



*ERÔS*  
*& THE POLIS*  
*LOVE IN CONTEXT*

**EDITED BY ED SANDERS**

**INSTITUTE OF CLASSICAL STUDIES  
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED STUDY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON**



*ERÔS AND THE POLIS*

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## **‘ERÔS AND THE *POLIS*’: AN INTRODUCTION**

**ED SANDERS**

The following four chapters originated as papers for a conference on *Erôs in Ancient Greece*, which was held at University College London in March 2009. Seventeen papers from the conference have been published in an edited collection, ranging in time from Hesiod to the ‘Second Sophistic’, and focusing on such themes as the phenomenology, psychology, and physiology of *erôs*; associated language, metaphors, and imagery; philosophical approaches to its role in political society; and the relationship between the human emotion and Eros the god.<sup>1</sup> The following chapters, which could not be included in that volume for thematic reasons, nevertheless share between themselves a commonality of theme, focusing as they do on a historicizing approach to the conventions and expectations of *erôs* in the context of the *polis* in the Archaic and Classical periods (loosely interpreting the latter so as to include Menander), and accordingly they are published here as a collection.

In ‘Politics, poetics and *erôs* in Archaic poetry’, James Davidson explores the homo-amatory poetry of four Archaic poets – Alcaeus, Theognis (and anonymous Theognidea), Ibycus and Anacreon – for what unites and divides them in their depictions of homosexual *erôs* in connection with politics. Nick Fisher’s ‘Erotic *charis*: What sorts of reciprocity?’ moves us forward in time to examine the connections between *erôs* and *charis* in both hetero- and homosexual relationships in the Classical period, focusing especially on Athenian literature. Dimitra Kokkini, in ‘The rejection of erotic passion by Euripides’ Hippiolytos’, maintains a much narrower focus on just one tragedy, and what the protagonist’s deliberate choice to remain celibate would mean in fifth-century Athens. Finally, Stavroula Kiritsi’s contribution – ‘*Erôs* in Menander: Three studies in male character’ – naturally focuses on Menander, but is informed by Aristotle’s discussions of *erôs* and *philia*, and of the characters of old and young men, in the *Rhetoric* and *Nicomachean Ethics*.

The ground covered in these four chapters is primarily (post-Homeric) Archaic and Classical poetic genres, namely lyric poetry, tragedy, and comedy. Lyric comprises the entirety of Davidson’s chapter, and a handful of poems are treated briefly by Fisher; tragedy occurs in Fisher’s chapter and throughout Kokkini’s; Old Comedy too appears briefly in Fisher’s chapter, while New Comedy is the main focus for Kiritsi. There is also considerable attention to philosophy in Fisher’s chapter, which discusses passages in several treatises of Xenophon and Plato, and Kiritsi’s briefer discussion of Aristotle.

A number of deeper connections between these chapters will become apparent. Davidson and Fisher both deal with the relationship between *erôs* and political life, narrowly interpreted, and with homosexuality – or more precisely pederasty – and the environments in

<sup>1</sup> E. Sanders, C. Thumiger, C. Carey, and N. J. Lowe (eds), *Erôs in ancient Greece* (Oxford 2013).

which it flourishes. Davidson's sees Alcaeus's homoerotic poetry as distinctive to him as an individual ('I' poetry), and designed for singing at private gatherings (frequently symposia) of a political faction. In Theognis and anonymous Theognidea, on the other hand, the context is 'we' – we the *erastai*, we the aristocrats, we the writers of Elegy – in which Theognis and Cyrnus in a sense become 'everyman': interchangeable *erastai* writing poems to interchangeable *erômenoi*, that any aristocrat could write (or sing at symposia) anywhere in the Greek world. With Ibycus and Anacreon, Davidson argues, we see a return to 'I', but mostly lose the connection to politics. The two differ in their themes and addressees; however, their common experience of working under the Samian tyranny required that – beyond eulogising Polycrates and his successors – they kept their poems firmly out of politics, and in the world of the homoerotic commonplace. In the part of his chapter dealing with homosexual relations, Fisher by contrast examines passages in Xenophon's *Symposium* and *Hiero* and Plato's *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* dealing with socially appropriate behaviour between homosexual lovers, and in particular the use of *charis* words in relation to such behaviour. Turning to the role of pederastic couples in Athenian politics, he depicts the increasing concern of the *dêmos* to police the homosexual practices of politically prominent citizens, anxious at the role homosexual relationships played in such anti-social and anti-democratic practices as flattery and sycophancy, and he draws a connection to other laws controlling such institutions as the *chorêgia* and *gymnasia* in which men had access to boys in homosocial environments.

One of Fisher's concerns here is with sexual practices that fall outside the mainstream conventions of society, in this case homosexual practices that are prevalent within one particular class, and which lead them into a variety of anti-social and anti-democratic behaviour. Kokkini also focuses on an unconventional sexual practice, in her case Hippolytos' over-commitment to chastity. Kokkini concentrates not on his private, psychological reasons for doing so, but rather examines what this choice meant in fifth-century BC Athens. While it would have been unusual for a young man to avoid casual sexual encounters (with women or boys) before marriage, Hippolytos goes further than that: he rejects ever having sex, and this choice places him at odds with a civic ideology in which it was every adult male citizen's duty to marry and produce legitimate offspring. In rejecting this duty to his *oikos*, and by extension to his *polis*, he misunderstands his political requirements. His downfall and death, Kokkini argues, therefore serves as a 'cautionary tale' to young Athenian men and women as to the importance of this duty.

Hippolytos uses the word *sôphrosunê* (self-control) to explain his abstinence. However, while this might normally be appropriate to female chastity, for males it was merely how they should behave while *epheboi* toward adult males. Kokkini believes that in repeatedly drawing attention to *sôphrosunê* as the reason for his refusal ever to have sex, yet passing his time always outdoors in his 'inviolable' meadow, Hippolytos adopts behavioural aspects of both the *parthenos* and the eternal *ephebos*, positioning himself uniquely between the two. *Sôphrosunê*, and the opposite abstraction *akrasia* (lack of self-control, incontinence), is also of interest to Kiritsi in examining male *erôs* episodes in Menander. Sostratos (*Dyskolos*) is struck with love, but manages to avoid most of the excesses that young men are prone to in New Comedy (e.g. rape), instead wishing to cherish (*stergein*) the girl as his wife. Moschion (*Samia*) is much less self-controlled, indeed going so far as to rape the girl he becomes enamoured of. However, this is out of character – Kiritsi shows that elsewhere he

is depicted as *sôphrôn* (self-controlled) and *kosmios* (orderly). These qualities swiftly bring him to feel shame at his actions, and a determination to put things right by marrying the girl. The least self-controlled in his *erôs* is Demeas (*Samia*) who, despite being a mature man, continues to act in a way even he knows is shameful, by living with a concubine in a long-term, non-marriage relationship. He is similarly unself-controlled in his violence towards her when he thinks himself betrayed. Only at the end, when he realises his mistake, does he both abandon his violence and name her as his wife (*gunê*) – by implication broadening his erotic passion to encompass *storgê*. Kiritsi argues that all three characters show some degree of incontinence in managing their erotic passion, but that over the course of the plays they must all, in their own ways, find continence. These plays encourage reflection by the audience and, Kiritsi postulates, provide lessons in how the violence of *erôs* can be successfully tamed in the context of the *oikos* and the *polis*. Self-control seems to be an important aspect of political *erôs* (in the broadest sense of ‘political’), provided – as with Hippolytos – it is not taken too far.

The Menandrian characters all realise that *storgê* and *philia* are at least as important as *erôs* to marriage. Another emotion that Kiritsi notes has an important role is *charis*. Demeas has provided Chrysis with financial and social benefits as part of his *erôs* for her, and is angry that she has not behaved appropriately in return. The mutual reciprocal benefits of erotic relationships are described by the term *charis*, a term to which (as noted above) Fisher devotes his whole chapter. He argues that erotic *charis* experiences fall into two (not necessarily discrete) types: the short term shared pleasures of a sexual encounter, or other ‘charm’ or sensory gratification provided by a person to whom we are erotically attracted; and the longer term mutual gratification derived from what we might term a loving ‘relationship’, which may not involve sex in theory, but in practice usually will. The part of his chapter dealing with heterosexual relationships focuses on marriage, and the example Kiritsi provides in *Samia* complements the much wider evidence that Fisher examines in more depth.

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# POLITICS, POETICS, AND *ERÔS* IN ARCHAIC POETRY

JAMES DAVIDSON

It has often been recognized that Greek Homosexuality in the Classical period could be tightly bound up with politics.<sup>1</sup> The two are certainly connected in Athenian discourse and fairly straightforwardly. Solon is said to have banned slaves falling in love, *i.e.* from performing the conspicuous practices of same-sex *erôs*.<sup>2</sup> The Pisistratids seem to have used *erôtikos* relationships as part of their network of power. Charmus, who was remembered both as Pisistratus' *erômenos* and his Polemarch, was said to have dedicated the famous altar of Eros in the Academy. No less famously, it was a failed attempt by Pisistratus' son Hipparchus to form an *erôtikos* relationship with Harmodius of the *Gephyraioi* that led to his assassination by the boy and his *erastês*.<sup>3</sup> Aristophanes' *Knights* combines the two themes in a brilliant and obscene fashion.<sup>4</sup> In Plato's *Symposium* the connection is made by both Pausanias and Aristophanes.<sup>5</sup> Few scholars nowadays would fail to recognize that Aeschines' speech *Against Timarchos* is not (just) a moralizing attack on a particular citizen for his homosexual whorishness, but (also) a political speech, a speech about political relationships, and indeed a speech that is designed to promote a particular geo-political agenda.

As for the areas outside Athens, it is now thirty years since Paul Cartledge wrote an entire article on 'The politics of Spartan pederasty', drawing attention in particular to how homosexual *erôs* was implicated in the way Agesilaus got his crown and Sphodrias got off.<sup>6</sup> Two years later Elizabeth Carney drew attention to the way that homosexual relations are implicated in Macedonian court politics and in particular in regicide.<sup>7</sup> There is evidence in the career of Meno of Pharsalus for a politics even of Thessalian homosexuality in the late fifth century BC.<sup>8</sup> Talking more generally it is striking that various Greek Homosexualities are discussed by ancient authors using the terminology not just of law/custom – *nomos* – but of law-giving – *nomothesia*. We should hardly be surprised, therefore, that discussion of

<sup>1</sup> I have capitalized Homosexuality here to indicate that we are talking not necessarily of sexual orientation but of a particular historical phenomenon and a particular academic topic.

<sup>2</sup> Aeschines 1.139.

<sup>3</sup> Athenaeus 13.609d; Pausanias 1.30.1; Thucydides 6.54.

<sup>4</sup> See especially ll. 425-28, 876-80.

<sup>5</sup> Plato, *Symposium* 183a, 184b, 192a.

<sup>6</sup> P. Cartledge, 'The politics of Spartan pederasty', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 27 (1981) 17-36.

<sup>7</sup> E. Carney, 'Regicide in Macedonia', *Parola del passato* 210 (1983) 260-72.

<sup>8</sup> J. Davidson, *The Greeks and Greek love* (London 2007) 360-65.

homosexual *erôs* is not only a feature of summary descriptions of ‘constitutions’ such as Xenophon’s treatise on the Spartans or the (lost) Aristotelian *Constitution of ‘the Cretans’* but even in discourses on the ideal constitution, most notably in Plato’s *Laws*.<sup>9</sup>

However, although it has rarely been adduced, there is a clear case of political same-sex love even in the *Iliad*. When Patroclus’ ghost revisits Achilles in Book 23, he recalls not their military adventures as comrades-in-arms, but their confidences in councils: ‘Alive no longer, no longer will we, sitting apart from our dear comrades, counsel each other with counsels ...’ (77–78). It is precisely this passage that Aeschines many years later cites as proof of their ‘disguised’ *erôs* (1.142). If there remains plenty of dispute as to whether or not Achilles and Patroclus were (intended by the original author(s) of the lines to be) sexual partners, what ancient readers would have seen, and clearly did see, was that even in the warlike *Iliad*, the couple’s military dyadishness also had a political (‘political’ with a small *p*) dyadishness away from the frontline, a miniature Council of Two, confiding, colluding, talking amongst themselves, within the general council.

In this article, therefore, I want to look in more detail at this nexus of same-sex *erôs* and politics in four of the most famous, and indeed infamous, homoamatory poets of the Archaic period:<sup>10</sup> Alcaeus, Theognis, Ibycus, and Anacreon. A brief glance at some of the materials available indicates that there are some striking juxtapositions to say the least; indeed later readers were consistently surprised or disappointed that men as politically earnest as Alcaeus and Theognis could stoop to *paidikoi erôtes*.

What will become clear is that the different political roles that same-sex *erôs* can be made to perform changes the way same-sex *erôs* is represented. It will also become clear that there is an important third element: poetics. Questions of style and genre, metre and language, and the construction of the speaking subject inform a poem’s relationship to the world of politics and also affect and are affected by the way relationships of same-sex *erôs* are represented, thus significantly complicating the way that these poets can be used in a history of Greek Homosexuality.

### *Alcaeus*

Judging from ancient impressions of him, probably the most disconcerting combination of politics and *erôs* was to be found in the works of Alcaeus. Indeed, if we had fewer impressions of him we might be tempted to postulate two quite different poets. For some, his most distinctive characteristic was his ‘terribilità’ – *deinotês* – and ‘intimidations’, ‘because Alcaeus was so acrimonious that he expelled many men from the city by the harshness of his poetry’.<sup>11</sup> But for Sextus Empiricus he is to be paired with tipsy, trivial Anacreon, a poet read by drunks and erotomaniacs, to license and encourage themselves in their vices.<sup>12</sup> This image of ‘soft’ Alcaeus can be traced as far back as fifth-century BC

<sup>9</sup> Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.8, above) 469-70, 464-65.

<sup>10</sup> In English I prefer ‘homoamatory’ to ‘homoerotic’ because of the lustful rather than romantic connotations of the latter in English. In doing so I intend no comment on Greek *eros*’ relationship to Latin *amor*. See further Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.8, above) 36.

<sup>11</sup> Porphyrio ad Hor. *Carm.* 4.9, 7 [= Campbell T 23].

<sup>12</sup> Sext. Emp. *Adv. Gramm.* I.298.

Athens, an archetype of the decadent mincing ‘Ionian’, with his elegant lyre (*barbitos*), his mitre, and his trailing robes, a poet who, predictably, can number transvestite Agathon amongst his biggest fans.<sup>13</sup>

Fortunately other ancient readers make it clear we are talking about the same man. ‘And finally’, wrote Cicero, ‘what have the most learned men and the greatest poets published about themselves in their poems and songs? A man distinguished in his own republic for bravery, what things Alcaeus wrote on the subject of the love of youths!’<sup>14</sup> Similarly Quintilian divides Alcaeus’ works down the middle. One part, that which includes attacks on ‘tyrants’, he praises for its style – *brevis et magnificus et diligens* – ‘but’, he continues, ‘he also fooled around and lowered himself to loves, though better suited to greater things.’<sup>15</sup> Athenaeus, unusually for him, puts his finger on the problem for ancient readers: ‘And even the very brave or even warlike poet Alcaeus said “and let him pour sweet perfume over our chests for us ...”’.<sup>16</sup>

Quintilian – *in parte operis* – could be interpreted as indicating that the political parts of Alcaeus’ *oeuvre*, the ferocious attacks on tyrants and treacherous Pittacus, could be sectioned off. Strabo in fact refers to ‘those poems called “party-politicals” (*stasiôtika*)’ while Dionysius of Halicarnassus directs admiration above all to what he calls ‘*to tôn politikôn poiêmatôn êthos*’.<sup>17</sup> This allowed Bergk in 1883 to divide Alcaeus’ works thematically into *hymnoi*, *stasiôtika*, *erôtika*, and *skolia*.<sup>18</sup> In 1894 Otto Crusius went further and argued that the ten-volume Alexandrian edition was actually organised thematically into four unequal sections: the first four books divided between hymns and the politicals, the last six between the amatory and the sympotic.<sup>19</sup> Even in the nineteenth century, however, a sharp distinction between drinking-songs and love-songs was unlikely to hold.<sup>20</sup> In fact, as Gauthier Liberman notes, the only ancient Greek example of a discrete array of poems that could be designated *erôtika*, apparently a volume or volumes so entitled, is in a reference

<sup>13</sup> Aristophanes, *Thesmophoriazusae* 160-63 cf. fr. 235 Kassel-Austin; the soft Ionian image of Alcaeus is quite consonant with the famous kalathoid vase in Munich, showing him alongside Sappho, ascribed to the Brygos Painter and dated to c. 480 BC, *Beazley Archive (BA)* # 204129, Munich Antikensammlungen 2416.

<sup>14</sup> Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes* 4.71: ‘Quid denique homines doctissimi et summi poetae de se ipsis et carminibus edunt et cantibus? Fortis vir in sua re publica cognitus quae de iuvenum amore scribit Alcaeus!’

<sup>15</sup> Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria* 10.1.63: ‘Alcaeus in parte operis aureo plectro merito donatur, qua tyrannos insectatus multum etiam moribus confert, in eloquendo quoque brevis et magnificus et diligens et plerumque oratori similis, sed et lusit et in amores descendit, maioribus tamen aptior’.

<sup>16</sup> Ath. 15.674d quoting fr. 362 ll. 3-4.

<sup>17</sup> Strabo 13.2.3; Dion. Hal. *De imit.* 31.2, 8 [= Campbell TT 1, 20].

<sup>18</sup> Th. Bergk, *Griechische Literaturgeschichte* 2 (Berlin 1883) 277ff.

<sup>19</sup> O. Crusius, ‘Alkaios’, *Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, coll. 1501-02.

<sup>20</sup> See for instance the remarkably sensible comments by F. B. Jevons, *A history of Greek literature from the earliest period to the death of Demosthenes* (London 1886) 131: ‘... it is hard to observe this division of classes, for the wine seems to have got into all of them’.

by Athenaeus to works of Bacchylides.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, since the nineteenth century, the evidence of papyri seems to have decisively undermined the notion of a book devoted solely to Alcaeus' Hymns, and scholarly opinion has turned against the idea of a book entitled *stasiôtika*, although, judging from those same papyri, a number of more political poems may well have been grouped together.<sup>22</sup>

At any rate, the evidence of Strabo and Dionysius is decisive that a number of Alcaeus' songs could be classified as '(party-)political' not only because of their content, but also, it would seem, because of their style, both powerful and 'pithy' (*brachu, brevis*) and so straightforward that if you took away the metre they could almost be prose.<sup>23</sup> Other poems seem to have had a different character entirely: erotic and/or sympotic in content, playful in tone and sometimes, perhaps, more 'poetic' or even purple in style.<sup>24</sup> Alcaeus seems to have enjoyed a degree of longevity; on at least one occasion the chest on which perfume is to be poured is old and grey (fr. 50). So perhaps he simply evolved as a poet. Perhaps he started out writing love-songs and ended up writing political diatribes, or started out with politics and wrote love lyrics in his retirement. Or perhaps he was simply a great poet in the way that Shakespeare is great, an innovative, individual, and versatile poet who could turn his hand to an enormous range of topics in an amazing variety of registers and tones, the earnest, taut and bitter, on the one hand, and on the other, playful, sweet, amorous, and loose.

I by no means wish to deny that Alcaeus was a great poet, and whichever way you examine the evidence he was innovative, versatile, and individual. Horace, however, his most careful reader, not only seems to preclude assigning Alcaeus' works to different parts of his biography, but he also allows us to put these two Alcaeuses – the 'soft man' and the 'hard man' – in some kind of rapport: the playful poetry – of 'Dionysus and Muses and Venus and her clinging son' – presented as a kind of respite from arms and war, the soft, effeminate life on the one hand, the hard, masculine life on the other, linked together in a never-ending cycle, like *yin* and *yang*.<sup>25</sup> Such a dynamic would be evident to any post-classical reader of the collected works simply because Alcaeus' rollercoaster biography was elsewhere in the *opera* so insistent. But Horace implies that the opposition was present in Alcaeus himself, for the 'soft' sympotic/erotic themes come '*inter arma*' or 'once his boat [of exile] had been moored on a soggy shore'.<sup>26</sup>

Even in the surviving fragments there are many hints of this kind of contextualization of the soft life. So Fragment 38a begins, 'drink [and get drunk], Melanippus, with me', but the poem soon turns much darker, to Sisyphus and this-worldly tribulations – don't set

<sup>21</sup> Ath. 15.667d, G. Liberman, 'Autour de l'édition Alexandrine d'Alcée', *Mélanges de l'Ecole française de Rome. Antiquité* 105 (1993) 1003-13 (1005 n.13).

<sup>22</sup> A. Pardini, 'La ripartizione in libri dell'opera di Alceo. Per un riesame della questione', *Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica* 119 (1991) 257-84 (269), *contra* Liberman, 'Alexandrine d'Alcée' (n.21, above) 1006-07.

<sup>23</sup> Dion. Hal. *De imit.* 31.2, 8.

<sup>24</sup> That is one conclusion from the fact that ancient commentators thought Aristophanes was parodying Alcaeus at *Birds* 1410 with schol. This is not to say that Alcaeus' sympotic poetry could not also be extremely succinct, e.g. fr. 346.

<sup>25</sup> Horace, *Carmina* 1.32.9-11.

<sup>26</sup> Hor. *Carm.* 1.32.6-8.



your heart on great things, once you are dead you are dead – and finishes with resignation, ‘we are young. Now’s the time, if ever there was a time, passive to put up with whatever god puts in our way’. According to Herodotus this same Melanippus, *anêr hetairos*, was the ultimate addressee of the notorious poem about Alcaeus leaving his shield behind at Sigeum, a poem which nicely encapsulates both the soldier and the softie.<sup>27</sup> In other fragments it is clear that in context the world of the symposium is very often, and quite explicitly, a refuge from the ‘weather’ outside, weather which may well be an allegory for political storms: ‘It’s raining, and out of heaven the storm is of a size; flowing streams are frozen stiff .... Let the storm fall over our heads. But pile up the fire in the meantime, mix the honeyed wine without stint, bury your head in soft cushiony fluff’.<sup>28</sup> Indeed Alcaeus talks straightforwardly of taking a breather from strife: ‘let us forget this anger ... let us take a break from soul-consuming faction, and civil war ...’ (fr. 70); or drowning his sorrows: ‘we won’t make headway by being vexed, Bycchis, the best remedy is to get the wine and get drunk’ (fr. 335); or smothering the acrid aromas of factionalism by drenching his head in sweet perfume. In other words, if not self-consciously anti-political, the sympotic world is represented as an antidote to or refuge from the political, or simply as time-out.

When we come to discuss the amatory elements in particular, we are presented with a problem: at first glance only a few brief lines of the surviving fragments could in any way be described as ‘descending to *amores*’.<sup>29</sup> There is (probably) a request that ‘charming – *ton charienta* – Meno’ be invited to a symposium if the singer is to have pleasure, which seems amatory, a reference to an *erômenos* (so we are told by the scholiast) who used to be invited for kid and pork (but is no longer *philos*), the praise of a mole on a boy’s finger (probably to be ascribed to this Alcaeus rather than another one of the same name) and, according to Horace, a song or songs about lovely dark-haired, dark-eyed Lycus.<sup>30</sup> To go any further we are obliged again to squeeze what we can from ancient readers.

Some Hellenistic poems, especially Theocritus’ *Idylls* 29-30 (to which one might add, for the sake of completion, the extremely fragmentary 31), written in Lesbian metres and a (hyper-)Lesbian dialect and anciently entitled *Paidika Aiolika*, are widely assumed to take Alcaeus’ amatory songs as their springboard.<sup>31</sup> But the content is fairly generic in the context of Archaic love-poetry. *Idyll* 29, apparently set at a symposium, is presented as advice to a boy from an older lover, warning him not to be fickle and hoping for a

<sup>27</sup> Alcaeus 38a, 428a; Herodotus 5.94-5, whose information is not contradicted by Strabo 13.1, 38.

<sup>28</sup> Alcaeus 338. The exact meaning of the last lines is uncertain, but *gnophallon* [= *knephallon*] seems to mean ‘fluff’ or ‘cushion’; I am not sure it can be extended to mean ‘fillet’, cf. B. C. MacLachlan, ‘Alcaeus’, in *A companion to Greek lyric poets*, ed. D. E. Gerber (Leiden 1997) 143 n.24. At any rate the emphasis seems to be on making oneself comfortable, not on getting dressed up for a party. On frequent allegories in Alcaeus, cf. Heraclitus *Allegoriae* 5 quoting fr. 208.

<sup>29</sup> R. Hunter, *Theocritus and the archaeology of Greek poetry* (Cambridge 1996) 172 goes further: ‘no single verse from among the tattered scraps of his poetry which have reached us can be securely identified as paederastic’.

<sup>30</sup> FR. 71, 368, 430, 431.

<sup>31</sup> On Theocritus’ Lesbianisms, only too vulnerable to ancient and modern correction/improvement, see A. S. F. Gow, *Theocritus: Edited with translation and commentary* (Cambridge 1952) lxxvii-lxxx.

relationship that continues into his maturity so that he and the boy become ‘*Achilleioi philoi*’ to each other. *Idyll* 30 is an internal dialogue about the feverish pains of love – ‘I am too old for this; will I never learn? No! *Erôs* is too powerful. I must submit to the yoke again’. Since *Idyll* 29 actually begins with a quotation from Alcaeus – ‘wine, dear boy, and truthfulness’ – Gow (*ad loc.*) thought it was ‘presumably an imitation of Alcaeus’.<sup>32</sup>

Less specific but more explicitly pertinent is the evidence of Cicero, that Alcaeus’ amatory poems could be self-referential (*de se ipsis*), lubricious (*lubidinosos ... amores*), and generally eyebrow-raising (*quae ...!*), while for Sextus Empiricus they revealed signs of *erôtomania*.<sup>33</sup> In particular, Cicero’s evidence for self-referentiality in a homoamatory context is important, because we know Alcaeus could speak in character, in one case (fr. 10B), speaking as a ‘wretched woman’ from the start of the song. Reading all this with Horace, the most straightforward interpretation is that the love-themed poems describe the off-duty or resigned, *carpe-diem* Alcaeus. We can easily imagine the poet comforting himself in exile, after his latest failure, drowning his sorrows in Lycus’ ebony eyes, or exhorting himself to get up off his couch and go back once more into the fray. In the context of a collected works, the alternation could indeed have provided an engrossing drama. In this case, the boys would be symbols of a life of lovely leisure (*habrosunê*). In particular that zooming in on the mole on a particular finger of a particular boy, clearly in an amatory context, will have served to occlude, if only for an intense minute or two, the bigger vista, the wider perspective of exile, struggle, and strife. In this case the intense homoerotic, or even homoerotomaniacal, close-up would be used to construct a tiny place of safe intimacy a million miles away from the storms outside.

We might surmise that Lycus and/or the possessor of the zoomed-in-upon finger is a handsome slave-boy – *puer*, according to Cicero – a symbol, therefore, not merely of lovely leisure but of lavish luxury.<sup>34</sup> But were there handsome slave-boys serving at Alcaeus’ drinking-parties? In fact I can find no definite allusions in the surviving fragments. His sympotic orders, ‘let him pour perfume’ and ‘mix a *krater*’, have no *pais* as addressee. Fr. 366 ‘Wine, dear boy, and truthfulness’ sounds like an instruction only in English translation, while a straightforward reading of fr. 338 would seem to imply that the same addressee will stoke the fire, mix the wine, and then bury his head in a cushion. In fact the Homeric scholiast commenting on the rape of Ganymede (apparently gathering evidence to forestall more dangerous conclusions as to Ganymede’s role) observes that Sappho herself said it was the custom for ‘nice-looking young nobles’ (*neous eugeneis*

<sup>32</sup> However, Hunter, *Theocritus and the archaeology* (n.29, above) 174, observes with reference to the Lesbianizing *Idyll* 28, ‘When every allowance for the state of our knowledge of archaic poetry has been made, it appears most probable that whereas the form of the poem is, broadly speaking, archaic, its subject-matter is post-classical. That this is also true for *Idylls* 29 and 30 is not to be assumed, but can hardly be ruled out.’ B. Acosta-Hughes, *Arion’s lyre: Archaic lyric into Hellenistic poetry* (Princeton 2010) 107-22 tries harder to find Alcaic echoes, but nothing from which we can draw any definite conclusions. We can at least agree with him that ‘the picture is a much richer one for Theocritus’ reading’ (122).

<sup>33</sup> Cic. *Tusc.* 4.71.

<sup>34</sup> Cicero, *de Natura Deorum* 1.79. One is immediately reminded of Ion’s famous anecdote about Sophocles and the wine-pourer on Chios, *FGrHist* 392 F6 [Ath. 13.603e-604d].

*euprepeis*) to pour wine.<sup>35</sup> Athenaeus may provide the context for the remark: ‘Lovely Sappho frequently praises her brother Larichus, on the grounds that he served as wine-pourer for the Mytileneans in the civic mess (*prytaneion*)’.<sup>36</sup> The scholiast further adduces the fact that it is *kouroi* who serve wine in *Iliad* 1.470 and the unmarried son of Menelaus who serves the wine in the *Odyssey* 15.120-23.

In this context one particular piece of evidence has not been given the attention it deserves. For the brief, succinct sympotic orders barked out in fr. 346 are addressed to an *aïtas*:<sup>37</sup>

Let’s drink! Why wait for lamps? Night’s a fingerwidth away. Take down the great painted cups, *aïtas*! For wine Zeus and Semele’s son gave to mortals to let us forget our cares. Mix it one and two, pour it out, full to the brim, let one cup jostle the next  
...

Ancient lexicographers are clear that *aïtas* is a term of same-sex *erôs*: ‘*Aeitan: ton hetairon. Aristophanes de ton erômenon*’.<sup>38</sup> Theocritus’ *Idyll* 12 was entitled *Aitês*, and in that poem (l. 13) the poet refers to it as a term belonging to the Thessalians, another Aeolian community, a term that apparently conjures up for Theocritus the image of an ideal homosexual relationship: ‘they loved each other under an equal yoke’ (l. 15). The scholiast notes that the feminine form was also used by Alcman to refer to ‘darling (*eperastous*) maidens’.<sup>39</sup> Almost all modern scholars accept both the *vocabulum* and its glossing, but translations nevertheless fail to bring out the full implications: ‘ragazzo’, ‘lad’, and ‘friend’.<sup>40</sup>

The apparently rather peculiar relationship thus envisaged between Alcaeus and his *aïtas*, both servant and *hetairos*, does however have one obvious parallel in the *Iliad* in the relationships between lords and their ‘squires’ or ‘henchmen’ (*therapontes*), most obviously, the relationship between Achilles and Patroclus. For like Alcaeus’ *aïtas*, Patroclus too is ordered to set up the wine-bowl, mix the wine, and prepare the cups for Agamemnon’s envoys, and later even to prepare a bed for Phoenix (9.202-04, 620-22).<sup>41</sup> Theocritus’ references to *aitês* as a Thessalian term in *Idyll* 12 and to Achilleian *philoï* in his *Paidika*

<sup>35</sup> Schol. T *ad Iliad* 20.234, Sappho fr. 203. Although ‘it is the custom’ sounds like an ancient footnote, the scholiast insists these are Sappho’s own words and a very similar phrase, interestingly, is used by Alcaeus himself with regard to dining customs: *outô touto nomisdetai* (fr. 71.2).

<sup>36</sup> Ath. 10.424e. In general see J. Bremmer, ‘Adolescents, *symposion*, and pederasty’, in *Sympotica: A symposium on the symposion*, ed. O. Murray (Oxford 1990) 135-48.

<sup>37</sup> So it is printed in Voigt’s now-standard text, following her rejection of Page’s objections, E.-M. Hamm, *Grammatik zu Sappho und Alkaios* (Berlin 1957) 64. Another *aïtas* may be recovered in fr. 358 l.1. Possibly it was this term that the scholiast was translating as *erômenos* in fr. 71.

<sup>38</sup> A. B. 348.2. The Aristophanes in question is probably the grammarian.

<sup>39</sup> Schol. *Argum. carm.* 12 [Alcman fr. 34].

<sup>40</sup> One conspicuous exception is the rendering ‘*gioia mia*’ by C. Neri, *La lirica greca* (Rome 2004) 198, although this could be criticized on grounds of tone.

<sup>41</sup> One might also note the combination of *erôs* and service at the court of Macedon in the relationships between the Kings and their bodyguards, Philip’s two Pausaniases, for instance and the *Basilikoi Paidês*, see Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.8, above) 366-69.

*Aiolika* may be more purposeful than they at first seem. It would hardly be surprising if Achilles loomed large in the songs of a warrior who fought the Athenians for control of the Troad from a base at a city called Achilleion, which sounds very much like a cult site.<sup>42</sup> At any rate no one should be terribly surprised if some fragments of Alcaeus were to appear that seemed to refer to the relationship of Achilles and his *therapôn* using the vocabulary of same-sex *erôs*.

Of course the oppositioning of the world of war to the world of wine, love, and song, on-duty to off-duty, was not original to Alcaeus and is probably deeply structural in Greek culture and often reflected ironically and self-consciously in sympotic discourse.<sup>43</sup> The oppositioning goes back at least as far as Callinus fr. 1 (see below) or even unemployed Achilles in the *Iliad* strumming the lyre. Alcaeus simply adds to that opposition an identification of war with civil war and, therefore, politics.

Another poem seems to juxtapose the homoerotic and political exile in a different way. The very fragmentary 296b from P. Oxy 2302, establishes an amatory context with an invocation of Aphrodite and comments, apparently, on the lovely springtime (coming-of-age?) of Damoanactidas, a boy of some distinction to judge from his name, and describes lovely olive-trees and youths (*neaniai*) wreathed with hyacinths, but then goes on to talk of his exile (*exephugon*) ‘from lovely’ [Lesbos?].<sup>44</sup> Perhaps in this case the poet is picturing to himself a festival/banquets of young men on Lesbos, rather as Sappho

<sup>42</sup> Hdt. 5.94.

<sup>43</sup> Sophocles on Chios again provides a charming example – ‘I am practising generalship (*stratégein*), gentlemen, since Pericles told me that though I may be a skilled poet, I knew nothing of the art of war (*stratégein*). Well don’t you think this stratagem (*stratégêma*) has turned out nicely?’ *FGrHist* 392 F6, [= Ath. 13.604d]. We may be able to see a similar ironic incursion of warfare into the symposium in Alcaeus fr. 346, where the poet asks that the cups ‘jostle’ one another, since the verb *ôtheô* is frequently used of the pushing and shoving of the hoplite battleline. If weapons of war were regularly used to decorate the walls where drinking parties took place, as H. van Wees, ‘Greeks bearing arms’, in *Archaic Greece: New approaches and new evidence*, eds N. Fisher and H. van Wees (London 1998) 333-78 (363-6) argues on mostly good grounds, this meeting of on-duty and off-duty would be all the more pointed and self-conscious. He perhaps relies too much on Alcaeus fr. 140, since there is no indication as to what this particular ‘*meGas domos*’, festooned with armoury, was (used for). ‘Oppositioning’, i.e. the *opposing* of war and wine, does not necessarily imply they are in a fixed mutually exclusive opposition, let alone that the symposium evolves into something that can be described as *quintessentially* an ‘anti-polis’, whatever that might mean. On this delicate topic see now the comprehensive critical survey by D. Hammer, ‘Ideology, the symposium, and Archaic politics’, *American Journal of Philology* 125 (2004) 479-512, esp. 491-503.

<sup>44</sup> On which cf. Acosta-Hughes, *Arion’s lyre* (n.32, above) 116-17. It has sometimes been inferred that the song about Damoanactidas and the reference to exile belong to two separate poems. *Neantias* is an age-class term that refers to different age-groups in different cultures – dialects and/or polities. In Attica and Homer it seems to refer to the full-grown, beardless ephebic form, more usually known (in Athens) as *meirakion/neaniskos*, e.g., Hom. *Od.* 10.278, cf. the Attic hero Neantias: D. Whitehead, *The demes of Attica* (Princeton 1986) 192-93; E. Kearns, The heroes of Attica, *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies (BICS) Supplement* 57 (London 1989) 188; D. Tsiafaki *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae (LIMC) Supplement* sv ‘Neantias I/II’. Elsewhere it can refer to young warriors at their peak or (possibly) even older, cf. Plu. *Lyc.* 21.2; Sosibius *FGrHist* 595 F 5 a; Ath. 15.678 bc, DL 8.10.

remembers lovely Anactoria, now abroad.<sup>45</sup> Or perhaps he is simply vaunting the physical virtues of Damoanactidas as a way of vaunting his political status: ‘so that we might read the eroticism of these fragments [of *paideioi humnoi*] as a conventional form of communal praise and affirmation of social pre-eminence’.<sup>46</sup> Or perhaps we should think of such poems as valuable gifts from an acquaintance now unfortunately in exile, who might expect some requital further down the line in the form of greater intimacy or services, a long-distance form of paying court.

Of course, inasmuch as many or most of Alcaeus’ songs were sympotic in the broad sense of songs for performance in the symposium, drinking and politics will inevitably find themselves mingling. As Jevons observed well over a century ago: ‘[the odes] were probably all delivered in the same way, to the same audience, and on the same sort of occasion. That is to say they were probably sung by Alcaeus, to his own accompaniment, over the wine to his political and personal friends. Hence his songs, when they are something more than drinking-songs might, without any inconsequence, turn to love or politics’.<sup>47</sup> But the symposium was more than just an occasion for a poem. If it is true that the world of Dionysus, Aphrodite, and the Muses was a world away from the world of war and civil strife, it is also a truism that drinking together is an important part of camaraderie. The Archaic symposium was the most important place for the making and maintenance of socio-political groupings, the crucible of *hetaireiai*, which were in turn the fundamental elements of faction-fighting and indeed civil war.<sup>48</sup> So Liberman concludes, ‘Le banquet peut jouer un rôle stasiotique’, Leslie Kurke suggests that ‘in a sense, the symposium was always a political gathering, in which a “band of companions” (*hetaireia*) constituted itself in opposition to other sympotic groups and to the city as a whole’, while Oswyn Murray talks even more forcefully of ‘a close fusion of commensality and politics’ in Alcaeus’ drinking party.<sup>49</sup> In this context, even an apparently unpolitical poem like 38A – ‘Drink and get drunk with me Melanippus ...’ can be seen as party-political inasmuch as it is addressed, so Herodotus informs us, to an *anêr hetairos*.

This close fusion is sometimes quite straightforward in Alcaeus. So we have the famous *nunc est bibendum* – ‘now men must get drunk, drink with all their strength, even, since Myrsilus is dead’ (fr. 332), and we are hardly surprised to find from Aristotle that one of

<sup>45</sup> Sappho fr. 16, *cf.* fr. 130, where Alcaeus in rustic exile near the Messon sanctuary recalls the Assemblies and Council of Mytilene.

<sup>46</sup> L. Kurke, ‘The strangeness of “song culture”: Archaic Greek poetry’, in *Literature in the Greek and Roman worlds: A new perspective*, ed. O. Taplin (Oxford 2000) 58-87 (78).

<sup>47</sup> Jevons, *A history of Greek literature* (n.20, above) 131.

<sup>48</sup> Although for more serious and dangerous projects an oath over a (commensal?) victim in front of divine witnesses might usefully supplement or precede the sharing of wine, *cf.* fr. 129 ll. 14-15.

