REGULATING the SYNTHETIC SOCIETY

Generative AI, Legal Questions and Societal Challenges

Bart van der Sloot

REGULATING THE SYNTHETIC SOCIETY

This open access book provides an introduction to Generative Artificial Intelligence and four cutting-edge technologies that it enables – humanoid robots, deepfakes, augmented reality, and virtual reality.

Experts predict that in five years' time, more than 90 per cent of all digital content will be wholly or partially AI generated. In a synthetic society, it may no longer be possible to establish what is real and what is not. Although they are only in their relative infancy, these technologies can already produce content that is indistinguishable from authentic material. The impact of this new reality on democracy, the judicial system, the functioning of the press, as well as on personal relationships, might be unprecedented.

The author describes the inner workings of each of these technologies and maps their positive uses in the fields of education, health and entertainment; conceptualises their negative uses for fraud, deception, exploitation and identity-theft; and explores their deeper effects on the post-truth society, the privatisation of the public sphere, and the loss of individual autonomy and societal trust.

The book evaluates how the current European legal paradigm applies to these technologies, focussing on the right to privacy and data protection, intellectual property, freedom of expression, procedural law, tort law, consumer and competition law, and the regulation of AI. It discusses regulatory alternatives to solve existing regulatory gaps and shows that there are no easy answers.

Regulating the Synthetic Society

Generative AI, Legal Questions and Societal Challenges

Bart van der Sloot

•HART•
OXFORD • LONDON • NEW YORK • NEW DELHI • SYDNEY

HART PUBLISHING

Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

Kemp House, Chawley Park, Cumnor Hill, Oxford, OX2 9PH, UK

1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA

29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland

HART PUBLISHING, the Hart/Stag logo, BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

First published in Great Britain 2024

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

Library of Congress Control Number: 2024931045

ISBN: PB: 978-1-50997-493-1
ePDF: 978-1-50997-496-2
ePub: 978-1-50997-495-5

Typeset by Compuscript Ltd, Shannon

To find out more about our authors and books visit www.hartpublishing.co.uk. Here you will find extracts, author information, details of forthcoming events and the option to sign up for our newsletters.

Reality is merely an illusion, albeit a very persistent one.

Albert Einstein, misquoted

Acknowledgements

This book was written in the context of the Dutch Scientific Organisation (NWO)'s Veni Grant (VI.Veni.201R.082).

Additional research time was made available through Tilburg University's sabbatical programme.

The Digital Legal Studies research initiative, which is funded through the Law Sector Plan of the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (OCW), and which received additional funding from Tilburg University's Law Faculty, covered the costs for language editing.

Tilburg University's Open Access Fund and Tilburg Law School's Signature Plan Incentive Scheme provided the funding for making the book available open access.

The Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences' Early Career Award stipend covered additional research costs.

Contents

List of Abbreviations

AI	Artificial Intelligence
AR	Augmented Reality
CFREU	Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU
CJEU	Court of Justice of the EU
CoE	Council of Europe
DF	Deepfake
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EU	European Union
GAN	Generative Adversarial Networks
GDPR	General Data Protection Regulation
HR	Humanoid Robot
IoT	Internet of Things
LLM	Large Language Model
PR	Physical Reality
SR	Synthetic Reality
VR	Virtual Reality

List of Figures

List of Tables

1

A Map to This Book

We all know that Artificial Intelligence can do amazing things. And I think we do not talk enough about what Artificial Intelligence is able to do to improve our daily lives. For example, if we look at the health care sector, we know that we use already now Artificial Intelligence for, for example, better diagnoses and earlier diagnoses. And better and earlier diagnoses are crucial when you treat for example cancer – or we use robots for precision surgery. But Artificial Intelligence is also key for us when we want to reach our goal to be climate neutral in 2050. Just think of precision farming: Precision farming, AI-driven, enables us to reduce pesticides, enables us to reduce fertilisers, for example. Or if you think of smart heating: Smart heating, AI-driven again, is saving millions and millions of tonnes of oil for example and therefore reducing the CO2 footprint … We want citizens to trust the new technology. And technology is always neutral, it depends on what we make with it. And therefore, we want the application of these new technologies to deserve the trust of our citizens. This is why we are promoting a responsible, human-centric approach to Artificial Intelligence.[1]

AI is a general technology that is accessible, powerful and adaptable for a vast range of uses – both civilian and military. And it is moving faster than even its developers anticipated. So we have a narrowing window of opportunity to guide this technology responsibly. I believe Europe, together with partners, should lead the way on a new global framework for AI, built on three pillars: guardrails, governance and guiding innovation.[2]

Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission, European Union

1.1. INTRODUCTION

As stressed by Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, Artificial Intelligence (AI) may radically change our lives and society as we know it. There will be opportunities and chances, but also challenges, hurdles and dangers. This book will focus on Generative AI, or AI's capacity to generate content, speech and action that is indistinguishable from human output. This chapter illustrates the myriad of questions and dilemmas that are triggered by

synthetic reality through one simple example of AI-generated content (section 1.2) and continues by introducing Generative AI and the four synthetic technologies central to this book: Humanoid Robots (HRs), Deepfakes (DFs), Augmented Reality (AR) and Virtual Reality (VR) (section 1.3). A description follows of what this book has to offer (section 1.4) as well as where its limitations lie (section 1.5). Finally, an overview of this book's content is provided (section 1.6).

1.2. WELCOME TO THE SYNTHETIC SOCIETY

Imagine it is 2034 and DF technology has developed as predicted. DFs can be produced in under a minute by any citizen anywhere in the world, provided they have access to a smartphone or a computer. DFs have become so realistic that humans cannot distinguish them from authentic material. Even algorithmic detection programmes can only do so in about 50 per cent of cases. Suppose someone posts a sensational video on a X-like platform, showing several white men desecrating the Quran. In no time, the clip generates attention. The left-wing media is outraged, anonymous users post racist comments and the right-wing media publishes an interview with a critic of Islam who claims that the holy book is dangerous and sanctions violence. Comedy shows make references to it. But is the video real? As a citizen, by 2034, you will have understood how easy it is to generate DFs and may have fooled people yourself. There will have been instances in the past where a media frenzy has turned out to be unjustified because the video, audio or text was later discovered to be fake. What do you do as a citizen? Do you ignore the news altogether, do you try to make your own assessment of its authenticity, or do you only trust reports that have appeared through traditional media channels that invest in verification procedures?

The rise of hybrid and synthetic media puts additional pressure on the mainstream media. Trust in these institutions is already waning: people are increasingly selecting sources that confirm their established worldviews, and more and more people are suffering from 'reality fatigue'. If the media are offered content several times a week that is found to be inaccurate, they may be forced to completely abandon working with User-Generated Content, due to the cost and the time that this analysis requires. This would mean that valuable content by citizen journalists would be ignored. In addition, traditional media may find that sensational content will be posted on platforms with lower quality standards, meaning traditional outlets are always two steps behind, and they may lose out on views and revenue.

The rise of DFs could also have a major effect on the courtroom. DFs are already being used as evidence in court cases. This is a trend that is likely to have gained momentum by 2034. Mistakes are likely to be made, which may require courts to verify all content for authenticity. This may trigger a range of questions. Should the prosecution prove that the evidence is authentic or is it up to the defence to show that it is not? What standards should be used for authenticity? And what if an AI detection program suggests that the likelihood that material is authentic is 68 per cent? Not only will the verification process affect the duration of court cases, but there will also always be 'plausible deniability'. A person will always be able to maintain that their conviction was based on fabricated evidence.

As a final example, the vast majority of DFs are sexual in nature: DF porn. Clips often depict celebrities, but they also show young girls still in high school performing sexual activities they did not carry out. A high number of teenage girls are already victims of online slut-shaming or other forms of online sexual harassment. These practices are sometimes referred to as 'slut-shaming 2.0', both because of the scale and intensity of online images and because it is often difficult to remove such content or escape from it. Through DF technology, these practices could be taken to the next level, or what may be called 'slut-shaming 3.0'. Experts fear the effect this might have on young girls' development and the societal position of women.

These are only some of the broader questions and themes raised by one of the technologies central to this book. As will become apparent, the other technologies discussed here raise similar complex questions: do we want to live in a society in which the primary social contact point of an increasing number of elderly people is a humanoid robot? Do we want to gamify warfare through AR? What happens if children who feel socially isolated prefer to live in VR instead of engaging with their peers in Physical Reality (PR)? These and other questions are addressed in this book. In particular, this volume assesses what role the legal regime can play in safeguarding important values that act as the pillars of our society, such as shared truth, individual autonomy and the democratic rule of law.

1.3. SETTING THE STAGE

The world is increasingly mediated through and affected by AI. Of all contemporary technological advances, Generative AI stands out. AI's capability to generate audio, video, text and other content will have a significant effect on reality and how we perceive it. Various trends, such

as developments in AI Robotics, DFs, AR and VR, the four synthetic technologies that will be central to this book, have meant that an ever-larger number of our everyday experiences are AI-generated: our reality is becoming ever more synthetic.

Humanoid Robots: HRs have the physical appearance of a human. They have the motoric skills to walk and talk like humans. They run on advanced software, which grants them human-like cognitive functions. To this end, HRs are equipped with sensors to gather the same input as humans. They are connected to the internet and have in-built cutting-edge technology, such as facial, object and emotion recognition. HRs are self-learning and act autonomously, using AI and Machine Learning. Large Language Models (LLMs) not only enhance their verbal capacities, but also allow them to better respond to questions or tasks.[3] LLMs can also power chat programs, for example, replacing customer service employees. Social interaction with HRs is becoming more fluid, natural and intuitive. Even back in 1996, when the Tamagotchi was introduced (a small, egg-shaped computer that ran a program with a pet that the owner took care of),[4] it was clear how quickly people became attached to inanimate objects. Now, with advances in design, functionality and sociability, people are increasingly interacting with and becoming fond of their robots. This is not limited to children or adolescents who prefer the comfort of AI friends over their peers, or men who find their life partners in HRs; it extends to elderly people who use AI as conversational partners, always available for social interaction, and more.[5] Experts predict that it will be increasingly difficult to distinguish robots from humans as technology and design progress, and the rise of Large Language Models has meant that communicating with HRs and chatbots can already be an exciting experience.

Deepfakes: DFs are content (video, audio or otherwise) that is wholly or partially fabricated, or existing content that has been manipulated, using AI. Several technologies can be used for this, but the most popular is based on Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN). As with HRs, the ultimate goal for DFs is that AI-generated content cannot be distinguished from authentic material. In just a few years, DF technology has advanced rapidly in terms of quality, speed of production and cost-efficiency, so much so that humans are no longer able to distinguish fake from authentic content. A fake video can be generated in a minute or two. Although the technology is still in its relative infancy, there are signs that people already find DF faces of non-existent people more trustworthy than those of real people.[6] Many DFs are used for relatively trivial purposes, but because in a DF, real people may appear to be doing and saying things they never did or

said, they can have a real and significant impact. DFs are used in warfare (for example, generals who appear to order their troops to lay down their arms), politics (for example, videos of political leaders swearing and cursing at their opponents just before election day) and the courtroom (for example, a mother who introduces a fake video of the father acting inappropriately towards their children in a custody case).

Augmented Reality: AR is reality as perceived by the user of particular piece of equipment that adds layers to reality using AI. Thus, one's perception of reality is grounded in PR, but AI-generated sensory (audio, video, olfactory etc) input is received on top of that or instead of certain parts of it. AR is often used in the same breath as 'gamification', in which an activity or task is made 'fun' by adding colours, sounds and other stimuli to reality. However, the technology can be deployed in a wide variety of ways, including for professional purposes. It can be used to show a route while walking in the forest by putting yellow smiley faces on the right track; it might be used in war zones to replace the sight of blood with more pleasant stimuli. In Smart Cities, AI is used to adjust the smell in the streets. A tangerine scent can be sprayed in areas if predictive programming has found a high likelihood of nightlife aggression. The smell of fruit is known to have a calming effect on people.[7]

Virtual Reality: In its ideal form, when a user is in VR, all sensory input is AI-generated. Most current forms of VR focus on creating AI-generated input for just one of our senses, namely sight. However, there are also experiments with sound, smell and touch. Although a user enters the new reality consciously, its virtuality is generally perceived as almost real, which is different from most forms of AR, where users are generally aware of the artificiality of the added sensory layers. VR can have real and concrete effects on people when they return to Physical Reality, such as when being treated for anxiety disorders or chronic pain. VR is also used for gaming, for treatment of people suffering from dissociative disorders, for military training and for educational purposes – for example, allowing children to participate in democratic debates in ancient Athens.

