

Alternative Histories of the Self

A Cultural History of
Sexuality and Secrets,
1762-1917

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To my sisters, Hilary Clark and Emily Victorson

Contents

List of Figures	viii
Text Acknowledgments	ix
Personal Acknowledgments	x
1 Introduction: Celebrating or Rejecting the Unique Self	1
2 The Chevalièr/e d'Eon: Transgender Heroine, Pugnacious Diplomat, or Pious Lady?	31
3 Secrets and Lies: Anne Lister's Love for Women and the Natural Self	51
4 Richard Johnson and the Imperial Self	77
5 James Hinton and the Sacrifice of the Self	99
6 "Better to Be an Active Devil Than a Crushed Saint": Edith Ellis and the New Life	123
Afterword	147
Notes	152
Index	200

List of Figures

3.1	Anne Lister. Courtesy of Calderdale Museum	52
4.1	Richard Johnson © The British Library Board Or. 6633, f. 68	84
5.1	James Hinton © Wellcome Collection, licensed under CC BY 4.0	100
6.1	Edith Ellis © The British Library Board Ms. 70,536, f. 92	124

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Introduction: Celebrating or Rejecting the Unique Self

I know my heart, and have studied mankind; I am not made like any one I have been acquainted with, perhaps like no one in existence; if not better, I at least claim originality, and whether Nature did wisely in breaking the mold with which she formed me, can only be determined after having read this work.

Rousseau, Confessions, p. 1

In his bestselling *Confessions*, the eighteenth-century philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau shocked and fascinated his readers by revealing not only his great thoughts but also his failed love affairs, emotional instability, and ethical lapses. He justified his defiance of conventional religious morality by declaring that he was a unique subject “unlike other men”; his inborn nature thus explained his flaws and his genius.

This proclamation inspired the Chevalièr/e d’Eon, a French diplomat, in moments of self-transformation. On crashing his career, he cited Rousseau to complain that the artifice of the court suppressed the virile courage of natural man. On becoming a woman, Rousseau inspired her to reveal what she saw as her true, natural self.¹ Anne Lister, a wealthy Yorkshire gentlewoman, also quoted Rousseau in her coded diaries to support her sense of herself as unique and unlike others. From a young age, she fell in love with women, who reciprocated her feelings and whom she seduced; she told them that her feelings were natural, and therefore justified.

This book draws on five case studies, beginning with d’Eon and Lister, to examine how my subjects used—or rejected—the notion of the unique self. My method is different from the usual histories that analyze how great philosophers thought about the self.² Instead, I look at how my subjects reinterpreted not only philosophy but also religion, classics, novels, poetry, and science to explain

themselves in their secret writings, such as diaries and notebooks. All my subjects had hidden lives, but this book is not about revealing the secret selves behind my subjects' public presence. In fact, the very notion of the unique self is a cultural invention largely created by Rousseau in the eighteenth century. All my subjects had difficulties conforming to the conventions of their times: did this make them more likely to question the power dynamics of their own societies?³ Or was the notion of the unique self, as some have argued, itself complicit in these power dynamics?⁴

Some have argued that this very notion of the unique, inborn self was linked with increasingly rigid assumptions about the naturalness of gender relations, and categories of sexual identity.⁵ Indeed, Rousseau was highly problematic for d'Eon and Lister, because he thought that only men could be unique individuals. Instead of expressing themselves and exploring their unconventional thoughts, he argued, women should be delicate girls and tender mothers. Neither d'Eon nor Lister could fit Rousseau's feminine ideal; d'Eon fought with swords and Lister liked to shoot pistols. How could they be inspired by Rousseau when he repudiated learned ladies and masculine women? To answer this question, I will look at how d'Eon, Lister, and three other unusual individuals engaged in what might be called a queer method of reading: they drew on seemingly inhospitable discourses and exploited their paradoxes to create their own sense of self.

The notion of the unique self has also been linked with liberal individualism. In this philosophy, characteristic of laissez-faire capitalism, the individual is defined as possessive, property-owning, coherent, autonomous, self-reliant, and competitive.⁶ Some versions of liberal individualism, especially in twentieth-century American culture, such as the philosophy of Ayn Rand, certainly celebrate the possessive, competitive individual as a unique self. But I will show that belief in the unique self did not always correlate with a belief in possessive individualism; furthermore, the notion of the self as fragmented could be used by capitalism and disciplinary discourses.⁷ This introduction will make this argument about British culture in general from the late eighteenth to the late nineteenth century, and then the essays in this book will focus on my individual subjects beginning with the Chevalier/e d'Eon and Anne Lister.

My third subject never wrote his name on his journals, which implied he did not care about the unique self. It took some sleuthing to discover that he was Richard Johnson, an official in the East India Company in the 1770s and 1780s. In public, Johnson served the empire; in private, he savagely criticized it. Johnson deeply admired Adam Smith, the prophet of laissez-faire capitalism and

the self-interested individual. In my introduction, I will ask what Adam Smith thought about the unique self.

My fourth subject, James Hinton, also rejected the unique self; instead, he called for the sacrifice of the self. Indeed, the sacrifice of the self was a major theme in Victorian Britain. Hinton urged idealistic young people to sacrifice their careers by serving the poor. In secret, he advocated an outrageous solution to the problem of prostitution and turned around Christianity to a radical vision that sexual pleasure could allow the self to dissolve in nature.

Hinton deeply influenced my last subject, Edith Lees Ellis, but as a woman, she could not accept his idea of the sacrifice of the self. Nor could she accept the admonition of socialists that individual self-cultivation must be sacrificed to the good of society. Instead, she tried to reconcile individuality and socialism. Attracted to women, she married sexologist Havelock Ellis, who used her as a case study to define the “sexual invert.” As such, Edith might be seen as a part of the process by which expert discourses diagnosed people into rigid categories caused by inherited deviance. But Edith twisted sexological and eugenic discourses to celebrate the abnormal genius.

Sexuality and secrets

Today, some people proclaim, “I need to be my true self” or “I was born this way” when they come out as transgender, gay, or lesbian. But during d’Eon’s and Lister’s times, these identities did not exist, and they were just emerging when Edith Ellis lived. We cannot assume that our present-day understandings of sexual and gender identity as gay, lesbian, trans, or even gender-fluid can be applied to how people thought of themselves in the past. Instead, historians explore what understandings of sexuality existed in different historical periods.

When I began this work by writing on Anne Lister, I was concerned with how she could understand her desires at a time when the term “lesbian” was not available to her. In elite, cosmopolitan metropolitan British culture, and in France, the terms “sapphist” and “tribade” circulated, although they were usually derogatory, but in the provinces, people found it difficult to conceive that women could have sex with each other. Nonetheless, Anne Lister had a strong sense of herself and her love for women, so she combined her readings in Rousseau, the renegade poet Lord Byron, and explicit sexual material in the classics to create her own sense of identity, declaring, “I love only women, and am loved by them in turn.” Yet I was still trying to trace a queer “genealogy”; as critic Laura Doan

points out, such projects are still focused on identity, on trying to find the roots of modern lesbian identity.⁸ Indeed, this book could be structured along these lines by regarding d'Eon and Lister as pioneers of trans and lesbian identities, respectively. Ending with Edith Ellis, I could trace how her husband defined women attracted to other women as sexual inverts, creating a new identity in the discourse of sexology, as discussed in the work of Michel Foucault. Furthermore, Havelock Ellis also used the case of the Chevalièr/e d'Eon to develop the category of eonism, or what he called transvestites.⁹

This book follows a different path, for I am now more interested in how my subjects defined themselves as unique or unusual subjects with transgressive opinions rather than simply trying to define how they saw sexual desire and practices in the past. More recently, historians have gone beyond the study of identity to take a “queer” approach.¹⁰ Queer theory critiques the notion that gender and sexual identities are fixed, whether as a male or female, or homosexual or heterosexual—or even bisexual. Instead, queer theory asserts that sexual desires and even gender expressions are fluid and unstable, escaping these rigid boundaries and destabilizing normative heterosexuality. If queer critics take seriously the importance of sexual fluidity, it is important to examine other forms of sexual transgression beyond same-sex desire. Did heterosexual transgressions incur the same stigma as same-sex desire? Richard Johnson and James Hinton, for instance, certainly did not conform to the norms of heterosexual monogamy.

These cases also raise interesting questions about the difference between sexual and gender identity. The Chevalier d'Eon wanted to be a woman and took on the identity of a woman, but she did not want to be feminine. Anne Lister did not want to be a man, but she desired to take on some of the attributes of male sexuality and privilege, and she dressed in a masculine waistcoat and feminine skirt. It is possible that for them, gender was a core aspect of their identity, but it did not correlate with feminine or masculine behavior and appearance. James Hinton also thought he had much of the woman in him, that he had elements of male and female, but he also thought that he was better at womanly perceptions than the women he knew; it was part of his self-perception as a genius. Rather than asking whether the Chevalièr/e d'Eon and Anne Lister fit into the categories of transgender or lesbian, I will argue that they queered the notion of the unique individual to justify their own feelings.

Furthermore, sex was not the only reason my subjects felt uncomfortable in the social conventions of their times. Two of my case studies will also enable me to touch on questions of whiteness and the empire in defining the self. Eliza

Raine, Anne Lister's first lover, was a half-Indian heiress. Did her money enable her to take on the identity of a privileged British lady? Or would racial prejudice undermine her sense of self? As we shall see, the answer to this question was rather tragic. Richard Johnson can illuminate debates about whether the British in India could take on elements of Indian culture, becoming hybrid selves.¹¹ He collected Indian miniatures and patronized Persian poetry, yet he served the East India Company. Did this status as a stranger in a strange land affect his sense of self? Johnson and d'Eon also had other secrets that could endanger their reputations. Their own judgment led them to criticize their societies, but they needed to conceal their opinions to get ahead in their careers.

Methodology: Queer reading

My subjects constructed a notion of the self (or rejected the idea of the self) with the ingredients of their own personalities, material circumstances, and the cultural discourses available to them.¹² In some ways, I am taking the method of queer reading beyond concerns with sexuality to a wider sense as bending from a straight line, or odd or unusual. While constrained by the social forces that shaped their lives, my subjects twisted and reshaped the cultural materials available to them.¹³

Personality may not matter when looking at large groups of people, but when looking at individuals, it does help explain why all my subjects found it difficult to conform to convention. The Chevalier/e d'Eon was rather irascible and ready to duel at the smallest slight. Richard Johnson's awkward, abrasive personality made it difficult for him to succeed as a diplomat. Anne Lister was intelligent and strong willed, but she tended to manipulate and deceive other people. James Hinton was a dreamy man; he could be oblivious of other's needs despite his philosophy of selflessness. Edith Ellis was always known as "nervy" and tormented by inner demons.

Personality alone does not explain their social positions, of course. All of my subjects came from families in the minor gentry or professional middle class, so they had the education and time to ponder the discourses that shaped their sense of self. But they had to please others to get ahead, and their hidden lives endangered their social positions. The Chevalier d'Eon and Richard Johnson were both diplomats with political secrets that threatened their careers. Anne Lister was the daughter of a drunken sea captain; she had to please her wealthy aunt and uncle to inherit Shibden Hall. In the nineteenth century, the social

position of professionals depended on public perception as much as the patronage of superiors. James Hinton was an aural surgeon, but he would have been ruined if patients knew his sexual secret. Edith Ellis inherited a small annuity, but she needed to teach, write, and lecture to earn enough to make a living. Although she was active in left-wing circles, she did not want her sexuality to be revealed publically.

Despite the precariousness of their fortunes, my subjects' elite class heritage marked their self-concept in ways very different from how working-class people might understand the self. In my earlier book *The Struggle for the Breeches*, I examined debates in working-class culture on a collective rather than individual level; other historians have perceptively explored working-class self-creation.¹⁴ While it might be thought that working-class people were more concerned with the community than with their individuality, Regenia Gagnier and Jonathan Rose have pointed out that working-class autobiographers and readers read against the grain to assert their own "singularity" within an oppressive social structure. This singularity could be perfectly congruent with a commitment to socialist community.¹⁵

The material appearances of houses and clothes can also be read as sources for the self, but they could be like a shell that both displayed the self and protected its secrets. Richard Johnson wore a dark English suit, but he had an Indian garden built around his house, and concealed his true opinions of the British Empire. Matt Cook has used the term "queer domesticity" to describe how people could reject—or be rejected by—the conventional family, and therefore need to create alternative homes for themselves.¹⁶ The Chevalier d'Eon first lost access to his ancestral home and estates at Tonnere when he was exiled in London as a disgraced diplomat; when she returned as a woman, she could no longer function as the squire of Tonnere, and lost her home once again. Anne Lister could not live with the woman she loved because she lacked her own home, but when she finally inherited Shibden Hall, its Tudor heritage bolstered her social position. Some of my subjects hated the constraints of bourgeois domestic life. James Hinton resented his wife's demands that he work to pay for a new parlor carpet instead of devoting himself to philosophy. Edith Ellis did not want to be a conventional wife; instead, she experimented with communal living and nonmonogamous marriage.

My subjects hinted at their nonconformity through their appearance, but they kept their most dangerous secrets hidden. The Chevalier/e d'Eon thought of him- or herself as a soldier, whatever gender she identified with. When she wore women's clothes, she pinned her military medals to her dress. Anne Lister

stirred up gossip with her masculine waistcoats. Hair also signaled gender nonconformity: as a woman, d'Eon dressed her hair like a fine lady, while Anne Lister and Edith Ellis cropped their curls into boyish styles, and James Hinton's unruly locks signaled his unconventional philosophy.

Only in their private writings did most of my subjects explore their most transgressive thoughts and desires. Codes could conceal diplomatic secrets, but in the context of this book, diarists sometimes wrote in code to keep secrets that made them vulnerable to others.¹⁷ Codes could also conceal secrets that might be transgressive or shocking to others—such as Anne Lister's relationships to other women. As Rebecca Steinitz observes, unpublished diaries could also provide a space for subjects to explore their “gender noncompliance.”¹⁸ Anne Lister pondered masculinity and wrote about her sex life with women in explicit terms in her coded diaries. Edith Ellis destroyed her letters for fear of exposure.

Diaries are written day by day, so they present the self in a different way than an autobiography, in which the writer creates a more or less coherent narrative of the evolution of a self. Since diaries are more fragmentary, the tensions and contradictions between identity and behavior become apparent.¹⁹ Diaries also allowed their writers to create a private sense of self at variance with their public presentation.²⁰ Professional men had to keep up a respectable facade behind which they might conceal unconventional thoughts—or sexual adventures.²¹ Later nineteenth-century diarists, such as the anonymous author of *My Secret Life*, and Arthur Munby, who was fascinated with working-class women, also recounted their illicit sexual or romantic adventures.²² Gentlemen enjoyed a much wider repertoire of available selves, however, than did most women, let alone those attracted to other women. As Felicity Nussbaum points out, the eighteenth-century diarist John Boswell could try out diverse masculine roles from a variety of cultural sources—the rogue from the theater, the hero from the classics, the patriarch from the Bible.²³ Women could respectably acquire only one role: that of marriage and motherhood—or become the pitied spinster. Women whose sexual experiences outside of marriage were discovered could lose all, so they had to be incredibly discreet.²⁴

While my subjects all kept secrets to themselves, they also shared themselves with others. Diaries were often written to be revealed; for instance, Christian believers read their diaries to each other or even had them published as spiritual exemplars. Scrutiny of sinful behavior was also a collective practice.²⁵ D'Eon wrote long letters to female relatives, friends, and patrons to explain her spiritual transformation. As a celebrity—first as a man, then as a woman—d'Eon also kept extensive scrapbooks of newspaper clippings that mentioned him or her. But

Anne Lister played a careful game of explaining what she defined as her sexual “nature” to her lovers, while concealing it from friends. Edith Ellis also became a celebrity lecturer in the United States, but she had to carefully manage her public face and her private loves: she burnt her letters toward the end of her life.

When people write about themselves, they may present themselves as discovering their true selves, as if they were spelunkers going down a cave to discover hidden artifacts. But diaries do not reveal a true hidden self in spontaneous language; rather, as Elwin Hofman notes, people create rather than discover a self.²⁶ To extend the metaphor, my subjects brought up sensations and memories from their caves of self-examination and refracted them through the discourses they read in order to create a self.

At the time, most of my subjects took notes on their reading, often in “commonplace books” that also held comments and occasionally autobiographical scraps. As Lucia Dacome observes, commonplace books were a way of creating the self through an assemblage of knowledge and memories.²⁷ Anne Lister wrote sexual phrases in Latin on slips of paper, but more often she systematically took notes on readings in special notebooks, and commented on them in her diaries. Hinton compulsively scribbled his observations on his reading and secret musings about spirituality, sexual desire, and social justice on scraps of paper, which his family later pasted into four large manuscript volumes, noting “not to be published” on particularly controversial quotes. In his notebooks, Richard Johnson kept detailed notes and comments on radical Enlightenment philosophers in his six anonymous journals, but he dared not publish his opinions. Fragmentary and episodic, all these notes differed from more considered published essays on the discourses of their time, but they provide an opportunity for us to see how my subjects took up, rejected, and twisted the dominant discourses of their time.

Religion was one of the most important discourses in understanding the self. Protestantism mandated self-examination as an important spiritual practice, disciplining the self’s unruly passions for the salvation of the soul. Diarists often rebuked themselves for their sins and assessed their spiritual progress at the end of each year.²⁸ But my subjects also contended with the huge debates within religion at this time: was Christianity a matter of following the rules (or the Law, in New Testament parlance)? For most of my subjects, appearing to follow the conventions of Christianity was essential for public acceptance, but they were often troubled by doubts and incongruities, especially given their unconventional behaviors or beliefs. Or was Christianity about the intense spiritual experience of communion with God that might overcome conventions

and the law? D'Eon and Hinton could follow this notion to justify their own unusual paths.

For eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century gentlemen, the Latin classics were the dominant discourse in defining masculinity and political virtue. Gentlemen were to emulate the Stoic virtues of the Roman citizen, who sacrificed his own private interests for the public good, and defended his country's honor with his sword.²⁹ There was also a hidden sexual side to the classics, however, especially in the widely read Roman poet Juvenal, who appears in three of my chapters. Juvenal satirized Roman elites as indulging in decadence and sex, especially sex between males. The Romans did not think in terms of heterosexuality and homosexuality, but rather dominance and submission: a male citizen could have sex with a male slave or a foreigner, as long as he took the dominant role. Some eighteenth-century radicals took up this notion to attack courtiers not only as effeminate, but as sodomitical, as sexually submitting to their royal and aristocratic superiors.³⁰ As a former courtier and as a person suspected of wearing woman's clothes, the Chevalier had to negotiate around these discourses in his public presentation. But Anne Lister read Juvenal in a completely different way: she sought evidence for sexual nonconformity in his text, reading between the lines for evidence of sex between women.

The late eighteenth century, sexuality, gender, and the self

The eighteenth century has long been seen as a time when older notions of the person competed with newer ideas of the self. Traditionally, people's place in a social hierarchy was seen as fixed and ordained by God and tradition; their place was also signified by their external appearance. The uniqueness of the individual was less important, as witnessed in the many tales about young men who went off to the wars and were not recognized when they returned; or when imposters were accepted as taking on another's identity.³¹ This can explain why people believed the Chevalier/e's d'Eon's story that she was born a woman and spent many years in disguise as a male diplomat.

To get ahead within the social hierarchy, elite men and women had to create a sense of self as a persona that would please their patrons; they did this by engaging in a process of "self-fashioning," to use Stephen Greenblatt's words.³² My subjects who were diplomats were supposed to please their superiors and represent their own lineages and nation, rather than their unique self. So they created a public self by refining their behavior, appearance, and speech to

present themselves well at court. Men as well as women displayed this persona through their elaborate, colorful, brocade, silk and lace clothing as an insignia of wealth and privilege. At the same time, creating a persona required the ability to observe and monitor oneself, to be aware of the potential difference between hidden feelings and the polished presentation. This awareness contributed to the modern notion of the self as self-aware and self-creating, but it also created a fragmented self, divided between public and private.³³

The distinction between the public persona and secret thoughts and desires was key in creating modern notions of the self. The eighteenth century has often been seen as the time of the invention of the modern self when the “individual” chafed at the constraints of tradition, by using his own reason, emotions, and experience to define himself, rather than simply fitting into the social hierarchy.³⁴ Earlier, more radical versions of Protestantism could encourage an idea of privacy as the zone of religious devotion, of inner belief protected from state intrusion.³⁵ By the eighteenth century, some men also claimed privacy as a zone where they could experiment with new secular thoughts that might go against tradition.³⁶ Some radicals, as historian Faramerz Dabiwala have suggested, even extended this zone of privacy to sex, arguing that sexual adventures were no one’s business. But Dabhoiwala admits that this privacy was generally seen as a privilege for upper-class, if not aristocratic, men.³⁷ Even they could be prosecuted if they challenged the church and the state. And anyone who undermined the conventional moral order of gender also faced danger; when the Chevalièr/e d’Eon asserted that it did not matter whether d’Eon was male or female, the courts and the press railed against him. Women had much less leeway in terms of sexual adventures and had to carefully conceal them.

The Enlightenment championed the individual judgment of people who critiqued the conventions of their time to come up with new ideas about the self. The self was no longer defined in external terms, by role and rank, but in internal terms, by self-examination. Philosophers such as Voltaire and Locke challenged the aristocratic social order by defining the individual through his acquisition of property rather than his inheritance of a title. They saw the individual, as historian Charly Coleman writes, as “a moral agent” who could use his reason and his will to be “in possession of itself [and property] and in control of its world.”³⁸ Looking inward, the individual might find himself roiled by emotions of desire, lust, or anger, but he did not aim to express his unique emotions but to control them through reason and self-discipline. Only then could he acquire property and knowledge, and therefore create a self.³⁹ Generally, only white men were seen as capable of becoming such individuals,

but a few women claimed that reason transcended sex, and asserted their own right to individual judgment.

The notion of the unique self was also an invention of the Enlightenment, but it was not necessarily the same as the possessive individual; the notion of the unique self stemmed from emotions rather than reason. As Ute Frevert writes, emotions were key to subjectivity, citing philosopher Johann Herder's proclamation that "I feel, therefore I am." Exploring one's feeling and sensations was just not a way of knowing the world, but of knowing oneself, and justifying one's difference from others as an innermost and unchangeable nature. Relying on one's emotions could also create sympathy with others by recognizing their different feelings.⁴⁰ The notion of the unique self was also linked to the evolution of the idea of genius. At first, "genius" generally meant the unique nature of a person or even a nation, their particular genius. But it soon acquired the larger meaning of an exceptionally talented individual.

A person who prized his uniqueness might also see himself as a genius who did not need to respect the needs of others, especially in the Romantic discourses that grew out of the late Enlightenment's focus on emotion. As Andrew Elfenbein writes, "geniuses intervened between the priests and the doctor as the privileged interpreters of the human soul and its sexual secrets. They never showed themselves to be more daring, original and creative than when they broke sexual taboos." Therefore, unconventional sexual tastes were often linked with genius.⁴¹ As Christine Battersby writes, when Romantic poets expressed intense emotions usually seen as feminine, they could be seen as geniuses transcending the masculine role, but emotional women were just being natural women.⁴² But some women did try to engage with the discourse of genius, such as Anne Lister.

As historian Charly Coleman writes, an important alternative trend in the Enlightenment saw humans less as discrete wholes and more as selves fragmented by thoughts, passions, and interests that did not necessarily cohere. This was especially true of the materialists, who saw human beings as biological organisms motivated by the forces of nature. For the Baron d'Holbach, a notable atheist, the "self existed as a mere function of nature, beholden to interior impulses and external forces over which it exercised no direct control." This theory could have radical implications: Coleman goes on to say that for d'Holbach, "to be human meant to be a thinking, feeling object among others, rather than an individual subject of divine lineage that governs its thoughts and stands accountable for its actions." Some materialists even "endorsed the dissolution, and even annihilation, of one's sense of self."⁴³

Other philosophers wanted to integrate the notion of human beings as made up of varied thoughts, passions, and emotions into a system of laws of nature that replaced religious laws, such as the laws that they believed governed economies and societies. These experts believed if individuals did not “conform to [this] abstract system of laws” they must submit to expert management—as we shall see, Claude Helvetius proposed this notion, inspiring Richard Johnson.⁴⁴ These experts were seen as exceptional people—even as geniuses—whose rare abilities allowed them this power. Other thinkers defined human nature in fixed terms, defining women and colonized people by their biology; from the bones to the blood, females were seen as essentially different than males.⁴⁵

My subjects drew on these debates in Enlightenment and later philosophers as they tried to create a notion of the self—or rejected the self. In the next sections, I will provide the background for these different philosophies, but I will also develop an argument about the relationship between those who focused on the possessive individual, those who celebrated the unique self, and those who downplayed the importance of the self, seeing the self as fragmented or dissolved. I will argue that in the eighteenth century, the notion of the unique self and possessive individualism differed substantially, although they later drew closer together. Furthermore, philosophies that downplayed the self could have both radical and conservative implications. Especially among my subjects, but even among philosophers, ideas of the self were never consistent or coherent but constantly debated.

The expressivist self: Rousseau

Rousseau’s autobiography was very important as a source for Anne Lister as well as the Chevalier d’Eon. He was one of the most important originators of the notion of the unique, or “expressivist self,” to use Charles Taylor’s term: the idea that we gain access to the truth about ourselves by connecting to nature through our own feelings.⁴⁶ The son of a watchmaker, Rousseau strove to educate himself and make his own way as a writer, relying on the patronage of powerful women along the way. But with his awkward, cantankerous personality, he was never comfortable in society.

In his philosophical writings, Rousseau imagined man as born alone and solitary; the natural world could fill all his needs. This was a common philosophical fantasy at a time when Europeans were discovering indigenous peoples who lived without governments, the so-called “Noble Savage.” In a state of nature, Rousseau imagined, man was naturally good; he was not consumed with selfishness but felt for others and was willing to help others.

Rousseau's natural, unique self was not the same as possessive individualism, for he criticized both aristocrats and capitalists. Civilization and property corrupted man and made him selfish. As a self-made man, Rousseau hated courtiers who concealed their true feelings behind a theatrical performance (the Chevalier d'Eon echoed this sentiment). In his novel *Emile*, Rousseau wrote that "[t]he man of the world lives entirely inside a mask. Almost never being in himself, he is always a stranger and ill at ease when he is forced to come back to himself."⁴⁷ But Rousseau did not posit liberal capitalist society as an alternative to aristocratic domination; instead, he criticized capitalism.⁴⁸ He claimed that in commercial society businessmen bamboozled others; claiming to be acting for the good of society, their false benevolence was a fraud. While nature enabled man to be self-sufficient, commerce also fragmented the self; capitalism broke down the holistic skills of the artisan by dividing production into unskilled tasks. Above all, both courtly and commercial society produced inequality.⁴⁹

Rousseau believed that as the subject experienced the disjuncture between corrupt society and the voice of nature within oneself, the subject would come to a superior system of ethics. Rousseau did not advocate actually returning to a state of nature; instead, the social contract would structure a society better than nature. In the social contract, everyone would join together to form a united people; they would agree to give up the autonomy—and solitude—of the state of nature for the protections of a well-governed society. However, this was different than monarchy; it was government of the people, by the people.

Rousseau's individual in the social contract is not autonomous; he depends on others. Unlike a courtly society based on patronage, people would be saved from having to be "personally dependent on other individuals" because they would be part of the whole. Unlike corrupt commercial society, this new society would be based on equality and sharing. This would require a "legislator" who could transform "each individual, who is by himself a complete and solitary whole, into part of a greater whole from which he in a manner receives his life and being." The social contract would benefit the citizen as an ethical subject by enabling him to flourish: "Whatever benefits he had in the state of nature but lost in the civil state, a man gains more than enough new ones to make up for them. His capabilities are put to good use and developed; his ideas are enriched, his sentiments made more noble, and his soul elevated." Furthermore, the individual citizen's moral standing is protected; an injury to one is an injury to all.⁵⁰ Rousseau's ideas of the social contract inspired many who wanted to overthrow the Ancien Regime.

In Rousseau's utopia, however, men could develop their own unique natures, while women had to remain in a conventionally feminine role. In *Emile*, his

book on education, Rousseau proclaims that “[o]ne must be familiar with the particular genius of the [male] child in order to know what moral regime is best for him. Every mind has its own form in accordance with which it must be governed.”⁵¹ In this context, genius meant the particular, unique nature of a person. A tutor should allow a child to express his own nature and follow his own curiosity, for instance, by wandering in the woods. But in the same work, girls are conventionally educated into their natural role as wives and mothers—uniqueness is not important for them, for “to cultivate the masculine virtues in women and to neglect their own is obviously to do them an injury.”⁵² Similarly, he wrote that “I would a thousand times rather have a homely girl, simply brought up, than a learned lady.”⁵³ As Margaret O’Grodnick observes, Rousseau thought that ideally, men were autonomous, authentic, and natural, but women were not authentic; instead they dissimulated, disguising their sexual desire to secretly govern men. He hated the courtly ladies on whose patronage he had depended and reviled their pretensions to learning. Hence, he did not think women should be autonomous.⁵⁴ How could this doctrine inspire the Chevalière d’Eon or Anne Lister, who were so proud of their learning?

In fact, many women read Rousseau enthusiastically. They loved his focus on sentiment that validated the traditional feminine role, and at the time it was innovative to suggest that women be educated, if only to be mothers. Furthermore, as Carla Hesse has written, women writers sometimes twisted Rousseau around; one used him to justify the notion that “the soul has no sex”—a slogan one of Rousseau’s characters had actually posed as a question.⁵⁵ Mary Wollstonecraft was entranced by Rousseau’s “chimeras” but offended by his strictures on women; his philosophy of education inspired her even as she turned it to apply to women.⁵⁶

Roseanne Kennedy has even argued that Rousseau’s strictures on women were not as rigid as they first appear, and that in fact he was more open minded about women’s role and education. As Kennedy writes, he also revealed himself as an “exhibitionist” and a masochist; he engaged in *ménages-à-trois* and fell in love with a woman dressed as a man.⁵⁷ James Rourke writes that “as Rousseau’s account of his own sex life shows, neither the roles of dominance and submission nor the desires to play those roles are filled naturally or inevitably by one sex or the other; the roles are always subject to appropriation by either subject in the circulation of sexual power and pleasure.”⁵⁸ In the *Confessions*, Rousseau began by celebrating his unique self, as born unlike all other men, but this did not mean he saw his personality as fixed—far from it. Rather, he was “chameleon-like,” vacillating between lazy

and industrious, kind and cold, “audacious” and fearful, and even masculine and feminine.⁵⁹

Rousseau celebrated defiance of and discomfiture with social norms. After all, transgression is always more interesting than self-control. Unlike his didactic literature which prescribed feminine roles, in Rousseau’s novels and autobiography, the hero empathizes with, rather than judges, those who might transgress the laws. In his *Confessions*, Rousseau often admits his own violations of ethical obligations to others; for instance, he abandoned his five illegitimate children to the Foundling Hospital, although he blamed sometimes poverty, and sometimes the libertine philosophers with whom he associated for encouraging him in this heartless attitude.⁶⁰ In his novels, Rousseau’s characters are torn between “the slavery of sense, the tyranny of the passions” and reason and conscience. In his novel *Emile*, the hero encounters a disgraced priest, known as the Savoyard Vicar, who proclaims, “Is not the wicked man, after all, my brother? How often have I been tempted to resemble him in partaking of his vices.” He goes on,

I perceive myself at once free, and a slave; I see what is good, I admire it, and yet I do the evil: I am active when I listen to my reason, and passive when hurried away by my passions; while my greatest uneasiness is to find, when fallen under temptations, that I had the power of resisting them.⁶¹

For Rousseau, one must not indulge in passions but instead look within one’s heart to find the true imperative of nature to sympathize with others.⁶²

By writing his *Confessions*, Rousseau wanted to reveal himself as he perceived himself in reality, not as his public image as a celebrity, as Whitney Arnold observes.⁶³ But this work even furthered his celebrity status, for the notion of the unique self became a cultural phenomenon to be emulated by others, rather than an expression of authenticity. In revealing all his foibles, Rousseau set a precedent for a new kind of expressivist self—not the virtuous citizen who empathized with others, but the renegade who gloried in his faults.⁶⁴

Adam Smith and the sensationalists

In contrast to the Chevalier d’Eon and Anne Lister, who obsessively documented their lives, Richard Johnson did not even write his name on his journals. Did he even care about the uniqueness of the self? To answer this question, I will trace these questions in two related philosophers that Johnson admired: Adam Smith and Smith’s friend Helvetius.⁶⁵

We think of Adam Smith as the prophet of free market capitalism, of the hard-driving entrepreneur free to compete without government intervention, celebrated in his 1776 *Wealth of Nations*. Historians have often puzzled over how to reconcile this image of the individual with his lectures on the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* that seem to base morality on empathy. I will argue that in neither work did Smith focus on the importance of the self's unique inner nature.

In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith does indeed argue that the foundation of morality is sympathy for others. However, unlike Rousseau, Smith did not think people became ethical just by looking within their own hearts and exploring their own feelings.⁶⁶ In his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith allowed that the sufferings of others evokes sympathy, but only because this sympathy weakly resembles people's own emotions of suffering. He wrote that the average person is more horrified at a wound to his own little finger than if all the people of China were to be swallowed up.⁶⁷ Therefore, we cannot simply rely on the inner emotions, the innate virtues of humanity, to produce ethical subjects. Interestingly, this distinction is highly gendered. Smith sees humanity as a feminine virtue, which "consists merely in the exquisite fellow-feeling which the spectator entertains with the sentiments of the persons principally concerned, so as to grieve for their sufferings, to resent their injuries, and to rejoice at their good fortune." To do any good, people must rationally analyze their own feelings to recognize the sufferings of others, and they must actually do something to help them. This process, argues Smith, often necessitate a "stronger power" than self-love.⁶⁸

This stronger power can be what Smith terms the impartial spectator: "the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct." The impartial spectator should closely observe other's feelings instead of focusing on one's own. Smith argues that we should not imagine how we would feel, for instance, at losing a son, but we should try to imagine how a different person would feel such a loss.⁶⁹ The impartial spectator can be considered to be a reasoned conscience that comes from within the self, but it does not stem from within the subject's individuality or uniqueness.⁷⁰ Rather, the impartial spectator reminds us that we are "but one of the multitude."⁷¹ We crave the recognition and respect of others, and one way of gaining this respect is to perform noble deeds, to sacrifice oneself for the good of others. If we just indulge ourselves without respecting others, we realize that "we become the proper objects of resentment, abhorrence, and execration."⁷² As Fonna Forman-Barzili points out, for Smith the source of self-knowledge was not looking within but looking at the mirror of society; this produces a sort of "social panopticon" where people are disciplined under the eyes of each other.⁷³

To be sure, an individual can acquire the ability to critique society's conventions by developing the "impartial spectator" within and cultivating the qualities of self-control and reflexivity, but this is not the same as simply expressing one's inner self as in Rousseau.

The Wealth of Nations, Smith's great 1776 tome on political economy, is often seen as celebrating the individual entrepreneur motivated by self-interest and criticizing government intervention. Indeed, Smith believed that government rules, guild regulations, and monopolistic trading companies hindered the entrepreneur's ability to innovate. Entrepreneurs would benefit society if they were allowed to act freely to find the most efficient possible way of manufacturing and selling. He hated the patronage society of eighteenth-century Britain, where able and educated middle-class men had to "truckle with meanness" to please their patrons.⁷⁴ Instead, they should advance on their own merits by acting in their own self-interest. The following passage from *The Wealth of Nations* is often cited as a foundation of the self-interested capitalist individual: "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love."⁷⁵

Yet, Smith does not see the entrepreneur as a unique self. First, in the same chapter, Smith emphasizes that as children, humans are much less differentiated as individuals than are animals—a point that seems directly aimed at Rousseau. He argues that when a future "philosopher and a common street porter ... came into the world, and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they were perhaps, very much alike, and neither their parents nor playfellows could perceive any remarkable difference." The eventual differences between them "arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education."⁷⁶

Second, human beings are not autonomous isolates, as Rousseau posited them in the state of nature. Instead, Smith argues that unlike animals, "man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren."⁷⁷ Smith idealistically depicted trade as requiring two parties to cooperate by making bargains that satisfy both parties' needs.⁷⁸ Furthermore, as Nancy Folbre points out, self-love needs to be limited by the domestic virtues, in part so that it would not lead to "free love," but also because domesticity would modulate self-interest so that it did not become greed.⁷⁹ People's passions and desires produced needs that entrepreneurs could satisfy, but these passions and desires also had to be disciplined by self-control. This society of "self-propelling" individuals acting in their own interest did produce social good, but their actions were not just random and individuated; instead, they were metaphorically guided by the "invisible hand." As Wahrman

and Sheehan note, these self-propelling individuals cohere into a “self-organizing system.”⁸⁰ This was the notion that *laissez-faire* would allow entrepreneurial energy to produce solutions that would benefit all.

Richard Johnson was also influenced by Adam Smith’s friend, the French philosopher Claude Helvetius, who advocated self-interest in an even more radical way than Smith. Helvetius rejected traditions and authorities such as Christianity as the source of morality. Unlike Rousseau, who thought that the source of morality lay in examining our hearts for the sentiments of nature and sympathy, Helvetius believed that we should rely on our physical sensations as a source of knowledge, and he thought that the same passions which are the “germ of an infinity of errors, are also the source of our knowledge,” for they give us strength and motivation. Greed and lust actually could be transformed into positive qualities that benefitted all. Helvetius even envisioned that brave soldiers and those who served society could be rewarded with the sexual favors of women, as in ancient Sparta, although he argued that “excess” of passions must be avoided to prevent derangement of the human organism.⁸¹ While Rousseau hated courtly ladies, Helvetius argued that “intriguing women” were more useful to society than “virtuous women,” for they wanted to please men with fashionable dress, so they bought hats from milliners, dresses from seamstresses, and so on, thus giving work to many and encouraging trade. Of course, all these qualities needed to be controlled by reason, which would enable people to act according to their own self-interest, but also to see that cooperating with others was in their self-interest. But societies should have “clear principles of morality, reason, and virtue” to enable people to behave according to the public interest, not just their private concerns. The goal of society was the happiness of all.⁸²

This notion of humans as made up of an assemblage of different passions and sensations could also lead philosophers to question the idea that different races and cultures were superior or inferior. Helvetius did not think there was any essential physical or mental difference that explained why Western countries were able to conquer Eastern empires; rather, forms of government and religion could make cultures vulnerable, and he thought that Western and Eastern civilizations each had their faults and virtues. Jennifer Pitts argues that Smith did not necessarily see Europeans as racially superior, and he severely criticized the violence of empires.⁸³ As Forman-Barzilai observes, Smith attacked the European hypocrisy of criticizing others’ barbaric practices, while ignoring their own. At the same time, Smith did believe that certain people were more culturally advanced than others, since they had progressed through the stages of civilization. And he opposed imperial adventures because they

were inefficient and wasteful as well as immoral.⁸⁴ In examining Johnson's thought, we will see how far his critique of empire could be sustained against countervailing racial ideas.

At the same time, these notions of human nature could lead to the idea that a wise person was needed to manage society in the best way to increase the happiness of all. Although we think of Smith as the advocate of small government, he suggests that a "scientific legislator" could dispassionately observe human society and human passions and figure out a form of government that respects tradition and reason by weighing the costs and benefits of custom and innovation. To be sure, Ryan Hanley stresses that Smith does not want a utopian system that would violate people's prejudices.⁸⁵ This scientific legislator should be modest about his own knowledge and not value his own ideas above the proper working of society.⁸⁶ But Helvetius went even further in suggesting that geniuses should manage the passions that motivate society. He viewed society as a vast machine that required expert management: while individuals who followed their own self-interest benefitted society, as Tal Gilead notes, he views individuals "in abstract terms"; they "have no significance in themselves" except as units in society.⁸⁷ And Helvetius went much further in imagining a society imagined by experts, in turn inspiring Jeremy Bentham.

In the nineteenth century, Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism extended many of these ideas of the scientific legislator and humans as units, and his followers put them into practice. Bentham saw humans as units composed of pleasures and pains, not as unique selves. Bentham believed that experts could study society, break down human behavior into all its component parts, and then run society like a machine in the most efficient possible way. Government experts could structure the laws—and institutions—to manipulate the levers of pleasure and pain to produce the outcome most beneficial for the greatest number.⁸⁸ Government policies would be like dikes that channeled the forces of human passions into productive pursuits instead of destruction—for instance, the dire consequences of procreation for population.⁸⁹

Early Victorian political economy and the sacrifice of the self

Adam Smith inspired nineteenth-century liberal individualism to argue that the individual had to be *free* to pursue political ideas and economic opportunities, and that government action would block this freedom. Ideally, people would be free to modulate their own behavior and act as they saw fit, as long as they

depended on themselves and did not harm others. But in the early nineteenth century, English political economists did not necessarily think that the individual needed to express his unique self in order to unleash this freedom.⁹⁰ Instead, they believed that individuals must discipline themselves in order to enjoy this freedom, and that individuals must submit to the laws of political economy.⁹¹

Harriet Martineau, the popularizer of political economy, recounts in her autobiography that even as a child she found her own emotional willfulness to be troubling; as a young adult, she could not reconcile the doctrine of free will with the assumption of God's power. Her anxieties were greatly relieved when she began to accept "necessarian" doctrines that the great natural laws of the universe—including political economy—determined what would happen.⁹² In her autobiography, she wrote that "[a]ll human action proceeds on the supposition that all the workings of the universe are governed by laws which cannot be broken by human will."⁹³ Individuals needed to recognize these laws and adjust their behavior in order to succeed within a universe; for instance, they had to discipline themselves by working hard and saving instead of depending on others—or the government—to help them.⁹⁴ Similarly, Andrew Ure, defender of laissez-faire and opponent of factory regulation, wrote that factory proprietors must practice "self-immolation for the good of others."⁹⁵

These ideas were congruent with the Christian advocates of political economy because Evangelicals focused on self-sacrifice and self-control. Evangelicals demanded the suppression rather than the celebration of desire. The successful man was to cultivate thrift and delayed gratification, for instance, by marrying late. Evangelicals concentrated on the salvation of the individual soul, requiring people to look deep within themselves to root out evidence of sin, and to then discipline and control themselves so that sinful passions would not recur. As Andrew Miller writes, Evangelicals held out Jesus as an example of "moral perfectionism"; believers should monitor their behavior to emulate Jesus, although they could never reach his perfection.⁹⁶ Hannah More, an important popularizer of Evangelicalism, wrote that "this inward eye, this power of introversion, is given us for a continual watch upon the soul." She also declared that "it is only by scrutinizing the heart that we can know it." This is very different from Rousseau's "I know my own heart." More admonished people to look within their own hearts to control the appetites, to restrain the passions, to keep the emotions from erupting in "continual insurrection," and to keep from self-love, which she saw as one of the worst faults.⁹⁷ But they should constantly examine their souls and sacrifice their selfish interests, as did Jesus, to this end. But searching in the soul was not to accept one's own nature, but to tame

and defeat it; one's nature was identified with original sin and uncontrollable passions.⁹⁸

The twin utilitarian and Evangelical doctrines of disciplining the passions had harsh consequences for the poor. Basically, only middle-class men were seen as able to be free, self-governing individuals. Harriet Martineau admonished working men to save their pennies for their old age; if they did not they would face the discipline of the workhouse. Followers of Bentham built these workhouses to deter the poor from demanding relief from the government; these prison-like institutions were intended to punish those who could not or would not work, and to reward the employed with freedom. Many Evangelicals also argued that believers should go out and sacrifice the self by serving the poor. But they also believed that their self-sacrifice, like that of Jesus Christ, allowed them to impose judgments on other people. If only the poor could control their appetites, advised the Rev. Thomas Chalmers, they could master their fates and become free individuals.⁹⁹ By the 1860s, the Charity Organization Society combined utilitarianism with Evangelicalism: they gave charity only to those who proved their respectability and forced the rest to go into the workhouse. Going even further, Herbert Spencer invented the notion of social Darwinism to denounce any kind of welfare: he believed that welfare benefits would enable the "unfit" poor to survive and damage the human race.

Herbert Spencer's Individualism, however, represented a significant move away from Evangelical and utilitarian ideas of the individual who must submit to the laws of political economy. Spencer, as well as other thinkers such as Thomas Carlyle and Samuel Smiles, denounced Victorian utilitarianism for producing a mechanical society that squelched the individual. Implicitly refuting Ure's call for proprietors to "immolate" themselves, they saw the individual entrepreneur as a hero. Renowned essayist Thomas Carlyle lamented that "[m]en are grown mechanical in head and in heart, as well as in hand. They have lost faith in individual endeavor ... and internal perfection." To save society, he celebrated the "captains of industry" who propelled themselves to success through sheer force of will.¹⁰⁰ Samuel Smiles, author of the bestseller *Self Help*, also rejected the mechanical philosophy of Benthamism; instead of submitting to abstract rules, the self-made man cultivated his own endeavors.

All these thinkers brought in elements of the unique self into possessive individualism. Above all, Spencer insisted that humans had an innate drive for liberty, defended personal rights against intrusive government (such as excessive police intervention), and celebrated individual eccentricity against hidebound conventions. In his early years, Spencer advocated women's rights and land

nationalization, although he later repudiated these views.¹⁰¹ Eventually, he focused on the individual as one element in the larger evolution of society toward a more cooperative, yet libertarian system. In fact, Spencer did not necessarily believe in a coherent self; instead, the self was “a composite of evolutionary inheritances, habit, and memories.”¹⁰² But his lasting legacy was a libertarian distrust of government, a refusal of help to the needy, and a celebration of capitalism.

Other thinkers presented a softer version of the unique possessive individual. Samuel Smiles stressed that the self-made man should be unselfish; he advocated altruism, and even supported government help for education.¹⁰³ Thomas Carlyle believed that businessmen must protect the poor as well as making money; only captains of industry could heal the divisions between rich and poor.

Above all, John Stuart Mill celebrated individuality, while modifying political economy. In his best-known work, *On Liberty*, Mill criticized Bentham for his vision of human beings as units to be manipulated; instead, Mill asserted that people could cultivate their own characters and improve themselves by expressing their individuality. Mill believed that “pagan self-assertion” needed to supplant “Christian self-denial,” for the “free development of individuality” should be not recognized as “essential” to “well-being.” Instead of denying their own impulses, men should ask themselves “what would suit my character and disposition.”¹⁰⁴ But Mill also believed that cultivating individuality meant respecting the needs of others. He argued that Christianity “gives to human morality an essentially selfish character, by disconnecting each man’s feeling of duty from the interests of his fellow creatures.” He moved away from his earlier insistence on absolute property rights and opposition to government regulation; he even declared that he was a socialist, although what he meant by that was that governments should intervene to ensure public health, to rein in selfish landlords, and to protect labor.¹⁰⁵

In contrast, James Hinton joined with other thinkers to demand the sacrifice of the self rather than the assertion of individuality. By mid-century, some liberal Christians also began to turn away from the rigid, punitive version of Evangelicalism. They criticized Evangelicals who admonished believers to suppress their own needs and pleasures for their own individual salvation but neglected the good of all. Influential liberal clergyman Frederic Dennison Maurice pointed out that “the giving up of Self” became an excuse “for the most intense calculating Selfishness.”¹⁰⁶ Liberal Christians wanted people to sacrifice themselves for the good of society; liberal theologians abandoned the gloomy warning that Christ suffered intensely for believers’ sins; instead, they

emphasized that God loved all people and wanted to save everyone, not just the Elect. They began to portray Jesus as a divine incarnation in a human body, who faced human temptations; conversely, all humanity embodied the divine.¹⁰⁷ For instance, James Hinton called on young people to abandon their careers, live in the slums, and minister to the poor, but he soon twisted this message in a highly unorthodox interpretation linking the divine to sexual pleasure.¹⁰⁸ But by the 1880s and 1890s, both Spencer's individualism and liberal Christianity came to be seen as outdated in dealing with the problems of the time.