<sup>49</sup> Liberman, ‘Alexandrine d’Alcée’ (n.21, above) 1008; L. V. Kurke, ‘Archaic Greek poetry’, in *The Cambridge companion to Archaic Greece*, ed. H. A. Shapiro (Cambridge 2007) 141-69 (147); O. Murray, ‘Forms of sociality’ in *The Greeks*, ed. J.-P. Vernant (Chicago 1995) 218-53 (227). In a somewhat later period there is good evidence that the primary mechanism of this homosociality was drinking the same mixture from the same wine-bowl at the same rate in a very cosy room. We might anyway have inferred that such commensal practices were already normal in Alcaeus’ society, but it is reassuring that Alcaeus refers to them (fr. 72, 206, 338, 367).

the *skolia* attacked the Mytileneans for making ‘base-born Phittacus’ tyrant.<sup>50</sup> What appears to be a less straightforward and more pointed use of the sympotic in a stasiotic context is an attack on (treacherous former *hetairos*) Pittacus and his supposedly un-Greek Thracian ascendants for their un-Greek/low-class/slavish drinking of unmixed wine (fr. 72); Pittacus betrays the orderly Greek symposium, as he betrayed Alcaeus and his brothers; or perhaps the message is that Pittacus was always unfit for sympotic comradeship.

It is noticeable that the fragment (fr. 71) referring to the former *erômenos* who used to be invited for kid and pork but is no longer *philos*, belongs to the same papyrus (P.Oxy 1234) and indeed precedes that attack on Pittacus, while following another. In other words, it seems to belong to a ‘stasiotic block’. We are invited, therefore, to read it stasiotically, as a milder kind of rebuke to a former *hetairos* for abandoning his *hetaireia*, a nice combination of the commensal, the political, and the erotical. If all this is true, if the commensal necessarily implies comradeship, then a request for Meno to be invited can be read as an intent not merely to get Meno into the party, but into the Party. In that case, the references to Meno’s *charis*, references that Quintilian might have placed under the heading of the ‘playful’, may be serving to camouflage a more earnest political intent.

Another even tinier fragment (*ô ponêre paidôn*) quoted by an ancient commentator trying to elucidate Alcaeus’ defence from an accusation of murder has been read in the same context, as an attack on a former *erômenos*. The papyrus is quite ragged. Therefore, drawing any definite inference as to what the ancient commentator said, let alone trying to reconstruct what Alcaeus said from the quotes the commentator adduced in support, is difficult and complicated. Nevertheless, a careful reading allows Massimo Vetta to see in the combination of praise and blame evidence for a close inter-relationship between the bond of *erôs* and alignment with a particular *hetaireia*.<sup>51</sup> If this is convincing, then we can view the two sides of Alcaeus’ character – the sour and the sweet – not as simply anomalous, or as an indication of Alcaeus’ versatility, and not merely in terms of an opposition of on-duty to off-duty, but as alternative discursive strategies – praise poetry versus blame poetry – with a single aim. Alcaeus’ recruitment drive is two-sided: the carrot of admiration might at any time be replaced by the stick of vituperation.

What of the eyebrow-raising lustfulness and erotomania referred to by Cicero and Sextus Empiricus? Horace assures us that Alcaeus never went as far as Archilochus’ ‘black verses’ in his lapses of taste.<sup>52</sup> It is perfectly possible, therefore, that we have all the evidence we need to account for Alcaeus’ later reputation. Overwrought descriptions of Lycus’ hair and eyes or simply a series of declarations of an ‘I’ consumed with love could in themselves be sufficient for Roman readers to view Alcaeus as lustful and erotomaniacal; a paean to a mole on a boy’s finger might be enough to raise Cicero’s

<sup>50</sup> Fr. 348 a, Aristotle, *Politics* 1285a.

<sup>51</sup> T 9 = P Oxy 2506 b 24-25, M. Vetta, ‘Il Oxy 2506 fr. 77 e la poesia pederotica di Alceo’, *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica* 39 (1982) 7-20 (18): ‘Il frammento dei rr. 24-5 ... ci apre ad un quadro di contestualità di *epainos* e *psogos*... della stretta interferenza del legame erotico coll’allineamento eterico ...’; cf. also W. Barner, ‘Zu den Alkaios-Fragmenten von Oxy. 2506’, *Hermes* 95 (1967) 1-28 (8-9).

<sup>52</sup> Horace, *Epistles* 1.19.28-33.

eyebrows, especially if it belonged to an *aitas* serving wine and if Alcaeus were, for instance, rather like Sophocles in Ion's Chian symposium, to describe putting it to his mouth. Quite possibly, then, the puzzlement and discomfort of Roman authors simply reveals their prudishness about homosexuality or at least the values of a different culture at a different time.

But Alcaeus could be coarse. Apart from the insults thrown at Pittacus, of which Diogenes Laertius (1.4.81) provides a list, there is a fragmentary commentary on a poem that seems to describe the *polis* as a creaky old whore with white impurity washing around her and through her 'legs'.<sup>53</sup> The ancient commentator also notes what he interprets as a reference to intercourse (*sunousia*) in the poem. And it seems impossible to account for the joltiness of Alcaeus' shifts between levels of lexicon and tone as simply a mirage caused by our and later readers' distance from his strange, Archaic *tempora* and *mores*. Alcaeus sets his own tone; he creates a discursive pattern or hints at a pattern enough to create an expectation, and then abruptly offends against it. In other words, the jolts seem to be an entirely deliberate part of Alcaeus' work, an intrinsic part of the texture of his verse. Fr. 129, for instance, begins with a description of a precinct, and invokes the gods of the place, who are summoned 'with kind heart to hear our prayers', a cletic hymn. A few lines later, however, Pittacus is addressed as 'pot-belly', as if we have suddenly moved from the discourse of the temple to the discourse of the lavatory-wall.

Along with the lapses in tone, there are lapses in standards of behaviour. Some historians of warfare have used the fact that Alcaeus, like Archilochus before him, mentions losing his shield apparently without shame, as evidence that falling out of line had not yet acquired stigma, because the Lesbians still fought in a more fluid *taxis*.<sup>54</sup> I find this argument unconvincing. It was surely a source of humiliation at any time to have one's shield displayed as someone else's trophy and yet Alcaeus not only does not hide the fact, but publishes it, doubly publishes it, in fact, since it is framed in the form of a 'public' announcement via a herald, making no secret, as it were, of the fact that he is making no secret of it. As far as the amatory poems are concerned, the conclusion must be that what Cicero found startling and Quintilian saw as 'descents' were not merely a result of different attitudes towards same-sex *erôs* in Archaic Greece and Rome, but an important element of Alcaeus' songs, a deliberate and self-conscious mingling of higher discourse and lower discourse in some places and of the earnest and the playful in other places, not just in the course of the works, but even perhaps in a single song, a roller-coaster of style and tone.

Here, alongside considerations of the structure of commensal practices we need to take into account considerations of genre-structure. For all we know Alcaeus may have worked hard to publish his songs to all corners of the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, they remain Aeolic, Lesbian, late 7<sup>th</sup>-century BC Mytilenean, 'Alcaic ... me-songs', and they were made in narrowcast format: specific localized content about local people, in localized dialect and local or idiosyncratic rhythms, for self-accompanied performance by

<sup>53</sup> Fr. 306 col i, cf. B. Gentili, 'The ship of state allegory and its workings', in *Poetry and its public in ancient Greece* (Baltimore 1988) 197-215 (209-13).

<sup>54</sup> H. van Wees, *Greek warfare: Myths and realities* (London 2004) 174.

well-practised and probably well-born players of the *barbitos*, a local version of the lyre.<sup>55</sup> Lapses in tone and anti-nomian ethics can actually help in this construction of the genre of Alcaeus and indeed of the poet's 'I'. So fr. 129 begins as a formal presentation piece, a highly dignified hymn, celebrating the gods, age-old sanctuaries, pious ancestors, and cultic epithets. When the word 'pot-belly' appears a few lines later it appears as an irruption of the personal through the screen of the impersonal: true feeling, common discourse, apparently Alcaeus' very own sentiments in his very own spontaneous words. If we remember the proverbial lines 'wine and truthfulness', we can even hear the tone of this discourse as one that emerges when alcohol loosens the tongue, making the performance vividly present, not just Alcaeus in his own words but Alcaeus in a certain condition, losing it, losing himself, at a symposium even now taking place, another indication of the 'personal', of the closeness of the poet's words to the poet's 'I'.<sup>56</sup>

So just as the wine serves a stasiotic purpose in the commensal practices of the symposium, so can the style, tone and content of sympotic literature. Apparently humiliating or confessional 'truths', like the shield hung up as a trophy on foreign soil could be as important an element in the forging of bonds as the wine itself. Such openness reflects the *parrhêsia* ('frankness') of the drinking-group, Alcaeus performing honesty and vulnerability for the sake of an audience imagined as an inner circle of trusted intimates, letting his guard down, showing himself up, only because he is, the tone of his discourse insists, among *sympotai* who understand the situation, who have endured the same losses and successes, who share his point of view, his hatred of Pittacus, his inebriation, and who remain faithful friends.

Moreover, when Plato and Theocritus invoke Alcaic honesty – 'wine, dear boy, and truthfulness' – they are talking of uncomfortable or embarrassing truths about same-sex amatory relationships, released when wine has loosened the tongue: Alcibiades' scandalous descriptions of his attempts to have sex with Socrates, on the one hand, Theocritus' accusations of fickleness on the other. Alcaeus' descents into lubriciousness might, therefore, have caused the eyebrows to be raised even of those who were not Roman, even of his first audiences in seventh- or sixth-century Lesbos. In fact the bitter political attacks on Pittacus and the eyebrow-raising songs about his own feelings for *iuvēnes* can be read not in opposition but as two sides of the same coin, working together to create and maintain a single kind of relationship with the reader/hearer. The overwrought, *erôs*-driven lyrics are simply another aspect of 'getting personal', the poet (the poet's 'I') (over)heard letting his guard down, exposing himself in public, baring his soul.

### *Theognis and elegy*

If the lyric poetry of Alcaeus is 'me-song' in narrow-cast format, then the elegiacs of Theognis are 'us-song' in broadcast format. All I mean by this is that they are written in couplets closely allied to panhellenic epic hexameters – a hexameter, followed by a pentameter, a kind of mid-paused hexameter – using panhellenic epic dialect and needing no years of training on the lyre to perform, but rather an *aulos* accompaniment from

<sup>55</sup> On the aristocratic associations of lyre-playing, cf. Davidson, *The Greeks and Greek love* (n.8, above) 399.

<sup>56</sup> This seems to have been the impression of some ancient readers, judging from Ath. 10.429a.



another drinker or a player hired for the evening, who by the later Archaic period at least would most probably be an *aulêtris*, an *aulos*-girl.<sup>57</sup> As such they were much more promiscuous than the personal lyre-songs of the Lesbians. Indeed, they seem to have been sung in rounds with each singer holding a myrtle or a laurel branch. So, on the walls of the Tomb of the Diver in Paestum, the fronds displayed next to each drinker, with a few more by the *krater* waiting to be distributed, indicate the group is exactly half-way through the third and final round of elegies.<sup>58</sup> The circulation around the sympotic group anticipates even wider circulation, not just between groups throughout the community, but between different communities throughout Greece: songs for export. And there is evidence that this broadcast feature, the ability to travel around the Greek world, was recognised as characteristic of this kind of song, most famously in Theognis' boast, a panhellenic boast that Alcaeus, with his strong local accent, could never credibly have made, a boast that might almost stand as part of a manifesto for the genre of sympotic elegy:

To you I've given wings, with which you will fly over the boundless main and all the world, effortlessly soaring, and you'll be present at all dinners and all feasts, placed in the mouths of many, and you'll be sung by lovely Young Men, beautifully arranged, with handsome tenor voices to the accompaniment of tenor-tongued *auliskoi*, and when the time comes for you to go down into the depths of the overcast earth to the wailings of the house of Hades, your fame will not die with you, not ever, though dead, but you will keep your name, Cyrnus, imperishable, ever on mankind's mind, roving the land of Greece and islands, crossing over the fishy untapped deep, not riding on the backs of horses, but dispatched by the splendid gifts of the violet-crowned Muses and you will be a song for all men who care to be cultured, now and in the future, so long as there is Earth and Sun (Thgn. ll. 237–52).

A wide range of different kinds of songs composed in elegies are now known. Nevertheless the basic structural elements of the composition and performance of sympotic elegy tend to draw the genre in particular directions. Depending on how it was played, the accompanying *aulos* carried associations of mournfulness – as in 'elegiac' – but also of collective action and marching, introducing a little hint of war into the off-duty

<sup>57</sup> The link between elegy and the *aulos* goes back as far as Mimnermus in the seventh century BC who was both a pipe-player and an elegist according to tradition and in love with an *aulêtris* called Nanno: Strabo 14.1, 28; Ath. 13.597a; and in general see most recently A. Aloni, 'Elegy: forms, functions and communication', in *The Cambridge companion to Greek lyric*, ed. F. Budelmann (Cambridge 2009) 168-88. In Athens, the *aulos* acquired a reputation as a low-class, uglifying instrument, cf. P. Wilson, 'The *aulos* in Athens', in *Performance culture and Athenian democracy*, eds R. Osborne and S. Goldhill (Cambridge 1999) 58-95, but as late as the Tomb of the Diver in the early Classical period one of the *sympotai* plays the *auloi* for the singer who shares his couch, while an *aulos*-girl leads a small *kômos*.

<sup>58</sup> Suda *sv skolion*, Sigma 643 [= Dicaearchus 88, Aristoxenus 125 (Wehrli)], Schol. *ad Ar. Nub.* 1364 [= Dicaearchus 89 (Wehrli)]; judging from the scenes from the Tomb of the Diver, it seems clear that the Hellenistic intellectuals were well-informed about ancient practices; cf. Wehrli *ad Dicaearchus* 88; Sommerstein *ad Nubes* 1365.

banquet, just like the one-time weapons on the banqueting wall.<sup>59</sup> The closeness of elegy to epic in metre and dialect created an expectation of dignity and decorum, but, as Gentili observes, the organization into elegiac couplets in contrast to the continuous forms of hexameter also gave elegy an epigrammatic character, a line followed by a punch line: ‘a formal closure well suited to the autonomy and absoluteness of poetic expression compressed within the dimensions of two verses’.<sup>60</sup> Elegy, if you like, was structurally paraenetic, well-suited to the composition of short takeaway phrases of generalized wisdom (*gnômai*). All of this is relevant to the way that same-sex *erôs* and politics appear differently in elegiac poets from the way they appear in Alcaeus.

There are, of course, well-known problems in using ‘Theognis’ as a source. The songs which come down to us under his name clearly relate to several different periods; some lines (ll. 39-52) have been read as indicating a date before the Megarian tyranny of c. 630 BC, some (ll. 773-88) relate to the Persian Wars. The collection is clearly composite; some of the couplets are repeated elsewhere in the collection, with slight modifications and some are elsewhere ascribed to other authors, including one Euenus of Paros who was probably a contemporary of Socrates. Indeed in a very interesting article Ewen Bowie has cogently argued that the inclusion of large amounts of Euenus including apparently a high proportion of those poems that seem both substantial and complete, among much older elegists, is enough of an anomaly to indicate that Euenus was himself the compiler of an early version of ‘Book One’ and possibly also of the pederastic ‘Book Two’.<sup>61</sup> Possibly the only reason the collection was assigned to ‘Theognis’ at all is because he wrote his own name into good quotable couplets on the subject of an author’s true ‘seal’, couplets that no decent anthologist could omit (ll. 19-23). It is rather as if someone were to remove a whole wall’s worth of Flemish paintings from their frames, cutting out the best bits and pasting them together into a huge crowd-scene, and then ascribing the collage to van Eyck because one of the cuttings contained his signature on the hem of a cloak. Moreover, although some ancient commentators disagreed with him and modern scholars have tended to ignore him, Plato quotes one Cynrus couplet (ll. 77-78) and confidently ascribes it to Theognis of *Sicilian*

<sup>59</sup> Mournfulness: Pollux *Onomasticon* 4.72; rousing to (military) action: [Hippocrates] *Epidemics* 5.81, Dio Chrysostom 1.1-2, and already of course on the Chigi vase; collective action (marching, grape-treading, wall-building, wall-demolishing, rowing *etc.*), M. L. West, *Ancient Greek music* (Oxford 1992) 29-30.

<sup>60</sup> B. Gentili, ‘Modes and forms of communication’, in *Poetry and its public in ancient Greece* (Baltimore 1988) 32-49 (35); however, Gentili also notes a tendency for texts to be ‘translated’ into Ionic.

<sup>61</sup> E. Bowie, ‘An early chapter in the history of the *Theognidea*’, in *Approaches to Archaic Greek poetry*, eds X. Riu and J. Pòrtulas (*Orione* 5; Messina 2012). Bowie offers good arguments against the theory that Book Two represents songs that were expurgated from Book One in the Byzantine period; *cf. id. Brill’s New Pauly* sv ‘Euenus’; L. E. Woodbury, ‘The riddle of Theognis: The latest answer’, *Phoenix* 5 (1951) 1-10 (4-6). I am less convinced however with his identification of Book Two with the ‘*Erotika* of Euenus’ mentioned by Artemidorus (1.4) and associated by Epictetus with the notoriously lascivious ‘Milesian Tales’ (*Discourses* 4.9.6) and perhaps Ausonius (*Nuptial Cento* 10).

Megara ‘*politên tôn en Sikeliâi Megareôn*’; this is careful, clever, well-informed Plato we are talking about; we should take his information more seriously.<sup>62</sup>

Probably the least controversial way of dealing with the anthology is to follow Martin West in isolating (1) a core-Theognis in the main ‘Cyrnus-block’ (19-254) – *purum*; (2) an inner periphery – *meliora* – including further Cyrnus-blocks (255–1022); (3) an outer periphery – *deteriora* (1023-1220); and (4) the so-called ‘pederastic supplement’, surviving in just one manuscript, where it is referred to as ‘Book II’.<sup>63</sup> As for the date of this Cyrnus-block, most recent scholars have reverted to the more traditional date of early- to mid-sixth century BC.<sup>64</sup>

In fact the controversies over the collection and its collation are revealing. In part they reflect the promiscuous format of elegy, and its modular structure, allowing one or more cut-out-and-keep couplets to be inserted or removed. And because elegies from various authors were sung at symposia, a singing relay going round the room, the collage represented by the Theognidea is actually quite a good image of elegy if not as written, then as performed, throughout the Greek world, from Ampurias to the Crimea by way of Paestum and Cyrene, each singer taking it in turns.<sup>65</sup> Meanwhile the ancient disputes over Theognis’ place and time reflect the fact that he makes no direct references that would allow us to pin him down; in other words he seems to have depersonalized his content as much as he panhellenized his lexicon and metre. He doesn’t even talk of ‘Megarians’ or ‘Megara’, but the ‘townspeople’, and the ‘polis’.<sup>66</sup> We do not necessarily need to accept the theory of Gregory Nagy and others that ‘Theognis’ is a ‘myth’ informing a particular kind of poetry with no particular author, a kind of *Redender Name*, but we can certainly say that this export-driven production of poetry inevitably presents a front that constructs more of a distance between the poet’s words and the poet’s ‘I’.

This is not to say ‘Theognis’ is a vague presence. On the one hand the content of the songs indicates for Carrière and many others ‘qu’il fut dans la vie publique, un farouche

<sup>62</sup> Pl. *Leg.* 1.630a, the scholium *ad loc.* indicates there was a great deal of debate about this (for which there is confirmation elsewhere) and eirenically wonders if the two traditions might not be reconciled by having Theognis move from one Megara to the other, an entirely reasonable proposition in itself, albeit one for which there is little other evidence.

<sup>63</sup> M. West ‘Theognis’, *OCD*<sup>3</sup>; M. West, *Studies in Greek elegy and iambus* (Berlin 1974) 40-60, esp. 42-43; cf. G. Nagy, ‘Theognis and Megara: A poet’s vision of his city’, in *Theognis of Megara: Poetry and the polis*, eds G. Nagy and T. J. Figueira (Baltimore 1985) 22-81; E. L. Bowie, ‘The Theognidea: A step toward a collection of fragments?’ in *Collecting fragments – Fragmente sammeln*, ed. G. W. Most (Göttingen 1997) 53-66.

<sup>64</sup> H. van Wees, ‘Megara’s mafiosi’, in *Alternatives to Athens*, eds R. Brock and S. Hodkinson (Oxford 2001) 52-67 suggests there is no reason to reject the traditional date of 540s BC (52 n.2). H. F. Johansen, ‘A poem by Theognis (Thgn. 19-38), Part II’, *Classica et Mediaevalia* 44 (1993) 5-29 thinks a date before c. 550 is ruled out on linguistic grounds; while Robin Lane Fox, ‘Theognis: An alternative to democracy’, in *Alternatives to Athens*, eds R. Brock and S. Hodkinson (Oxford 2001) 35-51 (37-40) prefers c. 600-560.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. M. West ‘Theognis’, *OCD*<sup>3</sup>: ‘... a representative cross-section of the elegiac poetry circulating in social settings between the late 7<sup>th</sup> and early 5<sup>th</sup> centuries ...’.

<sup>66</sup> It is possible that the later editors could have gotten rid of specific local detail, but in Theognis’ case there is not much sign it was there in the first place, hence the ancient dispute as to his origins.

aristocrate, ombrageux et vindicatif”, or as Oswyn Murray puts it ‘the poet of a class who became a class of poetry ... the unacceptable face of aristocracy’.<sup>67</sup> The politics in other words are mostly class politics, with warnings against *kakoi* and jumped up savages: ‘let no man persuade you to get friendly (*philêsai*) with a low-class man (*kakon andra*), Cynus; what is the advantage in having a wretch (*deilos anêr*) as one’s intimate friend (*philos*)?’ (ll. 101-02). ‘It is the same city, Cynus, but its people aren’t the same. They are men who not long ago knew not rights and rules, but clothed their ribs with goatskins and foraged outside like deer. Now they are “men of quality” (*agathoi*), son of Polypaos, and those who were noble (*esthloi*) are “wretches” (*deiloi*) now’ (ll. 53-58).

It is an irony often remarked upon that Theognis who ‘signs’ his songs with the ‘seal’ of his own name – ‘Cynus, let a seal be placed on these verses for me, skilled as I am at making them; if they are stolen the theft will not escape notice, nor will anyone take something of lower quality (*kakion*) when something/someone noble is at hand (*tousthlou pareontos*), but everyone will say: “These are the verses of Theognis the Megarian.”’ (ll. 19-23) – ended up in a mongrel collection. But one could say that the irony is structural. Alcaeus’ songs have Alcaeus written all over them. Theognis needs to flag up the name of the author. In other words, the ‘seal’ simply reflects the natural anxiety of a poet whose broadcast songs were designed for mixing with others in the same dialect and metre through symposia throughout the Greek world.

It is equally obvious from that seal ‘preface’ that the qualities Theognis ascribes to his poetry (*tousthlon*) are the same as those he ascribes to the class (*esthloi/agathoi*) for whom he would speak, and that the anxiety about authenticity and miscegenation of his verses parallels his anxiety about the people:

When it comes to sheep and donkeys and horses we try to seek out noble studs, Cynus, and quality stock, preferably, for them to mount; but a noble man does not mind marrying a base woman, daughter of a base father, if he is given lots of property. And a woman does not refuse to be the wife of a base man if he is rich. It is wealth not quality she is after. Money is what men honour; and so the good marries into the bad, the bad into the good. Wealth has mixed up lineage. So don’t be amazed, son of Polypaos, that the line of the townsmen is fading, since good is mixed with bad (ll. 183-92).

So whereas Alcaeus shows off an authenticity of utterance (an authenticity which might well be enhanced by descents to lower standards of ethics, language or propriety) in order to construct a sense of *parrhêsia* among aristocratic intimates, so Theognis vaunts an authenticity of being, his own authenticity as a member of the men of quality – implicitly and explicitly in opposition to those who merely pretend to quality, ‘the counterfeit gold and silver’ (e.g. ll. 117-28) – by means of the quality, the *branded* quality, of his songs.

In this way we could say that Theognis’ poetry, like Alcaeus’, is always essentially political, inasmuch as a kind of class-warfare is to be found not only in the content but in his identification of social quality and authenticity with the quality and authenticity of the ‘signed’ verses. But because of its generalized nature Theognis can never be, and seems

<sup>67</sup> J. Carrière ed., *Theognis: poèmes élégiaques* (Paris 1975) 8; O. Murray, *Early Greece* (London 1980) 221.

never to have been meant to be, the poet for a distinct faction operating within some or other Megarian society in, say, 560 BC; so it really is the poetry of a panhellenic class, to which Greeks with a particular sense of themselves from all over the Mediterranean might feel they belonged, and not of a group within any particular city.

Partly this is to do with facts. Archaic politics was about rival aristocratic factions in the plural, and although one faction might claim to be more authentically well-born than another, although aspersions might be cast on the ascendants of Pittacus, Pisistratus, Cleisthenes, Megacles, as indeed of Aeschines, Cleon, or Demosthenes, it is clear from the historical record and also from *e.g.* the songs of Alcaeus that these factions could lose members to opposing factions and indeed gain them. In no period in ancient history is there evidence for a properly cohesive pure old aristocracy fighting *en bloc* against a rival group of *arrivistes*, or hoplites, not even, especially not, when the factions are called *Optimates* and *Populares*. But apart from the historical record, we also have Theognis himself talking of marriage alliances between noble and ignoble, of *stasis* as involving *emphyloi phonoï* and when the question of *stasis* arises there seems no question of a faction of the *esthloi/agathoi* to which he would owe automatic allegiance; instead factionalism is seen as something outside his own politics and best to be avoided: ‘When the citizens are all stirred up, do not be too distressed, but walk in the middle of the road, Cyrnus, as I do’.<sup>68</sup>

Rather like the Roman responses to Alcaeus, Suda admires the exhortations, but is repelled by the ‘defilements and boy loves’ – *miariai kai paidikoi erôtes* – scattered in their midst.<sup>69</sup> So how do the political and the amatory connect in Theognis? The addressee, Cyrnus, an extremely unusual name, is mentioned so often that he functions as the effective ‘seal’ on the songs, his very name the stamp of Theognidean authenticity. In this way the same-sex relationship itself becomes a part of Theognis’ aristocratic politics, the very sound of the name of the *erômenos* a way of discriminating *tousthlon* from the *kakion*, the authentic song/poet/aristocrat from the spurious song/poet/aristocrat. The language used is not the language of *erôs* (though this is reasonably frequent in the pederastic supplement which opens with an invocation of Eros) but of the *pistos philos, hetairos*. This is identical to the language used of Homeric *hetairoi* and in particular of Homeric squires. Indeed, as

<sup>68</sup> 219-20 *cf.* 39-52. I see this is another side of Theognis’ explicit ambition to rise above the parochial to the Panhellenic level. Doubtless a team of modern sociologists launched upon Archaic Greece could produce a range of classes and types, organized according to outlook, ideology and way of life, but I am not yet convinced by Kurke and Morris that the evidence allows us usefully to talk of a coherent or cohesive ‘middling’ ideology, let alone a ‘middling’ element in Archaic society of which Theognis (in part) would be a prime exemplar; *cf.* Hammer, ‘Ideology, symposium, Archaic politics’ (n.43, above) 481-91; E. Kistler, “Kampf der Mentalitäten”. Ian Morris’ ‘Elitist’ versus ‘middling-ideology’?, in *Griechische Archaik: interne Entwicklungen – externe Impulse*, eds R. Rollinger and Ch. Ulf (Berlin 2004) 145-71.

<sup>69</sup> Suda ‘Theognis’ (*theta*, 136). This passage has been taken as evidence that Suda’s source had use of an unexpurgated version of ‘Book One’ in which the more pederastic verses of ‘Book Two’ were strewn throughout the text. But as Bowie, to mention only the most recent demurer, points out, the Suda text seems to post-date the compilation of the pederastic supplement, there is plenty of same-sex *erôs* in ‘Book One’ and there are unobjectionable verses in ‘Book Two’; moreover, a number of verses from Book Two are also found in Book One.

Hans van Wees has observed, the poet gives orders to Cynrus to ‘fit bits to the horses’ (l. 551), thereby placing him in the role of *therapôn* and immediately reminding us of the relationship between Achilles and his squire Patroclus, or indeed Alcaeus and his *aïtas*, ordered to get the tables ready, a term that, we recall, is glossed as both *erômenos* and as *hetairos* by the ancient lexicographers.<sup>70</sup>

In fact the use of the vocabulary of *hetaireia*, *philia*, and *pistis* in the context of what might otherwise seem in many ways a typical relationship of Greek Love blurs the distinction between comradeship and homosexuality, making of Theognis something of a bridge between the so-called *Waffenbrüderschaft* of Homer and the same-sex loves of the later period. It was only with a certain amount of effort that Vetta and others were able to discover in Alcaeus the ‘stretta interferenza del legame erotico coll’allineamento eterico ...’; in Theognis it is more explicit. The fidelity of the same-sex boyfriend is a model for the fidelity of the *hetairoi*, the hoped-for authenticity of Cynrus’ devotion a model for the devotion of the group: ‘Don’t love me with words and keep your mind and heart elsewhere, if you love me and your inner thoughts are faithful’.<sup>71</sup> ‘A man you can trust is worth his weight in gold and silver, Cynrus, at times of grievous factionalism’ (ll. 77-78). In other words politics, *erôs*, and poetry come together in an anxiety about quality and authenticity.

In the same way as the amatory informs the sense of a *hetaireia*, so the *hetaireia* informs the relationship of same-sex love.<sup>72</sup> There are no overwrought descriptions of erotic subjectivity, no lustful losing himself in Cynrus’ eyes or thighs, just a focus on the solidity of the relationship, a (hopefully) loyal mutually-devoted faction of two. So while Theognis chastises Cynrus for ‘pulling the wool over my eyes’, it is fine for him to deceive anyone else: ‘Out of your mouth seem everyone’s friend, but don’t get mixed up in any earnest venture, not any, not with anyone’;<sup>73</sup> ‘take on the disposition of the wily octopus which makes itself look like whichever rock it attaches itself to’ (ll. 215-16).<sup>74</sup> He wants, in other words, to monopolize Cynrus’ authenticity, to be his sole companion in earnest ventures – and ultimately to die by his side: ‘Here we are. We have reached that place of evil, Cynrus, despite all our prayers. Would that our allotted death would take us both together.’<sup>75</sup> Again this is a statement of ‘Achillean friendship’.

By the mid-sixth century BC there was already a long tradition of civic, exhortatory, militaristic elegy addressed to the community.<sup>76</sup> The earliest such example is probably

<sup>70</sup> Van Wees, ‘Megara’s mafiosi’ (n.63, above) 53 n.3.

<sup>71</sup> Thgn. 87-89 *cf.* 91-92 with an address to Cynrus, 93-100.

<sup>72</sup> W. Donlan, ‘*Pistos philos hetairos*’ in *Theognis of Megara: Poetry and the polis*, eds G. Nagy and T. Figueira (Baltimore 1985) 223-44 (224): ‘a very large number of verses in the collection are concerned with friendship – political, personal and erotic. There is little discernible difference in language, theme and tone among what appear to the modern observer as quite different forms of the friendship bond’.

<sup>73</sup> ll. 254 and 63-4.

<sup>74</sup> Not a ‘Cynrus-poem’, but well within the main ‘Cynrus-block’.

<sup>75</sup> ll. 819-20.

<sup>76</sup> C. Carey, ‘Genre, occasion and performance’, in *The Cambridge companion to Greek lyric*, ed. F. Budelmann (Cambridge 2009) 21-38 (23 and 38).

Callinus from the mid-seventh century BC: ‘How long are you going to lie back? When will you be possessed of bold spirit, Young Men?’<sup>77</sup> And the same style of address can be found in the elegies of Tyrtaeus and Solon. Theognis’ exhortations, however, though equally concerned with the community, are not addressed to the community. Like Achilles and Patroclus taking counsel with each other in the councils of the Achaeans, Theognis imparts confidences, secret knowledge that isolates the pair from the community in a kind of conspiratorial collusion. Just as Theognis the poet provides Cynrus with a route to panhellenic fame, so the figure of Cynrus provides the poet with a route to panhellenic symposia, above faction, above any particular community, but not, of course, above class. Cynrus is, in effect, a by-product of an attempt at a triangulation, a rising above stasis. This makes it hard to use this relationship as evidence for the history of homosexuality. In particular, the so-called ‘pedagogical’ nature of the relationship need not be a reflection of a norm or an ideal of Archaic homosexuality, but of the poet’s panhellenic ambition. For what in Theognis is called pedagogy is in other Elegiacs called paraenetic. In other words the pedagogy is informed by the genre, not (necessarily) by the Greek Homosexuality.

### *Ibycus*

Along with Alcaeus, Cicero flags up two other poets as distinguished for their homosexual lustfulness: Ibycus and Anacreon.<sup>78</sup> Centuries earlier, transvestite Agathon had already joined these two with Alcaeus as typical of the succulent luxuriousness (*chlidê*) of the ‘Ionian’ style.<sup>79</sup> The same trio appears again in a scholium to Pindar (ad *Isthmians* 2.1b) as precursors of Pindar in their labours *peri ta paidika*. But their political context was very different. Alcaeus, like Theognis, had presented himself as an opponent of tyrants or of a prospective tyranny, but the poets with whom Alcaeus was associated, as forming a group of typically soft, homoerotomaniacal Ionians, seem to have spent a significant part of their careers in Samos, working for, or at least at the pleasure of, tyrants – in particular for Polycrates of Samos and/or his dynasty.<sup>80</sup>

What makes this particularly odd is the tradition preserved by the Aristotelian Hieronymus of Rhodes that Polycrates attacked institutions of same-sex *erôs*:

So because of *erôtes* such as these, the tyrants (for these *philiai* are at war with them) tried completely to suppress *paidikoi erôtes*, cutting them off on all sides. There are some who even set fire to palaestras, and demolished them, as counter-walls, as it were, to their own citadels; this is what Polycrates did, tyrant of the Samians.

<sup>77</sup> Callinus 1.1-2.

<sup>78</sup> Cic. *Tusc.* 4.71.

<sup>79</sup> Ar. *Them.* 159-63.

<sup>80</sup> G. Shipley, *A history of Samos* (Oxford 1987) 71-72 reconstructs the dynasty as follows: ‘The dynasty began with Syloson I [‘certainly’ an ancestor of Polycrates] (c. 590). By c. 560 Aiakes I was tyrant; he educated his son Polycrates to take over the reins of power, which he did ... but there is evidence of an interruption after Aiakes I ...’.

Thomas Scanlon plausibly connects this tradition to evidence for a Samian festival of freedom, Eleutheria, associated with the founding of a gymnasium dedicated to Eros.<sup>81</sup> Graham Shipley, following J. P. Barron, suggests that the gymnasium and the festival were established by the aristocrats, the Geomoroï, during the presumed hiatus in tyrannical rule between the ousting of Polycrates' father Aeaces and the return of his sons.<sup>82</sup> It is surely significant, if only on the principle of the *lectio difficilior*, that such a tradition of Polycrates' hostility to the 'erôs of the *palaestras*' persisted for so long, despite Polycrates' association with these two famously/notoriously boy-besotted poets. But, then, if the tradition is indeed true, the paradox remains; at first glance, Samos under Polycrates would seem the least likely place for songs like these.

Here we can no longer avoid some mostly unresolved problems of chronology, regarding both the Samian tyranny and the lives of the two poets associated with it.<sup>83</sup> Polycrates' tyranny ended in c. 522 BC. Eusebius gives a date for his coup in c. 533 and Thucydides seems roughly to agree, placing Polycrates' thalassocracy after the Persian conquest of Ionia c. 530 (1.13.6). Historians, however, have thought that a mere decade does not allow enough time for those building works associated with Polycrates by Aristotle, the so-called *Polykrateia erga* (*Pol.* 5.1313b), that Thucydides has misunderstood some synchronism in his source and that Eusebius followed Thucydides in his error; there is therefore a widespread tendency to follow B. M. Mitchell in backdating Polycrates' coup to around c. 540 or earlier.<sup>84</sup>

Ibycus' move to Samos, on the other hand, was dated to the 54<sup>th</sup> Olympiad (564–1) and the time of Croesus by Suda, while Cyril of Alexandria dates his floruit to 59<sup>th</sup>

<sup>81</sup> Hieronymus of Rhodes fr. 34 (Wehrli) a Ath. 13.602d, T. F. Scanlon, *Eros and Greek athletics* (Oxford 2002) 266-69, with notes. We should note that the foundation of a cult of Eros in the gymnasium of the Academy in Athens, likewise associated with a festival, the Panathenaea, would therefore belong to approximately the same period, Pausanias 1.30.1 with Musti-Beschi *ad loc.*

<sup>82</sup> Shipley, *History of Samos* (n.80, above) 72 n.14 *cf.* 90.

<sup>83</sup> The entries in the Suda for the famous names of sixth-century Samos represent an extreme case of inconsistent and disparate dates. M. Ornaghi, 'I policrati ibicei. Ibico, Anacreonte, Policrate e la cronografia dei poeti della "corte" di Samo', *Annali Online di Ferrara – Lettere* 1 (2008) 14-72 [<http://annali.unife.it/lettere/2008vol1/ornaghi.pdf>] provides all the relevant texts and their variant readings/emendments, in this exhaustive analysis of the way the chronographic traditions in Suda (Hesychius) and Eusebius worked, and of how those chronologies are reflected in literature, without attempting to determine their veracity.

<sup>84</sup> B. M. Mitchell, 'Herodotus and Samos', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 95 (1975) 75-91, followed by Shipley, *History of Samos* (n.80, above), who is in turn followed by *e.g.* Ornaghi, 'I policrati ibicei' (n.83, above) 14 n.1 and M. H. Hansen and T. H. Nielsen, *The inventory of Archaic and Classical poleis* (Oxford and New York 2004). There seems no doubt however that, like the Pisistratids with the temple of Olympian Zeus, Polycrates can have done not much more than to lay the foundations for one of the works (which are ascribed by Herodotus not to Polycrates but to 'the Samians'), the temple of Hera. And generally speaking the arguments put forward do not seem to me to warrant such a widespread consensus for disregarding Eusebius' (and/or Thucydides') datifications, *cf.* also G. O. Hutchinson, *Greek lyric poetry: A selection of larger pieces* (Oxford 2001) 258: 'The grounds for beginning the reign in the 540s are in any case weak'.



