentiate it from other continents, because it became part of our everyday life and we can't witness the characteristic about it anymore, but take it as familiar. But how do we get to what makes Europe to Europe, what makes it special in regard to culture? Fact is that no one can be conscious of oneself without a counterpart. Only in the reflection of the counterpart I learn to see myself. Only then I experience the similarity and the differences in a way that makes me realize something about myself. So, could it then be possible that the best way of becoming aware of oneself is to get to know and understand the other? Someone whose life proceeded in a totally different way and has had another logic than our own. But where is it possible for Europeans to do that? Since Europe was spread across the globe, from colonialism to so called globalization, it lost its naïve and innocent counterpart. There shouldn't be any distinctive culture on earth, in which Europe has not always been present. Not only as a result of colonialism and economic exploitation of other's resources, but nowadays as well as a result of media, which keeps Europe continuously present in the mind of non-Europeans. Europe and its little daughter America obviously declared themselves to the centre and forgot at the same time to maintain a vivid counterpart, which is as much a centre as they are. And yet people living in other cultures and under other conditions remain different from Europeans. It belongs to a responsible existence as a European, to keep the responsibility that was transferred onto them by history, as

much as it is the task of the formerly colonized regions of the world to somehow find a constructive and conducive handling of this part of their past. And as Europe once made it present in its colonies, nowadays there is a presence of European attributes in almost every country on earth. Especially through its otherness, that is almost made omnipresent by the media, Europe is kept present in a way that is nearly painful. It makes the own existence within the counterpart in deficit or antiquated, less developed and less valuable. It leads to heavy reaction of rejection on the one hand and unrealistic fascination on the other. Fright marks the European's reaction but self-satisfied pleasure as well. Although both reactions only show the own suppressed possibilities, by which we too often neglect an aware way of handling, violence that is aimed against "the West", always has its causes in "the West" and not only monocausal reasons in the Orient. Nowhere this is shown better than at the European boarders, especially where Europe encounters Asia, namely in Turkey and Russia. In Russia various alternatives have always been taken into consideration: the option for Slavophiles in an aware antithesis to Europe, the option for Eurasian as an aware antithesis to a monopolar understanding of its self, the Western one as a burning admirer of Europeanizing Russia. The Ottoman Empire, later Turkey, has been shaped by this thought either in accordance with or in differentiation to Europe for centuries.

The Nobel Prize winner of 2006, Orhan Pamuk, verbalized that once quite impressively: "Only with a bunch of terms I could explain what Europe means to me. A bunch that includes the mix of reduction and admiration, love and disgust, rejection and attraction." Of course the image of Europe in people's heads outside Europe often is unjust. Europeans are seen as morally improper, as people who are underdeveloped and who can easily understand how organizations and institution function, but are not able to live a humanly fulfilled life. In former times Orhan Pamuk thought that he could get to know Europe by its books. Many people all over the world got an idea of Europe by reading books. Nowadays this happens via different media.

"Life is not, what we live, it is, what we imagine to live."[1]

2   Orhan Pamuk

Ferit Orhan Pamuk was born on June 7th in 1952 in Istanbul. He was born into a foundering upper class family. He passed Robert College that once was developed from missionary activities and studied architecture at Istanbul Technical University, but then turned to writing. The milieu in Istanbul and Turkey in the times of his childhood is subject in his novels and memoirs. Undoubtedly he is the internationally best known writer of present-day Turkey, even though he is certainly not un-

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[1] Pascal Mercier, *Night train to Lisbon* (London: Faber & Faber, 2008), 212.

disputed in his own country. In 2006 he received the Nobel Prize in Literature. Around the world it caused a sensation that he was prosecuted in Turkey for his statements on the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire in 1915. Public burning of his books and threats on his life were the consequence. Other writers stood up for him worldwide: Gabriel Garcia Márquez, Günter Grass, Umberto Eco, John Updike, Mario Vargas Llosa. The accusation against Pamuk started out from radical nationalists. Pamuk emphasized that for him it was a matter of freedom of speech. However, Pamuk was convicted in a second lawsuit in March 27th in 2011 and had to pay a fine to Turks, who argued that their honor was offended by Pamuk's expressions. Pamuk's statement that led to the charge against him and the fanatic outburst he had to face was: "Thirty thousand Kurds have been killed here, and a million Armenians. And almost nobody dares to mention that. So I do." He made this statement in a Suisse newspaper (Das Magazin), not in a Turkish journal. After he couldn't help himself by hiding, he had no other chance but to flee and escape the country. "What happened to the Ottoman Armenians in 1915 was a major thing that was hidden from the Turkish nation; it was a taboo. But we have to be able to talk about the past."[2] A law which was implemented in June 2005 was retrospectively applied on Pamuk. "A person who, being a Turk, explicitly insults the Republic or Turkish Grand National Assembly, shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months to three years." Pamuk was convicted. In spite of that, Pamuk repeated his point of view in Germany during an event in honor of him in October 2005. "I repeat, I said loud and clear that one million Armenians and 30,000 Kurds were killed in Turkey."[3] The procedure against Pamuk raised doubts regarding a possible joining of the EU of Turkey. Avowedly his case became a test to see whether Turkey would fit to the EU, or not. The European Parliament determined a high-ranking committee to monitor the trial against the writer. On January 22nd the sentences against Pamuk were canceled by an intervention of the minister of justice. However, the minister didn't offer him protection and the trial was dropped only for technical reasons. The prosecutors then insisted on a sentencing of Pamuk, which in their opinion was absolutely necessary. The main prosecutors of Pamuk were arrested with other radical nationalists in January 2008, since they were accused of having plans to murder the Armenic journalist Hrant Dink and Christian missionaries in Turkey. The case of Pamuk and his statements points out the whole dilemma of Turkey in its relationship to Europe.

But not only in his statement about the Armenians has he appeared to be someone, who as well saw Turkey with the eyes of Europe. All along the relationship between Turkey and Europe has been an outstanding topic within his work. The tension between East and West become manifest in his novels, whether put to

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[2] Rainsford, Sarah, Europe. "Author's trial set to test Turkey", BBC News, 2005-12-14, retrieved 2008-09-02.

[3] "Writer repeats Turk deaths claim", BBC News, 2005-10-23, retrieved 2011-05-13.

the age of Sultan Murat III, which would be the sixteenth century, just as in "My Name Is Red" (published 2000), or in his sensational novel "Snow", with the setting in Kar. In this novel he consistently points out the traces of the past: the city of many Armenians, who don't live there anymore, the city of Russians, who left the city to the Turks not until World War I has been over for quite a long time. The conflict between East and West is concentrated in the character of the novel's hero. He is a Turkish writer who lives in Germany and gets caught between the fronts of Islamists and secularists in Kar. Both parties are willing to kill for opposing ideals, while the writer, who is put into this situation from outside, from the West, maneuvers without any such positioning between the fronts. The writer of Turkish origin from Germany has his eye on the reading of Turgenjew "and like the Russian writer Ka to hard tired of his own country's never-ending troubles and come to despise its backwardness, only to find himself gazing back with love and longing after a move to Europe."[4] To view the country from outside, as it became unbearable from within. Is that the solution? The recourse to the powers outside contains dangers inside the country. It is considered to blame foreign powers for internal issues of religious and cultural life in Turkey "so that they can turn Turkey into a weak and divided nation"[5]. The recollection of Islam caused different reactions. There is an aging follower of the declining secularism who feels sorry for the opposing ways his children chose. "God wouldn´t even give me a child who might do all the things I had not done, who might release me from my misery by becoming the westernized, modern, self-possessed individual I had always dreamed of becoming."[6] There returns one to the Islam, out of fear of the reactionary Sheiks in the country.[7] And religion becomes a factor for the integration into the community. "As Ka knew from the beginning, in this part of the world faith in God was not something achieved by thinking sublime thoughts and stretching one´s creative powers to their outer limits; nor was it something one could do alone; above all it meant joining a mosque, becoming part of a community."[8] According to that, Ka, the hero of the novel, argues with his friend Muhtar, who got involved with Islamists: "The idea of a solitary westernized individual whose faith in God is private is very threatening to you. An atheist who belongs to a community is far easier for you to trust than a solitary man who believes in God. For you, a solitary man is far more wretched and sinful than a nonbeliever."[9] And there are clarifying moments which break through the self-humiliation of the Turks: "Most of the time it´s not the Europeans who belittle us. What happens when we look at them is that we belittle ourselves."[10] Europe opens new horizons: "But when I went to Europe, I

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[4] Orhan Pamuk, *Snow* (New York : Vintage, 2005), 31.

[5] Ibid., 43.

[6] Ibid., 53-54.

[7] Cp., 55.

[8] Ibid., 60-61.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid., 73.

realized there could be an Allah who was different from the Allah of the bearded provincial reactionaries."[11] Ka, living between two worlds, remains religiously without positioning. "I want to believe in the God you believe in and be like you, but because there´s a Westerner inside me, my mind is confused."[12] On the outside his existence between the cultures as well is being classified as inadmissible. "And now," said Sunay, "what are we to do with this poet of ours, whose intellect belongs to Europe, whose heart belongs to the religious high school militants, and whose head is all mixed up."[13] Because Istanbul's upper class believes in what the Europeans believe, their countrymen assume, "they think they´re something better than ordinary people."[14] One can only rule Turkey properly, if fear of the religion is spread.[15] Sentences about human rights are connected to the thoughts of "the wild simplifications of so many well-intentioned but shameless and slightly addled Western intellectuals and the platitudes repeated verbatim by their Turkish imitators"[16] who by continuously repeating those sentences left nothing but empty phrases. Finally the differences clash. The Islamist says: "The people of Europe are not our friends, they´re our enemies. And it´s not because we´re their enemies, it´s because they instinctively despise us."[17] The Europe-facing old leftist however says: "But we all know what Europe has come to mean." And he elaborates: "Europe is […] the future of our humanity."[18] Whereas the Islamist, who wants to address humanity but not Europe, stays Europe-sceptical: "Europe's not my future." And he points out the consequences of an orientation towards Europe: "As long as I live I shall never imitate them or hate myself for being unlike them."[19] An Islamist simply rhymes his convictions "We will never be Europeans!"[20] in plausible lines: "Europe, O Europe,/ Let´s stop and take a look,/ When we´re together in our dreams/ Let´s not let the devil have this way."[21] And when someone from Kar figured, that the writer wanted to write a novel about Kar, he told him: "No one could understand us from so far away."[22]

In a totally different way the novel "The Museum of Innocence" makes this conflict a subject of the discussion. Here Pamuk takes a look at the questions of lifestyle that one could understand as an echo to the conflict. Western sexual morals – sex before marriage – versus eastern sexual morals – sex after marriage. Vir-

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[11] Ibid., 96.
[12] Ibid., 98.
[13] Ibid., 206.
[14] Ibid., 103.
[15] Cp., 204.
[16] Ibid., 242-243.
[17] Ibid., 271.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid., 277.
[21] Ibid., 278.
[22] Ibid., 426.

ginity becomes a test of their position between Europe and Turkey. "If we´re really meant to be modern in our outlook, if we´re really European, as I said, it has no importance. If, on the other hand, we´re still tied to tradition […] the everyone's should be considered in the same way!"[23] Consideration of psychological help becomes an expression of the reception of western behavior: "There's nothing wrong with that. In Europe and America, everyone goes to them."[24] In his memorials "Istanbul" he finally mixes the struggle of westward or eastward orientation with his personal story with Istanbul and parental family. Several times Pamuk taught at universities in the US. In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech on December 7th 2006 he pointed his commitment to the values of Europe against the European complacency that is standing in the shadow of its created values.

Pamuk also reflects the relation between Turkey and Europe in prose. Who tries to adopt a western attitude is accused "to not be authentic".[25] One tries to internalize the European spirit and then feels guilty because of the impulse to imitate it. "Turkey shouldn't fret because it belongs to two different cultures and has two souls. Schizophrenia makes one intelligent."[26] He himself was able to experience how he started writing in a part of the world, which was so far away from Europe. Therefore he was capable of finding readers in various cultures and captivating them.[27] An interviewer reproached him with having grown up in a world, that he now was detached from and still had to live in. "As a writer you are certainly alone in modern Turkey today."[28] Initially Pamuk pointed out that for him community meant the destruction of his imagination and that the torture of being lonely was supported by it. But the following question: "How Turkish do you feel?" he answered with an intelligible confession: "First of all I'm born as a Turk and throughout confident with it. In an international context I'm perceived more a Turkish than I actually see myself. I'm known as a Turkish author. If Proust writes about love, he is seen as someone who talks about the universal love. When I wrote about love, especially in the beginning, people thought I was writing about love in Turkey. As my books were translated gradually, the Turks were proud of it. They claim me to be one of them and more than before I became a Turk to them. Once you are known internationally, the fact that you are Turkish will be emphasized internationally. Then again this fact is stressed by the Turks themselves, who make a claim to you. The own feeling of national identity becomes something, that is manipulated by others and forced by others onto you. In the meantime my fellow-countrymen care more about how Turkey is represented internationally, than

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[23] Orhan Pamuk, *The museum of innocence* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), 221.

[24] Ibid., 174.

[25] Orhan Pamuk, *Der Koffer meines Vaters. Aus dem Leben eines Schriftstellers* (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 2013), 314 (own translation from the German; the page numbers refer to the German version of the book).

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid., 323.

[28] Ibid., 324.

about my art. And that causes more and more problems in my country."[29] Europe evokes ambivalent feelings to the one, who is standing outside and looking across. "My image of Europe is not the brilliant, clear, magnificent and noble idea. For me the image of Europe is an urging, heavy question, a suspense of disgust and sympathy, desire and despise."[30] In Turkey Europe and the European thought seem to be instrument for some kind of civilizing process. "We desire something, because in Europe it does whereas in our own culture and history it does not exist. "[31] Europe deserves appreciation for promoting "as well outside the occident the values of freedom, equality and fraternity."[32] Therefore less Europe but more the ideal of Europe was required.[33] But that produces shame about the own ideal. He should be ashamed, because he is not a European.[34] And then he should be ashamed for what he did to be like the Europeans. "He is ashamed because he has his own identity and because he doesn't have his own identity."[35] A non-western understanding of integrity is wanted. The Turks were confused regarding the question of their identity. "Who are we, Moslems, Turks, oriental or Western, Mediterranean or Third World?"[36] This lasting constructing became a lifestyle. "I don't even know who we are. But if you ask me, then it is those absurd ideas of identity, that build the only common denominator for the issue of identity of a country's people."[37] But the other in our head should gradually appropriate.[38] The relation between Europe and Turkey stays a relation in Pamuk's work, not a unit. "As much as I can't imagine Turkey, that is not dreaming of Europe, I can't imagine Europe defining itself without Turkey."[39]

That's how the European within him is the embodiment of European culture and that's how he can't imagine Europe that doesn't count novels as its foundation. The European within him gives the Asian Turk within him the resisting profile. But more than that he gives him goals and visions to achieve, that the European easily reveals (Pamuk points out that the American invasion of the Iraq complicated the life and work of the democrats in the whole Near East (for him, Turkey belongs to it), whose profile in the Orient still is the European, even though it would require an own face next to the borrowed and imitated from Europe. Europe is an idea – from Greeks to the French revolution –, that can be transferred, not only a continent or a political union of European states.

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[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid., 79.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid., 162.
[33] Ibid., 80.
[34] Ibid., 84.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid., 145.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid., 152.
[39] Ibid., 163.

Zur Reichweite des Kulturtransfer-Begriffes am Beispiel der japanisch-deutschen Beziehungen

Toru Takenaka

1 Einleitung

Die historische Forschung steht neuerdings vor allem im Zeichen des globalen bzw. transnationalen Blickwinkels. Grenzübergreifende Phänomene, Netzwerke wechselseitiger Beziehungen, vielfältige Mobilität der Menschen zwischen Weltteilen durch Handelstätigkeiten und Migration und reger Austausch materieller wie auch immaterieller Güter zwischen Kulturräumen ziehen immer mehr Forschungsinteresse auf sich.[1] Dieser Trend verstärkt sich gewiss weiter, da die dahinter stehende Globalisierung das heutige Leben immer tiefer durchdringt und die Welt stärker gestaltet. Vielleicht zählt der Trend der Global- bzw. Transnationalgeschichte selbst zu den Globalisierungsphänomenen. Denn diese Forschungsströmung, die eigentlich Ende des vorigen Jahrhunderts in anglo-amerikanischen akademischen Kreisen ihren Anfang nahm, hat sich schnell auf viele andere Länder übertragen und findet überall regen Widerhall. Sie gilt auch im deutschen Historikerkreis inzwischen als etabliertes methodisches Prinzip.[2]

Nicht anders verhält es sich unter japanischen Forschern.[3] Diese können sogar auf eine für die transnationale Sicht äußerst günstige Hinterlassenschaft zurückgreifen, denn in der Forschungstradition des Landes ist seit jeher das Interesse für Beziehungen, vor allem diejenigen zwischen Staaten, ausgeprägt und dementsprechend ist darüber viel diskutiert und geschrieben worden. Dies ist wohl zum Großteil darauf zurückzuführen, dass die Japaner ein eigenartiges Weltbild und folglich auch ein sonderbares Verständnis für die Weltgeschichte hatten. Weil sie sich stets

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[1] Wolfgang Schwentker, „Globalisierung und Geschichtswissenschaft. Themen, Methoden und Kritik der Globalgeschichte," in *Globalisierung und Globalgeschichte*, Hg. Margarete Grandner u.a. (Wien: Mandelbaum, 2005); Janny de Jong, „Globalisation as a Field of Study for Historians," in *World and Global History. Research and Teaching*, Hg. Seija Jalagin u.a. (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2011).

[2] Dominic Sachsenmaier, *Global Perspective on Global History. Theories and Approaches in a Connected World* (Cambridge u.a.: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 126-71.

[3] Tsukasa Mizushima, *Gurobaru Hisutori Nyumon* [Einführung in die Globalgeschichte] (Tokyo: Yamakawa, 2010).

in der Nähe einer mächtigen Zivilisation – zunächst der chinesisch-indischen, dann der westlichen – fanden und ihrem hegemonialen Einfluss unterlagen, neigten sie vom Anfang ihrer Geschichte an dazu, sich in ihrem Weltbild anhand der Beziehungen zum jeweiligen Weltzentrum zu orientieren.[4] Immerhin sind in Japan beachtliche Errungenschaften in der Forschung über historische Beziehungen zu verzeichnen.[5] Merkwürdig ist allerdings, dass sich der Einfluss der beziehungshistorischen Sichtweise auf das ganze historiographische Schaffen ungeachtet der quantitativ so augenfälligen Dimension ihres wissenschaftlichen Ausstoßes ziemlich begrenzt ausnimmt. Wohl nicht nur in Japan sah man sie eher als kurioses Treiben an, das von der zentralen Entwicklungsrichtung des Faches abweicht und manchmal gar an Laienhaftigkeit grenzte. Angesichts der vorherrschenden historischen Erzählweise ist dies nicht besonders überraschend. Der Mainstream des Geschichtsschreibens war zum einen lange vom einzelstaatlich begrenzten Blickwinkel beherrscht und zum anderen im Wesentlichen auf die diachronische Entwicklung entlang der Zeitachse fixiert, ging aber nicht so sehr in die Breite.

Deswegen ist zu hoffen, dass die Erweiterung des Blickfelds zum Transnationalen die Beziehungsgeschichte in ein neues Licht taucht und das Interesse dafür neu belebt.[6] Ähnliches erlebte im Übrigen die Kolonialgeschichtsforschung, die dem Wesen nach viel mit der Beziehungsgeschichte zu tun hat. Nach einer zeitweiligen Interessenssteigerung in den 1970er Jahren kam die Forschung in der letzten Dekade des vorigen Jahrhunderts im Rückenwind der transnationalen Sicht aufs Neue in Schwung.[7] Die bisher als Einzelfälle von marginaler Bedeutung abgetanen kolonialen Phänomene werden nun als wesentlicher Teil der vielschichtigen Interdependenz von globalem Ausmaß angesehen und Geschichtsmächtigkeit zugesprochen. Dabei können Anregungen, die von der Globalgeschichte ausgehen, bei

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[4] Toru Takenaka, „The Idea of World History in Japan," in *World and Global History*, Hg. Jalagin u.a..

[5] Wenn man beispielsweise in der japanischen Datenbank der Forschungsliteratur, CiNii Books (http://ci.nii.ac.jp/books/?l=ja), nach dem Stichwort "kankei shi" (Beziehungsgeschichte) sucht, bekommt man 1773 Treffer (Stand: 24 Oktober 2012).

[6] Jennifer L. Jenkins u.a., „Asia, Germany and the Transnational Turn," in *German History* 28-4 (2010).

[7] Sebastian Conrad, *Deutsche Kolonialgeschichte* (München: C.H. Beck, 2008), 11f. Um einige Beispiele der Forschungsergebnisse zu nennen: Charles Stephenson, *Germany's Asia-Pacific Empire. Colonialism and Naval Policy 1885-1914* (Woodbridge u.a.: Boydell, 2009); Michael Perraudin/Jürgen Zimmerer, Hg., *German Colonialism and National Identity* (New York u.a.: Routledge, 2011); Volker Langbehn/Mohammad Salama, Hg., *German Colonialism. Race, the Holocaust, and Postwar Germany* (New York: Columbia University Press 2011). Zum Überblick über die Forschungsgeschichte sowie den jüngsten Trend der Kolonialgeschichtsforschung: Arthur J. Knoll/Hermann J. Hiery, „Introduction," in *The German Colonial Experience, Select Documents on German Rule in Africa, China, and the Pacific 1884-1914*, Hg. dies. (Lanham u.a.: University Press of America, 2010), xvi-xviii; Birthe Kundrus, „German Colonialism. Some Reflections on Reassessments, Specificities, and Constellations," in *German Colonialism*, Hg. Langbehn/Salama.

der Beziehungsgeschichte weitaus stärker ausfallen, weil man in theoretischen Überlegungen über die globalhistorische Betrachtung die Bedeutung von *connexion* hervorhebt, die neben *comparison* methodisch Gewähr leistet.[8] So ist wohl davon auszugehen, dass der empirischen Untersuchung über historische Beziehungen durch Fallstudien weiterhin Schub gegeben wird.

Wenn einerseits ein Aufschwung der Beziehungsgeschichte auch zu erwarten ist, so sollte man doch andererseits keineswegs vorschnell schließen, dass ein verändertes Umfeld allein inhaltliche Bereicherung der Forschung mit sich brächte. Vor allem ist darauf zu verweisen, dass man sich in dem Bereich bisher wenig mit methodologischen Fragen auseinander gesetzt hat und Untersuchungen infolgedessen oft nicht über die rein informative Dimension hinausgehen. Dies fällt besonders beim kulturellen Aspekt der Beziehungen schwer. Anders als etwa Außenpolitik und Handel, die jeweils auf einschlägige Überlegungen in benachbarten Fächern wie der Politik- und der Wirtschaftswissenschaften zurückgreifen können, gibt es für den Kulturaustausch kaum einen theoretischen Rückhalt, auf den man sich berufen kann. Im Ganzen gesehen ist deswegen die Tendenz erkennbar, auf Einzelfakten um der Fakten willen zu fokussieren und es lediglich auf deren Ermittlung durch detaillierte Quellenarbeit abzusehen. Infolgedessen wird nicht genug Wert darauf gelegt, mittels analytischer Fragestellungen einzelne Ereignisse in einen breiteren Kontext einzuordnen. Wenn der Aufschwung der Forschung von dieser unausgewogenen Faktenorientierung begleitet würde, liefe man aber Gefahr, sich einer nur wachsenden Flut empirischer Daten ratlos auszuliefern, die das verstärkte Engagement mit Fallstudien erzeugen würde. Ob der beziehungshistorischen Forschung daher tatsächlich ein Durchbruch gelingt, hängt nicht zuletzt davon ab, ob sie auch auf theoretischer Ebene ausreichend untermauert wird.

Zu diesem Zweck bieten sich verschiedene begriffliche Konzepte. Dieser Beitrag will davon den Begriff des Kulturtransfers aufgreifen und anhand der japanisch-deutschen Beziehungen auf seine Nutzen und Probleme hin prüfen.

2   Kulturtransfer als methodischer Ansatz

Die Beziehungen zwischen Japan und Deutschland gehören zu gut bestellten Forschungsfeldern, die bereits viele wissenschaftliche Früchte brachten.[9] Wenn es dort bisher überhaupt auf einen theoretischen Bezugsrahmen ankam, so ist es allen voran die Modernisierungstheorie. Heute noch findet sie – allerdings eher implizit und zudem im ausgedehnten Sinn – in der Forschung weitestgehend Anwen-

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[8] Patrick O'Brien, „Historiographical Traditions and Modern Imperatives for the Restoration of Global History," in *Journal of Global History* 1 (2006): 4f.

[9] Eines der jüngsten Beispiele ist: Akira Kudo/Nobuo Tajima/Erich Pauer, Hg., *Japan and Germany. Two Latecomers to the World Stage, 1890-1945*, 3 Bde., (Folkstone: Global Oriental, 2009).

dung.[10] Einer ihrer Vorzüge liegt darin, dass sich durch sie sachliche Aspekte der Beziehungen zwischen zwei Einheiten konzeptionell gut fassen lassen. So erklärt die Theorie, wie sich kulturelle Kontakte und Interaktionen zwischen Japan und Deutschland – oder besser: der fast einseitige Fluss geistiger Elemente von letzterem nach ersterem – gestalteten, indem sie sie am eindimensionalen Maßstab der Modernisierung misst. Die Deutschen nahmen demzufolge als Fortgeschrittene eine Stelle ganz oben auf der Skala ein. Kulturgüter wie Verfassung und Lokalverwaltung, Militärwesen, Wissenschaft und Universitätssystem bis hin zu klassischer Musik, Skilaufen und Tanz westlicher Art sollten sich naturgemäß auf die unten stehenden Japaner übertragen. Diese Erzählweise, die den Hauptantrieb des Austausches gerade in der den auszutauschenden kulturellen Artefakten immanenten Qualität sieht, macht es überflüssig, andere die Kontakte begleitenden bzw. ausgestaltenden Aspekte zu erörtern, z.B. nicht zuletzt Motive zum Austausch auf der Geber- und dessen Akzeptanz auf der Nehmerseite. Die Modernisierung dient zum anderen, vor allem für die japanisch-deutschen Beziehungen, auch als Koordinatensystem für eine vergleichende Perspektive.[11] Nach der Theorie gelten beide Länder als Spätankömmlinge in der modernen Welt, die den westeuropäischen und amerikanischen Vorreitern nacheiferten. Um die Rivalen zügig einzuholen, sei es für beide notwendig gewesen, dass der Staat die Initiative zur Modernisierung ergriff und sie tatkräftig vorantrieb, was aber zwangsläufig Verzerrungen und Ungleichmäßigkeiten hervorgerufen hätte. Kurzum, so heißt es, schlugen beide jeweils den „Sonderweg" gegenüber dem „normalen" modernen Entwicklungspfad ein. Aus diesem Diktum ergeben sich gleich eine Reihe von Fragen: Welche Abweichungen zum Normalfall lassen sich an der historischen Entwicklung beider Länder erkennen? Von welchen historischen bzw. gesellschaftlichen Gegebenheiten rühren Unterschiede her, die man zwischen beiden Sonderwegen wahrnimmt?[12]

Trotz aller Beliebtheit, der sich die Modernisierungsperspektive immer noch erfreut, sind die Grenzen ihrer Reichweite doch auch unübersehbar. So wird demnach in Bezug auf den Aspekt der Kontakte alles auf das simplistische Lehrmeister-Schüler-Schema reduziert. Die Annahme, dass es zwischen Kulturen Qualitätsgefälle gebe, die die Bewegungsrichtung der Kulturgüter bestimme, gilt auch als zu simpel. Ebenso problematisch ist es, einen dem Kulturgut immanenten qualitativen Wert vorauszusetzen, der außerdem über die Grenzen hinweg universell gültig sein

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[10] Zum Stellenwert der Modernisierungstheorie in der Historiographie des nachkriegszeitlichen Japans s. Sebastian Conrad, „What Time is Japan? Problems of Comparative (Intercultural) Historiography," in *History and Theory* 38-1 (1999).