Socialism, sexology, and the self

In 1884, a group of idealistic young people met in London to form a new fellowship that repudiated individualism as outdated and advocated socialism as the solution to poverty. Almost immediately, they split over their divergent views. The Fabian socialists, who became highly influential, emphasized the expert and downplayed the individual to construct what they saw as scientific socialism. The Fellowship of the New Life, including Edith Ellis, espoused an alternative model of socialism based on the expressive, unique self, and individuality.

The Fabians believed that the collective organization of society, such as the state ownership of some industries, would be more efficient and just than individualist capitalism. But unlike communists, they did not want violent revolution, but gradual, democratic change. While they sympathized with the poor, they thought that socialism should be based on science, not sentiment. They dismissed the older prophets such as Hinton who wanted an emotional connection with the poor; instead, they thought of themselves as experts who dispassionately analyzed poverty and proposed solutions.

In the old model of expertise, thinkers would pool out their speculations about society by reading tomes and following their own thoughts and emotions; in the new model, as outlined by Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, experts should not look within themselves; instead, they should try to set aside their own biases to create more correct observations. For instance, socialist eugenicist Karl Pearson began his career in the old model, writing mystical poetry and exploring his feelings, but then he decided that he had to conquer his own egotism through a "heroic struggle" of "self-elimination" in the name of duty.¹⁰⁹ Among the Fabians, Beatrice Webb developed her own expertise assisting Charles Booth in his great study of London poverty by surveying particular streets and neighborhoods, counting the inhabitants of each dwelling, their

occupations, and their level of poverty, and cross-checking this information with school officials and police constables. Such tasks were more important than her individual happiness: she rejected one suitor to whom she was intensely sexually attracted because she thought sociologist Sidney Webb would make a better partner in her political endeavors. As Deborah Epstein Nord observes, Webb portrayed her autobiography as of sociological interest in depicting a time and a movement, rather than as an assertion of her individuality.¹¹⁰ For the Fabians, the good of society was more important than an individual's self-development or uniqueness. As Fabian Sidney Webb wrote, "It is of comparatively little importance that individuals should develop to the utmost possible extent, if the life of the community in which they live is not thereby served."¹¹¹

Edith Lees Ellis and the Fellowship of the New Life were part of a wider intellectual movement that espoused the same goals as the Fabians, but they wanted to combine individuality and socialism. They differentiated the harsh competition of individualism from individuality: individuality was the idea that each person was unique, but the only way for this uniqueness to flourish was to recognize the uniqueness in others, and to set up a society that would cultivate each person's capabilities. For instance, in his *Soul of Man under Socialism*, the playwright Oscar Wilde asserted that true socialism and true individualism were not incompatible. He did not want "authoritarian" socialism that would force people into barracks in order to work. Rather, in true socialism the state would slowly disappear, and machines would make disagreeable work unnecessary. Private property would be abolished, freeing people from the anxiety of maintaining and increasing their possessions. As a result, all people, not just the rich, would be able to express what he perceived as their true inner selves and to cultivate their creative capabilities: "Be Thyself" was his motto. Of course, Wilde aimed to entertain rather than to organize actual socialist societies.¹¹²

Edith and the Fellowship of the New Life were inspired by Hinton's call to self-sacrifice, but they also wanted to cultivate individuality in a more advanced socialist society. Instead of seeing individuality as won by competing against others, the Fellowship thought that individuality could only flourish by cooperating with others.¹¹³ They tried to carry out this vision through a communal household, alternative schools, and farming cooperatives.

The Fellowship read the American visionaries Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau.¹¹⁴ Like Thoreau and Emerson, members of the Fellowship chafed against the rigid manners and uncomfortable clothes of conventional bourgeois society. Henry Salt, for instance, gave a lecture on Thoreau's Gospel of Simplicity, arguing that it "arose, not from misanthropic hatred of contact

with his fellowmen, but from a feeling that nature was a living entity.”¹¹⁵ The Fellowship loved Emerson’s early criticisms of property and celebrations of individual nonconformity in the face of oppressive traditions, but they did not espouse his later advocacy of political economy, capitalism, and competition.¹¹⁶

Instead, Edward Carpenter, a friend of Edith Ellis, pursued Eastern concepts of the not-self, or in Emerson’s terms the “oversoul.” In his earlier years, Emerson was very influenced by Hinduism and the notion of Brahma; man should know himself in order to connect with the divine spirit. Similarly, Carpenter advocated “the great deliverance from the prison-house of the separate self.”¹¹⁷ His concept of the self was closely tied to the Hindu notion in the Upanishads of the individual self as merging into the Great Self.¹¹⁸ For Carpenter, love and acceptance of the individual self and body led to this cosmic consciousness, and thus reconciled the individual self and the universal self.¹¹⁹ Edith Ellis declared that in Carpenter’s work, “The ‘I’ which is so prominent throughout is often not the self at all as an individual, but the self as made one with the people; the self as lost and found in the larger life of the whole.”¹²⁰

American poet Walt Whitman also influenced those who wanted to combine socialism, democracy, and sexual individuality. On a visit to America, Edward Carpenter wrote that Whitman, “a great Individuality” himself, taught him “that character and the statement of Self, persistently, under diverse conditions were all-important”; the self and the body could not be separated, for the body “radiant in meaning and beautiful beyond words, and the production of splendid men and women was the aim and only true aim of State-policy.” The ecstatic discovery and acceptance of the sexual self, in his case, his perceived nature as exclusively sexually attracted to and loving men, enabled him to recognize and love the individuality of others.¹²¹

Edith Ellis’s husband Havelock Ellis began his career on a mystical note, like Carpenter and Pearson, but he then assumed the mantle of expertise as a sexologist who created, diagnosed, and labeled the sexual identities of others. He drew on his wife and others of his acquaintance, such as Carpenter for case studies of “sexual inversion,” or homosexuality. Ellis argued that the homosexual could be a creative anomaly like the left-handed, but he also labeled “inverts” as “abnormal.”¹²² He asked questions designed to get his subjects to fit their own individual peculiarities into broader discourses of heredity. And as Foucault writes, such practices subject people to the disciplines that define them, for instance, as inverts or homosexuals, although he suggests that people can turn these discourses to their own ends.¹²³ Indeed, as we shall see, Edith Ellis twisted the discourses of sexology and eugenics to defend the “abnormal” and “invert” as

potential geniuses whose creative power should be celebrated, not condemned by society.

In doing so, Edith Ellis not only subjected these discourses to a queer reading, she also drew on another, quite different and alternative set of ideas of the self prevalent in the 1890s. As Alex Owen has written, this was a time when intellectuals became interested in exploring the “self as ultimate determiner of value.”¹²⁴ The iconoclastic German philosopher Nietzsche became very important in the effort to find a validation of the individuality of the sexual self, enabling his followers to repudiate what they saw as the repression of Christianity to tap into the creative and destructive life force of sexual desire. Although Nietzsche was notoriously misogynist, some “egoist” feminists twisted his ideas to develop an ideal of the “superwoman” as genius, as Lucy Delap has shown.¹²⁵ As we shall see, Edith Ellis attempted to integrate Nietzsche, Hinton, and Carpenter to produce a philosophy that combined an appreciation of individuality, even “abnormality” as genius, with a wider concern for social justice.

Conclusion

In this introduction, I have set out several notions of the self that circulated in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century culture and asked whether these particular notions of the self were congruent with or critical of capitalism and conservative notions of gender and sexuality. Obviously, possessive individualism, the notion of the self as an agent who defines himself by acquiring knowledge and possessions, was very well-suited to capitalism. Although it usually excluded women, liberal feminists could take it up. But possessive individualism did not necessarily correlate with the unique self. I have argued that while Adam Smith espoused possessive individualism, he did not particularly care about the uniqueness of the self. It was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that Herbert Spencer insisted that the capitalist entrepreneur must be celebrated as a unique self.

The notion of the sacrifice of the self was also very important in eighteenth- and especially nineteenth-century culture. It originated with Christian ideas of giving up one’s sinful self, emulating Christ’s sacrifice. Yet as we have seen, secular thinkers such as Andrew Ure and Harriet Martineau also wanted to subordinate self-will to the great laws of political economy. Evangelicals generally used the sacrifice of the self to justify their own elite position and to judge the poor. But Christian socialists and, in a more idiosyncratic way, James Hinton, demanded

that believers sacrifice themselves not just for individual salvation but to benefit the poor.

Some thinkers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century rejected the notion of the unique self and instead analyzed people as fragmented into passions and emotions. This idea could have radical implications in allowing for the possibility of unusual combinations of sexual desires and gender configurations. But experts also asserted that only they could study, diagnose, and manage the fragmented self. For instance, Bentham saw the self as lacking an essential core; instead, it was made of up responses to sensations and passions, and this fragmented self was subject to discipline in utilitarian institutions such as the poor law. Fabian socialists were much less punitive to the poor, but they also rejected the focus on the uniqueness of the self; they wanted to be experts who would manage society for the good of all. Psychiatric and other experts defined unconventional people as deviants who needed to be categorized, diagnosed, and even disciplined. But some experts, such as sexologist Havelock Ellis, tried to combine the categorization of unconventionality with a celebration of individuality.

The notion of the unique self could be used to critique society. Rousseau celebrated the unique self and criticized capitalism for forcing inauthenticity on subjects. He assumed only men could be unique selves, but as we shall see, the Chevalière/e d'Eon and Anne Lister used Rousseau to justify themselves as born unlike all others. But the unique self could also be seen as a genius or overman in the Nietzschean sense, whose superiority meant that he did not have to take others into account. Being a unique self could also be isolating from others, unless uniqueness led to a recognition of the difference and value of all. By the end of the nineteenth century, Edith Ellis and the Fellowship of the New Life sought to combine the unique self and the cultivation of individuality with socialism and sexual unconventionality.

Plan of the book

I originally wrote on each of my subjects (save Edith Ellis) in published articles and book chapters, but for the most part, the versions in this book are different from the published ones. The book begins with the tale of the Chevalier d'Eon. One of my previous articles concentrated on d'Eon's political career, and the other briefly sketched out how d'Eon drew on Rousseau. This book chapter compares d'Eon's narrative as both similar to and different from

modern transgender narratives, but it concentrates on integrating the gendered implications of his public political life as a celebrity with d'Eon's private life as a woman who wanted to challenge the boundaries of femininity; it shows how d'Eon reconciled her religious commitment with Rousseau's thought and her own gender adventures.

In my original article on Anne Lister, I concentrated on how she could construct a lesbian identity in the absence of the concept of lesbian in her social milieu. In this version, I add a significant section, drawing on new research by Patricia Hughes on Anne Lister's first lover, Eliza Raine, a half-Indian heiress, enabling me to deal with questions of race and empire. I have also rewritten the original to focus much more on her wider sense of self, emphasizing the question of her masculinity as well as her sexual relations with women. I deploy my concept of "twilight moments" to understand how the people around her saw these relationships as sometimes acceptable, sometimes suspicious, but usually incomprehensible.

My previous article on Richard Johnson, the East India Company official with the secret diaries, was coauthored with Aaron Windel, and compared Johnson to Thomas Law, a fellow official who was more successful at implementing his grand schemes for governing Indian land relations. While the article focused on managerial liberal imperialism, the chapter in the present book concentrates on Richard Johnson's implicit rejection of the idea of the unique self, and the question of whether he acquired a hybrid identity as he explored Indian art and religion.

My chapter on James Hinton, the mystic physician with outrageous sexual proposals, provides explanations of the social and theological background of Hinton's thought. Furthermore, I expand the original article to go into more detail about his influence on other thinkers such as Havelock Ellis.

Hinton led me to the subject of my last chapter on Edith Lees Ellis, which has never been published. Edith Lees Ellis has chiefly been studied as a lesbian who became a case study in the works of Havelock Ellis, her husband. But I am arguing that her sexual identity was only one part of her exploration of the idea of the unique self. She wanted to reconcile individuality and socialism, and interestingly, this task for Edith involved recognizing the individuality of domestic servants, who were often ignored in more conventional socialist movements. She also explored non-monogamy and the concept of "abnormality" as a problem—and a possibility—in eugenics. Ultimately, she tried to reconcile Hinton, Edward Carpenter, and Nietzsche in order to reconcile individuality and the wider social good.

In the conclusion, I bring the beginning and ending chapters together by discussing Havelock Ellis's case study of the Chevalier d'Eon. In Ellis's account, "transvestites" are not seen as exploring their unique selves; instead, they become a diagnosis and a category which Ellis called "eonism." While this represents the dominant history of the self as the subject of discourses, my subjects in this book reveal an alternative history of the self, not simply following the intellectual trends of their time, but twisting and transforming discourses as they explored their own lives.

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The Chevalièr/e d'Eon: Transgender Heroine, Pugnacious Diplomat, or Pious Lady?

The Chevalier d'Eon de Beaumont first achieved fame as a renegade French diplomat exiled in London; he belligerently challenged his opponents to duels and defended his honor in pamphlets. In 1776, d'Eon returned—as a woman—to Versailles, where Marie Antoinette's dressmaker taught her how to walk in high-heeled shoes. D'Eon declared that she was born a female but raised as a male; but on her deathbed, the body was revealed to be anatomically male.

For decades, d'Eon has been seen in the context of the category of transvestite or transgender, beginning with the sexologist Havelock Ellis, who used eonism as a term to diagnose what he called transvestites.¹ More recently, trans activists have claimed d'Eon as a predecessor, for instance, in Leslie Feinberg's *Transgender Warriors*; the Beaumont Society, a resource for transgender people, named itself in honor of d'Eon's full name.² As such, d'Eon could be seen as a person who finally revealed her true female self that had been trapped within a body born biologically male.³ Yet d'Eon did not want to be a feminine woman. She did not conform to conventions of eighteenth-century femininity despite living as a woman: she liked to wear her military decorations and made a living by fencing men in public exhibitions.⁴

Does d'Eon's life, therefore, represent the blurring of boundaries of gender, rather than a transformation from one gender to another?⁵ Today, many theorists emphasize that the phenomenon of transgender is about confounding the categories of gender.⁶ If people can change their gender, and even further, simultaneously express attributes conventionally thought as masculine or feminine, then the seeming naturalness of gender is undermined. Indeed, d'Eon might be seen as the epitome of gender fluidity in the mid-eighteenth century. This was a time of gender play in popular masquerades, when elite men might swish around in petticoats, and ladies could strut across the ballroom floor in trousers. More seriously, some contemporaries boldly stated that women were

capable of great learning and enterprise, citing d'Eon's feats as proof.⁷ But more commonly, contemporaries such as Rousseau scorned powerful women of the court, denigrated female learning, and celebrated motherhood as the only appropriate feminine role.⁸ This suggests that the fluidity of gender is not the only question; we must also look at the power relations of masculinity and femininity.

D'Eon, however, loved Rousseau, and repeatedly drew on his notion of the unique, authentic self. Does this prove queer theorists' argument that the notion of the true, authentic self is deceptive because it subjects people to conventional power relations?⁹ Instead, I would argue that d'Eon queered Rousseau's concepts by taking up his idea of the unique self and rejecting his rigid gender proscriptions. D'Eon wrote and rewrote many different versions of the self, inventing a narrative of herself to prove the authenticity of this transformation. The unique self was not, therefore, the same as a fixed or stable self.

Recently, Emily Rose has suggested referring to d'Eon as "ze" and "hir," current gender-neutral pronouns, in her ingenious article pointing out that d'Eon used both the masculine and feminine forms of French words to refer to herself after her transition.¹⁰ However, that strategy would blur the historical specificity of how d'Eon referred to him—and herself. In his early years, d'Eon was seen and presented himself as masculine, and it would be ahistorical to use a gender-neutral pronoun in discussing this period. But once d'Eon took on a female identity, I will follow d'Eon in using "she" and "her" when she used those terms, and when she was seen as a woman. I will also use the mixed-gender French term the "Chevalière/e" (the Chevalier was a noble title, and Chevalière is the feminine form).

D'Eon obsessively archived his and her life and the press clippings about the various scandals and controversies and may have written articles that appeared on his/her behalf in newspapers once rumors spread that she was a woman. She probably had a hand in a 1777 biography that briefly mentioned that she was born a female and brought up as a boy. In the subsequent years, d'Eon explored this transition in writings that she addressed to the public but never published.¹¹ Instead, she compulsively rewrote this complex, contradictory and fragmentary narrative over a period of years. As she wrote, "Since my beginning was not normal, there was no normal order in what followed."¹²

K. Drabinski has suggested that because of their discomfiture with convention, trans narratives of the self can "tell the story differently" by "pushing the edges of norms."¹³ But d'Eon's discomfiture was not only in terms of gender: in the first part of his life he was caught in a great controversy; should society continue in the *Ancien Régime* model, based on lineages of royal and aristocratic power

and fixed social hierarchies? Or should it become more open, based on popular representation and the merit of individuals? D'Eon did not quite fit in the first model. Did this discomfiture with his society stem from gender nonconformity, or did d'Eon's gender nonconformity result from a critique of contemporary society?

Masculinity and diplomacy

D'Eon was caught between two versions of political manhood: the courtly diplomat and the manly citizen. The courtier ostentatiously displayed his wealth with silk brocade coats and spangled lace cravats, and polished his manners to curry patronage from greater nobles. Lord Chesterfield, for instance, advised his son to please others by being civil, affable, polished, and polite—but also to get his way, especially with women, through deceit and dissimulation.¹⁴ At the same time, the French absolutist state needed to modernize, and it depended on well-educated bureaucrats to further its ends.

The first part of d'Eon's life followed the pattern of aristocratic and absolutist power in France that required him to subordinate his own feelings toward the interests of the powers that be. D'Eon's father was noble, but he served as an obscure provincial bureaucrat in the wine-growing region of Tonnerre. D'Eon himself made it up into the bureaucratic and diplomatic ranks by his assiduous scholarship, emulating such technocratic officials as Turgot.¹⁵ As a royal censor, he could read whatever he wanted in the outrageous new philosophies of the Enlightenment, but he had to conceal his own opinions in the interests of the state.¹⁶ He also scrambled up the ladder by attaching himself to patrons such as the Prince de Conti. As a diplomat in Russia at the Russian court, he had to be polished, secretive, suave, and discreet. He also fought in the Seven Years War as a dragoon; as a soldier, he was supposed to devote his courage and aggression to fighting whatever wars his king ordered.¹⁷

In 1762, d'Eon came to London as secretary to the Duc de Nivernais, who was negotiating the Treaty of Paris between Britain and France that ended the Seven Years War. But Louis XV also had some less peaceful tricks up his sleeve—he incorporated d'Eon into the “Secret,” his plans to invade England if the circumstances became favorable, and also commanded d'Eon to serve as a spy on British politics and the court. D'Eon was well placed for such a mission, because he was favored by King George III and his queen, and politicians and intellectuals such as Horace Walpole and David Hume.¹⁸ But then d'Eon's

patron, the Duc de Broglie, lost Louis XV's support; the king now leaned toward the favorites of his mistress, Madame de Pompadour. In the ensuing uncertainty, the Duc de Nivernais resigned as ambassador and returned to Paris, and d'Eon became Minister Plenipotentiary, or temporary ambassador. D'Eon expected the promotion to be made permanent, but instead the Comte de Guerchy was appointed and d'Eon was demoted to the rank of secretary. He refused to step down from his temporary post as Minister Plenipotentiary and disobeyed an Order of Recall from the foreign minister to return to Paris, where he awaited an uncertain fate. Instead, he vowed to remain in London, empowered by his possession of the papers with their dangerous "Secret." D'Eon and Guerchy started a paper war of pamphlets denouncing each other; d'Eon not only contrasted Guerchy's perceived stupidity and ignorance with his own erudition and experience, he challenged him to a duel, and accused Guerchy of trying to poison and kidnap him.¹⁹

D'Eon thus entered the public world of politics in Britain playing under the old rules, defending his honor and position. In traditional politics, men contended for power behind the scenes, occasionally employing writers to issue ironic personal attacks.²⁰ Interestingly, given d'Eon's later transformation, in 1763–4 his enemies did not attack him as effeminate, but as so aggressive that his behavior teetered into insanity. The controversy around d'Eon's behavior centered, not on whether d'Eon was indeed a man, but what sort of manhood should a political figure exhibit: the independent belligerence of the renegade or the suave finesse of the courtier? Guerchy's proxy Vergy portrayed him as a traitor who betrayed his king and country: "This is in truth to lose the quality of a man, and to give that of a madman."²¹ Vergy was not impugning d'Eon's virility, but rather, implying that he was insane. The *Monthly Review* wrote, "It is a pity, that his [d'Eon's] natural disposition and education had rendered him so unfit for a Courtier, he had not stuck entirely to his profession of arms."²² Ange de Goudard, Guerchy's own hack writer, described d'Eon as a "military minister ... abrupt and choleric [who] talks much of fighting. I suppose he places bravery above the negotiator's qualities."²³ Goudard admitted d'Eon's military virtues but recommended different qualities for an ambassador. The young dragoon, he implied, had ardor, bravery, courage, but he needed discernment, patience, and moderation, a temperament "quiet, sweet, serene, affable," and above all, characterized by "politesse." He should be discreet, circling slowly around problems, cleverly concealing his hand. Politics should be always disguised; he should never take truth for its emblem. Even dueling, he intimated, was unnecessary and ridiculous.²⁴

D'Eon also became embroiled in the debates over the meaning of secrets and privacy in the politics of the time. In the *Ancien Regime*, secrets were a tool of power, an instrument wielded by the king. In France, the police spied on aristocrats in hopes of finding sexual and financial secrets they could use to blackmail them. The privileged few, like d'Eon as a censor, could read the new philosophies forbidden to others. But d'Eon's *Lettres, mémoires, et négociations particulières* (1764) revealed private correspondence about the negotiations over the Treaty of Paris (though not the "Secret" itself).²⁵

In publicizing his quarrel, and by reprinting much of his diplomatic correspondence, d'Eon emerged from the clandestine world of diplomacy into the new public sphere of politics that was dramatically expanding at that very moment. John Wilkes, a Member of Parliament, had savagely attacked King George's ministers as "prostitutes" for allegedly secretly negotiating the 1763 Treaty of Paris against the interests of the English people. Complaining that the British Crown had given up too much valuable possessions (such as the lucrative West Indian sugar islands) to the vanquished French, Wilkes published his accusations in the press and even insinuated British courtiers had been bribed. Wilkes broadened this trope into a wider attack against the patronage power of the king and his court. He reviled courtiers as effeminate, that is to say, passive and dependent on the monarch's favor, soft, and mired in luxury. In contrast, the citizen who defied the court was hardy, independent, courageous, serving the people rather than submitting to the king.²⁶ Eventually, the crown tried to imprison Wilkes for libeling the king, but Wilkes asserted his right to public criticism, and crowds demonstrated in the streets to support him. Government spies then discovered his secret pornographic writings and succeeded in indicting him for blasphemy. Somewhat contradictorily, Wilkes asserted his right to criticize publicly the alleged sexual behavior of politicians and royalty and defended his own right to private sexual thoughts. The new public sphere was seen as defending the citizen against government intrusion. Nonetheless, Wilkes fled London as an outlaw. When Guerchy charged d'Eon with libel for publishing his secret letters, d'Eon became an outlaw as well.

Despite d'Eon's private misgivings, d'Eon and the Wilkesites came to be seen as allies. By 1765–7, Wilkes and d'Eon were inextricably linked as heroes who defied oppressive governments.²⁷ London citizens drank the health of d'Eon and Wilkes together and praised d'Eon as "a person of approved bravery ... as a man, a person of probity and honor."²⁸ By 1767, the *Gazette* (of Paris) proclaimed that the years 1763–7 would be years of "Tyranny" rescued by the efforts of d'Eon and Wilkes "to restore public Liberty," earning them the honor of "Citizens of

Ancient Rome.” They both withstood General Warrants and Lettres de Cachet, thus preserving the rights of the subject.²⁹ In evoking Rome, the Wilkesites alluded to the opposition tradition of classical republicanism, which upheld the masculine virtues of Roman citizens, who sacrificed their own personal interests for the public good, and who exhibited a stoic self-control rather than self-indulgence in luxuries. The opposite of the Roman citizen was the “effeminate” aristocrat; effeminacy meant acting like a woman, perceived as cowardly rather than courageous, but it could also mean associating too much with women and giving way to too much desire for sex—with women.

In some ways it might be seen as surprising for the Wilkesites to support d’Eon, because d’Eon did not have the most conventionally masculine appearance. Friends remembered him as somewhat plump, of medium height with “effeminate” small features.³⁰ And the Wilkesites, however, brought out a submerged meaning of effeminacy in Roman culture as connoting male-male desire. This was more explicit in the poet Juvenal, who was often used as a model for Georgian political invective. Juvenal attacked the aristocrats of his time as corrupt, self-indulgent, and submitting to tyranny, but he also made fun of them for submitting to other men sexually.³¹ This was not the same as our understanding of exclusive heterosexuality and homosexuality; instead, the Roman system was based on the sexual dominance of the male citizen over boys, servants, foreigners, slaves, or women. To take the passive role, for a Roman citizen, was to submit, to lose manhood, to show cowardice, and even to lose citizenship.³² Conversely, for a man to dominate another sexually was an unfair exertion of power. The Wilkesites took up this motif; for instance, an anonymous author praised Wilkes for fighting against the “stream of courtiers,” and compared Bute to a “S-d-mite” for taking revenge behind the scenes: “Thou stabb’st behind, afraid to face, and fight.”³³ To the Wilkesites, sodomy therefore implied submission and cowardice.³⁴ But the petite d’Eon was not seen in those terms because he proved his manhood by constant challenges to duel.

D’Eon transformed his own political philosophy from that of the courtier seeking patronage to that of the natural, authentic, independent citizen. Writing to his former employer, the Duc de Nivernais, he declared he had been willing to shed blood in the service of the king. But now, he lamented, “corruption, softness, voluptuousness, and a satiety of riches had tarnished the image of virtue which was always in his heart.”³⁵ Instead of secret diplomacy, he wrote, politics should be open, based on public utility, truth, and integrity.³⁶

Rousseau was especially important in d’Eon’s process of moving away from the courtly self to what he defined as the natural, authentic self. Both

had been forced into exile for defying the French Crown. Facing arrest for subversion, Rousseau sought refuge in England with the philosopher David Hume. As Gary Kates has shown, d'Eon closely identified with Rousseau in this incident, even writing the philosopher a letter comparing their plights. Both had experienced severe blows to the “natural law” of the self, wrote d'Eon, explaining that “the conservation of my integrity was the fundamental law of nature, and precedes the obligation of all other laws when they are in conflict; this natural law is independent of all human conventions.”³⁷

Rousseau himself had attacked the arts and sciences for imprisoning men in the toils of civilization and courtly corruption. At first, d'Eon reacted indignantly; without arts and sciences, men would be like animals without civilization, he declared.³⁸ But he soon reversed himself, celebrating the natural man as superior to the deceptions of the court. Evoking Rousseau's critique of the court as a theater where people presented false selves, d'Eon explained that his trouble with Guerchy stemmed from his inability to be a “harlequin” in the theater of politics.³⁹ In 1763, d'Eon wrote to his mother, comparing courtiers to chameleons who imitate their masters like monkeys.⁴⁰ Similarly, Rousseau compared courtiers to monkeys, for after all the French to imitate was the verb *singe*, to act like a monkey:

The monkey imitates man, whom he fears, and not the other animals, which he scorns. He thinks what is done by his betters must be good. Among ourselves, our harlequins imitate all that is good to degrade it and bring it into ridicule. Knowing their owners' baseness they try to equal what is better than they are, or they strive to imitate what they admire, and their bad taste appears in their choice of models. They would rather deceive others or win applause for their own talents than become wiser or better.

As Rousseau went on, “Imitation has its roots in our desire to escape from ourselves.”⁴¹

Rousseau had begun to explore the idea of the self as rooted in nature as opposed to civilization. As he wrote in the *Discourse on Inequality*,

how shall man hope to see himself as nature made him, across all the changes which the succession of place and time must have produced in his original constitution? How can he distinguish what is fundamental in his nature from the changes and additions which his circumstances and the advances he has made have introduced to modify his primitive condition?

He must return to his primitive roots and regain the strength of the animal.⁴²

Inspired by Rousseau, d'Eon began to develop an alternative notion of the self as the fierce, virile wild child. For instance, d'Eon wrote to his mother

that he was a “wild animal raised in the forests of Burgundy or Champagne.” If people criticized his wildness, he wrote, “respond to them with me and my friend Jean Jacques that nature treats all the animals abandoned to her bosom, with a predilection that seems to show how she is jealous of her right.” There is “More vigor, strength and courage in forests than in our houses; [animals] lose half of these advantages in becoming domesticated ... It is thus with men; in becoming social slaves of the great or the monkeys of their grandeur, they become weak, feeble, and their manner soft and effeminate, weakening their nerves, forces and courage.”⁴³ But this was also a divided self. Rousseau wrote, “Drawn this way by nature and that way by men, forced to divide ourselves between divergent impulses, we make a compromise and reach neither goal.”⁴⁴ As d’Eon struggled to retain his status as a French diplomat, he began to realize that he was not “in harmony with [him]self.”

In part, this was due to the fact that d’Eon was still a duplicitous diplomat who played both sides. Despite d’Eon’s notoriety and defiance, he still possessed “the Secret” of the French plans to invade England. To avoid its revelation, his French masters secretly agreed that Louis XV would pay him a pension, and in return, d’Eon would agree to renounce his pretensions to the ambassadorship, stop harassing Guerchy, and, more importantly, spy on British politics.⁴⁵ D’Eon sent extensive reports of the Wilkesite riots, which convulsed the capital, denigrating them as a threat to liberty, but he criticized the British parliament for being so easily bribed to vote against Wilkes.⁴⁶ D’Eon dined with Wilkes and tantalized him with allusions to diplomatic secrets about the Treaty of Paris. In 1769, Wilkes’s followers became increasingly angry that d’Eon would not publicly verify their suspicions that France had bribed British politicians to accept the treaty.⁴⁷ One Wilkesite, Musgrave, declared that, while d’Eon appeared to be a persecuted patriot, he was in truth just a corrupt French spy. The domestic corruption of the age, declared Musgrave, could easily lead to “connections equally mercenary with foreigners and enemies,” leading to a “French party, as well as a court party, in Parliament.”⁴⁸ Some correspondents in the controversy defended d’Eon, and most of those who attacked him did not question his masculinity. But for the first time, some linked d’Eon with stereotypes about Frenchmen as effeminate. “Tullius,” for instance, contrasted the “honest sincerity of the Englishman, and the evasive finesse of the Frenchman.”⁴⁹ One political letter described d’Eon as the “pretty Frenchman who lives in Petty France.”

The problem of gender

At the same time, d'Eon apparently became quite uncomfortable with the problem of his "nature." Despite his presentation as a virile, learned, diplomat, ready to leap to his sword, he still was a slight person. His masters had long reassured him that he did indeed seem to be a man, but this implied there was some doubt. In 1762, his patron, the Marquis de l'Hôpital congratulated him on his appointment as temporary ambassador: "you have distinguished yourself among men, by your spirit and courage, virtue and honor. Thus you are at present known as 'homme, Vir.' Whatever is wanting to you physically assures but the more the Effect of your Qualities, and the Employment of your Time."⁵⁰ Masculinity was something which had to be performed, constantly reasserted and defended, and which was not easily attained. Perhaps this explains d'Eon's constant belligerence, the way he picked fights in order to prove his manhood again and again. In 1771, he wrote to his patron Broglie,

I am enough mortified to be such as nature made me, and the "calme" of my temperament has never led to those pleasures, which leads my friends to imagine, as much in Russia, France and England, that I was "du genre féminin." I proved to them and will prove as much as I want, that I am not only a man, but a dragoon captain, with arms in my hand.⁵¹

As Marilyn Morris observes, during this political crisis, the "resulting loss of control over his life undoubtedly generated a fundamental transformation of self."⁵² Literary critic Eric Santner's concept of a "crisis of investiture" is a useful way to expand this insight. As Santner explains, when people take on positions in government, for instance, they are invested with "symbolic capital" and must perform according to their station. In the conflict with Guerchy, d'Eon was stripped of this symbolic capital. Furthermore, D'Eon not only lost control of his career, he lost faith in the political creed of his natal nation that inspired him as a bureaucrat, diplomat, and soldier to serve absolutist France. When a person loses not only his position but faith in a political creed, this can be a "crisis of investiture" leading to personal transformation. For instance, Santner demonstrates that after two such losses of position in the legal field, Daniel Paul Schreber, a famous patient of Freud, suffered mental breakdowns in which he was convinced he was a woman.⁵³ This was also a time in which Germany was convulsed by ideological challenges to the social order. Unlike Schreber, d'Eon was never psychotic, but this notion of a "crisis of investiture" provides some clues as to why d'Eon decided to be a woman.

Writing in the 1770s, d'Eon declared that during the 1760s he felt torn between "two passions": the passion to be a belligerent, honorable military man, and the passion to be a woman. As Gary Kates writes, during the 1760s, d'Eon collected an extensive library about accomplished women and feminist advocacy. In his later reminiscences, he wrote that he found dresses constraining, but "nature has come to oppose me, and to make me feel the need for women's clothes, so that I can sleep, eat, and study in peace."⁵⁴ By about 1770 or 1771, d'Eon began to circulate a rumor that he was really a woman. In 1774 or even earlier, as fashion historian Kimberley Chrisman-Campbell has found, d'Eon also privately started buying female corsets and other feminine garments for herself.⁵⁵ Perhaps to evade French spies and British creditors, d'Eon took on women's clothes as a disguise and found this state to be much more calming and relaxing than the performance of masculine bravado, which took so much energy and caused so much anxiety.

Many historians see d'Eon's transformation as an opportunistic political choice. D'Eon was still in possession of France's dangerous secret plan to invade Britain, and Louis XVI's ministers wanted him back. They sent over the playwright Caron de Beaumarchais and d'Eon's old friend Theveneau de Morande to negotiate d'Eon's return. As Gary Kates writes, if d'Eon could present himself as a woman, his political danger as a former diplomat and spy in possession of incriminating secrets could be neutralized, and he would not be imprisoned on his return to France.⁵⁶ Beaumarchais sometimes believed that d'Eon was a rather strange woman who was mentally a man.⁵⁷ In any case, rumors began to swirl that d'Eon was a woman, and gamblers placed huge bets on the question.

Publicly, d'Eon refused to declare whether he/she was a man or a woman: the accomplishments in the military, diplomacy, and learning should constitute the public identity of d'Eon, and the public had no business knowing d'Eon's private self. Newspapers published letters from supporters (or perhaps really from d'Eon) arguing this case. By 1776, a correspondent signing himself "Heartwell" wrote to the *Morning Chronicle* that

whether the Chevalier be a man or woman, is no more to the purpose than whether the worthy Knight [Justice John Fielding] can really see or not, or is as reported, stone blind, for it is the heart only, and not the head or tail, that makes a human being truly respectable and esteemable; and I hope myself not to be thought despicable, for having wrote this not from the head, but the heart.⁵⁸

Another defender of d'Eon wrote, "Now whether so respectable and amiable a Character is really a Man or Woman, or as great as a Sully, Colbert, or

Bolingbroke, or no greater than Pope Joan, or Joan of Arc, or the Pucelle D'Orléans ... Time will perhaps soon shew," but the writer remains content to be a friend and attorney to "this cruelly wronged, injured, and persecuted, most noble and gallant Chevalier or Demoiselle."⁵⁹

D'Eon was drawing on an idea, explored by some radicals during the Enlightenment, that people should be allowed to explore unusual ideas and desires in the privacy of their solitude. D'Eon was also emulating Wilkes, notorious for writing pornography, who had proclaimed, "In my own closet I had the right to examine, and even try by the keen edge of ridicule, any opinions I pleas'd."⁶⁰ A Wilkesite radical journal, *The Whisperer*, boldly asserted that magistrates had no more "right to direct the private behavior of men" or "to model people's speculations," than they had to regulate their dreams.⁶¹ Wahrman has also argued that during the 1760s and 1770s, British high society played with gender fluidity in masquerades, in which men could appear in flamboyant feminine costumes, and women could take the freedom of the trousers. But this gender fluidity had its dangers.

With rumors circulating that he was a woman, or dressed in woman's clothes, d'Eon might be seen as an effeminate sodomite. In the mid-1770s, the earlier Wilkesite insinuations that courtiers sexually submitted were now becoming more explicit denunciations of sodomites. The image of the sodomite emerged as a type of character who was effeminate, cowardly, and exclusively interested in sex with men. In France, the police and philosophers called them the *anti-physiques*, because they supposedly rejected the reproductive love of women.⁶² Wilkes was instrumental in publicizing this image from the 1760s onward. In 1772, Captain Jones was condemned to death for committing sodomy on a thirteen-year-old apprentice boy. When the king pardoned him, Wilkes attacked and won a city election. In the debate about the case, prostitutes allegedly defended Jones by claiming they could prove he was all-man, insinuating that a true sodomite would not be interested in sex with women. Furthermore, sodomy was associated with cross-dressing. A letter writer taking on the sobriquet "Juvenal" criticized "Juvenis" for lambasting libertine indulgence in mistresses and prostitution; at least they express the "manly ... Voice of Nature," he declared, unlike an "effeminate assembly," the Scavoir Vivre club, where "fashionable youth ... dress in women's silk gowns ... and imitate ... the delicacy of the nicest female at the toilet."⁶³

In 1776, d'Eon was linked to "mollies," the common term for effeminate men suspected of sodomy. The incident began when Thevèneau de Morande, d'Eon's former friend, turned against him when the negotiations with the

French court broke down, and d'Eon refused to go along with Morande's efforts to manipulate the betting on d'Eon's sex. Morande threatened to publish a scurrilous account of d'Eon's life as an "epicene," and in response, d'Eon, his brother-in-law, Thomas O'Gorman, and a friend, Captain Charles Horneck, challenged Morande to duels.⁶⁴ Horneck even threatened to declare Morande "the greatest JEAN FOUTRE in the universe."⁶⁵ In retaliation, Morande had the *Westminster Gazette* report that

Mr. Morande is very unhappy to have drawn vengeance of all the he-she things upon him; Miss d'Eon and her clique were sufficient to alarm every man who is afraid of an assassin, or a poisoner; if all our English Miss Molly's join in the confederacy, or even Captain H---'s acquaintance, all Fielding's men will not be sufficient to prevent the schemes which this worthy groupe are capable of executing.

The newspaper described Captain Horneck, an ally of d'Eon, as a "delicate" man of dubious sex who engaged in doubtful "pleasures" with a male "companion," and Horneck had earlier been caricatured as a "little lilly military Macaroni."⁶⁶ Interestingly enough, both these newspaper accounts tied d'Eon romantically to men suspected of sodomitical leanings, but they subtly differentiated between the "he-she things" and their allies the "Miss Mollies." Clearly, effeminate men were increasingly suspected of sodomy, but d'Eon continued to confound these categories as a seemingly celibate person of indeterminate sex.

In any case, so much money was at stake on the betting on d'Eon's sex that insurance policies had been taken out on the outcome; Lord Mansfield was called in to make a judicial decision one way or another, and in 1777, he reluctantly declared that the bets on d'Eon's sex were valid, bolstered by Morande's testimony that he had seen and felt that which proved d'Eon was a woman.⁶⁷ In 1778, Mansfield reversed his previous decision, arguing that bets on a third party's sex were not legally enforceable, because they required indecent evidence and damaged the subject's reputation.⁶⁸ As Lisa Forman Cody notes, this decision, like Mansfield's Somerset case (which decided that an enslaved person could not be forcibly taken out of England, de facto abolishing slavery in England) tacitly recognized people's ownership in their own bodies.⁶⁹ D'Eon was very grateful for this latter opinion. As Kates observed, this decision served the secret purpose of presenting himself as a woman in disguise. But it also validated her belief that she should be able to keep her gender identity private. She proclaimed that this was a victory for women's honor, which her enemies Beaumarchais and Morande had tried to damage. In a letter to Lord Mansfield, she wrote that women would

no longer have to fear such horrible damages as she experienced. As she went on, "Nature cannot tolerate any violence toward its inscrutable secrets."⁷⁰

D'Eon did not realize that women were not allowed to have inscrutable secrets. Women such as the historian Catherine Macaulay, the playwright Hannah More, and the sculptor Anne Damer could be celebrated as the muses of British culture, as exceptionally talented individuals, rather than patterns for their sex, but if there was any hint of any kind of sexual misbehavior, their reputations could be savaged.⁷¹ For instance, d'Eon's letter to Lord Mansfield was mocked in a faux *Epistle to Lord Mansfield*, which associated her with the reputed "sapphick" Anne Damer. Aristocratic Anne Damer was celebrated as a sculptor, but her love life was less happy. Her early marriage to a gambling, unfaithful libertine ended when he committed suicide. When Damer went on a trip to Italy to recover, rumors began to circulate that she had kissed another woman there. As a scurrilous poem implied,

if report is right,
The maids of warm Italia's Land,
Have felt the pressure of your hand,
The pressure of delight.⁷²

Damer was mocked for refusing to remarry. In another libellous poem, she was criticized for refusing the proper use of the "Sensitive plant," that is, the penis.⁷³ In the satirical *Epistle to Lord Mansfield*, Damer's lover "Jack" Cavendish (probably Elizabeth Cavendish) recognizes d'Eon as "one of us." In the epistle, though, d'Eon shies away from "sapphick" love as well as the love of man. As the epistle went on: "neither loving nor beloved, I was myself alone." The poem also alluded to d'Eon's self-presentation as Joan of Arc by alluding to the poem *La Pucelle d'Orleans*, attributed to Voltaire, that portrayed Joan as a sexual adventuress.⁷⁴

Mansfield's decision had cleared the way for d'Eon to return to France: in a secret pact, she agreed to declare herself to be a woman, and to keep the Secret hidden; in return, the French court stopped persecuting her. But on arriving in France, d'Eon wanted to be recognized as an exceptional woman and insisted on wearing her military uniform as a dragoon. However, the French court insisted that d'Eon conform to courtly femininity at the hands of Mlle Bertin, Marie Antoinette's dressmaker, who attired her in the elaborate court dress of the time. Apparently, the courtiers who saw d'Eon saw her as rather masculine and ungainly on her high heels.⁷⁵ Eleonor, Prioress of the Carmelites, wrote to d'Eon referring to her as "*le chevalier*" and "*elle ou pour lui comme vous voudres* (she or for him as you wish)."⁷⁶

The Chevalière in France: A virtuous woman

The Chevalière needed to find a cultural context in which to present her transition. Rumors that elite French male courtiers wore women's clothing occasionally circulated early in the century, although the notorious memoirs of the Abbé de Choisy, who wrote of passing as a woman, have recently been suggested to be fictional. Men might dress as women in a masquerade, carnival, or theatrical performance, but taking on a permanent female role would lead to a loss of privilege and dangerous sexual insinuations, especially in the later eighteenth century.⁷⁷

In contrast, French and British audiences would have heard reports of women passing as men, for several times a decade, stories would emerge of women disguised as men to make a living in a male occupation, or serving as soldiers and sailors.⁷⁸ Just before d'Eon began transitioning, a woman named Jeanne Baret disguised herself as a man to travel with Captain Cook around the world as an assistant botanist.⁷⁹ In France, female travelers sometimes wore trousers for safety, to pass as a man at least at a distance. Popular literature celebrated female sailors and often celebrated in popular literature for their bravery and heroism.⁸⁰ At the very time d'Eon returned to Versailles, a young woman dressed as a dragoon gave sword-fighting exhibitions on the streets of Paris.⁸¹

Even before her arrival in France, d'Eon began a campaign to be seen as an accomplished woman who passed as a man, "whose Heroic and wonderful deeds in Mars as well as Arts in the Field as well as in the Cabinet ... does so much Honour to the Fair Sex in particular and to Humanity in general."⁸² In a 1778 published memoir by La Fortelle, and probably written or at least informed by d'Eon, the author declares that d'Eon was born a girl but brought up as a boy by her parents, but the memoir concentrates on her stellar career as an intellectual, diplomat, and soldier.⁸³

Cross-dressing women were not universally lauded, however, especially if they were seen as sexual. Authorities sometimes persecuted women who disguised themselves as men and had sex with other women. In literature, depictions of women disguised as men tended to be sexualized, as in the 1744 novel, *The Entertaining Travels and Adventures of Mademoiselle de Richelieu*, presented the story of two female lovers who traveled Europe disguised as men. In two notorious narratives, biological women who transformed themselves into male soldiers were presented as seducing women, dueling men, and defying authorities in a bravura display of masculinity. Catalina/Antonio Erauso was born in 1596 as a woman in the Basque country and escaped a convent for a life of adventure as a male soldier in the New World. An account of Catherine Vizzani, an Italian

who became Giovanni Bordon, a soldier, was published in 1755 and translated by John Cleland, notorious author of a classic book of erotica, but Cleland uses the tale to denounce women who have sex with women.⁸⁴ Even the image of Joan of Arc as a man could incur criticism.⁸⁵

By placing the origin of her transformation in childhood, d'Eon avoided the question of sexuality and returned to what was seen as a pure self. In *Emile*, for instance, Rousseau argued that boys and girls are very similar.⁸⁶ It was only the advent of sex, and adulthood, which made men and women so different. As Rousseau wrote in *Emile*, "In all that does not relate to sex, woman is man. She has the same organs, the same needs, the same faculties. The machine is constructed in the same manner, the parts are the same, the workings of the one are the same as the other, and the appearance of the two is similar. From whatever aspect one considers them, they differ only by degree."⁸⁷ Of course, Rousseau went on to argue that girls should be educated to be pure yet feminine flirts and devoted mothers, rather than as intellectuals. By going back to the gender neutral state of childhood, and by renouncing sexual desire, d'Eon could emulate Rousseau's notion of the singular self without accepting his restrictive ideas of femininity.