Olympiad (544-40) and Eusebius (probably) to year one of the 60<sup>th</sup> Olympiad (540/39).<sup>85</sup> After a slight, plausible and widely accepted (though nevertheless highly consequential) emendation Suda seems further to mark Ibycus' arrival in Samos as 'when the father of Polycrates the tyrant ruled it'.<sup>86</sup> Ornaghi, moreover, plausibly argues that references to Polycrates and his brothers as 'the sons of Aeaces' (DL 2.5) and the fact that Polycrates killed his older brother while simply exiling his younger brother indicate something like an Aeacid dynasty, with an assumption of primogeniture.<sup>87</sup> Finally, Shipley and West agree that an earlier tyrant called Syloson mentioned by Polyaeus (6.45), whom Shipley dates to around 590 BC was very probably an older member of the same family. David Asheri, therefore, fairly summarises the current consensus: 'the hypothesis of a powerful tyranny before Polycrates has today a rather solid foundation; but the exact genealogical reconstruction is still uncertain'.<sup>88</sup>

Ibycus seems then to have begun his career in Rhegium in Southern Italy. He may or may not have travelled to Leontini, Sparta, and/or Sicyon to fulfil his earliest commissions. As his fame grew he went to Samos at the invitation, or at least at the pleasure, of a senior member of Polycrates' family, probably his father, Aeaces, probably himself a – or more probably the – dominant citizen at the time. This was possibly as early as the late 560s BC or as late as the 540s. He may or may not have witnessed/survived the presumed ousting of the family in the 540s or 530s and/or the subsequent coup in the 540s or 530s that brought Polycrates himself to power.<sup>89</sup> Only one late source, the novel *Metiochus and Parthenope*, puts Ibycus in the court of Polycrates in his pomp.<sup>90</sup>

<sup>85</sup> On Cyril, Ornaghi, 'I polibrati ibicei' (n.83, above) 14-15 and n.2. On the problems with Eusebius' text, see L. Woodbury's discussion in 'Ibycus and Polycrates', *Phoenix* 39 (1985) 193-220 (218-20) of the arguments of Alden Mosshammer. Similarly discrepant (and impossible) alternative dates are also found for Polycrates/Anacreon. The most probable explanation for this mess is that Anacreon was strongly associated with Polycrates, and Ibycus was seen to have preceded Anacreon in Samos, and that some indication in Ibycus of an earlier date, e.g. a reference to Croesus, sometimes led chronographers to yank the whole trio up the timeline, regardless of other evidence, or indeed common sense, cf. Woodbury, 'Ibycus and Polycrates' (this n.) 217-18, Ornaghi, 'I polibrati ibicei' (n.83, above) n.82.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. e.g. M. L. West, 'Melica', *Classical Quarterly* 20 (1970) 205-15 (208: 'to me it seems obviously right').

<sup>87</sup> Ornaghi, 'I polibrati ibicei' (n.83, above) 53.

<sup>88</sup> Asheri *ad* Hdt 3.39.1.

<sup>89</sup> The fact that (following the plausible and widely accepted emendation) Suda's three synchronisms [54<sup>th</sup> Olympiad > Croesus > father of Polycrates] are all (potentially) consistent and that the latter synchronism seems confirmed by fr. 282 (=S151) in honour of a young Polycrates, combined with the fact that Ibycus has been considered by ancient and modern readers alike very close in lots of different ways to Stesichorus (whom Suda dates c. 632-c. 556) make the early date more likely; personally, I find it hard to see poets as different as Anacreon and Ibycus singing duets at courtly symposia or even belonging to the same cultural milieu. We should also note that Ibycus was not said to be long-lived and that his *opera omnia* comprised just 7 volumes. Indeed he was said to have died an untimely death, murdered by pirates – *n.b.*: the Samians being the pirates *par excellence* at this time. Finally it is easy to see how references to a young Polycrates (e.g. in fr. 282) could have caused Ibycus to be down-dated, but it is hard to see how he could have been 'up-dated'

As for the character of Ibycus' poetry, he was said to have 'tuned his lyre Dorian style'. Although he was from a Euboean colony that employed an Ionic dialect, he used forms of words that show the closest affinity with those of Stesichorus, *i.e.* a form of non-Laconian Doric with *e.g.* Homeric genitives in *-oio* and Homericizing epithets and adjectives. From the remaining fragments, his songs seem to have been much longer and denser than those of *e.g.* Anacreon. The division of his songs into sets of three stanzas is another unusual feature that is shared only with Stesichorus among his antecedents/contemporaries. A feature more peculiar to Ibycus is the piling up of epithets and adjectives around a proper name, a feature that dismayed earlier scholars such as Bowra and Page.<sup>91</sup> Because of these features it was long assumed that Ibycus wrote songs to be performed by trained choruses. More recent scholars are less certain about that. One fragment refers to the accompaniment of an *aulete*, but Ibycus was also said to have invented the *iambykê* and to have sung to the lyre.<sup>92</sup> For all his fondness for short syllables, Ibycus doesn't trip off the tongue like Anacreon, and his dialect will have seemed natural nowhere outside the higher cultural echelons of Magna Graecia, and though he is never as difficult as, say, Pindar, he would certainly have required a bit of practice.

As for the content, Ibycus was singled-out by Cicero and Suda as 'the most erotomaniacal about Striplings' (*erôtomanestatos peri meirakia*).<sup>93</sup> Likewise for the Hellenistic poets, Ibycus was 'he who loved the lyre and who loved boys'.<sup>94</sup> References in the fragments to figures of myth and epic led earlier scholars to suggest that there must have been another kind of Ibycus, writing of the myths of Heracles and Troy in the lyric-epic style of Stesichorus of Himera.<sup>95</sup> So in his 1833 edition and commentary, Friedrich Wilhelm Schneidewin separated Ibycus' works into 'Carmina heroico-lyrica' and 'Carmina amatoria et ludicra', with the more Stesichoran works belonging to his early years in Southern Italy, the latter to Samos. When the long Fragment 282 was published in 1922, Maurice Bowra thought he had discovered the very moment when Ibycus switched: 'He touches lightly on the many themes of heroic song, only to announce this is what he is *not* going to sing'.<sup>96</sup> Although some still cling to that narrative, for most recent scholars, the lesson of fr. 282 along with the rather consistent testimonia, is that Ibycus combined panhellenic myth and other topics, principally *paidikoi erôtes*, in a manner that foreshadows the epinician poets of the late Archaic period, and that meanwhile there is still no cogent evidence for the existence of this other Ibycus of extensive stand-alone epic narratives.<sup>97</sup> 'The hypothesis that Ibycus'

(perhaps dragging Polycrates/Anacreon with him) without some strong indication in his own songs, *i.e.* references to Croesus, as Woodbury, 'Ibycus and Polycrates' (n.85, above) suggests.

<sup>90</sup> Ornaghi, 'I policrati ibicei' (n.83, above) 42.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. Woodbury, 'Ibycus and Polycrates' (n.85, above) 194-95.

<sup>92</sup> Hutchinson, *Greek lyric poetry* (n.84, above) 234.

<sup>93</sup> Suda sv 'Ibycus', Iota 80.

<sup>94</sup> AP 7.714 'ton phileonta lurên phileonta de paidas', cf. 9.184.

<sup>95</sup> *I.e.* from the 37<sup>th</sup> to the 56<sup>th</sup> Olympiad, Suda sv 'Stesichorus', Sigma 1095.

<sup>96</sup> M. Bowra, *Landmarks in Greek literature* (London 1966) 95.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. E. Krummen, 'Alcman, Stesichorus and Ibycus', in *The Cambridge companion to Greek lyric*, ed. F. Budelmann (Cambridge 2009) 189-203 (199). B. MacLachlan, 'Ibycus', in *A companion to*

references to myth came mainly in songs for individuals looks more and more plausible with each accession of evidence; the notion of long purely narrative poems has virtually no positive support'.<sup>98</sup>

Even if the fragment does not after all contain a reference to a turning-point in Ibycus' production, it remains very interesting. For the list of heroes culminates with three young beauties admired by Greeks and Trojans alike for their loveliness of form (*eroessan morphan*): Cyanippus, Zeuxippus, and Troilus. 'For them, forever, is a share in beauty. And you too, Polycrates', Ibycus concludes (ll. 46-48) 'will have undying fame (*kleos aphthiton*) in accordance with my song and my fame.' Whether Polycrates is here assumed to be a young member of a/the dominant family, a Samian Troilus, which seems by far the most likely possibility, or the famous tyrant himself in his prime, we see same-sex *erôs* being used for the first time not to combat 'tyrants', nor to warn against them, but to celebrate them and to support their monarchical regime.<sup>99</sup>

In one sense, then, this is by far the most straightforwardly political – even propagandistic – example of Greek Love we have hitherto come across. Eveline Krummen suggests that 'Ibycus' goal was to integrate the thalassocracy of Polycrates and current imperial politics into the glorious past ...'.<sup>100</sup> On the other hand one can, if one tries, detect a little more subtlety, to go no further, in the poet. He refers to Polycrates very briefly and he doesn't exactly say that Polycrates is as beautiful and desirable as Troilus, although the *kai su* may well lead us to expect that – another example of the misdirections and sharp turns that former critics such as Denys Page and Bowra found dilatory or tedious and that modern critics admire – Ibycus also reminds Polycrates of what he owes to his poet in a manner that will become familiar with later epinician *encomia*.

Bonnie MacLachlan *would* go further. Noting that much earlier in the poem, there is reference to the sufferings of the sack of Troy and to the role of the beauty of Helen in that tragedy, she observes that Ibycus 'allows the danger that lurks beneath beauty to be contrapuntal to a song of praise'.<sup>101</sup> This does not quite prove that Ibycus was a secretly subversive poet, as many have argued with regard to Roman imperial flatterers, but that sense of imminent danger, that negative subtext, is all the more pointed if we notice in the poet's long list of things he will not or cannot (*anônumon* l. 15) talk about, the particular emphasis on the sufferings of 'slim-ankled Cassandra and Priam's other children' (ll. 12-15),

*the Greek lyric poets*, ed. D. E. Gerber (Leiden 1997) 187-97, however, notes that some ancient readers ascribed to Ibycus a 'Funeral games of Pelias' (Ath. 4.172d), while Chamaeleon (fr. 25 Wehrli) ascribed *paidika* to Stesichorus (189-90, nn. 12 and 15; cf. 190-91).

<sup>98</sup> Hutchinson, *Greek lyric poetry* (n.84, above) 230.

<sup>99</sup> Hutchinson, *Greek lyric poetry* (n.84, above) 232-33 accepts that this Polycrates is the future tyrant, but does not accept that his father Aeaces was more than a powerful nobleman, on the grounds that Herodotus makes no mention of a previous tyranny. I agree with West, 'Melica' (n.86, above) 207, however, that the Polycrates of fr. 282 seems special: 'We have some idea of the kind of piece that Ibycus or Anacreon wrote about ordinary *paides kaloi*, and it was nothing like this'.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.* 202. The point is still valid if Ibycus is referring to the Samos of Polycrates' father, though Hutchinson, *Greek lyric poetry* (n.84, above) 237 would demur.

<sup>101</sup> MacLachlan, 'Ibycus' (n.97, above) 197.

prominent among whom, of course, was Troilus, who died a horrible death because of the passion his beauty provoked in Achilles, and who was the subject of another poem.<sup>102</sup>

Ibycus seems to have named other lovely boys, but the ancient tradition does not identify him with a single, or a series of, special ‘beloveds’ to compare with Theognis’ Cynrus, Alcaeus’ Lycus, or Anacreon’s Bathyllus, Cleobulus, or Megistes .... Judging from the scholiast to Apollonius of Rhodes, there was one song, and only one, known as ‘the one to Gorgias’, and it mentioned Zeus’ abduction of Ganymede and Dawn’s of Tithonus, presumably in a way that was flattering to the addressee.<sup>103</sup> Another (fr. 288) addressed one Euryalus, mythologizing him as offshoot of the Graces, darling of the Seasons, nursling of Peitho and Aphrodite.<sup>104</sup> Another (fr. 282 Bii, fr. 1), finally, is entitled ‘Callias’ and refers to boasts and praise in a way familiar from later epinician *encomia* in praise of well-born athletes.<sup>105</sup> That does not necessarily mean that they are ‘epinician’. It is more likely, given Ibycus’ reputation that the world of the gymnasium and general athletic excellence was incorporated into the praise of well-born *kaloï*, just as Athenian vase-painters presented images of their own local *kaloï* in the gymnasium. Still, it would be surprising to learn that Ibycus’ extravagantly hymned boys were handsome slaves.

So maybe these songs pre-date (or post-date) Ibycus’ time at court. But as Kantzios observes, not all of the elite abandoned their lands to go into permanent opposition/exile on the arrival of a tyrant, and as a rule many of them (eventually) worked with the new regime: the Penthelidae in Lesbos and indeed Alcaeus himself, according to one tradition, made an accommodation with the Lesbian tyrants; the Philaids, Alcmaeonids, and Gephyraioi *etc.* with the Pisistratid tyrants in Athens. As Robin Osborne puts it, ‘The Samos of Polykrates might seem ... to be not so very different from the Mytilene of Pittakos with a charismatic ruler keeping precarious control over a prospering but resentful elite’.<sup>106</sup> So one possibility is that these beloved boys are the scions of families related to, or close to, the regime and the celebration of their attractions perhaps a kind of favour of the tyrant’s court, like the Spanish monarchs lending out Velasquez or some other court-painter to paint a portrait of a favourite minister’s son. It has also been suggested that the song that mentions the piper may have been written for a Spartan inasmuch as it mentions Castor and Pollux (282Ai = S166). This is not much to build any kind of theory on, but there were unusually close ties between Sparta and Samos and at least one Spartiate was present on the island around the middle of the century to dedicate a

<sup>102</sup> Fr. 282B v; on Troilus, see Davidson, *The Greeks and Greek love* (n.8, above) 281-84.

<sup>103</sup> Schol. A Rhod. 3.114-17b [= fr. 289]: ‘en tēi eis Gorgian ôidēi’ *cf.* the papyrus commentary Oxy 2637 [= fr. 282B vii]: ‘Gorgia’.

<sup>104</sup> Euryalus is an extremely uncommon name.

<sup>105</sup> J. Barron, ‘Ibycus: *Gorgias* and other poems’, *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 31 (1984) 13-24 (20-22) suggested the poem was written to celebrate the victories of the Athenian Callias son of Phaenippus in horse-races/chariot-races at Olympia and Delphi in 564 BC; see D. G. Kyle, *Athletics in ancient Athens* (Leiden 1993) Appendix B # A30 203. Whether this is reckless speculation or a brilliant guess on Barron’s part, future discoveries may decide. Although more than twice as many Calliases are known from Attica than from any other region, it is an unusually common name in all regions.

<sup>106</sup> R. Osborne, *Greece in the making: 1200-479 BC* (London 1996) 279.

bronze lion to Hera.<sup>107</sup> It is perhaps just a coincidence (and not a particularly startling one!) that a poet working in Samos should refer to the national heroes of its most closely connected city, or perhaps Ibycus was used to creating elaborate poetic objects to be exchanged with foreign guests – an instrument, in other words, of foreign policy.

Students have noticed other peculiar features in the meagre remains of Ibycus' poetry: a heightened subjectivity combined with abstraction, *i.e.* a lot of talk about how he feels and what it is like to be in love, and at the same time a disconnectedness from the object of desire who often seems, at least in the fragments that have survived, to be anonymous. He also mythicizes and aestheticizes his objects, Euryalus, for example: the term *kalos* is unusually prominent, far more frequent in Ibycus than in his predecessors. In these respects the antecedent poet he most closely resembles is Sappho, who was, of course, formally excluded from citizen politics by her sex.

### *Anacreon*

There is nothing in the much more numerous fragments of Anacreon to compare with Ibycus' praise of Polycrates in fr. 282. But, according to Strabo 'his *opera omnia* was full of references to Polycrates', while Himerius (28.2) says that he sang of the *tuchê* of Polycrates in the context of a festival of Hera in a manner comparable to Pindar's praise of Hiero in *Olympians 1*.<sup>108</sup> It is to be hoped that when Himerius (47.1) quotes a line of Anacreon to begin an *encomium* to the proconsul Basilius – 'Hail dear light with a smile upon your charming face' (fr. 380) – he is not giving us a sample of the manner in which he flattered Polycrates. Some other fragments have been used as evidence that Anacreon was prepared to use his poetry to serve the regime, with mocking references *e.g.* to some rebellious fishermen (interestingly addressed to Megistes, apparently one of his beloveds), or the warriors of Ialysus. To this list, one might well add the jokey (or 'witty') reference to a Lesbian girl (a slave/prisoner-of-war?), the Lesbians being Polycrates' archenemies.<sup>109</sup>

At any rate, the association between the two, poet and patron, was not considered a tenuous one. Already in the fifth century BC, Herodotus pictures Polycrates as Anacreon's dining-companion.<sup>110</sup> Posidippus describes a seal of Polycrates designed with a lyre: '[You chose] as seal, Polycrates, the lyre of the singer man (*andros aoidou*) who used to play (*pho]rmiz[ontos*) at [your feet]' (9 AB). While Maximus of Tyre says that Anacreon 'debrutalised (*hêmerôsen*) Polycrates for the Samians by mixing into (*kerasas*) the tyranny *erôs* and the locks of Smerdies and Cleobulus and the pipes of Bathyllus and Ionian song' (37.5).

<sup>107</sup> Cf. Osborne, *Greece in the making* (n.106, above) 277-79.

<sup>108</sup> Strabo, *Geographica* 14.1,16: *pasa hê poiêsis esti plêrês tês peri autou mnêmês*.

<sup>109</sup> Fr. 353, 349. On Megistes' frequent presence in Anacreon cf. *Anth Plan.* 306, *AP* 7.25, 27, fr. 352, 416. The famous song (l. 358) about the Lesbian girl who isn't interested in him because she is a Lesbian and 'gapes after another girl' could be read in the context of Polycrates' great victories over the Lesbians; what Lesbians were there in Samos apart from prisoners-of-war? F. Budelmann, 'Anacreon and the *Anacreonta*', in *The Cambridge companion to Greek lyric*, ed. F. Budelmann (Cambridge 2009) 227-39 (232 n.23) also cites fr. 348, 371, 391, 401, 426, 505a, as hinting at politics.

<sup>110</sup> Hdt. 3.121.

Himerius, who knew his Anacreon, actually has an anecdote about Anacreon being brought to Samos by Aeaces, at the request of his son, then an *epebos*, and that it was through him that Polycrates learnt kingly virtue and so fulfilled his father's prayer.<sup>111</sup> This is further (slight) confirmation of the theory that Aeaces was himself tyrant and it shows interesting parallels with what Suda tells us about how Ibycus arrived on the island: 'the hypothesis that Ibycus and Anacreon went to Samos during his [*i.e.* Aeaces'] rule seems open to no objection'.<sup>112</sup> This hypothesis would mean, however, that Anacreon would have had to have survived the presumed ousting of Aeaces and Polycrates' subsequent *coup*; perhaps he followed his pupil into exile and returned with him, or perhaps he managed to rise above politics and accommodate himself to the interregnum and then to the (re-)establishment of Polycrates' tyranny. Anacreon was certainly a survivor; we know for sure he survived the end of Polycrates' regime in 522 BC and also the fall of the Pisistratids a decade later. So it is not beyond the realm of possibility to suggest that he survived an earlier coup or couple of coups. Anacreon was laughing all the way to a peaceful old age.

Anacreon is the third of Cicero's homo-lustful lyricists, and although not quite as 'bonkers about boys' as Ibycus, love seems to have dominated his *oeuvre* to an even greater extent so that Cicero can claim *Anacreontis quidem tota poesis est amatoria*.<sup>113</sup> These two apparently ubiquitous themes, Polycrates and love, must have overlapped occasionally, and it seems possible that the anecdotes about the shearing of Smerdies' hair, at least, derive from songs that mention the tyrant in something like a homoamatory context, even as Anacreon's rival for the affections of Smerdies.<sup>114</sup>

Anacreon was a very different kind of poet from Ibycus. From what remains of his *oeuvre* he seems to have written almost exclusively short, witty poems in Ionic, a dialect that would have been much more familiar to his audiences in Samos and Athens. Ever since antiquity he was characterised as a paragon of playfulness and simplicity (*apheleia*).<sup>115</sup> Recent scholars do not disagree: 'perhaps the chief characteristic of much of Anacreon's work is its simplicity and accessibility'.<sup>116</sup>

He was associated with a number of named boys. Who were they? Some have thought that the *kleos* element in Bathyllus, a form of Bathycles we are told by an ancient lexicographer, and Cleobulus indicate that they are not only not slaves but possibly of

<sup>111</sup> On this passage and its problematic text, *cf.* West, 'Melica' (n.85, above) 207-08; Ornaghi, 'I polycrati ibicei' (n.83, above) 52-58; R. J. Penella, *Man and the word: The Orations of Himerius* (Berkeley 2007) 81.

<sup>112</sup> West, 'Melica' (n.86, above) 208-09.

<sup>113</sup> Cic. *Tusc.* 4.71.

<sup>114</sup> On Polycrates and Smerdies Ath. 12.540e, Aelian *VH* 9.4, Stob. 4.21,24.

<sup>115</sup> Hermogenes, *Id.* 2.3.

<sup>116</sup> Budelmann, 'Anacreon and the *Anacreonta*' (n.108, above) 230. Budelmann (233-34) places this lack of difficulty alongside other features: 'distinctive', 'transferable', versatile ('the song suits different situations and different singers'), which he sees as part of a deliberate courting of popularity: 'one thing seems clear. Reperformance, by various singers and in various locations, is important for understanding Anacreon. It is not just accidental but is inscribed into at least one substantial group of his songs'.

aristocratic birth.<sup>117</sup> In his later years, under the early Athenian democracy, Anacreon certainly wrote songs in praise of the beauty of aristocrats, most famously for Critias, grandfather of the oligarch.<sup>118</sup> Apparently he also wrote one for ‘great Xanthippus’, which Himerius links to an early diversion to Athens en route to Polycrates’ court, although it may belong to the later period in which case this Xanthippus will be Pericles’ father, whose statue later stood by that of Anacreon on the Athenian Acropolis.<sup>119</sup> Fr. 364 is addressed to a pentathlete who throws the discus beautifully. On the other hand, Smerdies of the lovely locks is Thracian and could well be a slave, while ‘Samian Bathyllus’ seems to have been as famous for his *auloi* as Smerdies for his hair. Perhaps if not himself a slave, he was a professional, the court-*aulete*.

Despite the differences, Anacreon shares with Ibycus (and Sappho) an emphasis on subjectivity, with lots of first person singulars, leaps into imaginary places – Eros tossing him a purple ball in a playground where girls are playing – and leaps off imaginary places, such as the white rock of Leucas, and a similar kind of abstraction; his songs clearly travelled well.

#### *Politics and erôs on Samos*

We return to the question of how the poetry and, in particular, the homoamatory poetry of the ‘court-poets’ served a political purpose for their tyrant-masters, and how the construction of same-sex love in these songs may have been transformed by this peculiar political context. Most straightforwardly, for Bowra it was obvious that one reason for Ibycus’ ‘erotomaniac’ lyrics was because that was the kind of thing Polycrates liked: ‘[Ibycus’ poetry] was entirely consonant with Polycrates’ own tastes and conformed to the special version of “*l’amour courtois*” as it was cultivated at Samos’.<sup>120</sup> A later tradition assumed that Polycrates was in love not only with Smerdies but also Bathyllus (*Polycrati tyranno dilectus*).<sup>121</sup> Quite possibly then, Anacreon wrote Polycrates’ love-songs for him as it were. Others have focussed on what is perhaps the least controversial connection – the tyrants’ sponsorship of the arts:

The tyrants of both Samos and Athens engaged in large-scale policies of public display. Both undertook major architectural projects, both surrounded themselves with stars in various domains, and both probably instituted a set of musico-poetic competitions. In Athens Anacreon overlapped with Simonides, and in Samos probably with Ibycus. For both Polycrates and Hipparchus, acquiring Anacreon’s services was part of a larger cultural programme.

<sup>117</sup> *Etymologicum Genuinum* sv ‘Aristyllos’, cf. A. Lear, ‘Anacreon’s “Self”: An alternative role model for the Archaic elite male?’, *American Journal of Philology* 129 (2008) 47-76 (63-64).

<sup>118</sup> Fr. 412 a Schol. ad Aesch. *PV* 128; cf. Pl. *Chrm.* 157e.

<sup>119</sup> Fr. 491, a Himerius 39.10. On the statues, Pausanias 1.25.1 with Musti-Beschi *ad loc.*

<sup>120</sup> Bowra, *Landmarks* (n.95, above) 95. For Polycrates’ as himself a devotee of ‘intercourse with males’ – *peri tas tôn arrhenôn homilias eptoêmenos*, Ath. 12.540e.

<sup>121</sup> Apuleius *Flor.* 15.51, 54.

Anacreon's role in these programmes was probably less public than that of an engineer or an architect, or even that of a predominantly choral poet .... It is important to remember, however, that the (smallish) symposion may blend into the (largish) feast. Especially where Anacreon performed not so much as a member of a close-knit community but as a prized performer invited by a tyrant or a leading aristocrat, his host must have looked for ways of showing him off more widely. The surviving songs have all the characteristics of songs for private settings, but the divide between private and public will have been less strict at Anacreon's than Alcaeus' or Theognis' symposia.<sup>122</sup>

Budermann links the characteristic simplicity, adaptability, and transferability of Anacreon with the interests of his (tyrannical) patrons to maximize audiences through reperformance.<sup>123</sup> No one has ever ascribed such simplicity and accessibility to Ibycus. His songs with all their West Greek Doricisms, triadic stanzas, epicisms, mythifications, and piled-up epithets must rather have served as accumulations of cultural capital, elaborate and 'classy' luxury objects: *chlidê*. But the element of 'abstraction' and the use of especially panhellenic myths (Troy, Heracles) also made these fancy products transferable and exportable, if only among more practised performers. Further confirmation of the way the world of the poets might be connected to other artistic embellishments is the tradition that there was a beautiful statue of Bathyllus 'singing a song of Anacreon for friendship's sake(?)' dedicated by Polycrates, his admirer, next to the altar of Hera in Samos.<sup>124</sup> Like that statue, songs could serve to monumentalize court life.

For many others the key fact about love-poetry is that it is apolitical and yet still serves to bring members of a courtly symposium together in a kind of eroticized 'homosexuality'. The kind of love celebrated by Anacreon and Ibycus (*i.e.* non-reproductive, non-marital) 'plays into anti-communal postures .... Love poetry is a non-political way to promote feelings of fellowship and express separation from the normative demands of the community. Unsurprisingly, two of the major producers of sympotic love poetry, Ibykos and Anacreon, were associated with tyrants'.<sup>125</sup> For Kantzios it is the breakdown of aristocratic order and the consequent mingling of symposiasts with different backgrounds that forces the poets to turn to 'generic' themes such as love.<sup>126</sup> Lear even suggests 'one might almost regard Anacreon as a kind of tyrant's propagandist, encouraging elite adult males to concern themselves with private pleasures and leave public concerns to the tyrant.'<sup>127</sup>

But as we have seen, same-sex *erôs* could be closely connected to politics, not least on Samos. Ibycus' song in praise of young Polycrates only goes to confirm that, as perhaps does Anacreon's mention of rebels in a presumably intimate 'one-to-one'

<sup>122</sup> Budermann, 'Anacreon and the *Anacreonta*' (n.109, above) 228-29.

<sup>123</sup> Budermann, 'Anacreon and the *Anacreonta*' (n.109, above) 234.

<sup>124</sup> Apuleius *Flor.* 15.51, 54.

<sup>125</sup> E. Stehle, *Performance and gender in ancient Greece* (Princeton 1997) 250.

<sup>126</sup> I. Kantzios, 'Tyranny and the Symposion of Anacreon', *The Classical Journal* 100 (2005) 227-45 (232). Kantzios perhaps makes too much play of the social composition of the audiences in Samos under the tyrants for which there is so little evidence.

<sup>127</sup> Lear, 'Anacreon's "Self"' (n.117, above) 58-59.



conversation with his 'beloved' Megistes (fr. 353). So too do the traditions about Polycrates destroying the palaestras, especially if, as Shipley ingeniously suggests, he was destroying a particular gymnasium in honour of Eros attached to a festival of Eleutheria recently constructed to celebrate the ousting of some earlier members of his dynasty.<sup>128</sup> So *erôs* in Samos was not inherently apolitical but had to be *made* apolitical.

In fact many of the supposedly peculiar characteristics identified in 'Samian' same-sex love-poetry have been viewed as serving this project of depoliticization. So for Stehle, the songs 'show the speaker off as passionate and forceful and the object of passion as aestheticized. Whether virginal or provocative ... the unindividuated object becomes the focus of the whole group's feelings of desire ...'.<sup>129</sup> As Kantzios notes, there is an unusually high proportion of first person and second person singulars in Anacreon and yet he says very little about *who he is in the world*.<sup>130</sup> There is also a profusion of present tenses and of metasymphotic references, making him the poet of the here and now and of course of drinking, *i.e.* of the symposium: 'One of the most effective and least controversial topics is the very event that has brought his listeners together, that is, the symposion'.<sup>131</sup> In another context it has been argued that the poetry and imagery of the symposium have a general tendency to self-reflection *en abîme*, a '*spettacolo a se stesso*' in Rossi's famous formulation, but it may have its origins in the form of a deliberate and self-conscious narrowing of themes thanks to the peculiar political position of the poets writing under tyranny.<sup>132</sup>

Andrew Lear sees the political situation as an influence also on the way the 'Samian' poets treat their love-objects, whether non-citizen or slave or citizen or noble or free: 'what is most noteworthy about the social class of Anacreon's *eromenoi* is that he makes no strong distinction between a boy named Cleobulus and a boy named Smerdies'. Lear associates this with the 'bisexual' subjectivity of Anacreon's *oeuvre*, *i.e.* the fact that Anacreon talks of girls (also of mysterious status) in a similar fashion to the way he talks of boys: 'The kind of relationship that the Theognidea envision between poet/*erastes* and addressee/*eromenos* – simultaneously political, pedagogical, and erotic – could not, in Archaic Greece, obtain between men and women because both pedagogy and politics involved only males. Between

<sup>128</sup> Shipley, *History of Samos* (n.81, above) 72 n.14, *cf.* 90.

<sup>129</sup> Stehle, *Performance and gender* (n.125, above) 253.

<sup>130</sup> Kantzios, 'Tyranny and the symposion' (n.126, above) 232-34.

<sup>131</sup> Kantzios, 'Tyranny and the symposion' (n.126, above) 237-38. Kantzios sees similarities with Ibycus as confirmation of his theory: 'His work then, although different in meter, style, and expression from that of Anacreon, lies within the same thematic parameters and strengthens the view that there is indeed a connection between service at the courts and a particular type of thematography' (239). However references to Ibycus 'loving the lyre' and the fact that his imagined tomb was covered in ivy is not the best evidence for a profusion of metasymphotic references in his work.

<sup>132</sup> L. E. Rossi, 'Il simposio greco arcaico e classico come spettacolo a se stesso', in *Spettacoli conviviali dall' antichità classica alle corti italiane del '400*, (Viterbo, May 1983) (Viterbo 1985) 41-50.

men and women, only the erotic part of this relation could exist .... in Anacreon, disdain for politics and military action, disinterest in pedagogy, and “bisexuality” ... fit together ...’.<sup>133</sup>

To this one might add a further point about the homoamatory relationships revealed/presented by the ‘Samian’ poets. Both Alcaeus (in his use of the term *aïtas*) and Theognis seem to speak of a *hetaireic* homosexuality, something like an institutionalized same-sex relationship that finds close parallels in those relationships seen to operate between a lord and his faithful squire (*pistos hetairos, therapôn*) in the *Iliad*, most famously between Achilles and Patroclus his squire, who saddles up the horses like Theognis’ Cynus, and who serves the wine like Alcaeus’ *aïtas*. Such relationships served as part of the construction and maintenance of aristocratic *hetaireiai*. No such special one-to-one is indicated in Ibycus’ fragments, nor by any of his ancient readers. During his decade or so on Samos, Anacreon sang repeatedly of at least four ‘beloveds’: Smerdies the Thracian, Bathyllus, Cleobulus, and Megistes; later in Athens he also seems to have sung of the beauty of Critias in a similar way, but I doubt very much that the song(s) ever constructed this relationship as a solid and permanent one, comparable to that of a Thessalian *erastês* with his *aïtas*.

We need, of course, to remember how little we know: how little we know about the biographies of the poets, about the history of the Samian tyrannies, about the dating of different poems and therefore about the political circumstances under which any particular poems were composed or performed. Anacreon may have spent less than a quarter of his life in the courts of tyrants, and we still cannot be absolutely sure that Ibycus spent any time at all at a tyrant’s court. But there are some striking similarities between the two despite their very different styles, and some striking differences from the third member of the soft-living Ionian homoerotomaniacal trio – Alcaeus. We recall how often ancient readers were puzzled or disappointed about his ‘lapses’ into love and ludicra, but we also noted how often the world of love and the symposium on the one hand and the world of politics and war on the other were juxtaposed or even intertwined, even in the paltry remnants that have survived. The world of ‘Dionysus and Muses and Venus and her clinging son’ seems to have been constructed as respite or time-off or even as a refuge from civil warring.<sup>134</sup> In Ibycus and Anacreon, however, one side of that equation, the warlike and political side, has been drastically reduced, or exiled into the heroic past, as if they had permanently moored their boats ‘on a soggy shore’, as if they were enjoining their audiences’ ‘*carpe diem*’ without engaging in any dangerous activities that might cut their days any shorter. Any kind of dialogic alternation has become an internal conversation about the travails not of war but of love. For Ibycus (fr. 286), the wintry weather is now another form of emotional subjectivity, not a political storm roaring outside the safety of the cushiony fluff of the symposium.

In the case of Alcaeus we argued that intrusions of subjectivity, if only in the form of ‘getting personal’ (not least in lapses of taste whether of a vituperative or lustfully eyebrow-raising manner) could have served the function of constructing an honest intimacy with his intimates: *parrhêsia*. Ibycus too ‘bares his soul’, but does so in a way that seems to establish no shared or confessional rapport. In fact, it is so extremely

<sup>133</sup> Lear, ‘Anacreon’s “Self”’ (n.117, above) 64-65. Generally I am far more doubtful about the centrality of anything that might usefully be described as ‘pedagogy’ in Greek Love and many might dispute the total absence of pedagogy from e.g. the work of Sappho.

<sup>134</sup> Horace, *Carmina* 1.32.9-11, see here p. 8.

erotomaniacal it puts him beyond us and makes us his observers rather than confidants. It doesn't help of course that he is writing in a peculiar poetic dialect, natural neither to him nor his audiences, a 'front' that is presented as seamless, unperforated by lapses of 'personal language'. Although Anacreon speaks much more plainly, his wit and sophistication also serve to construct a more contrived self. It is very interesting that Athenaeus thought Alcaeus sounded as if he was composing under the influence, while Anacreon, despite his subject-matter, never was.<sup>135</sup> Instead the abstracted 'I' of these two poets becomes something more like a universalizing or even generic 'I' in the case of Anacreon, and a deracinated or dislodged 'I' in the case of Ibycus – an exportable 'I', at any rate, like that of Theognis, and quite unlike that of Alcaeus, so firmly rooted in a real, local, and contemporary world, full of local and contemporary details.

Finally we return again to the problem of the fact that Anacreon, at least, wrote at the pleasure of a tyrant known to later tradition as one who suppressed pederasty and razed *palaestras* on the grounds that they were centres of opposition. In particular, all four of Anacreon's much-talked-of and fondly remembered 'beloveds' (Bathyllus, Cleobulus, Megistes, and Smerdies) are linked to Samos and Polycrates. But if we look at the nature of the songs Anacreon wrote, they do not necessarily contradict a politics in confrontation with the *erôs* of the *palaestras*. In fact, we could argue that by including so much homoamatory verse in his collection, but by romanticizing even trivializing the relationships as part of a purely personal drama – *ludicra* – and by aestheticizing and objectifying his love-objects, some of whom might even be slaves, Anacreon was willy-nilly furthering Polycrates' policy of suppressing *hetaireic* homosexuality of the kind that we find in Alcaeus and Theognis. In other words his songs were supplanting a dangerous version of Greek homosexuality with a soft and safe, non-aristocratic, even popular version, not just apolitical but depoliticizing.

*Conclusion: Politics, poetics, and same-sex erôs in the Archaic period*

What seems clear at any rate is that the construction of Greek homosexuality in the works of the four most famous homoamatory poets of the Archaic period varies considerably depending on the politics of the poet in question and his poetics: the genre in which he is composing, the audiences he anticipates, the construction of his speaking Self, his metre, his style, his lexicon, and his tone. A tradition of the *pistos philos, hetairos*, a one-to-one relationship of devotion especially between a warrior and his *therapôn*, was powerfully present in the culture. In myths of devoted and even self-sacrificing same-sex pairs, Achilles and Patroclus, Heracles and Iolaus, reinforced through retelling in epic, through cults of Eros, cult-aetiologies, through images such as the ubiquitous images of Achilles avenging Antilochus by fighting Memnon, though he knew it would mean his death, and even everyday oaths, the Megarians swearing 'By Diocles' (who died for his beloved), the Thebans 'By Iolaus' (first seen at Heracles' side in a brooch of the seventh century BC).<sup>136</sup>

This model of the *pistos philos, hetairos* survived well into the Classical period, and is reflected in Plato, Aeschines' speech *Against Timarchos*, and much later in Theocritus and

<sup>135</sup> Ath. 10.429ab.

<sup>136</sup> See Davidson, *The Greeks and Greek love* (n.8, above) 17-18, 256-60, 271-78, 288-89, 381-88, 486-87 etc.

Plutarch's *Amatorius*. Indeed it was reinforced by more cults and statues, and the stories that went with them, notably Harmodius and Aristogeiton in the agora of Athens with a joint tomb (and indeed tomb-cult) outside the Academy. This *hetaireic* homosexuality is assumed especially in the 'Cyrnus-block' of the Theognid poems, notably in the poet's request to Cyrnus to put bits on the horses and his expectation that they will die side-by-side. But the companionship of 'Cyrnus' also serves Theognis' poetic purposes as a guarantor of his own authenticity within the promiscuous environment of rounds of miscegenated elegy, as a mark of distinctive detail in songs otherwise so devoid of local detail that classical readers could not even be sure which city he came from, and therefore as a mark of his politics of authenticity. Historians of sexuality should be careful therefore about assuming that the pedagogic element in this relationship is not merely a product of these other concerns, *i.e.* the use of a kind of poetry, elegy, well-suited to epigrammatic statements of wisdom *gnômai* and *parainetic*, which in this case is presented in the form not of a communal 'We' but of a dyadic 'You and me'.

The *hetaireic* homosexuality is present also in Alcaeus, but here it is joined with a different view of homosexuality that led later readers to be astonished at his 'softness' and erotomania. Here for the first time we see the possibility of same-sex *erôs* in a dialogue with politics and war, representing an escape from the storms outside. There is also, although this has to be reconstructed almost entirely from indirect references to his work from ancient readers, a heightened amatory subjectivity: dwelling on a mole on a boy's finger or on Lycus' dark eyes and hair – more personal, confessional, letting his guard down, sounding to later readers 'drunk'. But again, such an unguarded voice could also serve a *hetaireic* purpose, creating a bond of intimate speech, *parrhêsia* appropriate for intimates: 'wine, dear boy, and truthfulness' (fr. 366). There is also evidence that praise went hand in hand with vituperation of those who had betrayed him, addressing one *erômenos* 'you used to be *philos*', addressing another, apparently, as '*ponêros*' (see here p. 14).

Ancient readers noticed a similar kind of extreme homo-*erôtikos* subjectivity in Ibycus and Anacreon, both of whom seem to have spent time with Polycrates and his family on Samos. They too talk of themselves as lovers in the first person, they too dwell on a boy's beauty, on his lovely hair and bashful eyes, but this 'soft' erotomaniac homosexuality has here lost its alternation with politics and war. Ibycus mythicized his objects of praise, and the sufferings of war he won't mention are those of the siege of Troy. Instead he seems to have elaborated his homoamatory subjectivity to the extent that the abstracted and disconnected experiences of the admirer come to the fore at the expense of the beloveds, who may be nameless or the addressee of just one poem each. Anacreon on the other hand creates a cast of comely characters mentioned often in his work. Symptomatic themes of love and wine seemed to ancient readers to monopolize his work, and the boys are no longer addressed as aristocrats or citizens, indeed some of them seem to be musicians, like Bathyllus, or even slaves, like Smerdies. Again we must be careful about reading these statements of homosexuality as reflections of a discrete history of homosexuality. Students of literature have argued persuasively that the lovelorn 'I's of the 'Samian' poets rather reflect the restricted thematology of songs sung for tyrants, a specifically depoliticized or even depoliticizing *erôs* (see here p. 33).