1.4. WHAT THIS BOOK OFFERS

These are just a few trends that will influence our sense and perception of reality. Although these technologies are still in their relative infancy, they have already had real and tangible consequences for the personal lives of many and society at large. Even if these technologies advance in

accordance with the most conservative scenarios, reality will be increasingly mediated, affected, altered and substituted by AI-generated sensory input. Consequently, this book's central theme is reality.

Focusing on the implications of Synthetic Reality, this book discusses four fields of application: HRs, DFs, AR and VR. The reason for choosing these four is that they represent different technological currents that affect our perception of reality. An HR is placed in PR and acts and talks like a human. A DF is an AI generated representation of reality, though a distorted one. AR takes reality as a basis, but adds AI-generated stimuli to the user's perception. Through VR, the user's perception of reality is fully AI-generated, while her body remains in PR.

This book sets out to describe the effects of AI-generated content on reality and our perception of it. It describes the various ongoing technological developments and discusses the main fields of application of HRs, DFs, AR and VR. It discusses both the potential positive and negative effects of these applications, and homes in on the larger societal questions the technologies raise. It describes the current regulatory regime and evaluates how it applies to the technologies and their main use cases. Several regulatory gaps become apparent: points where



Figure 1.1 The four AI technologies discussed in this book



Figure 1.2 The impact these technologies have on reality

the negative consequences of the technologies cannot be adequately addressed through the current legal standards. The book closes by discussing several regulatory alternatives to the current regime that could solve these gaps, and discusses the merits and pitfalls of each of these alternatives. In the end, there may be more questions than answers.

This book is written for a broad audience, but caters in particular to lawyers, legal scholars, regulators, and law and technology students. Hence, its focus is on the consequences of synthetic technologies for society and how the legal regime could or should be adapted so that it can adequately address the harmful effects on personal and societal interests. After finishing the book, the reader should have a grasp on the basic qualities of the four technologies and their main fields of application, the beneficial and harmful consequences of their use in practice, and the bigger societal questions they raise. The reader should also have an understanding of how the current regulatory regime applies to the various technologies, what regulatory gaps there are and what potential regulatory alternatives could improve the prevailing legal standards. Above all, it should be clear that there often are no perfect solutions to the many uneasy questions Generative AI raises.

1.5. DELINEATION

There are several limitations that come with this approach.

First, the terms 'synthetic reality', 'Generative AI', 'Humanoid Robot', 'Deepfake', 'Augmented Reality' and 'Virtual Reality' do not lend themselves to exact definitions. When is fake material to be considered a DF? Does it depend on the technology used to produce the fake, whether the consumer believes it to be real, or its deep impact on the perception of reality? When exactly does reality become so augmented that it should be called VR? If 90 per cent of what a person sees consists of AI-generated layers, is that still AR? What if VR is an exact copy of PR – is that VR or more like an interactive film? At what point does a robot look, talk, think and act so much like a human that it should be considered humanoid? All these definitions depend on sliding scales rather than binary distinctions; they are best treated as ideal concepts that may never be fully realised.

Second, following the lack of binary distinctions, the concepts used in this book have significant overlap and are not always distinguishable in an absolute fashion. For example, the Metaverse makes use of AR, VR, the Internet of Things and tactile internet applications.[8] Sometimes, AR is based on a fully representational system, representing reality through a video screen, while adding an AI layer to the video recording of reality. HRs use a lot of the same technology as VR. Apple's Vision Pro uses VR, AR and DF technology. Japan's Moonshot program, which has the aim of the 'realization of a society in which human beings can be free from limitations of body, brain, space, and time by 2050',[9] depends on multiple synthetic technologies. In this book, the four technologies will be used as a rough division between AI impersonated reality, AI (mis)represented reality, AI altered reality and AI replaced reality.

Third, there are other, connected developments that do not take centre stage here, but are discussed where relevant. Each of the technologies depends on enabling hardware and software. Modern AI robotics, for example, requires an understanding of AI, Machine Learning, Large Language Models and the field of robotics, but also of the Internet of Things, facial and emotion recognition, and speech analysis. AR and VR depend on a wide variety of hardware for sensory input and output. DFs are typically generated using Generative Adversarial Networks, which also have a wide variety of other uses. All these adjoining technological concepts are only elaborated upon to the extent necessary for understanding the four central technologies.

Fourth, what connects the technologies in this book is that they are AI-driven. However, they may have effects that could be achieved through non-AI-mediated means. Glasses have allowed a distorted view of reality for decades. Smart Cities may be AI-driven, but spraying a tangerine scent is not structurally different from non-AI mediated forms of scent-nudging, such as perfumes sprayed in shops to arouse appetite. DFs may be more realistic, but photography and film have allowed for the manipulation of the truth since their introduction. Thus, although the technologies discussed in this book are certainly potentially disruptive, early forms of altered, manipulated and enhanced perceptions of reality exist in abundance.

Fifth, by the time this book is published, many concrete examples, applications and descriptions of the technologies may be outdated. All four of the technologies central to the discussion here are advancing at rapid speeds. This is why the description of societal effects and the analysis of the regulatory gaps and solutions steer clear of anecdotal evidence and incidental problems. Rather, the focus here is on the more general and structural changes that these technologies will bring about and the types of applications they enable. New and unforeseen developments and applications not covered by this book may take place, although speculation over how the technologies may evolve is included where relevant.

Sixth, this book describes the technologies and their prospected development over the coming years. Since the technologies are still in their relative infancy, most sources about their potential harms and benefits come from companies and start-ups that develop the technologies or market their applications, or from tech-savvy journalists and academics. Thus, the description of the technologies' potential applications (Chapter 2) and their functionality and design (Chapter 3) may have a particular bias towards positive use cases and an unrealistic perception of their effectiveness. Still, especially with AI robots and DFs, considerable academic and journalistic attention has been devoted to negative scenarios as well.

Seventh, this means that although the various technologies are already applied in practice, and the general idea is that they will evolve and have an ever greater societal impact, which will be taken as the basic assumption of this book, this is not a given. As with other technologies, most revolutionary predictions have not come to pass; this is no less true for the technologies described in this book. AR, for example, has been promoted ever since the 1990s, but has not been the success early adaptors and investors had believed it would be. AI more generally has not delivered on its early promises; we are already witnessing the fourth

generation of AI, which means that the former three have only yielded marginal results. This book takes a hypothetical scenario: what if the technologies do become relatively successful; how would they affect the world and how could the legal regime be adapted to adequately address their effects? Although the technologies will not develop along the lines now predicted, these predictions are the best there is to go on for now. It is important to think through this scenario because, in 10 years' time, if the technologies are as successful as we now believe they will be, it may be too late to introduce regulations to curb their effects.

Eighth, this book describes HRs, DFs, AR and VR through the lens of their effects on reality and our perception of it. Thus, it does not provide an exposé on AI robotics or a full description of VR's potential in the gaming industry or any other specific application. Rather, the descriptions are limited to aspects that have a bearing on this book's central theme: reality. The cases discussed serve as examples of how AI-generated reality may change our perception of ourselves, others and the world around us.

Ninth, this book's focus is legal in nature. The technologies are described from this perspective; the aspects and applications of the technologies that are relevant to the legal analysis are highlighted, while others may be ignored or only touched upon briefly. Thus, this book should not be taken as providing an exhaustive description of these technologies. It describes the technologies in a way that any well-informed reader can grasp their significance. The descriptions of the technologies and their applications (Chapters 2 and 3) summarise the most important developments in this field as discussed by other academics and will closely follow their findings. The novelty of this book lies in its societal, legal and regulatory analysis (Chapters 4, 5 and 6).

Tenth, the description of the legal framework is based on European law, provided by the Council of Europe, especially through the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and by the European Union, through laws like the General Data Protection Regulation, the Artificial Intelligence Act and the Digital Services Act. Not all legal domains are covered by the Council of Europe or the European Union, such as criminal law and tort law. These legal domains are largely left to the regulatory discretion of Member States, such as France, Germany and the Netherlands. This book largely leaves these domains untouched; if they play a role, the discussion here remains somewhat abstract, covering the basic concepts or doctrines that are part of most national legal regimes. The same applies to matters of procedural law and law enforcement. This is covered, but only from

a general perspective. In this way, the book avoids being relevant only to legal experts from one particular country.

1.6. OVERVIEW

This book is constructed as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the most important fields of application of synthetic technologies, as well as their positive and negative consequences. After an introduction (section 2.1), it focuses on the use cases for HRs (section 2.2), DF technology (section 2.3), AR (section 2.4) and VR (section 2.5), followed by a wrap-up (section 2.6).

Chapter 3 explains the basic design and architecture behind the four technologies. After an introduction (section 3.1), it provides the reader with an explanation of the hard- and software used for HRs (section 3.2), DFs (section 3.3), AR (section 3.4) and VR (section 3.5). This is followed by a conclusion (section 3.6).

Chapter 4 describes the broader societal effects of these technologies with regard to basic values shared throughout Western society, such as truth and trust (section 4.2), human recognition and social interaction (section 4.3), autonomy and equality (section 4.4), and the rule of law and protection of (non-)human rights (section 4.5). These sections are preceded by an introduction (section 4.1) and followed by a conclusion (section 4.6).

Chapter 5 evaluates how the current regulatory framework applies to the four synthetic technologies and their applications, which also exposes the most relevant regulatory gaps. After an introduction (section 5.1), it focuses on data protection law (section 5.2), freedom, privacy and property rights (section 5.3), rules on the production and use of technology and the transfer of data (section 5.4), and issues revolving around liability, law enforcement and procedural law (section 5.5). The final part summarises the chapter's main findings (section 5.6).

As Chapter 5 raises a great many questions regarding the applicability of the current legal framework on synthetic technologies and the need for revisions, Chapter 6 lays the groundwork for addressing these challenges. This book does not provide sweeping statements or easily implementable solutions. Rather, its main objective is to raise regulatory and societal questions, showing what is at stake with the rise of these technologies and that every regulatory option has both its merits and pitfalls. There are no easy solutions, which is what makes regulating the

synthetic society fascinating, essential and complex. After an introduction (section 6.1), this chapter will recount the main findings of this book (section 6.2) and map some of the proposals that experts have suggested for dealing with the moral, legal and societal questions raised by synthetic technology (section 6.3). It will also provide a model through which regulators can address the regulatory questions (section 6.4) and, finally, will provide concluding remarks (section 6.5).

2

Applications and Effects of Synthetic Technologies

AI could help people with improved health care, safer cars and other transport systems, tailored, cheaper and longer-lasting products and services. It can also facilitate access to information, education and training. The need for distance learning became more important because of the Covid-19 pandemic. AI can also make workplace safer as robots can be used for dangerous parts of jobs, and open new job positions as AI-driven industries grow and change. For businesses, AI can enable the development of a new generation of products and services, including in sectors where European companies already have strong positions: green and circular economy, machinery, farming, healthcare, fashion, tourism. It can boost sales, improve machine maintenance, increase production output and quality, improve customer service, as well as save energy. 11–37% Estimated increase of labour productivity related to AI by 2035. AI used in public services can reduce costs and offer new possibilities in public transport, education, energy and waste management and could also improve the sustainability of products. In this way AI could contribute to achieving the goals of the EU Green Deal. 1.5–4% Estimate of how much AI could help reduce global greenhouse emissions by 2030. Democracy could be made stronger by using data-based scrutiny, preventing disinformation and cyber attacks and ensuring access to quality information. AI could also support diversity and openness, for example by mitigating the possibility of prejudice in hiring decisions and using analytical data instead. AI is predicted to be used more in crime prevention and the criminal justice system, as massive data sets could be processed faster, prisoner flight risks assessed more accurately, crime or even terrorist attacks predicted and prevented. It is already used by online platforms to detect and react to unlawful and inappropriate online behaviour. In military matters, AI could be used for defence and attack strategies in hacking and phishing or to target key systems in cyberwarfare.[1]

European Parliament, European Union

2.1. INTRODUCTION

The European Parliament has mapped a high number of opportunities for Generative AI, as well as dangers, including those relating to privacy and security, job loss and discrimination. This chapter discusses the main use cases and their potential beneficial and detrimental effects for the four technologies that are central to this book: Humanoid Robots (HRs) (section 2.2), Deepfakes (DFs) (section 2.3), Augmented Reality (AR) (section 2.4) and Virtual Reality (VR) (section 2.5). The chapter closes with a conclusion (section 2.6). As such, this chapter lays the groundwork for Chapter 3 (describing the architecture and design of the four technologies), Chapter 4 (homing in on the larger societal effects and challenges synthetic reality triggers) and Chapter 5 (evaluating synthetic technologies and their use from a legal perspective).