[11] Zum komplementären Verhältnis zwischen der vergleichenden und der Beziehungsgeschichte s. Jürgen Kocka/Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, „Comparison and Beyond. Traditions, Scope, and Perspectives of Comparative History," in *Comparative and Transnational History. Central European Approaches and New Perspectives*, Hg. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt/Jürgen Kocka (New York: Berghahn, 2009), 19-21.

[12] Yukio Mochida, *Futatsu no Kindai. Doitsu to Nihon wa do chigauka* [Zwei Modernen. Unterschiede zwischen Deutschland und Japan] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun, 1988), bes. 65ff.

soll, was der Verschiedenheit der Wertvorstellungen je nach Kulturkreis nicht gerecht wird. Ferner wird der japanischen Seite in dieser Perspektive lediglich die passive Rolle eines reinen Empfängers zugeschrieben. Das verbaut gerade den Blick darauf, welch aktiver Verarbeitungsmechanismus bei der Aufnahme fremder Kulturgüter auf der Empfängerseite in Gang war. Was dann den Vergleichsaspekt angeht, so trifft die Kritik, die im Allgemeinen an der Sonderwegsthese geübt wird, auch darauf zu. Es ist ein sehr zweifelhaftes Unterfangen, das westeuropäische Entwicklungsmuster, wenn es so etwas Pauschales überhaupt gibt, als normativ hinzustellen und damit vergleichend den historischen Verlauf anderer Weltregionen zu bewerten.[13] Wenn Phänomene außerdem kurzerhand mit „Verzerrungen" oder „Abweichungen" abgetan werden, wird man häufig wesentliche Unterschiede zwischen beiden übersehen. Zur Perspektive darf man schließlich darauf verweisen, dass eher „harte" Themen wie Politik, Rechtswesen und Wirtschaft bevorzugt behandelt werden. Diese Bereiche versöhnen sich ja leichter mit der Idee einer stufenweisen Entwicklung, die auch der Modernisierungstheorie zugrunde liegt. „Weiche" Bereiche wie die Kultur hingegen kommen dementsprechend zu kurz.

Das zuletzt genannte Problem wird vom Begriff des Kulturimperialismus angesprochen. Er fokussiert besonders auf die kulturellen Aspekte der Beziehungen und will politische Subtexte hinter dem oberflächlich harmlosen Kulturaustausch ins Auge fassen.[14] Vor allem in der globalisierten Kulturwelt von heute, so die Theorie, werden Wertvorstellungen eines bestimmten Kulturkreises mit einem überwältigenden Potential – zumeist des amerikanischen – anderen Leuten aufgenötigt, und zwar entweder explizit mittels seiner Vormachtstellung in der Medienindustrie von Fernsehen und Film oder implizit durch die weltweite Verbreitung von Konsumgütern wie Coca-Cola, McDonald's usw. Es ist zwar richtig, dass die wesentlich zeitkritisch akzentuierte Theorie des Kulturimperialismus bisher wenig auf den Bereich der japanisch-deutschen historischen Beziehungen angewandt worden ist, jedoch ist es durchaus möglich, von einer Hegemoniestellung der deutschen Hochkultur in Intellektuellenkreisen Vorkriegs-Japans zu sprechen. Die akademische Welt seinerzeit war ja stark deutsch gefärbt: In vielen Bereichen wie Philosophie und Medizin wurden Wissenschaftskanons von Deutschland übernommen, und der institutionelle Aufbau des Hochschulwesens lehnte sich ans deutsche Vorbild an; das deutsche Bildungsideal beherrschte den Wissens- und Verhaltenskodex der Akademiker bis hin zum studentischen Alltagsleben, wo viele deutschstämmige Jargons im Umlauf waren.

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[13] Zum Versuch, Mängel der Modernisierungstheorie zu überwinden s. z.B. Michael Geyer, „Deutschland und Japan im Zeitalter der Globalisierung. Überlegungen zu einer komparativen Geschichte jenseits des Modernisierungs-Paradigmas," in *Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt 1871-1914*, Hg. Sebastian Conrad/Jürgen Osterhammel (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004).

[14] Zum Kulturimperialismus und der Kritik daran s. John Tomlinson, *Cultural imperialism. A Critical Introduction* (London: Pinter, 1991).

Man sollte sich jedoch auch über Probleme der Theorie im Klaren sein. Sie tendiert unweigerlich dazu, wie das Wort Imperialismus nun einmal andeutet, alles im Grunde durch die Brille des Herrschafts-Abhängigkeits-Verhältnisses zu betrachten. Das kann zu einer ungerechtfertigten Verschmälerung des Blickfeldes führen. Denn wenn man von einer Kolonisierung der geistigen Landschaft des vorkriegszeitlichen Japans durch deutsche kulturelle Elemente ausgeht, so entgeht der Aufmerksamkeit, wie die Empfänger die von außen eingeführten Güter bereitwillig entgegennahmen und sie spontan aufarbeiteten. Die Betonung der herrschaftlichen Komponenten läuft letzten Endes, genau wie bei der Modernisierung, auf eine Einbahnstraße vom Westen zum Nichtwesten hinaus. Indem man die Zwei-Länder-Beziehungen auf eine rigide Gegenüberstellung von Geber und Nehmer fixiert, wird der nichteuropäischen Seite immer eine rein passive Rolle zugeschrieben.

In theoretischen Überlegungen über die historischen Beziehungen sollte daher Wert darauf gelegt werden, die Wechselseitigkeit der Beziehungen gut zu erfassen und vor allem das Wirken beider Parteien angemessen zu würdigen. Es wird mittlerweile vielfach versucht, diesen Anforderungen Rechnung zu tragen. In der Musikologie beispielsweise wird das Konzept von *artistic sharing* vorgeschlagen,[15] und diesem Fachbereich entstammt ebenfalls der von Kartomi vertretene Begriff der Transkulturation, der nicht zuletzt „whole new organizing and conceptual or ideological principles" eines Kulturphänomens zu umfassen versucht.[16] Im Bereich der internationalen Beziehungen gehört wohl die Neue Internationalgeschichte dazu.[17] Vielleicht sei auch das von dem amerikanischen Politologen Nye ins Feld geführte *Soft Power*-Konzept erwähnt,[18] obgleich der eingängige Begriff in vielen Fällen weiter angewandt wird, als der Autor eigentlich meinte. Von den verschiedenen Ansätzen wollen wir uns hier dem Kulturtransfer zuwenden. Der Begriff, der eigentlich aus dem Bereich der deutsch-französischen Beziehungen hervorging, beleuchtet in angebrachter Weise die Akkulturation der Kulturgüter, die beim Überschritt der Grenzen zwischen Kulturräumen stattfindet. Denn jeder Kulturraum stellt ein relativ geschlossenes, eigenständiges System von Codes dar, dessen Bestandteile

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[15] Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, „Cultural Transfer," in *Explaining the history of American foreign relations*, Hg. Michael J. Hogan/Thomas G. Paterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004²).

[16] Margaret J. Kartomi, „The Process and Results of Musical Culture Contact," in *Ethnomusicology* 25 (1981): 244.

[17] Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, „Trumpeting down the walls of Jericho. The politics of art, music and emotion in German-American relations, 1870-1920," in *Journal of Social History* 36-3 (2003): 587. Vgl. auch dies., *Sound Diplomacy. Music and Emotions in Transatlantic Relations, 1850-1920* (Chicago etc.: University of Chicago Press, 2009). Als Kritik am kulturistischen Ansatz in den internationalen Beziehungen s. David Reynolds, „International History, the Cultural Turn and the Diplomatic Twitch," in *Cultural and Social History* (2006).

[18] Josepf S. Nye, *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

auf jeweils eigene Weise in gegenseitiger Abhängigkeit stehen und weder beliebig entfernt noch hinzugefügt werden können. Wenn ein Kulturgut daher zu einem fremden Ort hinübergebracht wird, geschieht zwangsläufig der Prozess der Akkulturation. So kann beispielsweise der Inhalt im Empfängerraum so abgeändert werden, dass er besser zu den einheimischen Verhältnissen passt. Ihm können aber auch neue Konnotationen und Werte je nach dem dortigen sozialen Kontext, in den er eingebettet wird, gegeben werden. Er kann ferner durchaus im möglicherweise völlig andersartigen Umfeld eine bisher im Heimatraum ungeahnte Funktion wahrnehmen. Der Kulturtransfer versucht die Dynamik der Akkulturation in ihren zahlreichen Facetten zu fassen. Insofern kann man sich davon ein effektives Instrumentarium für die Beziehungsgeschichte versprechen.[19]

Ungeachtet vieler Vorzüge ist es dennoch nicht zu bestreiten, dass der Begriff zu vieldeutig und nicht klar genug umrissen ist. Um ihn in der Forschung brauchbarer zu machen, gilt es, ihn deswegen durch einige theoretische Erwägungen zu präzisieren.

Eines der Probleme stellt die Identifizierung und Demarkierung einzelner Kulturräume als Analyseeinheiten dar. Um überhaupt von einer Beziehung sprechen zu können, müssen logischerweise zuallererst zwei in sich wesentlich geschlossene und daher prinzipiell eindeutig umgrenzte, von außen als solche erkennbare Einheiten bestehen. Darüber, ob von einem solchen Kulturraum denn überhaupt die Rede sein kann, lässt sich grundsätzlich streiten, wenn man vom konstruktivistischen Verständnis der Kultur ausgeht. Selbst im Fall eines essentialistischen Kulturbegriffs bleiben noch Unklarheiten. Vor allem ist die Ausdehnung eines Kulturraums kaum klar zu umreißen, da er in sich inhaltlich graduell variiert und am Randgebiet in einen anderen fließend übergeht. Darüber hinaus ist es keineswegs vorauszusetzen, dass ein wie auch immer umrissener Kulturraum kulturell einheitlich gekennzeichnet würde. Dies kann vor allem im Fall der Studien über die vormoderne Zeit fundamentale Schwierigkeiten bereiten, da man als verwendbare Einheit allenfalls von einem schwammigen Gegenstand wie „Zivilisation" ausgehen kann, wie Osterhammel meint.[20] Die moderne Beziehungsgeschichte hat es auch nicht leichter. Hier dürfte wohl der Nationalstaat heranzuziehen sein, was aber am genannten Problem wenig ändert. Denn der Nationalstaat deckt sich

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[19] Je nach Definition des Begriffs allerdings kann die Bewertung seiner Nützlichkeit variieren. So fällt z.B. Kaelble darüber ein negatives Urteil. Vgl. Hartmut Kaelble, „Foreword. Representations and Transfers," in *Cultural Transfers in Dispute. Representations in Asia, Europe and the Arab World since the Middle Age*, Hg. Jörg Feuchter u.a. (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2011), 11.

[20] Jürgen Osterhammel, „Internationale Geschichte, Globalisierung und die Pluralität der Kulturen," in Internationale Geschichte, Hg. Wilfried Loth/Jürgen Osterhammel (München: Oldenbourg, 2000). Siehe auch andere Aufsätze von demselben Autor: Ders., „Raumbeziehungen. Internationale Geschichte, Geopolitik und historische Geographie," in Ebd.; ders., „Transferanalyse und Vergleich im Fernverhältnis," in *Vergleich und Transfer*, Hg. Hartmut Kaelble/Jürgen Schriewer (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2003).

selbstverständlich nicht mit einem kohärenten Kulturraum. Es gibt oft ethnische Minderheiten mit einer eigenständigen Kulturtradition, vor allem an dessen Randgebiet.[21] Selbst innerhalb der ethnischen Mehrheit ist es angesichts der schichten- und milieuspezifischen Subkulturen höchst fragwürdig, wieweit man von einer Leitkultur zu sprechen vermag. So ist auf den Nationalstaat erst mit vielen Einschränkungen als Analyseeinheit der Beziehungen zurückzugreifen.[22] Es ist zwar richtig, dass das Problem von Identifizierung und Demarkierung im japanisch-deutschen Fall nicht so schwer wiegt, da es sich um zwei Räume handelt, die jeweils einen grundverschiedenen historischen Hintergrund hatten und überdies wegen ihrer großen Entfernung voneinander seit jeher ohne jegliche gegenseitige Beeinflussung auskamen. Für die beziehungshistorischen Studien im Allgemeinen bleibt es gleichwohl ein Desiderat, sich mit dem Problem je nach den sich aus der Themensetzung ergebenden Bedürfnissen zu beschäftigen.

Man sollte zum zweiten darüber nachdenken, welch großen epistemologischen Bewegungsraum der Kulturtransfer zulässt. Dabei geht es insbesondere um das Verhältnis zum semiotischen Standpunkt. Es scheint, dass man üblicherweise von semiotischen Prämissen ausgeht, wenn von Kulturtransfer die Rede ist. Dies ist nicht ganz unverständlich, da die historiographische Perspektivenerweiterung hin zum Globalen und Transnationalen, von dem der Kulturtransfer beträchtliche Impulse bekam, mit der „kulturistischen Wende" in der Geschichtswissenschaft einherging. So wird in der Geschichtsschreibung bevorzugt hermeneutisch vorgegangen, indem man auf Auslegen und Sinngebung der Fakten Wert legt, aber nicht so sehr auf deren Ermittlung und Begründung der Kausalität. Man darf indes wohl fragen, ob der Kulturtransfer denn epistemologisch noch offener sein kann. Es gibt jedenfalls keinen Grund, etwa auf die empirische Vorgehensweise verzichten zu müssen, die durchaus ebenso ertragreich sein kann, wie Paulmann anhand des deutsch-britischen Beispiels zeigt.[23]

Die Nutzbarkeit der empirischen Methode im breiteren Kontext hängt nicht zuletzt davon ab, wieweit sich ein sinnvolles, gut zu handhabendes Modell dafür entwickeln lässt. Dies ist unabdingbar, vor allem, wenn man die beziehungshistori-

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[21] Zur Problematik des Grenzgebiets in kultureller Begegnung s. Peter Burke, *What is Cultural History*, (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), 117-19.

[22] In diesem Zusammenhang sei auch erwähnt, dass der Kulturtransfer mit der Überwindung des nationalhistorischen Erzählens prinzipiell nichts zu tun hat. Insofern scheint die dementsprechend lautende These Midells nicht überzeugend zu sein. Vgl. Matthias Middell, „European History and Cultural Transfer," in *Diogenes* 48 (2000). So wird es auch gerechtfertigt, dass man als Analyseeinheit den Nationalstaat hinstellt, obwohl diese Sicht von Middell und Naumann kritisiert wird. Vgl. Matthias Middell/Katja Naumann, „Global History and the Spatial Turn. From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization," in *Journal of Global History* 5 (2010).

[23] Johannes Paulmann, „Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien. Einführung in ein Forschungskonzept," in *Aneignung und Abwehr. Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien im 19. Jahrhundert*, Hg. Rudolf Muhs u.a. (Bodenheim: Philo, 1998).

sche Forschung von ihrem methodischen Mangel, d.h. der unausgewogenen Faktenorientierung, lösen will. Ein gelungenes Modell würde die innere Logik des Transferprozesses beleuchten und zur weiteren Forschung neue Perspektiven eröffnen. Es gibt bereits mehrere Versuche herauszuarbeiten, welche Faktoren dabei berücksichtigt werden sollten. Osterhammel beispielsweise zählt die folgenden auf: Vorbedingungen für einen Transferfall, Auswahl der zu transferierenden Elemente, Verlauf sowie Träger des Transfers und seine langfristigen Auswirkungen.[24] Paulmann zufolge sollte ein Modell außerdem Transferwege bzw. -medien und sprachliche Bedingungen dafür einbeziehen. Ferner sollten auch Motive zum Transfer, Auswahlkriterien für die zu transferierenden Kulturgüter und schließlich ihr Nutzungszweck thematisiert werden.[25] Wenn es indes einmal darum geht, wie man diese einzelnen Faktoren in ein kohärentes Gebilde zusammenflechten sollte, so bleibt noch eine beträchtliche Strecke zu bewältigen. Dabei beschreibt das von Muhs und anderen vorgeschlagene Modell z.B. den Transferprozess in Etappen, und zwar von der Identifizierung der zwei Einheiten angefangen über die Aufnahme und Aufbewahrung fremder Elemente bis hin zur Besinnung auf das Partnerbild und dessen Verarbeitung.[26] Es lässt sich aber wohl zu Recht fragen, ob sich denn alle Transferfälle in ein solches einspuriges Entwicklungsschema hineinzwängen lassen. Der Modus des Transfers ist in der historischen Realität von Fall zu Fall ganz verschiedenartig. Es ist deswegen vielmehr angebracht, differenzierter vorzugehen, indem man verschiedene Typen und Entwicklungsmuster des Transfers annimmt. Dabei könnte es möglicherweise von Nutzen sein, die Diskussion über den Technologietransfer[27] zur Referenz heranzuziehen. Sie bietet für die Modellbildung des Kulturtransfers gewiss einige Anhaltspunkte, zumal es dabei teilweise auch um die Übertragung immaterieller Elemente wie Wissen und Knowhow geht. Insofern ist Paulmanns Vorschlag beachtenswert, Technologie und Kultur auf den gemeinsamen Nenner des interkulturellen Transfers zu bringen.[28] Ebenso viel Nutzen kann man sich auch von der Forschung über den Organisationstransfer versprechen.[29]

Bei weiteren Bemühungen um die Modellbildung sollte man sich trotz aller bisherigen Überlegungen wohl darauf gefasst machen, dass dies nicht so leicht von

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[24] Osterhammel, *Internationale Geschichte*, 405.

[25] Paulmann, *Interkultureller Transfer*, 31.

[26] Rudolf Muhs u.a., „Brücken über den Kanal? Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien im 19. Jahrhundert," in *Aneignung und Abwehr*, Hg. Muhs u.a., 18f.

[27] Ein Beispiel: Daniel R. *Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress* (Oxford u.a.: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[28] Johannes Paulmann, „Internationaler Vergleich und interkultureller Transfer. Zwei Forschungsansätze zur europäischen Geschichte des 18. bis 20. Jahrhunderts," in *Historische Zeitschrift* 267 (1998).

[29] D. Eleanor Westney, *Imitation and Innovation. The Transfers of Western Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan* (Cambridge, MA u.a.: Harvard University Press, 1987).

statten gehen wird. Dies liegt teilweise daran, dass der Kulturbegriff insbesondere nach der kulturistischen Wende inhaltlich wohl übermäßig ausgeweitet worden ist. Es scheint, dass er sich nun auf beinahe alle Bereiche menschlichen Handelns bezieht und für jede Art historischen Erzählens eingesetzt werden kann. Es ist daher bereits gar von einer „inflationären" Anwendung des Begriffs die Rede.[30] Ein so schwer fassbarer Begriff verträgt sich mit dem Modelldenken nicht leicht.

3   Beispiele des Kulturtransfers in den japanisch-deutschen Beziehungen

Schauen wir uns anhand einiger Fälle aus den historischen japanisch-deutschen Beziehungen an, wie sich der Prozess des Kulturtransfers tatsächlich gestaltete. Es handelt sich hier um Fälle, in denen der Transfer von Deutschland in Richtung Japan vor sich ging.[31]

Das erste Beispiel ist die Rezeption der Verfassung. Bei der Einführung des konstitutionellen Systems in Japan, die 1889 schließlich zur Erlassung der Meiji-Verfassung führte, wurde die verfassungsstaatliche Herrschaftsordnung Preußens zum Vorbild genommen. Dafür begab sich erst Itō Hirobumi, einer der mächtigsten Oligarchen, nach Berlin und Wien, um Theorie und Praxis des Konstitutionalismus vor Ort zu studieren, und dann wurden für den Entwurf des Verfassungstextes deutsche Juristen wie Hermann Roesler herangezogen.[32] In der Forschung ist daher häufig betont worden, dass das japanische Rechtswerk eine fast wortgetreue Wiederausgabe vom autoritären preußischen Original sei und dies für das gemeinsame katastrophale Schicksal beider Länder im 20. Jahrhundert mit verantwortlich gemacht werden könne.[33] Hingegen wird neuerdings der Blickpunkt zunehmend hervorgehoben, der auf die dynamische Gegenseitigkeit des Prozesses achtet. Demnach lässt sich „the development of the Meiji state into a constitution-

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[30] Boris Barth, „Internationale Geschichte und europäische Expansion. Die Imperialismen des 19. Jahrhunderts," in *Internationale Geschichte*, Hg. Loth/Osterhammel, 319.

[31] Auch in der Forschung über den gegenläufigen Fluss ist inzwischen schon beträchtlicher Fortschritt zu verzeichnen. Um nur einige Beispiele zu nennen: Ingrid Schuster, *China und Japan in der deutschen Literatur 1890-1925* (Bern/München: Francke, 1977); Peter Pantzer, „Kawakami Otojiro (1864-1911) und Sadayakko-Theater. Exotik und Premierenstimmung im deutschen Kaiserreich," in *Kulturvermittler zwischen Japan und Deutschland. Biographische Skizzen aus vier Jahrhunderten*, Hg. Japanisches Kulturinstitut Köln (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 1990); Gerhard Schepers, „Exoticism in Early Twentieth-Century German Literature on Japan," in *Japanese-German Relations, 1895-1945. War, Diplomacy and Public Opinion*, Hg. Christian W. Spang/Rolf-Harald Wippich (London usw.: Routledge, 2006).

[32] Zur Entstehung der Meiji-Verfassung s. Kazuto Sakamoto, *Itō Hirobumi to Meiji kokka keisei* [Itō Hirobumi und die Entstehung des Meiji-Staats] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1992). Zum deutschen Einfluss darauf gibt es zahlreiche Studien. Als die neueste s. Junko Ando, *Die Entstehung der Meiji-Verfassung* (München: Iudicium, 2000).

[33] Vgl. Yukio Mochida, *Hikaku kindaishi no ronri. Nihon to Doitsu* [Logik der vergleichenden historischen Untersuchung der Moderne. Japan und Deutschland] (Kyoto: Mineruva, 1970), 100.

al system as a process of encounter and negotiation with the principles of Western civilization resulting in their eventual acceptance and assimilation" verstehen.[34] Der Prozess bietet in der Tat interessanten Stoff zur Analyse des Modus des Kulturtransfers.

Für einen erfolgreichen Transfer ist es eine essentielle Vorbedingung, dass die Bereitschaft dazu sowohl auf der Geber- als auch der Nehmerseite vorhanden ist. Was die letztere angeht, bedarf man im Fall des Verfassungstransfers von Berlin nach Tokyo keiner eingehenden Erläuterung. Wenn man in einem nichteuropäischen Land seinerzeit ein konstitutionelles System einzuführen vorhatte, musste man sich für ein Modell eben dem Westen zuwenden. Dabei ist indes zu beachten, dass man bei der Modellsuche keineswegs willkürlich vorging. Die Richtlinie, das monarchische Rechtsmodell Preußens zum Vorbild zu nehmen, stand erst nach dem Abwägen mit dem britischen parlamentarischen Muster fest, das von heftigen Auseinandersetzungen mit den Liberalen in der Volksrechtbewegung in den 1870er und 80er Jahren begleitet wurde. Auf der Geberseite spielte eher ein persönliches Moment eine Rolle. Der Staatswissenschaftler Lorenz von Stein, der Itō in Wien ganz hilfsbereit seine Expertise zur Verfügung stellte und dadurch dessen Verfassungskonzept maßgeblich prägte, sah eigentlich in Japan einen Testfall für seine wissenschaftliche Lehre, die in der deutschen juristischen Welt keine wohlwollende Aufnahme fand.[35] Dass das Kerngeschäft des Transfers ferner durch persönlichen Verkehr wie die Entsendung Itōs nach Europa und auch die Beteiligung der deutschen Juristen an der Verfassungsvorlage zustande kam, ist ebenfalls bezeichnend für das Problem von Medien bzw. Agenten. Freilich bediente man sich auch der Informationsbeschaffung auf schriftlichem Weg, zumal sich die Regierungsbehörde seit den ersten Meiji-Jahren eifrig mit der Übersetzung europäischer Gesetzeswerke beschäftigte. Der Fall scheint jedoch zu zeigen, dass in der Übermittlung von Wissen und Erlebnissen persönliche Momente wohl entscheidend ins Gewicht fallen.

Der Verfassungstransfer liefert ebenfalls einen Beweis dafür, dass selbst höchst abstrakte Kulturelemente wie Rechtsnormen beim Transfer substantielle Veränderungen durchmachten. In Bemühungen um ein konstitutionelles System stießen japanische Rechtspolitiker auf die schwierige Frage, wie man den spirituellen Autoritätskern in die künftige Verfassungsstruktur einbauen sollte. Das europäische Modell, in dem das Christentum als Staatsreligion fest verankert war, ließ sich selbstverständlich nicht als solches übernehmen. Ohne eine Integrationsklammer aber wäre das politische Leben von Partikularinteressen, die vor allem durch die Volksvertretung zum Ausdruck kämen, zerrissen. Dem Rat der deutschen Berater, parlamentarische Komponenten deswegen möglichst wenig in die Verfassungsordnung einzubauen, folgte die Meiji-Führung jedoch nicht, weil sie es für not-

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[34] Kazuhiro Takii, *The Meiji constitution. The Japanese experience of the West and the shaping of the modern state*, übers. v. D. Noble, (Tokyo: I-House Press, 2007), xv.

[35] Takii, *Meiji constitution*, 72f.

wendig hielt, die Nation durch die politische Partizipation für das staatlich geförderte Modernisierungsprogramm einzuspannen. Das eigentliche Problem war dabei, dass das japanische Geistesleben keine transzendentale Religion im westlichen
Sinne kannte.[36] Gerade deswegen konnte Itō sich nicht etwa auf den überlieferten
Shintoismus, der aus heutiger Sicht möglicherweise als naheliegende Wahl gilt,
stützen und musste die tragenden Säulen der Verfassung anderswo suchen: nämlich im Tenno.[37] Infolgedessen wurde der Meiji-Konstitutionalismus, wie es in Art.
1 der Verfassung lautet, durch die Autorität des Kaisers „aus für immer ununterbrochener Linie" gedeckt. Obwohl Itō ohne Zweifel gar kein theokratisches Ziel
vorschwebte, wurde dadurch dem Souveränen eines Rechtsstaats ein spiritueller
Schein als Religionsersatz gewährt, was sich im nächsten Jahrhundert verhängnisvoll auswirken sollte. Und es zeigt sich, dass Christentum und Kaisertum in Bezug
auf den soziokulturellen Stellenwert im jeweiligen Geistesklima äquivalent waren.