Ancient readers frequently express surprise or shock that 'serious' ancient poets could descend to 'playful' or 'lustful' topics. In the nineteenth century this led to love lyrics

being assigned to different phases of a poet's career, to different volumes of his works and occasionally even to different authors. As more fragments have been discovered, however, this strict separation has become untenable. In the Archaic period, the soft and the hard, the playful and the earnest, the elevated and the low, politics and *erôs* were already intertwined.

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## EROTIC *CHARIS*: WHAT SORTS OF RECIPROACITY? \*

NICK FISHER

### *Introduction*

The range of meanings and uses of the crucial moral and aesthetic term *charis* is notoriously varied, complex, and elusive. This paper focuses on erotic *charis*, its relations to other forms of *charis*, and also to other terms such as *erôs* and *philia*.<sup>1</sup> In general, I hold with many recent scholars that *charis* was a wide-ranging but broadly coherent concept, covering many aspects of shared or collective pleasures and reciprocal activities.<sup>2</sup> One may divide uses of the term into two main categories, which operate on different time scales. First, there are the cases where the primary sense is the synchronic feelings of pleasure combined with shared goodwill at a single period of time: leading examples are the *charis* of love and sex; the impact of the ‘physical charm’ or ‘winsomeness’ of a beautiful person or sight on another individual or a group; commensality at feasts, *symposia*, and other parties; and shared performances of music, drama, dancing, and singing (often in association with the Muses). Second, there is the longer-term *charis* evidenced in one or more chains of good will, such as good deeds, thanks, gratitude, return, and payback. These are all indications of a continuing relationship over time of mutual acts of reciprocal benefits, involving a continuing sense of variable and negotiable obligations on recipients to respond in adequate, or more than adequate, terms. These benefits may be good and moral, or improper and

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. other recent papers where I consider other aspects of the concept: N. Fisher, ‘The pleasures of reciprocity: *Charis* and the athletic body in Pindar’, in *Penser et représenter le corps dans l’antiquité*, eds F. Prost and J. Wilgaux (Rennes 2006) 227-46; ‘The bad boyfriend, the flatterer and the sycophant: Related forms of the *kakos* in democratic Athens’, in *KAKOS: Badness and antivalue in Classical antiquity*, eds I. Sluiter and R. M. Rosen (Leiden 2008) 185-232; ‘*Kharis*, *Kharites*, festivals, and social peace in the Classical Greek city’, in *Valuing others in Classical antiquity*, eds I. Sluiter and R. M. Rosen (Leiden 2010) 71-112.

<sup>2</sup> See e.g. B. MacLachlan, *The age of grace: Charis in early Greek poetry* (Princeton 1993); R. Parker, ‘Pleasing thighs: Reciprocity in Greek religion’, in *Reciprocity in ancient Greece*, eds C. Gill, N. Postlethwaite and R. Seaford (Oxford 1998) 227-54; V. Azoulay, *Xenophon et les grâces du pouvoir* (Paris 2004); J. Davidson, *The Greeks and Greek love* (London 2007).

immoral, either because the balance of reciprocity is unequal or exploitative, or because the motives or advantages for either of the parties are immoral in themselves; even though they may be pleasurable or beneficial for those involved, they are damaging for others or for the community.

But these two senses are conceptually linked: in most cases of immediate pleasure there can be felt an implication of social relationships which should continue, and granting and receiving benefits usually involves shared pleasure. An equally important point, as I argue in more detail elsewhere,<sup>3</sup> is that it is misleading to restrict understanding or acceptance of any of the positive values involved in this complex concept to a narrow social group ('aristocrats' or 'elites'). These senses of *charis* constituted, in my view, values held dear by Greeks of all social classes and periods, who readily saw that varied relationships of this type, which were in principle lasting, made major contributions to the cohesiveness of their communities or social groups.

Here the focus is on erotic *charis*, and I take as convenient starting points some ideas put forward in James Davidson's fascinating and controversial recent book, *The Greeks and Greek Love*.<sup>4</sup> I shall be looking at three main areas. First, in cases where *charis* occurs in relation to marriage, I shall argue that many of them combine at least suggestions of sexual pleasures along with assertions of lasting friendship or love. Second, I shall present similar arguments in relation to treatments of pederasty, especially in Plato and Xenophon. Finally, starting from my agreement with Davidson that there was a wide measure of approval in Athenian society in principle for 'noble' pederastic relations, I shall comment on his identification of significant changes in Athenian social practices at the beginning of the fifth century BC, and of a 'crisis of *charis*' in Athenian civic life at that time.

First, it is necessary to make some further distinctions concerning the uses of *charis* in erotic discourse, relevant to the different senses of the term already adumbrated. Three different types and contexts may be distinguished.<sup>5</sup> In the first type, the main use related to the synchronic type, the shared excitement and pleasure of a specific event or moment in time, often focuses on the 'charm' or 'grace', the attractiveness, *éclat*, sparkle of a beautiful person (or group of people acting together), or of a work of art or performance of music or dance. Here the point of these usages is often the emotional effect this 'charm' has on an audience (whether of one, a few, or thousands). This effect is to draw the observer(s) into feelings of warmth, benevolence, or desire towards the person, people,

<sup>3</sup> In the papers cited in n.1 above.

<sup>4</sup> Davidson's book has encountered sustained, at times savage, criticism: see especially T. K. Hubbard's online review in *H-Histsex*, February 2009, and see the ensuing debates in Bryn Mawr Classical Review (BMCR): 2008.07.20, a review by E. C. Brook; 2009.09.61, a supplementary review by B. Verstraate; 2009.11.03, a response by Davidson; 2009.11.03, a response by K. Ormand. Some more favourable reviews: O. Taplin, *Guardian* 5<sup>th</sup> January 2008; O. Murray, *Literary Review*, July 2011; A. Blanshard, *JHS* 129 (2009) 179-80.

<sup>5</sup> These distinctions, and the use of Aristotle, are similar to those in Davidson's discussion in *Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above) Chapter 2 ('Grace, sex and favours'). See also Azoulay, *Xenophon* (n.2, above) Chapter 8.



sight, or display; often, but not always, it is sexually charged.<sup>6</sup> Well-known examples of the attractive power and pleasure involved include Homer, *Iliad* 14.183, Hesiod, *Works and Days* ll. 73-5, Pindar fr. 123, and Theognis ll. 1319-23. Two lesser-known but interesting instances are, first, the popular song at Chalkis quoted by Plutarch, encouraging noble pederasty:<sup>7</sup>

ὦ παῖδες, οἱ χαρίτων τε καὶ πατέρων λάχετ' ἐσθλῶν,  
μὴ φθονεῖθ' ὄρας ἀγαθοῖσιν ὀμίλιαν·  
σὺν γὰρ ἀνδρεία καὶ ὁ λυσιμελής  
Ἔρωσ ἐνὶ Χαλκιδέων θάλλει πόλεσιν.

You boys who have won a share of the *charites* and good fathers  
Do not begrudge giving to good men association with your youthful beauty,  
Along with courage limb-loosening Erōs too  
Flourishes in the cities of the Chalkidians.

Plut. *Erōt.* 761a-b

Second in a late fourth-century comic fragment (Damoxenos fr. 3 K-A) the effect of a ball-playing young dancer makes one of the audience declare that he has never heard or seen such *charis*, and had to leave, as he did not feel at all well.<sup>8</sup>

The second and the third types both concern the diachronic idea of a continuing exchange of reciprocal and beneficial acts and emotions, and each is discussed in two passages of Aristotle.<sup>9</sup> In the first of these passages, the focus is on the generalised sequence of exchanges which form a continuing chain, and in the second, the focus is on a single act in the chain, whether the initiatory act which inspires (or should inspire) feelings of gratitude or a reciprocal responsive action, immediately or later. First, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he describes *charis* as a form of 'proportional' reciprocity which is central to the functioning of any community, and the basis of all forms of exchange, including monetary exchange; this, he says, explains why cities typically place a shrine to the Charites, the concept's associated goddesses (or personifications), in a prominent place where exchanges take place (*EN* 1132b29-a6). In erotic relations, we typically have the case where one partner agrees to the other's requests for sexual pleasure, in the expectation of something pleasant in return (typically, the present middle forms (*charizesthai*) indicate the boyfriend's readiness to agree that the relationship may include sex, and aorist middle forms (*charisasthai*) the act of granting a sexual favour). Davidson makes rather too much of this distinction between present and aorist forms, and his frequent use of the colloquial paraphrases 'put out' or 'allow to get in one's pants' for the

<sup>6</sup> The personifications Charis and the Charites are here, as often, associated with Peitho, seductive persuasiveness: cf. E. Stafford, *Worshipping virtues: Personification and the divine in ancient Greece* (London 2000) 111-15.

<sup>7</sup> On this, cf. Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above) 354-55.

<sup>8</sup> Aristotle only rarely considers this *charis*: one example is in an analogy at *Pol.* 1309b20-31, where a nose which deviates slightly from the admired norm of straightness towards being either snub or hooked may yet be pretty (*kalé*) and have charm (*charis*) in relation to sight.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. also Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above) 40-42.

aorist instances arguably widens too far the emotional gap between the two.<sup>10</sup> For an example of the present used for (repeated) specific sexual acts, cf. Theopompos fr. 30K-A: (Lykabettos) ‘On my slopes over-active youths pleasure themselves with their mates’ (παρ’ ἐμοὶ τὰ λίαν μειράκια χαρίζεται τοῖς ἡλικιώταις). There are certainly very many cases where the exchange in erotic *charis* is non-symmetrical, involving provision of immediate sexual pleasure for the lover, and deferred and different pleasures or advantages for the beloved; but I shall suggest later that in many cases there are also suggestions, or at least hints, that in noble and loving relationships there may be on the beloved’s side both genuine affection and also some sexual pleasure (if usually less strong).

The third type is the exchange over time where an altruistic initiation of a chain of kindnesses produces the feeling of gratitude and obligation to return a benefit. This is the sense analyzed in the second of the Aristotelian passages, *Rhetoric* 2.7. As David Konstan has demonstrated, Aristotle’s strategy here derives from his fundamental purpose in this section of his work, which is to explore the precise emotions which the litigant should be seeking to create or avoid in the jury.<sup>11</sup> The definition of the term *charis* goes, in Konstan’s translation: ‘let *charis*, in relation to which someone who has it is said to have *charis*, be a service to someone who needs it, not in return for anything, nor so that the one who performs the service may gain something, but so that the other may’ (*Rhet.* 1385a16-19); this means that the *charis* which is here defined is a benefaction which initiates the reciprocal relationship, but the emotion which is then discussed in the chapter is not that associated with the initial performer of the service (e.g. a desire to do good to others, perhaps also to win honour), but the emotion of ‘gratitude’ experienced by the one who received the good deed and hence ‘has a *charis*’ or ‘is aware of a *charis*’ (*charin echei* or *charin oide*), and desires to return the favour. The implicit model relevant for a jury’s or an assembly’s emotions, as Konstan suggests,<sup>12</sup> might be the sort of benefactions litigants and orators regularly remind the people they have performed, such as liturgies, *epidoseis*, or help with arms or food supplies.<sup>13</sup> It is interesting, however, as Davidson observes, that the examples of needs or desires which a favour may be designed to meet are individual rather than collective, and that the first mentioned is *erôs*, followed by bodily pains and danger.<sup>14</sup> *Erôs* does not appear again in the chapter, and does not seem obviously relevant to any potential appeal to gratitude in the courts. As Davidson argues, it is striking that Aristotle mentions first erotic desire, the need for a sexual favour to be granted by the boyfriend, and that the language of great or difficult services is thus applied to the assuaging of the feelings of the lover who would then feel gratitude to the beloved. Given that *erôs* could not be seen as a central need in the context of political speeches, Aristotle perhaps mentioned it first to dispose of it, while the more general reference to

<sup>10</sup> Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above) 46-50.

<sup>11</sup> D. Konstan, *The emotions of the ancient Greeks* (Toronto 2006) 156-68.

<sup>12</sup> Konstan, *Emotions of the ancient Greeks* (n.11, above) 161.

<sup>13</sup> If this is right, we might suppose that the emphasis on ‘for the other, not for their own sakes’ did not rule out awareness of a longer-term calculation of reciprocal benefits back to the benefactor from the people, through the *philotimia-charis* mechanism.

<sup>14</sup> Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above) 50-51.

bodily pains and dangers would include needs, such as military danger or lack of resources, which would have political relevance; that he mentions it at all suggests it would seem a prime example of a major, and significant, need that would produce an asymmetrical *charis* relationship. Finally, it is worth stating that these (and all other senses) are often combined in texts to feed interestingly off each other.<sup>15</sup>

#### *Charis and marriage*

I turn now to evidence for the conceptions of erotic *charis* in proper and admirable sexual relationships. Davidson suggests that the language of such exchanges is found only very rarely in marriage, but very frequently in relation to homosexual relations, which are the contexts which suit them best. His main ground is that according to the accepted protocols the boyfriend has to make a choice whether or not to respond to the sexual advances of the would-be lover, whereas a wife in an arranged marriage has no choice, before or after the wedding; hence, issues of *charis* would be less likely to occur. The case of *hetairai*, who also might have a choice, was interestingly explored in his previous book.<sup>16</sup> It is true that a great many texts explore the problematic decision in same-sex relationships whether or not to grant favours (*charizesthai*), but his severe diminution of erotic *charis* in marriage should be challenged. At the level of symbols and ideology, the Charites were given major roles at wedding celebrations and various forms of *charis* not infrequently appear in discussions of mutual sexual pleasure in marriage and in the choices even wives might make, though in cases where the respectable relationships of marriage are in question, there is always a characteristic allusiveness and coyness.

In poetic versions of marriage songs the Charites and the Muses are called upon, along with Aphrodite and Eros, to help produce the appropriately erotic atmosphere through garlands, adornments, perfumes, music and dance. Sappho was the most famous exponent of the genre: see fr. 103, 112, 128, and Himerios' summary of one *epithalamion*, which describes how the poet, after the 'contests', enters the bedroom, garlands the room, makes the bed, draws the girls to the bridal chamber, and brings in Aphrodite on the chariot of the Charites with a chorus of *Erotes* to share the fun (Sappho fr. 194, Himerios 9.4). Similarly a comic fragment of Pherekrates connects the Charites with sex and the wedding:

<sup>15</sup> See e.g. MacLachlan, *Age of grace* (n.2, above) 66-72, 87-123; Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above) 38-50; Fisher, 'The pleasures of reciprocity' (n.1, above), where I analyzed Pind. *Ol.* 10 in terms of the mutually reinforcing build-up of *charis* as the beauty and attractiveness of the victor, the epinician poem itself as a gift and part of a chain of benefits with the parties in Lokri, and as a delight on the occasion; and the reciprocal and erotic relationship between the youthful victor Hagesidamos and his trainer Ilas, modelled on those of Patroclus and Achilles, and Zeus and Ganymede.

<sup>16</sup> Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above), 45-46; cf. J. Davidson, *Courtesans and fishcakes* (London 1997) 109-38. See now also S. Corner, 'Bringing the outside in: The *andron* as brothel and the symposium's civic sexuality', in *Greek prostitutes in the ancient Mediterranean, 800 BCE-200 CE*, eds A. Glazebrook and M. M. Henry (Madison WI 2011) 60-85.

ὦ Χάριτες, <ἔλθετε> ἀφροδίσιον  
<νῦν> τιν' ὑμέναιον ὑμνεῖτε γαμικόν τε.<sup>17</sup>

O Charites, come and sing a hymenaion  
proper for Aphrodite and the marriage.

Pherekrates (205 KA = Phot. a 3397)

Plutarch's treatises on love and marriage appeal to a long poetic tradition linking Aphrodite, Eros, the Charites, and Peitho, as he develops the theme of the positive values of seduction and sexual pleasures in marriage, and urges that even chaste wives must display these *charites* to keep their husbands moderately faithful (*Advice to Bride*, *Mor.* 138d, 141f-142b; *Erōtikos*, *Mor.* 751c-e).<sup>18</sup> Davidson significantly tries to minimize the enthusiasm with which Daphaios in the *Erōtikos* (ll. 750-51) claims *charis* as an essential part of the development of affection (*philia*) in a marriage: his statement 'one of Plutarch's friends defends marriage by noting that *charis* is occasionally [*sic*] used even [*sic*] to refer to heterosexual sex, as if there were a kind of courtliness within marriage, *i.e.* in the marriage-bed' seems seriously misleading to the rhetoric of the claims in this work and more generally for the importance of mutual pleasure in married sex.<sup>19</sup>

In our fullest theoretical account of the purposes and practices of marriage from Classical Athens, Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, Ischomachos represents to Socrates how he had to offer his young wife a clear, if coy, discussion of the importance of mutual sex in his marriage, when he found her trying to attract him by make-up and platform shoes:

Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, συνεληλύθαμεν, ὦ γύναι, ὡς καὶ τῶν σωμάτων κοινωνήσοντες ἀλλήλοις; Φασὶ γοῦν, ἔφη, οἱ ἄνθρωποι. Ποτέρως ἂν οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ δοκοῖν εἶναι ἀξιοφίλητος μᾶλλον κοινωνός, εἴ σοι τὸ σῶμα πειρώμην παρέχειν τὸ ἑμαυτοῦ ἐπιμελόμενος ὅπως ὑγιαίνον τε καὶ ἐρρωμένον ἔσται

'Did we not come together', I said, 'wife, so that we should also share our bodies with each other?'

'That's what they say', she said.

<sup>17</sup> As emended by T. Kock, 'Komiker-fragmente im lexicon sabbaiticum' *RhM* 48 (1893) 579-91 (582).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. E. Stafford, 'Plutarch on persuasion', in *Plutarch's advice to the bride and groom and consolation to his wife: Translation, commentary and interpretive essays*, ed. S. B. Pomeroy (Oxford and New York 1999) 162-72; Stafford, *Worshipping virtues* (n.6, above) 135-38, where she also discusses relevant illustrations involving these personifications in relation to wedding scenes. Cf. also J. Redfield, 'Notes on the Greek wedding', *Arethusa* 15 (1982) 181-201, and J. H. Oakley and R. Sinos, *The wedding in ancient Athens* (Madison WI 1993) 44-46. Cf. also the ironic reference to the *suzugiai* Charites, with their association with marriage, at Eur. *Hipp.* ll. 1148-49, with L. A. Swift, 'Mixed choruses and marriage songs: A new interpretation of the third stasimon of the *Hippolytus*', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 126 (2006) 125-40, esp. 129-31.

<sup>19</sup> *The Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above) 50, criticised by O. Taplin (review of Davidson, *Guardian* 5<sup>th</sup> January 2008), and see now the valuable survey of the positive role of Eros in Athenian literature, art, and cult by E. Stafford, 'From the gymnasium to the wedding: Eros in Athenian art and cult', in *Erōs in ancient Greece*, eds E. Sanders, C. Thumiger, C. Carey, and N. J. Lowe (Oxford 2013) 175-208.

‘Would I then seem to you more worthy of love as a companion of your body, if I tried to offer my body to you taking care that it is healthy and strong?’

Xen. *Oec.* 10.4-5

He thus talks of sex in marriage as a central activity which both share and enjoy, and his wife agrees, albeit in a phrase of a demure delicacy (‘that’s what they say’); he goes on to suggest that they would each feel sexual desire for the same natural and fit appearance by asking her whether he would seem ‘more worthy of love (*axiophilētos*) as a companion of her body’ if he kept his body fit and strong, or smeared with lead and eye make-up. The clear implication is that good wives were expected to experience their own sexual pleasures, but not to talk too openly about them, though they might legitimately expect their views to be considered on what made their husbands’ bodies attractive. After urging his wife to give up wearing make-up and to acquire the fit and natural look by energetic walking round the house, bread making, or shaking the bed linen, Ischomachos concludes:

καὶ ὄψις δέ, ὅπῳταν ἀνταγωνίζεται διακόνῳ καθαρωτέρα οὐσα πρεπόντως τε μᾶλλον ἡμφιεσμένη, κινητικὸν γίγνεται ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅπῳταν τὸ ἐκοῦσαν χαρίζεσθαι προσῆ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀναγκαζομένην ὑπηρετεῖν. αἱ δ’ αἰεὶ καθήμεναι σεμνῶς πρὸς τὰς κεκοσμημένας καὶ ἐξαπατώσας κρίνεσθαι παρέχουσιν ἑαυτάς.

As far as her appearance goes, when she is opposed to a slave servant girl, because she is cleaner and more suitably dressed, she is more sexually arousing, especially whenever she comes forward to give her favours willingly, instead of serving him under compulsion. But wives who sit around grandly offer themselves to be judged alongside those women who are tarted up and out to deceive. Xen. *Oec.* 10.12

The first contrast here is between a wife who loves her husband ‘from her soul’ (10.4) and is happy to express her willingness to share sex with her husband, and the slave who agrees to have sex under duress and does not feel love or affection; the second counsels against wives trying to look like *hetairai*, for whom idleness and the application of artificial aids speak loudly of their generally deceptive natures.<sup>20</sup>

Evidence from Athenian drama suggests very many Athenian husbands may have shared this view of the importance of the *charis* of mutually satisfying sex in marriage, while not necessarily being as keen to reject their wives’ use of make-up, perfumes, or fancy clothes. Cases of *charis* in Old Comedy in erotic contexts may play with the idea of the granting of sexual favours (*charizesthai*) or the generalized pleasures of sex.<sup>21</sup> The clearest expression of mutual sexual pleasure in a loving heterosexual couple comes in the sex scene of the *Ecclesiazusae*: the young man, temporarily rescued from the embraces of the first ugly old woman by his young girlfriend, whom he has already lyrically described

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Pomeroy, *Xenophon, Oeconomicus* (Oxford 1994) *ad loc.* However unrealistic in context, the effects described of the sex-show of the marriage of Dionysus and Ariadne at the end of Xenophon’s *Symposium* (9.2-7), that husbands rushed home to their wives, and bachelors swore to get married, rest on the assumption that mutually satisfying sex was the norm for marriage. Cf. also Xen. *Symp.* 8.3; Redfield, ‘Notes on the Greek wedding’ (n.18, above) 195-97.

<sup>21</sup> See the examples at J. Henderson, *The maculate muse: Obscene language in Attic comedy* (Oxford and New York, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 1990) 160.

as his ‘gold-wrought object of care, scion of Kypris, honey-bee of the Muses, nursling of the Charites and face of luxury’ (ll. 973-74),<sup>22</sup> thanks her for the sweetest favour she has done him (κεχάρισαι), and promises that tonight in return he will give her a great fat favour (μεγάλην ἀποδώσω καὶ παχεῖάν σοι χάριν, ll. 1045-48). If the primary sense of the *charis* words here focus on the reciprocal favours each is doing for the other, there is very clear evidence through their conversation of their pre-existing love and mutual sexual desire, and the lyrics give us his idea of the girl’s charms and power to inspire; the *double entendre* of ‘big fat favour’ presents a physically powerful comic thrust onto the promise of the big mutual sexual pleasure his generous endowment will provide for the girl.<sup>23</sup> But as Halliwell in particular has argued, this scene, somewhat detached from the characters and politics of the play, does not permit us to say anything secure about the social status of the girl and the nature of the relationship, in order to locate this image of a loving relationship where affection, desire, and sexual pleasures are all equally shared.<sup>24</sup>

In at least one play, however, the *Lysistrata*, there is clearly an underlying assumption of mutual heterosexual pleasures in marriage; a loving marital relationship is most evident in the famous scene which matches the *Ecclesiazusae* scene for exploitation of sexual titillation and frustration. It has often been observed, rightly I think, that despite the implausibilities and contradictions of the plot of this play, underlying everything is the assumption that mutually satisfying sex inside marriage is central for both husbands and wives; hence both miss it desperately, as the result first of the exigencies of the war, and then of the sex-strike. The Kinesias and Myrrhine scene brings out powerfully how their sex-life, their tenderness, and their nurture of their baby, reinforce each other.<sup>25</sup> Kinesias, moaning about his wife’s absence, claims, in paratragic style which imitates bereaved or abandoned husbands (until the last *para prosdokian* phrase), that he has had no *charis* in his life since she left, gets depressed whenever he enters the house, where everything is empty, nor can he take *charis* in food, because of his erection (ll. 864-87).<sup>26</sup> Here the lack of *charis* denotes the absence of shared pleasures, of companionship, food and sex, and no doubt the sexual deprivation which affects the others.<sup>27</sup> Aristophanes’ approach to sex is

<sup>22</sup> For lyric-parody here of Ibycus fr. 7 and other texts, see R. G. Usher, *Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae* (Oxford 1973) *ad loc.*

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Philokleon’s invitation to the girl-piper he has abstracted from the *symposion* to provide a return-gift (*charis*) to his cock (*Wasps* ll. 1345-47). Cf. J. Henderson, *The maculate muse* (n.21, above) 160: he suggests that mentions in comedy of the ritual cake used in nocturnal feasts known as the *charisios plakous* may possibly involve a similar double entendre with the phallos (see Athen. 646b, 668c; Ar. fr. 212 K-A, [*Daitaleis*] and Eub. fr. 1 K-A).

<sup>24</sup> S. Halliwell, ‘Aristophanic sex: The erotics of shamelessness’, in *The sleep of reason: Erotic experience and sexual ethics in ancient Greece and Rome*, eds M. C. Nussbaum and J. Sihvola (Chicago and London 2002) 126-36.

<sup>25</sup> J. Henderson, *Aristophanes, Lysistrata* (Oxford 1990) intr. xxxiii-iv, 176-77; C. Calame, *The poetics of eros in ancient Greece* (Princeton 1999) 121.

<sup>26</sup> The language is close to Eur. *Alc.* 940-49, *Hipp.* 1408, *Med.* 226-27, fr. 736.

<sup>27</sup> When Kinesias rejects the first perfume he is offered, it is on the grounds that it involves too much pounding/delay, and ‘does not smell of marriage’ (l. 943), and is then offered a different one as a further delaying tactic. As also in the initial scene where Lysistrata calls on her fellow-strikers

notoriously hard to fix, and is most often perhaps a celebration of shamelessness remote from normal moral constraints; but in this, ‘his most sentimental comedy’,<sup>28</sup> there is the pervasive assumption and employment of the *charis* of mutual pleasures in the marital bed.<sup>29</sup> In contrast to Ischomachos’ marriage, the wives in the *Lysistrata*, and especially Myrrhine in this scene, proclaim their passion for sex and delight in its seductive aids (perfume, see-through clothes, the *iunx*, and so on); some see these as indicating that in these respects they are presented as *hetairai*, not ‘chaste wives’.<sup>30</sup> But if, as I am arguing here, wives were expected and encouraged to be keen on sex inside the house, we should rather suppose that for many husbands such pleasure and use of seductive techniques were welcomed, and we should not see them here abandoning their wifely character in favour of that of *hetairai*, but rather as bringing these skills normally exercised in private into the public arena of the acropolis.

Tragedy might seem a less plausible quarry for a positive representation of marital love and sex. The sexuality of wives is a constant pre-occupation, and most often it is presented as profoundly subversive and upsetting. There are a great many lascivious or wild wives whose illicit or irrational sex drives destroy men and often themselves as well (e.g. Clytemnestra, Phaedra, Stheneboia, Pasiphae, and Skylla).<sup>31</sup> On the other hand, as has been demonstrated above all by Maarit Kaimio, there are some decent and loyal wives (e.g. Deianeira, Alkestis, and Eudadne) who are represented as having strong erotic feelings towards their husbands, and as expecting, and enjoying, mutually satisfying sex.<sup>32</sup> Kaimio

to deploy the array of diaphanous clothes, make-up, slippers, perfumes, and rouge, this suggests that marital sex inside the privacy of the house would normally involve perfume and all sorts of sexy enticements, *i.e.* that most husbands’ tastes were less austere than those of Ischomachos (though cost might be a problem). At *Eccl.* II. 520-26 Praxagora endorses enthusiastically her husband’s suggestion that ‘a woman can’t have a fuck without perfume’, whether inside or outside marriage; *cf.* also *Clouds* 51, *Plut. Mor.* 990b. Lubrication may also be an issue with perfumed oils, see M. F. Kilmer, *Greek erotica* (London 1993) 81-86.

<sup>28</sup> Halliwell, ‘Aristophanic sex’ (n.24, above) 125.

<sup>29</sup> The view that women experienced much greater sexual pleasures than men, enshrined in the myth of Teiresias (*Hes. fr.* 275), and supported by medical experts, is often invoked to explain men’s anxiety that their women may stray from the proper paths; but it may also, more positively, have encouraged husbands to expect their wives to enjoy it at least as much as any *hetairai*, and to welcome this. This view may be glimpsed also in Socrates’ statement in *Xen. Symp.* 8.21 (on which see also below, pp. 55-57) that a woman derives pleasure from sex even in a relationship not grounded in affection, whereas a boy does not.

<sup>30</sup> Most recently, C. A. Faraone, ‘Priestess and courtesan: The ambivalence of female leadership in Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata*’, in *Prostitutes and courtesans in the ancient world*, eds C. A. Faraone and L. K. McClure (Madison WI 2006) 207-23.

<sup>31</sup> The power of the dangerous *erôs* in tragedy to destroy the individual, family, and society is well analyzed by C. Thumiger, ‘Mad *erôs* and eroticised madness in tragedy’, in *Erôs in ancient Greece*, eds E. Sanders, C. Thumiger, C. Carey, and N. J. Lowe (Oxford 2013) 27-40; *cf.* also J. Gould, ‘Women in Classical Athens’, in *Myth, ritual, memory and exchange* (Oxford 2001) 141-55.

<sup>32</sup> M. Kaimio, ‘Erotic experience in the marital bed: Good wives in Greek tragedy’, in *The sleep of reason: Erotic experience and sexual ethics in ancient Greece and Rome*, eds M. C. Nussbaum and J. Sihvola (Chicago and London 2002) 95-119.

analyzes effectively the range of meanings of the various tragic words for ‘(marriage)-bed’ (*eunē*, *lechos*, *lektros*), which indicate very frequently wives’ commitment to sexual pleasure and their propensity to sexual jealousy.<sup>33</sup> Attention to *charis* words in sexual contexts can reinforce her convincing arguments, and I shall discuss here two examples, one concerned with the desires and behaviour of a notoriously ‘bad’ wife and the other with one unusually represented as a good one.

The Clytemnestra of Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* is presented as something of a sexual monster. Twice she uses a heavily eroticized *charis* of her pleasures at Agamemnon’s return.<sup>34</sup> First, with characteristic ambiguity, when talking to the silent Cassandra, she speaks of the imminent ox-sacrifice at the hearth, and then of the unexpected *charis* this brings her:

οὔτοι θυραία τῆδ’ ἐμοὶ σχολὴ πάρα  
 τρίβειν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐστίας μεσομφάλου  
 ἔστηκεν ἤδη μῆλα πρὸς σφαγὰς πάρος.

...

ὥς οὔποτ’ ἐλπίσασι τήνδ’ ἔξειν χάριν.

I do not have the time to waste here  
 by the door; already by the hearth in the middle  
 the beasts stand waiting for the slaughter

...

for us who never expected we would have this delight.

Aesch. *Ag.* ll. 1055-58

It seems probable here that we are expected to hear, first, an open reference to her delight and gratitude in the sacrifice to welcome her husband home;<sup>35</sup> second, an allusion to the renewal of all marital pleasures including the sexual (as in her earlier baroque images at ll. 895-902); and third, an ironic anticipation of her pleasure at his killing. This final perverted pleasure is brought out fully in her later powerful and shamelessly frank speeches after the killings:

παίω δέ νιν δίς· κὰν δυοῖν οἰμωγμάτοιν  
 μεθῆκεν αὐτοῦ κῶλα· καὶ πεπτωκότι  
 τρίτην ἐπενδίδωμι, τοῦ κατὰ χθονός,  
 Διὸς, νεκρῶν σωτήρος, εὐκταίαν χάριν.  
 οὔτω τὸν αὐτοῦ θυμὸν ὀρμαίνει πεσόν,  
 κάκφυσιῶν ὄξειαν αἵματος σφαγὴν

<sup>33</sup> Cf. also Pind. *Ol.* 7. 1-6 for *charis* of the wedding-banquet leading to the enviable harmony (*homophrôn euna*) of the marriage-bed. On *homophrosyne* as marital happiness, see Redfield, ‘Notes on the Greek wedding’ (n.18, above) 186-87, 196-97, and on sexual jealousy in tragedy, see now E. Sanders, ‘Sexual jealousy and *erôs* in Euripides’ *Medea*’, in *Erôs in ancient Greece*, eds E. Sanders, C. Thumiger, C. Carey, and N. J. Lowe (Oxford 2013) 41-57.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. also Thumiger, ‘Mad *erôs*’ (n.31, above) 10-11.

<sup>35</sup> Textual problems, and the likelihood of a missing line before 1058, unfortunately obscure the connection between the ox-sacrifice and her pleasure.



βάλλει μ' ἐρεμνῆ ψακάδι φοινίας δρόσου,  
χαίρουσαν οὐδὲν ἦσσον ἢ διοςδότῳ  
γάνει σπορητὸς κάλυκος ἐν λοχεύμασιν.

I strike him twice; and with two groaning cries  
he relaxed his limbs; and as he lay there  
I give him on top a third, for the one below the earth,  
Zeus, Saviour of the dead, a *charis* I have prayed for.  
So, fallen, he speeds away his own life-spirit  
and gasping out the keen slaughter of blood  
hits me with the dark shower of bloody dew,  
and I rejoiced no less than does the sown crop  
in the Zeus-given bright rain when the sheathes give birth.

Aesch. *Ag.* ll. 1384-93

The *euktaia charis* ('*charis* I have prayed for') of the third strike (l. 1387) is the densest and most complex use of *charis* in the trilogy. First, it is her votive thanks-offering to Zeus, constituting her revenge for Agamemnon's crimes against her daughter and herself. Second, we can hear this as a claim to be exacting a just retaliation, invoking the support of Zeus *Soter*, which reminds us of the violent *charis* which the chorus earlier had suggested Zeus was accustomed to impose on the doer who must suffer and (in theory) learn (ll. 176-83). Third, the *charis* conveys the pleasure she has prayed for: the next lines reveal the excessive and highly sexualized satisfaction she took in the killing. The gush of dark blood or dew the dying Agamemnon showers over his killer, in which she rejoices as do the crops with the fruitful rain, unmistakably brings to mind ejaculation and female orgasm.<sup>36</sup> Fourth, and last, there is the blasphemous invocation of the ritual of the third libation of the *symposion*, that locus of shared (usually male) pleasures, which connects Clytemnestra with the singing, blood-drinking chorus and *kōmos* of the Furies who live in the house, and this Zeus may also be Hades, Zeus of the dead. The sexual/sympotic pleasure in the killing is reinforced in a later speech, where her jealous hatred of Agamemnon's mistresses is most strongly revealed through the dense, final image of Cassandra's death: 'it brought me a delicate side-dish of bed-sex (*eunê*) to feed my luxury' (ll. 1446-47), making the killing seem both a sexual threesome and a delicious feast.<sup>37</sup> Clytemnestra's uses of sexual *charis* are perhaps the most complex and perverted

<sup>36</sup> See especially J. L. Moles, 'A neglected aspect of *Agamemnon* 1389-92', *LCM* 4 (1979) 179-89; cf. also S. Pulleyn, 'Erotic undertones in the language of Clytemnestra', *CQ* 47 (1997) 565-67; Kaimio, 'Erotic experience in the marital bed' (n.32, above) 108.

<sup>37</sup> At 1206, the description of Apollo's forced sex with Cassandra also has a highly ambiguous *charis*. Cassandra, agreeing with the suspicion that the god was struck with desire for her, says 'he was a strong wrestler with me, breathing *charis*'. This perhaps conveys many things: (a) the god breathed out his desire for the pleasure of sex, but as a 'wrestler' forcing himself, he seems little concerned with its immediate reciprocity; (b) he conveys his great sexual charm and power, which might overwhelm her despite embarking on a type of rape: cf. E. Fraenkel, *Aeschylus, Agamemnon* (Oxford 1950) *ad loc.*; and (c) he offers a later reward, as a sort of reciprocity, not (only) the normally expected heroic son who may found a city (by the '*nomos*', the rule, the chorus refer to in the next line), but also the rarer 'gift' of prophecy. One might see also here then an ironic version of the gods' *charis biaiōs* of *Ag.* 182,

found in extant tragedy, but they rest on, and reverse, the norm of a beneficial *charis* of the powerful sexual response of a good wife to her husband.

For the embodiment of this good *charis*, paradoxically, we can turn above all to Clytemnestra's sister, Helen, who in *Agamemnon*, as in many other tragedies, is repeatedly treated as the paradigm of a shameless and treacherous wife, over-sexed and luxurious. Her rehabilitation comes in Euripides' *Helen*, like the *Alcestis*, a relatively untragic play which celebrates the eventual reconstitution of a happy marriage triumphing over the threat of death. The revaluation of Helen's character works through the mechanism of the alternative Stesichorean version, that she spent the period of the Trojan War in Egypt, not Troy, and remained Menelaus' loving, faithful, and resourceful wife, who then managed their escape back to Greece from the evil Theoklymenos. As Foley has demonstrated, these scenes can be seen as re-enacting their remarriage as a form of rebirth after death, modelled on the Demeter and Kore myth, as also in the *Alcestis*.<sup>38</sup> There are multiple uses of *charis*-words in this play, as in others of his 'escape tragedies', and multiple ambiguities attend many of them.<sup>39</sup> There are strong hints of Helen's unashamed enjoyment of marital sexuality and of the couple's shared eroticism in their successful restoration of married happiness, as Kaimio has argued, and the *charis* of mutual sex can be added to those of the charm and persuasiveness of beauty, reciprocal favours and gratitude.<sup>40</sup>

Thus, erotic pleasures are evident on the surface in the recognition scene, where Helen takes the lead in talking of her passion and initiating happy embraces (above all ll. 625-57),<sup>41</sup> Menelaus (if the MSS attribution of speakers is correct) begins to respond at ll. 653-55, saying:

ἡλίους δὲ μυρίους  
μόλις διελθὼν ἠισθόμην τὰ τῆς θεοῦ.  
ἐμὰ δὲ χαρμονῶι δάκρυα πλέον ἔχει  
χάριτος ἢ λύπας.

only here the moral value in human terms of the exchange (forceful sex for a divine gift) is distinctly more dubious. Cf. also *Trag. Adesp.* 402 N<sup>2</sup> = *Plut. Erot.* 751d, where Herakles is asked whether he enacted *charitas* by force or by persuading the girl: βίη δὲ πράξας χάριτας ἢ πείσας κόρην;. In the absence of context one cannot know whether the *charis*, if it were a case of rape rather than seduction, includes a reference to any future benefit, or whether the focus is essentially on the ironic *charis* of a one-sided form of sex.

<sup>38</sup> H. Foley, *Female acts in Greek tragedy* (Princeton 1999) 301-31; see also R. Rehm, *Marriage to death* (Princeton 1994) 121-27, who also focuses on the ideas of the bathing as rebirth.

<sup>39</sup> See M. Wright, *Euripides' escape tragedies* (Oxford 2005) 324-25.

<sup>40</sup> Kaimio 'Erotic experience in the marital bed' (n.32, above) 109-13.