2.2. HUMANOID ROBOTS

Robots are increasingly being used for industrial and manufacturing jobs, especially for repetitive and precision tasks.[2] For example, teleoperated robot-assisted surgery provides surgeons with additional advantages in minimally invasive surgery with improved precision, dexterity and visualisation.[3] AI robots can perform surgical tasks autonomously,[4] but they mostly operate in human-robot teams.[5] Humans may also be equipped with robotic material, such as if a person who suffers from partial paralysis uses a robot exoskeleton to bring back normal arm functionality.[6] Some applications allow humans to 'be' the robot, that is, to steer its activities through telepresence.[7] Since robots are better and more efficient at certain types of jobs, robots substituting humans may lead to a reduction in waste production.[8] Similarly, in restaurants, robots can be used for hygienic reasons.[9] They can help with lifting and carrying heavy items[10] and are utilised for home delivery services[11] and for cleaning.[12] Using robots may have the advantage that humans no longer endure the poor work conditions or perform dangerous tasks.[13] Warfare, for example, is becoming increasingly outsourced to robots (eg, killer drones) and according to several experts, self-driving cars will, in time, be able to drive around more safely and in a more energy-friendly way than most humans.[14]

Although the market share of HRs is currently relatively small, it is expected to grow exponentially in the coming years, from about $1.3 billion in 2022 to about $17.3 billion in 2027.[15] Unsurprisingly, ever more companies, non-profit organisations and governmental

agencies are investing in and experimenting with HRs. Toyota, one of the frontrunners, is interestingly approaching HRs as a step beyond VR:

> Thanks to VR, there's no doubt that people have already experienced what it feels like to have their movements represented in a virtual world. As an extension of this, avatar robots like T-HR3, which possess an actual body, are capable of going beyond VR to physically influence the real world. Of course, we still have to overcome mountains of development issues, but in the future, people will be able to extend their ability to move and experience the world using remote avatar robots – and the ability to offer new mobility services like this is a goal that is well suited to Toyota as it transforms into a mobility company.[16]

Most current HRs are suitable for one preprogramed task. Although adaptive to context and circumstances, this usually involves a relative demarcated area of expertise. Such HRs are used, inter alia, in the leisure industry. For example, the Japanese hotel Henn Na has robots as workforce (front desk assistants, cleaning personnel etc), which can take the shape of humans, pets and even dinosaurs.[17] There are also humanoid bartering kiosks, where a HR prepares and serves food and beverages.[18] Airports are increasingly making use of customer service robots and HR luggage carry personnel. Inter alia, HRs can scan passport data, automatically fill in documents, issue electronic queue tickets and provide relevant information to visitors.[19] In addition, there are HR taxi drivers and tour guides at tourist spots all around the world.[20] One of the many advantages of smart HRs is that they can speak almost any language.[21] Experiments run with HRs performing various tasks, such as exploring the depth of the ocean,[22] assisting in educational tasks,[23] packaging and delivery[24] and in industrial environments.[25]

For text production and social intersectionality, several chatbots exist, the most well known currently being ChatGPT.[26] Chat programs allow for an advanced combination of a potential friend (social conversations) and a virtual assistant that can write a love story in Shakespearian style, look up concrete information or be a psychiatrist when needed.[27] Although it is not perfect, it is widely seen as almost fully human-like in terms of its conversational abilities. One of the criticisms is that ChatGPT sometimes makes factual errors, but, arguably, this only makes the bot more human. The criticism does uncover an interesting question: do people really want a HR or are they looking for a better-than-human companion? On the one hand, excessive intelligence and advanced capacities may alienate people from robots and arouse feelings of social discomfort; on

the other hand, there is a very low tolerance of robotic mistakes. Other AI programs exist that can produce video, audio and images.[28]

In the medical domain, HRs can be used to perform certain tasks that can involve embarrassment, such as matters involving genitalia or sexual diseases. Men and women who do not want to be examined or treated by a doctor of the opposite sex for religious or other motives may have less trouble with a gender-neutral robot or HR that can change its physical appearance according to the patient's preferences. HRs are also deployed to assist with non-patient-facing tasks, including running patient supplies, delivering lab samples, fetching items from central supply, distributing protective equipment and delivering medication. There are HRs that autonomously disinfect rooms, with one of the many advantages being that HRs cannot get infected (eg, by COVID-19).[29] Robots are used for home and elderly care. These robots are often multi-functional. They can help with cleaning the house, helping people to take their medicine in time, with getting up or supporting them when walking, dressing and undressing; they can also help people with cognitive problems to organise their lives, and they can act as a friend and conversational partner. In addition, home care HRs may be equipped with diagnostic software to allow for early diagnoses of, for example, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) or Alzheimer's disease.[30]

Government organisations also use HRs for a wide variety of tasks. In warfare, having HRs as foot soldiers might have the advantage that the opposing army believe they are facing human soldiers, while in fact they are better equipped and more able than average human soldiers, as well as being better shielded against the impact of bullets and other ammunition. HRs are used for friendly patrols, for example, at shopping centres. They can be designed in a way that their appearance does not stand out, and they look small and unintimidating, while being as strong as or stronger than most human security guards.[31] The Russians make use of HRs in space[32] and the US's National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is increasingly investing in robonauts:

> Working side by side with humans, or going where the risks are too great for people, Robonauts will expand our ability for construction and discovery. Central to that effort is a capability we call dexterous manipulation, embodied by an ability to use one's hand to do work, and our challenge has been to build machines with dexterity that exceeds that of a suited astronaut.[33]

Some HRs are designed for their own sake, without a concrete use case in mind, and many others for social interaction.[34] For example, Hanson

Figure 2.1 Patient care robot[35]
Source: ZUMA Press, Inc/Alamy Stock Photo.

Robotics won a United Nations (UN) innovation prize with its robot Sophia. Hanson believes that HRs with good aesthetic design, rich personalities and social cognitive intelligence can potentially connect deeply and meaningfully with humans. It has updated its model to Sophia 2020, which has several functionalities, including customised

skin tone, facial design, language and arm colours, integrated human-like emotional expressions, sentence and context understanding, mouth, face and whole body motion synchronised with speech output, facial recognition, body tracking and 74 degrees of motion freedom.[36] Pet-like robots also exist.[37] The purpose of these is to act as a canine friend,[38] to execute inspections[39] or to make announcements.[40] One such pet robot is Moxie, which is designed to be an AI friend to children and to help them grow intellectually and personally ('What do you get when advisors from Walt Disney and NASA team up with education experts? You get Moxie').[41] The team is quite ambitious in terms of what interaction with Moxie can accomplish in relation to a child's wellbeing. Moxie is said to help children, inter alia, with emotion regulation, relationship skills, expressing kindness, conflict resolution, acquiring calming techniques, understanding social cues, building healthy habits, showing leadership, acquiring communication skills, mindfulness, self-confidence, showing empathy and supporting others.[42]

A final area of application worth mentioning is HRs used as sex or love robots.[43] These robot functionalities are so popular that some experts predict that by 2050, having relationships with a robot might be fully normalised and socially accepted.[44] Others even claim that by that time, more sexual intercourse with sex robots will take place than with conspecifics:[45] synthetic love. Sex robots can cater to romantic needs and to sexual desires; sex doll brothels have already opened in Asia.[46] One of the advantages is that sex work, which can be seen as degrading and exploitative by nature, is no longer performed by real women. Love dolls can also be helpful to people who have suffered from traumatic experiences[47] and help elderly people or people with mental or physical disability to have a healthy sex life.[48]

However, there are also a number of potential disadvantages to the use of HRs.[49] To start with the last field of application discussed above, experts have pointed out that sex with HRs is mostly performed by men and that the use of a sex doll may feed into a macho-male perception of women and sex, as the robots are usually designed to obediently cater to the needs of their owner and to always be ready to perform their sexual duty, without having desires or preferences of their own. Some suggest that this might normalise a modern form of slavery and sexual exploitation. Either men copy that behaviour to the real world, with all the problems that go with it, or they prefer to stay with their sex robot.[50]

In addition, a fear of robotics in general is that of privacy threats, as these robots are equipped with multiple sensors, and of hackability. Since robots are often strong and sometimes work with vulnerable people, they

can do substantial harm, which can be as small as being reprogrammed to forget to remind an elderly person to take their medicine. There are questions about the extent to which every aspect of human interaction can be programmed or substituted by AI. For example, medical experts often operate on what they see as intuition:

> Intuition is often developed through experiences, non-analytical reasoning and thinking, feelings, a solid knowledge base and non-linear creation of knowledge. In patient care, intuition is very valuable and is often used because when needed, it re-emerges in the form of 'intuitive intelligence' or 'gut feelings'. However, because intuition is very difficult to capture or quantify, and thus stored so it can be later uncovered or mined as with other [big healthcare data] BHD; intuitive knowledge is often regarded as non-scientific and not suitable in investigations in the sciences including healthcare. This is in contrast to evidence-based medicine and decision making based on quantitative information from patients' data and improved health outcomes that can be measured and stored as BHD for later use.[51]

In addition, some experts believe that AI may not be good at picking up signals of non-identified diseases or in experimental diagnostics.

Another general fear of AI is that it is biased,[52] that humans might trick the self-learning AI system by giving selected input ques,[53] and that most self-learning systems are wholly or partially black boxes. This might reduce social acceptance of HRs and lead to unexpected outcomes. The lack of trust in HRs may be enhanced by the lack of universal and generally accepted standards for safety, audits, interoperability and risk management.[54] HRs are mostly produced, programmed and operated by private organisations with a commercial goal, which means that profit may be a bigger driver in programming HRs' algorithmic behaviour than the general interest or the interest of humans with which they interact. Finally, there are concerns in relation to powerful Large Language Models such as ChatGPT in terms of their ability to write essays and assignments. As a result, many universities are faced with the question of whether to prohibit the use of this program by students and, if so, how to enforce such a prohibition.[55]

2.3. DEEPFAKES

Deepfakes (DFs) allow citizens and companies to generate funny videos and satirical memes.[56] An example is putting Nicolas Cage into even more movies than he has already appeared in,[57] putting two politicians from opposing parties on Temptation Island[58] and having the head

of state deliver an alternative Christmas speech.[59] In a more homely setting, children can produce a funny video of their parents, while a fake video can be produced in which a celebrity appears to congratulate the birthday girl or boy or a DF of George W Bush talking about the Axis of Evil may be so altered that the name of the neighbour appears instead of Iran.

DFs also allow dead people to be brought back to life. Salvador Dalí may give a virtual tour in a museum[60] or Mona Lisa may address viewers in person.[61] Both Google[62] and Microsoft[63] allow a person to enhance old photos and make them more realistic. This technology may be used to bring an ancient ancestor back to life: seeing and hearing great-grandmother walk and talk in what appears to be authentic video material. Deceased loved ones can also be brought back to life through DFs, for example to give a speech at their own funeral, or to communicate with a late spouse to keep in contact.

