

CROSSING EMPIRE'S EDGE

FOREIGN MINISTRY POLICE
AND JAPANESE EXPANSIONISM
IN NORTHEAST ASIA



ERIK ESSELSTROM

Crossing Empire's Edge



The WORLD
of EAST ASIA

JOSHUA FOGEL, *GENERAL EDITOR*

For most of its past, East Asia was a world unto itself. The land now known as China sat roughly at its center and was surrounded by a number of places now called Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia, and Tibet, as well as a host of lands absorbed into one of these. The peoples and cultures of these lands interacted among themselves with virtually no reference to the outside world before the dawn of early modern times. The World of East Asia is a book series that aims to support the production of research on the interactions, both historical and contemporary, between and among these lands and their cultures and peoples and between East Asia and its Central, South, and Southeast Asian neighbors.

SERIES TITLES

Crossing Empire's Edge

Foreign Ministry Police and Japanese Expansionism in Northeast Asia,

BY ERIK ESSELSTROM

Memory Maps

The State and Manchuria in Postwar Japan,

BY MARIKO ASANO TAMANOI

T H E W O R L D O F E A S T A S I A

Crossing Empire's Edge

Foreign Ministry Police and Japanese
Expansionism in Northeast Asia

Erik Esselstrom



University of Hawai'i Press
HONOLULU

© 2009 University of Hawai'i Press

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Esselstrom, Erik.

Crossing empire's edge: Foreign Ministry police and Japanese expansion in Northeast Asia / by Erik Esselstrom.

p. cm.—(The world of East Asia)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-8248-3231-5 (hardcover : alk. paper)

1. Intelligence service—Japan. 2. Consular police—Japan.
3. Japan—Foreign relations—Korea. 4. Korea—Foreign relations—Japan. 5. Japan—Foreign relations—China. 6. China—Foreign relations—Japan. I. Title.

JQ1629.I6E87 2008

363.28—dc22

2008010427



An electronic version of this book is freely available thanks to the support of libraries working with Knowledge Unlatched. KU is a collaborative initiative designed to make high-quality books open access for the public good. The open-access ISBN for this book is 9780824887643 (PDF). More information about the initiative and links to the open-access version can be found at www.knowledgeunlatched.org.



The open access version of this book is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), which means that the work may be freely downloaded and shared for non-commercial purposes, provided credit is given to the author. Derivative works and commercial uses require permission from the publisher. For details, see <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>.

*For my parents,
Calvin and Sandra Esselstrom*



Northeast Asia (map produced by Bill Nelson)



Northeast China and the Korean Peninsula (map produced by Bill Nelson)

Contents

	Acknowledgments	xi
	Introduction	1
1	Patterns of Police Work in Late Chosŏn Korea	13
2	A Disputed Presence in Late Qing and Early Republican China	39
3	Policing Resistance to the Imperial State	65
4	Opposition, Escalation, and Integration	92
5	The Struggle for Security in Occupied China	119
	Conclusion	147
	Notes	155
	Bibliography	203
	Index	229

Acknowledgments

I owe a great debt to so many people who supported me during the years it took to research and write this book, but I must place Josh Fogel, Luke Roberts, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa at the top of the list. From the three of them, I learned so much about how to be both a disciplined scholar and a passionate teacher. E. Bruce Reynolds of San José State University and Jeffrey Hanes of the University of Oregon also deserve special recognition, as the time I spent working with them during the early years of my academic training had an indelible impact on the historian I am today. Special gratitude also goes to Mark Peattie, Frederick Dickinson, Daniel Botsman, Tak Matsusaka, and Bill Sewell for their enthusiastic participation in several conference sessions related to this project and to David Ambaras for his close and insightful reading of the original manuscript. For their involvement in many other workshops and meetings where I presented my research on the Japanese consular police, let me thank in particular Jun Uchida, Eiko Maruko Siniawer, Robert Cribb, Joseph Yick, Rustin Gates, Emer O'Dwyer, Robert Perrins, Aaron Skabelund, Thomas DuBois, and Marieke Bloembergen. From my years as a graduate student at the University of California, Santa Barbara, special thanks go to Shao Dan, Laura Nenzi, and Chip Dewell for their friendship and advice. I also feel so fortunate now to be a part of an intellectually rich and personally supportive group of colleagues in the Department of History at the University of Vermont.

The research for the dissertation that became this book was made possible by a fellowship award from the IIE Fulbright Program and the Japan-U.S. Education Commission. In Japan, Professor Hirano Ken'ichirō of the Graduate School of Political Science at Waseda University was a kind and generous host during my stay there as a graduate student researcher, and during the years since he has graciously sponsored several important short-term stints for me at Waseda to carry out follow-up work. Heartfelt thanks are also due to Professor Mizuno Naoki of the Institute for Research in Humanities (Jinbunken) at Kyoto University and the members of his consular police research group, especially Matsuda Toshihiko, Asano Toyomi, Soejima Shōichi, and Ishikawa Yoshihiro. I must also thank Professor Ogino Fujio of Otaru Commercial University for his advice and suggestions during our several meetings in Tokyo, and for his continued interest in and support of my work. Additional financial support over the

years was provided by the University of California Pacific Rim Research Program, the History Department and Graduate Division at UC Santa Barbara and the Regents of the University of California, the Asian Studies Program, Dean's Office of the College of Arts and Sciences, and Department of History at the University of Vermont, and the Northeast Asia Council of the Association for Asian Studies.

Passages within this book appeared previously in somewhat different form as segments of journal articles in *Modern Asian Studies* and *Intelligence and National Security*. I thank the editors of both journals for allowing me to reshape some of that content here. I am also so grateful for the consistently enthusiastic attention shown to this project by Patricia Crosby and her editorial team at the University of Hawai'i Press from the moment of my initial proposal until the final production of the book. The superb comments offered by the press' anonymous reviewers, too, made this a much better book than it would have been otherwise. The weaknesses that might remain are my responsibility alone.

Finally, this book (and my entire career as a professional historian) would never have been possible without the love, patience, and unwavering support of my wife, Megumi. Without her and our children in my life, all of this would not mean a thing to me.

Introduction

On the evening of March 11, 1919, a minor scuffle broke out between a handful of plain-clothed Japanese police officers and U.S. Army personnel outside a Korean brothel in the Japanese concession zone of Tianjin, China. According to U.S. sources, the violence escalated at around midnight the next evening, when “a large group of excited Japanese civilians carrying clubs and pistols invaded the French concession.” Following the mob into the French concession, “the acting Japanese consul, mounted on a horse, led a body of more than one hundred Japanese troops and officers armed with rifles with fixed bayonets.”¹ In the ensuing melee, two American soldiers found themselves in the custody of Japanese consular police forces. One had been struck on the head by a Japanese soldier outside the Empire Cinema, a local movie house in the French concession, and then transported to the Japanese consular police station, during which time a Japanese mob thrashed him with sticks. The second had been overwhelmed, while trying to escape, still half-dressed, from a Chinese brothel in the French concession, by a mob of close to sixty Japanese civilians who beat him severely. After taking him into their custody, a small band of Japanese soldiers later delivered him to the Japanese consular police station too.²

A pair of American military officers soon arrived at the Japanese consulate and demanded that any Americans being held in the jail be released immediately, but the Japanese police chief refused to take any action. Japanese consul Kamei Kanichirō further explained that he could not do anything before consulting with his American counterpart, Consul Stewart P. Heintzleman. By the time Heintzleman arrived, however, Kamei had already gone home. When Heintzleman nonetheless inquired as to the whereabouts of the two American soldiers, consular police chief Kaneko denied that any Americans were being held in his facility. Moments later, however, no doubt much to Kaneko’s chagrin, one of the Americans who had accompanied Heintzleman “discovered Corporal Rohner lying almost stark naked in a side courtyard” bleeding severely from several bayonet wounds to his back, and “a search of the place resulted in the discovery of Corporal DeCordova in a cell. In the office of the chief of police was found the hat of Corporal DeCordova and the clothes of Corporal Rohner.” The two men were then released into Heintzleman’s custody, and the remnants of the Japanese mob stoned the American consul’s car as it drove off.³

Numerous dimensions of treaty port life in early Republican China are revealed in the episode described above. It is, for instance, a vivid portrait of an international and multicultural urban milieu in which American soldiers visiting Korean brothels in the Japanese ward of a Chinese city could be chased down Asahi-gai until it became rue de Chalyard, and then beaten outside a movie house in the French concession, where Vietnamese patrolmen of the French police force finally cleared the crowd. It is also indicative of how simmering tensions among the civilian residents, government officials, and military forces of each national group could quite easily erupt into outbursts of violence. One of the most striking images, however, is that of a Japanese consul on horseback boldly leading a contingent of soldiers and police officers down an avenue ostensibly to protect Japanese residents of the city from attack by American soldiers. Who were these police forces that operated out of the Japanese consulate in Tianjin? On what legal basis did the Japanese Foreign Ministry establish such a security force? On what legal authority did these police believe they could arrest, detain, and physically abuse U.S. military personnel within the confines of the politically exclusive French settlement? It was with questions such as these that the research leading to this book first began.

What that research revealed was a story of roughly sixty-five years during which the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Gaimushō*) maintained an independent police force within the space of Japan's informal empire on the Asian continent rooted in a controversial interpretation of extraterritorial privilege. Justified as a logical and legitimate corollary of treaty agreements with Korea and China, and charged with a duty to "protect and control" civilian Japanese communities on the Asian mainland, this Japanese consular police force possesses the longest uninterrupted history of any Japanese colonial institution. The opening anecdote may give the impression that these consular policemen did little more than help keep the peace within the volatile urban setting of the foreign concession zones, and that in doing so they were often at the center of local jurisdictional conflicts with the other foreign powers in treaty port China. The Foreign Ministry's police force in continental East Asia, however, evolved over the course of those six decades from a relatively benign public security organization into a full-fledged political intelligence apparatus devoted to apprehending Korean, Chinese, and Japanese purveyors of "dangerous thought" throughout the empire. Consequently, its history principally concerns the course and character of interactions between the societies of East Asia, and as such, it sheds critical light on the broader politics of public memory, colonial victimization, and war responsibility that have such a powerful impact on international relations in East Asia today.

In his description of the Japanese presence in China's treaty port communities, one scholar has identified the police forces maintained by Japan's

consulate offices as “the largest and, to the Chinese, the most outrageously provocative of all the foreign gendarmeries.”⁴ Similarly, another has remarked that, of all Japan’s armed fists, “at least before the Manchurian Incident, it was the consular police who were singled out by the Chinese for the greatest condemnation.”⁵ It is remarkable indeed, then, that so little is known about a Japanese police force that many contemporary Koreans and Chinese (and Japanese!) viewed as one of the most odious tools of Japanese state oppression during the first half of the twentieth century. In fact, statistics reveal in no uncertain terms that Japan’s consular system, and even the Foreign Ministry itself, was largely defined during the prewar and wartime eras by its role as an institution designed to exercise functions of both social management and ideological control. From 1922 on, for example, consular police officers comprised no less than 40 percent of all Foreign Ministry employees. By 1933, that percentage had climbed to as high as 62 percent.⁶ When one looks at the numbers of Foreign Ministry staff stationed in overseas facilities, the statistics are even more striking. In 1921, for example, 560 of 1,133 Foreign Ministry personnel overseas were police officers, roughly 49 percent. By 1936, the ratio climbed as high as 1,794 of 2,557, or just over 70 percent.⁷ Obviously, then, the Japanese Foreign Ministry police was an institution whose history should no longer be overlooked. While a handful of East Asian historians have made initial forays into the topic, even with these valuable works our understanding of what part Japan’s consular police played in shaping the Japanese colonial presence in northeast Asia is minimal.⁸ The present study is the first in English to fill that void, and in telling the story of how the Japanese Foreign Ministry crossed the edge of empire through the actions of its consular police forces this book challenges a number of deeply ingrained paradigms related to Japanese colonial expansionism.

The dramatic events of September 18, 1931, when rogue agents of the Japanese military in China blew up a section of railway near Fengtian and then used the staged explosion as a pretext for the occupation by force of south Manchuria, occupies a prominent space in popular historical memory both within and beyond East Asian society. It is most often remembered as the moment at which the wild imaginings of Kwantung Army general Ishiwaru Kanji and his ultranationalist cronies hijacked the direction of an otherwise liberal Japanese interwar foreign policy. Internationalist diplomats in Tokyo, confounded by a military *fait accompli*, had little choice but to acquiesce to army interests, since failure to do so would reveal to the world that Japan’s civilian government had almost no capacity to rein in its own military forces in the field. While on some levels this narrative does reflect historical reality, in painting a picture of indisputable villains and victims it is also a view of history inextricably informed by the need to advance a certain narrative of prewar Japanese politics that would

both vindicate American destruction of that polity and exonerate “ordinary” Japanese from responsibility for that destruction.

The research of professional historians evaluating these events some thirty years later often substantiated and reflected this narrative in which Japan’s peaceful internationalism of the Taishō era was violently usurped by the aggressive militarism of the early Shōwa period.⁹ The notion that the contest between the Foreign Ministry and the Imperial Army was some kind of Manichean struggle between the forces of dark conquest and liberal accommodation, however, is no longer widely accepted. Historians studying specifically the inner workings of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, for example, have done much to reveal the great diversity of views within its many levels of bureaucracy.¹⁰ Furthermore, others have pointed out, in exposing the Machiavellian stratagems of many interwar diplomats, that “Antimilitarism did not necessarily imply opposition to military intervention and aggression, or resistance to the diplomacy of *fait accompli*.”¹¹ Despite these developments in the historiography, however, the Gaimushō is still often characterized as an advocate of “liberal” or “progressive” approaches to international relations in contradistinction to the Imperial Army, which was driven by unilateral security prerogatives and reckless ideological ambition. In that narrative, the Manchurian Incident of 1931 especially stands as a watershed moment in modern East Asian history when Japan returned to a policy of acquiring formal colonial territory. As one preeminent scholar has put it, “just when Japan appeared to be emerging as the paramount foreign economic power in China within the framework of the treaty system, it embarked on a new policy of establishing direct political control over Manchuria” in the late summer of 1931.¹² Even in deemphasizing the drama of the Manchurian Incident by describing it as a “shift in the equilibrium of an existing dualism rather than a revolutionary break,” other analyses of the Japanese Foreign Ministry in the pre-war state still seem trapped in a paradigm of dualism.¹³

To understand fully the complicity of the Foreign Ministry in the structures of Japanese imperialism demands more than mere recognition of internal factionalism within its bureaucracy, the opportunistic realism of its diplomatic agents, or its jurisdictional battles with other arms of the Japanese imperial state. What the history of the Japanese consular police reveals is that at the local level in continental East Asia the Foreign Ministry did not only react passively to the proactive initiatives of other imperial agencies but, rather, actively promoted colonial expansionism in accordance with its perceived political security prerogatives. For more than a decade before the Kwantung Army launched its unilateral campaign to defend Japan’s geopolitical security in 1931, the Foreign Ministry had been engaged in a war of its own against radical Korean nationalists operating in exile in treaty port China and through-

out Manchuria. Those nationalists had taken their struggle against formal empire to battlefields in the informal empire, and when Japanese police of the formal colonies could not fight them there, the Japanese consular police took up the cause. Furthermore, just as the emergence of international communism sparked efforts by civil and judicial authorities at home to crush nascent left-wing movements in Japan proper, so the Foreign Ministry took on the same task throughout northeast Asia and pursued that aim as well through its consular police forces.

The history of the consular police thus suggests that the piecemeal encroachment by Japanese authorities upon Chinese sovereignty during the interwar years was not only the consequence of the clashing interests of Chinese nationalism and Japanese empire building. It was also a manifestation of political and ideological conflict within metropolitan Japanese society during the 1920s. The struggle between conservative state authority and liberal social forces—a struggle in which the metropolitan police performed the most significant coercive functions of state power—was also played out in the colonial periphery, where the consular police became the imperial state's armed fist within noncolonial space and systematically targeted for suppression any individual or organization engaged in activity deemed hostile to the empire/nation. The sustained campaign by Japanese consular police forces in China and Manchuria to snuff out Korean resistance was more than a mere counterinsurgency program. When viewed alongside the Foreign Ministry's concomitant efforts to police Japanese leftists in China, it can be understood as one part of a larger state-organized policy aimed at crushing ideological threats to the *kokutai* (national polity), colonial or metropolitan.¹⁴

This is significant, because historians of Japanese foreign relations during the first half of the twentieth century often fail to recognize the interconnectivity of foreign policy and domestic society as an operative force in Japanese social and political life. As one critic has recently suggested, most work on Japanese imperialism “splits the narrative of modern Japan into two solitudes—the first, a domestic history untainted by interactions with the continent, and the second, a history of the colonies penetrated by the forces of the metropolis.”¹⁵ The problem with this approach is that in such metrocentric history “the transnational processes inherent to empire are truncated, reinforcing assumptions about national subjectivity and ensuring that history remains in service to the nation.”¹⁶ Scholars of European colonialism have for many years now been engaged in the sort of research that breaks these state-centered boundaries.¹⁷ Fortunately, recent years have also seen the production of several studies that begin to integrate the colonial and metropolitan history of modern Japanese society in meaningful and important ways, but much more still needs to be done.¹⁸

The work of intellectual, social, and labor historians of modern Japan

during the past twenty years has pointed the way forward in this respect by reframing domestic history in terms that transcend the simplistic dualism of a helpless society victimized by an oppressive state. More specifically, scholarship has come to emphasize the need to appreciate the subtle negotiation and collaboration between social groups and state power, rather than accept a one-dimensional portrait of popular victimization by an authoritarian government and its bureaucracies.¹⁹ As Sheldon Garon contends, for example, social liberalism and political fascism were not mutually exclusive in prewar Japan, and consequently “progressive individuals and groups cooperated with the authoritarian state on a widespread basis between 1931 and 1945.” Significantly, Garon continues, these alliances “first arose during the peaceful decade of the ‘liberal 1920s,’ not in the heat of the Fifteen Years’ War.”²⁰

A situation like this unlikely marriage of liberalism and authoritarianism in domestic society was also at work regarding the Gaimushō’s position in imperial Japan’s institutional machinery of foreign policy. The Gaimushō, through its consular system in Northeast Asia, acted in a manner identical to other administrative ministries in the Japanese state. Its duty was to intensively manage the everyday workings of civilian Japanese communities on the Asian mainland, and police work was a vital part of that mission. The pressures linked to managing those residents drove the Foreign Ministry to take measures that often far exceeded the internationally recognized parameters of treaty port imperialism in China. Furthermore, while the official voice of the Foreign Ministry proclaimed Japanese commitment to internationalism and mutual economic prosperity among the Great Powers in East Asia, at the local level the Gaimushō was engaged in a war during the 1920s against destabilizing political ideologies and their proponents. In contrast, then, to the notion that the Foreign Ministry had been forced to the periphery by the army on matters of continental policy by the early 1930s, the war on radical politics waged by the consular police after 1919 represents a dimension of Gaimushō interests that closely resembled the priorities of more conservative bureaucrats and the military. This is not to argue that the Foreign Ministry was necessarily a vanguard force behind aggressive expansionism; rather, its commitment to fighting communism through its consular security forces explains why the Gaimushō was not a consistent opponent of military expansionism and why in some cases it must even be understood as an advocate of that expansionism.

In addition to the interconnectivity of domestic politics and foreign policy, the history of the Foreign Ministry police also reminds us to appreciate the impact of both global international forces and local regional relationships in fomenting Japanese colonial expansionism. The trend in recent scholarship concerning the driving ideological energies of Japa-

nese imperialism has been to emphasize the impact of contemporaneous efforts by Japan's ruling elite to fully integrate post-Tokugawa Japan into the international community of the late nineteenth century by mastering the practice and rhetoric of empire building.²¹ Many dimensions of consular police history support this line of argumentation, but that history also suggests that the particular regional dynamics of East Asian society should not be entirely discarded by giving primacy to the global context.

Just as the contours of East Asian modernity itself can (and must) be located in the centuries preceding the era of intense Western pressure during the nineteenth century, the dynamics of Japanese responses to political convulsions on the continent from the 1850s on cannot be isolated from patterns of continental influence with deep roots.²² From the seventh-century Taika Reforms designed to bolster the nascent imperial institution on the archipelago in response to the rise of a strong and expansive Tang dynasty, to the early-seventeenth-century Ming–Qing conflict and its reverberations on the consolidation of power over the islands by the Tokugawa clan, changes within China's political and social order have consistently influenced transformations of the Japanese polity. By the early twentieth century, many within the ruling elite of Japan similarly viewed the internal disorder of continental Asian society as a threat to Japan because it left the entire region vulnerable to the social disease of Marxism, an illness that threatened to destabilize the political power structure on the home islands.

The intention here is not to offer an apologetic justification for Japanese aggression in China by historically contextualizing it. It would be a ludicrous argument indeed to contend, for example, that because Chinese society failed to unify itself efficiently after the collapse of imperial Confucianism in 1912, the Japanese were left with little choice but to seize control of the mainland themselves. Even so, the Japanese logic of pursuing an aggressive policy on the continent for the sake of its own domestic security cannot simply be dismissed as nothing but cynical, self-serving imperial rhetoric. To do so is to ignore centuries-old patterns in Japanese society's relationship with the twists and turns of continental political life. As one historian of China has recently argued, for example, one can only begin to meaningfully explore the complexities of Chinese collaboration with the Japanese military after 1937 by considering "the understanding Chinese have developed over at least a millennium about how local authority and elite representation are constrained by, but also must coexist interactively with, state authority."²³ Likewise, another historian has argued persuasively that the Japanese Imperial Army's invasion and conquest of Manchuria in 1932 was successful in large part because of the collaboration of local Chinese elites, and the ideology of resistance to Japanese aggression in northeast

China then developed outside of the region itself as a “resistancialist myth.”²⁴ This is a thesis that moves beyond the simple dualism of Japanese brutality and Chinese victimization to identify the reasons for local Chinese collaboration with Japanese authorities in Manchuria, namely the belief among many local Chinese landlords and entrepreneurs that Japan was “bringing modernity at a time when native Chinese governments seemed incapable of doing so.”²⁵ Analytical approaches such as these help one to move beyond the historiographical politics of postcolonialism and examine local colonial and wartime Sino-Japanese relations on their own contemporary terms.

Similarly, one must consider the logic of Japanese aggression in prewar China in the context of long-standing patterns of Japanese domestic political life that were intricately connected to the internal social order and disorder of Chinese society. On the surface this logic might seem to echo the arguments of early postwar Marxist scholarship in Japan that located a dark inevitability within the Japanese conquest of continental East Asia. Alternatively, one might hesitate to accept this premise because it can be easily twisted into a kind of rationalistic apologia for Japan’s invasion of China. I do not contend that these regional security anxieties constituted the principal context of Japanese expansionism. They formed, however, a significant context that shaped the Foreign Ministry’s actions in Northeast Asia, and thus they should not be ignored. In other words, what I mean to propose is a more specific formulation germane to the East Asian regional context of what Ronald Robinson has termed an “excentric theory” of imperialism in which the driving energy of expansionism is located neither at the colonial periphery nor in the metropolitan core but in the relationship between the two.²⁶ In broader terms as well, failing to appreciate this interconnection by overemphasizing the global context of Western imperial models is to neglect the regional dynamics of East Asian society that have been at work for thousands of years and thus privilege the power of the past two centuries over that of the past few millennia.

This book is based upon on a wide variety of primary and secondary sources, but the analysis and interpretations put forth here are drawn heavily from my reading of a collection of documents first assembled as the *Gaimushō keisatsushi* (A History of the Foreign Ministry Police). Consisting of over 72,000 pages, this collection is the largest and most significant source for exploring the history of Japan’s consular police in northeast Asia.²⁷ Its compilation began when, in light of the anticipated abolition of Japanese extraterritoriality in Manzhouguo at the end of 1937, the Gaimushō deemed it both appropriate and necessary to begin assembling a documentary record that would trace the role played by its

consular police forces in the construction and execution of Japanese policy in Manchuria during the more than thirty years since the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. In April 1937, Suematsu Kichiji, an influential figure whose role in the evolution of the consular police will be considered later, was selected to head the project, and on May 12, Foreign Minister Satō Naotake sent an order to all Japanese ambassadors abroad instructing them to begin collecting for submission to Tokyo any and all documentary records relevant to organization, deployment, and reform of Japanese consular police forces in Manchuria.²⁸

Initially, this “history of the Foreign Ministry police” was intended to be a history of solely those consular police forces in Manchuria, however, at some point during the first few exploratory sessions of the editorial committee, the scope of the project was expanded to include all consular police forces from their origins in treaty port Korea until the present day. By early May, Suematsu had selected two police veterans to begin gathering documents from various Tokyo area archives, and later that summer Japanese authorities in Korea started assembling consular police materials there. Progress was slow, however, since the second Sino-Japanese War erupted in the summer of 1937 and the exigencies of that conflict demanded the time and resources of everyone in the Foreign Ministry. The project nonetheless lumbered along for seven years, when in 1944 an index was finally produced and Suematsu took measures to make copies of the documents and protect them from air-raid conflagrations in Tokyo.²⁹

What motivated the editors of the *Gaimushō keisatsushi* to persevere for over seven years for the sake of creating this body of source materials? The police veteran editors claimed that the primary reason for the project was to “convey our glorious history to future generations.”³⁰ As Aiba Kiyoshi explained in greater depth in April 1944, by focusing on the consular duties of protecting Japanese civilians overseas the project would reveal changes over time in political affairs, popular conditions, economics, customs, and social life in general throughout the empire. However, as something that was much more than just a history of the consulates, Aiba believed that the project would be a guidebook better than any other for those of future generations who aim to study the “real history” of the Japanese empire.³¹

That the project was left incomplete due to the chaos in urban Japan during the final months of the war also helps to explain why historians have not explored these materials in a sustained and meaningful way.³² In fact, most of the documents survived in a rather raw, unfinished state; scanning the pages, for example, one quickly notices numerous instances where characters have been scratched out and corrected, awaiting later stages of editorial production. These sources thus represent an exciting opportunity to gain a new perspective on the local dynamics of Japan’s

colonial presence in East Asia. As many critics have pointed out, however, historical scholarship on the Japanese empire that follows such a close reading of official colonial archives can often become “colonized” by the ideological constructs of the original colonizers themselves.³³ In the *Gai-mushō keisatsushi*, for example, there is the obvious problem that any set of sources produced by an institution to tell its own history must be tainted to some extent by self-serving motives. Choices were made by the editors regarding which documents to include and which to leave out, and in those choices the values and interests of the editors are surely revealed. Japanese colonial sources such as these must therefore be treated critically, and the conclusions evident in those materials not simply accepted as true and accurate accounts of colonial conditions. By the same token, however, one should not be too quick to simply dismiss every explanation given by Japanese colonial actors as nothing more than deliberately cynical hyperbole. To do so is to employ an equally ahistorical line of reasoning. The most interesting and important question to explore is why Japanese authorities made the claims they did. Whether those claims were “true” or not is of less relevance than what these claims can reveal about the impact of the colonial experience on Japanese society.

The book is organized into five chapters that follow a chronological progression. The analysis is deliberately broad, because my goal was to sketch out a portrait of trends in the development of the consular police system over the course of more than half a century. To delve inside every topic in microhistorical detail would demand a book many times the size of this one. Instead, I encourage future investigators to pick up and expand upon the many specific story lines and comparative possibilities I introduce here. The aim in the first two chapters is to describe both how the consular police as an institution came to be and the implications of that process for interpreting Japan’s place in the system of informal treaty port imperialism in East Asia. Chapter 1 locates patterns found in later processes of imperial encroachment within the evolution of the Japanese consular police in preannexation Korea and also ties them to developments on the home islands. Chapter 2 then shifts to the establishment of Foreign Ministry police forces in mainland Chinese treaty ports and the Manchurian frontier in China’s northeast, where I explore and assign great significance to the dispute between the governments of China and Japan over the propriety and fundamental legal legitimacy of the consular police.

With that background, the next three chapters then present the most significant interpretive threads of this book. Chapter 3 explores the profound importance of the Korean independence movement in exile and

the emergence of formal communist organizations on the home islands, in response to which political intelligence work began to occupy a greater and greater portion of consular police resources. Chapter 4 continues the analysis of the relationship between consular police forces and elements of Korean resistance in China, but the story also reveals how Gaimushō police in the field came increasingly to favor unilateral solutions to the security crises posed by Korean resistance in China and its connections to domestic Japanese left-wing politics. The fifth and final chapter explores the period from 1932 until the end of the Second World War, an era of both cooperation and conflict between Foreign Ministry police and the Japanese Army. By highlighting efforts of the consular police to continue the execution of security measures born of the 1920s while still protecting their jurisdictional prerogatives against infringement by the military, the commitment of the Foreign Ministry to resisting militaristic expansionism is called into question. Finally, the Conclusion offers several broad themes related to how the history of the Japanese consular police in Northeast Asia makes it possible to begin transcending boundaries of both political geography and historical imagination.

1

Patterns of Police Work in Late Chosŏn Korea

As Japan's first modern colonial acquisition, Taiwan served as a critical testing ground for many early formations of Japanese colonial policy. Undoubtedly, the lessons learned through successes and failures during the first ten years of colonial rule there proved valuable in facilitating Japan's subsequent colonial annexation of Korea between 1905 and 1910. It would be logical to expect, for example, that Japan's colonial police institutions in Korea were closely derived from the experience of colonial police in Taiwan.¹ However, what historians have long neglected to recognize is that there had been quasi-colonial Japanese police in Korea since 1880, fifteen years before the acquisition of Taiwan in 1895. Therefore, when Japan's ruling elite made Korea a protectorate after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, beginning the eventual process of outright annexation, Japanese police had been operating in Korea for a quarter of a century. These were the consular police forces attached to and maintained by Japan's Foreign Ministry offices throughout the Korean peninsula.²

This chapter will first explore both the reasons for the initial establishment of consular police forces in the port cities opened by Japan's unequal treaties with Korea during the early 1880s, and the general characteristics of the police force and the nature of their activities. After describing the rapid increase in consular police personnel after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, I will then focus on the expansion of consular police infrastructure from 1902 to 1905, which greatly facilitated the establishment of an official colonial police organization during the protectorate period. This first stage in the history of the Japanese consular police demonstrates three key points: first, the Japanese Foreign Ministry played an active, if unwitting, role in paving the way for the colonial acquisition of Korea; second, the demands of common Japanese resident communities were instrumental in motivating the Foreign Ministry to expand its police presence in Korea; and, third, the pattern of consular police expansion followed by colonial conquest set a precedent for Japan's imperial project in Manchuria and China proper years later. The overarching aim is to explain why the Foreign Ministry created a consular police corps to play the role of protectors of civil

order, and how in the process those police became handmaidens of colonial conquest. That this semicolonial mission to bring civil stability under a central authority in treaty port Korea took shape just as the nascent Meiji regime in Tokyo was trying to accomplish the same goal in Japan itself is also a matter of critical significance in appreciating the interrelated political and social dynamics at work in this early stage of modern Japanese expansionism.

Treaty Port Origins and Activities

The Kanghwa commercial treaty of 1876 marks the starting point in the history of what one might call “modern” Korean-Japanese relations. The ruling elites of both societies had maintained official diplomatic contacts throughout the Tokugawa period, but circumstances of the mid-nineteenth century dictated a realignment of inter-East Asian relations. Just as the United States, followed by other Western powers, had done to Japan in the early 1850s, the Japanese in turn imposed an unequal treaty relationship upon the Korean court before its own fledgling Meiji state had even reached its tenth birthday. The southern Korean city of Pusan was the first to be “opened” by this treaty system, and the Meiji government soon sent a small staff of official representatives to the city. In addition, Japanese civilian merchants and settlers quickly arrived in modest numbers, and this mix of government bureaucrats and common citizens made up the burgeoning Japanese treaty port community.³

During the late 1870s, the treaty port environment in Pusan was a rough-and-tumble one. Poverty was high, as was the petty crime rate, with burglary, gambling, prostitution, and drug trafficking standing out as the most common urban security problems. Without any initial support from their government, the Japanese resident community attempted to establish a volunteer community security force to deal with these concerns. In response to the demands of his local constituents, Kondō Masaki, the official Japanese representative in Pusan, soon asked for budgetary assistance from his home government to support a group of six patrolmen to walk the beat in the concession neighborhood after hours, recommending that the costs be spilt evenly between Tokyo and the local resident association.⁴ By 1880, an official Japanese consulate office had been opened in Pusan and Kondō became its first appointed consul. While his earlier request had been granted, the resident Japanese population had continued to grow during the first few years after the opening of the concession, leading Kondō to believe that a more permanent police force was necessary. Arguing in March 1880 that not only the Japanese community but also the broader port population had risen greatly since 1876, bringing with it more crime and other urban

social problems, Kondō made a request to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo for a small consulate police force of eleven men; one at the rank of inspector (*keibu*), and the other ten as patrolmen (*junsu*).⁵ Arriving in Pusan a few weeks later, these eleven men were the first Japanese consular police officers in continental East Asia.

Pusan was not the only port opened by the requirements of the unequal treaty system. In the early spring of 1880, the coastal town of Wŏnsan was also being prepared for treaty-port status, and even before the port was officially opened in May the Gaimushō representative there, Inoue Kaoru, took the cue from Kondō in Pusan and made a request of his own for a small police contingent to be attached to the Wŏnsan consulate upon its establishment.⁶ For reasons that are not entirely clear, Inoue asked for a much larger force than what had been sent to Pusan: two inspectors and twenty-nine patrolmen. Nonetheless, his request was granted, and those thirty-two consular police arrived in Wŏnsan by late April. The port at Inch'ŏn, where a consulate was set up in 1882, had a police staff similar to the one in Pusan by July of that year, but the capital at Seoul was a somewhat different case. In November 1880 a Japanese embassy was established in the city complete with a police contingent of eleven officers, but that force was then bolstered with an additional seventeen patrolmen during and after 1882.⁷

This was in response to two serious episodes of urban violence in Seoul that took place during the first few years of consular police deployment on the peninsula, which undoubtedly served to further Japanese claims that their security forces in Korean cities were needed to maintain public order. The first was the so-called Imo Mutiny of 1882 during which Korean soldiers in Seoul attacked officials of the Min court and local Japanese diplomatic authorities. The Min court had recently succeeded in forcing the ultraconservative regent known as the Taewŏn'gun into the sidelines of Korean foreign-policy making and adopted a more conciliatory approach to the Japanese. Korean soldiers embittered by the presence of Japanese military officers in the capital forced Ambassador Hanabusa Yoshimoto to flee the city under the protection of military and police personnel.⁸ Only two years later a second outbreak of chaos in the capital erupted during an attempted coup d'état by the Japan-friendly reformer Kim Ok-kyun and his supporters in 1884. When Queen Min's security forces crushed the movement, sending many of its leaders to exile in Japan or a death sentence at home, the Japanese consulate in Seoul was attacked by riotous mobs, resulting in the death of several police officers. Much of this violence reflected, of course, the larger factional struggles both within the ruling Korean elite and between the governments of China and Japan. The Sino-Japanese treaty at Tientsin in 1885, however, temporarily cooled the rivalry be-

tween the two empires over influence in Korea, and the Japanese consular system on the peninsula stabilized for the next decade or so.⁹

By 1885, then, the overall strength of the Japanese consular police in Korea was roughly fifty men in the three treaty ports of Pusan, Wŏn-san, and Inch'ŏn, as well as the capital city of Seoul, and this total number did not change dramatically until a steep and rapid increase during and after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–1895. Fifty men may seem like a force too small to be of any real significance, but it is in the nature of their activities, as well as the police infrastructure they began to create, that one can begin to see their true importance.

When the first Japanese consular police took up their duties in Pusan and elsewhere during the 1880s, the modern police apparatus of the Meiji state throughout the home islands was itself still quite young. Japan's new leadership after the Restoration created a civilian police force that would work to maintain public security, health, and social order, as well as help enforce the political will of the new regime.¹⁰ The consular police in Korea were simultaneously charged with similar responsibilities. One of their earliest and perhaps most mundane duties was simple administrative record keeping. The consular office and its police staff kept track of local births and deaths among the resident Japanese community, and also the registration of newcomers from the metropole.¹¹ As many scholars have noted, the first wave of Japanese settlers in Korea often included variously disreputable social deviants and petty criminals as well as honest merchants and shopkeepers.¹² So the consular police, just like their domestic counterparts back home, made a serious effort to maintain a clear picture of exactly who was living in the concession community at any given time. To that end, travel within Korea, especially when it involved moving deeper into the interior of the country, was also closely monitored by the consular police, as those wishing to make such a journey had first to obtain official permission from the consulate.¹³

Responsibility for the management of public health and sanitation in the concession also fell upon the resident consul and his police staff. For example, the police often organized and supervised vaccination programs that were implemented to prevent outbreaks of cholera and similar conditions related to poor sanitation infrastructure.¹⁴ As preventative measures against such diseases, the consular police also maintained street cleaning and sewage disposal facilities, and to protect the general health of residents they routinely conducted health inspections of local bars and restaurants, as well as issuing regulations for the drinking-water supply, public bathing facilities, and milk and meat processing.¹⁵ Public health also often embraced matters of public security, and in this respect the consular police devoted considerable attention to controlling the number of privately owned weapons in the concession. In most cases, the consular

police completely banned firearms within the concession area, and there were also numerous issuances prohibiting the brandishing of swords and knives. It was possible, however, for those residents who wanted to hunt for small game beyond concession borders to register their weapons with the consular police and obtain a special permit.¹⁶

One issue that often combined problems of health, social order, and crime was prostitution. In Korea, as was the case in most early Japanese settler communities along the northeast Asian coast during the late nineteenth century, young Japanese prostitutes comprised a considerably large percentage of the local Japanese civilian population. In fact, consular police regulations concerning prostitution are the most common items to be found in the source materials. Many regulations were drafted to establish basic standards for the living and working conditions of the women involved in the business; however, the potential for outbreaks of sexually transmitted diseases such as syphilis was perhaps the major concern of the police. Initially, local Japanese consular authorities sought to control the public health impact of the sex trade by managing a system of licensed prostitution in treaty ports. After 1881, for example, brothels could obtain legal permission to operate in the Japanese concessions of Pusan and Wŏnsan, and consequently the prostitute population in those cities grew dramatically during the next few years. However, Japanese authorities reversed their policy on this matter when they began to examine how other foreign powers in Korea ran their concession properties, in most cases making prostitution officially illegal. Japanese consulates soon thereafter abandoned the former practices, therein creating, of course, the new problem of how to best “manage” the unlicensed sex trade.¹⁷

In time an elaborate system of punishments—fines, expulsion, and imprisonment—took shape to discourage both practitioners and patrons of the brothel network. But there was more to this policy shift than simple matters of local public health. In 1883, Consul Kobayashi at Inch’ŏn explained that nations engaged in the business of bringing “civilization” to as yet “uncivilized” societies, such as what he viewed Japan bringing to Korea, should not be involved in the official supervision of the flesh trade. Ten years later Foreign Minister Enomoto Takeaki directed all consuls in Korea on a similar theme. In explaining new measures to be taken to stem the tide of unrestricted emigration of Japanese women to Korea, Enomoto argued that the population explosion of Japanese prostitutes in the treaty ports was damaging the reputation of the entire Japanese overseas resident community, as well as sully the honor of the Japanese empire as a whole. Some women made the trip in order to work hard and earn an honest living, according to Enomoto, but those involved in the sex trade gave them all a bad name. Significantly, Enomoto also argued that the empire’s grand scheme of extending its influence across Asia was being compro-

mised by the public relations mess created by Japanese women entering the sex industry wherever they went.¹⁸

In the four cities where Japanese consulates maintained police forces, they also helped establish public hospitals open to all port residents, and these facilities were usually joint ventures, funded in roughly equal parts by the local Japanese Residents' Association and the local consular office.¹⁹ Jurisdiction and managerial authority over the hospitals, however, rested entirely with the local consul and his police staff, while day-to-day operation of these clinics was left to the local Japanese resident community. In fact, consular authorities attempted to place the burden of maintaining such facilities on the shoulders of the resident community to the greatest degree possible, since fiscal restraints made it difficult for the Foreign Ministry to completely fund public health institutions in the concession neighborhoods.²⁰ Even so, the fact that the editors of the *Gaimushō keisatsushi* chose to assemble a section of documents specifically related to hospitals clearly indicates a belief on the Japanese side that the maintenance of public health was an integral part of the consulate's duties within the treaty port community. Motivations behind the establishment of medical clinics, however, also reflected more self-serving aims. Commenting on Japanese hospitals in Pusan during the summer of 1885, for example, Foreign Minister Inoue explained that an important benefit of setting up clinics was, of course, the greater ease with which the physical health of Japanese residents could be maintained. Beyond that, however, Inoue went on to argue that by exposing the local population to Japanese medical practices, even those "stubborn Koreans" could be made to see the great efficacy of modern Japanese medicine. As such, public health clinics in Korean treaty ports could provide Japanese authorities with a "shortcut" to opening up the country even more.²¹

To facilitate the execution of their duties in all these areas, local consuls made various efforts to imbue their police officers with local language skills.²² During the first decade of consular police operations in the treaty ports, patrolmen were strongly encouraged, if not required, to acquire at least a functional ability in conversational Korean. Officers in Seoul, for example, pursued a one-year language course complete with textbooks, from which they had to "graduate" in a timely manner, while those who were studying other languages such as English could temporarily postpone their Korean lessons.²³ By the mid-1890s, language acquisition had been upgraded to an even higher priority. With greater numbers of Japanese civilians arriving in Seoul in 1894–1895, for example, Consul Uchida explained that the frequency of confrontations between Japanese, Korean, and Chinese residents was on the rise. While consular police could quickly respond to the scene when situations arose, not enough of them had adequate language skills to act as effective mediators. This had to be

remedied, in Uchida's view, so that the Japanese consular police could effectively keep the peace among the city's complex and multicultural community.²⁴ In other cities, Masan in particular, Russian-language ability was also a valuable skill for more practical and political reasons. One report from Masan in 1901 suggests, for example, that because of the numerous Russian ships docking in that port, consular police there needed Russian-language skills in order to foil the efforts of Russian "spies" carrying out surveillance in the concession.²⁵

Finally, it is worth noting that these numerous programs of consular police development were not always instigated solely through official government directives. As noted earlier, the Japanese resident community of Pusan played a key role in initiating the creation of a Japanese police force there during the late 1870s, and throughout the 1880s and early 1890s, Japanese civilian groups continued to pressure their consular representatives to improve security in their communities. In November 1892, for example, several leading members of a Japanese business organization in Seoul submitted petitions requesting an increase in Japanese police personnel, even offering to contribute financially to an expanded consular police budget if it would mean more officers on the streets of their neighborhoods.²⁶ Both settler community activism and state-centered geopolitical ambition, then, provided an initial impulse for the expansion of these early Japanese security networks throughout the Korean treaty port system.

Why Consular Police?

Before we examine the dramatic expansion of consular police facilities in Korea that followed the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, several questions concerning the reasoning that supported the establishment of Foreign Ministry security forces in Korea deserve consideration.

In a study of Japanese police forces in formal colonial territories, one historian argues that, because "in the Japanese view, management of colonial peoples resembled management of society in early Meiji . . . the colonial police came to play a role in the colonies very similar to that played by the Japanese police at home."²⁷ As this chapter has already begun to reveal, almost every facet of more well-known colonial and metropolitan police activity can be just as easily discerned in a survey of the Foreign Ministry's police forces and their operations. Consular police history, however, poses a particular problem in that the consular police performed these duties in legally noncolonial but unquestionably extranational space. In other words, the consular police were colonial police in just about everything but name. It is with this paradox in mind then that the function of the consular police in Korea must be considered.

The duties of the Japanese consular police in Korea during the 1880s and early 1890s incorporated a vast set of responsibilities, and these duties were not necessarily intended for the sole protection of resident Japanese civilians. In fact, the consular police defined their obligations in much broader terms characterized by an inclusive rhetorical commitment to “protect anyone in trouble, while making no distinction between Japanese and Koreans.”²⁸ Despite this expression of high-minded nobility of purpose, average Korean residents likely viewed the activities of Japanese police in their communities with more than a little suspicion.

Indeed, the problem of how to correctly define the identity of the Japanese consular police in the eyes of local Koreans and other foreign treaty port residents emerged as a matter of debate among Japanese officials early on. In particular, patrolman uniforms became a focus of concern. In an 1884 report, for example, Inch’ŏn Consul Kobayashi suggested that consular police in Korean treaty ports should have similar if not identical uniforms to those of police on the home islands. He reasoned that unique uniforms for consular police would distinguish them as some sort of extraordinary quasi-colonial security force, likely thus provoking criticism from other foreign residents in the concession.²⁹ His Foreign Ministry superiors agreed, and early renderings of consular police attire thus look strikingly similar to that of Home Ministry police officers in 1880s Tokyo. The significant point here is that Kobayashi made a deliberate effort to deemphasize the distinction between foreign and domestic spheres, or *gaichi* and *naichi* in later colonial parlance. Ironically, they did this in an effort to deflect potential criticism of the Foreign Ministry police institution as a tool of Japanese imperial encroachment. In later years, the fact that Japanese consular police in Manchuria were largely indistinguishable from the police forces of the army and the Kwantung colonial government was a target of heated protest by local Chinese authorities. It is evident from even these earliest of years, however, that the consular police by their very nature blurred the borders of colonial authority even in the minds of their Japanese inventors.

Furthermore, some Japanese even had their doubts about the propriety of the new consular police institution itself. Despite the fact that the consular police in Korea during the 1880s were still quite small in total manpower, one official Japanese observer made an especially prescient comment in 1886 about the potentially problematic issue of legitimacy in terms of international law. Questioning the jurisdictional propriety of one person—namely a Japanese consul—possessing both judicial and investigative powers, Akabane Tomoharu argued that judges and police officers should not be the same people.³⁰ The foundations of consular police legitimacy, then, seemed already to rest on rather shaky ground. Akabane’s point, however, was merely to draw attention to such possibly problematic

conflicts of interest, not to undermine the consular system itself. Still, that he would even raise the question reveals the existence of uncertainty, if not outright doubt, concerning consular police legality, opening the door for more forceful criticism to come when Gaimushō police would make their appearance in treaty-port China a decade later.

It is in the shadow of such doubts concerning legitimacy that one must begin to explore the logic behind the creation of the consular police system, and turning to the emergence of domestic security networks is the first step. The creation of a nationalized police system in Japan proper did not itself begin until after the establishment of the Home Ministry in 1874, and consequently the first officers to take up positions as consular policemen in treaty port Korea from 1880–1884 were drawn from a metropolitan police force still very much in its infancy. To transfer metropolitan police officers to serve in consular outposts would not have been unusual during the 1880s, because at that time the “diplomatic and consular officers were in no way different from the ordinary administrative officers in other departments” of the civilian bureaucracy. Not until 1893, in fact, were reforms put into place “whereby diplomatic and consular officers were confined to those who successfully passed examinations and the system of free transfers from the ordinary civil service to the diplomatic and consular service and vice versa was abolished.”³¹ Furthermore, the cost of maintaining domestic police posts during the first decade of Meiji was split evenly between the community and central government resources.³² Likewise, in the Japanese communities of Pusan, Inch’ŏn, and Seoul, fiscal burdens fell to a large extent on the residents themselves, and the same would be true in Chinese cities such as Tianjin and Nanjing after 1896. What all of this suggests is that a similar process of creating the institutional apparatus for the efficient and “modern” administration of localities unfolded along similar lines, and almost simultaneously, in both provincial Japan and throughout the nascent informal empire. In some sense, then, this process is one that transcends sharp distinctions between techniques of establishing and enforcing metropolitan and semicolonial sovereignty.

It is also possible, and perhaps critically important, then, to see that, while the Japanese state was laying the groundwork for not just social control but also political authority on the Korean peninsula, the same task was under way on the home islands. Indeed, as one scholar has noted, “Japan colonized Korea, but the Meiji government also colonized Japan from within.”³³ On this point, recent scholarship has revealed that the Meiji government modeled its 1874 police force on British colonial models as much as, if not more than, the 1870s French model in Paris.³⁴ Why was the colonial police model more appropriate than that of metropolitan France? The answer lies in the fact that the Meiji Restoration

was quite literally a conflict as a result of which the samurai elite of the southwestern Satsuma-Chōshū domain clique conquered and “colonized” their enemies and their territory.³⁵ This fact is reflected dramatically in the makeup of the early Meiji police force, which consisted substantially of former samurai from Satsuma. Of course, army and navy officer ranks were also dominated by former samurai from the southwest, but the lower ranks in those groups were largely commoners conscripted from around the country. In the metropolitan police ranks, on the other hand, Satsuma samurai dominated all levels of personnel, giving the metropolitan police an insular and more militant character. They were, in a sense, colonial security forces watching over Tokyo.³⁶ The logic behind the expansion and escalation of Japanese consular police in Korea, then, can be understood as a correlative process, not an end result, of the simultaneous construction of powerful security networks on the home islands.³⁷

Some characteristics of the early metropolitan and consular police systems were nonetheless indicative of the influence that continental European models of police systems (largely French and German), rather than those of Great Britain or the United States, had on the formation of Meiji police institutions. As Elise Tipton has argued, “Meiji founders employed the term ‘police’ in the broad seventeenth and eighteenth century sense of all internal administration rather than the narrow sense of crime prevention and detection.”³⁸ In the language of the Foreign Ministry, the duties of consular police in Korea were often summarized with the phrase *hogo torishimari*, translatable as “to protect and control,” and the term captures well the nature of Japanese police business both at home and overseas. In both locales, police served as a tool for facilitating social management and maintaining public security. This comprehensive social approach to police work was certainly evident in the evolution of consular police networks in treaty port Korea, and it would also be true in China and especially Manchuria during the early decades of the twentieth century.

If an appreciation of the domestic context of early Meiji-era police work can shed explanatory light on the perceived necessity for consular police in Korea, why was it that the ruling elite of Japan also believed that the creation of consular police was perfectly legitimate within the context of international law? Here the key can be found in considering Japan's relationship with the Western powers at the same historical moment of the 1870s. Most of the major states of Europe and North America possessed small settlements in Japanese ports where they enjoyed extraterritorial rights and maintained their own modest police forces. After obtaining similar extraterritorial privileges in 1876, Japan began to do the same in Korea. For just over twenty years (1876–1899), then, the Japanese state was

both subjected to and exercised the prerogatives of unequal treaty relationships, and this duality poses a number of vexing problems.³⁹

Looking at the foundation of the Tokyo metropolitan police, for example, the young Meiji government's introduction of a new police force was driven in part by its recognition of Japan's own semicolonial status, in that the inability of that Japanese state to prevent violence against foreigners and maintain civil order within their own cities undermined the desire of the Meiji regime to attain treaty revision with the Western powers.⁴⁰ A modern nation was defined by its ability to maintain control over its citizenry, and thus Japanese demands for equality with the West would carry more persuasive power once Meiji government's own domestic authority had been unquestionably secured. The irony, of course, is that while Japanese political elites were striving to attain treaty revision with the West in order to regain their own national sovereignty on the home islands, they simultaneously took successive steps to encroach upon the national sovereignty of Korea. This does shed important light, however, on the matter of why Japanese authorities insisted upon their right to maintain consular police forces. In their view, it was the inadequacy of "native" Korean police institutions that made Japanese consular police necessary. The Koreans would thus first be required to prove themselves capable of protecting the lives and property of foreign residents in the treaty ports before extraterritorial police power would be relinquished—an obviously self-serving logic that Japanese consular authorities would again employ in China after 1896. In short, just as recent scholarship has emphasized how Japan's ruling elite carefully and deliberately constructed the rhetoric of Korean annexation in 1910 to give it an internationally recognized veneer of legal legitimacy, so as early as the 1880s Japanese consular authorities followed a similar strategy in order to justify the maintenance of its consular police force.⁴¹

Expansion during the Sino-Japanese War Era

During the 1880s, the Foreign Ministry viewed the operation of consular police forces as essential until the Korean government could organize effective security forces of its own. The notion that consular police were a temporary necessity but not a permanent institution remained the dominant view from Kasumigaseki until the mid-1890s. At that point, however, the meaning of "protect and control" changed, and with that the consular police came to be understood as highly useful, if not quite indispensable, in facilitating larger geopolitical goals. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 was the turning point that solidified that transformation.⁴²

The consular police institutions that had taken shape during the early 1880s remained largely unchanged in terms of manpower until the mid-1890s. At that time, domestic unrest in Korea as well as rising tensions be-

tween Japan and China over their respective influences on the peninsula contributed to a growing sense of crisis facing the Japanese treaty port community, and the end of the war also saw a dramatic influx of new Japanese residents to Korean treaty ports.⁴³ Consular leadership and their police forces responded to all of these challenges by expanding the numerical and geographical scope of their presence. As early as June 1894, fifteen police officers from the police bureau of the Home Ministry were transferred to the Foreign Ministry in order to bolster its forces in Korea, and of those fifteen men ten were sent to Inch'ŏn and five to Pusan. By February 1896, the consul at Inch'ŏn sought an even greater increase when he asked for a staff of thirty patrolmen in his station, a staffing level it nearly reached by the spring of 1897. Wŏnsan and Pusan also grew considerably during the immediate postwar years, but Seoul was a somewhat unique case. Both the embassy and the consulate had maintained a small police force in the capital since the early 1880s, but budgetary restrictions put in place in 1889 had forced the embassy to transfer its officers to the consulate office in early 1892.⁴⁴ That force then continued to grow until it became the largest consular police contingent in Korea by the late 1890s, with three detectives and fifty patrolmen.⁴⁵

The exigencies of the Sino-Japanese War not only brought increases in already established consular police facilities; the postwar period saw several new consulates and subconsulates emerge on the scene. The expansion of consular facilities was seen as a necessary step in response to the rapid increase in Japanese resident populations after the war, as subconsulates at Mokp'ŏ (1897), Chinnamp'ŏ (1897), and Masan (1899) were all elevated to full consulate status by 1900. Additional subconsulates at Kunsan, Songjin, and P'yŏngyang opened in 1899, bringing the total number of Japanese consular offices in Korea to ten. When the police personnel increases at the four original offices are combined with the police stationed in the six new offices, the increase in Japan's consular police in Korea between 1894 and 1899 amounts to a rise from 52 to 134, or roughly 250 percent.⁴⁶

During this period of expansion the Japanese consular police also initiated a practice that would prove to be one of the most controversial in its future activities in China. As Japanese civilians began to move beyond the confines of the treaty port concession regions and into the Korean interior, the consular police felt bound to follow. Since they could not set up a consulate or subconsulate in every town where Japanese residents settled, they instead began establishing *hashutsujo* (police boxes) and *chūzaijo* (police substations) in more remote interior locations, a process not unlike what metropolitan police throughout the home islands had begun to do roughly a decade prior.⁴⁷ Usually staffed by a single officer, these outposts of consular police surveillance sprang up wherever Japanese civil-

ians staked a claim to residence. In this sense, Japanese merchants, business owners, and farmers and the consular police worked hand in hand to expand Japanese influence in and control over local Korean commerce and trade.⁴⁸

During the Sino-Japanese War, the consular police were also involved in a Japanese attempt to place advisers in the Korean government as a means of directing policy and reforming Korean administrative institutions.⁴⁹ These efforts were led by a highly placed police official in the Home Ministry police bureau named Takehisa Katsuzō. Takehisa and the men under his command spent two years training and advising Korean police in Seoul, and while their attempt ultimately came to naught, they set a precedent for a more aggressive policy of institutional advisers that would follow the Russo-Japanese War ten years later.

The Korean capital in the late summer of 1894 was an environment brimming with tensions of all sorts. The Korean government was under siege from Tonghak rebels across the country, and China and Japan were busy jockeying for position for influence over rulership in the Korean court. The Japanese resident population in Seoul was one of the largest in Korea at the time, and as a preparatory measure the Japanese Home Ministry decided to dispatch an emergency police force of roughly a hundred men to Korea in August 1894.⁵⁰ Takehisa held command over this force, and they were charged with the duty of protecting Japanese civilian life and property, most of them being sent to Seoul while some went to Wŏnsan. It was not long before the duties of this emergency police force expanded beyond the simple protection of Japanese civilians. By October 1894, Takehisa's term of service had been extended indefinitely, and the mission's purpose came to include training and advising Korean police in the capital. In November, there was even talk of sending more police into those areas of nearby Chinese territory that had been occupied by the Japanese army.⁵¹

While the initial expeditionary police force was comprised entirely of officers from the police bureau of the Home Ministry, there were of course already Japanese consular police in Seoul when the metropolitan police arrived. This gave rise to a sensitive and complicated administrative problem.⁵² The consular police in Seoul had had years of local experience, so they were naturally called upon by Takehisa and the Home Ministry police for assistance in the training of Korean officers. However, consular police were paid out of the consular budget, and Home Ministry police salaries were the responsibility of the Police Bureau back in Tokyo. It soon came to light that Home Ministry police were being paid roughly twice as much as consular police for the same work.⁵³ The controversy soon died down, however, because by December 1894 a large percentage of those officers dispatched to Korea as part of the emergency force in August had

been transferred to the Seoul consular police, while others were sent back to Tokyo in January and February 1895. Takehisa himself remained in Seoul throughout 1895 and worked with the consular police there as advisers to the Korean government. By July, almost all the original emergency police had returned to Japan, except for those who had been transferred to the consulate or who had volunteered to stay on as advisers under Takehisa's charge. Because the Korean court came to feel a closer affinity to the Russian consular authorities in Seoul during 1896, Takehisa was dismissed from his advisory position in the Korean government.⁵⁴

This era of police reform under the Takehisa and the Seoul consular police can be viewed in a number of ways. It is quite easy, for example, to condemn it as a *fait accompli* imposed upon the Korean court in the midst of Japan's emergency dispatch of police to Seoul in 1894, in that the Korean leadership was forced by Japan to accept as police advisers a group of police officers who had already been placed in their capital.⁵⁵ Alternatively, one cannot completely discount the fact that the Japanese community in Seoul did indeed face a significant amount of danger in the second half of 1894. That being the case, one might argue that the Foreign Ministry had both a right and an obligation to take steps necessary to ensure the security of its resident nationals. However, the work of Takehisa and his group of police advisers including those from the Seoul consulate, can also be viewed as a part of the *Kabo* domestic reforms that came in the wake of the social and political disturbances caused by the *Tonghak* Rebellion.⁵⁶ Many of the pro-Japanese Korean progressives of the 1880s were placed back into power when Japan seized control of the Korean government during the spring of 1894, and while the Japanese certainly kept a close watch over the Korean cabinet, the reforms "were by no means merely a narrow imperialistic device."⁵⁷ With the pro-Chinese *Min* oligarchs and the conservative *Taewŏn'gun* temporarily removed from positions of influence, the new reform-minded Korean leadership unleashed a series of wide-sweeping reform programs in the fields of commerce, industry, judiciary, and police work. It was as a part of this program that Takehisa was involved in assisting the establishment of a centralized police department in Seoul in 1894, and the consular police in Seoul were no doubt indispensable to Takehisa's mission. They had had almost fifteen years of local experience when Takehisa and his men arrived in the summer of 1894. It was their knowledge of local conditions as well as their ability to effectively communicate with Korean police, that made the advisory program possible.⁵⁸

Interwar Growth and Conflict

Japan's victory over China in 1895 and the peace settlement that followed in 1896 put an official end to Sino-Japanese rivalry over influence

on the Korean peninsula, but this did not mean that Japanese suzerainty would go unchallenged. The next and much more powerful rival was imperial Russia, and the contest with Russia, among several other factors, brought another wave of growth and change for the Japanese consular police in Korea during the first few years of the new century.

As noted earlier, the population of civilian Japanese residents in Korean port cities grew rapidly after the Sino-Japanese War, and by 1900 the Pusan consulate was expressing its need for more and better trained officers in the city. Citing remarkable growth in the local Japanese community, especially in residents engaged in the fishing industry, as well as the need for staff equipped to manage relations with Korean residents, one report complained that the current staff level was both too small and underqualified to deal with increasingly complex problems.⁵⁹ Local Japanese resident associations in other areas took it upon themselves to demand more and better police protection in their neighborhoods too. In October 1903, for example, representatives of the newer Japanese community in P'yŏngyang, a community much smaller by comparison than well-established ones in cities such as Pusan, petitioned for an increase of ten consular police patrolmen in their concession, arguing that it was because they constituted a mere three hundred or so Japanese in the midst of thousands of Koreans that more needed to be done to provide for the protection of their lives and property in the event of an emergency.⁶⁰ Judging from the impatient pleas of these Japanese residents, the expansion of civilian Japanese settlements throughout postwar Korea was far outpacing both the financial and manpower resources of the consular system.⁶¹

Korean treaty port settlements in general also grew after the war as more foreign nationals of several different countries took up residence in concession areas, and as these urban centers expanded in size, a need for a general concession police system arose.⁶² The administration of civil service institutions in Korean as well as Chinese treaty port concessions was a complicated matter, because decisions were made and a budget produced by a local administrative body comprised of representatives from all the countries involved. On the issues of concession police, most treaty port communities maintained a rudimentary police force staffed and paid by the local international board. As the foreign treaty port community grew, however, many local European diplomatic representatives quickly recognized that the Japanese consular police were a highly organized, well-trained, efficient, and effective local police organization. Since negotiating a budget for international concession police could be such a complicated chore, in many instances local foreign consulates simply opted to recognize the Japanese consular police as the *de facto* concession police. The case of Inch'ŏn is indicative of the general pattern evident elsewhere, as the local international resident council determined that to establish an

independent security force would simply create too heavy a financial burden. Therefore, they acceded to the notion of the Japanese consular police serving as the general concession security force, to the extent that it did not become troublesome for Japanese authorities.⁶³

The apparent enthusiasm with which other foreign governments welcomed the activities of the Japanese consular police was, however, rather short-lived. In particular, the attitude of fellow imperial powers in treaty port Korea began to change after Japan's victory over China in 1895, with many Western representatives growing more suspicious of Japanese intentions in Korea. For example, at Inch'ŏn in 1897 there were several episodes of protests by American and German diplomatic representatives that seemed to reveal a growing resentment toward Japan's control over local security operations.⁶⁴ Similar disputes erupted in Chinnamp'o in 1899, where the other foreign authorities were growing increasingly uncomfortable with having uniformed Japanese police roaming the concession neighborhoods.⁶⁵ No foreign power was more opposed to the idea of Japanese consular police as general concession security forces than imperial Russia, as the case of the Russian consulate in Masan illustrates vividly. In 1902 a dispute erupted between the Russian consul there and the Japanese consular representatives over the propriety of the Japanese consular police, with the Russians arguing that internationally recognized concession laws forbade the community from relying on the police forces of any one country for protection of the whole; police apparatus was, rather, the responsibility of the concession's local international administrative board. In fact, what the Russians really objected to was the idea that Japanese consular police would be the sole law enforcement body in a port that the Russians were eager to build up as a naval stronghold in the Pacific.⁶⁶

The interwar period also saw another burst of consular police expansion in geographical terms, and this growth was linked with the construction of a railway line between Seoul and Pusan.⁶⁷ Construction began on this new line in 1901, but as Japanese concerns over Russian designs in the region intensified, the pace was accelerated in 1902–1903. The construction project brought about significant population changes as the result, both of the recruitment and transportation of thousands of railway workers to the Korean interior where the construction would take place, and of the arrival of common merchants, shopkeepers, and other business adventurers, who soon began to set up shop in the small towns along the planned rail line, towns that were sure to grow once the project was completed.⁶⁸

On the issue of railroad-related police expansion, Seoul Ambassador Hayashi Gonsuke explained in a report to Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō in May 1903 that the private railroad companies involved in the construction projects were hardly capable of providing adequate secu-

urity on their own. Should disturbances break out, Hayashi reasoned, the local Japanese community might be in danger, Japanese companies would lose money, and a more widespread general disorder would be the result. All of these potential consequences, according to Hayashi, would reflect poorly on the dignity of the Japanese empire. Therefore, the best course of action would be to station consular police along the rail lines, with financial support from the railroad corporations, and to supervise security operations as a whole.⁶⁹ Hayashi, however, was a man of foresight, and he clearly recognized the opportunity at hand. To be sure, the presence of Japanese police along the rail lines would likely help prevent disputes between local Japanese and Korean residents, and it was indeed in the best interests of the empire to do whatever possible to avoid potential public relations problems caused by poor security in the construction zones. Nonetheless, Hayashi also clearly viewed the railroad expansion as a convenient and effective excuse for intensifying Japan's police presence throughout the Korean interior.⁷⁰

This railway-related growth accounted for the last substantial increase in consular police personnel in Korea before the outbreak of war with Russia. More important, it facilitated the expansion of a Japanese security infrastructure that would come to serve quite effectively the creation of a protectorate state on the peninsula under Japanese overlordship after 1905. While the construction of the Seoul–Pusan railroad had justified some of that growth, by July 1904 local consular leadership was pushing for even more. Consul Ariyoshi in Pusan argued that the population of Japanese civilians in the Korean interior had grown dramatically because of the railroad and its associated opportunities for profitable commerce, and as subjects of the empire police protection of these settlers had to be a high priority. To wait for a troublesome incident to erupt and then send in military police to quell the situation was not enough, in Ariyoshi's view. He argued instead that Japan needed to have officers—consular police officers that is—on the scene in the localities in order to best deal with situations as they arose.⁷¹ A preemptive escalation of sorts, Ariyoshi clearly advocated the need to expand the physical presence of Japan's consular police before military exigencies made it inevitable by 1905.

To facilitate the kind of expansionism Ariyoshi advised, during the years leading up to the war with Russia the consular police also conducted extraordinary amounts of research on local social and economic conditions throughout the Korean peninsula. Dozens, if not hundreds, of the reports produced during these investigative expeditions survive, and a careful examination of them reveals the tremendous extent to which the Japanese government sought detailed knowledge of the natural and human resources available in Korea.⁷² The most common type of research trip was carried out by two or three consular police officers,

who would make a journey of two to three weeks around a small region, and their reports typically included a narrative of their activities, statistics on local demographics, and carefully hand-drawn maps of the areas they visited. In many ways, the reports foreshadow the kind of research work carried out in China and Manchuria during subsequent decades by students of the East Asian Common Culture Academy (Tōa Dōbun Shoin) in Shanghai or the Research Section of the South Manchuria Railway Company. While the ostensible purpose of these research expeditions was most likely related to immediate strategic concerns about a future conflict with Russia, they also certainly reflect a desire for knowledge of regional conditions in order to better plan for Japan's long-term goals on the peninsula.⁷³

Integration during the Russo-Japanese War Era

The Russo-Japanese War, a watershed for so many things in modern Japanese history, also marks the initiation of the final phase in the development of the Japanese consular police in Korea. Just as the Sino-Japanese War had done ten years earlier, this period of conflict created a justification for the expansion of the size and scope of consular police activity. Furthermore, it created the environment in which the very nature of the institution would be transformed into a pillar of Japanese colonial control over the entire Korean peninsula.⁷⁴

Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities with Russia, the unique qualities of consular police field experience became clear to Japan's military planners as dozens of local Gaimushō police officers were enlisted by the army to serve as interpreters on the battle front and in occupied territories.⁷⁵ The language skills of consular police officers in Korea were apparently unrivaled by anyone in military intelligence. It seems clear, then, that the police officer language-training programs cultivated in the Korean consulates since the 1880s had produced a crop of patrolmen with considerable proficiency in spoken Korean.

The outbreak of war, however, meant much more than just new opportunities for consular police officers to tag along on army reconnaissance expeditions. In late 1904, the Japanese ambassador at Seoul, Hayashi Gonsuke, argued that current conditions in Korea demanded a drastic change in Japan's police presence there. Citing the dramatic increase in the resident Japanese population since the completion of the Seoul-Pusan railway, Hayashi sketched out an ambitious three-part plan for expansion of the consular police network. First, he recommended that the number of police stations, substations, and police boxes throughout the country be increased by a total of forty-one new facilities, secondly bolstering that infrastructure with an additional seven inspectors and one hundred and

seven patrolmen to be stationed in extant and newly constructed consular police facilities. Finally, he argued that a high-ranking police superintendent (*keishi*) be assigned to both the Seoul and Pusan consulates.⁷⁶

Foreign Ministry leadership back in Tokyo did not accept all of Hayashi's suggestions, largely because of budgetary restraints, but they did agree with the basic assumption that Japan's police forces in Korea needed to be reinforced and the first step in that direction was the creation of a new position in the consular police hierarchy. Up until that point, there had only been inspectors and patrolmen, with the consul being the immediate superior in charge of both. A new position of "station chief" (*shochō*), was instituted at those consulates with more than one inspector, and the offices that fulfilled that requirement were in Seoul, Pusan, Inch'ŏn, and Wŏnsan. Tokyo also acquiesced to Hayashi's request for a resident police superintendent, assigning a former metropolitan police inspector from Nagasaki, Kameyama Riheita, to the Seoul embassy as a superintendent in early January 1905.⁷⁷

Although the Foreign Ministry had rejected the idea of an outright escalation of consular police personnel in Korea, Hayashi and Foreign Minister Komura had been in discussions since December 1904 about an alternative method for strengthening the position of Japanese police on the peninsula. A Korean-Japanese agreement in September 1904 had provided for Japanese advisers to "serve" the Korean government on matters of finance and foreign affairs, and Hayashi and Komura planned to create a new position of police adviser along these same lines. This strategy would bring about a greater Japanese influence over police matters without a direct increase in consular police personnel. The man selected for the job was a veteran police inspector from the Home Ministry named Maruyama Shigetoshi, and his contract with the Korean government, orchestrated to appear as though he was coming at the behest of the Koreans, was put into action in late January 1905.