D'Eon began to develop a more elaborate narrative of her transformation from dragoon into woman in a series of unpublished letters to friends and manuscripts in which she emphasized her sexual purity. All her life, she proclaimed, she was as delicate as a girl must be, keeping the virtue of her chastity, even when she lived as a soldier.⁸⁸ For d'Eon, celebrating virginity also preserved her liberty and therefore was much preferable to the "slavery" of marriage. She also mentioned to Lady Robinson that her mother said "that marriage was invented by Satan to conserve the race of 'Rascals' on the earth."⁸⁹

Above, d'Eon valued virginity as part of her inner religious transformation. She wrote that she needed to give up the praise of the world for her accomplishments and turn to interior contemplation. As Gary Kates observes, she portrayed herself as undergoing a conversion experience like that of Saul on the road to Damascus; when she was wounded falling from a horse on Westminster Bridge, a doctor discovered her true sex.⁹⁰

D'Eon was also very interested in female saints and the supposed Pope Joan. In early Christianity, a number of saints were portrayed as born female, but then taking on a male role to devote themselves to Christ. Church fathers praised them for abandoning their femininity and becoming masculine, equating virginity and holy virility.⁹¹ D'Eon, however, saw these saints as escaping the dangers of male sexuality in order to prove their piety and their scholarly and managerial abilities.⁹²

For d'Eon, her femininity was saintly and her masculinity needed suppression. Writing to various ladies, she declared that she was subduing her old self, the belligerent, angry, courageous dragoon, so that her new self, the pure, obedient daughter, could emerge. In her private writings of 1778, she depicted dragoons as "lions, or rather mad, wild demons."⁹³

D'Eon might be seen as practicing the "virtue of abandon," in historian Charly Coleman's terms, as surrendering a sense of an autonomous masculine self to God, to become a different kind of self.⁹⁴ She advocated emulating Jesus's "self-annihilation" by sacrificing one's selfish interests in God that allowed a freedom in surrender. D'Eon proclaimed, "I always treated my body harshly in order to eliminate any desire it might have to rebel against me." But she needed the help of Jesus to do this, "who will transform our base flesh to make it conform to His glorious body thus exerts the power to subject all things to himself."⁹⁵

D'Eon's faith concentrated on a personal relationship with God rather than one mediated through authorities, a common although unorthodox theme in French religious thought.⁹⁶ Similarly, in a 1777 letter to her mother, d'Eon wrote, "Sacrifices, fasts, mortifications, alms and humiliations are good works in themselves; but it is a body without a soul when the heart is not changed, reformed, sacrificed and sanctified by the spirit of God, the only source of innocence and purity."⁹⁷ This statement also evokes Rousseau's character the Savoyard Vicar, a renegade vicar in the novel *Emile*, who focuses on the "inner light" of reason and conscience rather than the outer commands of authorities to follow rituals. For the vicar, the individual must use his reason to overcome the vagaries of his bodily passions. Similarly, d'Eon relied on God and religious faith to enable her to master her passions: she wrote, "We cannot force our passions to be awakened or extinguished. We believe we have overcome them when they merely shift their focus. We are not the masters of our physical existence; but we are the masters of our moral life."⁹⁸

Her denunciation of the "old law" of following rules and performing "good works for the new law of Jesus and the Gospel, allowed her to justify her gender transition, for in Jesus "there is no Jew or Greek, no slave, no free person, no male, and no female, but we are all one in Jesus Christ."⁹⁹ D'Eon also interpreted the gospels to argue that God did not care whether a soul was male or female, writing, "God has no interest in people's appearance, but that anyone, whatever his nationality or his social condition, who fears Him and who is committed to justice is pleasing to Him. Thus what God has purified let us not consider

to be soiled.”¹⁰⁰ God gave people their own natures; she argued that “God gives to each the body that it pleases Him to give, and each one is appropriate to its recipient.” Furthermore, she stated that “I am again such as nature made me, without consulting me, and by the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace toward me has not been in vain.”¹⁰¹ Was d'Eon arguing that she had a singular, unique, God-given body, which did not fit into conventional masculinity or femininity?

Rousseau's *Confessions* enabled d'Eon to develop this idea of the singular self even further. Rousseau began writing his confessions during his earlier stay in England, where he circulated them in salons, so it is possible d'Eon encountered these ideas before their publication in 1782. To be sure, d'Eon was highly ambivalent about this work. She wrote, “I forgive St Augustine for having written his confessions to God, but I do not forgive Rousseau for writing his confession to the general public, which did not ask for it.” She also coyly stated that “A vestal virgin cannot confess as boldly as a philosopher from Geneva.”¹⁰²

Rousseau's *Confessions* provided the most clearly articulated idea of a singular, unique self made by Nature:

I am made unlike any one I have ever met; I will even venture to say that I am like no one in the whole world. I may be no better, but at least I am different. Whether Nature did well or ill in breaking the mould in which she formed me, is a question which can only be resolved after the reading of my book.¹⁰³

Similarly, d'Eon proclaimed that she had a singular nature unlike that of others: “Leave the nature of the beast as it is. Whether it be good or evil, I cannot change it.”¹⁰⁴ In a letter to Lord Mansfield, she wrote, “you recognize that these masculine virtues in my sex hardly represent a rupture with nature.”¹⁰⁵ Nonetheless, Rousseau's unique self was not coherent and autonomous. As Jerrold Siegel argues, “Rousseau's claim to transparency did not mean that he saw his self as homogeneous or all of a piece; on the contrary, the only way of access to the crystalline purity lodged in his depths was by way of the jumbled, jagged, crooked assemblage that made up his overall being.”¹⁰⁶

Rousseau was much more flexible in terms of gender in his *Confessions* than in his didactic writings.¹⁰⁷ Rosanne Kennedy even titled her book *Rousseau in Drag*, citing a letter in which he wrote that he was wearing a feminine Armenian robe and weaving ribbons: “I have thought as a man and have been called bad. Well, now I shall be a woman.”¹⁰⁸ In the *Confessions*, Rousseau described himself as a “character at once effeminate and inflexible,

which by always wavering between weakness and courage, between self-indulgence and virtue, has throughout my life set me in conflict with myself, to such effect that abstinence and enjoyment, pleasure and prudence have alike eluded me.”¹⁰⁹ In her reminiscences, the Chevaliere did the same. She portrayed himself as torn between her “two personalities. My mind tended toward tranquility, solitude, and study” but her “heart loved the clash of weapons.” She faced a dilemma—to hide her sex in a convent or a regiment. Either way would be denying part of herself. “Unable to consult either man or woman, I consulted God and the Devil, and so as not to fall into the water, I jumped into the fire.”¹¹⁰

In asserting her singular nature, d’Eon was not arguing that she had a true feminine self that had been hidden by a male persona; rather, she lived her life in a way that refused rigid gender boundaries. D’Eon returned to a more public life on returning to England in 1785, where she continued to live as a woman, but as a rather masculine one. When dining with old friends, she stayed with the gentlemen when the ladies retreated from the table.

When the French Revolution broke out, she first lauded this transformation of politics and even presented a stone from the Bastille to the Revolution society in a London pub. For d’Eon, this redeemed her cause after her persecution by the French government in 1764.¹¹¹ In turn, the revolutionaries at first lauded her as an “astonishing woman, who proved that only education and prejudice demarcate the lines between the sexes.”¹¹² Anarchis Cloots, perhaps mockingly, requested her to abandon her toilette and form an Amazonian regiment to defend the revolution. She responded eagerly that she focused on books, not her dress, for “I detest the female garb as much as those who have compelled me to wear it.” Now with her king and her country in danger, “my warlike spirit revolts against my cap and my petticoats.” But she demanded that the king give her permission to fight, and that the assembly restore her rank in the military.¹¹³ But the revolutionary government soon cut off her pension, not surprisingly given her royalism. To support herself, d’Eon earned money by public exhibitions of fencing, her strong arm emerging from a lacy sleeve to point a sword at Mrs. Bateman, a female fencer with whom she lived, and in her sixties defeated the Chevalier St. George, described as a “celebrated mulatto fencing master.”¹¹⁴ But in her sixties, she was really too old for sword fighting, and a wound ended her public dueling career. She kept on trying to write her autobiography to make money, but it was never published. D’Eon died destitute in a rented room in 1810.

Conclusion

As with Rousseau and Wilkes, d'Eon's status as a celebrity points out the essential contradiction in the eighteenth-century celebration of the private self. These men insisted on their right to enjoy a private self, to indulge in and wrestle with their unusual desires, but they also became celebrities for their very private passions. But d'Eon had a much greater issue with the problem of privacy: as a woman, she was not allowed the privacy that gentlemen enjoyed. Mary Robinson, a feminist writer in the 1790s, pointed out that a man's reputation was considered his prized possession, and he could go to court to defend it, but when a woman's honor was impugned, she was defenseless. She used d'Eon to illustrate this point:

When this extraordinary female filled the arduous occupations of a soldier and an ambassador [*sic*], her talents, enterprize, and resolution, procured for her distinguished honours. But alas! When she was discovered to be a WOMAN, the highest terms of praise were converted into, "eccentricity, absurd and masculine temerity, at once ridiculous and disgusting."¹¹⁵

But as Katherine Binhammer and Sharon Seltzer point out, d'Eon was praised as a heroic woman who took on prestigious male accomplishments; if it were known she was born male, she might incur suspicion as an effeminate man, who would be scorned by Mary Robinson herself.¹¹⁶

To return to the themes with which I began this article, the case of d'Eon suggests that when a trans person claims to be revealing their true or authentic self, this does not necessarily mean that they espouse a rigid binary of masculinity and femininity. D'Eon drew on Rousseau's notion of the unique self, that he was born unlike all others, but in becoming a woman she still wanted to be what we would call gender fluid, to exhibit the conventionally masculine qualities of learning and military skill. She could not draw on the cultural model of transgender, since it did not exist at that time, but she did draw on the contemporary phenomenon of the woman who passed as a man to claim that she was born female and then accomplished great feats as a man. To answer the question of whether her discomfiture with gender led her to criticize other power relations in her society, historians debate which came first: did d'Eon's criticisms of the French absolutist state lead to a "crisis of investiture" and then a gender crisis? Or did she always feel like an outsider considering herself to be a woman in a man's body, and thus was always more willing to criticize her government? We will never know.

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Secrets and Lies: Anne Lister's Love for Women and the Natural Self

Anne Lister was an early nineteenth-century Yorkshire gentlewoman who educated herself in science and the classics; she climbed the social ladder and inherited Shibden Hall and then explored in the wild reaches of the Caucasus. The portrait of Anne Lister most familiar to readers of her published diaries was painted in 1830 by John Horner; it depicts her as a respectable, feminine lady, albeit a bit eccentric with her masculine waistcoat. The sketch reproduced here (Figure 3.1) was probably the one Lister sat for in November 1822, when she was thirty-one, according to her diary. Her hair is short and curly, her eyes are large, and a slight moustache gives her a more masculine look than the oil portrait. Although her friends did not like it, Lister did: she wrote, "there is something very characteristic in the figure."¹ This sketch now hangs in a dark upstairs hallway, near her bedroom. The two portraits indicate her public self as an heiress, and her private self as a lover of women.

In the sketch, a tiny heart-shaped brooch adorns her collar, and she holds a letter, probably by her lover Marianna Belcombe. The year before the sketch, she wrote in her diary, "I love and only love the fairer sex and thus, beloved by them in turn my heart revolts from any other love but theirs."² Trying to explain herself to Marianna, she also quoted Rousseau's famous dictum that "I know my own heart and I understand my fellow men. But I am made unlike anyone I have ever met." Lister was also implying that her desire was part of her "nature"—she was *made* unlike others.³ At first glance this might seem to be a robust assertion of lesbian identity as an exclusive love for women that was her authentic self. It would seem to undermine contemporary theories that people can only acquire sexual identities that are available in their own cultural discourses, for Lister had no access to a cultural discourse that defined a lesbian in those terms. But Lister's understanding of herself was not the same as our understanding of lesbian identity (which in itself is fluid and changing).



Figure 3.1 Anne Lister. Courtesy of Calderdale Museum

Instead, she actively created her own identity out of the cultural materials available to her, twisting and queering religion, romantic literature, and the classics to create a sense of self. For the Romantics, sexual desires represented the innermost passions that were authentic and closer to nature, defying the constraints of convention, even if they could also be thrillingly destructive. The very notion of one's desires being "natural" was therefore a cultural construction. At the same time, when Lister saw herself as "unlike all others," she did not claim belonging to a subculture, or identify herself with other women attracted to women. When she quoted "I know my own heart and I understand my fellow

men,” she did not mean that knowing herself made her empathize with others; rather, she used this knowledge to manipulate others. Lister carefully controlled which self she would display to the public and to her lovers. Duplicity and secrecy were lifelong habits, in part born out of necessity and in part out of her personality.

Lister used her diary to create a sense of self, keeping notes every day and then copying them into bound volumes that total millions of words.⁴ With its code, Lister’s diary was unlike that of many nineteenth-century women, who shared their entries with others, and sometimes published them. Lister occasionally read entries to her lovers but largely kept the diary secret by using a code based on Greek that she created with her first lover, Eliza Raine.⁵ The code, of course, was used for sexual matters but also recorded private thoughts and discussions about her relationships with her family and neighbors. Although her descendent John Lister cracked the diary’s code in the late nineteenth century, he and subsequent archivists were horrified at her sexual explicitness, and they concealed the key to the code for generations.⁶ In 1988, local historian Helena Whitbread, with the help of more modern archivists, transcribed and published a volume of excerpts from the diaries, publishing another in 1992.⁷ I have also read and transcribed selections from the diaries. Jill Liddington has focused on Anne Lister’s relationship with Ann Walker in the 1830s, and Lister’s political and economic activities.⁸ More recently, Patricia Hughes’s transcriptions of earlier diaries and the letters of Eliza Raine, the half-Indian heiress who was Lister’s first lover, provide material for new insights.⁹

Lister used her code to construct an alternative sense of self as a Byronic renegade and a masculine woman. Given her dress, her masculinity was more publicly apparent, but her renegade self was reserved for her lovers. Even then, she often concealed from them the truth about her behavior—and the extent of her sexual experience with women. Why did Lister have to hide her sexual relationships with women? After all, this was a time when romantic friendships between women were celebrated; Lister was fascinated with the Ladies of Llangollen, two Irish gentlewomen who ran off to live with each other in Wales, who were seen as a platonic pair of respectable learned ladies.¹⁰ In *Surpassing the Love of Men*, Lilian Faderman claims that these relationships were not sexual; when nineteenth-century women wrote to each other of falling in love, of covering each other with kisses, and yearning to hold the other all night in her arms, they were experiencing intense emotions, but they could not think of this love or express it in genital terms before sexologists came up with the notion of sexual inversion or lesbianism.¹¹ Lister, however, was convinced the

Ladies of Llangollen were lovers, in part because she herself definitely had sex with women.¹² Lister noted a cross in the margins of her diary to indicate sex (or perhaps orgasms), and sometimes went into detail about these “kisses.” She told Marianna, the love of her life, that “no one had ever given me kisses like hers,” and she listed the number of kisses that occurred when she “had” Marianna. She kissed Maria Barlow on the mouth and on the breast, sat her on her knee, and pressed her thigh into her. Eventually, she “grubbed,” that is, groped, her way up her petticoats, eventually able to touch her “queer” or genitals (from “quim”).¹³ A cross perhaps also signified masturbation; for instance, she wrote that she “incurred” crosses when thinking of her lovers or reading erotic classical literature.¹⁴

How could Lister know about and articulate sexual behavior between women? During the early nineteenth century, sex between women was not widely known as a possibility, unlike sex between men. Men who had sex with other men were known as sodomites, and Lister was certainly aware of them.¹⁵ On one hand, such men could cruise each other on the streets and sometimes find pubs where men like them congregated. On the other hand, they were reviled as “sodomites” and in danger of being hung for this capital offense. Sex between women was legal—and largely invisible. Although subcultures of women who preferred sex with other women probably existed among dancers and prostitutes in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Paris, no evidence for such subcultures has been found in England so far.¹⁶ Sophisticated metropolitan circles in Britain occasionally referred to “Tommys” and “Sapphists,” and in 1820 Queen Caroline was rumored to have had too close a relationship with another woman (as well as with men), and her enemies resurrected the claim that Caroline’s friend Anne Damer, the sculptor, was a lesbian; but there is no evidence that Lister knew of these rumors, although she was well aware of Queen Caroline’s trial for adultery.¹⁷

Did the ignorance of her provincial Yorkshire society shield Lister from prejudice? The terms “sapphist” or “tribade” were never used against Lister, but her masculinity sometimes incurred disapprobation (and admiration). However, as we shall see, her neighbors sometimes sensed that Lister’s attachments to women went beyond friendships, even if they could not provide a word for such a behavior. I have suggested that sexual relations between women can be conceptualized as a “twilight moment,” as acts that could *not* readily be understood or conceived, viewed as through the veil of twilight (as Anne Lister often uses the metaphor of the curtain). But at the same time these acts were not simply accepted, in the way that romantic friendship between women was.¹⁸ For instance, Lister was warned against behaving too affectionately with Marianna

Lawton after they married. And the very secrecy she practiced bears witness to her fear of being exposed.

Yet, how did Lister know about the possibility of sex between women if her provincial society never spoke openly of such things? Lister did not have sex with other women because she learned about it as a possibility from the culture; rather, after she began having sexual relationships with other women, she investigated cultural materials that might provide information to her, such as Romanticism, the classics, and popular sex manuals. Lister, to use Teresa de Lauretis's terms, "rearticulated" cultural materials through her "self-representation—in speech, gesture, costume, body stance and so on."¹⁹ Popular sexual manuals very rarely mentioned sex between women, but Lister explored concepts of anatomy to try to explain herself as a masculine woman. The classics presented explicit but negative images of sex between women that Lister had to assess and interpret. Romanticism rarely articulated sexual desire, but Lister could turn the Romantic notions of forbidden loves and outlaw selves to suit her purposes.²⁰ In fact, Lister spent her life creating herself into a distinctive self unlike all others.

Life and loves

If Anne Lister had not been intelligent, manipulative, assertive, and lucky, she would have been a poor spinster governess or an unhappy wife.²¹ She was the oldest daughter of Jeremy Lister, retired captain turned gentleman farmer who was never very successful, and Rebecca Battle Lister, who had a drinking problem.²² Four brothers stood before her in line to inherit her father's meager estate—but more significantly, the estate of James Walker, their wealthy, childless uncle who lived with his sister in the Tudor manse of Shibden Hall, near Halifax. Lister ensured that her aunt and uncle favored her, subtly positioning herself to inherit. Her aunt and uncle often gave her money, knowing she would spend it well on books, but to encourage their generosity she concealed how much money she actually had. For instance, in 1817, she received four five-guinea notes from her father, a large sum, but told her aunt and uncle only about three of the notes; she wished to keep one note to give to a lover. As she wrote in her journal, "This is a sort of dissimulation which my heart does not approve and I already repent having practiced it, but it is not pleasant not to have a sixpence but what they know of."²³ When her uncle grumbled about her father's incompetence, Lister suggested that he leave her father an annuity, leaving her in control of the property.²⁴ However, her uncle Lister did not approve of women

inheriting, so she proved her worth by helping manage the estate and pursuing her education with great discipline. At age twelve, she was also precociously intellectual; she thanked her aunt for books that appealed to her “young ingenious” meaning genius in the sense of unique nature.²⁵ At age fifteen, she began taking lessons in Latin and Greek with Mr. Knight and went to lectures on galvanism and chemistry. Two brothers died in infancy, and two in their youth, so Lister became the heiress in 1822 and inherited the hall in 1836.

The tomboyish Lister described herself as a “great pickle” who escaped from her mother’s control to wander in the streets among workpeople and “bad women.”²⁶ As a teenager, she borrowed her father’s pistols and visited Captain Bourne’s room to see his pistols, scandalizing the neighborhood; further scandal spread when she played cards with the Alexander boys, for young women were not supposed to visit young men without a chaperone. Little did they know that Lister was actually trying to seduce Miss Alexander. At fifteen, she began wearing semi-masculine dress, buying men’s braces and wearing an unconventional riding habit skirt to a party, where she was “quizzed as an original.”²⁷ She liked to stride about the Yorkshire moors, her short hair tousled by the wind, and decided to wear all black bodices which resembled men’s coats to save money (leaving more for books), and also to conceal her less-than-voluptuous figure.²⁸

Lister’s creation of herself as a masculine, learned woman who loved woman owed a great deal to her first lover, Eliza Raine. As Patricia Hughes has discovered, Eliza Raine was the daughter of an English physician who worked in Madras and formed a relationship with an Indian woman who bore him two children. The East India Company in India tried to discourage these relationships from the 1790s, just after Eliza was born, but they continued. As Durba Ghosh notes, British men often sent the children from these unions to England in order to be acculturated into British society.²⁹ When Dr. Raine died, he bequeathed his fortune to his daughters and entrusted them to his friend Dr. William Duffin, who brought the girls back to York with him. The Duffins sent Eliza to the Manor boarding school at York, where she met Lister and shared an attic bedroom with her. Patricia Hughes speculates that they were separated from the dormitory where the other girls slept because of Lister’s boyishness and Eliza’s color and illegitimacy.³⁰

The two girls instantly formed a strong bond based on romantic love and intellectual pursuits. They intensively studied English history, Greek drama, and Latin poets. Eliza Raine thought Anne Lister had “genius,” and they aspired to be learned ladies together. Indeed, as Sharon Marcus points out, female friendships were valued because they were supposed to encourage feminine cooperation and sentiment.³¹ For feminists, female friendships could also be a union of minds.

Mary Wollstonecraft believed female friendship could encourage great thoughts and mutual intellectual development as well as emotional support—as long as they did not lead to “unnatural affections.”³² And Eliza and Lister were indeed lovers. In their coded letters, Eliza referred to Lister as “my husband” and they exchanged rings; Lister declared that “when I think of our nuptials, my love, I am truly happy.”³³ Hughes interprets the notation “felix” or happiness, which they each wrote in the diaries at the same time when together, as indicating they had sexual relations, although we do not know precisely what they meant.³⁴ Eliza (and other friends) called Lister Welly, which Hughes sees as an allusion to the Marquis of Wellington, conqueror of India.³⁵

Yet after two years, the boarding school expelled Anne, but not Eliza. The excuse was that the two girls had been sending parcels to each other, and Lister’s aunt was summoned to take her away immediately.³⁶ Was it because the girls were lovers? Could the boarding school have discovered the sexual nature of their relationship? In the 1790s, a few sources, including Mary Wollstonecraft, vaguely warned against indecent intimacies between girls in schools.³⁷ The Manor School may have avoided making explicit what happened for fear of gossip, and indeed, in 1810, a scandal erupted in Edinburgh about schoolgirl sapphism. The case was not widely reported in the newspapers, however, so it is unlikely Lister knew of it; nonetheless, it demonstrates that some British elite people did know and disapprove of sex between females. Jane Cumming told her aunt that her boarding schoolmistresses, Miss Pirie and Miss Woods, made suspicious noises at night in bed together, such as heavy breathing, and the sound of a wet finger being pulled out of a bottle. As a result, Lady Cumming removed Jane from the school, and most of the other parents withdrew their daughters, bankrupting the school, and ruining Miss Pirie’s and Miss Woods’s reputation. In response, they charged Lady Cummings Gordon with libel, first losing, then winning in 1811. Pirie and Woods’s lawyers argued that they were innocent school teachers in a tumultuous friendship; they kissed and hugged in bed to reconcile after an intense quarrel, and it was very common for women to sleep together in the same bed. But lawyers for both sides cited extensive sources for the existence of sexual relations between women, including Latin texts, legal authorities, and erotic French literature. (The Latin sources recounting the existence of tribades were some of the same sources Lister would later investigate.) But the lawyer for Pirie and Woods (and the judge who found in their favor) declared that British women did not know of such things.³⁸

Race and class played complex roles in the cases of Jane Cumming and Eliza Raine. On one hand, Jane Cumming’s accusations were believed at first, since

her aunt was a leader in Edinburgh society. On the other, racism changed the outcome of the case: Jane Cumming was half-Indian, and Pirie and Woods won when their lawyers argued that only a brown-skinned girl brought up in a pagan hot climate could introduce such notions into a British boarding school. Although relationships between British men and Indian women were common in the late eighteenth century, the British government was cracking down on them by the 1790s and prejudice against mixed-race offspring increased by the early nineteenth century.³⁹ Similarly, at first Eliza was not expelled from the Manor school, since she was wealthy; Lister, the poor pupil, lost her place. Yorkshire society welcomed Eliza, given her prospective inheritance of £4,000. Lister's family continued to allow the girls to see each other outside school, treated Eliza like one of the family, and tried to marry her off to a family friend. But Eliza's sister Jane made an imprudent marriage to a British army officer who acquired her fortune, took her to India, and abandoned her there; penniless, pregnant, and ill, she returned to England and sought shelter with her sister, but Eliza's friends told her to turn Jane away to preserve her own reputation. Lister began to keep her distance, and society began to snub her. Eliza plaintively wrote to Lister that "people here I believe think me a very distant and odd character." They stared at her whenever she went out, and "I never enter a room but a general silence ensues, and all eyes seem eager to remark everything I do and say." Miss Marsh, her guardian's mistress, turned fiercely against Eliza with racist language, declaring that "where black blood is, there can be nothing amiable."⁴⁰ Eliza became increasingly socially isolated as Lister stopped visiting her; Lister preferred the company of Isabella Norcliffe and Marianna Belcombe, doctors' daughters from York. Eventually, Eliza's behavior degenerated, and she was confined to an asylum. When Lister visited her there in 1817, Eliza asked her "to take off my hat, felt my face, asked if I ever wore false faces, and at last said she 'believed it was my face.'" Eliza eventually died in the asylum in 1860.⁴¹

The problem of false faces and concealment dogged Lister all her life as she tried to find another life partner—and took other lovers. Wealthy Isabella Norcliffe desperately wanted to live with Lister as her partner, but Lister was repelled by her crudity, snuff-taking, and heavy drinking. While she continued to have sex with Isabella occasionally, Lister fell in love with Isabella's friend Marianna Belcombe and envisioned that they would live together in a female marriage. However, Marianna had no money of her own, and Lister had not yet become an heiress, so the two women could not fulfill their dream of living together like the Ladies of Llangollen. Seeking a more comfortable life, in 1816 Marianna married a wealthy older man, Charles Lawton, whose first

wife had died two years before under murky circumstances. Lister consented to this marriage, and indeed accompanied the couple for the first months of their relationship, as was often the case with romantic friends of new brides. The women believed that Charles would die soon, but when Charles found a letter from Lister expressing this hope, he forbade her from visiting Marianna. This broke Lister's heart, and she herself had a nervous collapse. Eventually, Marianna and Lister began to see each other again, but the relationship was never the same, and Lister began to seek out other lovers, such as Mrs. Maria Barlow, whom she met in Paris. She also had other sexual adventures and flirtations on the side (including with Marianna's sister Nantz). Eventually, she found a life partner in the person of a neighboring heiress, Ann Walker.

In all these relationships, Anne followed a practice of deception and manipulation: she did not tell Isabella about Marianna for years, and continued to have sex with her occasionally; she also read letters from one lover aloud to another lover to incite jealousy. She would also use the discourse of romantic friendship to begin a love affair by denying any sexual intent: as Annemarie Jagose writes, "her even cooler allusion to the fine discrimination between women's friendship and their sexual connection are not simply strategies of secrecy but also of seduction."⁴² In a pattern that becomes familiar in her diaries, she would discuss romantic friendship in order to get another woman to confess to sexual feelings, but then Lister would deny she ever had feelings for women. With Mrs. Maria Barlow, Lister declared that "she went to the utmost extent of friendship but that was enough"—and soon enough she was grubbling up Mrs. Barlow's petticoats.⁴³

Lister also needed to justify to herself what she was doing. She worried that her relationship with Marianna after her marriage was "fornication" and therefore "sinful."⁴⁴ Lister was a devout Anglican, but the way she interpreted Christianity was highly creative. She never took these texts as authoritative truth; instead, she examined them to her own ends, balancing her emotional and scholarly responses to come up with a new interpretation. Her rational sense wanted, and could not find, a logical "clear exposition of the faith," but her emotional sense of religion gave her hope.⁴⁵ She quoted eighteenth-century liberal theologian Paley, who argued that noticing the discrepancy between the several gospels doesn't mean they should be ignored. But this distance gave her a certain perspective. For instance, she did not believe that her relationship with Marianna was sinful because they were two women, but because Marianna was married. She expressed feelings of guilt—the same day she incurred a cross thinking of another woman and reading an erotic classical text, she wrote, "there

is no comfort but in god oh that my heart were right with him and then I should have peace—lord have mercy on me and not justice.”⁴⁶ However, it is significant she focused on mercy; as an Anglican, rather than an Evangelical, she did not obsessively focus on her sins. Her religion gave her solace through prayers rather than guilt; for instance, saddened by a letter from her mistress Mrs. Barlow, she cried and prayed to God “to cleanse the thoughts of my heart by the inspiration of his Holy Spirit,” and then “felt a little relieved.”⁴⁷ She seems to have felt guilty for abandoning Mrs. Barlow and two-timing Marianna rather than for having sex with a woman.

Instead of looking at Christianity as a received truth, she investigated other religions, and found that “the cross was an old symbol long before Christianity.”⁴⁸ She also studied the worship of the phallus in India and other cultures. Lister looked to the classics, the works of Lucian, for an explanation for Romans 26 that denounces “unnatural affections” between women, but she does not ever declare to herself or others that she believed that sex between women was immoral.⁴⁹ It is possible that this iconoclastic approach enabled her to see that Christianity’s strict hostility to sexuality was atypical among religions, and to develop her own, more flexible morality. Furthermore, religion was important to her as a social practice anchoring her in a local and a spiritual tradition, as Alan Bray has written. She also wanted to cement her relationship with Marianna, and later with Ann Walker, by taking the sacrament together in a local church.⁵⁰

While Lister reinterpreted Christian notions of sin, she reveled in the Romantic ideal of the outlaw.⁵¹ The Romantic movement in literature in some ways originated with the philosopher Rousseau, who focused on emotions as much as reason, and evolved to include the disreputable Lord Byron and his friend Thomas Moore, who wrote of intense forbidden passions, the storms of nature, and the turbulence of the heart. Byron, as Castle observes, was another key Romantic figure whose libertinism may have inspired Lister.⁵² Byron, of course, was the celebrity poet, “mad, bad, and dangerous to know” who had broken Lady Caroline Lamb’s heart and who abandoned his wife when he fled into exile. Less well known, but hinted at, was the fact that he had an incestuous affair with his half-sister, and had romantic and sexual relationships with men. The Romantics’ strength of character came not from their self-control but from the uncontainable force of their passions. As such, middle-class society often repudiated Romantics, while avidly reading their books. Lister followed suit: in conversation with acquaintances, she denounced Lady Caroline Lamb’s *Glenarvon*—a *roman à clef* about the author’s affair with Byron—as immoral.⁵³ In her diary, she repudiated novel reading as “stirring her emotions,” lamenting

that it had “got her into scrapes,” that is, an affair with Marianna Belcombe’s sister. But she obviously savored being bad, lacerating herself (figuratively) for delicious, wicked, indulgences. Lister publicly denounced Byron’s poem *Don Juan* as indecent; in private she loved his verses and mourned his death bitterly.⁵⁴ His theme of forbidden love may have appealed to her, the “unhallowed bliss,” “The smile none else might understand.”⁵⁵ Similarly, Mrs. Barlow declared to her, quoting from Thomas Moore (Byron’s friend), that they had “no priest but love,” quoting a poem about a doomed adulterous relationship.⁵⁶ As Charles Taylor points out, Rousseau rejected the notion of original sin. Instead, “the first impulse of nature is always right” and it is “social opinion” which is “perverted.” The Romantic self, therefore, allowed the transgression of social norms, and indeed, the quest of originality and uniqueness impelled such nonconformity.⁵⁷

Byron’s poetry was not just about doomed love between men and women, he also hinted at homoeroticism, although Lister had to read him with perspicacity and imagination, inspiring her to emulate both his romantic heroism and his duplicity. Byron’s romantic orientalism also hinted at transgressive sexuality. In an incident of his most famous poem, for instance, the aggressively heterosexual Don Juan is disguised as a woman and sold as a slave girl to a Sultan’s harem, where concubines vie for “her” sexual attentions.⁵⁸

Lister used these romantic texts as material objects that conveyed significant meanings. To Isabella Norcliffe, she also gave a bound volume of Thomas Moore’s poem “Lallah Rookh,” which was perfumed with the orientalist sensuality of slave girls chasing each other “Too eloquently like love’s pursuit.”⁵⁹ And Mrs. Barlow wanted Lister to give her an expensive edition of Byron as a gift.⁶⁰ Lister thought of giving Miss Browne, a “sweet interesting creature” who lived in the neighborhood, a copy of Byron’s poem “Cornelian.”⁶¹ This poem was about a poor young man who gave a cornelian ring to the poet, a gentleman, as a token of his affection. Although the ring was not a precious gem, the poet valued it above all else; and Lister seemed to have understood that the poem referred to a love affair, not just a friendship.⁶² At the same time, the poem conveyed Lister’s understanding that Miss Browne was not genteel enough to become Lister’s romantic partner. On her part, Miss Browne seems to have felt repelled by Lister’s advances and married a local young man. While Lister had kissed Miss Browne, she never openly expressed her intentions, but safely veiled them through her romantic allusions.

The Romantic tradition was most important to Lister in allowing her to create a sense of self, which could begin to reconcile her ethical and sexual concerns. While the eighteenth century could accept the duplicity of self as part of the

masquerade, the Romantics wanted to strip down to the “essential” inner core, which had to be hidden from the world. Byron also asserted the hero as someone who was different from other men, who refused to conform: as he wrote in *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, “He would not yield dominion of his mind/To spirits against whom his own rebell'd.”⁶³ As Clara Tuite notes, this notion of the Byronic hero was also a cultural artefact, a masculine persona that Anne Lister could evoke to make her desires legible and attract other women.⁶⁴ At the same time, Lister had to read both Byron and Rousseau against the grain, for they ridiculed learned ladies such as her.

This notion of nature as hidden from the world also derived from the *Confessions* of Rousseau, which Lister found “a singularly unique display of character” that she emulated to develop her own sense of self.⁶⁵ As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, Rousseau declared, and Lister quoted, “I am made unlike all other men.”⁶⁶ Rousseau defined his singular nature through confessing his adventures in masturbation, masochism, unhappy love affairs, and describing himself as “so effeminate but yet indomitable.”⁶⁷ This was a vision of the self as somewhat androgynous that could appeal to Lister. She also used the quote to defend herself—to herself against Marianna, who disliked Lister’s public masculinity. This implies that her masculinity was part of her inner nature and could not be changed.

Revealing one’s natural self was also a trope within romantic relationships that Lister and her lovers evoked. Eliza Raine wrote that she had thrown off her “entire disguise” by writing to Lister, the only one who could “see me natural.” She feared exposure: “I write to you as my thoughts flame in my brain, if they are condemnable, condemn them only in secret.” Eliza wrote that after Lister rejected her, she needed to reject her “former self” whose love made her a “helpless woman.” Instead, “happy religion” would enable her to withstand her suffering and devote herself, alone, to intellectual pursuits. After Eliza’s breakdown, Lister herself searched for a woman to whom she could reveal her innermost self: she wrote to her friend Sibella Maclean that “I rarely meet with those who interest me, who have the charm that brings me back to that disguised, and hidden nature, that suits not with the world.”⁶⁸ (Of course, Lister was very interested in socializing in the “world.”)

This notion of the disguised self was also a rhetoric of seduction. For instance, she almost embarked on an affair with the adventuress Harriet Milne (Marianna’s married sister), writing her that “You saw that lapse of reason that, in her fall, threw back the curtain which had hidden me from myself.”⁶⁹ This made it sound that Lister had not understood her own feelings of attraction to women, but in

fact Lister had been having serious relationships with women for years. Lister used this notion of her “nature” to justify herself to her lovers.

When Marianna Lawton felt horrified at the “unnatural” nature of their connection, Lister “observed upon my conduct & feelings being surely natural to me inasmuch as they were not taught, not fictitious but instinctive.”⁷⁰ Once she had started to make love with Mrs. Barlow, she declared again that her attraction to women was “all nature.”⁷¹ By the time she met Ann Walker, the explanation of nature had become old hat: When Ann Walker doubted the morality of their relationship, “I answered this in my usual way; it was my natural and undeviating feeling etc etc.”⁷²

Lister also used the rhetoric of nature to conceal. When she became acquainted with a Miss Pickford, a masculine learned lady, Lister was not willing to share confidences. When Miss Pickford discussed her own relationship with a Miss Threlfall, Lister said she did not “censure” them, since their feelings were guided by nature and “mutual affection,” rather than artificially learned. For herself, she told Miss Pickford, “I am taught by books, you by nature. I am very warm in friendship, perhaps few or none more so. My manners might mislead you but I don’t, in reality, go beyond the utmost verge of friendship.”⁷³ Lister was quite aware that she was deliberately misleading Miss Pickford about her love life; she wrote, “the success of my deceit almost smote me.”⁷⁴ And when Lister was alluding to being “taught by books,” she did not reveal how she gained her explicit sexual knowledge.

Lister also tried to explain her “nature” as biological. In Paris, she began to study anatomy in an effort to discern her own nature, attending dissections and discovering the similarities between male and female embryos. Finding no external signs of her own peculiar nature, as she thought of it, she “alluded to there being an internal correspondence or likeness of some of the male or female organs of generation,” and when she spoke to Mrs. Barlow about this, she also mentioned that testicles could be undescended. She derived this theory from reading the popular sex manual, *Aristotle’s Masterpiece*, which depicted the female genitals as like the male’s turned outside-in—that is, the penis analogous to the vagina, and the testicles resembling the ovaries.⁷⁵ However, it is unclear whether she saw herself as a woman who had masculine elements, as man with undescended testicles who appeared to be a woman, or if she thought that because since males and females were not that physically different, she could express her unique nature as she wished. She was also very interested in the female genitals, noting that “penis muliebris” meant “clitoris” and listed a number of synonyms such as “cunne,” “cyth,” and “kuliebri.” In fact, upon learning of the “clitoris” in

the dictionary when in Paris in 1830, she “incurred a cross” in “trying if I had much of one.” This suggests that her sexual practices might have become more elaborate with this knowledge.⁷⁶ While Lister used Romantic texts as a bond of emotion with lovers, she used classical texts as a shield to conceal. With typical duplicity, she publicly told Mrs. Barlow that classical learning was improper for ladies, “. . . [because it] undrew a curtain better for them not to peep behind.”⁷⁷ In her notes on readings, she quoted Plato’s disapproval of writing or speaking plainly as causing confusion among the vulgar. But she used allusions to the classics to get other women to reveal their own incriminating knowledge.⁷⁸ For instance, she asked learned lady Miss Pickford if she had read the Sixth Satire of Juvenal, and Miss Pickford’s positive answer confirmed her hunch that she took women as lovers, although Lister did not reciprocate this self-revelation.⁷⁹ A few years later, in France, Lister again used learning to hint a little more frankly at her predilections. Discussing various Latin poets with a Madame Galvani, she began by observing how indecent they were—ostensibly to disapprove of them—but in actuality to discern her knowledge of sexuality. Observing Lister flirting with Mrs. Barlow, her fellow lodger Miss Mack asked her “Etes-vous Achilles?” Clearly, she referred to the story of Achilles being dressed as a girl and his later passionate love for Patroclus. Only a woman with classical learning would understand this as a coded reference to sex between men. In response, Lister “laughed and said she made me blush.”⁸⁰ She did not share classical texts as erotic source with other women, keeping them for her private pleasure.

Classical knowledge was usually unavailable to women, deprived of university educations; Lister herself had a private tutor. On the surface, the classics were the visible pillar of masculine and aristocratic power; like the gleaming white marble statues that adorned the British Museum, they were supposed to convey self-control, dignity, heroism, and knowledge.⁸¹ Indeed, Lister read the conventional classics such as Plutarch and Horace, who provided solace in times of change; Stoicism also fed into her sense of self as disciplined and learned; as Foucault has written, “the care of the self,” not suppressing the passions as sinful, but moderating them for health and mental equanimity. But the classics also contained explicit accounts of sex between males (and occasionally females). As she learned that admired philosophers, such as Socrates, and most Roman Emperors, were not “free from the foulest impurities,” she could conceive of herself as a learned, admirable person with sexual secrets.⁸²

Beneath the marmoreal exterior the classics concealed a robust sexual vocabulary and vivid accounts of sex between men—and occasionally women.⁸³ Byron and his friends, for example, read the poetry of Catullus and Martial,

which praised the beauty of youths as well as women, pondered elements of Plato's *Symposium*, which celebrated the spiritual aspects of love between men, and enjoyed Juvenal's bawdy, explicit humor when he satirically asked why a man should marry when he could enjoy the pleasures of a boy. Unexpurgated, Latin poetry had a sexual vocabulary much more detailed than that of English, with different words for the active and passive partner in sex between men and between men and women, the different sexual acts, and their motions; to a lesser extent, there was also a sexual vocabulary about sex between women.⁸⁴ The explicit versions of these works, however, were available only in Greek and Latin, and translators increasingly bowdlerized and "straightened" them out. Lister copied Byron's quip in *Don Juan* that editors of Martial segregated all his "indecent" poems together in the end of a volume, ostensibly to warn against their obscenity but conveniently collecting them for the curious.⁸⁵ With her knowledge Lister would have realized that Byron's poem "To Emma" was based on Catullus's verse addressed to the boy Juventius, and hence conveyed a powerful homoerotic charge with its proclamation that a million kisses "scarce would quench desire."⁸⁶

The Roman understanding of sex and the self was very different from that of Lister's contemporaries or our own: Catullus did not think of himself as a homosexual or gay man. Instead, Roman men obsessively concerned themselves with expressing sexual dominance over others, whether boys, women, slaves, or foreigners. The Stoic sense of self was based on calmness, self-control, moderation, learning, and service to others, but their focus on preserving the invulnerability of the body was also an important aspect of manliness. The opposite to the Stoic self was the man who took the passive role in sex with other men, because he was seen as controlled by his own passions and unable to discipline himself. Latin poetry went much further to insult men in the passive role as effeminate and weak (though not as unnatural). Any sign of "effeminacy" was seen as humiliating to the individual and a dangerous indication of societal decadence.⁸⁷

References to lesbianism were few, oblique, and usually scornful, so Lister had to summon all her considerable scholarly and monetary resources to track down rare editions and read in French and Latin to find any references to sexuality between women.⁸⁸ In trying to figure out what "unnatural affections" between women meant in Romans 26, her note includes the name Lucian, whose *Dialogue of the Courtesans* tells the story of masculine Megilla and Leana, two rich women of Lesbos: justifying her sexual desires, Megilla says, "I was born a woman like the rest of you, but I have the mind and desires and everything

else of a man.”⁸⁹ Lister did not record reading Lucian, but she did copy the extensive footnotes by Lubini on a seventeenth-century edition of Juvenal describing sexual terms such as “fellatio” (as fellator, the person on whom it is performed, and fellatrix, who does the act), “frictrices,” “tribades,” “cineadus” (effeminate men who took the passive role in sex with men, although they might also have sex with women), “pedicus” (sex with boys), and so on. Juvenal used this obscene language to satirize Roman society as populated by effeminate men, drunkards, and adulterous women—the aristocratic vices of his age. One of the commentators Lister read on Juvenal, the Reverend D. H. Urquhart, excused the poet as a great republican spirit whose frank verses simply attacked the immorality of his time.⁹⁰ Nonetheless, most contemporary translations of Juvenal were highly censored. Lister definitely read Juvenal for prurient reasons, but she had to read between the lines.⁹¹ The English versions were much more oblique when it came to sex between women. In the Sixth Satire, when Tullia and her foster sister Maura

pass the ancient shrine of Chastity,
It's here
They stop their litters at night and
piss on the goddess' form,
Squirting like siphons, and ride each
other like horses, warm
And excited, with only the moon as
witness. Then home they fly.⁹²

Lubini explained that Juvenal borrowed his image from an epigram of Martial, who much more explicitly referred to “tribadism,” that is, women rubbing each other.⁹³ Martial’s epigrams, which Lister knew, are even more negative than Juvenal about lesbianism. He attacks a woman named Bassa for appearing to be chaste and doing without men, but in reality “fucking” (fututor) women.⁹⁴ Lister notes down the question with which he ends the poem: is it adultery if two women are connected with each other and then refers to the entry in her own journal about when she agonized about this question with Marianna. But the words such as “tribade” or “frictrice” did not convey much of a sense of identity, since they mostly referred to sexual acts.

As Judith Roof notes, lesbian readings of cultural texts produce the “split, self-contradictory, desiring subject,” both taken in by and refusing negative images.⁹⁵ Although Martial’s depictions of lesbian women were intended to be negative, they at least gave Lister evidence that lesbianism existed. Furthermore, she may

have enjoyed Martial's depiction of Philaenus's pursuit of athletic workouts, wine, and women, a lusty, vigorous image of womanhood quite different from those available to her in early nineteenth-century England.⁹⁶ In fact, she seems to have found reading Juvenal in Latin sexually stimulating.⁹⁷ When Lister read these poems, she did not react with shock, horror, and self-disgust, but rather learnedly speculated as to whether Bassa used a dildo or not, based on philological evidence.⁹⁸

Sappho might have provided a more positive model for Lister; the Greek poet was known in Lister's time chiefly for the beauty of her verse, and classical scholars generally bowdlerized Sappho's poems into heterosexual versions.⁹⁹ But Lister read Pierre Bayle's Dictionary entry on Sappho, which portrayed her as a brilliant, learned woman whose "amorous passion extended even to the persons of her own sex." Bayle's Sappho thus bears a close resemblance to the character of Lister herself. Bayle wonders why she was called "masculine Sappho" by Horace, citing several sources, which conclude that it was because "she was tribas [tribade, or lesbian], and that it denotes the inclination she had for the sciences, instead of handling the spindle and the distaff." However, Bayle also went into great detail about the story of her doomed love for the male youth Phaon. This dictionary entry, replete with footnotes and contending interpretations about every aspect of her life, also indicated the difficulty of finding a coherent "truth" about Sappho.¹⁰⁰ After noting "most interesting" (but nothing else) regarding her reading of Bayle, Lister set about tracking down his references to Sapphic allusions in Juvenal, Martial, and Horace.¹⁰¹

Lister seems to have been fascinated with androgynous beings, such as learned, masculine women of antiquity, or effeminate, even homosexual men. In her notes on readings, she quoted excerpts on Pope Joan, hermaphrodites, and eunuchs.¹⁰² Some further clues to Lister's androgyny can be found in her borrowings from Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. Observing the moon one evening with Miss Pickford, Lister "smiled and said the moon had tried both sexes, like old Tiresias, but that one could not make such an observation to everyone."¹⁰³ Tiresias was a seer; the gods, offended when he struck two mating snakes, transformed him from a man to a woman for seven years.¹⁰⁴ Having experienced love as both a man and woman, he agreed with the god Jove that women "received more pleasure out of love."¹⁰⁵ By choosing to cite Tiresias, Lister selectively read the messages of Ovid. She enjoyed the thought of switching from masculinity to femininity but implied that women have more pleasure than men. Instead of regarding her love as unnatural and doomed, she read in Ovid a sense of human nature as fluid, as constantly metamorphosing. Significantly, she did not cite the

only tale in his *Metamorphoses* in which a woman turned into a man. The girl Iphis is brought up as a boy by her mother, since her father commanded her to abandon a female infant. Proud of the boy Iphis, the father betroths her to the beautiful Isis, and they fall in love. But Iphis is in agony, for knowing she is a girl, her feelings seem unnatural, for among animals “A female never fires a female’s love”; she prays to the gods for help, who oblige by turning her into a male on her wedding night.¹⁰⁶

Ovid also provided Lister with other myths of metamorphosis, which could help her conceptualize her relationships. Lister referred to Miss Browne as “Kallista” in her diaries; Kallista is Greek for “most beautiful” but also refers to the myth, retold by Ovid, of the nymph Callisto, beloved of Diana, chaste leader of the hunt who rejected male company.¹⁰⁷ When Callisto rests while hunting, Jove comes upon her, and in order to seduce her, disguises himself as Diana. When Callisto becomes pregnant, Diana turns her into a bear in disgust and anger at her betrayal.¹⁰⁸ If Miss Brown was Callisto, who did Lister see herself as: Jove or Diana, or one in the disguise of the other? As Jove, Lister could inflame her fantasies of “taking” lower-class young women in a masculine guise. As Diana, Lister could imagine a comradeship of free, virginal young women hunting and loving in the forest, and identify with her rage when Jove raped Callisto, just as she resented the marriages of the young women she admired.