In der Tat kam dem Christentum in Meiji-Japan eine eigenartige ideologische
Funktion zu, gerade weil es sich um einen von außen neu eingeführten Glauben
handelte. Anders als in Europa, wo die christliche Kirche als Eckpfeiler im Gesellschaftsleben zur Aufrechterhaltung des Status quo eine entscheidende Rolle spielte,
distanzierten sich japanische Christen vom Establishment oder standen ihm gar
herausfordernd gegenüber. Das Christentum war geradezu der Glaube der „Verlierer der Restauration". Das kommt nicht zuletzt im soziologischen Profil der Gläubigen in den ersten Meiji-Jahren zum Ausdruck. Eine überwiegende Mehrheit von
ihnen stellten Ex-Samurai, und zwar vor allem diejenigen, die im Bürgerkrieg um
die Meiji-Restauration für den ausscheidenden Shogun Partei ergriffen hatten und
infolgedessen von der daraufhin errichteten kaiserlichen Herrschaft entfremdet
waren. Während sich einige von ihnen gegen die Regierung vergeblich gewaltsam
auflehnten, suchten andere darin Kompensation, ihre Ressentiments durch den
neuen, westlichen Glauben zu sublimieren. Ihre Religiosität basierte deswegen auf
der Überzeugung, dass eben sie die geistig und moralisch gegründete, authentische
Modernität verfolgen würden, während das Modernisierungsprogramm der Regierung bloß auf materiellen Reichtum abziele. Es verwundert daher nicht, dass nicht
wenige Christen der oppositionellen Volksrechtsbewegung nahestanden.[38]

Die Auswirkungen der spezifischen soziokulturellen Konstellation Meiji-Japans
auf den Kulturtransfer beschränkten sich jedoch nicht auf den rechtlichen Bereich.
Der künstlerische Transfer blieb beispielsweise davon nicht unberührt. Die christliche Kirche, wie in so vielen nichteuropäischen Ländern, agierte auch in Japan als

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[36] Shigeji Ogura/Teruomi Yamaguchi, *Tennō to Shukyō* [Kaiser und Religion] (Tokyo:
Kōdansha, 2011), 222-246.

[37] Masatsugu, Inada, *Meiji kenpō seiritsushi* [Entstehungsgeschichte der Meiji-
Verfassung], Bd. 2, (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1960-62), 567.

[38] Eiichi Kudō, *Meijiki no Kirisutokyō. Nihon Purotesutanto shi wa* [Das Chiristentum in der
Meiji-Ära. Historische Fakten aus der Geschichte des Protestantismus in Japan] (Tokyo:
Kyōbunkan, 1979), 18; Takashi Gonoi, *Nihon Kirisutokyō shi* [Geschichte des Christentums
in Japan] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1990), 268f., 279f.

Vehikel zur Übermittlung westlicher Musik. So waren in der Tat Hymnen für das Inselvolk, das jahrhundertelang wegen der Isolationspolitik von auswärtigen Kulturelementen weitgehend abgeschnitten gewesen war, oft die erste Begegnung mit fremden Klängen. Beim Komponieren der Lieder westlicher Art wurde seinerzeit obendrein die Melodie nicht selten von Psalmen entnommen. Es ist deswegen nur logisch, dass sich in der ersten Generation der japanischen West-Musiker unverhältnismäßig viele Christen fanden. Wenn sich das christliche Bekenntnis, wie oben erwähnt, auf der ideologisch aufgeladenen religiösen Energie gründete, so ist es durchaus vorstellbar, dass etwa in den schlichten Klängen des Klaviers ein politischer Subtext von Kompensation und Emanzipation mit ertönte.[39]

Man darf zwar den Beitrag der Staatsverwaltung in der Popularisierung westlicher Musik auf keinen Fall übersehen, denn sie leistete ihr dadurch gewiss entscheidend Vorschub, dass sie schon innerhalb eines Jahrzehnts nach der Restauration ein regelrechtes Ausbildungsinstitut dafür errichtete und außerdem den Musikunterricht westlicher Art für die Grundschulbildung obligatorisch vorschrieb.[40] Trotz alledem war aber auch mit noch so vielen Bemühungen von oben allein keine erfolgreiche Akzeptanz gewährleistet. Die eingeführte Musik fand erst dann großen Widerhall, als sie unten einen günstigen Resonanzboden vorfand, wiewohl dieser von anderslautenden Beweggründen beschaffen war. Hierin ist wohl einer der Gründe dafür zu suchen, warum die Popularisierung westlicher Musik im modernen Japan so schnell vor sich ging.

Jahrzehnte später diente westliche Musik erneut als ideologisches Mittel in einem anderen historischen Kontext. Es ging diesmal um Richard Wagner, um den um die Jahrhundertwende plötzlich ein Boom entstand. Der deutsche Komponist wurde zu einer Kultfigur unter jungen Schriftstellern, Wissenschaftlern und Studenten, die seine Musikdramen als die höchste Synthese der Künste mit vollem Enthusiasmus lobten. Am fernöstlichen Wagner-Boom indes gab es etwas sehr Merkwürdiges: Kaum einer von den japanischen Wagnerianern hatte jemals ein Musikdrama aus erster Hand erlebt. Denn ein solches groß angelegtes Opernwerk war damals dort unmöglich aufzuführen, da alle dafür erforderlichen Bestandteile wie Sänger, Orchester, Chor, Bühnenausstattung usw. noch fehlten. Es konnte daher keineswegs seine Musik sein, die die jungen Intellektuellen ansprach. Ihre

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[39] Toru Takenaka, „Foreign Sound as Compensation. Social and Cultural Factors in the Reception of Western Music in Meiji Japan (1867-1912)," in *Floodgates. Technologies, Cultural Ex/change and the Persistence of Place*, Hg. Susan Ingram u.a. (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2006).

[40] William P. Malm, „The Modern Music of Meiji Japan," in *Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture*, Hg. Donald H. Shively (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1971); Ury Eppstein, *The Beginnings of Western Music in Meiji Era Japan* (New York usw.: Edwin Mellen, 1994); Mattias Hirschfeld, *Beethoven in Japan. Zur Einführung und Verbreitung westlicher Musik in der japanischen Gesellschaft* (Hamburg: Von Bockel 2005); Toru Takenaka, „Isawa Shuji's 'national music'. National sentiment and cultural westernisation in Meiji Japan," in *Itinerario* 34-1 (2010).

Begeisterung wurde vielmehr von Wagners sozialphilosophischen Diskurs ange-facht, der auch dem fernöstlichen Publikum in Buchform zugänglich war.[41] Dahin-ter steckte starke Frustration der jungen akademischen Generation mit dem Status quo. Sie fand sich geradezu in einer Sackgasse, da der Umbruch der Restauration, der jedem eine Erfolgsgeschichte zu ermöglichen schien, längst zur Vergangenheit gehörte und das Gesellschaftsgefüge sich wieder zementierte.[42] Angesichts der schwindenden Zukunftsaussichten schien den mit Ressentiments beladenen japani-schen Akademikern Wagners kulturpessimistisches Anprangern des Wilhelminis-mus geradezu aus der Seele zu sprechen und bestärkte sie in ihrem Protest gegen das Meiji-Establishment. Und weil sich der deutsche Künstler nun einmal die Erlö-sung durch Musik auf seine Fahne schrieb, kam die japanische rebellische Jugend nicht umhin, sich auch unbekanntermaßen seinen Werken hinzugeben.[43] Von der Transfer-Perspektive her liefert der Fall des Wagner-Booms Anregungen zum Medien- und Agenten-Problem, da selbst bei sinnlichen Artefakten wie Musik Druckmedien offenbar eine große Rolle spielten. Obendrein verdeutlicht er, dass sich die Rezeption von Kulturgütern ganz unabhängig von der Natur der zu trans-ferierenden Güter und dem eigentlichen Kontext auf der Geberseite und primär nach der soziokulturellen Logik auf der Nehmerseite abspielte.

4   Schluss

Es ist anzunehmen, dass sich das Forschungsinteresse für die Beziehungsgeschich-te im Einklang mit der Perspektivenerweiterung zum Globalen und Transnationa-len in der Historiographie weiterhin verstärkt. Indem man den Blick auf Phäno-mene von Austausch und Kontakten ins Geschichtsschreiben einbezieht, lässt sich dessen Horizont substantiell ausdehnen und nicht zuletzt dynamische Aspekte der historischen Realität mehr denn je beleuchten. Indes ist die derzeitige beziehungs-historische Untersuchung mit ihrer wenig ausgeprägten analytischen Fragestellung und der unausgeglichenen Faktenorientierung diesen Erwartungen nicht gerade gewachsen. Ob es ihr gelingt, ihnen gerecht zu werden, hängt im Wesentlichen davon ab, ob eine methodische Erneuerung zu bewerkstelligen ist. Besonders von-nöten ist ein theoretischer Referenzrahmen, in dem faktische Befunde generalisie-rend verarbeitet werden können. Dies ist gerade der Grund dafür, warum man sich vom Konzept des Kulturtransfers großen Nutzen versprechen kann.

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[41] Dass das Image eines Tonkünstlers weniger von seiner Musik als vom Diskurs über ihn formiert wird, gehört vielmehr eher zur Regel, wie es z.B. aus dem Fall des Beethoven-Bildes in Deutschland hervorgeht. Vgl. David B. Dennis, *Beethoven in German Politics, 1870-1989* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), bes. 19f.

[42] Dies ist die soziokulturelle Konstellation in der zweiten Hälfte der Meiji-Ära, die Gluck mit dem Terminus "Meiji-Ideologie" erfasst. Vgl. Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths. Ideology in the Late Meiji Period, Princeton* (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).

[43] Toru Takenaka, „Wagner-Boom in Meiji-Japan," in *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft* 62-1 (2005).

Der zu erwartende Nutzen sollte aber darüber nicht hinwegtäuschen, dass das Konzept erst noch viele Hürden nehmen muss, um ans Ziel zu gelangen. Einerseits sollten die Bemühungen um mehr empirische Fakten nicht vernachlässigt werden. Andererseits sind aber bahnbrechende konzeptionelle Anregungen für die Modellbildung sehr erwünscht. Parallel dazu sollten weitere Fragen in den Überlegungen berücksichtigt werden, so z.B. die Frage, wie die multilaterale Dimension in den historischen Beziehungen besser berücksichtigt werden kann, da die Beziehungsgeschichte selbstverständlich nicht bilateral sein muss. Trotzdem scheinen die Aussichten, die das Konzept des Kulturtransfers verspricht, gut genug zu sein, uns weiter mit diesem Konzept zu beschäftigen.

Migration, Narration and the Second Generation

Sarah Eilingsfeld

1   Introduction

"Stories matter. Many stories matter. Stories have been used to dispossess and to malign, but stories can also be used to empower and to humanize. Stories can break the dignity of a people, but stories can also repair that broken dignity."[1]

Nigerian writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie addresses an issue that is visible for us in everyday life. She underlines the importance of stories and the power it inhabits to create change and empower people that were previously deprived of this level of empowerment. In order for stories to fulfil their potential, they need to show the diverse features of a person and not merely stress one aspect. As she points out, these "single stories" lead to a misguided image of people and their lives and assigns them an identity that might not mirror their true self. Nowadays these "dangers of a single story" are visible in minority discourse and debates on immigration and integration. Specific characteristics and attributes are ascribed to immigrants and their children that set them apart from main society. In Germany this is recently visible in the anti-Islam protests by the right-wing group PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident), or the UK debate around immigration, also mainly enforced by the anti-European party UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party).

Due to the recentness and importance of these issues, this paper will analyse how the second generation constructs their identity in regard to issues from within and outside their own ethnic community and how this is represented in contemporary literature. For this purpose, two novels from Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) will be analysed. *White Teeth* (2000) by English-Jamaican writer Zadie Smith deals with the situation of children of Jamaican and Asian descent in Eng-

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[1] Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, "The Danger of a Single Story", TED: October 2009, http://www.ted.com/talks/chimamanda_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_story/transcript (accessed 2 February 2015).

land. *Selam Berlin* (2003), written by German-Turkish writer Yadé Kara, portrays the life of children of Turkish descent in Germany.

The focus of this paper will be on narrations from the UK and Germany, as they occupy a position amongst the "leading immigrant-receiving countries"[2]. Both countries historically had an immense need for foreign workers in the 50s and 60s, leading to huge waves of migrants arriving in the UK and Germany, establishing diverse problems within the countries. Up to today, these issues keep stirring new debates about migration and integration in Europe.

There are diverse interpretations of the term 'Second Generation Migrants'.[3] In this paper, the expression refers to those children of immigrants that were born in the host country.[4] The term is quite controversial, because it labels its alleged members and marks them "as eternally different, forever non-British and not *really* one of us"[5]. In doing so they are given a marginal position within society, which might complicate the identity construction process.

The main research questions will be how the construction of identity in the second generation is represented within the two novels, what kind of identity they construct and how it is negotiated. Also, it will be examined how the characters deal with problems they experience both within the 'host' and the 'home' culture.

My hypothesis is that the second generation constructs strong hybrid identities. For this analysis, the emphasis will be on the works of Homi K. Bhabha, mainly the concepts of hybridity and the third space. The methodological approach in this paper will be one of a qualitative content analysis and close reading of the novels in regard to the identity construction they represent in order to answer the previously mentioned questions. The first in-depth content analysis will focus on the character of Irie in *White Teeth* (2000) and the second one on Hasan in *Selam Berlin* (2003). The conclusion will show that the type of identity represented in the novels is a very hybrid one. It will also be pointed out, however, that the situation of the second generation is still problematic. As these problems are visible in Germany and the UK, one can assume similar issues within other European countries. It is thus important to deal with these issues on a more European, and not merely national, level.

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[2] Chantal Lacroix, *Immigrants, Literature and National Integration* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 3.

[3] BRIDGE- Successful Pathways for the Second Generation, "Comparative Report about Second Generation Migrants in Europe," Report, January 2010, http://www.bridge2g.eu/userfiles/file/P1_Comparative%20report%20about%20SGM%20in%20Europe.pdf (accessed 27 February 2013), 3.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Amy Clarke, "The Second Generation: 'Migrants' or 'Natives'?" *The Migrationist,* 9 March 2013, Culture and Integration Section, http://themigrationist.net/2013/03/01/the-second-generation-migrants-or-natives/ (accessed on 5 March 2013).

2   The Question of Identity

Identity construction is a complex, on-going process and is constantly influenced by others and personal experiences. Stuart Hall describes it as being "fragmented and fractured"[6], showing that identities consist of many diverse parts that sometimes cannot be negotiated easily. As an ongoing process, identities are in a constant re-negotiation process. Glynis Breakwell speaks of "accommodation – assimilation and evaluation".[7] In these different stages, new elements are embedded into the existing identity structure (accommodated), then absorbed into the same (assimilation), leading to a change of the self. In the last phase an evaluation of the renegotiated identity takes place, giving it a new, and possibly different, meaning and value.[8]

Bhikhu Parekh established a three-dimensional model of the self.[9] It is constituted by the personal, the social and the human or universal identity, the last one identifying a person as a member of the human race. The different parts cannot be entirely separated and are interdependent and frequently overlap.[10] Identities are simultaneously constructed by a "powerful other"[11], i.e. group relations, as well as internally "through self-representation and differences from others"[12]. These others are needed for reflection, self-evaluation and self-definition as they show us how we are not: "Identity can function as point of identification and attachment only *because* of their capacity to exclude, to leave out […] Every identity has its 'margin'"[13].

By personal identity Parekh means the individual's self which is shaped by personal experiences, relations to family and friends and so on.[14] Within it, values and beliefs are constantly re-evaluated and re-negotiated. In contrast, social identities relate to various roles, memberships and communities one can be a part of. In each of these categories one creates a different type of social, or collective, self.[15] It is a

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[6] Stuart Hall, "Introduction: Who needs 'Identity'?" in *Questions of Cultural Identity,* ed. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (London: SAGE Publications, 1996), 4.

[7] Glynis M. Breakwell, "Identity Change in the Context of the Growing Influence of European Union Institutions," in *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU,* ed. Marylinn B. Brewer, Richard K.Herrmann and Thomas Risse (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 29.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Bhikhu Parekh, *A New Politics of Identity: Political Principles for an Interdependent World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 9.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Paul Jones and Michał Krzyżanowski, "Identity, Belonging and Migration: Beyond Constructing 'Others'," In *Identity, Belonging and Migration,* ed. Gerard Delanty, Paul Jones and Ruth Wodak (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008), 48.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Hall, "Introduction: Who needs 'Identity'?", 4. Italics provided.

[14] Parekh, *A New Politics of Identity,* 10.

[15] Ibid., 15.

way to "identify themselves to, and are in turn identified by, others"[16]. Cultural, religious and ethnic identities, for example, are forms of social identities.

For Stuart Hall, cultural identity is the basis of all other identities. It is furthermore "a powerful and creative force in emergent forms of representation amongst hitherto marginalized people"[17]. The emergence of immigrant literature as a new form of representation could be an example for this. By addressing both their own ethnic group as well as the majority community, they re-define their identity. Thus, collective identity can create feelings of solidarity and empowerment within one group but can also lead to the creation of a more positive perception of one's own identity in discriminatory surroundings.[18]

2.1   Postcolonial Perspectives: Hybridity and the Third Space

"There is a form of perverseness in taking the label 'post' for a state which is not yet fully present, and linking it to something which has not fully disappeared, but in many ways that paradoxical in-betweeness precisely characterizes the post-colonial world."[19]

With this statement, Childs and Williams give a good overview over the recent situation in many European countries. Even though most colonies have gained independence, many ideas of the concept of colonialism are still present. Quijano describes this as "coloniality of power".[20] The main idea is that "power structures at the global and national levels are still informed by colonial ideologies and structures that go back in time several centuries"[21]. Thus, 'post-colonial' societies are partly still influenced by concepts of colonial hierarchy. Furthermore some researchers argue that immigrants who do not have a direct colonial relationship to the host country "are racialized in ways similar to the 'colonial racial subjects of empire'"[22]. One example for this could be the portrayal of second generation Turks in Germany, which Ha called a form of "secondary colonisation".[23]

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[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid*.,* 34.

[19] Peter Childs and R.J. Patrick Williams, *An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory* (London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1997), 8.

[20] Margarita Cervantes-Rodriguez, Ramón Grasfoguel and Eric Mielants, "Introduction," in *Caribbean Migration to Western Europe and the United States: Essays on Incorporation, Identity, and Citizenship,* ed. Margarita Cervantes-Rodrigues, Ramón Grasfoguel and Eric Mielants (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2009), 7.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid., 10.

[23] Kien Nghi Ha, *Ethnizität und Migration Reloaded: Kulturelle Identität, Differenz und Hybridität im postkolonialen Diskurs* (Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Berlin, 2004), 24-25.

The term 'hybrid' itself comes from the Latin *hybrida* and describes something or someone "of mixed character; composed of different elements"[24]. Sackmann stresses that in hybrid migrant identities "certain elements of identification with the country of origin join together in an immigrant identity which also bears elements of identification with the country of immigration".[25] These identities are created in transnational, sometimes ambivalent and conflictive environments, which can then be mirrored in their identity construction process.

By including parts of the host culture in their personal identity, they are able to enter the main discourse and have access to a wider range of networks and support and can thus make their voices be heard.[26] Anjali Prabhu holds that hybridity "can provide a way out of binary thinking, allows the inscription of agency of the subaltern, and even permits a restructuring and destabilizing of power"[27]. It is a concept that challenges existing power relations and gives voice to minority discourse.

The best known, but also highly criticised, theory on hybridity comes from Homi K. Bhabha. According to him, hybrid identities are created in situations where two different cultures, two "incommensurable elements"[28], come together, and the individual has to find ways of connecting these. Through this the individual's identity is reconstructed and a new self-understanding is created. He further states that "Hybridity is the sign of the productivity of colonial power, its shifting forces and fixities; it is the name for the strategic reversal of the process of domination through disavowal".[29] As this statement shows, hybridity can be seen as a reversal and challenging of colonial relations. Colonial discourse is put into question, renegotiated and revaluated through minority discourse. In doing so, they are able to create new, hybrid forms of self-understanding and are able to challenge racialised identities. Furthermore, hybridity allows for "other 'denied' knowledge [to] enter upon the dominant discourse and estrange the basis of its authority – its rules of recognition".[30] Previously ignored positions are then introduced into the main discourse, and challenge previous perspectives.

Through the creation of hybrid identities the second generation is able to look at both cultures from an outside perspective and so learns to judge their own posi-

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[24] Oxford Online Dictionary, Hybridity, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/hybrid ?q=hybridity#hybrid__14 (accessed on 15 May 2013).

[25] Rosemarie Sackmann, "Introduction: Collective Identities and Social Integration," in *Identity and Integration: Migrants in Western Europe,* ed. Thomas Faist, Bernhard Peters and Rosemarie Sackmann (Hants: Ashgate Publishing Limited , 2003), 4.

[26] Pia Schwarz Lausten, "Living in a Language: Italian Migration Literature," in *Migration and Literature in Contemporary Europe*, ed. Mirjam Gebauer and Pia S. Lausten (Munich: Meidenbauer, 2010), 123.

[27] Anjali Prabhu, *Hybridity: Limits, Transformations, Prospects* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 1.

[28] Ibid., 313.

[29] Ibid., 159.

[30] Ibid., 162.

tion from a new point of view. This allows them to revaluate their own identity, but also gives them the chance to create new spaces of representation. As Prabhu puts it, hybridity is "generated by dominating discourses"[31], but it is formed and used as a tool in minority discourse.

Furthermore, for Bhabha hybridity is not simply a mixture of diverse identities, but it is about the identification with two different systems of representation ('us' and 'them') that leads to the creation of new signs of representation:

"[T]he importance of hybridity is that it bears the traces of those feelings and practices which inform it […] so that hybridity puts together the traces of certain other meanings and discourses. […] The process of cultural hybridity gives rise to something different, to something new and unrecognisable, a new era of negotiation of meaning and representation."[32]

This production of 'newness' however, is, according to Young, always connected to productions of anxieties and "an ultimately place of loss, of fading, of appearance and disappearance"[33].

For Bhabha "Hybridity […] is the 'third space' which enables other positions to emerge".[34] This concept was frequently criticised, as it was perceived as too complicated, leading researchers frequently to ignore his approach. As Young points out, the main problems with the concept are that it is not a 'real' physical location, it is not tangible and an individual might be part of it without consciously being aware of it.[35] Accordingly, the third space is created in a very tense environment in which diverse cultural identities constantly clash, resulting in a hybrid form of identity.[36] According to Ha, it is at the centre of this newly created space that "the doubling of time (past and present), of place (the home and foreign countries), and of the self (the own and the other)"[37] happens. The mentioned 'doubling' of the individual takes place in the third space. Due to their position in society, their "double-consciousness"[38] as Bhabha calls it, they are able to be critical of both their own ethnic community, as of the main society. Bhabha further suggests, that hybridity and the third space are "always a split screen of the self and its doubling".[39] By revaluating their identity, they also split themselves in different

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[31] Ibid.

[32] Jonathan Rutherford, "The Third Space. Interview with Homi Bhabha," in *Identity, Community, Culture, Difference,* ed. Ibid. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990), 211.

[33] Robert C. Young, "The Void of Misgiving," in *Communicating in the Third Space,* ed. Karin Ikas and Gerhard Wagner (New York: Routledge, 2009), 82.

[34] Rutherford, "The Third Space. Interview with Homi Bhabha", 211.

[35] Young, "The Void of Misgiving", 81.

[36] Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* 312.

[37] Ha, *Ethnizität und Migration Reloaded,* 142. (my translation)

[38] Homi K. Bhabha, "Preface: In the Cave of Making: Thoughts on Third Space," in *Communicating in the Third Space,* ed. Karin Ikas and Gerhard Wagner (New York: Routledge, 2009), X.

[39] Bhabha, *The Location of Culture,* 162.

parts which might not all become part of the new hybrid identity. It is due to this that he speaks of loss and anxieties in regards to the process. As their identity is a hybrid of both cultures, they are able to judge from yet another perspective and can see faults and virtues. They are acting in an in-between space between both cultures, and through dialogue with main society a third space was opened up as a place of articulation.[40] It is in this space that minorities receive access to public spaces, which gives them roles as actors within society, and takes away their position as 'victims'.[41]

Even though Bhabha has been strongly criticised, avoiding his ideas would take away a point of reference that is needed in order to analyse and interpret colonial relations and minority discourse. His concepts have to be seen as starting points and are as such still important for the analysis of minority related issues nowadays. Being aware of the limits of his concepts is significant, and will lead to a more thorough and balanced outcome of research.

In reaction to this criticism, Laura Moss created an alternative to Bhabha's concept of hybridity. For her

"hybridity is the joining of two entities to create a third entity. Such hybridity, in cultural terms, is neither an appropriation of one culture by another, nor the acculturation of one and another. Instead, it is the third element produced by the interaction of cultures, communities or individuals."[42]

The most interesting point of her approach is the idea that hybridity will soon become part of the everyday life of minorities and their children.[43] According to her, hybridity should become part of any society that promotes tolerance and multiple identities. She further holds that hybrid identities will soon be a matter of 'personal choice', so a kind of tool of which the second and following generations can make use in everyday life.

3 Identity and the Novel

Why is it literature a useful "tool" to analyse the identity construction process of the second generation?

"Minoritarian affiliations or solidarities arise in the response to the failures and limits of democratic representation, creating new modes of agency, new strategies of recognition, new forms of political and symbolic representation."[44]

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[40] Bhabha, "Preface: In the Cave of Making: Thoughts on Third Space", X.

[41] Ha, *Ethnizität und Migration Reloaded,* 172.

[42] Laura Moss, "The Politics of Everyday Hybridity: Zadie Smith's White Teeth," *Wasafiri* 18, no. 39 (2003): 12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02690050308589837 (accessed on 20 April 2013).

[43] Ibid.

[44] Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge Classics, 1994), XVII-XVIII.

Postcolonial theorist Homi K. Bhabha underlines the creative potential emerging from discrimination and misrepresentation in the migrant context. It is due to discrimination and prejudices created in the main society that migrants and their children have to find new ways of expressing their personal but also collective ethnic identities in the host society. One means of doing so is to write about their experiences in poems, novels or autobiographical narratives. These are tools immigrants and their children can use to become active participants in society as they create a new type of discourse and try to bring it into contact with the main society. By using these "new strategies of recognition"[45], they communicate their situation and problems to others, create a basis on which debates and change can be initiated and give themselves a voice. As Bhabha said: "No name is yours until you speak it; somebody returns your call and suddenly, the circuit of signs, gestures, gesticulations is established and you enter the territory of the right to narrate."[46] Narration empowers them and allows them to articulate this to the main society. Thus, they are able to enter a new area of discourse in which they can directly address and criticise their situation.

This self-empowerment and the creation of an 'own space' within another culture is nowadays more important than ever. In times of rapid globalisation, increased and facilitated mobility and the development of new means of technologies, migration but also the inclusion of the children of migrants, the so called 'Second Generation', has become a vital part of many Western societies. It is however a process full of conflict and controversies. As fictional creation, literature can neither directly affect political decisions and developments, nor portray the situation of all immigrants. However, it can be used as a tool to convey messages and to make people rethink their previous assumptions. As Homi Bhabha points out "We learn our most enduring lessons for living and thinking [...] from those who have suffered the sentence of history – subjugation, domination, diaspora, displacement."[47] By narrating their lives – and thus giving others the chance to take part in their experiences of "subjugation, domination, diaspora, displacement" – immigrants and their children allow the main society to come into contact with minority discourse. It is the immigrant author's position at the margins of society that allows for a revaluation of their personal and collective identity. In this connection literature can be used to communicate beyond the perceived differences and try to create a better understanding between majority and minority population. It is through the process of writing, by crossing borders, that the authors develop hybrid identities themselves, which can then be reflected in their way of writing. [48]

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[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid., XXV.
[47] Bhabha, *The Location of Culture,* 246.
[48] Ibid., 2.