Before describing the activities of Maruyama and his cadre of police advisers, it is illustrative to note an exchange between Hayashi and Komura about the nomenclature of their police adviser program. Hayashi made the case that instead of the term adviser, or *komon*, the Japanese should insist that Maruyama be referred to as a councilor (*sanyō*) or even manager (*kantoku*). He argued that "adviser" was too benign a term, and that it would not sufficiently encompass the full scope of direct involvement he expected Maruyama to have. Komura, however, responded that *komon* was indeed the proper term, because the financial and foreign-affairs advisers were also known as *komon*. Komura reasoned that keeping Maruyama's position on an equal footing with the other advisers would grant him legitimacy. Furthermore, the term "adviser" was broad enough to include a vast range of possible areas in which Maruyama

could involve himself and his staff. Komura's judgment ultimately won out, and Maruyama was from then on referred to as *Kankoku keimu komon* (adviser on police affairs in Korea).⁷⁸ It is important to note, however, that even though Hayashi and Komura disagreed on what would be the best term for his position, they both agreed that Maruyama needed to have the greatest latitude possible in his job description so that the Japanese government could have as much hands-on influence over police policy as possible.

Maruyama took up his new position in late January 1905.⁷⁹ One of his major overall goals was to create a nationwide network of police advisers, all responsible to his headquarters in Seoul. That network eventually came to consist of five police stations in the city of Seoul itself, while a system of thirteen field offices, one in each of the thirteen major provinces, was also put in place. Each of these regional branches was staffed by one superintendent, one inspector, three patrolmen, and one interpreter; these six officers in each of thirteen provinces amounted to seventy-eight men.⁸⁰ In the capital itself, Maruyama also devoted a considerable amount of resources to police training schools. In these small academies, Japanese police officers in the role of instructors conducted classes for Korean police from the Korean central police department. One source describes a Monday–Saturday curriculum with four hours of instruction each morning including physical conditioning, instruction in investigative techniques and criminal law, basic police duties and regulations, and Japanese-language practice.⁸¹

Where did the Japanese police who staffed all of these new positions come from? Many were transferred from positions in the Home Ministry police bureau or from various metropolitan police departments all over Japan. In fact, concerning the police adviser program under Maruyama, historian Ogino Fujio suggests that the plan to employ “police advisers” from metropolitan Japan was driven by the Home Ministry's desire to station its own security forces directly in Korea, and thereby more directly facilitate Japanese control over the internal conditions of Korean society.⁸² However, Maruyama also relied heavily on the Japanese consular police who had already been operating in Korea for over twenty years when he arrived. Consular police officers in the capital could be put to good use in cultivating cordial relations with Korean government because of their language skills, and they also were natural candidates for positions as police work instructors.⁸³ Police officers from the Seoul consulate were indeed often recruited as instructors in Maruyama's training academies, and they also served in the five main Seoul police stations and the thirteen provincial branch offices. Personnel statistics indicate that Maruyama consistently incorporated consular police into his cadre of advisers specifically because they often had finely

honed Korean-language skills, something that the fresh arrivals from Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagasaki rarely, if ever, possessed. This police adviser network continued to expand and diversify its activities throughout 1905, and there were one hundred seventeen Japanese police officers officially employed in the *keimu komon* program by the end of the year. Significantly, twenty-one of those officers were consular police, representing roughly 18 percent of the total.⁸⁴ The skills and experience of the consular police obviously proved quite valuable to Maruyama and the entire police adviser system.

It was not simply their practical skills, however, that made the consular police useful members of Maruyama's adviser system. The cover of legal legitimacy that their status as consular employees could provide, as well as their physical proximity to provincial areas, also had important benefits. In describing his plan to provide consular police inspectors with joint appointments as "assistant police advisers" (*keimu komon hosakan*), Ambassador Hayashi pointed out quite bluntly that local consular police captains were in the best possible position to undermine the authority of provincial Korean officials. Furthermore, because their presence in the countryside as consular staff was less conspicuous than having metropolitan police from Japan dispatched to those same areas, the "vanity" of the central Korean government, according to Hayashi, could still be satisfied.⁸⁵ This reliance on local consular police, however, did not last long, as only thirteen of the forty-three advisory officers posted to local areas in June 1905 were consular police officers. This shift can be explained at least in part by the fact that Maruyama was rather disappointed with the personal character of some Foreign Ministry police officers after they had assumed positions in his advisory force, and the Foreign Ministry itself even admitted that there were problems with the attitude and morale of their consular officers.⁸⁶ Nonetheless, even while recognizing these shortcomings, it cannot be denied that the mere existence of consular police forces in Korean treaty ports for over twenty years significantly facilitated the Japanese assumption of all police power in Korea by 1910, beginning with the police adviser system under Maruyama in 1905.⁸⁷

It is also useful at this point to make some comparisons between the attempts at police reforms under the direction of Takehisa Katsuzō in 1894–1896 and those of Maruyama Shigetoshi and the *keimu komon* system in 1905.⁸⁸ In the documents related to both episodes the most common phrase used to describe their goals in Korea was *keisatsu kaizen*, an improvement of domestic Korean police institutions. However, during Takehisa's tenure at the time of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese police involved in efforts at reforming Korean police organizations were most often referred to as *ōen keisatsu*, or "support police." In addition, the common use of the phrase *rinji haken*, or "temporary deployment," to describe

their mission implied a clear limit to their term of service. Of course, Takehisa and the consular police who worked for him might well have continued to advise the Korean court if the Russians had not replaced them as more trustworthy supporters. Nonetheless, most of those Japanese police sent to Korea in late 1894 were eventually sent back to Japan by the middle of 1895. The nature of the police deployments in 1905 under Maruyama was quite different. The assignment of large numbers of Japanese police to various new positions and locations was never referred to as “temporary.” Clearly, this time the Japanese police were there to stay.

The careful and deliberate planning that went into creating Maruyama's police advisory system thus on some level indicates its position in a larger program of enhancing Japanese control over the peninsula. At the same time that Maruyama and his cadre of police advisers were executing their mission of reforming Korean police institutions, however, a high-level police commissioner from Tokyo arrived in Seoul in the summer of 1905 to evaluate the effectiveness of Japanese police forces in Korea. In a summary report on his findings in September, he identified ten general areas of Japanese police operations that required immediate attention, and among his list were such things as unification of police duties, revamping overall management strategies, clarifying the limits of police duties, setting standards and rules of police behavior, standardizing staff and personnel strength, better budget planning, salaries and promotion schedules, and improving jail facilities.⁸⁹ These are hardly the observations of someone who found a well-oiled system rooted in a long-term plan for the destruction of Korean independence. What his recommendations suggest, rather, is that the consular police system in Korea and the subsequent police adviser programs took shape in a highly haphazard and ad hoc manner. Hardly a decades-long and carefully calculated program of encroachment on Korean sovereignty by hijacking its public security apparatus, Japanese police institutions in late Chosŏn Korea had evolved in a fractured and piecemeal way. The protection and advancement of Japanese interests were always the top priority, but the path toward that goal was a shaky and contentious one constantly shaped by the forces of contingency and opportunism.

The disorganized manner through which Japanese authorities came to control all police functions in Korea is also reflected in relations between the consular police and the Japanese army during 1905. Along with the Japanese consular police, protectorate police, and police advisers, there was one more foreign security force operating on the Korean peninsula in the milieu of the immediate post-Russo-Japanese War era: the *kenpeitai*, or military police. Perhaps not surprisingly, army leadership argued for placing local consular police under *kenpeitai* control in areas under military occupation, largely because consular and military police forces

had frequent jurisdictional clashes. The Foreign Ministry, however, resisted attempts to incorporate their police forces into the military police.⁹⁰ Guidelines worked out between the two sides dictated that on matters of public security in areas under army control, the *kenpeitai* would have ultimate jurisdiction, with local consular police answering to military authorities. However, in matters of normal police business, the consular police retained their jurisdictional prerogatives except in cases directly related to the army, wherein the consular police and the *kenpeitai* would work closely together.⁹¹ Even though the line between army and Foreign Ministry authority was hazy, and perhaps because of that fact, the consular police were determined to hold on to their position.

The role of the consular police in the system of police advisers under Maruyama came to an end in late 1905. In November a new treaty agreement between Korea and Japan mandated that Korea become a protectorate under Japanese authority, and during the following month new administrative institutions were developed. In February 1906, all of Japan's consulates and the embassy in Korea were closed, as the functions of the Foreign Ministry in Korea were now under the control of the new protectorate institutions. At that time there were roughly 270 Japanese consular police in Korea, and while a few of those officers were transferred to consulates in China, most were incorporated into the protectorate police organization.⁹² With that move, the twenty-five-year history of the Japanese consular police in Korea came to a close.⁹³

Concerning the transfer of all consular police in Korea to the jurisdiction of the protectorate administration in December 1905, the key point is that once the imperial Japanese state seized power over Korean foreign relations through the Second Japan-Korea Agreement, Japanese diplomatic offices on the peninsula became obsolete. Likewise, the logical and legal justification for Japanese consular police protecting and controlling Japanese residents also ceased to exist, in that the Korean peninsula was no longer "foreign" territory.⁹⁴ It is especially interesting to note that this process was almost identical to what would occur in December 1937 when extraterritoriality in Manzhouguo was abolished. In that case, however, the consular police were dissolved in order to create the fiction of Manchurian independence. In the earlier scenario, of course, they were disbanded in Korea to do the opposite—namely, to initiate the destruction of Korean sovereignty.

A collection of memoirs from the period of police advisers under Maruyama Shigetoshi reveals one last significant point to be mentioned in this chapter. As later discussion will show, the Japanese consular police in China and Manchuria gradually assumed duties of political policing in the informal empire, especially after 1919. Evidence suggests, however, that the so-called *kōtō keisatsu* (high-level police) of the consular police



Commemorative photo of the Japanese consulate staff at Chinnamp'o on the occasion of the office's closing, February 1, 1906. (Photo courtesy of the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic archives, Tokyo)

had even earlier origins. Apparently, the Seoul consular police were also engaged in the surveillance and suppression of “villainous” (*burai*) Japanese citizens in Korea, most likely referring to the rōnin adventurer types engaged in surreptitious activities designed to undermine the Korean government.⁹⁵ Among the earliest targets of politically driven Japanese consular police action, then, were Japanese nationals. Put differently, what made someone a target of consular police surveillance and suppression was behavior that posed a threat to the political will of the imperial Meiji regime. Targets of that sort could be Japanese just as easily as Korean.

Conclusions

Within this introductory survey of the Korean origins of Japanese consular police institutions four main themes are worth revisiting. First, this is the story of Japan's earliest quasi-colonial organization in northeast Asia. Extensive colonial police forces were a hallmark of Japan's rule over the formal empire in both Taiwan and Korea, but fifteen years before Japan acquired Taiwan and thirty years before the full-scale annexation of Korea, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had established a police

network that performed many of the functions normally associated with the apparatuses of colonialism. In everything but name the Japanese consular police on the Korean peninsula from 1880 to 1905 were a colonial public security institution. Therefore, in the search for precedents related to Japanese colonial security policy, we must recognize that Taiwan was not only the testing ground; treaty port Korea was as well. In addition, the steps taken by the Foreign Ministry police to secure control over treaty port society in late nineteenth-century Korea transpired simultaneously with like-minded efforts on the Japanese archipelago, reminding us of the need to place early police work in both its proper international and domestic contexts.

Second, the story illustrates how large a role the Foreign Ministry played in facilitating the eventual annexation of Korea. In the broadest view, the Japanese consular police created a peninsula-wide infrastructure for police surveillance through their establishment of police substations and field offices, and the police forces of the colonial government-general thus had a headstart on building the physical tools of police control. The consular police also conducted extensive field research that produced a massive body of empirical knowledge about local social and economic conditions in Korea, and this research was surely put to use in future land-use policy decisions under the formal colonial regime. Their local language skills also proved especially useful in facilitating the elimination of autonomous Korean police in favor of a Japanese colonial security bureau, with many of the police officers who would serve as colonial enforcers after 1910 being trained by consular police veterans. Finally, the consular police themselves became a part of the colonial police system in 1905, bringing with them twenty-five years of experience in the field.

Third, the history of the consular police makes clear the significant role played by Japanese residents in accelerating the complete imperial colonization of Korea, evident in two interrelated ways. Resident associations consistently made the first demands for a greater police presence in their neighborhoods. Obligated by their *raison d'être* of protecting Japanese civilian life and property overseas, the Foreign Ministry responded to such requests by sending in more patrolmen whenever it was politically and fiscally possible. Indeed, as Alain Delissen has also concluded, the Japanese community in treaty port Korea was “one of the major causes prompting increasing Japanese meddling in Korean affairs.”⁹⁶ Furthermore, organizations of local Japanese business people directly supported the police system financially by providing in many cases as much as half of the expense of maintaining the consular police forces in their communities.

Finally, as later chapters will show, the history of the consular police in Korea was simply a prelude to what was yet to come in China and Manchuria. After the political and commercial treaties of 1896 and 1915, there is a

clear pattern of initial consular police deployment in limited numbers followed by gradual and contested increases in strength. Eventually, the full-blown colonial conquest of Korea in 1910 would be repeated in Manchuria by 1932, and attempted in China after 1937. But, rather than reflecting a well-calculated and systematic program of Japanese aggression, the numerous jurisdictional conflicts and institutional rivalries, especially between the Foreign Ministry and the army, reveal that there was no uniform voice emanating from the Japanese side. While the end goal for all parties was the protection and advancement of the empire's interests, the question of how best to achieve those ends was fiercely debated.

One last comment on what transpired during the disturbances in Seoul during the summer of 1882 provides a telling sign of things to come and an appropriate note on which to end this chapter. In the violence of that episode, six consular police officers in the capital lost their lives. The ultimate sacrifice of these six men was soon thereafter commemorated at Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, the sacred space where Japan's war dead were and are still remembered. The official Foreign Ministry statement on those memorial services described the men as brave martyrs who faced danger squarely and gave their lives "for the sake of the nation" (*kokka no tame*).⁹⁷ This is among the earliest but certainly not the last expression of this sort. The consular police viewed themselves as more than mere beat cops and bureaucrats; their role in protecting the empire placed them among the ranks of honored national heroes. In tracing the evolution of the force over the next few decades in China and Manchuria, we shall witness this broad imperial ideology embraced by Foreign Ministry police becoming even more dramatic and militarized.

2

A Disputed Presence in Late Qing and Early Republican China

The early history of Japan's Foreign Ministry police in China, South Manchuria, and the Sino-Korean border region of Jiandao (J. Kantō; Kor. Gando) had two things in common with the establishment of the consular police in Korea. First, in all three cases the initial deployment of police forces was quite small, and their duties were limited to the protection and management of Japanese civilian life and property in open treaty port communities. Second, in each case the Japanese government cited mutually recognized treaty agreements between Japan and Korea or Japan and China as the legal basis for their maintenance of police units attached to consulate offices. The greatest difference between the early experiences in these two regions was that in China the establishment of Japanese consular police forces met with much greater resistance from the Chinese government and the local populations than had been the case in Korea. This fact is perhaps attributable in some part to more general and long-standing differences between Sino-Japanese and Korean-Japanese relations, but the contemporary geopolitical context is likely the more significant factor. East Asian international relations in the late 1890s were even more volatile than they had been in the early 1880s.

This chapter will explore the conditions under which the Foreign Ministry expanded its consular police infrastructure throughout northeast Asia from the end of the Sino-Japanese War until the turbulent year of 1919, when Korean independence and Chinese nationalist movements began to inspire a radical transformation in the character and scope of Japanese consular police activities. While the overall numbers of consular police personnel remained relatively small during this early period, the dubious legality of their existence came under assault from numerous directions. The discussion focuses first on the Chinese treaty port environment and then turns to Manchuria, with special emphasis given to the Jiandao region. In all three places, the Foreign Ministry saw the legal legitimacy and jurisdictional authority of its consular police forces contested by local Chinese officials, other foreign colonial powers, and even rival institutions of their own imperial government; but the Gaimushō refused to back down. As later chapters will show, this controversy continued to dog the Foreign Ministry throughout the

1920s, until some limited attempts were made in 1929–1930 to scale back the numbers and activities of the consular police. While the outbreak of military hostilities in the early 1930s ultimately made such legalistic disputes less significant as Sino-Japanese friction had by then become open Sino-Japanese war, it was during this early period of growth that the willingness of the Foreign Ministry to bend the “rules” of the treaty port imperialism was already evident. Recognizing this dimension of Japan’s early consular system on the continent thus helps bring to light those characteristics that facilitated the Foreign Ministry’s role in transnational security operations during later decades.

The Treaty Ports: Shanghai, Tianjin, and Xiamen

The first consular police officers to be stationed in China took up their positions only four years after the Gaimushō had sent a contingent of patrolmen to Pusan, Korea. Citing the problem of instability and popular unrest caused by recent Sino-French hostilities, as well as the growing resident Japanese population in the city, the Japanese consul in Shanghai requested in September 1884 that two police officers be stationed at his consulate.¹ In response, the Gaimushō arranged for two patrolmen from the municipal police force in Nagasaki to be transferred to the Foreign Ministry and then sent overseas to Shanghai as Japan’s first consular police officers in China. The size of the consular police force in Shanghai seems to have fluctuated between two and six officers for the next few years.² In September 1888, however, the two patrolmen assigned to the Shanghai consulate were sent back to Japan, and from that point until the signing of the 1896 commercial treaty no consular police were stationed in Shanghai, or anywhere else.³

Sources are sketchy on what these early consular police in Shanghai did, but it is reasonable to assume that their daily duties were quite similar to those of their contemporary counterparts in Korean treaty port communities. The Japanese civilian population in Shanghai was still rather small during the early 1880s, numbering only a few hundred residents, but the consul and his police staff were kept busy with the everyday administrative tasks associated with overseeing the economic and social activities of that community.⁴ There was, however, one significant difference between the contexts in which the consular police emerged in Korea and in China. When the first consular police arrived in Shanghai, Japan did not possess an unequal treaty advantage over the Qing empire, and thus the Japanese did not enjoy extraterritorial privileges in China. However, since the size of the force at the Shanghai consulate remained so small, it does not seem to have stirred up too much controversy during its first decade of operation.

Japan’s defeat of Qing China in 1895 and the subsequent treaty

agreements of 1896 then opened the door for an expansion of the consular police force at Shanghai, as well as for the establishment of new police offices in numerous other port cities.⁵ New ports opened by the 1896 treaty included Suzhou, Hangzhou, Shashi, and Chongqing, and by April of that year consular police forces had been assigned to those four cities, as well as to the already functioning consulates in Tianjin, Amoy (Xiamen), and Shanghai.⁶ Since the Japanese government consistently claimed that formally recognized treaty agreements between Japan and China clearly sanctified the establishment and maintenance of consular police forces, a closer examination of the 1896 commercial treaty is in order. The specific article from the treaty that relates to the issue of police powers reads: "It is agreed that Settlements to be possessed exclusively by Japan shall be established at the towns and ports newly opened to trade. The management of roads and local police authority shall be vested solely in the Japanese consuls."⁷

While the phrasing is slightly ambiguous, the implication is that Japanese consuls are to be granted police authority within "settlements possessed exclusively by Japan." This is the point on which the Chinese objections most often rested. In their view, foreign police operating anywhere beyond the specific borders of treaty port concession areas was not authorized by any treaty agreement and thus such forces were a blatant violation of Chinese sovereignty. The Japanese side, however, took the article to mean that wherever Japan had a consulate office it possessed the right to attach police forces to it.

Regardless of whether or not the 1896 treaty did indeed provide legal justification for the consular police, their mere presence in China's treaty port communities often led to both political and physical clashes between Chinese and Japanese security forces, and such incidents were usually one of two kinds. In the first case, Japanese consular authorities complained that Chinese police forces consistently failed in their duty to protect Japanese civilians from acts of violence perpetrated against them by local Chinese. This being so, Japanese officials had no choice but to station their own police in any area where Japanese residents settled. In the other case, it was violence against Japanese civilians committed by Chinese police and military forces themselves that consular authorities protested. Incidents of this sort were, in fact, often the most inflammatory.

But, the consular police were not only a thorn in the side of Sino-Japanese relations. In these early years, the Japanese consular police in Chinese treaty ports also clashed with citizens and soldiers of the Western powers with some regularity. One such case occurred in Tianjin in August 1913 near the border between the French and Japanese concessions. A small group of criminal suspects, attempting to elude capture by the French concession police, crossed Akiyama Street into the Japanese concession, at

which time they were apprehended by a group of assistant patrolman (*junho*) from the Tianjin consular police force. When the French officers caught up with their suspects already in Japanese custody, a brawl between the two groups of policemen ensued in which the French assistants inflicted a harsh beating on a number of the *junho* from the Japanese side. Later on, a large group of Japanese residents organized a rally to protest the treatment of their policemen, and when the group met with French military forces, a number of Japanese civilians were injured in the melee. In the diplomatic discussion that followed, it was decided that henceforth the Japanese police would have jurisdiction over Akiyama Street.⁸

The fracas between Japanese consular police and soldiers of the United States Army in Tianjin in the spring of 1919 described in the opening paragraphs of this book was a similar case.⁹ Japanese and American diplomats argued over a resolution to the incident for months on end, the sticking point in the negotiations being which side bore ultimate responsibility for the violence. Another factor at the root of the prolonged negotiation was that, according to the American side, the Japanese consular police possessed absolutely no authority to arrest and detain soldiers of the United States military, or any American citizen for that matter. Not only had they overstepped their already dubious jurisdictional footing, the American consul in Tianjin was also personally furious that he had been lied to by the Japanese consular police chief when the consul first arrived at the Japanese police station and inquired as to the whereabouts of the missing American soldier.¹⁰

Clashes of these sorts with French and American officials in Tianjin provide ample evidence of the boldness of Japanese consular police activities. Furthermore, these incidents suggest that the legal position of the consular police was in doubt not only in rural areas of Manchuria. Even in the urban centers of large and diverse treaty ports like Tianjin, the activities of the Japanese consular police were contested by the Chinese and westerners alike. They also reveal, however, the simultaneous dynamic of local collaboration with treaty port police systems as represented by the *junho*, or assistant patrolman. In the case of the Japanese consulate in Tianjin, dozens of Chinese, Taiwanese, and Koreans were organized and hired by the local Japanese Residents' Association to work as assistants to the local consular patrolmen.¹¹ This practice was widespread in all of Japan's consular police forces. At times, in fact, the number of non-Japanese *junho* working with a Japanese consular police unit made up a three- or four-to-one ratio. To take the case of Tianjin, for example, there were fifty *junho* employed by the consulate in 1910; and this number rose gradually over the next decade or so to eighty-four by 1916, one hundred nine in 1919, one hundred ninety in 1922, two hundred nineteen in 1925, and as many as two hundred eighty by 1928.¹²

The Foreign Ministry consistently argued that its establishment of consular police forces was necessary for the protection of Japanese citizens in China and Manchuria, but this category was not limited to ethnic Japanese from the home islands. The Japanese government considered Taiwanese after 1895 and Koreans after 1910 to be legal subjects of the Japanese imperial state, and as such the Foreign Ministry had an obligation to provide for the security of Korean and Taiwanese residents in mainland China and Manchuria as well as for ethnic Japanese nationals. The significance of this obligation for the Korean community in Jiandao was immense, but the history of the Japanese consular police in southern China is also filled with episodes of police action to prevent violence against Taiwanese residents in cities such as Fuzhou and Xiamen. Just as the policing of Koreans in Manchuria led to cooperation between the Jiandao consulate-general and the Korea Government-General, so the control of Taiwanese in the south facilitated similar relationships between the Taiwan colonial police bureau and their consular police counterparts on the mainland.¹³

Because native Taiwanese were subjects of the Japanese emperor after 1895, albeit without the same citizenship rights of metropolitan Japanese citizens, Taiwanese residing in China were the responsibility of the local Japanese consulate. As such, they could count on the protection of the Japanese consular police in conflicts with Chinese locals and government officials, and this protection facilitated the creation of an environment in which numerous Taiwanese began crossing the straits to settle in the treaty ports of the south China coast.¹⁴ This Taiwanese community in south China and the traffic in goods and people between Taiwan and the coastal communities created numerous problems for Japanese police forces. Intercepting the trade in illegal drugs, for example, was always a daunting and difficult task, and police forces from both sides of the water were routinely concerned about the publication and circulation of anti-Japanese literature. A report produced in August 1916 by the central police department of the Taiwan Civil Affairs Bureau also discussed the problem of pirate bands, operating from base areas on the China coast and small islands off the coast, attacking the northwest coast of Taiwan, and even included a series of schematic drawings of pirate vessels to help police identify suspicious ships efficiently. The report also suggested the need for better relations with Chinese police in coastal areas, as the unilateral escalation of Japanese police there was severely problematic.¹⁵

For the first twenty years or so after the establishment of the Taiwan Government-General, the security forces of the police bureau (*sōtokufu keimukyoku*) operated independently on the island but also by sending a small number of men to the China coast. Japanese consular police, of course, also carried out their duties in the southern treaty port commu-

nities, so by 1916 a move was made to coordinate the activities of these two forces since they both shared the same objectives. In late September of that year, the consuls at Xiamen and Fuzhou traveled to Taipei for a three-day conference with police officials in the Government-General. The agreements they reached in those talks facilitated the execution of police activities by coordinating the duties of consular police units in south China with those of the colonial Taiwan Government-General police bureau in a far more integrated way.

Among the new arrangements worked out in the conference, all Government-General police officers operating in China were placed under the direct supervision of the local consul. Political issues were also addressed in their decision to step up efforts to confiscate literature that “damages public peace,” as well as do more to stop the travel of “disreputable” Chinese and Taiwanese between the coast and the island colony. On the piracy problem, the colonial officials encouraged consular police authorities to investigate the coastal base areas of pirate groups with the help of local Chinese police forces. Providing the results of those investigations to the Government-General police and the Japanese Navy, they suggested, would help to eradicate the pirate threat in the region.¹⁶

These early efforts at coordinating the police activities of South China consulates and the Taiwan colonial police led to greater cooperation as the years passed. Yet, what is most striking here is that even as early as 1916 it is quite clear that the Foreign Ministry was prepared to perform the duties of a colonial police force on sovereign Chinese territory, becoming a *de facto* colonial security force, and this boldness provoked, not surprisingly, a rather hostile response from the Chinese side. For example, in making a number of contemporary observations about the disputed status of Japan’s consular police in China and Manchuria in 1920, the American legal pundit Westel Willoughby cited the example of the Japanese consulate in Xiamen. In response to the influx to the Fujian region of southern China of Taiwanese who had become naturalized Japanese subjects, the Japanese consulate in Xiamen rented a small house in 1916. Willoughby recalled that he staffed it with a handful of consular police officers and nailed a wooden sign above its doorway which read: “Police Sub-station of the Consulate of Great Japan at Amoy.” When local Chinese authorities protested, the consul responded by simply taking the sign from the doorway and hanging it inside the building instead—hardly an act of conciliation to the Chinese.¹⁷

Fortunately, the original source materials describe this episode in greater detail. The nine officers who staffed the new substation in Xiamen, it turns out, had been dispatched from the colonial police force on Taiwan.¹⁸ In December 1916, the Chinese described this move as a clear infringement on Chinese sovereignty and a violation of well-established

treaty agreements, and as such it was deemed imperative to immediately shut it down and remove those police.¹⁹ In his response to the Chinese side, Hayashi Gonsuke, then China minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary, left little room for debate. The consular police, he argued, were a natural part of extraterritoriality, so no treaty agreements had been broken. Furthermore, the new police substation was simply a preparatory step to facilitating better responses to conditions faced by Japanese residents, Hayashi contended, and thus was in no way a violation of Chinese sovereignty.²⁰ While this logic hardly satisfied the complaints of local Chinese officials, the Foreign Ministry nonetheless continued to employ the same sort of justifications in many different scenarios for years to come.

Protest and Rivalry in South Manchuria

The establishment of the consular police in Manchuria followed a somewhat diverse pattern from what had occurred in Korean and Chinese treaty ports. In all three cases, the Foreign Ministry deployed police forces to the field in response to requests from local consuls who sought ways to manage growing Japanese civilian populations during periods of instability and change in Korea-Japanese and Sino-Japanese relations. However, the consular police in Manchuria were established in conjunction with the simultaneous acquisition of formal colonial holdings, the Kwantung Leased Territory, and this fact presented the Foreign Ministry with a number of difficult challenges in exercising its authority on the ground.

The Foreign Ministry had maintained a consulate office in the town of Niuzhuang since the late 1890s, but it had been closed down after the war with Russia erupted in 1904. After the Japanese Army occupied the area around Yingkou in July of the same year, the Niuzhuang consulate was reopened in August and the resident consul made a request to Tokyo for one inspector and one patrolman to be assigned to his office. Metropolitan Gaimushō leadership responded by transferring two patrolmen out of the Tokyo metropolitan police bureau and sending them to Niuzhuang in September; these two officers were the first Japanese consular policemen in Manchuria.²¹ With the exception of an additional patrolman being assigned to the Niuzhuang office in June 1905, no new consular police were assigned to Manchuria until 1906, when in May a new consulate was opened in Andong with a police force of two patrolmen, to which was added one inspector in June. Over the course of the next six months, the consulate office in Fengtian was staffed with a significantly larger force of twenty-two officers and supplemented by a new subconsulate with six police officers at Xinminpu. Following the opening of new offices in Liaoyang and Tieling, the establishment of a consulate in Changchun with six officers in November brought the total

number of consular police in Manchuria to roughly fifty men stationed in seven facilities by the end of 1906.²²

Along with this expansion of consular facilities in south Manchuria, the Kwantung Government-General (*Kantō totokufu*) also began operations in September 1906 to manage the territorial and railway acquisitions gained through the victory over Russia. Officially, its jurisdiction was to include the Kwantung Leased Territory and the areas immediately adjacent to the South Manchuria Railway line that ran out from Dairen. In addition to its economic and administrative functions, the Kwantung regime also set up its own police bureau, which had the responsibility of providing for security within Japanese-controlled territory and along the railway.²³ Throughout the following year, however, the Foreign Ministry nevertheless continued to expand its facilities in the region by setting up new consulates in Harbin and Jilin, each complete with a police force of roughly half a dozen men. Several incremental personnel increases in various offices throughout 1907 ultimately brought the total number of consular police in southern Manchuria to roughly one hundred men by the end of 1907.²⁴

These first few years of growth and expansion in the consular police network in south Manchuria did not escape some conflict and controversy. For example, following a pattern of dispute to be repeated in countless episodes over the coming decades, a violent incident on the part of local Chinese police against Japanese civilians near Andong in January 1907 sparked a heated argument over just who possessed police power where. Chinese authorities refused to recognize the legal propriety of the new police forces deployed in the area largely because it was not an officially designated “commercial settlement” (*shōbuchi*). The Japanese in turn rested on the defense that in a “self-opened” commercial community, Japanese police power could be exercised legitimately, and further they refused to accept that Chinese police could hold any jurisdictional power over local Japanese residents.²⁵ Despite the disagreement, local Japanese consular officials continued to press for the expansion of their police facilities, and in June 1907, Andong Consul Okabe Saburō requested an increase of twenty-two officers, justifying the escalation as a necessary measure for dealing with the increasingly complicated matter of controlling unregulated border crossing between the northern Korean peninsula and south Manchuria.²⁶

As a center of Japanese political influence in the region, Fengtian also saw its share of early disputes over the presence of Japanese police in south Manchuria. In a report to Tokyo in June 1906, Fengtian consul Hagiwara Morikazu described the need for a large-scale increase of Japanese police in the area to prepare for the anticipated influx of Japanese residents and consequent economic development that was sure to come with the im-

pending extension of South Manchuria Railway lines to Changchun.²⁷ By August, a local Chinese warlord was strongly protesting such plans, as well as the general presence of new Japanese consular police substations near Fengtian after withdrawal of the Japanese Army once open hostilities with the Russians had ceased. Such complaints were answered with a bold assertion of Japanese authority, as Hagiwara argued that stationing Japanese police there was fundamentally necessary in order to control Japanese civilians. Furthermore, not only was it not a violation of Chinese sovereignty, as had been accused, but Hagiwara suggested that “your country is actually better off for it.” Hagiwara’s point was that having the consular police nearby made it easier to respond to and deal with incidents as they arose, a fact that benefited both sides.²⁸

It was not only government officials who led the charge for a stronger Japanese police presence and stricter limits on Chinese jurisdiction over security affairs. The Japanese Residents’ Association of Fengtian, for example, filed a petition addressed directly to Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu in which they detailed the numerous episodes of violence perpetrated against their community by unruly Chinese police. Specifically, they asked that the ministry take four measures on their behalf: (1) forbid Chinese police from being armed; (2) demand compensation payments to Japanese residents injured by Chinese police; (3) clarify the responsibilities of local Chinese police authorities; and (4) demand that Chinese police have absolutely no authority over Japanese residents.²⁹ From these requests, it seems clear that many if not most local disputes involving Japanese residents resulted, not from clashes with ordinary Chinese residents, but rather from what the Japanese perceived as unjust and even illegal harassment by Chinese officials.

Spurred on by such civilian demands, the growth of consular police infrastructure continued apace during 1907; but it was matched by increases in Kwantung Government-General police forces, leading inevitably to conflicts between the two over jurisdictional prerogatives. The Foreign Ministry tried desperately to protect the integrity of its authority in Manchuria, but the military administration in the Kwantung Leased Territory pressed the case for integration of Japanese police forces in the region. Their argument was that because Government-General police and the Foreign Ministry’s consular police operated under different guidelines and regulations, the Japanese resident community was greatly inconvenienced. Furthermore, this multibranch system unnecessarily complicated relations with local Chinese authorities.³⁰ Ultimately, the resolution reached in January 1908 favored the Government-General. The administrative reforms enacted at that time designated that the Foreign Ministry would retain its authority over formal diplomatic intercourse with the Chinese, although it needed to consult with Government-General

officials on major policy decisions. As for the problem of confusion over overlapping police jurisdictions, the new system, through joint appointments of consular officials and police with Government-General staff, placed all Gaimushō police forces under the joint supervision of Government-General police officials and their immediate consular superiors.³¹ This referred specifically to the consular police forces at the six consulates in Niuzhuang, Liaoyang, Fengtian, Tieling, Changchun, and Andong.³² In effect, the administrative reforms of 1908 served to greatly circumscribe the control of consuls in southern Manchuria over their own police forces. In fact, the consular police in areas under the umbrella of Government-General jurisdiction were for all intents and purposes Government-General police and not Foreign Ministry police at all.³³

While the 1908 resolution seemed on the surface to have solved the problem of multiple police institutions in South Manchuria, Gaimushō and Kwantung Leased Territory police officials continued to debate the relative merits of police integration. In 1916, Kwantung Resident-General Nakamura Satoru argued that the development of Japanese economic and political interests in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia required a more efficient security apparatus, namely the complete integration of local consular police under the authority of the Kwantung government. He explained to Foreign Minister Terauchi Masatake that the economic activities of Japanese residents in South Manchuria had grown nicely since the 1908 restructuring of Japanese police forces there, and because of the recent Russo-Japanese treaty, similar activity in North Manchuria (Harbin, Qiqihar, etc.) had also been developing. Nakamura thus suggested that perhaps Japan could use new consulate offices in those regions, with joint appointments of police from the Government-General, in order to expand Japanese security networks throughout northern Manchuria. In fact, Nakamura directly compared this plan with the similar practice of Korea Government-General police working out of the Andong consulate. In a more specific request, Nakamura asked that the police forces of new consulates opened in northern Manchuria after 1915 be fully integrated with Government-General police for the sake of maintaining the integrity of the 1908 system.³⁴

During a series of multilateral talks that took place during the summer of 1917, the Gaimushō responded by agreeing that the integration of Japanese police in Manchuria was needed, but in their view local consular police facilities were better situated to take control over all police matters. Representatives both from the South Manchuria Railway Company (Mantetsu) and the army argued that lack of unity between Japanese police forces was particularly disadvantageous because of the inconvenience it caused the Japanese resident community, and on a larger scale that it detracted from the dignity of Japanese empire as a

whole. Thus, further integration of the consular police into the Government-General security network was necessary. The Gaimushō countered these claims by arguing that all branches of the Japanese government in Manchuria could get along just fine with one another if each did its job properly and respected the jurisdictional prerogatives of the others. Certainly problems, disputes, and conflicts of various types would spring up now and then, the Foreign Ministry representatives agreed, but overhauling the whole system would create an even bigger problem. They argued, therefore, that simple solutions to everyday difficulties should be sought and no major change was needed.³⁵

These debates continued into the following year, and in July 1918 the chief of the Colonial Bureau (Takumukyoku) offered a new plan to the Terauchi Cabinet. In short, he advised that the Korea Government-General be granted complete police authority in Jiandao, while the Kwantung Government-General would assume identical powers in South Manchuria. Basically, the idea was to subsume all Manchurian consular police completely under Japan's formal colonial apparatus, but the Gaimushō again countered this assault on their jurisdictional prerogatives.³⁶ Because of recent complications regarding the administration of Shandong, the Chinese side, on both official and popular levels, was especially sensitive to Japanese claims of jurisdictional authority on Chinese soil. So a complete reform of police in Manchuria, according to the Foreign Ministry, would be both ill-timed and destabilizing.³⁷ By 1918, the Gaimushō's view had emerged as the more influential position, and the broader liberalization of Japan's colonial policy under the Hara Kei Cabinet from 1918 to 1921 returned the Manchurian consular police to a more preeminent position in relation to the Kwantung government. When that quasi-military office was in 1919 transformed into a civilian administrative bureau, the Kantō-chō, Gaimushō police regained much of the authority they had lost in 1908.³⁸

In the midst of these many disputes and debates, the consular police had nonetheless continued to expand since 1908.³⁹ However, the opening of a new consulate in Zhengjiatun in 1914 soon met with considerable opposition from the local Chinese population and the Republican Chinese government. Indeed, while problems linked to institutional rivalry with Kwantung Government-General police were an important preoccupation in the minds of consular police leadership, the growing volume of Chinese protests against Japanese police power in Manchuria was becoming an even bigger concern.

Back in Tokyo, the Foreign Ministry was sensitive to the problem of Chinese hostility toward the activities of Japanese police in south Manchuria. In July 1913, Foreign Minister Makino Nobuaki cabled the Korea Government-General with his suggestions on how to best avoid the provo-

cation of Chinese anger. In particular, Makino mentioned four scenarios in which Japanese police needed to take special care: (1) when detaining as possible suspects local Chinese of high social standing, most of all wealthy merchants; (2) when using borderline torture tactics during investigations of Chinese; (3) when a Chinese suspect suffered an unexplained death without clear cause while in Japanese police custody; and (4) when detaining a Chinese civilian outside the railway zone as a preventative step, even when there was clear criminal evidence against the Japanese resident involved in the matter. This sort of thing especially angered local Chinese police, Makino took time to note.⁴⁰ Such steps were apparently insufficient, as two years later, in July 1915, new Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki addressed the growing problem of Chinese demands for the complete withdrawal of Japanese consular police from South Manchuria. He directed all Japanese consuls throughout China to defend the legitimacy of the consular police in Manchuria based on Japan's legal treaty privileges. He went on to imply that the weakness and inadequacy of local Chinese security forces made Japanese police necessary; the logical conclusion being that only if and when the Chinese completely revamped their own police would it even be possible to discuss the withdrawal of Japanese consular police stations from the interior.⁴¹ Even if local Chinese authorities had been capable of making such improvements, however, it seems unlikely that the Japanese authorities would have immediately withdrawn their consular police from South Manchuria. By the late 1910s their usefulness had become all too clear.

Jurisdictional Ambiguity in Jiandao

As was the case in south Manchuria, the consular police in the Jiandao region also took shape under a unique set of circumstances. In fact, the history of the consular police in Jiandao was treated by the original editors of the *Gaimushō keisatsushi* as a separate and distinct institution within the general history of the Foreign Ministry police.⁴² The uniqueness of their situation and activities was due to the inextricable link between the administration of the Jiandao region of Manchuria and colonial Korea itself. The necessity of protecting and controlling Korean subjects in both areas demanded an extraordinary degree of cooperation between Jiandao area consulates and the colonial Korean Government-General.⁴³

By the early years of the twentieth century, the Jiandao region had become the focus of a politically complicated set of territorial ambiguities in Chinese-Japanese-Korean relations. The Qing dynasty had long restricted the settlement of non-Manchu peoples in Manchuria, but those limits had weakened considerably by the late 1890s. Consequently, Korean immigrants began to flow into the area in ever larger numbers. Actually

encouraged by the Qing state to develop this rustic frontier, the hope was that these Korean migrants would help ward off further Russian encroachment in the Qing northeast.⁴⁴ After Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 and the creation of a protectorate state on the Korean peninsula, Jiandao also became a keen concern of the Japanese government. The noted Sinologist Naitō Konan was sent to the area in 1906 at the behest of the Gaimushō to investigate local conditions in an effort to formulate an official Japanese policy on the question of Jiandao as a historically Chinese or Korean territory. For obvious reasons, the Japanese preferred to think of it as a natural extension of Korea, since this would bolster the claims of protectorate officials regarding the logical expansion of Japanese authority there, and Naitō's reports did indeed confirm this view.⁴⁵ Interestingly, even some contemporary Korean historians advocated the notion of Jiandao as a historically Korean region, though for different reasons than the Japanese. Sin Ch'aeho, for example, argued vociferously that Korea should not be thought of in exclusively peninsular terms, citing archeological evidence of Korean kingdoms in Jiandao from many centuries past.⁴⁶

The matter became an especially pressing concern when, in the aftermath of the establishment of the Korean protectorate in 1905, numerous Korean resistance fighters fled to the neighboring region of Jiandao to escape capture by Japanese police and military forces in Korea. The Japanese army in Korea set up a temporary field office in Jiandao in 1907 to prosecute their mission of eradicating opposition to the protectorate.⁴⁷ This was not accomplished, however, without some resistance from the Qing government; indeed, by 1909 the Jiandao problem had become a major issue in Sino-Japanese relations.⁴⁸ A treaty agreement reached in that year attempted to resolve the conflict by providing for the establishment of a Japanese consulate-general in Longjincun, along with four subconsulates in Juzijie, Toudaogou, Hunchun, and Baicaogou, through which the Japanese Foreign Ministry could exercise its jurisdiction over Korean residents in the immediate region.⁴⁹ From their opening each of these facilities was staffed with a consular police staff: forty-two officers at the consulate-general in Longjincun, and roughly six officers each at the four subconsulates. In accordance with the 1909 treaty, local Chinese authorities also established their own police forces in the same areas, and the duty with which all of these Japanese and Chinese police were charged was the maintenance of public security for Chinese, Korean, and Japanese residents alike in various local Jiandao region "commercial settlements." It surely did not come as a surprise to anyone, however, when these various police forces clashed over issues regarding just who had jurisdiction where.⁵⁰

Interpreting the historiographic meaning of the Jiandao Agreement of 1909 has become an important matter of discussion among Japanese and Korean scholars, with the debate centering on whether or

not it was a deliberately expansionistic move on the part of Japanese authorities.⁵¹ Whatever the real nature of the agreement, however, the overwhelming Korean resident majority in the Jiandao region remained the fundamental source of Sino-Japanese conflict in the area.⁵² On the issue of jurisdiction over the Koreans, the Chinese side maintained that Japanese authority was limited to the *shōbuchi* areas, outside of which the Chinese held the only legitimate police power. The Japanese side, however, reasoned that the consular police had a legitimate right to enforce law and order wherever Japanese residents resided. The Koreans in Jiandao were considered to be imperial subjects, and the consular police thus had a duty to protect them and their interests. The problem with this logic was that most Koreans did not live in the *shōbuchi* settlement areas. However, since nothing in the 1909 treaty specifically limited the scope of consular police authority, the Foreign Ministry refused to back down in the conflict over legitimate police jurisdiction.

A characteristic Sino-Japanese jurisdictional clash in the region occurred in January 1910. The local Chinese police had determined that the business of a local Japanese resident named Koga Shōjirō was illegal, so they set out to shut down his operation, while Koga in the meantime called upon his local consul for defense and protection. On January 28, local Chinese authorities and the Japanese consular police argued over Koga's case, and a brawl erupted between them, in which one Japanese consular patrolman was injured and a Korean assistant patrolman lost his hand from a sword blow. The local Japanese consul demanded that the Chinese police responsible for the violence be punished and reparations to the injured Japanese patrolmen be paid, but the only Chinese response to materialize was instead an increase in their local police force from thirty to sixty men.⁵³

Clashes such as these continued sporadically over the next few years, but when the Japanese government presented the Yuan Shikai regime with its infamous Twenty-One Demands in 1915, the deadlock over police authority in Jiandao was broken.⁵⁴ In the new treaty agreements that were negotiated out of the original demands, the 1909 Jiandao treaty was abrogated in favor of a new one that gave the consular police a much stronger hand in the region. As a result the number of consular police in the Jiandao region grew to just over one hundred men after 1915.⁵⁵ It is also clear that as early as December 1911 the Korean Government-General was already requesting cooperation from newly established Jiandao consulate police office to assist in political security operations. The Jiandao office arrested and deported several suspects in an assassination plot against Governor General Terauchi Masatake, for example, in early 1912, and between 1910 and 1915, it became increasingly common for the Police Bureau of the Korean Government-General to send

security teams across the border to gather intelligence with the support of local consular police officers.⁵⁶

What is most important to note here is that the evolution of Japanese consular police forces in Jiandao cannot be separated from the development of the formal institutions of Japanese colonial control of the Korean peninsula and the larger twists and turns of Sino-Japanese relations during the late Qing and early Republican eras. The early experience of the consular police in Jiandao also demonstrates two critically important characteristics of the Foreign Ministry police in general. First, they were committed to protecting Japanese civilian life and property in any location, without regard for whether or not they possessed an internationally recognized legal right to do so. Second, the Chinese government and local Chinese populations resisted this encroachment on their national sovereignty at every turn, leading to episodes of violent conflict on a regular basis. Also important is the fact that in both China (South China in particular) and Manchuria, the jurisdictional boundaries between consular and colonial police were more than a little hazy, since managing non-Japanese imperial subjects demanded close cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and colonial administrative regimes. But this cooperation was not always easy to come by, as institutional rivalries also drove the policy decisions of all the offices involved.

The Zhengjiatun Incident

What happened in 1916 at the Manchurian town of Zhengjiatun is representative of the wider Sino-Japanese conflict over who held legitimate authority over police activities within and beyond concession areas designated by mutually recognized treaty agreements, so it is worth considering in some depth.⁵⁷ In early August 1916, a Japanese businessman who had been physically abused by local Chinese security forces in Zhengjiatun called on his local consul to take his complaint to relevant Chinese authorities. When consular police sent to investigate the matter encountered their local Chinese counterparts, an armed clash ensued during which twelve Japanese were killed, including a consular police patrolman named Kawase Matsutarō.⁵⁸ A lengthy diplomatic dispute followed in the wake of the incident, with Japanese officials arguing that the violence was clear proof of the necessity for Japanese police forces in the southern Manchurian interior. They went even further in strengthening their position by demanding that Japanese police advisers should also be placed in Chinese police organizations. The Chinese side rejected these claims outright. The source of the dispute was in how each side interpreted the 1915 treaty agreements that provided for the security of Japanese civilians who settled in interior regions of Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia. The Chinese argued that Japa-

nese police jurisdiction was limited to the areas immediately adjacent to Mantetsu rail lines, and Zhengjiatun clearly did not fit that description; in areas beyond the railway concessions, only local Chinese authorities possessed legitimate police power. However, the Japanese consistently maintained that the 1915 treaty empowered consular officials with the right to station police wherever Japanese residents lived. In their view, the consular police were merely a natural extension of extraterritorial privileges.

In an effort to clarify the intended function of Foreign Ministry police and soothe Chinese anger over the issue, Japanese officials spelled out in specific terms the precise duties of the consular police in Manchuria: (1) to prevent Japanese subjects from committing crimes; (2) to protect Japanese subjects when attacked; (3) to search, arrest, and escort Japanese prisoners under the jurisdiction of a Japanese consulate; (4) to attend to the enforcement of consular orders in connection with civil cases, such as the duties of the registrar; (5) to investigate and supervise the personal standing of Japanese subjects; (6) to control and discipline Japanese subjects who violated the provisions of treaties between Japan and China; (7) to see that Japanese subjects abided by the provisions of Chinese police regulations when the agreement between Japan and China respecting the same should actually come into force.⁵⁹

The Chinese refused to accept this position because the 1915 treaty had stated that Japanese civilians residing in the interior would be subject to the police and taxation regulations of the local Chinese government. The Japanese consular police were thus *ipso facto* a violation of Chinese sovereignty. As the Chinese response stated:

As the seven principal functions of the Japanese police officers . . . are those which should properly belong to the Chinese police . . . there is no necessity for the establishment of a Japanese police force. Hence, the question of police cannot be associated with extraterritoriality and the Chinese government cannot recognize it as a corollary of the right of extraterritoriality. Ever since the conclusion of the extraterritoriality treaties between China and the foreign Powers for several decades, no such claim has ever been heard.⁶⁰

To that charge, Japanese authorities reiterated their earlier position, adding to it that while the Chinese government considered whether or not to grant its consent to the presence of Japanese consular police, “the Imperial Government will nevertheless be constrained to carry it [i.e., the stationing of additional consular police forces] into effect in case of necessity.”⁶¹ In other words, whether the Chinese recognized their legitimacy or not, the consular police would continue in their activities.

Not only did the local Gaimushō police forces remain on duty, but the

Japanese government also put forth an extensive list of demands in the wake of the disturbance at Zhengjiatun, including (1) employment of Japanese military advisers in Manchuria-Mongolia; (2) employment of Japanese military officers as public school instructors; (3) Zhang Zuolin's officers in Mukden were to apologize in person to Japanese authorities there; and (4) monetary compensation was demanded for the families of dead Japanese. In addition, they added four smaller provisions: (1) the punishment of the regional commanding Chinese officer; (2) the dismissal and punishment of officers and men directly involved in the incident; (3) all Chinese troops in Manchuria and Mongolia were ordered not to interfere with Japanese civilians, police, or military in any way; and (4) unconditional recognition of Japan's special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, namely local police power and Japanese police advisers in South Manchuria.⁶²

Japanese authorities clearly used the clash at Zhengjiatun as a convenient excuse for extracting further concessions from the Chinese, but such pressure did not come only from official channels of the Japanese government. Prominent members of the local Japanese community in Manchuria also recognized a clear opportunity taking shape during the discussions over how to best resolve the affair. For example, the editorial pages of the Dairen-based periodical *Tairiku* featured a variety of proactive positions in the weeks immediately following the incident.⁶³ Editor-in-Chief Yamada Takeyoshi began by describing the incident itself, including the gruesome mutilation of the Japanese victims by Chinese soldiers. He then went on to say that the incident had clearly marred the prestige of both the nation and the army, so a decisive retaliation was necessary. The root cause of the affair, Yamada explained, was the poor quality of Chinese security forces and the weak authority of the Chinese government itself in Manchuria. This incident, then, was a chance to take steps toward fundamentally fixing those problems. He contended that Japan had shown in Taiwan and Korea that it knew how to rule well, and Chinese in the Japanese-controlled Kwantung region were thriving in a stable and secure environment. Recognizing Japanese power in Manchuria and Mongolia was clearly the best option for Chinese and Japanese alike, in Yamada's view. If disorder was allowed to continue in the interior, no one would succeed. If the Chinese government was serious about Sino-Japanese friendship and local security, he concluded, they would accede to Japanese proposals.⁶⁴

Other pundits adopted a more hostile tone. Itō Kazuya, a local lawyer, claimed, "we ought to grab Zhang Zuolin by the scruff of the neck and use our Army to let him know who the boss is in Manchuria." But Itō also recognized that such a solution was not diplomatically feasible, so he urged the Japanese government to use diplomatic discussion to achieve a firm and final solution to these problems.⁶⁵ In one of the boldest editorials,

Nakanishi Masaki raged that Japan's army and empire had been insulted by Chinese impudence. "Why the hell do we even have a colonial government here? An army in Manchuria?" Nakanishi pondered cynically. He went on: "It's quite unbearable that our government won't take necessary steps because of needless fears about Western opinion." He explained further that because the Western powers were busy destroying each other in the Great War, only Japan was in a position to dominate in Asia. With more than a little contempt in his tone, Nakanishi concluded: "At first glance, China seems like a splendid country, but it really is an especially troublesome place. . . . The central government has no grip on the northeast, and as such it is overrun by banditry and warlords like Zhang Zuolin. . . . The whole place should be under Japanese control."⁶⁶

As Nakanishi's comments indicate, what position the Western powers would take on the affair was of considerable interest to both the Japanese and the Chinese. An editorial piece from the *Peking-Tientsin Times* gives some indication of the Western view on the episode. "If one assumes that the Chinese were entirely at fault in this matter," it read, "the Japanese demands, harsh though they may be, would not be open to serious criticism." However, the author went on to say that this was not a reasonable assumption. In short, what both sides needed was an impartial investigation and a mutually acceptable resolution. The article concluded with the notion that instability in China served no one's interests: "self-respect is an extremely important factor in the development of nations; where it is constantly wounded from abroad one cannot expect to find health in the body politic. . . . That being so, there should be a limit to the humiliations they [the Japanese] inflict upon it [China]."⁶⁷ A local Chinese commentator in the *Peking Gazette* also made it clear that securing the sympathy of the Western powers was critical. He characterized Japanese demands in the wake of the incident as "an attempt to repeat what was done by the Japanese in Korea when the administration of justice and prisons in that country was extorted under the Convention of 1909, that is as a measure to be followed inevitably by the annexation of the regions at some later and more convenient date." He went on: "Alone and unaided, we are powerless to contest with the Japanese on any matter on which they are insistent"; so, "let it once be made clear that China is resolved officially to consult the Powers guaranteeing her independence and territorial integrity." Only this would keep the rapacious aggression of the Japanese in check, the writer concluded.⁶⁸

Western commentators looking back on the incident several years later were divided in their opinions. The American scholar Westel Willoughby, a one-time adviser to the Republican government in China, saw the disturbances at Zhengjiatun as the result of Japan's incorrect interpretation of the 1915 treaty stipulations regarding police jurisdiction in the

Manchurian interior. He described the negotiations over the incident in this way:

Little imagination is required to perceive that, had these Chengchia-tun demands and desiderata been granted by China, Japan would have been enabled, without much further claims of right, to obtain effective military and police control of the Manchurian provinces. Fortunately for China, however, Japan did not at this time deem it advisable to enforce her demands. . . . The whole “incident” is, however, of significance in that it indicated what, at that time, were the further wishes of Japan with regard to Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.⁶⁹

Contrary to Willoughby’s case that the Foreign Ministry’s insistence on police jurisdiction in Manchuria was part of a much larger and more sinister subimperialist plot, another American scholar of East Asian international relations, C. Walter Young, took a different stand on the significance of the Zhengjiatun incident and its larger corollary issues of police prerogatives in Manchuria. Pointing out that Japanese claims of inadequacy in local Chinese public security institutions were not entirely unfounded, Young wrote:

Candor must compel the honest student of this subject to admit that the picture of continual banditry and disorder painted by Japanese writers on South Manchuria is much too highly colored, but fairness must compel him in the same breath to say that, while Manchuria as a whole has been better governed than most provinces of China, and there have been fewer major civil disturbances there than in almost any other part of China, yet, as anyone who is really familiar with Manchuria must admit, banditry has not been stamped out, even in the territories lying adjacent to the Kwantung leased territory itself.⁷⁰

Postwar historical studies of the Zhengjiatun affair most often conclude that it was the Chinese who had the stronger case on purely legal grounds in the jurisdictional dispute. In fact, even Kajikawa Masakatsu, editor of the postwar consular police commemorative history, admitted that the Japanese position on the legitimacy of consular police in the interior was “extremely delicate (*kiwamete bimyo de atta*).”⁷¹ Looking at long-term patterns of consular police expansion in South Manchuria, Tanigawa Yūichirō has also pointed out that among the thirty-eight police boxes linked to nine consular offices in Manchuria (excluding Jiandao) in 1923, only fifteen publicly displayed signs that identified their building as a police facility. Furthermore, almost all of those twenty-three police boxes that did not identify themselves publicly had

been established after the Zhengjiatun Incident of 1916.⁷² Clearly, then, while the incident did not slow down the pace of consular police escalation in Manchuria, it certainly caused the Foreign Ministry to expand their police networks in a more surreptitious way, suggesting that perhaps Japanese authorities recognized the dubious international legality of consular police operations in China. Indeed, Tanigawa ultimately concludes that the deliberately secretive expansion of Japanese consular police facilities throughout the Manchurian interior between 1915 and the early 1920s clearly indicates that Japanese authorities knew such escalation rested on exceedingly weak legal grounds.⁷³ The Japanese government believed that its imperial prerogatives justified the use of consular police regardless of specific legal semantics, and, as Ogino Fujio maintains, the Foreign Ministry never even considered withdrawing its consular police forces during the 1910s because it saw the institution as one particularly useful dimension of extraterritorial rights that could serve as a tool for the deliberate penetration of Chinese sovereignty.⁷⁴

The Debates Continue

While it will stretch beyond the chronological parameters of the present narrative, it is nonetheless useful to follow the debate over consular police legitimacy as it evolved during later decades. Quite striking is the fact that later defenders of Japan's right to station consular police throughout China were not only to be found within the Foreign Ministry, for Japanese legal professionals and academics often wrote to defend the institution against its Chinese and Western critics. One such author was Koga Motokichi. A prominent lawyer and China affairs enthusiast in Tokyo, Koga published a lengthy analysis of the problems associated with the operations of foreign police in China in the pages of *Shina kenkyū* (China Studies). In fact, in the first article of his six-part series, Koga kicked off his argument by citing Westel Willoughby as his model foreign critic of the consular police.⁷⁵ Refuting the points made by Willoughby in his *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, Koga nonetheless stressed the need to explain the Japanese position to the international community as it had become a focal point of foreign criticism.

Shinobu Junpei also addressed the problem of police legitimacy during the Manchurian crisis of the early 1930s.⁷⁶ He began by surveying the long history of treaty agreements that provided for the legal underpinnings of police forces operating from Japan's consulate offices, even citing Article 14 of the 1858 treaty between the Qing Empire and France as the first to establish an important precedent. That article stipulated that matters of legal jurisdiction not specifically addressed by the treaty would au-

tomatically fall to French authorities. Japan, according to Shinobu, reserved the same right, which made consular police unquestionably legal under formal treaty agreements with China.⁷⁷ After reviewing the history of controversies regarding Japanese police power in China, including the incidents of Chinese protest at Xiamen in 1916 and the Zhengjiatun affair, Shinobu turned to the pressing debate over the abolition of Japanese extraterritoriality in China. Citing the crucial need for adequate security to protect the lives and property of Japanese civilians, especially in the Jiandao region, Shinobu concluded that even if extraterritorial rights were relinquished, making the maintenance of consular police untenable, Japan would still need to take measures to facilitate the reform and improvement of Chinese police organizations, perhaps by compelling the employment of Japanese police advisers along the lines of men like Kawashima Naniwa, founder of the Peking Police Academy. Beyond that, Shinobu even suggested that Japan follow the model of French colonial authorities in their revamping of police institutions in Morocco, something that he had studied on his own in an attempt to devise a plan for solving the police problem in China and Manchuria.⁷⁸

When circumstances in 1932 compelled the Western powers finally to pass judgment on the validity of Japanese actions in Manchuria, Chinese spokesmen seeking Western sympathy often made reference to the long-standing controversy surrounding Japanese consular police forces. The Japanese government's persistence in maintaining this security apparatus of dubious legality was clear evidence, such advocates argued, of Japan's blatant disregard for Chinese sovereignty dating back almost two decades. Hsu Shushi, a Yenching University professor of political science, for example, referred to the Zhengjiatun Incident of 1917 in citing the ubiquitous presence of Japanese consular police throughout China's interior as one of many "questions awaiting solution" in Sino-Japanese relations at the time of the Manchurian Incident.⁷⁹ The official Chinese representative to the Council of the League of Nations, V. K. Wellington Koo, also pointed out to the Lytton Commission the problematic status of Japanese police boxes in Manchuria, which in his view were "illegally established and without treaty basis whatsoever."⁸⁰

Despite the strongly worded statements of these and other Chinese representatives, however, the report of the Lytton Commission did not make a clear condemnation of the Japanese consular police as illegal. The foreign observers only went so far as to say that the Japanese practice of establishing police units in its consular facilities throughout China ran "contrary to the general practice of countries having extra-territorial treaties."⁸¹ Consistent with the overall tone of the commission report, blanket rejections of Japanese contentions were avoided. However, the commission did include the removal of "special bodies" of Japanese police forces

from the Three Eastern Provinces among its many suggestions for bringing about a peaceful and mutually acceptable resolution to the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria.⁸² This would seem to have been, however vaguely phrased, recognition that Japanese claims to the legitimacy of consular police in Manchuria, if not unfounded, were nonetheless the cause of considerable and reasonable Chinese resentment.

In the wake of the Manchurian Incident, the Lytton Commission report, and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, Koga Motokichi again took up the cause of defending Japan's special brand of extraterritoriality in China that warranted the maintenance of consular police there. Here, too, he made reference to Willoughby as the *de facto* spokesman of Anglo-American criticism.⁸³ In discussing the ramifications of abolishing extraterritoriality in China and Manchuria, Koga took on the system's critics. Foreign scholars such as Willoughby, Koga maintained, were wrong to conclude that extraterritorial privilege undermined the administrative integrity of China. In fact, the opposite was true. Koga argued that extraterritorial rights and consular jurisdiction made it possible to hold Chinese society to the recognized legal standards of the international community. To relinquish those rights before Chinese institutions were able to adequately guarantee the property rights and personal liberty of foreign nationals residing within her borders, Koga reasoned, would actually work to hinder China's integration into the modern nation-state system.⁸⁴ This logic seemed to suggest that by exercising their extraterritorial rights, Japan and the other foreign powers were actually doing the Chinese a favor.

Self-serving argument as it clearly was, Japanese defenders of the consular police were not the only ones to make it. American, British, and other Western nationals, particularly those in the business of trade and commerce, were just as apt as their Japanese counterparts to tout the benefits of extraterritorial rights for the Chinese themselves. In an extensive editorial from the *Peking and Tientsin Times*, for example, H. G. W. Woodhead produced a litany of examples to illustrate the inadequacy of the Chinese legal system in 1929, concluding that the government of China at that moment was one "in which, apparently, elementary rights and liberties are in abeyance, or subject to the whims of Kuomintang committees."⁸⁵ An ardent opponent of abolishing extraterritoriality, Woodhead finished his tirade with a sentiment remarkably similar to that of Koga a few years later. "The premature abolition of extraterritoriality," Woodhead concluded, "would operate most disadvantageously towards the Chinese themselves for it would remove a strong incentive to judicial reform."⁸⁶ To make this point even more dramatically, Woodhead included the poignant words of Arnold Foster, a late veteran missionary, who once lectured, "Let every patriotic Chinese then look today, not with envious and

resentful eyes, but with eyes gleaming with gladness and expectation, on the privileges that Western nations enjoy in China.” The joys of freedom and security experienced by people in the West, the good preacher insisted, were what the Chinese themselves had to strive to obtain from their own rulers. They could not gain those benefits, Foster concluded, “by depriving the foreigner” of them, or “subjecting him to all the injustice” routinely meted out by Chinese officials upon their own people.⁸⁷

What links the contentions of Koga and Woodhead here is their shared faith in the propriety of international standards to which all nations must be held accountable. Elaborating on this notion of broad international consent, one of the most fascinating Japanese interpretations of consular police legitimacy was advanced by Shihozawa Kita, a Foreign Ministry Asia Bureau adviser, in 1938. Shihozawa explained it this way:

That the consular police operate within the parameters of international consent does not mean that they operate according to international consent; while the origins of police power are based in international consent and developed from it, the use of police power already cannot be restrained. That is to say that police power is limited by the extent to which consular jurisdiction can be exercised, and consular jurisdiction is something which operates according to treaties and precedent, and those treaties and precedents constitute international consent. There are clear cases and unstated cases of international consent, but in either case, the effect is not controllable.⁸⁸

In other words, Shihozawa argued that, in broad conceptual terms, consular police power was justified by the treaty port system. The specific form through which that power was exercised, however, was determined solely by consular jurisdiction. Framed in this way, the Japanese consular police could operate freely despite any protests related to specific circumstances, because the larger system of treaty port imperialism sanctioned their actions, in Shihozawa’s view, by an inherent form of international consent.

Even as late as 1943, Japanese academics were still arguing for the necessity of consular police in China because of the peculiar exigencies faced by Japan on the continent. For example, when Keiō University professor Hanabusa Nagamichi summarized the controversy, he made the same arguments that Koga had pursued fifteen years earlier. Also like Koga, Hanabusa cited Westel Willoughby specifically as an important voice of foreign criticism.⁸⁹ (One cannot help but wonder if Willoughby ever realized that his views had such an impact on so many Japanese.) In a lengthy review of the history of Sino-Japanese conflicts over the legitimacy of the consular police, Hanabusa cited the clashes at both Xiamen and

Zhenjiatun as cases in point, and in addressing the criticisms of European and American pundits such as Willoughby, Hanabusa suggested that the difference between the sizes of their national populations in China was the source of their different interpretations of consular police legality. It was because English, French, and American resident communities were so much smaller than Japanese communities that westerners did not appreciate the necessity for consular police forces in the Japanese case.⁹⁰

A theme that runs through all of these Japanese defenses of Foreign Ministry police legitimacy from the 1920s until the 1940s is the notion that Western criticisms of Japan on this matter revealed to Japanese observers the hypocrisy of the modern international treaty system in East Asia. It was a system created by the Western powers to justify and legitimize their predatory economic relationship with the Qing Empire, but once Japanese society had remade itself through the Meiji transformation and joined that circle of imperialist powers, it seemed the rules of the game were changed and the rug pulled out from under them. There is in the discussion from the Japanese side a pervading sense of frustration with Western criticism because it reflected the larger refusal of the Western powers to truly treat Japan as an equal. As for Chinese criticism, the Japanese argued along similar lines, suggesting that only if China could strengthen itself enough to join the international system would it be able to free itself from the abuses that system inflicted upon it. There is no doubt, of course, that both government officials and private-sector pundits sought to expand and protect Japan's interests in China at the expense of their Western rivals. But along with that competition and rivalry was a longing for recognition and legitimacy. In this sense, then, the debate over consular police legitimacy was also a stage upon which much larger issues of frustration and friction in imperial politics were being played out.

Conclusions

In his final analysis of the disputed legitimacy of the Japanese consular police, Willoughby offered the prescient comments of a Dr. C. C. Wu, who wrote in 1917:

From actual experience we know that the activities of these foreign police will not be confined to their countrymen; in a dispute between a Chinese and Japanese, both will be taken to the Japanese station by a Japanese policeman. This existence of an *imperium in imperio*, so far from accomplishing its avowed right of improving the relations of the countries and bringing about the development of economic interests, to no small degree will, it is feared, be the cause of continual friction between the officials and peoples of the two countries.⁹¹

Dr. Wu did not know how right he was. It is clear that the Japanese Foreign Ministry understood that its position on the establishment of consular police throughout China and Manchuria rested on shaky legal ground from the very beginning. Why, then, did the Gaimushō press its claim for legitimate police power in the face of such opposition from the Chinese side?

Did the construction of new police substations and the gradual enlargement of police personnel constitute a calculated program of encroachment upon Chinese sovereignty? Or were these developments reasonable ad hoc responses to conditions faced by an overseas Japanese community in a region lacking effective public security institutions?

What the evidence suggests is that a combination of factors motivated the Foreign Ministry to deflect the incessant criticism and insist on the legitimacy of their consular security forces. Consular police forces could certainly play an important role in facilitating the advancement of Japanese strategic and financial interests on the continent. Local Japanese residents, however, also demanded that they receive better protection from their consular officials, and increases in the numerical strength of consular police forces almost always came in response to specific incidents of violence in which Japanese civilian life and property had been destroyed. Finally, it is also quite obvious that the Foreign Ministry defended its right to consular police forces in an effort to maintain its jurisdictional prerogatives in the face of challenges from rival Japanese administrative bureaucracies. It is worth remembering, too, that these very same factors were evident in the pattern of consular police expansion in treaty-port Korea.