<sup>41</sup> Kaimio, 'Erotic experience in the marital bed' (n.32, above) 110; also E. Craik, 'Tragic love, comic sex?' in *Tragedy, comedy and the polis*, eds A. H. Sommerstein, S. Halliwell, J. Henderson, and B. Zimmermann (Bari 1993) 260-62. Menelaus is throughout noticeably cooler, partly because, naturally, he finds it hard to accept her constancy to him (see ll. 563-622, ll. 793-96; also Wright, *Euripides' escape tragedies* (n.39, above) 300-05).

After working through countless  
days I begin to understand the ways of the goddess.  
And in joy my tears now have more  
of pleasure (*charis*) than of pain.

Eur. *Hel.* ll. 653-55

*Charis* here probably has multiple elements, renewed emotional and physical pleasure and a sense of grateful relief. In a later scene, Helen, in Theoklymenos' presence, invites Menelaus (pretending to be another shipwrecked Greek) to go inside for her to give him a bath and smart fresh clothes; as Kaimio convincingly argues, the language with its *double entendres* encourages the audience to suppose that they will also be renewing their love through sex:<sup>42</sup>

ἀλλ', ὦ τάλας, ἔσελθε καὶ λουτρῶν τύχε  
ἐσθῆτά τ' ἐξάλλαξον. οὐκ ἐς ἀμβολὰς  
εὐεργετήσω σ'· εὐμενέστερον γὰρ ἂν  
τῷ φιλότατῳ μοι Μενέλεω τὰ πρόσφορα  
δρώϊης ἂν, ἡμῶν τυγχάνων οἴων σε χρη.

Well now, poor man, come inside, have a bath  
and change your clothes. I'm not going to do you a favour (*euergetêso*)  
just to cause delays; you will do what is appropriate  
for my dearest Menelaus with the more affection  
if you get what you should get from me.

Eur. *Hel.* ll. 1296-1300

The erotic atmosphere thus created is one of the themes picked up obliquely in the following *stasimon* on the Demeter and Kore story, with its account of how the Charites, the Muses, and Aphrodite, at Zeus' command, and with Dionysus' ecstatic instruments, bring joy and relief to the mourning Mother (ll. 1341-52).<sup>43</sup> Some of the many cases of reciprocal terms, including *charis*, in these later scenes of the play reinforce this amusing eroticism. While a number of instances concern Helen's requests for favours from Theonoe and Theoklymenos, some can be seen as creatively ambiguous, playing on the ideas of renewing the *charis*-bonds, sexual and affectionate, between the couple.

Helen comes out after the bath to report the success of the plan so far, in that Theonoe has told her brother the crucial lie:

προύργου δ' ἐς ἀλκὴν σῶμ' ὄπλοις ἠσκήσατο,  
ὡς βαρβάρων τροπαῖα μυρίων χερσὶ  
θήσων, ὅταν κωπήρες ἐσβῶμεν σκάφος.  
πέπλους δ' ἀμείψασ' ἀντὶ ναυφθόρου στολῆς  
ἐγὼ νιν ἐξήσκησα καὶ λουτροῖς χρῶα  
ἔδωκα, χρόνια νίπτρα ποταμίας δρόσου.

<sup>42</sup> Kaimio, 'Erotic experience in the marital bed' (n.32, above) 111-12.

<sup>43</sup> On echoes of Helen's sexuality in this song see also L. A. Swift, *The hidden chorus* (Oxford 2010) 229-40, though she is not persuaded that marital sex is to be supposed to be taking place offstage.

He has conveniently fitted out his body with weapons for battle,  
intending to set up trophies over countless barbarians  
with his hand, when we embark on the well-oared ship.  
I have exchanged his shipwrecked clothes for fresh garments  
fitted him out, and given his skin to the bath,  
a long-delayed washing with fresh river-waters.

Eur. *Hel.* ll. 1379-84

A little later, Theoklymenos speaks:

Ἐλένη, σὺ δ' ἦν σοι μὴ κακῶς δόξω λέγειν,  
πείθου, μὲν' αὐτοῦ· ταῦτ' ἀρ' παροῦσά τε  
πράξεις τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν σὸν ἦν τε μὴ παρῆις.  
δέδοικα γάρ σε μὴ τις ἐμπροσθὸν πόθος  
πέισσι μεθεῖναι σῶμ' ἐς οἶδμα πόντιον  
τοῦ πρόσθεν ἀνδρὸς χάρισιν ἐκπεληγμένην·  
ἄγαν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐ παρόνθ' ὅμως στένει.

You, Helen, if you don't think I am speaking wrongly,  
be persuaded, stay here; you will perform the same acts  
for your husband present or not present.  
I fear that some longing may fall on you  
to persuade you throw your body into the sea-swell,  
distracted at the delights shared (*charites*) with your former husband.  
Your grief for him is excessive, though he is no longer here.

Eur. *Hel.* ll. 1382-89

And Helen replies:

ὦ καινὸς ἡμῖν πόσις, ἀναγκαίως ἔχει  
τὰ πρῶτα λέκτρα νυμφικᾶς θ' ὀμιλίας  
τιμᾶν· ἐγὼ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὲν στέργειν πόσιν  
καὶ ξυνθάνομι' ἄν' ἀλλὰ τίς κείνῳ χάρις  
ξὺν κατθανόντι κατθανεῖν μ'; ἕα δέ με  
αὐτὴν μολοῦσαν ἐντάφια δοῦναι νεκρῷ

My new husband, it is quite necessary  
that I honour my first marriage bed and our marital  
intimacies; because I love for my husband so  
I would happily now die with him; but what return (*charis*) for him  
would my dying be with him dead? Let me  
go myself and give the burial rites to his dead body.

Eur. *Hel.* ll. 1390-1404

Helen thus tells the chorus how Menelaus seized the chance to get hold of armour and weapons, to 'take his share in performing the proper ritual return (*charis*) to the dead man'. And three lines later she reminds us how she 'gave his skin to the bath, a long-delayed washing with fresh river-waters'. It seems reasonable to suppose, with Kaimio, some sustained sexual innuendo in this talk of equipment, weapons, and spears, and the

pleasures of bathing after a very long time in squalor.<sup>44</sup> So, when Theoklymenos fears that ‘some longing may fall on you and persuade you to cast your body into the sea-swell, distraught at the *charites* of your former husband’, the types of *charis* envisaged here are the memories of their shared pleasures in marriage, referred to again by Helen a few lines lower down, which evidently include shared sexual enjoyment as well as shared affection and goodwill.<sup>45</sup> The ironies evident here will seem especially pointed and humorous if the audience has not only seen the couple embracing at their reunion but also has been encouraged to imagine them going considerably further while Helen was bathing him.

Three further, balancing, instances may carry similar plays of meanings. At l. 1411, Helen concludes her wheedling requests of Theoklymenos and her promises to be all the wife he could hope for, in exchange for his benefits to (dead) Menelaus and her, with the request to supply her with a ship ‘so that I may have a full *charis*’. We may hear in this *charis* ostensibly her pleasure in being able to give Menelaus the proper send-off he deserves, but secretly her pleasure at the renewal of her marriage and the prospect of escape. Similarly at ll. 1418-20, Helen hopes for benefits both for Theoklymenos and for her own plans; he asks her not to waste her cheeks with too many tears, and she responds with the statement that this day will show her *charis* to him, which conveys all of the following: (on the surface) her gratitude to Theoklymenos, displayed in the completion of the marriage, but also her actual negative, and deserved, return to him, by leaving; the power of her charms and persuasiveness (so *e.g.* Allan *ad loc*); and the renewed pleasures of her real marriage to Menelaus. And lastly, as Craik has suggested, we may be tempted to see a hint of a phallic *double entendre*, when Menelaus concludes his prayer to Zeus (ll. 1441-50) with the claim that he should not to be compelled to be miserable all his life, but might be permitted to ‘go forward with a straight foot’;<sup>46</sup> in which case, we may see in the *charis* he asks for in the next line, which will make him happy for the rest of his life, his return to Greece and the restoration of his happy, sexually active marriage.<sup>47</sup>

#### *Charis in homosexual relationships*

Davidson is of course right that fifth/fourth-century BC discourses on sex and morality focus much more on homosexual relationships, as being both more interesting and more problematic.<sup>48</sup> Before considering in detail his innovative ideas on the roles of *charis* and

<sup>44</sup> Kaimio, ‘Erotic experience in the marital bed’ (n.32, above) 112. Rehm, *Marriage to death* (n.38, above) 121-27 observes also here the play on washing the corpse for burial for the supposedly dead Menelaus.

<sup>45</sup> W. Allan, *Euripides, Helen* (Cambridge 2008) *ad loc* sees an erotic charge here in the collocation of ἐκπεπληγμένην χάρισιν, comparing Eur. *Hipp.* 38-9, ‘struck by the stimuli of love’, κάκπεπληγμένη κέντροις ἔρωτος.

<sup>46</sup> Craik, ‘Tragic love, comic sex?’ (n.41, above) 261.

<sup>47</sup> Although Rehm, *Marriage to death*, (n.38, above) 121-27 may possibly be right to see darker sides in the remarried couple’s immediate delight in the killing of unarmed Egyptians, renewing the horrors of war condemned by Helen earlier.

<sup>48</sup> Aristophanes’ myth in the *Symposium* is of course an exception in treating both forms of love as equally emotionally satisfying for different types of naturally determined individuals. It contains no *charis*-words, however, for the forms of mutual pleasure or satisfaction.

love in these contexts, a brief look at a later city-state society may be helpful. In Renaissance Florence (and other Italian cities), age-differentiated homosexual relations were apparently as prevalent as in many Greek *poleis*; their possible relevance for ancient Greece does not seem yet to have been fully exploited.<sup>49</sup> Fifteenth-century Florentines were notorious throughout Italy for their fondness of what was labelled sodomy (*sodomia*); this was normally held to imply anal sex between males, but could also cover *fellatio* or intercrural sex between males, and heterosexual anal sex. The practices produced a great deal of social tensions, moral anxiety, and policing and legislative activities. The analysis by Michael Rocke is based above all on the remarkably full records of the prosecutions and convictions of the board of magistrates most charged with policing the sodomy law, the rather Platonic-sounding ‘Office of the Night’. He has uncovered a society and culture which is in many ways reminiscent of Classical Athens, though naturally the active presence of a strongly hostile Christianity, above all in the period of influence of the fanatical priest Savanorola, had no Greek counterpart. However, it is remarkable how far, and for how long, despite this fierce opposition and the very severe legal punishments constantly threatened and occasionally inflicted, these practices retained their social importance and intellectual acceptability among many men in all social classes. Homosexual relationships (clearly distinct from a sense of a homosexual identity) engaged a very high proportion of young males: for example up to 15,000 males were at least incriminated in a forty-year period (and c. 2,500 convicted). They were normally conducted between young men (mostly between 19-40) and adolescent boys (mostly between 13-20); some older and married men continued to engage in them, though they incurred greater disapproval and higher penalties. The norm, as in Greece, expected a clear-cut division between older active partners and younger passives, though also plenty of examples exist of alternative patterns. They involved people of all social classes, both among the older actives and the younger passives; among the elite (which included many of the most famous Florentine artists, politicians and intellectuals) some knowledge and imitation of Greek – or specifically Platonic – models may have been influential, but this will not have been relevant for the many craftsmen, shopkeepers, innkeepers and textile wage-earners who were involved in them. The records also demonstrate clearly the reluctance of the courts (especially the ‘Office of the Night’) to convict or to impose the severe penalties permitted by the laws; many of the Officers themselves were accused.

What is immediately relevant for this article is the range of emotions which emerges. Many Florentine relationships were brief and transient, and many clearly were exploitative, violent, or mercenary; but there is much evidence too in the records of witness statements of

<sup>49</sup> For this discussion see M. Rocke, *Forbidden friendships: Homosexuality and male culture in Renaissance Florence* (Oxford 1995). Rocke’s book is mentioned briefly by D. Halperin, ‘Forgetting Foucault’, in *The sleep of reason: Erotic experience and sexual ethics in ancient Greece and Rome*, eds M. C. Nussbaum and J. Sihvola (Chicago and London 2002) 34-38 (= *How to do the history of homosexuality*, Chapter 4), where he engages in a comparison of the cuckold’s revenge in Apuleius and Boccaccio. His ability to believe that Florentine, or Greek, boys might not enjoy being fellated or masturbated is sensibly criticised by T. K. Hubbard (*BMCR* 2003.09.22).

love and passion, mutual affection, lasting companionship, and ‘virtual marriages’.<sup>50</sup> These relationships were evidently not operating within a distinct homosexual sub-culture, but, as one may suspect in Athens, they were integral parts of many broader social networks (despite the opposition of the church). They often involved the complicity of the boys’ families; they could be connected to political and patronal groups. Older lovers might frequently perform services of lasting value for their boyfriends, such as finding them jobs and providing useful social contacts. Finally, the evidence suggests that ‘passive’ youths were often supposed to get sexual enjoyment from the acts (whether buggery, fellatio, or masturbation). It is true that it is the lovers, not the younger boyfriends, who are said usually to be passionately in love with their partners, but there are many indications of mutual – and at times lasting – affection and companionship.

Such a case from a better-documented society cannot of course demonstrate the existence of comparable combinations of patterns in ancient Greece, but it can suggest the possibility that they did, if good evidence points in that direction. In the discussions about sexual ethics in the Classical texts much of the focus is on the propriety of responses of the ‘boyfriends’. Both Plato and Xenophon play decorously expressed games with the terms *charis* and *charizesthai* when they are exploring appropriate and inappropriate emotions and behaviour. Here too I suggest that some of these cases may well allow more for the expressions of mutual sexual enjoyments than often supposed, as well as for a positive reciprocal system which presents diverse and alternate favours and emotions on each side.

Xenophon’s *Symposium* makes little use of the *charizesthai* words in its discussion (above all in Chapter 8) of the protocols, declaring the moral superiority of love for the boy’s soul over his body. The focus here is primarily on the choices of love-object made by the lover rather than on the boyfriend’s readiness to offer favours or experience sexual pleasure. But where he does address the responses of the boyfriend, in a much quoted sentence in 8.21, there is a crucial interpretative choice to be made. I have indicated elsewhere my support for Ole Thomsen’s challenge to what has been the orthodox interpretation of this passage since Dover.<sup>51</sup> If one reads this section of Socrates’ speech fully in its context, it seems clear, as Thomsen argues, that the claim that the boyfriend gets no pleasure from sex, but looks on detached and sober while the lover is in a quasi-drunken rapture, is not a generalisation applicable to what ‘the boy’ feels in all types of same-sex relationships;<sup>52</sup> rather, the subject of this clause is still the immoral and

<sup>50</sup> Rocke, *Forbidden friendships* (n.48, above) 169-75.

<sup>51</sup> Fisher, ‘The pleasures of reciprocity’ (n.1, above) 232-35.

<sup>52</sup> O. Thomsen, ‘Socrates and love’, *C&M* 52 (2001) 117-78, criticising the view found in K. J. Dover, *Greek homosexuality* (London, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 1989) 52, 204; M. Foucault, *The uses of pleasure* (London and New York 1985) 223-24; D. Halperin, *One hundred years of homosexuality* (London 1990) 130-34; Calame, *The poetics of eros* (n.25, above) 190; N. Fisher, *Aeschines, Against Timarchos* (Oxford 2001) 43; A. Lear and E. Cantarella, *Images of ancient Greek pederasty: Boys were their gods* (Abingdon 2008) 9-10; Hubbard’s translation at T. K. Hubbard, *Homosexuality in Greece and Rome: A sourcebook of basic documents* (California 2003) 217. In his review of D. Halperin, *How to do the history of homosexuality* (*BMCR* 2003.09.22), Hubbard argues strongly that boys’ enjoyment must be assumed to be the norm in practice (in both anal penetration and manual stimulation), but he does not reinterpret the Xenophontic passages. Davidson seems not to commit himself on this issue either in *Courtesans and fishcakes* (n.16, above) or in *Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above).

mercenary boyfriend who serves the desires of his paying lover whom he does not love. This is made even clearer by the next sentence. Socrates is continuing to develop the contrast between the sexual responses in the two opposed types of relationship: in the good type, where both parties love each other's characters (*tous tropous phileisthai*), nothing 'unpleasant' (*chalepon*) has ever occurred, but in the association which is without shame 'many unholy things' happen (8.22).<sup>53</sup> Once this is accepted, it makes sense, where Socrates, a little earlier, gives a picture of the proper loving relationship, to include in the pleasures which the lover encourages the boyfriend to share with him the idea of (delicately expressed) mutual pleasure in sex, as well as more important and lasting intellectual and emotional delights:

ἂν δὲ καὶ ἀμφοτέρωτερά τε στερῶσιν, τὸ μὲν τῆς ὥρας ἄνθος ταχὺ δῆπου παρακμάζει, ἀπολείποντος δὲ τούτου ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν φιλίαν συναπομαραίνεσθαι, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ὄσον περ ἂν χρόνον ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἀξιεραστοτέρα γίγνεται. καὶ μὴν ἐν μὲν τῇ τῆς μορφῆς χρήσει ἔνεστι τις καὶ κόρος, ὥστε ἄπερ καὶ πρὸς τὰ σιτία διὰ πλησμονῆν, ταῦτα ἀνάγκη καὶ πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ πάσχειν· ἡ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς φιλία διὰ τὸ ἀγνῆ εἶναι καὶ ἀκορεστοτέρα ἐστίν, οὐ μέντοι, ὥς γ' ἂν τις οἰηθείη, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀνεπαφροδιτοτέρα, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς καὶ ἀποτελεῖται ἡ εὐχὴ ἐν ἣ αἰτούμεθα τὴν θεὸν ἐπαφρόδιτα καὶ ἔπη καὶ ἔργα διδόναι. ὥς μὲν γὰρ ἄγαταί τε καὶ φιλεῖ τὸν ἐρώμενον θάλλουσα μορφῇ τε ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ ἤθει αἰδήμονί τε καὶ γενναίῳ ψυχῇ εὐθὺς ἐν τοῖς ἥλιξιν ἡγεμονικῇ τε ἅμα καὶ φιλόφρων οὐσα οὐδὲν ἐπιδείτῃ λόγου· ὅτι δὲ εἰκὸς καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν παιδικῶν τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐραστὴν ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο διδάξω.

...

οἷς γε μὴν κοινὸν τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη τούτους ἡδέως μὲν προσορᾶν ἀλλήλους, εὐνοϊκῶς δὲ διαλέγεσθαι, πιστεύειν δὲ καὶ πιστεῦεσθαι, καὶ προνοεῖν μὲν ἀλλήλων, συνήδεσθαι δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσι, συνάχθεσθαι δὲ ἂν τι σφάλμα προσπίπτῃ, τότε δ' εὐφραϊνομένους διατελεῖν, ὅταν ὑγιαίνοντες συνῶσιν, ἂν δὲ κάμῃ ὀπότερος οὖν, πολὺ συνεχεστέραν τὴν συνουσίαν ἔχειν, καὶ ἀπόντων ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ παρόντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; οὐ ταῦτα πάντα ἐπαφρόδιτα; διὰ γέ τοι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα ἅμα ἐρώντες τῆς φιλίας καὶ χρώμενοι αὐτῇ εἰς γῆρας διατελοῦσι.

If they have affection in both ways [*i.e.* love for the body and the soul] the flower of youthful beauty soon wanes, and when that passes off the friendship inevitably wanes too, but the soul, for all the time that it is moving on to greater sense, becomes the more worth loving. In the use of beauty there is a certain satiety, so that as with gluttony in relation to foods, the lover inevitably feels the same towards the beloved; but friendship for the soul because it is pure is the more insatiable, nor, as one might think, is it for that reason any less full of Aphrodite's pleasures, but the prayer is clearly fulfilled in which we ask the goddess to grant us the words and deeds full of her favours. It needs no argument to show that the soul blooming in beauty appropriate to a free man and a respectful and noble

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Theognis II. 1235-38, where the poet promises he will not request from his beloved anything that lacks persuasion (*peitho*) or mutual pleasure (*charis*), nor demand anything that is not pleasant; and also Theognis II. 1227-34.



character, one which is both a leader and considerate among its contemporaries, admires and loves the beloved; but I shall now show that such a lover will be loved in return by the beloved.

...

Those who share their *philia* inevitably look at each other with pleasure, talk affectionately, trust and are trusted, take thought for each other, share pleasure at fine actions, share sorrow if any difficulty befalls them; they share their joy continuously when they are healthy, and if either is ill, they maintain their relationship more strongly, and they care about each other even more when apart than when together. Are not all of these things full of Aphrodite's pleasures? Because of these activities they continue into old age loving their friendship and maintaining it.

Xen. *Symp.* 8.14-18

Precise interpretation of this section is rendered somewhat difficult because of the (deliberate?) ambiguity of what is included within the terms *epaphrodita*, *eran*, and *philia*. But the argument does not seem to be that sex-free affection or love between a pair of noble, philosophical, and respectful souls is better and longer lasting than more physically-based relationships. The statement that noble and philosophical relationships are in fact 'more full of Aphrodite', and remain so, suggests rather that they contain all the available forms of love and affection, including the sexual (without of course giving any indication as to what sexual activities might be acceptable).

If this is the correct interpretation of Xenophon's presentation of Socrates' views, then the picture looks very similar to that offered by Xenophon's Hiero in his conversation with Simonides, where *charis*-terms are used liberally, and some shared sexual fun is indicated more explicitly.

παρὰ μὲν γὰρ πολεμίων ἀκόντων λαμβάνειν πάντων ἥδιστον ἔγωγε νομίζω εἶναι, παρὰ δὲ παιδικῶν βουλομένων ἥδιστα οἶμαι αἱ χάριτες εἶσιν. εὐθὺς γὰρ παρὰ τοῦ ἀντιφιλοῦντος ἡδεῖαι μὲν αἱ ἀντιβλέψεις, ἡδεῖαι δὲ αἱ ἐρωτήσεις, ἡδεῖαι δὲ αἱ ἀποκρίσεις, ἥδιστα δὲ καὶ ἐπαφροδιτόταται αἱ μάχαι τε καὶ ἔριδες· τὸ δὲ ἀκόντων παιδικῶν ἀπολαύειν ληλασίᾳ, ἔφη, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ εὐκέναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀφροδισίοις. καίτοι τῷ μὲν ληστή παρέχει τινὰς ὅμως ἡδονὰς τὸ τε κέρδος καὶ τὸ ἀνιᾶν τὸν ἐχθρόν· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἂν ἐρᾷ τις τοῦτω ἡδεσθαι ἀνωμένῳ καὶ φιλοῦντα μισεῖσθαι καὶ ἄπτεσθαι ἀχθομένου, πῶς οὐκί τοῦτο ἤδη δυσχερὲς τὸ πάθημα καὶ οἰκτρὸν; καὶ γὰρ δὴ τῷ μὲν ἰδιώτη εὐθὺς τεκμήριόν ἐστιν, ὅταν ὁ ἐρώμενός τι ὑπουργῇ, ὅτι ὡς φιλῶν χαρίζεται, διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδεμιᾶς ἀνάγκης οὔσης ὑπηρετεῖ, τῷ δὲ τυράνῳ οὔποτε ἔστι πιστεῦσαι ὡς φιλεῖται. ἐπιστάμεθα γὰρ δὴ τοὺς διὰ φόβον ὑπηρετοῦντας ὡς ἤ μάλιστα ἂν δύνωνται ἐξεικάζουσιν αὐτοὺς ταῖς τῶν φιλοῦντων ὑπουργίαις. καὶ τοίνυν αἱ ἐπιβουλαὶ ἐξ οὐδένων πλέονες τοῖς τυράννοις εἰσὶν ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν μάλιστα φιλεῖν αὐτοὺς προσποιη σαμένων.

I think it is the pleasantest thing of all to take things from one's enemies against their will, but from boyfriends the returns (*charites*) are the most pleasant when they are given willingly. From the boy who loves one back, there are delightful return glances, delightful questions, and most full of Aphrodite, the fights and wrangles. To take pleasure from boyfriends against their will, (he said), seems to me to be like plundering rather than sex. Yet it does offer the brigand some

pleasures in terms of his profit and causing his enemy pain; but when it is someone one loves, how can it not be a disagreeable and pitiful experience to take pleasure when he is pained, to be hated as one kisses him, to touch one who resents it? This provides immediately a clear sign for the ordinary man, when the beloved does him a service, that he is giving a favourable response because he loves him, because he knows that he is giving the service under no compulsion; but it is never possible for the tyrant to be confident that he is loved. After all, we all know that those who do a service through fear try as far as they can to make it seem like the services offered by those who do feel affection. After all, more often than not plots against tyrants come from those who most pretend to feel affection for them.

Xen. *Hier.* 1.34-38

Here the modest tyrant (not unlike Ischomachos with his wife) explains that for a lover's desire to be properly satisfied, he needs to feel he is loved in return. It is only from willing boyfriends that lovers get the sweetest 'pleasurable responses' (*charites*), such as glances, questions, and, the sweetest and sexiest, literally 'most full of Aphrodite', fights and disputes; but it is like piracy to force the boy, cause pain, and cause him to hate you as you kiss and touch him, as does the youth who hates it in *Symp.* 8.21.<sup>54</sup> While the focus in these most 'Aphrodised' *charites* here is on the lover's pleasures, they work only if they are given willingly and give pleasure to both, and the further descriptions of the sexy playfulness of glances, questions, wrestlings, and disputes confirm that the lover thinks that pleasures are felt also by the beloved. The problem for the tyrant, as opposed to the ordinary citizen, is that he cannot be sure whether or not his beloved is faking it.

This point is picked up again at 7.5-6, in a comparison between the granting of honours and sexual favours. The sexual services offered by those who don't love back, like honours given by fearful subjects, are seen as not constituting 'real' *charites*, and forced sex-acts (*aphrodisia biai*) are not pleasant:

Ἄλλ', ὃ Σιμωνίδη, καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ τῶν τυράννων ὅμοιαι ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οἷάπερ ἐγὼ σοι τὰ ἀφροδίσια ὄντα αὐτῶν ἀπέδειξα. οὔτε γὰρ αἱ μὴ ἐξ ἀντιφιλοῦντων ὑπουργαί χάριτες ἡμῖν ἐδόκουν εἶναι οὔτε τὰ ἀφροδίσια τὰ βίαια ἡδέα ἐφαίνετο. ὡσαύτως τοίνυν οὐδὲ αἱ ὑπουργαί αἱ ὑπὸ τῶν φοβουμένων τιμαὶ εἰσι.

Simonides, the honours given to tyrants seem to me to be comparable to what I showed you was the case with sexual pleasures. The services offered by those who do not love their lover back did not seem to us to be pleasurable returns, nor did forced sexual acts appear to be pleasant, and similarly services given by those who are frightened are not really honours.

Xen. *Hier.* 7.5-7

Xenophon's amiable and considerate tyrant thus insists that proper *charites* in sex involve both affection, and shared enjoyment, not pain, distaste, or resentment, as opposed to 'pleasures' granted by those acting against their will or through fear; he does not go so far as to say that the pleasures are equal in these loving relationships, let alone state explicitly that the beloved's enjoyment extends to a climax. We should not, however, exclude the possibility that such a conclusion would be understood.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. especially C. Hindley, 'Xenophon on male love', *CQ* 49 (1999) 74-99.

Xenophon's insistence that it matters greatly to the conscientious lover that his beloved responds favourably out of friendship and affection finds an echo in Aristotle's use of the example of a pederastic relationship in support of a logical point (Arist. *PA* 68a37-b7). The assumption which is crucial to the argument is that while a lover wishes that the beloved will both grant him the (sexual) favour and will do so because he has the state of mind to do so willingly, he would prefer the affection without the sex to the sex without the affection.<sup>55</sup> Love's goal (*telos*) is mutual affection (*philia*), not intercourse, and intercourse is either not a goal, or a goal for the sake of receiving affection. The implications of this argument seem to be that it was generally acceptable among Aristotle's educated audiences and readership that erotic love could reasonably be expected to lead to intercourse, but that the sex was thought by proper lovers to be less important than mutual friendship, and intercourse could be negotiated to increase, rather than detract from, the shared affection.<sup>56</sup>

This brings us to a – necessarily brief – consideration of the use of *charis*-words in the two great Platonic dialogues on *erôs*. The verb *charizesthai* occurs very frequently in the *Symposium*, especially in Pausanias' speech, used of the decision which boyfriends had to make whether or not to 'gratify' their lovers' requests. (Pl. *Symp.* 180c-185c) The first instance is his significant claim that as a result of what he regards as the bad practice of pursuing boys when they are too young, when their minds are not yet developed, and their beards not yet started, some people (*sc.* in Athens) 'are bold enough to say (*tolman legein*) that it is shameful (*aischron*) to *charizesthai* one's lovers' as they object to its untimeliness and injustice. On the other hand, such *charizesthai* is always thought acceptable in Elis and Boeotia (Pl. *Symp.* 181c-182b). The argument develops, with half a dozen similar cases of our word, to the conclusion that it is only when all strict codes or principles are observed, and the boyfriend has taken the care and time to check the lover's noble and educational intentions, and has satisfied the lover that he's complying for the right reasons, should the boyfriend grant his lover the favour (*charizetai*). Throughout, the arrangement is seen essentially as the boyfriend providing sexual and other pleasures for the lover, in exchange either for character-building benefits and lasting friendship (good) or transferable skills for politics (not so good), or for cash or presents (bad). While the idea of some sexual pleasure for the boyfriend is not excluded by Pausanias' speech, there seems no positive suggestion of it. In Agathon's speech, however, we might be tempted to suspect its presence, in the vague but sensual list of the good Eros' personified children – luxury (*truphê*), delicacy (*habrotês*), refinement (*chlidê*), pleasurable returns (*charites*), desire (*himeros*), and longing (*pothos*) (197d) – a hint of mutual pleasures shared by both

<sup>55</sup> The MSS diverge between *charizesthai* and *charisasthai* for two out of the four uses of the verb, and Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above) 46-47 suggests that the aorist should be read in two cases to mean 'give the favour' and the present retained when the sense is 'be inclined to give the favour'. The evidence of the MSS seems insufficient for such a firm conclusion.

<sup>56</sup> On this passage, and generally on Aristotle's views on these topics, cf. A. W. Price, *Love and friendship in Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford 1989) 236-49, and J. Sihvola, 'Aristotle on sex and love', in *The sleep of reason: Erotic experience and sexual ethics in ancient Greece and Rome*, eds M. C. Nussbaum and J. Sihvola (Chicago and London 2002) 200-21.

lover and boyfriend. More ambiguously, Alcibiades' narrative of his unconventional direct approach to Socrates, culminating in his over-forward but unsuccessful offer to give Socrates pleasure (*charizesthai*) under the same cloak (218c-d), seems to suggest that he positively wanted their relationship to be consummated physically, as he felt so much admiration and love for Socrates (219d, 222b). One might conclude from this that boyfriends who felt deep affection for their chosen lovers, and wished to please them, expected that the sexual experience would be at least agreeable, and possibly more than that; but they were definitely not expected openly to invite sexual intercourse.

In the *Phaedrus* there are also a great many uses of *charizesthai* in the competing 'non-lover speeches', that attributed to 'Lysias' (231a-c, 233c-234c) and Socrates' first speech (237b, 238e, 241a-d). These cases concern the choice the pursued boyfriend has to make when faced with proposals from his lover(s). The arguments all assume that this is a *charis* which expects a counter-*charis*, and the 'non-lover' argues that he will provide a much better, more secure, and longer-lasting return in benefits than the 'lover', who is much more likely to desert the beloved or do him harm later. As with Pausanias' speech, the question of sexual pleasure for the boyfriend is evidently not at issue. Much more interesting, of course, are two cases in the subsequent exposition of Socrates' more committed views, built on the analogy of the soul to the charioteer and good and bad horses. First, at 254a, the bad or hybridic horse of the lover prances about and drives the other horse and charioteer towards the boyfriend and reminds them of 'the joy of sex' (τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων χάριτος). Of course, the suggestion of full sex at this point is presented as clearly wrong; the other horse and charioteer resist the attempt to force them to do what is dreadful and illicit (δεινὰ καὶ παράνομα), and the bad horse is eventually, after intense struggles, restrained from carrying through the plan. It is, however, significant that the bad horse calls what he wants 'the *charis* of sex' rather than (say) the *hedonê*, given the regular use of *charis*-vocabulary for affectionate and reciprocal relations in these contexts. It seems probable that the bad horse wishes it to be understood that the boy will not only provide sexual pleasure for his lover, in the expectation of different sorts of favours later, but also implies that the sexual pleasures will be shared by them both.

Later Plato expounds, with complex imagery and allusions to myths and earlier poetry of an overwhelming depth and range, the fullest surviving description of the emotions on both sides in relationships between serious and mutually affectionate couples, one set presented as wholly good, the other given to some lapses (255a-257b).<sup>57</sup> It is made clear that the lover displays the initial and the stronger sexual desire and feelings, and it is his bad horse, the seat of desire, who makes the suggestion of sexual intercourse (255e-56a). But it

<sup>57</sup> See e.g. G. R. F. Ferrari, *Listening to the cicadas: A study of Plato's Phaedrus* (Cambridge 1987) 150-203; Price, *Love and friendship in Plato and Aristotle* (n.56, above) 74-94; Calame, *The poetics of eros* (n.25, above) 186-91; M. C. Nussbaum, 'Eros and ethical norms', in *The sleep of reason: Erotic experience and sexual ethics in ancient Greece and Rome*, eds M. C. Nussbaum and J. Sihvola (Chicago and London 2002) 69-73; Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above) 212-20. On the power and range of the imagery of this marvellous speech, cf. especially now D. L. Cairns, 'The imagery of *erôs* in Plato's *Phaedrus*', in *Erôs in ancient Greece*, eds E. Sanders, C. Thumiger, C. Carey, and N. J. Lowe (Oxford 2013) 233-50.

is equally clear that the beloved feels, if confusedly, an *anterôs*, a ‘counter-love’,<sup>58</sup> which is the mirror-image of his lover’s, and which he calls an affection (*philia*) which brings with it a sexual desire, if less strong, a desire for physical contact such as touching, kissing, and going to bed. While his ‘horse’ does not have anything to propose (unlike the Alcibiades of the *Symposium* to Socrates), he ‘swells’ with desire, kisses affectionately, and wishes to deny his lover nothing (255c-256a). The good couple are strong enough to deny themselves the pleasure, and share the delights of the pursuit of wisdom (256a-b). But full sex may take place between a serious-minded and loving couple, who are concerned with the more vulgar and unphilosophical, the more politically ambitious, way of life (*philotimotera diaita*). This comes about, through drink or other carelessness, when the two unruly beasts get the better of the other horses and ‘choose and carry out the most blessed life-choice of most people’ (τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν μακαριστὴν αἴρεσιν εἰλέσθην τε καὶ διεπραξάσθην) (256c). They may go on doing so occasionally, as their friendship (*philia*) lasts during and beyond their love (*erôs*); they believe they have thereby shared the greatest pledges, which would be sacrilege to break. As a longstanding and intensely serious couple, despite their carnal lapses, they have not deprived themselves of their ‘wings of immortality’, ‘in return for their love’ (ἔρωτος χάριν) (256b).

As has often been recognized, this astonishingly powerful description does recognize that intense pleasures (if unequally experienced and understood) may occur in shared sex between an essentially serious and loving couple, which should not be completely condemned (provided it happens infrequently).<sup>59</sup> Further, the expression of their love and counter-love in mutually satisfying sex (presumably with orgasm for both) is said by Plato to constitute for ‘most people’ the best life-experience and choice. By ‘most people’ here Plato probably meant not so much the majority of all free men as most educated people, who participated in some forms of cultivated discourse, philosophical, political, or cultural; the implications of the sentence seem to be that many such people regarded mutual sexual pleasure between loving or affectionate couples, whether pederastic or married, as perfectly normal.

Two conclusions may be drawn on the relation of this speech to other texts we have discussed. First, on the question of the views of Athenians, it seems consistent with Pausanias’ statement that in general they approved of the good forms of the relationship between citizen partners of unequal ages, if they had the right additional motives on top of sexual attractions and pleasure, and that it was practised ‘especially’ (but not exclusively) by the ‘noblest and best people’ (γενναιοτάτων καὶ ἀρίστων) (*Symp.* 182d). Second, the acknowledgment here of a strong sexual responsiveness in a loving boyfriend (if largely unspoken and initially not fully understood) is not, as usually held, a rare exception to the

<sup>58</sup> For *anterôs*, cf. also Xen. *Symp.* 8.3, Nikeratos’ wife’s reciprocation of erotic love for her husband.

<sup>59</sup> E.g. Price, *Love and friendship in Plato and Aristotle* (n.56, above) 86-88; Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above) 206-07; genuine reciprocity of pleasure is denied by Calame, *The poetics of eros* (n.25, above) 189-90, because his *anterôs* is not a proper form of love for the other, only a mirror of the lover’s love for him; against this, see e.g. Price, *Love and friendship in Plato and Aristotle* (n.56, above) 87, and in any case, this does not affect the reciprocity of the sexual responses.

standard picture elsewhere of a normally unresponsive boyfriend in good relationships.<sup>60</sup> It should be seen rather as the more explicit expression of an assumption found in a number of other texts, an assumption which may well have been generally well understood. What is unique here is the integration of this assumption into the beautifully written philosophical development of Plato's pederastic and pedagogical ideals.<sup>61</sup>

*A political crisis of charis?*

Pausanias and Aristophanes in the *Symposium*, and Socrates in the *Phaedrus*, all envisage pederastic couples, of the less committedly philosophical type, as engaging seriously in the life of politics. Davidson picks up effectively on such perceptions in comedy as well as in philosophical discourses, and attempts to identify some consequences in terms of significant social and political change in popular attitudes to pederasty from the mid-fifth century BC, which he labels a 'crisis of *charis*', concentrated in the relations between pederasty, prostitution, and politicians.<sup>62</sup> In a similar vein, I have recently discussed various laws and regulations passed in Athens in the second half of the fifth century BC, and argued that they reflected popular concerns not only about former notorious 'boyfriends' who moved into politics, but also the supposed flatterers and toadies (sycophants in our sense) and those engaged in legal abuses for wealth or advancement (sykophants in the Athenian sense), all of whom should be seen as offenders against the norms of *charis*.<sup>63</sup> We are essentially in agreement in identifying increasing complexity in Athenian attitudes, including a growth of anxiety about the abuse of reciprocal *charis* from the mid-fifth century BC onwards; I end with some brief comments on where we differ.

A common starting point is our shared belief, in opposition to many,<sup>64</sup> that approval of noble, appropriately reciprocal, homosexual *erôs* was widely shared among all types of citizens, who understood its conventions, including the acceptance of delicately veiled sex;<sup>65</sup> we further agree that active engagement in it grew in popularity, and became part of

<sup>60</sup> Ferrari, *Listening to the cicadas* (n.57, above) 175-77; Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above) 217-20.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. also Thomsen, 'Socrates and love' (n.52, above) 147-54 and *passim*.

<sup>62</sup> Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above) 446-65, 495-99.

<sup>63</sup> Fisher, 'Kharis, Kharites, festivals, and social peace' (n.1, above) 215-26.