3.1 *White Teeth* and *Selam Berlin*: A Short Summary

White Teeth describes the lives and relations of mainly two families, the Joneses and the Iqbals. While the first part focuses on the early lives of the fathers, the latter part emphasises the intergenerational problems between immigrants and their children. It is a story about past experiences, present problems, and the hope for a better future. While the first generation seems to be stuck in the past, their children struggle with life as the second generation in England.

Selam Berlin is a story about 19 years old Hasan Kazan, who was born in Berlin but spent his adolescence in Istanbul. At the fall of the Berlin Wall, Hasan leaves Turkey and moves back to his place of birth. Upon arrival, however, he comes to realise that the city has changed. During the novel he tries to find his place in the new Berlin, is continuously confronted with prejudices and has to learn to cope with these. *Selam Berlin* portrays Hasan's growing up and issues the second generation experiences.

In *White Teeth,* the focus of the following analysis will be on Irie Jones. In *Selam Berlin* the emphasis will be on Hasan Kazan. Both will be compared in order to give a diverse outlook of how identity can be constructed and renegotiated in the second generation.

3.2 The Second Generation and the Representation of Identity

White Teeth – Irie

Irie is one of the protagonists of the novel and as such a very interesting character. Born to an English father and a Jamaican mother, the readers can follow Irie's identity negotiation process in *White Teeth*. Her development can be divided into three parts: the first from the beginning of the novel until she meets the Chalfens, the second when she is with the Chalfens and the last stage when she stays with her grandmother Hortense. Finally, those different phases will lead to a strong hybrid identity. While the first phase is marked by a very unstable, self-conscious identity, the second and third phases show different forms of assimilation. In attempting to assimilate to the 'Englishness' of the Chalfens at first, but then turning to her grandmother in order to find her Jamaican roots, Irie has to revaluate and renegotiate her identity constantly. It is in these circumstances that she learns that she is not merely part of one group, but actually belongs to diverse ones.

As Irie is born to a half-English, half-Jamaican family, one would assume her to identify with both cultures to some degree. This is however where her inner struggles and her pain become most evident. Even though her outer appearance shows that she is not entirely English, she does not know anything about her Jamaican origins and culture. As Irene Pérez Fernandez points out, Irie's mother Clara is her only black referent, the only one that could help her "to value the sig-

nificance of her hybrid identity".[49] However, Clara is not able to do so as she has no knowledge of her own roots either and thus cannot support her daughter in her struggles.

Molly Thompson argues that "instead of being drawn to identifying with either half of themselves, they [the second generation] […] are often pushed one way or another or else repelled both ways".[50] Due to the fact that Irie has no knowledge of her Jamaican origins, her English part is the only point of reference she has. Instead of giving her a feeling of security and belonging though, it leads her to doubt herself even further. Her outer appearance clearly separates her from the white English community which makes it hard to find her place within it: "There was England, a gigantic mirror, and there was Irie, without reflection. A stranger in a stranger land".[51] Irie feels as if there is no place in the English society for someone like her. This lack of representation makes her identity negotiation increasingly difficult. She is constantly looking for a reflection of herself within English society, which becomes very obvious in her school when analysing Shakespeare's Sonnet 127. Here Shakespeare refers to his 'Dark Lady' which leads Irie to wonder whether he might speak about a Black woman, a reflection of Irie to some degree. This thought however is turned down in a hurtful manner by Irie's teacher:

"'I mean I can't be sure, but it does seem terribly unlikely, unless she was a slave of some kind, and he's unlikely to have written a series of sonnets to a lord and then a slave lady, is he?' Irie reddened. She had thought, just then, that she had seen something like a reflection, but it was receding."[52]

This reaction is a devastating experience for Irie and increased her self-consciousness. Martha Addante points out that this scene is vital for Irie's further development, as it "marks one of the first instances where she begins to remap British culture and create a space for herself within it"[53]. While this might be true, Addante ignores the result of the teacher's reaction and the effect it has on Irie. When rejecting Irie's idea she pushes her in one 'corner', showing Irie that she is not really part of this culture. At this point, Irie is not confident enough to challenge the concept of 'Britishness'. For Addante, this re-reading of cultural texts can be described as an "act of enunciation, of cultural translation"[54]. At this point, Irie is trapped in-between two cultures she does not feel part of. She is lost and in try-

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[49] Irene Pérez Fernandez, "Exploring Hybridity and Multiculturalism: Intra and Inter Family Relations in Zadie Smith's *White Teeth*," *Odisea* 10 (2009): 149.

[50] Molly Thompson, "'Happy Multicultural Land'? The Implications of an 'Excess of Belonging' in Zadie Smith's *White Teeth*," in *Write Black, Write British: From Postcolonial to Black British Literature,* ed. Kadija Sesay (Hertford: Hansib Publications Limited, 2005), 127-8.

[51] Zadie Smith, *White Teeth* (London: Penguin Books, 2000), 266.

[52] Ibid., 272.

[53] Martha Addante, "Multiculturalism and the Nation in Zadie Smith's *White Teeth," Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict*, 2007-2008 Annual Edition: 78.

[54] Ibid.

ing to fit in with the English, wants to change her appearance. As Molly Thompson points out, the UK offers "few images with which to identify and where 'white' ideals of beauty dominate"[55].

In the second stage of her development, she comes into contact with the Chalfens, for her the personification of 'Englishness':

"She wanted their Englishness. Their Chalfishness. It didn't occur to her that the Chalfens were […] immigrants too (third generation, by way of Germany and Poland, née Chalfenovsky), or that they might be as needy of her as she was of them."[56]

In pointing this out, Zadie Smith makes us aware of a kind of hierarchical order within migrant groups. By being white and looking the same as the English, the Chalfens have been integrated completely and are thus not perceived as immigrants anymore.

Turning towards the Chalfens is yet another strategy Irie uses in order to become entirely English and find her place. Realising this will not work, she turns away from them. In doing so, Zadie Smith underlines the importance of roots and one's own history. This is also what Irie comes to realise. After fighting with her parents, she decides to move to her grandmother's. Thompson describes this as a "metaphorical journey to her – original – homeland"[57]. It is in these surroundings that she becomes aware of her roots and her other half. By her second name, Ambrosia, she is connected to Jamaican culture. In learning more about this, Irie's whole perception of her world changes:

"And in the mornings it wasn't Italianate vineyards out there any more, it was sugar, sugar, sugar, and next door was nothing but tobacco and she presumptuously fancied that the smell of plantain sent her back somewhere, somewhere quite fictional, for she'd never been there. Somewhere Columbus called St. Jago but the arawaks stubbornly renamed Xaymaca […] She laid claim to the past… her vision of the past – aggressively, as if retrieving misdirected mail. So *this* was where she came from. This all *belonged* to her […] X marks the spot and Irie put an X on everything she found, collecting bits and bobs […] and storing them under the sofa, so that as if by osmosis the richness of them would pass through the fabric while she was sleeping and seep right into her."[58]

Due to this experience, Irie becomes familiar with both worlds that she is part of. She can finally renegotiate her hybrid identity in a way that gives her new options and ways of shaping her life. After looking for points of references within British society, and not finding them, she found her roots in Jamaican culture which gives her strength and emotional support. She finally found a 'reflection' of

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[55] Thompson, "'Happy Multicultural Land'?", 128.

[56] Smith, *White Teeth,* 328.

[57] Thompson, "'Happy Multicultural Land'?", 132.

[58] Smith, *White Teeth,* 400. Italics provided.

her self. Addante summarises that "Irie's re-education at the hand of Hortense Bowden ultimately enables her to feel at home in her skin and in the nation"[59]. It allows her to renegotiate her identity taking both parts of her into consideration. It represents the starting point of the revaluation of her identity:

"No fictions, no myths, no lies, no tangled webs – this is how Irie imagined her homeland. Because *homeland* is one of the magical fantasy words like *unicorn* and *soul* and *infinity* that have now passed into the language. And the particular magic of *homeland,* its particular spell over Irie, was that it sounded like a beginning […] A blank page."[60]

While Smith criticises the concept of homeland as something imaginary, it still seems important for Irie. It gives her hope for a new start, the possibility of change and thus strengthens and empowers her.

Due to the development of the previously described 'double consciousness', Irie is able to criticise the first generation and their behaviour towards their children:

"They [other parents] don't mind what their kids do in life, as longs as they're reasonably, you know, *healthy. Happy.* And every single fucking day is not this huge battle between who they are and who they should be, what they were and what they will be."[61]

Irie criticises them for living in the past and for not accepting the way their children are. Her double vision allows her to judge it from an outside perspective.

Instead of losing a part of herself in the construction of a hybrid self, Irie gained new parts by learning about her roots. It is thus not necessary always a loss, but can also be a process in which new insights are gained and new parts of oneself are discovered.

In her essay, Laura Moss remarks:

"What happens when the hybrid figures presented are not in a state of flux, panic, trauma, or border-crossing? What is beyond seeing hybridity as either a clash or a syncretic merging of cultures, races, languages? […] Instead of viewing it [hybridity] as *necessary* problem, I argue that hybridity is now at least partially being chosen, even as the problems of such a choice need to be recognised."[62]

Irie had to find a way of combining both parts of her, as neither of them alone was able to give her a point of reference within society. By not knowing her Jamaican origins at first, and by not fitting into British society, hybridity could be seen as a means of survival for her, maybe a way of making the best out of her in-between situation. Rather than seeing the concept of hybridity as the problem however, I

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[59] Addante, "Multiculturalism and the Nation in Zadie Smith's *White Teeth",* 79.

[60] Smith, *White Teeth,* 402. Italics provided.

[61] Smith, *White Teeth,* 514-15. Italics provided.

[62] Moss, "The Politics of Everyday Hybridity", 13.

would argue that the development, the negotiation, of this identity is, as Irie is constantly confronted with different perspectives on hybrid identities and belonging.

For her, hybridity is not normality yet, it still has to be worked on. For a hybrid identity to become normality I would argue that it has to be accepted by both minority and majority society as well. At the end of the novel, this is still not entirely achieved. However, the author, and Irie, gives an outlook of the near future, where discussions surrounding the concept of hybridity, roots etc. will lose their importance and might become normality for real:

"In a vision, Irie has seen a time, a time not far from now, when roots won't matter any more because they can't because they mustn't because they're too long and they're too torturous and they're just buried too damn deep. She looks forward to it."[63]

It is Irie's wish that roots will lose their importance. Even though she finds her hybrid self in the end, the process was a very long and painful one and she would not wish her child to go through the same. If roots did not matter anymore, main society had to accept individuals for whom they are. Like this, following generations would be freer and could live a life where their hybridity is not perceived as 'baggage', something in-between being splitting and doubling, but a source of empowerment.

Selam Berlin – Hasan

"Having been prepared by the colonial education, I knew England from the inside. But I am not and never will be 'English'. I know both places intimately, but I am not wholly of either place. And that's exactly the diasporic experience, far away enough to experience the sense of exile and loss, close enough to understand the enigma of an always-postponed 'arrival'."[64]

These thoughts, expressed by Stuart Hall are mirrored in the beginning of *Selam Berlin*. Hasan, the 19 year old protagonist, was born in Germany and lived there until the age of 12. Moving back to Istanbul, he however still received a rather German education at the local German school. Due to this, he was able to maintain connections to value systems and traditions from both countries, just like Hall did with Jamaica and England.

In the novel, the reader can follow Hasan's identity negotiation process, which seems to be mirrored by the historical events in Berlin. While the reunification process connects two states with different value systems and traditions, Hasan tries to find ways of connecting his Eastern (Turkish) and Western (German) parts of

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[63] Smith, *White Teeth*, 527.

[64] Stuart Hall, quoted in Chris Rojek, *Stuart Hall* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003), 60.

self. Upon his return to Berlin in 1989, it is not just him who has to renegotiate his identity, but it is also the newly formed state and its citizens that have to redefine their common self and values. As Esen points out, this process is established on diverse levels. She claims that the novel "depicts a Berlin filled with on-going negotiations and conflicts around social and cultural as well as spatial borders"[65]. Hasan needs to find his place within this new construct, which will provide him with new challenges and difficult situations. This East-West binary in regard to Hasan, but also Germany, is at the centre of the novel and continuously influences his identity renegotiation. The changed political reality portrayed in the novel challenges previous categorisations of "East/West; us/them; here/there"[66], which used to be points of reference in the Berlin Hasan remembers from his childhood. Fachinger suggests that the author wants to stress the instability of such binary concepts.[67] They have to be constantly reinterpreted and can thus not be reliable points of orientation.

Adelson describes how these "historical events […] become spaces where Turkish and German characters gain referentiality past their 'clearly recognizable' social or ethnic milieu."[68] In presenting the development of Hasan in this specific historical context, Kara makes him – and the second generation in general – part of the collective German identity and history. The fall of the Berlin wall represents a new start for Germany and simultaneously the chance to change the discourses on migration and integration. By connecting minority and main discourse through these historical events, she stresses the need to revise and challenge old ways of thinking.

From the very beginning his hybrid self is visible: "My name is Hasan Kazan. In Berlin some people call me Hansi."[69] Accepting the German 'version' of his name underlines that he is able to switch between different parts of his self. To him, the diverse fragments of his identity are neither conflictive nor problematic. As he was born in Berlin, and spent the first 12 years there, he received a huge part of his socialisation within the country. However, living in an area of Berlin with many Turks he was always close to the Turkish culture as well. At the moment his parents' noticed the growing influence of 'Western values', both sons were sent back to Istanbul. Still, Hasan was neither perceived as entirely German in Berlin, nor completely Turkish in Istanbul: "Back then my parents could not know that

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[65] Adile Esen, "Beyond 'in-between', Travels and Transformations in Contemporary Turkish-German Literature and Film," (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2009), 117.

[66] Petra Fachinger, "A New Kind of Creative Energy: Yadé Kara's *Selam Berlin* and Fatih Akin's *Kurz und Schmerzlos* and *Gegen die Wand," German Life and Letters* 60, no.2 (2007): 250.

[67] Ibid.

[68] B. Venkat Mani, *Cosmopolitan Claims: Turkish-German Literatures from Nadolny to Pamuk* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2007), 18.

[69] Yadé Kara, *Selam Berlin* (Zürich: Diogenes Verlag, 2003), 5. My translation.

years later the people would call us 'Kanacken' here, and 'Almanci' there. Whether Kanacke or Almanci. Whatever, I was, whomever I was. I was a 'Kreuzberger'."[70]

His hybrid identity is often not accepted or understood by others. Due to the human need to categorise others, he is not fully seen as part of either group, and thus remains on the margins of both. While Hasan himself does not feel trapped between two cultures, as he understands he is part of both, other people, such as the film director Wolf, expect him to be lost and stuck between two parts of himself. These people assume that Hasan, and the second generation in general, merely think about 'who they are', 'where they belong' etc. as if it was a conscious process. Hasan learns to play with these ascribed identities by using specific parts of his self, depending on the situation:

"When there was a fight à la turca, I turned on my German side. The more emotional, irrational a situation became, the more controlled and rational I became. To superstition, reading tea leaves and the evil eye I reacted cool and matter-of-fact. It surprised and scared people at the same time."[71]

While this could be interpreted as an act of defiance on the one hand, on the other hand it shows that Hasan enjoys being different as it gives him the chance to play with people's assumptions and turn their expectations upside down.

For him, the diverse parts of his self are compatible and not conflictive. Hasan does not always want to 'explain' himself to others. His hybrid identity is normality to him, a part of his everyday life, and thus rather reflects Laura Moss' approach to the concept than Bhabha's conflictive position.

"Actually I had everything of both. Of East and West, of German and Turkish, of here and there. But people like Wolf could not understand that. They always perceived me as a problematic case. Someone, who is torn between the cultures, someone, who did not belong. Piss off! I was how I was. The others tried to persuade me of problems, that I did not have. They could not classify me. I was a bouncy ball, jumping back and forth between East and West, ha."[72]

Hasan criticises how others try to categorise him. In showing this, the author criticises modern societies in which these 'old' ways of thinking, of categorising people, is still apparent. With new generations of immigrant children growing up in Germany as their home, this is not feasible anymore and has to be rethought. Hybrid identities, as Moss pointed out, might become a part of everyday life in the future and thus new ways of thinking have to be established in order to provide a space for hybrid identities. This point is also stressed by Adile Esen. According to her, the second generation is frequently expected to be stuck between two

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[70] Ibid. My translation.
[71] Ibid., 18. My translation.
[72] Ibid., 223. My translation.

worlds.[73] However, Yadé Kara defies this assumption by showing characters that only "partially partake in the perpetuation of the paradigm, as they are also able to challenge it"[74].

It is Hasan's particular situation, the fact that he never lived in only one place but has always been moving back and forth between Germany and Turkey, that hybridity naturally became a part of his transnational life. This new emerging generation, due to their presence in two cultures, has a 'double vision', as Bhabha called it. They can see advantages and faults in either group and are thus able to criticise both from a new perspective. Due to his specific position, he is also able to criticise the behaviour of the previous generation of Turks in Germany: "But here, the Turks hung on to their 'Turkishness' to such an extreme degree, it was almost too much to bear."[75]

Chantal Lacroix underlines further that "authors of the second and third generations appear critical in new ways of the prejudices they encounter in Germany, but also of the self-pity, subservience, backwardness or greed of their parents' generation"[76].

One important aspect in the novel is the confrontation with racialized ethnicities. Hasan wants to reject these assigned roles and continuously becomes more frustrated with them, as he sees that people like Wolf do not care to really understand his backgrounds and the way the Turkish community is living nowadays. They frequently homogenise a whole community, ascribing them a specific identity based on prejudices and stereotypes. Upon meeting his flatmates for the first time, Hasan is confronted with a prejudiced perspective on Turks: "So, we want you to promise, that you will not have family visits with eight children, barbecue parties on the balcony or slaughtering of muttons in the bath tub."[77]

Many of the German characters portrayed in the novel show this kind of thinking which leads to the conclusion that too little is still known about the Turkish culture in Germany. It is through novels like these that intercultural communication is created. By criticising prejudiced behaviour, the author shows that a lot of work is still to be done. In addition, by also criticising the behaviour of the first generation, Kara stresses that changes have to be made on both sides.

Finally, in the course of the novel, Hasan does not only grow up, but he also becomes aware of problems in Berlin. While his first vision of the city was rather idealised, he has to realise that discrimination and prejudice unfortunately are still part of the everyday life. He manages to revaluate his hybrid identity and realises that transnational life is meant for him. One could assume that it has been during the many travels that a third space has been created. Whilst travelling from one

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[73] Adile Esen, "Beyond 'in-between'", 109.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Kara, *Selam Berlin,* 29. My translation.

[76] Lacroix, *Immigrants, Literature and National Integration,* 26.

[77] Kara, *Selam Berlin,* 199. My translation.

place to the other, he had to revaluate experiences and had to integrate them into his self.

At the end of a novel, when Berlin is officially reunited and Hasan finds himself on Potsdamer Platz, one can see that his identity is more stable and much clearer to him than before. In reaffirming his hybrid identity we can see that he has grown up, knows who he is and will not let himself be categorised in any way. It is at the very end of the novel, that Hasan finds his place in the new Germany:

"Above me, the lights of building cranes and construction sites, below me the ashes of the world war. Inside of me stirred and pushed this city, this flat city, that I loved and hated at the same time. From a distance I could hear rockets being fired off. They came from the Reichstag. And I knew: right in this moment the liberty bell was tolled and the flag was raised. And at midnight, two German states became one Germany again […] and suddenly knew which way my life was going to head."[78]

By placing himself in the middle of Berlin's past and future, he realises that he is part of its present and history. He experienced the reunification process, renegotiated his identity in this context and found his place as a Turkish-German within German society. These experiences affirmed that his hybrid identity can be a source of strength and progress. Petra Fachinger suggests that these last sentences of the novel show Hasan's "self-confidence and independence from cultural and societal constraints".[79] Due to this, he is able to judge his situation and others from a different perspective. Hybridity then does not merely serve him as a means of empowerment, but also gives him more perspectives to judge and choose from. Finally, one could suggest that the rockets and the toll of the bell are not just the final reunification of Germany, but also the final strengthening of the diverse parts of Hasan's self.

One could assume that Yadé Kara wants to show that Hasan is part of a new generation of Turkish-Germans that are hybrid, transcultural and open-minded for new experiences and perspectives. Nowadays, there is no need to tie yourself down or to make life time decisions. One can always redefine him-/herself, change perspectives and move on. Due to her own position within this group, Yadé Kara is able to portray a "generation of German-Turks in Germany with the flexibility and mobility a transnational and post-ethnic society demands"[80]. Again, this supports the argument for hybridity as increasingly becoming the norm.

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[78] Kara, *Selam Berlin,* 382. My translation.
[79] Petra Fachinger, "A New Kind of Creative Energy", 253.
[80] Esen, "Beyond 'in-between'", 130.

3.3   Summary

In both novels one can see a huge diversity of second generation characters, all presenting different possibilities of identity construction and negotiation within their parent's host country.

Smith shows that the identity negotiation process can happen in diverse phases. While Irie is at first insecure with her in-between position and cannot find a place, she tries to find herself in relation to others. At first, she wants to strengthen her English identity by identifying with the Chalfens. As this proves futile, she turns to her grandmother, who represents her Jamaican origins. As Roger points out:

> "For Smith, the greatest potential for understanding and healing arguably lies in the full recognition of complexity, denying neither past nor present, acknowledging the variety of influences that come into play and the mixed emotions concerning both mother country and adoptive country."[81]

It is only by being connected to both home and host country that Irie can find self-esteem and a sense of belonging. However, *White Teeth* also points out that depending on diverse factors, such as family support, the social environment and their own personality, the process of identity construction can have very different outcomes.

In *Selam Berlin*, the identity construction process is presented in a different matter. While Hasan's hybrid identity is stressed from the beginning, it is throughout the novel that he has to find a place for his self within the new Berlin. He has to re-define his identity in relation to this new context. Previous points of reference, for example the wall (as his "playground"[82]), do not carry the same meaning anymore. His change can then be seen as an adaptation and renegotiation process connected to the historical changes. This stresses one big difference between the novels: while the characters in W*hite Teeth* have to learn to juggle past, present and possible future, the characters in *Selam Berlin* have to find their position in society in the present, during a time of extreme changes within the city. This underlines what Beukema has pointed out: "in order to be able to formulate their own identities […] there must be a beginning (a root) and a process (a route)"[83]. This is also visible in Irie's imaginary 'journey' back home through her grandmother, but also for Hasan whose roots are his hybrid Turkish-German self from the Berlin he remembers, and the route being the renegotiation of his identity in this new, changed city.

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[81] Katina Rogers, "Affirming Complexity: 'White Teeth' and Cosmopolitanism," *Interdisciplinary Literary Studies* 9, no.2 (2008): 58. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41210294 (accessed on 2 June 2013).

[82] Kara, *Selam Berlin,* 48.

[83] Taryn Beukema, "Men Negotiating Identity in Zadie Smith's *White Teeth,*" *Postcolonial Text* 4, no.3 (2008): 12.

These differences underline the diverse ways in which the authors interpret hybridity. For Yadé Kara, on the one hand, hybridity (if achieved), has mainly positive connotations and is presented as a source of power and strength for the second generation. It is represented as 'normality' and is something they do not struggle with, most of the time. Zadie Smith however sees the concept as one that might at some point – hopefully – become normality for further generations but which has not been achieved yet. Both novels underline that socio-economic factors and the handling of topics like immigration and integration have an immense influence on the way the second generation is treated. This in turn influences the way those children negotiate their identities within their parents' host country.

Both novels furthermore put an emphasis on intergenerational conflict. Irie and Hasan both criticise the 'backwardness' of their parents' generation, as they seem to be stuck in the past. While the first generation wants to reaffirm their cultural identity, the second generation wants to negotiate an identity that includes both 'worlds' they live in. These conflicts influence their identity re-negotiation, and might even hinder it to some degree, as one can see with the example of Irie. Due to the second generation's 'double vision' however, they are able to criticise and judge their parents from an outside position and can thus negotiate their self in a newly defined context.

In both novels the second generation frequently struggles with finding points of reference within main society. One can notice this with Irie, trying to find a reflection of herself in England. Due to the emotional support offered by her grandmother, she is able to confront these issues, and manages to find a place for herself within English society. Smith thus shows the importance of social capital and a network of support that one can fall back on but also underlines the dangers and problems of excluding and stereotyping the second generation.

Similarly, in *Selam Berlin* Hasan often feels under-represented. As a child this was most striking to him, and he was constantly searching for something 'Turkish' in the media and mainstream society. Due to his constant travels and moves between Istanbul and Germany Hasan was able to construct a hybrid identity which gives him confidence and which he attempts to use to his advantage. Maybe it is also influenced by his living in Kreuzberg, however. As the Turkish community there is very large, he has many people that are similar to him all around. He can thus always go back there and find people like him, while Irie struggles to do so in Willesden where, as one character pointed out, there was "just not enough of any one thing to gang up against other thing".[84] Due to this huge diversity, they cannot rely on the same emotional support that comes from strong ethnic communities.

Related to this, one common theme that is visible within the novels is the criticism of the author's towards homogenisations of ethnic communities and racialised identities. In *White Teeth*, Smith portrays "a heterogeneous concept of nation

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[84] Ibid., 63.

where diversity and tolerance are the only means to peaceful co-existence".[85] Furthermore, the novel expresses the consequences and dangers of a homogenisation of Britain. If the second generation cannot find their place, and are never fully accepted, they might try to find other means of showing their frustrations, such as race riots. These issues are portrayed similarly in *Selam Berlin*. Hasan is frequently confronted with prejudices and stereotypes. Even though this frustrates him, he does not react with aggression, but tries to find possible solutions. He comes to realise that some people, like the director Wolf, are not worth the effort as they will not change their ways of thinking anyways:

"How was I supposed to explain 60 Million Turks to Wolf. I mean, you could find everything within that group. From the old shepherd on Mount Ararat to the New York Yuppie with an office at the Bosporus.[86]
'Aha, now I know why all those boys in Kreuzberg go around with knives. They all carry knives, right?' I shook my head. 'Oh no, not at all' I objected. 'Only some kids have – ' 'But Hasan…?' Wolf interrupted me. 'I have lived in Kreuzberg… […] The boys that go around there carry knives in their bags, in their shoes, in their hair. I have noticed quite a lot there – the tricks and methods of those tough boys.' […] Hasan, I told myself, stay cool. You can't change his damn opinion anyways. The pictures in his head are cast in concrete."[87]

Hasan realises that aggression will not solve his problem and change those people's perspective. In doing so, he shows that Wolf's stereotypical opinion on young Turks is an illusion.[88] This empowers Hasan and allows him to "transgress the 'in-betweeness' assigned to him"[89].