The Japanese consular police were just one of many armed flanks that once roamed Japan's continental empire, all of which Albert Feuerwerker has condemned as "blatant infringements of China's sovereignty."⁹² The numerous diplomatic arguments between officials and physical clashes between police officers in the field in this early period may have eventually motivated the Foreign Ministry to reconsider its position on police jurisdiction when the framework of the so-called Washington System was worked out after the First World War. The rise of Korean and Chinese nationalist movements, however, as well as the burgeoning threat of international communism after 1919, made such a reversal highly unlikely if not impossible. Indeed, before 1919 the imperial Japanese government viewed the consular police as a clearly useful tool for expanding and protecting Japanese interests on the continent, but not necessarily as an absolutely vital branch of the imperial bureaucracy. This understanding had begun to change by 1920, as the imperial state faced serious threats on both foreign and domestic fronts from international communism and Korean nationalism. In this new environment, Foreign Ministry police forces became a cru-

cial weapon in the state's war on colonial resistance and political dissent; they were critical in maintaining the integrity of Japanese colonial rule in Korea, as well as in suppressing the Japanese left. As such, the Foreign Ministry came to play an active role in securing colonial power abroad and authoritarian power at home. The matter of how and why this transformation took shape in the way it did is the subject of the next three chapters.

3

Policing Resistance to the Imperial State

Until the end of the First World War, the Japanese consular police in northeast Asia had been a relatively small organization, focused on the duty of managing the public welfare of Japanese resident communities on the continent. As such, their daily activities consisted primarily of mundane administrative tasks and the execution of basic public health and security measures. The eruption of the Korean independence movement on March 1, 1919, and the emergence of an international communist movement centered in Moscow, however, both inspired a radical transformation in the perceived mission of the Japanese consular police. The treaty port environments of China provided Korean independence activists with a safe haven of sorts to organize and execute their plans for resistance to Japanese imperialism because there they were beyond the reach of colonial Japanese police in Korea and could thus operate with relative freedom.¹ In a short time, however, as their activities quickly came under the surveillance of Japanese consular authorities, the suppression of Korean nationalist and communist movements in China and Manchuria became the overwhelmingly dominant theme in consular police activities during the 1920s.²

Unfortunately for the Japanese, however, just as the March First Movement in Korea created this new security crisis, Chinese resentment concerning the dubious legality of Japanese police operating on Chinese soil also boiled over following China's own nationalist awakening of May Fourth. With widespread anti-Japanese demonstrations rocking almost every major city in China during the summer of 1919, this was clearly not an environment in which one could expect Sino-Japanese police cooperation to improve. What then compounded the difficulty even further for Japanese authorities was their perception that the need to crush the Korean nationalist movement in China was more than just a matter of consolidating overseas colonial authority; the connections between Korean independence activists and Japanese socialists made policing political resistance to the imperial Japanese state throughout the informal empire in China a task with domestic as well as international consequences.

This chapter turns first to the nature of colonial resistance and political dissent in Chinese treaty ports, particularly Shanghai, where the con-

sular police initially sought solutions based on cooperation with other foreign powers in the city, especially France. The focus then shifts to Ji-andao, where a combination of strong Chinese resistance to the expansion of consular police facilities and more radicalized expressions of Korean resistance pushed the Gaimushō toward more unilateral policies. Third, the analysis will delve deeply into an attempt by the Fengtian consular police to cultivate local Korean collaborators in their fight against violent Korean resistance, and finally, the discussion will examine a series of interrelated political security agreements in 1925 that began to set consular police evolution on a new course. What runs through the entire chapter, however, is the central theme of consular police action against ideological threats to the imperial state, whether those threats were posed by nationalists or communists, Koreans or Japanese.

Politics and Terrorism in the Treaty Ports

The challenge posed by the Korean independence movement in exile first made itself known in the foreign concession districts of urban Shanghai. The French Concession in particular quickly evolved after 1919 into a hotbed of Korean anti-Japanese organization and activity. Throughout the 1920s, both the colonial Korean Government-General and the Home Ministry in Tokyo engaged in coordinated actions with Foreign Ministry police in Shanghai to acquire intelligence about and execute the arrest of participants in these “subversive” movements.³

The most visible target of Japanese consular police concern in Shanghai was the Provisional Government of Korea, formed in exile during the spring of 1919.⁴ Generally speaking, moderate resistance organizations such as the Provisional Government aimed to achieve independence from Japanese colonial domination by seeking support from and obtaining legitimacy through the recognition of the Western international community. Seeking financial aid from both the Soviet Union and the United States, the leaders of this government body in exile made their headquarters in the French Concession of Shanghai, where they enjoyed a reasonable degree of free movement and expression because Japanese police could not act unilaterally within the French Concession. An international settlement police force, which did include dozens of Japanese, operated in other areas of the port, but the French zone was exclusive, making it the favored staging ground for Korean independence activists.⁵ In addition to the Shanghai government in exile, other moderate independence activists set up similar bodies in Irkutsk and Vladivostok.⁶ The Shanghai branch, however, was the largest and most visible, with many of the most internationally recognized Korean independence leaders being affiliated with the Shanghai group. Nonetheless, the varied nature of Korean resistance

as reflected in the large number of exile organizations contributed to conflict and competition between them for financial and logistical support from foreign governments.

As early as July 1919, when the independence movement was still only a few months old, the Korean Government-General had provided Foreign Ministry police in Shanghai with a detailed list of Korean activists to be arrested and detained or deported as soon as possible. The list included twenty-two men, ranging in age from the late thirties to mid-fifties, all residents of the French Concession, and the description of their crimes contained charges of conspiring to undermine Japanese colonial rule in Korea by fomenting dissent among overseas Koreans and pursuing the acquisition of money and weapons to be used against Japan.⁷ Assistance in apprehending these “criminals” was not often forthcoming from Chinese authorities in the city, perhaps understandably so, but it was cooperation from the French government that the Japanese consular police needed most.⁸

By June 1920, the consular police in Shanghai had independently assembled a vast amount of information on the organization and membership of the Provisional Government.⁹ As early as October 1919, however, evidence suggests that preliminary efforts toward Japanese–French cooperation in suppressing the Korean Provisional Government were also already taking shape. What brought the two sides together at this early stage was the mutual recognition of their shared problems related to colonial security; French authorities wanted the metropolitan Japanese government to hand over Vietnamese revolutionaries in Tokyo, while Japanese officials wanted help in cracking down on these Korean activists in Shanghai.¹⁰ The possibility of collaborative police action was evident during the latter half of 1920—for example, when French concession authorities cooperated with Japanese police by seizing the printing equipment of a pro-independence Korean newspaper and closing down its office. When the same paper was back in business by December, however, Japanese police then again pressed their French counterparts for assistance.¹¹

In fact, the activities of Korean radicals in the French Concession quickly emerged as a thorn in the side of Japanese diplomacy with France. One consular official complained in August 1922, for example, of what seemed to him French duplicity in anti-Japanese Korean activities. “On the surface they offer assistance,” he explained, “but then they do not follow through with their promises and there is no sincerity in their words.” Moreover, this official also claimed that French concession authorities even sometimes went so far as to provide protection for Korean radicals.¹² While international cooperation was thus not always forthcoming, the Japanese consular police nonetheless did attempt to forge such ties early on.

Shanghai was not the only treaty port environment where Korean in-

dependence activism began to occupy a great deal of consular police time and resources; Tianjin also emerged as a center of organizational operations behind the Korean independence movement. As early as August 1920, Tianjin consular police office began reporting on the movements of “rebellious groups” (*futei dan*) in their concession neighborhoods.¹³ By the spring of 1921, police were making arrests of suspected radicals when possible and carrying out surveillance of others, such as An Chang-ho, when they made public speeches.¹⁴ Pockets of Korean resistance groups in Peking also soon spoke up in opposition to Japanese colonial policy on the peninsula. In March 1921, Peking consular police placed several dozen local Korean residents on a list of suspects targeted for surveillance, and a year later police introduced a more formal plan for the control of “rebellious Koreans.” As explained in the plan description, the growth in numbers of radical Korean activists in North China since 1919 far outpaced the numbers of Japanese police there to control them, but the current staff pledged to do as much as they could while seeking out the cooperation of local Chinese security forces.¹⁵

The increasing significance of anti-Japanese activism among overseas Koreans was not limited to North China. Consular police in several southern Chinese cities also reported trouble in their neighborhoods. Several examples from Nanjing and Canton stand out in particular. Consular police in Canton reported to Tokyo on the local activities of prominent independence activist of Yō Un-hyōng in May 1921.¹⁶ Later that year in September, concern also grew over how best to control a local organization called the *China-Korea Assistance Association* (Chū-Kan kyōkai), established to facilitate mutual assistance between local Chinese and Korean residents.¹⁷ A similar group, *China-Korea Mutual Aid Society* (Chū-Kan kokumin gojōsha sōsha), had been formed a year earlier in Shanghai, so the consular police had already been alerted to the problem of potential ties between discontented Chinese and Korean residents that shared animosity toward Japan.¹⁸

The anti-Japanese activism of moderate political independence organizations and mutual assistance associations was undoubtedly a major source of consular police anxiety and a primary target of consular police surveillance, but more radical Korean activists took center stage during the early 1920s. Specifically, an organization known as the Ŭiyōldan soon became an equally if not more important target of Gaimushō police action in Shanghai.¹⁹ The Ŭiyōldan, founded and headed by Kim Wōn-bong, was an organization committed to the physical destruction of Japanese power in Korea, and its members carried out bombings of colonial offices on the peninsula as well as attacks on symbols of Japanese authority throughout northeast Asia. They also engaged in tactical assassinations of Japanese colonial officials, and it was their attempted assassination of

General Tanaka Giichi in Shanghai in the spring of 1922 that brought the Ūiyōdan to the forefront of consular police strategy.²⁰ Until that time, Ūiyōdan operations had been largely limited to targets within the Korean peninsula, but when they took their brand of anti-Japanese terrorism to Shanghai, Kim Wōn-bong and his associates became the problem of Gaimushō police. In fact, it was the Shanghai consular police who arrested several members of the plot against General Tanaka.²¹

Much as they had done following the establishment of the Provisional Government, the Shanghai consular police quickly assembled an extraordinary amount of information about Ūiyōdan organization, leadership, and ideology.²² The Ūiyōdan was particularly adept at assassination via strategically planted explosive devices, so the consular police made preventing the group from acquiring such materiel a high priority. In the fall of 1923, the Shanghai police scored a significant victory in this mission when an undercover sting operation resulted in the seizure of fifty bombs from the Ūiyōdan in the French Concession. This episode reveals more, however, than just the efficacy of consular police tactics in Shanghai. The investigation also revealed that Ūiyōdan activists were working hand in hand with rebel groups from western Jiandao and other parts of Manchuria. Furthermore, it is important to note that the details of these arrests were first made known to Kasumigaseki by the Korea Government-General police bureau chief, not the Shanghai consul; compelling evidence indeed of how deep the hands of colonial authorities in Korea could reach into Gaimushō police affairs in China.²³

The activities of the Ūiyōdan are especially significant because they so effectively illustrate the complexity of imperial resistance and Japanese attempts to crush it. Ūiyōdan fighters targeted symbols of Japanese power from Seoul to Shanghai to Osaka. In turn, metropolitan police forces in Tokyo compiled intelligence reports on the group, just as colonial security forces did in Korea and consular police departments did in China.²⁴ The Foreign Ministry police were thus one link in a transregional chain of political security institutions stretching across northeast Asia by the mid-1920s. In 1924, Shanghai consular police made an important advance in their efforts against politically subversive and terrorist organizations, especially the Ūiyōdan. Using information obtained through “interrogations” of several Ūiyōdan members in police custody, Shanghai officers executed several sting operations in January, netting additional key intelligence and making more arrests. Despite that progress, however, the greatest obstacle standing in the way of Japanese plans to crush movements such as the Ūiyōdan was the lack of cooperation from French concession security forces.²⁵

In fact, the problem of police collaboration was severe enough to reach the highest levels of Japanese–French diplomacy. In 1924, for example, Shanghai consul Yada Shichitarō asked French authorities to

banish “recalcitrant Koreans [*futei Senjin*]” from the Shanghai concession to the greatest extent possible and by whatever means available. He also then pressed the French to allow for the arrest of suspects directly by Japanese police authorities, and even further urged that France approve of Japanese police being armed in the concession area. If that just was not feasible, then the French should offer as much police muscle as possible in support of Japanese security sweeps. Finally, Yada stressed the need for good intelligence from French police on the known addresses of suspected Korean independence agitators.

The French response was carefully crafted. As for the first point, the French ambassador explained that banishing someone not clearly engaged in activity that created disorder in the concession was problematic. He then continued to point out that, regrettably, even when including Vietnamese and Chinese assistants, the French concession police force had only six hundred men and that fact made it difficult to support Japanese police operations with large numbers of officers. Finally, he added that French intelligence on addresses of local Koreans was not up-to-date and would be of little use to Japanese police. In short, the French ambassador stonewalled every point put forth by Consul Yada.²⁶

How can this French reluctance to provide greater assistance be explained? It must be pointed out that during earlier years (especially before 1910), the Japanese had been less than eager to help the French crack-down on Vietnamese activists in Tokyo.²⁷ The revolutionary Phan Bội Châu among others was of particular concern to French authorities, who well knew that he was living in protected exile in Tokyo during the years following the Russo-Japanese War.²⁸ For many in Japanese diplomatic circles, the idea of helping a European colonial power to suppress the national aspirations of a fledgling Asian independence movement put them in an awkward position, to say the least. Many Gaimushō officials were also involved (or had been) with the East Asia Common Culture Academy (*Tō-A Dōbun Shōin*), an institution devoted to pan-Asian progress and education.²⁹ As such, many were quite friendly with Vietnamese nationalists in exile, and helping the French government to arrest them would have been unthinkable. After the 1910 annexation of Korea, however, the Japanese state, of course, had its own anticolonial resistance to worry about. A decade later, when the independence movement of 1919 had come to pose a serious security problem in Shanghai, the Japanese now needed French help. Perhaps understandably, then, the French did more than a little foot dragging when it came to Japanese requests for help against Korean exiles in Shanghai. It is important to remember, however, that French reluctance to provide assistance in the suppression of Korean resistance cannot necessarily be interpreted as a form of French support or sympathy for Korean independence activists. French authorities would

have quite readily turned over valuable intelligence information to their fellow colonial overlords in Tokyo if only Japanese security forces had reciprocated with information on exiled Vietnamese revolutionaries.³⁰

Even if French help had been more forthcoming, Korean independence activists were not the only problem in Shanghai. A series of reports from the early 1920s also indicates the concern expressed by colonial authorities in Korea regarding Shanghai as a site where Japanese, Korean, and Chinese “extremists” might find common ground and begin to pool their resources. One of the earliest warnings came in May 1920, when the Government-General warned of Bolsheviks arriving in Shanghai from Vladivostok and a meeting between a Japanese socialist named Kita Kijirō, Korean revolutionaries, and anti-Japanese Chinese.³¹ A July 1921 document further suggested that Korean communists in Shanghai might conspire with Japanese communists and acquire from them much needed financial support.³² Another report from November 1921 identified a particularly suspicious Japanese communist in Shanghai named Aoyama, and then cited evidence that certain Koreans had recently traveled to Tokyo to establish links with the nascent Japanese Communist Party (JCP).³³

As George Beckmann and Okubo Genji made clear in their classic study of the Japanese Communist Party, the Comintern played a critical role in facilitating the initial creation of the official party organization. It is not insignificant that the part of intermediary between Moscow and Tokyo was played by Korean communist agents, whose connections to the Comintern had already been established. Between the late spring of 1920 and the summer of 1921, several meetings between Japanese communists such as Ōsugi Sakae and Kondō Eizō and Korean agents took place in Tokyo and Shanghai.³⁴ Metropolitan police authorities in Tokyo knew quite well that leading leftists such as Ōsugi Sakae, Yamakawa Hiroshi, and Katayama Sen had connections with Korean communists and Soviet agents in Shanghai.³⁵ The consular police there served in effect as the local branch office of homeland state authority, seeking to stifle voices of political dissent well beyond the borders of domestic society. The nature and progress of Korean resistance in Shanghai, then, was much more than a just threat to Japanese colonial control over the peninsula. The success of the Korean communist organization in Shanghai with the aid of the Comintern posed a direct threat to the stability of metropolitan society itself.

Vice Home Minister Kobashi Ichita articulated this fear dramatically in April 1921, arguing that because the world had seen a widespread escalation of Russian extremism since the end of the First World War, domestic security forces had taken steps to bolster and unify their intelligence. Because Russian, Chinese, and Korean “plots” against Japan could find in Shanghai fertile ground in which to blossom, Kobashi claimed, stronger steps toward intelligence integration were needed. To that end, he in-

structed that experienced intelligence officers from the Korea Government-General and the Home Ministry be stationed within the Shanghai consular police force to oversee that integration. The Foreign Ministry's Asia Bureau responded in June by approving the joint appointment of a Home Ministry police superintendent as a consular police superintendent in Shanghai, suggesting important links between domestic and foreign police work at a time when formal communist parties were taking shape on both fronts.³⁶

The substantial number of Korean students in Japan during the early 1920s and the efforts of metropolitan police to keep a close eye on their political activities is a further reminder of the transnational dimension of the colonial security problem.³⁷ The most well-known example of both official and popular conflation of Korean nationalist activism and left-wing Japanese dissent took place in the aftermath of the Great Kanto earthquake of September 1, 1923. Suspicious of their inciting insurrection amid the chaos of the quake-ravaged capital, metropolitan police and vigilante gangs murdered thousands of resident Koreans and detained thousands of Japanese leftists and labor leaders, a number of whom also died in police custody. The case of Japanese anticolonial anarchist Kaneko Fumiko, who was arrested along with her romantic and revolutionary Korean partner, Pak Yöl in the course of post-quake police action, also seemed to confirm the potential for collaboration between rebellious Koreans and Japanese in the eyes of police authorities.³⁸ Perhaps the more revealing case, however, was that of Sano Manabu earlier that year. Sano was a central leader in the Japanese communist movement, and in May 1923 metropolitan police raided his Waseda University office, eventually turning up lists of all JCP members. Shortly thereafter, police began arresting its members in a series of nationwide actions during June 1923. Sano was among those to escape the dragnet, and it is worth noting that he fled to Shanghai, where he then became the concern of the Japanese consular police.³⁹ Because socialism was thus considered an ideological threat that crossed national boundaries and identities, the boundaries of Japanese police power needed to be just as flexible and porous. It was the Foreign Ministry police that made such a security network possible.

Resistance and Counterinsurgency in Jiandao

Like Shanghai, the Jiandao area became a hotbed of revolutionary anti-Japanese activity after the eruption of the Korean independence movement of 1919. Unlike Shanghai, however, most Korean organizations in Jiandao and throughout Manchuria were prone almost immediately to develop more radical forms of resistance against Japanese colonialism. Because of its strategic location across the Korea-Manchuria border, Ko-

rean guerrillas could conduct operations on Korean territory and then quickly retreat to the refuge offered on the Chinese side of the boundary. Cities in the Manchurian frontier and the Russian Far East also offered refuge for the strategic planning of Korean independence groups committed to violent resistance. Before the year was out, the Gaimushō clearly recognized the critical severity of this problem. Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya ordered the consuls in China, Manchuria, and Vladivostok to do everything possible to crush rebellious Korean organizations within their jurisdiction. Significantly, Uchida also directed them to execute this objective through cooperation with local Chinese (or Russian) authorities.⁴⁰ A multilateral framework was thus the preferred option of the Foreign Ministry early on, and this was a policy that consular police leadership would attempt to employ for as long as possible.

The police force of the Korea Government-General, however, surely had the greatest interest in and motivation for the suppression of Korean radicals in Manchuria, as its ability to rule was directly undermined by their activities. Therefore, on several occasions in late 1919 and early 1920, police bureau detachments from the northern portions of the Korean peninsula crossed the border and conducted raids on suspected radical base camps in Jiandao and elsewhere. These border crossings were illegal, of course, since the Korea Government-General had no legitimate jurisdiction within sovereign Chinese territory. When such operations did take place, local Chinese authorities responded, and rightly so, with protests and demands for an immediate end to such incursions.⁴¹

With the political limitations facing colonial police from Korea and the physical retribution that often fell upon local Korean collaborators, the pressure to crush Jiandao-based guerrilla activity increasingly came to rest on the shoulders of the Jiandao consular police force.⁴² The Jiandao consular police chief, Suematsu Kichiji, made numerous arguments based on his deep understanding of local conditions regarding the threat of increasing levels of “Bolshevization” in Korean communities. Financial and human resources then available in Jiandao to combat this threat, Suematsu claimed, were not nearly adequate.⁴³ This was the beginning of a long and contentious battle between consular police leaders in the field and their Tokyo-based supervisors. In the summer of 1920, Suematsu provided the Gaimushō with even more warnings about the increasing radicalization of Jiandao Koreans and the evolving influence of Soviet communism in Jiandao.⁴⁴ Still, Foreign Ministry bureaucrats in Kasumigaseki refused requests from the field for more staff on the grounds that an increase in police personnel would only further aggravate the Chinese side. Their suggestion, instead, was that the Jiandao consular police force work diligently to foster cooperation with local Chinese police in controlling the security crisis in the region.⁴⁵

Jiandao consular police chief Suematsu Kichiji, 1920s. (Photo courtesy of the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic archives, Tokyo)



Local Jiandao consular police did indeed attempt to develop cooperative solutions with local Chinese security forces. For example, during July and August 1920, several programs to loan weapons and other equipment to Chinese police were put into place.⁴⁶ However, problems in communication and coordination between the two sides persisted, as evidenced by an incident during which three Japanese patrolmen on an undercover assignment disguised in Korean and Chinese dress were arrested and detained by Chinese police.⁴⁷ Regional Japanese branch offices of the Jiandao consular police network also held meetings to better integrate their intelligence and make what little they could do against the insurgency more effective.⁴⁸ However, without sufficient manpower, the limits of consular police efficacy were obvious to those at the local level.

Events during the fall of 1920 placed intense new pressures on the Jiandao consular police to expand their capabilities when in mid-September a “bandit” force several hundred men strong attacked the town of Hunchun. In their raid, the attackers burned several consular buildings, looted local shops, and murdered a number of local Japanese and Korean residents. A handful of consular police officers were also

wounded and killed during the battle.⁴⁹ In response to the attack at Hunchun, elements of the Japanese Army in Korea crossed the border and joined Jiandao region consular police forces in what came to be called the Jiandao Expedition.⁵⁰ From late 1920 through the early spring of 1921, army and police forces carried out “search and destroy” patrols that included numerous on-site executions as well as arrests. Foreign criticism of Japanese tactics during the expedition was severe, and Western Christian missionaries in Korea, mostly Americans, were especially harsh in their public condemnation of Japanese brutality.⁵¹ However, the Japanese defended their actions as a necessary response to lawlessness on the Manchurian frontier. In fact, several Japanese defenders of the expedition drew a direct comparison between it and the United States invasion of northern Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa, whose armies had terrorized American communities in the southwest.⁵²

The exact story of what happened on the night of September 12, 1920, in Hunchun is a matter of heated controversy. Many Korean scholars, and some Japanese, argue that the Hunchun attack was most likely staged by agents of the Japanese Army in Korea to provide a reason for large-scale military operations in the area against any and all anti-Japanese elements there. Other Japanese historians have argued that the conspiracy theory is patently false. They stress that Jiandao was indeed a lawless frontier region in which bandit gangs routinely terrorized local communities. Thus, they argue that the Japanese response, if a bit too severe, was ultimately justified.⁵³ Perhaps it is also significant to consider the timing of the Hunchun attack in evaluating the Japanese response to it. Earlier in 1920, there had been a massacre of Japanese civilians by Russian bandits in Siberia at the village of Nikolaevsk. In fact, the Seoul-based Japanese periodical *Chōsen oyobi Manshū* ran an editorial in October 1920 asking if the Hunchun Incident was not a second Nikolaevsk.⁵⁴ While this certainly would not justify the violence wrought on thousands of innocent Korean residents at the hands of the Japanese Army, it is nonetheless necessary to consider the state of mind of Japanese resident communities in Manchuria and the Russian Far East after Nikolaevsk.

Indeed, the role played by local Japanese and Korean communities in providing support for the Jiandao Expedition was substantial. Community groups repeatedly sent petitions to the Foreign Ministry demanding a strong response to the recent attacks. In fact, local Korean resident associations were often more adamant in their demands for greater Japanese police actions than were the local Japanese communities. In addition, these groups sent many requests to delay the withdrawal of troops until a greater degree of stability had been restored. Pressure from local Chinese authorities and international criticism had pushed Japan toward the troop withdrawal, but the local Korean community

tried hard to prevent it. In their view, Japanese police power was the only force available to protect their livelihoods from the depredations of criminal gangs and radical Korean resistance groups.⁵⁵

After the Japanese Army had withdrawn from the area in the spring of 1921, the Gaimushō responded to the recent crisis by bolstering its consular police facilities in Jiandao. For example, a number of new branch police stations were set up in order to strengthen local-intelligence gathering capabilities.⁵⁶ In response to the various new police facilities that Jiandao consular authorities were establishing in the region, local Chinese officials lodged numerous petitions in opposition to the expansion. In fact, the Chinese side refused even to recognize the legal legitimacy of the new Japanese police outposts and furthermore demanded that the new stations be closed down and their officers withdrawn.⁵⁷ The Chinese strongly objected to these fortifications of Japanese police power in Jiandao because in their view the withdrawal of army units was meaningless if Japan simply replaced them with larger numbers of quasi-colonial police officers. Despite Chinese protest, however, the expansion went on. Perhaps the most significant step was the establishment of a *keisatsubu*, or “police headquarters,” at the main consulate in Longjincun in April 1921. The new office would serve as a central point of command and control for all Japanese police operations in the Jiandao region. The headquarters divided its duties into three subsections: normal police duties, police training, and special high police work, or *tokubetsu kōtō keisatsu (tokkō)*. The creation of a *tokkō* department within the Jiandao police network was a significant step in the politicization of consular police functions in Manchuria.⁵⁸

The summer of 1922 saw what appeared to many to be a replay of the Hunchun Incident two years earlier. On this occasion, a gang of several hundred mounted “bandits” attacked the town of Toudaogou. As before, they burned Japanese consular facilities and also attacked the police station and its jail to release several imprisoned comrades. Furthermore, the attackers went out of their way to target the homes and businesses of local Koreans deemed to be “Japan-friendly.” This was especially true of Koreans who worked in and with Japanese police networks.⁵⁹ To many in the local consular police network, the violence at Toudaogou was proof that local Chinese police could not effectively counter the wanton destruction of bandit gangs and the subversive activities of more politically minded Korean radical organizations. In the wake of the Toudaogou incident, the Foreign Ministry thus initiated another wave of personnel increases and other police-force reinforcements that continued throughout 1923 and into the following year. By the middle of 1924, the expansion of Japanese consular police forces in Jiandao had stabilized. The consulate-general at Longjincun, including its *keisatsubu* and the regular police section, had



Police staff of the Hunchun Consulate training on machine guns, early 1920s. (Photo courtesy of the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic archives, Tokyo)

159 officers. Another 323 policemen were scattered between the four sub-consulates and their smaller branch outposts, making a total of 482 consular police officers in the Jiandao region as of May 1924. That nearly 20 percent of those officers were Korean reflects the politically and ideologically divided nature of their community in Jiandao.⁶⁰

It is also worth noting that the same pressures that led to the creation of a *tokkō* section in the Jiandao consular police office in 1924 were, of course, also at work in the homeland. The economic recession in Japan during the last year of the First World War sparked an increase in labor activism and rural unrest, the most well-known episode of disorder being the Rice Riots of 1918. The Home Ministry responded to these events by re-vamping its police surveillance system, while the Justice Ministry began pushing for new laws designed to preserve public order. The year 1922 then saw the official establishment of the Japanese Communist Party, and widespread arrests of JCP members were carried out in 1923. Between 1923 and 1924, the Metropolitan Police Bureau (Keishichō) also increased its number of *tokkō* officers by twice the amount of the previous year's increase. New *tokkō* sections were also set up throughout 1923 in Hokkaido, Kanagawa, Nagano, Aichi, Kyoto, Hyogo, Yamaguchi, and Fukuoka.⁶¹ At home and abroad during the early 1920s, then, Japanese police networks responded to the challenge of left-wing radicalism, both Japanese and Korean, with vigor.

Finally, one should recognize that the early history of the Jiandao consular police and its response to the evolution of overseas Korean resistance is markedly different from the manner in which consular police forces developed in Chinese treaty ports such as Shanghai and Tianjin. In Jiandao, Gaimushō police faced more serious and immediate threats of vio-

lence from radical Korean independence groups. They also had to face much stronger opposition to their activities from local Chinese authorities. With superiors back in Tokyo who could not see local circumstances in the same light, the Jiandao consular police thus began to cultivate a spirit of unilateral adventurism very early on in the war against Korean resistance in exile.

Local Collaborators: The Manchuria People's Protection Society

Nationalist movements in China and Korea during the spring and summer of 1919 created a two-tiered problem for Japanese police, especially in Manchuria. The political opposition and terrorist violence inspired by the Korean independence movement of March first meant that the necessity for effective police work was greater than ever before. Almost simultaneously, however, the Chinese nationalist movement of May fourth meant that smooth and reliable Sino-Japanese cooperation regarding police work would become more elusive than ever before. The solution to this difficult conundrum would then here seem quite impossible: to find local non-Chinese collaborators in Manchuria who were amenable to the notion of suppressing Korean independence activists. The Japanese consular police in Fengtian, however, managed to stumble upon this very thing.

The position of the Foreign Ministry's consular police forces in south Manchuria was quite different from that of forces in other parts of Manchuria. In Fengtian and regions immediately surrounding the South Manchuria Railway Company's main line, the authority and jurisdiction of consular police had to compete with police forces of Japan's Kwantung Government-General. Beyond that, the most influential regional Chinese warlord, Zhang Zuolin, also made Fengtian his headquarters. Therefore, local Chinese authorities under Zhang's control also competed for influence over the management of Chinese, Korean, and Japanese communities in the area.⁶² As in other parts of Manchuria, the Fengtian area played host to various anti-Japanese Korean organizations. However, unlike the course of action in Jiandao where Japan had ultimately relied on unilateral solutions to the security crisis, what had emerged by late 1920 was the need to formulate a strategy for suppressing Korean independence activists in Manchuria that did not rely solely on Japanese military power in the region. Japanese authorities needed a subtler (yet still swift and uncompromising) approach that would solve their security problems while stirring up as little protest as possible from Chinese and Western voices. To those ends, a fascinating collaborative venture aimed at crushing local Korean radicalism took shape during the early 1920s. This Sino-Korean-Japanese security orga-

nization was called the *Manshū hominkai* (hereafter *MHK*), a name translatable as the Manchuria People's Protection Society.⁶³

Early in 1920, Ch'oe Ch'anggyu and a Korean associate called on the offices of the Kwantung Government-General in Lushun and presented a plan for developing a local self-defense organization in South Manchuria. After later obtaining a letter of introduction from Saitō Makoto, the governor-general of Korea, they approached the Japanese consulate in Fengtian to pitch their idea to police leadership there. By early June, the plan had been approved and the *MHK* was born.⁶⁴ Significantly, a large majority of the group's leadership were former members of the *Ilchinhoe*, a collaborationist association that helped facilitate the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. *Ilchinhoe* ideology was rooted in late nineteenth-century Tonghak religious philosophy, the Tonghak movement being the violent and xenophobic peasant uprising behind civil disturbances on the Korean peninsula during the early 1890s. The process by which this Tonghak antiforeignism became *Ilchinhoe* collaborationism is best understood as a subtle shift from suspicion and fear of all foreigners to a more focused hostility aimed at the powers of Western Europe and North America. Thus, the *Ilchinhoe* saw cooperation with Japan as the best possible strategy for combating the predatory inclinations of more powerful foreign foes.⁶⁵ As Stewart Lone has further explained, the *Ilchinhoe* had operated with two aims in mind: "reform of an unequal and unstable society and the ejection of the corrupt ruling dynasty."⁶⁶ In other words, these "pro-Japanese collaborators" were driven above all else by a desire for social and political reform within their own society. The *Ilchinhoe* judged cooperation with the Japanese to be the best way to achieve those goals. The ideological underpinnings of the *MHK*, based on a branch of Tonghak teachings called *Chōngdogyo*, were quite similar.⁶⁷

According to the group's founding manifesto, their aim was twofold.⁶⁸ One goal was the promotion of the general welfare of the Korean community in Manchuria. This would be done through educational and employment assistance, as well as by way of proper moral guidance under their religious principles. The second general aim of the organization was to stand in opposition to both radical Korean independence associations in Manchuria and the Provisional Government in Shanghai. Manchurian rebels and urban independence intellectuals were equally guilty of corrupting traditional Korean morality in the eyes of the *MHK*. Funding for the organization came largely from the Japanese colonial Government-General in Korea, but the Foreign Ministry also provided a limited amount of budgetary assistance. However, money and other resources funneled into the group were often lost to the pillaging of radical Korean opposition groups or to extortion by local Chinese authorities. Indeed, from the Chinese side the *MHK* appeared to

be a puppet organization designed to facilitate Japanese encroachment on Chinese territory and aid in undermining Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. As such, MHK members were often the target of violent re-primination by local Chinese police.⁶⁹

The early activities of the MHK included a wide variety of programs designed to improve the living conditions of local Koreans. They supported education and public health, and they also encouraged the development of local Korean entrepreneurship and economic development. In addition to these rather benign ventures, the MHK also facilitated the surveillance and arrest of Korean radicals operating throughout southern Manchuria. They provided critical intelligence by infiltrating local anti-Japanese organizations, and MHK members also participated in what amounted to political assassination squads led by Japanese *kempeitai* (military police) or Kwantung Government-General police officers.

A closer look at the details of the first official MHK “research expedition” reveals a more complete sense of the group’s operations and ideology. A Japanese report clearly indicates that a significant reason behind the establishment of the group was to deal with the problem of “disloyal Koreans” after the withdrawal of the Siberian expedition in 1922. The same report also claims that the participation of Zhang Zuolin was necessary for MHK activities, as only Zhang could instruct his local officials to protect MHK members and facilitate the group’s missions.⁷⁰ In the first budget outlay, specific amounts of money were earmarked for certain activities. Almost half of the first budget went to costs of establishing the group, and another large chunk of funds went to supporting the research expeditions. Other expenses included construction costs for *jeugyo* (the sect of Ch’ongdogyo to which many members subscribed) churches, reward money for arrests, and propaganda activities in local Korean communities. Key among those activities was the publication of a group newsletter called the *Manshū hominkai kaihō*, or *Minkaihō*.⁷¹

The “research groups” mentioned above are perhaps the most intriguing aspect of MHK operations. Nine groups of police operatives participated in the first “research” expedition in January 1921. Each team was comprised of eighteen men (ten Japanese consular and military police, five MHK members, and three provincial Chinese police officers), accounting for a total of 162 men who fanned out across southern Manchuria that month in search of “rebellious” Koreans. Their operations were carried out in secret, members were well-armed and disguised, and Zhang Zuolin’s regime in Fengtian had provided the weapons.⁷² In their first trip, which lasted eight days from May 21 to May 29, a number of arrests were made and important documents seized. Curiously, the reports on this first expedition also reveal a rather provocative pattern of behavior. With alarming regularity, suspects arrested by MHK “research” squads are said

to have put up some kind of resistance after being taken into custody, and they were subsequently shot during the scuffle. The consistency of these reports suggests that, for all intents and purposes, these MHK research teams were paramilitary death squads.⁷³

By the spring of 1921 the group had opened branches in numerous cities throughout southern Manchuria. Their early success inspired group leaders to petition for an expanded budget in March 1921.⁷⁴ In their request, the MHK leadership cited the various dangers faced by the Korean community in Manchuria. At the root of most problems was the “dangerous thought” of extremist Russian Bolshevism. This ideology, the petitioners claimed, was having a profoundly negative effect on local Korean residents, since Korean radicals, inspired by these foreign evils, abused and pillaged Korean communities, and consequently popular anti-Japanese inclinations grew ever more intense. The MHK described their own role as being the most effective tool for fighting the social destruction caused by the importation of Western communist ideology and for preserving peace and stability among what they viewed as the brotherhood of East Asians. This petition was also clear in pointing out the corruptive influence of Western religious teachings, namely Christianity, suggesting that the MHK’s dual spiritual mission was helping the fight on that front as well. Signed by sixteen of the most influential leaders in the organization, the petition was received well by Japanese authorities in Fengtian, who authorized budget increases for the coming year. Certainly, these petitioners were to some extent telling Japanese officials what they wanted to hear in order to secure financial support for their activities. The group’s eager participation in violent assaults against fellow Korean residents, however, leaves little doubt that at least some of the ideological conflict and political rivalry within their community was quite genuine.

Aiba Kiyoshi, a long-time Foreign Ministry police veteran, had been working as an interpreter in Fengtian when the MHK was founded.⁷⁵ Many years later, in September 1940, Aiba wrote up a report based on his experiences with the MHK to be included in the official Foreign Ministry police historical compendium, for which he was then serving as an editor. Although composed some fifteen years after the group’s abolition, Aiba’s report provides a number of fascinating insights into the nature of the organization.⁷⁶ On the matter of the group’s foundation and early activities, Aiba noted that the leadership of the group was indeed almost exclusively made up of former Ilchinhoe officeholders, and he also drew a fascinating comparison between MHK ideology and the contemporary Japanese concept of *Dai Ajia shugi* or “Greater East Asianism,” a rhetorical pillar of Japanese conquest in China during the 1940s. Aiba further stated unequivocally that MHK research groups had indeed carried out the pursuit and assassination of rebellious Koreans, with the full knowledge and

consent of Zhang Zuolin. He also confirmed that MHK bands joined with Japanese army units during the Jiandao Expedition of 1920–1921, hunting down and shooting suspected Korean radicals.

In Aiba's estimation, the activities of the MHK had ultimately produced numerous positive results. Both the number of "rebel gangs" (*futei dan*) and the scope of their disruptive activities were reduced during the MHK years of operation. Travel by Japanese civilians in Korea-Manchuria border regions had been made safer, Aiba claimed, and resistance groups faced greater difficulty in extorting money from local communities. The MHK had also served usefully, according to Aiba, as a conduit by which Japan-friendly ideas could be infused into local Korean communities, especially through their educational activities. Finally, border crossings from Manchuria into the Korean peninsula by "rebel gangs" decreased, and border incursions by Korean colonial police bureau forces became less frequent, helping smooth out Sino-Japanese relations in the area.⁷⁷

It would seem, then, that Japanese authorities had found an answer to their delicate diplomatic problem. Radical Korean independence fighters were being suppressed, and it was being done without stirring the anger of local Chinese officials. In fact, local Chinese authorities were making the work possible. The early success did not last, however, as this attempt at counterinsurgency through indigenous collaborators soon fell victim to many of the difficulties that plague similar strategies in other geopolitical environments.

Despite the operational success and budgetary enthusiasm of 1921, problems began to emerge in the organization by the end of 1922. In September of that year, Japanese authorities convened a general conference of regional MHK leadership in Fengtian. Japanese Consul-General Akatsuka Shōsuke identified a number of problematic issues in his opening remarks, in particular the matter of ideological divisions within the MHK. These differences needed to be addressed, but Akatsuka argued that the more pressing problem was the breakdown of cooperation between Japanese and Chinese security forces in efforts to suppress radical Korean resistance activity in Manchuria.⁷⁸ By the spring of 1923, however, the problems identified by Akatsuka had not been resolved. In fact, internal dissension and factionalization within the MHK had intensified. A petition filed by a small group of regional MHK leaders in April is indicative of the suspicions and mutual distrust that was beginning to tear the organization apart from the inside. After reviewing the history and mission of the organization, the petitioners brought up the matter of 25,000 yen earmarked for its activities that had mysteriously disappeared. While the accusation was vague, Ch'oe was mentioned by name in the complaint, a clear hint that his enemies suspected him of embezzlement.⁷⁹ By July, this same group of insiders was

openly accusing Ch'oe and other high-level MHK officials of appropriating funds for their own personal use. "Ch'oe speaks of serving the good of the people," they stated, "but in his heart he serves only himself."⁸⁰ The petition went on to describe a list of twenty-one crimes perpetrated by Ch'oe against the group and the Korean community in Manchuria as a whole. In short, the document was more than just a statement of censure; it was a call for Ch'oe's expulsion from the organization.

To some Japanese officials, particularly those in the Kwantung Government-General, internal dissension such as this was proof that the MHK was a dismal failure. In fact, Japanese critics of the organization identified three main problems. First, radical Korean groups saw MHK members as running dogs of Japanese imperialism and thus targeted them and their families for violent intimidation and sometimes even assassination. Second, local Chinese authorities were also growing increasingly hostile to the MHK for reasons similar to those of radical Korean opposition forces, namely that the organization seemed to be a front for Japanese encroachment on Chinese sovereignty. Finally, as evidenced by the claims against Ch'oe, the MHK itself was disintegrating from within due to ideological conflicts between its members. The solution was simple according to the critics. First, the MHK had to be completely shut down and then replaced with a more low-key Korean residents' association like those already in operation throughout Manchuria. Finally, former leaders of the group would have to be paid off with a handsome severance package, with extra careful attention to Ch'oe because of his deep connections to the Fengtian consulate.⁸¹

In October 1923, fearful that his organization would soon be on the chopping block, Ch'oe wrote to Foreign Minister Ijūin in defense of the MHK. He argued that inflammatory propaganda of rival religious sects had exaggerated the degree of internal division within his group. Furthermore, he suggested that competition between Japanese institutions was the driving force behind efforts to disband the MHK, by which he meant the jurisdictional rivalry between the Kwantung Government-General and the Foreign Ministry's consular offices in South Manchuria.⁸² The opponents of the MHK however, were, determined to put an end to its operations. So much so, in fact, that Foreign Ministry officials in Tokyo had quickly resigned themselves to the inevitable dissolution of the group. In planning a strategy for dealing with local conditions after the MHK was no more, Gaimushō authorities in Tokyo instructed local Manchurian consuls to collect weapons from MHK members who had participated in armed "research trips" along with Japanese police and soldiers as well as to assemble and safely store documents related to MHK operations. Furthermore, because the MHK had been especially useful as an intelligence-gathering tool, such operations were sure to suffer once the group was

disbanded, so consuls were instructed to compensate for that loss by going back to more traditional use of spies and paid informants.⁸³

The group was finally disbanded in early 1924 despite the protests of Ch'oe and Fengtian Consul Akatsuka, who continued to defend its utility in the face of criticism from the Kwantung Government-General and the absence of support from high-level Foreign Ministry leadership. As Ch'oe and others had predicted, MHK members quickly became the targets of violent reprisals by radical Korean activists. Ch'oe himself fell victim to this vengeance when a band of radical Korean assassins invaded his home in Fengtian in June 1924. They had intended to kill Ch'oe, but when they discovered him to be away from the house, they murdered his wife and mother-in-law instead. The Fengtian consular police gave chase that day, shooting and killing one of the nine assassins. A second was shot the following day, and the remaining seven were arrested and taken into Japanese custody. In a chilling statement given to the Japanese police, one of the assailants sent a message directly to Ch'oe. "We may have failed the first time, but there will be a second and a third," he proclaimed. "We will follow you all the way to Tokyo!"⁸⁴

In July, Ch'oe made a final desperate and impassioned plea for support from Japanese authorities. He began by arguing that the three greatest threats to peace and stability in Manchuria were American missionaries with their Christian propaganda, Russian Bolsheviks with their Communist propaganda, and the violence of radical Korean resistance groups. The MHK had been established to combat all of these "evils," and in Ch'oe's view they had done just that. Since their inception, the group had protected "decent" Korean civilians from dangerous revolutionaries, broken up dozens of rebel groups, and seized mountains of secret and sensitive documents. All of that work had made them targets of recriminatory violence from radical Koreans, Ch'oe explained, and the protection of Japanese authorities was all that kept them safe. By eliminating the group, Ch'oe continued, some two hundred families or roughly a thousand people were sure to face severe poverty, hardship, and perhaps even worse. In fact, Ch'oe suggested that the order to shut down the MHK was in effect a death warrant for those two hundred families.⁸⁵

Ch'oe's pleas, however, fell on deaf ears, as the Foreign Ministry never revitalized his organization. To turn back to the recollections of Aiba Kiyoshi, he commented in his 1940 report on the conditions that brought about the dissolution of the MHK. According to Aiba's account, Consul Akatsuka had argued that Japan's greatest priority then was to crush radical anti-Japanese groups in Manchuria, and the MHK was clearly the most effective Japan-friendly group around to help achieve that greater goal. Yamagata Isaburō, of the Kwantung Government-General, however, claimed that MHK activities were "immoral" and had brought great pain

and misery to many innocent civilians. The Japanese government, according to Yamagata, could no longer provide assistance to such a group, regardless of their utility in realizing other political goals.⁸⁶

Despite Yamagata's moralism, the likely reason for his attacks on the MHK was institutional jealousy. During the early 1920s, the Kwantung Government-General had been forced to recognize the jurisdiction of Foreign Ministry police in areas of South Manchuria where its leadership believed their own police units should have greater authority.⁸⁷ The MHK was a consular project, so destroying it was one way to undermine Foreign Ministry police authority in the area. This is indicative of the endemic jurisdictional rivalry that plagued Japan's network of colonial offices throughout northeast Asia.

Stepping up the Pressure: 1925

As should be evident by this point, the Korean independence movement in exile presented the Gaimushō with a host of difficult problems on the informal frontiers of the empire, and these difficulties were compounded by anxiety over the activities of Japanese communists who posed an internal threat to the stability of the domestic political landscape. In Shanghai and other treaty port cities, where these two movements converged, the Japanese consular police were still quite small numerically and the scope of their budget and operations accordingly limited. In Manchuria, the Foreign Ministry had larger numbers of police officers attached to the consulate offices, but opposition from the Chinese side severely circumscribed their activities. By 1925, however, the evolution of the Japanese consular police had reached a critical stage. In Shanghai, they moved to diversify their personnel to include keen specialists in political surveillance, the first such step to be taken by the Gaimushō in China proper. Simultaneously in Manchuria, a new collaborative relationship with the Chinese aimed at managing the problem of Korean resistance in exile was sealed in ink, if not always in practice.

The May 30 incident of 1925, in which British police gunned down a dozen Chinese students in Shanghai during a peaceful protest against foreign corporate exploitation of local Chinese workers, inspired a surge of Chinese nationalist sentiment that in turn provided critical momentum to the drive for more political police in the Shanghai consulate. The original push for that expansion, however, had come several months earlier when, in March, Shanghai Consul Yada Shichitarō spelled out a plan to Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō for the reorganization of consular police forces in the port. Because the civilian Japanese population in Shanghai had grown considerably in recent years, Yada pointed out, the ratio of police officers to residents in the concession area was

much lower than in the homeland (*naichi*). In addition, the growth of radical political movements and resident Korean independence activists demanded, according to Yada, that a new office devoted solely to political surveillance be set up to combat such urban elements.⁸⁸

However, not just expansion, Yada contended, but also improvement of existing police facilities was necessary. One particular area targeted for reform was related to the origins of consular police personnel. Yada argued, for example, that police chiefs from the Home Ministry in Tokyo should not be appointed as consular police chiefs. Likewise, he continued, the practice of sending police staff from Taiwan and Korea to serve as Gaimushō police in China should also be abandoned. Why? Yada explained, echoing arguments made by consular officials in South Manchuria, that having so many different institutions and bureaucracies involved in staffing and financing consular police operations was inefficient and confusing. In terms of general reforms, Yada also claimed that overall Gaimushō police numbers had to be increased, *tokkō* capabilities expanded, and police commissioners drawn from the Gaimushō whenever possible. Finally, he noted that his police department was in dire need of more officers with English, Russian, Korean, and Chinese language skills.⁸⁹

An official Foreign Ministry directive put Yada's plan for expansion into effect in early 1926.⁹⁰ Later that year, a more specific order related to an increase of intelligence-related personnel made clear the new direction that the Shanghai consular police were taking after 1925. The August cable from Yada elaborated on his logic, giving Kasumigaseki additional reasons for the targeted expansion of intelligence operations. Shanghai had become a global center of communist activism, Yada reiterated, and the May 25 incident and its related anti-Japanese boycotts heightened the degree of labor unrest in the city, leaving Japanese businesses in need of greater police protection. Finally, Yada argued, the activities of Korean independence radicals were still serious, and expanded powers of surveillance and arrest were necessary to suppress them.⁹¹ Cooperation with the French in advancing some of these aims began slowly to improve after 1925, but there were still impediments to the efficient exchange of intelligence between the two sides. Japanese homeland authorities did finally turn over information regarding the exiled independence activist Prince Cường Đê to French authorities, but the value of the intelligence was marginal at best, leaving the French side less than satisfied. Why were the Japanese still holding back? First, they lacked confidence in the value of what information on Koreans in Shanghai the French might be willing to share in return for their cooperation. They had heard French promises before, but did not trust them entirely. Second, many high-level figures in the Japanese government such as Inukai Tsuyoshi were still supportive of Prince Cường Đê and his exiled Vietnamese compatriots.⁹²

Consular police leadership in Shanghai, then, was clearly moving to intensify and expand police operations against Korean radicalism during 1925–1926, while simultaneously taking steps to consolidate their authority in the field and clarify the jurisdictional boundaries between themselves and Japan's other colonial institutions. In Manchuria, too, the consular police entered a new era, but it was not entirely of their own making. Foremost among the many problems triggered by the Jian-dao Expedition was sensitivity among Japanese authorities in Manchuria to public opinion regarding Japan's actions in the region. As such, collaborative arrangements with local Chinese security forces to deal with the Korean problem became the most sought-after solution, the ill-fated MHK being one such project. In the summer of 1925, however, the police bureau chief of the Korea Government-General made a deal with the police chief of Zhang Zuolin's Fengtian regime that provided a new framework of Sino-Japanese cooperation in the management of Manchurian Koreans.

Later dubbed the Mitsuya Agreement, its consequences have largely escaped the purview of Western scholars for decades. Inoue Manabu, however, pointed out the peculiar significance of this moment in north-east Asian interregional politics over thirty years ago, suggesting that the 1925 accord dramatically embodied the perplexing contradictions at work in relations among Japanese imperialists, Chinese landlord elites, regional warlords, and a socially fractured Korean diaspora community in Manchuria.⁹³ Specifically, the agreement reached between Mitsuya Miyamatsu and his Chinese counterpart in Fengtian, Yu Cheng, contained eight main articles that stated: (1) Chinese authorities would keep an accurate census of resident Koreans, and those Koreans would be responsible for monitoring each other's behavior; (2) Chinese authorities would order all resident Koreans to refrain from entering Korea with arms, offenders to be arrested and handed over to Japanese officials; (3) Chinese would disband all societies of "disloyal Koreans" and confiscate their weapons; (4) local Chinese police would conduct periodic raids on suspected Korean organizations; (5) Chinese authorities would immediately arrest all Koreans on a list provided by Japanese authorities in Korea; (6) Chinese and Japanese authorities would share intelligence regarding operations against disloyal Korean organizations; (7) Chinese and Japanese police would not trespass into each other's territory; (8) both sides would come to a resolution of previous incidents in a timely manner.⁹⁴

Several factors can help to explain how and why the Mitsuya Agreement was reached. For the Chinese, the activities of radical Korean independence groups were potentially dangerous because they gave the Japanese an excuse to violate Chinese territorial sovereignty in their pursuit of those "rebellious" Koreans; collaboration with the Japanese against

the Koreans thus served the “nationalist” interests of the Chinese. For Japanese authorities, interestingly, the Mitsuya Agreement represented a withdrawal from the policy advocated since 1915. At that time, Japan asserted its exclusive right to supervise Koreans in Manchuria as imperial subjects. However, overly zealous pursuit of Korean radicals by Japanese police had caused numerous clashes with local Chinese authorities. Therefore, to improve relations with China in the wake of rising anti-Japanese sentiment there, it was necessary to turn over responsibility for the suppression of Korean radicals to the Chinese side to as great a degree as possible.⁹⁵

What did the agreement mean in terms of the relationship between the police forces of the Korean Government-General and the Japanese consular police in Manchuria? Colonial police bureau veteran Kamio Kazuharu provided some answers at a Kyoto University seminar in 1959.⁹⁶ Kamio explained that the Jiandao consular police were critical of the Mitsuya Agreement because it seemed to undermine the position of Gaimushō police in the region. In principle, the agreement implied that the local consular police force was inadequate in terms of both strength and efficacy. In practice, the agreement sometimes even excluded the Jiandao consular police, in 1925 the largest body of Gaimushō police in northeast Asia, from meaningful participation in regional political security operations. Significantly, the Kwantung Army also criticized the agreement because it left sensitive and critical strategic concerns too much in the hands of local Chinese security forces. However, to the Korean Government-General, only local Chinese police had the ability to effectively penetrate the deepest recesses of the Manchurian interior in order to locate the suspected Korean radicals who were the colonial police’s greatest concern, and then turn them over to Japanese authorities.⁹⁷ In short, then, the agreement represents a significant moment at which the shared concerns of the Jiandao consular police and the Kwantung Army seemed to put both at odds with colonial authorities in Korea.

Despite the controversy, the number of disturbances led by “recalcitrant Koreans” in Manchuria decreased dramatically in 1925–1926, suggesting that the Mitsuya Agreement had begun to yield valuable results. Chinese police were zealous in their pursuit of suspected Korean radicals, motivated in no small part by the financial incentives often offered by Japanese officials in Korea for arrests, although entirely innocent Korean residents in Manchuria also often faced harassment by Chinese security forces. Nonetheless, with newly enthusiastic Chinese support, the police campaign against Korean communists in Manchuria scored a major victory in 1927. Police units from the Jiandao consulate raided a meeting of the East Manchurian branch of the Korean Communist Party (KCP) held in Longjincun, arresting several dozen leading members of the party and seizing thousands of pages of sensitive party docu-

ments. From these materials, Japanese police came to learn a tremendous number of details concerning the organization and membership of the Korean communist movement in Manchuria.⁹⁸ Indeed, Dae-sook Suh has noted in his history of the Korean nationalist movement that, due to the more effective collaboration of Sino-Japanese police forces, “Manchuria ceased to be a haven in which the Communists could strengthen their forces.”⁹⁹ While the number of KCP members arrested and ultimately sent back to Korea for incarceration was relatively small, Suh points out that “the Japanese consulate police had the names of the most important Communists . . . , which made future activities of the Communists extremely difficult.”¹⁰⁰

The conclusion of the Mitsuya Agreement in 1925 thus marked a clear turning point in several ways for the history of Japanese consular police operations in Jiandao. The year 1925 was, of course, also a key turning point in the evolution of metropolitan police work. In that year, the Japanese Diet passed the Peace Preservation Law, which enabled the state to arrest and prosecute anyone suspected of activities designed to alter the “national polity” (*kokutai*) or deny the system of private property. While the 1925 law is often viewed as a signifier of the imperial state’s repressive nature, it is important to remember that the final law was the product of negotiation between the Justice and Home ministries; Justice Ministry officials had sought harsher terms for the law, but these were tempered by Home Ministry bureaucrats.¹⁰¹ Even so, the law does mark the point at which the state authorities took a firmer stand against the rising tide of radical social movements at home, and this was more than just a matter of silencing domestic political opposition. In fact, a lengthy report from the metropolitan police department produced in June 1925 illuminates the interconnectivity of imperial resistance and its suppression during that critical year. In tracing the long history of the socialist movement in Japan, the report highlighted the role of Korean socialists in facilitating the survival of the Japanese left by way of their position as a conduit with the Soviet Union—a role they were still playing in 1925.¹⁰² Thus, the Peace Preservation Law, the Mitsuya Agreement, and the opening of a *tokkō* office in the Shanghai consulate-general can all be viewed as steps toward the same goal: suppression of political dissent, Korean and Japanese alike.

Finally, just as the character of Japanese consular police work in China was changing dramatically by 1925, it is important to recognize that the rising tide of nationalist consciousness in China was also reaching new heights in that year and after. Chiang Kai-shek’s military campaigns to wrest provincial authority from the hands of regional warlords, as well as the broader rights recovery movement aimed at undoing the unequal treaty system and restoring Chinese sovereign rights, both contributed to

the emergence of a local political environment within which Japanese police forces would find it more and more difficult to secure Chinese collaboration with their security measures against Korean resistance groups. It is both ironic and unfortunate, then, that during the same year that saw the conclusion of the Mitsuya Agreement, the foundations upon which the efficacy of that concord rested simultaneously began to erode. To that topic the discussion will turn more directly in the next chapter.

Conclusions

The degree to which fear of a united front of Japanese and Korean socialists actually reflected the functioning relationship between the two groups is doubtful, of course, since many Japanese socialists, like most of Japanese society at the time, often tended to view Koreans as inferior to themselves; moreover, the Japanese socialist movement as a whole lacked a truly dynamic internationalism.¹⁰³ It is important to remember, even so, that the perception on the part of imperial government police forces that these groups were part and parcel of the same threat is in a way reminiscent of early U.S. Cold War geopolitical rhetoric that conflated Soviet and Chinese communism as two prongs of the same “red menace.” In both cases, the most threatening ideological dimensions of the enemy were over-emphasized while clear differences of culture, tradition, ethnicity, and national identity were downplayed or outright ignored. Whether U.S. ideologues, for examples, genuinely believed during the early 1950s that Mao was a proxy stooge of the Kremlin, or simply used such rhetoric to justify their policies, does not change the fact that it was an effective motivational force. Likewise, even if the Foreign Ministry, Home Ministry, and Korean Government-General deliberately overstated the likelihood that socialist ideology could unite Japanese, Korean, and Chinese dissenters into a potent force of resistance to the imperial Japanese state, that the case was made in those terms at all is what matters most in the present evaluation of Gaimushō police activity. The Foreign Ministry justified the expansion of its police networks in Shanghai and elsewhere as a measure to counter this transnational threat. Real or imagined, the threat nonetheless served its purpose.

To be sure, all of the foreign powers in Shanghai sought to suppress leftist movements there, since “the Shanghai Municipal Police and the French Concession Police were both part of global colonial networks of imperial control systems.”¹⁰⁴ In this sense, the British, French, and Japanese all shared a common political security concern regarding the presence in Shanghai of Indian, Vietnamese, and Korean nationalists and communists. For the Japanese, however, this concern was especially acute. Compared to Paris or London, Shanghai was a mere stone’s throw from the metropoli-

tan center of the imperial Japanese state in Tokyo. This being so, communist activism there posed a far more immediate threat to the stability of domestic society in the eyes of Japanese authorities. The vigor with which metropolitan police pursued the left at home leaves little doubt that the conservative imperial bureaucracy believed the threat was quite real. Likewise, the fact that the Foreign Ministry devoted so much time and resources to policing radical resistance throughout the informal empire strongly suggests that their professed mission to protect and control overseas Japanese, too, was more than shallow spin meant merely to screen the brute violence of imperial expansionism. Recognizing this factor certainly does not justify Japanese violations of Chinese sovereignty in the pursuit of political security imperatives, but rather reminds one of the complex regional dynamics at work in Japanese police operations in Shanghai.

In the broadest sense, the character of Japanese consular police activity and ideology clearly began to change after 1919. No longer functioning simply as a local public health and security force, the *Gaimushō* began using its police networks on the ground in China and Manchuria to execute the surveillance and suppression of radical Korean independence activism as well as Japanese socialism, and it is significant that this transformation began to take shape during the early 1920s. The operations of Korean independence activists in China, and the response of the Japanese consular police to their perceived threat, need to be recognized as a powerful factor in the evolution of Foreign Ministry perceptions and policy. Similarly, while it is certainly true that “anticommunism served as a colonial discourse of exclusion” by which Japanese authorities could justify their suppression of nationalist independence movements, this is an incomplete and ultimately unsatisfactory explanation of Japanese policy when one considers the political significance of connections between Korean nationalists and Japanese socialists.¹⁰⁵ Anticommunism had as much to do with securing the ideological conformity of the home islands as with crushing anticolonial resistance movements, and the Japanese consular police occupied a key position at the intersection of both concerns. In doing so, they functioned as a branch of the Foreign Ministry that shared many of the same concerns, attitudes, and prerogatives as other arms of Japan’s conservative imperial bureaucracy.

4

Opposition, Escalation, and Integration

On May 8, 2002, a small group of tired and desperate North Korean refugees rushed the gates of Japanese Consulate-General office in Shenyang, China, seeking political asylum. An armed contingent of local Chinese police quickly stormed after them and dragged the ragged travelers kicking and screaming from the consulate grounds. In the aftermath of this relatively insignificant local fracas, as dramatic videotape of the incident appeared on news broadcasts in Japan for weeks on end, many Japanese politicians and media outlets used the episode to criticize the Chinese government for its blatant disregard for Japanese jurisdictional authority within the confines of its own consular compound.¹ Obviously, the early twenty-first century geopolitical context of this clash was vastly different from the local environment of the 1920s within which Chinese and Japanese authorities fought doggedly with much more at stake over the contentious issue of which side possessed legitimate jurisdictional prerogatives over the Korean resident population in China's northeastern provinces. Even so, the 2002 incident was nonetheless a dramatic reminder of an earlier era characterized by considerable ambiguity in the geographical, cultural, and political borders of northeast Asian society. Perhaps it is no small irony either that Shenyang, known in the 1930s as Mukden, was also the site of the opening salvo of Japan's campaign to conquer Manchuria in September 1931—a conquest often justified at the time as necessary to protect the rights of Korean subjects of the Japanese empire.

It is the nature of that conquest to which the discussion must now turn. As illustrated in Chapter 3, the year 1925 marked a significant point in the evolution of consular police strategy regarding the problem of Korean resistance in exile in two major ways. In Manchuria, a mutually satisfactory Sino-Japanese collaborative relationship had been achieved for the moment through the Mitsuya Agreement. In Shanghai, while truly effective cooperation with French concession authorities had still not been realized, the Japanese consular police there escalated the intensity of their commitment to deal with the Korean problem by creating a distinct *tokkō* section within their office. It thus seemed as if an effective framework for dealing with the problem of Korean resistance in

exile, and its equally important relationship to the Japanese socialist underground, had finally been achieved.

However, a combination of circumstances in 1927–1928 led Foreign Minister Shidehara to initiate a series of initiatives aimed at lowering the public profile of Japan’s consular police in China and Manchuria. In short, Chinese nationalism was making Sino-Japanese police collaboration increasingly difficult in urban areas and the mere presence of Japanese consular police increasingly controversial. Shidehara’s attempts to appease Chinese sentiment, however, proved to be in vain. Political security conditions in Manchuria took a turn for the worse in 1930, and the consular police responded to those developments with vigor. While Shidehara tried to contain the situation and stay on course with plans to relinquish more security duties to Chinese police authorities, his efforts were undermined by the Foreign Ministry’s own police leadership in the field. When the Kwantung Army made its move on Fengtian in September 1931 the crisis escalated, and by the spring of 1932 consular police forces were fighting side by side with Kwantung Army units in local campaigns to suppress resistance to the Japanese conquest of Manchuria. By also linking this story to related “terrorist” attacks and police operations in Shanghai and Tokyo in 1929 and 1932, this chapter will reveal a portrait of the Gaimushō’s role in the invasion of Manchuria that differs remarkably from most orthodox interpretations. Far from standing in stark opposition to the expansionist impulses of the Kwantung Army, the Foreign Ministry’s commitment to policing radical politics beyond the boundaries of the formal empire placed it at the forefront of Japanese encroachments upon Chinese sovereignty.²

The Collapse of Sino-Japanese Cooperation

As noted earlier, the consequences of the Mitsuya Agreement were immediate and impressive. Despite the early successes, however, Suematsu Kichiji, the police chief at the Jiandao consulate, had some serious reservations about both the utility and the propriety of the Mitsuya Agreement. As such, he made a number of suggestions regarding the best course for Japanese action in dealing with the Korean problem in mid-1926. As early as 1921, Suematsu had warned the Foreign Ministry about the dangers of Communist infiltration among Manchurian Korean communities, and this concern grew only greater over the years. First among his recommendations was an expanded budget for intelligence-gathering operations focused specifically on communist activities. He also argued that Japan should maintain close links with local schools and media outlets to guide Korean residents away from “harmful thought,” as well as set up private schools run by the Japanese to accomplish the same goals. More police

personnel with skills in translating local communist propaganda were also crucial according to Suematsu, and while he agreed that cooperation with local Chinese security forces was desirable to the greatest extent possible, he had little faith in the efficacy of that strategy. In his view, Japan needed to develop a deeper understanding of the local conditions faced by Koreans in order to deal effectively with their problems.³

Gaimushō police in Jiandao thus expressed serious doubts regarding the framework of Sino-Japanese cooperation based on the Mitsuya Agreement. But the Korea Government-General's position came under attack from another direction in September 1927, when the Chinese government initiated a systematic policy of persecuting Manchurian Koreans. Chinese actions included preventing the sale of land to Koreans, blocking Korean settlement farther into the Manchurian interior, closing Korean schools, and harassing pro-Japanese organizations of local Korean residents. This hostility can be explained by several factors, each with deep roots. First, since the annexation of Korea and the beginnings of Japanese extraterritoriality extending over Koreans, Korean residents seemed, to the Chinese side, to represent a local vanguard of Japan's invasion of Manchuria and Mongolia. Second, the presence of radical Korean resistance groups, especially Communists, was both a disruptive social force and a source of Sino-Japanese diplomatic friction, which in turn gave Japanese authorities excuses to violate Chinese sovereignty and to pressure domestic Chinese political figures. Third, by not allowing Koreans to naturalize as Chinese and then pressing for the right of these "Japanese" Koreans to buy and own land, Japan was blatantly violating Chinese law.⁴ In short, many of the concerns related to resident Koreans that had often facilitated Chinese collaboration with Japanese authorities during the early 1920s were now making that collaboration more and more unsustainable.⁵

While Chinese nationalism was beginning to chip away at the framework of collaboration between Japanese colonial police in Korea and Zhang Zuolin's regime in Fengtian, the Foreign Ministry itself also grew increasingly more concerned with the potential threat posed by the rising tide of Chinese nationalism to its own position in the Jiandao region. Demonstrations in Shanghai following the May 30 incident of 1925 had already awakened Gaimushō leaders to the power of popular anti-Japanese demonstrations in China. But when the Foreign Ministry attempted to set up a sub-office of the Andong consulate in 1927, they met face to face with an intensity of Chinese resistance they had not previously confronted in the northeastern provinces.⁶

Much like the situation faced by Gaimushō police in Jiandao, consular leaders in Andong were consumed with problems associated with their local Korean populations. However, unlike Jiandao, which had possessed a sizeable police force since 1909, the Japanese consulate at An-

dong was understaffed. As such, the Andong consul had asked as early as 1923 for a new subconsulate to be opened in Maoershan. The Korea Government-General, which also had an interest in strengthening the apparatus of control over Koreans near Andong, had also pressured the Gaimushō in 1924 to open a new facility in Maoershan; so in June 1924 Shidehara instructed minister Yoshizawa Kenkichi in Beijing to ask the Chinese for official permission to do so. The Chinese, however, refused on the grounds that Maoershan was not an “open settlement” (*kaihōchi*). The Foreign Ministry raised the issue again in 1926, asking the Korea Government-General for assistance in persuading the Chinese to acquiesce. After 1925, however, colonial authorities in Korea were of a different opinion on the matter. The Mitsuya Agreement, of course, was by that time acting as the framework for security cooperation between colonial authorities in Korea and local Chinese officials. Therefore, the Government-General would have been in violation of the agreement had it helped the Gaimushō set up new offices along the Sino-Korean border.⁷

Undaunted, the Foreign Ministry continued its drive to expand the jurisdictional grip of the Andong consulate by opening a subconsulate at Maoershan.⁸ In early 1927, a police chief from the Hunchun consulate was assigned to be the new chief at the Maoershan office, and four patrolmen accompanied him in March on his first visit to the future site of the office to survey the area and make preparations for construction. Rumors soon spread through the local Chinese community that the office was meant to be a new step toward the Japanese invasion of sovereign Chinese territory, and by April anti-Japanese pamphlets began to circulate in greater volume. Local Chinese residents even formed protest associations that filed formal petitions of opposition to the new subconsulate, taking their case to Chinese and Japanese officials in Fengtian. By May, the protest movement had spread beyond Andong to other parts of South Manchuria, with petitions being filed with greater regularity and formal opposition groups continuing to build support.⁹

Throughout the spring and summer of 1927, the colonial regime in Korea refused to aid the Gaimushō in pressing its case for the necessity and legitimacy of a subconsulate office in Maoershan. The Foreign Ministry was thus left to push the issue with Chinese authorities on its own. In March 1927, Shidehara told Yoshizawa in Beijing to give the Chinese two main reasons for setting up the new office. First, because the volume of trade had increased so much in the area during recent years, additional consular staff and offices were necessary to manage the local economy. Second, the jurisdictional authority of the Andong consulate was simply stretched too thin. Significantly, Shidehara stressed the economic imperatives that were driving the expansion, not concerns about matters of political security. The Chinese side, however, continued to resist, as the pressure

from local opposition groups often headed by community leaders in business and education proved to be an influential force.¹⁰

The Foreign Ministry did eventually open the subconsulate at Maoershan despite the vociferous opposition to it. That opposition, however, did not subside; in fact, it intensified. Consequently, the Maoershan subconsulate was compelled to close its doors for good in the summer of 1929, and its staff returned to the main office at Andong.¹¹ The protests at Maoershan, however, are significant for a number of reasons, most of which are related to the Mitsuya Agreement of 1925. To the Chinese, the agreement provided a clear framework for Sino-Japanese cooperation in the management of local Koreans. The Foreign Ministry's insistence on opening a new office along the Chinese side of the Korean border could thus only be interpreted as a move of aggression by the Japanese. However, the episode may be more important for what it reveals about the relations between different appendages of the Japanese colonial presence in northeast Asia. Why did the Foreign Ministry insist on pressing its case in the face of ardent Chinese opposition and without the support of the Korea Government-General? It must be remembered that the Mitsuya Agreement was struck between Korea Government-General police and Chinese security forces in Fengtian. With the agreement, the Korea Government-General had in a sense sacrificed Gaimushō claims of Japanese authority over resident Koreans in Manchuria. Therefore, Foreign Ministry persistence about opening the Maoershan office can be viewed as a struggle to exercise the power it had been stripped of by the 1925 accord and thereby protect the integrity of its jurisdictional authority in Manchuria.¹²

Years after Japan's surrender, former Government-General official Kamio Kazuharu made an insightful, if a bit snide and condescending, remark on this matter of consular police determination to defend their position in the northeastern provinces. Whenever Government-General police crossed the border into Jiandao, Kamio noted, the consular police would demand that they pull out, citing the fact that only the Gaimushō held authority there. However, as soon as some kind of large disturbance broke out, something that was beyond consular police capacity to quell, Kamio claimed, they were quick to beg for help from the Korean Government-General police.¹³ Putting aside his contemptuous tone, Kamio's comments nonetheless reveal a great deal about the institutional rivalry that surely fueled Foreign Ministry persistence in this case.