Lister definitely had a male persona; Eliza called her “husband” and allowed her to manage her finances, but they were also equal partners intellectually. Her next lover, Isabella Norcliffe, was rather gruff and masculine.¹⁰⁹ Indeed, when Isabella visited Eliza, Eliza found her to be uncannily like Lister in her manly ways; she “ate heartily and drank freely, with all the airs of masculine fervour,” and “sat with all the freedom of a man.”¹¹⁰ But Lister turned against this masculinity and began to prefer feminine women, such as Marianna, who called her “Fred.” Lister was not attracted to Miss Pickford, despite her classical erudition, for Lister was not “an admirer of learned ladies ... [who are] not the sweet, interesting creatures that I love.”¹¹¹

Lister turned her masculine persona from a stigma into a way of appropriating masculine sexual privilege for herself, pursuing mistresses as well as potential “wives.” Lister’s masculinity signaled to lovers that a woman could sexually desire other women, in a way both threatening and alluring. Chatting in bed, Marianna “owned that [Lister’s manners] were not masculine but such as my form, voice, & style of conversation, such a peculiar flattery & attraction did I shew, that if this sort of thing was not carried off by my talents & cleverness, I should be disgusting.” Lister managed to mollify Marianna’s anxieties that night

with a “good kiss,” but a later incident incited Marianna’s anxieties even more.¹¹² In 1823, Lister strode across the moors for miles to meet Marianna as she came from York, leaping over “three steps” to bound into the coach with wild hair and sweaty clothes. Marianna recoiled with horror at her masculine appearance, and Lister felt irrevocably hurt. Their relationship never recovered.¹¹³ Other women still found her masculinity alluring, however. Flirting with Marianna’s sisters, she wrote, “my manners are certainly peculiar, not all masculine but rather softly gentleman-like. I know how to please girls.”¹¹⁴ Lister here differentiated among different kinds of masculinity, choosing an upper-class manner rather than a crudely lower-class approach. Mrs. Kelly (her former innamorata Miss Browne) refuted people who thought Lister should wear a bonnet. “She contended I should not, and said my whole style of dress suited myself and my manner & was consistent & becoming to me. I was more masculine, she said, She meant in understanding.”¹¹⁵ In Paris, some of her new acquaintances even wondered if she were a man, but Mrs. Barlow “herself thought I wished to imitate the manners of a gentleman but now she knows me better, it was not put on.”¹¹⁶ Back in Yorkshire, Lister, frustrated in her relationship with Marianna, began an avid flirtation with Marianna’s sister Mrs. Harriet Milne, who was notorious for her affairs with men. After church one day, Mrs. Milne responded to Lister’s “marked attention” by admitting “she liked me in my greatcoat and hat,” flushing as she spoke.

On Lister’s part, Mrs. Milne’s letter made her think, “Tis well I have not a penis. I might never have been continent.”¹¹⁷ Lister also sometimes imagined sexual desire herself in masculine, phallic terms. At one point, she wrote, “All this work and ordering and exercise seem to excite my manly feelings. I saw a pretty girl go up the lane and desire rather came over me.”¹¹⁸ Noting a fantasy of taking a young woman of her acquaintance into a shed and being “connected” with her (having sex) she recounts her “foolish fancying” “supposing myself in men’s clothes and having a penis, tho’ nothing more.”¹¹⁹ It’s quite important that she says, “Tho’ nothing more.” She also thought that if she had a penis, “tho’ but of small length, I should surely break the ice some of these times” with Mrs. Barlow.¹²⁰ As de Lauretis observes, “masculinity alone carries a strong connotation of sexual desire for the female body.” When a woman imagines having a phallus, the phallus becomes a “fetish,” or a signifier, for what she is normally denied; the female body.¹²¹ For Lister, therefore, imagining having a phallus was a way of representing her desire for a woman (and for male privilege) in a culture, which gave her almost no other ways of representing desire for women.

While she fantasized about having a penis, in lovemaking she does not seem to have used a dildo. To Mrs. Barlow, she repudiated “Sapphic” love as “artifice,” by which she seems to have meant the use of a dildo.¹²² Of course, she may have been lying, and she was certainly fascinated by such practices.¹²³ Yet Lister preferred the active role in lovemaking. When Mrs. Barlow felt inside Lister’s bosom, Lister “let her do it, observing I should hope to do the same,” but added that “I do what I like but never permit them to do so.” She also reacted negatively when Mrs. Barlow tried to touch her “queer” (genitals) because it was “womanizing me too much.”¹²⁴ Lister preferred Marianna because Marianna did not “see her as a woman too much,” not only sexually but in terms of observing the intimate details of her life such as menstruation. Marianna knew how to “manage” Lister’s temper, which was quite difficult; Lister was also “sensitive” to “anything that reminded me of my petticoats.”¹²⁵ However, it is interesting that Mrs. Barlow expected to be able to touch Lister, perhaps having experienced or desiring more reciprocal lovemaking. It is unclear whether Lister received as well as gave orgasms: she liked to press herself naked to other woman, for instance, in her relationship with Ann Walker, she mentions, “I had as much kiss as possible with drawers on” and “a kiss last night but no better than the last. She said I did not give her dinky as at first how it was. That is, she did not feel moisture from me as before.”¹²⁶ This implies that Ann Walker expected to feel Lister’s arousal.

While for Lister, the lack of a penis symbolized her lack of social power, her very success with women also undercut the assumption that a penis was necessary at all. As Judith Butler argues, when a lesbian “has” a phallus she exposes the “phantasmatic status” of the “seemingly natural link between maleness and power,” and exploits the eroticism of a phallus that does not need to be attached to a man, although at the same time she also signifies the phallus as a traditional masculine symbol.¹²⁷ As Lister recorded in her diary, when she made advances, Mrs. Barlow “began joking, saying I had nothing to give; meaning I had no penis.” But she went on to make clear that the male organ was not the issue, for she “Then declared she was the last to care for my having one. If I only wore breeches it would be enough.” Mrs. Barlow really wanted Lister to be like a husband to her, to support her and acknowledge her. Lister wrote in her journal that “I often felt the want of breeches—the want of being a proper protector to her” but she also noted that “if, in fact, I would really claim her as my own she would be satisfied.”¹²⁸ Clearly, the breeches—a phallic symbol—symbolized the male social role of being able to marry a woman, to protect her and support her.

Did Lister therefore simply want to be a man? Indeed, a number of women of her time lived as men, including one intellectual, Mary Diana Dods. Dods

was the illegitimate daughter of a noble family, who took up a male pseudonym to earn money by writing. When a female friend of hers became pregnant out of wedlock, Dods disguised herself as a man and passed as her husband when they went to France; returning to England, she carried on living as a man.¹²⁹ James Barry, born Margaret Bulkley, disguised herself as a boy in order to gain a medical education and became a distinguished medical doctor as a man.¹³⁰ Miss Pickford also passed as a captain and enjoyed flirting with young women in that disguise.¹³¹ But Lister never fantasized about such prospects the way she fantasized about having a penis. We do not know if this was because passing as a man would mean giving up her respectable position as an heiress, and with that, any possibility of an independent livelihood. And she enjoyed the company of women too much to pass as a man. Her negotiations with Mrs. Barlow are quite revealing on this subject. Mrs. Barlow lamented they could not marry, sighing, "It would have been better had you been brought up as your father's son," implying they could then marry. But Lister replied, "No, you mistake me. It would not have done at all. I could not have married [meaning to Marianna] & should have been shut out from ladies' society. I could not have been with you as I am."¹³²

To use Judith Butler's notion of "performativity," Lister's combination of femininity and masculinity undermined and threatened conventional gender dichotomies during a period of great anxiety about the blurring of boundaries between the genders. During the era of the Napoleonic Wars, ballads celebrated female sailors, while caricaturists mocked dandies who wore stays.¹³³ While public awareness of sodomy and the subculture of effeminate male homosexuals was high at this time (certainly reaching Lister), the linkage of lesbianism and female cross-dressing was much more occluded. Female sailors and soldiers were generally presented as donning male garb only to search for their male lovers. To be sure, tales and supposed autobiographies of cross-dressing women sometimes presented them as flirting with young girls who mistook them for men, and occasional "female husband" cases appeared in the newspapers and ballad literature.¹³⁴ But they were seen as marvels and as strange instead of as a category of women attracted to women.¹³⁵ Cross-dressing actresses such as Madame Vestris, who performed in York before at least one of Lister's friends, were openly thought to allure women as they performed in breeches roles. A poem about Madame Vestris proclaimed, "Her very hair and style would corrupt with a smile—/Let a virgin resist if she can." These accounts both acknowledged that a woman could attract another woman sexually and evaded the possibility of lesbianism; first, they could only conceive of a woman attracting another

woman if she were passing as a man, and second, they denied that this attraction could be fulfilled without a penis. The poem about Madame Vestris goes on to undercut the possibility of this lesbian allure: "Her ambrosial kisses seem heavenly blisses—/What a pity she is not a man."¹³⁶ Similarly, an 1816 caricature titled "My Brother's Breeches—or not quite the thing" portrayed a young woman wearing breeches, telling her friend, "There Maria I think I make as good a Man as my Brother." Maria retorts, "No indeed Cousin! I should think not Quite."¹³⁷

Lister's masculine appearance could incite hostility in neighbors and lovers. In the fraught political years from the French Revolution to Peterloo, some novelists ridiculed masculine women as feminists and therefore unnatural, such the mannish Miss Sparkes or the obnoxious Harriot Freke.¹³⁸ Despite—or because of—Lister's notoriously masculine appearance, she was often sexually harassed when walking in her neighborhood.¹³⁹ For instance, when Lister was walking in her own neighborhood, a male passerby asked, "Does your cock stand?"¹⁴⁰ This insult hinted that even if she was a masculine woman, she did not have the real signifier of masculinity. Rumors spread in York about her seductive ways: a Mr. Lally had apparently said, "he would as soon turn a man loose in his house as me." He also joked that Lister's relationship with Isabella Norcliffe failed because "two Jacks" could not go together.¹⁴¹ In the neighborhood, she was known as "Gentleman Jack," an epithet which may have evoked "Jack Whore," a term for a "large masculine overgrown wench."¹⁴² "Jack Whore" probably did not have lesbian connotations; "masculine" women were often referred to in newspapers of the time but without any hint that they desired women.¹⁴³ Waiting for a carriage in York, "several prostitutes . . . would have it that I was a man & one of them gave me a familiar knock on the left breast and would have persisted in following me but for" the manservant.¹⁴⁴ As Marianna and she walked through the fields, a countryman asked them if they were man and wife.¹⁴⁵ For the most part, however, hostility seems to have been directed at Lister's masculinity, rather than her sexual relations between women, which were only hazily understood if suspected at all.

Masculinity was not just about sexuality; mainly it connoted economic and political power. The first three decades of the nineteenth century were a time when rakish aristocratic libertinism was challenged by middle-class respectability.¹⁴⁶ Lister often emulated the first ideal, especially during the 1820s when she embarked on foreign adventures of seduction; but she also knew the real foundation of aristocratic power—landowning—remained, and wanted access to that power. Shibden Hall's estate did not provide enough income to support the social life she'd imagined. In the late 1820s, she moved in high Tory circles

and formed friendships with aristocratic women, but she still felt somewhat awkward and out of place, sometimes snubbed at aristocratic gatherings.¹⁴⁷

By 1831, Lister also felt alone after her long search for a suitable partner and tried to compose herself into a Stoic equanimity at the prospect: "What I dreaded is at hand and I dread it no more! My heart is lighter than I thought it could be." But in the same year, she met neighboring heiress Ann Walker. Ann Walker was of a nervous, drooping disposition and could not make up her mind whether she would consent to sex with Lister, travel with her, or live with her. Lister first saw off a rival, a Mr. Ainsworth, and then told Ann, "I did not think her at liberty to marry anyone without my consent." This stance gave Lister a "power over her which I was determined to use in her service" although of course she noted "I pledged myself to nothing." Although occasionally she fancied herself in love with her, she also knew she was playing a romantic part in order to seduce her, and became impatient with Walker's evasive coyness. To her journal, she wrote, "She likes me but my affections are not so fearfully and irretrievably hers as she thinks and I shall manage well enough."¹⁴⁸ After much negotiation, the two women finally agreed to live with each other in a marital situation at Shibden Hall, and Lister began to manage Ann Walker's property as well as her own.

To reassure her, Lister wished to sanctify it as a marriage by taking the sacraments together—and by establishing a partnership as equals to validate their sexual relationship. As Alan Bray has written in a beautiful chapter, by taking the sacraments together to cement their union, Lister turned the Christian tradition to her own ends, evoking traditions of spiritual friendship even as she made love to Ann Walker. By doing so, she also embedded herself in the long history of Halifax and the Lister family. Together, their money enabled them to renovate Shibden Hall in a way that presented Lister's image of herself as a learned lady of historical heritage but also as an elite person literally above the common folk. She restored elements of the hall to emphasize the ancient Tudor heritage, but she also built a passageway under the garden so that she would not have to see the dirty gardener as he passed from the woods to the house. She also put into place plans to build a library tower with a view over the moors and shelves for her extensive collection of books, perhaps envisioning herself above it all, ensconced in learning and superior to others.¹⁴⁹

Their union also gave them more local power. Despite the 1832 Reform Act, which gave the vote to middle-class men, landowners still controlled their tenants' votes. In her diary, she could not decide whether she should support or oppose the Reform Bill to grant middle-class men the suffrage. Although, with typical duplicity, she denounced the Reform Act publicly, she realized that

with Halifax's new members of Parliament she could exercise great power as a landowner.¹⁵⁰ Yet, Lister also became frustrated by the contradiction between her status as the proprietor of Shibden Hall and her lack of political power as a woman. Although she ridiculed the idea of female suffrage at the time of Peterloo in 1819, she started thinking differently during the Reform Act debates of 1831–2. Confiding to her diary that she believed ladies ought to be admitted to the new Literary and Philosophical Society of Halifax (as long as they did not wear large bonnets!), led her to “my old thought and wish for ladies under certain restrictions to be restored to certain political rights, voting for members ... why should [civil and political rights] be withheld from any persons of sufficient property interest in the state and education to be fairly presumed to know how to make a good use of it.”¹⁵¹

Since she became a landowner, even her neighbors who may have expressed hostility toward her masculinity had to acknowledge her economic and political power. But she exercised this power ruthlessly. She told her tenants how to vote and would only take on new tenants who were Tory. However, in the 1835 election her Tory Anglican principles lost, and some of her tenants voted against her. This was the context in which the *Leeds Mercury* inserted a notice that Captain Tom Lister and Miss Ann Walker had married; it was a hostile response not only to their gender but to her political power in a fraught political time.¹⁵² She also played an active role in the complex financial management of her new partner Ann Walker's estate near hers. This could make her unpopular especially when she intervened in a dispute over a well on Ann Walker's land. The local people and tenants had long used the well, but Ann Walker claimed it as her own, and Anne Lister instructed her men to put a tar barrel in the well to poison it for a year. However, a magistrate found against her, and the local people burnt her and Ann in effigy.¹⁵³ Again, this hostility derived as much from their economic dominance as from suspicion about their sexual union.

Conclusion

Anne Lister never saw her library completed, for she yearned for adventure beyond Yorkshire. Eventually, the two Annes traveled all over Europe and finally to Russia, where Lister became acquainted with the elites of Armenia and Georgia. However, Lister contracted a fever and died in a remote area of the Caucasus; Ann Walker brought her body back, but then went insane upon her return.¹⁵⁴ A distant relative inherited Shibden Hall on her death, and walled up

her notebooks in a hidden cupboard when he discovered the sexual content of her code.

On one hand, Lister's diaries proved that a person in the nineteenth century could create a positive identity for herself as a woman whose nature made her love only women, in the absence of any discourse that provided such an identity. As a young woman, she found that the model of passionate friendship was inadequate to express her sexual feelings and actions, and unrealistic in an era when her lovers had to marry for money. Instead, she invented her own patterns of sexual behavior and even words for sex with her lovers. Some of the women she had sex with seemed to be sexually adventuresome, like Mrs. Barlow or Mrs. Milne, willing to try male or female lovers; others, such as Marianna, were feminine but seemed only interested in men for their money. Yet seducing such women required careful, protracted campaigns in which Lister had to explain and justify her "nature" as a woman who loved only women sexually. She took the fragments of cultural representations of desire between women—romantic friendship, racy sex manuals, and footnotes in Latin texts—to create her own discourses of seduction and self. But she used this knowledge not only to seduce women but to manipulate them into incriminating themselves with their own sexual knowledge, while keeping the power of her own secrets. Lister's desire for other women was not just about her sex life; she thought of these desires as an essential part of her nature.

In arguing this I am not claiming that there is a lesbian nature that exists across time and space. Rather, Anne Lister drew on contemporary discourses of Romanticism to create a sense of self as *unlike* others, not as someone who belonged to a category. She did not think of herself as having anything in common with the women who would be her lovers. Anne Lister did not become part of a lesbian subculture, only a fragile network of lovers, ex-lovers, and friends, for her chronic concealment and duplicity tangled her love relationships into webs of deceit and competition. In this she differed from the women Martha Vicinus studies, such as the circles in Rome of sculptors, poetesses, and actresses such as Charlotte Cushman, who provided support and friendship despite their own very complicated love relationships.¹⁵⁵ Other masculine women who liked women existed, such as Isabella Norcliffe and Miss Pickford, and she was eager to find out if more Miss Pickfords existed, but she did not see them as potential members of a community, or as like herself. Rousseau's notion of the unique self enabled Anne Lister to justify and articulate her desires for women—and her desire to take masculine freedoms—as part of her nature. But the focus on uniqueness also isolated her from others and barricaded her heart.

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Richard Johnson and the Imperial Self

Authored with Aaron Windel

In the winter of 1790, a British gentleman sailed on the ship *Pigot* from Calcutta to Madras, across the Indian Ocean, around the Cape of Good Hope and home to London. Apparently, the swaying of the ship did not bother him too much, for he passed the long months by reading Enlightenment texts on human nature, politics, and empire. He scribbled quotes and comments in the commonplace books he'd been keeping for over ten years, but he never put his name on his journals; perhaps, he feared his savage criticisms of the British Empire would be discovered.

Who was the author? According to the Ames Library at the University of Minnesota, Warren Hastings wrote them; but the journals criticized the controversial governor general of Bengal's policies as "ruinous." Clearly, Hastings did not write these journals. The last notebook provides a clue: the author embarked on the ship *Pigot* in January 1790.¹ I made a transparency of the handwriting and took it to the India Office Library in London, where I found a list of the *Pigot's* passengers for that date.² One Richard Johnson was listed; I looked up his papers in the British Library, took one of his manuscripts, slid the transparency over the top, and the handwritten letters aligned perfectly. Many other details coincide; for instance, Richard Johnson traveled in the same areas at the same time as the writer of the diary in the Ames Library and knew the same people. Aaron Windel found more information about Richard Johnson's career in further research.

Richard Johnson was a minor official in the East India Company, which had acquired territorial footholds in India and functioned as a "company state."³ After the Battle of Plassey in 1757, the company won the power to administer Bengal in 1765 and made (or forced) alliances with the various rulers of the smaller states; it sent British "Residents" to ensure these allies toed the line.

Johnson became an assistant to one of these Residents in Oudh, and became an emissary to Hyderabad, but his career was never very successful for he faced charges of corruption at Oudh, was dismissed from Hyderabad, and finally retired as a quiet member of the Board of Revenue. He did manage to pack his collection of exquisite Indian miniatures and important manuscripts into great chests onboard the *Pigot*; later falling on hard times, he sold them to the India Office Library.⁴

Why should we care about this little-known man? Despite his obscurity, the documentation of the three sides of Johnson's personality—the diplomat, the Enlightenment thinker, and the orientalist—gives us unparalleled access to a personal element in the debates about the empire—and the formation of the self. Cultural critics have argued for years that discourses (such as Enlightenment texts) shape how subjects think of themselves, perceive the world, and act upon it.⁵ Johnson's notebooks provide a perfect test case, for we know what he read and what he thought about these texts; in turn, his public documents—his letters to his superiors, and official reports on his actions—reveal what he did. His worldview was shaped by three main, and often conflicting, sources: the East India Company's policies and orders; Indian texts in Persian, Sanskrit, and Hindustani (the word used at the time), and Enlightenment texts.⁶

East India Company officials wanted to gather knowledge about India. To justify their conquest, they often portrayed the former Mughal rulers as "effeminate" and decadent, or as viciously aggressive; above all, they portrayed them as oriental despots.⁷ At the same time, they also needed detailed knowledge of the complex politics of Indian courts, their laws, and customs in order to rule. For instance, Warren Hastings commissioned translations of Hindu and Muslim law codes.

Yet by exposing themselves to Indian culture in such depth, could East India Company officials become hybrid subjects, as Maya Jasanoff and William Dalrymple have recently argued, engaging in intimate and intellectual relationships with Indians?⁸ While Jasanoff acknowledges that oriental knowledge could be a tool for rule, she also points out that a few East Indian Company men, such as Johnson, admired Indian culture. Indeed, Johnson's great friend Sir William Jones may have translated Hindu laws to aid rulers, but he also praised Hindu religion as beautiful and philosophical.⁹ While critics often accused the Enlightenment of supporting imperialism, Sankar Muthu has recently argued that in the late eighteenth century, some Enlightenment thinkers powerfully criticized imperialism.¹⁰ Johnson read such texts but he never openly voiced his criticisms. Was Johnson a hybrid subject, a servant of empire, or its critic?

How did his readings affect his actions? Johnson could not simply put his Enlightenment ideas into effect, because he was caught in a world where two contending principles of empire contended and competed: interest and patronage, and rules and procedures. Diplomats like Johnson had to base their professional actions on their interest—what would bring them financial and political advantage as individuals. The East India Company operated through the rules of patronage; aspiring officials could only get ahead if they found a powerful patron, and Warren Hastings was the most powerful of all. Hastings promised to serve the king by the “acquisition of new resources of wealth and affluence to the British Empire ... by means which the most wary prudence might allow.”¹¹ He gave lavish gifts to Indian rulers; when these rulers refused to obey his wishes, he ruthlessly waged war against them. Johnson had to negotiate this complex and dangerous world, as we shall see, got into deep trouble in doing so.

Edmund Burke famously tried to impeach Hastings for corruption, arguing that principle, not patronage, should motivate the East India Company, and accusing Hastings and the East India Company of becoming oriental despots themselves. The oriental despot connoted a malignant, excessive, sexualized predatory masculinity, to which Burke counterposed a severe, controlled masculinity that emulated the Roman citizen.¹² Burke’s ally Philip Francis had a secret past as the anonymous polemicist Junius, who virulently attacked George III and his ministers like another Juvenal railing against the corruption of the age.¹³ He somehow acquired a position on the Bengal Council, where he directed his fire against Hastings, accusing him of corruption and abuse of power, and sending back incriminating evidence to Burke. As Robert Travers writes, Burke and Francis wanted to protect the ancient constitutions of England and India against despotism and corruption.¹⁴

Johnson, however, belonged to a newer generation of East India Company civil servants who were less interested in tradition or ancient constitutions and more interested in new ways of managing society. Nicholas Dirks has recently described this as a transition from “a politics of negotiation and conflict” to “an economy of rules and procedures.” In the “economy of rules and procedures,” British imperialists tried to gather extensive information about their domains in order to rule them most efficiently and to make the best use of resources. They tried to establish a rational system of governance and justice and to eliminate corruption and bribery.¹⁵ This was part of a wider move across Europe among government ministers such as Turgot in France, or the cameralists in Germany, who wanted efficient government even as they served absolutist ministers. Despite his espousal of the ancient constitution, Philip Francis also espoused

great plans to reform land tenure, and some of them were implemented.¹⁶ But unlike Francis, Johnson was not interested in the classical precedents of Roman republicanism, and he did not resort to Francis's gendered insults; unlike Francis, Johnson never quoted Roman classics in his notes.¹⁷ Displaying his masculinity in appearance and rhetoric was less important than reason, logic, scholarship, and good management.

Johnson failed to put many of his schemes into practice, in part because he became entangled in the competing interests of Hastings and Francis, and his need to further his career in the East India Company conflicted with his knowledge of its destructive practices. Furthermore, personality explains why men such as his colleagues Philip Francis and Thomas Law were more effective than the often hapless Johnson. Somehow, he was often viewed as duplicitous yet easy to offend and unable to ingratiate himself successfully.¹⁸

Very occasionally, Johnson agonized in his journals and letters about these dilemmas. But unlike the Chevalier d'Eon or Anne Lister, Johnson did not appeal to his true inner self, for as we notice from the lack of a name on the journal, he did not believe in the true inner self. Instead, like Adam Smith, he believed that everyone was born the same, shaped only by education. In his notion of human nature, people were fragmented, shaped by their sensations, and torn by passions and interests. Yet Johnson was able to turn his own struggles with passions, interest, and principle into a project of formulating theoretical perspectives to manage the passions and interests in a systematic way.

Johnson's life and career in India

Johnson's father was a doctor, and his family was engaged in commerce. He began his career as a minor Indian official and worked for the trading firm of Croftes, eventually gaining the favor of Warren Hastings, who employed him as his assistant from 1772 to 1779. Rumors circulated that Johnson obtained the divorce of Marian Imhoff, the woman Hastings wanted to marry, basically by buying off her husband. In return, Francis reported, Johnson's brother obtained lucrative army contracts.¹⁹ In turn, Hastings included Johnson in his inner circle and took him on a trip around Oudh in the summer of 1779.

Johnson secretly believed that Hastings was not ruling in the most efficient and just manner. When he took his own trip some months later, he recorded his criticisms of East India Company rule in general and Hastings in particular in his notebook. Surveying the rich soil and resources of Oudh, he bemoaned

the devastation he saw, and blamed it on the East India Company. “Whosoever has any feeling left cannot come to this place [Farrukhabad] regretting to the utmost the devastation and ruin that follows our Sword throughout this devoted Empire.”²⁰ Furthermore, he criticized Hastings for his “ruinous farming system” of collecting revenues. The zemindars, or local landholders, were given leases of three to five years, leaving them “without any radical interest in the future welfare of the land he rented” and thus prone to “plunder.”²¹ Previously, the zemindars employed local craftsmen and merchants, and gold circulated within the area. Now, Johnson wrote, “six needy English agents” collected revenue for a government “separately and conjunctively ignorant of the people they govern—laws, religion, customs and language.”²² As historian Christopher Bayly observes, British officials, unlike rajahs, could not stimulate manufacture and consumption, because they exported all profits rather than reinvesting them.²³ Johnson noted in his diary evidence of mismanagement and decay, which he often blamed on his own countrymen. However, he also blamed the rajahs and zemindars for oppressing the peasants by trying to extract too much revenue from them. Revolts soon broke out in these troubled areas.²⁴

Why did Johnson never publish these thoughts? First, anyone who criticized the EIC needed powerful allies such as Edmund Burke, for critics would harshly impugn them. Many critics of EIC policy only published their issues when they felt abandoned or rejected by the company. William Bolts, a Dutch trader who blamed the loss of his fortune on the EIC, had attacked the company as a trading monopoly that governed badly. Instead, Bolts argued, the British government should “secure the hearts of the natives by establishing a due administration of justice, and by encouraging manufactories and a free trade in the inland parts of the subjected provinces, without which they can never prosper.”²⁵ Bolts’s condemnations of the excesses of the EIC were well publicized in Britain in the 1770s, but East India Company allies claimed that he was trying to bolster his own fortune, while criticizing corruption. When William Macintosh published negative accounts of Hastings’s rule in India, Hastings’s ally Joseph Price alleged that William Macintosh was of mixed race and that he was paid by Philip Francis to criticize the company.²⁶

Johnson kept his thoughts to himself, and in 1780 succeeded in obtaining a potentially lucrative appointment as assistant to Nathaniel Middleton, Resident at Lucknow, in Oudh. The resident was to advise the Nawab, or ruler, of Oudh, whose father had allied himself to the British—after they defeated him in battle. This was a plum appointment, for Lucknow was a beautiful, cultured city where the decadent ruler Asaf-ud-Daulah patronized poets and musicians.²⁷ Johnson

immersed himself in this culture, learning the Arabic, Persian, Turki, and Hindustani languages, patronizing poets, commissioning manuscript copies of historical and religious texts, and collecting brightly colored miniatures in the bazaar. The poet Sauda dedicated verses to him, and Johnson later hosted the Indian scholar Tofuzzel Hussein.²⁸ Johnson wanted to stay in his garden in Lucknow to complete “some literary objects in the Sanskrit and Persian,” declaring that “my sole remaining happiness consists of staying here ... so habituated and wedded am I to this country.”²⁹

Johnson was completely open about his sex life in Lucknow, known for its courtesans. In the eighteenth century, British East India Company servants very commonly kept such Indian mistresses, since few English women came to India. Indeed, Johnson had earlier tried to marry a white woman with whom he was much in love, but she chose his friend.³⁰ But for Johnson, marriage was chiefly advantageous in terms of getting valuable connections and enhancing a reputation as respectable.³¹ In Lucknow, Johnson collected mistresses; like Indian rulers, he was not monogamous. He had two “bibis” and fathered at least six children with them, acknowledging them in Calcutta’s baptism registers.³² As Durba Ghosh observes, in the eighteenth century British men commonly sent back their mixed-race offspring to be educated.³³ Indeed, Johnson entrusted these children to his mother in Britain as “live lumber,” writing that “you will find them very good natured people. I have already explained in what moderate expectation I wish them to be educated—so as to be prepared for decent husbands in the Inland country towns—where they may live and die to uncontaminated by the luxuries and extravagancies and follies to say no worse of the vile Metropolis.”³⁴ Despite this fondness, his attachment had its limits. For instance, he mused, “we can have no full delight in our offspring” unless they are legitimate.³⁵ He also wondered how attached his mistresses were to him: he heard that an English captain’s “girl killed herself on hearing of his death if true this is one instance against the supposition that they are seldom fond of their European masters.”³⁶

Johnson also collected a number of erotic works that he did not segregate in his collection or try to hide, such as a folder of thirty-six ragamala paintings of scenes illustrating Indian songs; later officials of the India Office Library thought they should be destroyed as obscene.³⁷ In his writings on religion, he explained the sexual figures often found in Indian temple carvings as spiritual representations of the power of reproduction: “What idea could be communicated of a creating power for the race of man but two figures of each sex copulating which however indecent in a civilized state conveys no such shame in early periods.” To be sure,

he explained that in “advanced and increased society ... it was discovered that giving way to inflaming Ideas and representations was injurious,” but he also notes that the Bible contains such injurious motifs, such as the fact that Lot committed incest.³⁸

Johnson also created an image of himself as an Indian official. When he was nominated for the embassy to the Mughal emperor, he acquired the title of Mumtaz al-Daula Mafakhkhar al-Mulk Bahadur Husam-I Jang (chosen of the dynasty, exalted of the kingdom, the hero, valiant in war). Although the embassy excursion never transpired, he used the insignia of the title on his bookplate, according to Falk and Archer.³⁹ He also commissioned a painting of himself seated on a chair, or divan, that closely resemble portraits of Warren Hastings, Indian emperors, and lesser officials (Figure 4.1). As in the portrait of Warren Hastings, Johnson has a book in his hand, and an Indian servant waits on him; as Falk and Archer notes, the servant in Johnson’s portrait also carries a fly whisk and fringed umbrella, the “insignia of greatness.”⁴⁰ Art historian Natasha Eaton observes that British officials (including Johnson) gave portraits of officials such as Warren Hastings as diplomatic gifts, to echo the elaborate gift-giving characteristic of Indian courtly diplomacy.⁴¹

At the same time, scholars such as Bernard Cohn have shown that this erudition was a tool for rule. The British had realized by the late eighteenth century that they needed to know Persian, the language of Mughal bureaucracy, in order to govern more effectively and to exert more power. As Cohn notes, collecting was also a way that the British established their hegemony over knowledge of Indian culture; Jasanoff mentions that collecting could be like conquest.⁴² Hastings commissioned translations of Hindu laws so that he could establish courts and therefore extend British sovereignty over Indian society. By tracing Johnson’s life and writings over time, we can see that he did not integrate his fascination with Indian culture and language into the other parts of his life; rather, his life demonstrates that erudition in Indian culture enabled him to rule more efficiently. Indeed, Johnson believed that knowledge of Indian courtly life was essential to function as a diplomat and keep the upper hand. During a later posting to Hyderabad, he wrote of Indian rulers, “Forms and Ceremonies are all that are left to them, and they are proportionally tenacious of them ... drawing from the Resident public acts of submission as due to a Superior power.” He advised that “Policy may often make it expedient to give up points of form to obtain substantial objects in exchange.” But at the same time Johnson made clear that behind the politeness of personal favor lay a ruthless resort to force, concluding, “I am satisfied that all negotiations with any native independent




Figure 4.1 Richard Johnson © The British Library Board Or. 6633, f. 68

Power must be conducted with a high hand to ensure any reasonable degree of Success.”⁴³

Although Johnson profited greatly in Oudh, it was a difficult place to manage. The British regarded the nawab of Oudh, Asaf-ud-Daulah, as incompetent, weak, and corrupt.⁴⁴ Powerful Indian ministers, such as Haider Beg, ran the domain, while Asaf concentrated on patronizing the arts and poetry—and boys and girls. The British believed that a treaty meant Oudh owed them huge amounts of money, and they constantly tried to extract this cash. Johnson sometimes saw himself as an ally of the Indians. He advised the minister Haidar Beg not to pay the demands of the company, since the resources of the nawab, or, ruler, were inadequate to do so. This followed neatly from the feelings Johnson expressed in his private diary. Yet Johnson also thought, as did both Indian and British sources, that Asaf was too incompetent, and his ministers too self-interested, to harvest the resources of their land.⁴⁵ So Johnson stepped in to appoint aumils (minor officials) to collect revenues. Rather than solving the problem, a Persian official noted, the “intrigues of Hyder Beg, Middleton and Johnson caused revenue demands to be even worse and sparked revolt.”⁴⁶ Johnson then ran afoul of Haidar Beg, who was using the British in order to manipulate his master. Haidar Beg accused Johnson of usurping authority, and the EIC accused Johnson of profiting from the interest himself.⁴⁷

Johnson asserted that “white faced enemies” opposed his advocacy for the “black or native” interests in Oudh, but he soon alienated both sides, writing, “I am now adding a multitude of the black tribe” (such as Haidar Beg) to these enemies.⁴⁸ Johnson made things worse when Hastings ordered that the property of the Begums of Oudh, Asaf’s powerful mother and grandmother, be seized, and that their eunuch officials be imprisoned until they released the money owed. As a result, dozens of women in the zenana, or women’s quarters, of the Begums, suffered from hunger as funds were cut off, and the officials claimed they were being tortured. But Johnson refused the pleas of a British officer to interfere.⁴⁹ Oudh erupted into revolt, but Johnson did not keep Hastings informed of the day-to-day events.⁵⁰

As a result, he got into deep political trouble; Hastings recalled him, and the council brought him up on charges “For assuming an unlicensed authority in prejudice of the Vizier’s government, and interfering in the management of his Country in opposition to his will, and [ignoring] the endeavors and remonstrances of his minister [Haider Beg].”⁵¹ Johnson begged, pleaded, and groveled to stay in Lucknow, the garden paradise where his bibis were about to give birth.⁵² In a letter to Sir Elijah Impey, a judge and powerful politician, Johnson defended himself from

an accusation of providing bad information about Hastings to Impey by claiming he was just trying to defend Hastings against his enemies, who were “dictated by private interest [and] malice.” Johnson used a story in the *Gulistan* (a well-known book of Persian tales) to excuse his lies. In the first tale, a prisoner harshly insults the sultan who has just sentenced him to death. The sultan asks one of his viziers, a benevolent man, what the prisoner said, and the vizier responds that the prisoner is just speaking nonsense and asks the sultan to forgive him. But another vizier accuses the first of lying: one should always be truthful, he says, and the truth is that the prisoner indecently insulted the sultan. The sultan rebukes him, declaring, “falsehood mixed with good advice is preferable to truth tending to excite strife.” He pardons the prisoner.⁵³ But in a note on the manuscript letter, Elijah Barnwell Impey, Sir Impey’s son, scorns “the flippancy and bad taste” of this letter.⁵⁴

Johnson did not do much better with Hastings himself, who apparently asked him why Johnson had betrayed the favor and kindness Hastings had shown him on a recent trip. Apparently, Johnson lost his temper, and the next day wrote to apologize, excusing himself with the claim that “nature got the ascendancy over that command which every man should have over his feelings.” Hastings’s favor of him “bound me to every return and duty, involved in the terms of Patron, Parent and Governor. These three comprise probably the strongest ties in society, and by these your then treatment bound me—and by them I still hold myself bound.” It is interesting that Johnson refers to “nature” as a force which stirred up feelings and made them less controllable by reason, rather than nature as a sign of authenticity. Indeed, Johnson still wheedled Hastings to downgrade the charges against him.⁵⁵ Hastings said Johnson was guilty of “political inadequacy,” but he ultimately allowed him to be acquitted of the charges of corruption and reinstated in EIC service.⁵⁶

Johnson’s reputation suffered nonetheless. Hastings himself distrusted Johnson, writing to his wife in 1784 that “I have been privately told that the Friends of Richard Johnson are among my worst Enemies in England. He is a sad Fellow, if this is true. Be on your Guard both with him and Middleton.”⁵⁷ During the impeachment, Burke accused Johnson of complicity in the Begums’ mistreatment and Hastings of bribing him with huge contracts.⁵⁸ Johnson was known as “Rupree Johnson” and the “beardless Machiavel.”⁵⁹

This investigation represented a turning point in Johnson’s life. Although he criticized corruption, he realized he had become corrupt himself. As he wrote to his mother, “my late disgrace by my removal from my station at Lucnow [*sic*] has broken my swelling and misplaced pride, has made me behave with more decency to others before set at naught and look with more attention and concern

unto myself.”⁶⁰ Among his sins were “avarice,” “ambition,” and “licentiousness.” In his notebooks, he wrote, “Having no friend it is hard I do not befriend myself somewhat more than I do. It will be too late when shame and beggary overtake me. And my indolence bids fair to bring this soon about—which my wanton extravagance does not promise to retard.”⁶¹ Along with his obvious shame and regret, though, was a conviction that the same passions that had caused him to go astray could be harnessed for some good. “But my honored madam,” he wrote to his mother in 1783, “I need no setting right seeing and knowing but too well my own errors I can only see my disorder to correct it not to cure it.”⁶²

To reconcile the different parts of his personality, the intriguer and the principled thinker, Johnson determined to examine his conduct by following the models of the King of Prussia’s “Anti-Machiavel” and Benjamin Franklin.⁶³ Other EIC servants were similarly disposed to deliberate self-reflection and careful public presentation as pragmatic keys to further their careers. Philip Francis had set forth “Hints for My Own Conduct” when he arrived in India, vowing to be “independent of any supposed connexion To observe the strictest moderation not only in the transaction of business, but in all my discourses, especially where the interests or characters of individuals are concerned.” Francis promised himself that he would be “respectful” and evince “gravity and dignity” rather than dispute about trifles. This was all highly ironic, given that Francis proceeded to seduce women, duel his rivals, and insult his enemies.⁶⁴ Johnson was not so flagrantly libertine, but when he resolved to discipline himself by self-examination, this was not to reveal a true inner self, as with Rousseau, but to examine himself from the outside.

In 1783, Johnson wrote in his journals about being torn between principles or interest in determining his conduct which faction to join in the bitter disputes over Hastings’s impeachment.⁶⁵ Yet on the next page he quoted Abbé Raynal, who wrote that “when private enrichment forms the only code of the Individual that pernicious and destructive Code must equally pervade the Gov[ernmen]t for the Govt being composed of these individuals must necessarily partake of their nature.”⁶⁶ If the East India Company was corrupt, then it was because it was peopled by such corrupt servants as himself.

Johnson’s studies of religion also illustrate this conflict between interest and principle. Like other East India Company civil servants, Johnson found that studying Indian religions led him to decenter Christianity as absolute truth.⁶⁷ But as Justin Biel points out, while most of his contemporaries who studied Indian religion thought that a fundamental truth underlaid comparative faiths, Johnson turned against all religion. This was in part because he saw the destructive

aspects of religious conflict around him; as he wrote in his notebook one day in Calcutta, he was disturbed by the simultaneous “jarrings” of the Hindu Durgah celebration, when dancers and musicians celebrated the goddess Durgah, and the Muslim “Ashurah,” when the Muslims would process to mourn the Shi’a martyr, and the “agent of our Christian government checking the two.”

As Johnson examined Hinduism as well as Sufi texts and the Koran, he compared them to Christianity, and found all these religions to be implausible. In 1783, Johnson began to translate the Hindu *Upanishads* and other texts with the help of a pandit, or learned man; this was probably Mutiram, mentioned in a letter from William Jones, who asked Johnson to query Mutiram, his “pandit” about points of Hindu mythology. Mutiram was also a diplomat who served as Johnson’s agent in Hyderabad.⁶⁸ With the guidance of Mutiram, Johnson translated Dara Shikuh’s *Sirr-I-Akar*, an idiosyncratic translation of the *Upanishads*, and the *Dabistan*, a seventeenth-century work from Kashmir on comparative religion.⁶⁹ Dara Shikuh, the brother of Indian emperor Aurangzeb, was interested in the common truths of all religion, and, unlike his brother, welcomed all religions. In Johnson’s translation, Dara Shikuh states that he is a “seeker of the truth, and the true description of God regardless in what language it be made whether Arabic Araci [Hebraic] Sooriani [Syriac] or Sanskrit.” This work was a “treasure of the doctrine of the unity” of God. As Biel observes, Johnson (and others) were learning from the Indian traditions of religious toleration as well as imposing their own perspectives. However, Johnson was much more skeptical of Hinduism than other British scholars who interpreted Hindu mythology as evidence for a belief in God as a Trinity before Christianity.⁷⁰ As Mutiram explained to him, Dara Shikuh’s version of the *Upanishads* also conveyed an abstract philosophy in terms that common people could understand. For instance, the “soul” is the “spirit of God” but it is also embodied in the heart. A similar perspective informed the *Dabistan*.

Johnson never published the translations he carried out with Mutiram. For William Jones and other scholars in his circle, these texts, as Michael Franklin notes, made “public what was frequently a private process of self-enlightenment.”⁷¹ But that would have been too risky for Johnson, for in the process of critiquing Hinduism he lost his faith in Christianity. This caused him emotional agony, and divided the self shaped by his family from the self ruled by reason. He wrote, “I can only set down & weep at heart ... I feel myself in an inexpressible but equally irremediable agony on this account.” Christianity had shaped his self as it was “authoritatively pressed upon me by those I respect most my parents my tutors my Govt and my countrymen pressed upon with my first Ideas with my

alphabet no wonder I am awed by it. It has grown with & into every part of me.” Yet now, “at a riper period the intruding eye of reason will against my respectful feelings pierce into [and] examine it.” He asked himself, “How can I check this vagrant spirit” of inquiry? For Johnson, the self—the “me”—was created by the influence of his schooling and parents; “reason” is almost seen as an outside force deconstructing himself. He distrusts his own judgment. “How shall I ply my own reason or how oppose or how be assured that it will not misguide me?” He is aware that if he is “weak I know it not. If am I strong I cannot measure to what degree, strong is comparative and may be total weakness compared to absolute truth and wisdom.”⁷²

Interestingly, Johnson’s notion of the self echoed Adam Smith’s remarks on the individual subject rather than Rousseau’s notion of the unique self. In fact, Johnson rejected his earlier attraction to Rousseau’s praise of the state of nature.⁷³ As we have seen in the introduction, Smith implicitly repudiated Rousseau’s notion that every man is born with a distinct and singular nature. Instead, all humans are more or less the same on birth, and shaped by their environments.⁷⁴ Although he could not have read Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Johnson’s references to reason evoke Smith’s “impartial spectator,” that is, the conscience based on reason.⁷⁵

Eventually, Johnson admitted to his sister that he had rejected Christianity. Johnson used his logic to deconstruct the notion that humans were created for the glory of God: “Glory is an ostentation therefore not pure,” and “glory” is a “mortal passion” therefore “making God into the image of man,” partaking of qualities such as “wrath, mercy, and revenge.” Johnson did not depend on God for happiness. Instead, he told his sister that “we are chiefly formed for our own Happiness which is to be sought in the most pure enjoyment of the faculties that have been allotted to us, which can only be obtained ... in connection with each other and therefore in the happiness of others pursue your own.”⁷⁶ Johnson vowed “never to push my understanding which is only the action of the senses beyond the means my senses can furnish me with.”⁷⁷ This was a classic statement of Enlightenment materialism, which rejected the authority of tradition and instead depended on the perception of the senses of the material world.

Yet practical concerns prevented him from articulating his loss of faith publicly. As he wrote in his private notebook in 1789, he faced a dilemma. If “he hides his sentiments” that Christianity is false, “It must arise from fear, and he is guilty of hypocrisy. If he exposes them he loses the esteem & friendship of many valuable men of the orthodox persuasion nay he exchanges it probably for their detestation or contempt. He is deemed unfit to be admitted into serious

families and precluded from many degrees & modes of preferment. It seems clear that *Prudence* commands silence.” Perhaps he could be like Epicurus, he thought, who attended “superstitious ceremonies” out of civic duty. Inwardly he was free, but “outwardly bound by the laws of human society.” Like other Enlightenment figures Johnson believed that even if religion was implausible and irrational, it was useful for social order. Logically, it would make sense to appeal to reason and allow every man to find his own religion, but practically, that would take away from the fear of consequences and make it more difficult for the magistracy to govern.⁷⁸

To reconcile his inner turmoil and spiritual misgivings, Johnson decided to analyze the workings of the passions and the interests more generally on the human mind. He read the King of Prussia’s “Anti Machiavel,” which advised against the opportunistic and exploitative tactics of Machiavelli and advocated enlightened rule. Like Machiavelli and Hobbes, Johnson believed that understanding the passions was essential to governance. As Hobbes wrote, “examine yourself to see how passions of one man are similar to those of others in order to govern mankind.”⁷⁹ Johnson explored the theory of the passions and the interests to hone both his practice of pragmatic politics and his theory of managerial governance, which sought efficiency through knowledge of territory and people. In some situations, a manager could manipulate others’ passions through patronage, flattery, or influence; in others, he could manage the passions and interests for more efficient governance.