> 'It makes me so happy to see him smile again', one user said after animating a photo of her husband, who died 4 years earlier. 'It's as if they are looking at you and your surroundings and seeing how much things have changed', said another user. Reporter Joe Fitzgerald Rodriguez commented that the feature gave him a chance to see his late father's face move again after he lost the only videotape he had of him years ago. 'Forget iPhones and self-driving cars', one commenter said in response to a Deep Nostalgia™ animation. 'This is the moment we officially started living in the future!'[64]

Grief therapy by communicating with a deceased spouse is an option as well.[65]

DFs are also increasingly being used in the film industry. In the film *Furious 7*, Paul Walker, who died while still shooting, was seemingly brought back to life to complete the film.[66] The technology also allows an actor to be scanned to have their virtual image star in films, saving time, money and energy. This may be particularly advantageous for work now performed by stuntmen.[67] DFs have a broader effect on the entertainment industry as well. For example, virtual influencers and bands, which are not based on any existing person, have been created and have already acquired a large following and sponsorship contracts and have given performances in physical concert halls.[68] DF technology can also be used for social interaction between citizens, in both personal and business contexts. For instance, in live video calls, people can assume the appearance of a cat, dog or fictional character,[69] and if participants speak different languages, their words can be translated live while their lips are synchronised to match the translation. Thus, a Chinese person

and a Danish person can communicate with each other in their own respective languages, while the other perceives their conversation partner as speaking in their language. According to researchers, this technique will 'significantly improve the overall user experience for consuming and interacting with multimodal content across languages'.[70]

DF technology is also used for a wide variety of purposes in the medical domain.[71] For instance, synthetic Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) images of brains with tumours can be created and algorithms can be trained from these images to detect early forms of cancer or brain diseases, such as Alzheimer's. Not only can this technology be used for MRI scans, it is also capable of developing images of liver lesions[72] and skin lesions that can be used by dermatologists.[73] In addition, through DF technology, people with ALS could retain the ability to speak using their own voice,[74] which is also the case for people with dysarthria, a speech disorder caused by damage to the nervous system.[75] The privacy of citizens could also be enhanced or protected. For example, by having the patient assume a different identity, they could remain anonymous while being able to participate in live conversations, as a witness in a criminal trial or as a patient in a clinical trial, for example.[76]

DF technology also offers opportunities within the context of law enforcement. Virtual people can be used to infiltrate criminal networks[77] and Sweetie, a virtual avatar, was deployed to track down child molesters and pederasts:

> Sweetie is a ten-year-old virtual Filipino girl. A very realistic girl deployed online in chat rooms and dating sites. When men approach her for sexually oriented chats, she engages in conversation with them. All the information this yields is stored and used to warn, track down, or even catch and convict perpetrators.[78]

Sweetie 2.0 has led to convictions in multiple jurisdictions.[79] More controversially, DF child pornography can be produced starring non-existent children to infiltrate networks or track consumers of that content.

Retail companies can develop virtual models which customers can use to swap their own bodies for those of virtual models. This will make it possible to virtually try on clothes or glasses by taking the customer's body type into account.[80] The app Superpersonal offers a virtual fitting room, allowing customers to try on clothes based on data about their gender, height and weight.[81] The demand for e-commerce has increased due to the closure of physical shops globally during and after the pandemic. The size of the virtual fitting room market is expected to grow from over US$3 billion in 2019 to $6.5 billion in 2025.[82]

Within the educational context, DFs offer the opportunity to deliver more interactive lessons, for example, by a history teacher who can have Napoleon speak in class about which decisions he made and why.[83] Charities deploy DFs by having a celebrity call out to support a good cause in all the world's languages,[84] by having a politician make a statement that motivates people to act[85] or by showing people who do not support providing shelter to refugees what a war ruined city looks like by turning their own village into one.[86] Using DF technology also allows politicians to reach out to minority groups in their own language.[87]

There are at least an equal number of applications of DF technology with negative consequences. One of the first DFs was produced and shared by citizens in 2017 on Reddit: faces of famous people such as Taylor Swift were placed on the bodies of porn actors. This practice has remained popular since then. From February 2018, major platforms responded by restricting the applications of DFs,[88] including Reddit.[89] The vast majority of DF porn is of women: the women tend to be either celebrities or people in direct contact with the producer of the DF, such as classmates, colleagues, neighbours or exes.[90] While female politicians are regular victims of pornographic DFs, male politicians are often Deepfaked in a way that they appear to use foul language or make controversial claims,[91] such as Donald Trump supposedly calling on Belgium to get out of the Paris Agreement[92] or Barack Obama appearing to make Trump out to be a 'total and complete dipshit'.[93]

In April 2020, DF audio clips surfaced using a text-to-speech model trained in Jay-Z's speech patterns to impersonate him quoting the 'To be, or not to be' monologue from Shakespeare's *Hamlet*.[94] Jay-Z's label petitioned for its removal due to copyright infringement. YouTube initially responded by removing the video, but later reinstated it online because the plaintiff had not provided sufficient grounds to show that the material was indeed unlawful.[95] The use of data relating to dead people also raises the question of the extent to which intellectual property rights rest on images of dead people and the extent to which their descendants can invoke them. Increased exploitation of the deceased's imagery might also trigger a debate on post-mortem privacy: should deceased people have reputational and personality rights?[96]

DFs can also be used for financial gain, such as manipulating markets. After a false message circulated on WhatsApp in 2019 stating that Metro Bank was no longer liquid, people flocked to bank branches

to claim their money. This ultimately led to the company's stock falling by 9 per cent.[97] Criminals can use DFs to impersonate chief executive officers (CEOs) of listed companies, appearing to make statements that cause share prices of their companies to fall. Europol therefore calls DFs a considerable danger as they might be used for, among other things, 'perpetrating extortion and fraud, facilitating document fraud, falsifying online identities and fooling KYC [Know Your Customer] mechanisms, falsifying or manipulating electronic evidence for criminal justice investigations, disrupting financial markets' and, for example, extracting trade secrets through DFs.[98] An early example of fraud comes from 2019, when someone was defrauded by means of a DF audio fragment. A CEO of a UK energy company transferred €220,000 to a Hungarian bank account, believing he was on the phone to his boss, the head of the German parent company, who seemed to be instructing him to do so.[99]

By means of a DF video, a politician during a general election could discredit their opponent or stir up a political scandal. For example, a DF of former Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, in which he insulted a fellow politician, sparked public outrage.

> The deepfake video refers to Renzi's decision Sept. 17 to leave the Democratic Party and form his own party. In the parody, the supposed Renzi is seen talking when he thinks he is off air. He discusses the reaction of various politicians, including Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte; Luigi Di Maio, leader of the Five Star Movement; and Italy's president, Sergio Mattarella … The video is so outrageous that it is clearly a parody, but deepfake technology makes it look incredibly realistic. So when people started sharing it online, claiming that it was a real video, quite a few social media users fell for it and were outraged by what they saw as Renzi's bad behavior.[100]

As such, DFs could influence democratic elections, a threat that could come from domestic sources and from foreign nations such as Russia.[101] For example, in a letter to the House of Representatives, the Minister of the Interior of the Netherlands pointed to the dangers of disinformation:

> [P]olitical influence is not a new phenomenon. It comprises the integral, often covert use of (misleading) arguments, selective information and disinformation (regarding politically sensitive themes) for the purpose of achieving political goals towards a predetermined audience. However, the emergence of the internet has triggered a new dynamic: wide dissemination of disinformation and fake news is easy, quick and cheap to generate and often, the source can remain anonymous. As indicated in the annual reports of the intelligence agency, there are state actors that focus on the Netherlands and that have the intention and capacity to interfere in democratic processes.

> They are interested in political decision-making and high-quality technological knowledge (ICT, maritime technology, biotechnology and aerospace sectors).[102]

DFs can also be used to provoke domestic or interstate conflict. In 2018, Gabon's President Ali Bongo was out of the country for medical treatment. People grew suspicious of the President's wellbeing, with some believing that he had already passed away. After several months, the Vice-President announced that the President had suffered a stroke. Civil society and the general public continued to question why the President had not yet appeared in public, prompting the government to release a video of him. Many did not believe the video was real and a week after the video was published, the Gabon army staged a coup, which ultimately failed.[103]

The relationship between different states can also be strained by DFs. For example, in 2020, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison demanded an apology from China after a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman posted a fake photo on Twitter (now known as X) showing an Australian soldier holding a knife to the throat of an Afghan child; however, China refused to do so.[104] Europol also fears that DFs will be used for 'distributing disinformation and manipulating public opinion, inciting acts of violence toward minority groups, supporting the narratives of extremist or even terrorist groups, and, stoking social unrest and political polarization'.[105] For example, in Myanmar, DFs of members of the Muslim minority were created and spread, showing them to perform controversial activities in order to incite hatred and violence against them.

2.4. AUGMENTED REALITY

One of the first applications of Augmented Reality (AR) was in the movie industry: a great many developments have materialised since, such as turning 2D images into 3D ones by adding layers of information to the film or by stimulating other senses than sight, such as producing olfactory and haptic sensory input correlating with the visual cues. In sports, a person's performance rates, biophysical indicators and other relevant information can be visually projected through an AR device, potentially comparing that information to that of competitors. It is also used for sport fans watching a game – for example, having AR project the offside line on the TV coverage of a football match or replacing the puck in ice hockey for a special coloured symbol that allows viewers to more easily follow the game.[106] In gaming, old-fashioned board games may

be turned into 3D environments when viewed through an AR device; if interconnected, the AR devices of the players who are physically remote may project the same 3D environment onto different 2D game boards and allow for remote interaction. Alternatively, a game master can use AR to create a virtual environment populated with avatars, tying them to a specific location in the real world where the players are. The most famous of all AR games is perhaps *Pokemon Go*, in which figures and items are projected onto the real world, which participants need to catch or interact with.[107]

The first popularisation of AR was arguably by Boeing, who had employees wear goggles when working on machines to allow them to receive additional information.[108] Today, AR is used by the military, in aviation, in car factories and many other production fields. Inter alia, by using goggles, mechanics can see each step necessary for repair or assembly, identify the right equipment and scroll through textual instructions.[109] For repetitive precision work, artificial stimuli can provide warnings if something goes amiss, resulting in more reliable production processes. AR is also increasingly used in commercial settings. For example, an app may show ratings, reviews or advertising when customers shop in commercial areas.[110] AR can be used to virtually try on clothes, allowing the user to see how they would look by looking in the mirror through an AR device.[111]

In social settings, AR can be used to facilitate interactions between humans and avatars, such as through virtual avatars also being invited to a party and to join in on discussions.[112] AR can be used to scan faces using facial recognition and provide overlay information – for example, from LinkedIn or other webpages. Emotion recognition can be used if, for example, a neighbour rings the doorbell aggressively. Wikitude[113] allows users to project information from Wikipedia onto reality.[114] In a similar vein, AR can be used in tourist settings, such as by overlaying the visual representation of the Colosseum in Rome on the ruins that still stand.[115] A virtual tour guide can inform the visitor about the historical sites, adapting to contextual cues and the specific questions of the visitor(s). Similarly, museum experiences can be enhanced using AR. For example, in a natural history museum, dinosaurs may be brought to life visually, or their assumed sound and smell can be produced. For foreign tourists in particular, AR could prove vital when signs in local languages are incomprehensible. AR is also used to obscure things, such as military infrastructure or the wall that separates Israel from Palestine.[116]

In the context of security, there are several AR apps that allow citizens to collaborate with law enforcement officials to solve crimes in a

game-like setting[117] and to get under the skin of a border patrol agent, a police officer patrolling the streets or a combatant in an armed overseas conflict. Chinese police officials use smart glasses to identify potential suspects.[118] Police officers may use emotion recognition to obtain information about the emotional state of a suspect. The US military uses AR for military training:

> As the Army looks to further modernize its force, it has focused on synthetic training environments to boost Soldier readiness and lethality. IVAS is a single platform that Soldiers and Marines use to fight, rehearse, and train. The Soldier Lethality Cross-Functional Team identified technology that makes it possible to deliver a single system across the force. Similar technology has been used by the Navy and Air Force, which have used it to train fighter pilots.[119]

AR is used in medical settings as well, inter alia, allowing medical professionals to produce 3D virtual models for analysis and surgical planning.[120] The visualisation of the path through the anatomy of the area where a tumour must be removed, for example, can be done by first creating a 3D model from multiple views and slices in the pre-operative study. The model can be projected over the target surface to help the surgical procedure. Developers have created an AR contact lens to measure blood glucose and cholesterol, and to project relevant information on a patient's body while a surgical team is performing a procedure. Using an optical see-through display can also help ultrasound technicians by allowing them to view volumetric rendered images of foetuses overlaid onto the abdomen of pregnant women; this image can depict what is occurring inside the abdomen.[121]