By 1928, then, the collaborative strategy embodied by the Mitsuya Agreement was being significantly undermined by two forces. First, the rising tide of Chinese national consciousness made cooperation with the Japanese increasingly difficult. Even though Chinese officials saw Korean radicalism as a disruptive force that needed to be extinguished, the Japanese presence in Manchuria was also viewed as more and more

onerous. Second, jurisdictional rivalry among Japan's own colonial institutions weakened the potential efficacy of the Mitsuya accord. Significantly, the Jiandao consular police and the Kwantung Army shared the belief that the agreement had gone too far in relinquishing Japanese jurisdictional prerogatives to the Chinese, and such shared views between the consular police and the army would come to facilitate greater cooperation between them during the early 1930s.

Upon his return to the position of Foreign Minister in 1929, Shidehara quickly recognized the need to address the first of those problems by moving to appease rising anti-Japanese sentiments in China. One step in particular, closely linked with plans eventually to abrogate extraterritoriality in China, was to scale back the physical presence of Japanese consular police forces. To achieve this goal, the Asia Bureau of the Foreign Ministry issued a plan for the "improvement" of Japan's consular police forces in China and Manchuria in August 1929. The plan focused first on the matter of nomenclature. Citing the fact that Chinese authorities had never officially recognized the legitimacy of police forces attached to Japanese consular facilities, the 1929 directive declared that such police stations would no longer be referred to as "police" stations. Instead, all signs, stationery, name cards, and so on, would simply identify the occupants as consular employees. Similarly, the custom of having consular police wear distinctive military-like uniforms, making them largely indistinguishable from Kwantung Army police, was also a source of conflict with the Chinese. So, consular police in many offices were directed to perform their duties in civilian attire.¹⁴ Aside from lowering the visual profile of the consular police, steps were also taken to improve the professionalism of the police officers themselves and further hone their skills in local languages.¹⁵

While Chinese resentment and suspicion of Japan's consular police in urban centers like Tianjin, Shanghai, and Canton had certainly motivated Shidehara's reform mission, it was Chinese opposition to Japanese police in Manchuria that continued to dominate the concerns of Kasumigaseki. In September 1929, Shidehara expressed to Jiandao Consul Okada Kanekazu his hope that a further deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations because of the police problem could be avoided. Citing the recent proliferation of Chinese petitions, especially in Jiandao, Shidehara pointed out that not only did the Chinese want to put an end to the opening of additional Japanese police stations, they wanted currently operating facilities shut down. Violent clashes between Chinese and Japanese police in Manchuria, which were becoming increasingly common, only added more fuel to the fire. Thus, Shidehara suggested, Japanese consular police should allow local Chinese security forces to handle daily criminal affairs as much as possible.¹⁶

More formally, the Foreign Ministry issued a general directive to all

consular police in Jiandao in May 1930. The report began by describing a string of recent violent incidents rooted in anti-Japanese orientation of many Chinese officials and the rising tide of the rights recovery movement. While the security crisis might lead one to argue that more Japanese police were needed, personnel increases only further stoked the fires of Chinese hostility. Improving cooperation and communication with local Chinese police was the only alternative. To achieve that goal, four issues were of critical importance: (1) Japanese police must be sure they had sufficient evidence when making an arrest; (2) better cooperation was needed to prevent unnecessary harassment of Korean civilians by Chinese military police; (3) intelligence needed to be shared with the Chinese side; (4) intelligence gathering and analysis had to be improved. In short, better intelligence could prevent altercations with the Chinese before they occurred.¹⁷

While Shidehara pursued an agenda based on appeasing the rising tide of anti-Japanese nationalism in China by lowering the profile of Japanese consular police forces there, other elements within the Gaimushō were pushing for an expansion of consular police numbers and facilities in Manchuria. In his correspondences with Fengtian Consul Hayashi Kyūjirō in August 1928, for example, Arita Hachirō of the Foreign Ministry's Asia Bureau detailed plans for the aggrandizement of consular police forces in Manchuria to "protect" Japanese resident communities there. His plan was to expand consular police power at the expense of the Kwantung Leased Territory Government by cutting the budget for their police forces operating within South Manchurian consulates. The Kantō-chō, not surprisingly, opposed the plan, and this dispute was placed at the center of negotiations then under way with the Home Ministry over police budgets for the coming year.¹⁸

By April of 1929, the Asia Bureau had a more detailed plan for the expansion of consular police forces in Manchuria. The report focused on four main topics: (1) the enrichment of consular police to protect residents and "increase profits" in Manchuria; (2) the integration of Japanese police forces in Manchuria, largely under the direction of Gaimushō police forces; (3) the investigation and control of the communist movement in China, including Chinese, Korean, Soviet, and Japanese activists; and (4) the reform of consular prisons in Manchuria.¹⁹ The Asia Bureau, however, was not unaware of the problems that Shidehara was trying to solve with his plans to reform the consular police and hopefully make them a less onerous presence in the eyes of local Chinese. In fact, the Asia Bureau had its own plan for reforming the consular police in August 1929. It was based on recognition that the rising tide of the Chinese rights recovery movement often targeted the injustices of extraterritoriality. Chinese attacks on the consular police as an infringement on Chinese national sovereignty were thus becoming more and more common. To counter this

problem and to avoid direct clashes with Chinese security forces in Manchuria, the Japanese consular police needed to be a well-trained and well-disciplined institution.²⁰ While this was still just a proposal, local circumstances would soon provide those advocating escalation with an effective impetus to execute those plans.

The May 30 Jiandao Uprising

Despite Shidehara's attempts to reverse the course of consular police expansion, circumstances that developed in the field during 1929 and 1930 made such a backward move difficult, if not impossible. More significant, however, is the fact that consular police leadership on the ground in Manchuria, especially in Jiandao, took conscious steps to undermine Shidehara's policy of accommodation. Nowhere was this more evident than during the policy discussions and deal making that followed a large Communist disturbance in late May 1930 near the Jiandao consulate-general at Longjincun. In fact, the May 30 uprising was in many ways a more crucial turning point for the consular police in Jiandao and elsewhere than the Manchurian Incident of September 18, 1931.²¹

Before describing the events of May 30, however, it is important to note several developments in the relations between the Comintern, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Korean Communist movement in Manchuria. Factionalism had plagued the Korean Communists for years, and Japanese consular police action against them in Manchuria, resulting in mass arrests and forfeited intelligence, had severely weakened the movement as a whole. In an effort to reinvigorate the Korean Communists and put an end to their internal strife, the Comintern ordered in late 1929 that the Korean Communist movement in Manchuria be placed under the immediate supervision of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Thus it was under the influence of more aggressively anti-Japanese leaders in the CCP, namely Li Li-san, that the plan for the Jiandao uprising took shape in early 1930.²²

That plan materialized on May 30, when a mounted band of Chinese and Korean Communist guerrillas, numbering between six and seven hundred strong, attacked the concession areas of Hunchun, Longjincun, and Toudaogou. They cut telephone lines, tossed grenades and Molotov cocktails into homes and administrative offices, and stole weapons and other property. During the course of the attack, "the Japanese Consulate was invaded and the Japanese consulate police massacred: the Communists set fire to various Japanese clubs and houses of wealthy Chinese and Korean collaborators, killing any and all Japanese they encountered."²³ Indeed, those targeted in the attacks were not randomly selected. In fact, the Communist rioters went out of their way to burn the houses of either

well-known or merely suspected Korean collaborators, and even those residents simply thought to be friendly with Japanese authorities.²⁴

Shidehara's initial response to the uprising was to urge caution and restraint on the part of local residents and consular police forces. Aware of Chinese sensitivity to Japanese police action on Chinese territory, he ordered local consuls to discuss matters with local authorities and leave retaliatory security measures to Chinese police. Nonetheless, Shidehara was not entirely ignorant of the need for more manpower on the ground. He thus agreed to arrange for an additional twenty officers to be stationed at the Longjincun consulate-general.²⁵ However, the Jiandao consul-general, Okada Kanekazu, held a much different view. Okada argued that an immediate increase in police personnel was necessary to meet the threat of Communist "bandit" activity, and he thus requested that at least two hundred additional police officers be dispatched to the Jiandao region as soon as possible.²⁶ Shidehara refused Okada's request on the grounds that such a dramatic increase in personnel would surely be unacceptable to the Chinese. Unwilling to risk delicate negotiations over the abolition of extraterritoriality in China then under way, Shidehara reiterated his instruction that Japanese consular police forces should cooperate with local Chinese police and do everything possible to avoid arousing greater anti-Japanese sentiment in the area.

While Okada's opposition to Shidehara's plan posed a major obstacle to its success, it was the consular police chief in Jiandao, Aiba Kiyoshi, who took even greater steps to undermine Shidehara's control over the Foreign Ministry's response to the May 30 crisis. Frustrated by Shidehara's timidity, Aiba contacted the Korean colonial governor-general, Saitō Makoto, and asked him about the possibility of support for the Jiandao consular police in the form of a dispatch of several hundred police officers from northern Korea across the border into Jiandao.²⁷ Recognizing an opportunity to extend the direct influence of the Korea Government-General over the Korean problem in Jiandao, Saitō immediately contacted Shidehara with a detailed plan involving the dispatch of several hundred support police from the Government-General police force.²⁸ However, Shidehara declined Saitō's offer, thus countering Aiba's scheme, arguing that such an expedition was not necessary and would likely only cause more problems.²⁹

A second outbreak of local Communist-led violence erupted, however, in Jilin on August 1, and this gave additional evidence in support of those who had recommended an immediate increase in Japanese police personnel.³⁰ In early September, Shidehara sought once again to put an end to the debate by issuing an official Foreign Ministry statement on the status and function of Japanese consular police forces in Jiandao. However, just as Shidehara took his stand on the issue, Saitō Makoto issued a plan of his own to the minister of colonial affairs, Matsuda Genji. Saitō's plan called

for the eventual incorporation of all Gaimushō police in Jiandao into the police bureau of the Korea Government-General. To Saitō, the management of the Korean problem in Jiandao was far too important to be left to the Chinese side, and the actions of Gaimushō police were too circumscribed to be effective. Only by making Jiandao a formal part of colonial Korea could the crisis be resolved.³¹ The feasibility of Shidehara's plan to keep police authority in Chinese hands was further complicated in September by numerous reports of Chinese police summarily executing Korean suspects rounded up in the anti-bandit campaign. However, in October, the murder of several Japanese consular police officers by Chinese soldiers dealt an even more severe blow to Shidehara's plans. In fact, these deaths provided the cause for a long desired expedition of extra police officers from the colonial regime in Korea into Jiandao. In the weeks that followed, Shidehara pressed for a quick withdrawal of these police, but Saitō and Okada both warned against it.³²

While Shidehara continually pressed for greater unity between Chinese and Japanese police forces, the prospect of improving cooperation with Japanese police authorities in Jiandao put the Manchurian warlord Zhang Xueliang in a difficult position. On the one hand, it was clearly in his best interests to eliminate the problem of banditry, communist or otherwise. Public peace and security would help in stabilizing his rule in Manchuria as a whole. Furthermore, all Chinese authorities, including Zhang, knew quite well what had happened in 1920 when "bandit" attacks in Hunchun prompted a severe response by the Japanese military during the Jiandao Expedition. No one wanted a repeat of that disaster, which was a real possibility in summer of 1930. However, Zhang was also more committed to the cause of Chinese nationalism than his father, Zhang Zuolin, had been. As a result, cooperating with Japanese police on any level was politically unpopular. In addition, coordinating Chinese security campaigns with those of the Japanese consular police would implicitly suggest recognition of the legitimacy of the consular police in Jiandao.³³ This, of course, was something that Chinese authorities had been rejecting for almost twenty years.

In early November, Shidehara was finally successful in negotiating the withdrawal of the Government-General police expeditionary forces, but he also recognized that total reliance on the Chinese side was problematic to say the least. Despite his reluctance to approve an official police personnel increase in Jiandao, Shidehara was not a fool. He fully understood the magnitude of the security crisis, but he also desired stable relations with the Chinese. What options, then, did the foreign minister have? Shidehara and Jiandao consul Okada explored one possibility in late 1930 and early 1931. Their strategy was to secretly recruit "police employees" (*keisatsu yōnin*), who for forty yen per month would provide intelligence on

local communist guerrilla activity as well as provide proper guidance and protection for local Korean communities. Those who performed exceptionally well could even be hired on eventually as consular patrolmen.³⁴ The obvious purpose of this program was to circumvent Chinese opposition to official police personnel increases by secretly bolstering local police offices with these “adjunct” security forces.

Despite these efforts, by the spring of 1931 it was cooperation between Jiandao consular police forces and the Korea Government-General, not improved relations with the Chinese, that brought about a severe decline in communist guerrilla activity in the region. While the 1925 Mitsuya Agreement had driven a wedge of sorts between police forces of the Jiandao consulates and those of the colonial regime in Korea, the May 30 riots had brought them back together, as demonstrated by the scheming of Aiba, Okada, and Saitō. In the meantime, however, the voices of those Chinese who saw Japanese police on the continent as blatant violations of Chinese sovereignty continued to grow louder and more vociferous in early 1931. This was the case not only in Jiandao but across China as a whole, from Xiamen to Qingdao to Harbin.³⁵

In response to the Chinese outcry, by late March the Foreign Ministry had begun complicated negotiations with the Chinese government over the question of when and how to abolish Japanese extraterritoriality. Because the Japanese side still had grave concerns over the ability of Chinese police forces to provide for adequate public security in Jiandao, however, the idea of relinquishing Japan's extraterritorial rights there did not sit well even with Shidehara himself. Therefore, the foreign minister directed Japan's representatives in the negotiations to treat Jiandao as a special area, not to be included in general discussions of the abolition issue. This exception was to be based on the 1909 Jiandao treaty, which indicated that Koreans living in Jiandao were legally distinct from Koreans living in other areas of China. Furthermore, because the Jiandao region had been developed by Koreans under Japanese direction, Shidehara argued, Japan had special concerns there that deserved separate consideration. The underlying reason for this equivocation was, of course, that Japan would have no legal ability to respond to security threats in the region if extraterritoriality was abolished there.³⁶

In the summer of 1931, Foreign Ministry leadership in Tokyo made a more direct move to reestablish their authority over the direction of police action in Jiandao. Aiba and Okada had been disregarding Shidehara's instructions for over a year, giving the Korea Government-General and the Colonial Ministry a stronger hand in the region while weakening the influence of Kasumigaseki. To put a stop to these trends, Aiba Kiyoshi was replaced by Suematsu Kichiji as the Jiandao consular police chief in June 1931.³⁷ Initially, Suematsu was sent to the Jiandao consul-

ate merely to advise Aiba and Okada on police matters. Aiba and Suematsu, however, had very different notions of what the most effective security policy would be. In Aiba's view, Chinese police forces were entirely incapable or unwilling to crack down on anti-Japanese guerrilla movements and common bandit gangs, and this conviction had led to his direct clash with Foreign Minister Shidehara. Suematsu, on the other hand, brought an entirely different set of ideas to the table. With more field experience in the Jiandao region than anyone else involved in the debate, Suematsu had a deeper understanding of the root causes behind social instability in the area. He argued that resident Koreans should be allowed to live as naturalized Chinese and that Japanese authorities had been too overbearing in their efforts to control every aspect of local Korean life. He further suggested that more support should be given to local Korean community organizations and that the education of Korean residents beyond legally recognized settlement areas should be left to Chinese educational institutions. Finally, Suematsu argued that Japanese should be prohibited from forcefully seizing land from local Chinese and Korean residents.³⁸ To Suematsu, the problem was much deeper than the issue of legitimate police authority. Political unrest in Jiandao was the result of the poor social conditions of the local Korean resident community. Only by improving those conditions could the threat of Communist rebellion be eliminated.

So, in the months immediately preceding the Manchurian Incident, three competing sets of ideas were jockeying for position over the question of Japanese consular police forces in Jiandao. Foreign Minister Shidehara maintained that local Chinese police forces should be left in charge of security matters in the region because any increase in Japanese police personnel would risk upsetting the delicate negotiations then under way concerning the abolition of extraterritoriality in China. In contrast, Consul Okada, Aiba Kiyoshi, and Saitō Makoto advanced the view that Chinese police were useless, and that the only way to effectively crush the communist insurgency was to increase drastically the number of Japanese police in the area and give them a free hand to carry out operations aimed at suppressing political subversives. Suematsu's view was an alternative to both positions. He rejected the strong-arm methods of Aiba, Okada, and Saitō, because harsh retaliation by Japanese authorities only fueled the fire of anti-Japanese sentiment. However, Suematsu also feared that if a social solution to the crisis could not be found, the prerogative of public security might eventually demand the colonial conquest of the region along the lines of what had brought about the annexation of Korea in 1910.

Unfortunately, a series of events in the summer and fall of 1931 turned Suematsu's fear into reality when Ishiwara Kanji and his coconspirators in the Kwantung Army sensed the time was ripe to take Japan's



Police personnel from a sub-station of the Jiandao consulate at Longjincun on a “bandit suppression” mission, 1930s. (Photo courtesy of the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic archives, Tokyo)

China policy into their own hands. It should be clear, however, that the Japanese consular police in Jiandao had already “retaliated with vigor” to the May 30 riots, arresting over thirteen thousand people by the late spring of 1931.³⁹ The manner in which local Gaimushō police reacted to the Kwantung Army’s invasion of Manchuria in September must be considered with that fact in mind.

The Impact of the Manchurian Incident

In the immediate aftermath of the Kwantung Army’s invasion of September 18, 1931, Okada and Shidehara exchanged numerous messages detailing the course of events in Manchuria and the response of the local Japanese and Korean communities there. Their primary concern at first was to keep a lid on the loud cries for military intervention coming from local residents’ associations. To that end, Suematsu Kichiji met with several local Chinese police officials on September 19 and the group decided on several measures aimed at containing the crisis. No public meetings or assemblies would be allowed, for example, and steps would be taken to control inflammatory rhetoric of local residents. An 11:00 p.m. blackout order was also given in order to keep people in their homes during the

late evening and early morning hours. Finally, both sides agreed that in the event some kind of disturbance should erupt, Sino-Japanese police cooperation was of the utmost importance in quelling public disorder.⁴⁰

Despite these efforts, the foreign minister was concerned about the spread of violence in the area, so less than a week after the Kwantung Army launched their operations near Fengtian, Shidehara made a stark reversal in the policies he had pursued after the May 30 crisis of 1930. At that time, he had fiercely refused to accommodate demands from Okada, Aiba, and the Korea Government-General to dispatch several hundred additional police officers to supplement Jiandao consular forces. This time, however, Shidehara initiated an offer of additional police on September 23. In a cable to Okada, the foreign minister explained that, should the consul desire additional police forces in order to contain the emerging crisis, such forces could and would be provided immediately. His concern was that the local chaos caused by the Kwantung Army's movements might ignite a much larger breakdown of public order. In addition to the offer made to Okada in Jiandao, Shidehara also sent a preparatory communication to the Japanese police authorities in Korea to be sure that those emergency forces would be ready to move if and when called upon.⁴¹

Okada's reaction to Shidehara's offer is equally intriguing. Okada explained that, despite the complaints of local residents, there was no immediate need for reinforcements. However, he took Shidehara's offer of additional police officers as a chance to remind the foreign minister of their conflict over the question of personnel increases in the summer and fall of 1930. Okada explained that, although the present situation was under control, the Jiandao consular police force was still drastically understaffed, just as it had been a year earlier. Therefore, an increase was necessary, not because of present circumstances, according to the Jiandao consul, but rather because Shidehara had failed to take the appropriate measures after the May 30 uprising. Nonetheless, Okada was not about to let an opportunity for expansion pass by, so he told Shidehara that an increase of fifty officers would suffice for the moment.⁴²

Throughout October, Shidehara and Okada further discussed the specific steps to be taken in escalating the consular police presence in Jiandao. Based largely on the demands made in petitions by local Korean residents' associations, Okada developed a plan including the opening of two new police substations. The initial plan was for fifteen officers to be stationed at each new station. Okada and Shidehara spent most of November working out the details of staffing the new facilities and coming up with a satisfactory budget for their operation. As was often the case, the foreign minister's major concern was finding the money to fund new police facilities. The two new offices opened in early December, and the overall personnel increase in Jiandao turned out to be close to ninety officers

in total. By the end of 1931, then, the Jiandao consular police force had expanded to just over five hundred men.⁴³ These forces went to work against the “bandits” and Communists of Jiandao in early 1932, and throughout the year they engaged in paramilitary operations alongside elements of the Kwantung Army and its military police units.

By the beginning of 1932, Shidehara had lost his job and the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo was beginning to take on a new character. However, consular police leadership in the field had remained constant throughout the early months of the Manchurian crisis, as Jiandao consul Okada was still at his post when Yoshizawa Kenkichi became the new foreign minister. The two men soon began developing plans to expand consular police activity in Jiandao and Manchuria as a whole. The first step was to bolster consular police forces in northern Manchuria, an area that had been lightly staffed before 1931, so in February Yoshizawa instructed Okada to transfer a large number of Jiandao consular police officers to Harbin and Jilin. Later on, those who had been transferred would be replaced, in most cases by recently recruited and trained Korean patrolmen. The immediate need was to increase the consular police presence beyond Jiandao, where it was already strong.⁴⁴ More concrete plans for expansion then emerged in March. In a report on the conditions of the local Communist insurgency in Jiandao, Okada claimed that significant progress had been made in suppressing communist activity during late 1930 and throughout 1931, but, ironically enough, the Manchurian Incident had actually disrupted those trends. Chinese anger over the Kwantung Army's invasion of Manchuria had made effective cooperation with local Chinese police institutions close to impossible, and the lack of effective police action on the Chinese side had given the local communist movement a chance to regroup and mobilize. Therefore, according to Okada, Japanese police forces needed to engage the communist insurgency with a more direct and vigorous campaign.⁴⁵

After several periodic personnel increases throughout the summer of 1932, the consular police force in the Jiandao region reached a total of 665 men by the end of September. A summary of consular police actions during the year indicated that the police engaged in 332 distinct encounters with communist and rebel forces throughout the year. Total casualties on the police side were nine killed and twelve wounded, while the rebels sustained over twenty-seven hundred killed and wounded.⁴⁶ How reliable these statistics are is certainly debatable. Nonetheless, they do clearly indicate that the consular police in Jiandao participated fully in military efforts to crush resistance to the conquest of Manchuria. Data concerning arrests of Korean suspects and confiscation of politically sensitive documents also illustrate well the impact of the May 30 uprisings on the militarization of consular police forces in Jiandao before the Manchurian

Incident. The number of arrests of “rebellious Koreans,” for example, jumped from 39 in 1929 to 1,274 in 1930. That figure then reached 2,485 in 1932, but the greatest increase percentage-wise clearly took place in the wake of the May 30 riots.⁴⁷ Furthermore, it must be stressed that those arrests were made possible by closer ties between Foreign Ministry police in Jiandao and colonial police authorities in Korea.

Not by coincidence, the number of police officers added to Jiandao forces after September 1931 corresponds almost exactly to the two hundred-man increase that Okada and Aiba had requested in June 1930. Looked at in this light, the expansion of consular police numbers and activities in the wake of the Manchurian Incident seem more like a logical outcome of pressure initiated in the summer of 1930 rather than an unprecedented response to the crisis conditions forced upon Japan’s consular offices by the unilateral actions of the military in Manchuria during the late summer of 1931. Certainly one could argue that “restraints on consular police forces in all of China ceased in the wake of the Manchurian Incident,” but this gives the impression that Kwantung Army action made it possible for Gaimushō police to operate more freely.⁴⁸ It is clear, however, that the Jiandao consular police applied equal pressure to abandon a path of conciliation; the Kwantung Army’s invasion simply gave more muscle to their demands.⁴⁹ As Gaimushō veteran Aiba Kiyoshi himself put it when describing the Jiandao consular



Officers from the Erdaogou sub-station of the Jiandao consulate at Longjincun celebrating with weapons captured in counterinsurgency operations, early 1930s. (Photo courtesy of the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic archives, Tokyo)

police in 1930, "They were altogether much more like soldiers than they were police [*keisatsu to iu yori mo, mattaku guntai desu ne*]." ⁵⁰ What opposition they may have had toward the Kwantung Army adventurism was not rooted in a fundamental rejection of unilateral action. Rather, they desired consular leadership over that unilateralism.

That the problem of resistance in exile to Japan's colonial rule of Korea is inextricably bound to the Manchurian Incident of September 1931 is not an entirely new idea. ⁵¹ However, previous scholarship has emphasized plans by militant leaders in the Korean Government-General to stage a "Jiandao incident" of sorts in the summer of 1931. Their aim was to provide a pretext for a border incursion by the Japanese Army in Korea that would solve the problem of Korean resistance in Jiandao once and for all. Once they had occupied the region, the plan was to abolish the consular police and make Jiandao a part of formal Korean colonial territory. ⁵² It is clearly necessary, however, to insert the Foreign Ministry into the equation by recognizing the agency of the Jiandao consular police in energizing their own escalation of hostilities without the initiative of Japanese armies in Korea or Manchuria.

Metropolitan Connections

With the initial wave of resistance to the Japanese conquest of Manchuria for the most part snuffed out by the middle of 1932, the Gaimushō quickly moved to reorganize the administrative framework of its consular police network in the region. Two significant changes stand out in particular: a sizeable and region-wide personnel increase and the abandonment of the Mitsuya protocol of 1925. On the first point, consular police in northern Manchuria lagged far behind in overall numbers when compared to those in Jiandao, or even in South Manchuria. To correct this discrepancy, a new police station (*keisatsubu*) was established in Harbin in August 1932. On the second point, whereas the conclusion of the Mitsuya Agreement in 1925 had marked a new stage in Sino-Japanese collaboration to crush radical Korean resistance in Manchuria, by late 1932 such collaboration had become impossible. Fengtian was by that time, of course, completely under Japanese control. Thus, the Mitsuya Agreement was formally abrogated on December 12, 1932. ⁵³

It is critical to remember, however, that events in Manchuria during the late 1920s and early 1930s did not play out in a vacuum. In fact, while Shidehara was busily trying to lower the profile of Japanese consular police in treaty port China to make their presence less odious to the Chinese government and ordinary residents, police officers in the field, especially in Shanghai, continued with their business as usual. Two high-profile arrests, in particular, illustrate well the continuity in consular police opera-

tions regardless of high-level Kasumigaseki diplomacy. And this continuity suggests that events in Manchuria, Shanghai, and Tokyo during 1932 were all interrelated when examined through the lens of political police work.

As noted earlier, many Japanese leftists in Shanghai had a keen interest in the development of the Chinese communist movement, which made them targets of consular police surveillance.⁵⁴ During the late 1920s, for example, Japanese Communist Party member Nishizato Tatsuo was writing for the Japanese-language newspaper *Shanghai Nippō*. In his memoirs he describes feeling inspired by the heroic struggles of workers and farmers in the Jiangxi Soviet and writing detailed reports about the movement in his paper. Finding his reports to be “sympathetic to communist revolution,” however, the Shanghai consular police censored Nishizato’s articles. Nishizato also translated numerous works of leftist Chinese intellectuals and published them in the *Shanghai Nippō*, for which he was constantly harangued by the consular police. “I often went back and forth with those guys,” Nishizato later recalled.⁵⁵

Similarly, just as consular police forces targeted leftist Japanese writers in China as potential subversives, so those writers in turn often targeted the consular police as prime examples of the insidious injustice that characterized Japan’s imperial presence in China. Proletarian author Kuroshima Denji’s *Militarized Streets*, a devastating semifictional critique of Japanese actions in North China around 1930, for example, highlights the shameless corruption of consular police officers routinely shaking down local Chinese residents for bribes and “protection” money. Especially powerful, however, is Kuroshima’s harrowing indictment of consular jurisdiction through a depiction of three Chinese arms smugglers being publicly executed for their crimes. “When people deal timidly in small quantities of guns or drugs, they atone for it with their blood,” Kuroshima wrote. Referring then to the ease with which Japanese citizens involved in illicit trade could avoid punishment by way of their extraterritorial privilege, he continued: “But those who operate on a truly grand scale grab up all they can and make their underlings pay the price. . . . This was why the Chinese people cried out for the abolition of consular trials and immunity from local law.”⁵⁶

In their pursuit of such sympathetic Japanese voices, the Shanghai consular police made a major arrest in 1929—that of Sano Manabu. Sano had come to Shanghai to participate in meetings organized to coordinate cooperation between the Chinese and Japanese Communist parties and the Comintern, and the circumstances of his arrest are worth describing in detail.⁵⁷ While the Shanghai consular police took great pride in their role in capturing Sano, it was a local Chinese police officer and a paid Chinese informant who actually apprehended the Japanese Communist leader on the afternoon of June 16. After lengthy discussions between

local Japanese consular authorities and the Chinese police over how and when to turn Sano over to the Japanese police, he came under Japanese custody on June 21. That Chinese police had made this important arrest without direct involvement of Japanese officers had a larger public relations value that was not lost on Japanese consul Kamimura. He was quick to tout the success of this operation as clear evidence that Sino-Japanese security cooperation could indeed work smoothly even within an environment of high anti-Japanese sentiment throughout Chinese treaty ports and strong demands by many Chinese for the removal of Japanese police forces from sovereign Chinese territory.⁵⁸

The Shanghai consular police had targeted Sano, of course, because he was the most internationally recognizable representative of the Japanese Communist Party in Shanghai. His close ties with members of the CCP and the KCP made his capture a high priority, as the anticipated intelligence yield from his interrogation would be quite high. While Sano's highly publicized *tenkō* ("conversion") in which he denounced his affiliation with the Communist movement did not come until 1933, he almost immediately turned over a significant amount of information about the inner workings of the CCP and its relationship with the Comintern. Among the many topics covered in his lengthy handwritten report on the current state of the CCP, Sano acknowledged that he was not aware of any specific Comintern documents that spoke directly to the relationship between the CCP and the JCP. He did, however, offer his own view on that matter to his Japanese interrogators.

The Chinese revolution, Sano explained, was destined to have a tremendous impact on the global socialist fight against imperialism. Japanese imperialism, however, was clearly the CCP's greatest mortal enemy. If the Japanese empire could be brought down, the Chinese revolution would rapidly gain strength, Sano went on, and its success would inspire socialist movements worldwide. The socialist movement in Japan would in turn thus be aided by the success of the CCP's struggle on the mainland.⁵⁹ This logic reveals in a dramatic way just why the Japanese consular police were so intent on crushing Korean, Chinese, and Japanese communism on the frontiers of the empire. In effect, the consular police understood themselves as the first line of defense against the communist revolutionary tide that was perceived as a threat not just to the colonial empire but to the metropolitan homeland itself.

Indeed, Sano's arrest in Shanghai was directly linked to contemporary developments in the police war on communism on the home islands. The Justice Ministry had organized a massive sweep of suspected JCP members in the spring of 1928, and on the morning of March 15, the nationwide crackdown began, ultimately netting roughly 1,600 suspects and thousands of pages of party documents. Prime Minister

Tanaka Giichi responded to the arrests by urging revisions to the 1925 Peace Preservation Law that would enhance the state's ability to suppress leftist radicalism by broadening the definition of threats to the *kokutai* and adopting the death penalty for convicted offenders.⁶⁰ The mass arrests of March 1928 had netted almost every major leader in the Japanese Communist Party; only those who had been abroad at the time, such as Sano, escaped the dragnet.⁶¹ It was the responsibility of the Shanghai consular police, then, to complete the metropolitan-centered security operation that had begun in the spring of 1928.⁶² Another nationwide dragnet on the home islands in April 1929 "represented the severest blow yet suffered by the [Japanese] communists."⁶³ Thus, the capture of Sano in the summer of 1929 was the final stage in a series of arrests including those of Nabeyama Sadachika, Ichikawa Shōichi, Mitamura Shirō, and Watanabe Masanosuke.⁶⁴ Japanese Communists, however, were not the only targets of these transnational police operations.

As noted earlier, the Shanghai consular police had been following the career and movements of Yō Un-hyōng since 1919. Less than a month after Sano's arrest, but more than ten years since they began keeping tabs on him, the Shanghai consular police scored a second major victory in their battle against the Korea independence movement with the arrest of Yō, a well-known Korean communist and former Provisional Government minister. Japanese officers apprehended Yō at an athletic field in the international settlement while the unsuspecting man was watching a baseball game there on July 10, and he was subsequently detained under the charge of violating the Peace Preservation Law.⁶⁵ By the end of the month, Yō had been sent to Seoul to be held and interrogated. Yō had been a key personality in the movement since its earliest formative days, so the intelligence coffers of the Japanese police benefited greatly from the depth of his revolutionary experience.⁶⁶ Indeed, Yō's incarceration was clearly a significant victory for the Japanese police network in China. Dae-sook Suh has noted that the arrest of Yō and other key leaders among the Korean Communists in Shanghai between 1928 and 1932 all but brought the Communist movement in Shanghai to a halt.⁶⁷ This was the case, too, of course, in Manchuria, where the escalation of Jiandao consular police operations after the May 30 riots and joint actions with the Kwantung Army after the Manchurian Incident had succeeded in crushing most organized resistance by the end of 1932.

The near simultaneity of the arrests of Yō Un-hyōng and Sano Manabu by the Shanghai consular police in mid-1929 is especially significant in two distinct ways. First, it demonstrates the centrality of anti-communism in Gaimushō police strategy, a characteristic that can be traced back to at least the early 1920s. Korean or Japanese, what made one a target of consular police surveillance and suspicion was "danger-

ous thought,” namely left-wing radicalism of any type. Furthermore, these two arrests reflect continuity in political police operations in the homeland and on the imperial periphery, as socialism posed a terrifying threat to social stability in both locales, and as such it had to be crushed. The second significant meaning of the dual arrests is in the fact that the Shanghai police were clearly still focused upon and committed to their duties in the field, despite the attempts by high-level Gaimushō leadership in Tokyo to lower their profile and appease Chinese nationalist demands. The consular police in Shanghai had a mission to suppress international communism and the Korean independence movement, and they were determined to carry it out, even unilaterally if and when that was necessary.⁶⁸

To further explain the interrelatedness of metropolitan police work at home and consular police work in China during the late 1920s, one must examine the link between Japanese socialist organizations and Chinese popular nationalism. The case of the Shandong expeditions of 1927–1928, when Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi authorized the deployment of military forces to “protect” Japanese residents in north China from Chiang Kai-shek’s National Revolutionary Army, is a useful case in point. The popular Chinese reaction to these incursions is well known, but left-wing Japanese groups were also quite critical of what they saw as blatant imperial aggression. Not only that, they often explicitly linked military aggression in China with political oppression at home. A 1928 leftist pamphlet, for example, argued that opposition to the Shandong expedition and resistance to the Peace Preservation Law were part of the same struggle.⁶⁹ A similar, but more elaborate, case was made by the Japan Communist Party in 1929 in a pamphlet arguing that the Shandong incursion and the struggles of the Japanese proletariat were two parts of the same process, the logic being that the same industrial bourgeoisie that was bankrolling Japanese militarism overseas was exploiting workers at home. After making reference to their revolutionary comrades in the CCP, the pamphlet concluded with a rousing call for opposition to the Peace Preservation Law.⁷⁰

The evolution of *tokkō* activities among the consular police during the 1920s, then, should be examined in light of similar trends in domestic security networks. The first half of the decade was characterized by tension and rivalry between the Home Ministry and the Justice Ministry, with Home Ministry positions usually emerging as official policy. However, as Richard Mitchell has argued, the gradual strengthening of the Peace Preservation Law after 1925 had the dual effect of enhancing the influence of Justice Ministry procurators and deflating the power of Home Ministry bureaucrats.⁷¹ The mass arrests of JCP suspects in March 1928 then sparked more draconian revisions to the Peace Preservation Law. Ulti-

mately, the various domestic and foreign crises of the early 1930s brought on a new wave of reforms to metropolitan police networks providing for even more comprehensive tools of social control. A similar process is evident in the development of Foreign Ministry police overseas. Between 1919 and 1925, political surveillance came to the forefront of consular police operations, but the trend both in treaty ports like Shanghai and on the Manchurian frontier was to develop multilateral strategies. The Mitsuya Agreement of 1925 and the concomitant establishment of *tokkō* sections in the Shanghai consular police station facilitated a more effective campaign against leftist suspects. The numerous raids on Jiandao area Korean Communist Party offices in 1927–1928, as well as the arrests of Yō Un-hyōng and Sano Manabu in Shanghai in 1929, were the result of this stronger police presence. Because the response of the Japanese consular police to the May 30 riots in Jiandao and the Manchurian Incident made Sino-Japanese police cooperation virtually impossible, the door to unilateral escalation and more severe measures against Korean, Chinese, and Japanese leftists alike opened wide during the 1930s.

Transnational “Terrorist” Bombings

The arrests of Sano and Yō clearly indicate that the Japanese consular police were escalating their program of suppressing leftist activists (Korean and Japanese alike) long before the Manchurian Incident of 1931. The expansion of Shanghai consular police power during the spring of 1932, then, should not be viewed as an isolated response to new conditions created by the army’s invasion of the northeast. Rather, it must be understood as a logical next step in the pattern of intensification of police actions against communists that began in 1919.

To understand events in Shanghai, however, one must turn first to Tokyo. On January 8, 1932, a young Korean revolutionary named Yi Pong-ch’ang tossed a live grenade at the passing motorcade of the emperor outside the palace gates.⁷² Later dubbed the Sakuradamon Incident by the Japanese, interrogations of Yi revealed that the plot had been masterminded by the well-known Korean independence activist Kim Ku from his base of operations in the French Concession of Shanghai. Additional police reports reveal that Yi had received the bombs used in the attack from representatives of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai and that Kim Ku then wired additional funds to him via bank transfer after he arrived in Tokyo to carry out the plot.⁷³ While damage from the attack was minimal, the fact that the struggle of Korean resistance fighters in treaty port China had been unleashed within the very core of the empire’s metropolitan center was a deeply disturbing turn of events in the eyes of Japanese police authorities.⁷⁴ In-

deed, the incident inspired the government to order the Home Ministry to begin planning for significant reforms of domestic police aimed at rooting out such “abominable incidents.”⁷⁵ The Shanghai consular police were determined to find those responsible for the Tokyo bombing, with some sources even suggesting the use of torture on local Koreans to extort information regarding the whereabouts of Kim Ku.⁷⁶

The full import of what happened in Tokyo in January became clearer when a more effective terrorist attack was carried out in Shanghai several months later. On the afternoon of April 29, about a dozen high-ranking Japanese civil and military officials were presiding over a Japanese community celebration of the emperor's birthday. Shanghai's Japanese residents had been encouraged to bring *bentō* boxes to the festivities, but the twenty-five-year-old Korean Yun Pong-gil's lunchbox was a cleverly disguised explosive device. Just as the national anthem *Kimigayo* reached its final few notes, Yun hurled the bomb onto the stage, where it exploded, maiming several Japanese, including Japanese minister plenipotentiary to China, Shigemitsu Mamoru, and the Japanese commander of forces in Shanghai, General Shirakawa Yoshinori. Shigemitsu lost his leg in the attack and Shirakawa later died from injuries sustained that day. Interviews with Yun after his arrest also revealed that Kim Ku was the main planner behind the attack; Yun himself was executed for his role in the bombing on December 19, 1932.⁷⁷

The significance of these two interrelated bombings was made clear by the Foreign Ministry's Asia Bureau in June 1932. A report drafted by Section Two identified these two attacks as unmistakable signs that the threat posed by the Korean resistance movement in Shanghai had reached an unacceptably dangerous level. Acknowledging that the lack of French cooperation in policing Koreans in the concessions area had prevented the Japanese from solving this problem much earlier, the Asia Bureau recognized that now such cooperation was absolutely vital. To obtain it, then, the Japanese government had to be willing to provide French authorities with intelligence regarding Vietnamese political refugees in Tokyo, something they had been reluctant to do throughout the 1920s. In addition, the Shanghai consular police needed to prepare for a rapid expansion of their resources and information-gathering networks.⁷⁸

On the matter of French cooperation, it had already begun to improve in the immediate wake of the April 29 bombings. The Shanghai consular police executed a raid of the Korean Provisional Government headquarters in the French Concession of the city the very next day. This was an extraordinary victory for the intelligence-gathering elements of the Shanghai police force. In fact, with the documents seized in April 1932, they were able to write a complete history of the overseas Korean independence movement, so rich in detail that contemporary

scholars should consider it one of the most valuable primary sources available today.⁷⁹ Why did the French finally agree to aid the Shanghai consular police in their war against Korean radicalism? On the one hand, French authorities were troubled by the violence brought to their concession by the resident Korean revolutionaries, many of whom had become more militant by the early 1930s. On the other, as the Asia Bureau report suggests, the Japanese came to realize that improving security in Shanghai was more important than protecting their Vietnamese friends in Tokyo. That being the case, Japanese police at home finally provided intelligence to France regarding Vietnamese exiles in Tokyo, such as Prince Cường Đê. In short, the French and the Japanese came to an understanding on issues of independence activists in exile. In exchange for information on Vietnamese in Tokyo, the French would help bring down the hammer on Koreans in Shanghai.⁸⁰

Reflecting back upon the events of 1932, a report from the Shanghai consular police department in late 1937 explicitly linked the January Sakuradamon Incident in Tokyo and the March Shanghai park bombing. These events, according to the report, stood out as pivotal moments in the explosion of anti-Japanese “terrorism” after the Manchurian Incident.⁸¹ The physical distance between Tokyo and Shanghai and the status of one as a metropolitan center, the other as a hub of the colonial periphery, were both transcended by the danger of political crime evident at both sites. The cities were linked by police priorities, metropolitan and colonial, Home Ministry and Foreign Ministry. The arrests of Sano Manabu and Yō Un-hyōng in 1929, the escalation of consular police action in Jiandao after 1930, and the achievement of Japanese–French security cooperation in 1932 all illustrate how the imperial Japanese state’s commitment to crushing subversive left-wing movements in any and all forms extended to its sphere of influence in treaty port China and Manchuria; and the Japanese consular police played a central role in facilitating that objective.

Conclusions

Japan’s political elites scrambled throughout 1932 to manufacture strategic, economic, and legal justifications in defense of the nation’s thorough conquest of China’s northeastern provinces and the “liberation” of Manzhouguo. Because postwar historians know, of course, that the military occupation of Manchuria ultimately led to the full-scale invasion of China and finally to a cataclysmic war with the United States and Great Britain, attempts by the civilian Japanese government to explain its military actions in 1932 have been largely written off as rhetorical spin designed only to veil the civilian sector’s helplessness in the face of the Kwantung Army’s *fait accompli*. What the history of consular police ac-

tions before 1932 make clear, however, is that Japan's civilian government had itself been locked in an often violent struggle against the forces of subversive political thought on the frontiers of the empire. This struggle played a significant role in the escalation of Japan's colonial presence on the continent that is still often exclusively ascribed to the unilateralism of right-wing extremists in the military.

A lengthy report issued by the Foreign Ministry in 1932 entitled *Relations of Japan with Manchuria and Mongolia* sheds further light on this interpretive dilemma. In describing the position of Japan during the 1920s within the turbulent political context of East Asia after the end of the First World War, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Chinese and Korean Nationalist movements, the report explains, "It goes without saying that the safety of a State is imperiled not only by the invasion of its territory by a strong armed force, but also by any disturbance of the stability of its political ideas, social organization, and the like."⁸² The most potentially dangerous "disturbance" in official Japanese eyes was, of course, communism, a perceived menace to which Japan was especially vulnerable because of its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union and China. Because "a certain number of Japanese have recently become adherents of communism and have occasionally attempted to cause social unrest by unlawful means," the report continued, "the Japanese people cannot relax their vigilance against the nefarious activities of these black sheep."⁸³ Japanese imperial subjects in Manchuria and Mongolia were of special concern, because "among them there are not a few Japanese and Koreans who are engaged, in remote places beyond the control of Japanese authorities, in the concoction of nefarious anti-Japanese plots. This is a matter of grave concern to Japan." The problem of suppressing these political criminals had been at the center of Sino-Japanese conflict throughout the 1920s, because "to leave their control in the hands of the Chinese authorities is anything but satisfactory, consequently the duty of controlling Japanese conspirators in China falls on the shoulders of Japanese authorities."⁸⁴

This problem, however, was much larger than the simple matter of a handful of troublemakers on the empire's periphery. The report went on: "the Japanese communists in Manchuria, who are mostly of Korean origin, are plotting to undermine the existing political institution of Japan by working in concert with their partizans [*sic*] in Japan Proper and Korea. It goes without saying that these dangerous elements must be placed under thorough and strict restraint."⁸⁵ Regional Japanese authorities had been reasonably successful in keeping the communist movement in check throughout Manchuria since the early 1920s. The end of the decade had, however, seen a series of troubling trends, namely the unification of the Korean Communist Party in Manchuria with the Chinese Communist Party, thus giving the KCP a direct link with the Comintern. Reinvingo-

rated after 1929, the Korean communists turned to more violent tactics of resistance. “Finally on May 30, 1930, they started a riot in Chientao and continued their agitation incessantly for several months,” and while that movement was put down by consular police action, “their agitation, however, is still continued in secret and there is little doubt that if opportunity presents itself they will seize it and come again to the front.”⁸⁶

Speaking of the more moderate adherents of the “so-called ‘Korean Nationalism’ ” the Gaimushō report paid them little attention: “These organizations are not powerful enough to be formidable, because besides lacking a central organ to unite them, they have frequently been taught a severe lesson by the Japanese authorities.”⁸⁷ In fact, despite the recognition that Korean Communists and Nationalists “resemble each other in constituting a menace to the safety of Japan, the one scheming to undermine our state foundations, and the other to overthrow our rule in Korea,” the Nationalists “need not at present be taken too seriously, because they have no powerful support behind them. . . . As for the Communists, it is a different matter altogether.”⁸⁸

Communism in Manchuria posed a much more serious threat in the eyes of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Korean Communists, “by maintaining close connections with their friends both in China and Japan . . . are maturing a sinister design against the state foundations of Japan.” The Japanese government was thus compelled to take action against such elements, “because such measures will at the same time serve as a restraint upon their friends in Japan Proper and cannot but furnish a means of safeguarding the security of our country.”⁸⁹

The most important theme to emerge here is the clear connection being drawn by the Foreign Ministry between the activities of communists abroad and communists in Japan. The report continued, “Japan is exercising very strict control over communist movements at home, but . . . she cannot regard with equanimity the ‘bolshevization’ of China, because her policy against communism must necessarily be shaped in accordance with the situation in that country.” The potential “bolshevization” of Manchuria was an especially serious concern, because should that occur, “it would immediately disturb the peace and order of Korea, which in turn would affect the peace and order of Japan Proper. So far as the question of ‘bolshevization’ is concerned, therefore, the purgation of the two regions [Manchuria and Mongolia] from communistic elements is the key to the preservation of peace and order in Japan.”⁹⁰ Not insignificantly, the Foreign Ministry was quick to point out that its security forces, the consular police, had been instrumental in preventing this dreaded “bolshevization” so far. “Fortunately, up to the present,” the report claims, “the activities of the Third International and the Chinese Communist Party in the two regions has not borne much fruit. This is accounted for partly by the strong, though invis-

ble, pressure exercised by Japan in the two regions, which has induced the communist agitators to deem it advisable to turn their attention to other parts of China which would offer less resistance.”⁹¹

Certainly, it is easy to dismiss this reasoning as cynical and self-serving hyperbole intended solely to provide justification for the Kwantung Army's invasion of Manchuria, which the Foreign Ministry had done so little to prevent. The evidence in this chapter demonstrates, however, that this 1932 Foreign Ministry statement is much more than insincere propaganda. It reflects clearly the depth to which the Foreign Ministry was committed to its mission of combating the spread of communism from East Asia into the Japanese homeland. And, most important, this commitment began as early as 1919; it was not a reaction to immediate events of the early 1930s. And, of course, it was through its consular police forces that the Gaimushō was able to participate in this mission. Thus, while it is understandable why one might argue, from the postwar vantage point, that “the steady rise of Japanese militarism . . . replaced the consulate police with the thought police, high police, military police, gendarmes, and other regulatory agencies,” the problem with this explanation lies in how it relegates the Foreign Ministry police to a role as passive participants in a story line driven by the Japanese military.⁹² Close examination of the long history of consular police activism in the fight against overseas Korean independence activism and Japanese socialism reveals clearly that the Japanese consular police in Manchuria were not necessarily “replaced” by more militant elements. In fact, their activities in many cases cultivated and encouraged the emergence of that militarism.

5

The Struggle for Security in Occupied China

Without a doubt the Manchurian crisis of 1930–1932 had a powerful effect on the evolution of consular police ideology, activity, and organization. However, as illustrated in Chapter 4, these changes did not necessarily mark a radical shift in direction, but rather brought to fuller fruition trends with roots in the 1920s. This chapter will examine the further expansion of Gaimushō police facilities and operations in Manzhouguo and China proper during the mid-1930s and throughout the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945. During these years, Japan’s consular police forces continued to play an active role in prosecuting the war on Korean resistance in exile, but combating Chinese communism and Soviet intrigue took a more significant position at the forefront of consular police goals and strategy. The scope of political police work at home and abroad also changed in important ways during the 1930s as, with communist organizations all but eliminated in Japan proper by 1933, *tokkō* police forces began to turn their attention as well to right-wing extremists and virtually any social group whose ideology could be viewed as a threat to the state and its interests. In occupied China, too, the consular police not only had to continue their war against communism and anticolonial resistance, but they also broadened the scope of their surveillance in the same manner as did the metropolitan police. As many consular police officers would comment, *tokkō* work in wartime northeast Asia thus became far more complicated than was “special policing” at home.

The discussion begins with the five-year span between 1932 and 1937 during which the Gaimushō moved to both expand and centralize its police operations in China by establishing new “command and control” facilities in Shanghai and Tianjin. Similarly, the consular police in Manchuria after 1932 fought to maintain their role in the complicated security apparatus of the new Manzhouguo state. The focus then turns to the continued growth of Gaimushō police operations in occupied China during the Sino-Japanese War, again exploring key developments in Shanghai and the Tianjin/Beijing area; and here, too, it will be clear that military security in China was linked to political stability at home, and that the consular police played a vital role in pursuing both. While there

is little doubt that the Foreign Ministry incrementally “lost control” of China affairs after the Manchurian Incident, relying on this passive explanation for the transformation of the its consular system into an apparatus of wartime colonial control largely absolves the ministry of responsibility.¹ The history of the consular police in China and Manchuria reveals a far more proactive struggle on the part of the Gaimushō to shape continental policy, and the ministry used its consular police forces as a tool to that end. To be sure, Japan’s diplomatic corps was ultimately overpowered by the military’s war machine, but not because its policies stood in stark opposition to those of the Imperial Army. Rather, the two sides most often clashed on matters of means, not ends.

Expansion in Shanghai

Since at least as early as 1925, the consular police force in Shanghai had included a small number of officers dedicated solely to the task of political surveillance over individuals and groups committed to resistance against the imperial state, whether it was Korean, Chinese, or Japanese. These activities took on a new urgency, however, after the Shanghai Incident of 1932, when Japanese aerial bombardment of the city only served to harden the Chinese will to resist Japanese aggression. In response to the drastic worsening of Sino-Japanese relations in the city, the Gaimushō took steps to bolster its police facilities there, especially in terms of *tokkō* police work.² In June 1932, the Foreign Ministry’s Asia Bureau spelled out its reasons for expanding the size and scope of consular police operations in Shanghai through the establishment of a new police department within the Shanghai Consulate-General. Shanghai was a dangerous place, according to this report, filled with a dizzying variety of criminal plots. To make matters worse, the report continued, the numerous foreign countries with interests and investments in the city had police forces of their own, and because the concerns and priorities of each nation were different, effective cooperation between them was rather difficult to achieve.³ Shanghai was also the center of three destabilizing anti-Japanese movements, in the Asia Bureau’s view. The port, of course, had long been a hotbed of Korean resistance in exile. Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party was recovering from its decimation in 1927, and Shanghai was once again emerging as a center of their organizational activity and underground agitation.⁴ Finally, the USSR and the Comintern continued to make Shanghai a focal point of international communist intrigue in East Asia. The combination of these three forces, the report argued, posed a serious threat to Japan’s colonial rule in Korea and its larger strategic position on the mainland.⁵

The establishment of a new “police headquarters” (*keisatsubu*) in the Shanghai office, the report concluded, was the immediate answer to these

problems.⁶ The early efficacy of the new consular police office, however, was aided by two additional factors. First, cooperation with French concession police had improved greatly since the spring of 1932, as French and Japanese police had found a common threat in Korean “terrorism” around which they could assist each other through intelligence sharing and arrests of suspects on foreign soil. In fact, it seems that closer cooperation with Japanese security forces might have made the French themselves more likely targets of Korean violence. One municipal police report, for example, suggests that a group of Korean “terrorists” were plotting to assassinate the French consul and police chief in order to throw a bit of cold water on French willingness to assist the Japanese.⁷ The second factor enhancing the efficiency of new police department operations was related to the staffing of the new office. Experienced *tokkō* police officers from the home islands assumed a large number of the new positions in the police department, and officers from the colonial police bureaus of the Korea and Taiwan Governments-General also filled several new posts in the Shanghai *keisatsubu*.⁸ It is also important to remember that this integration of Gaimushō police into other administrative organs of the imperial Japanese state is consistent with earlier patterns. While the Foreign Ministry sometimes resented such movements as infringements upon its jurisdictional prerogatives, circumstances could also dictate a more amenable stance on the matter.

The new Shanghai consular police department was subdivided into three sections: Section One handled business related to the general management of the police department, such as accounting, training, and equipment; Section Three was charged with duties related to everyday concession policing such as drugs, prostitution, traffic, and petty crimes; Section Two, then, was designated as the office of “special police work.” Put briefly, the duties of Section Two included gathering intelligence on movements of “dangerous thought” like socialism, communism, and anarchism, and it also held authority over the surveillance of any activity related to Japanese rule in Korea or Taiwan. Finally, it was charged with responsibility for any other area related to *tokkō* police work, a broad license to investigate almost anything at will.⁹ Despite the fact that Section Two was only one of three official sections in the Shanghai *keisatsubu*, Gaimushō police veteran Kajikawa Masakatsu has noted that, in practice, “the police department *was* the special high police section (*keisatsubu ikōru tokubetsu keisatsuka de atta*).”¹⁰ The most important duty of Section Two was undoubtedly the surveillance and arrest of Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese leftists in Shanghai. Much of what Japanese authorities came to know, for example, about the role of Uchiyama Kanzō’s bookstore as a meeting place for Japanese and Chinese communists, as well as the connections that many Japanese socialists in Shanghai had with prominent

Chinese such as Lu Xun, came as a result of Section Two police investigations of resident Japanese leftists such as Kaji Wataru in 1932.¹¹ By 1933 the work of Section Two had expanded sufficiently that the section itself was divided into several areas of subspecialty. Some officers were assigned to general affairs, research, investigation, foreign contacts, and the like; the rest were designated as specialists in affairs involving Chinese, Russians, Japanese, Koreans, or Taiwanese.¹²

The priorities of the new Shanghai consular police department were also clearly reflected in a substantial year-end report on *tokkō*-related work in the city in 1932. The five chapters of the report are titled for the five main targets of police surveillance: conditions of resident Japanese; matters relating to Koreans; matters relating to Taiwanese; conditions of the Chinese Communist Party and the labor movement; conditions of the Russians. The information contained therein about Korean, Taiwanese, and Chinese political movements is to be expected, but the section on Japanese residents is especially revealing. In recalling the history of Shanghai as a center of the Chinese communist movement and a site of interaction between Japanese communists and their Chinese, Korean, and Soviet comrades, the report specifically mentioned the 1929 arrest of Sano Manabu as the point at which the early expansion of Japanese communism was checked, reinforcing the long-standing links between domestic and colonial police work. After 1931, of course, new circumstances had given rise to escalations of both communist resistance and police repression, and the new police department was meant to meet those challenges.¹³

Indeed, the activities of the new department in Shanghai also strongly reflected not just their local security imperatives but the ideological agenda of metropolitan forces back home. Controlling the Japanese left in Shanghai was of crucial importance, a 1935 Justice Ministry report argued, because Shanghai had been the original furnace in which the JCP was initially forged. As such, ideological movements in domestic society could not be controlled without successful political police work in Shanghai.¹⁴ One can see this logic at work, for example, in the attention paid to a letter from a Japanese Communist Party member in Kobe to the Chinese communist youth league in Shanghai in 1934. After beginning the note "My Dear Chinese comrades," the author went on to expound upon his hopes that Japan's imperialist invasion of Manchuria would soon be defeated.¹⁵ In the eyes of metropolitan and colonial police, maintaining public peace, gathering intelligence on Chinese communists, and suppressing Japanese leftists were all a part of the imperial state's program to solve the same problem: dissent and resistance. The military campaign raging against the armies of China was a part of the same larger struggle that included the ideological campaign against rebellious Japanese citizens themselves.

Japanese leftists committed to resisting the militarism of their own society found in Shanghai an especially important arena for waging their ideological campaign.¹⁶ The case of several dozen former and current students of the TōA Dōbun Shoin in March 1933, for example, suggests that one critical target was the Japanese military itself. The story began to unfold when a local restaurateur turned in a case of matchboxes to the Shanghai consular police when he discovered that hidden within several individual boxes were folded antiwar leaflets. Clearly, whoever placed them there knew that Japanese sailors frequented this particular café and thus it was a prime location to surreptitiously distribute their propaganda materials. Municipal police soon arrested a Japanese man named Sakamaki Takashi under authority of a search warrant issued by the Japanese Consulate-General on charges of violating the Peace Preservation Law. A Chinese named Wang Nai-an was with Sakamaki when he was arrested, and Sakamaki later fingered him as his liaison with the Chinese Communist Party. Apparently, Sakamaki was a former student of the academy, and his arrest led to the further arrest of a ring of current students, some twenty or so in number, for their involvement in this plot. The Shanghai consular police later identified Sakamaki as the chief of the Japanese section of the Foreign Soldiers of the Chinese Communist Party, which he had joined in May 1932.¹⁷

A quick look at the translations of the leaflets that were discovered reveals the political and ideological strategy employed by these left-wing antiwar activists:

Let us oppose the massacre of Chinese labourers and farmers. The Japanese government of capitalists and landowners which occupied Shan-haikwan [sic] is attempting to make you kill Chinese farmers and labourers in the Shanghai area. The emergency call which started three days ago is nothing but preparation for the massacre. . . . Do not kill the Chinese brethren. Oppose the war of the capitalists and landowners.

Another stated:

Dear sailors, do not be deceived by such words as “for the sake of our homeland” and “for our nationals.” In our country our aged parents are suffering from cold by being robbed of their supporters. For whose sake are we staying in Shanghai? Do not the landowners and capitalists squeeze our comrades, labourers and tenant-farmers? We still continue to live a life of slavery even in Shanghai. Our work is worse than that of miners. If we make a slight mistake punishment will be freely imposed on us in such a cruel manner as if dealt to animals. . . . Oppose discriminating treatment between officers and men. Our brethren in

Japan have already commenced a movement to oppose the capitalists and landowners. We must therefore unite ourselves firmly . . . in order to oppose officers.¹⁸

These activists clearly saw the struggles of the rural poor in Japan as inextricably linked to the hardships faced by Chinese farmers under Japanese military occupation. The war being waged upon the Chinese, in their view, was sponsored by the same elite class of big business bureaucrats and landlords that exploited the Japanese underclass on the home islands.¹⁹ Quite naturally, then, Japanese police both at home and in China targeted such voices for suppression. The place of the East Asian Common Culture Academy in this episode is also especially and illustratively ironic. The academy had, of course, once been a site for promoting Pan-Asian unity that the Japanese government itself greatly supported, as evidenced by the reluctance of Japanese officials to cooperate with French police on the matter of Vietnamese revolutionaries. Now, while the government still promoted a rather cynical ideal of Asian unity within its rhetoric of territorial conquest, revolutionary Pan-Asian socialism had become a target of Japanese police suppression.

Escalation in Tianjin

Conditions in North China also changed dramatically after the Manchurian Incident and the urban violence of 1932 in cities such as Shanghai. While the Gaimushō did not take steps in Tianjin as immediate as those taken in Shanghai to bolster its consular police forces, the Tianjin consular police nonetheless continued to evolve in response to local conditions.²⁰ Back on the home islands, domestic *tokkō* activities expanded dramatically during the early 1930s in response to a perceived threat of social disorder on the part of state authorities, and a report from the Tianjin consular police office in late 1933 suggests that similar concerns were on the mind of Gaimushō police leadership. The report identified two particular “ideological problems” (*shisō mondai*) that consular police felt could prove destabilizing to the resident Japanese community in Tianjin. First, there had been a general rise in the number of residents placed under surveillance throughout the year, and of special concern among those being watched were the children of local residents who had returned to Japan to study and while there had been exposed to left-wing ideology. In a reversal of usual trends, here it seemed that the police feared dangerous “domestic elements” (*naichi bunshi*) from the home islands might spread subversive ideas to the Japanese community in China! The second main concern had to do with a striking rise in the number of so-called *Shina rōnin*, or “China adventurers,” and other right-wing elements in the

treaty ports since the stabilization of conditions in Manzhouguo.²¹ The influence of these suspicious characters, too, could have unwanted consequences, consular authorities warned. Of prime significance here is that those targeted by police as dangerous to public security were of both the left and right ideologically, just as was the case in metropolitan Japan.

From 1933 until 1936, the Tianjin consular police maintained a steady level of staffing, but conditions on the ground were also creating a sense of urgency for official expansion of police facilities there. During those four years, the number of Gaimushō police in Tianjin fluctuated between roughly seventy-five and ninety officers. This manpower, however, was bolstered by a large number of Chinese assistant patrolmen, or *junho*. In fact, in each of these years the number of Chinese *junho* hovered at around three hundred and fifty. As for local conditions, consular officials cited increases in banditry committed by defeated Chinese soldiers from Manchuria, who began infiltrating the suburbs of Tianjin during 1932. The number and nature of anti-Japanese activities in and around Tianjin were also on the rise, and numerous assassination plots involving both Korean and Chinese suspects were uncovered by the consular police throughout 1932–1933. A potentially more serious threat, by 1934 Tianjin consular police had also come to believe that Kim Wōn-bong and his infamous Ū-yōldan, which had terrorized Shanghai and other Chinese cities with waves of bombings and assassinations during the 1920s, were beginning to regroup in Tianjin in 1934.²² As early as March 1936, then, the Tianjin consulate had begun to request that its police forces be expanded to deal with volatile local conditions. In response, sixty-five Gaimushō police officers from the Manzhouguo Embassy police were transferred to Tianjin in August to bolster the consular police presence there.²³

Ultimately, in September 1936, the Gaimushō approved funding for the establishment of a new North China *keisatsubu* at the Tianjin consulate-general, following the pattern set by the Shanghai office in 1932.²⁴ The general threat of international communism in northeast Asia was an overarching concern, but reports also cited increasing disorder being stirred up by “gangs of adventurers” (*rōnin gun*) from both Manzhouguo and even the home islands. In short, surveillance of “rebellious” (*futei*) elements of all kinds needed to be stepped up. As a part of that process, the necessity of providing support to local pro-Japanese ruling associations was also cited as a reason for expanding consular police numbers and activities in and around Tianjin.²⁵ Another significant motivating factor surely was that the army’s Tianjin garrison, too, had ambitious plans for strengthening its position in 1936, something that civilian leadership in Tokyo surely hoped to avoid. In this light, “Tokyo’s attempt in expanding the consular police force in North China at this time was obviously a move towards restraining the newly reinforced Tientsin Gar-

ri-son.”²⁶ The two sides were engaged in a race of sorts to see which institution could first establish its jurisdictional authority in provincial localities within this volatile climate.

A report produced by the new police headquarters itself in December 1936 also provides numerous significant details concerning the reasons behind creating the new facility and the problems associated with carrying out the expansion. According to this report, the need for expanding consular police *tokkō* capabilities in North China had been clear enough since the Manchurian Incident in September 1931, but several factors continued to complicate the situation even after the Tanggu Truce of May 1933. Not only was the political scene in North China unstable and unpredictable, there had also been a rapid increase in the Japanese civilian population in the region since late 1931. Beyond that, a new vitality in the Chinese Red Army, the report pointed out, coupled with the fact that puppet regimes amenable to Japanese interests in North China were not yet sufficiently strong or stable to be relied upon by the Japanese authorities, made for a doubly dangerous environment.²⁷ It was in the light of all these concerns that *tokkō* police operations had been boosted in March 1936 by way of personnel increases drawn from metropolitan police in Tokyo and transfers from the Manzhouguo Embassy in Xinjing. In September 1936, the new *keisatsubu* officially opened and various upgrades to existing substations also carried out, with the three main offices under Tianjin jurisdiction being Shanhaiguan, Beijing, and Zhangjiakou.²⁸

The expansion was not accomplished without some difficulty, however, as opposition from the Chinese continued to be a serious concern. The official report includes, for example, a translation from a local Chinese newspaper editorial in Tianjin describing operations of Japanese police on Chinese soil (beyond mutually recognized settlement areas) as violations of national sovereignty, a claim with a very long history, of course. Furthermore, various phases of incomplete preparations in Japanese police facilities and the as yet unfulfilled pacification of Inner Mongolia both slowed things down, according to this report. Problems were not only to be found in the field, however, as fiscal disputes also erupted between the relevant bureaucracies back home in Tokyo. From the Gaimushō perspective, the need for expansion was clear, but people like Aiba Kiyoshi (by this time working in the Asia Bureau) and others had to fight it out with the Finance Ministry to secure budget funds.²⁹ What these budget fights also reflect, Lincoln Li suggests, is that the consular police network based in Tianjin hoped to take advantage of the strength of the North China Army by “wresting the political functions from it.” This goal was blocked, however, both by the Foreign Ministry’s failure to secure budgetary resources for it and by the army’s expansion of its own political branch, the Special Service.³⁰

Perhaps the most revealing security-related concept to emerge from the expansion process in Tianjin was expressed by the new police chief at the Tianjin office in late 1936, Ōe Hikaru. In his inaugural address to the Tianjin staff, Ōe elaborated upon what he termed *shisō gaikō* (thought diplomacy), by which he meant diplomatic machinery devoted to achieving an all-important ideological victory. Ōe claimed that “thought diplomacy” had to be recognized as a vitally crucial pillar of Japan’s overall continental policy, and this was especially true regarding affairs in China. Japanese authorities needed to revamp their methods of combating communism, Ōe argued, by putting greater focus on winning the hearts and minds of ordinary people, and the new *keisatsubu* provided the foundation for that mission.³¹ Such an approach, of course, was not unique to the Foreign Ministry, but rather reflected a widespread attitude among civilian Japanese agencies involved in China affairs.³²

In another speech a few days later, Ōe expanded on this vision, speaking at great length about relations between new staff and preexisting officers. The new arrivals, most of whom had been freshly transferred from Manzhouguo, Ōe urged not to assume that the knowledge gained through their experience there could be directly applied to their duties in North China. Circumstances in Manchuria were quite different, Ōe explained, and he then encouraged the North China police veterans to help new arrivals learn about local conditions as quickly as possible.³³ Ōe had seen firsthand the militarization of Japanese control in Manchuria and was apparently convinced that a different course should be followed in China. It was not the legitimacy of Japanese authority there that he questioned, but rather the dubious long-term efficacy of relying solely on brute force to pacify the region.