As Mary Poovey writes, earlier theorists advocated for disinterested, impartial knowledge about government, promulgated for the good of the state rather than an individual’s profit.⁸⁰ A. O. Hirschman’s study of eighteenth-century economic philosophy chronicles the genealogy of a discourse concerning passions to one that revolved around “interest” as a motivator of political and economic action. While Machiavelli had argued that managing passions could be a form of government, Mandeville was one of the first to suggest that the proper management of vice could bring about public benefit. Others claimed that the various passions could be used as countervailing forces. The passion for money—now dubbed “interest”—was considered a constant; at the same time it was considered the lesser of the evil passions. The trick was to harness certain passions and interests as checks against those passions that could be destructive for the public and debasing for the individual. The common good could be best served by finding a way toward understanding and channeling the myriad passions that control men’s actions. According to Hirschman, Adam Smith’s major intervention was to equate passions and interest.⁸¹

Johnson was torn between setting the individual free from government and furthering the common good through government. He was deeply influenced by the philosopher Adam Ferguson who has sometimes been seen as a bridge between the older traditions of classical republicanism and the new Scottish Enlightenment's focus on the individual's self-interest.⁸² For instance, in *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, Ferguson lamented the condition of the eighteenth-century state, which had sacrificed public duty and claimed the diminished role of arbitrator between citizens. He wrote, "To the ancient Greek, or the Roman, the individual was nothing, and the public everything. To the modern, in too many nations of Europe, the individual is everything, and the public nothing. The state is merely a combination of departments, in which consideration, wealth, eminence, or power, is offered as the reward of service."⁸³ Ferguson believed that the solution, as with Adam Smith, was for individuals to follow their own interests. "The public interest is often secure, not because individuals are disposed to regard it as the end of their conduct, but because each, in his place, is determined to preserve his own. Liberty is maintained by the continued differences and oppositions of numbers, not by their concurring zeal on behalf of equitable government."⁸⁴ But for Ferguson, it was also the pursuit of private interests to the point of corruption that was the fatal flaw of commercial society, wherein, as Gary McDowell has argued, "a single tyrant would be replaced by a whole society."⁸⁵ Johnson, however, rarely considered political virtue in the classical republican sense of masculine valor; rather, he took a view that individual interests and passions can be harnessed for the public good if managed in a systematic way. Smith argued that freeing the individual from the constraints of government was the key to the *Wealth of Nations*. Johnson was highly influenced by Smith, but whereas Smith believed that letting people pursue their own interests would benefit the good of society, Johnson speculated about more overt management of the passions and interests.⁸⁶

Johnson was also deeply influenced by the French philosopher Helvetius, a friend of Adam Smith who was a mid-eighteenth-century precursor to the Utilitarians and who suggested that a managerial elite should rule governments and societies.⁸⁷ As Helvetius wrote, "It requires those vast geniuses that embrace all the parts of a government to determine how far the fire of the passions ought to be exalted or moderated." Helvetius did not think that there were inborn moral traditions, or indeed, that any one civilization had a stronger religious, moral, or intellectual tradition; all had their flaws, but some had more powerful forms of government. Instead, people acted according to their own interests, which could benefit society. The passions of covetousness and ambition actually stimulated

the economy and the arts. But societies should have “clear principles of morality, reason, and virtue” to enable people to behave according to the public interest, not just their private concerns. Legislatures should manipulate “pleasure and pain,” which are the motors of all behavior.⁸⁸

Johnson, like Hobbes, did not see the power of reason in human action. Rather, volition was illusory and action emerged from the passions. Managers needed to understand and manipulate the passions of individuals so that they would act in concert for the public good. Johnson turned political scientist and drafted a table of the passions as a preliminary study, illustrating his managerial mind-set. Wanting a model for such a study, Johnson looked first to Hobbes who had ascribed special importance to the passions, namely those of fear and desire, in the origins of the Commonwealth. But Hobbes’s list was only a beginning and did not account for the multitude of passions that could activate men. Johnson hoped to take the abstract list of passions and implement it in government. Under the heading “Government—What Should Be Its Principles?” Johnson wrote that the object of government should be to guide and reform the passions of men. Historically, he argued, law had been used to protect life, property, liberty, and the general peace, but governments had completely ignored the power of the passions. Legal protections were useless if “the passions are not attended to and provided for” since “happiness and misery turn on these.” The site of intervention for government should be education, which could be used to both gather knowledge about the passions and manipulate those passions. “Education,” he wrote, “should be our prime object (hitherto overlooked by gov.) ... [Education] of his love, his hatred his affection, ... his jealousies.” Johnson believed these should all be the object of law and wanted to see laws changed until “it should appear that all that is possible to guide, animate, check and control him had been effected.”⁸⁹

Johnson followed theory to argue that the passions could degenerate human progress if not managed well.⁹⁰ Applying the theory to the political problems of his day and especially to the question of popular sovereignty, Johnson wrote in his commonplace book that once a nation achieves “a certain degree of civilization,” it sets up “a Government a[s] manager of their general interests under such a condition as they are best able to frame.” For Johnson, the British Constitution was by far the most perfect delegation of powers, but even in such a polished system the danger for corruption leading to despotism was profound. Johnson was further motivated to take up politics when he considered that at the moment there were very few people in parliament poised to direct the law in such a way.⁹¹

How did Johnson's understanding of the passions influence his view of race and empire? On one hand, Johnson believed in a common human nature, since everyone was prone to passions: "If we look into the conduct of individuals, whether ourselves or neighbors. If we look through the pages of history at the conduct of nations we find the whole series an [ebullition] of Passions bearing everything down before it. The American savages, the holy crusades. The civilized English seem all impelled by the same unbounded passions."⁹² This belief in universal human nature was also characteristic of the free traders and of Evangelicals, who thought Indians were capable of advancement.⁹³ In the notebooks, Johnson did not regard Indians as essentially different, and he did not espouse the contemporary stereotype of Indians as effeminate and unable to rule themselves.⁹⁴

Furthermore, despite his service to the East India Company, Johnson privately criticized the whole principle of empire. He wondered "whether the support of our constitution and our internal strength and prosperity would not be more found in the loss of these foreign conquests and a more limited pursuit of national external Glory."⁹⁵ In his commonplace book, Johnson adopted Ferguson's critique of empire as his own, copying down these words from *A History of Civil Society*: "... the ruinous progress of Empire; and hence free nations, under the stress of acquiring dominion, suffer themselves in the end to be yoked with the slaves they had conquered."⁹⁶ Above all, Johnson was inspired by Adam Smith, especially his critique of monopolies and empire, which he said "deserves to be recorded in letters of Gold."⁹⁷ Smith believed that India was a drain on the prosperity of Britain and criticized the East India Company as "monopolistic, military and despotical," inconvenient to Britain and destructive to India's inhabitants.⁹⁸ Johnson also read Raynal's *L'Histoire des deux Indes* (written with Diderot), which denounced "The rage of conquest, and what is no less destructive an evil, the greediness of traders, [that] have, in their turns, ravaged and oppressed the finest country on the face of the globe."⁹⁹

On the other hand, Johnson, like other contemporary critics of empire, did not want to give up empire altogether but to rule it more efficiently and justly. In this he followed contemporary writers who criticized the British government in India, but still believed that India needed rescuing from its ancient despotic government. Raynal (or Diderot) envisioned that if the British gave up on monopolies, they might be able to overthrow injustice, inequality and the caste system, and bring equal laws to India.¹⁰⁰ William Macintosh, EIC critic and Johnson's contemporary, believed that the company and the Mughal emperor should share the sovereignty of India and govern in

the joint interests of India and England. This would “restore to deserted lands their exiled inhabitants to erect, among a much-injured people, the standard of liberty and justice; whence improvements in agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, would flow of course . . . to rescue millions of mankind from savage anarchy and oppression; and to restore them to the enjoyment of property, liberty, and life.”¹⁰¹

Although Johnson did not espouse innate racial differences in his notebooks, he followed many eighteenth-century writers, like Adam Smith, who believed that man advanced through stages, such as the transition from pastoral to agricultural to feudal society, and that human nature therefore evolved—with British people of course being at the commercial apex.¹⁰² On shipboard in 1790, Johnson wrote in his private notebooks that “the superiority of the individual and aggregate of a state must proceed from liberty and good government. Therefore, the English are individually and in aggregate superior to all other nations.”¹⁰³ In contrast, he believed that Indian leaders “are moved by the basest and worst of passions alone. That of justice do not exist among them even as shadows. The consequence of which is that they never believe these noble sentiments to exist in others.”¹⁰⁴

Johnson, however, had to be very discreet in advising the British government for fear of damaging his own prospects. In letters about policies toward Tipu Sultan, his lofty ideals competed with the need to curry favor. Successive governors, especially Cornwallis, had singled out Tipu Sultan, the ruler of Mysore, as a formidable danger to the British.¹⁰⁵ Tipu Sultan was the son of Haidar Ali, a warrior who had conquered other kingdoms around him in South India; Tipu built on his father’s military might to create a formidable and modernizing government. Like an Enlightened despot, he managed the resources of his domains by building dams, roads, and ports; he corresponded with the Sultan of Turkey, the King of France—and the Jacobin revolutionaries who overthrew him.¹⁰⁶

In advising Cornwallis and Dundas on Tipu, Johnson’s criticisms of the empire competed with pragmatic advice. On one hand, in 1784, Johnson severely criticized the “wild effects of [Tipu’s] inordinate ambition,” citing Tipu’s modernizing efforts such as uniform weights and measures, which perhaps were too much like British assertions of managerial sovereignty.¹⁰⁷ To assert British honor, Johnson went on, it was necessary to have recourse to violence, following realist principles. “Every restraint proceeding from moderation or honor or generosity in us, they invariably attribute to timidity. They therefore will never think the better of us for not asserting our rights. Their governments are all

military. They cannot be persuaded that our government is anything else. They only know us as conquerors.”¹⁰⁸ On the other, Johnson wrote in 1787 that “The territories in India were accidentally gained by a body of merchants” motivated by “profit.” War against Tipu would not follow principles of “oeconomy” for it would be expensive and damage profits. Johnson wanted the British to follow the principles of honor and justice; if they attacked Tipu, it should not be because he was a rival to their dominance in South India, but because Tipu had violated treaties.¹⁰⁹

On his return to England in 1790, Johnson realized he had landed in hot water by even contemplating the reasons against war and tried to backpedal, disavowing knowledge of his former allies and his former opinions.¹¹⁰ He even defended Cornwallis’s war against Tipu.¹¹¹ Nonetheless, Johnson badgered Cornwallis with his schemes to manipulate Indians’ passions and interests, evoking the material in his notebooks: “Nothing is more common thro’ every degree of life than the misconduct of the weak against their superiors when they fancy themselves backed and supported.”¹¹² In a letter to Dundas, then president of the Board of Control for India, he wrote that the British government was not doing a good job of controlling “the three great passions that poison and defeat all good agency, I mean, avidity of gain, ambition of place, and jealousy between clashing authorities.”¹¹³ In a very Benthamite way, he stated that the government must reward good conduct and punish bad actions in order to control these passions. In a letter to Cornwallis, Johnson wanted to redeem the empire from its abuses and help it in public opinion: “Yet I have felt upon the spot that it would infinitely conciliate and gratify the Natives, if their Conquerors visibly and ostensibly appear’d to make the consideration of their interests, an integral part of the system. An approved agency of this sort happily selected from among those of the best character, might not only comfort and attach the Natives, but gratify many humane minds among our Country men and others, who not participating in the system think the vengeance of Heaven call’d down upon the Nation for a conquest and management in which no feature is visible, save our own interest absolute and exclusive.”¹¹⁴ However, Johnson failed to gain the support of Dundas or Cornwallis; Dundas’s own adviser suggested Johnson was incompetent to speak on EIC finances, thus scuppering his plans to establish a bank of India.¹¹⁵

Johnson had become a member of Parliament for Milthorpe in 1791, and in 1792 married Sophia Courtenay, the daughter of John Courtenay, a reforming Member of Parliament.¹¹⁶ Like his father-in-law, Johnson opposed the war in France and resigned his seat in Parliament rather than vote against the ministry

on these grounds.¹¹⁷ Johnson also advocated for mild parliamentary reform in his notebooks.¹¹⁸ While he approved of Granville Sharp's call for the expansion of the suffrage based on fundamental natural rights, not just the ancient constitution, Johnson, like Philip Francis, thought of representation in terms of what was the most efficient form of management. He feared that the people did not have the judgment to weigh the common good, although they should consent to government. However, unlike his colleagues Philip Francis and Thomas Law, he never publically expressed even lukewarm public support for parliamentary reform.¹¹⁹

Johnson did manage to father several legitimate children with his young wife and established a bank in Britain, but the bank eventually failed and he was forced out. He petitioned to return to India to regain his health and fortune, but died before he could take the voyage.

Conclusion

Johnson therefore contributed a great deal to British knowledge about India: the enormous collection of Indian miniatures and manuscripts he sold to the India Office Library became the foundation of its collections. He yearned to return to the land where he had been ensconced with his bibis and books in a verdant garden. Did this make him a hybrid subject with conflicting loyalties to Britain and India? As we have seen, Johnson compartmentalized his Enlightenment knowledge and his knowledge of Indian religious texts, keeping separate journals for each subject. And he used knowledge as a tool for rule. Although he criticized empire privately, he never did so publically, and these criticisms did not stop him from engaging in corruption and high-handed interference himself in Oudh.

Johnson espoused very scornful views of Indian culture by the end of his life. In his letters to the jurist James Mackintosh (who served in India himself), he described India as uncivilized, redeemed only by "the fortunate results to humanity from our conquests in these regions which ... proves an immeasurable blessing for the natives." While in his early years he favorably cited the Abbé Raynal, author with Diderot of criticisms of the empire, now he urged Mackintosh to defeat "Raynal and his phantom army." He also argued that the British did not need to learn anything from the Indians, and that in fact their religion was barbaric, since "male adults were sacrificed to idols, that women are constantly burned with their deceased husbands, and that children

are murdered for the purposes of enchantment.”¹²⁰ On one hand, it is possible that Johnson was trying to curry favor with Macintosh to redeem his position, and that he really did not believe in these negative images. On the other hand, he may have been influenced by the increasing tendency to portray India as uncivilized and barbaric, shortly to be set in stone by James Mill’s notorious *History of British India* (1817).

What can Johnson tell us about the wider questions of the self and gender? Johnson differed from Edmund Burke and Philip Francis in his lack of preoccupation with masculinity. He did not denounce others as effeminate or brag of his own courage and virility. Nor was he the “man of feeling” of contemporary novels, who wept at the sufferings of others. He did not look within his heart, as did the Chevalier d’Eon and Anne Lister, to find a distinct, inner nature as celebrated by Rousseau that would excuse all his peccadillos. As a privileged white man in India, he did not have to question his gender or keep his sexual relations private, even as he took Indian mistresses. This was not an expression of his allegiance to Indian culture, for he never referred to the fate of his “bibis,” only to his own children. To be sure, he did have to keep his criticisms of the East India Company secret, because he could not put his ideas into action in the political climate of the time. In part, this was due to his personality that rubbed people the wrong way; others, like Philip Francis and Thomas Law, were more successful in navigating the shoals of Indian politics to put their principles into great plans for land reform. Instead, Johnson briefly turned his gaze inward to examine his emotions from the perspective of the impartial spectator, to use Adam Smith’s term, to see his own faults and dilemmas as an object of study. He immediately turned from scrutinizing his own passions to look outward, to examine the passions of people in society as a whole, dreaming up schemes for managing society by manipulating people’s emotions. In doing so, he set a precedent for a new kind of self, the faceless scientific legislator.

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James Hinton and the Sacrifice of the Self

James Hinton was an influential prophet with a secret. Respected in eminent Victorian intellectual circles, his call to self-sacrifice influenced young people to abandon their comfortable homes and careers to serve the poor in the slums.¹ Hinton was also rather eccentric. He didn't just pontificate about the poor, he once disguised himself as a beggar and wandered London's West End.² Secretly, Hinton abandoned his earlier Evangelical upbringing and advocated polygamy as the solution to poverty and prostitution. He arrived at this startling prescription queering the dominant discourses of his time: Darwinism and Evangelical Christianity. Eventually, he influenced the sexual radicals of the 1880s and 1890s.

Yet, during his lifetime, Hinton was known only as the prophet of self-sacrifice. Social purity activist Ellice Hopkins even wrote a biography of Hinton that portrayed him as an eccentric yet devout Christian, ignoring—or ignorant of—his heterodox views on prostitution.³ During his lifetime, only a few intimates knew of the radical ideas that he scribbled on scraps of paper. His female relatives collected his notes into five fat manuscript volumes, marking some statements as “not to be published.” Toward the end of his life, some of these notes were published in his *Selections from Manuscripts*, but few slogged through the four closely printed, privately published volumes to find the hints of polygamy in the last one.

It is hard to get at Hinton, the man behind the eccentric image, for he detested the focus on the individual self and public appearances. His wife Margaret complained that “he was such a troublesome man ... it was so hard to get him to have his hair cut and his photograph taken.”⁴ He did write a short manuscript autobiography, but it is not a conventional narrative of the self; rather, Hinton transformed his personal experiences of youth, marriage, and work into larger abstract philosophical problems. Instead of narrating the self, he aimed to abandon it.



JAMES HINTON.

Wellcome Images

Figure 5.1 James Hinton © Wellcome Collection, licensed under CC BY 4.0

Hinton's winding path away from and toward Christianity

Evangelicals had long admonished Christians to emulate Jesus in sacrificing themselves. Early nineteenth-century theology focused on the atonement, the notion that Jesus had given up his life with great sufferings so that God the Father would forgive humans their miserable sins.⁵ Self-love distracted people from God and encouraged the desires, which encouraged sin and therefore mocked the sufferings of the atonement. For Hannah More, self-love was the canker at the heart of the soul, “the ever-flowing fountain of all the evil tempers which deform our hearts, of all the boiling passions which inflame and disorder society,” leading us to set up “our own passions against the will of God.”⁶

To suppress these “boiling passions,” people were supposed to live simple, self-denying lives. As Deborah Cohen observes, Evangelical households tended to be rather plain, with uncomfortable chairs instead of sofas that would encourage lazy lounging.⁷ Families spent Sundays as a day of devotion rather than relaxation, with long hours in chapel or church, sitting in a stiff, tense quietness.

The doctrine of self-sacrifice applied differently to middle-class men, women, and the poor. Victorian Evangelicals exhorted women to sacrifice themselves to serve others, especially their family members.⁸ Moralists told Christian men to control their selfish passions in order to succeed. While Victorians believed desire was “essential to the subject’s growth,” impelling men to strive for love, comfort, and success, it “also posed a threat to [the subject’s] individuality,” as Nancy Armstrong writes. The proper individual could not govern himself and accumulate prudently if he were driven by his own desires.⁹ Desire was often seen as something characteristic of the lower self that needed to be sacrificed and tamed by the will, and in Evangelical religion, redeemed by Christ. And it was also seen as characteristic of the lower orders. Evangelicals believed that their piety and self-denial gave them the right to judge others, especially the poor, whom they blamed for their own misery.

The scion of an Evangelical Baptist family, Hinton was an unlikely prophet of polygamy. John Howard Hinton, Hinton’s father, was “a narrow, humorless,” Calvinist preacher: “autocratic and overbearing,” he wept “profusely in the pulpit” when he preached before large audiences of “intelligent well-to-do tradesmen, bank clerks” and professionals.¹⁰ As a Calvinist, Hinton senior first believed that the atonement only redeemed the sins of a certain Elect; most people were

doomed to the miseries of hell. But he moved away from the strict version of the atonement toward a more universal view of salvation, arguing that Jesus died so that all could be forgiven, not just a select few.¹¹ He also espoused more liberal political ideas that many Evangelicals, not only agitating against slavery, but lecturing for Joseph Sturge's Complete Suffrage association and admonishing business leaders to share their profits with the working class. However, he opposed the Owenites who envisioned utopian socialist communities funded by the redistribution of property.¹²

Hinton's mother shocked her husband's congregation with theological innovations that deeply influenced her son, twisting the Evangelical focus on female self-sacrifice into a validation of womanhood. When an acquaintance remarked that her son had "something of the woman in him," Mrs. Hinton replied, "I desire nothing better for my sons than that they should have something of the woman in them. Jesus Christ had." In a tract anticipating the millennial second coming, *Thoughts for the Heart* (1847), she celebrated women as more spiritual than men. Man needed to learn to "master the blind selfishness of the mere animal within him," and it was woman's task to help him do this by sacrificing himself for him. Eliza Hinton believed that present society degraded woman and refused to recognize her spiritual superiority.

Her beliefs about immortality also presaged her son's focus on the dissolution of the self. Theologians were engaged in a debate about the immortality of the soul; Mrs. Hinton argued that it was presumptuous "self-exaltation of poor human nature" to imagine that souls would be saved and live forever as individuals, or that the damned would suffer the burning fires of hell forever. Instead, after the second coming, sinners who rejected Christ would be annihilated rather than suffer forever in the burning fires of hell; those who were saved would lose their individuality and become part of God. This notion resembles her son's later vision of souls giving up their existence as individual selves and dissolving into the divine presence of Nature.¹³

Hinton did not follow the family path into the clergy. After several false starts as a clerk and an apprentice, he qualified as a doctor. But Hinton's medical training led him to reject biblical accounts of miracles. Raised to believe in the Bible as the inerrant word of God, he found inconsistencies and injustices in the text that led him to doubt the existence of God, causing him intense mental anguish. This disturbed his fiancée Margaret Haddon, who was a devout Christian.¹⁴

To escape this turmoil, he traveled to Sierra Leone to tend to African laborers freed from the slave trade only to be shipped to Jamaica as laborers. He wanted to study "savage life, and form some idea of the nature of man apart from

Christianity.” Hinton learned Yoruba to be able to converse with these people and admired the strength of some of the women who took charge of their fellow laborers aboard ship and in Jamaica. He refuted the British criticism of Africans for supposedly making women do such heavy labor; it was just a matter of custom, he said, and the women took pride in their strength. Despite this sympathy with the laborers, he evinced some racist views, regarding the “emancipated Negroes” as inferior to the “genuine Africans,” but when he saw enslaved people in New Orleans, he changed his mind and admired their accomplishments. Hinton criticized white society more harshly; although each individual seemed to be a reasonably good person, the whole society was “odious” having been founded on self-interest—presumably meaning slavery—instead of care for others.¹⁵ However, Hinton did not address questions of race and empire in his later work.

Upon his return to Britain, Hinton focused on his medical career and became a successful surgeon operating on the ears. However, in 1859, he abandoned this career to concentrate on philosophical writing, producing a number of influential books, including *Man in His Dwelling Place* (1859), *Life in Nature* (1862), and *The Mystery of Pain* (1866).¹⁶ His dual medical and literary accomplishments earned him a place in the elite Metaphysical Society, where he joined such luminaries as the Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone, and Cardinal Manning, and the poet Alfred Lord Tennyson in discussing science and religion.¹⁷

Hinton regained his Christian faith in a rather distinctive interpretation that tried to unite spirit and matter. In his early work, he followed Evangelical religion in advocating the control of pleasure as key to the sacrifice of the self, but put these traditions in a more modern frame that would appeal to those interested in science and nature. For Hinton, to focus on the self was to be spiritually dead. Self-sacrifice was the solution, not only for personal salvation but for personal solace. In *The Mystery of Pain*, one of his most influential books, he repudiated the notion that pain was a punishment for sin, but he still asserted that pain could acquire meaning if it were seen as glorious martyrdom and self-sacrifice.¹⁸ Christian theology of the time held that the believer gives up his “old self,” metaphorically crucified as Jesus died, in order to have a new life redeemed from sin.¹⁹ The Congregationalist theologian Edward White (the pastor for Hinton’s sister-in-law Caroline Haddon) declared that the way to salvation “is to abandon self as the centre of our being; to abound in labor for the glory of Christ in the salvation of men,” to “go about doing good.”²⁰ Hinton also read deeply in the theological words of the poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who speculated that the Christian believer must die in the self in order to be reborn. However, Coleridge advocated starting with self-knowledge, and then moving beyond this

stage toward greater communion with the divine and others.²¹ Hinton ignored the first stage and went straight to the second.

In his early writings, Hinton advocated the self-discipline of limiting pleasure, following other modern thinkers. He followed Coleridge in rebuking those who involve themselves spiritually and financially in “heavy debt for certain gewgaws, for high-seasoned meats, and intoxicating drinks, and glistening apparel,” instead of focusing on the spiritual life.²² John Howard Hinton declared that without God’s guidance man would be enslaved by his passions.²³ Edward White fulminated against the “animal passions, forming into habits of licentiousness, and mingling with impure, malignant affections, [that] predominate in the individual, and permeate society.”²⁴

In his early career, James Hinton similarly admonished his followers to restrain their passions and desires: instead of being “a slave of passion,” awaiting inevitable evils, the soul must accept Jesus and be redeemed. In 1860, Hinton distrusted the physical world, seeing it as a shadow of the spiritual world. He believed that Jesus took on physicality as a degradation, to sacrifice himself for man.²⁵ In 1861, he warned his readers that “the burning passions in their hearts are never quenched, nor can be quenched; that one desire sated, another takes its place; that the imperious appetites are their plague and torment.”²⁶

Hinton and the family

In his early writings, Hinton saw marriage in rather mystical terms, as the union of the two opposite principles of male and female into one, which could produce a higher, spiritual form of life. As so often with Hinton, he intensified the conventional Victorian focus on romantic love—and brought out its contradictions. While Evangelicals saw marriage and family as a religious calling, Luke 14:26 quotes Jesus as admonishing his followers to leave their families, even to hate their families, for family life could distract from God. While Evangelical, middle-class Victorians valued family life above all, Hinton’s father warned that because “the time is short,” death would soon vanquish the precious affections of husband and wife and parent and child; therefore, the believer should focus on God.²⁷ Hinton junior took this even further to consistently criticize marriage and the family. In 1856, he wrote in his private *Selections from Manuscripts* that the love of a mother for child, or love in marriage, could still be seen as love of self; true divine love, by contrast, required giving up the self to God.²⁸ In his 1861 book, *Man in His Dwelling Place*, he wrote that while marital affection was

God's own gift, it "fills our hearts with passions, and burns us up with the fire of insatiable desires."²⁹

Hinton's turn from the practice of medicine to philosophical writing troubled his own marriage, since it necessitated a move for a few years from their large comfortable home to a small terraced house in Tottenham, where his wife Margaret had to keep the house clean with one servant. When she pled for money for the children's clothes and school, Hinton declared it was a "superstition ... that people 'ought' to live according to their income; ... that a man's duty is to give all luxury to wife, all advantages to child and so on."³⁰ As usual with Hinton, he elevated his petty marital complaints to a philosophical level. When Margaret asked that he pay to replace a ragged carpet, he wrote in his manuscripts that "we see the utmost evils but attend more to our own trifling pleasures."³¹ He rebuked his wife for spending so much time on housekeeping instead of higher pursuits: "The sensitiveness of your senses to dirt makes you blind."³² Of course, she was cleaning for him instead of pursuing her own vocation of nature painting.

Like some other Victorian men, Hinton chafed against domestic obligations.³³ James Fitzjames Stephen, a fellow member of the Metaphysical Society, denounced the luxuries of the home for sapping the energy men needed to rule authoritatively.³⁴ In contrast, Hinton linked this flight from domesticity to social justice. He thought that men, urged on by their wives, selfishly concentrated too much on the domestic pleasures of the home; people should recognize that their own domestic comfort depended on the misery of others. This notion that domesticity was selfish even influenced Hinton's friend, social purity activist Ellice Hopkins, who criticized middle-class Victorian families for refusing to let their daughters leave home to engage in philanthropy. She declared, "Is there not at least some truth in James Hinton's sarcastic observation that 'the devil always comes to an Englishman in the shape of his wife and family?' From the very strength of our family instincts, our family selfishness is the hardest thing we have to overcome."³⁵ In his New Reformation society, Scottish businessman and writer Alexander Alison similarly criticized the "love of children" as potentially selfish and undermining of Christianity.³⁶

Hinton and the New Reformation

The New Reformation movement of the mid-nineteenth century reacted against strict Evangelicalism's suspicion of science and insistence that the Bible was the absolute truth. In reaction, the New Reformation uphold the spiritual truth of

the Bible but used textual analysis to point out that it was authored by many people, not a divine voice. Thus, they hoped to reconcile science and religion, and spirituality and social justice.

Above all, the new reformers—including Hinton and Ellice Hopkins—rebuked Evangelicals for ensuring their own salvation as individuals but neglecting the misery of the masses.³⁷ As Hopkins waspishly noted, “Christianity assumes more or less the form of a Life Insurance Office, at which in return for a certain amount of faith and goodness you insure yourself against the risk of perdition hereafter,” but such Christians only consider the rest of society as an afterthought.³⁸ Frederick Denison Maurice declared that Evangelicals “have made the giving up of Self the plea for the most intense calculating Selfishness.” A Christian socialist, unorthodox Anglican preacher, and member of the Metaphysical Society, Maurice criticized members of the middle class for selfishly competing against each other, thus harming the wider interests of society.³⁹ For Maurice, Christianity should reconcile the self and other: the “self must be an object of intense torment and hatred to me, unless I am the member of a body,” but at the same time, “I cannot love another person unless I do also love myself.”⁴⁰ Maurice therefore espoused the sacrifice of the self for the good of all. Hinton also linked self-sacrifice and social justice. As Hinton wrote in his journals in 1873, “the true meaning of the glory of God, and the service of Him,” is that “regard must be to *all*, not to a few.”⁴¹

As a doctor, he walked from the prosperous West End of London to its miserable East End, where ragged children played on dung heaps in the street and ravaged prostitutes solicited men from dark alleys. For Hinton, help had to come from a deep sympathy with the poor, rather than the judgmental stance of the old Evangelicals. He also disliked the new Charity Organization Society that asserted its own expertise to categorize the poor as deserving or undeserving; in response, Hinton argued that philanthropy should not be conducted as a business.⁴²

As an alternative, Hinton pioneered the popularity of altruism in the Victorian age, a word he borrowed from the sociologist Auguste Comte, who countered the Catholic notion of original sin by asserting that altruism was innate within human beings. Like Hinton, Comte was against the notion of the unitary, indivisible self.⁴³ Hinton used Comte’s notion of altruism as an alternative to political economy, which he denounced for its “gross follies and evils, and monstrous wastes.”⁴⁴ But he was not a socialist. He thought that workers who demanded their rights were still too selfish; as he proclaimed, “The use of rights is to give them up, not to maintain them.”⁴⁵

Hinton and science

Hinton thought that we should learn altruism from the study of nature in modern science, for in nature, “nothing exists in and for itself.” He saw the material world as infused with and motivated by spiritual power, which humans could not often perceive. In *Life in Nature*, Hinton criticized the mysticism which put the spirit above nature, the body, and the organic world. Rather, he believed that spirit and nature were one: “nature itself must be the phenomenon—or appearance—of the spiritual world.”⁴⁶ By the late 1860s and early 1870s, he equated Nature with God. In *Man in His Dwelling Place*, he celebrated “Life infinite and boundless; throbbing in our veins with a tiny thrill of the vast pulse that courses through the infinitude of space; the joy and sorrow in our hearts calling us to an universal sympathy, guaranteeing to us a sympathy that is universal, in return.”⁴⁷ His thought therefore resembled the popular philosophy of vitalism, the idea that a life force, or vital spark, animated all living beings, but he went beyond this to see inorganic matter animated by magnetism, electricity, and chemistry as part of this spiritual unity.⁴⁸

Hinton espoused a view of science which challenged the Victorian focus on individual competition and Darwin’s vision of animals competing tooth and claw for mates and survival. Hinton was very interested in the idea of “individuation,” which he drew from Coleridge.⁴⁹ Unlike Coleridge, he did not see a distinct inner will or life force producing the shape and forms of beings, or individuating them. Instead, he believed that plants or animals grew against physical resistance, such as wind or a tree branch, which produced different forms, such as spirals, in nature.⁵⁰ Hinton viewed all living things as only individuated because they were separate units; composed of the energy and matter of the universe, they were not defined by their utter difference from that which surrounded them.

While Hinton objected to the focus on individual competition in the new Darwinian philosophy, he readily accepted the principle of evolution—that plants and animals evolved through adaptation to their environment. But he thought that self-sacrifice was key to evolution, for in nature, “a force [gives] up itself that another may be.”⁵¹ Thus nature (both organic and inorganic) could be seen as transcending “the universal rapine and utter selfhood of the animal creation.” In nature, he declared, “the glorious sweep of her order refuses to revolve around that miserable center of the self.”⁵²

In *Life and Nature* and other works from the 1860s, Hinton still took a negative view of passion, including sexual passion. Hinton regarded nature as operating through forces of opposition, such as decay and nutrition, force and resistance;

one thing that needed to be resisted was passion; he argued that “passion resisted is the source of life”... Man’s “passions duly subjugated are the very source and secret of his life,” but if they run “riot without check, [they] work in him mere corruption, and consume his manhood.”⁵³ In 1856, he wrote that “sensuality is above all things the very image of death. The abhorrence for unchastity has this deep foundation in nature; and is perhaps of all facts the most expressive.”⁵⁴

The turn to pleasure

In the 1860s and 1870s, Hinton moved from repudiating to celebrating pleasure. Given Hinton’s interest in the play of opposites, he came to see pleasure and pain as necessary components of human life and spirituality. As his sister-in-law Caroline Haddon explained of his thought, “Life presents itself everywhere, whether in the individual body or the social organism, as a series of processes of nutrition and function, or the production and the ceasing of a tension, the storing up of force and its liberation.” If the passions and pleasures are restrained, “disease, decay, corruption spring up.”⁵⁵ In the *Contemporary Review*, Hinton wrote that “the spiritual and sensuous” should not be seen as engaged in a strife or a competition, but instead “they are joint factors in a common work” of doing good for all.⁵⁶

In this, Hinton took part in a larger cultural move toward pleasure and away from the self-denial of both Evangelicalism and political economy.⁵⁷ Thinkers of the New Reformation pointed out that “self-denial, for the sake of self-denial, does no good This is mere self-culture; and self-culture, being occupied forever about self, leaves you only in that circle of self from which religion is to free you.” Instead, sacrificing pleasure was only meaningful if it benefited others.⁵⁸ By 1863, even Rev. John Howard Hinton admitted “sensual pleasures generally, in themselves not sinful, but liable to excess, or to excessive regard” if they were “the object and business of your life”; he added that self-denial was not one of the essentials of Christianity.⁵⁹ Ellice Hopkins also criticized total abstinence from alcohol as a realistic goal for working men. Working men needed their pleasures, she argued, and clubs for working men should serve drink.⁶⁰ Secular thinkers like Herbert Spencer and Comte also rehabilitated pleasure.⁶¹ Like Hinton in his later thought, Comte believed that the natural instincts toward nutrition, reproduction, and other pleasures were not harmful, if subordinated and controlled toward socially useful ends. Comte also condemned “excessive austerities,” which made people unfit to serve others.⁶²

Evangelicals and political economists had argued that sexual desire had to be suppressed in order to delay marriage. But by mid-century, this harsh dictum had been challenged. Idiosyncratic theologian F. D. Maurice criticized Evangelicals for denying the pleasures and needs of the flesh in marriage, and the pleasures of the physical world in general. Of course, Maurice was not a sensualist in the way Hinton became; rather, this plea for the material body derived from his belief in the regeneration of the body through Jesus, and in the idea of the incarnation.⁶³ Similarly, in her Christian socialist novel, read by Hinton, Eliza Lynn Linton refutes the political economist who tells the poor that abstinence and delayed marriage were the only solution to their woes. People need their pleasures, she insisted. "Pleasure and pain and sin and virtue all rested equally ... in Christ's bosom, for He condemned no one."⁶⁴ Of course, these writers wanted sexual pleasure to be found only in marriage.

As a doctor, Hinton was confounded by the mid-Victorian tendency to denigrate sex in public yet indulge in it in private. He noted that sexual passion was seen as something that should be treated with "shame and secrecy"; for instance, when he was a boy he felt guilty on reading an obstetrical book in his father's library, and indeed the book soon disappeared from the shelves.⁶⁵ To Hinton's horror, many doctors believed that men needed sexual intercourse for health.⁶⁶ A young curate told Hinton that "I have not been *much* with women ... only thirty."⁶⁷ This attitude, Hinton argued, cheapened and degraded sex. Doctors debated how much women experienced sexual pleasure, some, like the best-selling William Acton, declared that respectable women did not feel sexual passion, while others, like the eminent but less influential James Paget, asserted that healthy women did and should experience pleasure in the marriage bed.⁶⁸ In his notebooks, Hinton wrote that women abhorred sex, but not because they disliked the act itself, but because men approached them crudely and used them for their own sexual satisfaction.⁶⁹ At the same time, Hinton thought that this artificial and distorted "absence of bodily passion in women" was actually very cruel to men, because Hinton believed that men *did* have sexual needs that they could not suppress.⁷⁰

Prostitution and polygamy

Prostitutes thronged the streets of Victorian London, ranging from the elegant courtesans in carriages to the ragged streetwalkers lurking in East End alleys. Respectable women were not supposed to notice, but men could not evade this reality. As a teenager, working in a draper's shop in East London, two women

crudely propositioned Hinton. He wept when he told this story to Ellice Hopkins many years later.⁷¹ As a doctor, he also saw the ravages of hereditary syphilis on children's hearing and brain function.⁷²

Hinton and many others thought that prostitutes as martyrs to conventional virtue suffered for the "redemption of the world." Jesus sheltered the outcast, the prostitutes, and thieves, wrote novelist Eliza Lynn Linton, noting that prostitutes saw themselves as martyrs who made the comfortable, virtuous lives of middle-class women possible.⁷³ Similarly, Ellice Hopkins ministered to the poor, the outcasts, and prostitutes, and she and Hinton had long conversations about the martyrdom of prostitutes. Influenced by Hinton, Ellice Hopkins saw the spiritual and scientific as intertwined, as the divine infused nature and the body. She regarded the body as "a temple of the holy" and endlessly campaigned for sexual purity, especially male chastity, as the solution to prostitution.⁷⁴

In 1860, Hinton blamed men's lack of self-control for prostitution, but he came to believe that chastity caused prostitution and that sexual satisfaction for both men and women would solve it.⁷⁵ He disagreed with the campaign against the Contagious Diseases Acts that mandated compulsory registration, examination, and treatment of prostitutes for venereal disease, privately claiming that "this rousing of women against the oppression of the prostitutes" really aimed at "the enforcing of celibacy on the unlucky." As he mused in his manuscripts, "Of course, soldiers and servant girls ought to sleep together; and our business is to find the means and conditions; if marriage won't do, then we must find some other way that will."⁷⁶

Hinton decided that this other way was polygamy. Alluding to the common fear of "surplus women" in Victorian England, he argued that many poor women had to resort to prostitution because they could not find husbands and could not support themselves. At the same time, monogamous marriage did not satisfy men's sexual needs. Polygamy would allow men to support two or more wives and gain sexual satisfaction. But for Hinton, polygamy would indeed be a sacrifice, because he thought that supporting a wife was a terrible burden, and supporting several wives would presumably be even more onerous.⁷⁷ But if men supported more than one wife, in his view, fewer women would have to be prostitutes. Although he theoretically admitted the possibility that women could have several husbands, he insisted the female nature was to sacrifice the self.⁷⁸

For Hinton, polygamy would also solve the flaws of the institution of monogamous marriage. Hinton did not advocate early marriage as a solution to the problem of prostitution, as had Eliza Lynn Linton, because he was personally as well as intellectually discontented with the Victorian institution of marriage.

Given his reluctance to examine himself, and his tendency to turn personal problems into abstractions, it is impossible to identify a personal crisis out of which a need for sexual pleasure emerged. But he certainly wrote that marriage destroyed the soul. He repeatedly (although privately) denounced the “scorching misery of the home” as stemming from the Satanic worship of the self.⁷⁹ For Hinton, like other sexual radicals, sexual passion was part of a larger spiritual quest, which could not be satisfied in marriage, a yearning for “the pleasure of body and soul, craving of soul, sympathy, as well as body.”⁸⁰ He admitted that love intoxicates but questioned whether that feeling should be permanent, while he insisted the highest and truest love (of sympathy and companionship) may arise without passion. He also complained of “the enforced contact; we cannot choose our times of loving intercourse, as we can with our other friends.”⁸¹ At one point Hinton considered divorce as a solution to unhappy marriages, but he then decided divorce would not solve the problem.⁸² Nor did he propose birth control to enable people to enjoy sexual pleasure freely. When treating a patient whose wife was worn out by eleven childbirths, he mused to himself that if the man had two wives, they could share the burden of childbearing.⁸³

Other Victorian radicals proposed free love as an alternative to unhappy marriages. They declared that ordinary marriages were based on property and on dull, prosaic companionship. Instead, men and woman should form relationships on the basis of spiritual closeness and an intense soul-bonding—a “spiritual marriage.”⁸⁴ This passion would take precedence over any legal marriage, and indeed, Victorian radicals often opposed the formalities of matrimony. After the 1830s, free love flourished much more in the United States than in Britain.⁸⁵ But Hinton did not focus on free love; in his writings, he only once discusses this feeling and craving for a particular woman. He did not see sexual love as the union of two individuals, because he wanted to abandon the self; he wanted to connect to the life force of the universe rather than an individual.

Religion and polygamy

Polygamy was discussed in Victorian Britain either as an atavistic remnant of barbaric societies, or as a bizarre product of utopian sects. Comte mentioned polygamy as a part of an earlier stage of civilization and saw monogamy as more advanced.⁸⁶ In 1855, Bishop Colenso of Natal sparked a firestorm of controversy when he refused to force Christian converts to give up their plural wives; he argued that polygamy could be compatible with Christianity.⁸⁷ An 1867 article

in the *Westminster Review* was also fairly positive about women's status under polygamy in Turkey.⁸⁸

Hinton was quite interested in Mormon polygamy, a topic of fascination in mid-Victorian Britain. Some, like William Hepworth Dixon, author of *Spiritual Wives*, praised the Mormons for their industry and enjoyment of everyday pleasures.⁸⁹ As Sebastian Lecourt observes, Victorians debated how far society should tolerate the strange customs of new religions, but they also worried about polygamy.⁹⁰ In 1861, Richard Burton, famed explorer and sexual renegade, published *City of Saints*, his controversial book on the Mormons in Utah. Burton daringly asserted that polygamy was characteristic of most of the world's societies and that it prevented adultery and prostitution, which destroy "the frame-work of society, and the peace of the domestic circle."⁹¹ Monogamous societies were hypocritical because by sanctioning prostitution they in fact allowed men to be de facto polygamists without responsibility, a sentiment Hinton also often voiced. While many reviewers disapproved of Burton for accepting Mormon polygamy, his book did open up a discussion of polygamy, as, for instance, practiced in ancient Judaism and contemporary Islam. In 1873, Burton spurred his fellow members of the London Anthropological Society to consider that polygamy might improve the status of women and was not as barbaric as usually proposed. Other critics condemned Burton for his advocacy of the practice.⁹²

In his manuscripts, Hinton denigrated Mormonism as "brutal," perhaps because he did not think women were given a choice in their marriages. But he echoed Burton in arguing that plural marriage with "sister wives" would help women bear the burden of domestic drudgery now borne by servants.⁹³ (Other writers pointed out Mormon men married women instead of paying them as servants.)⁹⁴ In his manuscripts, Hinton mused,

Were it not a lovely order if all the work in the house being done by ladies—wives, if that were called for, but all ladies, all equal, all full of equal sympathy, and bound together by affection in a true human order, instead of one autocrat exalted above all the others, made into menials and debarred from all sympathy and with the tie of money, almost or altogether alone.⁹⁵

However, at an 1873 discussion, one of the members of the London Anthropological Society dismissed the possibility of polygamy in the present day on the grounds that "few of us would wish to revert to a condition under which we should marry, not only our wives and our wives' sisters, but should be requested by them to include in the matrimonial circle their respective ladies' maids, or, it may be, even the cook and the housemaid."⁹⁶

Hinton also advocated polygamy because he wanted an ordered expression of sexual desire that would benefit society, not just individual spiritual and sexual fulfillment. He thought that polygamy would solve the problem of emotional possessiveness. He believed that it was strange for the husband and wife to have an intense emotional bond “surrounded by a number of women (and men, too, often) treated as if they had no human feelings, no passions, or as if they were of no account.”⁹⁷ At the same time, Hinton thought polygamy could sacralize sex: “embracing a woman, purely for her sake, for service, is a *more* spiritual thing, sublime, purer, more noble than any prayer.”⁹⁸

Hinton sought sustenance in non-Western religions for his belief in self-sacrifice and polygamy. Like F. D. Maurice, who inspired him, Hinton was interested in commonalities of Christianity with other religions, but ultimately believed that Christianity was superior.⁹⁹ Hinton admired Islam for its piety, austerity, and polygamy, and he was fascinated with Hinduism and Buddhism as well. The latter two particularly impressed him by subordinating the self to the divine. Hinton compared the self-sacrifice of women in polygamy to the sacrifice of Buddha, and of Christ. “Women sacrificing themselves thus for the world; the enthroned highest women, with all gifts externally all graces within—how exactly it would be Buddha’s history again, raised with what glory: his history precisely; the highest of humanity taking away pain, distress, all loss that man’s and woman’s misery may cease.”¹⁰⁰ He praised Yudhishthira, a character in the Mahabharata, for refusing to ascend into heaven, and instead, helping others.¹⁰¹ But he asserted that Buddhism became too ascetic and self-righteous; in contrast, Christ reacted against Pharisee self-righteousness by eating with taxpayers and prostitutes.¹⁰² Hinton was also interested in John Stuart Glennie’s argument that the image of Jesus grew out of the nature worship of Osiris. While he admired Glennie for suggesting that “oneness with self was a means to oneness with selves,” he criticized his emphasis on monogamy.¹⁰³

Polygamy

Remarkably, Hinton was able to reinterpret Christianity in a way which enabled him to justify polygamy. First, he argued that true Christianity meant repudiating the law, that is, the scriptural admonitions to follow conventional morality. Like his father, Hinton wrestled with and reinterpreted the apostle Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, which focused on the question of the law. This of course, was long a subject of Christian debate; Martin Luther had insisted that God’s grace was

more important than following the law and doing good works. Hinton's father, John Howard Hinton, followed this path to some extent in elevating grace over the law. He had to explain Romans 7:7, which was usually translated as "the law excited in me sinful affections." Hinton senior insisted that this should be translated as "the law disapproved of sinful affections."¹⁰⁴ His son focused more on the apostle's admonitions to give up the law and rely on faith for salvation. He extended this to view Jesus as a "law-breaker" who indulged in wine and other pleasures and asserted that making laws was actually evil. He thought that laws used force to compel obedience, instead of ensuring harmony.¹⁰⁵

Second, Hinton reinterpreted the Passion of Christ to mean ecstasy, rather than suffering. While his father declared that suffering with Jesus was glorious, Hinton junior believed the passion of Christ was the great passion of intense union with God and nature that transcended the self.¹⁰⁶ He asserted that neither Jesus nor the apostle Paul wanted believers to deny passion.¹⁰⁷ Christ, according to Hinton, repudiated the insistence on following the "law," and instead focused on grace and the spirit. God was Nature, and following Nature was "being able to obey our impulse—like the wind of the spirit."¹⁰⁸ Following the antinomian tradition that people could only be saved by God's grace, that obeying the law made no difference, Hinton thought that to be saved, one must give up all restraints, because to follow restraints was to assume that one's own actions would save oneself. Rather, one must abandon oneself to Jesus: as Hinton proclaimed, "Let no restraint be from *pleasure*, but from injuring another." He believed that one should not restrain oneself because that made oneself a better person—that was the inferior "rule of Self."¹⁰⁹

Hinton also combined his scientific vitalism with Christianity to see sexual passion as a way of connecting with the life force of the universe. As he declaimed, "a grandeur, awfulness, and joy unspeakable clothe all our life ... The secret stirrings and heavings of our hearts, the throbbing passions, the awful questionings, the baffled strife to penetrate the breathing mystery around us," all were part of this pulsing of pleasure.¹¹⁰ Hinton wanted sexual desire to be seen as sacred, the "highest, closest, most perfect union of man with nature, this thing *spiritual* above all that bears the name, the intensest contact of man with that which alone is holy or sacred."¹¹¹ By giving up the self to nature's pleasures, he wrote, "is it not the becoming less individual (as isolated) the more human, the more expressive of nature?"¹¹² Hinton wrote that "the self is nothing but the forbidding of joy: that is, it is the absence of nature."

Sexual desire, like other sensual pleasures, such as flowers, music, or fresh air, was a gift of God. If the divine was Nature, then it was godly for men to

follow their natural impulses toward pleasure, as long as they hurt no one else. Hinton claimed that “the tendency and impulse to desire the love of woman and of many women, and to the extreme, goes naturally with refusal of pleasures for self.” At the same time, he saw women as objects of artistic consumption, fantasizing about “a delicious level of Art, and music, and food and wine, and pleasant talk, and utmost reach of intellectual and emotional passion, with the utmost beauty too; women and in plenty naked, for beauty’s sake.”¹¹³ He believed these pleasures were superior to the domestic luxuries—or necessities—his wife demanded that he provide.