An important area of application for AR is in education. AR educational tools have become increasingly popular, with the COVID-19 pandemic leading to a particular rise in this popularity on account of the increase in home schooling. AR can assist students with their tasks and give immediate feedback when performing them. Research suggests that using AR, difficult or tough topics can be gamified, thus making learning more fun and thereby increasing students' performance ratings. Through AR, students can also interact with and challenge each other – for example, they can compete to win a gold medal in quizzes or tasks. Biology students can study virtual organs while being together in a physical classroom. History lessons may be partially taught through role-playing games, where children can wear their normal clothes, but AR turns their outfit into one of the historical figures.[122] Augmented

books can be designed, with symbols, historical figures and buildings popping up next to the relevant text or with additional information being shown next to key words, figures or events. The goal is to make reading more fun for young and adolescent readers. Some devices allow an overlay of astrological information on or connecting lines of a zodiac sign projected on the sky at night, which might be used for astrological training.[123]

A final positive way in which AR is used is in smart environments, such as smart homes, smart cities, smart cars and navigation apps.[124] In smart homes, disabled people can control the environment using a handheld mobile device equipped with a Mobile AR (MAR) application:

> The activity could be operating electrical appliances, opening the doors, switching off or dimming the lights. Increasing the accessibility of people having motor disabilities in a smart city enables the users to interact with items placed beyond their arm's length. Navigation through smart cities using MAR provides visitors with a better experience. MAR enhanced smart building management systems are capable of recognizing building geometry, simulate building visualisation, identify assets and incorporate the feedback from the user to enable proper management of the smart building. Applications like IKEA Place equipped with AR, allow users to visualize the furniture placement before making the purchase decision … For smart homes, security monitoring enabled with AR can alert suspicious behaviors and current warnings on property owner's remote mobile screen. These warnings can be enhanced with the details of suspicious individuals if they have criminal records.[125]

The French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health & Safety has summarised the dangers of AR and VR as signalled in the academic literature, although not all these effects have been proven beyond doubt:[126]

1. Effects relating to the ergonomics of AR/VR interfaces (musculoskeletal disorders, accidents, effects due to the hygiene of the interface and to noise levels).
2. Cybersickness: nausea, vomiting, headaches, general discomfort, vision effects, physiological effects (cardiac, gastric, respiratory, dermal etc) and vestibular effects (dizziness).
3. Impaired sensorimotor coordination caused by exposure.
4. Psychological and psychosocial effects such as emotional risks, derealisation (detachment from one's surroundings), dependency on the interface and content, content-related effects (violence, relationship to sexuality etc) and social isolation.

5. Effects that alter self-image (through avatars).
6. Effects relating to physical agents emitted by virtual and/or augmented reality devices (for example, blue light and temporal light modulation, and electromagnetic fields).
7. Neurological effects (epileptic seizures).
8. Effects on development (emotional and cognitive) of the visual and auditory systems.

Of these effects, perhaps most attention has been paid to the safety risks created by Pokemon Go, as children crossed busy streets while playing the game without paying attention to traffic. A more underwhelming criticism of AR is its relative lack of usefulness: 'AR is fun for gaming but it has no actual purpose. None could find a reason to pay so much money for a device which has no useful purpose.'[127] A scenario that is real but relatively unexplored is where a hacker deliberately places incorrect information in the AR, leading people to make wrong decisions that negatively affect them, others or the environment. Even without malicious intent, AR can have harmful effects. The most frequently used variants of AR have one thing in common: additional information being provided to the user. This may lead to information overload or distract the user when they need to focus, such as in traffic.[128] AR-generated texts or objects may block important cues from sight. Even the practice of projecting additional textual information or infographics onto the sides of the user's view may be dangerous, as objects in the periphery of one's sight may provide important information.

> Peripheral vision is more important than you might think, because it provides a wealth of information about speed and distance from objects. Central vision, despite the great detail it offers, gives you only a rough estimate of movement toward or away from you, based on changes in size or in the parallax angle between your eyes. But objects moving within your peripheral vision stimulate photoreceptors from the center of the retina to the edge, providing much better information about the speed of motion. Your brain detects objects in your peripheral field and evaluates if and how they (or you) are moving. Interfering with this process can cause you to misjudge relative motion and could cause you to stumble; it might even get you hit by a car one day. It's ironic, really. You buy an AR device to make you more able, yet you're likely to experience some of the same problems faced by visually impaired individuals: reduced depth of focus, distance and speed perception, and reaction time. Indeed, AR users may be at more risk than someone with a permanent vision problem, because they have developed no compensatory strategies for lost vision.[129]

Gaming is one of the most prominent modern addictions among children, which might be incentivised using AR.[130] A negative consequence

of AR devices is their effect on the privacy of both the AR user and of bystanders,[131] as AR devices that are equipped with facial and emotion recognition software gather substantial amounts of sensitive data about people that generally have not given their consent for this to happen.[132] Social discomfort may also arise when different people experience different realities – for example, at a party, some see and hear avatars while others do not. AR can also make certain tasks more 'fun' or less 'appalling', such as making warfare less bloody, and this may withhold important negative sensory input from the combatant, which normally leads to reticence. AR can also be used to block certain 'unnecessary information', which may include innocent citizens being present near a drone strike target.

2.5. VIRTUAL REALITY

Various applications have emerged for Virtual Reality (VR).[133] Most of these align with the use cases for AR, although often taking the concepts one step further. For example, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, VR was propagated as facilitating a new form of tourism: tourism 2.0. VR allows citizens to roam the world and experience spectacular sites while remaining in the comfort of their chairs. This form of travelling has a positive effect on the environment because it lowers the carbon footprint of travelling. VR can also allow people to experience specific sites that are threatened by climate change without aggravating the problem by producing waste production or relying on tourist infrastructure, which could be particularly valuable for areas such as the polar regions. There is also room for VR-enabled crisis tourism, where people want to go to a site where a catastrophe has occurred or to a war zone. This may cater to voyeuristic needs and may also cause people to donate to charities and good causes after having witnessed the impact of catastrophes with their own eyes.[134]

VR is also used in medicine.[135] It is used in implantology and orthognathic surgery, inter alia, to reconstruct the orbital floor following blowout fractures and the planning of mandibular reconstruction following cancer resection. During the COVID-19 pandemic, VR was used for staff training, patient education and virtual consultations.[136] VR treatments are being experimented with in relation to patients with somatoparaphrenia (a delusional perception that a limb or side of their body does not belong to them). It is also used for pain relief. Because people are prone to identify with the avatar, their healthy representation

in VR may relieve pain or diminish the feeling of disembodiment. Importantly, these effects are not temporary, but may have long-lasting effects after the user has returned to Physical Reality: they may even be permanent because the brain circuits can be partially reconfigured through VR.[137] For the visually impaired, training in a virtual environment can help while learning to navigate using cane skills.[138]

VR is considered especially promising for the treatment of psychological disorders[139] and sexual therapy,[140] although there are relatively few studies on the concrete effects of VR in treatment.[141] VR is used for the treatment of anxiety disorders, such as phobias, post-traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder and agoraphobia, social anxiety disorders, psychological stress and generalised anxiety disorders. It is also deployed for the treatment of eating and weight disorders, because VR exposure to stimuli, such as food, may reduce the level of anxiety elicited by them in real life, because it may allow for the reconsolidation of negative memories and because it may change a person's body representation or perception. For example, an obese person's VR representation may be slim, so they can get accustomed to perceiving themselves as being thinner. VR is also experimented with in the treatment of children with autism spectrum disorder and neurodevelopmental disorders, such as attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD),[142] and for people with dementia, to bring them back to a happy place in their youth. Moreover, VR-based cognitive neurorehabilitation systems are used:

> [F]or improving the rehabilitation of stroke patients with arm and hand paresis. Using a custom, low-cost kinematic tracking system designed for clinical or home use, patients engage in task-oriented interactions with objects in a virtual environment. Our paradigm is based on the hypothesis that observed actions correlated with self-generated or intended actions activate the motor pathways by means of the so-called 'mirror-system'.[143]

One of the domains in which VR has truly thrived is in education.[144] There are a myriad of applications, including bringing schoolchildren back to ancient sites during history classes. In biological and medical sciences, VR equipment can have a significant advantage over conventional education, both because material may not be available (eg, due to a limit in the number of human or animal organs or body tissue) and because it may be difficult for a whole group of students to see the actual material and the dissection of it.[145] In medical training, considerable investments have been made in screen-based learning, 360° visualisation and interactive VR rooms where students can work together.[146] Most of

the existing models of simulation focus on teaching surgical trainees' technical skills.[147]

Mixed reality (MxR) is used for military training as well:

> The Close-Range Weapons Simulators (CRWS) project provides a good example of how real equipment – in this case deactivated weapons removed from the original shore-based training establishment of HMS Cambridge – were used to augment the VR experience. Observations of training procedures at HMS Cambridge drove the choice of a head-tracked [head-mounted display] HMD-based solution for the VR system, based on the interactions of gunners with their weapons and other shipboard personnel. However, the techniques by which the weapons were physically moved during operation dictated that an MxR training solution was essential. To operate the 20 mm cannon, the gunner is strapped into the shoulder rests and uses his full body weight in order to move the weapon in azimuth and elevation. For the 30 mm cannon, the gunner sits within a small open cabin and operates the azimuth, elevation and firing functions of the weapon via a small control panel. These features also drove the choice of a partially face-enclosing HMD, the Kaiser XL-50, which, at the time, afforded a degree of unobscured real-world peripheral vision to the wearer.[148]

VR is also used in the film industry. Combining 360° film material with VR-enabled interactivity, immersion and narratives is sometimes called 'total art'. Preliminary experiments with these types of films show changes to the viewer's perception from 'merely' viewing a movie to experiencing it – living the film. Especially when shot from a first-person perspective and when the film allows the viewer to give interactive feedback, these experiences may be perceived as real.[149] Total art may blur the line between gaming and watching a movie, fitting with the trend of producing games that have film-quality audio and video as well as an increased emphasis on narrative. Interestingly, the media is also starting to embrace the potential of VR for news coverage – for example, for covering conflict zones.[150]

Another flourishing field of application, as with HRs, is the use of VR for sex-related purposes. VR pornography is appreciated more by its viewers than 2D pornography. It gives the viewer the feeling of intimacy and presence, allowing for more interaction and a stronger first-person experience, as well as increased sexual arousal.[151] Even in 2017, Pornhub reported that VR porn was one of the fastest-growing segments in the porn industry.[152] The advantage is that no porn actors need to be involved, so certain explicit or humiliating activities need not be performed by humans.[153] One sub-branch of VR porn is that of

teledildonics, which is a fully immersive, mixed-reality experience that combines VR porn with physical objects and stimulators, such as dildos, vibrators and plugs. This technology can also be used by partners who live apart from each other to enjoy a realistic romantic sex experience.[154]

Many of the dangers of VR or dangerous applications have already been touched on while discussing the negative use cases of AI robotics and AR, including privacy and security risks, and the risk that a hacker may infiltrate the virtual world.[155] Because people are more immersed in VR than in AR, a malicious hack could have an even more severe impact, especially when people use VR for the treatment of traumatic experiences. As most VR worlds are not designed exclusively by the user or the company offering the VR world, co-users may affect the design of the VR world and the activities that take place therein. This means, for example, that users may be confronted with other avatars performing explicit activities, which may trigger old traumas or create new ones.[156] Alternatively, a VR avatar may be used to impersonate a person against their volition, a virtual form of identity theft that may both lead to atrocities in the VR world itself as in the real world, as viewing a person's avatar performing certain activities or making certain statements may have either a conscious or subconscious effect on how other users see them in real life.[157]

Since VR worlds are based on as-if scenarios and because they often allow users to start over or have different lives in different worlds, this might cause users to become estranged from real-life scenarios, where decisions can often not be reversed, and it is not always possible to start over again. Another potential effect of VR is that experiences are 'optimised', so people might have difficulty going back to non-VR-mediated experiences, such as with sex. Certain VR games, such as *Dead or Alive Xtreme 3*, allow the user to sexually assault women. Another fear is that of body neglect, especially when adolescents stay in VR worlds for prolonged periods, preferring their avatars and the VR world to their own bodies and lives.[158] This may lead to self-loathing, distorted self-image, depersonalisation and derealisation, giving rise to mental disorders as mentioned in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition* .