There is one additional dimension to consular police activity in North China during the mid-1930s that merits at least brief attention here. Despite their obsession with political security in occupied China, the consular police were also engaged in the facilitation of Japanese economic interests in the Beijing-Tianjin region. This itself is, of course, nothing new, as the consular police had played a part in advancing the commercial interests of Japanese resident communities since the 1880s in Korea. The commerce they protected in North China, however, was described by contemporary observer Itō Takeo in this way: “Bands of armed ships and trucks of adventurist merchants, ignoring customs checkpoints of the Nationalist government, unloaded in China large quantities of such items as narcotics, cotton thread, and cloth.”³⁴ In other words, it is quite clear that Japanese Foreign Ministry police facilitated an immense smuggling network during the mid-1930s. Another commentator had this to say about the illegal trade: “The goods left Dairen in fleets of 10 to 30 motor vessels, they sailed across the Gulf of

Peichihli [Beizhili], which had been cleared of preventative vessels by the Japanese Navy, and were landed on the sandy beaches of East Hopei [Hebei] with the passive assent or active assistance of the Japanese consular police.”³⁵ The actual trade in smuggled goods such as silk and cotton cloth, sugar, and gasoline was carried out in most cases by resident Korean and Japanese civilians, and their aim was to avoid Chinese customs duties, generating profits for Japanese manufacturers. In the course of this illegal trade, Chinese customs officials were often abused and their offices damaged by Korean and Japanese smugglers while the Japanese consular police did nothing to stop it. In fact, at the peak of the smuggling era during the early summer of 1936, the consular police often demanded that Chinese officials return contraband they had rightfully seized. By July 1936, official consular protection of smugglers was withdrawn, but the trade nonetheless continued.³⁶

The Japanese consular police in China just before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 have been described as “bands of armed Japanese scattered inside Chinese territory, performing espionage work, organizing Japanese residents into volunteer corps, and putting political pressure on local authorities to allow the advance of Japanese interests.”³⁷ Undoubtedly, Gaimushō police activity during the mid-1930s does indeed reveal how “the Japanese Foreign Ministry thus saw to it that direct action in China was no longer the monopoly of the military overseas.”³⁸ But this Foreign Ministry activism on the continent was certainly not something new to the post-1931 era of Japanese expansionism. The basic tasks of both protecting and advancing Japanese state and citizen interests while simultaneously controlling the limits of acceptable political discourse had their roots in earlier decades. This continuity in forms of “direct action” by the consular police since at least 1925, if not earlier, should place events after 1937 in a much different light. But, before turning to that matter, the final act in the story of the consular police in Manchuria must be told.

Foreign Ministry Police in Manzhouguo

By early 1933, the most persistent elements of resistance to the new order in Manchuria had been more or less crushed, at least in some part through the cooperation of provincial Gaimushō police forces and the Kwantung Army. As the army sought to consolidate both its strategic position and its authority over all Japanese continental policy, a desire to unify the numerous police institutions at work in Manchuria also began to take shape.³⁹ The preeminent position of the consular police in this process of integration was significant because it suggests that Gaimushō police in the field and the Kwantung Army were not necessarily driven apart by the colonial conquest of Manchuria in 1931–1932. Rather, in

many ways that turn of events brought them closer together in terms of overall goals, strategy, and even tactics.

As of March 1933, there were still three main police institutions functioning within the territory of Manzhouguo: police forces of the Kwantung Government-General, the army's own *kenpeitai* or military police, and the Gaimushō's consular police.⁴⁰ Significantly, the most important rivalry to first take shape was not between army police and Foreign Ministry police, but rather between Kwantung government police and Manchurian consular police. Tension between these two forces was nothing new; since its inception in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War, the Kantō-chō had been a rival to Foreign Ministry authority in Manchuria on both police and other matters of local jurisdiction. A key question therefore is how did these three police institutions become one unified security network by 1937?⁴¹

In terms of overall numbers, by March 1933 there were 1,390 Gaimushō police in all three regions of Manzhouguo (North, South, and Jiandao). Among the subsections of a Xinjing embassy report describing consular police operations were the following categories: protection of resident Japanese, protection of Korean farmers, support of army operations, battles with bandits, protection of new railroad construction sites, control of the Communist movement, investigation of political plots and foreigners, cooperating with the Manzhouguo police apparatus, and assisting with research on local Japanese business and industry.⁴² Clearly, Gaimushō police still had a far-reaching presence in Manchuria that could serve army interests well. The plan for unifying police power within Manzhouguo that ultimately took shape thus placed Gaimushō police on a higher level than their Kwantung regime counterparts. In fact, the plan was to incorporate all Kantō-chō police into the consular police system, which itself would then be subordinate to the Kwantung Army and its military police, a plan the Kantō-chō was sure to resist fiercely.⁴³ To facilitate the construction of a unified command and control network over all Japanese police in Manchuria, the Gaimushō and the army agreed on the establishment of a Manchuria Embassy Police Bureau in Xinjing in the autumn of 1933.⁴⁴ The new office was responsible for coordinating all consular police activity in Manchuria, and its top official posts were filled by Kenpeitai officers.⁴⁵ Both the Kantō-chō and the Colonial Ministry (Takumushō) opposed the budget for setting up this new bureau, but their resistance had little practical effect.⁴⁶

Nonetheless, the protests launched by Kwantung government police leaders during these discussions reveal the logic behind the decision to incorporate those forces into the Gaimushō police system. In an effort to establish public peace and gain recognition of Manzhouguo as a legitimate state, the army needed to provide for the appearance of genuine independence and sovereignty. The Kantō-chō was, of course, a

formal colonial institution set up to administer the Kwantung Leased Territory. If its police forces were allowed to continue operating, the fiction of Manzhouguo's independence would be jeopardized. By subsuming Kantō-chō police units into the Gaimushō police system, the level of manpower could be maintained under cover of the entirely legal framework of extraterritoriality that assured the legitimacy of Foreign Ministry police.⁴⁷ It was an ingenious logic indeed. Furthermore, this reasoning clearly indicates the close affinity between Kwantung Army goals and the long-standing legacy of consular police activities in Manchuria. Significantly, it also reflects a deliberate manipulation of consular "legitimacy" previously put to use on the Korean peninsula as early as 1905.

Once the new police bureau was up and running in Xinjing, the police department (*keisatsubu*) at Harbin, which had been established not even two years earlier, became obsolete and was thus closed on January 1, 1934. Several weeks later, all police personnel under the command of the Kantō-chō were officially placed under the jurisdiction of the Manchurian Embassy police bureau. In a move meant to appease high-level Kwantung government leaders who remained opposed to the reorganization, the Kantō-chō police bureau chief was appointed as a "police adviser" (*keimu komon*) in the embassy.⁴⁸ While the Harbin office was closed, the police department in Jiandao remained in operation. The Jiandao police office, of course, was the oldest, and throughout the 1920s the largest, Gaimushō police facility in all of northeast Asia. Even within Manzhouguo, the Jiandao area still posed a special problem, so the extra police presence there was deemed necessary.

Gaimushō police in Manzhouguo had numerous other concerns in addition to the basic tasks of securing the public peace and integrating themselves into the army-dominated administrative framework of state. Significantly, Chinese Communists and Korean resistance fighters were not the only dangerous elements that became targets of consular police operations in Manzhouguo. Gaimushō police were also committed to combating the problem of controlling Japanese civilians engaged in unlawful (*furyō*) activities, which could include behavior such as inciting political subversion; violence against "Manchurians"; business fraud; smuggling contraband (weapons, opium, and the like); defaulting on debts; and subverting national policy and Japanese–Manchurian friendship and goodwill.⁴⁹ Even so, perhaps still highest among consular priorities were the problems related to the control of international socialism.⁵⁰ At a meeting of thought police leadership convened in April 1935, for example, Embassy Police Bureau Chief Iwasa spoke in his opening remarks of the responsibility that consular police officers carried in promoting correct ideologies. To do this effectively, Iwasa exhorted his officers to study and understand sociology and politics, and he further-

more stressed the importance of close cooperation between Gaimushō police in Manzhouguo and the army's military police.⁵¹

Indeed, the relationship between Gaimushō police within Manzhouguo and the Kwantung Army seems to have been more productive than in other regions of occupied China. Statistics culled from the records of the Foreign Ministry's Asia Bureau are particularly illustrative of the close cooperation between the Kwantung Army and the Jiandao consular police. During the nearly six-year period between the establishment of Manzhouguo in March 1932 and the abolition of extraterritoriality in December 1937, roughly 1,700 joint expeditions between the two forces were carried out against guerrilla resistance and insurgency, involving just over ten thousand men. The peak of activity came in 1933 when there were 586 missions executed by nearly four thousand officers and soldiers.⁵² Another example of their close links were the activities of "public security enforcement squads" (*chian kōsaku han/chian shukusei han*). At the request of army officials, these teams of Manchurian consular police would arrive on the scene after the army had completed the military pacification of a particular region and take up the tasks of local intelligence gathering and analysis, public relations with the community, and censorship.⁵³ These public security activities, however, were not merely ad hoc responses to local conditions; there was a much larger process at work. In fact, the embassy police bureau had a complicated and long-range plan for the involvement of consular police units in the pacification of Manzhouguo from April 1936 until March 1939.⁵⁴ Gaimushō police most certainly saw a future for their institution in the construction of a "New Order in East Asia."⁵⁵

The last significant conference of Gaimushō police in Manzhouguo convened in May 1937. By that time, preparations were well under way to abolish extraterritoriality in Manzhouguo. The privilege of extraterritoriality, of course, had served as the pretext for Japanese consular police legitimacy throughout northeast Asia since 1880.⁵⁶ Once removed, the consular police would be illegal, and thus the tone of this meeting was both reflective concerning the long and distinguished history of the consular police in Manchuria, and forward-thinking on matters of the empire's future.⁵⁷ Finally, it was on December 1, 1937, that all Gaimushō police in Manchuria were absorbed into the police bureau of the Manzhouguo government.⁵⁸ At that time, the total number of Japanese consular police in Manchuria could be placed at roughly 1,900 men.

If cooperation between the two sides was often quite successful, one must wonder why it was that Kwantung Army officials ultimately decided to abolish extraterritoriality. While the army clearly saw the utility of the consular police in fabricating an illusion of sovereignty in Manzhouguo, attempts by the Foreign Ministry to strengthen its police forces in North

China in 1936 had begun to change that view. Indeed, as Lincoln Li has noted, “The rapid buildup of the consular police alarmed the Kwantung Army and it took steps to forestall any similar development in Manchuria.”⁵⁹ The abolition of extraterritoriality in 1937, then, in Li’s view was “a measure designed not to strengthen the hands of the puppet government there, but to deprive the Foreign Ministry of a potential instrument in Manchuria.”⁶⁰ Ironically, however, while the abolition of extraterritoriality in Manzhouguo in 1937 did indeed weaken the Foreign Ministry position there, it also contributed to strengthening consular police forces in North China, since former Manchurian officers could be transferred to Tianjin.⁶¹

Contrary to the notion that the creation of Manzhouguo was a decisive blow to the position of the Gaimushō in shaping Japan’s Manchuria policy, the story of the consular police suggests a far more complicated process. The security interests of Gaimushō police in Manchuria melded quite smoothly with those of the Kwantung Army at first. The army gave the consular police the strength they had never before possessed, and the consular police gave the army the cover of legal legitimacy that they desperately needed. Put simply, policemen and soldiers have much more in common than do policemen and diplomats. In spite or perhaps because of that fact, however, both sides consistently jockeyed for position—sometimes over jurisdictional turf and at other times over distinct policy directions—within the official bureaucracy of Japanese expansionism. Though the Gaimushō lost that struggle in Manzhouguo, the contest continued after 1937 within the borders of occupied China.

Wartime Growth in Occupied China

The “China Incident” of July 1937 had an immediate impact on consular police operations in North China. Within one week of the clash between Chinese and Japanese soldiers near the Marco Polo Bridge outside of Beijing, Tianjin consular police chief Ōe instructed the forces under his command on how to respond to the new conditions. He began by pointing out what he saw as the two broadest and most immediate priorities: protection of resident Japanese communities and close cooperation with the army to carry out the “sacred work” of “civilizing East Asia” (*Tō-A kaimēi no seigyō*). He then went on to outline several more specific measures to be taken by the Tianjin consular police force, which included expanding intelligence-gathering networks and transmitting fresh information to the military without delay, disrupting enemy intelligence networks, disseminating propaganda against the CCP and the Nanjing government, keeping a close watch on “bad elements” (*furyō bunshi*) within the Japanese resident community, and controlling rumor mongering among the people in order to maintain public order.⁶² In this one speech Chief Ōe conveniently sum-

marized all of the characteristic activities of the consular police during the wartime era. A more detailed exploration of those activities, however, must follow a brief survey of the physical expansion of Foreign Ministry police facilities throughout occupied China.

One of the most illuminating documents related to the expansion of Gaimushō police facilities in North China during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War was produced by the Tianjin police department in December 1937. The introduction explained that Gaimushō police forces in North China were too shorthanded to deal adequately with the rapid pace of change in local conditions after July 1937. Of special importance among those changes were an influx of unlawful (*furyō*) Japanese and the increasing radicalization of Chinese resistance forces. A greater Gaimushō police presence would thus facilitate the control of these troublesome newcomers to the local Japanese community as well as the intensification of political surveillance concerning Chinese Communists.⁶³ Principally, the dramatic increase in the overall local Japanese civilian population seems to have been at the heart of Gaimushō desires to bolster its local police forces. Among many concerns, the illegal drug trade was a high police priority, with the Japanese community of Tianjin being a locale of special concern. In June 1937, for example, the Tianjin consular police under the direction of Consul Horiuchi Tateki executed a large-scale raid of illicit narcotic dealers in the city, netting over two dozen suspects. To the embarrassment of consular authorities, however, the arrests and interrogations also implicated a number of officers on the Tianjin police force itself.⁶⁴

By November 1937, discussions were under way regarding the expansion of Gaimushō police operations in North China, centered at that time in the police department of Tianjin Consulate-General. In February 1938, twenty-two new police officers arrived in Tianjin from Gaimushō headquarters in Tokyo, followed by an additional one hundred men in March, and these increases were supplemented by the transfer of one hundred police officers from the colonial Korea police bureau in March and eight more from a special security force in Tianjin. In total, Gaimushō police numbers in the greater Tianjin area thus increased by 329 officers, and with these increases came the official closing of the *keisatsubu* in Tianjin in favor of a new office, the North China *keimubu* (department of police affairs).⁶⁵

Opened in early June 1938, the North China Department of Police Affairs supervised thirty-five facilities in all under its jurisdiction totaling some 773 officers, but that official total does not include the hundreds of Chinese assistant patrolmen who also participated in the execution of Gaimushō police operations. At the time the *keimubu* was established, these nearly eight hundred Gaimushō police “protected” a

civilian population of 92,000 Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese in the North China jurisdiction of the Tianjin police headquarters.⁶⁶ The office continued to expand throughout the following year, with the number of consular police employed by the North China Department of Police Affairs reaching 957 by December 1938.⁶⁷ Those numbers grew to 1,032 officers stationed in sixty-three facilities by the end of 1939, and then 1,267 men in sixty-seven stations by the end of 1940.⁶⁸


Less than one year after operations began at the North China *keimubu* in Tianjin, Gaimushō police officials in Shanghai initiated discussions regarding the establishment of a similar department in central China.⁶⁹ In the course of a two-day conference at the Astor House Hotel in Shanghai in mid-June 1939, a plan finally emerged for a Central China Department of Police Affairs. While structurally modeled largely upon the Tianjin bureau, which was later moved to Peking, the Shanghai office had a significantly smaller initial outlay of personnel, including only thirty-four men.⁷⁰ The regular consular police department in Shanghai was already quite large by the late 1930s, however, with several hundred Japanese officers and numerous additional Chinese assistants, so the overall numbers were not far behind those in Tianjin.

An official Foreign Ministry press release on September 30, 1939, outlined in more detail the motivation for establishing the new police bureau in Shanghai. After noting the glorious accomplishments of the Imperial Army in fighting bravely since 1937, the statement added that Japan's consular police had played an integral part in fostering local Sino-Japanese cooperation since the outbreak of war. Although numerous new police substations had been established in a piecemeal way to deal with immediate conditions since 1937, now a central office of command and control was deemed necessary, and this was the primary reason behind opening the Central China Department of Police Affairs on October 1.⁷¹ In a more dramatic statement, the new department chief, in a speech to mark the opening of the new office, explained that the history of the Foreign Ministry police in northeast Asia was at the dawn of a new age, and the duties of the consular police were now more important than ever before. Together with the Imperial Army and Japan's other administrative institutions on the continent, Gaimushō police would also take part in the grand project of "constructing the New Order in East Asia."⁷²

As of October 1939, there were a total of 557 Japanese consular police officers under the jurisdiction of the Central China Department of Police Affairs, and these numbers continued to climb. That number was 590 by the end of 1939, and it reached 730 in 1940, with those officers distributed throughout a network of twenty-six stations, substations, and field offices.⁷³ The new police bureau in Shanghai, however, aimed to increase the quality not just the quantity of its personnel to execute their

mission more effectively, so police officers received extensive training there. A note on the seminars provided during a training session for twenty-five new recruits in February 1940 reveals the qualifications most valued in a consular police officer. During a total of fifty-two hours of instruction, discussion topics included thirteen hours of Chinese language; thirteen hours of training in martial arts and weapons; two hours on current affairs in China; two hours on international law; three hours on consular jurisdiction regulations; three hours on “higher police” duties; four hours on consular police law; and three hours on public security management.⁷⁴ Additional training sessions were provided for the all-important business of political intelligence, as a seminar in April 1940 included lectures by senior officers on such topics as “Police Officers under Today’s Conditions”; “The Meaning of the Sino-Japanese War in the Context of Contemporary International Affairs”; “The Concept of Special Higher Police Work”; “Observing and Controlling Social and Intellectual Movements”; “Observing and Controlling Right-Wing Movements”; “Total War and the Duty of the Police Officer”; “Military Intelligence and Security Methods”; “Points on Intelligence Gathering regarding China”; and “Observing and Controlling Foreigners.”⁷⁵

What were the long-term aims of this new police bureau? At a March 1941 conference of consular *tokkō* section chiefs, the Shanghai police bureau chief explained that when the military operations ended, the war itself was not over. Echoing the comments of Ōe Hikaru in 1936, he said that the real fight continued in the realms of economy and thought, and in these struggles Gaimushō police would play a critical role. Working day and night to gather intelligence and keep watch over suspicious ideological movements, according to this police chief, was the core of consular police duty.⁷⁶ At the same meeting, a representative of the Foreign Ministry’s Asia Bureau also talked at great length on the organization, ideology, and activities of the Chinese Communist Party, touching on matters of party structure, relations with the Comintern, political goals of the CCP, and even the role of “disloyal” Japanese (*futei Hōjin*) in the war of resistance against Japan.⁷⁷ A researcher from the Asia Development Board (Kō-A in) then tackled the complex issues linked to what he termed “thought problems” (*shisō mondai*).⁷⁸ In fact, he took a truly global approach to the topic, viewing it in terms of world historical development. Human civilization was characterized, he argued, by three momentous intellectual revolutions. The rise of Christianity had been the first, and the second took place during the Renaissance; global society was now in the midst of the third revolution: the emergence of socialism and communism. The battle being waged by the consular police against this ideological enemy thus took on enormous significance, in his view, a significance that extended well beyond the immediate objective of pacifying occupied



Police staff from a sub-station of Tianjin Consulate-General police force, early 1940s. (Photo courtesy of the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic archives, Tokyo)

China. Those who stood in the way of that mission quickly found themselves under the watchful eye of both newly enhanced Foreign Ministry police bureaus.

Targets of Wartime Surveillance

To be sure, Japanese consular police in North China were still very much engaged in the surveillance of resident Koreans during the war. A 1939 report from the North China consular police bureau in Beijing provided a list of over one hundred suspected Korean “subversives” targeted for arrest, which included the suspects’ names, last known addresses, occupational information, and details of their political activities.⁷⁹ The list was also prefaced by a short description of the three top concerns of consular police in Beijing. First, they were deeply alarmed at the rapid increase in the Korean resident population after 1937, which had grown at a rate even greater than the increase in Japanese residents. The second concern pointed out that recent Korean social movements and Chinese resistance movements were becoming more likely to join forces in all out anti-Japanese war. The final point then suggested that such a war was already under way in the homeland (*naichi*), Korea, and Manchuria,

as evidence of which the author specifically cited a bombing incident in Osaka that had been linked to “terror” groups on the continent.⁸⁰

Significantly, however, the consular police in North China were also deeply involved in the political surveillance of resident Japanese. One department report from Tianjin described the social pressures facing local Japanese communities caused by the recent influx of new residents from Manchuria and colonial Korea. Interaction and tension between new and old residents brought about factionalism within the community and a general mood of disorder and chaos, and such conflict created an environment ripe for the agitation of both left-wing and right-wing extremists, as well as the flourishing of secret societies among residents.⁸¹ Interestingly, the policing of resident Japanese also seems to have included policing the police themselves. At a meeting of North China police chiefs, Tianjin section chief Ōe made explicit mention of recent corruption scandals among consular police officers, and he urged his colleagues to work diligently to purge the consular police of illicit activities.⁸² This problem was apparently a difficult one to solve, however, since almost one year later the Beijing embassy police chief was still discussing at some length the matter of “bad and dishonest police officers (*furyō fusei keisatsukan*).”⁸³

Turning more specifically to the matter of “dangerous thought” within the Japanese resident community, an especially revealing document is a detailed chart illustrating the networks of right-wing and left-wing associations under surveillance in North China produced by the Beijing Embassy Police Bureau in May 1939.⁸⁴ The chart identified dozens of socialist groups and ultranationalist societies, and their border-crossing affiliations that connected homeland cities like Tokyo, Osaka, and Niigata to northern Chinese cities such as Beijing, Tianjin, and Qingdao. By depicting these relationships, the chart is a dramatic reminder of two critically important issues. First, in the eyes of the imperial Japanese state bureaucracy, right-wing groups were often just as great a security concern by the late 1930s as those of the left. Second, political police work was truly borderless, as the threats to the *kokutai* were ideological as much as they were national.

Similar to the lists of suspicious Koreans drawn up by the Beijing embassy police staff, the Central China Police Bureau in Shanghai produced a report of its own in October 1939. However, theirs was not a list of “recalcitrant Koreans”; these lists contained the names of Japanese citizens.⁸⁵ While not as detailed as the other lists of Korean suspects, the information provided is nonetheless sufficient to draw some preliminary conclusions. First of all, the wide variety of occupations identified among the suspects suggests that few residents could escape the watchful police eye. People on the list included several journalists, a cosmetic wholesaler, import/export brokers, a dance-hall manager, bankers, landlords, mer-

chants, an auto mechanic, a theater owner, and a handful of local research institute staffers. It is also worth noting that most of those on the list were recent arrivals to the Shanghai area, corroborating statements in other sources about general suspicion surrounding the motives of new Japanese residents after 1937. Perhaps most revealing, however, is the large number of military intelligence operatives on the various lists. Perhaps these military intelligence and local propaganda agents had grown too sympathetic with the Chinese and Korean social movements they were assigned to infiltrate, and thereby became suspects of their own thought police. Of course, the opposite, that these were soldiers connected to right-wing extremism, could also have been the case.

In any event, it is clear that the consular police in central China were also deeply concerned about the troublesome behavior of “unlawful Japanese” (*furuyō Hōjin*).⁸⁶ As was true in North China, the category of unlawful Japanese could include the police themselves, as the case of a Shanghai resident, Russian native and British subject Elizaveta Mihailovna Newton, suggests. Ms. Newton was the proprietor of the “De Luxe Tea Room,” and on June 1, 1939, two Japanese consular police officers removed from her shop two illegal slot machines. According to Ms. Newton, this seizure came on the heels of a visit by two Japanese (one in plain clothes, one in uniform) a week earlier, at which time the two men, both probably consular police officers, said if she paid them a hundred dollars per week, they would allow her to run Bingo games and operate slot machines in her café. Following her complaints about the seizure of her property, a lone Japanese man in plain clothes came to her café on June 2 and told her to keep her mouth shut or the store would be closed and she might be hurt herself.⁸⁷ One cannot help but wonder how common this sort of gangster-style extortion was among local consular police officers.⁸⁸

Most important, however, the surveillance of so-called *furuyō* Japanese in China is inseparable from how Japanese authorities viewed the impact of the new war on political movements back on the home islands. As a Home Ministry police official explained in 1938, for those on the political left, the war was further evidence of the militaristic aggression of the imperial state, and opposing the war, or even working toward a Japanese defeat, would assist in the social revolution they sought at home. For right-wing ultranationalist societies, too, the war represented an opportunity of sorts for the construction of a new society. In delivering a final decisive blow against the expansion of communism, which is how such groups understood the meaning of the war, the imperial state could be revitalized in an even stronger embodiment of the *kokutai*. State security officials, of course, sought to curb both of these extremes.⁸⁹ Since both groups were active in the cities of wartime China, the responsibility for their surveillance and suppression fell on the local consular

police because they were vital extensions of the home government's "thought police" apparatus.

Still, while the failed military coup of February 26, 1936, in Tokyo had shown that the extreme right had to be kept on a leash, it was quite naturally those on the political left who bore the brunt of greater police pressure during the war. The right wing after all supported the state's war effort, whereas the left vehemently opposed it. Popular antiwar sentiments during the final stages of the Pacific War have been examined insightfully by John Dower, but such feelings were made public through graffiti and leaflets within months of the war's outbreak in 1937.⁹⁰ In taking note of stock such socialist phrases from "Overthrow the bourgeois government" and "Land to the farmers" to more explicitly anticolonial and China-friendly ideas such as "Absolutely oppose imperialist war for the sake of capitalists!" metropolitan police recognized the ideological dissent that threatened to undermine public support for the war effort.⁹¹

An especially dramatic example of the clear connection between leftist opposition to the war and, by extension, the Japanese imperial state can be found in the activities and writings of Hasegawa Teru, who was an active member of the Japanese People's Anti-War League (*Nihonjinmin hansen dōmei*) in China after 1937.⁹² In a letter to her comrades back in Tokyo penned shortly after the war broke out, Hasegawa passionately argued that in China's victory, and Japan's defeat, one had to see a more hopeful future of all of Asia. She wore the label of "traitor" as a badge of courage and instead lamented her cultural connections to a society that "simply invades the lands of others, and calmly brings down hell upon a completely innocent and powerless people."⁹³ One of Hasegawa's best-known compatriots in the league, Kaji Wataru, echoed these sentiments when he expressed his agreement with the wartime logic of Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong, who suggested that only after Japan was defeated in China and then more broadly defeated in the world war could genuine social revolution liberate the Japanese people themselves.⁹⁴ That Japanese citizens such as Hasegawa and Kaji were advocating these views within occupied China itself is a matter of a crucial importance, as it illuminates their conviction that the front lines of military battle on the Asian continent were also the front lines of an ideological struggle on the home front. It also further reflects the problematic function of Sino-Japanese Pan-Asianism during the 1930s, which could be employed alternatively as a sincere language of resistance by Chinese nationalists and Japanese socialists, or as a cynical language of conquest by the Japanese imperial army.⁹⁵

Within this wartime environment, Foreign Ministry police obviously played a key role in facilitating the imperial state's war on internal dissenters, but neither is this something new to the post-1937 era. Sano Manabu had made similar arguments about China's victory being crucial for the



Police staff of the Shanghai Consulate-General, early 1940s. (Photo courtesy of the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic archives, Tokyo)

future socialist revolution in Japan during his police interrogation in 1929. And, of course, it was the Shanghai consular police who had played the critical role in facilitating Sano's arrest. What must be recognized here, then, is the continuity in anticommunist Japanese police actions in China from the 1920s on, as well as the special function of *Gaimushō* police in that pattern. An equally important dimension of that continuity is the often conflict-prone relationship between the police forces of the army and the Foreign Ministry.

Wartime Relations with the Army

Gaimushō police adjusted to the new conditions created by the army's invasion of North China by crafting a role for themselves in the pacification of occupied territories. For example, the consular police under the jurisdiction of both Tianjin and Shanghai police departments participated in what was termed *senbu* operations. Defined at the time as "communicating the will of the government and pacifying the people," *senbu* activity came to be an important element of consular police duty in China under wartime conditions.⁹⁶ Documents from the Shanghai police department in December 1937 give some sense of what those operations included. One objective was to facilitate the return of refugees displaced by battles be-

tween the Japanese Army and Chinese resistance forces, while also posting army proclamations, orders, and restrictions in public and tearing down anti-Japanese posters, pamphlets, and graffiti. *Senbu* activity could also refer to such tasks as organizing civilian security militias, reopening hospitals and other public health facilities, and disposing of corpses. Even mundane duties like preparing nationality registers for returning refugees and conducting spot checks of local food-service businesses were often a part of *senbu* operations.⁹⁷ Documents from Tianjin in late 1937 reveal similar patterns of consular police participation in *senbu* activities there.⁹⁸

As Gaimushō police veteran Kajikawa Masakatsu put it, the primary objective of battle was military victory, but the real fight did not end when the gun barrels cooled. After the smoke cleared, the hearts and minds of the local population had to be won over if the military victory was to hold its ground. The consular police mission through *senbu* operations was thus also to convince local Chinese that Japanese Army engagements were not designed to take over China, but to restore peace and stability to East Asia as a whole.⁹⁹ To achieve this goal, Kajikawa explained, Foreign Ministry police would distribute free food and medicine to local communities, facilitate the reopening of local schools and other public service institutions, and generally assist in restoring the everyday exchange of goods and services in the localities. According to Kajikawa, the first and perhaps most important requirement for participation in *senbu* work was that one possess strong Chinese-language skills. Long experience living in China, along with knowledge of local geography, culture, and customs, were also indispensable. Long-resident Japanese merchants as well employees of the Mantetsu and the Manzhouguo administrative network often met these requirements, but local Japanese consular police, who often prided themselves on their language training and detailed familiarity with local conditions, made especially effective *senbu* unit participants.¹⁰⁰ These pacification programs, however, could be quite dangerous for any local Chinese that cooperated. Assassinations of “Japan-friendly” Chinese informers during the autumn of 1937, for example, became quite common, and Gaimushō police in Shanghai, calling them “antiterrorist” operations, expended considerable time and resources in apprehending the killers and interrogating them for usable intelligence.¹⁰¹

While local consular police regularly participated in these “pacification” programs alongside their military counterparts, conflict between the two groups was equally if not more common during the first few years of the war. Gaimushō police had to compete with their rivals in the military for primacy in directing the policy that would facilitate both the practical and ideological goals of the military occupation. Even in the heat of full-scale war with China after 1937, Gaimushō police continued to de-

fend their position and authority in the face of the army's militarization of Japan's presence in North China. A consular report on the proposed expansion of police facilities in Tianjin argued, for example, that intensified Kenpeitai activity in the region created the appearance that Japan was trying to turn North China into another Manzhouguo. By strengthening Gaimushō police forces instead, according to the Tianjin consular police, Japan's ultimate security aims could be achieved eliciting the least possible Chinese resentment and resistance.¹⁰² The irony in this logic is difficult to miss. The legal illegitimacy of Foreign Ministry police in China had been the source of decades of Chinese hostility, and here with the Gaimushō officials trying to suggest that their police forces were now the least likely to provoke anger from the Chinese side; although, when one considers the ferocious brutality of the Japanese Army in China, perhaps the reasoning was not so unsound after all.

Regardless, the *kusho mondai*, as the "jurisdictional dispute" was known at the time, went on to become a heated topic in meetings of senior consular police officials in many parts of occupied China.¹⁰³ At a police chief's conference in Shanghai in January 1940, Shanghai chief Miura explained that the problem was really one of improving close cooperation between the consular police and the army's Kenpeitai, not merely bold attempts by the military police to take over consular police operations.¹⁰⁴ Tianjin police chief Ueda then used the experience of his region to offer a suggestion for the Shanghai area, explaining that, in Tianjin, because of Gaimushō police protest, the Kenpeitai stopped making direct jurisdictional demands regarding tokkō affairs and instead began making requests to the local consular police, which they complied with or refused of their own will.¹⁰⁵ Despite Chief Ueda's optimism, however, jurisdictional rivalries with the military were "for the consular police, a serious problem," as some sources even reveal discussions between police chiefs regarding the proper role of Gaimushō security forces in the management of the army's prostitution centers, euphemistically referred to as "comfort stations."¹⁰⁶

Surely cooperation between the two groups was difficult because Gaimushō police were far outnumbered by military police, but the turf wars were also attributable to the fact that consular police leadership often advocated fundamentally different approaches to solving local security problems. At a 1940 meeting in Beijing, for example, Section Two police chief Mitsumura pressed for a broad strategy to replace conquest by brute military force with a more comprehensive approach. His argument was that an expansion of the war on economic and ideological fronts would ultimately be more successful in bringing Japanese goals to fruition. But Mitsumura also believed that Gaimushō police needed to move beyond piecemeal responses to security crises and instead develop a more comprehensive and

thorough program of higher police work that could effectively address the serious threats posed by international communism.¹⁰⁷ So, the goal of Mitsumura's vision was not that different from that of the army; he just envisioned a different path toward reaching it. To some degree, of course, the tension between the two forces was also due simply to the raw personal resentment felt by some local consular police toward the army's military security forces. Some officers were embittered at being reduced to handmaidens of the military. "If we are to be beard trimmers for those guys, I'll quit the consular police," quipped one officer. "The source of the security crisis in occupied areas is the poor methods of the Kenpeitai, and they are to be in charge?" exclaimed another.¹⁰⁸ Many consular police officers no doubt believed that they were far more qualified than the military police to manage local security affairs efficiently and effectively.

In an ironic twist, it would also seem that sometimes Japanese consular police could count on more effective collaboration with foreign police in Shanghai than on the military police of their own Imperial Army. On March 15, 1939, for example, the municipal police aided in the arrest of three Chinese suspected of arms trafficking in support of Chinese guerrilla fighters. The suspects were first turned over to the Japanese consular police for three days, "to allow them to continue inquiries" (which likely meant torture), and then five additional days beyond that. Documents seized during the arrest were also provided to the consular police.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, on May 30, 1939, the Japanese consular police received an anonymous tip that nine "terrorists" were occupying two rooms at a Shanghai hotel to work out their plans for bombing attacks on several targets, including the Kempeitai headquarters on the "Floating Restaurant" near the Bund. Assistance was provided by the municipal police, but the raid revealed nothing to suggest that the tipster's letter was authentic.¹¹⁰

It was not always matters of political security that were at the center of these disputes, as numerous disputes between consular police in North China and the Imperial Army's military police were also related to the "management" of the drug trade there. Control of illegal narcotics had been a duty of Foreign Ministry police since their earliest days on the Korean peninsula. In wartime China, however, the illicit sale of opium, heroin, and morphine was a lucrative trade in which the Japanese military was deeply involved, using the profits to fund its numerous local Chinese puppet political regimes within occupied territories. Army officials regularly gave pharmaceutical licenses to resident Japanese involved in narcotics dealing in exchange for kickback payments and sometimes even kept for themselves narcotic evidence that was to be used in trials, no doubt with an eye to selling it later on.¹¹¹ Consular police efforts to thwart the drug trade, then, were likely motivated both by their obligations to the local law-abiding Japanese community and by a

desire to throw a monkey wrench into the machinery of army domination in North China after 1937.

Postscript

Regrettably, the evolution of Gaimushō police after 1942 is difficult to trace.¹¹² One can perhaps begin with the establishment of the Asia Development Board in 1938, which was a key step in the process by which Gaimushō institutional autonomy was undermined by more militaristic bureaucracies at home. That process was completed in 1942 with the creation of the Greater East Asia Ministry, or Dai Tō-A shō, which replaced the numerous departments of diplomatic affairs with one centralized bureau.¹¹³ Despite the change in nomenclature, however, the organization and activities of the consular police on the ground in China seem to have remained largely unaltered.¹¹⁴ At the time of the Greater East Asia Ministry's founding, there were roughly two thousand consular police in China, and according to Gaimushō police veteran Kajikawa Masakatsu, when the Foreign Ministry police became the Greater East Asia Ministry police, the everyday lives of those officers did not change at all. In fact, it meant little more to them, Kajikawa claims, than changing the titles on the police department stationery.¹¹⁵

The postwar recollections of a Shanghai consul named Nakagawa Yū illustrate well that continuity. Thinking back upon the summer of 1942, Nakagawa reminisced:

This was after the Pacific War had begun, so things in Shanghai were already pretty bad. Every morning when I got to work, on my desk I'd find a report from the Shanghai consular police department about all the incidents that had occurred in the Shanghai area. In one day we'd have all sorts of problems, from dance-hall fights involving Japanese residents, terrorist elements from Chengde destroying a movie theater with bombs, to the movements of Communist party members from the homeland (*naichi*) who had infiltrated the area. The consular police were the important eyes, ears, and hands above the regular work of the consulate-general.¹¹⁶

Nakagawa's description sounds remarkably familiar indeed. In fact, his observations could aptly portray consular police work in any part of occupied China.

There are, however, at least a few important dimensions of consular police activity specific to the remaining years of the war after 1941. Numbers of personnel, for example, experienced another great increase linked to a rapid influx of new residents from the Japanese home islands. In terms

of police operations, it also seems clear that westerners in China, especially British and Americans, came to be viewed as subjects of “enemy countries,” making them more likely to fall under suspicion and surveillance. Finally, some research suggests that consular police actually worked as guards in prison camps housing detained civilians of the Allied nations in Shanghai and other coastal cities.¹¹⁷ While surviving documentary evidence is scarce, one source indicates that, upon Japan’s defeat in August 1945, the Greater East Asia Ministry was disbanded and the Foreign Ministry reinstated as the primary office of Japanese diplomatic business. Consular police in China at that time numbered roughly 3,470 officers.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, even in defeat it appears that these forces continued on with their duties of protecting Japanese civilians overseas by facilitating the repatriation of residents in China back to Japan.¹¹⁹

Conclusions

Although the final few years of Foreign Ministry police history may be hazy, the overall story of consular police evolution during the decade from the establishment of Manzhouguo and the Shanghai Incident of 1932 until the end of the Second World War in 1945 makes the resiliency of three long-established patterns abundantly clear. First, the Foreign Ministry continued to use its consular police forces to protect the physical security and advance the economic interests of the Japanese civilian community in China. Second, the consular police also continued to play a key role in crushing subversive political movements seen as threats to both imperial control and domestic stability. Third, the Gaimushō continued to employ its consular police resources as a means of competing with other Japanese governmental and military institutions in a proactive way over who would exert more influence on the course of Japan’s China policy. In particular, local Foreign Ministry police prerogatives on the ground in China and Manchuria were not necessarily undermined by a more aggressive and unilateral Japanese Army during the 1930s and early 1940s. On the contrary, the two forces had largely identical aims; they simply disagreed on how best to execute them.

A final reflection upon the matter of consular police ideology and “culture” can help to explain how and why this was the case. The official Foreign Ministry police song adopted in 1933, for example, is a mixture of themes and imagery familiar to anyone who has studied the rhetoric of Japanese imperialism. “We serve in Manchuria. . . . In an intense cold of 34 degrees below zero,” it begins, and “Our countrymen are troubled by bandits such as. . . . The duty of protection is heavy.” What provided their inspiration in the face of such challenges? “Look up and see the flag of imperial might shine brilliantly,” the first stanza closes, and “protect the

first wave of our countrymen.” Later verses then continue: “In the universe of East Asia’s common culture and common race. . . . Our obligation is a mission of peace. . . . Look up and see the light of Amida’s purple clouds shine brilliantly. . . . Protect East Asia’s way to peace.”¹²⁰ A second wartime song composed in 1939 offers even more clues to the character of what is obviously an increasingly militarized Foreign Ministry police corps. It begins: “The ideals of the one hundred million of the Yamato race. . . . Will rise up and spread out . . . ,” and then continues: “Supporting strength in all eight corners of the world. . . . One must protect fellow countrymen. . . . One must rise to the duty of higher police work,” and finishes, like the 1933 version, with a call for sacrifice: “Offer yourself to die as a martyr for justice. . . . Protect Asia’s way to peace.”¹²¹

Comparing these expressions to the ideological zealotry of the Japanese Army during the 1930s confirms that police often went to extremes of violence and intimidation during the wartime era, because, “like the military, the police represented the imperial mandate, and they justified each action accordingly.”¹²² Gaimushō police certainly viewed their role in the suppression of radical political resistance as inspired by imperial prerogatives. Indeed, the police operations of the Japanese Foreign Ministry in treaty port China and throughout Manchuria during the late 1920s and early 1930s solidly place that institution within the circle of responsibility for the violent conquest of China during the early 1940s that was inspired by those prerogatives.

Conclusion

Anyone who has spent time in East Asia during the summer months knows that it is a time of both oppressive heat and even more oppressive memories. Every August the citizens of China, Korea, and Japan are reminded of the fateful day in 1945 that signaled hard-fought victory for one society, long-desired freedom for another, and grim apocalyptic defeat for the third. Although the number of people with personal memories of the colonial and wartime eras grows ever smaller each summer, the power that public memories of violence and victimization wield seems to grow ever stronger. As vehement Chinese and Korean protests over both Japanese visits to their war memorial at Yasukuni shrine and the content of Japanese public school textbooks reflect, for the people of East Asia today the meanings of this past are as passionately and politically important as they have ever been.

In Japan, this problem of public memory is particularly complicated because of that society's past as both an inarguably brutal colonizer of its Asian neighbors and as an undeniably pitiable victim of nuclear annihilation. Whether an individual feels a stronger pull toward one identity or the other depends largely on how that person comes to terms in their own heart and mind with the matter of responsibility. The self-absolving victim places all blame on a devious cabal of right-wing fascists that enslaved common society using ultranationalist jingoism and authoritarian discipline. The guilt-ridden colonizer sees complicity in every facet of the culture and politics of the society that pursued such selfish aims with such ruthless vigor. Of course, most people probably locate themselves at any one of a thousand points in between those two extremes.

The history of Japan's Foreign Ministry police forces in northeast Asia can help us to negotiate these delicate problems of postwar memory and postcolonial politics by deepening our appreciation of the complexity at work in Japanese foreign policy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, this history also shows that the line between foreign and domestic policy itself was not always as clear as historians today commonly represent it. Indeed, this book has illuminated how it was that activities of the Japanese consular police were able to transcend borders of geography, politics, nation, ideology, and community in Japan and throughout northeast Asia during this era. Thus, by way of conclusion, there are several themes through which this no-

tion of crossing the boundaries between Japan and its colonial empire can be summarized.

First, a central contention of this book has been that the jurisdictional boundaries both professional historians and popular historical consciousness commonly draw between institutional actors within the structure of the imperial Japanese state are often analytically problematic. Of particular concern here is the boundary between the Japanese Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Much scholarship still contends that a friction existed between the army and the Foreign Ministry that derived from their inherently unilateral versus multilateral ideological, political, and strategic orientations. The activities of the consular police reveal in striking ways the severe limitations embedded within this conceptual binary. At some level, of course, the Foreign Ministry did have a vested interest in promoting “internationalism” and peaceful coexistence between nations under the Washington System of the 1920s because this system is what provided the Gaimushō itself with its *raison d’être*. After all, if Japan was to pursue a unilateral course of action in East Asia with no regard for the position and policy of other powers, the Foreign Ministry would have no reason to exist. That being the case, the Foreign Ministry, in order to preserve its jurisdictional prerogatives, often did “insist that it could not be transformed into a colonial agency.”¹ If what one means, however, by a “colonial agent” is a group or institution that facilitates the efficient execution of the regulatory powers of a strong, centralized authority over a weaker and relatively disorganized polity, what the history of the consular police suggests is that the Foreign Ministry’s consular apparatus in Korea, China, and Manchuria constituted a colonial agency from its very inception.

Furthermore, for at least as long as a decade before the Kwantung Army launched its “unilateral” drive to conquer Manchuria in 1931, the consular police had been engaged in an often unilateral war of their own against Korean resistance fighters. When the army did finally take action to secure its military objectives, those moves were not always met with protest, but sometimes actually with encouragement and cooperation from the local consular police. It was a broadly defined and mutually held fear of threats to the *kokutai* that crossed the border between civilian and military prerogatives. This is especially important when reflecting on the topic of Japan’s surrender in August 1945. Academic and political debates over the motivations for Japanese surrender have raged for decades, and the body of scholarly literature on the topic is enormous. While its relative weight in influencing the final decision can be debated, one clearly significant factor in the thinking of Emperor Hirohito and his circle of advisers was their fear of a social revolution in Japan that would destroy the emperor system itself. Indeed, recent studies have powerfully argued that in

making his “sacred decision” to accept the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation, Hirohito’s “primary concern was above all the preservation of the imperial house.”² In short, what the ruling elite of Japan feared as much as, or perhaps even more than, nuclear annihilation was a popular uprising against the imperial system

Prince Konoe Fumimaro, of course, made a similar argument in his February 1945 plea to the throne pressing for an immediate end to the war. While Konoe contended erroneously that leftists within the military had been scheming since 1931 to carry out “internal reform”³ and destroy the emperor system, the “interpretation that this was merely a calculated evocation of the apocalypse . . . best relegated to history’s curiosity shop, must be weighed against a number of considerations.”⁴ The history of the Japanese consular police is one such consideration, because it significantly substantiates the notion that many within the imperial state bureaucracy understood domestic social and political stability to be inextricably connected to colonial security. In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 especially, it became clear that the struggle against Chinese and Korean communist nationalism on the front lines of battle was inseparable from the fight to crush leftist social movements in the homeland. In this light, the notion that the Japanese decision to accept defeat by the Allied Powers was in many ways a matter of domestic policy begins to appear more reasonable.

A related theme concerns the popular conception among historians of Japanese colonialism that the empire in northeast Asia was clearly divided into formal and informal spheres. Orthodox narratives describe the early 1920s as the end of formal empire building in the wake of the First World War, with the decade to follow taking shape as an era of Japanese participation in the multilateral informal imperialism of the treaty port system. The events of September 1931 then come to stand out as a “shift in direction to a new military imperialism” and a new era of formal empire building.⁵ This boundary between formal and informal empire is in many ways an analytical construct manufactured anachronistically by historians, and furthermore it is a conceptual framework derived largely from the British colonial experience.

For both of these reasons, the formal-informal paradigm is often an inadequate and simplistic formula for understanding the Japanese experience in northeast Asia. The history of the consular police demonstrates especially well why that is so. They were, in everything but name, colonial police that operated beyond the geographical confines of the formal colonies. More so, the consular police also illustrate that the 1920s cannot simply be described as a decade of multilateral economic exploitation in the treaty ports without colonial expansion. To be sure, Japan did not acquire any new territories during this decade, but when viewed in terms of state-led efforts to police subversive thought and

thereby protect “national interests,” these years can nonetheless be seen as an era of continuity between the two recognized periods of formal colonial conquest in 1895–1922 and 1931–1945.

Third, colonial history almost by definition relies upon a clear delineation between the metropolitan core of a Great Power state and the peripheral regions of its colonial territories. Scholars of European empire, largely in response to the work of Edward Said, have been breaking down this boundary for several decades now. Historians of East Asia, however, have been slow to follow suit. One brilliant exception is the work of Komagome Takeshi. In terms of the cultural dynamics of Japanese imperialism, Komagome argues insightfully that Japanese colonial policies of cultural assimilation must be understood in the context of simultaneous early twentieth-century Japanese efforts to define their own “modern” culture.⁶ Only by exploring that complexity can one come close to resolving the inconsistencies and contradictions of a cultural policy that on one hand celebrated the common culture (*dōbun*) shared by colonizer and colonized while on the other often enforced with violence the “nationalization” (*kōminka*) of subject peoples.

Similarly, the activities of Japanese Foreign Ministry police reflect the larger process through which the ruling elites of East Asia began to build modern national identities during the late nineteenth century. Part of that process included the identification and control of “national” citizens both at home and overseas, and the Japanese Foreign Ministry invented the consular police in order to facilitate that mission.⁷ Those who threatened the state’s vision of this new national polity were targeted for suppression, and just as the Home Ministry’s metropolitan police served that function on the home islands, so the Foreign Ministry police carried it out overseas. The Foreign Ministry was not simply a diplomatic corps; it was one of many Meiji imperial bureaucracies established as a tool to facilitate state control over its citizen/subjects. Viewed in this way, the problem of Japanese colonial expansion becomes more complex and multifaceted. What investigation of the Foreign Ministry police enables one to understand is that forces driving colonial expansion could transcend the boundaries between the home islands and the continent. It is possible, and perhaps even necessary, to describe Japanese police work at home and abroad as two branches of the same state-driven process of authoritarian consolidation. From such a vantage point, the borders between colonial and metropolitan become less clear, as political crime and the state’s efforts to control it in the empire and the metropole fueled developments on both fronts.

The fourth theme concerns the problem of agency. While the official organs of Japanese state power in continental northeast Asia changed dramatically over the decades through a process of creation, conflict, and

consolidation, the one constant representative face of Japan in Korea and China was that of the local Japanese resident community. In fact, when we think of the initial wave of merchants, traders, and prostitutes who arrived in Pusan in the late 1870s and the thousands of exhausted repatriates listing across the ocean back to their “homeland” in the autumn of 1945, one could describe this group as both the first to arrive on the scene and the last to leave behind the Japanese colonial project. What is most striking about this community is the fact that they were not merely pawns in the great game of Japanese state-centered policy making, nor were they always the innocent victims of a national policy gone awry. The Japanese resident community possessed considerable agency in the evolution of national policy on the continent.

Again, the history of the consular police is replete with evidence of this fact. It was the demands of local Japanese residents that brought the first Japanese consular police to treaty port Korea in 1880. In almost every case of police expansion in Korea after that point, and in China later on for that matter, one can find petitions from Japanese resident organizations demanding that expansion. Their influence, however, went beyond filing simple pleas for support from their home government. As described in earlier chapters, the entire system of assistant patrolmen, which when factored in to the total equation of consular police manpower estimates increases the number by two- or even threefold, was organized and financed by local Japanese resident associations. The activism of local Japanese residents in facilitating the imperial expansionism of their home government, then, further complicates our perception of the borders between state and societal agency and responsibility.

Fifth, one common criticism of much work on Japanese colonial history is the excessive subjectivity granted to the nation-state. One way to overcome this limitation is to view northeast Asia as a cohesive geographical region, rather than an amalgamation of “nations” with hard borders. A handful of recent studies have done much to breathe fresh air of this type into the field of Japanese imperial history by placing the Jiandao region or the Sea of Japan/East Sea more broadly at the geographical and conceptual center of complex political, economic, and social interactions between the polities of Japan, Korea, and China.⁸ What these studies achieve is a reimagining of the political map in ways that facilitate non-national approaches to the dynamic interactions of competing societies in northeast Asia. An examination of Japan’s consular police networks also contributes to this project of transcending national boundaries in order to develop a regional perspective on northeast Asian political interactions during the prewar era. The Japanese consular police were simultaneously an extension of metropolitan and colonial sovereignty, and their mission to eliminate ideological threats

to the imperial state recognized no boundaries of national origin. Suppressing the left from Tokyo to Shanghai, from Seoul to Harbin, was all part of the same process.⁹

The example of the Manchuria Peoples' Protection Society from Chapter 3 is perhaps the most suggestive case in point. Collaboration between a Chinese warlord regime, conservative Korean expatriates, and Japanese police forces is not easily explained by way of national identities. Rather, when we view that collaboration as emerging from the convergence of regional and ideological interests among various political forces, it becomes easier to understand. *Manshū hominkai* ideologues saw the spiritual and cultural bankruptcy of contemporary Korean society as a problem far more severe than having their politically defined "nation-state" under the overlordship of Japanese imperialists. In other words, political ills could not be remedied if underlying social ills were allowed to fester untreated. The greatest of all social ills, in their view, was the infiltration of traditional Korean belief systems by foreign ideologies such as Christianity and Marxism. It was this mind-set that made it possible for these Korean "collaborators" to lend assistance to Japanese and Chinese security forces in their quest to exterminate radical Korean resistance activists in Manchuria, and this Pan-Asian vision reveals the problem of projecting postwar nation-based categories of identity onto prewar social groups that sought self-definition through non-national conceptual frameworks.¹⁰

A nuanced interpretation of such complex political behavior, however, is not easy to sell in postwar East Asia. The legacies of collaboration can still sting in contemporary Korean society, for example, as the recent case of lawmaker Representative Kim Hee-sun made clear. In the fall of 2004, a conservative monthly news magazine reported that not only were Kim's long-claimed ties with the well-known independence activist Kim Hak-kyu unfounded, but her own father had in fact served as a police officer in Manchuria under the supervision of Japanese colonial authorities.¹¹ A greater scandal for an aspiring Korean politician is hard to imagine. The realities of colonial power, however, almost always reveal to some extent the efficacy of networks of local collaboration that defy the historiographic exigencies of postcolonial national identity formation.

Finally, attempts by scholars to cross the border between Japanese colonial history and the experience of other modern Western imperial powers have been few and far between. A recent essay in the *American Historical Review* is representative of the lack of sincere interest in the Japanese case among historians of European colonialism, where the author explains that he has excluded Japanese imperialism from his discussion, "for reasons of space."¹² Japanese colonial planners, however, certainly looked to models in the wider world of their day, so historians of Japanese expansionism should be able to do the same.¹³ The problem of colonial security

in the British and French empires is one possible avenue of comparative analysis, since a substantial body of work exists concerning matters of police work in colonial Africa, India, and the Middle East.¹⁴ A particularly provocative example might be the case of the British Foreign Office, which used its facilities in the United States and Canada during the early twentieth century to gather intelligence on the activities of Indian independence activists there.¹⁵ Great Britain, of course, did not possess extraterritorial rights in North America, however, so British security agents could not carry out counterinsurgency efforts to the degree of those Japan pursued in treaty port China and Manchuria. This limitation itself, furthermore, raises an important point about the comparative approach. While it can be useful to consider Japanese colonialism as one of many modern “colonialisms” in East Asia, one should not ignore the particularities of Japan’s unique position as an Asian imperialist in Asia itself.

Rather than using the British or French experience as the point of reference, it may be more useful instead to draw comparisons between twentieth-century Japanese policy in continental northeast Asia and United States policy in Central America. While such a comparison has not been developed explicitly here, the history of the Japanese consular police offers some suggestive interpretive possibilities. The United States, for example, regularly infiltrated, disrupted, and even overthrew local governments throughout Latin America during the first half of the century, and on more than one occasion, the United States sent in Marines to quell uprisings and “protect” American citizens and interests.¹⁶ How should one appropriately compare, for example, U.S. military intervention in the Sandinista uprising of 1927–1932 in Nicaragua with Japanese military and consular police intervention in radical Korean revolutionary activities during the 1920s? While one might be loath even to ponder it because contemporary Japanese expansionists encouraged the very same comparisons to justify their violations of Chinese and Korean sovereignty, the comparison is not a useless one. While the degree of difference between Japanese expansionism in East Asia and United States “imperialism” in Central America is undoubtedly vast, both nonetheless involved a dynamic of regionalism that cannot be ignored, and thus each might in some ways be more usefully compared with the other than with the management of far-flung overseas holdings by continental European imperial powers.

All of these themes are closely related to the vexing nationalist dilemmas that complicate representations of East Asian history today, over which there are so many battles raging. In China, the CCP encourages anti-Japanese demonstrations over textbook revisions to fuel a new nationalism that has replaced the party’s utterly meaningless communist identity, while simultaneously crushing the demonstrations of peasants fighting state programs of economic “development” that dislocate thou-

sands from their ancestral livelihoods. In Korea, too, a new brand of post-Cold War nationalism feeds in large part on official and popular expressions of anti-Japanese sentiment, as evidenced, for example, in the 2002 World Cup soccer tournament where South Korean fans boisterously cheered Japan's elimination from the contest. In Japan, nationalist historians and conservative politicians lambaste what they term "masochistic" history that depicts modern Japan's colonial experience too harshly, while leftist teachers who in protest refuse to stand during the national anthem at school ceremonies find their paychecks docked in retaliation by Ministry of Education bureaucrats. As long as the national identities of these three societies continue to depend on negative depictions of one another, the history that so inextricably links them all will continue to be abused and manipulated for domestic political consumption.

These battles over history are, of course, in no way unique to East Asian society. It is an inescapable function of historical knowledge to define and redefine a society's sense of shared identity, and this process seems inevitably to include the devaluation of other societies in turn. But, this does not have to be the agenda served by historical scholarship and education. *Toward a History beyond Borders*, a recent book edited jointly by a Sino-Japanese trio of scholars, shows that there are many in East Asia today who understand the absolute necessity of moving beyond the limitations inherent in national historical narratives.¹⁷ This is an admirable, and hopefully not futile, mission from which observers within and beyond East Asia should at least try to learn.

Notes

Introduction

1. Acting Secretary of State William Phillips to Ambassador Roland Morris (Tokyo), April 5 and 6, 1919, United States, Department of State, *Confidential U.S. Diplomatic Post Records* (microform): *Japan*, pt. 2, 1919–1929, reel 3 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1982).

2. “Report of the Committee of Inquiry,” enclosed in Paul S. Reinsch (Peking) to Roland Morris (Tokyo), May 3, 1919, *Confidential U.S. Diplomatic Post Records*, reel 3.

3. *Ibid.* Official Japanese statements on the fracas in Tianjin were attached to Roland Morris to State Department, March 23, 1919, in CDP, reel 3. Press coverage of the riots can be found in the *North China Herald*, March 22; the *Japan Advertiser* of March 15, 17, 19, 20, and 23; and the *North China Star* of March 19, 21, and April 8—all in 1919. For a detailed examination of this incident and its aftermath, see Erik Esselstrom, “‘Of Such Local Significance’: Culture, Diplomacy, and the Tientsin Incident of 1919,” M.A. thesis, University of Oregon, Asian Studies Program, 1996.

4. Mark R. Peattie, “Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895–1937,” in *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 201.

5. Barbara J. Brooks, “The Japanese Consul in China, 1895–1937,” *Sino-Japanese Studies* 10, no. 1 (October 1997): 21.

6. Ogino Fujio, *Gaimushō keisatsushi: zairyūmin hogo torishimari to tokkō keisatsu kinō* (Tokyo: Azekura shobō, 2005), 895.

7. *Ibid.*, 897.

8. In Japanese, see Soejima Shōichi, “Chōsen ni okeru Nihon no ryōjikan keisatsu,” *Wakayama daigaku kyōiku gakubu kiyō: jinbun kagaku* 35 (1986): 125–148, and “Chūgoku ni okeru Nihon no ryōjikan keisatsu,” *Wakayama daigaku kyōiku gakubu kiyō: jinbun kagaku* 39 (1990): 63–80; Kawamura Kazuo, “Chōsen ni okeru waga ryōjikan keisatsu shi,” *Chōsen gaku* 50 (1969): 77–166; Ogino Fujio, “Gaimushō keisatsu ron: tokkō keisatsu toshite kinō,” *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 665 (1994): 14–25, 79; Son Ansok, “Nit-Chū sensōki ni okeru Shanhai sōryōjikan keisatsu,” in *Senji Shanhai 1937–45 nen*, ed. Takatsuna Hirofumi (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan 2005), 135–164; Tanigawa Yūichirō, “‘ManMo TōKo jōyaku’ to Kantō ryōjikan keisatsu zōkyō,” *Nihon shokuminchi kenkyū* 16 (2004): 1–17. For

additional secondary reference, see Gaimushō, *Gaimushō no hyakunen* (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1969), 1370–1408; Kajikawa Masakatsu, *Gaimushō keisatsu ryakushi* (Nagoya: Gaikei kayūkai, 1988). It should be mentioned here that in April 2002, Professor Mizuno Naoki of the Institute for Research in Humanities at Kyoto University inaugurated a “consular police research group” (*ryōjikan keisatsu kenkyūhan*). The group includes Japanese scholars of Korean, Chinese, and Japanese history, as well as several Chinese and Korean scholars from foreign universities. At some future point, Professor Mizuno will likely coordinate the publication of his group’s work in Japanese as an edited volume. In English, see Erik Esselstrom, “Japanese Police and Korean Resistance in Prewar China: The Problem of Legal Legitimacy and Local Collaboration,” *Intelligence and National Security* 21, no. 3 (June 2006): 342–363, and “Rethinking the Colonial Conquest of Manchuria: The Japanese Consular Police in Jiandao, 1909–1937,” *Modern Asian Studies* 39, no. 1 (February 2005): 39–75. For brief secondary references in English, see Peattie, “Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895–1937,” 202–203; Barbara Brooks, *Japan’s Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895–1937* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2000), 93–100; and Lincoln Li, *The Japanese Army in North China, 1937–1941: Problems of Political and Economic Control* (Tokyo: Oxford University Press, 1975), 30–32, 36, 39.

9. See, for example, Takehiko Yoshihisa, *Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963); Sadako N. Ogata, *Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931–1932* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964); James B. Crowley, *Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–1938* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).

10. Usui Katsumi, “The Role of the Foreign Ministry,” in *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931–1941*, ed. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 146–147; Barbara Brooks, “China Experts in the Gaimushō, 1895–1937,” in *Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937*, ed. Duus, Myers, and Peattie; and Brooks, *Japan’s Imperial Diplomacy*.

11. John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 35.

12. Peter Duus, “Japan’s Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937: An Overview,” in *Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937*, ed. Duus, Myers, and Peattie, xxiv. Similarly, Mark Peattie has also suggested that “in the overheated atmosphere of the 1930s, the Japanese empire once more became expansive,” clearly emphasizing the notion that a return to previously abandoned patterns of colonial conquest was under way; see his “The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945,” in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 6: *The Twentieth Century*, ed. Peter Duus (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 236. Akira Iriye was among the first to establish this orthodox narrative with his remarkable study of East Asian international relations after the First World War; *After Im-*

perialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East 1921–1931 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). Also see his “The Failure of Economic Expansion, 1918–1931,” in *Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taishō Democracy*, ed. Bernard Silberman and H. D. Harootunian (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), 237–269. See also Louise Young, who describes Foreign Ministry–Army Ministry disputes over Manchurian policy in 1931 as one of two “axes of conflict” to emerge from the legacy of the 1920s; Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 119–123. Young supports this statement with references to two important works largely responsible for establishing this paradigm: Crowley, *Japan’s Quest for Autonomy*, and Ogata, *Defiance in Manchuria*.

13. Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 392.

14. The history of political police work in metropolitan Japan has, of course, been explored extensively in English and Japanese. See, for example, Richard H. Mitchell, *Thought Control in Prewar Japan* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1976), *Censorship in Imperial Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), *Janus-Faced Justice: Political Criminals in Imperial Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1992); and Elise K. Tipton, *The Japanese Police State: The Tokkō in Interwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1990). In Japanese, see Ogino Fujio, *Tokkō keisatsu taisei shi: shakai undō yokuatsu torishimari no kōzō to jittai* (Tokyo: Sekita shobō, 1988).

15. André Schmid, “Colonialism and the ‘Korea Problem’ in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review Article,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 4 (November 2000): 952

16. *Ibid.*, 954.

17. For a useful summary of this scholarship, see Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, ed. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 1–56.

18. See Young, *Japan’s Total Empire*; Sandra Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931–1933* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002); Frederick Dickinson, *War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

19. See Carol Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); Andrew Gordon, *The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan: Heavy Industry, 1853–1955* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), and *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Sheldon Garon, *The State and Labor in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), and *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

20. Sheldon Garon, “Rethinking Modernization and Modernity in Japanese History: A Focus on State–Society Relations,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 53, no. 2 (May 1994): 350.

21. See, for example, Marius Jansen, “Japanese Imperialism: Late Meiji Perspectives,” in *The Japanese Colonial Empire*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Peter Duus, “Conclusion: Mimesis and Dependence,” in his *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 424–438; Robert Esklidsen, “Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan’s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan,” *American Historical Review* 107, no. 2 (April 2002): 388–418; Alexis Dudden, *Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2005). A tangential but similar argument concerning the influence of Western disciplinary models on Japanese “modernity” and imperialism is Daniel V. Botsman, *Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

22. See Joshua A. Fogel, “Issues in the Evolution of Modern China in East Asian Comparative Perspective,” *The History Teacher* 29, no. 4 (August 1996): 425–448.

23. Timothy Brook, *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 12.

24. Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

25. Rana Mitter, “Evil Empire? Competing Constructions of Japanese Imperialism in Manchuria, 1928–1937,” in *Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895–1945*, ed. Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 146–147. For similar arguments about Manzhouguo, see Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).

26. Ronald Robinson, “The Excentric Idea of Imperialism, with or without Empire,” in *Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities*, ed. Wolfgang Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (London: German Historical Institute, 1986), 271.

27. Researchers can find the *Gaimushō keisatsushi* available in three formats. The original documents are housed in the official archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Gaimushō gaikō shiryōkan*). However, two of the original 114 volumes cannot be located, and thus only 112 are now housed in the Azabu archives. See Ogino Fujio, “‘Gaimushō keisatsu shi’ kaidai,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Fujii shuppan, 2001), 3–14. The originals were also photographed and reproduced as microfilm reels by U.S. authorities during the postwar occupation of Japan. These microfilm reels are kept at the Library of Congress in Washington, DC, and an overview of their contents can be found in *Checklist of Archives in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, 1868–1945*, ed. Cecil Uyehara. The third format is

a fifty-four-volume series of bound copies taken from the microfilm reels and published by the Tokyo-based company Fuji shuppan between 1996–2001. This is the version that I cite in the pages to come. The citation format will be: *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, section number, volume number, page(s).

28. Naitō Kazuhisa, “‘Gaimushō keisatsushi’ ni tsuite,” *Gaikō shiryō-kanpō* 8 (March 1995): 69–74.

29. Ogino, “‘Gaimushō keisatsushi’ kaidai,” 6–11.

30. *Ibid.*, 5. Ogino cites Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives (JFMA) document *Gaimushō keisatsushi hensan ikken*.

31. Naitō, “‘Gaimushō keisatsushi’ ni tsuite,” 70; Ogino, “‘Gaimushō keisatsushi’ kaidai,” 14.

32. In his work, both alone and with Robert Scalapino, Chong-sik Lee has used sources from the microfilmed version of the *Gaimushō keisatsushi* in the U.S. Library of Congress. However, Lee does not differentiate these materials from other Japanese colonial sources. He refers to “Japanese police” throughout his narrative, but his main analytical focus is on the Korean Communist movement as it is recounted through these source materials. As such, he does not recognize that the phrase “Japanese police” must be qualified. There were at least four different Japanese police organizations operating in Manchuria during the 1920s and 1930s: the Kwantung Army military police (Kenpeitai), Kwantung Leased Territory police, Korean Colonial Government police, and Foreign Ministry police. See Chong-sik Lee, *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and Soviet Interest, 1922–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), and Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea. Part I: The Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). The most recent English-language work to make use of the *Gaimushō keisatsushi* is Hyun Ok Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria* (Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2005).

33. See Schmid, “Colonialism and the ‘Korea Problem’ in the Historiography of Modern Japan,” 954. Schmid is especially harsh in his treatment of influential work on the Japanese colonial empire done by Mark Peattie and Peter Duus. Regarding Peattie, Schmid laments his “insufficiently critical approach to the modernizing claims of colonial officials.” (961) He draws a similar conclusion in his criticism of Duus’ *The Abacus and the Sword*, claiming that “implicit in Duus’s account of collaboration is the notion that all Koreans interested in ‘civilizing’ reform would naturally ally themselves with Japan, an assumption all too reminiscent of contemporary Japanese colonial discourse” (969).

Chapter 1: Patterns of Police Work in Late Chosŏn Korea

1. Ching-chih Chen, “Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire,” in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 220.

This essay is one of the best (and only) secondary treatments of Japanese colonial police forces in English. Chen, however, does not even mention the existence of consular police.

2. Two early secondary studies of the consular police in Korea are Kawamura Kazuo, “Chōsen ni okeru waga ryōjikan keisatsu shi,” *Chōsen gakuho* 50 (January 1969): 77–116, and Soejima Shōichi, “Chōsen ni okeru Nihon no ryōjikan keisatsu,” *Wakayama daigaku kyōiku gakubu kiyō—jinbun kagaku* 35 (1986): 1–24.

3. One of the most useful recent secondary treatments of Japanese treaty port communities in Korea is Takasaki Sōji, *Shokuminchī Chōsen no Nihonjin* (Tokyo: Iwanami shinsho, 2002). In English, see Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*; Alain Delissen, “Denied and Beseiged: The Japanese Community of Korea, 1876–1945,” in *New Frontiers: Imperialism’s New Communities in East Asia, 1842–1953*, ed. Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000); The character of Japanese resident communities after 1910 is brilliantly explored by Jun Uchida in her “‘Brokers of Empire’: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1910–1937,” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2005; John Uchida, “Settler Colonialism: Japanese Merchants under Cultural Rule in the 1920s,” Harvard University, Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, *Occasional Paper in Japanese Studies*, No. 2002–03, 11–22; and Jun Uchida “Shokuminchiki Chōsen ni okeru dōka seisaku to zai Chō Nihonjin-dōminkai o jirei to shite,” *Chōsen shi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 41 (October 2003): 173–201. See also Kimura Kenji, “Kindai Nik-Kan kankei shita no zai-Chō Nihonjin: Chōsen jitsugyō kyōkai no soshiki to katsudō o chūshin ni,” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 23 (March 1986): 185–213.

4. “Busankō e keisatsukan sōchi no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–5 (“Keisatsukan no haichi, kinmu, zairyūmin no hogo torishimari”), vol. 2, pp. 3–4. Kawamura, “Chōsen ni okeru waga,” 79–80.