Hinton also privately entertained eugenic ideas that would later become more widespread. Indeed, Hinton’s belief in the sacrifice of the self was congruent with the suggestion on the part of George Darwin that individuals must be prepared to give up their rights to marry unrestrictedly because society would benefit from eugenic regulations.¹¹⁴ But Hinton was also willing to challenge basic morality on these grounds. He thought that infanticide might be justifiable in certain situations, so that the strong would not be harmed by the weak. He pondered, “Why not infanticide? Is that so certainly a crime; why worse than preventing them from being? At least there would be the choice of those who promised best, and would not heaven profit of the best?”¹¹⁵ Even more sinisterly, he mused, “Killing off a certain children—e.g. it is curious how men consent not to this good, and so on. How much of justice they do, and at what a sacrifice.”¹¹⁶ He also thought that a woman whose health or heredity prevented her from giving her husband “fit” children should allow him to have children with another woman.¹¹⁷

Hinton’s self as not-self

Hinton did write a few pages titled “Autobiography” in his notes, but this was not a conventional narrative of a life but a mystical meditation on the nature of the self. Hinton portrayed himself as dominated by emotion, much the same way as a woman would be. In fact, he perceived “the woman in myself so clearly,” in that he knew things through “feeling sure.” But he also believed himself as superior to actual women, for they did not know the difference between “true and arbitrary altruistic seeing.” His genius derived, he thought from his ability to be “less myself,” which enabled him to help others: “My heart is all gone to live in and work through my brain: it does not exist anymore for true personal love and devotion.” But this was a “victory of the heart over my brain.” In sacrificing himself, he believed he would save others, like Jesus. He saw himself as a pure

expression of Nature, rather than as an individual, and this lack of ego enabled him to see the “cruel sufferings” that others accepted “as a matter of course.” Because of this, he believed that he was a genius who did not have to conform to conventions. He wrote that there was no “blasphemy in the union of God’s name with Genius, for Genius is simply another word for nature, and its doing is God’s doing.”¹¹⁸ He mused that “there should be different moral codes for different persons,” and persons “of marked unlikeness to almost all others” should not have to follow general formulas.¹¹⁹ He wrote to his sister-in-law Caroline Haddon that “I have seen so clearly and simply that I am one of the ‘bad people.’ Their nature is my nature ... And this that is in me *is* the thing men hate and persecute as crime; ... yet again the despised and hated things shall be seen to be the things chosen of God.”¹²⁰ He exclaimed to his wife on going to bed one night, “Christ was the savior of men, but I am the savior of women—and I don’t envy him a bit.”¹²¹ Hinton’s mother told him that he was like a woman in being Christlike and self-sacrificing. But he believed that when a man made love with a woman, he was sacrificing himself by fulfilling her needs and by himself merging into nature; conversely, women had a duty to sacrifice themselves to men’s greater sexual needs. Interestingly, Mary Everest Boole, one of his disciples, later described him as an “invert” genius like Oscar Wilde: even though she did not think Hinton ever indulged in “vice,” she asserted that “there exists a condition of inverse consciousness which appears to be the common basis of the highest genius and the most incurable insanity; of the most sublime renunciation and the most abject depravity.”¹²²

Hinton and women

Apparently, Hinton was seen at almost every meeting about the Woman Question and thought women should earn their own living as nurses or even doctors. But he was not a feminist.¹²³ Like Comte, he viewed woman as Nature, as self-sacrificing. He opposed the vote and disliked feminists who wanted women to be independent from their husbands, for he thought that the true meaning of womanhood was to be united with, and sacrificing to men. Conventional marriage, he complained, favored women’s need for power.¹²⁴

Hinton found monogamy sexually confining. A passage in one of the manuscript volumes hints that he may have frequented prostitutes. In a transcription of a conversation, Hinton tried to refute the rumor that he believed in his principle because it “made it right for me to fondle any number of girls,”

protesting that “assuredly I care more about whether the girls are fondled if it is good for them, than whether I do it.” A “girl” retorted, “Yes, you do,” meaning that he cared that he was the one who fondled. Was the girl a prostitute?¹²⁵ But Hinton told Mrs. Fancourt Barnes, “If I had had a mistress, none of this would have happened.”¹²⁶ Edith Ellis, the subject of the next chapter, wrote that “it is easy to realise that a man like Hinton had many adventures and entanglements which savoured neither of hypocrisy, impurity, nor crudity, and yet brought upon his life the foul names with which the fearful and unimaginative stigmatise the poet or pioneer.” She went on to note that “Hinton’s love for other women was like summer lightning and for his wife a devouring pain.”¹²⁷

How did women react to Hinton at the time? He was also notorious in his circles for making passes at women, such as the novelist Emma Brooke, whom he told “he wished to teach me the duty and loveliness of yielding myself to ‘other’s needs and wishes’ and of over-coming all ‘self-regarding impulses.’” Brooke was repulsed, as she wrote to Havelock Ellis years later. Several women of his acquaintance told him they opposed polygamy and asserted the importance of monogamy for women. In 1873, he also wrote to the philosopher Frances Power Cobbe challenging her notion that the sanctity of marriage was a universal, inborn value. Many respectable women he came across as a surgeon, he alleged, did not think it was morally wrong to have sex with a man without being married to him.¹²⁸

Nonetheless, several women followed Hinton enthusiastically during his lifetime. Mary Everest Boole, the widow of the famous mathematician George Boole (as in Boolean logic) became Hinton’s secretary sometime after 1864 after she lost her post as a librarian for publishing a book on psychic science. Rumor had it Hinton and Boole were lovers, but her impact on him was largely intellectual. Boole taught him enough algebra to make the connection between mathematics and psychology, and they were both very interested in the nurturing of genius.¹²⁹ She was both attracted to and repelled by the idea of the “oneness of humanity” requiring individuals to sacrifice themselves. In a remarkable letter, she wrote to Hinton,

I *do* rejoice in finding out what God pleases to do with me; and the more hateful the thing is the more joy there is, in service, in hearing if he likes it ... didn’t I tell you that if I wasn’t God’s child I would like next best to be a good man’s dog ... I would like to be the thing the man had under his foot—the thing that had no ideas beyond doing the man’s will (that is if I liked the man).¹³⁰

A remarkable educator and thinker herself, Boole published in old age *The Forging of Passion into Power*, a book that extended some of Hinton’s ideas by equating

sex and thinking: she wrote that “Normal sex-action is fertile contact between suitably differentiated polars... When this happens in the organs of generation we call it fecundation; when it happens in the brain we call it inspiration (artistic, poetic, prophetic, or spiritual inspiration, as the case may be).”¹³¹

Caroline Haddon, his sister-in-law, later told Havelock Ellis that James Hinton used to put her “naked on his knee and fondle her, on the theory that a man’s wish for contact with a woman’s body was right and had to be gratified.”¹³² Despite her accomplishments as an investor and schoolmistress, she found the idea of female self-sacrifice compelling if difficult. In 1873, she wrote to Hinton about a wife she knew who

all her life ... suppressed her natural instincts and desires for the sake of other’s needs, and now, the result is, that she has got into this wretched, nervous, sleepless state, which she feels is a hindrance to her husband in his work. And yet it has come out of her doing what you say is the right thing: her life has been used up for others, and now it seems all gone.

Haddon also quoted feminist philosopher Frances Power Cobbe, who argued that women were too self-abnegating—they should concentrate on doing good, not sacrificing themselves, whereas men tended to demand sacrifices from women and needed to abnegate the self more.¹³³ But after his death, Caroline Haddon became a key disciple in disseminating Hinton’s philosophy. In 1885, she published an anonymous pamphlet called *The Future of Marriage: An Eirenikon, by a Respectable Woman*, in which she argued that women had sexual needs that monogamy could not always fulfill.¹³⁴ Edward Carpenter apparently liked it, and George Bernard Shaw reviewed it.¹³⁵ Shaw acknowledged that the pamphlet advocated “a true human serviceable polyandry that should be, according to analogy, the sole cure for the hideous and degrading polyandry that now runs riot in our streets.” Shaw predicted “Free Love would prove just such another delusion as Free Contract for the laborer.” A wife might resent her husband keeping his mistress in a suburban villa, but with free love or polygamy, the mistress would be luxuriating in the parlor of the domestic sanctum, while the older wife would be relegated to the kitchen.¹³⁶

Hinton’s death and posthumous reputation

Hinton did not publish his ideas on polygamy during his lifetime but only hinted at them in articles for publication. Alan Willard Brown asserts that he must have discussed his advocacy of polygamy with members of the Metaphysical Society,

but Thomas Dixon finds this unlikely.¹³⁷ Yet rumors seemed to have circulated about Hinton's unorthodox ideas and perhaps practices. In 1875, he appears to have been denied membership in a proposed club for both men and women (not the famous Men's and Women's Club) and indignantly wrote in his notes, "Here is this 'club for men and women,' it has for its officers, even, people who entirely refuse established rights, only secretly, and it cannot have even among its members one who says he thinks they are false and perhaps may openly break them."¹³⁸

Hinton eventually became even more eccentric and agitated, and his wife took him to the Azores in hopes of calming his mind, but he died there of an "inflammation of the brain" in 1875. There is no record, published or unpublished, of Hinton trying to take a second wife, but he apparently passed on a belief in polygamy to his offspring. His son, Charles Howard Hinton, was convicted of bigamy.¹³⁹ His niece, Ida Nettleship, married the bohemian painter Augustus John, and lived in a ménage à trois with him and another woman for several years, both bearing children to him.¹⁴⁰

In the 1880s, Margaret Hinton compiled some of his writings in *Philosophy and Religion* (1881), but she omitted his later thoughts on "a question of ethics"—that is, polygamy. She was bolder in *The Lawbreaker* (1884) but still the book only obliquely hinted at polygamy.¹⁴¹ Even so, she and Caroline Haddon were blackballed from the progressive intellectual "Men's and Women's Club" in 1885.¹⁴²

Haddon and Mrs. Hinton were assisted in editing Hinton's work by a young medical student named Havelock Ellis. On a trip to Australia as a young man, Hinton's writings had saved Havelock Ellis from spiritual torment, since science robbed him of his Christian belief, but he still needed to feel a purpose in life. So on his return to London, he looked up Mrs. Hinton, and she and Caroline Haddon told him about Hinton's views on polygamy, although they insisted that it was "inadvisable to show his manuscripts to people except to a small circle of intimate admirers."¹⁴³ He became close to both women, and Caroline Haddon paid for his medical education, although he confessed to being "afraid" of this rather formidable woman.¹⁴⁴ Havelock Ellis's books and articles also alluded to Hinton's belief in polygamy much less directly than in the manuscripts on which they were based.¹⁴⁵ In his 1880s publications on Hinton, Ellis emphasized Hinton's views on science, the self and spirituality. In an article in *Mind*, Ellis explained that Hinton's new conception of goodness could be "followed by those who are now thrust outside the pale of virtue," for "the throwing off of the external right is the liberation of a great new force; it means nothing less than the

freedom of pleasure, of impulse.”¹⁴⁶ But he was still vague about Hinton’s views on sexual ethics. In fact, James Aldis satirically complained that Hinton did not make clear what moral “law” he was arguing against—was it primogeniture?¹⁴⁷ Aldis argued that Hinton failed to appreciate that the law of monogamy was based on the Darwinian struggle in nature: “Monogamy is the only form of human life that can stand the struggle for existence; it is the final Gospel, not of Christ, but of the survival of the Fittest.”¹⁴⁸

Yet Hinton played a key role in the transformation of individualism in Victorian culture away from the Evangelical insistence on selfish self-denial, or Spencerian harsh competitive self-reliance. By mid-century, Hinton, like Frederic Denison Maurice and many others, began to advocate a form of self-sacrifice as service to society without repudiating desire and pleasure. Desire became something that tied an individual into the larger society rather than threatening individuality. However, Hinton was enmeshed in the Christian notion of self-sacrifice. He wanted polygamy to anchor desire in a social order, rather than allowing desire to express an individual self.

Yet Havelock Ellis, his friend Edward Carpenter, and his wife Edith Lees Ellis, took up Hinton’s ideas for the next generation in the utopian socialist Fellowship of the New Life, as we shall see in the next chapter. Edith, especially, devoted herself to Hinton’s ideas, but she rejected his call for women to lose their individuality in a grand version of self-sacrifice. Instead, she tried to create a different kind of monogamy and a different kind of socialism that could reconcile individuality and service to society.

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“Better to Be an Active Devil Than a Crushed Saint”: Edith Ellis and the New Life

In the summer of 1890, two intellectuals awkwardly walked on the wild cliffs of Lamorna. Their first meeting several years before had not gone well; Havelock Ellis thought Edith Lees too boyish to be attractive, and Edith found him badly dressed and taciturn. So when her host, Agnes Jones, mentioned that Havelock was about to arrive, Edith decided to leave. Instead, she would tramp around the Cornwall coast with her servant and friend Ellen Taylor. But Ellen was tired, and Edith stayed. The crashing waves stirred Havelock's and Edith's souls as they agreed that marriage should not merge two souls into one but preserve each partner's independence.¹ The next year, Havelock and Edith wed (I will refer to them as Havelock and Edith to avoid confusion between the two Ellises). On their honeymoon, Havelock measured Edith's fingers, chin, and ears with a tape-measure.² He knew something was different about her, but it was not until the next year that Edith told him that she had a sexual relationship with another woman. Critics have mostly focused on how Havelock then defined Edith as a “sexual invert” using his expertise as a sexologist.³

If we return to Lamorna, we can gain a new perspective on Edith. First, their host at Lamorna, Agnes Jones, followed James Hinton, the prophetic mystic who, as we learned in the last chapter, celebrated social justice—and secretly advocated polygamy.⁴ Agnes Jones may have been Hinton's lover, and she hoped Havelock would take his place as a lover and as a prophet.⁵ Havelock demurred, but he loved Hinton's critique of the miseries of poverty and sexual repression, and his celebration of sexual desire as the life force that pulsed through nature. Edith of course did not know Hinton, who died when she was young, but she became friends with Caroline Haddon, Hinton's sister-in-law and editor, and Edith published two books on Hinton.⁶

Hinton inspired Edith to envision a new kind of marriage, a new kind of individual, and a new kind of socialism. First, she both drew on and transformed



Figure 6.1 Edith Ellis © The British Library Board Ms. 70,536, f. 92

Hinton's ideas to articulate a new version of non-monogamy that preserved women's individuality and sexual desires within a close social bond. Second, she celebrated the “abnormal” as a genius instead of a degenerate. As far as we know, Edith did not explore her sexual self in private writings—and if she did, she burned her papers. This was not only because she feared exposure: as an extrovert, Edith may have been less interested in the subtleties of her own nature and more focused on how “the abnormal” could serve society. Instead, she turned to fiction and philosophy, combining Hinton and Nietzsche into an original synthesis.

The fact that Ellen Taylor, Edith's friend and servant, accompanied her at Lamorna also illustrates Edith's wider vision of socialism. Ellen gave Edith an intimate understanding of the grievances of servants; unlike most ladies who complained about the “servant question,” Edith recognized servants' individuality. While most socialists focused on the industrial working class, Edith placed domestic service at the center of the class struggle. But reconciling socialism and domestic service, and individuality and collectivism, was easier said than done, a theme Edith explored in the novel *Attainment* (1909). This very autobiographical writing tells the story of how she came to be involved in the utopian Fellowship of the New Life.⁷

The ethical life of an activist

As a young woman, Edith needed to earn her own living at teaching, but teaching exhausted her. So she sought refuge with her boarding school chum, Honor Brooke, the daughter of the Rev. Stopford Brooke, a charismatic parson who preached to Queen Victoria. Yet Brooke was unconventional; in earlier years, he spent every Friday evening with James Hinton, lost his faith in the resurrection, and left the Church of England.⁸ Evoking Hinton, he preached a doctrine of service and self-sacrifice: “Nor will pain ever cease in the world till self-desire ceases. Only in loss of self is joy.”⁹ In the novel *Attainment*, Brooke becomes Stanley Evans, a fashionable preacher whose unorthodox sermons attract “the fashionable world, who were tired of the mere formal teaching of the law-abiding churches.”¹⁰ Like Brooke, Evans urges his followers to go forth into the slums and serve the poor through philanthropy. Yet he fails to tell the wealthy to sacrifice their own riches and hosts fashionable soirées where society ladies mingled with philosophers and poets; his followers fill his mansion with art treasures and flowers.¹¹

These luxuries disillusion Rachel, Edith's alter ego in the novel, when she notices that Brooke's housemaid can't hear his sermons because she's too busy dusting the paintings, lighting five bedroom fires, and making tea for the other servants. While the daughters sleep in luxurious bedrooms upstairs, the housemaid bunks down in the dark kitchen with another maid.¹² Rachel begins to question philanthropy's worth. She works at a school that sends slum children to holiday camps in the summer, but the headmistress scorns the children as "scum"—according to the latest scientific principles, she proclaims, they should not have been born. When a fashionably dressed woman with a powdered face brings her child for the camp, the headmistress thinks she's a prostitute and refuses to take the child. Rachel pays for the little girl herself, but the incident opens her eyes: Victorian philanthropy judged those it claimed to help. Rachel begins to think of philanthropy as "not only futile but dangerous . . . an attempt to patch up a rotten economic condition." Echoing Hinton's notion of Jesus as a lawbreaker, Rachel declares that "Christ's gospel . . . was not anything if it was not against all acknowledged law and order."¹³

At Brooke's soirées, Edith met other tormented young people. She fell in love with Percival Chubb, but Chubb was more interested in mystic Thomas Davidson, a peripatetic philosopher influenced by Thoreau's ideas of self-reliance.¹⁴ Chubb was a friend of Havelock and introduced him to Davidson; in turn, Havelock tried to interest Davidson in Hinton. Davidson also wanted to serve others, so he advised young men to found a semi-monastic brotherhood to "bring about a noble and happy life" for all. Havelock liked this vision, but he wanted to include women, such as Hinton's female relatives and followers such as Agnes Jones (the one who introduced Havelock and Edith).¹⁵

Together, they formed the Fellowship of the New Life in 1883, an idealistic group of clerks, teachers, junior doctors, and writers dedicated to plain living and high thinking; Edith soon joined the group—while Havelock dropped out and Davidson moved to New York. They rejected Brooke's philanthropy as helping only "some few of the poor wretches who are waiting for our English Wealth-god to crush them out of existence." Instead, as Edith proclaimed, "What we want are workers who will aid us in stopping the Idol's car." For most of them, it was socialism that would stop the Idol's car of capitalism.¹⁶ Percival Chubb complained that "our middle and upper classes . . . are accustomed to keep others in servitude to minister to their needs; [they] live in idleness on others' labor or strive against their fellows for a living or for wealth, instead of working side by side with them for a common aim."¹⁷ The fellowship supported the usual

socialist causes, such as unions of laundry women, busmen, and miners.¹⁸ Edith herself lectured in Manchester on the “Masses and the Classes,” advocating for the eight-hour day and other rights for workers.¹⁹ But they also wanted to create new ways of relating to each other, experimenting with cooperative schools and even a commune. For the fellowship, socialism was spiritual, inspired by Thoreau, Emerson, and even Jesus; it meant not just fomenting revolution but reforming the heart.²⁰

The fellowship immediately split over the issue of the individual. Some organized into the Fabian Society, because they believed that only experts could formulate a socialism scientific enough to combat the powerful Individualist ideology of the time. Individualism’s best-known proponent, Herbert Spencer, argued that the government should not interfere in the workings of the economy but leave it to individual entrepreneurs to compete in the struggle for survival. Fabians declared that this competition was destructive, wasteful, and left too many working people hungry; instead, experts could efficiently manage government and the economy through centralized state ownership. But Fabians scorned the fellowship’s mystical quest to transform individuals as well as society. Sidney Webb stated that “it is of comparatively little importance that individuals should develop to the utmost possible extent, if the life of the community in which they live is not thereby served.”²¹

In contrast, Edith and the Fellowship of the New Life believed that developing the individuality of their members was necessary to transform society. For Edith, Fabian socialism “left so little to the imagination, so little margin for the flexibility of human nature and the personality of the individual.”²² In her lecture on “Masses and the Classes,” given in Manchester, she declared that “Individualism, which has become a disease in the Classes, is beginning to assert itself as a healthy manifestation in the Masses.”²³ What Edith meant as individualism was quite different from Spencer’s individualism: instead of competing with others, individuality meant respecting others’ differences and cooperating for the good of all. While competitive individualism was increasingly linked to Social Darwinism, the fellowship followed James Hinton’s understanding of evolution based on cooperation and Edward Carpenter’s vision of evolution based on the connection of humans and animals and the inner development of the soul.²⁴ Maurice Adams, another member, believed that the middle class must take up the transformation that the working class had already accomplished: “wherever the workers are not degraded to the condition of mere animals by oppression and overwork, the essential elements of an ethical and truly human life always exist among them. The necessity of

doing good honest work for one's living, of serving oneself, and the absence of false conventions are conducive to the moral life."²⁵ Edith advocated living an "ethical life" that could reconcile the individual and the group.²⁶ In an ideal society, Havelock argued,

while we are socializing all those things of which all have equal common need, we are more and more tending to leave to the individual the control of those things which in our complex civilization constitute individuality. We socialize what we call our physical life in order that we may attain greater freedom for what we call our spiritual life.²⁷

The fellowship also wanted to move beyond Hinton's altruism to celebrate individuality.²⁸ As fellowship member W. J. Jupp wrote, those inspired by Hinton's altruism "hurried hither and thither seeking to do things for other people, holding it 'selfish' to give much attention to their own affairs and needs." Worst of all, they were sentimental and humorless.²⁹ At a discussion of Hinton's work led by Caroline Haddon, a member asked, "Does not Altruism swamp Individuality, which is all important to the welfare of the community, for the best work is that which proceeds from the compulsion of a man's own nature."³⁰ As Harold Oakeshott wrote in summing up the fellowship's work, "Our nature was regarded then not as something to be 'lived down' or recognized shamefacedly, but rather as something of which we should seek true knowledge, and endeavor to turn to its best ends."³¹

What did they mean by "man's own nature?" Fellowship members believed that the body's urges connected the individual to humanity and the larger universe. In *Attainment*, the character based on Davidson declares that Eastern religions understand that life, death, love, and childbirth are all suffused with "radiancy." If individuals can find this radiancy in themselves, they can transform society.³² Another character, Renton, based on William Morris and Hinton, declares it is "better to be an active Devil than a crushed Saint."³³ A crushed saint surely evokes the social purity message of women's advocates, imperialists, and clergymen who campaigned against seduction, masturbation, and homosexuality.

While Hinton assumed that natural sexuality concerned the relations of men and women, Davidson himself had intense romantic relationships with young men such as Percival Chubb.³⁴ The fellowship subtly expanded this notion of natural sexuality to include untraditional desires. Oakeshott explained that the fellowship encouraged members to develop "those individual traits or instincts which tradition may condemn so long as they answer the test of social good."³⁵ Edward Carpenter, pioneer sex radical and member of the fellowship,

eventually celebrated what he called "homogenic love."³⁶ However, this theme remained as a subtext rather than being openly asserted, even by Edith.

Edith argued that women needed to reject self-sacrificing conventional femininity. Few women actually joined the fellowship, perhaps deterred by its impractical idealism, but Edith implored them to live an "unhampered life" "free of artificiality," "prudishness and dolldom." This womanhood should be "true in its instincts and courageous to fulfill them." Women shouldn't complain about women's "wrongs," while depending on men; instead, they should work shoulder to shoulder with men.³⁷ Another fellowship member, Jane Holah, declared that "much of women's so-called self-sacrifice is mean, abject, as selfish, at bottom, as the masculine self-assertion; it is selfishness choosing the line of least resistance." "Individuality" is a sacred trust, she insisted, which could not be alienated, since it came from the divine light within.³⁸

Above all, the fellowship saw conventional domestic life as stifling and sought to create alternative homes. In the modern drawing room, declared Edward Carpenter, "a stupor comes over the mind as it gazes at the aimless armchairs," and "frozen speech and constipated manners" paralyze women and men. Instead of preserving this frozen life by oppressing servants, he argued, people should only have furnishings that were necessary and easy to clean, unlike the dust magnets of conventional velvet drapes and elaborate furniture.³⁹ Indeed, the Arts and Crafts movement had already celebrated simpler, more authentic creations than the tawdry machine-carved armchairs found in every department store; Oscar Wilde advised hostesses to express their individuality by collecting blue-and-white China and oriental knick-knacks.⁴⁰

Edith saw that aesthetic taste was not enough to transform society, for middle-class households depended on servants to clean their precious arts-and-crafts objects; for them, rejecting the conventionality of Victorian life was a matter of taste rather than justice. Edith pointed out that middle-class people confined their servants to sunless rooms with "the worn-out hangings, the broken-down bed or washstand is taken there ... the hardest and cheapest mattress." This violated the principle that human beings should be regarded as ends in themselves, not as means for other's goals, a central tenet of the fellowship. In the pages of the fellowship journal, Edith highlighted the exploitation of domestic servants as a "disease in the body politic." She observed that service was "a ceaseless round of mechanical duties, unenlightened by smiles and friendships and keen human interests."⁴¹

In its utopian community at 29 Doughty Street London, founded in 1891, the fellowship tried to create a new form of domestic life that would reconcile

masters and servants, and women's individuality and communal life. The fellowship commune resembled Jane Hume Clapperton's vision of Unitary Homes, in which individuals and families would combine together to establish a household where each person could have their separate room to cultivate solitude but also come together in tasteful common rooms, such as a billiard room and library. Housework would be carried out cooperatively.⁴² But housework became a sticking point in the commune. In another novelistic account, one idealistic young man proposes that in a "communistic household," the men would go out "doing the really hard work," while sheltering women in the home and preserving female spiritual superiority. A young woman asks if that means women have to do the scrubbing and cooking and washing and mending—and who would black the boots and carry up the coals?⁴³ These young women had had enough of self-sacrifice, spending their youth tending to ill relatives or crotchety fathers, immolating their own artistic aspirations on the altar of family duty.

In Edith's *Attainment*, the fictional commune wanted to break down the distinction between servant and master by having everyone share in the cooking and cleaning, even blacking their own boots. But Courtney, one of the fictional members, finds his task of washing down the front doorstep to be intensely humiliating—he anxiously looks up and down the street to see if anyone witnesses his shame as he kneels, scrubbing the step. Edith's character Rachel went even further—she wanted the commune to welcome servants as equals. Why don't people invite their servants to dinner parties, asks the charismatic philosopher Renton in *Attainment*, echoing a proposal made by William Morris: "An experiment in sheer justice in daily living might open our eyes to the distance we have travelled from the paths of any one of the great world gospels."⁴⁴ Rising to the challenge, the character Rachel invites her loyal servant and friend Ann to join their communal household as an equal.⁴⁵ But Ann is not interested in joining the collective; instead, she demands double wages for doing the rough chores. Not very surprising, the members were incompetent at housework, and "It took Ann very often an extra hour in the mornings to undo the heroic attempts of the Brotherhood at manual labor." Furthermore, Ann must cater to each member's individual diets, such as Prince Orloff, who survived on nuts and fruit. Rachel urges Ann to take off her cap and sit down and eat with the fellows, but belatedly realizes that Ann would rather take a private break from their company. To help Ann, Rachel herself also takes on much of the burden of running the house.

Romance also entangled the commune. In real life, rumors spread that they were going to live out "Hintonian" principles, that is, polygamy.⁴⁶ In the novel, however, Edith writes that the commune began on the principle of celibacy:

“there is no time to waste on founding families and absorbing ourselves in mere domesticity.”⁴⁷ According to the novel, many members were not able to live up to this ideal. An elderly botanist invites a maid to the music hall; a robed gentleman wants to take off his clothes, and several couples end up marrying. When Rachel meets the bronzed young Basil Serjeant, their eyes lock as they discuss the allure of nature. Basil was really Havelock, and Edith left the commune soon after she married him; the commune shortly broke apart. As Edith herself declared later, “Fellowship is Hell.”⁴⁸

The marriage of two writers: 1891–1898

Edith abandoned her “ethical life” with the commune, but she still wanted to create a new kind of marriage. To be sure, she and Havelock did not risk living together in a free union without legal ties, but they aimed to preserve their own individuality and independence within the marriage. Since Havelock was an introvert who wished to concentrate on his writing and Edith an extrovert who loved to socialize, they often established separate households. Havelock often kept rooms in London, while Edith fixed up a succession of cottages in Cornwall. A photo shows the couple in front of a bookshelf crammed with thick leather-bound books; it is ornamented by photographic portraits, presumably of friends, and candles stuck in wine bottles, a domestic scene that combined style, economy, and sociability.⁴⁹ For Havelock, lodgings were essential as a place of solitude and scholarship, so Edith always provided him with a room or separate studio where he could write in peace. She valued sociability: a home was a place to invite people in, whether visitors from London or neighbors in Cornwall; a home also allowed her to immerse herself in nature, so she kept a menagerie in Cornwall including a pony, a donkey, a cow, and various dogs and cats.

Edith and Havelock also forged new ways of loving. Although they were often separated and took other lovers, this was a marriage based on emotions, if not conventional romantic ones. She seems to have seen their relationship as one of mother and child—although sometimes she played the mother, and sometimes the child. Havelock’s personality included a “womanly element” and he took care of her with “maternal feeling.” At the same time, she cherished him as her “sweet babe” whom she could rock to sleep on her breast.⁵⁰ Their sex life was rather difficult, as Edith found fumbling with birth control—presumably a Dutch cap, or early diaphragm—to be awkward. Havelock had long struggled with impotence, since what most aroused him was women urinating. Shortly

after their marriage, Edith confessed that she had fallen passionately in love with her friend Claire, and they consummated their desire. Later, Edith had a series of relationships with other women, including a poet named Lily, who lived near her in Cornwall. Havelock later wrote that this made it more difficult for him to be deeply intimate with her.⁵¹

Havelock also tried to understand Edith through the lens of his scientific studies of sexuality, in which he categorized Edith as an “invert.” As Edith told New York journalists many years later, “For twenty-five years I have been under the microscope of my husband’s investigation, psychically, physically, every way!” But she said, “I’m used to being mentally vivisected now, and don’t mind.”⁵² Havelock’s new scientific stance differed from his earlier method of drawing on his thoughts and feelings to engage with literature. In 1886, Havelock had written in his diary, “I do not think one can help others in any way more effectively than by lifting up the veil which hides personality, by showing them what one really is, and where one has failed.”⁵³ But to be a scientific expert, he switched his focus from inward self-examination to objective examinations of outward evidence. Of course, as Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison write, this claim to be objective gave the expert even greater power and authority.⁵⁴

Havelock initially echoed other sexologists such as the early Krafft-Ebing in speculating that same-sex relationships were neurotic, “morbid,” and caused by a hereditary taint. Then his collaborator, John Addington Symonds, himself an “invert,” pushed Havelock to think of “inversion” as a benign sport of nature.⁵⁵ In an essay transcribed by Edith, Symonds insisted that inverts only appear neurotic because conventional social mores frustrate their desires.⁵⁶ Havelock came around to this view, using his authority to plea for society “to accommodate the sexual impulses of its members.”⁵⁷

By using the case study as a method, on one level Havelock took on the power of the expert to identify and categorize individuals into diagnoses. Havelock included case studies from other authorities, including a doctor who measured the genitals and tweaked the nipples of a Miss M. in a failed attempt to find a physical sign of lesbianism. The subjects of the case study are thus like butterflies pinned in a case to be examined by experts, but case studies also explored the variations and individuality of their subjects.⁵⁸ “Inverts” also shaped the case studies toward their own ends, as Harry Oosterhuis has written, emphasizing their own emotions, subjectivity, and self-judgment—or acceptance.⁵⁹ Furthermore, as Johanna Gehmacher writes, these cases do not fit precisely into the sexologist’s categories and thus “disturb the norm” through their heterogeneity.⁶⁰

Edith recruited her friends to provide case studies, and Havelock featured her as "Miss H."⁶¹ A close reading reveals a tension between Havelock as the expert author, and Miss H's own views. Havelock himself viewed masculinity and femininity as important archetypes that could vary in actual life, but, as Lucy Delap notes, Edith had much more flexible views of gender.⁶² In the case study, Miss H admits that as a child, she took the role of a man in games, and as an adult, "she likes to take the active and protecting role" with feminine women. But Miss H does not describe herself as particularly masculine. Havelock also judged Miss H by noting that "the inverted instinct is well under control," implying that if it were not she might be considered neurotic. But in the case study, Miss H declares herself as much healthier due to "loving women," "while repression leads to morbidity and hysteria." Yet, she also asserts that inversion was only "morally right" if it were "part of one's own nature," and not as a "mere makeshift or expression of sensuality" on the part of "normal" women. This was a definition of morality dependent on the nature of the self, which justified actions that might be seen as abnormal if just indulged out of curiosity.⁶³ Furthermore, while Havelock declared that inverts should not marry, Miss H admitted that she might marry if the right man came along—a sly allusion to the fact that Edith and Havelock had already married.

Soon after their marriage, Edith critiqued conventional marriage in *Seed-Time*, the journal of the Fellowship of the New Life.⁶⁴ On one hand, she drew on contemporary eugenic ideas to criticize traditional marriages for matching people on the basis of property rather than healthy inheritance. Citing the authority of the "man of science in the dissecting room" against the man of God in the pulpit, she raised the question of eugenic legislation. In doing so, she allied herself with Havelock, a medical doctor by training, against her contemporaries and friends Edward Carpenter and Henry Salt, who denounced the vivisection of animals. Indeed, contemporary activists linked human and animal vivisection. Edith had been alarmed by an eugenic tract, *Marriage and Disease* by barrister S. A. K. Strahan (1892), who warned that ignorant marriages passed on cancer, epilepsy, idiocy, and sterility (Strahan followed Lamarck's contention that acquired characteristics could be inherited). She denounced the "anti-social women who would willingly shirk the imperative work of motherhood simply because of its pains and responsibilities." On the other hand, Edith never fulfilled this imperative because a doctor told her that she should not have children, due to her nervous temperament.

Yet, Edith belonged to a more utopian, and feminist school that believed eugenics was more rational and scientific in imagining a better world than old-

fashioned religious prescriptions.⁶⁵ She also joked that if people took experts like Strahan too seriously, they would not marry if they had an old uncle who would hallucinate after lobster dinners. Unlike those eugenicists who wanted women to sacrifice their education for the good of the race, Edith declared that women needed to be economically independent for marriage to be equal and eugenically fit.⁶⁶ And Edith did not endorse the view that the poor were degenerate and should not reproduce. Recall her negative depiction of the headmistress who said that slum children were “scum” who should never have been born.

The next year Edith’s ideas on marriage became more radical and feminist—so radical that her lecture shocked the “respectables” of Southport, and even the free-thinking South Place institution would not accept her speech. Eventually, she published them as *A Noviciate for Marriage* (1894), but the pamphlet did not sell. However, she anticipated some of Edward Carpenter’s own “sex-bombs,” as Edith termed his pamphlet on sex and marriage, published in 1894. What was so radical about these ideas? Overall, Edith was now advocating a sort of trial marriage that would allow a potential husband and wife to truly know each other, all their little idiosyncrasies and peculiarities, perhaps an allusion to the difficulty of getting along with prickly Havelock. But this was also a much more feminist perspective. According to Havelock, Edith knew nothing of sexual anatomy before their wedding, and he writes in his memoirs that he had to enlighten her.⁶⁷ But in the *Noviciate*, this amusing story becomes more sinister: “The majority of women walk into marriage,” she wrote, “as sheep walk into a slaughterhouse from a quiet field, in absolute unconsciousness of the fate awaiting them until the door is shut and cries are of no avail.”⁶⁸ Edith’s insistence that husbands also needed to reveal their own skeletons in their hereditary closet might be an allusion to Havelock’s own sexual problems.

Edith also espoused a radical philosophy of sexual desire as a natural force that linked the reproductive powers of nature with nonreproductive human creativity and bonding based on emotions rather than property and power. Her experience of animal breeding had inspired her with a robust respect for nature: Edith wrote to Edward Carpenter that if “some of these spiritual dames and manhating shrews [referring to social purity advocates] would only farm they’d know more [about sex] than all their lectures and big bookcases teach them.”⁶⁹ She envisioned a “new sexual renaissance, which will probably combine a healthy, temperate animalism with Browning’s vision of that rare mating when soul lies by soul.”⁷⁰ She cited Walt Whitman that “sex was a strong clean necessity:—rank like the earth but sweet and fresh and wholesome like the spring flowers.” By quoting Whitman, Edith might also be alluding to his

nonheterosexual ideas about desire between men. While eugenicists saw the "abnormal" as degenerate, Edith presciently criticized contemporary social purity advocates for "hounding abnormal sexual offenders to death"; she was writing a year before Oscar Wilde was put on trial, and at the time when she had revealed her own attraction to women.

Attracted to their own sex, Edith and Edward Carpenter also needed to explore new forms of non-monogamy. Carpenter had bonded with George Adams, a young working-class man, and continued the relationship even after George married a woman. While Carpenter advocated free unions instead of formal marriage, he stressed lifelong bonds as an ideal, and stressed the importance of restraint and control in indulging in sexual pleasure. He argued that sex should be respected as a powerful natural force, but not "slimed" with pleasure for its own ends. Yet, Carpenter found conventional monogamous marriages stifling because neither spouse was allowed to have close friends of the opposite sex; ideally, spouses should form "strong" relationships with members of the same sex, providing an outlet for different interests.⁷¹ He may have been thinking of his friends Henry and Kate Salt, or Stewart Headlam and his wife; in both couples the wife was primarily attracted to women, as with Edith and Havelock.⁷² Edith later quoted Carpenter to repudiate "self-absorbed, possessive love, however apparently unselfish, [as] death, [that] chains the one who gives and the one who takes."⁷³ Edith wanted a truly "free love" that would make "license impossible," unlike the hypocrisy of British society, which advocated purity before marriage but allowed license afterwards.⁷⁴ Edith and Havelock followed a form of non-monogamy different from Hinton's polygamy or the conventions that bourgeois men could take mistresses, while their wives remained chaste. Edith critiqued Hinton's view of non-monogamy because "it did not include the complete freedom of woman to choose her own way of deliverance from the further tyranny of man and the cruelty of women."⁷⁵ Edith had a number of relationships with women, while Havelock had a long relationship with a woman named Amy, who calmed and soothed him.

Edith turned to fiction to explore her ideas in a more sensuous, personal way, while still reflecting on the lives of others rather than her own. This was the novel *Seaweed*, published in 1898. On the surface, this novel, subtitled *A Cornish Idyll*, told the story of quaint sailors and miners in local dialect. But in fact it directly engaged with contemporary debates about non-monogamy, for the plot concerns a miner crippled by an accident who cannot make love with his wife. He knows she wants a child and needs sexual pleasure, but the parson declares that allowing her to take a lover would violate the rules of God—besides, he

argues, women don't feel such impure passions. The miner rejects this religious advice: "Is it the will o' the Lord that us should go right agin nature and throttle a parcel o' longings that God hissel' or the devil has given us?[sic]" The miner resolves to find a man for his wife, but she's already taken a handsome sailor. She tells her lover, "We've longings like you we're not cold and frightened like you do say; we're just as fierce, just as warm and ... just as mad over the flesh of what we do love as you, and madder, too, for we can't rend ourselves from what we've kissed noways no, not noways, and you men folkses can."⁷⁶ Yet after her "sexual spasm," she rends herself away from the sailor and returns to her husband. Even if he cannot satisfy her, she loves him best of all. This novel also had a radical eugenic message: the need to produce children overrode the conventions of traditional marriage.

Seaweed joined in a wider conversation of non-monogamy and sexuality in 1898 in publications of the University Press, run by the mysterious Roland de Villiers; this press also published Havelock's own *Sexual Inversion*. *Seaweed* was first serialized in one of de Villiers's journals, *The University Review: A Free Magazine*. The *University Review* also provided a forum for Orford Northcote, who praised variety in marriage in an article on "Anthropology and Monogamy." As with other radical eugenicists, Northcote rejected fusty old religious mores of monogamy and declared that lovers in free unions would not only produce more eugenically fit children but also experience more sexual pleasure that would improve their mental and physical well-being. The magazine also proposed an essay contest on the dangers of celibacy, and published articles from other advanced thinkers such as George Ives (a homosexual activist) and vegetarian Henry Salt (also a member of the Fellowship of the New Life); it favorably reviewed Havelock's own *Sexual Inversion*.⁷⁷ De Villiers also published the periodical *The Adult*, edited by George Bedborough; very radical for its time, it not only advocated the legitimization of children born out of wedlock but also celebrated free love. Its authors wrote that like the butterfly that fluttered from flower to flower, sucking nectar, individuals should flutter from lover to lover, gaining pleasure without commitment.⁷⁸ George Bedborough was a communist, vegetarian, and freethinker who lived with his wife in a free union; they each took their own lovers. The *Adult* reviewed *Seaweed* favorably, and Bedborough also sold copies of *Seaweed* and *Sexual Inversion* from his front room. The *Adult*'s authors spoke at meetings alongside anarchists, sparking the interest of the police, who raided Bedborough's office and seized copies of Edith's book *Seaweed* along with *The Adult* and *Sexual Inversion*. The latter two were suppressed as obscene, and there were few copies left of *Seaweed* to be sold.⁷⁹

British authorities did not welcome these new ideas that non-monogamy and sexual inversion could be creative and natural.

The abnormal

Edith celebrated the "abnormal"—a word that definitely connoted homosexuality but also had a wider meaning of those who did not conform to the norm. Her use of the term built on but differed from Havelock's ideas. In his published work, Havelock regarded the invert as an anomaly rather than a pathology, much like a left-handed person, or a person with color-blindness. He wrote that "the sexual invert may thus be roughly compared to the congenital idiot, to the instinctive criminal, to the man of genius."⁸⁰ While this may sound condemnatory, Havelock meant that inverts might have something special to contribute to society and indeed he listed men such as Michelangelo under this rubric. In his 1890 book, *The Criminal*, he begins by stating that "the political criminal is, as Lombroso calls him, 'the true precursor of the progressive movement of humanity.'"⁸¹ But although Havelock criticized Lombroso's insistence that the criminal is atavistic, he was fascinated by his pseudo-scientific measurements of criminal physiognomy. Furthermore, Havelock thought that men were much more likely to be geniuses, for men exhibited the extremes of exceptional intellect and abnormality, while women tended to be more average.⁸² Havelock always argued for the "rights" of inverts, but he later became even more wedded to biological understandings of sexuality, gender differences, and eugenics; yet the tensions between the expert discourse of abnormality and the sensuous, mystical discourse of sexuality persisted.

Edith took up the notion of the "abnormal" as creative, but she still had to grapple with Havelock's implication that abnormality was also neurasthenic. She explored this tension in fiction. Two of the male protagonists in her fiction are variously represented as disabled (in *Seaweed*), and as a man fascinated by corpses (*The Idealist*). In both stories, the protagonist cannot function "normally" but cries out for understanding. In *The Idealist*, published in 1911, which Havelock noted as the story in which she engaged with inversion most directly, the narrator meets a Cornish sailor, Nathaniel Penworthy, who finds drowned women in the sea and communes with them. As Jo-Ann Wallace observes, the narrator is at first repelled by him but comes to appreciate his "abnormality" in language that strongly evokes sexological accounts of inversion: "The sudden comprehension of the abnormal had thrust me into the realisation of the normal, and I was

readjusting my ideas.” But this quote also goes on to tap into the wellspring of a more mystical idea of sexual desire that undermined the scientific pretensions of sexology: “I forgot back memories of spiritual strangulations of my own, which I had confused with stupid technical names.” She also goes on to evoke Hinton’s more spiritual account of sexual desire as the connection with the life force and the paradoxical morality of immorality:

At last I was decent enough to face the fact that I had banged the half-open door, from whence love had once beckoned me, because maxims held me and joy scared me. This unashamed lover of his own vision had dwarfed my immoral moralities to a comprehension of spiritual realities, before which all else seemed trite and vague.

In *The Idealist*, she also represents abnormality in less technical terms as a beautiful variation: Nathaniel sees a beautiful reddish purple blade of corn that stands tall above the other plants, but “perhaps even the poppies in the corn had a spite against it.” Yet, he also recognizes that “it seemed to have more of the song of the wind in it and the colors in the sky than the yellow blades had.”⁸³

In using necrophilia to stand for homosexuality, this strange story might seem to indicate a deep shame. But it also celebrated the unique creativity of something so unconventional—even horrifying. While critics have linked this story to her ideas about eugenics, an exploration of her writings on Nietzsche, Hinton, and Carpenter, published as *Three Modern Seers* in 1910, give a deeper understanding of this ambivalence. Perhaps she used the figure of the necrophiliac to emphasize the Nietzschean argument that the most transgressive, and unconventional actions were the most creative. For Edith and many other radical intellectuals at the time, Nietzsche inspired them with his uncompromising vision of the individual breaking free from the bonds of convention—especially religion—to express the life force of creativity and sexuality.⁸⁴ Drawing on all these thinkers, Edith argued that conventions stifled creativity, free thought, and the pulsing power of the life force. She cited Hinton’s concept of Jesus as the lawbreaker who broke down the old law to allow the new spiritual, sensual passion to flourish, and then went further to evoke Nietzsche’s dictum that “whoever must be a creator in good and evil ... must first be an annihilator and break values.” Edith loved how Nietzsche inverted conventional notions of good and evil: conventional goodness had negative consequences, and conversely, what was usually denigrated as evil, abnormal, and degenerate should be prized as a source of creativity and change.⁸⁵ She wrote that the “power in evil is the very force we have to reckon with in it, in order to forge it into

good.” For instance, Nietzsche declared that the “degenerate” types may lead to advancement in a society become complacent, a notion that perhaps inspired Edith’s valorization of the abnormal. For Nietzsche, the lawbreaker would transmute evil into goodness by unleashing its creative power.⁸⁶

In this book and others, Edith used the motif of the devil and sin to evoke creativity and innovation, quoting Hinton to assert that “it is surely better to be a natural devil than an artificial saint.”⁸⁷ For Edith, this devilish motif was a way of reversing the conventional religious morality of her time. Building on this idea, she often referred to herself as devilish—in a positive sense.⁸⁸ Writing to Carpenter, she declared that her “sins” are the “dear odd pals that have taught me all I know.” In her lecture on Wilde, she stated that we need “a spiritual daredevilry.”⁸⁹ In her 1898 story *Dolores*, an irritable wife moans, “I’ve got a devil in me”; instead of suppressing her discontent, she must explore it by kissing a female flamenco dancer.⁹⁰

Following Nietzsche, Hinton (and Havelock), Edith celebrated the genius as the one who could tap into the power of goodness and evil. She argued that “fluid and receptive” genius destabilized “rigid and stagnant” convention.⁹¹ Furthermore,

the fact that genius is the organ of Nature’s aspirations is often the very reason she breaks or destroys her instrument, in compelling a man or woman to feel a myriad impulses and passions new to the general world. This is one of the reasons genius is so often self-centered, and yet in spite of this appearance the impulses and actions are often more indirectly for the good of the race.⁹²

In her queer reading, Edith had to twist Nietzsche to accommodate Hinton. Nietzsche advocated asserting the individual ego over social needs, but Hinton called for the sacrifice of the self. So Edith argued that the old self, or conventional self, had to be broken down, to create a new, more real and creative self, drawing on Nietzsche’s demand to annihilate the “false” self in order to find the true self: as Nietzsche wrote, “how could you wish to become new unless you had first become ashes!”⁹³ In Edith’s interpretation, Hinton calls on us to “fulfill the demands of a real self and a sane service in order to get rid of a false self and an artificial service.”⁹⁴ She went on to twist Hinton to argue that “the casting out of self, to Hinton, means, not a sinking of individuality and the cultivation of mock heroism, but a defining of real individuality and a realization of others’ needs.” This went far beyond Hinton’s call for the sacrifice of the self and the merging of the self in the whole. Conversely, Edith downplayed Nietzsche’s rejection of the idea of sympathy for others, and especially living for others and self-sacrifice.⁹⁵

Edith also reinterpreted Nietzsche's take on "Love thy neighbor." Nietzsche was usually seen as rejecting the love of the neighbor and instead asserting the superiority of the "overman" over the ordinary person: his character Zarathustra admonishes "you" to flee the "bad love" of the neighbor; one seeks the love of the neighbor because one is fleeing knowledge of oneself.⁹⁶ Nonetheless, Edith interpreted Nietzsche as declaring that one must "Love your neighbor as yourself, because you realize through your own needs and development what are your neighbors' needs." This derived from the interpretation of Nietzsche in *Affirmations*, in which Havelock quoted Nietzsche's Zarathustra as saying, "Do what you will," said Zarathustra, "but first be one of those who are able to will. Love your neighbor as yourself—but first be one of those who are able to love themselves."⁹⁷ However, Edith's creative misinterpretation allowed her to reconcile Hinton's notion of self-sacrifice for society with her need to assert her individuality, especially as someone who could not conform to conventional femininity. At the same time, Edith had to rewrite Nietzsche to accommodate her feminism. For Edith, Nietzsche was a "valuable tonic" but left something to be desired as a "gospel," because women were growing weary of being regarded as a "dangerous plaything" or a frivolous distraction.⁹⁸

Edith Ellis's valorization of social transgression as creative also helps to explain her lectures on eugenics and the abnormal in 1911, when she challenged the conventional association of abnormality with unfit. Her first lecture on the subject, "Eugenics and Spiritual Parenthood," was presented to the Eugenics Education Society on November 6, 1911.⁹⁹ This society aimed to promulgate the ideas of eugenics to a wider sphere, and at the time, it was composed of almost as many women as men, for as we have seen many feminists espoused eugenic ideas, believing that independent women would produce more fit children. The society was also divided between reform eugenicists who wanted to shape the environment to improve human fitness, and mainstream eugenicists who wanted control over human breeding since they thought fitness was strictly shaped by heredity.¹⁰⁰ For most eugenicists, the abnormal, most notably the invert, represented a nonreproductive deviation in the onward march of human evolution.