In addition, using VR may have physical effects. A substantial number of users suffer from motion sickness.[159] This is especially prevalent in VR situations where a person is supposed to walk in order to roam the virtual world. The eyes of a user can become fatigued when looking at virtual screens for a long period

of time. In VR games too, users tend to push their limits beyond what they would naturally do – for example, in terms of sleep.[160] Importantly, the long-term effects of VR experiences are largely unknown, and data about the impact on children that partially grow up in such worlds will most likely only be available in 20 years' time. Among other predictions, experts suggest that staying in VR for prolonged periods of time may lead to social isolation. Also, the fact that users each live in their own worlds may lead to a decrease in shared experiences, which is the cement of social interaction and a well-functioning society. However, experts also point out that impersonating others through VR may lead to greater empathy and understanding.[161]

2.6. CONCLUSION

HRs, DFs, AR and VR have a wide variety of applications. This chapter has provided a non-exhaustive list of examples of the most prominent use cases and domains in which the techniques are deployed. These can be roughly represented as follows.



Figure 2.2 Use of HR, DF, AR and VR in the medical sector

Figure 2.3 Use of HR, DF, AR and VR for industry and commerce



Figure 2.4 Use of HR, DF, AR and VR for education and communication



Figure 2.5 Use of HR, DF, AR and VR in the entertainment sector



Figure 2.6 Use of HR, DF, AR and VR in the security sector

Several existing and potential future risks and benefits of the four technologies have also been discussed in this chapter. These can be summarised as follows:

Figure 2.7 Benefits of HR, DF, AR and VR

Figure 2.8 Risks of HR, DF, AR and VR

However, it should be stressed that it is not always possible to distinguish between positive and negative consequences. The normative evaluation of the use of the four technologies depends on one's personal, ethical and political views. Is having Napoleon teach history classes to children good in terms of engagement or bad because it accustoms them to living in a post-truth society? Is a politician speaking in the dialect or language of every minority in their country good in terms of inclusion or a modern form of voter deception? Is being able to speak to a deceased partner good for one's mental health or bad because the normal path for grief processing is disrupted? Is it good that the police use child avatars and fake child pornography to infiltrate paedophile networks or bad because it actually produces (synthetic) child pornography itself? Is having robots replace sex workers good because women are no longer forced to do degrading work or bad because it deprives them of work, allows men to develop dark fantasies and facilitates them in terms of living these fantasies out?

3

Under the Hood
Architecture and Design of Synthetic Technologies

AI refers to systems that display intelligent behaviour by analysing their environment and taking action – with some degree of autonomy – to achieve specific goals. Since AI refers to so many techniques and contexts, greater precision is required in order to hold meaningful and constructive debates about it. For example, arguments about simple 'expert systems' used in advisory roles need to be distinguished those from those concerning complex datadriven algorithms that automatically implement decisions about individuals. Similarly, it is important to distinguish arguments about speculative future developments that may never occur from those about current AI that already affects society today.[1]

Defining the precise object of regulation in dynamic technological domains is a challenge in itself. Given that AI is still an open-ended notion that refers to a very wide range of products and applications, there is no transnational agreement on a commonly accepted working definition, neither at the technical nor the legal/policy level. As there is no legal and political consensus over what AI is, a plurality of definitions has emerged in Europe and worldwide that are either too inclusive or too sectorspecific. This fragmented conceptual landscape may prevent the immediate development of a lex robotica and possibly undermine all efforts to create a common legal nomenclature, which is particularly instrumental for the drafting, adoption and effective implementation of binding legal norms.[2]

European Parliament, European Union

3.1. INTRODUCTION

After having given a first sketch of how synthetic technologies can and will be used in practice, this chapter will provide definitions of the various technologies, describe the software

and hardware that enable synthetic AI, and explain the various variants of the four technologies discussed in this book: Humanoid Robots (section 3.2), Deepfake technology (section 3.3), Augmented Reality (section 3.4) and Virtual Reality (section 3.5). The chapter closes with a short conclusion (section 3.6). After having given the practical and technical background, Chapter 4 will move to the heart of this book: the societal questions raised by Generative AI.

3.2. HUMANOID ROBOTS

Humanoid Robots (HRs) are essentially based on two fields of expertise: robotics and AI, where AI is often applied in combination with the Internet of Things.

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) defines robots as agentive devices in a broad sense, intended to act in the physical world to accomplish one or more tasks. In some cases, the actions of a robot might be subordinate to the actions of other agents, either software-driven or human. According to the IEEE's definition, a robot is composed of suitable mechanical and electronic parts, through which it can form social groups, which may interact to achieve common goals. A robot or a group of robots can form a robotic system in special environments geared to facilitate its work.[3] The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) defines robots in similar vein as 'automatically controlled, reprogrammable multipurpose manipulator programmable in three or more axes, which can be either fixed in place or mobile for use in industrial automation applications'. It sees robots as suited to two main performative functions:

- Tasks in personal use include handling or serving of items, transportation, physical support, providing guidance or information, grooming, cooking and food handling, and cleaning.
- Tasks in professional use include inspection, surveillance, handling of items, person transportation, providing guidance or information, cooking and food handling, and cleaning.[4]

The term 'Artificial Intelligence' was first coined in the 1950s to describe a relatively new field of science, which was pursued by academia, the tech industry and the military to create human-like computer intelligence. In the 1970s, the first attempts were made to arrive at intelligent programs, such as in the field of speech recognition, with the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) putting in a particular amount of work.

These attempts were generally unsuccessful and, subsequently, investments dwindled. It was only in the 1980s, largely due to investment from the Japanese government, that AI was reinvigorated, primarily in the field of so-called 'expert systems'. In the 1990s, machine learning, statistical analytics and probabilistic computing were perfected, sparking a third wave of AI investments. Subsequently, the rise of 'Big Data' enabled the development of next-level intelligent robots, such as 'robonauts', smart drones and self-driving cars.[5] The Internet of Things powers the most advanced robots currently in use.

Despite the famous Turing test,[6] the question of whether a robot is 'intelligent' is not a binary one. Factors that play a role in assessing its intelligence include its capacity to learn from experience, to be flexible to changing environments and settings, to include all relevant sensory input in its decision-making process while ignoring irrelevant input, making appropriate estimations and decisions, and turning these into concrete actions that meet the goals being pursued. John Searle distinguished between what he called strong and weak AI.[7] Weak AI refers to systems that are good at a relatively small or defined task, while strong AI is of at least comparable intelligence to humans. Most contemporary robots still fall into the weak AI category, but this is likely to change over time. Again, in reality, there is no binary distinction between weak and strong AI, but rather sliding scales and gradual differences.



Figure 3.1 Representation of modern robots[8]

Robots can be divided into several generations:[9]

1) Robotics 1.0: robots that have simple mechatronic structures without any degree of autonomy.
2) Robotics 2.0: pre-programmed systems widely used in industry, such as for assembly lines and in nuclear facilities.
3) Robotics 3.0: teleoperated systems that are used in space and medicine.
4) Robotics 4.0: robots that are sensor-driven, allowing for interconnected and collaborative robots. Most current service robots that require human–robot interaction fall into this category.
5) Robotics 5.0: robots equipped with autonomous capacities, allowing for more complex behavioural patterns and safety-critical tasks in the proximity of humans. Most self-driving cars belong to this category, as do many advanced surgical robots.
6) Robotics 6.0: the newest generation of robots will integrate all the qualities of the previous generations and have more sensory input, greater cognitive abilities and a connection to the internet, enabling more advanced self-learning systems.

There are multiple types of robots that can be distinguished based on their functionality, such as the following:

1) Swarm robots: robots that are usually less advanced and are coordinated using a central system.
2) Co-robots: robots designed to aid humans in performing concrete tasks, such as industrial manufacturing work.
3) Networked robots: robots connected to each other via a network and that coordinate and cooperate, usually to carry out a shared task.
4) Cloud robots: robots connected to the cloud that depend on distributed computing facilities. They are able to share experiences and knowledge through the cloud, enhancing their learning capacities.
5) Fog robots: robots that efficiently distribute computation and memory between edge, gateway and cloud; the 'fog' is usually closer to the end-user, bringing cloud capabilities down to the ground and making them generally more reliable.
6) Drew robots: the tasks of these robots are distributed over a large number of devices, which are heterogeneous, ad hoc programmable and self-adaptive, enabling highly distributed applications that do not use central nodes.

7) Cognitive robots: robots that can behave intelligently thanks to their processing architecture, which allows them to learn and reason about how to behave in response to complex goals in a complex world.
8) Smart robots: robots equipped with an AI system that can learn from its environment and experience and build on its capabilities using that knowledge. This makes their self-learning and directional capacity greater than that of cognitive robots.
9) Ubiquitous robots: smart robots with additional technologies from ubiquitous and pervasive computing, sensor networks and ambient intelligence built into their systems.
10) The Internet of Robotic Things: robots that connect with and use sensor and data analytics technologies from the Internet of Things to enhance their situational awareness, enabling more precise task execution.

Figure 3.2 UN prize-winning humanoid robot[10]
Source: UN Photo/Manuel Elías.

The capabilities of HRs have increased dramatically thanks to rapid developments in sensory input hardware, technologies for processing input signals and increased ability to translate analytical insights directly into movement, speech and other actions. The distinction between non-humanoid and humanoid robots is not binary, but a

gradual spectrum.[11] It depends on a variety of factors, such as their input, throughput and output capacity, and their appearance. Importantly, unlike other robots, humans are the benchmark for HRs. Thus, while most robots are instrumentalised to perform tasks in a better, quicker or more efficient way than humans (eg, because they can function more precisely and consistently, have more sensory input capacities or have better analytical skills), HRs proper should ideally have no fewer and no more capacities than a human. To be more precise, they should ideally stay within typical human limits. Perhaps the terms 'Humanoid Robot' and 'Artificial Intelligence' reflect the initial ideal of creating a human-like entity, while currently, the goal is to work towards a supra-human robot and Superior Intelligence.

Equipping robots with AI generally means that they are better equipped to perform complex tasks and take appropriate decisions. Long-term autonomy (LTA), or the capacity to perform a series of complex tasks over time, is also increased by AI. LTA has been increased



Figure 3.3 The four factors that determine the 'humanoidness' of robots, with human capacities being the benchmark

by the rapid evolution in battery longevity and the rise of solar energy as well. Combined, these developments have meant that robots have a larger operational range. Owing to the widespread availability of the internet, robots can roam the streets in large parts of the world, getting process feedback through server or cloud connectivity.[12] HRs generally use the 'sense, plan, act' model, comparable to the 'input, throughput, output' model used in computer sciences.[13]

To operate correctly, HRs include a wide range of technologically advanced hardware, such as cameras, microphones, speakers, motors and tactile sensors. These may provide information that is unavailable to humans, such as infrared or auditory signals that humans cannot detect. These input cues can be enhanced by information found on the internet, ranging from weather data to information about concrete topics or objects. AI robots can have a range of built-in software applications,[14] such as object recognition, computer vision software, facial and emotion recognition, natural language processing, Simultaneous Localisation and Mapping (SLAM), path planning and other high-level management features.[15] In order to move and balance, robots are also equipped with magnets or alternative ways of directing their movements.