5. “Chōsen-koku Busanho keisatsushi no gi ni tsuki jōshin,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–5, vol. 2, pp. 5–6; Kawamura, “Chōsen ni okeru waga,” 80–81; Barbara Brooks, “The Japanese Consul in China, 1895–1937,” *Sino-Japanese Studies* 10, no. 1 (October 1997): 19.

6. “Chōsen-koku Kunsankō kyoryūjin hōgō no tame keibu oyobi junsu ninyō no gijōshin,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–5, vol. 2, p. 4; Kawamura, “Chōsen ni okeru waga,” 81–82.

7. Subsequently, in 1884, a consulate was also set up in the capital city with a modest six officers of its own. Kawamura, “Chōsen ni okeru waga,” 85–87; Soejima, 8–9. For an overview of the high-level diplomatic discussions of these early years in the new treaty ports, see Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868–1910* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), 78–123.

8. C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, *Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876–1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 33–40.

9. Kajikawa Masakatsu, *Gaimushō keisatsu ryakushi* (Nagoya: Gaikeika yūkai, 1988), 31–32. For a detailed exploration of the 1884 coup attempt, see Harold F. Cook, *Korea's 1884 Incident: Its Background and Kim Ok-kyun's Elusive Dream* (Seoul: Taewon Publishing Company, 1972).

10. For an overview of such early efforts at policing domestic society, see Obinata Sumio, *Keisatsu no shakaishi* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2003), 30–52.

11. See *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–10 (“Ryōjikanrei,” 1879–1905), vol. 3; for example, “Shussan todoke kisoku” and “Shibō todoke kisoku,” 245; “To Kan kikoku tenshuku narabini Chōsen kaikōba ōrai todoke kata kisoku,” 239.

12. Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, chap. 9, *passim*. See also Takasaki, *Shokuminchi Chōsen no Nihonjin*, 1–24. Another excellent description of the everyday life of Japanese residents in Korean treaty ports is Kimura Kenji, “Chōsen kyoryūchi ni okeru Nihonjin no seikatsu taiyō,” *Hitotsubashi ronsō* 115, no. 2 (February 1996): 382–402.

13. “Chōsen-koku naichi ryokō torishimari kikoku,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–10, vol. 3, p. 244. The consular police also played an important role in managing the local economy in the treaty ports where they operated. In each of the early concession areas, consular police issued licenses and permits for the opening of new businesses, and any new construction within the concessions also required consular approval. To keep a handle on the activities of local creditors, the consular police also issued numerous regulations to govern the conduct of brokerage houses. Finally, local industries such as fishing and mining also came under the watchful eye of consular police authorities.

14. “Koreya byō yobō narabini toriatsukau kisoku,” in *ibid.*, 234–236.

15. “Shigai sōji kisoku,” *ibid.*, 239; “Ryōriten inshokuten torishimari kisoku,” *ibid.*, 353–355; “Suidō torishimari kisoku,” *ibid.*, 273; “Gyūnyū torishimari kisoku,” *ibid.*, 281; “Yuya torishimari kisoku,” *ibid.*, 314–315.

16. “Nama fugu baibai kinshi no koto,” *ibid.*, 315; “Taitō kinshi no ken,” *ibid.*, 331; “Jūryō torishimari kisoku,” *ibid.*, 310–311; “Kyoryūchinai ni oite jūryō kinshi no ken,” *ibid.*, 254.

17. “Kazashiki eigyō oyobi shōgi eigyō haishi kata no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–1, vol. 1, pp. 98–102.

18. “Mitsuinbai torishimari no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–1, vol. 1, pp. 102–115. For Kobayashi’s comments, see, pp. 105–106; for Enomoto, see pp. 114–115.

19. Details available in *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–9 (“Nihon gawa shisetsu byōin”), vol. 3, pp. 181–232. An important sociological study of medical history and colonial authority in Taiwan is Ming-cheng M. Lo, *Doctors within Borders: Profession, Ethnicity, and Modernity in Colonial Taiwan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

20. “Busankō minei byōin no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–9, vol. 3, pp. 182–183.

21. “Kyōritsu byōin setsuritsu no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–9, vol.

3, p. 187. Brett Walker has also argued insightfully for the role played by medical technology in facilitating Japanese expansionism in his “The Early Modern Japanese State and Ainu Vaccinations: Redefining the Body Politic, 1799–1868,” *Past and Present* 163 (May 1999): 121–160.

22. Details available in “Gaikokugogaku gakushū,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–7 (“gaikokugogaku gakushū, keisatsu yosan, keisatsusho no kasai, shōbōgumi, shinbunshi, zairyū kinshi, kyoryūchi keisatsu, gunji keisatsu kankei”), vol. 3, pp. 37–47.

23. “Chōgo kyōkasho ‘kōrisuchi’ kaifu gata no ken,” *ibid.*, p. 38.

24. “Junsa o shite Chōsen go oyobi Shin-kokugo kōshū kata no ken,” *ibid.*, p. 39. Uchida had five specific recommendations: (1) anyone in the Seoul office not already proficient in Korean had to spend at least one hour per day studying; (2) the consul would also select a few officers to study Chinese, and those individuals did not have to learn Korean; (3) officers would be tested at the end of every month for basic language proficiency; (4) officers who demonstrated adequate skills would not be required to pursue further study; and (5) areas of training were to include conversation, dictation, and two-way translation (Korean-Japanese).

25. “Keisatsukan gogaku gakushu shōrei no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–7, vol. 3, pp. 40–41. For analysis of language acquisition programs for police officers in colonial Korea after 1910, see Yamada Hirohito, “Nihonjin keisatsukan ni taisuru Chōsen go shōrei seisaku,” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 38 (October 2000): 123–149.

26. “Keisatsuhi o futan shi junsa kōnyū no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–5, vol. 2, p. 57; “Junsa zōin ni kansuru ken,” *ibid.*, p. 58.

27. Ching-chih Chen, “Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire,” 213.

28. “Junsa kisoku,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–3 vol. 1, p. 200.

29. “Junsa no fukusei oyobi taiken kata no ken,” *ibid.*, p. 226.

30. “Keisatsu jimū ni kanshi Akabane kōsaikan shiho ikensho tenrin,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–5, vol. 2, pp. 45–47.

31. Takeuchi Tatsuji, *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire* (New York: Doubleday, 1935), 75.

32. Andrew Fraser, “Local Administration: The Example of Awa-Tokushima,” in *Japan in Transition from Tokugawa to Meiji*, ed. Marius Jansen and Martin Collcutt (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 120.

33. Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea*, 75.

34. Umemori Naoyuki, “Modernization through Colonial Mediations: The Establishment of the Police and Prison System in Meiji Japan” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2002). The case for Paris as the model is made in D. Eleanor Westney, “The Emulation of Western Organizations in Meiji Japan: The Case of the Paris Prefecture of Police and the Keishi-chō,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 8, no. 2 (Summer 1982): 307–342.

35. Umemori, “Modernization through Colonial Mediations,” 50–55. A wonderful autobiographical account of a former Aizu samurai who clearly saw the Meiji war as a regional conflict can be found in Teruko Craig, trans., *Remembering Aizu: The Testament of Shiba Gorō* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999).

36. Umemori, “Modernization Through Colonial Mediations,” 108–109. Umemori cites statistics in Obinata Sumio’s *Nihon kindai kokka no seiritsu to keisatsu* (Tokyo: Azekura shobō, 1992) in support of this claim. An outstanding book that argues for the need to understand the evolution of centralized political control over the archipelago during the Edo period in colonial terms is Brett Walker, *The Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology and Culture in Japanese Expansion, 1590–1800* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

37. Comparatively speaking, Mike Brogden has argued that similar comparisons can be drawn between the London Metropolitan Police of the nineteenth century and British colonial police. Contrary to the notion that Britain’s colonial security forces in Asia, for example, were modeled exclusively on earlier systems of quasi-colonial police forces in Ireland, Brogden argues that, in many ways, “colonial policing replicated the policing of Victorian society.” See his “The Emergence of the Police—The Colonial Dimension,” *British Journal of Criminology* 27, no. 1 (Winter 1987), 12. See also Brogden, “An Act to Colonise the Internal Lands of the Island: Empire and the Origins of the Professional Police,” *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 15 (1987), 179–208.

38. Tipton, *The Japanese Police State*, 38.

39. Ogino, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, 17.

40. Umemori, “Modernization through Colonial Mediations,” 55–59. For more on this idea and others in Japanese, see Umemori, “Kiritsu no ryotei: Meiji shoki keisatsu seido no keisei to shokuminchi,” *Waseda seiji keizai gaku zasshi* 354 (2004): 44–62.

41. See Dudden, *Japan’s Colonization of Korea*.

42. Ogino, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, 73–74.

43. A useful brief overview of the Japanese community in Korea during the era of the Sino-Japanese War is Takasaki Sōji, “Zai Chō Nihonjin to Nis-Shin sensō,” in *Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1992–1993), 5:3–25. See also Takasaki, *Shokuminchi Chōsen no Nihonjin*, 45–98.

44. “Kōshikan tsuki junsu Keijō ryōjikan ni haizoku no ken”; “Kōshikan tsuki junsu haishi no ken”; “Kōshikan tsuki junsu haishi ni tsuki kōshikan ni goei junsu haichi no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–5, vol. 2, pp. 53–54. See also Kajikawa, *Gaimushō keisatsu ryakushi*, 32–36.

45. “Zai Kan-koku teikoku kōshikan oyobi kaku ryōjikan keisatsukan no haichi,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–6, vol. 3, p. 4.

46. “Zai Kan-koku teikoku kōshikan oyobi kaku ryōjikan keisatsukan no haichi,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–6 (“Keisatsukan no haichi, kinmu,

zairyūmin no hogo torishimari furoku”), vol. 3, p. 4. The changes in consular police personnel figures are also recounted in Moppo shi hensankai, ed., *Moppo shi* (Seoul, 1914), reprinted in *Kankoku chiri fūzoku shi sōsho*, vol. 97 (Seoul: Keijin bunkasha, 1990), 70–71.

47. See Obinata Sumio, *Kindai Nihon no keisatsu to chiiki shakai* (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 2000), 67–81.

48. Soejima, “Chōsen ni okeru Nihon,” 14–15.

49. For an overview of Japanese attempts to guide reform in Korea during the Sino-Japanese War, see Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, chap. 2 (“The Failed Protectorate, 1894–1895”), 66–102. See also Conroy, *Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868–1910*, 261–285.

50. “Meiji 27 nen Chōsen jiken ni kanshi rinji ōen keisatsukan no hai oyobi rinji zōin,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–5, vol. 2, pp. 78–92.

51. Ibid. See also Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 90. In at least a preliminary sense, the lead up to the Sino-Japanese War also created conditions within which the Japanese consular police began to take on a more overtly political function. During the Tonghak disturbance, for example, the consular police began to move beyond their duties of simple “protection and control” over Japanese residents. They were in a strategic position to obtain and deliver to the military valuable intelligence on Tonghak activities and movements. Ogino Fujio argues that this marks a significant early attempt by the Japanese state to monitor and perhaps even influence political conditions within Korea. See Ogino, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, 76–77.

52. “Chōsen-koiku iken Takehisa Katsuzō keishi ni zenkoku keisatsu komon shokutaku no ken,” in *Kan-Nichi gaikō mikan himitsu shiryō sōsho*, ed. Kim Yong-gu (Seoul: Ajia bunkasha, 1995), 21: 137–155. See also Ichikawa Masaaki, ed., *Nih-Kan gaikō shiryō*, vol. 4: *Nis-Shin sensō* (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1980), 253.

53. “Meiji 27 nen Chōsen jiken ni kanshi rinji ōen keisatsukan no hai oyobi rinji zōin,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–5, vol. 2, pp. 84–85.

54. Matsuda Toshihiko, “Chōsen shokuminchika no katei ni okeru keisatsu kikō (1904–1910),” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 31 (October 1993): 132. On Takehisa Katsuzō, Ogino Fujio, undoubtedly the most well-informed of the handful of Japanese scholars who have written about the consular police during this era, admits that he simply does not know enough about how the police reform program under Takehisa was received and what it accomplished, if anything. See Ogino, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, 83.

55. Representative of this sort of view on the 1894 domestic scene is Pak Jong-gun, “1894 nen ni okeru Nihongun teppei mondai to Chōsen ‘naisei kaikaku’ an tōjō no haikai,” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 5 (November 1968): 30–64.

56. A highly detailed and perceptive discussion of Japanese involvement in the Kabo reform movement is Yu Yong-ik (Akizuki Nozomi and Hirose Teizō, trans.), *Nis-Shin sensōki no Kankoku kaikaku undō* (Tokyo: Hōsei

daigaku shuppankyoku, 2000). For a brief discussion in English, see Carter Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New: A History* (Seoul: Ilchokak; distributed by Harvard University Press), 222–230.

57. Conroy, *Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868–1910*, 268. One recent work that perpetuates the notion that the Kabo Reforms, and just about every other step taken by the Japanese state in its relations with Korea, were part of one overarching colonial conspiracy is that of Pak Tuk-chun (Ryan Sanjin, trans.), *Nihon teikokushugi no Chōsen shinryakushi: 1868–1905* (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 2004). A more thoughtful and balanced exploration of the Kabo era in terms of Korean perceptions of modernity and reform is Tsukishi Tatsuhiko, “Kōgo kaikaku no kindai kokka kōsō,” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 33 (October 1995): 67–92.

58. A recent detailed exploration of police reforms during the Kabo movement is Itō Shunsuke, “Chōsen ni okeru kindai keisatsu seido no dōnyū katei: kōgo kaikaku no hyōka ni tai suru ikkōsatsu,” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 41 (October 2003): 89–117. Itō argues that Korean officials keen to enact reformist policies tried to resist the Japanese model, but were pressured to accept Takehisa’s plans when their own views were obstructed by the more conservative positions of the Taewōn’gun. The internal struggle within Korean official circles over reform in 1894–1896 is also briefly discussed in André Schmid, *Korea between Empires, 1895–1919* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 27, 29–30.

59. “Keisatsu jimū no sasshin ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–5, vol. 2, pp. 170–175.

60. “Keisatsukan zōha seigan no ken,” *ibid.*, 205–206.

61. The Japanese Resident Association of Seoul mentions numerous requests it received for increases in consular police protection in its official community history. See Keijō kyoryūmindan, *Keijō hattatsu shi* (Seoul, 1912); reprinted in *Kankoku heigōshi kenkyū shiryō*, vol. 27 (Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 2001), pp. 56–57, 59–60.

62. A short series of documents on this topic can be found in “Kakukoku kyoryūchi keisatsu,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–7, vol. 3, pp. 75–81. For additional documents, see Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, hereafter JFMA, file no. 4.2.2–102, *Kankoku kakukoku kyoryūchi keisatsu jimū o teikoku kōkan tsuki keisatsukan ni shokutaku ikken*.

63. “Jinsen kakukoku kyoryūchi keisatsu ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–7, vol. 3, p. 75. For a useful discussion of the multinational dynamics at work in Kunsan, see Furukawa Akira, “Kunsan kakukoku kyoryūchi (kyōdō sokai) no kenkyū,” *Chōsen gakuho* 160 (July 1996): 45–88.

64. “Jinsenkō kyoryūchi keisatsu ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–7, volume 3, 75–77.

65. “Kyoryūchi keisatsu ni kansuru ken,” *ibid.*, 77. See also Kajikawa, *Gaimushō keisatsu ryakushi*, 36–37.

66. Kawamura, “Chōsen ni okeru waga,” 93–95; “Basan kakukoku kyoryūchi keisatsu ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–7, vol. 3, pp. 79–80.

67. For secondary discussion, see Janet Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy, Business Opinion and the Seoul–Pusan Railway, 1894–1906,” *Modern Asian Studies* 11, no. 4 (1977): 573–599.

68. Soejima, “Chōsen ni okeru Nihon,” 17–18. See also Keijō kyoryūmindan, *Keijō hattatsu shi*, in *Kankoku heigōshi kenkyū shiryō*, 27: 86–87.

69. “Kei-Bu tetsudō kōji hōgō oyobi do rōdōsha torishimari no tame keisatsukan haken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–5, vol. 2, pp. 200–204.

70. *Ibid.*, 201. Peter Duus also discusses railway construction as a means of expanding Japanese commercial interests on the peninsula in *The Abacus and the Sword*, 136–157; the Seoul–Pusan line is described on 146–154.

71. “Keisatsu bunsho Kankoku naichi ni setsubi ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–5, vol. 2, pp. 244–245.

72. JFMA, file (no.6.1.6–5, *Kankoku zai kin keibu junsu kakuchi shutchō zakken*). A fascinating analysis of such reports can be found in Kimura Kenji, “Meijiiki Nihon no chōsa hōkokusho ni miru Chōsen ninshiki,” in *Kindai kōryūshi to sōgo ninshiki*, ed. Miyajima Hiroshi and Kim Yong’dok (Tokyo: Keio daigaku shuppankyoku, 2001), 1:365–397.

73. This assertion is based on an overview of the voluminous reports contained in the aforementioned JFMA file. There is also an extensive and quite interesting collection of these consular police research reports under the subtitle of “Kankoku zaikin keibu junsu kakuchi shutchō hōkokusho” contained within volumes 37–43 of Kim Yong-gu, ed., *Kan-Nichi gaikō mikan himitsu shiryō sōsho*, 50 vol. (Seoul: Ajia bunkasha, 1995).

74. Miscellaneous documents related to the consular police during this era can be found in *Nik-Kan gaikō shiryō*, ed. Ichikawa Masaaki, vol. 6: *Nichi-Ro sensō* (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1980), 44, 265–266, 269–270, 336, 340–342, 353, 377–380, 412–413; On the activities of Maruyama Shigetoshi specifically, see 446–452, 485–489.

75. JFMA, file no.6.1.5–34, *Chōgo tsuyaku no tame zai Kankoku ryōjikan tsuki junsu shiyō kata ni tsuki rikugun sho yori shoyō ikken*.

76. Soejima, “Chōsen ni okeru Nihon no ryōjikan keisatsu,” 18; Kawamura, “Chōsen ni okeru waga ryōjikan keisatsu shi,” 104.

77. Soejima, 19; Kawamura, 108–109.

78. Exchange between Komura and Hayashi, January 6–February 1, 1905; “Keimu komon,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–8 (“Keimu komon”), vol. 3, pp. 90–91.

79. Vast documentation on the activities of Maruyama and his police advisers can be found in JFMA, file no.3.8.4–31, *Kankoku ni oite keimu komon yōhei narabini dō koku keisatsu seidō kaikaku ikken* (4 vols.) For additional documents, see “Kankoku keimu komon yōhei narabini keisatsu seido kaikaku

no ken,” *Nihon gaikō bunsho*, vol. 38, pt. 1, pp. 827–860. Additional description and documentation concerning the police adviser program and the reorganization of Japanese police forces in Korea during 1905–1906 can be found in Gaimushō jōyakukyoku hokika, *Nihon tōchi jidai no Chōsen*, dated 1941 (Tokyo: Gaimushō jōyakukyoku hōkika, 1973), 224–239. See also Keijō kyoryūmindan, *Keijō hattatsushi* in *Kankoku heigōshi kenkyū shiryō*, 27:139. Maruyama Shigetoshi is also included in a well-known history of Japanese continental adventurers produced by the Black Dragon Society in 1936. The entry on Maruyama describes him as a man who worked hard to improve both police institutions in Korea and improve public security conditions there. It also notes that he went on to become the prefectural governor of Shimane in 1909 before his death in 1911. See Kokuryūkai, *TōA senkaku shishi kiden* (1939), vol. 3, reprinted in the series Meiji hyakunen sōsho (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1968), 497.

80. Hayashi to Komura, April 19, 1905, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–8, vol. 3, p. 106. See also Kajikawa, *Gaimushō keisatsu ryakushi*, 38–41.

81. “Keimu gakkō ni okeru kyōshū ni jikkō,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–8, vol. 3, pp. 133–135.

82. Ogino, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, 123–133.

83. “Zaikin teikoku keisatsukan o komon keisatsukan ni saiō no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–8, vol. 3, pp. 110–111.

84. “Keimu komon fuzokuin genzaiin torishirabe no ken,” *ibid.*, 149–153.

85. “Ryōjikan keibu o keimu komon hosakan ken’ninhō no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–5, vol. 2, p. 330.

86. Toshihiko Matsuda, “The Colonization of Korea and the Consular Police, 1904–1910,” conference paper for the AAS Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA, 2004.

87. For more on Maruyama Shigetoshi’s role in facilitating the future annexation of Korea in 1905 and beyond, see Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 187, 195, 207, 213.

88. Contemporary accounts of the evolution of Japanese police forces in Korea before annexation, including references to Takehisa Katsuzō and Maruyama Shigetoshi, can be found in Kankokugaku bunken kenkyūjo, ed., *Kankoku shisei ippan* (dated 1906), in *Kyū Kan matsu Nittei shinryaku shiryō sōsho* (Seoul: Ajia bunkasha, 1984), 1:25–38; A more lengthy description is in *Kankoku shisei nenpō* (dated 1906), in *Kyū Kan matsu Nittei shinryaku shiryō sōsho*, 2:106–127.

89. “Keisatsu kaizen no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–5, vol. 2, pp. 331–353.

90. Ogino, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, 133–137.

91. “Kankoku ni okeru gunji keisatsu to ryōjikan keisatsu to no kankei,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–7, vol. 3, pp. 81–83.

92. “Zai Kan-koku teikoku kōshikan oyobi kaku ryōjikan keisatsukan no haichi,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–6, vol. 3, p. 4; *Gaimushō no hyakunen*, 1378. Kajikawa, *Gaimushō keisatsu ryakushi*, 41. Soejima, “Chōsen ni okeru Nihon,” 136. Kajikawa and Soejima both give 248 as the total number in later 1905, but the original source data calculates at 268. Barbara Brooks gives a figure of “about 300” in her “The Japanese Consul in China, 1895–1937,” 19.

93. For details on the steps through which all Japanese police forces in Korea were consolidated under the government-general police bureau in 1910, see Matsuda, “Chōsen shokuminchika no katei ni okeru keisatsu kikō (1904–1910).”

94. Ogino, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, 137–145.

95. “Ryōji keisatsu no gaiyō,” in Iwai Keitarō, ed., *Komon keisatsu shoshi* (1910), *Kankoku heigōshi kenkyū shiryō*, vol. 4 (Tokyo: Ryukishosha, 1995), p. 296.

96. Delissen, “Denied and Beseiged: The Japanese Community of Korea, 1876–1945,” 128.

97. “Chōsen-koku ni oite senshi no junsu Yasukuni jinja e gōshi,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 1–5, vol. 2, pp. 26–29.

Chapter 2: A Disputed Presence in Late Qing and Early Republican China

1. “Shinkoku Shanhai e junsu haken . . .,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 2–5, vol. 5, pp. 133–134; Chen Zuen, “Shanghai Nihonjin kyoryūmin kankei nenpyō: Meiji hen,” *Hōsei daigaku kyōeibu kiyō: jimbun kagaku hen* 90 (February 1994): 21. An excellent overview of the Japanese community in Shanghai is Katsuragawa Mitsumasa, “Shanhai no Nihonjin shakai,” *Kokusai toshi Shanhai* (Osaka: Osaka sangyō daigaku, 1995), 29–97. See also Chen Zuen, “Seiyō Shanhai to Nihonjin kyoryūmin shakai,” in *Chūgoku ni okeru Nihon sokai: Jūkei Kankō Kōshu Shanhai*, ed. Ōzato Hiroaki and Son Ansok (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobō, 2006), as well as Yamamura Mutuso, “Dai ichi-ji taisenki ni okeru Shanhai Nihonjin kyoryūmin shakai no kōsei to ‘dochakuha’ chukensō,” *Wakō keizai* 30, no. 1 (September 1997): 85–105. In English, see Joshua Fogel, “‘Shanghai Japan’: The Japanese Residents Association of Shanghai,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 4 (November 2000): 927–950, and Christian Henriot, “‘Little Japan’ in Shanghai: An Insulated Community,” in *New Frontiers*, ed. Bickers and Henriot, 146–169.

2. Soejima Shōichi, “Chūgoku ni okeru Nihon no ryōjikan keisatsu,” *Wakayama daigaku kyōiku gakubu kiyō—jimbun kagaku* 39 (February 1990): 63–80.

3. Ogino, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, 578–579. Mark Peattie states that “by 1886” there were consular police in various other port cities, but this is incorrect; see Peattie, “Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895–1937,” 202n50. The mistake, however, could quite likely just be a typographical error.

4. The population estimate comes from Henriot, “‘Little Japan’ in Shanghai,” 148.

5. “Keibu haichi no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 2–5, vol. 5, p. 135.

6. *Gaimushō no hyakunen*, 1391–1395. Ogino, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, 581–589. Each of these seven consulate offices were outfitted with a police contingent of one inspector and up to half a dozen patrolmen, but because of its larger resident Japanese population, the Shanghai consulate was staffed with an extra inspector. New consulates and accompanying consular police forces were also opened in numerous areas during the decade between the end of the Sino-Japanese War and the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War roughly ten years later. New consular facilities in Hankou (1898) and Fuzhou (1899) were followed by a small wave of expansion in the wake of the Boxer Uprising of 1900. At that time, the consular police force in Tianjin was expanded, and police forces were assigned to the embassy in Beijing (1900) and the consulate in Nanjing (1901). During and immediately after the Russo-Japanese War, additional consulates and police staff were stationed at Shantou (1904), Changsha (1904), and Guangdong (1906). The First World War and its aftermath then brought a final wave of growth to the early expansion of Japan’s consular police apparatus in China. Offices in Jinan (1914), Jiujiang (1915), Chengdu (1916), Yun’nan (1918), and Yichang (1919), were followed after the Paris Peace Conference by the establishment of consular police forces in Zhengjia-kou (1922) and Qingdao (1922). Qingdao was a somewhat unique case in terms of the size of the initial police deployment there. In most cities, the consular police force was initiated with less than ten men, but because of its large Japanese population and its new status as a semicolonial Japanese possession since 1914, the Qingdao consulate maintained a police force of more than sixty men from its very inception. Soejima, “Chūgoku ni okeru Nihon no ryōjikan keisatsu,” 68.

7. John V. A. MacMurray, ed., *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1894–1919*, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), 21.

8. Tenshin kyoryūmindan, *Tenshin kyoryūmindan sanjūshūnen kinenshi* (Tianjin, 1941), 235–236. See also “Fukoku junho no bōkō,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–9.1, vol. 34, pp. 31–39. For additional reference, two of the best recent articles concerning the Japanese resident community in Tianjin more broadly are Katsuragawa Mitsumasa, “Sokai zaijū Nihonjin no ninshiki: Tenshin o ichirei toshite,” in *Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki*, ed. Furuya Tetsuo (Tokyo: Ryokuin shobō, 1996), 351–394, and Kishi Toshihiko, “Kindai Tenshin no toshi comyuniti to nashonarizumu,” in *Gendai Chūgoku no kōzō hendō*, ed. Nishimura Shigeo, vol. 3: *Nashonarizumu—rekishi kara no sekkin* (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 2002), 175–200. Katsuragawa deals more precisely with the matter of prostitution in the Japanese concession at Tianjin in “Tenshin sokai ni okeru baishun,” *Kindai shaki to baishun mondai* (Osaka: Osaka sangyō daigaku, 2000), 117–146. For a focused look at the

1920s, see Kobayashi Motohiro, “1920 nendai Tenshin ni okeru Nihonjin kyoryūmin,” *Shien* 55, no. 2 (March 1995): 53–73.

9. For additional source documents, see JFMA file no.4.2.5-186-1-1-1, *Bōkō kankei zakken: Tenshin ni oite hon Hōjin Beihei shōtotsu jiken*; “Tenshin ni okeru Nichi-Beijin shōtotsu jiken gaiyō,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–9.1, vol. 34, pp. 81–93.

10. Erik Esselstrom, “‘Of Such Local Significance’: Culture, Diplomacy, and the Tientsin Incident of 1919” (M.A. thesis, Asian Studies Program, University of Oregon, 1996).

11. Tenshin kyoryūmindan, *Tenshin kyoryūmindan gyōsei gaikan* (Tianjin, 1927), 31. Ching-chih Chen discusses the function of *junho* in colonial Taiwan in his “Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire,” 215.

12. Tenshin kyoryūmindan, *Tenshin kyoryūmindan nijūshūnen kinenshi* (Tianjin, 1930), 607.

13. Asano Toyomi’s work on this topic is instructive. My understanding of the issues raised in this section was deepened by reading his “The Japanese Consular Police and Social Control in the Taiwan Straits,” a conference paper for the 2004 AAS Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA, 2004. An excellent article that treats the matter of legal integration and identity within the Japanese empire is Tanaka Ryūichi, “Teikoku Nihon no shihō rensa,” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 38 (October 2000): 61–91.

14. Nakamura Takashi, “‘Taiwan sekimin’ o meguru shomondai,” *Tōnan Ajia kenkyū* 18, no. 3 (December 1980): 66–89. Tai Kuo-hui, “Nihon shokuminchi shihai to Taiwan sekimin,” *Taiwan genkindai kenkyū* 3 (1980): 105–128. In English, see Barbara Brooks, “Japanese Colonial Citizenship in Treaty Port China: The Location of Koreans and Taiwanese in the Imperial Order” in *New Frontiers*, ed. Bickers and Henriot, 109–124; and her *Japan’s Imperial Diplomacy*, 105–109. Japanese-language research on the dynamics of legal jurisdiction over Koreans in China is enormous. Most of it, however, focuses on south Manchuria and Jiandao. One recent exception that explores the position of Koreans in Shanghai is Takei Yoshikazu, “Senzen Shanhai ni okeru Chōsenjin no kokuseki mondai,” *Chūgoku kenkyū geppō* 60, no. 1 (January 2006): 7–21. For an overview, see Mizuno Naoki, “Kokuseki o meguru higashi Ajia kankei—shokuminchi ki Chōsenjin kokuseki mondai no isō,” in *Kindai Nihon ni okeru higashi Ajia mondai*, ed. Furuya Tetsuo and Yamamuro Shin’ichi (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 2001), 211–237.

15. “Taiwan ni okeru kaizoku to nan-Shi to no kankei,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–33, vol. 52, pp. 18–25. Ogino Fujio also suspects that Amoy and Fuzhou consular police staff were involved in the political surveillance of Taiwanese independence activists, but he has not found substantial specific evidence in support of that notion. See Ogino, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, 594.

16. “Keisatsu jimu ni kanshi Shamen, Fukushū ni ryōji to Taiwan sōtokufu kyōtei jikō,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, section 5–32, volume 51, 97–102.

17. Westel Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, 1st ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1920), 80–82.

18. “Tōkan keisatsu bunsho o Shamen gawa ni setchi no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–32, vol. 51, pp. 102–103.

19. “Shamen ryōjikan keisatsu bunsho kaisetsu ni kanshi gaikōbu yori kōgi no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–32, vol. 51, pp. 103–105.

20. *Ibid.*, 104.

21. Soejima, “Chūgoku ni okeru Nihon no ryōjikan keisatsu,” 66–67.

22. *Ibid.*, 67.

23. For an overview of the Kantō totokufu, see Kurihara Ken, “Kantō totokufu mondai teiyō—toku ni kanseijō yori mita totoku no zai-Man ryōji shiki kantoku mondai,” in *Tai Man-Mō seisakushi no ichimen: Nichi-Ro sengo yori Taishōki ni itaru*, ed. Kurihara Ken (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1966).

24. Soejima, “Chūgoku ni okeru Nihon no ryōjikan keisatsu,” 67–68.

25. “Shin-koiku junsu no bōkō jiken shimatsu ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3–1, vol. 7, pp. 27–32.

26. “Junsu zōin no ken,” *ibid.*, 34–35.

27. “Minami Manshū tetsudō fuzokuchi keisatsu ni kansuru ken,” *ibid.*, 40–42.

28. “Waga keisatsukan haken ni kanshi Jō shōgun yori kōgi no ken,” *ibid.*, 47–48.

29. “Junkei bōkō jiken oyobi zairyūmin taikai chinjō no ken,” *ibid.*, 59–62.

30. Saitō Ryōji, *Kantō-kyoku keisatsu yonjū nen no ayumi to sono shūen* (Tokyo: Kantō-kyoku keiyaku jimukyoku, 1981), 17–18; Kantō-chō, *Kantō-chō shisei ni-jū nen shi* (1926), 268–269; Kantō totokufu kanbō monjo ka, *Kantō totokufu shisei shi* (1919), 135–136. For secondary analysis of Army–Foreign Ministry conflict on these matters, see Teramoto Yasutoshi, “Nichi-Ro sensō go no tai-Man seisaku o meguru Gaimushō to rikugun no tairitsu,” *Seiji keizai shigaku* 237 (January 1986): 76–93. A more recent and highly perceptive analysis is Yamazaki Yukō, “Mantetsu tsuki zokuchi gyōseiken no hōteki seikaku: Kantōgun no kyōbaba senryaku,” in *Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no hōteki tenkai*, ed. Asano Toyomi and Matsuda Toshihiko (Tokyo: shinsansha, 2004).

31. “Zai-Manshū teikoku ryōjikan tsuki keisatsukan ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 2–5, vol. 5, pp. 136–138; “Tōtokfu kansei kaisei ni kanshi naikun no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3–2, vol. 7, p. 169; Saitō, *Kantō-kyoku keisatsu yonjū nen no ayumi to sono shūen*, 17–18; Kantō-totokufu, *Kantō totokufu jimu gaiyō* (1913), 81–82.

32. *Kantō-chō shisei nijū nen shi*, 283–284.

33. The distinct position of consular police in South Manchuria is reflected in the structure of the *Gaimushō keisatsushi* itself. The editors did not create separate sections for each consulate, as they did for other regions,

but rather grouped all consulates in South Manchuria under one category. This is also one of the smallest sections of the history.

34. “Kantō totokufu kansei kaisei ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3–2, vol. 7, p. 206; “Man-Mō ni okeru keisatsukan no keitō tōichi ni kansuru ken,” *ibid.*, 207.

35. “Taishō 6 nen 6 gatsu Manshū ni okeru teikoku kikan tōichi ni kansuru ken,” *ibid.*, 217–223.

36. “Manshū oyobi Mō-Ko ni okeru shisetsu keiei kaizen ni kansuru ken,” *ibid.*, 227–228.

37. “Manshū oyobi Mō-Ko ni okeru shisetsu keiei kaizen ni kansuru Takumushō an ni taisuru iken,” *ibid.*, 229–232.

38. “Kantō-chō kansei oyobi do kaisei,” *ibid.*, 235–240. For general background information on the reforms under the Hara Cabinet, see Yagyū Masafumi, “Kantō totokufu kansei no kaikaku to Kantōgun no dokuritsu: Hara naikaku to tai Manshū gyōsei kikō kaikaku mondai,” *Komazawa shigaku* 35 (May 1986): 167–189.

39. A consulate with police forces opened in Qiqihar later that year, and several older consulates opened subconsulate offices. In 1916 a subconsulate of the Changchun office opened in Nongan, and similar branch offices of the Tieling consulate opened in Hailong and Taolu. The following year of 1917 also saw two new consulates open in Chifeng and Chengde, as well as a subconsulate of the Fengtian office in Tonghua. Soejima, “Chūgoku ni okeru Nihon no ryōjikan keisatsu,” 68.

40. “Minami Manshū ni okeru waga keisatsukan no Shinajin ni taisuru taido ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3–2, vol. 7, pp. 198–199.

41. “Minami Manshū ni okeru waga keisatsukan shutchōjo teppai yōkyū ni kansuru ken,” *ibid.*, 200–201.

42. Section 4, which is devoted entirely to the history of the consular police in Jiandao, begins with a subsection covering the outbreak of the 1919 Korean independence movement until the Hunchun Incident of 1920. The next two subsections describe the Hunchun Incident, the Jiandao Expedition of 1922, and the subsequent police personnel increases. Next, the period from the Toudaogou Incident until the May 30 uprising is covered as one unit of chronological narrative. Finally, the last two subsections address the year and a half between the May 30 riots and the Manchurian Incident, and then the years following September 18, including a special section devoted exclusively to the joint paramilitary operations conducted by the Jiandao consular police and the Kwantung Army during 1932.

43. An excellent series of articles describing the position of Koreans in Jiandao largely from the Korean perspective is Shin Kyu-seop, “Nihon no Kantō seisaku to Chōsenjin shakai: 1920 nendai zenhan made no kajū seisaku o chūshin to shite,” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 31 (October 1993): 157–187; “Shoki ‘Manshūkoku’ ni okeru Chōsenjin tōgō seisaku: zen Man

Chōsenjin minkai rengōkai no bunseki o chūshin ni,” *Nihon shokuminchi kenkyū* 9 (July 1997): 16–31; “Zai Man Chōsenjin no ‘Manshūkoku’ kan oyobi ‘Nihon teikoku,’” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 38 (October 2000): 93–121.

44. Hyun Ok Park, “Korean Manchuria: The Racial Politics of Territorial Osmosis,” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 99, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 196. For more detailed background information, see No Kye-hyōn, “Kantō kyōyaku ni kansuru gaikō teki kōsatsu,” *Kan* 106 (1987): 145–181.

45. See Tanigawa Yūichirō, “Naitō Konan to Kantō mondai ni kansuru jakkan no saikentō,” *Chūgoku kenkyū geppō* 55, no. 4 (April 2001): 39–46; Nawa Etsuko, “Naitō Konan to ‘Kantō mondai’ ni kansuru shinbun ronchō,” *Okayama daigaku daigakuin bunka kagaku kenkyūka kiyō* 9 (March 2000): 137–155.

46. André Schmid, “Rediscovering Manchuria: Sin Ch’aeho and the Politics of Territorial History in Korea,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 56, no. 1 (February 1997): 26–46.

47. For a detailed secondary analysis of how this field office came to be, see Ch’oe Jang-gun, “Kankoku tōkan Ito Hirobumi no Kantō ryōdo seisaku—tōkanfu hashutsujo no setsubi kettei no keii,” *Hōgaku shinpō* 102, nos. 7, 8 (February 1996): 175–202; 102, and no. 9 (March 1996): 171–187. See also Bai Rongxun, *Higashi Ajia seiji gaikō shi kenkyū: kantō jōyaku to saiban kankatsu ken* (Osaka: Osaka keizai hōka daigaku, 2005), 20–27. For additional documents, see “Tōkanfu rinji Kantō hashutsujo,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 4–1, vol. 19, pp. 20–24. There is also a contemporary recounting of the establishment of this field office in “Tōkanfu rinji Kantō hashutsujo kiyō,” in *Chōsen tōchi shiryō*, ed. Kim Chōng-ju (Tokyo: Kankoku shiryō kenkyūjo, 1970–1972), 1:1–262.

48. A detailed history of early Sino-Japanese debates and disputes over the administration of Jiandao is a three-part article series by Kanbe Teruo and Kuroya Takako, “Kantō ryōyū o meguru Nis-Shin no kakuchiku,” *Oita daigaku kyōiku gakubu kenkyū kiyō* 13, no. 2 (1991): 255–274; “Shōki Kantō mondai ni okeru Nis-Shin no funsō jiken,” *Oita daigaku kyōiku gakubu kenkyū kiyō* 14, no. 1 (1992): 173–188; “Go Rokutei to Kantō mondai,” *Oita daigaku kyōiku gakubu kenkyū kiyō* 14, no. 1 (1992): 158–172.

49. See “Kantō jōyaku kōshō keika,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 4–1, vol. 19, pp. 35–42; also, Bai, *Higashi Ajia seiji gaikō shi kenkyū*, 28–52.

50. Bai Rongxun, “Kantō ‘shōbuchi’ ni okeru Nit-Chū kōshō,” *Higashi Ajia kenkyū* 29 (August 2000): 17–33. For additional discussion, see No Kye-hyōn, “Kantō kyōyaku ni kansuru gaikō teki kōsatsu,” *Kan* 106 (1987): 145–181; Shin Kyu-seop, “Nihon no Kantō seisaku to Chōsenjin shakai: 1920 nendai zenhan made no kajū seisaku o chūshin to shite.”

51. One of the earliest explanations was offered by Hayashi Masakazu, who argued that the Jiandao problem had deep roots in Sino-Japanese-Korean territorial disputes, since the border between Korean and Manchuria had a long history of being somewhat ill-defined. Recognizing the weakness of their claims in those disputes, Hayashi suggests, Japanese authorities pas-

sively acceded to Chinese demands in the Jiandao agreement while nonetheless continuing to press their claims in 1915 and beyond. Tanigawa Yūichirō has also taken a moderate view of the accord in arguing that the Jiandao agreement was not necessarily a reversal of previously aggressive expansion, but rather a natural effort to find the most effective solution to larger problems, namely the complex question of legal authority over Koreans beyond the peninsula. Hyun Ok Park, however, sees a more sinister motive behind the agreement, describing it as an early step in the process of Japan's "osmotic" expansion beyond the Korean peninsula and into China's northeastern provinces. See Hayashi Masakazu, "Kantō mondai ni kansuru Nis-Shin kōshō no keii," *Shundai shigaku* 10 (March 1960): 181-199; Tanigawa Yūichirō, "'Kantō kyōyaku' teiketsu katei no saikentō," *Bungaku kenkyū ronshū* 14 (February 2001): 169-186; Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed*, 98-100.

52. See Brooks, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy*, 110-115. One of the only substantial studies in English on the Korean community in Jiandao is Paul Hobom Shin, "The Korean Colony in Chientao: A Study of Japanese Imperialism and Militant Korean Nationalism, 1905-1932" (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1980). In Japanese, see Yoda Yoshiie, "Manshū ni okeru Chōsenjin imin," in *Nihon teikokushugika no Manshū imin*, ed. Manshū iminshi kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1976).

53. Bai, "Kantō 'shōbuchi' ni okeru Nit-Chū kōshō," 28-29.

54. Bai, *Higashi Ajia seiji gaikō shi kenkyū*, 147-156. Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed*, 98-100.

55. Yi, *Kindai higashi Ajia no seiji rikigaku*, 99. This increase was accompanied by the construction of several new local police substations by 1918 in Tianbaoshan, Badaogou, and Nanyangping to facilitate management of the expected influx of Korean immigrants and the rising number of Japanese settlers from the home islands. See also Tanigawa Yūichirō, "'ManMo TōKo jōyaku' to Kantō ryōjikan keisatsu zōkyō," *Nihon shokuminchi kenkyū* 16 (2004), 5-6.

56. Ogino, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, 405.

57. The most complete collection of documents related to the Zhengjia-tun affair can be found in *Nihon gaikō bunsho*, 1916, vol. 2, sec. 10, "Tonkaton ni oite Nit-Chū ryōgoku guntai shototsu," pp. 591-750. For a contemporary American editorial on the incident, see James Brown Scott, "The Chengchia Tun Agreement," *The American Journal of International Law* 11, no. 3 (July 1917): 631-635. English translations of the official documentary exchange between the Chinese and Japanese diplomatic representatives are included along with Scott's editorial in the same issue of *The American Journal of International Law* as "Documents regarding the Chengchia Tun Affair between China and Japan," 112-125. For secondary description of the Zhengjia-tun incident in English, see Brooks, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy*, 96-97.

58. "Kawase junsu senshi no ken," *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3-10, vol. 12, pp. 50-68; Soejima, "Chūgoku ni okeru Nihon no ryōjikan keisatsu," 74-76.

59. Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, 1st ed., 84.
60. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements*, 2:1351.
61. Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, 85.
62. *Nihon gaikō bunsho*, doc. no. 722, vol. 2, sec. 10, pp. 668–699.
63. *Tairiku* (Dairen), no. 38 (September 1916).
64. *Ibid.*, 5–7.
65. *Ibid.*, 9.
66. *Ibid.*, 9–10.
67. This editorial appears in *Nihon gaikō bunsho*, doc. no. 718, vol. 2, sec. 10, 659–665.
68. October 19, 1916, *Peking Gazette*, “The Chengchiatun Negotiations: A Formula of Defence,” in *Nihon gaikō bunsho*, doc. no. 743, vol. 2, sec. 10, pp. 700–702.
69. Westel Willoughby, *The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), 12.
70. C. Walter Young, *Japanese Jurisdiction in the South Manchuria Railway Areas* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1931), 300–301.
71. Kajikawa, *Gaimushō keisatsu ryakushi*, 69.
72. Tanigawa Yūichirō, “‘ManMo TōKo jōyaku’ to Kantō ryōjikan keisatsu zōkyō,” 5–6.
73. *Ibid.*, 13.
74. Ogino, 589.
75. Koga Motokichi, “Shina ni okeru gaikoku keisatsuken,” *Gekkan Shina kenkyū* 1, no. 5 (April 1925): 1–41, and continued in 1, no. 6 (May 1925): 1–44; “Minami Manshu tetsudō fuzokuchi no keisatsuken ni tsuite,” *Gekkan Shina kenkyū* 2, no. 1 (June 1925): 55–94; “Shina ni okeru gaikoku keisatsuryoku,” *Gekkan Shina kenkyū* 2, no. 2 (July 1925): 33–74; “Shina ni okeru sokai keisatsu,” *Gekkan Shina kenkyū* 2, no. 3 (August 1925): 1–45; “Shina ni okeru keisatsuryoku no kyōgō,” *Gekkan Shina kenkyū* 2, no. 4 (September 1925): 37–84.
76. Shinobu Junpei, *Man-Mō tokushū keneki ron* (Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha, 1932), 428–452.
77. *Ibid.*, 438–439.
78. *Ibid.*, 451.
79. Hsu Hsu-shi, *Essays on the Manchurian Problem* (Shanghai: China Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1932), 177.
80. V. K. Wellington Koo, *Memoranda Presented to the Lytton Commission*, vol. 1 (New York: Chinese Cultural Society, 1932), 170–171.
81. *Manchuria: Report of the Commission of Enquiry Appointed by the League of Nations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1932), 53.
82. *Ibid.*, 134.
83. Koga Motokichi, *Shina oyobi Manshū ni okeru chigai hōken oyobi ryōji saibanken* (Tokyo: Nis-Shi mondai kenkyūkai, 1933), 121.

84. Ibid., 8–13.

85. H. G. W. Woodhead, *Extraterritoriality in China: The Case against Abolition* (Tianjin, 1929), 12.

86. Ibid., 55.

87. Arnold Foster, quoted by Woodhead in *ibid.*, 55.

88. Shihozawa Kita, *Nihon ryōjikan keisatsu hō* (Tokyo: Shinkokaku, 1938), 10.

89. Hanabusa Nagamichi, *Nihon no zai-Ka chigai hōken* (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1943), 81.

90. Ibid., 80–82.

91. Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, 87; from a paper published by Wu as an appendix in B. L. Putnam Weale, *The Fight for the Republic in China* (New York: Dodds, Mead and Company, 1917).

92. Albert Feuerwerker, “The Foreign Presence in China,” in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 12: *Republican China, Part I*, ed. John K. Fairbank (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 154.

Chapter 3: Policing Resistance to the Imperial State

1. A useful English-language summary of the early Korean resistance movement in exile is Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea, Part I: The Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 3–65. Alternatively, one might consult Scalapino and Lee, “The Origins of the Korean Communist Movement (I),” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 20, no. 1 (November 1960): 9–31 and “The Origins of the Korean Communist Movement (II),” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 20, no. 2 (February 1961): 149–167. In Japanese, see Kang Dōsang, “Kaigai ni okeru Chōsen dokuritsu undō no hatten,” *Tōyō bunka kenkyūjo kiyō* 51 (March 1970): 25–79; Yu Hyo-jong, “Kyokutō Roshia ni okeru Chōsen minzoku undō: ‘Kankoku heigō’ kara dai ichi-ji sekai taisen no boppatsu made,” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 22 (March 1985): 135–166; Tsurushima Setsurei, *Chūgoku Chōsenzoku no kenkyū* (Osaka: Kansai daigaku shuppanbu, 1997); and Kim Jung-Mi, *Chūgoku tōhokubu ni okeru kō-Nichi Chōsen Chūgoku minshūshi josetsu* (Tokyo: Gendai kikaku shitsu, 1992).

2. In preparing this chapter, I have benefited greatly from the unpublished presentation notes of Mizuno Naoki of Kyoto University, “Shanghai Furansu sokai to Chōsen minzoku undō” (April 2003).

3. For a broad overview of the Foreign Ministry’s perception of the problem, see Gaimushō Ajia kyoku, “Chōsen dokuritsu undō mondai” (1922), in *Chōsen tōchi shiryō*, ed. Kim Chōng-ju (Tokyo: Kankoku shiryō kenkyūjo, 1970–1972), 7:327–454.

4. For background information on the Korean government in exile, see Hong Sun-ok, “Dai Kan minkoku rinji seifu no seiritsu katei,” *Kan* 9, nos. 4–5 (April–May 1980): 3–34, and Li Hyun-hi, “Dai Kan Minkoku rinji seifu

kenkyū,” *Tōkyō joshi daigaku hikaku bunka kenkyū kiyō* 56 (1995): 89–105. In English, see Chong-sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 4–24.

5. For brilliant descriptions of the complex international security networks that operated in prewar and wartime Shanghai, see Frederic Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai, 1927–1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), and *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937–1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

6. See Hara Teruyuki, “Kyokutō Roshia ni okeru Chōsen dokuritsu undō to Nihon,” *Sanzenri* 17 (February 1979): 47–53.

7. “Shanghai Fukoku sokai futei Senjin taiho kata ni kan suru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–19.1, vol. 42, pp. 319–322.

8. Chōsen sōtokufu keimukyoku, “Shina kanken futei Senjin futorishimari jirei” (June 1920), in *Chōsen tōchi shiryō*, ed. Kim Chōng-ju (Tokyo: Kankoku shiryō kenkyūjo, 1970–1972), 6:317–338.

9. “Hanseifu no soshiki oyobi sono ato no kōdō,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–19.1, vol. 43, pp. 260–295.

10. “Shanghai Fukoku sokai kanken no futei Senjin torishimari,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–19.1, vol. 44, pp. 15–17.

11. See exchanges between Foreign Minister Uchida to Ambassador Matsui (Paris) and Chōsen Government-General to Uchida, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, section 5–19.1, vol. 44, pp. 58–60. An excellent article describing the newspaper in question is Son Ansok, “Shanghai no Chōsengo ‘dokuritsu shinbun’ ni tsuite—shinshiryō ni yoru shoshiteki kenkyū to saikentō no kanōsei,” *Chikaki ni arite* 29 (May 1996): 17–33.

12. “Fukoku kanken no fusei ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–19.1, vol. 44, pp. 118–119.

13. “Tenshin ni okeru futei Senjin kōdō ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–9.1, vol. 34, pp. 95–96.

14. “Futei Senjin An Shōkō no enzetsu ni kansuru ken,” *ibid.*, 111–112. For background on An Chang-ho, see Nagano Shin’ichirō, “An Shōkō no shisō to kōdō,” *Tōyō kenkyū* 105 (December 1992): 1–34. An took Chinese citizenship in Shanghai in July 1923. A fascinating examination of how Japanese police dealt with An’s naturalization as a Chinese in their attempts to arrest him can be found in Takei Yoshikazu, “Senzen Shanghai ni okeru Chōsenjin no kokuseki mondai,” *Chūgoku kenkyū geppō* 60, no. 1 (January 2006): 14–16.

15. “Taishō 11 nen 3 gatsu futei Senjin torishimari hōshin,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–3.1, vol. 30, p. 46.

16. “Futei Senjin Rō Unkō no kōdō ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–35, vol. 53, pp. 21–22. For background on Yō Un-hyōng, see An U-sik and Matsumoto Ken’ichi, “Chōsen dokuritsu undō to Ro Unkō no hiun,” *Chishiki* 107 (October 1990): 226–240.

17. “Chū-Kan kyōkai soshiki ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–35, vol. 53, pp. 23–25.

18. See Son Ansok, “1920 nedai, Shanhai no Chū-Chō rentai soshiki: ‘Chū-Kan kokumin gojoshu soshu’ no seiritsu, kōsei, katsudō o chushin ni,” *Chūgoku kenkyū geppō* 50; no. 1, (January 1996): 15–31.

19. Voluminous records related to the Ūiyōdan can be found in JFMA file no. 4.3.2.2–1, *Futeidan kankei zakken: Chōsen no bu: Giretsudan kōdō*.

20. Kajimura Hideki, “Giretsudan to Kin Genhō,” in *Chōsen gendai no minshū undō* (Tokyo: Akaishi shoten, 1993); Kim Chang-su, “Minzoku undō to shite no giretsudan katsudō,” *Kan* 7, nos. 11/12 (November/December 1978): 115–141; Pak T’ae-wŏn, *Kin Jakuzan to Giretsudan: 1920 nendai ni okeru Chōsen dokuritsu undō to teroru* (Tokyo: Hokuseisha, 1980).

21. “Shanhai ni okeru Tanaka taishō sogeki jiken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–19.2, vol. 44, pp. 280–308.

22. “Giretsudan inbō jiken senkyō,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–19.3, vol. 45, 4–17.

23. “Bakudan ōshū to kokugai futei Senjin no dōsei ni kansuru ken,” *ibid.*, 31.

24. See, for example, Naimushō keiho kyoku, “Giretsudan ippa no kyōbō keikaku gaiyō” (January 1924), in *Tokkō keisatsu kankei shiryō shūsei*, ed. Ogino Fujio, vol. 12, sec. 5–8, pp. 97–103.

25. “Giretsudan no kōdō oyobi dōdanchō Kin Genhō taiho sōchi,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–19.3, vol. 45, pp. 50–72.

26. See exchange between Foreign Minister Shidehara to Consul Yada (Shanghai), Yada to Shidehara, and Shidehara to Ambassador Ishii (Paris), *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–19.3, vol. 45, pp. 116–119.

27. See J. Kim Mulholland, “The French Response to the Vietnamese Nationalist Movement, 1905–14,” *Journal of Modern History* 47 (December 1975): 655–675.

28. See William J. Duiker, “Phan Boi Chau: Asian Revolutionary in a Changing World,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 31, no. 1 (November 1971): 77–88.

29. An excellent discussion of the East Asian Common Culture Academy is Douglas R. Reynolds, “Training Young China Hands: TōA Dōbun Shoin and Its Precursors, 1886–1945,” in *Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937*, ed. Duus, Myers, and Peattie. For more on related topics of Sino-Japanese cultural exchange, see Douglas R. Reynolds, *China, 1898–1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

30. Son Ansok, “Shanhai o meguru Nichi-Bu no jōhō kōkan netowaaku—‘teikoku’ to ‘shokuminchi’ no jōhō tōsei,” *Nihon Shanhaishi kenkyūkai*, ed., *Shanhai hitoēsō suru nettowaaku* (Tokyo: Kyuko shoin, 2000); see also Shiraishi Masaya, “Tōyū undō (Betonamu) o meguru Nichi-Fu ryō tōkyoku no taiō,” *Ōsaka gaikokugo daigaku gakuho* 73 (1986): 111–140.

31. “Shanghai kageki Chōsenjin to shakaishugisha to teikei,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–20, vol. 47, p. 5.

32. “Shanghai ni okeru Kyōsantō no jōkyō,” *ibid.*, 4.

33. “Shanghai ni okeru Kyōsantō no jōkyō,” *ibid.*, 15–18.

34. George Beckmann and Okubo Genji, *The Japanese Communist Party, 1922–1945* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), 30–35.

35. Naimushō keiho kyoku, “Honpō shakaishugisha to Rokoku kagekiha to no kankei” (June 1922), in *Tokkō keisatsu kankei shiryō shūsei*, ed. Ogino Fujio, vol. 1, sec. 1–2, pp. 53–58; and “Honpō shakaishugisha to Rokoku kagekiha to no kankei-sankō shorui” (June 1922) vol. 1, sec. 1–3, pp. 59–75.

36. “Kaigai ni okeru chōhō kikan tōichi ni kan suru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–18.1, vol. 42, pp. 143–145.

37. See Michael Weiner, *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 63–93.

38. On Kaneko, see “Chapter Four: The Road to Nihilism—Kaneko Fumiko,” in *Reflections on the Way to the Gallows: Rebel Women in Prewar Japan*, ed. Mikiso Hane (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 75–124; Kaneko Fumiko, *The Prison Memoirs of a Japanese Woman*, translated by Jean Inglis (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991).

39. Beckmann and Okubo, *Japanese Communist Party, 1922–1945*, 66–78.

40. “Futei Senjin torishimari ni kansuru kunrei,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 4–2, vol. 20, pp. 56–57.

41. “Chōsen sōtokufu kankyō hokudō keisatsukan no ekkyō sōsa,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 4–2, vol. 20, pp. 63–73.

42. Sources in the Gaimushō archives reveal numerous interviews with Korean policemen who were intimidated and threatened by local Korean radicals if they did not abandon their participation in Japanese security forces. See, for example, “Ri junsu junshoku jiken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 4–2, vol. 20, p. 150.

43. “Zai gai Kanzoku dokuritsu undō no sūsei to kageki shisō denpa no kinkyō ni kansuru ken,” *ibid.*, 4–2, vol. 20, 147–149. Suematsu Kichiji (1879–1951) is an important figure in the general history of the consular police. He was also a member of the editorial board that compiled the *Gaimushō keisatsushi*.

44. “Rokoku kagekiha to Kantō chihō futei Senjindan to no kankei,” *ibid.*, 191–195.

45. “Keisatsu kikō jūjitsu no ken,” *ibid.*, 200–201.

46. “Saitō komon Kantō haken buki taiyo,” *ibid.*, 227–255.

47. “Shina gunkei ni waga ryōjikan junsu taiho ni kansuru ken,” *ibid.*, 314–316.

48. “Kaku bunkan shunin uchiawase kaigi ni kansuru ken,” *ibid.*, 289–293.

49. Detailed documentation of the incident can be found JFMA, file no. 5.3.2–156, *Konshun ni okeru Chōsenjin bōdō ikken*.

50. A detailed history of the Jiandao Expedition from the Japanese perspective of the time can be found in Kim Chōng-ju, ed., *Chōsen tōchi shiryō* (Tokyo: Kankoku shiryō kenkyūjo, 1970–1972), 2:1–346.

51. A useful summary of the Jiandao Expedition based on sources found in British Foreign Office records is chapter 9 of Dae-yeol Ku, *Korea under Colonialism: The March First Movement and Anglo-Japanese Relations* (Seoul: Seoul Computer Press, 1985), 266–291.

52. JFMA, file no. 5.3.2.156–5, *Konshun ni okeru Chōsenjin bōdō jiken: gai-koku no taido kōron no bu*.

53. Along with most Korean scholars, Higashio Kazuko also expresses doubt regarding the incidental nature of the Hunchun violence, in “Konshun jihen to Kantō shuppei,” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 14 (March 1977): 58–85. The most detailed defense of the Japanese response to the Hunchun violence is Sasaki Harutaka, “‘Konshun jihen’ kangae,” *Boei daigakkō kiyō* 39 (September 1979): 293–332; 40 (March 1980): 233–275; 41 (September 1980): 361–388. One additional study of the Hunchun Incident is Hayashi Masakazu, “Konshun jiken no keika,” *Shundai shigaku* 19 (September 1966): 107–126.

54. “Konshun jiken o ika ni kaiketsu sen to suru ka?” *Chōsen oyobi Manshū* 160 (October 1920): 5–6.

55. “Teppei enki seigansho sōfu no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 4–3, vol. 21, pp. 72–76.

56. “Kantō hōmen teppei zengo ni okeru sochi ni kansuru Gaimushō no hōsaku,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 4–4, vol. 21, pp. 151–158.

57. “Kantō waga keisatsu bunsho no setsubi Shina gawa fu ninshiki no ken,” *ibid.*, 165–179.

58. “Keisatsubu no setsubi oyobi kengen ni kansuru ken,” *ibid.*, 182; “Keisatsubu jimu bunshō ni kansuru ken,” *ibid.*, 216.

59. The details of the Toudaogou Incident are described in “Tōdōkō bazoku shūgeki jiken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 4–5.1, vol. 22, pp. 8–55; extensive documents are also available in JFMA, file no. 4.3.2–15, *Tōdōkō jiken*. In *Chōsen tōchi shiryō*, see 7:247–57.

60. “Kantō sōryōjikan shokuinhyō,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 4–9, vol. 27, 269–272.

61. Elise K. Tipton, *The Japanese Police State: The Tokkō in Interwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1990), 19–23.

62. For an excellent discussion of the problems posed by Japanese legal jurisdiction over resident Koreans in Manchuria, see Barbara Brooks, “Peopling the Japanese Empire: The Koreans in Manchuria and the Rhetoric of Inclusion,” in *Japan’s Competing Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy, 1900–1930*, ed. Sharon Minichiello (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press

1998), 25–44. The definitive study of Zhang Zuolin in English is Gavan McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China: China, Japan, and the Manchurian Idea* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1977).

63. Hyun Ok Park describes the Hominkai (Kor. Pominhoe) in one page of *Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria* (Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2005), 84. Otherwise, my article on the topic from which the following discussion is drawn is the only secondary description of the group in English. See Erik Esselstrom, “Japanese Police and Korean Resistance in Prewar China: The Problem of Legal Legitimacy and Local Collaboration,” *Intelligence and National Security* 21, no. 3 (June 2006): 342–363.

64. “Manshū homin kabushiki kaisha ni kansuru keika oyobi genjō”; “Manshū hominkai setsuritsu ninka no ken”; “Manshū hominkai setsubi ninka ni tsuki hogo gata Shina kanken e kōshō no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3–3, vol. 8, pp. 4–14.

65. Kim Dong-myung, “Isshinkai to Nihon: ‘seigōhō’ to ‘heigō,’” *Chōsen-shi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 31 (1993): 97–126.

66. Stewart Lone, “Of ‘Collaborators’ and Kings: The Ilchinhoe, Korean Court, and Japanese Agricultural-Political Demands during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905,” *Papers on Far Eastern History* 38 (1988): 117.

67. For additional discussions of Chōngdogyo thought and its political manifestations, see Kang Song-un, “20 seiki shotō ni okeru Tendōkyō jōsōbu no katsudō to sono seikaku,” *Chōsen-shi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 24 (March 1987): 155–179, and Kawase Takaya, “‘Kokka’ kan to ‘kindai bunmei’ kan—Tendōkyō kanbu ‘minzoku taihyō’ ni tsuite,” *Tōkyō daigaku shūkyōgaku nenpō* 14 (1996): 97–109. In English, see Kim Yong-Choon, “Ch’ōndogyo Thought and Its Significance in Korean Tradition,” *Korea Journal* 15, no. 5 (May 1975): 47–53.

68. “Manshū homin kabushiki kaisha ni kan suru keika oyobi genjō,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, see 3–3, vol. 8, pp. 4–6.

69. Report from Fengtian consulate entitled “Sōsetsu tōji ni okeru Manshū hominkai no jōkyō,” in “Manshū hominkai setsubi ninka ni tsuki hogo gata Shina kanken e kōshō no ken,” *ibid.*, 10–14.

70. “Futei Senjin torishimari oyobi hominkai enjo no tame chōsahan haken no ken,” *ibid.*, 140–144.

71. *Ibid.*

72. “Chōsahan haken keikaku no ken,” *ibid.*, 144–147.

73. “Chōsahan no kōdō ni kan suru ken,” *ibid.*, 147–150.

74. “Hominkai setsuritsu keikaku ni kan suru ken,” *ibid.*, 17–20.

75. Aiba Kiyoshi (1886–1970) was also an editor of the *Gaimushō keisatsushi*. By the time he took up his position at the Jiandao consulate in 1927, Aiba had already served in various colonial police organizations for over twenty years. In his late teens, Aiba traveled to Korea as an exchange student to receive intensive language training. His success in that venture

earned him a position as interpreter in the cadre of police advisers led by Maruyama Shigetoshi throughout 1905. From there he bounced about between police units in the Korean colonial government and several Gaimushō posts before eventually arriving in Jiandao. His personal papers (*Aiba Kiyoshi bunsho*) are housed at the Tokyo Kankoku kenkyūin, but I have yet to gain access to them.

76. “Manshū hominkai ryakki,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, section 3–3, volume 8, 128–139.

77. *Ibid.*, 133–134.

78. “Hominkai shibu kaichō kaigi no ken,” *ibid.*, 49–56.

79. “Manshū hominkai kaiin taihyo tangansho,” *ibid.*, 59–60.

80. “Zai Hōten sōryōjikan kinmu Gaimushō shokutaku Sai Shoikei haiseki bun chinjōsho,” *ibid.*, 69–72.

81. “Manshū hominkai haishi ni kansuru ken,” *ibid.*, 72–73.

82. “Manshū hominkai komon Sai Shoikei kingen,” *ibid.*, 84–88.

83. “Manshū hominkai haishi narabi ni zengo sochi no ken,” *ibid.*, 75–79.

84. “Sai shokutaku kazoku satsugai jiken ni kansuru ken,” *ibid.*, 96–97.

85. “Tōji Manshū hominkai komon (kaicho kenmu) Sai Shoikei kazoku sōnan no ken,” *ibid.*, 97–100.

86. “Manshū hominkai ryakki,” *ibid.*, 134–135.

87. For discussion of the infighting and rivalry within the Japanese government concerning the administration of South Manchuria, see Brooks, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy*, 118–126.

88. “Shanghai sōryōjikan keisatsushō kakujū no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–18.1, vol. 42, pp. 157–160.

89. *Ibid.*

90. “Zai Shanghai sōryōjikan keisatsu soshiki kaizen ni kansuru ken,” *ibid.*, 160.

91. “Chōhō jimu sennin keisatsukan zōin no ken,” *ibid.*, 161–163.

92. Son Ansok, “Shanghai wo meguru Nichi-Fu no jōhō kōkan netto-waaku,” 443.

93. Inoue Manabu, “Nihon teikokushugi to Kantō mondai: 1910 nendai—20 nendai zenhan,” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 10 (March 1973): 69.

94. “Futei senjin torishimari ni kansuru Nis-Shi kyōtei (Mitsuya kyōtei) ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 2–1, vol. 4, pp. 72–73. An English translation of the agreement can be found in C. Walter Young, *Korean Problems in Manchuria as Factors in the Sino-Japanese Dispute: An Analytical and Interpretive Study* (Geneva: Supplementary Documents to the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, 1932), 30–31, and in Dae-sook Suh, ed., *Documents of Korean Communism, 1918–1948* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 123–126. The original Japanese text can also be found in Kajimura Hideki, “1930 nendai Manshū ni okeru kō-Nichi tōsō ni tai suru Nihon

teikokushugi no shosakudō—‘zai Manshū Chōsenjin mondai’ to kanren shite,” *Nihonshi kenkyū* 94 (November 1967), 50–51.

95. Yi, *Kindai higashi Ajia no seiji rikigaku*, 223–226.

96. The papers, notes, and discussions that took place during this seminar are available in two sources. The first is a recent article by Tanaka Ryūichi and Miyata Setsuko, “Chōsen tōchi ni okeru ‘zai Man Chōsenjin’ mondai,” *Tōyō bunka kenkyū* 3 (March 2001): 129–177. In fact, Miyata was a participant in the seminar as a graduate student. Also present was the noted Japanese scholar of modern Korea, Kajimura Hideki. The second is the journal *Chōsen kindai shiryō kenkyū shūsei*.

97. *Chōsen kindai shiryō kenkyū shūsei*, no. 2 (August 1959), p. 130. These comments are recorded in the question-and-answer notes, as part of the article “Nihon tōchi ka no zai-Man Chōsenjin mondai.”

98. “Chōsen kyōsantō Manshū sōkyoku tō Man dō kanbu tōin kenkyō ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 4–5.3, vol. 23, pp. 252–271. See also Yi, *Kindai higashi Ajia no seiji rikigaku*, 245–248.

99. Dae-sook Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918–1948* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), 150.

100. *Ibid.*

101. Garon, *State and Labor in Modern Japan*, 130–136; Mitchell, *Thought Control in Prewar Japan*, 56–66.

102. Naimushō keiho kyoku, “Saikin shakaishugi narabi shakai undō no gaikyō” (June 1925), in Ogino, ed., *Tokkō keisatsu kankei shiryō shūsei*, vol. 1, sec. 1–8, pp. 100–154, in particular 106–107.

103. Weiner, *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan*, 84. On the lack of genuine internationalism within the Japanese socialist movement during the interwar years, see Stephen Large, *Organized Workers and Socialist Politics in Interwar Japan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), and Andrew Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). For more analysis of the place that the Korean communist movement came to occupy in the consciousness of Japanese socialists, see Ishizaka Kōichi, “Nihonjin shakaishugisha no Chōsen ninshiki: 1910 nendai ni tsuite no kōsatsu,” *Shien* 48, no. 2 (October 1988): 44–64, and his larger monograph, *Kindai Nihon no shakaishugi to Chōsen* (Tokyo: Shakai hyoronsha, 1993).

104. Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai, 1927–1937*, 142.

105. The quote here is from Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed*, 108.

Chapter 4: Opposition, Escalation, and Integration

1. For insightful analysis of this incident and its politicization in recent Sino-Japanese relations, see Ming Wan, *Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).

2. Koike Sei'ichi has written an insightful trio of articles examining the position of the Foreign Ministry at the time of the Manchurian Incident. See his “‘Chigai hōken no teppai’ to ‘chian jiji’: Manshū jihen zengo no ‘ren-zokusei’ ni kan suru ikkōsatsu,” *Hiroshima heiwa kagaku* 18 (1995): 87–111; “‘Kokka’ to shite no Chūgoku, ‘ba’ to shite to Chūgoku: Manshū jihen mae, gaikōkan no tai Chūgoku ninshiki,” *Kokusai seiji* 108 (March 1995): 148–160; “‘Yūwa’ no henyō: Manshū jihenki no Gaimushō,” *Gunji shigaku* 37, nos. 2, 3 (October 2001): 103–121.