<sup>64</sup> E.g. D. Cohen, *Law, sexuality and society* (Cambridge 1991) 171-202; G. Sissa, 'Sexual bodybuilding: Aeschines Against Timarchos', in *Constructions of the Classical body*, ed. J. I. Porter (Michigan 1999) 147-68; T. K. Hubbard, 'Popular perceptions of elite homosexuality in Classical Athens', *Arion* 6 (1998) 48-78 (repeated in his online review of Davidson in *H-Histsex*, February 2009); D. Pritchard, 'Athletics, education and participation in Classical Athens', in *Sport and festival in the ancient Greek world*, eds D. Phillips and D. Pritchard (Swansea 2003) 293-349: 330-32.

<sup>65</sup> The strongest argument for this view is the fact that both Aeschines' prosecution and Timarchos' defence team share the view that ordinary Athenians see noble *erôs* as an essential and valuable part of Athenian cultural traditions (Aeschin. 1.132-50). The attempts of Sissa and Hubbard (both in n.64, above) to dispose of this argument by the claim that these sections of Aeschines' speech are later additions, for educated readers not the jury, are arbitrary. The interesting, if speculative, article by A. Lanni, 'The expressive effect of the Athenian prostitution laws', *Classical Antiquity* 29 (2010)

official democratic ideology (seen above all in the heroicisation of Harmodius and Aristogeiton and their representations in official monuments).<sup>66</sup> Davidson's new argument discovers two further developments, which in his view together led also to the issue of youths' responses becoming politically charged by the start of the fourth century BC. First, he identifies an increase in the awareness of a wider range of same-sex opportunities visibly available in the city from the fifth century BC onwards, consisting in the development of a specialised market of attractive slave-musicians and rent-boys, as well as street-prostitutes. This introduced a perception of a wave of 'homowhorishness', forms of homosexual encounters not confined to the elite and ranging from one-off acts of commercial sex to longer term commercial hirings (such as the supposed arrangements for the Plataean boy in *Lysias* 3), which contrasted significantly with the *gymnasia*-based and *charis*-regulated relationships combining *erôs* and *philia*. In turn, this prevalence of varieties of more commercial lust is supposed to arouse anxiety and confusion among the debating classes in the Socratic circles, and led some there, according to Plato's Pausanias (*Symp.* 182a), to have been bold enough to oppose the whole idea of homosexuality (as Plato himself would finally do in the *Laws*), and others to seek to draw up and enforce boundaries more explicitly.

There are difficulties with this first argument. First, the serious lack of evidence for social conditions and attitudes in Athens before the start of the Peloponnesian War makes it very difficult to plot the timing of changes, whether in realities or in perceptions; hence Hubbard with some reason condemns the whole argument as unsubstantiated speculation.<sup>67</sup> If, however, one is prepared to contemplate this sort of argument, it seems doubtful that awareness of the availability of a range of types of male prostitutes or 'escorts' was a startlingly new phenomenon of the fifth century BC. While it seems very likely that the population growth and economic expansion in Athens shortly before and after the Persian Wars, especially in the city and the Piraeus, produced an expansion in actual numbers of brothels and prostitutes, both female and male, as well as an increase in individual slave holdings and hence slave specialisms, this does not necessarily imply the existence of different types of male prostitutes was not widely understood before that, and even less that widespread sexual abuse of male slaves was a new phenomenon in the fifth century BC.<sup>68</sup> The need for moralists to distinguish different sorts of 'favourable returns'

45-67, argues that the passing of these laws may well have had considerable inhibiting effects on citizens' behaviour, but her view that the passing of the laws reflected a growing populist hostility to elite homosexual friendships seems to me to underestimate continuing popular attachment to, and involvement in, the ideals of chaste pederasty, and their desire to re-impose existing standards of propriety.

<sup>66</sup> On this, cf. also V. Wohl, 'The *eros* of Alcibiades', *Classical Antiquity* 18 (1999) 349-80.

<sup>67</sup> Hubbard, online review of Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love*, in *H-Histsex*, February 2009.

<sup>68</sup> Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above) 490 supports his view by suggesting that references to male sex-slaves are almost non-existent in Aristophanes, but very common in Plautus' versions of fourth-century BC comedies. First, however, in so far as this is a change (and there are examples of male prostitutes, e.g. at Ar. *Kn.* ll. 1384-87, *Frogs* 148, *Wealth* ll. 153-56), this may reflect the generally greater roles for slaves and interest in master-slave relations in Middle and New Comedy; and second, there is the well-known problem of the extent to which such themes in Plautus may be his additions to his models and reflect Roman concerns.

offered to supposedly respectable youths in exchange for their sexual favours had very probably been present in Athens and elsewhere for some time before the Persian Wars.

But what needs an explanation is the apparent increased concern to police the borderline between acceptable and non-acceptable yieldings by youthful citizens by a raft of new laws and regulations. Here it seems to me that Davidson is right to point to the plethora of jokes in Old Comedy arising from the perception that the most successful young politicians – and other celebrities – had been seen to be participating in the gymnastic and sympotic cultures, had formed close friendships there, and moved on from there into politics and the law courts, where they were also closely associated in ‘friendships’ with more experienced operators.<sup>69</sup> He is right also to link this, albeit briefly, to a more general set of perceptions which he labels a ‘crisis of *charis*’ because it was created by anxieties about the impropriety of many *charis*-relations among the young politicians. The primary text he cites for this crisis comes not from the fifth or fourth centuries BC, but the second century AD (Plut. *Political Precepts*, *Mor.* 806e-07b), and it is not concerned with sexual relations, but with the conflicting obligations of politicians towards the state and to their personal friends. I agree with him that very much the same sort of moral concerns are associated with good and less good types of reciprocity in the different spheres of operation of sexual, social, and political life, and they are all equally related to the broad context of expanding participation in many areas of political and social life. As I have argued in more detail, accusations in comedy and the law courts against the shameless boyfriends who benefit from their lovers as they enter politics, against the ‘flatterers’ or ‘parasites’, the subordinate associates of leading politicians who surrender their masculine independence to do favours for their superior ‘friends’ in exchange for money, gifts, food and drink, or advancement, and the ‘sykophants’ who exploit the law courts and assembly to attack and profit from the enemies of their friends, all tend to cluster together, and are condemned under the same code of values.<sup>70</sup>

More than moral anxiety and uneasy jokes resulted. Davidson fruitfully links together the two measures introduced by the mid-420s BC to deal with active citizens who had been prostitutes or escorts (*hetairêkotes*), that is the *dokimasia rhêtorôn* and the *graphê hetairêseos*, with the *eisangelia* law which included in its targets those engaged in organising a *hetairikon*, a political association: this measure was probably introduced in one of the democratic restorations after the assaults on the democracy of the *Hermokopidai* and the two oligarchic movements.<sup>71</sup> The measures neatly combine anxieties about secretive groups who might be plotting anti-democratic moves with worries about personal attachments, rooted in erotic love (whether more commercial or more honourable), which lasted on into public life. As Davidson shows, Aeschines’ treatment of the relationships involving Leodamas, Hegesandros, and Timarchos exhibits the same multiple anxieties.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>69</sup> See Aristophanes, *Ach.* 77-79, 716-17, *Kn.* 423-28, 730-40, 874-80, *Clouds* 1089-1113, *Wasps* 1068-70, *Eccl.* 111-14, fr. 424 K-A (*Holkades*), fr. 677KA; Eupolis fr. 104 K-A (*Demoi*); Plat. *Com.* fr. 202 K-A, Plat. *Symp.* 191e-92a. Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above) 462-63.

<sup>70</sup> See Fisher, ‘*Kharis*, *Kharites*, festivals, and social peace’ (n.1, above) 215-26.

<sup>71</sup> Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above) 496-99.

<sup>72</sup> Aeschines 1.55-76; Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above) 455-59.



One can add in fact a wide raft of other measures under this same broad heading of social anxieties, laws which can all be seen as part of a developing process of exercising controls over socially dangerous behaviour, especially when it involved younger citizens, as offenders or as victims. A variety of laws, using the *probolê* procedure, were passed to regulate various festival contests and ensure good order; and, a law imposed an age-limit of forty on *chorêgoi* in order to prevent improper abuse of young chorus members by the rich and powerful sponsors. These were all apparently introduced after the end of the Peloponnesian War.<sup>73</sup> Further regulations concerned with restricting opening hours and setting age-limits for attendance at schools, *gymnasia*, and *palaistrai* (Aeschin. 1.9-10) probably are late fifth-century BC additions to Solonian laws which excluded slaves from *gymnasia* and from being *erastai* (Aeschin. 1.138-9).<sup>74</sup> Sycophancy, like *hetairêsis*, was perceived as a major problem by all classes of citizens and in all genres but was very hard to define or to prove in court. A *graphê* and an *eisangelia* directed at it were introduced perhaps in the 420s BC (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 59.3, Isocr. 15.314). Later, when fears of the seriously disruptive influence of sycophants were at their greatest just before the end of the Peloponnesian War, and at the restoration of the democracy, more *probolai* were introduced; on the second occasion, post 403 BC, the law established an annual invitation to bring a maximum of six prosecutions (three against citizens, three against metics) against sykophants or deceivers of the people (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 43). All this indicates well the spirit of consensus on the issue, that the *dêmos*, as well as the complaining rich, recognised that sykophants, operating alone, in pairs, or in gangs, threatened the values and functioning of the democracy, in the same sorts of ways as those who had formed disorderly and illicit friendships with their elders.<sup>75</sup>

### Conclusion

Thus, in broadly erotic contexts, *charis* has a wide range of meanings and usages which are all interconnected. The term, with its associated personifications and goddesses, often plays a significant part in literary presentations of sexual relations, both homosexual and heterosexual, and in surviving debates on key issues of sexual and social politics. Close attention to those uses of *charis* which embrace the ideas of reciprocal pleasure and affection strongly reinforces the view that the less dominant partner, in the contexts of both married and homosexual love, was normally expected to experience sexual pleasure (females more so than males); particularly in the case of homosexual love, it was felt inappropriate for such matters to be discussed openly with any one outside the relationship. The complex sympotic

<sup>73</sup> For details, see Fisher, *Aischines, Against Timarchos, ad loc.*, and Fisher 'Kharis, Kharites, festivals, and social peace' (n.1, above) 218-26.

<sup>74</sup> Davidson's belief (*Greeks and Greek love* (n.2, above) 68-71, 78-88, 184, 425-26) that Athenian laws explicitly prohibited erotic relations with 'boys' (*paides*) – for him roughly the under-18s – and excluded adults from entering *gymnasia* when the boys were exercising, lacks convincing evidence in support, and runs counter to Pausanias' statement that there *should* be such a law against the love of boys (Plat. *Symp.* 181d-e); further, if such laws had existed, one would have expected that Aeschines would have quoted them explicitly, which he does not quite do, either at 1.7-17 or at 1.139. On this cf. Hubbard's review of Davidson, *H-Histsex* (n.67, above).

<sup>75</sup> On this, cf. also Fisher, 'The bad boyfriend, the flatterer and the sycophant' (n.1, above) 215-26.

discussions in Plato, Xenophon, and Aeschines' prosecution of Timarchos alike reveal the delicacy and uncertainties of the moral boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in homosexual relationships, and the slipperiness of these distinctions; they also reveal contradictory attitudes among many Athenian citizens and the tensions the contradictions produced in Athenian society. The legislative changes which can be identified in the last third of the fifth century BC should be seen as responses to this widespread anxiety among the Athenians, as many suspected that the combination of increasing numbers of young citizens engaging in politics and the law courts, and the strains of war, social conflicts, and changing social attitudes, was resulting in unacceptable levels of improper behaviour in erotic relationships, which ignored the protocols of reciprocal love and friendship embodied in the concept of *charis*.

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# THE REJECTION OF EROTIC PASSION BY EURIPIDES' HIPPOLYTOS \*

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## *Introduction*

The principal focus of this article is Hippolytos' contravention of the status of a man as a sexual being within the context of the family and the *polis*. As I discuss in depth below, sexuality in Greek society, unlike many modern cultures, is not simply a matter of individual preference, but is located within a nexus of larger relationships, duties, and responsibilities. I intend to show that, because the social aspect of male and female sexuality and sexual roles is central in Classical Greece, Hippolytos' rejection of erotic passion goes beyond personal choice, into the sphere of male social roles.

The gulf between ancient and modern perceptions in this respect is nowhere clearer than in the psychological readings of sexuality which have been influential in recent studies of the play. The centrality of the idea of male chastity and Hippolytos' obsession with sexual abstinence offers a very appealing case for psychoanalytical study.<sup>1</sup> However, it is my belief that psychoanalytical readings of Hippolytos have crucial limitations.<sup>2</sup> In

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I have used the following translations for the ancient texts included in this article: V. Bers, *Demosthenes, Speeches 50-59* (Austin 2003); D. A. Campbell, *Greek Lyric III, Stesichorus, Ibycus, Simonides, and others* (Cambridge MA and London 1991); D. Kovacs, *Euripides: Children of Heracles, Hippolytus, Adromache, Hecuba* (Cambridge MA and London 1995).

<sup>1</sup> See for instance C. Segal, *Interpreting Greek tragedy: Myth, poetry, text* (Ithaca and London 1986) 268-93, where he uses a combination of psychoanalysis and structuralism in reading *Hippolytos* and argues in favour of the value of both disciplines in approaching Greek drama; G. Devereux, *The character of the Euripidean Hippolytos: An ethno-psychoanalytical study* (Chico CA 1985); H. M. Roisman, *Nothing is at it seems: The tragedy of the implicit in Euripides' Hippolytus* (Lanham MD and Oxford 1999), where she says that her analysis 'holds that psychological subtlety is tightly woven into Euripides' dramatic strategy, and interprets the play with an eye to the plausibility and consistency of the characters, whom Euripides sculpts as distinct and complex individuals' (xiv); J. Glenn, 'The fantasies of Phaedra: A psychoanalytical reading', *Classical World* 69 (1976) 435-42, focusing on the psychology of the other major character of the play.

<sup>2</sup> There is an ongoing debate on the use of psychoanalysis in Classics between those scholars who are in favour and those who reject the approach as anachronistic. On the matter see M. Leonard, 'Antigone, the political and the ethics of psychoanalysis', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 49 (2003)

placing the focus on the psyche, they neglect the social ramifications emerging from his behaviour. This approach diverts us from ancient constructions of sexual identity and tacitly imposes the values of a society in which sex is largely a matter of individual preference. The flaw (apart from the need to import material into the text) is that it ignores the cultural context within which the play was received by its first audience. For the Greeks, the *act* of sex was a private matter,<sup>3</sup> in that decency demands concealment (and this figures prominently in inverted form in the way Greeks speak of the Other, *i.e.* the non-Greeks),<sup>4</sup> but the *role* of sex was a collective and public issue, in the sense that procreation is both related to the preservation of the *oikos*, and its presence in the community, and a man's civic duty to add to the citizen body by begetting legitimate children.<sup>5</sup> As the discussion below will show, individual sexuality is located within a nexus of obligations and relationships and cannot be extracted from that network. An approach which focuses exclusively on Hippolytos' internal psychology misses the outward facing dimension of sex and consequently risks narrowing excessively the dynamics of the play. My interest here, then, is not in the psychology, but in the sociology of the hero. Accordingly, my approach will focus on those aspects of the *Hippolytos* which are gender-specific, related to the duties and responsibilities of the adult male; my intention is to examine the relation of Hippolytos' deliberate celibacy to male practice in the cultural context in which the play was performed.

*Athenian attitudes towards male and female sexual activity in fifth-century BC Athens*

The Athenian male was presented with a number of outlets for his sexual activity before or even after marriage, at least in theory. Taking into consideration that the normal marrying age for a man was somewhere around thirty years of age and that any kind of

130-54, where she maps out the debate and argues against the rejection of psychoanalysis as a useful tool for interpreting texts (also including a large bibliography on Classics and psychoanalysis). See also S. Goldhill 'Modern critical approaches to Greek tragedy', in *The Cambridge companion to Greek tragedy*, ed. P. E. Easterling (Cambridge 1997) 324-47 on modern theory and tragedy.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. e.g. Hdt. 1.8 on the difference between Greek and barbarian practice when it comes to privacy in the act of sex, and F. Hartog, *Le miroir d'Hérodote: Essai sur la représentation de l'autre* (Paris 1980) 337, *ad loc.* Also K. J. Dover, *Greek popular morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford 1974) 206, where he speaks of sex seen as a private matter by the Greeks and their reaction when faced with 'barbaric' customs allowing sex to be performed out of doors and in public (*cf. e.g.* Xen. *Anab.* 5.4.34).

<sup>4</sup> On Greek perceptions of the barbarian as the 'Other' see e.g. J. M. Hall, *Hellenicity: Between ethnicity and culture* (Chicago and London 2002) Chapter 6, where he speaks of the increasing occurrence of barbarians in fifth-century BC art and literature in the aftermath of the Persian Wars, noting that 'the invention of a barbarian antitype provided a completely new mechanism for defining Hellenic identity' (179), and E. Hall, *Inventing the barbarian: Greek self-definition through tragedy* (Oxford 1989) on the construction of the barbarian image in fifth-century BC tragedy; *cf.* J. M. Hall, *Ethnic identity in Greek antiquity* (Cambridge 1997) 33, where he points out that 'ethnic identity can only be constituted by opposition to other ethnic identities'.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. D. Cohen, *Law, sexuality, and society: The enforcement of morals in Classical Athens* (Cambridge 1992) 85, on marriage as a need for families to establish/strengthen their position, and see below the detailed analysis on male obligations towards the *oikos* and the *polis*.

contact with respectable unmarried women (especially wealthy ones) was not possible due to social restrictions, since the latter would usually only appear in public for religious festivals, funerals, and family celebrations of close relatives,<sup>6</sup> it was only natural to assume that an unmarried man would, and was in fact at liberty to, seek sexual satisfaction through different outlets if he so wished. Besides, sexual activity with prostitutes or *hetairai* was a safe way of preventing men from engaging in contra-normative behaviour and preying on decent women. Moreover, in contrast to the Christian tradition, sexual desire was not considered inherently bad; it was viewed as a normal physiological need and both law and social attitudes allowed men considerable freedom. A striking example is offered by Demosthenes, *Speeches* 59.122:

τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἑταίρας ἡδονῆς ἕνεκ' ἔχομεν, τὰς δὲ παλλακὰς τῆς καθ' ἡμέραν  
θεραπείας τοῦ σώματος, τὰς δὲ γυναικὰς τοῦ παιδοποιεῖσθαι γνησίως καὶ τῶν  
ἕνδον φύλακα πιστὴν ἔχειν

We have *hetairai* for the sake of pleasure, concubines (*pallakai*) for meeting our bodily needs day-by-day, but wives for having legitimate children and to be trustworthy guardians of our household. (trans. V. Bers)

My interest here is not the (dubious) accuracy of this statement as an account either of male behaviour or of female roles but the matter of fact way in which a speaker who adopts a consistent moral stance describes the range of (hetero)sexual outlets theoretically available to a man.

The same freedom of action existed with reference to homosexual relationships. By the time he reached adolescence, a man might find himself on the receiving end of homoerotic advances from older men,<sup>7</sup> and he in turn, especially in the years before

<sup>6</sup> See e.g. S. Blundell, *Women in ancient Greece* (London 1995) 162, on Solon's law on restrictions about women attending funerals; R. Just, *Women in Athenian law and life* (London and New York 1989) 109-11, on women appearing in public for marriages, funerals, religious duties, and sometimes state celebrations; S. B. Pomeroy, *Goddesses, whores, wives and slaves: Women in Classical antiquity* (London 1994) 71-73, 75-78, where she notes that female activity would ideally take place inside, but in religion female presence was central, etc. For the appearance of women in public see Dover, *Greek popular morality* (n.3, above) 209; Cohen, *Law, sexuality, and society* (n.5, above) 136ff. Although Just, *Women in Athenian law and life*, 106-25 *passim*, especially 111-14, Cohen, *Law, sexuality and society* (n.5, above) 136 and J. Davidson, *Courtesans and fishcakes: The consuming passions of Classical Athens* (London 1997) 127-29 have rightly noted the normative and rhetorical elements in Athenian presentations of female visibility, with the consequent tendency to overstatement (ancient and modern) on the subject of female seclusion, both ideology and practice appear to have favoured segregation of the sexes and limitation on female accessibility to unrelated males – at least in the upper classes where any extra-domestic task could be performed by slaves.

<sup>7</sup> It is quite possible that texts over-schematize the nature of homoerotic relationships, but one could not argue that they mislead us altogether, since they are produced for an audience very familiar with the sexual culture. On chaperoning young boys in order to protect them from these advances see J. Davidson, *The Greeks and Greek love: A radical reappraisal of homosexuality in ancient Greece* (London 2007) 69.

marriage, might engage in the erotic pursuit of adolescent males.<sup>8</sup> We cannot of course apply these generalizations to every Athenian male; the duration, or even the ‘homosexual “phase”’ itself (to use Garland’s terminology about the *erômenos* phase in teenage years) did not necessarily apply to everyone – especially since it was mainly practiced by the upper class.<sup>9</sup> But we are here concerned with agreed models, not universal experience.

This is true of any kind of sexual activity – before or after marriage: the liberty to form extra-marital sexual relations with (male and female) prostitutes and/or *erômenoi* does not mean that it was necessarily universal – not to mention that the homoerotic pursuit of free boys presupposed a level of financial leisure, since courtship was a potentially expensive endeavour, which would place it beyond the means of those in lower socio-economic groups.<sup>10</sup> The number of these experiences varied between individuals and not every man chose to take advantage of it too often (or even at all), especially since too much indulgence in sexual activity was open to censure as indicative of lack of self-control and dangerous for the city if politicians (such as Timarchus in Aeschin. 1.42) were behaving thus,<sup>11</sup> but also because, although there were no legal restrictions concerning extra-marital sex for men (except of course with citizen women), the positive attributes of marital fidelity are not completely absent from our texts.<sup>12</sup>

One thing is certain, however: in a civic context, lifelong celibacy was not generally regarded as praiseworthy and certainly never required in a man. In general, absence of

<sup>8</sup> Dover, *Greek popular morality* (n.3, above) 213; R. Garland, *The Greek way of life from conception to old age* (London 1990) 187, 210, on homosexuality helping the transition from adolescence and adulthood. Also Cohen, *Law, sexuality and society* (n.5, above) 171-202; T. K. Hubbard, *Homosexuality in Greece and Rome: A sourcebook of basic documents* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 2003) 2 and *passim*; D. M. Halperin, *One hundred years of homosexuality* (New York 1990) 47, 97 and K. J. Dover, *Greek homosexuality* (London 1978) 16 on domination and sexual roles; Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.7, above) 31, 88. Also see N. Fisher, ‘Erotic *charis*: What sorts of reciprocity?’, this volume, pp. 39-66 on the range of acceptable behaviours concerning homosexual relations.

<sup>9</sup> Garland, *Greek way of life* (n.8, above) 187. Cohen, *Law, sexuality and society* (n.5, above) 171-202 has demonstrated how pursuing a young *erômenos* was not devoid of anxiety, creating implications both for the honour and reputation of the *erastês* and that of the *erômenos* (which become evident by the frequency they appear in the sources). See also Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.7, above) 31, on how showing recognition of and encouraging someone’s advances was potentially harmful to the boy’s reputation.

<sup>10</sup> See Dover, *Greek homosexuality* (n.8, above) 92-93, on the gifts youths are presented with when courted by men as shown on vase depictions; also Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.7, above) 343, 474. On the contrary, hiring a male or a female prostitute could be as cheap as one *obol*, as Davidson, *Courtesans and fishcakes* (n.6, above) 196 notes.

<sup>11</sup> See N. Fisher, *Aeschines, Against Timarchos* (Oxford 2001) 55-58, 174.

<sup>12</sup> Dover, *Greek popular morality* (n.3, above) 210; Xen. *Oec.* 1.13, stresses how taking a mistress is bad both for body and soul as well as financially; cf. Isocr. 3.40. W. K. Lacey, *The family in Classical Greece* (London 1968) 166 (using evidence from *Pol.* 1335a; *Lys.* 106 *etc.*) offers a different point of view by arguing that extra-marital sex could have been a way of maintaining a small family and thus avoiding the exposure of unwanted children.

restrictions and absence of celibacy as an ideal for men (unlike Christian cultures), as well as the plethora of options concerning extra-marital sex, created a situation in which a man would be unlikely (although it would not be impossible) to reach a marriageable age without having engaged in some sort of sexual activity, however limited that might have been. And it would have been even harder to remain celibate for life. The reason was that, even if a male chose to abstain from sex in his youth, procreation within a family context was part of male duty towards the city and the *oikos* and not a matter of personal choice.<sup>13</sup> In that respect, concerning the need for reproduction, being sexually active was a vital part of masculine identity.

Virginity on the other hand was clearly projected as a female quality. An unmarried female citizen should be a virgin, while there is no such expectation in the case of a male citizen. But even then, it was only a temporary status: chastity was zealously safeguarded, and praised, until the day of a girl's marriage, for a number of reasons. First of all, there was the need of a man functioning in a patrilineal society to know beyond doubt that his children are truly his.<sup>14</sup> Additionally, female sexuality was a focus of male anxiety, and women are often described by men as more emotional and more susceptible to pleasure, including illicit pleasures such as adultery, so the restrictions placed on their sexual activity before and after their wedding can be explained by the need to prevent them from expressing what was thought to be part of their nature.<sup>15</sup> For example, *Hipp.* ll. 966-70:

ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ μῶρον ἀνδράσιν μὲν οὐκ ἔνι,  
 γυναιξὶ δ' ἐμπέφυκεν; οἶδ' ἐγὼ νέουσι  
 οὐδὲν γυναικῶν ὄντας ἀσφαλεστέρους,  
 ὅταν ταράξῃ Κύπρις ἠβῶσαν φρένα  
 τὸ δ' ἄρσεν αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖ προσκείμενον.

But will you say that folly is not to be found in men but is native to women? I know young men who are no more stable than women when Cypris stirs their young hearts to confusion. But their standing as males serves them well. (trans. D. Kovacs)

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Hdt. 1.61 referring to Megakles' fury against Peisistratus for preventing the former's daughter from having legitimate children; also Hartog, *Miroir d'Hérodote* (n.3, above) 337.

<sup>14</sup> E. Irwin, 'The invention of virginity on Olympus', in *Virginity revisited: Configurations of the unpossessed body*, eds B. MacLachlan and J. Fletcher (Toronto 2007) 13-23 (16); C. Carey, 'Rape and adultery in Athenian law', *Classical Quarterly* 45 (1995) 407-17 (416).

<sup>15</sup> Dover, *Greek popular morality* (n.3, above) 101; Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (n.8, above) 67. Despite this conviction about female nature, laws for adultery rule a punishment only for the man involved, creating the sense that a free woman does not consent to extra-marital sex, but rather that she is somehow forced into it – see Lys. 1.32-33 and Carey 'Rape and adultery' (n.14, above) 416-17 on the distinction between rape and adultery. On the impossibility for the woman's consent in the Archaic age see A. R. W. Harrison, *The law of Athens*, 2 vols (London and Indianapolis 1968-71): vol. I, 34; D. Ogden 'Rape, adultery and protection of bloodline in Classical Athens', in *Rape in antiquity*, eds S. Deacy and K. F. Pierce (London 1997) 28; see also E. Cantarella, 'Gender, sexuality and law', in *The Cambridge companion to ancient Greek law*, eds M. Gagarin and D. Cohen (New York 2005) 244, noting that 'women's consent was not an issue taken into account *per se* by the Athenian legislators'.

*Sôphrosunê and gender*

Female sexual modesty and chastity were described by the word *sôphrosunê*, the same word Hippolytos uses to describe the reasons for his abstinence from sex. As Cairns rightly notes, this does not mean that Hippolytos is ‘eccentrically effeminate’.<sup>16</sup> The word was used for men as well, but in the sense of mastery over desires and impulses, and exercise of self-control.<sup>17</sup> This is why, despite the considerably larger freedom they had when it came to their sexual activity, too much indulgence in bodily pleasures was criticized as lack of self-control, and for that reason, a man displaying it might be perceived as a potential threat when found in a position of power within the city.<sup>18</sup>

*Sôphrosunê* is generally used in the sense of sexual modesty for men only in reference to the adolescent man in his relationships with the men aspiring to become his *erastai*.<sup>19</sup> In many cases, the young man would eventually succumb to the advances of the older man (in the same way the young girl would abandon her modesty and become a wife) and in a few years he would become an adult man, leaving this kind of *sôphrosunê* behind him. But even if he did not succumb, this would not affect his evolving into an adult male citizen. Dover notes that ‘whereas a woman insulated from contact with men throughout her youth and encouraged to treat all men alike with mistrust may find it hard to make the transition from the approved role of virgin daughter to the approved roles of bride, housewife and mother, a boy who rejects the advances of *erastai* will nevertheless turn into an adult male citizen, and his performance of that role will not be impaired by his past chastity’.<sup>20</sup> After the man’s transition into the state of adulthood, the relation between *sôphrosunê* and sexual modesty ceases to exist and the stress falls on self-mastery of impulses in general, including but not exclusively referring to, sexual impulses.

Hippolytos prides himself that his unique behaviour (*i.e.* his rejection of sex and his distance from the life of the *polis*, as it will be shown below) derives from his *sôphrosunê*. In ll. 73-113 *to sôphronein* is the attribute of those allowed to approach Artemis’ meadow; in a long monologue in ll. 983-1035, while defending himself against Theseus’ accusations of raping Phaedra, he once again speaks of his *sôphrosunê* as the driving force behind his decision to abstain from the life of the *polis*. When he first appears on stage, he asserts that *sôphrosunê* cannot be taught and a man either possesses it or does not (ll. 79-80) – and this,

<sup>16</sup> D. L. Cairns, ‘The meadow of Artemis and the character of the Euripidean *Hippolytus*’, *QUCC* 57 (1997) 55.

<sup>17</sup> Cairns, ‘The meadow of Artemis’ (n.16, above) 55. Cf. Pl. *Symp.* 216d7 (γέμει σωφροσύνης) and 219d4-5 (τὴν τούτου φύσιν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν), where Alcibiades uses the word *sôphrosunê* to describe Socrates’ behaviour in relation to the latter’s rejection of the young man’s sexual advances.

<sup>18</sup> Dover, *Greek popular morality* (n.3, above) 179, 207, 210. See also Dover, *Greek homosexuality* (n.8, above) 23. Cf. *e.g.* Aeschin. 1.42 and n.11, above.

<sup>19</sup> Cairns, ‘The meadow of Artemis’ (n.16, above) 56; Davidson, *Greeks and Greek love* (n.7, above) 31; K. Ormand, *Controlling desires: Sexuality in ancient Greece and Rome* (Westport 2009) 53-54.

<sup>20</sup> Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (n.8, above) 89.



of course, must be seen as a purely masculine quality.<sup>21</sup> Even at the moment of his death, he declares that he is the most pure and the most *sôphrôn* of men (l. 1460), as he has done since the beginning of the play, implicitly or explicitly (ll. 80, 995, 1007, 1013, 1100, 1365). He fails to see that sexual purity is only one of the aspects of *sôphrosunê*, not the totality as he seems to believe. He defines it exclusively as total abstinence from sex and bodily purity, whereas this kind of *sôphrosunê* is only a part of the maturing process for both sexes and is expected to give way to sexual activity.<sup>22</sup> As Cairns notes, Hippolytos' behaviour resembles a female or male adolescent that refuses to mature.<sup>23</sup>

The intertextual relationship between the untouched meadow in his prayer to Artemis (ll. 73-87) and Ibycus' Fragment 286 is revealing in this respect:

ἦρι μὲν αἴ τε Κυδώνιαι  
μηλίδες ἀρδόμεναι ῥοῶν  
ἐκ ποταμῶν, ἵνα Παρθένων  
κῆπος ἀκήρατος, αἴ τ' οἴνανθίδες  
αὐζόμεναι σκιεροῖσιν ὑφ' ἔρνεσιν  
οἴναρέοις θαλέθοισιν· ἐμοὶ δ' ἔρος  
οὐδεμίαν κατάκοιτος ὥραν.  
†τε† ὑπὸ στεροπᾶς φλέγων  
Θρηίκιος Βορέας  
αἴσσων παρὰ Κύπριδος ἀζαλέ-  
αις μανίαισιν ἐρεμνὸς ἀθαμβῆς  
ἐγκρατέως πεδόθεν †φυλάσσει†  
ἡμετέρας φρένας.

In the spring flourish Cydonian quince-trees, watered from flowing rivers where stands the inviolate garden of the Maidens, and vine-blossoms growing under the shady vine-branches; but for me love rests at no season: like the Thracian north wind blazing with lightning rushing from the Cyprian with parching fits of madness, dark and shameless, it powerfully shakes my heart from the roots.  
(trans. D. A. Campbell)

The connection is inescapable and is rightly noted by commentators, but interestingly – and unsurprisingly – the inviolate meadow there appears to be a female experience, thus

<sup>21</sup> Cf. the reaction to the sophists, whose claim that virtue can be taught was in complete antithesis to the pre-existing and elitist idea that qualities are inborn and are simply brought out by education; see W. K. C. Guthrie, *The sophists* (Cambridge 1971) 66ff.; M. Gagarin, *Antiphon the Athenian: Oratory, law, and justice in the age of the sophists* (Austin TX 2002) 10-13.

<sup>22</sup> This distorted interpretation of inflexible commitment to the idea of *sôphrosunê* is a major factor leading to Hippolytos' destruction; see C. Gill, 'The articulation of the self in Euripides' *Hippolytus*', in *Euripides, women and sexuality*, ed. A. Powell (London and New York 1990) 94, also speaking about Phaedra's fixation on her faulty interpretation of *sôphrosunê*.

<sup>23</sup> Cairns, 'The meadow of Artemis' (n.16, above) 57-58.

underscoring the peculiarity of Hippolytos' conduct.<sup>24</sup> The description of the untouched meadow has long been recognized as a symbol of his sexuality. The sense of inviolability created by the language of exclusivity Hippolytos uses when speaking of the meadow not only refers to the sanctity of the meadow belonging to a goddess, but is also a clear metaphor for his own chastity. As Parker notes, 'the inviolable meadow of a god is a fit symbol of the chastity of a virtuous youth, as both are protected by *aidōs*';<sup>25</sup> this aspect is crystallized in the word *aidōs* found in the centre of Hippolytos' description of the meadow as inviolable: 'reverence tends it with streams of river water' (l. 78: Αἰδῶς δὲ ποταμίαισι κηπεύει δρόσοις). In addition to *aidōs*, in the fifteen lines the description of the meadow occupies (ll. 73-87), Hippolytos uses seven words and phrases to stress the exclusivity of his relationship with this meadow: 'untouched meadow' (ll. 73-74: ἀκηράτου λειμῶνος); 'where ... [a shepherd] does not dare ... where the iron scythe has never come' (ll. 75-76: οὔτε ... ἀξιῶ ... οὔτε ἤλθε πῶ σίδηρος); 'untouched meadow' (ll. 76-77: ἀκήρατον λειμῶνα); 'for those that nothing has been taught' (l. 79: ὅσοις διδακτὸν μηδέν); 'for the base it is not right' (l. 81: τοῖς κακοῖσι δ' οὐ θέμις); 'from a pious hand' (l. 82: χειρὸς εὐσεβοῦς ἄπο); and, 'I alone of mortals have this privilege' (l. 84: μόνῳ γὰρ ἔστι τοῦτ' ἐμοὶ γέρας βροτῶν).<sup>26</sup> Only those few who are worthy, because they are *eusebeis* (pious) and possess *to sôphronein* by nature can be allowed to approach it. To other people the meadow remains unapproachable. In the same way Hippolytos regards his chastity as an ideal unrealizable by the ordinary man. His explicit declaration that he has never tasted the gifts of Aphrodite and he never intends to (ll. 1002ff.) indicates that not only has he never had a heterosexual experience, but also that he has never had a homoerotic one either. Indeed, homosexuality never becomes an issue in the play, since sexuality is treated solely in relation to heterosexual relations (as is standard in tragedy).

Moreover, Hippolytos emphasizes the personal and individual aspects of sexuality, as his insistence on his uniqueness indicates. But in the social context of his audience, sexuality is not just a personal matter; on the contrary it is closely related to social roles. His abstention viewed against the larger context of the *oikos* is delinquent. His deliberate failure to pass from the stage of the adolescent to that of a man shows that he chooses to abstain from accepting the full rights and responsibilities of an adult male, by rendering himself incapable of expressing his sexuality and consequently fulfilling his duty towards his *oikos* (see below).

<sup>24</sup> See M. Davies, *Poetarum melicorum graecorum fragmenta; vol. 1: Alcman, Stesichorus, Ibycus* (Oxford 1991) 284; D. A. Campbell, *Greek lyric poetry: A selection of early Greek lyric, elegiac and iambic poetry* (London 1967) 310-11. Besides, as L. A. Swift, *The hidden chorus: Echoes of genre in tragic lyric* (New York 2010) 269 rightly points out, his interpretation of the symbolism of the meadow is distorted for an additional reason: 'the meadow is virginal, but is not chaste: it represents virginity only insofar as it is about to be lost. Hippolytos, however, envisages his meadow as expressing his closeness to Artemis and his refusal to come to terms with sexual development. The description thus sets up a tension between the traditional model and the way Hippolytos conceptualizes his meadow'.

<sup>25</sup> R. Parker, *Miasma: Pollution and purification in early Greek religion* (Oxford 1983) 190.

<sup>26</sup> All translations D. Kovacs. Cf. Parker, *Miasma* (n.25, above) 190.

Devereux sees him as an adolescent, stuck in a situation one stage before maturity and refusing to grow up.<sup>27</sup> However, this is to ignore the cultural norms underlying his depiction; he is in some respects much closer to a young *parthenos* than an *ephēbos*, in other words he is closer to female behavioural patterns than male ones. He is trapped in a situation resembling what Irwin calls with reference to young girls, 'the liminal state of *partheneia*': his status is similar to the state of a Greek *parthenos*, whose body was thought to be unformed before the loss of her virginity and who would gain her status as a complete woman only after childbirth.<sup>28</sup> At the same time, however, his activities take place in the open, outside the walls of the *oikos*, away from the space of female activity which is traditionally confined within the house, and they involve non-female behaviours and objectives. Thus, he is physically as well as sexually unable to identify with either male or female behavioural patterns.

### *Sexual abstinence and cult*

So far we have treated sexuality as a purely secular issue in terms of individual experience. For Hippolytos, however, abhorrence of sex is inextricably connected with his worship of Artemis. In this section we shall examine the relationship between celibacy and cult.

Abstinence from sex and complete rejection of any kind of engagement in the deeds of Aphrodite is for Hippolytos, who wants to remain pure (ll. 99-103), the ideal way of living. In his mind, keeping a safe distance from the female sex and maintaining his chastity places him on a higher level than other people, proves his *sôphrosunê*, and gains him the privilege of associating with Artemis (ll. 78-87) – to the extent a mortal can associate with an immortal. To the modern reader, his obsession with chastity may not seem outlandish. Some of the major religions in the world, such as Christianity and Buddhism, project an ascetic ideal including sexual abstinence as a requirement for those who want to reach the higher levels of communicating with god. For fifth-century BC Athens, however, or even for the 'heroic era' in which the play supposedly takes place, the idea of lifelong chastity for the pious, or even for priests and priestesses, is an alien concept. There were restrictions in place preventing sexual activity from taking place in temples or requiring some sort of purification before entering a temple after having sexual intercourse (both of which seem to stem from a requirement for ritual cleanliness in order to avoid pollution), or simply asking for a limited period of abstinence before participating in certain religious festivals.<sup>29</sup> Even then, abstinence is not required for everyone participating, but only those directly involved in the ritual.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, this is not a moral prescript; rather, as Parker says, because 'sex is a private affair .... The insulation of sex from the sacred is merely a specialized case of the general principle that sexual activity, like other bodily functions, requires disguise in formal context. The symbolic veil that, by

<sup>27</sup> Devereux, *The character of the Euripidean Hippolytos* (n.1, above).