The field of soft robotics is important in terms of appearance, which focuses on the use of materials and design: biomimetics:[16]

> Much of the research in soft robotics is linked to biomimetics, thus living organisms are often considered as a model, because they are masters to put in place simplifying principles that make their sensory-motor behavior efficient and highly flexible to respond to dynamic changes. The secret of natural systems lies in the smart characteristics of how their body is designed and in how their intelligence is embodied and distributed in it, allowing them to effectively adapt, grow and survive. And here lays the link with soft robotics: similarly, soft robots benefit of the use of smart and multi-functional materials (gels, elastomers, biological materials, etc) and of a body compliant with the external environment. Intelligence is also integrated in the body ('embodied') and co-develops with it, emerging from the interaction of the body itself with the world. This way, soft robots' sensory-motor behavior becomes more efficient in responding to dynamic changes, as for living organisms.[17]

Although still in its relative infancy, the use of softer and more natural materials is vital for creating a fully humanoid robot. In addition to the advances in the 'naturalness' of their outer appearance, the intuitiveness with which they walk and talk in robot–human interactions has increased dramatically over the last decade. Soft robotics also makes

HRs more intelligent, because the material is equipped with sensors or responsive feedback systems. There are no perfect humanoid robots yet, but there are robots that are close to humanness on particular fronts, such as through their appearances or conversational capacities.

3.3. DEEPFAKES

Figure 3.4 Altering faces through DF technology[18]
Source: iStock/Getty Images Plus, FotografieLink.

Deepfake (DF) is the name given to Machine Learning technology that uses AI and Deep Learning. Using Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs), which are based on and inspired by biological neural networks, systems learn how to perform tasks by looking at examples, without specific rules being programmed into their systems.[19] By discovering patterns, these networks can produce new sounds and images that are based on but are different from existing material. The most advanced technology for generating Deepfakes is Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs).[20] Although the underlying technology is much older, the term 'Deepfake' was first used in 2017, a combination of 'Deep Learning' and 'Fake'.

GANs consist of two competing networks: a generator G(x) and a discriminator D(x).[21] The two competing networks play an adversarial game in which the generator tries to 'fool' the discriminator by generating data comparable to, but different from, the material in the existing training set; meanwhile, the discriminator tries not to be 'fooled' by

identifying fabrications.[22] The generator creates images from random noise (z) and learns how to generate realistic images. The input noise is sampled using uniform or normal distribution. After this, it is fed back into the generator, from which a generated image will emerge. The fake and authentic images are then fed into the discriminator, which learns how to distinguish them.[23]



Figure 3.5 Simplified representation of GAN[24]

Using this technique by looking at, say, 1,000 photos of Donald Trump, a new photo can be produced. Although this technique is most frequently deployed to create pictures and videos, the technology can also be used for audio manipulation or to generate text or satellite data.[25] The technique was initially complex, involved significant costs and required specialised equipment and programmes; now, it is possible for anyone to create a DF simply by using a smartphone.[26] DF videos of a person can be created on the basis of a single photo,[27] and the technology is increasingly being deployed to bring to life high-resolution, whole-body images of ancient figures and non-existent people.[28]

It is best to conceive of the definition of DF as an ideal concept. Most DFs are videos created using advanced technological means in which an existing person appears to be doing or saying something that they never did or said, but it is impossible for the watcher of the video to discern this manipulation. Numerous peripheral applications to this core or ideal version exist. These include videos produced by low-quality technological means ('cheapfakes'), high-quality videos of non-existent people that appear to be real, fake audio clips[29] or manipulated satellite data and highly realistic minor manipulations of relative unimportance, such as smoothing skin tones. Six relevant factors are important for the question of whether material should be considered a DF:

1) The type of data carrier and the extent to which the fake 'infiltrates' the consumer's mind in its unfiltered form. For example, there is less

cognitive and emotional distance between a video and the consumer's perception than when it comes to a written text.

2) The advanced or cutting-edge nature of the technology used for creating the material – generally, the more advanced this is, the more difficult it is to spot the manipulation.
3) The degree of manipulation – the bigger the manipulation, the more the perception of reality is distorted.
4) The degree to which the manipulation is essential or relevant to the context. Even minor manipulations can be essential in specific contexts; for example, equalised skin tones can produce inaccurate outcomes in a digital consult with the dermatologist.
5) Whether the DF involves a living, deceased or non-existent person. The extent to which a DF of this variety has an impact on the consumer's worldview may be similar for each of these, but with DFs of living persons, the real-world consequences are usually more substantial.
6) The extent to which the user believes the material to be true. This perception is ultimately subjective, but it also depends on whether the consumer could see the person performing or saying the thing they are depicted as doing or saying. For example, hearing Barack Obama say 'I'm the greatest human being on earth' is intuitively less convincing than hearing another former US president saying it, although neither may have said it.

AI-driven detection programs initially operated in a fairly straightforward manner, for example, by focusing on whether the person depicted in a video blinked,[30] which was often not the case for inauthentic video, when DF technology first emerged.[31] DF technology has since addressed that glitch, so detection programs now focus on spotting artefacts of manipulation or the absence of data commonly found in authentic media, that is, artefacts of normal/authentic media production.[32] DFs generated using GAN models are generally difficult to detect, as new output can be produced from existing input data, meaning that it cannot be compared with existing material and does not contain residuals from it.[33]

In 2019, Facebook, Microsoft, the Partnership on AI coalition and academics from seven universities collaborated in the Deepfake Detection Challenge.[34] The best model was initially said to have an accuracy of 82.56 per cent, but, after being tested again using a black box data set, the accuracy dropped to 65.18 per cent.[35] Microsoft developed a Video Authenticator Tool in 2020, which can attribute an authenticity score to a photo or a video related to the probability that it is artificial.[36] There are

other technologies as well that can both detect manipulated content and verify authentic images.[37] Experts predict that, in time, the effectiveness of AI detection programs will decrease and an estimated 50 per cent success ratio will be reached.

3.4. AUGMENTED REALITY

The term 'Augmented Reality' (AR) is said to have been coined by Boeing researcher Tom Caudell in 1990, but the underlying technology is much older. As early as the 1950s, Morton Heilig worked on what he called the 'Cinema of the Future', which allowed for interactive video screenings, and on what was known as the Sensorama, a machine that allowed for a multi-sensory experience of a film.[38] The machine can be considered as a prototype of Virtual Reality (VR), but is often also taken to be the start of AR. Ivan Sutherland subsequently invented the head-mounted display in 1966 and an AR system using an optical see-through head-mounted display two years later. Subsequently, rooms were designed that allowed users to interact with virtual objects.[39] By the 1990s, a number of major companies started using AR, inter alia, for visualisation and training. Since 2008, the technologies that make AR possible have become

Figure 3.6 AR based on see-through goggles
Source: Getty – Westend61.

powerful and compact enough to deliver AR experiences to personal computers and mobile devices.[40]

AR allows for real-time direct and indirect viewing of the physical world in an enhanced or distorted way, by adding computer generated information to it.[41] AR is often compared to VR, and it is sometimes described as the less scary and more promising variant of the two.[42] AR devices like the Microsoft HoloLens and Magic Leap One superimpose a layer of digital content onto the real or physical environment:

> Typically, the digital objects – which can be anything ranging from a simple shape to a realistic model of a person – are rendered in stereo (i.e. with separate images projected into each eye) to give the illusion of depth when situated next to real objects. Moreover, the digital objects are registered, using cameras and sensors that track a user's position in an absolute location, such that when a person moves, the object stays in the programmed position.[43]



Figure 3.7 Milgram's reality-virtuality continuum[44]

In the 1990s, Milgram proposed a virtuality continuum in order to stress the difference between AR and VR.[45] Others have suggested that AR should be seen as an alternative to both VR and Telepresence (eg, video calling a colleague from abroad in a meeting). While in VR, computer-generated 3D environments allow users to enter and interact with synthetic environments; in telepresence, the goal is to extend the user's sensory-motor facilities to a remote environment:

> In this sense, telepresence can be defined as a human/machine system in which the human operator receives sufficient information about the teleoperator and the task environment, displayed in a sufficiently natural way, that the operator feels physically present at the remote site. Very similar to virtual reality, in which we aim to achieve the illusion of presence within a computer simulation, telepresence aims to achieve the illusion of presence at a remote location. AR can be considered a technology between VR and telepresence. While in VR the environment is completely synthetic and in telepresence it is completely real, in AR the user sees the real world augmented with virtual objects.[46]

AR can be roughly divided into marker-based and markerless applications. Marker-based AR entails a camera that perceives a specific cue for the software to call up the correct information. Comparatively, markerless applications use positional data (eg, a mobile's GPS or image recognition); input to the camera is compared to a library of images or other database to find a match. The latter version has wider applicability since it can function anywhere without the need for special labelling or supplemental reference points.[47] Most AR systems operate through three steps: recognising, tracking and mixing. In the recognition phase, an image, sound or other input data is identified. AR systems generally require extensive calibration.[48] During tracking, real-time location data and data about the object are analysed to adjust the superimposed layer to the perspective of the user. Finally, reality is mixed with synthetic media.



Figure 3.8 Different realities on the axes of authenticity and spatial convergence[49]

Mobile devices have sparked the latest advances in AR:[50]

1) Cloud-based architecture: these systems operate in a client-server model with Mobile Augmented Reality Devices (MARs) executing the terminal applications, while the AR server is located in the cloud and is accessible through the internet. The server performs the most computationally intensive tasks. Its main advantage is that it allows for high-quality AR, while the mobile device itself can be light and use relatively little computational power. One disadvantage is that there is the delay and the required availability of internet access.

2) Edge-based architecture: these also operate in a client-server model, but the AR server is hosted at the network edge. This is more suitable to serve latency critical applications, as edge servers at the core network provide a large number of services. One potential downside of this mobile AR variant is that of a single point of failure, as failure of an edge AR server can potentially affect the entire system.
3) Localised architecture: this functions with an AR server very close to the MAR device, or without the AR server, in which case the MAR device performs all the computing tasks. The advantage of this approach is that there is less or no dependence on the internet and a server, and the fact that the data stay on the MAR. One disadvantage is the lower quality and shorter battery life of the MAR.
4) Hybrid architecture: this integrates the three previous approaches, allowing AR to switch between or combine several platforms whenever this is profitable in terms of functionality, efficiency and longevity. Although this approach eliminates many of the specific disadvantages of the other approaches, its disadvantage is that the combination of and switch between different types of architecture is not always smooth.

AR tracking generally happens in one of the following ways:[51]

1) Fiducial marker-based tracking: in fiducial marker-based tracking, black-and-white squares with geometric figures are used as typical markers. This gives high contrast compared to the background environment, allowing for easy recognition. One of the disadvantages of this approach is that the objects always have to be visible and cannot be obscured during augmentation.
2) Hybrid-based tracking: two or more data sources (eg, GPS, compass and accelerometer) are used to calculate position and orientation. This yields information about what should be augmented in the field of view without any actual processing of the real image (although it is used for placing the augmented layer).
3) Model-based tracking: by manipulating their position, colour or orientation, representations can accurately resemble pre-determined 3D objects.
4) Natural feature tracking: objects in the real world can be used as markers, focusing on peculiar features that distinguish them from others.

Many early mobile AR systems primarily relied on mobile trackballs, trackpads and gyroscopic mice to support continuous 2D pointing tasks. Devices like computer mice are tangible and unidirectional; they communicate from the user to the AR system only. In most current AR

applications, these devices have been replaced by 3D equivalents, like paddles and wands.[52] These are called Tangible User Interfaces (TUIs) or bidirectional TUIs. Most of these are haptic User Interfaces (UIs). Haptic devices rely on both kinaesthetic (force, motion) and tactile sense (tact, touch). Instead of using hand-worn trackers, hand movement can also be tracked visually, such as through cameras pointed at the user's hands. Gaze tracking has recently attracted considerable attention, as have aural solutions and speech commands. Biometric devices can measure heart rate and bioelectric signals, such as galvanic skin response, neural activity and muscle activity; these signals are used to feed biological activity back into the AR.[53]

AR devices work through various display types, such as the following:[54]

1) Monitor-based: the least futuristic, but currently the most used form of AR is where the image is shown on a desktop monitor or a mobile device (eg, Google Lens).
2) Optical see-through: these systems are based on a transparent, head-mounted display to show the virtual environment directly over the real world. It is placed in front of the user's eyes; the material of the display can be glass, plastic or any other transparent material.
3) Video see-through: a see-through device is typically placed on the head. However, it does not project a layer on the glass through which reality is seen, as in the second approach. Instead, it makes a combined projection by filming the environment and projecting those shots, with the additional artificial layer, on the screen in front of the user's eyes.
4) Virtual retinal: this version of AR is based on the projection of AI-generated content directly onto the retina of the eyes of the users, producing a rasterised image.