3. “Kantō Konshun chihō kyōsanshugi undō ni taisuru sochi,” in *Gaimushō bunsho*, (Washington, DC: Library of Congress), microfilm reel SP 157.

4. Bai Rongxun, “Manshū Chōsenjin no kokuseki mondai to hōteki chii,” *Bungaku kenkyū ronshū* 16 (February 2002), 103–121. Another useful article dealing with the matter of resident Koreans in Manchuria as a factor in Sino-Japanese tension is Son Chun-il, “Manshū jihen zen no ‘zai Man Chōsenjin’ mondai to sono kukyō,” *Higashi Ajia kindaiishi* 5 (March 2002): 36–52. A contemporary Mantetsu research report on the subject is Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha shomubu chōsaka, *Shina gawa no tai Senjin seisaku ni tai shi Nihon no toritaru shochi* (Dairen, 1929).

5. In reporting to the League of Nations in 1932, C. Walter Young described Chinese “oppression” of resident Manchurian Koreans after 1927 as a significant factor in the Japanese decision to seek unilateral control over the northeast. See his *Korean Problems in Manchuria as Factors in the Sino-Japanese Dispute* (Geneva: Supplementary Documents to the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, 1932), 24–26. Two fascinating articles that focus on Sino-Japanese competition to cultivate influence over resident Koreans in Jiandao through educational programs are Takenaka Ken'ichi, “Kantō ni okeru minzokushugi soshiki ni yoru Chōsenjin kyōiku,” *Higashi Ajia kenkyū* 27 (February 2000): 5–17, and Yu Feng-chun, “Chūgoku Chōsenzoku kyōiku o meguru Chū-Nichi ryōgoku no kyōsō: 1905–31 nen no ‘Kantō’ o chūshin ni,” *Ajia bunka kenkyū* 8 (June 2001): 207–220.

6. For a contemporary report on the following events, see “Rinkō ryōji bunkan setsubi hantai undō to sono keii,” *Chōsa jippō* 7, no. 9 (September 1927), 508–516. For extensive additional documentation, see “Antō ryōjikan Bōjisan bunka setchi mondai,” *Nihon gaikō bunsho*, Shōwa I, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 68–122.

7. Tomitsuka Kazuhiko, “Showa 2 nen Bōjisan bunkan setsubi to zai Man Chōsenjin mondai,” *Hōsei daigaku daigakuin kiyō* 22 (1989): 87–98. For another secondary analysis, see Yoshii Ken'ichi, “Antō ryōjikan bunkan setchi mondai no hamon: Yoshida Shigeru to Tanaka gaikō,” *Kan Nihonkai kenkyū nenpō* 4 (March 1997): 78–93, and Yoshii, *Kan Nihonkai chiiki shakai no henyō*, 168–190.

8. For additional documents, see JFMA, file no. M.1.3.0–2–1–1, *Zai-Shi teikoku kōkan kankei zakken: Bōjisan bunkan kankei*.

9. “Bōjisan bunkan kaisetsu sochi ni kansuru keika,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3–5, vol. 10, pp. 5–9.

10. Ogata Yōichi, “1927 nen no Rinkō Nihon ryōjikan setsubi jiken: Chūgoku ni okeru han-Nichi undō no tenki,” *Tōyō gaku* 60, nos. 1–2 (November 1978): 132–165.

11. *Ibid.*, 152–154.

12. Tomitsuka, “Showa 2 nen Bōjisama,” 94.

13. Tanaka et al., “Chōsen tōchi ni okeru ‘zai Man Chōsenjin’ mondai,” 218.

14. See JFMA, file no. D.2.1.0 -2, *Zai-Shi teikoku keisatsukan no seifuku kiyō seigen mondai ikken*. On the topic of discussions concerning the abolition of extraterritoriality during the late 1920s, see Soejima Shōichi, “Chūgoku no fubyōdō jōyaku teppai to ‘Manshū jihen,’” in *Nit-Chū sensōshi kenkyū*, ed. Furuya Tetsuo (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1984).

15. Soejima Shōichi, “Chūgoku ni okeru ryōjikan keisatsu,” 76–77.

16. “Kantō chihō ni okeru waga keisatsukan kōshi ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 4–5.3, vol. 23, pp. 338–339.

17. “Kantō chihō ni okeru waga keisatsukan no kōshi narabi ni keisatsukan jūjitsu ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 4–5.3, vol. 23, pp. 422–427.

18. “Manshū chihō keisatsu kikan jūjitsu ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3–2, vol. 7, pp. 262–263.

19. “Showa 4 nen 4 gatsu, Gaimushō Ajia kyoku an,” *ibid.*, 276–286.

20. “Gaimushō keisatsu kikan no kaizen ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 2–5, vol. 5, pp. 251–266.

21. A very useful collection of documents produced by the Jiandao Consulate-General has been assembled under the title *Manshu jihen zen'ya ni okeru zai kantō nihon sōryōjikan bunsho*, vol. 1 (Yao: Ōsaka keizai hōka daigaku shuppanbu, 1999). The May 30 riots are also often discussed in general histories of the Korean Communist movement, and sometimes in works dealing with Chinese Communist Party history. See, for example, the work of Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee.

22. Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea. Part I: The Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 151–157; see also Yi Song-hwan, *Kindai hīgashi Ajia no seiji rikigaku*: 249–254. A particularly insightful summary of the incorporation of Korean communists into the CCP and the failure of the Li Li-san line in the CCP’s Manchurian strategy can be found in Chong-Sik Lee, *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 111–126.

23. Dae-sok Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918–1948*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), 232.

24. *Man-Mō jōjō* 105 (June 25, 1930). For secondary treatment, see Kanemori Shōsaku, “‘Manshū’ ni okeru Chū-Chō Kyōsantō no gōdō to Kantō 5.30 hōki ni tsuite,” *Chōsenshi sō* 7 (June 1983): 3–40. The riots and Foreign Minister Shidehara’s reactions to them are described well in Yoshii,

Kan Nihonkai chiiki shakai no henyō, 223–231, as well as in Yi, *Kindai higashi Ajia no seiji rikigaku*, 266–284. See also Tsurushima Setsurei, *Chūgoku Chōsen-zoku no kenkyū* (Osaka: Kansai daigaku shuppanbu, 1997), 290–299.

25. “Kantō chihō ni okeru waga keisatsukan no kōshi ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 4–6, vol. 24, pp. 14–28. *Nihon gaikō bunsho*, Showaki-I, pt. 1, vol. 4, docs. no. 85, no. 89.

26. *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, *ibid.*, 16–17; *Nihon gaikō bunsho*, *ibid.*, doc. no. 90.

27. “Showa 5 nen Kantō bōdō no genin ni tsuki hōkoku” (Aiba to Saitō, June 27), *Saitō Makoto bunsho*, *Chōsen sōtokufu jidai kankei shiryō*, vol. 11 (Seoul: Koma shorin, 1990).

28. *Nihon gaikō bunsho*, Showaki-I, pt. 1, vol. 4, doc. no. 93.

29. *Ibid.*, doc. no. 95.

30. *Ibid.*, doc. no. 103.

31. *Saitō Makoto bunsho*, *Chōsen sōtokufu jidai kankei shiryō*, vol. 11, pp. 207–221.

32. “Shina rikugun no waga keisatsukan sasshō jiken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 4–6, vol. 24, pp. 77–108.

33. Yi, *Kindai higashi Ajia no seiji rikigaku*, 277–278.

34. “Keisatsu yōnin rinji saiyō ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 2–5, vol. 5, pp. 189–198.

35. “Shina gawa no waga keisatsu kikan tettai kōdō,” *ibid.*, 198–204.

36. “Showa 6 nen 3 gatsu 30 nichi Kantō mondai ni kan suru Gaimu, Takumu, Chōsen Sōtokufu kyōgi kaigi jiroku yōshi,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 4–6, vol. 24, pp. 182–188.

37. Aiba himself recounts the circumstances surrounding his replacement in Tanaka et al., “Chōsen tōchi ni okeru ‘zai Man Chōsenjin’ mondai,” 251.

38. “Kantō zaijū Chōsenjin ni tsuite,” in JFMA, file no. B.4.0.0–C/X 1–13, *Shina chigai hōken teppai mondai ikken*; also cited in Yoshii, *Kan Nihonkai chiiki shakai*, 225–226. For an earlier statement of Suematsu’s ideas concerning the problem of resident Koreans, see his report entitled “Chōsenjin no Kantō Konshun do setsuzoku chihō ijū ni kansuru chōsa” (March 1926), *Chōsen tōji shiryō*, vol. 10, pp. 333–369.

39. Chong-Sik Lee, *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and Societ Interests, 1922–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), 120. Lee cites Manshūkoku gunseibu gunji chōsabū, ed., *Manshū Kyōsanhi no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Kyokutō kenkyūjo shuppankai, 1969), 69, for the figure of 13, 168 arrests.

40. “Manshū jihen ni yoru Kantō chihō no jōkyō,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 4–7.1, vol. 25, pp. 4–13.

41. *Ibid.*, 9–10.

42. “Keisatsu kikan kakujū hō no ken,” *ibid.*, 14–45.

43. “Keisatsu kikan kakujū hō no ken,” *ibid.*, 15–22, 23.

44. Yoshizawa to Okada, 18 February 1932, *ibid.*, 87.

45. “Kantō chihō ni okeru Kyōsantō undō torishimari no ken,” *ibid.*, 98–102.

46. “Kantō Konshun chihō chian jōkyō,” *ibid.*, 260.

47. “Showa 7 nenjū Kantō (Konshun-ken o fukumu) oyobi setsujōchihō chian jōkyō,” *ibid.*, 242–244.

48. Barbara J. Brooks, *Japan’s Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895–1938* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2000), 99.

49. Similarly, Koike Seiichi has recently argued that the Kwantung Army used the crisis over extraterritoriality negotiations and resident Koreans to justify their advance into Manchuria. Again, this may be true, but the Jiandao consular police were making the same case long before September 18, 1931. See Koike Seiichi, “Chigai hōken no teppai to chian jiji—Manshū jihen zengo no renzokusei ni kansuru ikkōsatsu,” *Hiroshima heiwa kagaku* 18 (1995): 87–111.

50. Tanaka et al., “Chōsen tōchi ni okeru ‘zai Man Chōsenjin’ mondai,” 251.

51. Nakatsuka Akira, “Chōsen shihai no mujun to ‘Manshū jihen,’” *Kikan gendai shi* 1 (November 1972): 20–27. Another important early work to identify the significance of resident Koreans to anti-Japanese resistance in Manchuria was Kajimura Hideki’s article “1930 nendai Manshū ni okeru kō-Nichi tōsō ni tai suru Nihon teikokushugi no shosakudō—‘zai Manshū Chōsenjin mondai’ to kanren shite,” *Nihonshi kenkyū* 94 (November 1967): 25–55.

52. Nakatsuka, “Chōsen shikai no mujun,” 26–27. Yoshii Ken-ichi describes the Chōsen Army’s scheme to occupy all of Jiandao and incorporate the consular police into its own security forces in *Kan Nihonkai chiiki shakai no henyō*, 232–237. Yi Song-hwan also mentions these plans in *Kindai higashi Ajia no seiji rikigaku*, 303–304. Additional relevant primary sources can be found in *Gendaishi shiryō*, vol. 7, *Manshū jihen*, 457–466.

53. “Mitsuya kyōtei haishi ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 2–1, vol. 4, pp. 78–79.

54. The political environment of Shanghai and its draw for Japanese leftists during the late 1920s is well described by Chalmers Johnson in *An Instance of Treason: Ozaki Hotsumi and the Sorge Spy Ring* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964; 1990 rev. ed.), 41–59.

55. Nishizato Tatsuo, *Kakumei no Shanhai de: Aru Nihonjin Chūgoku kyōsantōin no kiroku* (Tokyo: Nit-Chū shuppan, 1977), 81, 85.

56. Kuroshima Denji (Zeljko Cipris, trans.), “ Militarized Streets,” in *A Flock of Swirling Crows and Other Proletarian Writings* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2005), 168–169.

57. My understanding of the circumstances surrounding Sano’s arrest has been aided by the unpublished research presentation notes of Professor Ishikawa Yoshihiro, entitled “Sano Manabu no taiho to Shanhai no ryōjikan keisatsu” (February 2003), Kyoto University.

58. Uemura to Tanaka, June 22, 1929, “Sano Manabu taiho kankei,”

Tokkō keisatsu kankei shiryō shūsei, vol. 6, sec. 1–44, p. 373. “Nihon kyōsantō chūō shikkō iin Sano Manabu no taiho,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–20, vol. 47, pp. 97–99.

59. “Chūgoku kyōsantō no genjō,” *ibid.*, 100–106. The original document in Sano’s own hand is reproduced in “Sano Manabu taiho kankei,” *Tokkō keisatsu kankei shiryō shūsei*, vol. 6, sec. 1–44, pp. 387–392.

60. Roland H. Mitchell, *Thought Control in Prewar Japan*, (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1976), 81–96; Elise K. Tipton, *The Japanese Police State: The Tokkō in Interwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1990), 69–70.

61. Robert Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 34.

62. See Naimushō keiho kyoku, “Himitsu kessha Nihon kyōsantō jiken no gaiyō” (June 1928), in Ogino Fujio, ed., *Tokkō keisatsu kankei shiryō shūsei*, vol. 4, sec. 1–19, pp. 323–404.

63. George M. Beckmann and Okubo Genji, *The Japanese Communist Party, 1922–1945*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), 181.

64. Ogino Fujio, *Tokkō keisatsu taisei shi* (Tokyo: Sekita shobō, 1988), 213.

65. Dae-sook Suh suggests that it was British police who arrested Yō and then turned him over to the Japanese consular police in Shanghai; see Suh, *Korean Communist Movement, 1918–1948*, 176. Documents in the *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, however, do not corroborate this.

66. “Kyōsantō kanbu Ro Unkō no taiho,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, section 5–20, vol. 47, pp. 107–108; “Kyōsantō shuryō Ro Unkō kenji ni sōchi no ken,” *ibid.*, volume 47, 108–131. Particularly fascinating among the many documents related to the interrogation of Yō Ūn-hyōng is a report that recounts Yō’s own opinions concerning various East Asian social movements of the day as well as his views on the nature of Japanese colonial rule in Korea. For details, see “Zai Shanhai kyōsantō shuryo Ri unkō torishirabe jōkyō ni kan suru ken,” *ibid.*, 109–132.

67. Suh, *Korean Communist Movement, 1918–1948*, 176.

68. Interdepartmental cooperation between police stations in Shanghai and in metropolitan Japan was not always related to thought crime. In April 1929, for example, Shanghai consular police arrested a Japanese man named H. Fukuda and his Korean associate on charges of illicit arms trafficking. Fukuda had been arrested in 1925 and expelled from Shanghai for a period of three years, only to return and wind up in trouble with the law once again. His arrest came about, however, from intelligence provided by Nagasaki police who had some of Fukuda’s homeland partners in custody. See file no. D154, *Shanghai Municipal Police Files*, microfilm reel 2.

69. Naimushō keihokuyoku, *Tokubestu kōtō keisatsu shiryō* (September 1928), in Shakai mondai shiryō kenkyukai, ed., *Tokubestu kōtō keisatsu shiryō*, vol. 1 (Kyoto: Tōyō bunkasha, 1973), 146–152.

70. “Kokoku no dōshi e no tsūshin,” *Tokubestu kōtō keisatsu shiryō* (January 1929), in Shakai mondai shiryō kenkyukai, ed., *Tokubestu kōtō keisatsu shiryō*, 3: 49–67. The Shanghai consular police also frequently detained and extradited Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese suspects on charges of violating the Peace Preservation Law after the revisions made to it in 1928 expanding the investigative powers of Japanese police forces. See Ogino Fujio, ed., *Chian ijihō kankei shiryōshū*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Shin Nihon shuppansha, 1996), 567–575.

71. Mitchell, *Thought Control in Prewar Japan*, 95–96.

72. In late January, the *Shanghai Korean News* (*Shanghai Kanbun*) published this brief statement on the life of Yi Pong-ch’ang, the Sakuradamon bomber:

At 11:30 a.m. January 8, Li Bong Chang attacked the Japanese emperor in Tokyo like thunder from a cloudless sky. His heroic action gave the world a big surprise and caused a great shock to all Japanese, making them tremble at the bravery of Koreans. The following is a brief history of Li Bong Chang—He was born in Seoul, Korea, age thirty-two. His home is very poor. He was very much interested in military knowledge in the hope of recovering Korea from Japan. He admires brave men and hates cowards. Being a member of a poor family, he visited Tokyo and Osaka where he secured employment as a daily labourer. Whilst he was leading a labourer’s life his determination to take revenge on the Japanese become very strong whenever he was humiliated by Japanese labourers. He waited for a chance to take his long cherished revenge. As he could not secure the necessary weapons he came to Shanghai last winter and called on the Korean Provisional Government and promised to carry out his plan. He secured a job in a Japanese shop, the Nishokai Company in Hongkew, under the assumed name of Z. Kinoshita (Japanese name) in order to turn away the watchful eyes of the Japanese police. In the middle of December he received two bombs and \$400 from the Korean Provisional Government and immediately proceeded to Tokyo to carry out his plan on January 8. (File no. D3087, *Shanghai Municipal Police Files*, microfilm reel 7)

73. File no. D3059, *Shanghai Municipal Police Files*, microfilm reel 7.

74. “Sakuradamon soto daigyaku jiken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushū*, sec. 5–19.4, vol. 45, pp. 290–293. “Sakuradamachi ni okeru Ri Hosho (Yi Pong-ch’ang) fukei jiken,” Ogino, ed., *Tokkō keisatsu kankei shiryō shūsei*, vol. 12, sec. 5–10, pp. 149–159. Chong-Sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 184.

75. Ogino, *Tokkō keisatsu taisei shi*, 225. The arrest of Yi Pong-ch’ang is also described in great detail in Naimushō keihokyoku hoanka, *Tokkō geppō* (January 1932), pp. 42–45, 66–67, including extensive information concerning Yi’s family background, education, and early political activities. This

report also includes translations of the official statements on the incident issued by the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, the Korean Independence Party, and the Korean Communist Party. Not surprisingly, all depict Yi as a national hero and martyr.

76. File no. D3087, *Shanghai Municipal Police Files*, microfilm reel 7.

77. “Futei Senjin bakudan tōteki jiken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–19.4, vol. 45, pp. 294–316. “Shanghai ni okeru In Hōkichi (Yun Pong-gil) bakudan jiken,” *Tokkō keisatsu kankei shiryō shūsei*, vol. 12, sec. 5–11, pp. 163–174. Lee, *Politics of Korean Nationalism*, 184–185. See also documents 493, 494, and 495 in “Shanghai jihen kankei: tsuki Shanghai Fukoku sokai sōsaku mondai,” *Nihon gaikō bunsho*, Showa-ki, ser. 2, pt. 1, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Gaimushō, 1996), 504–508.

78. “Shanghai Chōsenjin dokuritsu undōsha torishimari taisaku,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–19.4, vol. 45, pp. 317–320. See also document 498 in “Shanghai jihen kankei,” pp. 515–525. The April park bombing is also noted as a turning point in Japanese consular police escalation in Takatsuna Hirofumi and Chen Zuen, eds., *Riben qiao min zai Shanghai, 1870–1945* (Shanghai: Shanghai ci shu chu ban she, 2000).

79. “1919–1932 Chōsen minzoku undō nenkan (Shōwa 7 nen 4 gatsu 30 nichī Shanghai Futsu sokai dai Kan kyō mindan jimusho ni oite ōshū no dai Kan minkoku rinji seifu oyobi dō kyō mindan hokan bunken ni yoru),” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–19.5, vol. 46, pp. 136–303. Chong-sik Lee cites this document as “one of the most valuable sources” on the Korean resistance movement in exile in his *Politics of Korean Nationalism*, 305.

80. Son Ansok, “Shanghai o meguru Nichi-Fu no jōhō kōkan nettowaaku: ‘teikoku’ to ‘shokuminchi’ no jōhō tōsei.” See also documents 496 and 497 in “Shanghai jihen kankei: tsuki Shanghai Fukoku sokai sōsaku mondai,” *Nihon gaikō bunsho*, Showa-ki, ser. 2, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 508–514.

81. “Zai Shanghai sōryōjikan ni okeru tokkō keisatsu jimū jōkyō,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–18.2, vol. 43, p. 102.

82. Gaimushō, *Relations of Japan with Manchuria and Mongolia* (Tokyo, 1932), 18. This and the following quotes are from chapter 2, entitled “Bearings of the Confused State of Political Thought and Ideas in the Far East on the State Foundations of Japan.”

83. *Ibid.*, 20.

84. *Ibid.*, 21.

85. *Ibid.*

86. *Ibid.*, 23.

87. *Ibid.*

88. *Ibid.*, 24.

89. *Ibid.*

90. *Ibid.*, 26.

91. *Ibid.*, 27.

92. Suh, *Korean Communist Movement, 1918–1948*, 186.

Chapter 5: The Struggle for Security in Occupied China

1. Barbara J. Brooks makes this “loss of control” argument in *Japan’s Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895–1938* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2000).

2. Ogino Fujio, “Gaimushō keisatsu ron: Tokkō keisatsu to shite no kinō,” *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 665 (November 1994): 17–19.

3. “Zai Shanhai sōryōjikan Tokkō keisatsu kikan kakujū ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–18.1, vol. 42, pp. 272–275.

4. See Patricia Stranahan, *Underground: The Shanghai Communist Party and the Politics of Survival, 1927–1937* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).

5. “Zai Shanhai sōryōjikan Tokkō keisatsu kikan kakujū ni kansuru ken.”

6. Son Ansok, “Nit-Chū sensōki ni okeru Shanhai sōryōjikan keisatsu,” in *Senji Shanhai 1937–45 nen*, ed. Takatsuna Hirofumi (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 2005), 138–144.

7. File no. D5599, *Shanghai Municipal Police Files*, microfilm reel 19.

8. Son Ansok, “Nit-Chū sensōki ni okeru Shanhai sōryōjikan keisatsu.”

9. *Ibid.*

10. Kajikawa Masakatsu, *Gaimushō keisatsu ryakushi*, (Nagoya: Gaikeika yūkai, 1988) 113.

11. Son Ansok, “Nit-Chū sensōki ni okeru Shanhai sōryōjikan keisatsu,” 147. A brief but highly informative account of Uchiyama’s bookstore is in Takatsuna Hirofumi, “Shanghai Uchiyama shoten shoshi,” in *Shanghai hitoesō suru net-towaaku*, ed. Nihon Shanhaishi kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Kyuko shoin, 2000), 361–400. The bookstore as a site of interaction between communists in Shanghai is also described by Chalmers Johnson in his *An Instance of Treason: Ozaki Hotsumi and the Sorge Spy Ring* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990).

12. “Zai Shanhai Nihon sōryōjikan keisatsubu shomu saisoku,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–18.1, vol. 42, pp. 289–293.

13. Zai Shanhai sōryōjikan keisatsubu, “Tokkō keisatsu ni kan suru jikō” (1932), in Ogino, ed., *Tokkō keisatsu kankei shiryō shūsei*, vol. 38, sec. 9–71, pp. 3–44.

14. Shihōshō keijikyoku, “Shanghai zairyū Hōjin (Sen, Tai zai sekinin wo nozoku) no shisō jōkyō,” *Shisō geppō* (October 1935): 203–204.

15. Zai Shanhai sōryōjikan keisatsubu, “Tokkō keisatsu ni kan suru jikō” (1934), in Ogino, ed., *Tokkō keisatsu kankei shiryō shūsei*, vol. 38, sec. 9–73, pp. 186–187.

16. For more on Japanese leftists in Shanghai, see Joshua Fogel, “The Other Japanese Community: Left-wing Japanese Activities in Wartime Shanghai,” in *Wartime Shanghai*, ed. Wen-hsin Yeh (London: Routledge, 1998), 42–61.

17. File no. D4301, *Shanghai Municipal Police Files*, microfilm reel 13.

18. Ibid.

19. A similar collection of Communist handbills in Japanese discovered in the Chinese ward on January 4, 1934, and turned into the Japanese Consular Police can be found in file no. D5638, *Shanghai Municipal Police Files*, microfilm reel 19.

20. Ogino, “Gaimushō keisatsu ron: tokkō keisatsu to shite no kinō,” 20–21. An excellent analysis of Tianjin during the 1930s is Kobayashi Motohiro, “Tenshin jiken saikō: Tenshin sōryōjikan, Shina chūtongun, Nihonjin kyoryūmin,” *Nihon shokuminchi kenkyū* 8 (July 1996): 1–17.

21. “Showa 8 nen zai Tenshin sōryōjikan keisatsu jimū jōkyō,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–9.2, vol. 34, p. 293. There had also been concerns about the influx of Russian and Chinese criminals from Manzhouguo into Shanghai and other port cities for several years. See, for example, file no. D6338, *Shanghai Municipal Police Files*, microfilm reel 22.

22. General observations based on various documents from *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–9.2.

23. “Tenshin sōryōjikan keisatsubu no enkaku,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–1, vol. 28, pp. 3–11.

24. Additional source documents can be found in JFMA file no. M.1.3.0–2–1–2, *Zai Shi teikoku kōkan kankei zakken: Tenshin sōryōjikan keisatsubu*. For additional discussion and documentation, see Ogino Fujio, *Gaimushō keisatsushi: zairyūmin hogo torishimari to tokkō keisatsu kinō*, (Tokyo: Azekura shobō, 2005), 719–736.

25. “Hoku-Shi ryōjikan keisatsu jūjitsu yobikin seikyū riyū,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–2 vol. 29, pp. 23–25.

26. Lincoln Li, *The Japanese Army in North China, 1937–1941* (Tokyo: Oxford University Press, 1975), 36.

27. Zai Tenshin Nihon sōryōjikan keisatsubu, *Zai Tenshin Nihon sōryōjikan keisatsubu kaisetsu jōkyō* (Tianjin, 1936), 4. An excellent discussion of the complexities at work in relations between the army and local Chinese political leadership is Marjorie Dryburgh, *North China and Japanese Expansion, 1933–1937: Regional Power and the National Interest* (Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 2000).

28. “1. Gaikyō,” in *Zai Tenshin Nihon sōryōjikan keisatsubu kaisetsu jōkyō*, 4–5.

29. “2. Kaisetsu junbi,” in *ibid.*, 6–12.

30. Lincoln Li, *Japanese Army in North China*, 32.

31. “Ōe keisatsubuchō chakunin aisatsu yōshi” (appendix 1), *Zai Tenshin Nihon sōryōjikan keisatsubu kaisetsu jōkyō*. Ogino Fujio uses the term *shisō gaikō* in his 1996 article, he but does not attribute it to Chief Ōe or any other consular police official. It may, however, just be a coincidental turn of phrase. See Ogino, “Gaimushō keisatsu ron,” 20.

32. See, for example, Lo, “Chapter Six, Borders of Medicine: The

Dōjinkai Project in China,” in *Doctors within Borders: Profession, Ethnicity, and Modernity in Colonial Taiwan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 151–180; Akira Iriye, “Toward a New Cultural Order: The Hsinmin Hui,” in *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interaction*, ed. Akira Iriye (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 254–274.

33. *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–2, vol. 29, pp. 42–45. Additional information concerning the numbers of consular police officers deployed in various cities in 1936 can be found in *Gaimushō Tō-A kyoku*, *Gaimushō shitsumu hōkoku: Tō-A kyoku*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Kuresu shuppan, 1993), 227–279.

34. Itō Takeo (Joshua Fogel, trans.), *Life along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Itō Takeo* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1988), 165–166.

35. Haldore Hanson, “Smuggler, Soldier and Diplomat,” *Pacific Affairs* 9, no. 4 (December 1936): 544.

36. *Ibid.*, passim. Also see Burke Inlow, “Japan’s ‘Special Trade’ in North China, 1935–1937,” *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 6, no. 2 (February 1947): 139–167. For discussion of consular police involvement in the illegal narcotics trade, see Kobayashi Motohiro, “Drug Operations by Resident Japanese in Tianjin,” in *Opium Regimes*, ed. Brook and Wakabayashi, 152–166. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi also makes some insightful observations regarding the reticence of left-wing Japanese historians in the postwar era to deal objectively with the participation of Korean and Taiwanese imperial subjects in the North China drug trade in his “‘Imperial Japanese’ Drug Trafficking in China: Historiographic Perspectives,” *Sino-Japanese Studies* 13, no. 1 (October 2000): 3–19.

37. Lincoln Li, *Japanese Army in North China*, 31.

38. *Ibid.*

39. Although he does not deal specifically with the consular police, Iijima Mitsuru discusses the problems that came along with army–police integration within Manzhouguo in “Manshūkoku ni okeru ‘gunkei tōgō’ no seiritsu to hōkai,” *Shundai shigaku* 108 (December 1999): 45–69.

40. Tanaka Ryūichi, “‘Manshūkoku’ shoki no ryōjikan keisatsu to chigai hōken teppai,” *Nihon shokuminchi kenkyū* 12 (July 2000): 1–13. See also Soejima Shōichi, “‘Manshūkoku’ tōchi to chigai hōken teppai,” in *‘Manshūkoku’ no kenkyū*, ed. Yamamoto Yūzō (Tokyo: Ryokuin shobō, 1995), 131–155. Useful discussions in English are in Suk-jung Han, “The Problem of Sovereignty: Manzhouguo, 1932–1937,” *Positions* 12, no. 2 (2004): 457–478, and Peter Oblas, “Naturalist Law and Japan’s Legitimization of Empire in Manchuria: Thomas Baty and Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 15 (2004): 35–55.

41. Related documents are available in JFMA file no. D.2.1.2 -4-1, *Manshūkoku keisatsu kikan kankei: Gaimushō keisatsukan Manshūkoku e tenkan kankei*.

42. “Zai Man Gaimushō keisatsukan no ninmu suikō jōkyō narabi ni shōrai no jūjitsu keikaku,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3–4.1, vol. 8, pp. 345–358.

43. “Zai Man Nihon keisatsu seido tōgō kaizen ni kansuru ikenshin,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3-4.1, vol. 8, pp. 375-376.

44. See JFMA file no. M.1.3.0-5-1, *Zai Man teikoku keisatsu kikan tōsei kankei zakken: zai Man taishikan keimubu setchi kankei*.

45. “Showa 8 nen zai Man ryōjikan keisatsu kikan no kakuchō,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3-4.1, vol. 8, pp. 391-393.

46. *Ibid.*, and Tanaka Ryūichi, “‘Manshūkoku’ shoki no ryōjikan keisatsu to chigai hōken teppai,” *Nihon shokuminchi kenkyū* 12 (July 2000): 3-4.

47. “Showa 8 nen zai Man taishikan keimubu kōsei no keii,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3-4.1, vol. 8, pp. 393-405.

48. “Showa 9 nen taishikan keimubu no kōsei, tsuki Hoku Man keimubu no haishi,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3-4.2, vol. 9, 5-14.

49. “Hōjin furyō kōi ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3-4, vol. 9, p. 14.

50. This is made clear in an embassy police bureau report from late 1934. See “Showa 9 nen Manshū ni okeru Kyōsantō undō oyobi kore ni taisuru Gaimushō keisatsukan no katsudō,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3-4.2, vol. 9, pp. 73-97.

51. “Kōtō keisatsu shunin kaigi kaisai no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3-4.2, vol. 9, pp. 114-131.

52. *Showa 12 nendo shitsumu hōkoku* (December 1, 1937), in *Gaimushō Tō-A kyoku*, *Gaimushō shitsumu hōkoku: Tō-A kyoku*, vol. 4 (Tokyo: Kuresu shuppan, 1993), 138-139.

53. “Showa 10 nen tokubetsu chian kōsaku han ni zai Man Gaimushō keisatsu sankā,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3-4.2, vol. 9, 145-149.

54. “Showa 11 nen Manshūkoku chian jōkyō oyobi shukusei,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3-4.3, vol. 9, pp. 244-253.

55. Sources from these years constantly refer to the role of the consular police in “building the New East Asian Order” (*shin tō-A chitsujō kensetsu*). Additional details related to overall consular police numbers by December 1937 can be found in *Gaimushō Tō-A kyoku*, *Gaimushō shitsumu hōkoku: Tō-A kyoku*, 4: 109-196.

56. Excellent examinations of the complex logic of consequences related to the 1937 abolition of extraterritoriality in Manzhouguo include Soejima Shōichi, “‘Manshūkoku’ tōchi to chigai hōken teppai,” in *‘Manshūkoku’ no kenkyū*, ed. Yamamoto Yūzō (Tokyo: Ryokuin shobō, 1995), 131-155; Tanaka Ryūichi, “Tairistu to tōgō no ‘Sen-Man’ kankei: ‘naisen ittai,’ ‘gozoku kyōwa,’ Sen-Man ichinyo no shosō,” *Historia* 152 (September 1996): 106-132, and “[Manshūkoku] to Nihon no teikoku shihai: sono hōronteki tankyū,” *Rekishū kagaku* 173 (June 2003): 13-22; Shin Kyu-seop, “Zai Man Chōsenjin no ‘Manshūkoku’ kan oyobi ‘Nihon teikoku,’” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 38 (October 2000): 93-121.

57. “Zen Man Gaimushō shochō kaigi jōkyō no ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 3-4.3, vol. 9, pp. 282-306.

58. “Showa 12 nen Manshūkoku ni okeru chigai hōken teppai ni tomonau keisatsukan ijō,” *ibid.*, 352-374.

59. Lincoln Li, *Japanese Army in North China*, 31.

60. *Ibid.*

61. The motivations for abolishing extraterritoriality in Manzhouguo are also discussed by Hyun Ok Park in *Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria* (Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2005), 137-138, although the author consistently gives the incorrect date of 1935 for the year in which it took place.

62. “Shina jihen ni kanshi Ōe keibuchō no kuntatsu,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5-9.2, vol. 34, p. 437.

63. “Hoku Shi keisatsu kakujū ni kansuru setsumeisho,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5-1, vol. 28, pp. 74-92.

64. Kobayashi Motohiro, “Tenshin no naka no Nihon shakai,” in *Tenshinshi: saisei suru toshi no toporojū*, ed. Tenshin chiikishi kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Tōhō shoten, 1999), 200.

65. “Showa 13 nen 6 gatsu hoku-Shi keimubu no setsubi oyobi dō kiji,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5-1 vol. 28, pp. 11-19. See also Ogino, “Gaimushō keisatsu ron,” 23-25, as well as Ogino, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, 746-755.

66. “Showa 13 nen 6 gatsu hoku-Shi keimubu no setsubi oyobi dō kiji,” 18.

67. *Ibid.*, 21-63.

68. “Showa 14 nen hoku-Shi keimubu no kiji,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5-1, vol. 28, 108-110; “Showa 15 nen hoku-Shi keimubu no kiji,” *ibid.*, pp. 221-223.

69. See Son Ansok, “Nit-Chū sensōki ni okeru Shanhai sōryōjikan keisatsu,” 148-152, as well as Ogino, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, 797-807. The evolution of Chinese police forces and the Shanghai Municipal Police in occupied Shanghai is described well in Frederic Wakeman, “Urban Controls in Wartime Shanghai,” in Wen-hsin Yeh, ed., *Wartime Shanghai*, (London, Routledge, 1998), 133-156.

70. “Keimubu setsubi hō ni kansuru kyōgikai kaisai hō ni kansuru ken,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5-17, vol. 41, pp. 140-145. Also see Ogino, “Gaimushō keisatsu ron,” 23-25.

71. “Chū-Shi keimubu no setchi ni tsuite,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5-17, vol. 41, pp. 152-153.

72. “Showa 14 nen 10 gatsu yori dō 12 gatsu itaru made no kiji (keimubuin ni tai suru keimubuchō kunjū),” *ibid.*, 153-154.

73. “Kanka keisatsu shokuin haichi tōkeihyō,” *ibid.*, 253.

74. “Showa 15 nen chu no kiji,” *ibid.*, 196.

75. *Ibid.*, 203-204. Additional details concerning the establishment of

the Central China Police Bureau as well as other issues in 1938 can be found in Gaimushō Tō-A kyoku, *Gaimushō shitsumu hōkoku*, 6:84–176.

76. “Dai ikkai chū-Shi keimubu kanka kōtō shunin kaig roku,” in Ogino, ed., *Tokkō keisatsu kankei shiryō shūsei*, 26:318–319. For an overview of consular police activities in Shanghai after 1940, see Son Ansok, “Nit-Chū sen-sōki ni okeru Shanhai sōryōjikan keisatsu,” 155–156.

77. *Ibid.*, 346–352.

78. *Ibid.*, 352–357.

79. “Hoku-Shi chihō ni okeru yōshisatsu (yōgisha o fukumu) Chōsenjin no jōkyō” (June 1939), in *Shōwa shisō tōsei shi shiryō*, vol. 22: *Chūgoku jōsei hen*, ed. Okudaira Yasuhiro (Tokyo: Seikatsusha, 1981), 160–291. The lists themselves are fascinating for what they reveal about just which Korean residents fell under the surveillance of the consular police in occupied China. The suspects identified by name included people labeled as nationalists, Communists, independence activists, revolutionaries, anarchists, and the like. They were also identified by occupation, which included doctors, clergymen, journalists, shopkeepers, students, printers, restaurateurs, teachers, innkeepers, and pharmacists.

80. *Ibid.*, 163–164. For the perspective of the metropolitan police on the problem of Korean independence activists in occupied China, especially Kim Ku and Kim Wōnbong, see Shihōshō keijikyoku, “Chūka minkoku ni okeru Chōsen dokuritsu undō no shin tenkai,” *Shisō geppō* (October 1939), 379–389; “Zai Shi Chōsenjin no han-Nichi undō ni kan suru chōsa,” *Shisō geppō* (November 1940), 1–22; “Ka-hoku ni okeru Chōsenjin mondai,” *Shisō geppō* (November–December 1942), 189–222.

81. “Showa 14 nenjū zai Tenshin sōryōjikan keisatsushō keisatsu jimu hōkoku,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–9.3, vol. 35, p. 183.

82. “Hoku-Shi keisatsushōchō kaigi ni okeru kunjū,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–9.3, vol. 35, p. 98.

83. “Nentō no kotoba,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–9.3, vol. 35, pp. 214–217.

84. “Zai hoku-Shi sayūyokukei dantai shinshutsu jōkyō oyobi shidō ren-raku keitō zuhyō” (May 1939), in Okudaira, ed., *Shōwa shisō tōsei shi shiryō*, 22:158–159.

85. “Shisō torishimari narabini yōshisatsubito chōsahyō,” part of a larger report entitled “Man-Shi ni okeru yōshisatsu, yōchūjin chōsahyō,” in Okudaira, ed., *Shōwa shisō tōsei shi shiryō*, 22:295–373.

86. “Shōwa 15 nenchū no kiji,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–17, vol. 41, pp. 209–211.

87. File no. D8299/34, *Shanghai Municipal Police Files*, microfilm reel 48.

88. Ching-chih Chen points out that formal colonial authorities went to great lengths to discipline officers engaged in unlawful behavior; see his “Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire,” 238. As for the consular

police, a year-end report filed by the Tianjin consular police department in December 1930 claimed that consular police officers needed to better their “moral” training in order to help them resist the temptation of accepting bribes from local Japanese residents engaged in illicit activities such as smuggling drugs and other contraband. See “Showa 5 nen Tenshin sōryōjikan keisatsu jimu jōkyō,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–9.1, vol. 34, pp. 207–209.

89. Shimizu Shigeo, “Jihen ka ni okeru kokunai shisō undō sono hoka” (October 1938), in Ogino, ed., *Tokkō keisatsu kankei shiryō shūsei*, vol. 19, sec. 9–5, pp. 165–175. Shimizu was a public security section chief in the Home Ministry Police Bureau. He produced this report as a representative member of a larger policy study group called the Nihon gaikō kyōkai.

90. John Dower, “Sensational Rumors, Seditious Graffiti and the Nightmares of the Thought Police,” in *Japan in War and Peace*, ed. John Dower (New York: The New Press, 1995), 101–154.

91. Shihōshō keijikyoku, “Shina jihen boppatsugo no kokunai ni okeru hansen nado bunsho ni kan suru chōsa,” *Shisō geppō* (September 1938), 1–23.

92. For a brief description of Hasegawa’s wartime activities, see Barak Kushner, *The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2006), 144–146.

93. My familiarity with this remarkable letter entitled “Chūgoku no shōri wa zen Ajia no ashita e no kagi de aru” is based on versions of it found in four sources: Hasegawa Teru, (Takasugi Ichirō, trans.), *Arashi no naka no sasayaki* (Tokyo: Shinhyōron, 1980), 153–158; Miyamoto Masao, ed., *Hasegawa Teru sakuhinshū: hansen esuperanchisuto* (Tokyo: Akishobō, 1979), 127–130; Takasugi Ichirō, *Chūgoku no midori no hoshi* (Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 1980), 80–85; and Tone Kōichi, *Teru no shōgai* (Tokyo: Yōbunsha, 1969), 30–36.

94. Gaimushō Tō-A kyoku, “zai Han Hōjin kyōsanshugi Kaji Wataru no ensetsu ‘Nihonjinmin no hansen undō no igi’ ni kan suru ken,” *Shisō geppō* (October 1938), 195–207. Similarly, Japanese representative to the Comintern Nosaka Sanzō elaborated on like-minded themes in an essay entitled “The China War and the Japanese People” printed in a Moscow-based communist newspaper in October 1938. See Keishi sōkan, “‘Shina no sensō to Nihonjinmin’ to dai shi cominterun Nihon taihyō Okano no kikō seru cominterun kikanshi kiji ni kan suru ken,” *Shisō geppō* (January 1939), 191–212. A number of fascinating works on the antiwar activities of Japanese citizens and POWs in China have appeared in recent years. See, for example, Fujiwara Akira and Himeta Mitsuyoshi, eds., *Nit-Chū sensō ka Chūgoku ni okeru Nihonjin no hansen katsudō* (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1999), and Kikuchi Kazutaka, *Nihonjin hansen heishi to Nit-Chū sensō: Jūkei kokumin seifu chiki no horyō shūyōjo to kanren sasete* (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobō, 2003). On Hasegawa Teru in particular, see Hasegawa Teru henshū iinkai, eds., *Hasegawa Teru: Nit-Chū sensō ka de hansen hōshō shita Nihon josei* (Osaka: Seseragi shuppan, 2007).

95. An excellent collection of essays on the complex dynamics of Pan-Asian thought and activism is Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann, eds., *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

96. This is the definition provided by Kajikawa in *Gaimushō keisatsu ryakushi*, 140.

97. “Showa 12 nen senbu kōsaku sankā,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–18.2, vol. 43, p. 83.

98. “Showa 12 nen senbu kōsaku sankā,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–9.2, vol. 34, pp. 478–479. An excellent collection of documents describing Imperial Army “pacification operations” (*senbu kōsaku*) is Inoue Hisashi, ed., *Kachū senbu kōsaku shiryō*, vol. 13 of *Jū-go nen sensō gokuhī shiryōshū* (Tokyo: Fujii shuppan, 1989). In his wonderful book *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China*, Timothy Brook describes the *senbu* operations of the Army’s Special Services Department (SSD), or Tokumubu. Brook draws heavily from the above-cited volume edited by Inoue.

99. Kajikawa, *Gaimushō keisatsu ryakushi*, 140. Additional details on the nature of “*senbu*” activities and other issues related to consular police actions during the months following the China Incident can be found in *Gaimushō Tō-A kyoku*, *Gaimushō shitsumu hōkoku*, 4:609–635.

100. Kajikawa, *Gaimushō keisatsu ryakushi*, 141. Ironically, “reformed” Japanese leftists with China experience also made effective *senbu* agents. Nishizato Tatsuo, for example, who returned to Shanghai after the military conquest of the city in 1937 to write for the *Yomiuri shinbun*, was actually asked by a local military intelligence chief to assist in *senbu* operations in the area, as the military was in dire need of Japanese with adequate Chinese-language ability. “Are you aware that I was once convicted for thought crimes?” Nishizato asked when approached to take part in the task. “We know that. But, you’re a convert (*tenkō*), right?” the officer replied. “Yes, since some time ago,” Nishizato responded. “Right, so won’t you help us out here?” the officer quipped. See Nishizato Tatsuo, *Kakumei no Shanhai de: Aru Nihonjin Chūgoku kyōsantōin no kiroku*, (Tokyo: Nit-Chū shuppan, 1977), 210.

101. “Shanghai ni okeru kō-Nichi tero bunshi no katsudō jōkyō” (October 1940), in Shihōshō keijikyoku, *Shisō jōsei shisatsu hōkokushū*, reprinted in *Shakai mondai shiryō sōsho* (Kyoto: Tōyō bunkasha, 1977), 19–44.

102. “Hoku Shi keisatsu kakujū ni kansuru setsumeisho,” *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, sec. 5–1, vol. 28, pp. 78–79.

103. See Ogino, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, 782–796.

104. Zai Shanhai Nihon taishikan chū-Shi keimubu, *Chū-Shi ryōjikan keisatsushochō kaigiroku* (January 1940), 14–18.

105. *Ibid.*, 182–184.

106. Zai-Shanghai Nihon taishikan chū-Shi keimubu, “Chū-Shi ryōjikan keisatsushochō kaigiroku” (January 1940), in *Foreign Affairs’ Documents*,

1914–1945, ed. Gaimushō (Washington, DC: Library of Congress Photoduplication Service, 1970), 170–184. There is also a short collection of reports from the Shanghai Consulate-General regarding consular police involvement with “comfort stations” in Josei no tame no Ajia heiwa kokumin kikin, ed., *Seifu chōsa ‘jūgun ianfu’ kankei shiryō shūsei* (Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1997), 1:431–486. George Hicks also claims, for example, that in 1938 Japanese consular police in Nanjing managed prostitution centers serving civilians, but he does not cite a specific document as evidence. See George Hicks, *The Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War* (New York: Norton, 1994), 226.

107. “Hoku-Shi kōtō shunin kaigiroku,” in Ogino, ed., *Tokkō keisatsu kankei shiryō shūsei*, 26:259–260. A large portion of the minutes from this conference include summarized reports on conditions in the localities. The details are categorized under several headings: operational conditions, espionage activities and spies, relations with other local institutions, miscellaneous matters. In addition to the local reports, another section of the conference notes deal with general investigations into several large problem areas: Japanese and Koreans under surveillance, political goals and local handiwork of Chinese Communists, international communist collaboration, banditry and local popular sentiments (see 260–285, passim). For another reproduction of meeting notes from a North China police chief conference, see *Hoku-Shi ryōjikan keisatsushochō kaigiroku*, in Awaya Kentarō and Chadani Seiichi, eds., *Nit-Chu sensō tai Chūgoku jōhō sen shiryō* (Tokyo: Gendai shiryō shuppan, 2000), 3–349.

108. Kajikawa, *Gaimushō keisatsu rykaushi*, 201.

109. File no. D8299/35, *Shanghai Municipal Police Files*, microfilm reel 48.

110. File no. D8299/60, *Shanghai Municipal Police Files*, microfilm reel 48.

111. Kobayashi Motohiro, “Drug Operations by Resident Japanese in Tianjin,” 163–164. For an overview of narcotics in the Japanese empire, see John Jennings, *The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia, 1895–1945* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997).

112. One major weakness of the *Gaimushō keisatsushi* as a body of historical source materials is the paucity of extant documentation related to the transformation of Foreign Ministry police into Greater East Asia Ministry police in 1942 and the record of their subsequent activities until the end of the war.

113. For discussion of these changes, see Brooks, *Japan’s Imperial Diplomacy*, 195–206.

114. Ogino, *Gaimushō keisatsu shi*, 818–829.

115. Kajikawa, *Gaimushō keisatsu rykaushi*, 206.

116. Nakagawa Yū, “Gaimushō keisatsu to watashi,” in Wada Izumi, ed., *Gaimushō keisatsu*, (Ueda, 1981), 1.

117. On the matter of consular police as prison guards, see Greg Leck, *Captives of Empire: The Japanese Internment of Allied Civilians in China, 1941–1945*. Mr. Leck contacted me by E-mail during the summer of 2005 to

ask about my research on the consular police. In his own studies, he had come across evidence of consular police working in Japanese prison camps holding Allied civilians in China. I do not know what Leck's academic credentials are, and I have not read his book. It is being privately marketed, however, so I assume it has not been subjected to any kind of peer review.

118. Wada, *Gaimushō keisatsu*, 2. Also cited in Ogino, *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, 857.

119. Wada, *Gaimushō keisatsu*, 2.

120. *Gaimushō keisatsushi* (microfilm version), section SP 205–3, frame 3477. Kajikawa Masakatsu included this song in his work, but he curiously left out one of the verses. The original as it appears in the *Gaimushō keisatsushi* is therefore the source for this translation.

121. Kajikawa, *Gaimushō keisatsu rykaushi*, 271, 274–275. This final song is not included in the *Gaimushō keisatsushi*, but it is a part of Kajikawa's history. He explains that this “phantom version” of the original “Gaimushō keisatsu ka” was written in 1939 by an army general, but it never completely replaced the original version composed by Consul Iwasaki six years earlier. All of these themes, such as the phrase “one hundred million of the Yamato race” (*yamato minzoku ichioku*), have been explored by John Dower and Louise Young in their respective works on wartime culture. See John Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 208–215; Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 88–95.

122. Richard H. Mitchell, *Janus-Faced Justice: Political Criminals in Imperial Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1992), 161.

Conclusion

1. Barbara J. Brooks, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000), 116.

2. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 302.

3. “Memorial of Prince Konoye Urging Termination of the War,” in David J. Lu, *Japan: A Documentary History* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 450.

4. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 278.

5. Louise Young, “Japan's Wartime Empire in China,” in *The Shadows of Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919–1939*, ed. Roger Chickering and Stig Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 328.

6. Komagome Takeshi, *Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tōgō* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996).

7. Son Ansok, “Nit-Chū sensōki ni okeru Shanhai sōryōjikan keisatsu,”

in *Senji Shanhai 1937–45 nen*, ed. Takatsuna Hirofumi (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 2005), 157.

8. See Yi Song-hwan, *Kindai higashi Ajia no seiji rikigaku: Kantō o meguru Nit-Chū-Chō Kankei no rekishiteki tenkai* (Tokyo: Kinoshosha, 1991), and Yoshii Ken'ichi, *Kan Nihonkai chiiki shakai no hen'yō: Manmo, Kantō, to Ura Nihon* (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 2000). In English, Michael Lewis has touched on the regional theme as well in his discussion of economic links between Toyama prefecture and the mainland across the sea; see “Chapter Five: Local Imperialism and the Chimera of Progress,” in his *Becoming Apart, National Power and Local Politics in Toyama, 1868–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 188–243. The work of Marjorie Dryburgh also has an insightful focus on regionalism; see her *North China and Japanese Expansion, 1933–1937: Regional Power and the National Interest* (Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 2000). Another excellent collection of recent essays that explores problematic ambiguities of Manchuria and Manchukuo as transnational space can be found in “Manshū to wa nan datta no ka?” *Kan: rekishi, kankyō, bunmei* 10 (Summer 2002): 33–337.

9. My thinking on the problem of national subjectivity is greatly influenced by my experience as a student of Luke Roberts. While I have often joked with him about his relentless passion for the local history of Tosa, I have also learned so much about the problematic nature of national historical narratives from listening to him talk about and teach “Japanese” history. See his “Cultivating Non-National Historical Understandings in Local History,” in *The Teleology of the Modern Nation State: Japan and China*, ed. Joshua Fogel (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 161–173.

10. In many ways, the thinking of MHK leaders reflected the kind of cultural rather than political nationalism at work in what Ken Wells has called “passive collaboration.” See his “Between the Devil and the Deep: Nonpolitical Nationalism and Passive Collaboration in Korea during the 1920s,” *Papers on Far Eastern History* 37 (March 1988): 125–147. Rebecca Karl has written persuasively on the problems of disentangling conceptions of “nation” and “state” in late Qing China in her *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002). Prasenjit Duara has also argued insightfully that the Japanese colonial construction of Manchukuo must be seen as a manifestation of alternate views of East Asian modernity, not merely as an army-dominated “puppet-state,” in his *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).

11. “Rep. Kim’s Father Served for Japan Police,” *The Korea Times*, September 16, 2004 (on-line edition). The delicate issue of Korean collaborators has also been taken up recently in two popular books by Korean authors published in Japanese: Kim Wan-söp, *Shin-Nichi ha no tame no benmei* (Tokyo:

Sōshisha 2002), and Ch'oe Gi-ho, *Nik-Kan heigō no shinjitsu: Kankoku shika no shōgen* (Tokyo: Bijinesusha 2003).

12. Patrick Wolfe, “History and Imperialism: A Century of Theory, from Marx to Postcolonialism,” *American Historical Review* 102, no. 2 (April 1997), 388, see footnote 2.

13. See for example, Matsuda Toshihiko, who explores how Japanese authorities on the eve of Korea's annexation looked to British models of policing in Egypt in his “Kankoku heigō zenya no Ejiputo keisatsu seido chōsa—Kankoku naibu keimu kyokuchō Matsui Shigeru no kōsō ni tsuite,” *Shirin* 83, no. 1 (January 2000): 71–103.

14. Two recent articles of particular interest are David Killingray, “Securing the British Empire: Policing and Colonial Order, 1920–1960,” in *The Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives*, ed. Mark Mazower (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997), 167–190; and Martin Thomas, “Bedouin Tribes and the Imperial Intelligence Services in Syria, Iraq and Transjordan in the 1920s,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 38, no. 4 (October 2003): 539–562. While its release followed my completion of this book, Martin Thomas' *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Control* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007) will no doubt also be a useful comparative reference work.

15. Richard Popplewell, “The Surveillance of Indian ‘Seditionists’ in North America, 1905–1915,” in *Intelligence and International Relations, 1900–1945*, ed. Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1987), 49–76.

16. For a broad overview of the American relationship with Mexico, for example, see W. Dirk Raat, “US Intelligence Operations and Covert Action in Mexico, 1900–47,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 22 (1987): 615–638.

17. Liu Jie, Mitani Hiroshi, and Daqing Yang, eds., *Kokkyō o koeru rekishi ninshiki: Nit-Chū taiwa no kokoromi* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2006).

Bibliography

- Anderson, David, and David Killingray, eds. *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority, and Control, 1830–1940*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1991.
- Andrew, Christopher, and Jeremy Noakes, eds. *Intelligence and International Relations, 1900–1945*. Exeter, UK: Exeter University Press, 1987.
- An U-sik and Matsumoto Ken'ichi. "Chōsen dokuritsu undō to Ro Unkō no hiun." *Chishiki* 107 (October 1990): 226–240.
- Arnold, David. "The Armed Police and Colonial Rule in South India, 1914–1947." *Modern Asian Studies* 2, no. 1 (February 1977): 101–125.
- . *Police Power and Colonial Rule: Madras, 1859–1947*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Asano Ken'ichi. "Futei no bōdō to kimetsuketa Nittei media Kankoku san-ichi undō wa dō hōdō sareta ka?" *Hyōron shakai kagaku* 58 (June 1998): 121–134.
- Asano Toyomi. "The Japanese Consular Police and Social Control across the Taiwan Strait." Conference paper for the 2004 AAS Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA.
- Asano Toyomi and Matsuda Toshihiko, eds. *Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no hōteki tenkai*. Tokyo: Shinsansha, 2004.
- Auslin, Michael. *Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004.
- Baba Akira. *Nit-Chū kankei to gaisei kikō no kenkyū*. Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1983.
- Bai Rongxun. *Higashi Ajia seiji gaikō shi kenkyū: kantō jōyaku to saiban kankatsu ken*. Osaka: Osaka keizai hōka daigaku, 2005.
- . "'Nidōkō jiken': Kantō 'zakkyōchi' Chōsenjin no saiban o chūshin ni." *Higashi Ajia kenkyū* 27 (February 2000): 19–33.
- . "Kantō 'shōbuchi' ni okeru Nit-Chū kōshō." *Higashi Ajia kenkyū* 29 (August 2000): 17–33.
- . "Manshū Chōsenjin no 'kokuseki' mondai to hōteki chii." *Bungaku kenkyū ronshū* 16 (February 2002): 103–121.
- Barret, David, and Larry Shu, eds. *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932–1945: The Limits of Accommodation*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.
- Beasley, W. G. *Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

- Beckmann, George M., and Okubo Genji. *The Japanese Communist Party, 1922–1945*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969.
- Bickers, Robert. *Empire Made Me: An Englishman Adrift in Shanghai*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.
- . “Who Were the Shanghai Municipal Police, and Why Were They There? The British Recruits of 1919.” In *New Frontiers*, edited by Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot.
- Bickers, Robert, and Christian Henriot, eds. *New Frontiers: Imperialism’s New Communities in East Asia, 1842–1953*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000.
- Botsman, Daniel. *Power and Punishment in the Making of Modern Japan*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.
- Boyle, John Hunter. *China and Japan at War: The Politics of Collaboration*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972.
- Brogden, Mike. “An Act to Colonise the Internal Lands of the Island: Empire and the Origins of the Professional Police.” *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 15 (1987): 179–208.
- . “The Emergence of the Police—The Colonial Dimension.” *British Journal of Criminology* 27, no. 1 (Winter 1987): 4–14.
- Brook, Timothy. *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.
- . “Collaborationist Nationalism in Occupied Wartime China.” In *Nation Work*, edited by Timothy Brook and André Schmid.
- Brook, Timothy, and André Schmid, eds. *Nation Work: Asian Elites and National Identities*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000.
- Brook, Timothy, and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, eds. *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
- Brooks, Barbara J. “China Experts in the Gaimushō: 1895–1937.” In *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937*, edited by Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie.
- . “Japanese Colonial Citizenship in Treaty Port China: The Location of Koreans and Taiwanese in the Imperial Order.” In *New Frontiers*, edited by Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot.
- . “The Japanese Consul in China, 1895–1937.” *Sino-Japanese Studies* 10, no. 1 (October 1997): 8–32.
- . *Japan’s Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895–1938*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2000.
- . “Peopling the Japanese Empire: The Koreans in Manchuria and the Rhetoric of Inclusion.” In *Japan’s Competing Modernities*, edited by Sharon Minichiello.
- Chen, Ching-chih. “Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire.”

- In *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, edited by Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie.
- Chen Zuen. “Seiyō Shanhai to Nihonjin kyoryūmin shakai.” In *Chūgoku ni okeru Nihon sokai: Jūkei Kankō Kōshu Shanhai*, edited by Ōzato Hiroaki and Son Ansok. Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobō, 2006.
- . “Shanhai Nihonjin kyoryūmin kankei nenpyō—Meiji hen.” *Hōsei daigaku kyōeibu kiyō: jinbun kagaku hen* 90 (February 1994): 19–30.
- Ch’oe Gi-ho. *Nik-Kan heigō no shinjitsu: Kankoku shika no shōgen*. Tokyo: Bijinesusha, 2003.
- Ch’oe Jang-gun. “Kankoku tōkan Ito Hirobumi no Kantō ryōdo seisaku—tōkanfu hashutsujo no setsubi kettei no keii.” *Hōgaku shinpō* 102, nos. 7, 8 (February 1996): 175–202, and no. 9 (March 1996): 171–187.
- Chōsen kenpeitai shireibu. *Chōsen kenpeitai rekishi*. Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 2000.
- Chōsen oyobi Manshū*. Dairen. Serial.
- Chōsen sōtokufu. *Shisei san-jū nen shi*. Seoul, 1940.
- Chōsen sōtokufu keimukyoku. *Chian jōkyō* (1930). Reprint. Kobe: Seikyū bunkyo, 1984.
- Chung, Youn-tae. “Refracted Modernity and the Issue of Pro-Japanese Collaborators in Korea.” *Korea Journal* 42, no. 3 (Autumn 2002): 18–59.
- Coble, Parks M. *Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931–1937*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.
- Condliffe, J. B., ed. *Problems of the Pacific: Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations*. New York: Greenwood, 1928.
- . *Problems of the Pacific 1929: Proceedings of the Third Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations*. New York: Greenwood, 1930.
- Conroy, Hilary. *The Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868–1910*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960.
- Cook, Harold F. *Korea’s 1884 Incident: Its Background and Kim Ok-kyun’s Elusive Dream*. Seoul: Taewon Publishing Company, 1972.
- Cooper, Frederick, and Ann Laura Stoler, eds. *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- Coox, Alvin D., and Hilary Conroy, eds. *China and Japan: Search for Balance since World War One*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 1978.
- Crowley, James B. *Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–1938*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- De Ceuster, Koen. “The Nation Exorcised: The Historiography of Collaboration in South Korea.” *Korean Studies* 25, no. 2 (2002): 207–242.
- Delissen, Alain. “Denied and Beseiged: The Japanese Community of Korea, 1876–1945.” In *New Frontiers*, edited by Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot.

- Dickinson, Frederick R. *War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.
- “Documents regarding the Chengchia Tun Affair between China and Japan.” *The American Journal of International Law* 11, no. 3, Supplement: Official Documents (July 1917): 112–125.
- Dower, John. *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979.
- . *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986.
- Dryburgh, Marjorie. *North China and Japanese Expansion, 1933–1937: Regional Power and the National Interest*. Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 2000.
- Duara, Prasenjit. *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- . *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003.
- . “Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900–1945.” *American Historical Review* 102, no. 4 (October 1997): 1030–1051.
- Dudden, Alexis. *Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2005.
- . “Japan’s Engagement with International Terms.” In *Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations*, edited by Lydia Liu. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999.
- Duiker, William J. “Phan Boi Chau: Asian Revolutionary in a Changing World.” *Journal of Asian Studies* 31, no. 1 (November 1971): 77–88.
- Duus, Peter. *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
- Duus, Peter, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds. *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- , eds. *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Eckert, Carter J. “Epilogue: Exorcising Hegel’s Ghosts: Toward a Postnationalist Historiography of Korea.” In *Colonial Modernity in Korea*, edited by Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson.
- . *Offspring of Empire: The Koch’ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991.
- Esklidsen, Robert. “Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan’s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan.” *American Historical Review* 107, no. 2 (April 2002): 388–418.
- Esselstrom, Erik W. “Japanese Police and Korean Resistance in Prewar

- China: The Problem of Legal Legitimacy and Local Collaboration.” *Intelligence and National Security* 21, no. 3 (June 2006): 342–363.
- . “‘Of Such Local Significance’: Culture, Diplomacy, and the Tientsin Incident of 1919.” M.A. thesis, Asian Studies Program, University of Oregon, 1996.
- . “Rethinking the Colonial Conquest of Manchuria: The Japanese Consular Police in Jiandao, 1909–1937.” *Modern Asian Studies* 39, no. 1 (February 2005): 39–75.
- Feuerwerker, Albert. “The Foreign Presence in China.” In *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 12: *Republican China, Part I*, edited by John K. Fairbank. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Fishel, Wesley R. *The End of Extraterritoriality in China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952.
- Fogel, Joshua A. “Integrating into Chinese Society: A Comparison of the Japanese Communities of Shanghai and Harbin.” In *Japan’s Competing Modernities*, edited by Sharon Minichiello. 1998.
- . “Introduction: Itō Takeo and the Research Work of the South Manchurian Railway Company.” In *Life along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Itō Takeo*, translated by Joshua Fogel. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1988.
- . “Issues in the Evolution of Modern China in East Asian Comparative Perspective.” *The History Teacher* 29, no. 4 (August 1996): 425–448.
- . *The Literature of Travel in the Japanese Rediscovery of China, 1862–1945*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996.
- , ed. *The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
- . “The Other Japanese Community: Leftwing Japanese Activities in Wartime Shanghai.” In *Wartime Shanghai*, edited by Wen-hsin Yeh.
- . “‘Shanghai Japan’: The Japanese Residents Association of Shanghai.” *Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 4 (November 2000): 927–950.
- , ed. *The Teleology of the Modern Nation-State: Japan and China*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.
- Fraser, Andrew. “Local Administration: The Example of Awa-Tokushima.” In *Japan in Transition from Tokugawa to Meiji*, edited by Marius Jansen and Martin Colcutt. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Frühstück, Sabine. *Colonizing Sex: Sexology and Social Control in Modern Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
- Fujinaga Takashi. “Shanghai Nihongun no ianjo to Chōsenjin.” In *Kokusai toshi Shanhai*, 99–179. Osaka: Osaka sangyō daigaku, 1995.
- Fujiwara Akira and Himeta Mitsuyoshi, eds. *Nit-chū sensō ka Chūgoku ni okeru Nihonjin no hansen katsudō*. Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1999.
- Furukawa Akira. “Kunsan kakukoku kyoryūchi (kyōdō sokai) no kenkyū.” *Chōsen gakuho* 160 (July 1996): 45–88.

- Furuya Tetsuo. "Tai Chūgoku seisaku no kōzō o megutte." In *Kindai Nihon ni okeru hīgashi Ajia mondai*, edited by Furuya Tetsuo and Yamamuro Shinichi, 182–209. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 2001.
- Gaimushō. *Gaimushō monjo*. Microfilm. Washington, DC: Library of Congress.
- . *Nihon gaikō monjo*. Tokyo: Gaimushō, 1993–2000.
- . *Relations of Japan with Manchuria and Mongolia*. Tokyo, 1932.
- Gaimushō gaikō shiryōkan, ed. *Gaikō shiryōkan shozō gaimushō kiroku sōmoku roku: senzenki*. 2 Vols. Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1992.
- Gaimushō jōyaku kyoku. *Nihon tōchi jidai no Chōsen*. Tokyo: Jōyakukyoku hōkika, 1941. Reprint 1971.
- Gaimushō junsu kyōshūjo. *Gaimushō keisatsu hōki ruisan*. Tokyo: Shinkokaku, 1938.
- Gaimushō keisatsu kyōsaikai, ed. *Gaimushō keisatsukan fukumu sankōsho*. Tokyo: Eibundo, 1933.
- Gaimushō keisatsushi hensan iinkai. *Gaimushō keisatsushi*. Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 1996–2001. Reprinted in 54 volumes. Part One: *Moto Kankoku no bu*, eleven sections (vols. 1–3); Part Two: *Keisatsu kankei jōyaku oyobi shohōkirui (Manshū oyobi Shina nado)*, nine sections (vols. 4–6); Part Three: *Manshū no bu*, eighteen sections (vols. 7–18); Part Four: *Kantō no bu*, eleven sections (vols. 19–27); Part Five: *Shina no bu*, thirty-eight sections (vols. 28–53).
- Gaimushō no hyakunen hensan iinkai. *Gaimushō no hyakunen*. Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1969.
- Gaimushō Tō-A kyoku. *Gaimushō shitsumu hōkoku: Tō-A Kyoku (1936–1940)*. 6 vols. Tokyo: Kuresu shuppan, 1993.
- Gaimushō tsūshō kyoku. *Ryōjikan shitsumu sankōsho (1910)*. In *Gaimushō seido soshiki jinji kankei chōshoshū*, edited by Meiji-ki gaikō shiryō kenkyūkai. Vols. 8 and 9. Tokyo: Kuresu shuppan, 1995.
- Garon, Sheldon. *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- . "Rethinking Modernization and Modernity in Japanese History: A Focus on State-Society Relations." *Journal of Asian Studies* 53, no. 2 (May 1994): 346–366.
- . *The State and Labor in Modern Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
- Gluck, Carol. *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985.
- Gordon, Andrew. *The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan: Heavy Industry, 1853–1955*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.
- . *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
- Gotō Sōichirō, ed. *Kantō-chō keimukyoku shiryō*. Meiji daigaku toshokanzō. Microfilms, 80 reels. Tokyo: Nihon tosho sentaa, 2001.

- Hamano Kenzaburō. *Aa Manshū*. Tokyo: Akimoto shobō, 1970.
- Han, Suk-jung. "The Problem of Sovereignty: Manchukuo, 1932–1937." *Positions* 12, no. 2 (2004): 457–478.
- Hanabusa Nagamichi. *Nihon no zai-Ka chigai hoken*. Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1943.
- Hane, Mikiso. *Reflections on the Way to the Gallows: Rebel Women in Prewar Japan*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988.
- Hanson Haldore. "Smuggler, Soldier and Diplomat." *Pacific Affairs* 9, no. 4 (December 1936): 544–556.
- Haraguchi Yukio. "San-ichi undō dan'atsu jirei no kenkyū—keimukyoku hōkoku no hihanteki kentō o chūshin to shite." *Chōsen shi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 23 (March 1986): 215–243.
- Hara Teruyuki. "Kyokutō Roshia ni okeru Chōsen dokuritsu undō to Nihon." *Sanzenri* 17 (February 1979): 47–53.
- Hasegawa Teru. *Arashi no naka no sasayaki*. Translated by Takasugi Ichirō. Tokyo: Shinhyōron, 1980.
- Hasegawa Teru henshū inkai, eds. *Hasegawa Teru: Nit-Chū sensō ka de hansen hōsō o shita Nihon josei*. Osaka: Saseragi shuppan, 2007.
- Hattori Ryūji. *Higashi Ajia kokusai kenkyō no hendō to Nihon gaikō 1918–1931*. Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2001.
- . "Higashi Ajia kokusai seiji kenkyū no kanōsei." *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 779 (September 2003): 8–12.
- . "Senkan zenki higashi Ajia kokusai seiji kenkyū no hōhōronteki oboegaki." *Seiji keizai shigaku* 396 (August 1999): 1–17.
- Hayashi Kyūjirō. *Manshū jihen to Hōten sōryōji*. Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1978.
- Hayashi Masakazu. "Kantō mondai ni kan suru Nis-Shin kōshō no keii." *Shundai shigaku* 10 (March 1960): 181–199.
- . "Konshun jiken no keika." *Shundai shigaku* 19 (September 1966): 107–126.
- Henriot, Christian. "'Little Japan' in Shanghai: An Insulated Community, 1875–1945." In *New Frontiers*, edited by Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot.
- Henriot, Christian, and Wen-hsin Yeh, eds. *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai under Japanese Occupation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Hicks, George. *The Comfort Women: Japan's Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War*. New York: Norton, 1994.
- Higashio Kazuko. "Konshun jiken to Kantō shuppei." *Chōsen shi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 14 (March 1977): 58–85.
- Hirano Ken'ichirō. "Manshū jihen mae ni okeru zai Man Nihonjin no dōkō—Manshūkoku seikaku keisei no yō'on." *Kokusai seiji (Manshū jihen)* 1 (1970): 51–76.
- Hoston, Germaine A. *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.