It is also interesting then to see how the authors portray the British and German middle classes, or 'intellectuals', which are represented by the Chalfens in *White Teeth* and by Wolf in *Selam Berlin*. As described above, Wolf thinks he knows everything there is to know about Turks. In the way he speaks and acts, however, it becomes obvious that his opinion is formed by prejudices and stereotypes. In *White Teeth,* the Chalfens, and most of all Joyce, see it as their mission to educate these 'poor' migrant children. This help is continuously presented as a proof of her 'goodness' but it could be rather seen as a "civilizing mission", thus stressing and underlining still existing colonial ideas.[90] While Joyce is frequently compared to a missionary, Marcus Chalfen expresses another form of colonial relation. Upon meeting Neena, Marcus remarks: "I can't help thinking […] that a Chalfen man and an Iqbal woman would be a hell of a mix […] You'd give us sex and we'd give

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[85] Addante, "Multiculturalism and the Nation in Zadie Smith's *White Teeth",* 73.

[86] Kara, *Selam Berlin,* 244. My translation.

[87] Ibid., 245. My translation.

[88] Adile Esen, "Beyond 'in-between'", 130.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Addante, "Multiculturalism and the Nation in Zadie Smith's *White Teeth,"* 77.

you sensibility or something"[91]. In saying so he does not only emphasise colonial hierarchies but also orientalises Neena.

By portraying these characters, both Kara and Smith, want to show that a good education does not automatically create understanding and tolerance. Due to their self-definition as intellectuals, they believe themselves infallible. As Sara Upstone underlines "the format may have changed, but prejudice remains"[92]. In pointing this out, the authors criticise modern societies. The entire society needs to review their perspective on minorities and their children in order to portray a more balanced and realistic image of these. In doing so, previous concepts of 'Germanness' and 'Britishness' are challenged. Minorities need to be included in a more open and diverse definition of both concepts. They portray a new generation of children growing up in Germany and the UK which will create multiple affiliations. In times of globalisation, a new perspective of the second generation and their place in society needs to be created, which is what these two authors attempt to do.

4   Conclusion

"This has been the century of strangers, brown, yellow and white. This has been the century of the great immigrant experiment. It is only this late in the day that you can walk into a playground and find Isaac Leung by the fishpond, Danny Rahman in the football cage, Quang O'Rourke bouncing a basketball, and Irie Jones humming a tune. Children with first and last names on a direct collision course. Names that secrete within them mass exodus, cramped boats and planes, cold arrivals, medical checks. […] Yet, despite all the mixing up, despite the fact that we have finally slipped into each other's lives with reasonable comfort (…) despite all this, it is still hard to admit that there is no one more English than the Indian, no one more Indian than the English […]. But it makes an immigrant laugh to hear the nationalist, scared of integration, penetration, miscenegation, when this is small fry, peanuts, compared to what the immigrant fears – dissolution, disappearance."[93]

This quote from *White Teeth* summarises aspects about the second generation nowadays. While, as could be observed within the novels, the second generation characters try to create a hybrid space for themselves, the first generations still hold much closer ties to the country of origin. In seeing their children integrate further into the mainstream they fear that they lose their ethnic identity and that they will forget about their origins. In doing so, however, the parental generation does not understand that for their children both cultures are important parts of their self-definition. For them hybridity, in the statement underlined by the mixture of first and last names, is seen as a natural part of their identities. In doing so, Smith stresses the continuous development towards hybrid identities as normality. This

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[91] Smith, *White Teeth,* 349.
[92] Upstone, "Same Old, Same Old: Zadie Smith's *White Teeth* and Monica Ali's *Brick Lane*", 338.
[93] Smith, *White Teeth,* 326-7.

tendency can also be observed within *Selam Berlin* and shows that a new generation of writers has emerged that does not want to portray a second generation stuck between two positions, but rather a second generation that has learned to make the best out of their situation by combining both cultures they grew up with. That this is not always an easy undertaking as pointed out in the analysis. Discrimination and prejudice from main society, but also pressure from the first generation might impede the development of a strong hybrid self and might instead lead to the creation of subcultures, identification with lower classes or even extremism. It becomes clear that the process of hybridisation is rather complicated and can be constituted by diverse phases of renegotiation and revaluation of the self.

The analysis of both novels has proven the previous hypotheses to be, at least partly, true. The characters in the novels frequently struggled with the generational differences and expectations from the first generation, prejudices and stereotypes from main society and the problem of representation. All these aspects influenced their identity construction to a large extent. One has to keep in mind however, that personality and own disposition influence the development as well. This is why Hasan, who has got a strong self-esteem and an emotional support network, can construct a strong hybrid identity from the very beginning, while Irie has to find her roots first, before she can become self-confident and happy with her hybrid self.

By presenting diverse characters and different possibilities of development, both authors want to show that the second generation – just like the first – is not a homogenous group and should thus not be treated as such. By homogenising them and ascribing them prejudiced migrant identities, majority society impedes their development and pushes them away from a culture they previously felt connected to. Through their writing, both Kara and Smith challenge concepts of homogenisation, stereotypes and prejudice, and want to show that nothing is ever merely black or white, that binary concepts do not work any longer in a globalised world. Rather, they want to stress diversity as an advantage and the recognition of such as the precondition for progress. Even though intercultural literature cannot affect politics directly; however, it can change the way readers perceive immigrants and their children within society. By engaging with the characters, the readers can revaluate their way of thinking and acting. This could form the basis for further change on a wider level and should thus be seen as a starting point. The creative potential of literature should not be underestimated and literature by the second generation should be seen as part of the national literature. If more people attempt to understand the situation and position of the second generation, instead of merely judging them from a prejudiced position, it will be easier for these children to create strong hybrid identities. Hybridity should not only be seen as normality for children of the second generation but also as an aspect of main society's everyday life. Globalisation will continue to bring different societies and countries closer and due to this, also migration to Europe will continue. It is then important to change our way of acting and thinking in relation to the second generation as they already

are an important part of European society. Understanding them better, listening to what they have to say and giving them opportunities to be who they are, without being excluded due to their religion or ethnicity, should become the main goal nowadays.

As could be seen in the research, a hybrid identity with a healthy self-conscious can be seen as a source of empowerment, a means to see beyond merely one culture or the other, but often second generation children struggle during the process. In the process of hybridisation, as Bhabha's theory pointed out, some aspects of the original culture might get lost. Due to this, the parents fear that at some point, nothing of their culture will be left ("dissolution, disappearance"). This constant battle between tradition and modernity, sometimes mirrored as conflict between East and West, shows that prejudices and stereotypes are still very present in both societies. Even though there is a tendency toward hybrid, transnational identities, the process of negotiating these is far from easy for the individuals. Yadé Kara portrays Hasan's hybrid development in a rather positive light, as something normal, and thus stresses what many researchers have found out recently: that hybridity, in opposition to Bhabha's original concept, is not about merely the hurtful loss of parts, but increasingly becomes normality. In comparison to Zadie Smith's novel, Kara's perspective almost seems too positive. This however is due to the different situations the characters find themselves in. Hasan in SB can rely on a strong ethnic network of support, within his family and his circle of friends. He shares the same cultural background with them, has similar physical features and can thus share his experiences of discrimination and prejudices with them. For Irie however, who cannot find her 'reflection' at first in neither group she is part of, there is no support network to lean upon. It is only during her development that she finds out who she is and where she belongs. Hasan has experienced both cultures and lived in both countries, which makes it much easier for him to accept his hybrid identity as part of himself.

All of this has shown, that a new generation of children needs new, or at least updated, theories. Previous theories are still useful but they need to be adapted to the changed experiences of the individuals. Theories, such as Homi Bhabha's, are useful as a starting point in order to analyse the identities and developments of the second generation. However, it became apparent that his concept seems to be more adapt to the experiences of the first generation than those of the second generation. Due to this, one can see the urgent need to revise such concepts and adapt them to modern times. Researchers such as Laura Moss have started to negotiate his ideas in a modern context, giving new insights into the life of the second generation. Another important factor for the development of these studies could be a closer connection to other concepts such as assimilation theories. There is such a huge diversity of second generation experiences that one theoretical approach is not sufficient in order to understand their situation and identity construction process fully. As newer theories have shown, the concept of assimilation is becoming a two-way street, showing that both minority and majority society are

changed by the input. Societies and governments should underline that this process is not a threat to their 'national' identity but rather an added element that brings newness, productivity and progress.

Forever Old?
Cultural Mis/Perceptions of Europe
in Films Popular in America

Elizabeth M. Goering & Andrea Krause

1   Introduction

The title of this volume invites us to "Imagine Europe," and as we do so, it is important to also examine how Europe is imagined by the outside world. This paper focuses specifically on the perceptions Americans have of Europe and Europeans. For many Americans, the "imagined Europe" is constructed by Hollywood. If you are a film aficionado, you can probably picture some of the most iconic film images of Europe: Paris cityscapes with sidewalk cafes, the Eiffel Tower, the Arc de Triomphe, and the Louvre; or quaint Italian villages and rolling vineyards that are the setting for many a romance film. For many Americans, these film images are "the imagined Europe," and, as such, they play a key role in shaping the perceptions the outside world has of Europe. This study utilizes a variety of content analytical methodologies to systematically analyze the representations of Europe that are communicated through films that are popular with American audiences.

2   Image and Cultural Perceptions

A useful starting point for this analysis is the clarification of definitions. This is especially important for this study, because so many diverse disciplines have concerned themselves with issues of identity, image, and reputation, and terminology is not always used consistently across disciplinary boundaries, making it essential for each researcher to clarify exactly what s/he means when utilizing this terminology.

In lay terms, image is the picture that forms in your mind when you think about a particular entity, whether that be a person, organization, institution, or nation. According to Gilpin, image is a combination of the ways in which an entity presents itself, representations by media and other third parties, and perceptions

rooted in stake-holder interactions with the entity[1]. Some theorists have found it useful to divide the concept of "image" into separate constructs. Alvesson, for example, uses the term "projected image"[2] to describe the way in which an entity seeks to be seen by outsiders through its self-presentation. Dutton & Dukerich note that another important aspect of image is "construed external image,"[3] which is the way an entity believes it is seen by others. Closely related to image are the constructs of "reputation"[4] or "transient impression,"[5] which refer to the collective judgments of an entity held by outsiders.

Throughout this paper, we will use the terms "image" or "cultural perceptions" to refer to the composite picture we have of others – a picture that is formed through our interactions with the other, the self-presentation of the other, and the representation of the other by outside parties, including the media. Cultural perceptions are not simply stereotypes. While our cultural perceptions may incorporate stereotypical categorizations, for most of us, our picture of others is much more complex than simple stereotypes.

Understanding image or cultural perceptions is important because perceptions are the foundation of social action. We respond to and interact with others on the basis of our perceptions of them. In addition, perceptions play a key role in shaping one's own identity. Identity is the collective understanding of "that which is core, distinctive, and enduring"[6] about oneself, whether one be an individual, an institution, a nation, or an organization. Gilpin highlights the transactional role of image and perception in shaping identity, explaining that identity is an "internal component" consisting of "self-perception, projections of this self-perception, and beliefs about others' views" of the self.[7]

This relationship between how one thinks one is viewed by others and identity is not just true for individuals. In fact, it is true for nations and larger cultural groups, as well. Trivundza explains: "National identities are temporary fixations of intersecting discourses that produce multiple, even contradictory identifications that individuals internalize and re-negotiate in the passing of time; they result from a continuing process of active construction, of 'imagining' self and others that

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[1] Dawn Gilpin, "Organizational Image Construction in a Fragmented Online Media Environment," *Journal of Public Relations Research* 22 (2010): 265-287, esp. 266.

[2] Mats Alvesson, "Organization: From substance to Image?," *Organizational Studies* 11 (1990): 373-394, cit. 375.

[3] Jane E. Dutton, Janet M. Dukerich and Clia V. Harquail, "Organizational Images and Member Identification," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 39 (1994): 239-263, cit. 239.

[4] Charles J. Fombrun, *Reputation: Realizing Value from the Corporate Image* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996).

[5] Dennis A. Gioia, Majken Schultz and Kevin G. Corley, "Organizational Identity, Image, and Adaptive Instability," *Academy of Management Review* 66 (2000): 63-81, cit. 66.

[6] Ibid, 63.

[7] Dawn Gilpin, *Organizational Image Construction*, 267.

develops through the processes of socialization and is constructed and maintained in the 'embodied habits of social life'."[8]

As we explore questions of image and identity, it is important to keep in mind that both constructs are transitory and non-monolithic. According to Hall, "Within cultural studies, it is axiomatic that identities are never formed in the singular and are always in process: 'far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject to the continuous 'play' of history, culture and power."[9] Thus, while we can seek to catch a glimpse of how an entity sees itself or how that entity is perceived by others, it is essential to remember that we are limited to seeing a temporally and contextually bound picture of that entity.

3   The Role of Media in Shaping Cultural Perceptions

Cultural perceptions are co-constructed through symbolic interchanges. There are many spheres of discourse that contribute to the communicative construction of perception, including interaction with peers, messages heard within governmental, educational or religious institutions, interaction within families, and, of course, media messages. In fact, research shows that media play a significant role in shaping perceptions.

Media typically perpetuate the notion of "we" and "they." As Ranganthan explains, "the concept of the 'other' is generally articulated and reiterated through mass media."[10] Media messages encourage people "to see the world in national terms in general and to think in patriotic terms about their own nation in particular." Ranganthan concludes that every media message "makes the distinction between 'we' and 'they', clearly underscoring the 'other'."[11] Thus, when movie-goers view representations of others in film, they cannot help but make sense of the world of the other through the lens of their own reality.

Semikhat explores further this relationship between the representational reality of the film world and experienced reality, observing that "film is a model of a human idea about the world, but not the world itself, nor a copy of it. That is why the images present in the plots of movies not only have their own referents in social reality, but also have a feedback effect on these referents. The reality of film is woven from images that must be recognizable without fail, otherwise the connecting thread between everyday existence, the practices of individuals, and what they see in the movies would be lost."[12] Semikhat concludes that "the plot, images, and

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[8] Ilija Tomanic Trivundza, "Slovene film, national identity and the celluloid hegemony of the mythical post-independence time," *Cultural Studies* 24 (2010): 663.

[9] Stuart Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora," in *Identity, Community, Culture, Difference,* ed. Jonathan Rutherford (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990), 225.

[10] Maya Ranganathan, "Towards a More Inclusive Indian Identity?: A Case Study of the Bollywood Film *Swades,*" *National Identities* 12 (2010): 41-59, cit. 41.

[11] Ibid.

[12] E. I. Semikhat, "Gender Specifics of National Imagery in Soviet Film, or National Identity in Mass Culture," *Anthropology & Archeology of Eurasia* 49 (2010): 76-83, cit. 77.

situation must not simply correlate with social reality, they must be perceived by the audience as plausible, familiar, similar to those they encounter in everyday activity."[13] When viewing films that depict cultural others, however, the litmus test of plausibility seems to shift slightly. The "plot, images, and situation" do not necessarily need to feel plausible for the viewer's world; they must seem plausible for the cultural context depicted in the film. Thus, film viewers will create a mental image of the world being depicted in the film that allows for the plausibility of the represented reality.

Some theorists maintain that the representational reality of film may, in some instances, have an even greater significance than the experienced reality. Semikhat explains:

> For a contemporary person, the movie version of reality is incomparably more significant than any other that existed before motion pictures originated and became common. (…) The means of mass communication create diverse cultural fields, varied according to structure and axiological orientation. This is a prerequisite for study of the content of mass information, translated by these means, and revealing its influence on various phenomena of social life. In this context, it is significant that the modern mass media produce diverse visual signs that have a considerable impact on people's behavior.[14]

Clearly, the powerful role of the media in shaping perceptions has been well-established. In addition, considerable research has analyzed how particular spaces or cultures are presented in film. Much of this research examines representations of non-European places and peoples. Ranganathan, for example, analyzes Indian identity communicated through Indian films and examines how understandings of Indian national identity are shaped by the "transnational cultural flows and mass movements of population" that characterize the "postcolonial simulacra" as depicted in film.[15] Shaheen has conducted extensive research on movie representations of Arabs. He has analyzed over 800 feature films, concluding that the dominant media portrait of Arabs as "alien, violent strangers, intent upon battling non-believers throughout the world"[16] has created harmful stereotypes.

There is a small but growing body of research that has focused on representations of particular places or events in European history. For example, Archer provides an analysis of representations of Paris in Parisian-made films[17]. Mazierska compares how three films made outside Poland represent the implementation of martial law in 1981 as the communist government made a final attempt to maintain authority. She sees the films as "testimonies" to how "this event was perceived

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[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid, 78.

[15] Ranganathan, Towards a More Inclusive Indian Identity?, 42.

[16] Jack G. Shaheen, "Hollywood's Muslim Arabs," *Muslim World* 90 (2000): 22-43, cit. 22.

[17] Neil Archer, "The City Presented to Itself: Perspective, Performance and the Anxiety of Authenticity in Recent Parisian Films," *Studies in European Cinema* 8 (2011): 197.

outside Poland, both by Polish emigrants and foreigners."[18] In another analysis of European cinematic representation, Trivundza examines the identity constructed through Slovene films made in the first 15 years of the country's independence. Trivundza concludes that the films "avoid dealing with its specific socio-historical context of post-communist transition" and, as a whole, the body of films "closely resonates with Slovene official national and political discourse."[19]

Some research looks at film representations of co-cultures within Europe. Macdonald (2011), for example, analyzes how British Muslims of South Asian origin are represented in British documentaries and films, while Semikhat (2010) explores the stereotypical representation of Ukrainians in Soviet films. The focus of Semikhat's research is "the phenomenon of national stereotypes and their role in shaping the national consciousness of a contemporary individual," and her work demonstrates how "historical characteristics and prerequisites" have shaped the images present in current mass communication and, in turn, analyzes the significance of those images in "the contemporary sociocultural context."[20]

Finally, a limited body of research seeks to assess the accuracy of how particular events in European history are represented. For example, Foster offers an analysis of the correspondence between "Britain's official position on its postwar relations with Europe" and "their depiction in the nation's popular culture."[21] While these studies do illustrate the role movies can and do play in communicating image and identity, because the films analyzed in these research projects have had relatively limited release worldwide, they tell us little about the communicative construction of larger cultural perceptions.

Two studies conducted by the authors of this chapter[22] examine representations of Russia and Russians in popular American films, focusing specifically on the ways in which those representations have changed since the end of the Cold War. While these studies do provide an analysis of perceptions of Europe that are being constructed outside of Europe through film, they are limited in their focus to a single country. Therefore, this study seeks to examine how the entire European continent is represented in films that are commonly viewed outside of Europe.

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[18] Ewa Maziersaka, "Polish Martial Law of 1981 Seen from Abroad," *New Cinemas: Journal of Contemporary Film* 7.3 (2009): 197-209, cit. 197.

[19] Trivundza, *Slovene film, national identity*, 662.

[20] Myra Macdonald, "British Muslims, Memory and Identity: Representations in British Film and Television Documentary," *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 14 (2011): 77.

[21] Kevin Foster, "Snobs, Yobs, and Italian Jobs: European Union, British Identity, and the Crime Film," *The Journal of Popular Culture* 44 (2011): 1010-1026, cit. 1011.

[22] Elizabeth M. Goering and Andrea Krause, "Still Enemies at the Gate?: The Changing Iconography of Russia and Russians in Hollywood Films," *International Journal of the Humanities* 3.7 (2006): 13-20; and Elizabeth Goering, "Mother Russia's New Sons and Daughters: The Changing Representation of Russian Identity in Film," in *Topical Problems of Communication and Culture-2*, ed. Nadejda Greidina (Pyatigorsk, Russia: Pyatigorsk State Linguistic University).

4   Methods

4.1 The Dataset

The seventy-five movies with the highest American domestic box office gross receipts in each of the first three years of this decade (2010-2012) were identified (altogether 225), using the Box Office Mojo website (http://boxofficemojo.com/yearly/). The years 2010-2012 were selected because they represented the most current image-constructing messages at the time the study was conducted. Domestic box office receipts were picked as the criterion for film-selection because we were interested in the representations American audiences are actually consuming, and the amount of money a film brings in is a strong indicator of the number of people who have seen the film. Finally, in selecting films for inclusion in the study, we were less concerned with who was making the messages and most concerned with whether the messages were being seen by a relatively large segment of the population. Therefore, we did not use the national origin of the film as a criterion in film selection.

4.2 Data Analysis

The data analysis process consisted of three steps. The first step involved completing a descriptive analysis of the dataset by content analyzing the plot synopsis published on the Internet Movie Database website, www.imdb.com, for each of the 225 films. The two authors carefully read each of the film synopses and coded them using the following categories: the film contains no representation of Europe or Europeans; the film is set exclusively or primarily in Europe; scenes in the film are set in Europe; the film is not set in Europe but includes obviously European characters.

The second step in the data analysis process was to conduct a thematic content analysis of a sub-sample of films. Specifically, the films with representations of Europe (altogether 54) were viewed and analyzed by the two co-authors using thematic content analytical methods, as described by Bereleson.[23] Through this method, the primary topics and issues related to the films' representations of Europe as place, culture, values, and people were identified. The two coders then worked collaboratively to place their individual observations into broad thematic categories. Themes meeting the criteria identified by Owen – recurrence, repetition and forcefulness – were included in the final results.[24]

Finally, we provide a close textual reading of one particular film representing Europe, *Midnight in Paris*, directed by Woody Allen. Because this film was one of

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[23] Bernard Berelson, *Content Analysis in Communication Research* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1971).

[24] William Foster Owen, "Interpretive Themes in Relational Communication," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 70 (1984): 274-287, esp. 275.

the few popular films that was not produced within the more traditional mass-market film industry, we were interested in seeing if it would offer a representation of Europe that was different or unique from the images common in the mainstream films.

5   Results

5.1 Descriptive analysis of dataset

The first step in the data analysis was to create a composite overview of representations of Europe in films popular in the US. Table 1 provides an overview of the numbers of films that depicted Europe and/or Europeans. As this table illustrates, the majority of films do not include representations of Europe, with only 27% (61/225) of the films including European settings or characters. In addition, Europe was the primary setting for the film in only one-third (22/61) of those films. In other words, American movie-goers are provided with glimpses of Europe, but relatively few sustained representations of life on the European continent.

Table 1: Numbers of films with representations of Europe/Europeans

Number of films with:	2010	2011	2012	TOTAL
No European settings or characters	54	54	56	164
European settings for some scenes	14	9	9	32
Europe as the primary setting for the film	6	8	8	22
European characters but not set in Europe	1	4	2	7

Table 2 provides an overview of the genres of the films that included European representations. As this table illustrates, the most common type of film in which Europe is depicted is the "action/adventure" film.

Table 2: Representations of Europe/Europeans by film genre

History/Biography	3
Crime	5
Romance	6
Mystery	7
Family	7
Animated	13
Thriller/Horror	17
Comedy	18
Drama	21
Science Fiction/Fantasy	22
Action/Adventure	45
TOTAL	164*

* This number is greater than the total number of films representing Europe because several films were classified in multiple genres.

Table 3 offers a breakdown of the time periods represented in the films. While more films (38%) are set in the present than in any other time period, the second most common temporal setting in the dataset is a mythical or fictionalized past, with 29% of the films set in the "once upon a time" of fairy tales or in a time of Greek mythology.

Table 3: Temporal settings of representations of Europe/Europeans

"Once upon a time"	18
Pre-19th Century	4
19th Century	4
20th Century	10
21st Century	23
Future	5
TOTAL	64*

* This number is greater than the total number of films representing Europe because some films were set in multiple time periods.

The final dimension included in the descriptive analysis of the films was the European locations represented in the dataset (see Table 4). The United Kingdom, France (particularly Paris), Russia and Germany are represented with relative frequency. Depictions of other countries are much rarer. Given the impact of film in shaping cultural perceptions, one might conclude that to many Americans, Europe *is* the UK, France, Germany, Russia – and maybe Italy and Greece (although, as

noted above, the Greece represented in the films in this dataset is an ancient or mythological Greece, not present-day Greece).

Table 4: European locations represented in films popular in America

United Kingdom	19	Albania	1
- London	8	Austria	1
- Scotland	2	Budapest, Hungary	1
- Wales	1	Finland	1
France	11	Moldova	1
- Paris	8	Monaco	1
Russia	8	Monte Carlo	1
Germany	7	Romania	1
Greece	4	Serbia	1
- mythical or ancient Greece	4	Sweden	1
Italy	4	Turkey	1
Switzerland	3	Vatican City	1
"exotic European locales"	1	Ukraine	1
Fictional Viking island	1	TOTAL	71*

* This number is greater than the total number of films representing Europe because some films were set in multiple locations.

5.2 Thematic Analysis

As explained above, the second stage in the data analysis process was to conduct a thematic content analysis of the films that portrayed Europe. Through this analysis, four thematic categories emerged that met the criteria identified by Owen of recurrence, repetition and forcefulness.

Europe is America's "once upon a time"

Many of the films representing Europe are Americanized adaptations of European fairy tales. The promotional poster for the movie *Mirror, Mirror*, for example, claims, "The Snow White legend comes alive." The Snow White fairy tale is also the impetus behind *Snow White and the Huntsman*, while *Tangled* is a retelling of Rapunzel, and *Puss in Boots* offers an animated mash-up of several fairy tales including Puss in Boots, Jack and the Beanstalk, and Humpty Dumpty. These films are examples of what Friedmeyer calls the "Disneyfication" of folktales: "The heroines are pure, beautiful and sweet and the heroes are a mixture of John Wayne and Brad Pitt. Instead of journeys and quests, there are chase scenes and knife fights. Friend-

ly animals and song remove any evidence of the dark, forbidding German forests found in the Grimms' fairy tales"[25]

In several of these films, Europe, or at least European folklore, is "claimed" or "coopted" by Americans. Percy Jackson (*Percy Jackson and the Olympians: The Lightning Thief*), for instance, is an American teenager who just happens to be a demigod, the son of Poseidon. To prevent war between the gods, Percy must return a stolen bolt of lightning to Zeus, a mission he successfully completes, thereby saving the world.

As with fairy tales themselves, these movie adaptations of fairy tales and mythology often promote particular values. Because most of these films are Hollywood productions, the values they communicate generally have a fairly obvious American twist, endorsing individual ingenuity and self-sufficiency. The young Viking, Hiccup, in *How to Train a Dragon*, for example, demonstrates and is rewarded for his ingenuity, and *Robin Hood* learns to follow his heart, even when it runs counter to the mainstream. The *Immortals* are rewarded for their individual heroism in fighting against a "power-hungry king", and Merida, the young heroine in *Brave*, models for the viewer the importance of standing up for oneself.

Europe is where Americans go to "find themselves," to fall in love, or to face their demons

The second theme observed in the dataset is that Europe is a place where American's go to find themselves. One of the best examples of this theme is seen in the 2010 film, *Eat, Pray, Love*, in which the recently divorced Liz Gilberts (played by Julia Roberts) sets off on a trip around the world to try to discover true meaning in her life. She begins her journey in Italy, where she seeks to find herself in the pleasures of eating. How lost the protagonist initially is – and how in need she is of "finding herself" – is highlighted by her faltering efforts to find a place to live, to find her way around a city in which every street looks the same to her, or even to order a cappuccino at a busy coffee shop. Through her self-perseverance and connecting with the right people at the right time, Ms Gilberts is able to make substantial progress on her journey of self-discovery. She learns that true meaning cannot come from nourishment alone and leaves Europe, moving on to see if she can find meaning elsewhere in the world.