<sup>28</sup> Irwin, 'The invention of virginity' (n.14, above) 16.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *Lys.* 912-13; Parker, *Miasma* (n.25, above) 74-76; W. Burkert, *Greek religion, Archaic and Classical*, trans. J. Raffan (Oxford 1985) 98.

<sup>30</sup> See Parker, *Miasma* (n.25, above) 85-86, and Burkert, *Greek religion* (n.29, above) 237-46 *passim* on abstinence requirements in preparation for some festivals.

washing, the worshipper sets up between his sexual activity and the gods is an expression of respect, rather like putting on clean clothes before approaching a shrine'.<sup>31</sup> Especially regarding abstinence before the Thesmophoria, Parker notes that 'everything marks the period of abstinence as abnormal; virgins, who are permanently pure, have no part in the rites'.<sup>32</sup> Certainly, abstinence as a goal in itself, as Hippolytos thinks of it, is nowhere present as an indication of piety or a requirement for religious practices.<sup>33</sup>

Dillon notes that priests and priestesses sometimes had to abstain from sex, and when they did it was only for a limited period of time.<sup>34</sup> Only the priest of Herakles Misogynes in Phocis had to abstain for a whole year, an unusually long period for ancient Greek cult.<sup>35</sup> Especially for women, abstinence was only temporary because of social requirements for their sex; apparently, as Dillon points out, 'adult women's virginity was not prized', as distinct from their chastity.<sup>36</sup> Each cult would have its own requirements, often depending on the status of the deity of the cult (virgin priestesses for virginal deities like Artemis, matrons for matronly goddesses like Demeter), but even then there were many exceptions.<sup>37</sup> Turner argues that the similarity between the goddess and the priestess could have had its origin 'in a primitive belief that during the performance of religious rites priestesses entered into a state of unity or 'oneness' with the deity. The achievement of the state of unity or 'entheos' was facilitated by similarities between the deity and the priestess'.<sup>38</sup>

It is important here to stress that in most cases priesthoods were not lifelong appointments. Connelly notes that women typically held office for a short period, such as a year, or even just one festival period; in cases where priesthoods were held for life, the priestesses were married and had families.<sup>39</sup> This was true both for male and female

<sup>31</sup> Parker, *Miasma* (n.25, above) 76.

<sup>32</sup> Parker, *Miasma* (n.25, above) 83; Burkert, *Greek religion* (n.29, above) 242. Although, Burkert also notes (387 n.44) that 'according to one branch of the tradition, the Lokrian Maidens ... remained in the Athena temple at Ilion until their death'.

<sup>33</sup> As W. Burkert says in his *Ancient mystery cults* (Cambridge, MA 1987) 108, 'sexuality becomes a means for breaking through to some uncommon experience, rather than an end in itself'.

<sup>34</sup> M. Dillon, *Girls and women in Classical Greek religion* (London and New York 2002) 77.

<sup>35</sup> Parker, *Miasma* (n.25, above) 84. The restriction apparently refers only to relations with women; see Plut. *Mor.* 403ff.

<sup>36</sup> Dillon, *Girls and women* (n.34, above) 106. On remaining a virgin for life and its implications on a woman's health see S. B. Pomeroy, *Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece: Representations and realities* (New York 1997) 171; Dem. 45.74; Hyp. 1.13; cf. Isae. 2.7; Lys. 13.45. See also H. King, 'Bound to bleed. Artemis and Greek women', in *Sexuality and gender in the Classical world*, ed. L. K. McClure (Oxford 2002) 89-90; Hippocrates *Peri Partheniôn*.

<sup>37</sup> J. A. Turner, *Hieriai: Acquisition of feminine priesthoods in ancient Greece* (PhD thesis, Santa Barbara 1983) 174, 176.

<sup>38</sup> Turner, *Hieriai* (n.37, above) 176.

<sup>39</sup> J. B. Connelly, *Portrait of a priestess. Women and ritual in ancient Greece* (New Jersey and London 2007) 17-18; also Burkert, *Greek Religion* (n.29, above) on the priests not being obliged to live in the temple for the whole course of their office, but rather for small periods of time (96), and, on priesthoods being, in their majority, temporary and 'part-time' (97-98).

priests, who were usually married and who would occasionally go through short periods of abstinence; or they were elderly and for that reason not usually very sexually active.<sup>40</sup> In cases where celibacy was required during office, this did not mean that the priestesses had to be virgins; moreover, these posts were usually occupied by mature or even elderly women past their child-bearing years, who presumably had been married and fulfilled their female duty as society required.<sup>41</sup> The example of the Pythia is illuminating in this respect: myth attests that the priestess used to be a young virgin, but this soon changed after a prophetess was raped and the young virgin was replaced by a mature woman over fifty, who from the moment she resumed office had to abstain from sex for the rest of her life, since the post was lifelong.<sup>42</sup> Connelly notes that 'perpetual chastity seems to have been a more realistic requirement for an elderly servant than for a young woman in her prime'; the same can be seen in Plato (*Leg.* 759d) and Aristotle (*Pol.* 1329a27-34) who both argue that priests and priestesses should be elderly, thus highlighting the fact that abstinence might be hard for a younger person.<sup>43</sup>

Young virgins had a variety of roles in cult, but they only served for a limited period of time.<sup>44</sup> Dillon observes that usually the young virgins appointed in office 'relinquished their roles when the time of marriage came, emphasizing that marriage was the role allocated by society to the adolescent woman' (cf. Ar. *Lys.* II. 638-47 on a series of religious offices undertaken by noble young girls prior to marriage).<sup>45</sup> Thus, being a *kanêphoros* for instance, allowed marriageable girls to be seen in public; in the case of the *ergastinai*, their training in wool working could be seen as a training period in adolescence in the same way the *ephêboi* received military training.<sup>46</sup>

The girls in the service of Artemis at Brauron were very young, between five and ten years old, and the purpose of their office was to prepare themselves for marriage; Connelly notes that 'the girls were placed under the care of the virgin Artemis, who

<sup>40</sup> Parker, *Miasma* (n.25, above) 86-89.

<sup>41</sup> E.g. the priestess of Artemis Hymnia, see Paus. 8.5.12 and M. R. Lefkowitz and M. B. Fant, *Women's life in Greece and Rome* (London 1982) 387; or the priestess of Artemis at Ecbatana in Persia (Plut. *Artaxerxes* 27.3), who only had to abstain while serving the goddess, but did not have to be a virgin (Turner, *Hieriai* (n.37, above) 206, 210). Also Connelly, *Portrait of a priestess* (n.39, above) 18, who notes that the Vestal virgins in Rome, whose celibacy lasted for thirty years, did not have an equivalent in the Greek world. Parker in *Miasma* (n.25, above) 89, speaks of the priestess of Nemesis at Rhamnous who did not have to be a virgin, but had to have 'finished with sex' before assuming office' (see *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 3462).

<sup>42</sup> Connelly, *Portrait of a priestess* (n.39, above) 44, 73; Diod. Sic. 16.26.

<sup>43</sup> Connelly, *Portrait of a priestess* (n.39, above) 44; Parker *Miasma* (n.25, above) 87.

<sup>44</sup> Like e.g. the *kanêforoi*, the *ergastinai*, the *arrhêforoi* etc. See Connelly, *Portrait of a priestess* (n.39, above) 39, 40; J. Larson, *Ancient Greek cults* (New York and Oxford 2007) 45; L. Viitaniemi, 'Parthenia-remarks on virginity and its meanings in the religious context of ancient Greece', in *Aspects of women in antiquity: Proceedings of the first Nordic symposium on women's lives in antiquity. Göteborg 12-15 June 1997*, eds L. L. Lovén and A. Strömberg (Jonsered 1998) 50-54.

<sup>45</sup> Dillon, *Girls and women* (n.34, above) 77.

<sup>46</sup> Connelly, *Portrait of a priestess* (n.39, above) 33, 39.

shepherded them through the dangerous transitional period between childhood and puberty'.<sup>47</sup> The same was true for the other priestesses of Artemis: many were young girls that held office until they got married.<sup>48</sup> Parker found only one case in the sources of a 'virgin priestess for life', the priestess of Heracles in Thespiiai, who had to remain celibate in memory of the one of the fifty daughters of Thestios who did not consent to have sex with Herakles, for which he cursed her to remain a virgin forever.<sup>49</sup>

Requirements for abstinence were even more limited for men. Apart from the short periods of celibacy before important celebrations already mentioned, we only find two instances of prolonged male celibacy. The first is the above-mentioned one-year abstinence of the priest of Heracles Misogynes (a title that stresses the distinctiveness of the cult) and the other is – interestingly – the lifelong abstinence of the priest of Artemis Hymnia in Mantinea.<sup>50</sup> The latter post, however, was occupied by a middle-aged man, just as the priestess of Artemis Hymnia was a middle-aged woman, and so abstinence was much more easily achieved. The almost complete absence of this practice reveals clearly Hippolytos' misguided perception of the religious duties of a pious man; his chastity would not have been considered normal even if he held office as a priest of Artemis, since even in this case complete abstinence was extremely rare, and unattested in Attica.

So despite her own virginal status, Artemis' cult did not usually demand chastity from its priests and priestesses. There is nothing in her cult asking for the abandonment of sex or legitimizing the choice Hippolytos has made. Moreover, Artemis would receive ceremonial visits to her festival from girls who were about to marry, and she was also the protectress of women during childbirth, an action that presupposes sexual activity and thus makes women unsuitable to become Artemis' companions.<sup>51</sup>

Chastity is only one of Artemis' characteristics, but to Hippolytos, whose life is defined by sexual abstinence, it becomes the main characteristic and around it he builds his own version of her cult. The falsity of his perception is further accentuated by the fact that he cannot see that there are common elements shared by Aphrodite and Artemis, both in imagery and in function in cult, such as her role in child-birth, which has obvious connections with Aphrodite, since it is the act of sex that leads to procreation.<sup>52</sup> The two

<sup>47</sup> Connelly, *Portrait of a priestess* (n.39, above) 32; see also Parker, *Miasma* (n.25, above) 92; Viitaniemi, 'Parthenia-remarks' (n.44, above) 52; Garland, *Greek way of life* (n.8, above) 190; C. Sourvinou-Inwood, *Reading Greek culture: Texts and images, rituals and myths* (New York 1991) 75-76, who notes that the ritual must also be related to 'the notion of the *parthenos*' animality' and the need to be 'tamed' before marriage.

<sup>48</sup> See Dillon, *Girls and women* (n.34, above) 75.

<sup>49</sup> Parker, *Miasma* (n.25, above) 93; Paus. 9.27.6.

<sup>50</sup> Dillon, *Girls and women* (n.34, above) 75; he also notes that the same lifelong abstinence was exercised by the priestess of the cult.

<sup>51</sup> On the visits by young brides see e.g. *SEG IX* 72.13-16 and R. S. Kraemer, *Women's religions in the Graeco-Roman world* (New York 2004) 17. On the controversial powers of Artemis see Burkert, *Greek religion* (n.29, above) 151.

<sup>52</sup> See J. Corelis, 'Artemis and the symbolism of the *Hippolytus*', *Helios* 4 (1976) 52-54 (52); C. Sourvinou-Inwood, *Tragedy and Athenian religion* (Lanham 2003) 328.

goddesses use similar language in the play.<sup>53</sup> Hippolytos himself calls Artemis *ourania* (heavenly) ('come follow me and sing of Zeus' heavenly daughter Artemis, who cares for us'; ll. 58-60: ἔπεσθ' ἄιδοντες ἔπεσθε / τὰν Διὸς οὐρανίαν / Ἄρτεμιν, αἶ μελόμεσθα, trans. D. Kovacs), an epithet traditionally associated with Aphrodite. This, as Sourvinou-Inwood rightly has pointed out, 'would have registered with the audience as illustrating his unbalanced privileging of Artemis at the expense of Aphrodite that Aphrodite had just spoken of'.<sup>54</sup> Again, his behaviour resembles not an adult male, but the status of young virgins serving Artemis, who, however, only held office as an intermediate, transitional phase before marriage and children. In his case, on the other hand, the uncompromising and unconditional rejection of sex indicates that this is a fixed and permanent state (see especially l. 87: 'may I end life's race even as I began it!'; τέλος δὲ κάμψαιμ' ὅσπερ ἠρξάμην βίου, trans. D. Kovacs).

*The goddess and the male hero*

It is worth asking if the close relationship with Artemis in some way renders Hippolytos' choice of lifestyle less aberrant. Put simply, does the close association with a female deity remodel in some sense our expectations of male conduct? Does it invite a different construction of masculinity which makes Hippolytos' behaviour, if not normal, then at least within the spectrum of male conduct? His relationship with Artemis is certainly not unique in Greek myth; many great male heroes are described as having formed a special bond with a female deity. An obvious case in point is the relationship between Athena and Odysseus or Athena and Herakles. But in no case do these relationships become exclusive for the hero, and they never prevent other relationships between the hero and his wife/lovers. Rather, these relationships are part of one of the functions of Athena, and Artemis, in ancient Greek cult, that of the *kourotrophic* deity. Both goddesses chose virginity over marriage, which means that they enjoyed a freedom that was unthinkable for a Greek woman.<sup>55</sup> The difference from the other female deities was that Artemis and Athena did not have lovers, mortal or immortal; instead, they had young men under their protection, but without their relationship having any sexual connotations. In the case of deities such as Artemis or Athena, where physical contact is out of the question because of the virginal status of the goddesses, the relationship with the mortal men is restricted to that between the protectress and the protected. In the case of Artemis, there are a number

<sup>53</sup> See F. M. Dunn, 'Female symmetry: the two tombs of Hippolytus', *Materiali e discussioni* 28 (1992) 103-11 (103).

<sup>54</sup> C. Sourvinou-Inwood, *Tragedy and Athenian religion* (n.52, above) 327.

<sup>55</sup> Pomeroy, *Goddesses, whores, wives and slaves* (n.6, above) 6, argues that Artemis and Athena had in fact many consorts, but the failure to submit to a monogamous relationship 'was misinterpreted as virginity by succeeding generations of men who connected loss of virginity only with conventional marriage'. Even if Pomeroy's argument is right as far as the beginning of the cult is concerned, references as early as Homer show that the virginity of Artemis and Athena is undisputable and sexual advances from gods and men are always unsuccessful.

of cults across Greece, including Attica, dedicated to the goddess' function as a protectress of young boys and *ephēboi*.<sup>56</sup>

Hippolytos' special bond with the goddess is therefore not unparalleled, at least in principle. What is unusual in his case is the intensity with which he experiences this bond and the hyperbole characterizing his expression of piety towards Artemis. For the *ephēboi*, their dedications to Artemis' cult are just another obligation they need to fulfil to the goddess as part of their process of maturation.<sup>57</sup> In the case of Odysseus and Herakles, their relationship with the goddess offers support and protection only, but it does not function as an alternative to their sexual activity, despite the fact that their protectress is also a virginal goddess. Myth gives to both heroes wives, and in addition a number of erotic partners. Odysseus' relationships in the *Odyssey* include not just his wife but also Kalypso and Kirke, whereas for Herakles explicit erotic relationships are still more prominent; he is a central figure in Old Comedy, where his insatiable sexual appetite is a recurrent *topos*. But, for Hippolytos, the relationship with the goddess functions as a substitute for sexual activity, which it reflects in its emotional intensity. He fails to grasp, or he simply refuses to recognize, the diversity of Artemis' cult. His narrow understanding of what a relationship with Artemis means leads him to choose only one aspect of the goddess and turn it into an absolute requirement. He similarly fails to recognize that this relationship can never have the genuine closeness based on equality which characterizes the relationship between two mortals. This will become plain at the end of the play. Despite the special bond between Hippolytos and Artemis, she will not try to save him from destruction, whereas a human companion would have done anything possible to prevent it from happening. On the contrary, Artemis recognizes her sister's right to demand what is due to her and declares her powerlessness to stand in her way, projecting it as a rule among gods, ll. 1327-34:

θεοῖσι δ' ὦδ' ἔχει νόμος  
 οὐδεὶς ἀπαντᾶν βούλεται προθυμία  
 τῇ τοῦ θέλοντος, ἀλλ' ἀφιστάμεσθ' αἰεί.  
 ἐπεὶ, σάφ' ἴσθι, Ζῆνα μὴ φοβουμένη  
 οὐκ ἄν ποτ' ἦλθον ἐς τόδ' αἰσχύνης ἐγὼ  
 ὥστ' ἄνδρα πάντων φίλτατον βροτῶν ἐμοὶ  
 θανεῖν ἐᾶσαι.

Among the gods the custom is this: no god will cross the will of another, but we all stand aside. For you can be sure that if I had not been afraid of Zeus, I would never have endured such disgrace as to allow the man I love most among mortals to die.  
 (trans. D. Kovacs)

<sup>56</sup> Irwin, *The invention of virginity* (n.14, above) 15. Also N. Marinatos, *The goddess and the warrior: The naked goddess and mistress of animals in early Greek religion* (London and New York 2000) 92.

<sup>57</sup> On the debate concerning the existence of *ephebeia* as an organized system of maturation in the fifth century BC see U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Aristoteles und Athen* (Berlin 1893) 193ff.; A. M. Bowie, *Aristophanes: Myth, ritual and comedy* (Cambridge 1993) 50-51.



She can only take revenge for the destruction of her *protégé* afterwards by punishing one of Aphrodite's *protégés* in return, ll. 1420-22:

ἐγὼ γὰρ αὐτῆς ἄλλον ἐξ ἐμῆς χειρὸς  
 ὃς ἂν μάλιστα φίλτατος κυρῆ βροτῶν  
 τόξοις ἀφύκτοις τοῖσδε τιμωρήσομαι.<sup>58</sup>

That mortal of hers she loves the most I shall punish with these inescapable arrows shot from my hand. (trans. D. Kovacs)

Hippolytos' bitter outburst against the female sex in ll. 616ff. reveals that his abstinence is related to and parallels his ideas concerning women, which seem to have merged with his interpretation of Artemis' cult. The part of Artemis' mythology where she is presented as the virginal goddess hunting in the wild with her companions offers him the ideal frame to explain his choice of lifestyle. The problem is, of course, that in myth all of Artemis' hunting companions are female, who can only remain in her entourage as long as they keep their chastity. The cautionary tale of Kallisto, who succumbed to Zeus and was for that punished fiercely by Artemis' arrows, proves it.<sup>59</sup> The goddess herself, like her sister Athena, refused marriage and never succumbed to a suitor. And she would punish fiercely those men who dared to see her naked. There are, however, no references to men belonging to Artemis' entourage; this is a female-only *thiasos* and Hippolytos' case is unique, both in the sense that he defines himself as a follower of Artemis ('I meet with you'; l. 85: σοὶ καὶ ζύνειμι) and that he chooses to remain chaste until he dies (l. 87: τέλος δὲ κάμψομαι ὥσπερ ἠρξάμην βίου – translation above). This means that if he wants to be part of Artemis' entourage he has to adopt the part of the female, since there is no equivalent male deity.<sup>60</sup>

#### *A man's duty to the polis and the oikos*

Thus far we have viewed Hippolytos' behaviour either from a purely personal or from a religious perspective. But his religious elitism is part of a wider elitist behaviour which is at odds with the civic and domestic life of the adult male, including marriage and procreation as a civic duty, participation in the democratic assembly, and generally acting for the benefit of the city.<sup>61</sup> This elitism, part of his rejection of sex and official cult worship, is the elitism of withdrawal. It places him against the rest of society, in the same way that his exclusive allegiance to Artemis places him against normal patterns of piety. Through Hippolytos' celibacy, we get problematization of the function of a man within

<sup>58</sup> See B. M. W. Knox, 'The *Hippolytus* of Euripides', in *Oxford readings in Greek tragedy*, ed. E. Segal (Oxford 1968) 107.

<sup>59</sup> Devereux, *The character of Hippolytos* (n.1, above) 23. On Kallisto see Burkert, *Greek religion* (n.29, above) 150-51; Irwin, *The invention of virginity* (n.14, above) 15; Apollod. *Libr.* 3.8.2.

<sup>60</sup> Pomeroy, *Goddesses, whores, wives and slaves* (n.6, above) 5.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. S. Mills, *Euripides: Hippolytus* (London 2002) 64-65, sees his downfall more as a result of his arrogance for thinking that, by choosing celibacy, he was superior to all other men, and moreover Aphrodite, and less as the consequence of his fixation on remaining a virgin.

the *polis*, democratic or otherwise.<sup>62</sup> In the context of the *polis*, sex is more than physical activity; it reflects, confirms and rehearses roles and status. A man is a man not only because of his physical characteristics, but also because he fulfils certain duties imposed on him by society. Politics, like war, is a performative process in Classical Athens.<sup>63</sup> Both males and females have duties within the city, but the civic demands on women are far more limited. For men in the democracy, with its emphasis on the active male citizenry (aged 18-60), high and constant participation is demanded if they are to perform their citizen functions. Scholars rightly stress the fact that Athenian democracy was more than just a political system; it was also a system of sex and gender, in which sexual roles were firmly demarcated, which created a very specific ideal of masculine behaviour, further accentuated by constructing male identity in opposition to women, slaves, and foreigners.<sup>64</sup> As Parker says, referring to Theonoe in Euripides' *Helen*, 'withdrawal from the sexual structure of society brings with it withdrawal from the social structure'.<sup>65</sup> In the area of sexuality the personal is political, since reproduction is critical for the *polis* (and the *oikos*), and thus male identity is determined by the way a man uses his body sexually. Hippolytos' abstinence automatically questions his manliness on a civic level.<sup>66</sup>

Moreover, life within the *oikos* was equally significant for the construction of male identity and closely related to civic duties. Theoretically, as a young man as well as the son of a king, Hippolytos is automatically faced with a number of issues concerning his place within the *polis* and his father's *oikos*. Hippolytos rejects any kind of association with women, which of course includes marriage and consequently procreation (ll. 616ff.). Producing offspring was both a civic and a private duty: civic because a man ought to produce new citizens for the sake of the city,<sup>67</sup> and private because it was a man's filial duty to produce heirs for the *oikos* he has inherited from his father, to save it from extinction. And

<sup>62</sup> Cf. P. J. Rhodes, 'Nothing to do with democracy: Athenian drama and the *polis*', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 123 (2003) 104-19, where he argues that the notion of tragedy as related to democratic ideology is not as straightforward as it may seem, and makes the case that it rather refers to ideology of the *polis*, democratic or not; for tragedy as closely connected to the ideology of the democratic *polis*, see S. Goldhill, 'Civic ideology and the problem of difference: The politics of Aeschylean tragedy, once again', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 120 (2000) 34-56.

<sup>63</sup> See S. Goldhill and R. Osborne eds, *Performance culture and Athenian democracy* (Cambridge 1999), especially 'Programme notes' 1-29; M. R. Christ, *The bad citizen in Classical Athens* (New York 2006) 38.

<sup>64</sup> See P. Cartledge, *The Greeks: A portrait of self and others* (Oxford 1993) 40-41, 55-56, Chapter 4 *passim* on 'otherness'; also W. Allan, *Euripides: Medea* (London 2002) Chapter 3, where he speaks of barbarian stereotypes emerging within the tragedy and argues that, in the end, the barbarian Medea is presented as more 'heroic' than her Greek husband; Halperin, *One hundred years of homosexuality* (n.8, above) 104, says 'it is only within these cross-cutting fields of gender, sex and status that the meaning of citizenship in Classical Athens appears in all its sociological complexity'.

<sup>65</sup> Parker, *Miasma* (n.25, above) 93.

<sup>66</sup> This issue is not affected by Hippolytos' status as a *nothos*.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. D. M. MacDowell, *The law in Classical Athens* (London 1978) 86, 'in some ancient states financial or other penalties were imposed on a man who did not marry and have children, but it is not certain that this was ever so in Athens'.

although Hippolytos' status as a bastard makes things less clear-cut, because it is not clear what his obligations are towards an *oikos* in which he is not the legitimate heir, the obligation to procreate as a male duty is still felt. Even Hippolytos himself seems to acknowledge the need for a man to have children in principle. At the end of his misogynistic speech, where he condemns the entire female sex as a κίβδηλον κακόν ('deceitful evil'; ll. 616ff.), he expresses the wish that men were able to buy their children from temples instead of having to depend on women for child-bearing. The focus is again on his rejection of the physical act of sex, not the product of this act; presumably, therefore, he would have had children if there were an alternative way. The result, however, is the same, and by his behaviour Hippolytos fails to fulfil his duty to the *oikos* and by extension to the *polis*.<sup>68</sup>

### Conclusion

It is clear that Hippolytos' abstinence can find justification neither in cult, nor in mythological precedents, nor in social practice. By renouncing sexual activity, he inevitably renounces a large part of his male identity. In theory he is at liberty to choose to abstain. But in doing so, he negates a number of features central to maleness: being a man automatically presupposes a number of duties and responsibilities. These are often contradictory, and men struggle to meet them all, but they cannot ignore any of them as this automatically implies that they are losing a part of what it means to be a man. There is no evolution in Hippolytos' character; he dies a firm believer in his personal idea that he is the most pious and the purest of men, despite the fact that his destruction was caused exactly by his unwillingness to realize that this inflexible and selective perception of piety was as harmful as a total lack of piety and self-control. Euripides constructs a male character who fails in his religious, civic, and private life/duties. Hippolytos claims a kind of *sôphrosunê* which manifests itself in the most excessive way: he utterly rejects sexual activity, which leads to his distance from the *oikos* and the *polis*; and, he rejects every practice associated with masculine identity, especially of adult males. All this contributes to his liminality and creates an unbridgeable gap between him and acceptable male practice – and consequently, between him and the rest of society – which can only be restored after his death. The establishment of a cult at his tomb places his death into the realm of public ritual, finally connecting Hippolytos with the rest of the citizens from whom he so consciously distanced himself throughout the play. More importantly, his cult is directly connected with female life, and more precisely with the transition of young girls from the state of *partheneia* to that of the married woman. The establishment of that kind of cult for Hippolytos, the man who hated women and guarded his own chastity, seems ironic at first, but this contradiction with his life serves as a cautionary tale in order to encourage virgins to accept their maturation and to respect both Artemis and Aphrodite equally, a balance which is in sharp contrast to Hippolytos' hyperbolic rejection of the deeds of Aphrodite in favour of Artemis' purity while he was still alive.

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<sup>68</sup> Cf. S. Goldhill, *Reading Greek tragedy* (Cambridge 1986) 118, 'for Hippolytus' rejection of the goddess Aphrodite cannot be separated from the idea of the male role in the *oikos*...the aim of successful child production is of paramount concern to the household'.



# **ERÔS IN MENANDER: THREE STUDIES IN MALE CHARACTER\***

**STAVROULA KIRITSI**

*Erôs* is one of the core elements of Menandrian comedy.<sup>1</sup> Erotic love is at the centre of the plot, while the characters, driven by the force of their emotions and desires, interact and develop in an atmosphere of confusion and misunderstandings. Whereas a good deal of attention has been paid to the moral and ideological aspects of the plays, there has so far been considerably less interest in the emotional dimension of the characters and, in particular, in the role of emotions in the construction of character in Menander. What does their propensity to *erôs* reveal about their psychological make up? How do they handle *erôs*? What emotional and behavioural characteristics do these individuals share, or not share, in manifesting *erôs*? Are amusement and entertainment Menander's sole purpose in presenting characters stricken by *erôs*, or is there a larger purpose beyond comic effect? These are questions I address by examining men in love in *Dyskolos* and *Samia*. At this point the reader may ask: why men? The main reason is that *erôs* is primarily experienced by men in New Comedy. As has been rightly observed by Dorota Dutsch and David Konstan: 'unmarried citizen girls ... are never represented as the subjects of erotic desire, which would be seen as a violation of moral propriety'. In agreement with this norm, when a woman is presented as experiencing erotic passion in New Comedy she is invariably a courtesan, but courtesans who experience *erôs* are not encountered in the surviving plays of Menander; and where the emotions of a woman of respectable social status come into focus (as with Pamphile in *Epitrepontes*), the emotion is never *erôs*.<sup>2</sup> So men it is.

In the course of my investigation I make use of Aristotle's views on *erôs* to construct its cultural and intellectual background. Although Aristotle had relatively little to say about *erôs* (in comparison, for example, with Plato, who dealt with it at some length, e.g. in the *Symposium*), there are several good reasons for using him as a way of approaching the phenomenology of *erôs* in Menander, without necessarily arguing that Menander was influenced by Aristotle's views.<sup>3</sup> First, human character and behaviour were studied very

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<sup>1</sup> On *erôs* as a main theme in Menander's surviving plays see also D. Konstan, *Greek comedy and ideology* (Oxford 1995) 93-106, where he discusses the function of *erôs* in *Dyskolos*.

<sup>2</sup> D. Dutsch and D. Konstan 'Women's emotion in New Comedy', in *Emotion, genre and gender in Classical antiquity*, ed. D. Munteanu (London 2011) 57-88 (at 60 and 68 respectively).

<sup>3</sup> The possibility of a philosophical, Aristotelian or Peripatetic, influence on Menander's characters and plays has been endlessly discussed. However, there is no consensus as to the nature or the

systematically by Aristotle, arguably for the first time in ancient Greece.<sup>4</sup> (Aristotle's conception of character or *êthos* does not correspond exactly to modern notions, but my use of the term in what follows should not cause any confusion.)<sup>5</sup> Second, his method of inquiring into human behaviour takes, as a point of departure, commonly held Greek views, or what he calls *endoxa*, particularly in association with emotions and desires, including *erôs*.<sup>6</sup> In drawing on a perceived consensus (even if one accepts, as we must, the subjective nature of Aristotle's presentation of that consensus), Aristotle helps us to see the expectations that audiences might bring to the theatre.<sup>7</sup> Third, Aristotle has the

degree of this influence, or as to who is the philosopher with the greatest influence. See for example: L. A. Post, 'Aristotle and Menander', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 69 (1938) 1-42; K. Gaiser, 'Menander und der Peripatos,' *Antike und Abendland* 13 (1967) 8-40; A. Barigazzi, *La formazione spirituale di Menandro* (Torino 1965); T. B. L. Webster, *An introduction to Menander* (Manchester and New York 1974); W. W. Fortenbaugh, 'Menander's *Perikeiromene*: Misfortune, vehemence, and Polemon', *Phoenix* 28 (1974) 430-43; C. Lord, 'Aristotle, Menander and the *Adelphoe* of Terence', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 107 (1977) 183-202; N. Bozanic, *Structure, language and the action in the comedies of Menander* (unpublished PhD thesis, University of London 1977); R. L. Hunter, *The New Comedy of Greece and Rome* (Cambridge 1985), esp. 148-49; K. J. Reckford, *Aristophanes' Old and New Comedy* (Chapel Hill and London 1987) 355-56; D. Wiles, *The masks of Menander: Sign and meaning in Greek and Roman performance* (Cambridge 1991); C. Cusset, *Ménandre ou la comédie tragique* (Paris 2003).

<sup>4</sup> On Aristotle's theory of emotions, see especially W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle on emotion* (London 2002<sup>2</sup>, 1975<sup>1</sup>); M. C. Nussbaum, 'Aristotle on emotions and rational persuasion', in *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley 1996) 303-23; T. H. Irwin, 'Ethics in the *Rhetoric* and in the *Ethics*', in *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley 1996) 142-74; S. R. Leighton, 'Aristotle and the Emotions', in *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley 1996) 206-37; M. J. Elster, *Alchemies of the mind: Rationality and the emotions* (Cambridge 1999); D. Konstan, *The emotions of the ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical literature* (Toronto 2006); E. Sanders, 'Pathos phaulon: Aristotle and the rhetoric of phthonos', in *KAKOS: Badness and anti-value in Classical antiquity*, eds I. Sluiter and R. M. Rosen (Leiden 2008) 255-81.

<sup>5</sup> This is not the place to enter into a detailed discussion of the difference between modern and ancient ideas of character and the self. P. Veyne, in *A history of private life*, trans. A. Goldhammer, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA 1987-91) 231, takes an extreme view: 'No ancient ... is capable of talking about himself. Nothing is more misleading than the use of 'I' in Greco-Roman poetry'. For a critique and overview of the issue, see C. Thumiger, *Hidden paths: Self and characterization in Greek tragedy: Euripides' Bacchae*, *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement* 99 (2007) 3-57; Thumiger argues that the distinction between the 'public' and the 'modern subjective-individualist' conception of character is as much a function of genre as of historical development (5-6).

<sup>6</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1145b2-20.

<sup>7</sup> On Aristotle's philosophical method of inquiring into moral issues, taking as a point of departure commonly held views based on appearances (*phainomena*), common words (*legomena*) and common beliefs (*endoxa*), see J. A. Stewart, *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford 1892) II.120-23; J. Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London 1900) xl-xlvi; H. H. Joachim, *The Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford 1951) 219; G. Striker, 'Emotions in context: Aristotle's treatment of the passions in the *Rhetoric* and his moral psychology', in *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley 1996) 287-88; Irwin, 'Ethics' (n.4, above) 142; J. M. Cooper, *Reason and emotion: Essays on ancient moral psychology and ethical theory* (Princeton 1999) 281-91 and 402-05.

merit of examining certain behavioural traits according to age groups. For instance, lack of self-control (*akrasia*) in respect to sexual pleasures is, he says, a general characteristic of the young. Those who are mature (*hoi akmazontes*), according to Aristotle, are not – or at all events should not be – inclined to excessive behaviour with regard to their emotions (*pathê*) and desires or pleasures (*epithumiai*), but are expected to be moderate (*sôphrones*).<sup>8</sup> Aristotle's attention to age in relation to character is of particular importance to New Comedy, in which – in contrast to Old Comedy, with its middle-aged protagonists – the central figure is in general a young man and hence especially (though not uniquely) vulnerable to erotic passion.

A further reason for making Aristotle the principal point of reference is that he discusses *erôs* in the context of friendship; for New Comedy explores *erôs* not in isolation but in relation to and as part of a larger range of sentimental attachments extending from erotic passion to the love between family members and friends. Finally, Aristotle's theory of *mimêsis* as a kind of learning and understanding invites us to consider the value of Menandrian comedy,<sup>9</sup> including his treatment of *erôs* – both in itself and as part of this larger emotional continuum – as a way of educating one's emotions and desires. This allows one to look at the way in which Menandrian comedy relates to the Greek value system in general, and to consider the social aspects of Menandrian comedy itself (an issue to which I return at the end). I begin, therefore, by examining what Aristotle has to say on *erôs*.

#### *Aristotle on erôs*

As noted above, unlike Plato, Aristotle does not discuss *erôs* extensively. In the *Rhetoric* he speaks mainly of the *pathos* of *to philein*, that is, love in general and not of *erôs*.<sup>10</sup> For Aristotle, the *pathê* constitute a special set of sentiments, which may or may not include desire in the sense of *epithumia*. Typically, the *pathê* include *orgê* (anger), *phobos* (fear), *chara* (joy) and *to philein* (love).<sup>11</sup> When Aristotle refers to *pothos* (lust, desire, or simply

<sup>8</sup> Arist. *Rh.* 1390a29-1390b11.

<sup>9</sup> On Aristotle's view of the role of *mimêsis*, in the context of art, as learning and understanding (*μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογιζέσθαι*), see *Poet.* 1448b4-19, and L. Golden, *Aristotle on tragic and comic mimêsis* (Atlanta 1992), esp. 24-25 where he stresses that: 'Aristotle provides a strong indication that the mimetic process has an *essentially intellectual goal*.... The philosophical dimension of poetry is its ability to *represent universals* that subsume and illuminate *numerous particulars*. The movement from particular to universal involved in *mimêsis* is undoubtedly the process Aristotle describes at 1448b16-17, where he says that we 'learn and infer what each thing is, for example that this is that' [my emphases].

<sup>10</sup> Cooper, *Reason and emotion* (n.7, above) 422 points out that Aristotle omits the analysis of certain emotions in the *Rhetoric*, among them erotic love, because they had no relevance to the orators' aim, which was to arouse or allay the passions in the courtroom or the assembly.

<sup>11</sup> The *pathê*, and *epithumiai*, are listed by Aristotle with small variations in different treatises: *Arist. Eth. Nic.* 1105b21-23; *De an.* 403a7 and 16-19, 414b1-5; *Eth. Eud.* 1220b12-14; *Rh.* 1378a19-22; on the range of meanings of *pathos*, and Aristotle's several lists of *pathê*, see D. Konstan, 'The Concept of "Emotion" from Plato to Cicero', *Méthexis* 19 (2006) 139-51.

the sense of missing another person), it is as an instance of desire.<sup>12</sup> The classification of *erôs* within this binary system is problematic. In the *Rhetoric*, for example, *erôs* is linked with *epithumia*, but at the same time seems to be distinguished from it (καὶ ὄν ἢ ἔρωσ ἢ ἐπιθυμία φύσει ἐστίν).<sup>13</sup>

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle mentions *erôs* in connection with *philia*. In particular, he associates erotic *philia* with youth:

the young are also erotically inclined [*erôtikoi*], for erotic friendship is for the larger part a matter of emotion and because of pleasure; hence they love and quickly stop loving, often changing in the course of the same day. But the young do wish to spend their days together, since that is how they gain the object that accords with their kind of friendship.<sup>14</sup>

The way, however, that young people experience erotic *philia* is not far from the way they experience *philia* in general:

friendship between young people seems to be because of pleasure, since the young live by emotion, and more than anything pursue what is pleasant for them and what is there in front of them; but as their age changes, the things they find pleasant also become different. This is why they are quick to become friends and to stop to being friends; for the friendship changes along with what is pleasant for them and the shift in that sort of pleasure is quick.<sup>15</sup>

Konstan notes that:

at one point Aristotle seems to suggest that *erôs* is an intensification or excess (*hyperbolê*) of *philia*<sup>16</sup> in that one may have several *philoï* or friends, though not very many, whereas one usually feels *erôs* for just one individual at a time. He remarks too that an erotic relationship between a man and a boy can result in *philia*

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1105b22 and [*Mag. Mor.*] 1186a12-14.

<sup>13</sup> Arist. *Rh.* 1385a21-4, 1392a22-3.

<sup>14</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1156b1-6: καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ δ' οἱ νέοι· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς· διόπερ φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως παύονται, πολλάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας μεταπίπτοντες. συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ συζῆν οὗτοι βούλονται· γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ τὴν φιλίαν οὕτως, trans. S. Broadie and C. Rowe (Oxford 2002) 211. Cf. *Rh.* 1389a3-7: 'in terms of their character, the young are prone to desires and inclined to do whatever they desire. Of the desires of the body they are most inclined to pursue that relating to sex [περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια], and they are powerless [ἀκρατεῖς] against this. They are changeable and fickle in desires, and though they intensely lust, they are quickly satisfied...', trans. G. A. Kennedy (New York and Oxford 1991) 165.

<sup>15</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1156a31-6: ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι' ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ ἡδὸν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτούσης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα. διὸ ταχέως γίνονται φίλοι καὶ παύονται· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἡδεῖ ἡ φιλία μεταπίπτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἡδονῆς ταχεῖα ἢ μεταβολή, trans. Broadie and Rowe (n.14, above) 211.