- . *The State, Identity, and the National Question in China and Japan*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- . “The State, Modernity, and the Fate of Liberalism in Prewar Japan.” *Journal of Asian Studies* 51, no. 2 (May 1992): 287–316.
- Hsu, Shu-hsi. *Essays on the Manchurian Problem*. Shanghai: China Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1932.
- . “Manchurian Backgrounds II.” *Pacific Affairs* 5, no. 2 (February 1932): 131–150.
- Hunter, Janet. “Japanese Government Policy, Business Opinion and the Seoul-Pusan Railway, 1894–1906.” *Modern Asian Studies* 2, no. 4 (1977): 573–599.
- Ichikawa Masaaki, ed. *Nik-Kan gaikō shiryō*. Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1980.
- . *Nik-Kan heigō shiryō*. Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1978.
- Iijima Mitsuru. “Manshūkoku ni okeru ‘gunkei tōgō’ no seiritsu to hōkai.” *Shundai shigaku* 108 (December 1999): 45–68.
- Iijima Wataru. “Kindai Chūgoku ni okeru ‘eisei’ no tenkai—20 seiki shoki ‘Manshu’ o chūshin ni.” *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 703 (October 1997): 123–132.
- Inlow, Burke. “Japan’s ‘Special Trade’ in North China, 1935–1937.” *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 6, no. 2 (February 1947): 139–167.
- Inoue Hisashi. “Chūgoku kyōsantō no horyo seisaku to Nihonjin hansen undo.” *Chikaku ni arite* 34 (November 1998): 3–14.
- , ed. *Ka-chū senbu kōsaku shiryō*. Vol. 13 of *Jū-go nen sensō gokuhī shiryōshū*. Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 1989.
- Inoue Manabu. “Nihon teikokushugi to Kantō mondai: 1910 nendai–20 nendai zenhan.” *Chōsen shi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 10 (March 1973): 35–83.
- Iriye, Akira. *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965.
- . “The Failure of Economic Expansion, 1918–1931.” In *Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taishō Democracy*, edited by Bernard Silberman and H. D. Harootunian. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974.
- . “Toward a New Cultural Order: The Hsinmin Hui.” In *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions*, edited by Akira Iriye. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- Ishizaka Kōichi. *Kindai Nihon no shakaishugi to Chōsen*. Tokyo: Shakai hyōronsha, 1993.
- . “Nihonjin shakaishugisha no Chōsen ninshiki: 1910 nendai ni tsuite no kōsatsu.” *Shien* 48, no. 2 (October 1988): 44–64.
- Itō Kazuhiko. “Nihon no zai Man Chōsenjin seisaku.” *Tokyo joshi daigaku hikaku bunka kenkyū kiyō* 53 (1992): 65–83.
- Itō Shunsuke. “Chōsen ni okeru kindai keisatsu seido no dōnyū katei: Kōgo

- kaikaku no hyōka ni tai suru ikkōsatsu.” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 41 (October 2003): 89–117.
- Itō Takeo. *Life along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Itō Takeo*. Translated with an introduction by Joshua Fogel. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1988.
- Iwai Keitarō, ed. *Komon keisatsu shoshi*. (1910). Reprint. Tokyo: Ryukishosha, 1995.
- Iwama Hiro. *Man-Mō no inkō—Kantō to Konshun*. Tokyo: Kokkyō jijō chōsakai, 1932.
- Jansen, Marius. “Japanese Imperialism: Late Meiji Perspectives.” In *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, edited by Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Jennings, John. *The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia, 1895–1945*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.
- Johnson, Chalmers. *An Instance of Treason: Ozaki Hotsumi and the Sorge Spy Ring*. Rev. ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990.
- Josei no tame no Ajia heiwa kokumin kikin, eds. *Seifu chōsa jūgun ianfu kankei shiryō shūsei*. Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1997.
- Kajikawa Masakatsu. *Gaimushō keisatsu ryakushi*. Nagoya: Gaikeika yūkai, 1988.
- Kajimura Hideki. “Chōsen kyōsantō—danshō.” *Sanzenri* 27 (August 1981): 48–55.
- . “Dai Kanmin-ko-ku rinji seifu o megutte.” *Sanzenri* 17 (February 1979): 63–70.
- . “Giretsudan to Kin Gen hō.” In *Chōsen kindai no minshū undō Kajimura Hideki chosakushū*, vol. 4. Tokyo: Akaishi shoten, 1993.
- . “Giretsudan to Kin Genhō - sono shoki no shisō.” *Sanzenri* 21 (February 1980): 39–47.
- . “1930 nendai Manshū ni okeru kō-Nichi tōsō ni tai suru Nihon teikokushugi no shosakudō—‘zai Manshū Chōsenjin mondai’ to kanren shite.” *Nihonshi kenkyū* 94 (November 1967): 25–55.
- Kaji Wataru shiryō chōsa kankōkai, eds. *Nihonjinmin hansen dōmei shiryō*. Vol. 10. Tokyo: Fujii shuppan, 1995.
- Kanbe, Teruo, and Kuroya Takako. “Go Rokutei to Kantō mondai.” *Oita daigaku kyōiku gakubu kenkyū kiyō* 14, no. 1 (1992): 158–172.
- . “Kantō ryōyū o meguru Nis-Shin no kakuchiku.” *Oita daigaku kyōiku gakubu kenkyū kiyō* 13, no. 2 (1991): 255–274.
- . “Shoki Kantō mondai ni okeru Nis-Shin no funsō jiken.” *Oita daigaku kyōiku gakubu kenkyū kiyō* 14, no. 1 (1992): 173–188.
- Kaneko Fumiko. *The Prison Memoirs of a Japanese Woman*. Translated by Jean Inglis. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991.
- Kaneko Fumio. “Nihon no shokuminchishugi: Taiwan-Chōsen-Man-

- shū—1980 nendai gohan kara 90 nendai zenhan no kenkyū dōkō.” *Yokohama shiritsu daigaku ronsō* 46, nos. 1–3 (March 1995): 35–45.
- Kanemori Shōsaku. “‘Manshū’ ni okeru Chū-Chō kyōsantō no gōdō to Kantō 5.30 hōki ni tsuite.” *Chōsenshi sō 7* (June 1983): 3–40.
- Kang Dōsang. “Kaigai ni okeru Chōsen dokuritsu undō no hatten.” *Tōyō bunka kenkyūjo kiyō* 51 (March 1970): 25–79.
- . “Ro Unkō to kyokutō minzoku taikai.” *Sanzenri* 47 (August 1986): 190–205.
- Kang Song-un. “20 seiki shotō ni okeru Tendōkyō jōsōbu no katsudō to sono seikaku.” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 24 (March 1987): 155–179.
- Kankokugaku bunken kenkyūjo, ed. *Kankoku shisei ippan* (1906). In *Kyū Kan matsu Nittei shinryaku shiyō sōsho*, vol. 1. Seoul: Ajia bunkasha, 1984.
- . *Kankoku shisei nenpō*. In *Kyū Kan matsu Nittei shinryaku shiyō sōsho*, vol. 2. Seoul: Ajia bunkasha, 1984.
- Kantō totokufu. *Kantō totokufu jimu gaiyō*. 1913.
- Kantō-chō. *Kantō-chō shisei ni-jū nen shi*. 1926.
- Kantō-kyoku. *Kantō-kyoku shisei san-jū nen shi*. 1936.
- Kantō totokufu kanbō monjo ka. *Kantō totokufu shisei shi Meiji 19—Taishō 5*. 1919.
- Karl, Rebecca E. *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002.
- Katsuragawa Mitsumasa. “Shanghai no Nihonjin shakai.” In *Kokusai toshi Shanghai*, 29–97. Osaka: Osaka sangyō daigaku, 1995.
- . “Sokai zaijū Nihonjin no ninshiki—Tenshin o ichirei toshite.” In *Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki*, edited by Furuya Tetsuo, 351–394. Tokyo: Ryokuin shobō, 1996.
- . “Tenshin sokai ni okeru baishun.” In *Kindai shaki to baishun mondai*, 117–146. Osaka: Osaka sangyō daigaku, 2000.
- Kawakami, K. K. “Manchurian Backgrounds I.” *Pacific Affairs* 5, no. 2 (February 1932): 111–130.
- Kawamura Kazuo. “Chōsen ni okeru waga ryōjikan keisatsu.” *Chōsen gakuho* 50 (January 1969): 77–166.
- Kawase Takaya. “‘Kokka’ kan to ‘kindai bunmei’ kan—Tendōkyō kanbu ‘minzoku taihyō’ ni tsuite.” *Tōkyō daigaku shūkyōgaku nennpō* 14 (1996): 97–109.
- Keijō kyoryūmindan. *Keijō hattatsu shi*. Seoul, 1912. In *Kankoku chiri fūzoku shi sōsho*. Seoul: Keijin bunkasha, 1990. Also reprinted in *Kankoku heigōshi kenkyū shiryō*, vol. 27. Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 2001.
- Kikuchi Kazutaka. *Nihonjin hansen heishi to Nit-Chuu sensō: Jūkei kokumin seifu chiki no horyo shūyōjo to kanren sasete*. Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobō, 2003.
- Kim, C. I. Eugene, and Han-Kyo Kim. *Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876–1910*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

- Kim Chang-su. "Minzoku undō toshite no giretsudan katsudō." *Kan* 7, nos. 11–12 (November–December 1978): 115–141.
- Kim Chōng-ju, ed. *Chōsen tōchi shiryō*. 12 vol. Tokyo: Kankoku shiryō kenkyūjo, 1970–1972.
- Kim Chong-myōng, ed. *Chōsen dokuritsu undō*. Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1967.
- Kim Dong-myung. "Isshinkai to Nihon: 'seigōho' to heigō." *Chōsen shi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 31 (October 1993): 97–126.
- Kim Jung-Mi. *Chūgoku tōhokubu ni okeru kō-Nichi Chōsen Chūgoku minshūshi josetsu*. Tokyo: Gendai kikaku shitsu, 1992.
- Kim Wan-sōp. *Shin-Nichi ha no tame no benmei*. Tokyo: Sōshisha, 2002.
- Kim Yong-Choon. "Ch'ōndogyo Thought and Its Significance in Korean Tradition." *Korea Journal* 15, no. 5 (May 1975): 47–53.
- Kim Yong-gu, ed. *Kan-Nichi gaikō mikan himitsu shiryō sōsho*. 50 vol. Seoul: Ajia bunkasha, 1995.
- Kimura Kan. "Chōsen / Kankoku ni okeru kindai to minzoku no sōkoku—'shin-Nichi ha' o tsūjite." *Seiji keizai shigaku* (March 2000): 10–30.
- Kimura Kenji. "Chōsen kyoryūchi ni okeru Nihonjin no seikatsu taiyō." *Hitotsubashi ronsō* 115, no. 2 (February 1996): 382–402.
- . "Kindai Nik-Kan kankei shita no zai-Chō Nihonjin: Chōsen jitsugyō kyōkai no soshiki to katsudō o chūshin ni." *Chōsen shi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 23 (March 1986): 185–213.
- . "Meijiki Nihon no chōsa hōkokusho ni miru Chōsen ninshiki." In *Kindai kōryūshi to sōgo ninshiki*, edited by Miyajima Hiroshi and Kim Yong'dok, vol. 1: 365–397. Tokyo: Keio daigaku shuppankyoku, 2001.
- . "Meiji ki no Nihon kyoryūmindan." *Sanzenri* 47 (August 1986): 65–73.
- Kishi Toshihiko. "Kindai Tenshin no toshi comyuniti to nashonarizumu." In *Gendai Chūgoku no kōzō hendō*, edited by Nishimua Shigeo. volv 3: *Nashonarizumu—rekishi kara no sekin*. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 2002.
- . "Teikoku no 'bunshin' no hōkai to 'ikukan' no sōde—dai ichiji taisen jiki no Tenshin sokai sesshū mondai o megutte." *Chikaki ni arite* 39 (August 2001): 235–252.
- Kobayashi Motohiro. "Drug Operations by Resident Japanese in Tianjin." In *Opium Regimes*, edited by Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayshi.
- . "1920 nendai Tenshin ni okeru Nihonjin kyoryūmin." *Shien* 55, no. 2 (March 1995): 53–73.
- . "Tenshin jiken saikō: Tenshin sōryōjikan, Shina chūtongun, Nihonjin kyoryūmin." *Nihon shokuminchi kenkyū* 8 (July 1996): 1–7.
- . "Tenshin no naka no Nihon shakai." In *Tenshinshi: saisei suru toshi no toporōjū*, edited by Tenshin chiikishi kenkyūkai. Tokyo: Tōhō shoten, 1999.
- Kobayashi Tatsuo and Shimada Toshihiko, eds. *Gendaishi shiryō*. Vol. 7: *Manshū jihen*. Tokyo: Mizusu shobō, 1964.

- Koga Motokichi. "Shina ni okeru gaikoku keisatsuken." *Gekkan Shina kenkyū* 2, no. 5 (April 1925): 1–41; continued in vol. 1, no. 6 (May 1925): 1–44.
- . "Minami Manshu tetsudō fuzokuchi no keisatsuken ni tsuite." *Gekkan Shina kenkyū* 2, no. 1 (June 1925): 55–94.
- . "Shina ni okeru gaikoku keisatsuryoku." *Gekkan Shina kenkyū* 2, no. 2 (July 1925): 33–74.
- . "Shina ni okeru sokai keisatsu." *Gekkan Shina kenkyū* 2, no. 3 (August 1925): 1–45.
- . "Shina ni okeru keisatsuryoku no kyōgō." *Gekkan Shina kenkyū* 2, no. 4 (September 1925): 37–84.
- . *Shina oyobi Manshū ni okeru chigai hōken teppai mondai*. Tokyo: Nis-Shi mondai kenkyūkai, 1933.
- Koike Sei'ichi. "'Chigai hōken no teppai' to 'chian iji' : Manshū jihen zengo no 'renzokusei' ni kan suru ikkōsatsu." *Hiroshima heiwa kagaku* 18 (1995): 87–111.
- . "Gaimushō monjo Gaimushō kiroku no seikō katei: Gaimushō monjo no monjogakuteki ishiron." *Nihon rekishi* 584 (January 1997): 1–15.
- . "'Kokka' to shite no Chūgoku, 'ba' to shite to Chūgoku: Manshū jihen mae, gaikōkan no tai Chūgoku ninshiki." *Kokusai seiji* 108 (March 1995): 148–160.
- . "'Yūwa' no henyō: Manshū jihenki no Gaimushō." *Gunji shigaku* 37, nos. 2, 3 (October 2001): 103–121.
- Kokuryūkai. *TōA senkaku shishi kiden*. Vol. 3. Tokyo, 1939. Reprinted in the series *Meiji hyakunen sōsho*. Tokyo: Hara shobo, 1968.
- Komagome Takeshi. *Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tōgō*. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996.
- Ku, Dae-yeol. *Korea under Colonialism: The March First Movement and Anglo-Japanese Relations*. Seoul: Seoul Computer Press, 1985.
- Kurihara Ken. "Kantō totokufu mondai teiyō—toku ni kanseijō yori mita totoku no zai Man ryōji shiki kantoku mondai." In *Tai Man-Mō seisakushi no ichimen: Nichi-Ro sengo yori Taishōki ni itaru*, edited by Kurihara Ken. Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1966.
- Kuriya Kentarō and Chadani Sei'ichi, eds. *Nit-Chū sensō tai-Chūgoku jōhōsen shiryō*. Tokyo: Gendai shiryō shuppan, 2000.
- Kuroshima Denji. "Militarized Streets." In *A Flock of Swirling Crows and Other Proletarian Writings*. Translated by Zeljko Cipris. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005.
- Kushner, Barak. *The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propoganda*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006.
- Large, Stephen. *Organized Workers and Socialist Politics in Interwar Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Lee, Chong-sik. *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963.

- . *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and Soviet Interest, 1922–1945*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965.
- . “Witch Hunt among the Guerillas: The Min-Sheng-T’uan Incident.” *The China Quarterly* 26 (April–June 1966): 107–117.
- Lewis, Michael. *Becoming Apart: National Power and Local Politics in Toyama, 1868–1945*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
- . *Rioters and Citizens: Mass Protest in Imperial Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
- Li, Hyun-hi. “Dai Kan minkoku rinji seifu kenkyū.” *Tokyo joshi daigaku hikaku bunka kenkyūjo kiyō* 56 (1995): 89–105.
- Li, Lincoln. *The Japanese Army in North China, 1937–1941*. Tokyo: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Liu Jie. “‘Chūgokutsū’ gaikōkan to Gaimushō no Chūgoku seisaku, 1935–1937.” *Gunji shigaku* 33, nos. 2–3 (December 1997): 83–108.
- . *Nit-Chū sensō ka no gaikō*. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1995.
- Liu Jie, Mitani Hiroshi, and Daqing Yang, eds. *Kokkyō o koeru rekishi ninshiki: Nit-Chū taiwa no kokoromi*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2006.
- Lo, Ming-cheng M. *Doctors within Borders: Profession, Ethnicity, and Modernity in Colonial Taiwan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
- Lone, Stewart. *Army, Empire and Politics in Meiji Japan: The Three Careers of General Katsura Tarō*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.
- . “The Japanese Annexation of Korea 1910: The Failure of East Asian Co-Prosperity.” *Modern Asian Studies* 25, no. 1 (1991): 143–173.
- . “Of ‘Collaborators’ and Kings: The Ilchinhoe, Korean Court, and Japanese Agricultural-Political Demands during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905.” *Papers on Far Eastern History* 38 (September 1988): 103–124.
- MacMurray, John V. A., comp. *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1894–1919*. 2 vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 1921.
- McCormack, Gavan. *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China: China, Japan, and the Manchurian Idea*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1977.
- . “Manchukuo: Constructing the Past.” *East Asian History* 2 (December 1991): 105–124.
- Makuuchi Mitsuo. *Manshūkoku keisatsu gaishi*. Tokyo: San-ichi shobō, 1996.
- Manshūkoku gunseibu gunji chōsabu, ed. *Manshū kyōsanhi no kenkyū*. Tokyo: Kyokutō kenkyūjo shuppankai, 1969.
- “Manshū to wa nan datta no ka?” *Kan: rekishi, kankyō, bunmei* 10 (Summer 2002): 33–337.
- Mantetsu chōsaka. *Man-Mō jijō*. Dairen. Serial.
- Matsuda Toshihiko. “Chōsen shokuminchika no katei ni okeru keisatsu kikō, 1904–1910.” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 31 (October 1993): 127–156.
- . “The Colonization of Korea and the Consular Police, 1904–1910.” Conference paper for the 2004 AAS Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA.
- . “Kankoku heigō zenyā no ejiputo keisatsu seido chōsa—Kankoku

- naibu keimu kyokuchō Matsui Shigeru no kōsō ni tsuite.” *Shirin* 83, no. 1 (January 2000): 71–103.
- . “Maruyama Tsurukichi no Chōsen dokuritsu undō ninshiki: bunka seijiki no shokuminchi keisatsukanryō.” *Chōsen minzoku undō shi kenkyū* 8 (April 1992): 65–106.
- . “Nihon tōchika no Chōsen ni okeru kenpei keisatsu kikō, 1910–1919.” *Shirin* 78, no. 6 (November 1995): 30–65.
- . “Nihon tōchika no Chōsen ni okeru keisatsu kikō no kaihen—kenpeitai seido kara futsu keisatsu seido e no tenkan o megutte.” *Shirin* 74, no. 5 (September 1991): 67–102.
- . “Sōryokusenki no shokuminchi Chōsen ni okeru keisatsu gyōsei.” *Nihonshi kenkyū* 452 (April 2000): 195–223.
- Matsusaka, Yoshihisa Tak. *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- Mazower, Mark, ed. *The Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives*. Providence, RI, and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997.
- McCormack, Gavan. *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China: China, Japan, and the Manchurian Idea*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1977.
- Michelson, Mark Charles. “A Place in the Sun: The Foreign Ministry and Perceptions and Policies in Japan’s International Relations, 1931–1941.” Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1979.
- Midorikawa Katsuko. “Manpōzan jiken oyobi Chōsennai hai-Ka jiken ni tuite no ikkōsatsu.” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 6 (June 1969): 129–152.
- Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha shomubu chōsaka. *Shina gawa no tai Senjin seisaku ni tai shi Nihon no toritaru shochi*. Dairen, 1929.
- Minichiello, Sharon, ed. *Japan’s Competing Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy, 1900–1930*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press 1998.
- Mitchell, Richard H. *Censorship in Imperial Japan*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.
- . *Janus-Faced Justice: Political Criminals in Imperial Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1992.
- . *Thought Control in Prewar Japan*. Ithaca, NYS and London: Cornell University Press, 1976.
- Mitter, Rana. “Evil Empire? Competing Constructions of Japanese Imperialism in Manchuria, 1928–1937.” In *Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895–1945*, edited by Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb. New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003.
- . *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
- Miyamoto Masao, ed. *Hasegawa Teru sakuhinshū: Hansen esuperanchisuto*. Tokyo: Akishobō, 1979.
- Mizuno Naoki. “Japanese Suppression of the Overseas Korean Independence Movement: Consular Police, Nationality, and Peace Preserva-

- tion Law.” Translated by Erik Esselstrom. Conference paper for the 2004 AAS Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA.
- . “Kokuseki o meguru higashi Ajia kankei—shokuminchi ki Chōsenjin kokuseki mondai no isō.” In *Kindai Nihon ni okeru higashi Ajia mondai*, edited by Furuya Tetsuo and Yamamuro Shin’ichi, 211–237. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 2001.
- . “Kominterun dai nana kai taikai to zai-Man Chōsenjin no kō-Nichi tōsō: Zai-Man Kanjin sokoku kfukukai.” *Rekishī hyōron* 423 (July 1985): 48–57.
- . “Nihon shokuminchi to chian jji hō.” *Sanzenri* 47 (August 1986): 32–39.
- . “Ro Unkō to Chūgoku kokumin kakumei—Chūgoku kokumintō ni zen taikai ni okeru ensetsu o megutte.” *Chōsen minzoku undō shi kenkyū* 8 (April 1992): 36–63.
- . “Senjiki Chōsen ni okeru chian seisaku.” *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 777 (July 2003): 1–11.
- . “Zai Man Chōsenjin shin-Nichi dantai minseidan ni tsuite.” In *Ronshū Chōsen kingendai shi*, edited by Kawai Kazuo et al., 329–361. Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 1996.
- Moppo shi hensankai, Ed. *Moppo shi*. Seoul, 1914. Reprinted in *Kankoku chiri fuuzoku shi sōsho*, vol. 97. Seoul: Keijin bunkasha, 1990.
- Morikawa Tetsurō. *Chōsen dokuritsu undō ansatsu shi*. Tokyo: San-ichi shobō, 1976.
- Mulholland, J. Kim. “The French Response to the Vietnamese Nationalist Movement, 1905–14.” *Journal of Modern History* 47 (December 1975): 655–675.
- Muramatsu Takao. “Nihon teikokushugi ka ni okeru ‘Manshū’ e no Chōsenjin idō ni tsuite.” *Mita gakkai zasshi* 63, no. 6 (June 1970): 61–87.
- Myers, Ramon H., and Mark R. Peattie, eds. *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Nadelmann, Ethan. *Cops across Borders. The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993.
- Nagano Shinichirō. “An Shōkō no shisō to kōdō.” *Tōyō kenkyū* 105 (December 1992): 1–34.
- Naimushō keihokyoku hoanka. *Tokkō geppō*. Monthly summary. January 1932.
- Naitō Kazuhisa. “Gaimushō keisatsushi ni tsuite.” *Gaikō shiryōkanpō* 8 (March 1995): 69–74.
- Nakamura Takashi. “‘Taiwan sekimin’ wo meguru shomondai.” *Tōnan Ajia kenkyū* 18, no. 3 (December 1980): 66–89.
- Nakatsuka Akira. “Chōsen shihai no mujun to ‘Manshū jihen.’” *Kikan gendaishi* 1 (November 1972): 20–27.
- Narangoa, Li, and Robert Cribb. “Japan and the Transformation of Na-

tional Identities in Asia in the Imperial Era.” In *Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895–1945*, edited by Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb. New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003.

Nawa Etsuko. “Naitō Konan to ‘Kantō mondai’ ni kan suru shinbunron-chō.” *Okayama daigaku daigakuin bunka kagaku kenkyūka kiyō* 9 (March 2000): 137–155.

Nihon Gaimushō gaikō shiryōkanzō [Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Archives]. Azabu, Tokyo. Files consulted include: 4.2.2 no. 102 *Kankoku kakukoku kyoryūchi keisatsu jimu o teikoku kōkan tsuki keisatsukan ni shokutaku ikken*; 4.2.5 no. 176 *Shinkoku junhō oyobi dōkokujin bōkō zakken*; 4.2.5 no. 186–1–1–1 *Bōkō kankei zakken: Tenshin ni oite hon Hōjin Bei hei shōtotsu jiken*; 4.3.2 no. 2–1–7 *Futeidan kankei zakken: Chōsenjin no bu: zai-Shanhai chihō*; 4.3.2 no. 15 *Tōdōkō jiken*; 4.3.2 no. 15–1 *Tōdōkō jiken: Shina gawa no taidō*; 4.3.2 no. 15–2; *Tōdōkō jiken: Chōsenjin kankei*; 4.3.2 no. 15–3 *Tōdōkō jiken: gaihyō*; 4.3.2 no. 2–1–18; *Futeidan kankei zakken: Chōsen no bu: Giretsudan kōdō*; 4.3.2 no. 2–1–21 *Futeidan kankei zakken: Chōsen no bu: Giretsudan kōdō tsuki Kin Genhō*; B.4.0.0 no. C/X 1–13 *Shina chigai hōken teppai mondai ikken*; D.2.1.0 no. 2 *Zai-Shi teikoku keisatsukan no seifuku kiyō seigen mondai ikken*; D.2.1.2 no. 4–4 *Manshūkoku keisatsu kikan kankei zassan: Manshūkoku keisatsushōnai ni ryōjikan keisatsu heichi*; D.2.6.0 no. 6 *Zai-Shi kaku kōkan junhō higai kankei zakken*; D.2.3.0 no. 3–1 *Zai-Shi Man ryōjikan tokkō keisatsu hōkoku zakken: Harubin sōryōjikan no bu*; 3.8.4 no. 31 *Kankoku ni oite keimu komon yōhei narabini dōkoku keisatsu seido kaikaku ikken* (4 vols.); D.2.1.2 no. 4–1 *Manshūkoku keisatsu kikan kankei: Gaimushō keisatsukan Manshūkoku e tenkan kankei*; M.1.3.0 no. 2–1–1 *Zai-Shi teikoku kōkan kankei zakken: Bōjisan bunkan kankei*; M.1.3.0 no. 2–1–2 *Zai-Shi teikoku kōkan kankei zakken: Tenshin sōryōjikan keisatsubu*; M.1.3.0 no. 5 *Zai-Man teikoku keisatsu kikan tōsei kankei zakken*; M.1.3.0 no. 5–1 *Zai-Man teikoku keisatsu kikan tōsei kankei zakken: zai-Man taishikan keimubu setchi kankei*; M.1.3.0 no. 6 *Zai-Shanhai tokubetsu kōtō keisatsu kikan kankei ikken*; M.1.3.0 no. 9 *Zai-Man Shi teikoku ryōjikan keisatsu (fukumu kōkan) shashinshū (Keikachō)*; 5.3.2 no. 156–1 *Konshun ni okeru Chōsenjin bōdō ikken: hottan oyobi keika jōhō no bu*; 5.3.2 no. 156–5 *Konshun ni okeru Chōsenjin bōdō ikken: gaikoku no taidō kōron no bu*; 5.3.2 no. 156–8 *Konshun ni okeru Chōsenjin bōdō ikken: zairyūmin seigan oyobi ketsugi no bu*; 6.1.2 no. 74 *Honshō keisatsukan no Chōsen sōtokufu keisatsukan kennin ikken*; 6.1.5 no. 69 *Gaimushō kan’in oyobi keisatsukan shobatsu zakken*; 6.1.5 no. 6 *Kantō ni okeru kyōhi bōdō jiken*; 6.1.5 no. 22 *Chōsenkoku e haken keisatsukan kankei zakken*; 6.1.5 no. 34 *Chōgo tsūyaku no tame zai-Kankoku ryōjikan tsuki junsu shiyō kata ni tsuki Rikugunshō yori seikyū ikken*; 6.1.6 no. 2–2 *Teikoku kanri shutchō oyobi junkai zakken zaigai keisatsukan no bu*; 6.1.6 no. 5 *Kankoku zaikin keibu junsu kakuchi shutcho zakken*; Gikai chōsho TA—3

- Saikin Shina oyobi Manshū kankei shomondai tekiyō* (*keisatsu kankei shomondai*), 1934; *Gikai chōsho* TA—6 *Saikin Shina oyobi Manshū kankei shomondai tekiyō* (*keisatsu kankei shomondai*), 1935.
- Nihon Shanhaishi kenkyukai, ed. *Shanghai hitoeseō suru nettowaaku*. Tokyo: Kyuko shoin, 2000.
- “Nihon tōchika no zai Man Chōsenjin mondai.” *Chōsen kindai shiryō kenkyū shūsei* 2 (August 1959): 83–133.
- Nish, Ian. *Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002.
- . *Japan's Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China and the League of Nations, 1931–1933*. New York: Kegan Paul International, 1993.
- Nishizato Tatsuo. *Kakumei no Shanhai de: Aru Nihonjin Chūgoku kyōsantōin no kiroku*. Tokyo: Nit-Chū shuppan, 1977.
- Obinata Sumio. *Keisatsu no shakaishi*. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2003.
- . *Kindai Nihon no keisatsu to chiiki shakai*. Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 2000.
- Oblas, Peter. “Naturalist Law and Japan’s Legitimization of Empire in Manchuria: Thomas Baty and Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 15 (2004): 35–55.
- Ogata, Sadako. *Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931–1932*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964.
- Ogata Yōichi. “1927 nen no Rinko Nihon ryōjikan setsubi jiken—Chūgoku tōhoku ni okeru han-Nichi undō no tenki.” *Tōyō gaku* 60, nos. 1–2 (November 1978): 132–165.
- Ogino Fujio, ed. *Chian ijihō kankei shiryōshū*. Vol. 1. Tokyo: Shin Nihon shuppansha, 1996.
- . “Gaimushō keisatsu ron: tokkō keisatsu toshite no kinō.” *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 665 (November 1994): 14–25, 79.
- . *Gaimushō keisatsushi: zairyūmin hogo torishimari to tokkō keisatsu kinō*. Tokyo: Azekura shobō, 2005.
- . *Shisō kenji*. Tokyo: Iwanami shinshū, 2000.
- . *Tokkō keisatsu kankei shiryō shūsei*. 38 vols. Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 1991–1995.
- . *Tokkō keisatsu taisei shi: Shakai undō yokuatsu torishimari no kōzō to jit-tai*. Tokyo: Sekita shobō, 1988.
- Ōhata Hiroshi. “Chōsen dokuritsu undō no comyunikeeshon senryaku.” *Shinbun kenkyū kiyō* 39 (1989): 1–70.
- Okudaira Yasuhiro, ed. *Shōwa shisō tōseishi shiryō*, vol. 22: *Chūgoku jōsei hen*. Tokyo: Seikatsusha, 1981.
- Osaka keizai hōka daigaku Kantō shiryō kenkyūkai, ed. *Manshū jihen zenya ni okeru zai Kantō Nihon sōryōjikan monjo*. Osaka: Osaka keizai hōka daigaku shuppanbu, 1999.
- Pak Jong-gun. “1894 nen ni okeru Nihongun teppei mondai to Chōsen ‘nai-

- sei kaikaku' an tōjō no haikai." *Chōsen shi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 5 (November 1968): 30–64.
- Pak T'ae-wŏn. *Kim Jakuzan to Giretsudan: 1920 nendai ni okeru Chōsen dokuritsu undō to teroru*. Tokyo: Hokuseisha, 1980.
- Pak Tuk-chun. *Nihon teikokushugi no Chōsen shinryaku shi* (1868–1905). Translated by Ryan Sanjin. Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 2004.
- Park, Hyun Ok. "Korean Manchuria: The Racial Politics of Territorial Osmosis." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 99, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 193–215.
- . *Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria*. Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2005.
- Peattie, Mark R. *Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.
- . "Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895–1937." In *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937*, edited by Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie.
- . *Nan'yō: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1988.
- Popplewell, Richard J. *Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire, 1904–1924*. London: Frank Cass, 1995.
- . "The Surveillance of Indian 'Seditionists' in North America, 1905–1915." In *Intelligence and International Relations, 1900–194*, edited by Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes. Exeter, UK: Exeter University Publications, 1987.
- Raat, W. Dirk. "US Intelligence Operations and Covert Action in Mexico, 1900–47." *Journal of Contemporary History* 22 (1987): 615–638.
- Reynolds, Douglas R. *China, 1898–1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.
- . "Training Young China Hands: TōA Dōbun Shōin and Its Precursors, 1886–1945." In *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937*, edited by Peter Duus, Ramon Myers, and Mark Peattie.
- "Rinko ryōji bunkan setsubi hantai undō to sono keii." *Chōsa geppō* 7, no. 9 (September 1927): 508–516.
- Roberts, Luke S. "Cultivating Non-national Historical Understandings in Local History." In *The Teleology of the Modern Nation State: Japan and China*, edited by Joshua Fogel. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.
- Robinson, Ronald. "The Excentric Idea of Imperialism, with or without Empire." In *Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities*, ed. Wolfgang Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel. London: German Historical Institute, 1986.
- Rokkaku Tsunehiro, ed. *Chūgokugo kyōhonrui shūsei*. Pt. 5, vol. 2. Tokyo: Fujii shuppan, 1995.

- Rōyama, Masamichi. *Foreign Policy of Japan, 1914–1939*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973. Originally published in 1941 by the Japan Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Tokyo.
- Saaler, Sven, and J. Victor Koschmann, eds. *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Saitō Makoto bunsho: *Chōsen sōtokufu jidai kankei shiryō*. 17 vols. Seoul: Koma shorin, 1990.
- Saitō Ryōji. *Kantō-kyoku keisatsu yonjū nen no ayumi to sono shūen*. Tokyo: Kantō-kyoku keiyukai jimukyoku, 1981.
- Sasaki Harutaka. *Chōsen sensō zenshi toshite no Kankoku dokuritsu undō no kenkyū*. Tokyo: Kokusho kanko kai, 1985.
- . “‘Konshun jiken’ kangae.” *Bōei daigakkō kiyō* 39 (September 1979): 293–332; 40 (March 1980): 233–275; 41 (September 1980): 361–388.
- Satō Motoei. *Kindai Nihon no gaikō to gunji: Keneki yōgo to shinryaku no kōzō*. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 2000.
- . *Showa shoki tai Chūgoku seisaku no kenkyū: Tanaka naikaku no tai Man-Mō seisaku*. Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1992.
- Scalapino, Robert. *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1960*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
- Scalapino, Robert, and Chong-sik Lee. *Communism in Korea. Part I: The Movement*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
- . “The Origins of the Korean Communist Movement (I).” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 20, no. 1 (November 1960): 9–31.
- . “The Origins of the Korean Communist Movement (II).” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 20, no. 2 (February 1961): 149–167.
- Schmid, André. “Colonialism and the ‘Korea Problem’ in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review Article.” *Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 4 (November 2000): 951–976.
- . *Korea between Empires, 1895–1919*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
- . “Rediscovering Manchuria: Sin Ch’aeho and the Politics of Territorial History in Korea.” *Journal of Asian Studies* 56, no. 1 (February 1997): 26–46.
- Scott, James Brown. “The Chengchia Tun Agreement.” *The American Journal of International Law* 11, no. 3 (July 1917): 631–635.
- Scully, Eileen P. *Bargaining with the State from Afar: American Citizenship in Treaty Port China, 1844–1942*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- Seybolt, Peter J. “The War within a War: A Case Study of a County on the North China Plain.” In *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932–1945*, edited by David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shu, 201–225.
- Shakai mondai shiryō kenkyukai, ed. *Tokubestu kōtō keisatsu shiryō*. Kyoto: Tōyō bunkasha, 1973.

- Shanghai Municipal Police Files, 1894–1949*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources. Microfilm.
- Shiga Masaru. *Manshū kingendaishi*. Tokyo: Gendai kikaku shitsu, 1988.
- Shihōshō keijikyoku. *Shisō geppō*. Monthly summary. Numerous issues.
- Shin, Gi-Wook. *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006.
- Shin, Gi-Wook, and Michael Robinson, eds. *Colonial Modernity in Korea*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999.
- Shin, Paul Hobom. “The Korean Colony in Chientao: A Study of Japanese Imperialism and Militant Korean Nationalism, 1905–1932.” Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1980.
- Shin Kyu-seop. “Nihon no Kantō seisaku to Chōsenjin shakai: 1920 nendai zenhan made no kajū seisaku o chūshin to shite.” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 31 (October 1993): 157–187.
- . “Shoki ‘Manshūkoku’ ni okeru Chōsenjin tōgō seisaku: Zen Man Chōsenjin minkai rengōkai no bunseki o chūshin ni.” *Nihon shokuminchi kenkyū* 9 (July 1997): 16–31.
- . “Zai Man Chōsenjin no ‘Manshūkoku’ kan oyobi ‘Nihon teikoku.’” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 38 (October 2000): 93–121.
- Shinobu Junpei. *Man-Mō tokushu keneki ron*. Tokyo: Nihon hyōronshahan, 1932.
- Shinobu Seisaburō. “Tsūshū jiken.” *Seiji keizai shigaku* 297 (January 1991): 1–13.
- Shintenchū*. Dairen. Periodical.
- Shiozawa Kita. *Nihon ryōjikan keisatsu hō*. Tokyo: Shinkokaku, 1938.
- Shiraishi Masaya. “Tōyu undō (Betonamu) wo meguru Nichi-Bu ryōtōkyoku no taiō.” *Ōsaka gaikokugo daigaku gakuho* 73 (1986): 111–140.
- Silvestri, Michael. “‘The Sinn Féin of India’: Irish Nationalism and the Policing of Revolutionary Terrorism in Bengal.” *Journal of British Studies* 39 (October 2000), 37–49.
- Soejima Shōichi. “Chōsen ni okeru Nihon no ryōjikan keisatsu.” *Wakayama daigaku kyōiku gakubu kiyō jinbun kagaku* 35 (1986): 125–148.
- . “Chūgoku ni okeru Nihon no ryōjikan keisatsu.” *Wakayama daigaku kyōiku gakubu kiyō jinbun kagaku* 39 (February 1990): 63–80.
- . “Chūgoku no fubyōdō jōyaku teppai to ‘Manshū jihen.’” In *Nit-Chū sensōshi kenkyū*, edited by Furuya Tetsuo. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1984.
- . “‘Manshūkoku’ tōchi to chigai hōken teppai.” In *‘Manshūkoku’ no kenkyū*, edited by Yamamoto Yūzō. Tokyo: Ryokuin shobō, 1995.
- Sōgō Shunsuke. “1920 nendai Manshū ni okeru dokuritsu undō dantai to Chōsenjin shakai: Seigifu o jirei toshite.” *Chōsen gakuho* 65 (October 1997): 73–103.
- Son Ansok. “1920 nedai, Shanhai no Chū-Chō rentai soshiki: ‘Chū-Kan ko-

- kumin gojoshu Soshu' no seiritsu, kōsei, katsudō o chushin ni." *Chūgoku kenkyū geppō* 50, no. 1, (January 1996): 15–31.
- . "Nit-Chū sensōki ni okeru Shanhai sōryōjikan keisatsu." In *Senji Shanhai 1937–45 nen*, edited by Takatsuna Hirofumi. Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 2005.
- . "Shanhai no Chōsen 'dokuritsu shinbun' ni tsuite: shinshiryō ni yoru shoshiteki kenkyū to saikentō no kanōsei." *Chikaki ni arite* 29 (May 1996): 17–33.
- . "Shanhai wo meguru Nichi-Fu no jōhō kōkan nettowaaku: 'teikoku' to 'shokuminchi' no jōhō tōsei." In *Shanhai hitoēsō suru nettowaaku*, edited by Nihon Shanhaishi kenkyukai. Tokyo: Kyuko shoin, 2000.
- . "Shinkoku ryūgakusei torishimari kisoku jiken no shoso—seiji kōsai go daijin, Shanhai, shoshite Kankoku to no kanren o chushin ni." *Chūgoku kenkyū geppō* 49, no. 3, (March 1995): 1–13.
- Son Chun-il. "Manshū jihen zen no 'zai Man Chōsenjin' mondai to sono kukyō." *Higashi Ajia kindai shi* 5 (March 2002): 36–52.
- Stegewerns, Dick, ed. *Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan: Autonomy, Asian Brotherhood, and World Citizenship*. London: Routledge-Curzon, 2003.
- Stoler, Ann Laura, and Frederick Cooper. "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda." In *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, edited by Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- Stranahan, Patricia. *Underground: The Shanghai Communist Party and the Politics of Survival, 1927–1937*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.
- Suematsu Kichiji. *Keisatsu kunwa*. Tokyo: Nihon shoin, 1928.
- Suh, Dae-sook. *Documents of Korean Communism, 1918–1948*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- . *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918–1948*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967.
- Suzuki Takashi. *Nihon teikokushugi to Manshū, 1900–1945*. 2 vols. Tokyo: Kakushobō, 1992.
- Tai Kuohui. "Nihon shokuminchi shihai to Taiwan sekimin." *Taiwan genkindai kenkyū* 3 (1980): 105–128.
- Takasaki Sōji. *Shokuminchi Chōsen no Nihonjin*. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2002.
- . "Zai Chō Nihonjin to Nis-Shin sensō." In *Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi*, 5:3–25. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1992–1993.
- Takasugi Ichirō. *Chūgoku no midori no hoshi*. Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 1980.
- Takatsuna Hirofumi, ed. *Senji Shanhai 1937–45 nen*. Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 2005.
- Takatsuna Hirofumi and Chen Zuen, eds. *Riben qiao min zai Shanghai, 1870–1945*. Shanghai: Shanghai ci shu chu ban she, 2000.

- . “Shanghai Uchiyama shoten shoshi.” In *Shanghai hitoesō suru net-towaaku*, edited by Nihon Shanhaishi kenkyūkai. Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 2000.
- Takei Yoshikazu. “Senzen Shanghai ni okeru Chōsenjin no kokuseki mondai.” *Chūgoku kenkyū geppō* 60, no. 1 (January 2006): 7–21.
- Takenaka Ken’ichi. “Kantō ni okeru minzokushugi soshiki ni yoru Chōsenjin kyōiku.” *Higashi Ajia kenkyū* 27 (February 2000): 5–17.
- Takeuchi, Tatsuji. *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire*. New York: Doubleday, 1935.
- Tanaka Ryūichi. “Chōsen tōchi ni okeru ‘zai Man Chōsenjin’ mondai.” *Tōyō bunka kenkyū* 3 (March 2001): 129–177.
- . “‘Manshūkoku’ ni okeru tōchi kikō no keisei to ‘kokumin’ no sōshutsu.” *Nihonshi kenkyū* 511 (March 2005): 61–78.
- . “Manshūkoku shoki no ryōjikan keisatsu to chigai hōken teppai.” *Nihon shokuminchi kenkyū* 12 (July 2000): 1–13.
- . “[Manshūkoku] to Nihon no teikoku shihai: Sono hōronteki tankyū.” *Rekishi kagaku* 173 (June 2003): 13–22.
- . “Tairistu to tōgō no ‘Sen-Man’ kankei: ‘naisen ittai’, ‘gozoku kyōwa’, Sen-Man ichinyo no shosō.” *Historia* 152 (September 1996): 106–132.
- . “Teikoku Nihon no shihō rensa.” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 38 (October 2000): 61–91.
- Tanigawa Yūichirō. “‘Kantō kyōyaku’ teiketsu katei no saikentō.” *Bungaku kenkyū ronshū* 14 (February 2001): 169–186.
- . “‘ManMo TōKo jōyaku’ to Kantō ryōjikan keisatsu zōkyō.” *Nihon shokuminchi kenkyū* 16 (2004): 1–17.
- . “Naitō Konan to Kantō mondai ni kansuru jakkan no saikentō.” *Chūgoku kenkyū geppō* 55, no. 4 (April 2001): 39–46.
- Tenshin chiikishi kenkyūkai. *Tenshinshi: saisei suru toshi no toporojū*. Tokyo: Tōhō shoten, 1999.
- Tenshin kyoryūmindan. *Tenshin kyoryūmindan gyōsei gaikan*. Tianjin, 1927.
- . *Tenshin kyoryūmindan ni-jū shunen kinenshi*. Tianjin, 1930.
- . *Tenshin kyoryūmindan san-jū shunen kinenshi*. Tianjin, 1941.
- Teramoto Yasutoshi. “Nichi-Ro sensōgo no tai Man seisaku o meguru Gai-mushō to rikugun no tairitsu.” *Seiji keizai shigaku* 237 (January 1986): 76–93.
- Thomas, Martin. “Bedouin Tribes and the Imperial Intelligence Services in Syria, Iraq and Transjordan in the 1920s.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 38, no. 4 (October 2003): 539–562.
- Tiedemann, R. G. “The Persistence of Banditry: Incidents in Border Districts of the North China Plain.” *Modern China* 8, no. 4 (October 1982): 395–433.
- Tipton, Elise K. *The Japanese Police State: The Tokkō in Interwar Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1990.

- , ed. *Society and the State in Interwar Japan*. New York: Routledge, 1997.
- Tollefson, Harold. *Policing Islam: The British Occupation of Egypt and the Anglo-American Struggle over Control of the Police, 1882–1914*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999.
- Tomizuka Kazuhiko. “Shōwa 2 nen Bōjisan bunkan setsubi to zai-Man Chōsenjin mondai.” *Hōsei daigaku daigakuin kiyō* 22 (1989): 87–98.
- Tone Kōichi. *Teru no shōgai*. Tokyo: Yōbunsha, 1969.
- Toro, Marōa Celia. “The Internationalization of Police: The DEA in Mexico.” *Journal of American History* 86, no. 2 September 1999, 623–640.
- Townshend, Charles. “The Defence of Palestine: Insurrection and Public Security, 1936–1939.” *The English Historical Review* 103, no. 409 (October 1988): 917–949.
- Tsukiashi Tatsuhiko. “Kōgo kaikaku no kindai kokka kōsō.” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 33 (October 1995): 67–92.
- Tsurushima Setsurei. *Chūgoku Chōsenzoku no kenkyū*. Osaka: Kansai daigaku shuppanbu, 1997.
- Uchida, Jun. “‘Brokers of Empire’: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1910–1937.” Ph. D. diss., Harvard University, 2005.
- . “Settler Colonialism: Japanese Merchants under Cultural Rule in the 1920s.” Harvard University, Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, *Occasional Paper in Japanese Studies* (June 2002): 11–22.
- . “Shokuminchiki Chōsen ni okeru dōka seisaku to zai—Chō Nihonjin-dōminkai o jirei toshite.” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 41 (October 2003): 173–201.
- Uchida Tomoyuki. “Juo kokumin seifu no kōNichi seiji senden seisaku to Nihonjin hansen undō.” *Chūgoku kenkyū geppō* 52, no. 10 (October 1998): 1–16.
- Uyehara, Cecil H., ed. *Checklist of Archives in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, 1868–1945*. Washington, DC: Library of Congress Photoduplication Service, 1954.
- Umemori Naoyuki. “Kiritsu no ryotei: Meiji shoki keisatsu seido no keisei to shokuminchi.” *Waseda seiji keizai gaku zasshi* 354 (2004): 44–62.
- . “Modernization through Colonial Mediations: The Establishment of the Police and Prison System in Meiji Japan.” Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2002.
- U.S. Department of State. *Confidential U.S. Diplomatic Post Records: Japan, Part II, 1919–1929*. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1982. Microform.
- Usui, Katsumi. “Japanese Approaches to China in the Mid-1930s: Two Alternatives.” In *American, Japanese and Chinese Perspectives on Wartime Asia, 1931–1949*, edited by Akira Iriye and Warren Cohen, 93–116. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1990.

- . “The Role of the Foreign Ministry.” In *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931–1941*, edited by Dorothy Borg and Shunpei Okamoto. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973.
- Uyehara, Cecil H. *Leftwing Social Movements in Japan: An Annotated Bibliography*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1972.
- Wada, Izumi, ed. *Gaimushō keisatsu*. Ueda, 1981.
- Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi. “‘Imperial Japanese’ Drug Trafficking in China: Historiographic Perspectives.” *Sino-Japanese Studies* 13, no. 1 (October 2000): 3–19.
- Wakeman, Frederic. *Policing Shanghai, 1927–1937*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
- . *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937–1941*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- . *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
- Walker, Brett. *The Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology and Culture in Japanese Expansion, 1590–1800*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
- . “The Early Modern Japanese State and Ainu Vaccinations: Redefining the Body Politic, 1799–1868.” *Past and Present* 163 (May 1999): 121–160.
- Wan, Ming. *Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006.
- Weale, B. L. Putnam. *The Fight for the Republic in China*. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1917.
- Weiner, Michael. *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan*. London and New York: Routledge, 1994.
- Wells, Ken. “Between the Devil and the Deep: Nonpolitical Nationalism and Passive Collaboration in Korea during the 1920s.” *Papers on Far Eastern History* 37 (March 1988): 125–147.
- Westney, D. Eleanor. “The Emulation of Western Organizations in Meiji Japan: The Case of the Paris Prefecture of Police and the Keishi-chō.” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 8, no. 2 (Summer 1982): 307–342.
- Willoughby, Westel. *China at the Conference: A Report*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1922.
- . *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*. 1st ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1920.
- . *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*. 2nd ed. 2 vols. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1927.
- . *Japan’s Case Examined*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1940.
- . *The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935.
- Wilson, Sandra. *The Manchuria Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931–1933*. London: Routledge, 2002.

- , ed. *Nation and Nationalism in Japan*. London: Routledge Curzon, 2002.
- . “The ‘New Paradise’: Japanese Emigration to Manchuria in the 1930s and 1940s.” *International History Review* 17, no. 2 (May 1995): 249–285.
- Woodhead, H. G. W. *Extraterritoriality in China: The Case against Abolition*. Tianjin, 1929.
- Yagyū Masafumi. “Kantō totokufu kansei no kaikaku to Kantōgun no dokuritsu: Hara Kei naikaku no tai Manshū gyōsei kikō kaikaku mondai.” *Komazawa shigaku* 35 (May 1986): 167–189.
- Yamada Hirohito. “Nihonjin keisatsukan ni taisuru Chōsenjo shōrei seisaku.” *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 38 (October 2000): 123–149.
- Yamamura Mutuso. “Dai ichi-ji taisenki ni okeru Shanhai Nihonjin kyorūmin shakai no kōsei to ‘dochakuha’ chukensō.” *Wakō keizai* 30, no. 1 (September 1997): 85–105.
- Yamamuro Shin’ichi. *Manchuria under Japanese Dominion*. Translated by Joshua Fogel. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.
- . *Kimera: Manshūkoku no shōzō*. Tokyo: Chūo kōron, 1993.
- Yamazaki Yukō. “Mantetsu tsuki zokuchi gyōseiken no hōteki seikaku: Kantōgun no kyōbaba senryaku.” In *Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no hōteki tenkai*, edited by Asano Toyomi and Matsuda Toshihiko. Tokyo: Shinshansha, 2004.
- Yanagisawa Asobu. “Nihon teikokushugi no ‘Manshū’ shihaishi kenkyū.” In *Kindai Nit-Chū kankeishi saikō*, edited by Tanaka Akira. Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 2002.
- Yanagisawa Asobu and Okabe Makio, eds. *Teikokushugi to shokuminchi*. Tokyo: Tokyodo shuppan, 2001.
- Yano, Christine. “Defining the Modern Nation in Japanese Popular Song, 1914–1932.” In *Japan’s Competing Modernities*, edited by Sharon Minichiello, 247–264.
- Yeh, Wen-hsin, ed. *Wartime Shanghai*. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Yi Song-hwan. *Kindai higashi Ajia no seiji rikigaku: Kantō o meguru Nit-Chū-Chō kankei no rekishiteki tenkai*. Tokyo: Kinshosha, 1991.
- Yoda Yoshiie. “Manshū ni okeru Chōsenjin imin.” In *Nihon teikokushugika no Manshū imin*, edited by Manshū iminshi kenkyūkai. Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1976.
- Yoshihashi, Takehiko. *Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963.
- Yoshii Ken’ichi. “Antō ryōjikan bunkan setchi mondai no hamon: Yoshida Shigeru to Tanaka gaikō.” *Kan Nihonkai kenkyū nenpō* 4 (March 1997): 78–93.
- . *Kan Nihonkai chiiki shaki no henyō: ManMo, Kantō, to Ura Nihon*. Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 2000.
- Young, C. Walter. *The International Legal Status of the Kwangtung Leased Territory*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1931.

- . *The International Relations of Manchuria*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929.
- . *Japanese Jurisdiction in the South Manchuria Railway Areas*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1931.
- . *Japan's Special Position in Manchuria*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1931.
- . *Korean Problems in Manchuria as Factors in the Sino-Japanese Dispute: An Analytical and Interpretive Study*. Geneva: Supplementary Documents to the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, 1932.
- Young, Louise. *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
- . "Japan's Wartime Empire in China." In *The Shadows of Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919–1939*, edited by Roger Chickering and Stig Forster. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Yu Feng-chun. "Chūgoku Chōsenzoku kyōiku o meguru Chū-Nichi ryōgoku no kyōsō: 1905–31 nen no 'Kantō' o chūshin ni." *Ajia bunka kenkyū* 8 (June 2001): 207–220.
- Yu Hyo-jong. "Kyokutō Roshia ni okeru Chōsen minzoku undō: 'Kankoku heigō' kara dai ichi-ji sekai taisen no boppatsu made." *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 22 (March 1985): 135–166.
- Yu Xinqun. "Dai ichiji Shanhai jihen to Gaimushō no yakuwari." *Aichi daigaku hokei ronshū* 105 (August 1984): 55–87.
- . "Kairai Manshūkoku no juritsu to Gaimushō." *Shakai Kagaku tokyū* 29, no. 2 (February 1984): 87–128.
- . *Manshū jihenki no Nit-Chū gaikō shi kenkyū*. Tokyo: Toho shoten, 1986.
- . "Manshū jihen to Shidehara gaikō." *Nihonshi kenkyū* 253 (September 1983): 363–404.
- Yu Yong-ik. *Nis-Shin sensōki no Kankoku kaikaku undō*. Translated by Akizuki Nozomi and Hirose Teizō. Tokyo: Hōsei daigaku shuppankyoku, 2000.
- Zai-Shanghai Nihon sōryōjikan keisatsubu dai ni ka. *Shin Chūgoku*. Shanghai, 1932.
- Zai-Shanghai Nihon taishikan chū-Shi keimubu. *Chū-Shi ryōjikan keisatsushōchō kaigiroku* (January 1940). In *Gaimushō, Foreign Affairs' Documents, 1914–1945*. Washington, DC: Library of Congress of Photoduplication Service, 1970. Microfilm.
- Zai-Tenshin Nihon sōryōjikan keisatsubu. *Zai Tenshin Nihon sōryōjikan keisatsubu kaisetsu jōkyō* (Tianjin, 1936). Washington, DC: Library of Congress. Photocopy.

Index

- Aiba Kiyoshi, 9, 126; biographical information, 181n.75; and the Manshū hominkai, 81–82, 84; and the May 30 Jiandao riots, 100–103, 107
- Akabane Tomoharu, 20–21
- Akatsuka Shōsuke, 82, 84
- An Chang-ho, 68, 177n.14
- Andong Consulate, 45–46, 48; and the protests at Maoershan, 94–96
- Arita Hachirō, 98
- Asia Bureau (Foreign Ministry), 61, 72, 120, 126, 131, 135; 1929 plan for consular police reform, 97–98; response to the 1932 bombings in Shanghai and Tokyo, 114–115
- Asia Development Board (Kō-A in), 135, 144
- Chiang Kai-shek, 89, 112
- Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 99, 110, 112, 120, 185nn.21, 22; as mentioned in the 1932 Foreign Ministry report on problems in Manchuria, 116–117; as a target of consular police action in occupied China, 122–123, 132, 135, 139, 153
- Ch'oe Changgyu, 79, 82–84
- Chōngdogyo, 79, 181n.67
- Chōsen oyobi Manshū* (periodical), 75
- chūzaijo* (police substation), 24
- comfort women, 198n.106
- Comintern, 71, 99, 116, 120, 135, 197n.94; and the arrest of Sano Manabu in 1929, 109–110
- corruption: of consular police officers, 137–138
- Cường Đê, Prince, 86, 115
- Enomoto Takeaki, 17
- extraterritoriality and/or extraterritorial privilege, 2, 8, 94, 109, 153; in China, 40, 45, 54, 58–60; discussions of abolition, 97–98, 100, 102–103; in Korea, 22–23, 35; in Manzhouguo, 130–132
- Feuerwerker, Albert, 63
- French concession (Shanghai), 90, 92; in the aftermath of the 1932 bombing in Shanghai, 113–114, 121; as a site of Korean independence activity, 66–67, 69–70
- futei Senjin* (rebellious Koreans), 70
- gaichi* and *naichi*, 20, 86, 124, 136, 144
- Gaimushō keisatsushi* (*A History of the Foreign Ministry Police*), 8–10, 18, 50, 158n.27
- Garon, Sheldon, 6
- Greater East Asia Ministry (Dai Tō-A shō), 144
- Hagiwara Morikazu, 46–47
- Hanabusa Nagamichi, 61–62
- Hanabusa Yoshimoto, 15
- Hasegawa Teru, 139
- hashutsujo* (police boxes), 24

- Hayashi Gonsuke, 28, 30–31, 45
 Hayashi Kyūjirō, 98
 Hayashi Tadasu, 47
 Hirohito, Emperor, 148–149
hogo torishimari, 22
 Home Ministry (Naimushō), 98, 112, 138, 150, 197n.89; and the consular police in Korea, 20–21, 24–25, 31–32; and the consular police in Shanghai, 66, 72, 77, 86, 89, 90; response to the 1932 bombings in Shanghai and Tokyo, 114–115
 Horiuchi Tateki, 133
 Hsu Shushi, 59
 Hunchun Incident of 1920, 74–76, 101, 172n.42, 180n.53
- Ichikawa Shōichi, 111
 Ilchinhoe: connections to the Manshū hominkai, 79–81
 Imo Mutiny (1882), 15
 Inoue Kaoru, 15
 Inukai Tsuyoshi, 86
 Ishiware, Kanji, 3, 103
 Itō Takeo, 127
- Japanese Communist Party (JCP): connections in Shanghai, 71–72, 77; and the arrest of Sano Manabu, 109–112, 122
 Japanese Residents' Associations and resident communities, 14, 18–19, 27, 42, 47
 Jiandao: Qing government policy concerning resident Koreans, 50–51
 Jiandao Agreement of 1909, 51, 102, 173n. 51
 Jiandao Expedition, 75, 82, 87
 Jiandao Uprising (May 30, 1930), 99–100
junho (assistant patrolman), 42, 125, 170n.11
- Kabo reforms of 1894, 26, 164n.56, 165nn.57–58
 Kaji Wataru, 122, 139
 Kajikawa Masakatsu, 57, 121, 141, 144
 Kameyama Riheita, 31
 Kamio Kazuharu, 88, 96
 Kaneko Fumiko, 72
 Kanghai Treaty, 14
 Kantō-chō (civilian administrative bureau of the Kwantung Leased Territory), 49, 98, 129–130
 Katayama Sen, 71
 Katō Takaaki, 50
 Kawashima Naniwa, 59
keimu komon (police adviser), 32–33, 130
keimubu (department of police affairs): in Shanghai, 134; in Tianjin, 133
keisatsubu (police headquarters): in Harbin, 108, 132; in Jiandao, 76; in Shanghai, 120–121; in Tianjin, 125–127, 133
kenpeitai (military police), 80, 129, 159n.32; jurisdictional disputes with consular police in occupied China, 142–143; in Korea, 34–35
 Kim Ku, 113–114
 Kim Ok-kyun, 15
 Kim Wŏn-bong, 68–69, 125
 Kobashi Ichita, 71
 Koga Motokichi, 58, 60–61
kokutai (national polity), 5, 89, 111, 137–138, 148
 Komagome Takeshi, 150
 Komura Jutarō, 28, 31
 Kondō Eizō, 71
 Kondō Masaki, 14
 Konoe Fumimaro, 149
 Koo, V. K. Wellington, 59
 Korea Communist Party (KCP), 88–89, 110, 113, 189n.75
 Korea Government-General (Chōsen

- sōtokufu), 73, 90; and the Jiandao uprising of 1930, 100–102; jurisdictional rivalries in treaty port China, 43, 48–50, 52; and Korean resistance in Shanghai, 66–67, 69, 72; and the Manchurian Incident, 105, 108; and the Mitsuya Agreement of 1925, 87–88; and the protests at Maoershan, 94–96
- Kuroshima Denji, 109
- kusho mondai* (jurisdictional disputes), 142
- Kwantung Army, 3–4, 88, 93, 97, 111, 115, 118, 148, 159n.32, 172n.42, 187n.49; relations with the consular police during the Manchurian Incident, 103–108; relations with the consular police in Manzhouguo, 128, 130–132
- Kwantung Government-General, 46–47, 49, 78, 85, 129
- Kwantung Leased Territory, 45–48, 57, 98, 130, 159n.32
- language training/skills of consular police officers, 18–19, 30, 32–33, 37, 86, 144
- League of Nations, 58–60
- Li, Lincoln, 126, 132
- Li Li-san, 99, 185n.22
- Lu Xun, 122
- Lytton Commission, 59–60
- Makino Nobuaki, 49–50
- Manchurian Incident of 1931, 3–4, 59–60, 99, 120, 124, 126, 172n.42, 189n.2; relationship to the Jiandao uprising of May 1930, 103–104, 106–108, 111, 113, 115
- Manshū hominkai (MHK, Manchuria People's Protection Society), 78–85
- Mantetsu (South Manchuria Railway Company), 30, 46–48, 54, 78, 141
- Manzhouguo, 8, 35, 119, 141–142, 145, 192n.21, 194n.56; the consular police in, 125–132
- Mao Zedong, 90, 139
- Maoershan: Chinese protests at, 95–96
- March 15 Incident of 1928, 110
- Maruyama Shigetoshi, 31–35, 166n.79, 167n.88
- Masan: disputes with Russian authorities, 19, 24, 28
- Matsuda Genji, 100
- May 30 Incident of 1925 (Shanghai), 85
- Metropolitan Police Bureau (Keishichō), 77
- Mitamura Shirō, 111
- Mitsuya Agreement (Mitsuya kyōtei), 102, 113, 182n.44; establishment of, 87–90; results of and problems with, 92–97; abrogation of, 108
- Nabeyama Sadachika, 111
- Naitō Konan, 51
- Nakagawa Yū, 144
- Nakamura Satoru, 48
- narcotics (illicit drug trade), 14, 43, 109, 121, 127, 142–143, 193n.36, 196n.88
- Nihon jinmin hansen dōmei (Japanese People's Anti-war League), 139
- Nikolaevsk Incident, 75
- Nishizato Tatsuo, 109, 198n.100
- Nozaka Sanzō, 197n.94
- Ōe Hikaru, 127, 135
- Ogino Fujio, 32, 58, 164n.51, 170n.15, 192n.31
- Okabe Saburō, 46

- Okada Kanekazu, 97, 100–107
 Ōsugi Sakae, 71
- Pak Yōl, 72
 Peace Preservation Law, 89, 111–112, 123, 189n.70
Peking Gazette (periodical), 56
Peking-Tientsin Times (periodical), 56
 Phan Bội Châu, 70
 prostitution, 14, 17, 121, 142, 169n.8, 198n.6
 Provisional Government of Korea, 66–67, 69, 79, 113–114, 189n.72
 public health, 16–18, 80, 91, 141
- Relations of Japan with Manchuria and Mongolia*, 116–118
 Robinson, Ronald: “excentric theory” of imperialism, 8
- Saitō Makoto, 79, 100–103
 Sakuradamon Incident (January 1932), 113–115, 189n.72
 Sano Manabu, 72, 109–111, 113, 115
 Satō Naotake, 9
 Satsuma-Chōshū, 22
 Seoul-Pusan railway: consular police expansion associated with, 28–29
senbu operations, 140–141, 198n.100
 Shandong Expedition, 112
 Shidehara Kijūrō, 85, 93, 95, 97, 100–102, 106, 108
 Shigemitsu Mamoru, 114
 Shihozawa Kita, 61
Shina kenkyū (periodical), 58
Shina rōnin (China adventurers), 124
 Shinobu Junpei, 58–59
 Shirakawa Yoshinori, 114
shisō mondai (ideological problems), 124, 135
shōbuchi (commercial settlement), 46, 52
 Sin Ch’aeho, 51
 smuggling, 127–128, 130, 196n.88
 Suematsu Kichiji, 9; disagreements over policy after the Manchurian Incident, 102–104; and Koreans in Jiandao during the 1920s, 73–74, 93–94
 Suh, Dae-sook, 89, 111, 188n.65
- Taewŏn’gun, 15, 26, 165n.58
Tairiku (periodical): editorials in, 55–56
 Taiwan Government-General (*sōtokufu*): jurisdiction over Taiwanese subjects in China, 43–45
 Takehisa Katsuzō, 25–26, 33, 164n.52, 165n.58
 Tanaka Giichi, 69, 111, 112
 Tanigawa Yūichirō, 57–58, 173n.51
 Terauchi Masatake, 48–49, 52
 Tipton, Elise K., 22
 Tōa Dōbun Shoin (East Asia Common Culture Academy), 30, 70, 123
tokkō (*tokubetsu kōtō keisatsu*, special high-level police), 35; office in Jiandao, 76–77; targets in Chinese treaty ports, 86, 89, 92, 112–113; targets in occupied China, 119–122, 124, 126, 135, 142
 Tonghak Movement, 25–26, 79, 164n.51
 Toudaogou Incident, 76, 172n.42
- Uchida Yasuya, 73
 Uchiyama Kanzō, 121
 Ūiyöldan, 68–69, 125
 uniforms: of consular police officers, 20, 97
 United States policy in Latin America: comparisons to, 75, 153
- Washington System, 63, 148
 Watanabe Masanosuke, 111
 Willoughby, Westel, 44, 56, 58, 60–62

- Xiamen (Amoy), 43–44; Taiwanese subjects in, 59
- Yada Shichitarō, 69–70, 85–86
- Yamagata Isaburō, 84
- Yamakawa Hiroshi, 71
- Yasukuni Shrine, 38, 147
- Yi Pong-ch'ang, 113, 189n.72
- Yō Un-hyōng, 68, 188n.66; arrest by Shanghai consular police in 1929, 111–115
- Yoshizawa Kenkichi, 95, 106
- Young, C. Walter, 57
- Yu Cheng, 87
- Yuan Shikai, 57
- Yun Pong-gil, 114
- Zhang Xueliang, 101
- Zhang Zuolin, 101; and the Manshū hominkai, 78, 80, 87; and the Zhengjiatun Incident, 55
- Zhengjiatun, 49, 174n.57; incident of 1916, 53–59

About the Author

Erik Esselstrom earned his Ph.D. from the University of California at Santa Barbara, and is presently an assistant professor of East Asian history at the University of Vermont. He has conducted research collaboratively with Japanese, Chinese, and Korean scholars at Waseda University in Tokyo and the Institute for Research in Humanities of Kyoto University. He has authored numerous articles and essays on topics in modern China-Japan relations.



Production Notes for ESSELSTROM | CROSSING THE EMPIRE'S EDGE

Jacket design by Julie Matsumoto-Chun

Text design by Paul Herr, University of Hawai'i Press
with display in Tonneau and text in New Baskerville

Text composition by inari information services

Printing and binding by The Maple-Vail Book
Manufacturing Group

Printed on 60 lb. Glatfelter Offset B18, 420 ppi