A common variation on the theme of Europe being a site for self-discovery is evident in films such as *Ghost Rider* or *The Devil Inside*. In each of these films, Europe is the place Americans must go to face their demons. In *The Devil Inside*, for example, a young American travels to Europe to make a documentary about – and thereby come to terms with – her mother's past. As she researches the story of her

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[25] Wendy Friedmeyer, "The Disneyfication of Folklore: Adolescence and Archetypes," http://www.teachingliterature.org/teachingliterature/pdf/story/disneyfication_friedmeyer.pdf (accesssed 17 Sept 2014).

mother murdering three priests, she must confront not only the demons that likely possessed her mother but her own demons as well.

Yet another variation on this second theme is Europe as a place to go to fall in love. In *Letters to Juliet*, for instance, Sophie and her fiancé Victor take a pre-wedding trip to Verona, Italy, only to discover that they are not the perfect match they thought they were. Through a plot that involves Romeo and Juliet's balcony, which has become a place where young women come to leave written missives about their lost loves; a group of do-gooders called the "Secretaries of Juliet" who collect the letters and respond to them with words of advice and encouragement; and the resolution of a 50-year old love story, Sophie finds her true love.

In all of these examples, Europe is a location to which individuals travel or return in order to become better people. This theme of Europe being a location where one can seek self-actualization seems to be common within the representations of Europe that are consumed by American film-goers.

Europe is an exotic location for action and adventure

The third theme observed in our analysis of the movies representing Europe is Europe as an exotic location for action, adventure and romance. This theme is apparent in films such as *Taken 2, Ghost Protocol, Avengers, The Bourne Legacy*, and *Madagascar 3: Europe's Most Wanted.*

One of the most common manifestations of this theme is Europe as a stopping point in a story of espionage or intrigue that flits all around the world. For example, the action in *Inception* travels from Buenos Aires, to Mombasa, to Paris, to Los Angeles. In *Red,* an innocent American is drawn into a plot that takes him to Russia and Moldova. *Knight and Day* begins at the security gate of the Wichita Airport (you cannot find a much plainer setting than that), but once the unsuspecting June Havens, played by Cameron Diaz, is drawn into the operations of rogue spy Roy Miller, played by Tom Cruise, the action moves to much more exotic locales including the Alps, Salzburg, and Spain (of course, to Pamplona during the running of the bulls). The movie *Killers* is a spy story that, according to its promotional materials, takes the viewer on a journey to "exotic European locales." Finally, the action in another Tom Cruise film, *Mission Impossible: Ghost Protocol,* takes place in multiple locations, including Budapest, Russia, and Serbia. These films that dart around Europe and other exotic locales worldwide give more of a sense of Europe as a continent; and yet, there is a sameness to the representation. The differences between Budapest and Moscow, for example, are only evident in the inclusion of iconic landmarks in the long shots used to set the scene and the name of the city appearing in subtitles across the screen.

In many of the films that fit within this thematic category, remnants of the Cold War are still visible. In the previously mentioned *Mission Impossible,* Ethan Hunt (played by Tom Cruise) must save the world from Cobalt, a Swedish-born Russian who has acquired a Russian nuclear weapon and is in the process of ob-

taining the codes needed to launch it at the U.S. This film and others like it in the dataset, such as *SALT* or *The Expendables II*, illustrate that one of the mainstays of Hollywood's representation of American-ness is America's role in protecting the world against evil, and it seems that even more than 20 years after the end of the Cold War, filmmakers are unwilling to give up the convenient dichotomy between good and evil that the Cold War provided.

The films that illustrate this thematic category tell us more than just about Europe as a physical space; they also communicate European values (or at least American assumptions about European values) and they tell us something about the relationships between Europe and America. Specifically, these films seem to set up Americans as the rescuers of Europe. Perhaps it is no coincidence that one American's response to a question posed on Yahoo Answers, "What do Americans think of Europe and Europeans?" echoes this theme: "To be honest, I kind of turn my nose up to the Europeans. They think they're so much better than Americans, yet they called us up not once but TWICE to bail them out of two world wars."[26]

Europe is not only a stopping point in the adventures of secret agents or Americans on a rescue mission, it is also a stopping point for the well-to-do. This is evidenced in at least two of the films in the dataset. In *The Social Network,* Harvard students jet across the Atlantic to participate in racing regattas in England, and in *Iron Man 2*, billionaire Tony Stark (played by Robert Downey, Jr.) dashes to Monaco for the Monaco 500. Depictions such as these reinforce the image of Europe as a playground for the rich and famous.

Finally, Europe is a stopping point for Americans who are in need of particular expertise that can be found in Europe. In the film *Get Him to the Greek*, rock star Aldous Snow visits London because it is seen by Americans as being a hub of the music industry. The protagonists in several films, including *Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps*, visit Switzerland because of its role in the financial world; while in *Contagion*, workers at the World Health Organization in Switzerland collaborate with health organizations from around the world to contain an infectious disease that threatens the planet. In these films, specific places in Europe are visited because they are recognized worldwide as leaders in a particular area.

In an interesting reversal of this third thematic category, several films depict Europe as a place to leave, as opposed to a place to visit. In some cases, characters in the films leave their real European world to enter a fantasy world, as is the case in the *Harry Potter* and *Chronicles of Narnia* films that were included in this dataset as well as *Alice in Wonderland*. In other films, Europeans leave their homelands to emigrate elsewhere. This is the case in *Dark Shadows*, where the Barnabus Collins' family leaves Liverpool for America and the *Best Exotic Marigold Hotel*, a delightful comedy about a group of Brits who leave England for a more economical retirement in India.

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[26] Yahoo! Answers. "What do Americans think of Europe and Europeans?" https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20111010160217AAal0B2 (accessed 11 July 2014).

Europe is an historical space

The final thematic category emerging in our content analysis of the films in our dataset is Europe as an historical space. Several of the films, including *War Horse, The King's Speech, Iron Lady*, and *Red Tails*, depicted the Europe of the past. Unlike the movies in the first thematic category, however, these films depict actual historical events that took place in Europe.

As has been the case throughout film history, at least one of the films in this dataset dramatizes the actions of particular Americans during the wars. In this case, the focus is on a squadron of African American fighter pilots, the Tuskegee Airmen. While their counterparts back in the U.S. were still living under discriminatory Jim Crow laws, and even within the U.S. military, Blacks were subject to discrimination; this brave group of fighter pilots was making history through their service in WWII. Their story is told in the film *Red Tails*.

Among the most returned-to histories are stories set in one of the World Wars. For example, *War Horse* tells the story of the close friendship between Albert and Joey, a horse that is drafted into service during WWI. The film chronicles the parallel and intersecting adventures of man and horse as they fight the German army. The horse is captured by and later escapes the German army; the man is blinded in a heroic battle. However, in the end, the two find each other once again and are united.

As has been noted previously, the number of films representing Europe and Europeans that are actually seen by relatively large numbers of Americans is relatively small. In analyzing the films in this thematic category, it becomes apparent that the number of European historical events that are presented to Americans in film is even smaller. When one adds to that the fact that often the historical events depicted are really stories of American histories that just happened to take place in Europe, one realizes the very narrow range of the historical representations of Europe Americans are being exposed to through popular films.

5.3 Close textual reading of Midnight in Paris

As we have seen throughout this analysis, American movie-goers are provided with few sustained representations of Europe. To assess whether non-Hollywood films depict Europe in alternative ways, we conducted a close textual reading of one particular film in our dataset, *Midnight in Paris*,[27] written and directed by the film auteur Woody Allen. Particularly interesting about this film for this volume is that Woody Allen addresses filmically the very issue of a changing Europe.

Like many of the other films discussed thus far, *Midnight in Paris* begins with panoramic shots that set the stage. In this case, the viewer is introduced to Paris

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[27] *Midnight in Paris*, DVD, directed by Woody Allen (2011. Culver City, CA: Sony Pictures Home Entertainment, 2011).

through warm-hued, sepia-toned images of Paris' favorite tourist locations – almost a video postcard – clearly invoking an old, nostalgic image of Europe.

In typical Woody Allen fashion, the visual cozy nostalgia is quickly undercut through the dialogue of the opening scene that, interestingly, takes place against a black back-drop. The scene opens with the protagonist, Gil, waxing eloquent about how fabulous Paris is: "This is unbelievable – look at this. There's no city like this in the world. There never was." Through his words, Gil paints a picture of an imagined Paris that exists nowhere and everywhere in time, ending with a question for his fiancé, "Could you ever think of us moving here after we're married?" His fiancé Inez' unhesitant response provides a startling counterpoint to Gil's nostalgic image of Paris: "Oh god, no. I could never live outside of the United States. And if I could it would be someplace totally different.... Like Hawaii." Through the warring images and word pictures of this opening scene, Woody Allen effectively sets up his cinematic exploration of image and memory, nostalgia and reality, clearly making the imagined Europe a primary focus of this film.

Many of the themes discussed in the previous section are also evident in *Midnight in Paris*. Europe is represented as a playground for Americans, a great place for wealthy Americans to go antique shopping ("It's very hard to find anything like this at home," observes Inez' shopaholic mother) and buy pieces of Europe to ship home for "the Malibu beach house." Even when Gil is transported back to Paris of the 1920s, Paris is presented as a playground for privileged Americans, with expatriots enjoying a bohemian life of parties and drink as they await creative inspiration. The scenes depicting the Lost Generation – Ernest Hemingway, Cole Porter, F. Scott and Zelda Fitzgerald – also reiterate a second theme discussed in the previous section, Europe as the place Americans go to find themselves and their stories. It should come as no surprise that Gil, himself a budding writer hoping to write the next great American novel, meets up with Hemingway on one of his visits to the past. In this scene, Woody Allen indulges Gil's desire to participate in an idealized Paris of the past but simultaneously undercuts the validity of this nostalgia. Papa Hemingway is clearly represented as a pompous, pontificating American who just happens to be living in Paris.

But still, Gil and his old image of Paris cannot be shaken off or derided that easily and he holds on adamantly to his nostalgic view of the City of Lights and his belief that Paris is the place that gives meaning not only to his life but to the entire world: "When you think in the cold, violent, meaningless universe Paris exists – these lights – I mean nothing's happening on Jupiter or Neptune or out beyond – but from way out in space you can see these lights in the whole dark void – the cafes, people drinking and dancing." It would have been easy, and even in keeping with Allen's typical, cynical style, to dismiss Gil's nostalgic waxing and to force him back into the modern-day Paris that his fiancé inhabits. Allen chooses a very different ending for his film, though. Gil and Inez realize that their perceptions – and not just of Paris – are so disparate that they cannot stay together. Gil decides to stay in Paris to work on his novel and on an evening walk through his beloved city,

he meets Gabrielle, an employee at an antique shop who shares Gil's passion for Paris in the rain and old Cole Porter albums. As the two walk through the warm-hued, postcard-like images of Paris, this time in the rain, Allen merges past and present, reifying and endorsing, via his filming techniques and iconography, the old image of Paris. Thus, through his likable protagonist, Gil, a naive but sincere American, Woody Allen ends up affirming even more forcefully than many Hollywood movies the "forever old" identity of imagined Europe.

6   Discussion and Conclusion

This study used a variety of content analytical methodologies to systematically analyze the image of Europe that is presented to Americans in popular films. The results suggest that one can, indeed, discern patterns in the representation of Europe that may shed light on how Europe is imagined and reimagined by Americans.

One notable conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that much can be learned about the Europe that is "imagined" on the silver screen by focusing on what is absent from the representation. This study suggests that, sadly, Europe itself is relatively absent. Geographically, the settings depicted in films that are widely viewed in America show a fairly limited number of European countries and cities, and the films tend to repeat common iconic locations rather than introducing viewers to new and different parts of Europe. In addition, the viewers of the movies analyzed for this study learn very little about day to day life on the European continent. Since the majority of the films are set either in an historical or mythical past or they focus on the lives of secret agents, terrorists, or spies, the movies provide a very limited picture of the life of the European "everyman." Finally, the viewer of the films included in this data set receives a very restricted picture of European values and histories, because the focus of most of the stories is America. This is in keeping with Rangathan's[28] claim that media messages are, indeed, first and foremost messages that reinforce nationalism and foster a sense of patriotism. Thus, the American movie-goer who watches these films arguably learns more about themselves than they learn about European cultural identity. After all, Europe is presented as America's "once upon a time." It is the place Americans go to find themselves, when they are need of action or adventure, or when they could use a particular expertise that can be found in Europe. Even in the non-Hollywood films of Woody Allen, the European story becomes an American story.

If the impetus to "Imagine Europe" is actually an invitation to discard boxed-in perceptions of old Europe and to open up spaces for dynamic visions of a new Europe-in-the-(re)-making, then this investigation of film images of an "imagined Europe" cannot but strike a discordant note. Rather than European identity being, as Hall suggests, always in process, "subject to the continuous 'play' of history,

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[28] Maya Ranganathan, *Towards a More Inclusive Indian Identity*, 41.

culture, and power,"[29] these popular films portray a Europe forever tethered to a narrow array of old familiar images and values that appear to get recycled in almost all film media messages about Europe that are consumed in America.

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[29] Stuart Hall, *Cultural Identity and Diaspora*, 225.

Beyond Bookkeeping.
Reimagining Europe in Times of Crisis

Lars Klein

1   Introduction

The nature and aim of Europeanization has been under much discussion since the start of the crisis in 2008. What has started as economic crisis elsewhere soon struck the European Union, first in Greece, later in Spain, Italy, until it was the major concern of politicians and citizens in the whole of Europe. While the economic turned into a financial crisis, Europe was increasingly equaled with the European Union and the EU with its currency, the Euro. Numerous new publications, however, conceded a crisis not only of economic and financial sectors, but considered the crisis a political one: Oskar Negt asked for a "New Social Contract for Europe"[1], the "German Europe" was critically examined by Ulrich Beck[2], Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Guy Verhofstadt argued "For Europe!"[3], "If Europe fails" asked Geert Mak with omitting the question mark[4].

The article at hand was written in this situation. It argues that in the course of the crisis the ideas of what Europe is and what it means for its citizens has been narrowed down to its economic function to an extent that all other narratives were substantially weakened. Against that, the article will develop another perspective on Europeanness. Identifying a 'European identity' has been a major issue in European Studies for many years.[5] This quest for identity will be approached via un-

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[1] Title translated by the author. Oskar Negt, *Gesellschaftsentwurf für Europa. Plädoyer für ein gerechtes Gemeinwesen* (Göttingen: Steidl / ifa, 2012).

[2] Ulrich Beck, *German Europe* (Cambridge [et al.]: Polity Press, 2013).

[3] Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Guy Verhofstadt, *For Europe! Manifesto for a postnational revolution in Europe* (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012).

[4] Title translated by the author. Geert Mak, *Was, wenn Europa scheitert* (München: Pantheon Verlag, 2012).

[5] See for example: Julian Nida-Rümelin and Werner Weidenfeld, eds., *Europäische Identität. Voraussetzungen und Strategien* (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2007); Michael Bruter, *Citizens of Europe? The emergence of a mass European identity* (New York / London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Lars-Erik Cederman, ed., *Constructing Europe's identity. The external dimension* (Boulder / London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001); Monica Sassatelli, *Becoming Europeans. Cultural Identity and Cultural Policies* (London / New York:

derstandings and concepts of personal identity in order to examine some recurring problems in the discourse on collective and European identities from there. It will finally be argued that the narrowing down of European identity to its economic function has been done to an extent that it is hard to re-establish other narratives.

2   What is individual identity?

Identity is an issue in everyday situations. While a question in the form 'What is your identity?' is rather unlikely, a person is often asked to identify himself and to present a respective ID card. The dates that such a document entails usually comprise not only place of birth, date of birth or a current address. We can find other markers of identity already: the eye colour, height, given name, family name. Identity thus must have to do with individual data, but also with family and the environment a person lives in. The ID cards can be of different kinds, and it is easy to mock their different forms according to popular country stereotypes: Germans being part of the personnel of their country (*Personalausweis*); US-Americans using their driver's license as ID-card; the British only needing a passport when they travel, as if they are sure of their identity once at home.

It is also easy to imagine a situation in which it is asked: 'What do you identify with?' The answer to this question might comprise personal affections and relations just as professional and political loyalties. And while somebody might say: 'I have a Polish or European identity (whatever these might be)', it is hard to imagine somebody saying, he or she identified with country x or y, with Europe or Asia.

We can conclude that asking for an identity means to ask for very fundamental feelings. What is meant is: who are you? In presenting an ID card, this question can only be answered very superficially. If we want to get an idea of personal identities, we have to dig deeper. We may want to start by looking into a mirror. Jacques Lacan has famously held that the idea we have of ourselves as psychological wholes is fostered by the image we get of ourselves in the mirror. He described the very first encounters a child makes with its reflection.[6] In such a situation, a child would examine the reflection, assuming it was another body, and slowly find out that it was what it was, a mirror image of itself. We might imagine that scene with the parents standing by, observing, and maybe holding the child in front of the mirror. Our idea of ourselves as wholes and the respective development of our

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Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Cathleen Kantner, "Collective Identity as Shared Ethical Self-Understanding. The Case of the Emerging European Identity," *European Journal of Social Theory* 9.4 (2006), 501-523; Fritz Erich Anhelm, ed., *Was ist europäische Identität im Europa der Kulturen? Oder: Wozu brauchen wir europäische Kulturpolitik?* (Rehburg-Loccum: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, 2006); Klaus Eder and Willfried Spohn, eds., *Collective Memory and European Identity. The Effects of Integration and Enlargement* (Aldershot et al.: Ashgate, 2005); Wolfgang Schmale, *Geschichte und Zukunft der Europäischen Identität* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 2008); Richard Robyn, ed., *The Changing Face of European Identity* (London / New York: Routledge 2005).

[6] Jacques Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I As Reveled in Psychoanalytic Experience," in ibid., *Ecrits: A Selection* (London: Routledge, 1989), 1-8: 2.

ideal-I, he says, has us follow our mirror image and aim for an overcoming of inner divisions and contradictions.[7] In our lives, however, we will hardly get a clear picture of who we are. We will always be many things at once, always be torn between many positions, always be unconscious of many things that still define and guide us. So our longing for our *ideal-I* necessarily runs empty and can never be fully fulfilled.

That does not mean that we are born with a specific identity. We rather acquire and actively build our identities. But how do we do that? In establishing the idea of the parent holding the child in front of the mirror, Lacan has hinted at three important features of his theory: Firstly, the interactions with (concrete or imagined) others is important; secondly, the *I* is mediated through the other, and finally and more concretely, the *I* is always "in the field of the other".[8] These ideas are not originally brought forward by Lacan, but developed further by him.

Jean-Paul Sartre, one of the thinkers Lacan has long struggled with, has held that our very being escapes us insofar it has its basis outside of us.[9] It is in the relationship with the other that is thus essential. The introduction of the other, however, does not necessarily provide for an easier answer to our question of who we are. On the contrary, we are again faced with many modes and many theories of who the concrete other is or what the figure of the other might actually be. If we stick to Sartre, we find his theory developed in a chapter on the gaze in "Being and Nothingness". Here Sartre comes up with a famous example: "I walk through a public park," it begins. We read about the narrator walking and getting an overview of a park in which he spots different things and different people. He centers the park according to his position and according to what he sees.[10] In realizing that he liked a particular object and in wondering whether another person walking through the same park might not find other objects or people more noteworthy, "the decentering of my world" starts.[11] He becomes aware that the other has a point of view and walks in a direction that he cannot easily grasp and predict. For Sartre it is here that the challenge and real struggle between different ways of claiming the world shows.[12] As a result, we are forced to always question and reformat our world.

Sartre's ideas of the other in "Being and Nothingness" where oriented at Heidegger, and the reception of Sartre's book was likewise influenced by Heidegger's dark and demeaning concepts of the diffuse, impersonal and passive

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[7] Lacan, *The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I*, 5.

[8] Title translated by the author. Jacques Lacan, *Das Seminar. Buch XI. Die vier Grundbegriffe der Psychoanalyse* (Weinheim / Berlin: Quadriga, 1987), 90.

[9] Title translated by the author. Jean Paul Sartre, *Das Sein und das Nichts. Versuch eine phänomenologischen Ontologie* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1991), 470.

[10] Ibid., 459.

[11] Ibid., 462.

[12] Ibid., 463.

mass.[13] One might see this differently, since according to Sartre's understanding, an individual is always asked to come to a decision that stands and can be accepted by the other. That is its ultimate aim: to find acceptance and acknowledgement by others. For Sartre this means being acknowledged in the most fundamental way as the person somebody wants to be. It is not too difficult to apply this thinking from people to other entities, to collectives, to states, and we will get to that in the next step.

To conclude this very brief approach to personal identity, we come to our first set of conclusions and find that:
- Identities are idiosyncratic,
- Identities are unstable,
- Identities are relational,
- Identities are negotiated in contact with others.

3   Why is individual identity necessary?

We have heard from Lacan that he considers individuals' identities as so shaken that their very idea needs to be secured and its wholeness guaranteed by an other. Sartre has formulated more radically that the other is making our world.[14] According to him, we have to find acceptance and find it in our relation to the other. How then can we know which offerings are acceptable for the other? At this point, the step towards collective identities is not far, though not undertaken explicitly by Sartre or Lacan. Concepts of collective identity have been developed in the early 20th century already, most famously by Maurice Halbwachs[15], but made their way into the academic discourse on identity only very much later.[16]

In order to follow up on this question briefly, we turn the question of individual identity around and try to make the concept of identity more tangible might be through cinema and television. A very popular idea played with a lot is that of somebody having lost his or her identity. How then is it re-established? We find a rather radical example in the Hollywood blockbuster "The Bourne Identity."[17] The protagonist finds himself on a ship on the ocean, not knowing who he is or how he got on that ship with people unknown to him. Finding out who he was, reclaim-

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[13] See: Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1993), 120-127.

[14] Sartre, *Das Sein und das Nichts*, 473.

[15] Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory* (Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).

[16] See. for example: Aleida Assmann, "Memory, Individual and Collective", in *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*, ed. by Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 210-224; Jan Assmann, "Collective Memory and Cultural History", *New German Critique* 65 (1995): 125-133.

[17] *The Bourne Identity,* directed by Doug Liman (2002; L.A., Universal Pictures Germany GmbH 2003).

ing his life and getting into a position where he could make his own decisions turns out to be a bloody fight. Jason Bourne's quest further entails the uncovering of a political complot, which takes it further than necessary in the context of our question of who we are. There are thus very narrow limits to any analogy from the work on individual identity as done in the "Bourne Trilogy"[18] to the non-fictional world we find ourselves in. We can watch Jason Bourne finding pieces of his earlier life, connecting the dots, wondering about features and competences he discovers in himself. It is a long journey he starts, and it takes him through a number of countries and different environments. At first, however, he finds all but water around him. How to find orientation in such a situation?

The very idea of a person having lost his or her orientation on a ship on the ocean is cleverly chosen and provokes many associations. Nietzsche, for example, spoke of the horizon being wiped out, of there being no point of orientation without religion and the firm belief in God. There is nothing to hold on to, people are left to themselves. Nietzsche says that we get to flounder.[19] The horizon is wiped out; we cannot mark our goals on it. This picture is from the "Gay Science", in which we a few pages later encounter the jester who cries that God was dead.[20] What Nietzsche reminds us of is not that there is no God, but that religion no longer provides the very frame for our lives that it once may have provided the people with. Now everybody is out in the open, trying to stabilize his and her identity. Jason Bourne's quest starts in interaction with the fellow sailors who have found him, in sharing their lives, helping them fishing, getting to read the maps on board and reaching ground.

So he sorts out who and what he identifies with and who and what he does not. The longer this process goes, the more complicated it gets. Instead of referring to the lacking point of orientation, we could say now there was too much water, too many possibilities to seize, and too many points of orientation. What he has to do is to narrow down his aims, ideas of himself and his environment. Charles Taylor would say he was building a frame for his life.[21] Depending from where he looks he has different things in sight. There are points he cannot see from here or there. He has to except some focus, but might want to choose a different frame at times to go in different directions.

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[18] The movie was followed by "*The Bourne Supremacy*", DVD, directed by Paul Greengrass (2004, L.A., Universal Pictures Germany GmbH 2005) and "*The Bourne Ultimatum*", DVD, directed by Paul Greengrass (2007, L.A., Universal Pictures Germany GmbH, 2007), in which the case of Jason Bourne was further followed up on and closed.

[19] See: Friedrich Nietzsche, "Die fröhliche Wissenschaft", in ibid., *Morgenröthe. Idyllen aus Messina. Die fröhliche Wissenschaft. Kritische Studienausgabe. Band 3* (München et al.: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag / Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 481. See also: Charles Taylor, *Quellen des Selbst. Die Entstehung der neuzeitlichen Identität* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1996), 56.

[20] See: Nietzsche, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, 481.

[21] Taylor, *Quellen des Selbst*, 54.

The idea of the frame sounds rather plain and simple. It entails an understanding of identities being idiosyncratic. That is not to be confused with arbitrariness. For Taylor, it is not at all arbitrary how we frame our lives. Taylor speaks of a frame one has to find for his and her life.[22] Of course this frame has to be manufactured. It has to be made and has to fit to the individual, although we may find that more than one person fits into that frame. Religion might be included in the picture, but it does not provide for the frame itself. If religion does not provide meaning anymore, we have to find the stability of ourselves.

We cannot live in a state of constant insecurity, we might sum up in, again, a rather simple fashion. We need some stability. Jason Bourne can be seen as a very postmodern hero: Religious or spiritual offerings do not matter for him, state authorities cannot be trusted, personal relations prove to be unreliable. Comfort and security only are reached once fundamental feelings are developed, personal relations are firmly established and once he finds out where and how he wants to live (and we leave it at that and ignore how this happy life is eventually destroyed again and Bourne is asked to solve the final mysteries of his story).

We arrive at our second set of conclusions:
- Having a sense of identity is vital,
- Identity is something that makes us single out what is important for us.

4   How does collective identity work?

Now, this second set of conclusions explains a little better than the first one why identities are important. But how many people can fit in our frame, which kind of frame do we need for how many people? In other words: What about collective and group identities?

These questions lead us the field of national identity. There is a broad agreement in academia since Eric Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson published their works in 1984 the latest that national identities are constructed. Political identities just as personal identities are contingent; they can just as well be different. That sounds harmless, but it is not. All co-called 'nations', Ekkehart Krippendorff reminds us, are made up and a result of rulings. Its 'national consciousness' was the product of education and 'soft' force. As undisputed as that might be as such, Krippendorff continues, as much do the problems arise when it comes to filling this national, or, in the case of Europe, supranational consciousness.[23] The problem arises once it is insisted on what has been randomly created; insisted on wordings and perspectives, on one angle.

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[22] Ibid., 40.

[23] Ekkehart Krippendorff, *Die Kunst, nicht regiert zu werden* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1999), 100.

   Collective identities are stabilized through stories, images, or myths. What has been widely discussed in academia is illustrated in passing in the novel "White Noise" by Don DeLillo.[24] Its protagonist with the speaking name Jack Gladney is all but a happy person. He struggles with his overwhelming fear of death. At the University Upon a Hill, he is a Professor for Hitler Studies, a program he has invented himself, since he considered Hitler not only being larger than life, but larger than death.[25] His friend Murray teaches one course on Elvis Presley and one on "The History of Car Crashes". Together, they get to visit a barn.[26] This barn is set in the countryside, in a village called Farmington. There are several signs leading to it, advertising it as "most photographed barn". All photos, as it turns out, are shot from an "elevated spot", including the postcards that can be bought on the site. There is not the slightest suggestion or hint in the novel's scene that anybody even considers a different perspective. Why now is this perspective not challenged? What makes the barn the most photographed one? Why can it be seen to stand for an idea of America, why does its view provide comfort and security? These are some questions to consider when analyzing the idea of America in the novel and that might be symbolized by the barn here. The barn might be that successful, since it is set in a nice village with the speaking name Farmington. It might be seen as original of rural middle America, might stand for the plain man, the farmer (not intellectual), the villager, stand for those who pushed the frontier westwards.