Edith lectured to the Eugenics Society at a time when the Eugenic Education Society was lobbying to give the state power to segregate the "feeble-minded" into special institutions and even sterilize them as "unfit." Although segregation succeeded, Parliament rejected compulsory sterilization.¹⁰¹ Many at the time, including Havelock Ellis himself, depicted the feeble-minded in very negative and alarmist terms as "a burden to the present generation and a menace to future

generations," prone to criminality and prostitution, and as "unmitigated evil" that "dilutes the spiritual quality of the community." He did not like legislation that mandated involuntary sterilization, especially when it involved castration, because he wanted to focus on voluntary choice, but he did consider that less invasive forms of sterilization would be good for those who could not be let free in the community otherwise.¹⁰² One of the cases he discussed from Switzerland involved a man who had sex with male minors but was otherwise mentally fit.¹⁰³

Edith challenged many of the assumptions of the eugenics movement. First, she declared that a child born out of "passionate love" could improve society more than "one born true to the letter of rational breeding" in a cold and scientific union. Although Edith did not mention sterilization directly in her lecture, she feared "the tyranny of legislation [that] often intensifies the evil it is the wish of ardent lawmakers to dispel." She warned against the dangers of "eliminating the unfit and encouraging the fit" unless "we introduce large and sound ideas." Instead of legislation, she advocated education. To be sure, Edith did not directly defend the feeble-minded: she was more concerned with the "abnormal" and their special talents. She declared that "our object surely is not only to limit the production of the unfit, but to get the best results out of those in the community who are a bewilderment to the State and who seem unfitted from a eugenic standpoint to propagate."¹⁰⁴ Edith argued that the "abnormal" could be "spiritual parents" who could serve society through their own gifts rather than having biological children. The notion that spinsters could be mothers to society through social work was common at the time, but Edith meant something quite different.

Edith argued that the "abnormal" might be a genius—a theme found in Nietzsche and eugenics. In his early work on the genius, the founder of eugenics, Francis Galton, tried to argue that the accumulation of individual variations from the normal could produce genius—or of course, degeneration.¹⁰⁵ Nietzsche inspired some eugenicists to see the abnormal as a potential "overman" who towered above the "unfit."¹⁰⁶ In her American lectures on eugenics, Edith declared, "We do not want a race of averages!" and she used her story *The Idealist* to celebrate those who transgressed the norm. The power of the abnormal needed to be developed, like the "discordant" notes that gave music interest.¹⁰⁷

Edith went further than this to link "genius" and "inversion." After all, she insisted, "Science and love have proved that there are, and always have been, men who have the souls of women, and women who have the souls of men." Edith insisted that the "abnormal" must be allowed to express his or her own "nature," but at the same time, be prepared to "lay down his life for the world," evoking

Hintonian notions of self-sacrifice. However, this lecture does not seem to have been greeted enthusiastically by the Eugenics Society; it was not published in their journal, and she was not invited back to speak.¹⁰⁸

Edith received a more enthusiastic welcome when she lectured on eugenics to the *Freewomen* discussion group, composed of readers of the iconoclastic avant-garde feminist magazine of the same name, on July 17, 1912. A large audience attended Edith's talk, with many "anti-eugenicists" in the audience.¹⁰⁹ The editor of the *Freewoman*, Dora Marsden, was hostile to eugenics on individualist grounds, and the journal denounced the effort to pass a bill enabling the compulsory sterilization of the feeble-minded because this compulsion could extend to anyone odd and eccentric.¹¹⁰ As Edith asked, how could moralists denounce the abnormal as diseased when conventional morality led to so much disease and misery? She argued that conventional morality was especially harmful to women: "Cannot a man destroy a woman's soul in marriage and buy her body outside marriage?" A man who took a woman against her will committed a "spiritual murder." And women's dependence on men forced them to "surrender to physical passion for ulterior reasons, such as being supported economically." This argument was similar to that of those feminists who focused on sexuality as exploitative, but Edith also appealed to the *Freewoman* audience who were more interested in women's sexual expression and advocated birth control. Edith did that it was women's responsibility not to bring into the world those "who would be badly handicapped before birth." However, the brief mention of her talk in the *Freewoman* did not go into any more detail.

In the version of her lecture printed much later, Edith also diverged from eugenics to celebrate sexuality—even nonreproductive sexual desire, as a "divine fire." Rejecting the tendency of eugenics to define "abnormal" sexology in terms of mental illness, she declared that "sex is not a mania. It is a mysticism."¹¹¹ For Edith, sexual desire was a creative force that should be cultivated. The true abnormal was not only the "invert," but a genius such as Nietzsche and Blake; as she declared, "it is before potential artists and erring idealists of the Oscar Wilde type that eugenic law-makers must pause and re-value values."¹¹²

Unlike most British people at the time, the *Freewoman* audience was also familiar with the notion of the invert, since the journal published several articles on that topic.¹¹³ Edith proclaimed that "I am what I am," should be the true invert's motto, and "And I refuse to pretend to be what I am not."¹¹⁴ Edith was arguing for the naturalness and utility of "abnormal" sexual desires to warn against legislation, implicitly linking the proposal to sterilize the feeble-minded

with "outmoded" laws that condemned the "abnormal" (which must refer to laws against sex between men). She warned that "mock abnormality," that is, "passional experiments and episodes outside normal lines merely of self-gratification" were "a great danger to the State" and said that inverts should not be allowed to marry. Similarly, in the *Freewoman* Harry Birnstingl argued that supposedly sexless spinsters may contribute to society because of and not in spite of their "abnormality," if they are allowed to express their naturally inverted desires.¹¹⁵ However, another writer in the *Freewoman* attacked his article and denigrated inversion.¹¹⁶ Two years after Edith gave her lecture, Dora Marsden herself both echoed her argument and criticized it.¹¹⁷ She asserted that for some inverts, their "physiological idiosyncrasy" may be turned to their advantage (perhaps as a superior genius sort of person as Edith argues), but she objected when this was used to cast a "romantic glow" over "gratuitous vice." Furthermore, Marsden was very uncomfortable with any effort to categorize people into types such as Uranians (Marsden herself had close but fraught relationships with other women).¹¹⁸

Edith was very nervous to speak even obliquely on inversion, because rumors were circulating about her own sexuality. Even Edward Carpenter's sister questioned her about this "with trembling lips and hands." Edith wrote to Carpenter that the confrontation made her feel "ill," but she "calmly said if it is true [she was an invert] it would be sheer purity, sweet to me and so for me the best." Facing her anxiety, she decided that "I'm not going ever again to be afraid. ... not if they spit at me."¹¹⁹

In her lectures in the United States, it is unclear how explicit she was about lesbianism. She advertised that she would speak on "sexual abnormality," but Margaret Anderson publically criticized Edith Ellis in the modernist journal *The Little Review* for not openly defending homosexuality.¹²⁰ One reader wrote to the journal that Mrs. Ellis's lecture, however indirect, had confirmed her belief that "inverts" had weaker constitutions and should be treated with understanding and pity rather than legislation.¹²¹ Edith's message, therefore, was lost in her evasion. Furthermore, the problem with the notion of invert as genius was that it did not provide grounds for solidarity with others, or defending ordinary inverts.

In her lecture tours in the United States between 1914 and 1915, Edith called herself "Mrs. Havelock Ellis" and bragged of the love letters she received from her husband. Nonetheless, Edith advocated a different kind of marriage in these lectures: they were so happy, she proclaimed, because they were independent of each other. With her short hair and boyish energy, she became a celebrity whose radical critique of gender relations excited large audiences.

She stood on a table at the Chicago women's club to proclaim that wives should be independent of their husbands. On a Washington meeting, suffragists were distracted by a cat who licked off the icing facade of a cake model of the White House made for the occasion, but Edith got them to focus on the proposal that wives should refuse to kiss their husbands—or clean or cook—until the vote was won.¹²²

In these lectures, Edith also evoked the Nietzschean notion of the superman—as the superwoman. Lecturing on eugenics in Chicago, she declared that “the time will come when the superman and the superwoman see nothing but beauty in the world and the prude will be regarded as abnormal.”¹²³ But Edith's vision of the superwoman was not elitist, unlike Dora Marsden's ideal of the “freewomen” as true individuals superior to the “bondswoman” with their “servant” mentality.¹²⁴ Marsden believed that the superwoman, or freewoman, should not stoop to housework; domestic servants should look after her. But Edith thought that the genius should see beyond the conventional social arrangement in which some compelled others into servitude; the genius must not seek just her own needs, but use her powers to transform society. In her lectures on domestic service, she astutely commented that in the “average English home ... we have the aristocrat (the woman) in the house, and woman menials doing all the work, and another aristocrat (the man) using women either as beasts of burden or objects of desire with the excuse, ‘Oh, she is not my wife.’”¹²⁵

Edith's triumphant lecture tour faltered, however, as her health began to break down, and rumors started to circulate that she and Havelock practiced free love—he was having a relationship with birth control advocate Margaret Sanger—and perhaps there were some suspicions about her relationship with a woman. Edith destroyed her letters and returned to Britain. She had been suffering from diabetes, which could not be treated at the time, and an underlying heart condition wore her out. The stress produced a nervous breakdown and suicide attempt when she threw herself out of a fourth floor window at a sanatorium. Confined to her bed, she raved and hallucinated, shocking Olive Schreiner, who wrote to Havelock that Edith was a victim of Hintonism. For Schreiner, “The curse of Hintonism is that it makes out you can freely & recklessly play with the gratification of sex instinct—it's like teaching a child you can strike matches & throw them down just wherever you think good.”¹²⁶ Edith Ellis played with fire, both in her own life and in her writings, but what burned her was not her gratifications but the unresolved tensions between the discourse of abnormality and her own more mystical individual exploration of self and other.

Conclusion

What can we learn from Edith Lees Ellis about the history of the individual and the self? She advocated for greater openness about sex, and her own husband’s work made her “inversion” more potentially visible. But she destroyed her own personal papers and never openly wrote about her relationships with women, fearing negative reactions.¹²⁷ To be sure, knowledge of the concept of lesbianism was still confined to avant-garde circles, but even there most intellectuals still regarded inverts as degenerate. However, Edith is really more interesting in the way she helped to articulate a socialist and feminist vision of individuality. This individuality respected the difference of others while responding to the individual’s needs, unlike Evangelical self-sacrifice that so damaged women, the competitive individualism of political economy that damaged the poor, and the anti-individualism of the Fabians that could produce bureaucratic experts exerting too much control. And she also combined Hinton’s mysticism, Nietzsche’s madness, and eugenics—in ways completely differently than they would have intended—to celebrate the invert as a genius with special powers. Unlike the elitist egoists of her time, her sensitivity to class—especially the issue of domestic servants—enabled her to assert her own individuality and recognize others’ needs.

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Afterword

I began this book with the Chevalièr/e d'Eon's narrative of transformation from a polished diplomat to an Amazonian woman. At the time, she was regarded as wonderful and strange, as a singular individual. By 1920, Havelock Ellis used her story to coin the term "eonism" to diagnose those who wanted to dress in the clothes of the opposite gender. The Chevalièr/e saw herself as unique; Ellis made her into a category.

While the Chevalièr/e drew on Rousseau's philosophies and the lives of saints, Havelock Ellis cited sexology and eugenics; tracing the roots of their "deviation" to their heredity and upbringing, he saw different sexual types as variations from what he saw as masculine and feminine biological norms, a long-standing concern of his thought. Other doctors claimed that "transvestites" developed an erotic fixation on women's clothing and derived pleasure from wearing women's clothing.¹ But Havelock Ellis criticized these experts for overemphasizing the fetishism of women's clothes, and pointed out that eonists' desires went far beyond eroticism or the "impulse to disguise ... since the subject of this anomaly, far from seeking disguise by adopting the garments of the opposite sex, feels on the contrary that he has thereby become emancipated from disguise and is at last really himself."² Instead, eonism was a "deep demand of their own nature" and "constitutional predisposition." But Ellis overemphasized d'Eon's femininity: he claims that d'Eon followed little "feminine avocations" (of which there is no evidence) but ignores the fact that d'Eon did not really like being feminine, although she wanted to be a woman.

At the same time, Havelock Ellis was fascinated by the way sexual variation escaped the boundaries of conventional gender norms. He suggested that "every living being is in perpetual slight movement and perpetually throwing off evanescent thoughts and feelings." This is a vision of individual nature as changing and complex, rather than fixed in a narrative of pathology. Ellis both valued his subjects for their peculiarities as well as diagnosing them for varying from the norm; for instance, he wrote that eonists were often "refined, sensitive, and highly intelligent."³

Ellis's notion of the self encompassed the relationship of the self to others, rather than seeing the self as isolated and enclosed. People project themselves

onto others, and define themselves through others. He thought the eonist engaged in “aesthetic inversion”; he imaginatively identifies with women, for we “imitate the beauty we see, and sympathetically place ourselves in it.” The eonist just takes this identification with female beauty to the extreme. “He has put too much of ‘me’ into the ‘you’ that attracts him.” This point did not actually fit the Chevalièr/e very well, because there is no evidence d’Eon was ever attracted to anyone, and she emulated learned, courageous, and saintly women instead of conventional feminine beauty. Nonetheless, Ellis’s insight hints at the notion that defining the self is not a solitary pursuit, but always involves explaining oneself to other people, and inventing the self in the process. But Havelock Ellis, as an expert, distanced himself from this process, and took on the authority to invent the selves of others. As Ivan Crozier writes, once Ellis gathered up his case studies the “individualities” of the subject were dropped in favor of an “objective ... overarching theory which would subsume any form of individuality.”⁴

This book, however, has decentered expert discourses such as that of Havelock Ellis; instead of examining how experts increasingly slotted people such as d’Eon as categories of deviance, I focus on how my subjects defined their own lives. My subjects created a sense of self not by taking on—or refusing—preconceived identities, but by exploring the fissures between the dominant discourses of their times, and their own feelings and experiences. While philosophers analyze the self as an abstraction, these studies show how people do not just adopt discourses or identities wholesale, but twisted them into different meanings. My subjects transformed Rousseau into a feminist, Jesus into a sexual radical, and Nietzsche into a compassionate character who loved his neighbor.

As I asked at the beginning of this book: did those who felt a disjuncture between their beliefs and their feelings, and the conventions of the time, become more critical of social hierarchies in general? From my case studies, the evidence is mixed. The Chevalièr/e d’Eon used the notion of the unique self as he broke with absolutist France to ally with British radicals, and eventually to support the French Revolution; she also became a feminist who broadened the possibilities for women’s achievements. But Anne Lister was so focused on her own concept of herself as unique that she did not see herself as having commonalities with other women, even when she met masculine women like herself. She saw other people, even her lovers, in instrumental terms, to be lied to and manipulated. Unlike Rousseau, she was happy with an aristocratic, capitalist social order. For Lister, the unique self became selfish.

Conversely, those who rejected the notion of the unique self might criticize their own societies—or accept inequalities. Richard Johnson was not interested

in celebrating himself as different from others. To be sure, he experienced a disjuncture between his work for the British Empire, and his observations of its corruption and inefficiencies. He briefly recognized his own complicity in this. But instead of further exploring his own emotions, he turned expert to examine and manage the emotions of others in society. Ultimately, this led him away from his earlier criticisms of the empire to propose that the British Empire could be managed more efficiently—and to an acceptance of racist ideas of Indians.

James Hinton also rejected the notion of the unique self, but he called for the sacrifice of the self rather than the management of the self. He deeply felt for the sufferings of the poor, especially prostitutes, and his call for social justice influenced altruistic movements of his time, such as philanthropy and socialism. But Hinton failed to analyze his own feelings; while he did not see himself as an expert, he imagined himself as a prophet and a genius who transcended ordinary morality and expected his wife and other women to sacrifice for him.

I also began this book by asking if white men's transgressive behavior or beliefs with women could be analyzed as queer. On one hand, James Hinton's advocacy of polygamy potentially disturbed the normative monogamy of the conventional Victorian family, which is why he kept this belief secret. Yet as he repeatedly pointed out, Victorian men commonly went to prostitutes or kept mistresses; this was what I have called a "twilight moment," for a man could go to a brothel in the evening and in the morning appear as a respectable gentleman with no damage to his reputation.⁵ In another example, Richard Johnson could write to his superiors about his Indian mistresses, since in the late eighteenth century this was such a common practice. But he had to conceal his secret criticisms of the empire and Christianity in order to keep his career. Both Hinton and Johnson may have queered the dominant ideas of their time, but as men they did not face the risks faced by people who engaged in queer behavior. Both Johnson and Hinton, as gentlemen, could successfully manage their careers by hiding their secrets. D'Eon lost her position not only because she stole diplomatic secrets, but because she became a woman. Lister's class position protected her, but she only got away with her many seductions of women because her contemporaries found it difficult to conceive of lesbianism. Edith Ellis had to hide her relationships with women, even in advanced circles.

In the context of this book, however, Edith Ellis becomes interesting not just as a case study in her husband's studies of sexual inversion, but because she tried to overcome the limitations both of the unique self—and the sacrifice of the self. James Hinton's idea that young people should serve the poor deeply inspired her, but she balked at his insistence that women must sacrifice themselves to the sexual needs of men. She believed that socialism would be more powerful than

philanthropy, but she also feared that Fabianism would ignore individuality. So she was a key player in the effort to imbue socialism with an appreciation for individual variation, especially sexual variation.

All of these issues, of course, had much larger implications than the struggles of my five subjects with their inability to conform. In my next book, I will examine how the notion of human nature as fragmented and manipulable could lead to the establishment of regimented institutions of surveillance and discipline. The concept of the self fragmented into emotions, borrowed from Helvetius by Johnson, was taken up by the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, who wanted to trigger the emotions of pleasure and pain for the greatest good of the greatest number, and influenced the management of prisons and workhouses. Johnson's analysis of the passions also fits into the longer trajectory leading toward Havelock Ellis, of experts who broke down the elements of human nature and studied its variations, in order to define, control, and discipline people. But this notion of human nature as diverse and fragmented also made experts like Bentham and Ellis more open to human variation; Bentham secretly advocated the decriminalization of sodomy, and Ellis took up the cause more openly.⁶

The Fabian socialists can also be put into this trajectory; although they criticized Bentham as inhumane, they too wanted to study and manage individuals as units in the larger society. The Fabians were very effective in instituting welfare measures that benefitted people's health and well-being, but they could also be coercive. The dominant group of Fabians supported imperialism as a force for modernization of "primitive" peoples. Many Fabians also espoused eugenics, the pseudo-science of human breeding thought to be based on expert knowledge rather than sentiment.⁷ People must choose marriage partners, they argued, with the good of the human race in mind, to propagate the fit rather than perpetuate disease. The good of society was therefore more important than the rights of individuals.

In reaction to this, some radicals asserted the autonomy and dignity of all, even those seen as most deviant or degraded. As we have seen, Edith Ellis opposed eugenic legislation and stressed that even the "abnormal" could contribute to society through their creativity and even genius. Edith did not see the unique self as the overman (or overwoman) in Nietzschean terms as superior to others. Rather, given her focus on domestic service, she saw everyone as capable of uniqueness and dignity. Some of her fellow radicals in the Fellowship of the New Life also belonged to the Humanitarian League, an organization that developed these ideas into a radical understanding of human rights. Most notably, Henry Salt went further than Edith to criticize imperialism and racism and argued that

colonized people deserved human rights even if they were not what Europeans considered as “civilized.” Salt did not believe that people had to live up to the ideal of the possessive individual in order to enjoy these rights, nor did they need to conform to British ways; rather, human rights were an inherent attribute of humanity. By recognizing the suffering of others—even of animals—these rights would be respected.⁸

The internal explorations of the unique self provided an ethical grounding for this wider vision. For Edward Carpenter, Edith’s dear friend, socialism “defined a dream and an ideal, that of the common life conjoined to the free individuality, which somewhere and some when must be realized, because it springs from and is the expression of the very root-nature of man.”⁹ Carpenter therefore celebrated the unique nature of every human being but believed that this nature could only be fulfilled in a socialist society. Recently, Leela Gandhi has proposed that “Carpenter’s ethics of shared or common life improves on democratic politics.” By discovering our own subjectivity, we can discover the humanity in others: “Replacing the figure of the ‘dear self’ with the figure of ‘everyone,’ it tricks us into becoming other—regarding precisely when most self-regarding.”¹⁰

Of course, this golden rule can founder on cultural blindness if we assume that our neighbors want what we want for ourselves. But as Gandhi recognizes, the fellowship’s focus on individuality within the whole was premised on valuing people’s differences. Edith believed that one must examine oneself and celebrate one’s own uniqueness, like the beautiful tall wheat sheaf growing above the others in the field. As Edith argued, rewriting Nietzsche and Hinton to do so, “Love your neighbor as yourself, because you realize through your own needs and development what are your neighbors’ needs.”¹¹

Notes

Chapter 1

- 1 I refer to d'Eon as a man when I am referring to the period before 1776, when d'Eon defended his masculinity, and after the transition, I refer to d'Eon as a woman as she then referred to herself, and when referring to d'Eon in general I use the masculine and feminine title Chevalièr/e.
- 2 For classic studies, see Jerrold Seigel, *The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); Raymond Martin and John Barresi, *The Rise and Fall of the Soul and Self* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
- 3 Or as Judith Butler asks, did this disjuncture between convention and desires create a necessary reflexivity? Judith Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 8.
- 4 Uniqueness is somewhat different than authenticity, which does not require uniqueness. But they are often confused. Thanks to Andy Elfenbein for this point. Thinkers from Adorno to Foucault have criticized the notion of authenticity and the authentic self as giving a false sense of freedom and autonomy, and ignoring how people are created through the discourses and power structures of their time. Martin Jay, "Taking on the Stigma of Inauthenticity: Adorno's Critique of Genuineness," *New German Critique*, no. 97 (2006): 24; Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Vintage, 1994 [1970]), 387.
- 5 Dror Wahrman, *The Making of the Modern Self* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).
- 6 C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). For postmodern critics who conflate these different aspects of individualism and the unique self, see Nick Mansfield, *Subjectivity: Theories of the Self from Freud to Haraway* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 55; Joseph Indaimo, *The Self, Ethics, and Human Rights* (London: Routledge, 2015), 2; Stuart Hall, "Introduction," in *Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies*, ed. Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert, and Kenneth Thompson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 597.
- 7 In differentiating between the history of the self and the history of individualism, I am working in the same trajectory as Seigel, *Idea of the Self*; Jan Goldstein, *The*

- Post-Revolutionary Self: Politics and Psyche in France 1750–1850* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Charly Coleman, *The Virtues of Abandon: An Anti-Individualist History of the French Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014).
- 8 Laura L. Doan, *Disturbing Practices: History, Sexuality, and Women's Experience of Modern War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 83. For somewhat different yet productive approach not so concerned with downplaying sexual identities in the past, yet insistent on historical specificity, see Valerie Traub, *Thinking Sex with the Early Moderns* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).
 - 9 Ivan Crozier, "Havelock Ellis, Eonism and the Patient's Discourse: Or, Writing a Book about Sex," *History of Psychiatry* 11, no. 42, Pt. 2 (2000): 125–30; Havelock Ellis, "Eonism," in *Studies in the Psychology of Sex* (New York: Random House, 1936).
 - 10 Doan, *Disturbing Practices*; Robyn Wiegman and Elizabeth A. Wilson, "Introduction: Antinormativity's Queer Conventions," *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 26, no. 1 (2015): 1–25; Patricia Elliot, *Debates in Transgender, Queer, and Feminist Theory* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2016); Heather Love, "Queer," *Transgender Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (2014): 176.
 - 11 Maya Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire: Conquest and Collecting in the East 1750–1850* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009), 64.
 - 12 Similarly, Seigel divides components of the self into the bodily self, temperament, desires, the social relationships of the self, and the reflexive self. Seigel, *Idea of the Self*, 6–7.
 - 13 Doan, *Disturbing Practices*, 43.
 - 14 For my earlier work, see Anna Clark, *The Struggle for the Breeches: Gender and the Making of the British Working Class* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). For examinations of working-class self construction, Patrick Joyce, *Democratic Subjects: The Self and the Social in Nineteenth-Century England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Jonathan Rose, *The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). For imperialism and subjectivity, Antoinette Burton, *At the Heart of the Empire: Indians and the Colonial Encounter in Late-Victorian Britain* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Theodore Koditschek, *Liberalism, Imperialism, and the Historical Imagination: Nineteenth-Century Visions of a Greater Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
 - 15 Regenia Gagnier, *Subjectivities: A History of Self-Representation in Britain, 1832–1920* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 144; Rose, *Intellectual Life*, 19–44.
 - 16 Matt Cook, *Queer Domesticities: Homosexuality and Home Life in Twentieth-Century London* (New York: Springer, 2014), 1–10.

- 17 Patricia Meyer Spacks, *Privacy: Concealing the Eighteenth Century Self* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 185.
- 18 Rebecca Steinitz, *Time, Space, and Gender in the Nineteenth-Century British Diary* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 156.
- 19 For a study of diaries in general, see Robert A. Fothergill, *Private Chronicles: A Study of English Diaries* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 30.
- 20 Irving Howe, "The Self in Literature," in *Constructions of the Self*, ed. George Levine (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 249.
- 21 Felicity Nussbaum, *The Autobiographical Subject* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 25.
- 22 For *My Secret Life*, see Steven Marcus, *The Other Victorians* (New York: Basic Books, 1966), 91, 92; for Munby, Leonore Davidoff, "Class and Gender in Victorian Britain: Arthur J. Munby and Hannah Cullwick," *Feminist Studies* 5 (1979): 87–133.
- 23 Nussbaum, *Autobiographical Subject*, 36.
- 24 A rare example of a woman alluding obliquely to sexual experiences outside marriage is the journal of Marianna Lady Brougham, who became pregnant before she married Lord Brougham. She often wrote "—" in her journal when he visited, perhaps alluding to sex. She becomes quite miserable, noting "may God have pity on me"; she seems to have been pregnant and is saved only when Brougham marries her and they circulate the news of their marriage with deliberate vagueness about the date. Marianne Lady Brougham's diaries. Brougham Collection, Special Collections, University College Library, London.
- 25 Andrew Chambers, "Reading, the Godly, and Self-Writing in England, circa 1580–1720," *Journal of British Studies* 46, no. 4 (2007): 807.
- 26 Elwin Hofman, "How to Do the History of the Self," *History of the Human Sciences* 29, no. 3 (2016): 8–24.
- 27 Lucia Dacome, "Noting the Mind: Commonplace Books and the Pursuit of the Self in Eighteenth Century Britain," *The Journal of the History of Ideas* 65 (2004): 604. See also Amanda Watson, "Shared Reading at a Distance," *Book History* (Johns Hopkins University Press) 18, no. 1 (2015): 103–33; Cheryl L. Nixon, "Ann Radcliffe's Commonplace Book: Assembling the Female Body and the Material Text," *Women's Writing* 22 (2015): 355–75.
- 28 Lyons, *Invention of the Self*, 88.
- 29 J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 313, 394, 411–12; Caroline Robbins, *The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthman* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), 43, 49, 182, 201.
- 30 Anna Clark, *Scandal: The Sexual Politics of the British Constitution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 219. Wahrman writes about Juvenal and gender but uses the term "homosexual" which is not nuanced enough. Dror Wahrman,

- “Gender in Translation: How the English Wrote Their Juvenal, 1644–1815,” *Representations* 65 (1999): 1–41.
- 31 Wahrman, *The Making of the Modern Self*, 22.
- 32 Stephen Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).
- 33 Cody is building on Elias here. Lisa Forman Cody, “Sex, Civility, and the Self: Du Coudray, D’èon, and Eighteenth-Century Conceptions of Gendered, National, and Psychological Identity,” *French Historical Studies* 24, no. 3 (2001): 384–400.
- 34 John Ormsby Lyons, *The Invention of the Self* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1978).
- 35 Justin Blake Biel, “Divide and Tolerate: Imperial Secularisms in Ireland, India, and Britain, 1774–1815,” PhD dissertation, University of Minnesota, 2014.
- 36 Spacks, *Privacy: Concealing the Eighteenth Century Self*, 14.
- 37 Faramerz Dabhoiwala, *The Origins of Sex: A History of the First Sexual Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 118.
- 38 Goldstein, *The Post-Revolutionary Self*, 115, 57.
- 39 Nancy Armstrong, *How Novels Think: The Limits of British Individualism from 1719–1900* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 7.
- 40 Ute Frevert, “Defining Emotions: Concepts and Debates over Three Centuries,” in *Emotional Lexicons: Continuity and Change in the Vocabulary of Feeling 1700–2000*, ed. Ute Frevert et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 5.
- 41 Andrew Elfenbein, *Romantic Genius: The Prehistory of a Homosexual Role* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 7.
- 42 Christine Battersby, *Gender and Genius: Towards a Feminist Aesthetics* (Bloomington: Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).
- 43 Coleman, *The Virtues of Abandon*, 8.
- 44 Coleman declares that for philosopher Quesnay, justification for economic policy “stemmed not only from the sanctity of individuals—that is, from their autonomy, agency, and independency—but also from their conformity with an abstract system of laws that transcended the perspective of any particular subject and could be imposed, if necessary, against one’s express will.” He also cites La Mettrie as an example of a philosopher who thought that an elect elite should rule to control people’s passions. Later, I will discuss Helvetius as an example of this. *Ibid.*, 146, 220.
- 45 Londa L. Schiebinger, *Nature’s Body: Gender in the Making of Modern Science* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1993); Thomas W. Laqueur, *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
- 46 Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 356–70.
- 47 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile, or Education* (1762), 213.

- 48 Etienne Balibar, *Equaliberty*, trans. James Ingram (Durham: Duke University Press), 86; Coleman, *The Virtues of Abandon*, 221.
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- 50 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourses*, trans. G.D.H. Cole (London and Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1923), Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2

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- 43 D’Eon, *Lettres, Memoires*, i. “Eleve parmi les rocher & les montagnes, une education male m’a donne le courage de dire cette verite & la force de l’écouter; elle m’a donne une treme d’ame, qui ne peut se plier ni au mange ni aux bassesses des courtisans: aussi ai-je fait la triste experience que l’innocence & la droiture nous brouillent souvent, presque autant, avec la Cour, que pouroit le faire le contraire.”

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- 51 Gaillardet, *Mémoires* 193, letter to Broglie, May 7, 1771. Je suis assez mortifie d’être encore tel que la nature m’a fait, et que le calme de mon temperament naturel ne m’ayant jamais porte aux plaisirs, cela a donne lieu a l’innocence de mes amis d’imaginer, tant en france qu’en Russie et en Angleterre que j’étais du genre femini. La malice des mes ennemis a fortifie le tout, depuis mes malheurs que je n’ai nullement merite, et dont je devrais être quitte depouis longtemps. Je leur ai prouve et pourverai tant qu’ils voudront, que je suis non-seulement un homme, mais un capitaine de dragons, et les armes a la main.”
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- 56 Kates, *Monsieur d’Eon*, 191.
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- 61 *Whisperer*, no. 33 (September 29, 1770): 202.
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- 67 Burrows, *A King’s Ransom*, 89.
- 68 Kates, *Monsieur d’Eon Is a Woman*, 71.
- 69 Lisa Forman Cody, “Sex, Civility and the Self: Du Coudray, d’Eon, and Eighteenth-Century Conceptions of Gendered, National, and Psychological Identity,” *French Historical Studies* 24, no. 3 (2001): 390–400.
- 70 ‘Vous reconnaissez enfin que les vertus males dans mon sexe n’y sont point un écart de la nature dont on ait le droit de se jouer & qu’elle ne peut point souffrir de violence dans ses secrets inscrutable de qui n’en soit une pour les mœurs. Chevalier d’Eon to Lord Mansfield (February 8, 1778). British Library Add Ms. 11341, f. 129.
- 71 Anna Clark, *Scandal: The Sexual Politics of the British Constitution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 49, 141.
- 72 *A Sapphick Epistle, from Jack Cavendish, to the Honorable Mrs. D-R* (London, 1778), p. 20. British Library 11631.g. 31 (10).
- 73 J. Perry, *Mimosa, or the Sensitive Plant, a poem dedicated to Mr. Banks* (London, 1779), 1.
- 74 Anon., *An Epistle from Mademoiselle D’Eon to the Right Honorable L-d M-D, C-f-J-E of the C-t of K-g’s B-h, on his determination in regard to her sex* (London, 1778), p. 16.
- 75 Chrisman-Campbell, “Dressing d’Eon,” 104.
- 76 “Histoires des femmes-hommes ou des femmes qu ont deguisées leur sexes for se consacrer à Dieu & professer la Vie Monastique.” D’Eon papers Brotherton Collection, University of Leeds Library.
- 77 Paul Scott, “Authenticity and Textual Transvestism in the Memoirs of the Abbé De Choisy,” *French Studies* 69, no. 1 (2015): 14–29; Gary Ferguson, “Early Modern Transitions: From Montaigne to Choisy,” *L’Esprit Créateur* 53, no. 1 (2013): 145–57.
- 78 Julie Wheelwright, *Amazons and Military Maids: Women Who Dressed as Men in the Pursuit of Life, Liberty and Happiness* (London: Pandora, 1989).
- 79 Glynis Ridley, *The Discovery of Jeanne Baret* (London and New York: Penguin Random House, 2010).

- 80 Dianne Dugaw, *Warrior Women and Popular Balladry, 1650–1850* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
- 81 *The Maiden of Tonnerre*, 63.
- 82 British Library Add Ms. 11,340, f. 36.
- 83 M. de la Fortelle, *La Vie Militaire, Politique et Privée de Mademoiselle Charles-Genevieve-Louise-Auguste-Andrée-Thimothée d'Eon de Beaumont* (Paris, 1779).
- 84 Susan Lanser, *The Sexuality of History: Modernity and the Sapphic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 168; *The entertaining travels and adventures of Mademoiselle de Richelieu. Cousin to the present Duke of that Name who made the tour of Europe, dressed in men's cloaths, attended by her Maid Lucy as her Valet de Chambre. Now done into English from the lady's own manuscript. By the translator of the Memoirs and adventures of the Marques of Bretagne and Duke of Harcourt* The second edition (London, 1740?). *Eighteenth Century Collections online*. Gale, University of Minnesota, January 25, 2017; Catalina de Erauso, *Lieutenant Nun: Memoir of a Basque Transvestite in the New World*, trans. Michelle Stepto and Gabriel Stepto (Boston: Beacon Press, 2011); Giovanni Bianchi, trans. John Cleland, *An Historical and Physical Dissertation on the Case of Catherine Vizzani, Containing the Adventures of a Young Woman* (London, 1755); Hal Gladfelder, *Fanny Hill in Bombay: The Making and Unmaking of John Cleland* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 13
- 85 Fraser Easton, "Covering Sexual Disguise: Passing Women and Generic Constraint." *Studies in Eighteenth Century Culture* 35 (January 2006): 95–125 and "Gender's Two Bodies: Women Warriors, Female Husbands and Plebeian Life," *Past & Present* 180, no. 1 (August 2003): 131–74; Nicole Pellegrin, "Le Genre et l'habit. Figures du Transvestisme Féminin sous l'Ancien Régime," *Clio: Histoire, Femmes Et Sociétés* 2, no. 10 (December 1999): 2053.
- 86 Jerrold Seigel, *The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Rousseau, *Emile*, Book 4, paragraph 744.
- 87 Rousseau, *Emile*, Book 5, paragraph 1251.
- 88 M. de la Fortelle, *La Vie Militaire, Politique et Privée*, 10.
- 89 D'Eon, *Lettres de Lady Robinson*, Brotherton Collection, f. 75.
- 90 Kates, *Maiden of Tonnerre*, 79.
- 91 Virginia Burrus, *The Sex Lives of Saints: An Erotics of Ancient Hagiography*, *Divinations* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 143–46; Teresa M. Shaw, *The Burden of the Flesh: Fasting and Sexuality in Early Christianity* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), 241.
- 92 "Histoires des femmes-hommes ou des femmes qu ont deguisées leur sexes pour se consacrer à Dieu, & professer la Vie Monastique," 2, in d'Eon papers, Brotherton Collection, and Kates, *Maiden of Tonnerre*, 146–60.

- 93 *The Maiden of Tonnerre*, 113.
- 94 Charly Coleman, *The Virtues of Abandon: An Anti-Individualist History of the French Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 89–125.
- 95 *The Maiden of Tonnerre*, 106.
- 96 For d'Eon's religiosity and his relationship with Jansenism, see Kates, *Monsieur d'Eon*, 266.
- 97 *The Maiden of Tonnerre*, 96.
- 98 *The Maiden of Tonnerre*, 102. D'Eon had written to Rousseau in 1766 a few years after *Emile* appeared and was prosecuted, admiring him as a fellow persecuted patriot but repudiating his religious ideas. Kates, *Monsieur d'Eon*, 144.
- 99 *The Maiden of Tonnerre*, 110.
- 100 *The Maiden of Tonnerre*, 79
- 101 *The Maiden of Tonnerre*, extract from 1778, p. 102.
- 102 A Special Request by Mlle d'Eon for a Small Favor from Readers, Authors, and the Members of the Universal Republic of Letters," 133
- 103 Rousseau, *Confessions*, p. 1; "Je ne suis fait comme aucun de ceux que j'ai vus; j'ose croire n'être fait comme aucun de ceux qui existent. Si je ne vaud pas mieux, au moins je suis autre. Si la nature a bien ou mal fait de briser le moule dans lequel elle m'a jeté, c'est ce dont on ne peut juger qu'après m'avoir lu."
- 104 *The Maiden of Tonnerre*, 61.
- 105 Chevalier d'Eon to Lord Mansfield, 8 Feb. 1778. British Library Add Ms. 11341, f. 129.
- 106 Seigel, *Idea of the Self*, 237.
- 107 John O'Neal also suggests that this is why Rousseau appealed to d'Eon. John C. O'Neal, *The Progressive Poetics of Confusion in the French Enlightenment* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2011), 167.
- 108 Roseanne Kennedy, *Rousseau in Drag: Deconstructing Gender* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 2–4.
- 109 Rousseau, *Confessions*, 23; "ce caractère efféminé, mais pourtant indomptable, qui, flottant toujours entre la faiblesse et le courage, entre la mollesse et la vertu, m'a jusqu'au bout mis en contradiction avec moi-même, et a fait que l'abstinence et la jouissance, le plaisir et la sagesse, m'ont également échappé."
- 110 *The Maiden of Tonnerre*, p. 7.
- 111 Brotherton Collection, extract from *The Oracle, Bell's World*, July 27, 1790, f. 95.
- 112 Meeting of the National Assembly, Extrait du Patriote Francoise, June 13, 1792, in d'Eon Collection, Brotherton Library, University of Leeds.
- 113 *Public Advertizer*, June 16, 1792.
- 114 Vizately, *The True Story of the Chevalier d'Eon*, 310.
- 115 Mary Robinson, *A Letter to the Women of England, on the Injustice of Mental Subordination* (London, 1799), 71.

- 116 Katherine Binhammer, “Thinking Gender with Sexuality in 1790s’ Feminist Thought,” *Feminist Studies* 28, no. 3 (2002): 667–90; Sharon Setzer, “The Dying Game: Crossdressing in Mary Robinson’s Walsingham,” *Nineteenth Century Contexts* 22, no. 3 (2000): 305–28.

Chapter 3

- 1 Helena Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart: The Journals of Anne Lister* (London: Virago, 1988), 227.
- 2 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 145.
- 3 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 283.
- 4 Jill Liddington, “Anne Lister of Shibden Hall, Halifax (1791–1840): Her Diaries and the Historians,” *History Workshop* 35 (1995): 61.
- 5 Patricia Hughes, *Miss Anne Lister’s Early Life and the Curious Tale of Eliza Raine* (Ebook: Hues Books, 2015), 27.
- 6 Jill Liddington, *Female Fortune: Land, Gender, and Authority: The Anne Lister Diaries and Other Writings, 1833–36* (London: Rivers Oram Press, 1998), 52.
- 7 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart; No Priest but Love: Excerpts from the Diaries of Anne Lister, 1824–1826* (Otley: Smith Settle, 1992).
- 8 Jill Liddington, *Nature’s Domain: Anne Lister and the Landscape of Love* (Halifax: Pennine Pens, 2003); *Female Fortune*.
- 9 Patricia Hughes, *Anne Lister’s Secret Diary for 1817* (Privately published, 2014); *Miss Anne Lister’s Early Life*.
- 10 Emma Donohue, *Passions between Women* (New York: Harper, 1993), 50, 124; Elizabeth Mavor, *The Ladies of Llangollen* (Harmondworth: Penguin, 1973).
- 11 Lillian Faderman, *Surpassing the Love of Men* (New York: Women’s Press, 1985). For a more nuanced recent discussion, see S. Marcus, *Between Women: Friendship, Desire, and Marriage in Victorian England* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
- 12 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 210.
- 13 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 122–26; Liddington, *Female Fortune*, 86, 121, 04.
- 14 *Aristotle’s Masterpiece*, the popular sex manual that Anne read, refers to the “clytoris” as the seat of women’s pleasure, and also notes that the “ancients” claimed that “joint emission” (orgasm) was necessary for women to conceive. *The Whole of Aristotle’s Compleat Masterpiece, in Three Parts: Displaying the Secrets of Nature in the Generation of Man*, 54th ed. (London, 1793), 50.
- 15 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 212.
- 16 In the course of extensive research on other projects into popular literature, prostitution, cross-dressing, police court records, newspapers, and trials in the

- late eighteenth- and early nineteenth century in London, Glasgow, Yorkshire and Manchester I actively looked evidence of lesbian subcultures and found none. It is possible that lesbian networks or subcultures did not exist in England in the way they existed in France and Amsterdam. However, British and American women living in Italy formed an intense network of women in romantic and sexual relationships with other women, as Martha Vicinus has found. Martha Vicinus, *Intimate Friends: Women Who Loved Women, 1778–1928* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). Such subcultures existed in Paris among dancers, actresses and prostitutes, as Michael Ryan, a doctor, noted in his *Prostitution in London* (London, 1839), 56, 179. Dr. Ryan said he had seen no evidence of such women in London. For Paris, see D.A. Coward, “Attitudes to Homosexuality in 18th century France,” *Journal of European Studies* 10 (1980): 246–47; Marie-Jo Bonnet, *Un Choix sans equivoque: Recherches historiques sur les Relations Amoureuses entre les Femmes XVIe–XXe siecle* (Paris: Denoël, 1981), 65. For Amsterdam, see Theo van der Meer, “Tribades on Trial: Female Same-Sex Offenders in Late Eighteenth-Century Amsterdam,” in *Forbidden History: The State, Society and the Regulation of Sexuality in Modern Europe*, ed. John C. Fout (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 189–210. For Britain, see Randolph Trumbach, “The Origins and Development of the Modern Lesbian Role,” *Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques* 20, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 1287–320.
- 17 Malcolm Chase, *1820: Disorder and Stability in the United Kingdom* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).
 - 18 Anna Clark, “Twilight Moments,” *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 14, no. 1 (2005): 139–60.
 - 19 Teresa De Lauretis, *The Practice of Love: Lesbian Sexuality and Perverse Desire* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 308.
 - 20 Coleridge’s poem “Christabel” (written 1800) depicts a serpentine seductress named Geraldine who takes to the heroine’s bed.
 - 21 For such a person, see Miss Weeton who experienced both states. H. Milford, *Miss Weeton; Journal of a Governess: 1811–1825*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939).
 - 22 For mother’s drinking problem, see Hughes, *Miss Anne Lister’s Early Life*, 130.
 - 23 *Anne Lister’s Secret Diary for 1817*, 7.
 - 24 Halifax, England, Calderdale archives, SH/7/ML/E/4 Anne Lister Manuscript diaries, July 21, 1820. Henceforth referred to as Manuscript diaries.
 - 25 Muriel M. Green, ed., *Miss Lister of Shibden Hall* (London: Book Press, 1992), 28.
 - 26 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 2.
 - 27 Hughes, *Miss Anne Lister’s Early Life*, 24, 39–40.
 - 28 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 1, 14, 167, 223.

- 29 Durba Ghosh, *Sex and the Family in Colonial India: The Making of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 101–28.
- 30 Hughes, *Miss Anne Lister's Early Life*, 15.
- 31 Marcus, *Between Women*, 39.
- 32 Lisa Moore, *Dangerous Intimacies: Toward a Sapphic History of the British Novel* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 148.
- 33 As Martha Vicinus has written, Lister was one of several women in sexual relationships with each other who often used the language of husband and wife. Vicinus, *Intimate Friends*, 9, 90.
- 34 In another coded passage in a letter, Eliza asked “do dear husband if ps had happened since you went to York,” (when Lister was with other women). Hughes interprets “ps” as sex 3rd Aug. 1808. Eliza Raine’s diary, Hughes, *Miss Anne Lister's Early Life*, 38, 41.
- 35 Hughes, *Miss Anne Lister's Early Life*, 27.
- 36 Hughes, *Miss Anne Lister's Early Life*, 21.
- 37 Susan S. Lanser, *The Sexuality of History: Modernity and the Sapphic, 1565–1830* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 224.
- 38 Frances Singh, “The Girl Who Raged and Her Virago of a Grandmother: The Co-Biography of Jane Cumming and Dame Helen Cumming Gordon,” in *Women, Gender, and Print Culture in Eighteenth-Century Britain: Essays in Memory of Betty Rizzo*, ed. T. Berg and S. Kane (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013), 261–84.
- 39 Ghosh, *Sex and the Family*, 128.
- 40 Hughes, *Miss Anne Lister's Early Life*, 80–91, 151.
- 41 Hughes, *Miss Anne Lister's Early Life*, 210.
- 42 A. Jagose, *Inconsequence: Lesbian Representation and the Logic of Sexual Sequence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 18.
- 43 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 49.
- 44 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 281; *No Priest but Love*, 168.
- 45 Liddington, *Female Fortune*, 164.
- 46 Manuscript Diary, July 21, 1820.
- 47 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 143.
- 48 Halifax, England, Calderdale Archives, 1819, SH 7/ML/EX1, Extracts on readings, February 3, 1831.
- 49 Lister, Extracts from readings, vol. 6, loose sheet.
- 50 Bray, *The Friend*, 246.
- 51 Of course, many other people of her class and time enjoyed Byron while trying to be very respectable. See Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, *Family Fortunes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 259.
- 52 Terry Castle, *The Apparitional Lesbian: Female Homosexuality and Modern Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 104.