<sup>16</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1158a10-13.



when the boy matures, if they both have decent characters. But the implication appears to be that *philia* follows upon *erôs*, rather than that it evolves naturally from it.<sup>17</sup>

Therefore, for Aristotle only that erotic *philia* which is based on the good characters of both parties can last, as is the case with *philia* in general;<sup>18</sup> thus, although *erôs* and *philia* are not the same, they share certain characteristics. It is also important to note that for Aristotle, *erôs* is not reducible to mere sexual impulse. This view is confirmed in the *Prior Analytics*, where he argues it relates to affectionate relationships:

therefore in love to have one's affection returned is preferable to intercourse with the beloved. Therefore love aims at affection rather than at intercourse; and if affection is the principal aim of love, it is also the *end* of love. Therefore intercourse is either not an end at all, or only with a view to receiving affection.<sup>19</sup>

The excessive pursuit of desires, including *erôs*,<sup>20</sup> according to Aristotle, leads to self-indulgence (*akolasia*), a characteristic of a worthless or bad person (*phaulos*);<sup>21</sup> while the mean, which is characteristic of a wise person (*phronimos*) and is in agreement with reason (*kata ton logon*),<sup>22</sup> leads to the virtue of moderation (*sôphrosunê*).<sup>23</sup> As Aristotle puts it:

the unself-controlled person [*akratês*] acts because of his affective state, knowing that what he is doing is a bad thing, while the self-controlled one [*enkratês*] knows that his appetites are bad but does not follow them because of what reason tells him.<sup>24</sup>

Aristotle distinguishes between those desires that are fine and choiceworthy and those that are not.<sup>25</sup> Further, he stresses that the irrational part of the soul (where the emotions and

<sup>17</sup> D. Konstan, 'Love and cognition: The view from ancient Greece and beyond', *Acta Neuro-psychologica* 8 (2010) 1-8 (6).

<sup>18</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1164a2-13.

<sup>19</sup> Arist. *An. pr.* 68b3-7: τὸ ἄρα φιλεῖσθαι τῆς συνουσίας αἰρετώτερον κατὰ τὸν ἔρωτα. μᾶλλον ἄρα ὁ ἔρωσ ἐστὶ τῆς φιλίας ἢ τοῦ συνεῖναι· εἰ δὲ μάλιστα τούτου, καὶ τέλος τοῦτο. τὸ ἄρα συνεῖναι ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ὄλως ἢ τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι ἔνεκεν, trans. H. Tredennick (Cambridge, MA 1938) 513.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1147b23-30.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1145b8-20 and 1154a15-21.

<sup>22</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1106b36-1107a9.

<sup>23</sup> For *sôphrosunê* and *phronêsis* as *aretai*, see Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1103a4-10; for a close link between the two *aretai*, see Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1140b11-21 and cf. [*Mag. Mor.*] 1198b5-20.

<sup>24</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1145b12-14: καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατῆς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατῆς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον, trans. Broadie and Rowe (n.14, above) 190. The extent to which Menander's characters suffer from lack of self-control (*akrasia*) is one issue which I will address in the rest of the article, throughout which I use the English terms 'lack of self control' or 'incontinence' to render the Greek term *akrasia*.

<sup>25</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1148a22-26.

desires belong) can be controlled by reason.<sup>26</sup> Hence, *erós*, insofar as it is a kind of desire, can in principle be controlled or can be expressed appropriately, for desires participate somehow in reasoning. *Logos* alone, however, cannot determine the appropriate expression of emotions and desires, as this also involves dispositions (*hexeis*): only through the exercise of reason and with the correct dispositions is a person capable of attaining virtue. When he discusses wisdom (*phronêsis*), Aristotle is clear that the young lack the ‘correct prescription’ (*orthos logos*), which leads to prudence. As they grow up they acquire experience, which together with the correct education of their character, enables them to master their passions and desires through habituation and wisdom.<sup>27</sup> Thus, rather than being subject to external pressures alone, eventually they should be able to act by themselves in accord with *orthos logos*.<sup>28</sup>

### *Sostratos in Dyskolos*

The representation of Sostratos’ *erós* unfolds at the same time as the delineation of his character, that is, his moral and intellectual qualities. Though these latter are important, what drives the plot is not Sostratos’ set of moral strengths and weaknesses *per se* but rather the end in view, namely the consummation of his *erós*; but in his case, it is his intention to accomplish this through marriage. To a certain extent the audience is predisposed to sympathize with Sostratos thanks to Pan’s remarks in the prologue concerning Sostratos’ age and status in society (Menander, *Dyskolos* ll. 39-41) as well his confession that it was he, Pan, who instigated *erós* in the young man (43-45). It is interesting that, in the prologue, Pan does not offer any information about Sostratos’ *êthos*, unlike his comments on Gorgias, which stress the experience (*empeiria*) and maturity Gorgias has acquired from hardship, despite his young age (27-29), and on Knemon, which point to his curmudgeonliness. Pan’s presentation of Sostratos and his *erós* raises certain expectations in the audience of how a rich, young man might manifest his *erós*, but does not provide sufficient information on Sostratos for one to anticipate the outcome clearly. The fulfilment of Pan’s plan remains in the hands of Sostratos, as he make practical decisions that will permit him to fulfil his erotic ambitions – whether in a proper fashion or otherwise.

What initiates Sostratos’ love at first sight is simply the girl’s physical beauty (*cf.* 50-54). As Aristotle states, ‘... the pleasure gained through sight is of being in love’.<sup>29</sup> Sostratos does not, however, exceed the limits of decent behaviour in order to satisfy his *erós*;<sup>30</sup> although Aristotle associates lack of self-control with youth, Sostratos is clearly an exception. For, though the wealthy young man in love is given the opportunity to take

<sup>26</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1102b30-1: τὸ δ’ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὄλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως [τοῦ λόγου], ἢ κατήκοὸν ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν.

<sup>27</sup> *Cf.* Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1142a11-16 and G. Karamanolis, ‘Η σχέση ηθικής αρετής και φρόνησης στην αριστοτελική ηθική’, *Υπόμνημα* 8 (2009) 51-78 (72-73).

<sup>28</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1144b26-7.

<sup>29</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1167a4: ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἢ διὰ τῆς ὀψεως ἡδονή, trans. Broadie and Rowe (n.14, above) 232.

<sup>30</sup> See also S. M. Goldberg, *The making of Menander’s comedy* (London 1980) 76, who emphasizes Sostratos’ noble qualities.

advantage of the young girl during their encounter in an isolated place, a narrative situation loaded with erotic potential (a scenario realized in numerous mythic archetypes and tragic and comic plots, for example Menander's own *Epitrepontes*), nonetheless he exercises self-control, limiting himself to extolling her beauty (191-93) and helping her to fill her jar with water from the spring (197-99). The few words they exchange (199-201, 211-12) are enough for Sostratos to confirm his feelings of *erōs* and to express his appreciation of her character (201-03). His opinion, based at first on an idealizing image of the girl under the influence of his *erōs*, is confirmed later on, when he is informed by her brother Gorgias about her upbringing (381-89).<sup>31</sup> The only moment that Sostratos loses self-control is when, as he narrates the story, he *almost* kisses the girl, and this occurs only once, albeit at a most inappropriate moment, during Knemon's rescue (686-88). The image clearly serves comic purposes, but it also reveals, in addition to Sostratos' impulsiveness and lack of restraint, his ability to make fun of himself in retrospect, and so hints at a certain urbanity in him, or what Aristotle calls wittiness (*eutrapeleia*).<sup>32</sup> In all, Sostratos' incontinence under the force of his *erōs* is innocuous, not the lack of self-control that has truly vicious consequences.

Sostratos appears to be hasty in acting on his *erōs*, but in so doing he has honourable motives, that is, to ask the girl's hand in marriage from her *kurios* (guardian). Sostratos is aware of his inappropriate action – ἥμαρτον, he says (75) – in sending his slave Pyrrhias to address the girl's *kurios* on his behalf, rather than doing so himself. According to Sostratos' own evaluation, he makes a misjudgement, because it is hard for a man who is in love to discern the right course of action (76-77: ἥρμοττ' ἴσως τὸ τοιοῦτ' ὄ γ'. ἀλλ' οὐ ράδιον ἐρῶντα συνιδεῖν ἐστὶ τί ποτε συμφέρει). Despite this moment of reflection, however, Sostratos does not seem to have learned his lesson. For, in order to carry out his own plan, he continues to depend on other, seemingly more practical people in various ways – people who have sounder judgement – such as his friend Chaireas (55-57) and the family slave Getas (181-85). Yet he is quick to reject Chaireas' advice when it runs counter to his own intuitions, and if the audience was led to suppose, for a moment, that Getas would serve as the *servus callidus* and resolve all problems for Sostratos, they would soon learn that Getas is unavailable, and that Sostratos will indeed follow up on his plan. To be sure, he will find an ally in Gorgias, Knemon's stepson, but he will win his favour on his own, without the help of clever counsellors.

Sostratos' main weakness seems to be his inexperience and lack of self-confidence.<sup>33</sup> He finds in Gorgias a suitable person to help him realize his plan, since Gorgias not only has general experience of life (though not of *erōs*),<sup>34</sup> but more importantly knows Knemon's character very well (326-27, 338-40). For, what Sostratos needs is Gorgias'

<sup>31</sup> See E. W. Handley, *The Dyskolos of Menander* (London 1992<sup>2</sup>) 167.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1108a24 and 1128a10.

<sup>33</sup> According to N. Zagagi, 'Sostratos as a comic, over-active and impatient lover: On Menander's dramatic art in his play *Dyskolos*', *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 36 (1979) 39-48, Sostratos' main character trait is his over-activeness and eagerness, which moves and links the plot, – a view followed by P. G. Brown, 'The construction of Menander's *Dyskolos*, Acts I-IV, *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 94 (1992) 8-20 (14).

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Menander, *Dyskolos* 341-44.

knowledge of the particular situation, that is, Knemon's likely responses and how to get around them. Despite his initial reluctance, Gorgias is persuaded to assist Sostratos because he appreciates the latter's genuinely decent character (315-19; cf. 764), and not through any kind of ruse or deception, such as a clever slave might have planned. This in turn is important for our understanding of Sostratos' character. Regardless of Gorgias' account of the difficultness of Knemon's character,<sup>35</sup> Sostratos is determined to follow his heart, that is, to act on his *erôs*. He insists that his love for the girl is genuine and that there is nothing that can stop him from making her his wife. He is prepared to marry her even without a dowry, promising 'to love her' (307-09: *stergôn*) – an offer that itself reveals something of Sostratos' impulsiveness and innocence, since there might be something insulting in accepting a wife on those terms.<sup>36</sup> When the time comes, Gorgias will indeed offer a dowry, one large enough that Sostratos' father will mildly protest at it. Menander's choice of *stergein* to express Sostratos' feelings toward the girl reveals another dimension to the young man's *erôs*. *Stergein* and *agapân* are used in Greek literature and philosophy to express the bond of affection, above all between parents and children. For example, *stergein* is used by Plato (*Leg.* 745b), Sophocles (*OT* 1023), and Euripides (*El.* 1102) in speaking about the mutual love between children and their parents, whereas Euripides (*Andr.* 907) uses the word with reference to the love between husband and wife.<sup>37</sup> *Stergein* and *agapân* are also used by Aristotle to underline the emotional bond in various friendly relations, which range from love for oneself to love among family members and between lovers.<sup>38</sup> The emotional dimension of Greek perceptions of friendship, or more properly love (*philia*), within the family, has been stressed by Konstan,<sup>39</sup> as well as by Elizabeth Belfiore. On the basis of Aristotle's views on *philia*, she points out that 'we first love and act as friends towards family members'; she notes further that 'family friendship is a particular kind of friendship between people who are unequal in virtue'.<sup>40</sup> It is important here not to confuse ancient Greek and English usage with reference to love. Menander's use of *stergein*, then, has the effect of complementing the passionate nature of Sostratos' *erôs* with a gentler, less impulsive and more sustained emotion, in the context of a relationship that will end up in marriage.

<sup>35</sup> On Gorgias' characterization of Knemon, see Handley, *Dyskolos* (n.31, above) 189.

<sup>36</sup> See D. Konstan, *Roman comedy* (Ithaca 1983) 43.

<sup>37</sup> LSJ, *sv.* *stergô*.

<sup>38</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1157a28, 1161b18, 1161b25, 1162a12, 1164a10, 1167a3, 1167b32-1168a3 (the love and affection artists feel towards their creations). On Aristotle's use of *στοργή*, *ἔρωσ*, *φιλεῖν* and *ἀγαπᾶν*, see E. M. Cope, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a commentary*, rev. and ed. J. E. Sandys (London and Cambridge 1877) I.292-96.

<sup>39</sup> D. Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical world* (Cambridge 1997); D. Konstan, 'Οἰκία δ' ἔστ' ἰς τις φιλία: Love and the Greek Family', *Syllecta Classica* 11 (2000) 106-26 (120-22); D. Konstan, 'Στοργή in Greek amatory epigrams', in *Dic mihi, Musa, virum: Homenaje al professor Antonio López Eire*, eds F. Cortés Gabaudan and J. Méndez Dosuna (Salamanca 2010) 363-69, where he stresses that *storgê* in literature used with a familial tone and that it is rarely used in erotic contexts, and when it is used in epigrams, it is usually towards a boy who needs cherishing.

<sup>40</sup> E. Belfiore, 'Family friendship in Aristotle's Ethics', *Ancient Philosophy* 21 (2001) 113-32 (114, 115, and 126).

In Sostratos we observe how Menander has created a character of a young man lacking experience, who despite his *erōs* does not allow himself to be blindly led by desire. In addition, his *erōs* is characterized by affection, which as an important element in the formation of friendship adds an additional and highly significant aspect to his relationship with the girl. The significance of *erōs* in marriage and the foundation of a new *oikos* is confirmed by Sostratos' father, Kallipides, who affirms that for a young man a marriage is firm or solid if he enters into it on account of *erōs* (788-90: νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς ἔγωγε, γινώσκων ὅτι νέῳ γάμος βέβαιος οὕτως γίνεται ἐὰν δι' ἔρωτα τοῦτο συμπεισθῆ ποεῖν). This view is rare enough in New Comedy, even if Kallipides is careful to indicate that it is male *erōs* that is at stake: there is no mention of the girl's feelings. But that concession on Kallipides' part to the passions of young men in love must be read in the context of the emphasis on more appropriate marital sentiments of *philia* and *storgē*, as expressed by Sostratos.

#### *Moschion in Samia*

Moschion's character (that is, his complex of character traits) is delineated by Menander mainly through Demeas' monologues and Moschion's self-characterization and actions. Moschion is presented as a well-brought-up young man, enjoying a luxurious life, honest and responsible, who, though he follows his father's example in terms of behaviour and citizenship, nevertheless committed rape in his own house under the influence of *erōs* (Menander, *Samia* ll. 38-41) with a neighbouring girl known to him and his family for some time (37-38, cf. 625), and, more importantly, during the celebration of the Adonia (39).<sup>41</sup> Unlike the young Sostratos in *Dyskolos*, Moschion loses self-control under the circumstances. The text is silent about what actually happened. What we know is Moschion's own description of his feelings due to his action and the result of his action: 'I hesitate to say what happened next. I am ashamed perhaps. But what is the point? I am still ashamed. The girl got pregnant' (47-49: ὀκνῶ λέγειν τὰ λοιπ' ἕως δ' αἰσχύνομαι ὅτ' οὐδὲν ὄφελος· ἀλλ' ὅμως αἰσχύνομαι, ἐκύησεν ἡ παῖς).

As a result of his own wrongdoing (he confesses that he erred: ἡμάρτηκα, (3), Moschion suffers (2-3) for the pain he is about to cause his father with the news of the baby and the rape. Moschion thinks highly of his stepfather Demeas. Whatever he has achieved in life, he says, is entirely due to him. This confession bespeaks his respect for the man who raised him, and considerable self-awareness and a sense of social responsibility, perhaps rare in a young man who is more likely to be puffed up at his own achievements – and indeed, by the end of the play we will see a less mature side of him.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1148a21-31: 'but given that some appetites and pleasures have objects that are generically fine and good (since some pleasant things are by nature desirable) ... people are not censured for being affected by them in the first place, *i.e.* for desiring and 'loving' them, but for being affected in a certain way [ἀλλὰ τῷ πῶς], *i.e.* excessively 'which is why censure attaches to those who either overcome by or pursue something naturally fine and good contrary to what reason prescribes...', trans. Broadie and Rowe (n.14, above) 195.

<sup>42</sup> See D. Konstan, 'El derecho de enfadarse: Un patrón narrativo en la comedia clásica,' in *IV Jornadas Filológicas: Aproximaciones interdisciplinarias a la antigüedad griega y latina*, in *Memoriam Gretel Wernher*, eds G. von der Walde and J. Rojas (Bogotá 2010) 39-57.

In the prologue, however, Menander has gone to some pains to show both the basic decency of the young man and the fact that it is due, at least in part, to the healthy, familial environment in which Moschion's character was moulded.

Moschion recognizes his own misconduct, as is indicated by the word *aischunomai* ('I am ashamed') when he has to face his father (67).<sup>43</sup> This verb in Greek can have both a retrospective and a prospective aspect, as Konstan has argued, signifying both a feeling of shame at some offense one has committed and a sense of shame that would inhibit one from committing such an act in the future.<sup>44</sup> It is the former which is at issue here. Moschion evidently did not feel shame before the rape, that is, at the prospect of committing it, but only after he had committed it and in relation to his father's opinion – he uses the verb twice (47-48) without an object. Nonetheless, his feeling of shame indicates that Moschion's lack of control is not an ingrained character trait, but was due to a momentary lapse, pardonable in part just because of his youth and the influence of passion – these were, indeed, regularly appealed to as excuses, and recommended by the writers on rhetoric. Thus, in Euripides' *Suppliant Women*, the chorus introduce an excuse that turns up again and again in the rhetorical manuals: 'he did wrong; but this is characteristic of young people, and one should have *sungnômê*' (250-51). Apsines (276.3-7) includes among the reasons for *sungnômê* drunkenness and madness. In Latin too, passionate love (Quintilian *Declamation* 291.3) and youth (Quintilian *Declamation* 260.8, 286.8) are appealed to as excuses for misbehaviour.<sup>45</sup>

Moschion was led by his *erōs* without considering beforehand the possible consequences of satisfying his sexual desire, that is, the production of an illegitimate child. His lack of self-control in regard to sexual pleasure in this single instance led him to ignore this risk as his mind was temporarily obfuscated.<sup>46</sup> To some degree, his behaviour could be construed as involuntary, which would earn him *sungnômê* according to Aristotle, if not on account of ignorance of the circumstances, then perhaps insofar as he was induced to do what he did by a passion that few people could resist; for Aristotle allows this too as an excuse for otherwise culpable behaviour. As Aristotle puts it, 'in some cases it is not praise we accord someone but sympathy (*sungnômê*) – cases where a person does the sorts of things one shouldn't do because of what is such as to over-extend the natural capacity of human beings – what no one could withstand'.<sup>47</sup> So too, Aristotle later observes that we are more inclined to grant *sungnômê* to people who surrender to the kinds of desires that are natural and common to all human beings because they are presumably irresistible.<sup>48</sup> This interpretation is perhaps confirmed by Moschion's own

<sup>43</sup> For the *pathos* of *aischunê*, see Arist. *Rh.* 1383b11-1385a13. On shame in Aristotle and Greek literature, see D. L. Cairns, *AIDŌS: The psychology and ethics of honour and shame in Ancient Greek literature* (Oxford 1993).

<sup>44</sup> D. Konstan, *The emotions of the ancient Greeks* (n.4, above) 93-96.

<sup>45</sup> See D. Konstan, *Before forgiveness: The origins of a moral idea* (Cambridge 2010) 37, 40-41, and 43-44.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1147a15-1147b19, which discusses by what kind of ignorance the unself-controlled is afflicted.

<sup>47</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1110a23-6, trans. Broadie and Rowe (n.14, above) 123.

<sup>48</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1149b4-6.

evaluation of how *erós* prevailed over his reason, when he exclaims at the end of the play that he will not leave Athens for foreign parts because ‘*erós*, which now reigns over my judgement, does not permit or allow it’ (631-32: οὐ γὰρ ἔξεστ’ οὐδ’ ἔγωγε ὁ τῆς ἐμῆς νῦν κύριος γνῶμης Ἔρωσ). That the issue of a child was a central consideration with regard to the consequences of rape is clear from Menander’s *Epitrepontes*. Rape itself could be concealed, but a child necessarily complicated the situation; but, in addition, giving birth to a *nothos* might be a stigma in itself, one that might even override in importance the act of rape.<sup>49</sup>

An important element of Moschion’s character is his *kosmiotês* (orderliness), which is mentioned by both Demeas and Moschion (18, 273, 344). This is evident in the way Moschion returns *charis* (gratitude) to his father for what the father has done for him. *Kosmios* can be interpreted as meaning ‘well-behaved’ in terms of social etiquette, but it also suggests ‘honest’, ‘orderly’, and ‘decent’, in regard to good citizenship.<sup>50</sup> Moschion’s *tropos* (behaviour or character),<sup>51</sup> as his father confirms, has always been *kosmios* and *sôphrôn* (344).<sup>52</sup> Demeas’ perception of his son’s *sôphrosunê* and *kosmiotês* is based on the fact that Moschion has always been self-controlled and well-behaved not only toward his father (273) but also toward all fellow-citizens (344-45). This implies that Moschion had not committed any offence nor acted dishonourably in the past. Moschion’s *kosmiotês*, however, is compromised as a result of his raping a free female citizen. But it is not this lapse that Demeas will have to wrestle with, when it comes to judging his son’s character and behaviour. For, by a turn in the plot, Demeas will first be persuaded that his son has had sexual relations not with his neighbour’s daughter but with his own concubine, Chrysis. Even though Demeas is well aware that a young man can lose self-control and surrender himself to sexual pleasures under certain circumstances (339-42), he is not prepared to accept that his son is responsible for the supposed misconduct with his own *hetaira*. He thus offers just the kind of excuses for his son’s misbehaviour that the rhetoricians proposed: his youth, the effect of wine, and the seductive charms of an older

<sup>49</sup> See D. Konstan, *Greek comedy and ideology* (n.1, above) 141-52, and W. D. Furley, *Menander’s Epitrepontes* (London 2009) 233-34.

<sup>50</sup> For meanings of *kosmios*, see LSJ; cf. Part I = ΜΕΡΟΣ ΠΡΩΤΟ Dedoussi, *Μενάνδρου Σαμία: εισαγωγή, κείμενο, μετάφραση, υπόμνημα* (Athens 2006) 104. For different interpretations of *kosmiotês*, see A. Blanchard, ‘Moschion ὁ κόσμιος et l’interprétation de la *Samienne* de Ménandre’, *Revue des études Grecques* 115 (2002.1) 58-74; S. West ‘Notes on the *Samia*’, *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 88 (1991) 11-23 (20-22).

<sup>51</sup> Menander mainly uses the word *tropos* to describe the character of a person, the deeply rooted behavioural patterns, as we would say.

<sup>52</sup> *Kosmiotês*, either on its own or coupled with *sôphrosunê* or other positive moral qualities, or contrasted with negative qualities and behaviour such as *akolasia*, had been discussed by Plato, *Resp.* 486b6-8, *Phd.* 108a6-7, *Grg.* 506e2-507a3; Aristotle [*Mag. Mor.*] 1186b25-33 and *Eth. Nic.* 1109a14-19; and the orators, e.g., *Lys.* 21.19. For the concept of *sôphrosunê* and the presentation of self in Euripides’ *Hippolytus*, see C. Gill, ‘The articulation of self in Euripides’ *Hippolytus*’, in *Euripides, women and sexuality*, ed. A. Powell (London 1990) 76-107. On *sôphrosunê* and its association with gender, on *sôphrosunê* and *erós*, and on *erós* within the context of family and polis, see D. Kokkini, ‘The rejection of erotic passion by Euripides’ *Hippolytos*’, *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement* 119 (2013) 67-83.

and experienced woman. Demeas' way of exonerating his son, both recognizing that he is, by nature and education, *kosmios* and *sôphrôn* and also capable, as his father is well aware, of lapsing into misconduct due to his young age and *erôs*, not only reflects commonplace perceptions of male youth, as illustrated by the comments of Aristotle mentioned above, but also invites the audience to reflect on whether *sôphrosunê* and *kosmiotês* are temporary or permanent states of character, and what the limits of excusability are. For even as the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* allows that drunkenness is among the affects (*pathê*) that may excuse wrongful behaviour,<sup>53</sup> Aristotle himself is more cautious, and affirms that one remains responsible for acts committed under the influence of wine, since one ought not to have drunk to excess in the first place.<sup>54</sup> Besides, would Demeas' excuses for his son's supposed relations with Chrysis have worked as well to exonerate him from the rape of a citizen girl, who can not be suspected of attempting to seduce him? The different aspects of Moschion's behaviour reflect his complex character, and this, combined with Demeas' reaction, invite the audience to reflect on *erôs* and its consequences.

Although Moschion seems to lose self-control in consummating his *erôs* for Plangon, nevertheless he does have true feelings for her. Together with his *pothos* for the girl (624) Moschion mentions familiarity (*sunêtheia*) developed over time (624-25).<sup>55</sup> This latter is important, since it is the basis, according to Aristotle, not of *erôs*, which was commonly recognized as sudden and inspired, as we have noted, by *opsis* or sight, but of *philia*, the kind of love that obtained between family members generally and husband and wife in particular.<sup>56</sup> The word *philtatê* (630), by which Moschion addresses his future wife (in her absence), in this context goes beyond the conventional use of the word as a term of address.<sup>57</sup> Moschion not only desires Plangon, but also feels affection for her, which shows appreciation of her character (which he will have had the opportunity to observe) rather than simply erotic desire. Once more, as with Sostratos, Menander stresses that though the desire for union is instigated by *erôs*, it is affection that develops and brings about this union, as in the case of Sostratos above.

#### *Demeas in Samia*

Moschion attributes his father's *erôs* for his *hetaira* to human nature (Menander, *Samia* l. 22). He also states that Demeas was ashamed and hid his desire (21-23), presumably because of his age and perhaps also because he had a son still living with him. Demeas' *aischunê* is linked both with his self-respect and with his son's respect for him (27), but more importantly with the risk of being exposed to social ridicule.<sup>58</sup> He is aware, no

<sup>53</sup> D. Konstan, *Before forgiveness* (n.45, above) 35-36.

<sup>54</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1110b24-7.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Konstan, *The emotions of the Ancient Greeks* (n.4, above) 178.

<sup>56</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1162a16-33.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. E. Dickey, *Greek Forms of address: From Herodotus to Lucian* (Oxford 1996) 135-39.

<sup>58</sup> Demeas' shame before his son mirrors that of Moschion before his father. Though Menander probably exaggerates the public disapproval attendant on such strong passion at an advanced age, he does not invent (cf. *Lys.* 3.3-4).



doubt, that such a passion was more suited to youth than to men of his age. Moschion had recommended that his father become *enkratês* of his *hetaira* (25), suggesting that his desire for Chrysis could find an acceptable resolution should he take control over her, as opposed to controlling himself, the common Aristotelian sense of *enkratês*.<sup>59</sup> I suspect that here there is a play on Aristotle's notion of *enkrateia* as a moral trait: as a young man, Moschion does not think of self-control as the solution to an erotic tension, but rather of gaining the object of one's desire. This advice is consistent with Moschion's own lack of control and his violent manner of satisfying his own passion. Moschion also warned his father that younger rivals would compete for Chrysis (25-26). Demeas responds by taking Chrysis under his wing, possibly jealous of the young rivals and hence fearing public exposure and, above all, the loss of the woman with whom he had become infatuated.

Demeas appears, then, to be lacking in self-control in acting upon his son's advice and seeking to satisfy his *erôs*. The strength of his passion is in a Greek context not fitting in a mature man and so, in conceiving a passion for a woman which dominates his life, he can be said to behave in a way that is *akratês*. Here again, in becoming *enkratês* of the woman, he is able to satisfy his desire without finding himself in an unseemly situation – he keeps the woman at home, and does not have to compete with young bloods in symposiastic parties and the like – and yet it is not quite the kind of control that Aristotle had in mind. But Demeas is at least aware of the possible consequences, should he decide to indulge his passion; he does feel ashamed, and only proceeds to admit the woman to his home when he is reassured that his son – the person in whose eyes he most feels shame – approves of the arrangement. The audience would expect Demeas to be able to show self-control, in the sense of being capable of controlling his desire, and refrain from the very beginning from committing an action that might bring dishonour on both himself and his *oikos*. Actually, it is only after his *oikos* and his honour are insulted that, despite his expressed *pothos* for Chrysis (350), Demeas controls his *erôs* by suppressing it (350). We may imagine that he has made some progress in the course of the play, and has learned that there were unanticipated consequences to bringing such a woman into his home. It is difficult to say whether Menander intended the audience to reflect on the dangers of such an arrangement, and the poor model it might set for the young man; but New Comedy was well adapted to making manifest the complications of what might seem like conventional domestic situations, and it would hardly be a surprise if Menander were probing here into the problem of concubinage within the family.

Demeas is angry not only at Chrysis' betrayal and hurt to his feelings, but also at her lack of respect and appreciation for what she had been offered by him in the past (376-78, 387) – in other words, he is angry with her lack of gratitude and reciprocation for the *charis* she had received from him. The *charis* Demeas would have expected from Chrysis is that she reciprocates his feelings by behaving appropriately, since it would have been impossible for her, as a *hetaira*, to return in equal measure what Demeas had offered her in financial or social advantages.

The struggle between Demeas' reason and his emotions is the dominant aspect of his character. This is manifested in his reasoning and his carefully constructed syllogisms concerning the possible causes of the supposed relationship between Moschion and

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1145b8-20 and 1151b32-1152a3.

Chrysis, as well as by his perception and evaluation of Moschion's character and of the situation in general. His reasoning, however, is flawed. Demeas considers the general facts, namely that Chrysis, an *hetaira*, might be expected to behave in a seductive way, aroused by the charms of a young man – after all, this was a major concern of his in bringing her into his home in the first place; in this way, he excuses his son, recalling his immaculate behaviour and attributing his temporary lapse to Chrysis' seduction. Insofar as the particular facts are concerned, Demeas considers only that subset of them that are knowable to him. Demeas' deep *erôs* for Chrysis and her supposed betrayal and insult, together with his ignorance of some crucial facts – what he will later call a *hamartia* (703–08) – makes it inevitable that Demeas will draw false conclusions, based not on reason alone but on what appears to be the truth.<sup>60</sup> Considering all factors is a *sine qua non* of a wise man, according to Aristotle, provided of course that one has access to them. Demeas' case is ambiguous in this regard. He might have gotten a full explanation of the story, had he allowed the slave Parmenon to tell it to him, but his rage is so great that he cuts Parmenon off and threatens to torture him (324-25). By expelling Chrysis from his house and from his life without investigating the facts adequately, Demeas behaves like an unself-controlled person.<sup>61</sup> This is not to say that Demeas is by nature unself-controlled, but simply that, under the pressure of difficult circumstances and in ignorance of crucial facts (an ignorance partly caused by his own excessive anger, as he refuses to listen to Parmenon's explanation), he loses his self-control and ability to reason properly. If one considers that Demeas has behaved as any human being might when placed in such a stressful situation, then his behavior might be considered pardonable, as Aristotle explains. Once again, the audience will have had to think it through. It is just this tension between a character type and a figure who may act out of character that renders Menander's practical illustrations of *êthos* in action so rich and complex.

In Demeas we see a different response to *erôs* than we saw in the case of the other characters. His feeling is more intense and he suffers more than young men do, a suffering of a different kind, too, compounded of shame, desire, and kindness. His 'reasonable' disposition coexists with a propensity to passion, as we see in Moschion's account of the prehistory. He has more experience than his son does of the social consequences of his desire, but not enough to anticipate the danger – which does not in fact materialize – of a liaison between his concubine and his young and handsome son. In the end, however, once the misunderstanding is resolved, Demeas is reconciled and reunites with Chrysis, taking her back into his *oikos* (569, *cf.* 575). It is at this stage that Demeas, relieved as he

<sup>60</sup> Demeas' want of wisdom (*phronêsis*) seems to be confirmed by Moschion's characterization of his father as *agnômôn* when he expresses his desire to take revenge on him, so that Demeas would never again dare to belittle and hold unfair judgement and ungrateful feelings towards him (637). As in the case of *enkratês*, the use of the word *agnômôn* by Menander, apart from its simple interpretation as ungrateful, may reveal another dimension of the son's, and the audience's, expectations from such a father, namely to be able to hold and exercise good judgement and fairness expressed in his *gnômê*. Aristotle links *gnômê* with *sungnômê* (Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1143a19-24), which Demeas displays only in the end (695-712). On the meaning of *gnômê*, see Broadie and Rowe, *Nicomachean Ethics* (n.14, above) 377; on the strategies of *sungnômê* in *Samia*, see D. Konstan, *Before forgiveness* (n.45, above) 67-73.

<sup>61</sup> *Cf.* Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1147a17-1147b19.

recognizes Chrysis' innocence, names her as his woman (τῆς γυναικὸς, 561), a term used also in the sense of wife,<sup>62</sup> thus revealing his tender feelings towards her. Though, when Demeas first heard the story – made up to conceal Moschion's offense – that she had given birth to and reared a child she ostensibly had with Demeas, he was furious and explicitly denied her status as a *gametên hetairan* (129-30: τί γάρ; γαμετὴν ἑταίραν, ὡς ἔουκ', ἐλάνθανον ἔχων).<sup>63</sup> Despite the rupture and the more stormy nature of the passion, here too as in the preceding cases, *erôs* needs to be complemented by gentler feelings if it is to be the basis of a sustainable relationship.

### Conclusion

Lack of self-control may be especially common among the young in popular perception,<sup>64</sup> and in the schemata of Aristotle.<sup>65</sup> But there is no neat correlation between years and behaviour in the case studies we have analysed. In response to the questions I posed in the beginning, my analysis of the three men in love in *Dyskolos* and *Samia* shows that, although all of them are marked by a certain degree of incontinence due to their *erôs*, nevertheless what characterizes the expression of the young men's *erôs* is a combination of desire with affection. All three characters, in managing their *erôs*, display a mixture of flaws and good qualities, for they are not simply incontinent, nor are they completely successful in mastering their emotions and desires. More importantly, the degree and mode of incontinence in respect to *erôs* reveal their characters. The expression of their *erôs* is related to their flawed judgement or a certain trait or emotion, of which they eventually become aware by reflecting on the results or possible consequences of their desire and, ultimately, on themselves. Insofar as *erôs* is concerned, despite its intensity it has not permanently distorted their reason. In this sense, these characters not only amuse and entertain the audience, but also act as educators in the broader meaning of the word. They make the audience think and reflect on similar states in their own lives. As Andreas Fountoulakis has pointed out in an important study of Menander's didactic purpose,

<sup>62</sup> For the meaning of *gynê*, see LSJ, sv: (a) a general term for women regardless of marital status; (b) expressing respect; (c) wife, consort; and (d) partner.

<sup>63</sup> On the impropriety of treating a *hetaira* as a legitimate or *gametê* wife, Cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 4.2; Isae. 12.7, 9; 3.6, 14, 24, 45, 80; 8.19; [Dem.] 59.60. For Chrysis' status, see L. K. McClure, *Courtesans at table: Gender and Greek literary culture in Athenaeus* (New York and London 2003) 25-26 and 212 n.16.

<sup>64</sup> See for example, Lys. 3.4 (with C. Carey, *Lysias: Selected speeches* (Cambridge 1989) 94-95); Lys. 24.15-17; K. J. Dover, *Greek popular morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford 1974) 103; E. Cantarella, *Bisexuality in the ancient world*, trans. C. Ó. Cuilleánáin (New Haven and London 1992) 27-34; N. R. E. Fisher, *Hybris: A study in the values of honour and shame in ancient Greece* (Warminster 1992) 13-21, 33-35 and 96-99.

<sup>65</sup> It is important to remain aware that these characters, while susceptible to analysis in terms of Aristotelian psychology, resist his neat formulations. Aristotle is an invaluable hermeneutic tool for approaching the psychology and sociology of Menandrian characters. However, the 'Aristotelian' reading has its limits. Menander's characters are more 'complex' than his or any philosophical taxonomy.

Menander invites the audience to reflect on the characters' experiences by putting themselves in similar positions.<sup>66</sup>

In this article, I have concentrated on discussing the characters purely in terms of individual psychology. But individuals do not live in a vacuum, either in the extra-theatrical world or in the fictions of Menander. The reading of the Menandrian plays I have proposed suggests that one of their social and political functions is to educate the audience's emotions and encourage them to express emotions and desires in an appropriate way through the exercise of reason.<sup>67</sup> To know oneself, to accept and moderate one's flaws to strive constantly for a balance between emotion or desire and reason, is a fundamental principle for a good life in a healthy society, which presupposes the sharing of common values and expectations.

Similarly, in Menander's social and cultural environment, personal and familial relations based on *philia* within the *oikos* are models of conduct affecting society at large. If *erós* in Menander is seen in this perspective, we may discern models of social codes of cohesion and mutual respect within the *oikos* and the *polis*.<sup>68</sup> For, the family is the training ground for educating one's *pathé*. This is the 'political' message which the 'domestic' Menandrian comedy offered to its audience. As Panos Charitoglou has observed in his reflections on how to present Menander to a modern Greek audience: 'This is where Menander's humane attitude lies: he succeeds, through human conflicts, in improving mankind'.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> A. Fountoulakis, *Αναζητώντας τον διδακτικό Μένανδρο: Μια προσέγγιση του Μενάνδρου και μία διερεύνηση της Σαμίας* (Athens 2004) 69 and 75.

<sup>67</sup> Following S. Goldhill, 'Civic ideology and the problem of difference', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 120 (2000) 34-56 (38-39) in distinguishing between a *function* and an *intention* of Attic drama.

<sup>68</sup> N. Bozanic, *Structure, language and action* (n.3, above) 133-35, who, taking as a point of departure this idea as expressed in Aristophanes' speech in *Symposium* (192d-193a), briefly examines it in *Perikeiromene* and *Dyskolos*.

<sup>69</sup> P. Charitoglou in his note on the programme of the production for the *National Theatre of Northern Greece* in 1975/76: 'Εδώ κρύβεται η ανθρωπιά του ποιητή, που κατορθώνει μέσα από τις ανθρώπινες συγκρούσεις να καλυτερέψει τον άνθρωπο'.

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The cover image is of Cupid, or Eros, presenting a rose to a butterfly, by Antoine-Denis Chaudet, c. 1802, completed, after Chaudet's death in 1810, by Pierre Cartellier, and shown in the Paris Salon of 1817.

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Arising out of a conference on 'Erôs in Ancient Greece', the articles in this volume share a historicizing approach to the conventions and expectations of *erôs* in the context of the *polis*, in the Archaic and Classical periods of ancient Greece.

The articles focus on (post-Homeric) Archaic and Classical poetic genres – namely lyric poetry, tragedy, and comedy – and some philosophical texts by Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle.

They pursue a variety of issues, including: the connection between homosexual *erôs* and politics; sexual practices that fell outside societal norms (aristocratic homosexuality, chastity); the roles of *sôphrosynê* (self-control) and *akrasia* (incontinence) in erotic relationships; and the connection between *erôs* and other socially important emotions such as *charis*, *philia*, and *storgê*.

The exploration of such issues from a variety of standpoints, and through a range of texts, allows us to place *erôs* as an emotion in its socio-political context.

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