   While it is easy to project all those elements into the "most photographed barn of America", it is hard enough to even imagine a building that stands for Europe and could fulfill a similar function. Does the European Central Bank or the European Council or the European parliament in Strasbourg work as 'European house'? And if so, does it have to be looked at from the elevated spot solely in order to allow for a proper perspective on what Europe stands for?
   Judging from the debates on Europe since 2008 there would be no doubt that the European Central Bank has to be chosen as the equivalent to the farm in "White Noise". We have the EU that is only looked at from an economic point of view. 'Europe' is presented as a fixed entity without alternatives. Like somebody claimed the barn as being most photographed, the EU – Europe – was set to be all about the Euro and the financial system.[27] This is not only true when looking at inner-European debates, but also when looked at from the outside. Natalia Chaban

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   [24] Don DeLillo, *White Noise. Text and Critcism*, ed. by Marc Osteen (London et al.: Penguin, 1998).
   [25] Ibid., 287.
   [26] This scene on the pages 12-13.
   [27] See for example: Gero Jenner, "Auch Spanien wankt – und Europa steht vor dem Zerfall", *Die Presse*, 29 May 2012, http://diepresse.com/home/wirtschaft/eurokrise/761339/Auch-Spanien-wankt-und-Europa-steht-vor-dem-Zerfall (accessed 20 August 2014); Martin Greive, "Zerfällt die EU, folgt die ‚Balkanisierung Europas'", *Die Welt*, 03. July 2011, http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article13463994/Zerfaellt-die-EU-folgt-die-Balkanisierung-Europas.html (accessed 20 August 2014).

has found that in Asia-Pacific perceptions of Europe, then director of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet, was the most visible EU official, topping Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the EU Commission, and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton. Accordingly, the European Central Bank was mentioned more often than the Commission or other institutions.[28]

If we try to explain what the European house looks like, we run into some trouble. When we do, usually we realize that it is impossible to find agreement on what we understand as European. Is it freedom, democracy, Christendom, Greek heritage, Roman heritage, lessons of the First or Second World War?[29] Can we identify features of Europe by pointing to an 'other'? Andrew Pagden has explained that this is not easy, since everything that is European is in fact non-European and everything that we claim as universal is universal from a Eurocentric perspective.[30]

To briefly sum up: We have heard that personal identities are idiosyncratic, that a person can be many things at once that still all make up his or her identity. If personal identity is such a tricky and fragmented entity, why is a European identity expected to be identical? Why not accept that the idea of wholeness is as misguided when it comes to personal identity as it is in the case of a European identity?

Third set of conclusions:
- Collective identities are constructed,
- They are made of shared beliefs,
- Collective identities have to have narrative plausibility,
- Collective identities can change.

5   What is it that holds Europe together?

In his essay "How do we want to live?"[31], the philosopher Peter Bieri claims that we cannot set one foot in front of the other without knowing why. As soon as we forget the reason, we stand still, he states. In order to be able to act we would have to understand what we want and what we want to do.[32] Always knowing why we

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[28] See: Natalia Chaban, "Public, Elite and Media: Perceptions of the EU in the Asia Pacific Region" (paper presented at the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, 03 November 2011).

[29] See for example: Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt, *The cultural values of Europe* (Liverpool: Liverpool Univiversity Press, 2008).

[30] Anthony Pagden, "Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent", in *The Idea of Europe from Antiquity to the European Union*, ed. by Anthony Pagden (Cambridge: University Press, 2002), 33-54.

[31] Title translated by the author.

[32] "Wir können keinen Schritt tun, ohne zu wissen, warum. Wenn wir den Grund vergessen haben, bleiben wir stehen. Erst wenn wir wieder wissen, was wir wollen, gehen wir weiter. Wir müssen, um handeln zu können, verstehen, was wir wollen und tun." – Peter Bieri, *Wie wollen wir leben?* (Wien: Residenz Verlag, 2011), 35.

do what we do and what we aim for in doing so is not easy. That accounts for personal as well as collective decisions. It is easy to see that the path the EU took in the wake of the financial crisis since 2008 has not always been properly explained. To risk the Euro meant to risk the Union and Europeanization as such, was said. Letting Greece collapse meant to have serious repercussions all over Europe and the world. This discourse on how Europe has to solve its financial crisis, how responsibility and burden lies on them and there being no alternative to budget cuts in Greece, which are supervised by European and financial institutions, has hollowed out the whole narrative of Europe.

What if there is no convincing narrative of Europe, not a convincing European house in sight? Many politicians thought it might be a clever idea to at least present certain initiatives as being without alternatives. It might help to successfully introduce these initiatives, but in arguing that way, politicians run the risk to lose those who disagree or are hesitant – who do not know the reasons for what they are to do and why they are to do it, in order to stay in that picture. They might opt out of a political process or turn against certain initiatives or bodies. So do we pause then as soon as we realize that we do not know why we, for example, should pay a couple of billion Euros to 'save Greece'? Or do we pause when we realize that the political legitimacy of the EU cannot be substantiated on the basis of the voter's turnout in European elections? Struggling with these questions might even lead to the larger issues at stake here: Why again Europeanize? A Croat may wonder whether she or he really wants to join the EU, just as a Pole might double check whether the Euro should really be introduced.

Whatever was presented as way to go without any alternatives was either focused on economics or EU-institutions, or both. This happened in the political as well as the public discourse. Even in the interventions by Jürgen Habermas, the addressees were the political elites in Europe.[33] Habermas considered the development of European constitution a product of the political elite.[34] It is for that reason that his interventions calling for unity, the establishment of a political identity in Europe, or even the finalization of political integration processes, were addressed to politicians.

In his understanding of Europe and Europeanization processes, however, Habermas has proven to be a consistent critic of the directions taken since the eruption of the financial crisis. He has warned of a success of "neoliberal orthodoxy" early on[35], which for him seemed to be achieved with the initiatives by Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy during the 'European sovereign debt crisis'[36]. He

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[33] See for example: Jürgen Habermas, "Wir brauchen Europa! Die neue Hartleibigkeit: Ist uns die gemeinsame Zukunft schon gleichgültig geworden?", *Die Zeit*, no. 21, 20 May 2010, 47.

[34] As was argued in: Negt, *Gesellschaftsentwurf für Europa*, 16.

[35] The term was used already earlier in: Jürgen Habermas, *Ach, Europa: Kleine politische Schriften XI* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008), 85.

[36] Jürgen Habermas, "Rettet die Würde der Demokratie", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, no. 258, 05 November 2011, 31.

called for reclaiming political creative powers on the supranational level.[37] Habermas has vividly renewed this critique at the Annual Meeting of German Legal Society in 2012, when he spoke of the then prime ministers of Italy and Greece, Mario Monti and Loukas Papademos, as confidants of the markets and included now the German Supreme Court in his critique as they had failed to reclaim scope for design, the elbowroom for politics.[38] Angela Merkel has fed these doubts only a couple of days after Habermas' speech by saying that European countries are being watched very closely by the markets and that she had to be very careful to do the right thing and to come up with good solutions to comfort the markets.[39] Indeed the question arises who is setting the framework for whom. Politics at this point has become a mere appendage of market rates, Oskar Negt has argued.[40] The economically powerful were setting the agenda, he writes, and they did so without assuming a position of responsibility for the economy of the whole house.[41] Negt conceded that under these conditions "conscious politics" was suspended and cohesion in Europe severely threatened, precisely because whatever was done in economic and financial politics was unlikely to strengthen the community, working- and living processes in Europe.[42]

Negt's position can of course easily be countered. We might consider European Stability Mechanisms and the billions that have been blocked to save troubled states as acts of solidarity. What we have seen in the past years, however, is that people in Europe move in exactly the other direction. There have been many demonstrations against Europe and European institutions, which were considered roots of the problem, but not means to their resolution.[43] There has been a strengthening of national, if not nationalistic or even right-wing parties all over Europe, which foster national egoisms.[44]

We are left with what Swiss writer Adolf Muschg has warned of as early as 2003, namely that Europe "loses its basis as a society of solidarity. When there are no longer any surpluses from which to distribute the wealth, it can no longer offer

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[37] See: Jürgen Habermas, "Wir brauchen Europa!".

[38] Jürgen Habermas, "Heraus aus dem Teufelskreis", *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, no. 220, 22/23 September 2012, 15.

[39] See: "Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel beim Tag der Deutschen Industrie am 25. September 2012 in Berlin", in: *Bulletin der Bundesregierung*, no. 83-1, 25 September 2012, http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Bulletin/2012/09/83-1-bk-bdi.html (accessed 26 September 2014).

[40] Negt, *Gesellschaftsentwurf für Europa*, 26.

[41] Ibid., 66.

[42] Ibid., 26, 66, 22.

[43] Mary Kaldor, Sabine Selchow, Sean Deel and Tamsin Murray-Leach, *The ‚bubbling up' of subterranean politics in Europe* (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012), 18-23.

[44] As to be seen in national and local elections from Greece to the Landtagswahlen in Germany in late 2014.

any compensation to its members."[45] Muschg was not only saying that Europe was not about bookkeeping, and any idea what Europe was all about could not be instrumental to its economic function, but that it had to be the other way around. Seen that way, the European Central Bank has to be considered the wrong choice for the European house also for it does not provide cohesion. The abstract house of European institutions was uninhabited, as Ulrich Beck has found. The irony was, he said, how nobody realized.[46]

We arrive at our fourth set of conclusions:
-    The current EU-Europe is being presented as if being without alternatives,
-    The current discourse on Europe is institution-centered,
-    Old ideas of Europe are no longer effective,
-    Top-down identity building processes do not address Europeans.

6   Are there alternative narratives of Europe?

Narratives of individual lives as of collectives, nations and supra-national entities the like are constructed. They have, as Klaus Eder has elaborated on, soft boundaries and are stabilized through stories.[47] The traditional narratives of Europeanization after World War II no longer seem effective. It has been held that the immediate aims of the European unification process, such as the reconciliation of nations, security, mobility and prosperity, have largely been achieved.[48] The new narrative seems simple and brief: This Europe is one that works beyond borders because it is forced to by globalization. In other words: because Europe wants to have its share economically, its addressees are 'the markets' and other important powers like the US, China, India with which Europe wants to compete as world actors. Its addressees are not the Europeans. The difficulties in these complicated processes are obvious: Top-down decisions are taken which do affect Europeans, but have its addressees elsewhere. Whenever done from politicians, especially in times of the current crisis, seems essentialist, is a way of arriving at normative ideas of how things should be.

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45 Adolf Muschg, "'Core Europe': Thoughts about the European Identity", in *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe. Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War*, ed. Levy, Daniel, Pensky, Max, Torpey, John, (London / New York: Verso, 2005), 21-27: 27.

46 Ulrich Beck and Martin Schulz, "Mehr Willy Brandt wagen", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, no. 117, 23 May 2013, 25.

47 Klaus Eder, "Europe's Borders. The Narrative Construction of the Boundaries of Europe", *European Journal of Social Theory* 9, no. 2 (2006): 255-271.

48 Bettina Thalmeier, "Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer europäischen Identitätspolitik", in *Europäische Identität: Voraussetzungen und Strategien*, ed. Julian Nida-Rümelin and Werner Weidenfeld (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 175.

David Harvey has been a close and critical observer of the crisis since 2008 and a staunch critic of the course the EU has taken. In his book "Rebel City" he has formulated what accounts for any discussion of how we want to live: "the question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from the question of what kind of people we want to be, what kinds of social relations we seek, what relations to nature we cherish, what style of life we desire […]."[49]

If we start to think about our individual identity that way, we are in an active position and we seek to participate in society and politics. But such a position rests on a political course with alternatives and cannot be met by a 'true financial government', but by strengthening the European Parliament, by elections, referenda and most of all by open debates, and all of this might be supplemented and reinforced by a changing understanding of citizenship.

We arrive at a different Europe if we focus on those things that are considered now the ends of a process, but which in fact can just as well be considered means: open borders, common market, common currency, and building of a democratic space for what are now some 500 million people. Some markers of Europeanness or even European identity are the willingness to discuss, the honest attempts to understand the other, the acceptance of diversity as a good in itself, awareness of identities overlapping. If we understand 'European identity' and a respective 'European project' that way, it still is a huge one. It does not end at borders that are created artificially, but borders are considered as being created, as permeable, open. In this Europe everybody would be invited to participate. This process cannot work as a top-down process.

Just as the persons walking through a park in our example mentioned above, the struggle about what is noteworthy and important is as vital as the aim to be acknowledged. The means of such a struggle is participation, its arena are the public debates just as democratic institutions; it could work via referenda, in a truly transnational way. Indeed, this Europe would be a cosmopolitan Europe that is not developed on the basis of nation states or as a quasi-nation state as if it had one identity. It would be a Europe that really is up to the 'challenges of the 21st century', the 'challenges of Globalization', because it would be indeed something new. If we take Europe as collective project with a multitude of construction-sites that all have their own procedures as well as aims, writes Oskar Negt, the provisional as much as temporary pauses and setbacks, can be considered destructive only if the will to succeed fades.[50]

This would be a different Europe. It has to be seen in how far they can now be secured and in how far these elements can be picked up on in a convincing new narrative of Europe.

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[49] David Harvey, *The right to the city*, in ibid., *Rebel Cities*, 3-27 (London/New York: Verso, 2012), 4.

[50] Negt, *Gesellschaftsentwurf für Europa*, 116f.

This leads us to a fifth and final set of conclusions:
- 'Europe' stays open and unfinished,
- This 'Europe' can only be based on a conceptualization of culture and feelings of belonging, marked by ambivalence and transition (Bo Stråth)
- And an arena for an open debate is needed.

Imagining a Cosmopolitized Europe. From the Study of the 'New' to the Discovery of the 'Unexpected'*

Sabine Selchow

1   Introduction

The title of the public lecture series, the contributions to which constitute this edited collection, was 'Imagining Europe: Visions, Memories and Counter-Narratives'. This present chapter is not proposing a distinct vision for the political entity 'Europe'. Nor is it concerned with the empirical questions, which visions, memories and counter-narratives are held by different social actors within and outside Europe, how the symbolic struggle over 'Europe' looks, or with the socio-political consequences of the dominant imaginations. The chapter is about the *scholarly* imagination of Europe. It addresses scholars who are involved in the analysis of contemporary politics within Europe and is concerned with the way in which they imagine their object of study because it is this imagination that preconfigures, which problems are perceived as problems and which questions are addressed in their analysis.

If we look at the contemporary academic discourse of political studies in general and the scholarship on international relations in particular, we notice that many analysts start on the basis that there is something 'new' about the world: that it is a "brave new world"[1] we are living in, that we are facing 'new' challenges and problems and threats, and that 'new' solutions are needed. Starting on this premise, much of the scholarship in political studies and international relations is then about the study of this 'new' world and the search for 'new' solutions that could address and deal with the perceived 'new' challenges we are said to be facing. The many different governance experiments and socio-political constellations that shape the

[1] Jens Bartelson, "Three Concepts of Globalization," *International Sociology*, 15(2) (2000): 192.

European landscape these days are manifestations of this search for solutions to the 'problems' of the perceived 'new' world.

Yet, despite all innovative thinking, scholarly productivity, growth of think tanks and efforts and advances in knowledge transfer, it is striking that in so many instances political reality falls short in dealing adequately with the contemporary, 'new' challenges. If we look at how the issue of climate change is dealt with or if we look at the significant and ever growing number of people who die in their attempts to overcome the European border by crossing the Mediterranean Sea, we cannot but realise that existing (European) institutional settings and governance constellations fail the 'new' world – despite the mass of scholarly recommendations for how to 'really' and 'properly' deal with it.

There are two general possibilities for why there is this mismatch between the eager scholarly knowledge production of innovative approaches to the 'new' world, on the one side, and the reality of these approaches that seems to fail the 'new' world, on the other: either the developed solutions for dealing with the 'new' world are not yet the best and have to be improved, or there is something wrong with the very imagination of the 'new' world, for which these solutions are developed and suggested.

In this chapter I hold that it is this second aspect that accounts for the mismatch between the supposedly 'new' world and the many suggestions to deal with its 'new' challenges. The chapter argues that what is needed is not simply a conventional scholarship in and about a 'new' world but an unconventional, in the sense of *different in kind* scholarship *from within* a *differently imagined* world. The chapter argues for a scholarly approach that commences from a different *starting point,* one that opens up different pathways for the exploration of the contemporary (political) world and holds the chance of generating *different* solutions to pressing problems, rather than 'new' solutions to 'new' problems. At the heart of this approach is a shift from the scholarly goal of dealing with the 'new' to the search for the 'unexpected'.

The aim of this chapter is to sketch the contours of how such a different starting point could look. In that, the chapter starts by distinguishing between the discovery of the 'unexpected' and the study of the 'new'. Reflecting on the potentials and the restrictions of the existing 'unconventional' scholarship in the political studies discourse, especially its subfield International Relations (IR), the premises of which foster exactly such a discovery of the 'unexpected', the chapter suggests bringing into the study of politics sociologist Ulrich Beck's theories of 'cosmopolitisation', 'global risk' and 'reflexive modernisation'[2]. This is because Beck's theories enable a re-imagination of the world, in which key premises that underlie the conventional imagination of the world, prominently the equation of society with *national* society and the distinction between 'inside' and 'outside', are not only dis-

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[2] E.g. Ulrich Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006) and ibid., *World at Risk*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009).

mantled but replaced by (an understanding that contemporary socio-political reality is shaped by) a different logic: the logic of 'cosmopolitisation'. The chapter suggests that this kind of re-imagination of the world is a fruitful starting-point for the critical exploration of the contemporary world and the search for the 'unexpected' in attempts to find (institutional) answers to contemporary problems because it enables the exploration of the world *from within* a different world.

2   The discovery of the 'unexpected' vs the study of the 'new'

There is a difference between discovering the 'unexpected' and studying the 'new'. Discovering the 'unexpected' is not about challenging conventional knowledge about the world by claiming that something observed is qualitatively 'different in kind' and has 'not been there before' but it is about generating insights from a position that is different (in kind) from the conventional one/s; it is about generating knowledge from an unconventional starting point. This does not mean that the discovery of the 'unexpected' might not discover things that could be labeled qualitatively 'different in kind' or 'not been there before', i.e. 'new'. It simply means that the basic aims and claims of the discovery of the 'unexpected' are different ones in that it is about (the validity of) the unconventional starting point and the (distinct) world that is apparent from it, and not so much about the (claimed qualitatively 'different in kind') nature of the studied object as seen from a conventional perspective.

This is only a fine difference, but it is an important one. So, when Nobel laureate Albert Szent-Györgyi suggests that '[d]iscovery consists of looking at the same thing as everyone else and thinking something different'[3], he captures the nature of conventional scholarly discoveries (potentially of the 'new'). Setting out to discover the 'unexpected', in contrast, does not involve looking at 'the same thing as everyone else' but looking at a different (in kind) thing to begin with. The construction of the 'different in kind' world with its 'different in kind' things is an essential part of the process of the 'discovery' of the 'unexpected'.

For those who set out to discover and study the 'new' the challenge is to prove that something is truly 'new'. This is unavoidably, although, always in contrast to the 'old', and, as such, ends up in part reproducing the 'old'. For those scholars who set out to discover the 'unexpected', on the contrary, the challenge is to engage with the conventions in a way that 'allows' them to establish and justify their perspective (and the world that is visible from it) as 'acceptable', i.e. that allows them to move their different and unconventional starting point and the world that is produced through it into 'the true'.[4] As such, the discovery of the 'unexpected' is inevitably always also about epistemological concerns.

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[3] Quoted in Yan Li, Jian Wang, Xianglong Li, Wu Zhao "Design Creativity in Product Innovation." *The International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology* 33 (2007): 214.

[4] Michael Foucault, "The Order of Discourse", in *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader,* ed. Robert Young (London: Routledge, 1981) 59-61.

3   For example: unconventional approaches in International Relations

Over the past three decades an exciting, 'unconventional' scholarship developed in the political studies subfield International Relations (IR) that strives for the discovery of the 'unexpected'. Motivated by the assumption that '[t]he most challenging political problems of our time […] arise primarily from a need to re-imagine what we mean by politics'[5], scholars in this camp set out to intervene in conventional understandings and established practices. In striving for the discovery of the 'unexpected', these scholars take a position that questions 'the very status of the ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions upon which the mainstream depends'[6]. Knowledge from this unconventional position is produced both *from within* and *about* a world that is understood as being (something) fundamentally different from the 'thing' at which the (various) conventional positions look. This world is not only not perceived as 'having fallen from heaven'[7], or as being constructed by social actors, but as the product of discourses, of which the conventional scholarly position is one. It is a world that is about 'textuality' (discourse) rather than 'objective reality' (essence), e.g. a world in which (modern) dichotomies, such as national/international, inside/outside are not (perceived as being) natural but as discursive products.

Consequently, given the way in which the 'something' (i.e. the world) that these scholars observe looks, it is at the heart of these 'unconventional' approaches to focus on the symbolic systems through which the distinctions that guide life are made. This implies a turning away from the conventional way of conducting social and political scientific research.

Broadly speaking, the conventional way of conducting research is in one way or other linear, in that it determines and formulates a research problem, develops a structure that contains specific hypotheses, which are assessed, and leads to findings that are then interpreted in the light of the pre-set hypotheses. The idea(l) of a decontextualised method and a rigorous deductive approach, which proceeds

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Ibid., 59-60 uses the example of Gregor Mendel's theory of hereditary traits to clarify the difference between 'truth' and 'in the true' ('discourse'). While Gregor Mendel's theory of hereditary traits is today a well-accepted and well-established scientific insight, and, indeed, while one can wonder with Foucault (ibid., 60), "how the botanists or biologists of the nineteenth century managed not to see that what Mendel was saying was true", it was dismissed outright by biologists for a long time. This was due to the fact that although Mendel "spoke the truth, […] he was not 'within the true' of the biological discourse of his time" (ibid., 61). "It is always possible that one might speak the truth in the space of a wild exteriority, but one is 'in the true' only by obeying the rules of a discursive 'policing' which one has to reactivate in each of one's discourses", explains Foucault (ibid.).

[5] R.B.J. Walker, "Both Globalization and Sovereignty: Re-Imagining the Political," in *Principled World Poli-tics*, ed. Wapner, Paul and Lester Edwin J. Ruiz (Lanham: Rowman&Littlefield, 2000), 23.

[6] Milja Kurki and Colin Wight, "International Relations and Social Science", in *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, ed. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 23.

[7] Thomas Risse, "Social Constructivism Meets Globalization", in *Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies*, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 126-147.

strictly on the basis of a theory that is then transformed into a consistent decontextualised method and is finally verified based on empirical findings, appears 'suspect' from this perspective[8]. Instead of verifying a pre-set hypothesis, 'unconventional' studies aim to carve out what is typical about a socio-political phenomenon, and discuss and evaluate it as such[9]. Hence, rather than setting out to detect causal explanations and 'real causes', they are concerned to de-naturalise alleged natural orders and perceptions and to make things 'strange', to use an expression of James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro[10]. Importantly, though, they investigate a 'different in kind' world to begin with, and, as such, they aim for the discovery of the 'unexpected', in the sense of something that is not visible from conventional starting-points but is generated from within a 'different in kind' world, which, however, is only visible from an unconventional perspective to begin with.

The case of unconventional IR scholarship shows that it is not easy to bring a different world into 'the true', in the Foucaultian sense referred to above. Although there has long been a trend away from the convention of IR positivist positions, its unconventional outlook is still met with profound skepticism by the conventions in the field. Michael H. Lessnoff's decision to explicitly exclude, among others, Michel Foucault, Richard Rorty and Jacques Derrida from his introductory book *Political Philosophers of the Twentieth Century* on the basis that 'none of them seems […] to have said anything about politics that is both original and significant – in so far as their writings are comprehensible at all'[11], might be an extreme form of this 'skepticism' with which 'unconventional' approaches are viewed. In its basic sentiment, however, it is symptomatic for the positioning of this scholarship at the margins of the disciplinary and disciplined knowledge production and imagination of the world. Yet, if one understands that (scholarly) knowledge production is not simply a neutral exercise that (critically or not) captures the empirical world, i.e. a routinized, apolitical practice, the unconventional IR scholarship is not only intriguing but serves the important purpose of intervening into conventional knowledge (production). From that perspective it is inspiring.

However, despite its profound theoretical value, it has to be acknowledged that radical *empirical* studies are rarely produced by this scholarship, more precisely, empirical studies that significantly shake up the reality of political life and practices. It might be the almost singular focus on the struggle to bring their 'different in

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[8] Matthias Jung, *Öffentlichkeit und Sprachwandel: Zur Geschichte des Diskurses über die Atomenergie* (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994).

[9] Wolfgang Wagner, „Die soziale Konstruktion aussenpolitischer Interessen: Deutsche und britische Debatten ueber eine Staerkung der Gemeinsamen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen Union," in *Konstruktivistische Analysen der international Politik*, ed. Ulbert, Cornelia and Christoph Weller (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fuer Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), 68.

[10] James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro, eds., *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington: Lexington, 1989).

[11] Lessnoff quoted in Alan Finlayson and Jeremy Valentine, eds., *Politics and Poststructuralism: An Introduction* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 2.

kind' world into 'the true' that accounts for the fact that there is a considerable amount of sophisticated 'unconventional' writings on a) how the 'different in kind' world looks (in contrast to the conventional one), b) what makes it different, and c) why it should be 'in the true' (i.e. what is wrong with (the idea of) the world as it is conventionally constructed and analysed). Yet, as it stands, there are relatively few studies that actually set out in a radical way to empirically discover the 'unexpected' (from) within the 'different in kind' world that this scholarship sees. This has led Thomas Risse[12] to wittily conclude: 'es wird empirisch nichts so heiss gegessen, wie es theoretisch gekocht wird'.[13] In a similar vein, Jacob Torfing[14] observes that many contributions have 'thrown the methodological baby out with the epistemological bath water'. Instead of discovering the 'unexpected' many existing unconventional analyses 'illustrate a preestablished ['unconventional'] theoretical argument and do not attempt to learn from the empirical analysis'[15]. More often than not they 'simply' demonstrate that, and in what ways, society is reproduced through power/knowledge.

Sharing the premises and (political) goals of the unconventional scholarship in IR, i.e. holding the conviction that the discovery and exploration of the 'unexpected' is an imperative task for contemporary political analysts, sharing the insight that what is needed in order to deal with contemporary problems is a re-imagination of what we mean by politics, and believing in the necessity of a contextualisation of social and political scientific research, this chapter advocates adding another dimension to the scholarly pre-imagination of the political world and Europe. It advocates looking beyond the discursive boundaries of political studies and taking up sociologist Ulrich Beck's theoretical suggestions around the concept of 'cosmopolitisation' in order to find ways to establish 'rails on which standard academic […] inquiry runs into new regions'[16]. In short, it also suggests studying politics from *within* a different world but suggests a distinct way of (pre)imagining this world. It suggests imagining it as 'cosmopolitized'. This means it suggests taking a 'cosmopolitan observer perspective' in the pre-imagination of the contemporary political world and Europe.