- 53 Lisa Moore, “‘Something More Tender Still Than Friendship’: Romantic Friendship in Early-Nineteenth-Century England,” *Feminist Studies* 18, no. 3 (1992): 512.
- 54 Manuscript Diary, July 25, 1820, also Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 344.
- 55 Byron, “To Thyrza,” quoted by Crompton, *Byron and Greek Love*, 178.
- 56 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 49.
- 57 Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 357.
- 58 Susan J. Wolfson, “‘Their She Condition’: Cross-Dressing and the Politics of Gender in *Don Juan*,” *English Literary History* 54 (1987): 606.
- 59 Thomas Moore, *Lalla Rookh* (London, 1818), 8th ed., 65.
- 60 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 103.
- 61 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 78.
- 62 Louis Crompton, *Byron and Greek Love: Homophobia in 19th-Century England* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 98–102. Interestingly enough, Byron had tried to suppress this poem when Edlestone, his beloved, was arrested for homosexual acts. Anne therefore may have had a very rare copy.
- 63 Byron, *Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage*, 34d canto XII.
- 64 Clara Tuite, “The Byronic Woman: Anne Lister’s Style, Sociability, and Sexuality,” in *Romantic Sociability: Social Networks and Literary Culture in Britain, 1770–1840*, ed. Gillian Russell and Clara Tuite (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 190.
- 65 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 103.
- 66 Similar to Barbara Taylor’s discussion of how Rousseau inspired and angered Mary Wollstonecraft. “Mary Wollstonecraft and the Wild Wish of Early Feminism,” *History Workshop Journal* 33 (1992): 209.
- 67 *The Confessions of Jean Jacques Rousseau* (New York, 1947), 3.
- 68 Muriel Green, ed., *Miss Lister of Shibden Hall: Selected Letters (1800–1840)* (Sussex: Book Guild, 1992), 77.
- 69 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 153.
- 70 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 297.
- 71 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 49.
- 72 Liddington, *Nature’s Domain*, 91.
- 73 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 273.
- 74 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 281.
- 75 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 49. For such theories, which were common medically until the 18th century and persisted after that in popular culture, see Thomas Laqueur, *Making Sex* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
- 76 Catherine A Euler, “Moving between Worlds: Gender, Class, Politics, Sexuality and Women’s Networks in the Diaries of Anne Lister of Shibden Hall, Halifax, Yorkshire, 1830–1840” (University of York, 1995), 322.

- 77 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 20.
- 78 Anna Clark, “Anne Lister’s Construction of Lesbian Identity,” *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 7, no. 1 (1996): 32. See also Stephen Colclough, “Do You Not Know the Quotation?: Reading Anne Lister/Anne Lister Reading,” in *Lesbian Dames: Sapphism in the Long Eighteenth Century*, ed. C. Gonda and J.C. Beynon (London: Ashgate, 2010), 159–72.
- 79 Liddington, “Anne Lister,” 61.
- 80 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 26, 29.
- 81 Richard Jenkyns, *The Victorians and Ancient Greece* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 63–64, 169, 280–81.
- 82 Lister, Calderdale Archives SH 7/ML/EX 1. Extracts from readings, vol. 7, f. 37.
- 83 Crompton, *Byron and Greek Love: Homophobia in 19th-Century England*, 89–98; Joan deJean, *Fictions of Sappho, 1546–1937* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 210; Linda Dowling, *Hellenism and Homosexuality in Victorian Oxford* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).
- 84 J.N. Adams, *The Latin Sexual Vocabulary* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).
- 85 Extracts from readings, vol. 6, f. 41(1819).
- 86 Christine Battersby, *Gender and Genius: Towards a Feminist Aesthetics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 13–14.
- 87 Eva Keuls, *The Reign of the Phallus: Sexual Politics in Ancient Athens* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Amy Richlin, *The Garden of Priapus: Sexuality and Aggression in Roman Humor* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
- 88 Judith P. Hallett, “Female Homoeroticism and the Denial of Roman Reality in Latin Literature,” *Yale Journal of Criticism* 3 (1989): 209–27.
- 89 Shelley P. Haley, “Lucian’s ‘Leana and Clonarium’: Voyeurism or a Challenge to Assumptions?,” in *Among Women*, ed. Nancy Sorkin Rabinowitz and Lisa Auanger (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002), 295.
- 90 Rev. D.H. Urquhart, *Commentaries on Classical Learning* (London, 1803), 332.
- 91 For instance Donoghue notes that Mrs. Thrale was not able to detect the lesbian allusions in Juvenal, although she was looking for them. Emma Donoghue, *Passions between Women* (London: Scarlett Press, 1993), 267.
- 92 Juvenal, *The Sixteen Satires* (London: Penguin, 1975) Satire 6, line 306ff.
- 93 For the most complete analysis of eroticism between women, see Bernadette J. Brooten, *Love between Women: Early Christian Responses to Female Homoeroticism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 47–49. Extracts from readings, vol. 6, f. 33.
- 94 Martial, *Epigrammes*, translated into French prose by Michel de Marolles (Paris, 1655), Book 1, No. 91.
- 95 Judith Roof, *A Lure of Knowledge: Lesbian Sexuality and Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 72, 162.

- 96 For instance, feminist classicists have argued that other Roman authors, such as Propertius, might be read as providing more varied and vigorous images of women than usually available, even if their intent was sexist. As Barbara Gold notes, the feminist reader can try to hear “voices speaking against the text.” Barbara K. Gold, “But Ariadne was never there in the first place: finding the female in Roman poetry,” in *Feminist Theory and the Classics*, ed. Nancy Sorkin Rabinowitz and Amy Richlin (New York: Routledge, 1993), 89; see also Judith P. Hallett, “Feminist Theory, Historical Periods, Literary Canons, and the Study of Graeco-Roman Antiquity,” 63 in the same volume.
- 97 Manuscript Diary, July 21, 1820.
- 98 Fragment in Extracts from readings, October 3, 1814, in code.
- 99 De Jean, *Fictions of Sappho*, 116–98.
- 100 Pierre Bayle, *Historical and Critical Dictionary*, 2nd ed., edited, revised and corrected by Mr. Des Maizeaux (London, 1738), vol. 5, 44.
- 101 Manuscript Diary, March 16, 1820.
- 102 Extracts from readings, vol. 2, f. 133.
- 103 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 235–36.
- 104 Interestingly enough, “Michael Field” (Katherine Bradley and Edith Cooper, poets who lived, loved, and wrote together) also cited the tale of Tiresias in their oeuvre applying classical precedents to same sex love. Chris White, “Poets and Lovers Evermore: The Poetry and Journals of Michael Field,” in *Sexual Sameness. Textual Differences in Lesbian and Gay Writing*, ed. Joseph Bristow (New York: Routledge, 1992), 30.
- 105 Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, trans. A.D. Melville (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 60–61.
- 106 Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, 222.
- 107 Terry Castle also notes that Anne may be referring to this Callisto but does not develop the interpretation. Castle, *Apparitional Lesbian*, p. 104. For earlier, anxious reactions to the lesbian implications of the Callisto story, see Valerie Traub, *The Renaissance of Lesbianism in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 264.
- 108 Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, 36–40.
- 109 Liddington, “Anne Lister,” p. 62; vol. 2, p. 127.
- 110 Hughes, *Miss Anne Lister’s Early Life*, 93.
- 111 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 237.
- 112 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 116.
- 113 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 277.
- 114 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 136.
- 115 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 342.
- 116 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 37, 198.

- 117 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 153.
- 118 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 267.
- 119 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 151.
- 120 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 42.
- 121 De Lauretis, *Practice of Love*, 228.
- 122 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 49.
- 123 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 291; *No Priest but Love*, 32.
- 124 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 85.
- 125 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 173.
- 126 Liddington, *Female Fortune*, 86, 121.
- 127 Butler, *Bodies that Matter*, 89.
- 128 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 81.
- 129 Betty T. Bennett, *Mary Diana Dods: A Gentleman and a Scholar* (New York: Morrow, 1991); for another intellectual woman who passed as a man, see the case of Theodora de Verdion, the daughter of a Berlin architect who passed in England as a man. She was often rumored to be a woman, but her eccentricity, swearing and heavy drinking kept such rumors at bay. She died in 1802. See Kirby's *Wonderful and Eccentric Museum* (London, 1820), vol. 7, p. 48; J.T. Smith, *Antient [sic] Topography of London* (London, 1817), 20.
- 130 Michael du Preez and Jeremy Dronfield, *Dr James Barry: A Woman Ahead of Her Time* (London: Oneworld Publications, 2016).
- 131 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 290.
- 132 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 36.
- 133 Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 136. For discussion of gender images in the early nineteenth century, see Anna Clark, "Womanhood and Manhood in the Transition from Plebeian to Working Class Culture" (Unpublished Rutgers University PhD, 1987), 165–222. For examples, see Tegg's *Caricatures* (London, 1819), vol. 5, pp. 312, 323, 331, 332.
- 134 For example, the story of Helen Oliver, a journeymen plasterer who seems to have got the idea for cross-dressing from a ploughman, actually a woman in disguise, who was thought to be her male lover. See "Helen Oliver," in British Library, Miscellaneous Collection of Broad-sides, 1875.b. 30 (4); *Times*, April 20, 1822. For flirtation, see "The Life and Extraordinary Adventures of Mary Lacy, the female sailor," in C.D. Donald, Collection of Broad-sides (Glasgow, 1890), Mitchell Library, Glasgow. For female husband, see Michael Ryan, *Medical Jurisprudence* (London, 1836), 227. For a general discussion and more examples, see Clark, "Womanhood and Manhood," 196–213; Julie Wheelwright, *Amazons and Military Maids* (London: Pandora, 1989), 59; Rudolf M. Dekker and Lotte C. van de Pol, *The Tradition of Female Transvestism in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Macmillan, 1989).

- 135 This continued into the early twentieth century. See Alison Oram, *Her Husband Was a Woman!: Women's Gender-Crossing in Modern British Popular Culture* (London: Routledge, 2007).
- 136 *Memoirs of the Life, Public and Private Adventures of Madame Vestris* (London, 1839), 54; see also C.E. Pearce, *Life of Madame Vestris* (London, 1923), 56.
- 137 M. Dorothy George, *Catalogue of Political and Personal Satires in the British Museum* (London: Publications of the British Museum, 1978), no. 12843.
- 138 Patricia Demers, *The World of Hannah More* (Lexington: The University of Kentucky, 1996), 92.
- 139 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 113.
- 140 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 49.
- 141 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 127.
- 142 *Dictionary of the Vulgar Tongue* (London, 1811; reprinted London, 1981).
- 143 For example, *Weekly Dispatch*, April 11, 1841; May 18, 1845; *Daily News*, July 12, 1846.
- 144 Whitbread, *I Know My Own Heart*, 65.
- 145 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 171.
- 146 Davidoff and Hall, *Family Fortunes*, 110.
- 147 Liddington, *Female Fortune*, 22.
- 148 Manuscript Diary, November 12, 1832.
- 149 Liddington, *Nature's Domain*, 51.
- 150 Manuscript diaries, March 5, 1831; Liddington, *Female Fortune*, 68–69.
- 151 Manuscript Diary, February 27, 1831.
- 152 *Leeds Mercury*, January 10, 1835, 5
- 153 Liddington, *Female Fortune*, 212.
- 154 Whitbread, *No Priest but Love*, 206; Manuscript Diary, November 5, 1832 for her equivocal courtship.
- 155 Vicinus, *Intimate Friends, 1778–1928*.

Chapter 4

- 1 Richard Johnson arrived on the ship Pigot from Bengal on June 28, 1790; the Pigot had departed in January. *The World*, June 29, 1790.
- 2 On February 12, 1790 the diarist wrote that he left Madras for England (having embarked in Calcutta in January) on the Pigot. Attributed to Warren Hastings, but by Richard Johnson, "Tour from Calcutta," Ames Library, University of Minnesota, MssB. 114, Item 1, Phillipps Ms 17184, f. 66; I.B. Banerjee, ed., *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. XI, 1789–92 (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1974), January 6, 1790, records that Richard Johnson had permission to leave then on the Pigot. In the India Office Library, British Library, OIC H435 there is an

extract from the public letter from Bengal dated 13 Feb. 1790 giving permission to Richard Johnson, “a gentleman high in your [the East India Company’s] service,” to proceed to Europe in the *Pigot*. Numerous items labeled “Phillipps Ms” are also found in the Richard Johnson papers in the John Rylands Library, the University of Manchester; for instance there is a Phillipps 17534 in that collection, and a Phillipps 17535 in the Ames collection. Sir Thomas Phillipps collected extensive East India Company manuscripts concerning Warren Hastings, Richard Johnson and others. The best source on Johnson, although it is not cognizant of the Ames manuscripts, is P.J. Marshall, “Johnson, Richard (1753–1807),” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

- 3 Philip J. Stern, *The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
- 4 Mildred Archer and Toby Falk, *Indian Miniatures in the India Office Library* (London: Southeby Park Bernet, 1981), 14–29.
- 5 John Brewer suggests that microhistories of individuals can help answer these questions. John Brewer, “Microhistory and the Histories of Everyday Life,” *Cultural & Social History* 7, 1 (2010): 91. For such a microhistory of an extended family, see Emma Rothschild, *The Inner Life of Empires* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 7.
- 6 Tillman Nechtman also looks at East India company servants and Enlightenment texts, but his subjects tend to be more laudatory about the East India Company than Johnson. Tillman Nechtman, *The Nabobs: Enlightenment and Empire in Eighteenth Century Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Ch. 1.
- 7 Partha Chatterjee, *The Black Hole of Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 37; Ronald Inden, “Orientalist Constructions of India,” *Modern Asian Studies* 20, no. 3 (1986): 401–46; Peter Marshall, “Taming the Exotic: British and India in the Eighteenth Century,” in *Exoticism and the Enlightenment*, ed. George Rousseau and Roy Porter (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 55; for contemporary examples, see Robert Orme, *Historical Fragments of the Mogul Empire, of the Morattoes, and of the English Concerns in Indostan*, ed. J.P. Guha (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1974); William Robertson, *An Historical Disquisition concerning the Knowledge Which the Ancients Had of India* (Philadelphia, 1812 from 5th London edition, 1791); Jonathan Scott, translator, *A Translation of the Memoirs of Eradut Khan, a Nobleman of Hindostan, containing Interesting Anecdotes of the Emperor Aulumgeer Aurungzebe, and of his Successors, Shaw Aulum and Jehaundur Shaw; in which are Displayed the Causes of the very Precipitate Decline of the Mogul Empire in India* (London, 1786); Francois Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire, A.D. 1656–1668*, trans. Irving Brock and Archibald Constable (Delhi: S. Chand, 1968 [1670]).
- 8 Maya Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East, 1750–1850*, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 2005), 52; William Dalrymple, *White*

- Mughals: Love and Betrayal in Eighteenth-Century India* (Hammersmith, London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2002), 211.
- 9 Hinduism of course is not a monolithic religion, but an agglomeration of many spiritual traditions. However, men such as Jones tended to regard it as a more or less unitary religion.
 - 10 Sankar Muthu, *Enlightenment against Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 268.
 - 11 Hastings to Lord North. December 4, 1774. Letters from Bengal, Ames Library, University of Minnesota.
 - 12 Anna Clark, *The Sexual Politics of the English Constitution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), Chapter 3; Linda Colley, “Gendering the Globe: The Political and Imperial Thought of Philip Francis,” *Past and Present* 209, no. 1 (2010): 117–48.
 - 13 T.H. Bowyer, “The Appointment of Philip Francis to the Bengal Supreme Council,” *The Historical Journal* 38, no. 1 (1995): 145–49.
 - 14 Robert Travers, *Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century Britain: The British in Bengal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 150.
 - 15 Nicholas Dirks, *Scandal of Empire* (New York: Belknap Press, 2006), 211. Andrew Sartori points out we don’t know exactly how this happened: Andrew Sartori, “The British Empire and Its Liberal Mission,” *Journal of Modern History* 78, no. 3 (2006): 623–42.
 - 16 Travers differs from Guha on the philosophical basis for Francis’s reforms. Ranijit Guha, *A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 84–156.
 - 17 Colley, “Gendering the Globe,” 117–48.
 - 18 For an interpretation of Johnson that focuses on governmentality and contrasts him with Thomas Law, see Anna Clark and Aaron Windel, “The Early Roots of Liberal Imperialism: ‘The Science of a Legislator’ in Eighteenth-Century India,” *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 14, no. 2 (2013).
 - 19 Joseph Parkes and Herman Merivale, *Memoirs of Sir Philip Francis, K.C.B.: With Correspondence and Journals* (London: 1867), vol. 2, 109, 162.
 - 20 Journal of Tour to Ghyretty 1779–80, Ames Library, University of Minnesota, MssB. 115, f. 66.
 - 21 Journal, 1779–80, MssB. 115, f. 31.
 - 22 Journal, 1779–80, MssB. 115, ff. 31–38.
 - 23 C.A. Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion 1770–1870* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), 82.
 - 24 Narahari Kaviraj, *A Peasant Uprising in Bengal 1783. The First Formidable Peasant Uprising against the Rule of the East India Company* (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1972), 50; John Waring Scott, *A Second Letter from Major Scott*

- to Mr. Fox, containing the Final Decision of the Governor General and Council of Bengal on the Charges Brought against Rajah Deby Sing (London, 1789), 19.
- 25 William Bolts, *Considerations on India Affairs; Particularly Respecting the Present State of Bengal and Its Dependencies* (London, 1772–5), vol. 1, p. x.
 - 26 Joseph Price, *Some Observations and Remarks on a Late Publication, Entitled Travels in Europe, Asia, and Africa: In Which the Real Author of that New and Curious Asiatic Atalantis, His Character and Abilities, Are Fully Made Known to the Public*, 2nd ed. (London: 1782); Parkes and Merivale, *Francis*, vol. 2, p. 205.
 - 27 Amir Hasan, *Palace Culture of Lucknow* (Delhi: BR Publishing Corporation, 1983), 110.
 - 28 Dalrymple, *White Mughals*, 211; “Note,” *Asiatic Annual Register* (1803), 4; Toby Falk and Mildred Archer, *Indian Miniatures in the India Office Library* (London: Sotheby Parke Bernet/Oxford University Press, 1981), 16; Katherine Butler Schofield, “Reviving the Golden Age Again: Classicization, Hindustani Music, and the Mughals,” *Ethnomusicology* 54, no. 3 (2010): 484–515.
 - 29 Richard Johnson, “Letter to Sir Elijah Impey,” Impey Collection, British Library Add Mss. 16263.
 - 30 Richard Johnson, Letter to mother, November 16, [1777], East India Company Johnson Papers, John Rylands Library, English Manuscripts 179, slot 6, f. 20. Thanks to Justin Biel and Aaron Windel for obtaining these letters.
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 - 32 Falk and Archer, *Indian Miniatures in the India Office Library*, 24.
 - 33 Durba Ghosh, *Sex and the Family in Colonial India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 129.
 - 34 Richard Johnson, Letter to his mother, November 9, 1788, John Rylands Library, Manchester, Richard Johnson Collection, English Ms. 179 vol. 2, f. 43.
 - 35 Johnson notebook, Ames MssB. 114, Item 1, Phillips 17184, f. 14.
 - 36 Richard Johnson, Diary of a journey from Calcutta, November 21, 1789, Ames MssB. 115, f. 56.
 - 37 Falk and Archer, *Indian Miniatures in the India Office Library*, 304, 16.
 - 38 Johnson, Notes on the Dabistan, Ames MssB. 114, Item 4, f. 7. Genesis 19:30–38.
 - 39 Falk and Archer, *Indian Miniatures in the India Office Library*, 17.
 - 40 Falk and Archer, *Indian Miniatures in the India Office Library*, 18. For portraits of Mughal emperors seated with servants holding fringed umbrellas and flywhisks, see portraits of Muhammad Shah and Bahadur Shah, ca. 1730, in Malini Roy, “The Revival of Mughal Painting Tradition” William Dalrymple and Yuthika Sharma, eds., *Princes and Painting in Mughal Delhi* (New Haven: Asia Society Museum and Yale University Press, 2012), 19; For a similar portrait of lesser rulers in Johnson’s collection, see portrait of Mir Muhammad Husayn seated on Divan, India, c. 1782 British Library, Or. 6633, f. 61v and Hasan

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 - 47 *Papers Printed by the Order the House of Commons in the Years 1786 and 1787 Relating to the Charges of Delinquency Exhibited in that House against Warren Hastings* (London, 1788), 15.
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- 51 Mr. Johnson's Defence to the Hon. Warren Hastings. Secret Consultations, July 29, 1783. *Proceedings and Correspondence Relating to Charges Brought against Nathaniel Middleton and Richard Johnson for Misconduct in Oudh 1781–82*. BL, IOR H 235, f. 207–63.
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- 68 The translations only exist in the Minnesota commonplace books—they were never published. For Jones, see *ibid.*: 316–18; Brian A. Hatcher, “What’s Become of the Pandit? Rethinking the History of Sanskrit Scholars in Colonial Bengal,” *Modern Asian Studies* 39 (2005): 683–723. For Mutiram as diplomat, see Richard Johnson, Letter to Warren Hastings, June 26, 1784, Hastings Manuscripts, BL Add Mss. 29,164, f. 295.
- 69 Archer cites a letter from John Shore to Jones saying, “Mr Richard Johnson thinks he has a young friend who will translate the Dabestan.” *Letters of William Jones*, Vol. 2, letter 461, 739.
- 70 Ames MssB. 114 Item 4, ff. 8–15. M. Athar Ali, “Pursuing an Elusive Seeker of Universal Truth: The Identity and Environment of the Author of the Dabistan-I Mazahib,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 9, no. 3 (1999): 365–73.
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- 72 Tour from Calcutta, November 17, 1789, Ames Library MssB. 114, Item 1, Philipps 17184, f. 30; Commonplace Book, March 25, 1789, MssB. 114, Item 2, Philipps 17185, f. 29. See also the work of John Malcolm, a little later, discussed in Martha McLaren, “Philosophical History and the Ideology of the Company State: The Historical Works of John Malcolm and Mountstuart Elphinstone,” *Indo-British Review* 21 (1993): 174–75.
- 73 Journal, April 14, 1783. Ames Library, University of Minnesota, MssB. 114, Item 6, Philipps 17535.
- 74 *Wealth of Nations*, 1.2.4.
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- 94 Robert Orme, *Historical Fragments of the Mogul Empire, of the Morattoes, and of the English Concerns in Indostan*, ed. J.P. Guha (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1974 [1753]), 299
- 95 Commonplace Book, March 25, 1789, Ames Library, MssB. 114, Item 2. Phillips 17185, f. 6.
- 96 Adam Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (Edinburgh: Printed for Bell, 1767), 100. Johnson wrote of this portion of Ferguson’s essay: “This Question: so exactly concurred with mine that I could not help transcribing it in support of my own.” Commonplace Book, March 25, 1789, Ms. B114, Item 2, Phillips 17185, f. 6.
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- 106 Chatterjee, *The Black Hole of Empire*, 93.
- 107 Extract of letter from Johnson to Lord Macartney, President and members of the Select Committee at Fort St. George, in *Extracts from Bengal Select Letters Home regarding the Mahrattas*, vol. 2, p. 295, IOR H/239, f. 155. It is interesting to compare Johnson’s thoughts with Munro, who admired Hyder and to a lesser extent Tippoo but thought Tippoo should be crushed as a threat to British power. Rev. G.R. Gleig, *The Life of Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, Bart. and K.C.B., Late Governor of Madras* (London, 1830), vol. 1, p. 214.
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- 109 Letter from Johnson to Cornwallis, March 17, 1787, TNA: PRO 30/11/15, ff. 169–174.
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Chapter 5

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Chapter 6

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 - 10 Edith Ellis, *Attainment* (London: Alston Rivers, 1909), 55.
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 - 14 William J. Jupp, *Wayfarings: An Adventure of Life and Liberation in the Way of the Spirit* (London: Headley, 1918), 84; Ellis, *My Life*, 200–02; M. Bevir, *The Making of British Socialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 243–44.
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- 49 Grosskurth, *Havelock Ellis*, 228.
- 50 *My Life*, 291, 301.
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- 73 Quoting Carpenter, Ellis, *Three Modern Seers*, 221.
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- 125 Ellis, *James Hinton*, 225; Mrs. Havelock [Edith] Ellis, “The Future of Domestic Service,” British Library, Havelock Ellis, Add Mss. 70,537, f. 225; “Servants,” *New York Times*, March 26, 1911.
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Afterword

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Index

Note: Page references with letter “n” followed by locators denote note numbers.

- abnormal 3, 25–6, 28, 125, 137–8, 140–3, 150
Acton, William 109
Adams, Maurice 127
adultery 54, 59
Aldis, James 120
Alison, Alexander 105
altruism 106–7, 115, 149
Americans 93, 141, 143–4
anatomy 55, 63, 134
Ancien Regime 13, 32
Anderson, Margaret 143
animals 17, 37–8, 46, 133–4, 151
Archer, Mildred 83
aristocracy 10, 13, 32, 35–6, 72–3, 148
Aristotle's Masterpiece 63, 168 n.14
Arnold, Whitney 15
Asaf-ud-Daulah 81, 85
atheism 11
atonement 101–2
Augustine, Saint 47
authenticity 15, 152 n.4, 156 n.63
autobiography 6, 20, 32, 48, 99, 115
autonomy 13–14, 17
- Baret, Jeanne 44
Barlow, Maria 54, 59, 63, 69, 70
Barry, James 71
Battersby, Christine 11
Bayle, Pierre 67
Bayly, Christopher 81
Beaumarchais, Caron de 40, 42
Beaumont Society 31
Bedborough, George 136
Beg, Haidar 85
Begums of Oudh 85
Belcombe, Marianna. *See* Lawton, Marianna
Bentham, Jeremy 19, 21–2, 27, 150
Bertin, Mlle. Rose 43
Bible 7, 83, 102, 106
- Biel, Justin 87
Binhammer, Katherine 49
biology 11–12
Birnstingl, Harry 143
birth control 111, 131, 142, 144
Blake, William 142
blasphemy 35
Bolts, William 81
Boole, Mary Everest 116–17, 196 n.85
Booth, Charles 23–4
Boswell, John 7
Bray, Alan 73
Broglie, Duc de (Victor) 34
Brooke, Emma 117
Brooke, Rev. Stopford 125–6
Brown, Alan Willard 118
Buddha 113
Burke, Edmund 79, 81, 86, 97
Burton, Richard 112
Butler, Judith 70
Byron, George Gordon, Lord 3, 53, 60–2, 64–5
- capitalism 2, 13, 16–17, 22–3, 25–6, 126, 148
Carlyle, Thomas 21–2
Caroline of Brunswick, Queen 54
Carpenter, Edward 25–6, 28, 151
 Edith Ellis and 127, 129, 133–5, 138–9, 143
 Hinton and 118, 120
Catullus 64–5
Cavendish, Elizabeth 43
celebrity 7, 15, 49
celibacy 42, 110, 130
censorship 33, 35, 66, 134, 136
Chalmers, Rev. Thomas 21
Charity Organization Society 21, 106
Chesterfield, Lord Philip Stanhope 33
childhood 17, 37, 45, 82, 105, 141
Chrisman-Campbell, Kimberley 40

- Christianity 3, 7–8, 18, 20, 22–3, 26, 47, 73
 d'Eon and 45–8
 Hinton and 99, 100–6, 111
 Johnson and 87–90
 Lister and 59–60, 73
 Chubb, Percival 126
 citizens 9, 13, 15, 33, 35–6, 79, 91
 civilization 13, 18, 37, 91–2, 111
 Clapperton, Jane Hume 130
 class 5–7, 10, 55, 57, 127
 classical republicanism 36, 80, 91
 Cleland, John 45
 clitoris 63, 168 n.14
 clothing 6–7, 10, 18, 24
 d'Eon and 31, 38, 41, 43–4, 147
 Hinton and 105
 Lister and 51, 53, 56, 70
 Cobbe, Frances Power 118
 codes 7, 53, 57
 Cody, Lisa Foreman 42
 Cohen, Deborah 101
 Cohn, Bernard 83
 Coleman, Charly 10–11, 46
 Colenso, Bishop 111
 Coleridge, Samuel Taylor 103, 107, 169 n.20
 commonplace books 8, 77, 92
 communal living 6, 24, 127, 129–30
 Comte, Auguste 106, 108, 116
Confessions 1, 14–15
 constitutions 79, 92
 Conti, Prince de (Louis Francois) 33
 Cook, Matt 6
 cooperatives 24
 Cornwallis, Lord Charles 94–5
 corruption 79, 86–7, 91–2, 96
 courtiers 13, 18, 32–7, 43, 83
 crisis of investiture 39, 49
 cross-dressing 4, 14, 41, 44, 47, 61, 71
 Crozier, Ivan 148
 Cumming, Lady Gordon and Jane 57
- Dabhoiwola, Faramerz 10
 Dacome, Lucia 8
 Dalrymple, William 78
 Damer, Anne 43, 54
 Darwin, George 115
 Darwinism 107, 120
 Daston, Lorraine 23, 132
 Davidson, Thomas 126, 192 n.28
 Delap, Lucy 26
- de Lauretis, Teresa 55, 69
 d'Eon, Chevalier/e 1–7, 9–10, 12, 14–15,
 27–9, 31–50, 147–8
 career 33–40
 gambling on identity 40–2
 gender issues 31, 36, 38, 41–2, 152 n.1
Lettres, mémoires, et négociations 35
 return to England and death 48
 return to France 43–9
 desire 10, 17, 20, 26, 101
 despotism 78–9
 devil 48, 105, 123, 128, 136, 139
 d'Holbach, Baron (Paul Thiry) 11
 diaries 7, 51, 53, 59, 70
 Diderot, Denis 93, 96
 dildo 70
 diplomats 1, 5, 7, 9, 31, 34–5, 38, 78–9, 83
 Dirks, Nicholas 79
 discipline (social) 16, 20–1, 25, 27, 150
 divorce 111
 Dixon, Thomas 119
 Dixon, William Hepworth 112
 Doan, Laura 3–4
 Dods, Mary Diana 70–1
 domesticity 17, 105, 118, 129–31, 144
 Drabinski, K. 32
 dreams 41
 dueling 34, 36, 48, 87
 Dundas, Henry 94–5
- East India Company 2, 5, 28, 56, 77–80,
 86–7, 93
 Eaton, Natasha 83
 education 14, 17, 22, 33, 45, 51
 effeminacy 34–6, 38, 41–2, 47, 49, 62,
 65–6, 71
 Indian 78, 93, 163 n.34
 Elfenbein, Andrew 11
 Ellis, Edith Lees 3–7, 23–8, 117, 120,
 123–46, 149, 151
Attainment 125–6, 130–1
 eugenics and 133–5, 140–2, 144
 Fellowship of the New Life 126–31
Idealist, The 137–8, 141
 lesbianism 123, 132–3, 142–5
 marriage 123, 131, 133–5, 142–4
Seaweed 135–7
 servants and 123, 125, 129
Three Modern Seers 138–41
 tour in America and death 143–5

- Ellis, Havelock 3–4, 25, 27–9, 118–20
Affirmations 140
The Criminal 137
 eonism 147–8
 Fellowship of New Life 126
 marriage to Edith 123, 131, 134–5
Sexual Inversion 132–3, 136–7
- Emerson, Ralph Waldo 24–5, 127
 emotions 10–11, 16, 20, 53, 60, 97, 132, 134
- empire 4, 6, 18–19, 28, 77–81, 93, 149–50
- Enlightenment 8, 10–11, 33, 40, 77–9, 89–90
- eonism 4, 29, 31, 147–8
- Erauso, Catalina/Antonio 44
- ethics 13, 15–16
- eugenics 3, 21, 23, 25, 28
 Edith Ellis on 133–8, 140–2, 144, 150, 194 n.66
 Hinton on 115
- Evangelicals 20–2, 26, 93, 99, 101–2, 104–6, 108–10, 145
- evolution 22, 107
- experts 12, 19, 25, 27, 127, 132, 145, 148, 150
- Fabian socialism 23–4, 27, 127, 145, 150
- Faderman, Lilian 53
- Falk, Toby 83
- Feinberg, Leslie 31
- Fellowship of the New Life 23–5, 27, 120, 126–31, 133, 150
- female husband 71
- femininity 4, 13, 15–16, 28
 d'Eon and 31–2, 46, 48
 Havelock Ellis on 133
 Lister and 67
- feminism 26, 40, 48, 56, 116, 133, 148
- Ferguson, Adam 91, 93
- Folbre, Nancy 17
- Forman-Barzili, Fonna 16, 18
- Foucault, Michel 4, 25, 64
- France 31–5, 38, 94, 148, 158 n.90
- Francis, Philip 79–81, 87, 96–7
- Franklin, Benjamin 87
- Franklin, Michael 88
- free love 111, 118, 135–6, 144
- Freewoman* 142–3
- Freud, Sigmund 39
- Frevert, Ute 11
- friendship 56, 59, 63, 87
- Gagnier, Regenia 6
- Galison, Peter 23, 132
- Galton, Francis 141, 197 n.105
- Gandhi, Leela 151
- gardens 6, 82
- Gehmacher, Johanna 132
- gender 2, 4, 7, 26–7, 31
 fluidity 3, 31, 41, 48, 67
 nonconformity 33
- genius 1, 3, 11–12, 14, 19, 26, 27, 91, 196 n.85
 Edith and Havelock Ellis on 137, 139, 141–5, 150
 Hinton and 115–16
 Lister and 56
- George III 33, 35, 79
- Germany 39, 79
- Ghosh, Durba 82
- Gilead, Tal 19
- Girlhood 45
- Glennie, John Stuart 113
- Goudard, Ange de 34
- government 17, 20, 21–2, 91–2
- Greenblatt, Stephen 9
- Guerchy, Comte de (Claude Régnier) 34–5, 37–8
- Gulistan* 86
- Haddon, Caroline 103, 116, 118–19, 123
- Haddon, Margaret. *See* Hinton, Margaret née Haddon
- Hanley, Ryan 19
- Hastings, Warren 77, 79–80, 83, 85–7
- Headlam, Stewart 135
- Helvetius, Claude 12, 15, 18–19, 91–2, 150
- Herder, Johann 11
- Hesse, Carla 14
- heterosexuality 4, 9, 36
- Hinduism 25, 78, 82, 88, 113, 177 n.9
 Laws 83
- Hinton, Charles 119
- Hinton, Eliza 102, 116
- Hinton, James 3–9, 22–4, 26, 28, 99–121, 125, 149, 151
 autobiography 99, 115
 Christianity and 103–6, 114
Life in Nature 103, 107
 manuscripts 99, 119
 marriage 102, 104–5, 110–11, 116–17
 medical career 103, 106, 108, 110

- Mystery of Pain* 103
 polygamy 109–14, 117–20
 portrait 99–100
 posthumous influence 119–20, 123–4,
 126, 130, 135, 138–9, 142, 144, 145
 Hinton, John Howard 101, 104, 108, 114
 Hinton, Margaret née Haddon 102, 105,
 117, 119
 Hirschman, A. O. 90
 Hobbes, Thomas 90, 92
 Hofman, Elwin 8
 homes 5–6, 33, 55, 72–4, 101, 105, 129, 131
 homosexuality 3–4, 9, 25, 36, 41, 65, 71,
 137–8. *See also* lesbianism
 in India 85
 honor 31, 34–5, 39, 95
 Hopkins, Ellice 99, 105–6, 108, 110
 Horace 64, 67
 Horneck, Captain Charles 42
 Hughes, Patricia 28, 53, 56
 Humanitarian League 150
 humanity 16–17
 Hume, David 33, 37
 Hussein, Tofuzzel 82
 Hyderabad 78, 83
- Imhoff, Marian 80
 impartial spectator 16–17, 89, 97
 Impey, Sir Elijah 86–7
 India 5–6, 28, 56–7, 77–97
 individualism 2, 21–4, 120, 127, 145, 158 n.90
 individuality 3, 23–8, 125, 127, 139, 145,
 150–1
 individuals 10, 17–18, 20, 23, 91, 155 n.44
 individuation 107
 infanticide 115
 insanity 34, 39, 58, 74, 116, 142, 144
 interracial relationships 58, 82
 Islam 88
 Ives, George 136
- Jagose, Annemarrie 59
 Jasanoff, Maya 78, 83
 Jesus Christ 20, 22–3, 26, 46, 101, 104,
 110, 113–15, 120, 126–7, 138, 148
 Joan of Arc 41, 43, 45
 Johnson, Richard 2, 5–6, 8, 12, 15, 18–19,
 28, 77–97, 148–50
 career 80–7, 95–7
 collections 77, 96
- Enlightenment thinkers and 90–2
 race and empire 93–7
 religion and 87–90
 sex life and marriage 82, 96, 149
 Jones, Agnes 123, 126
 Jones, Sir William 78, 88
 Juvenal 9, 36, 41, 65–7
- Kates, Gary 37, 40, 42, 45
 Kennedy, Roseanne 14, 47
 Krafft-Ebing, Richard von 132
- Ladies of Llangollen 53–4, 58
 Lamb, Lady Caroline 60
 La Mettrie, Julien Offray de 155 n.44
 Latin literature 8–9, 56, 57, 64
 law, Old Testament 46, 113–14
 Law, Thomas 28, 80, 96–7
 Lawton, Marianna (née Belcombe) 51, 55,
 58–9, 63, 68–70
 Lecourt, Sebastian 112
 legislator 13, 19, 97
 lesbianism 3–4, 7, 24, 43, 168 n.16, 194 n.63
 Edith Ellis and 132–3, 135, 143, 149
 Lister and 51, 53–5, 65, 66, 70–1
 Liddington, Jill 53
 Linton, Eliza Lynn 109–10
 Lister, Anne 19, 11–12, 14–15, 27, 51–75,
 148–9
 childhood and girlhood 55–6
 Christianity and 59–60, 73
 classics and 64–8
 economic and political role 55, 73–4
 lesbian identity 71–2
 love affairs and sex 54, 57–9, 70–3
 masculinity 62, 67–9, 72
 romanticism and 60–1, 64
 travels and death 74
- Locke, John 10
 Lombroso, Cesare 137
 Louis XV 33, 38
 Louis XVI 40
 Lucian 60, 65–6
 Luther, Martin 113
- Macaulay, Catherine 43
 Macdowell, Gary 91
 Machiavelli, Niccolò 90
 Macintosh, William 81, 93
 Mackintosh, James 96–7

- Mandeville, Bernard 90
 Mansfield, Lord (William Murray) 42–3
 Marcus, Sharon 56
 Marie Antoinette 31, 43
 marriage 45
 Ellis, Edith and 123, 131, 133, 135,
 142–4
 Hinton and 102, 104–5, 110–11, 116, 118
 Johnson and 82, 95–6
 Lister and 57, 58, 71
 Marsden, Dora 142–4
 martial 64, 66–7
 Martineau, Harriet 20–1, 26
 masculinity 4, 6–7, 11, 14–15, 28
 d'Eon and 31–4, 36, 39, 46, 49
 Havelock Ellis on 133
 Johnson and 91
 Lister and 56, 62, 68
 masquerades 31, 41
 masturbation 54, 62
 materialists 11
 Maurice, Frederic Denison 22, 106, 108–9,
 113, 120
ménage-à-trois 14, 119
 Metaphysical Society 105, 118
 microhistories 176 n.5
 middle class 17, 21, 60, 73, 126–7, 129
 Middleton, Nathaniel 81, 85–6
 Mill, James 97
 Mill, John Stuart 22
 Miller, Andrew 20
 misogynist 26
 mollies 41–2
 monogamy and non-monogamy 6, 28, 82,
 110, 112, 116–18, 135–6, 149
 Moore, Thomas 60–1
 Morande, Theveneau de 40–2
 More, Hannah 20, 43, 101
 Mormons 112, 188 n.94
 Morris, Marilyn 39
 Morris, William 130
 Munby, Arthur 7
 Muthu, Sankar 78
 Mutiram 88
My Secret Life 7

 nationalization 22
 natural law 12, 114, 156 n.62
 nature (of person) 1, 13, 25
 d'Eon and 39, 43, 47
 Edith Ellis on 141
 Havelock Ellis on 147
 Hinton and 102, 107
 Johnson and 86, 89
 Lister and 51, 63
 necrophilia 138
 Nettleship, Ida 119
 New Reformation 105, 108
 newspapers 7, 32, 40
 Nietzsche, Friedrich 26–8, 125, 138–42,
 144, 148, 150–1
 Nivernais, Duc de (Louis Jules Mancini
 Mazarini) 33, 46
 Norcliffe, Isabella 58, 61, 68
 Nord, Deborah Epstein 24
 normal 32, 133, 137, 147
 novels 61, 97, 109, 125, 135
 Nussbaum, Felicity 7

 Oosterhuis, Harry 132
 orientalism 61, 78
 Oudh 78, 80–1, 85, 96
 overman 27, 140–1, 150
 Ovid 67–8
 Owen, Alex 26

 Paget, James 109
 panopticon 16
 passions 15, 17–21, 27, 46, 80, 87, 90–4,
 101, 104, 108, 113–14
 patronage 12, 17, 33, 35–6, 85, 90
 Pearson, Karl 23, 25, 194 n.66
 penis 69–71
 personality 5, 12, 14, 127, 132
 philanthropy 105–6, 125–6, 149–50
 Pickford, Miss Frances 63–4, 67–8
 Pigot (ship) 77–8
 Pirie and Woods school scandal 57
 Pitts, Jennifer 18
 Plato 64–5
 pleasure 108–9
 police 21, 35, 41, 136
 political economy 17, 20, 22, 25, 26, 90,
 106, 145, 155 n.44
 polygamy 99, 110–11, 117–19, 130, 149
 Poovey, Mary 90
 Pope Joan 41, 45, 67
 pornography 35, 82

- possessive individualism 2, 11–13, 21–2, 26
 poverty 21–4, 27, 101, 123
 privacy 10, 34–5, 41, 49, 109
 pronouns, gendered 32, 43
 prostitution 99, 106, 109–10, 116–17, 141
- queer
 domesticity 6
 genealogy 3
 reading 5, 52
 theory 2, 4
- race 18–19, 56–8, 82, 85, 93–4, 97, 102–3, 150
 Raine, Eliza 4–5, 28, 53, 56–8, 62, 68
 Rand, Ayn 2
 Raynal, Abbé Guillaume de 87, 93, 96
 reason 10–11, 15, 18–19, 46, 60, 80, 86, 88–92, 156 n.62
 reform, parliamentary 7, 73, 101, 116
 add suffrage women 144
 religion 3, 7–10, 12, 20, 22–3, 27–8, 62, 82, 113, 138. *See also* Christianity; Hinduism; Islam
 renegade 15, 34, 53
 rights 106, 137, 150–1
 Robinson, Mary 49
 Roman culture 9, 36, 79–80, 91, 173 n.96.
 See also Latin literature
 Romantics 11, 52, 55, 60–1, 64
 Roof, Judith 66
 Rose, Emily 32
 Rose, Jonathan 6
 Rourke, James 14
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 1–3, 12–18, 20, 27–8, 49, 148
 Confessions 1, 14–15, 47, 51, 62
 d'Eon and 32, 36–7, 147
 Discourse on Inequality 37
 Emile 13–15, 45, 46
 Johnson and 87, 89, 97
 Lister and 51, 60, 62
- Salt, Henry 24, 133, 135–6, 150–1
 Sanger, Margaret 144
 Santner, Eric 39
 sapphic 3, 43, 64, 70
 Sappho 67
- Savoyard Vicar 15, 46
 Schreiner, Olive 144
 secrets 3, 6–7, 10, 149
 d'Eon and 33–5, 38, 43
 Hinton and 99, 109
 Lister and 53, 64
 self 5, 10–12, 38, 88, 99, 106, 115–16, 147
 annihilation or abandonment of 11, 20, 23, 46, 102, 107, 111, 114, 192 n.28
 authentic 32, 36, 86
 coherent 22, 158 n.90
 expressivist 12, 15
 fragmented 2, 10–13, 27, 47, 80, 150
 hybrid 5, 28, 78, 96
 natural 1, 8, 11, 13, 36, 63
 Romantic 61–2
 unique 2–3, 11–17, 19, 21, 23, 26, 27, 151
 self-examination 10, 87, 111
 self-fashioning 9
 selfishness 12, 13, 22, 46, 101–2, 105–6, 120, 128, 148
 self-sacrifice 3, 16, 19–21, 26, 99, 103, 106, 125, 139–40, 149
 women's 101–2, 110, 113, 116, 118–19, 129–30, 142, 145
- Seltzer, Sharon 49
 sensations 15, 27, 80, 89
 servants, domestic 28, 112, 125–6, 129–30, 144–5, 150
 Seven Years' War 33
 sex manuals 55, 63
 sexology 3–4, 27, 53, 123, 132–3, 137–8
 sexual desire 45, 113, 134, 138
 sexual inversion 3, 25, 53, 132–3, 137, 140, 142–3, 145, 196 n.85
 sexuality 3, 6–9, 11, 26, 45, 109, 154 n.24
 sexual pleasure 23, 111, 114–15, 118, 135
 sexual purity 110
 Sharp, Granville 96
 Sheehan, Jonathan 18
 Shibden Hall 5–6, 55, 72–4
 Shikuh, Dara 88
 Siegel, Jerrold 47
 sin 7, 20–2
 slavery 42, 101–3

- slums 23
 Smiles, Samuel 21–2
 Smith, Adam 2–3, 15–19, 26, 80, 89–90, 93–4, 97
 social Darwinism 21, 127
 socialism 3, 6, 22–8, 102, 106, 108, 123, 127, 145, 149, 151
 sodomy 36, 41, 54, 163 n.34
 Somerset case 42
 Spencer, Herbert 21–3, 26, 108, 110, 127
 Steinitz, Rebecca 7
 Stephen, James Fitzjames 15, 105
 sterilization 140–2
 Stoicism 36, 64–5, 73
 Strahan, S. A. K. 133–4
 superwoman 26, 144
 Symonds, John Addington 132
 syphilis 110
- Taylor, Charles 12, 61
 Taylor, Ellen 123, 125
 theater 7, 13
Theory of Moral Sentiments 16
 Thoreau, Henry David 24, 127
 Tipu Sultan 94–5
 Tiresias 67
 Tonnere 6, 33
 transgender 3–4, 31, 40, 44, 49
 transvestitism 4, 14, 28, 31
 Travers, Robert 79
 Treaty of Paris 33, 35
 tribade 3, 54, 57, 66
 Tuite, Clara 62
 Turgot, Anne-Robert-Jacques 33, 79
 twilight moments 28, 54, 149
- Ure, Andrew 20–1, 26
 utilitarianism 19, 21
- Vergy, Treyssac de 34
 Vestris, Madame Lucia 71–2
 Villiers, Roland de 136
 virginity 45, 47
 vitalism 107, 114
 Vizzani, Catherine 44
 Voltaire (Francois-Marie Arouet) 10, 43
- Wahrman, Dror 17
 Walker, Ann 53, 59, 63, 70, 73–4
 Wallace, Jo-Ann 137
 Walpole, Horace 33
 Webb, Beatrice 23–4
 Webb, Sidney 24, 127
 Whitbread, Helena 53
 White, Rev. Edward 103
 Whitman, Walt 25, 134
 Wilde, Oscar 24, 116, 129, 135, 142
 Wilkes, John 35–6, 38, 41, 49
 Windel, Aaron 28, 77
 Wollstonecraft, Mary 14, 57
 women 2, 11, 13–14, 18, 28, 43, 115, 117, 173 n.96
 Fellowship of New life and 129–30
 Indian 96–7
 learned 32, 63, 67–8, 148
 Nietzsche and 140
 passing as men 44
 rights of 21
 sexual needs of 109, 136, 142
 working class 6–7, 125, 127, 135