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[12] Thomas Risse, "Konstruktivismus, Rationalismus und Theorien Internationaler Beziehungen – warum empirisch nichts so heiß gegessen wird, wie es theoretisch gekocht wurde," in *Die neuen Internationalen Beziehungen. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven in Deutschland*, ed. Hellmann, Günther, Klaus Dieter Wolf and Michael Zürn (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003), 99-132.

[13] This is an abbrevation of the German saying: 'es wird nichts so heiss gegessen, wie es gekocht wird.' One does not eat things as hot as they have been cooked, i.e. things might be cooked on high temperature but only eaten when they have cooled down. Risse rewrites this saying to: things are 'methodologically' not eaten as hot as they have been theoretcially cooked, i.e. what might be dicussed radically in theory looses its radicalness when it comes to its methodological application.

[14] Jacob Torfing, (2005) "Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments, and Challenges," in *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance*, ed. Howarth, David and Jacob Torfing (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 27.

[15] Ibid., 26.

[16] Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision,* 74.

4   The 'cosmopolitan observer perspective'

The idea of a 'cosmopolitan observer perspective' has been developed by Ulrich Beck in his efforts to outline and establish an epistemological turn in the social sciences[17]. It goes back to his theory of reflexive modernization. At the heart of this theory – and the various discussions, expansions and amendments of it – is the argument that the state of societies cannot be captured through established conceptions of 'society' and through the established grammar that underlies the social sciences, notably the discipline of sociology, to which Beck implicitly and explicitly refers. As such, Beck's main concern is an epistemological one.

His main thesis is that, rather than capturing societies via established conceptions of 'society', they need to be understood as being subject to a process that he calls 'cosmopolitization'. With 'cosmopolitization' he does not refer to a conscious (political) process around the normative project of cosmopolitanism. Rather, he understands it as a process that is the product of the 'unwanted [in the sense of unintended] and unobserved side effect of actions that are not intended as 'cosmopolitan' in the normative sense'[18]. What he refers to with the term 'cosmopolitization' is 'an unforeseen social effect of actions directed to other ends performed by human beings operating within a network of global interdependence risks'[19]. As such, it is not a process that is voluntarily, let alone strategically, set into gear under the label of 'cosmopolitization'. It is an effect that inevitably, unintentionally and 'accidentally' happens to be set into gear by the actions of social actors, which run under different labels and with different intentions. 'Cosmopolitization' then is a reflexive process which brings the 'global other' into the midst of other 'global others'[20]. It brings the world into one's life.

Beck does not claim there is anything 'new' about the (unintended) multi-perspectival melange that he captures in the term 'cosmopolitization'; the (forced) mixing of cultures is not anything new in world history', he stresses[21]. However, what is notable for contemporary times, Beck suggests, is the 'awareness of it, its self-conscious political affirmation, its reflection and recognition before a global public via the mass media, in the news and in the global social movements of blacks, women and minorities, and in the current vogue for such venerable concepts as „diaspora" in the cultural sciences'[22]. It is also manifest in what we could call 'cosmopolitised institutions', as seen in the case of 'patent law and in other core areas of commercial law [where] a state-non-state public-private both/and is

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[17] Ibid., 33.

[18] Ibid., 18.

[19] Ibid., 48.

[20] Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 417.

[21] Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision,* 21.

[22] Ibid.

gaining ground'[23]. It is this dimension of the (unintended) multi-perspectival me-
lange, the process of 'cosmopolitization', that is interesting for (the sociologist)
Beck because, as he suggests, it implies an acknowledgment that there is an internal
cosmopolitization of national societies unfolding[24].

It is worth pausing here to ensure Beck's point is clear: his conceptualization
of the process of 'cosmopolitization' (from the position of a scientific observer,
who looks through the lens of the theory of 'cosmopolitization'), draws a picture
of societies as 'cosmopolitised' societies, where the adjective 'cosmopolitised' re-
fers to the (unintended) side effect of actions by social actors (which Beck calls
'cosmopolitization'), and explicitly not to normative premises associated with
'cosmopolitanism'. For Beck, this is a lived reality which has so far not been cap-
tured as a distinct process that internally cosmopolitizes national societies. Again,
he does not claim that the (unintended) mixing of worlds, which he captures in his
term 'cosmopolitization', constitutes a 'new' reality. Nor does he argue that people
have not been / are not aware of the (unintended) mixing of cultures or of the fact
that their actions have side effects as such – nor that these phenomena have not
been captured under different labels. What he argues is 'simply' that this has not
been conceptualized as a distinct social effect, namely as the process of (the inter-
nal) 'cosmopolitization' (of national societies), which he calls 'cosmopolitization'.

Moving further now, as Beck's theory suggests, acknowledging it as a distinct
process, i.e. as the unintended process of 'cosmopolitization', is crucial because the
conceptualization of the process of 'cosmopolitization', together with the acknowl-
edgement of the internal 'cosmopolitization' of national societies as a lived reality,
inevitably necessitates acknowledging that 'the equation of the nation-state with
national society'[25], that is, 'one of the most powerful convictions concerning socie-
ty and politics'[26], has become obsolete. This, in turn, constitutes the basis and the
need for (and Beck's efforts towards) an epistemological turn as the central claim
and aim of his work.

Calling it the national outlook/perspective (*nationaler Blick*), when held by so-
cial actors, and methodological nationalism, when underlying social scientific en-
deavours, Beck argues that understandings of the world that build on the premise
of 'the equation of the nation-state with national society' are no longer able to
capture the reality of societies. In fact, given his stress that 'cosmopolitization' is
not 'new', he would probably argue it *never* actually captured the reality of societies.
Yet, it has been possible (so far) to avoid acknowledging this fact and to live
through a national outlook/perspective; this is because this national out-
look/perspective is cemented in modern national institutions and, not least, be-

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[23] Ibid., 86.

[24] Ibid., 9.

[25] Ibid., 48.

[26] Ibid., 24.

cause, as Beck, Bonss and Lau[27] explain, modern thinking is of a kind that makes it resilient against its own demystification since it is based on a system of dualisms and (conceptual) demarcations which automatically stabilizes and reproduces itself. What is needed to capture reality as it is (according to Beck) and what constitutes the core of his epistemological turn, is what he calls a cosmopolitan outlook/perspective (*kosmopolitischer Blick*) on the side of social actors and social sciences researchers, which is based on 'methodological cosmopolitanism', again, where the adjective 'cosmopolitan' refers to the process of cosmopolitization and not to the normative project of cosmopolitanism. The cosmopolitan outlook/perspective and social sciences based on methodological cosmopolitanism acknowledge that '[t]he national outlook, together with its associated grammar, is becoming false. It fails to grasp that political, economic and cultural actions and their (intended and unintended) consequences know no borders, indeed, it is completely blind to the fact that, even when nationalism is reignited by the collision with globality, this can only be conceptualized from the cosmopolitan perspective'[28], e.g. by understanding the revival of exclusive nationalism as a fight against the 'cosmopolitization' of life worlds[29].

In this sense, the process of 'cosmopolitization' is not to be understood as the opposite of nationalization, and 'the cosmopolitan' is not to be understood as the opposite of 'the national'. As Beck[30] stresses, 'the cosmopolitan' is an integral part of the redefinition of 'the national'. 'The national outlook excludes the cosmopolitan outlook. The cosmopolitan outlook, by contrast, conceives the national outlook as national and reveals its constitutive failures. It follows that the cosmopolitan outlook uncovers the same national reality differently, and different, additional, realities, in new ways. The cosmopolitan outlook, therefore, encompasses and reinterprets the reality of the national outlook, whereas the national outlook is blind to and obscures 'the realities of the cosmopolitan age'[31]. Again, to avoid misunderstandings, Beck's diagnosis does not suggest that there is a world without (national) borders or that there *should* be a world without (national) borders. Nor does it suggest that the nation-state does not matter anymore or will not matter in the future. Rather, the epistemological turn that he outlines invites analysts to develop and take a position, in which they do not start based on the 'pre-theoretical

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[27] Ulrich Beck, Wolfgang Bonss and Christoph Lau „Entgrenzung erzwingt Entscheidung: Was ist neu an der Theorie reflexiver Modernisierung?" in *Entgrenzung und Entscheidung*, ed. Ulrich Beck and Christoph Lau (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2004), 47.

[28] Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision,* 18.

[29] Ibid., 4.

[30] Ulrich Beck, *Der kosmopolitische Blick, oder, Krieg ist Frieden* (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 2004), 15.

[31] Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision,* 31.

commitment'[32] that society means national society and in which they are 'naturally' guided by its related grammar.

On the one side, Beck sees the need for this epistemological turn grounded in the fact that, as he stresses, the unintended and accidental multi-perspectival me- lange, that he calls 'cosmopolitization', and the internal 'cosmopolitization' of na- tional societies are a *lived reality*; he invents the German term *Wirklichkeitskosmopolit- ismus* to make this point clear[33] and introduces the concept of 'cosmopolitan spaces of action'[34].

In sketching the concept of 'cosmopolitan spaces of action' Beck distin- guishes between 'doctrines' and 'spaces of action', which constitute the parameters of action. While contemporary doctrines could be exclusive, particular, and nar- row, e.g. nationalist and anti-European, contemporary action, if it wants to be ra- tional and successful, is inevitably shaped by the parameters of contemporary 'spaces of action', which are cosmopolitan in the sense that contemporary rational successful action cannot *not* build a bridge to the world of others (and beyond borders). An example that Beck[35] brings up are anti-European parties such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which follows an exclusive and anti-Europe doc- trine, but, at the same time, sits in the European parliament, i.e. its unsuccessful action entails taking advantage of the resources that the 'cosmopolitan spaces of action' offer, namely (the entering of) the European Parliament as an existential aspect of the party's existence. To be clear this does not mean that successful ac- tion needs to be literally transborder but it means that it inevitably takes place with- in a cosmopolitan frame of reference. The concept of 'cosmopolitan spaces of action' then captures that the cosmopolitized reality constitutes everybody's (stra- tegic) lived reality. It is not about cosmopolitan idealism, about cosmopolitan doc- trines but about the realism of contemporary rational action. Consequently, every- one who aims to capture lived reality cannot but strive for an epistemological turn with a grammar that acknowledges this reality.

On the other side, Beck sees the need for an epistemological turn grounded in the reality of what he calls 'global risk'. With 'global risk', he refers to a particular kind of uncertainty, namely the potential consequences of 'industrial, that is, tech- no-economic decisions and considerations of utility'[36]. 'Industrial, techno-

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[32] Henrietta L. Moore, (2004) "Global Anxieties: Concept-metaphors and Pre-theoretical Com- mitments in Anthropology," *Anthropological Theory* 4(1) (2004):75.

[33] Beck, *Der kosmopolitische Blick*, 31.

[34] Ulrich Beck, "Metamorphosis, 'cosmopolitan spaces of action' and digital data as cosmopoli- tan data," Paper presented at 'In Search of Cosmopolitan Data and Research Methods-workshop, 8-9 December 2014 (Maison Suger, Paris, France).

[35] Ulrich Beck, "How the European Project Can Be Saved: The Cosmopolitan Outlook," Public lecture held on 13 November 2014 (Belgrade: Heinrich Boell Stiftung).

[36] Ulrich Beck, "From Industrial Society to Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social Structure and Ecological Enlightenment," *Theory, Culture & Society*, 9 (1992): 98.

economic decisions and considerations of utility' are, as he explains, those decisions and considerations that have 'their 'peaceful origin' in the centres of rationality and prosperity with the blessings of the guarantors of law and order' (ibid.)[37].

As outlined in more detail elsewhere[38], there are two distinct aspects to the potential consequences of 'industrial, techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility', i.e. 'global risks'. In order to further fill in the picture of Beck's theory it is worth highlighting these here. First, they constitute a specific kind of uncertainty that cannot be simply 'tamed' through a 'traditional' modern imagination, i.e. through the logic of 'risk' as we know it. This is because they cannot be readily and 'naturally' understood as something 'unknown', in the sense of 'not yet known'. Rather, 'industrial, techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility', i.e. 'global risks', need to be understood as producing non-knowledge[39]. Further, potential consequences of 'industrial, techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility', i.e. 'global risks', constitute a 'different in kind' uncertainty that can no longer be simply 'tamed' through a 'traditional' modern imagination, i.e. through the logic of 'risk' as we know it, because we know that there are potential consequences which produce instances that stand and remain beyond knowledge. So, in addition to imagining them as non-knowledge (*Nichtwissen*), potential consequences of 'techno-economic decisions and considerations', i.e. 'global risks', also need to be imagined as (which is not to say that they are) instances that might remain beyond knowledge. Last but not least, the potential consequences of 'industrial, techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility', i.e. 'global risks' are 'different in kind' because they need to be imagined as 'socially delimited in space and time'[40]. Again, this does not suggest that they are necessarily 'socially delimited in space and time' but that they need to be imagined *as if* they were, because they could be. Overall, as Beck suggests, potential consequences of 'techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility', i.e. 'global risks', cannot be taken in a modern sense, namely as if they could be 'tamed' by 'more knowledge but [are] instead a result of more knowledge'[41]. The second aspect that makes the potential consequences of 'industrial, techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility', i.e. 'global risks', distinct is that they need to be seen as the 'fruits' of the process of modernization. The potential consequences of 'industrial, techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility', i.e. 'global risks', are not the dark side effects but the *results* of the *success* of modernization.

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[37] Ibid.

[38] Sabine Selchow, "Security Policy and (Global) Risk(s)", in *Handbook of Global Security Policy*, eds. Mary Kaldor and Iavor Rangelov (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 68-84.

[39] *Nichtwissen*; see especially Beck, *World at Risk*; also in depth Peter Wehling, *Im Schatten des Wissens? Perspektiven der Soziologie des Nichtwissens* (Konstanz: UVK, 2006).

[40] Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, "The Cosmopolitan Turn in Social Theory and Research," *The British Journal of Sociology* 61:3 (2010): 418.

[41] Beck, *World at Risk*, 5.

This turns the whole modern narrative upside down, which, in turn, necessitates an adjustment of the grammar that guides us in analyzing the (no-longer-so-modern) social world. At the same time it also demands that social actors take a 'cosmopolitan perspective' because, through a 'national perspective', they reproduce an artificial layer which is not only incongruent with the ('cosmopolitised') reality of societies, but which also reproduces institutions that are increasingly unsuitable to deal with ('cosmopolitised') challenges and, furthermore, that actually *produce* challenges; i.e. are a core part of the 'problem'.

The theories of 'reflexive modernisation' and, in particular, 'cosmopolitisation', are fascinating because, as Beck suggests, the observer perspective that they entail 'uncovers the same […] reality differently, and different, additional, realities in new ways'[42]. As such, it is not simply about a different perspective on the same world, but a different perspective (coming out of and) on a different world, namely (one that is understood to be) a 'reflexive modern' and 'cosmopolitised' one. In the imagination of the 'reflexive modern' and 'cosmopolitized' world key premises that underlie the conventional imagination of the world, namely the equation of society with *national* society and the distinction between 'inside' and 'outside', are already dismantled. In fact, they are actually not only deconstructed and dismantled but replaced by (an understanding for that contemporary socio-political reality is shaped by) a different logic: the logic of 'cosmopolitisation'.

5   'A new research agenda': Too cold for scholars in political studies

While Beck's theories make a good case for the need of a shift to 'cosmopolitan' social scientific research, at the moment, the scholarship around 'reflexive modernisation' and 'cosmopolitisation' looks similar to the one around the unconventional IR theories, mentioned above. There is much theory but almost no (radical) empiricism. There are a good number of sophisticated theoretical pieces on 'methodological cosmopolitanism', why it matters, why one should take it seriously, i.e. why it should be 'in the true', including a monograph that lays out *Cosmopolitan Europe*[43]. Yet, there has not been much systematic empirical exploration that starts on this theoretical ground; there are no concrete suggestions for a methodology that comes out of and is true to the distinct imagination of the world that is unfolded in these theories. One could come back to Risse, mentioned above, and state that here, too, 'empirisch (noch) nichts so heiss gegessen, wie es theoretisch gekocht wird'.

One of the very few scholarly attempts that sets out to fill this empirical gap is a recent *Global Networks*-article, entitled 'Cosmopolitan communities of climate risk: conceptual and empirical suggestions for a new research agenda' by Ulrich

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[42] Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision,* 31.

[43] Beck and Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe.*

Beck, Anders Blok, David Tyfield and Joy Zhang[44]. Grounded in the above sketched theories of 'reflexive modernisation', 'global risk' and 'cosmopolitisation', the authors suggest that the process of 'cosmopolitisation' is 'the social force of emerging cosmopolitan realities'[45], hence, needs to be taken as the empirical focus of social scientific research. They then take this presumption and these theories as the basis for the development of a hypothesis: they presume that 'one of the [...] realities [that cosmopolitization produces] is the possible emergence, locally and globally, of 'cosmopolitan communities of climate risk' in response to a 'world at risk'' (ibid.)[46]. The hypothesis is then translated into a 'key research question for contemporary social science […]: how and where are new cosmopolitan communities of climate risk being imagined and realized?' In order to provide the ground for answering this question empirically, Beck et al[47] then define 'cosmopolitan communities of climate risk' as

a. 'new transnational constellations of social actors' that

b. have arisen 'from common experiences of mediated climate threats, organized around pragmatic reasoning of causal relations and responsibilities', and

c. hold 'the potential of 'enabling collective action, cosmopolitical decision-making and international norm generation'.

Finally, they introduce three research projects that they understand to be 'explorations' of 'the prospect of new cosmopolitan risk communities across three different social settings – green urbanism; lowcarbon innovation; and grassroots environmentalism'.

This recent *Global Networks*-article is worth mentioning here not only because it is a rare attempt to bring methodological cosmopolitanism to empirical life, but because it exemplifies an approach to (the way in which) methodological cosmopolitanism (could play out) that somewhat tames the potential for an epistemological turn instead of pushing for it. This is because of the nature of the approach that the authors introduce in their 'new research agenda'. They suggest a traditional, linear research practice that sets out to discover the 'new', namely 'cosmopolitan communities of climate risk', which they pre-define as 'new' and 'transnational'. With that, and paraphrasing Albert Szent-Györgyi again, they look 'at the same thing as everyone else' – namely city networks, lowcarbon innovation and grassroots environmentalism – and 'think something different', namely, that these are 'cosmopolitan communities of climate risk'. The suggested research agenda is designed then to study the 'new', namely the 'cosmopolitan communities of climate

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[44] Ulrich Beck et al., "Cosmopolitan communities of climate risk: conceptual and empirical suggestions for a new research agenda," *Global Networks* 13:1 (2013): 1-21.

[45] Ibid., 1.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid., 2.

risk' in these three phenomena, instead of striving for the discovery of the 'unexpected' within a different, i.e. 'cosmopolitised' world.

The development of a 'cosmopolitan' empirical research agenda that establishes the study of a specific, relatively narrow 'new' social phenomenon – namely 'cosmopolitan communities of climate risk' – as it is presented in Beck et al might be fruitful in many respects. However, what it does not provide is 'rails on which standard academic […] inquiry runs into new regions'[48], at least not into *radically* 'new regions' within the study of politics, i.e. ones that unfold beyond the borders of sociology. This is not only because, as the authors acknowledge themselves[49], it only focuses on one distinct (very sociological) aspect of the 'cosmopolitised' reality but because it takes a somewhat conventional and non-radical move in that it sets out to find a 'new', pre-defined phenomenon in the 'old' world, instead of discovering the 'unexpected' *from within* a *different* world. Empirical endeavors that follow this suggested research agenda inevitably run the danger of primarily testing and reproducing the underlying theory.

6   Conclusion: Eating it (as) hot (as possible)

This chapter started with the conviction that the complex contemporary political world and Europe require scholarly analyses that aim to discover and explore the 'unexpected' rather than study the 'new'. I argued that that studying and searching for the 'new' runs the risk of symbolically reproducing the 'old'. The chapter suggested that this requires a different starting point, a different scholarly imagination of the political world and Europe – different from the conventional one, which has brought out contemporary political reality and its institutions. In order to discover the 'unexpected' in the exploration of the political world and Europe in a way that generates empirical insights that could intervene into the reality of contemporary political practice, the chapter suggested bringing together the premises of the unconventional IR scholarship with a pre-imagination of the world and Europe grounded in Ulrich Beck's theories of 'cosmopolitization', 'global risk' and 'reflexive modernisation'. In other words, I suggested a 'new research agenda', to use Beck et al's[50] words, that takes the contextualised and experimental methodological 'practice' promoted by 'unconventional' IR scholars *into* the cosmopolitised political world and Europe in order to explore them *from within* and discover the 'unexpected'. Bringing together Beck's theories with the unconventional IR scholarship promises to be fruitful because imagining the political world and Europe through a 'cosmopolitan lens' not only implies the dismantling of key premises that shape the conventional imagination of the world, such as the equation between society and

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[48] Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision,* 74.

[49] Beck et al., "Cosmopolitan communities of climate risk", 2.

[50] Ibid.

national society and the distinction between inside and outside, but replaces them with (the view on) a different logic: the logic of cosmopolitisation.

True to the premise of a contextualised and creative research 'practice' there is no universal research design for the exploration of the 'unexpected' within the cosmopolitised world and Europe. One of many empirical explorations would be to rewrite the notion of politics and power grounded in an analysis of how cosmopolitised political subjects, i.e. subjects understood as products of cosmopolitising discourses, use the resources that the 'cosmopolitan spaces of action' offer.

About the Contributors

Dr. VLADIMIR CVETKOVIĆ is a non-residential research fellow of the Institute of Philosophy and Social Theory of the University of Belgrade, Serbia. Previously he conducted research and taught at the universities of Aarhus (Denmark), St Andrews (UK), Oslo (Norway), Belgrade and Nis (Serbia). His research interests include Patristics and Byzantine tradition, especially Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor, as well as Modern Orthodox theology. He is the author of a monograph on Gregory of Nyssa and time (in Serbian) and of more than fifty scholarly articles in areas of Philosophy, Patristics and Orthodox Theology published in English, Serbian, French, Romanian, Bulgarian and Greek, as well as the editor of several volumes on theology of Georges Florovsky and Justin Popovic in Serbian and German.

SARAH EILINGSFELD is an Euroculture alumni from the years 2011-13. She studied at Georg-August-Universität Göttingen and Jagiellonian University Kraków, where her research focus and interests lay mainly in the areas of migration, diversity, diaspora and cultural studies. After completing diverse work placements in the cultural and political sector, she is currently working as a project manager at the social enterprise SchulePLUS in Berlin. There, she conceptualises and manages diverse educational projects in Berlin, but also creates new networks between schools and the economic sector.

Dr. ELIZABETH GOERING is an Associate Professor in the Department of Communication Studies at Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI), Indiana, USA. The primary focus of her research and teaching is the relationship between culture and communication, a topic she has explored in a variety of contexts including organizational, interpersonal, media, and health. She recently published a book, coauthored with Dr. Marta Anton, entitled *Understanding Patients' Voices: A Multi-method Approach to Health Discourse* (John Benjamins, 2015), and her research has appeared in a variety of journals including *Communication & Medicine*, *The Journal of Business Communication*, *Women and Language*, and the *Journal of Popular Culture*.

Dr. LARS KLEIN is Senior Lecturer in the Erasmus Mundus Programme "Euroculture – Society, politics and culture in a global context" at Georg-August-Universität Göttingen. He holds an M.A. in North American Studies and Philosophy and a PhD in Modern and Contemporary History with the thesis "Die 'Vietnam-Generation' der Kriegsberichterstatter" (Göttingen, 2011). Visiting scholarships e.g. at the BMW Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University, IUPUI, and the University of Pune. Among his publications are the articles "Teil eines kosmopolitischen Projektes? Mögliche Wege, einer 'europäischen Identität' zu entkommen" (2015) and "'Words That Can Only Be Used 100% Ironically'. Von den neuen Generationen und alten Theorien" (2013).

Dr. ANDREA KRAUSE is a Lehrkraft für besondere Aufgaben in the Institut für Anglistik und Amerikanistik at the Universität Paderborn, Germany. Her primary focus of research is contemporary American and British literature and film with a particular interest in science fiction, fantasy, and young adult fiction. Her publications include book chapters on the popular *Harry Potter* series, including one entitled "Beyond Parseltongue: An Analysis of Communicator Style in Harry Potter" which appeared in *Legilimens!: Perspectives in Harry Potter Studies,* edited by C.E. Bell and published by Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Dr. Krause has also written articles that appear in the *Journal of Popular Culture* and *The International Journal of the Humanities* as well as book reviews for the *Journal of American Culture* and *Modern Fiction Studies.*

Dr. HIROAKI MURAKAMI is Assistant Professor of European history at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba in Japan: The author of *The Historical Sociology of Generation: On the genealogy of a cultural interpretive pattern* (shōwadō, 2012: in JPS). His research field is social history, especially the historical development of various *mentalités* concerning themes such as generation, war memories, statistics, population problem and public hygiene.

Dr. SABINE SELCHOW is Research Fellow in the ERC-funded projects 'Methodological Cosmopolitanism', Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Germany (grant holder: Ulrich Beck) and 'Security in Transition', London School of Economics, UK (grant holder: Mary Kaldor). Since 2012 she has been Visiting Faculty at Sciences Po, Paris, where she teaches in the Master of Public Administration programme. Dr Selchow studied North American Studies and Communications Studies at Freie Universität Berlin and at Duke University, USA. She holds a PhD in

Government from LSE. Her book *Negotiations of the "New World": The Omnipresence of "Global" as a Political Phenomenon* (transcript) is forthcoming.

Dr. TORU TAKENAKA has been at Osaka University since 1993 (as professor since 2000), where he teaches European, in particular German, modern history. In 1994 he received his PhD from Kyoto University. He is the author of *Siemens in Japan: Von der Landesöffnung bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg* (1996) and a number of articles and book chapters.

Dr. MARTIN TAMCKE is Professor of Ecumenical Theology and Oriental Church- and Mission-History, Director of Studies of Euroculture and of Intercultural Theology at Georg-August-Univ. Göttingen. He is member of the Committee for the Dialogue of the EKD with the Russian Orthodox Church and of the International Advisory Committee of the World Congress of Middle Eastern Studies. He was visiting professor at universities in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East and teaches at Orthodox and Islamic Faculties abroad on a regular basis. He was conferred Honorary Doctorates by Joensuu University and the Åbo Akademi University. His publications include *Christen in der islamischen Welt* (Berlin 2012), *Orthodoxes Christentum* (München 2007) and *Tolstojs Religion* (Berlin 2010).

In the course of the so-called 'economic and financial crisis' from 2008 onwards, there has been a fierce debate about the role and purpose of the European Union. It was led in politics and the media just as in academia. The economic usefulness of the Euro has been discussed, and the political implications of a fostered European unification. Most often, the state of Europeanization has been presented as being without alternatives: no Europe without Greece; no Euro without Greece; no way back to the nation state in its old form. As a result, the debate on Europe was largely narrowed down to the very questions of the immediate crisis, namely economics and finance. Only a few voices held that the crisis in fact was one of politics, not of economics. And only late did politicians mention again that Europe is more than the EU. Alternative views of Europe, however, were scarce and often presented full of consequences. It thus came without much surprise that the lacking imaginative power of politicians as well as intellectuals was criticized.

The idea for this volume sprang from that situation. The editors invited scholars from various disciplines to present them with ways of imagining Europe that go beyond the rather limited view of EU institutions. How was, how is Europe imagined? Which memories are evoked, which visions explicated? Which counter-narratives to prominent discourses are there?

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