3.5. VIRTUAL REALITY

Arguably, it was Jaron Lanier who coined the term 'Virtual Reality' in 1989, giving rise to the first wave of VR technologies and applications. Many of these were used in the entertainment sector. It was only in 2012, with the introduction of Oculus Rift, that a second and more advanced wave of VR products reached the market.

Figure 3.9 VR used in school
Source: Getty – izusek.

A distinction is often made between three types of VR:[55]

1) Desktop VR: this uses subjective immersion, which is less realistic, although the feeling of immersion can be enhanced through stereoscopic vision.
2) Cave VR: this operates in a small room specially designed for VR experiences in which a computer-generated environment is projected onto the walls.[56] Most Cave VR systems work in a two-stream fashion, depending on both physical to virtual synchronisation and also virtual to physical synchronisation.[57]
3) Fully Immersive VR: the user finds themself in a fully AI-generated environment and gets sensory input from that environment through visual and audial display and force feedback from sensors.

As with AR, there are various forms of computing that can assist in designing VR, such as Mobile Cloud Computing, Edge Computing and Fog Computing.[58] VR hardware can be divided into input and output hardware.[59]

In terms of the input devices, several categories can be distinguished:

1) Controllers: commonly hand-worn and allow for input from buttons or touchpads, for example, one joystick for each hand. These input

devices may either be wired or wireless, or, if multiple input devices are used, a combination of both.
2) Navigation devices: the user can be provided with the illusion of moving through space while staying relatively static through the use of navigation devices.
3) Body tracking devices: gestures and other body signals can be tracked by body tracking devices, such as through magnetic data gloves.

Four types of output devices can be distinguished:

1) Mobile Head-Mounted Displays (HMDs): these are usually deployed wirelessly and are able to operate without an additional computer. Such devices could be add-on frames for a smartphone, an ergonomically designed smartphone case or a stand-alone system specifically designed for this purpose.
2) Wired HMDs: most stationary HMDs are connected to a powerful computer, but they still allow the user to move around the space, usually a secluded room. This type is particularly suitable for both gaming and training purposes.
3) Haptic devices: these are generally worn on the body, but they can also be carried by the user.
4) Multi-sensor devices: these allow for a combination of audio, video, haptic and/or olfactory sensory output.

The latter category already shows that although most VR systems focus on producing visually realistic information, other senses may be equally or even more important.[60] Aural cues can either be integrated into the environment by having speakers in the room (eg, in the cave or behind the desktop) or more directly, through in-ear or on-ear devices. Haptic sensory signals have been used for a long time, if only the rumble pack integrated in joysticks or controllers since the 1990s, which give the user a vibratory feeling when, for example, their avatar hits a wall or gets punched. Smell is perhaps still the least-developed sense in AI-simulated worlds, although there have been significant developments in this field:

> Virtual olfaction is … defined as the act of smelling an odorant produced by a virtual olfactory display. The last concept is teleolfaction, defined as the act of smelling a mixture of odorants whose composition is related to a mixture present in a remote place. Odorant storage is, perhaps, the most mature of the various technologies required for a virtual olfactory display. Odorants can be stored in several ways, including liquids, gels, or waxy solids. The most popular storage method for previous and current VE-related

> work seems to be to microencapsulate odorants: droplets of liquid are encapsulated in a wall of gelatin and printed on a flat surface using silk screen techniques. This method is the basis of scratch-and-sniff patches, where the odorant is released by subjecting the particle to mechanical shear or melting the gelatin wall. Microencapsulation offers the advantages of discrete metering of odorant dosage, stability at room temperatures, and the unlikelihood of messy spills. Other commonly used methods include air dilution olfactometry, breathable membranes coated with a liquid odor, and a system of liquid injection into an electrostatic field with air flow control.[61]

It is still not exactly clear how identification with avatars in VR works, although many experiments have established that our brains tend to identify with extended versions of ourselves. Drivers are familiar with how quickly cars start to feel like extensions of the body. Even in the classic experiment, where a participant has to place their hand under the table and a rubber hand laid on the table where their hand could have been, and a hammer is smashed on the rubber hand, the brain and body reacts, even though the participant is consciously aware that this is not their hand.[62] Because the VR world appears to be real, the user sees the world through the avatar and receives all kinds of stimuli that they see as corresponding with what the avatar is experiencing; consequently, a strong identification is generally established. Even although they cognitively know that the avatar is not them, they emotionally identify with it, sometimes even more so than they do with their 'physical avatar', if only because the appearance of the virtual avatar is customised to the player's preferred body representation.[63]

3.6. CONCLUSION

This chapter provided a brief sketch of four AI-driven technologies that affect our reality and our perception of it. Each of these technologies does so in distinct ways.

Ideally, HRs are indistinguishable from human agents. However, most contemporary HRs only excel in one or two domains, such as their physical appearance, their social skills (eg, an advanced chatbot) or their ability to perform one specific task (eg, cleaning, sex or manufacturing), but holistic robots are in the making. Some HRs are designed in a way to resemble a specific person, such as a deceased loved one, but most have their own 'character'. With the more advanced robots, their character will evolve and change over time, through integrated self-learning systems based on engagement with humans and the environment.

DFs aim to be indistinguishable from authentic material, yet do so on a representational level. When deployed for satire, DFs are often so remarkable (eg, Trump doing a tap dance) that the consumer knows it to be fake, but the cues are found in contextual information (ie, this is not something this person would do) rather than from technical limitations – otherwise, DFs are often indistinguishable from authentic material. There are fully virtual DF people, which, like humanoid robots, do not represent a particular existing person or a person that has existed, but appear to be unique beings.[64]

With AR, the perception of the consumer that the Synthetic Reality is Physical Reality (PR) or an accurate representation of it is not always important. It may be that when olfactory reality is altered, this subconsciously influences an oblivious citizen, and when combatants only train in augmented environments where the sight of blood is obfuscated, they may, in time, forget about the AI-affected nature of their reality. However, in most current forms of AR, such as when smiley faces are placed on the right track, when information is projected next to historical objects or when a virtual assistant gives an audio tour of the Egyptian pyramids, the consumer knows and remains aware of the augmented nature of their reality. Gamification is highly dependent on the artificiality of the perceived reality: examples are Disney-esque sounds and visual cues that turn ordinary tasks into fun experiences.

In VR, Physical Reality is replaced in full. VR may but does not necessarily create a realistic world or accurate representation of the world; especially in gaming, it allows the user to explore a new, virtual world. Likewise, a user's avatars may or may not resemble the user. Although identification is typically more easily established in an environment that resembles the world as the user knows it, this is not necessarily true for the avatar. Identification also depends on the ideal body projection. Matrix-like scenarios, in which people live in VR from cradle to grave, are still a long way off, so contemporary and near-future VR will entail users consciously entering VR, although they may forget about its virtuality when they stay in that reality for longer periods of time. An exception may be young children or those that have cognitive limitations, such as people suffering from Alzheimer's disease.

All four technologies are highly dependent on visual exactness. For HRs, this concerns the physical appearance of the robot; for the other three technologies, this entails the representational exactitude. Even with virtual creatures in VR, their representation should be consistent and intuitive, and they should meet users' expectations of how these creatures should look, move and speak. Audio is very important to HR and

DF, with the question of whether a natural person would speak like the HR and DF being the benchmark. Speech recognition, natural language processing and conversational software are important in this respect. Smell is sometimes used in AR and VR and olfactory experiences can now be fully AI-generated.[65] It could be used with HRs, but so far, this type of application has not taken off. In DFs, no expected olfactory application is foreseen. Haptic AI-generated input is important for AR and especially for VR, such as in gaming. For HRs, haptic stimuli are often integral to interaction as the HR is placed in Physical Reality. It is important that the feel and touch of a human are represented; advances in the field of soft robotics are being made. Gustatory input systems seem to be mostly absent for any of the four technologies, although they can be envisaged for HR and VR. Taste, like smell, sound and imagery, can be produced artificially.

DFs and AR are generally unidirectional: DFs can be consumed as a final product and AR generally produces additional sensory input in the form of visual or audio cues. Still, AR can be interactional, such as if the user asks their virtual tour guide questions when walking around the pyramids. With DFs too, there are applications in which, for example, a person can make a video call with their face replaced with that of a politician. In these instances, DF technology translates the facial expressions, lip movements and speech acts of a real person to that of the impersonated person in real time. VR and HRs depend heavily on their interactional faculties. In VR, the avatar needs to be able to interact with the environment and with other (AI or human-driven) avatars. This generally holds true for HRs as well, which need to be able to respond to their environment, humans and other HRs. For HRs that have one task, such as manufacturing, this is less the case.

There are questions as to delineation with each of the technologies. For example, there is discussion as to whether and to what extent augmented sound and smell should be seen as AR. For example, playing music from a CD, smart device or other medium is generally not seen as a form of AR, but when sounds are played as corresponding with an artificially produced visual image, this might be the case. Is hearing a virtual tour guide when at the Pyramids of Giza essentially different from listening to the same tour guide while viewing computer images of the pyramids? How is it different from listening to a virtual tour guide when looking at photos of the pyramids? How is it different from listening to the tour guide at the physical pyramids on a CD? There is a similar discussion with respect to perfume and artificial odours. Is spraying pine resin perfume in the house already AR, or is it only AR when looking at

grass onto which AI-generated pine trees are projected? Or is the determinative factor whether the stimuli themselves are created through AI – that is, should AI create the scent or is it enough if AI determines when and how the scent is sprayed? A human with a robot arm is clearly not a HR, although it is a way in which artificially generated reality is merged with non-Synthetic Reality. But what if more body parts are replaced and a person's speech abilities are computer-aided? There is no clear-cut distinction between human and a HR, or between a HR and a non-HR.

Finally, there is overlap between the various concepts, especially between DFs, AR, and VR, and many of the underlying technologies are shared by each of the four technologies. VR is not clearly distinguishable from video see-through AR, in which PR is copied and integrated with AI-generated content in a representational image, sound etc. Similarly, monitor AR and desktop VR are closely related, and they are not sharply distinguishable from interactive DFs, which allow users to interact with a fully virtual humanoid avatar in a video-call. Chatbots are often categorised as prototype one-dimensional robots, but they could also be seen as DFs, especially when the chatbot is granted an acoustic voice and a realistic outer appearance. In such scenarios, multiple technologies are applied simultaneously.



Figure 3.10 Categorisation of the four techniques on two axes (interactionality and reality)

4

Societal Challenges

AI can be – and reportedly is – used to disrupt democracy through interference in electoral processes, personalised political targeting, shaping voters' behaviour and manipulating public opinion. Furthermore, AI has seemingly been used to amplify the spread of misinformation, 'echo chambers', propaganda and hate speech, thus eroding critical thinking, contributing to rising populism and the polarisation of democratic societies.

Moreover, the broad use by States and private actors of AI-based technologies to control individuals, such as the automated filtering of information amounting to censorship, mass surveillance using smartphones, the gathering of personal data and tracking one's activity online and offline may lead to the erosion of citizens' psychological integrity, civil rights and political freedoms and the emergence of digital authoritarianism – a new social order competing with democracy.

The concentration of data, information, power and influence in the hands of a few major private companies involved in developing and providing AI-based technologies and services, and the growing dependence of individuals, institutions and society as a whole on these services, are also a cause for concern. These big companies no longer serve as simple channels of communication between individuals and institutions but play an increasingly prominent role on their own, controlling and filtering information flows, exercising automated censorship of content published on social media, setting the agenda and shaping and transforming social and political models. Acting on the basis of business models that prioritise the profits of shareholders over the common good, these actors may be a threat to democratic order and should be subject to democratic oversight.[1]

Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe

4.1. INTRODUCTION

Chapter 2 already mapped some of the direct effects (both positive and negative) of synthetic technologies. This chapter will home in on the long-term societal consequences and evaluate how values functioning as the pillars of contemporary society may be reconfigured in a synthesised world. Obviously, these long-term effects

are undetermined and unknown to a large extent. New effects may emerge that are currently inconceivable; effects that are now materialising may be curbed or tackled, for example, through legislative changes. Predictions about the direction in which the technologies will evolve are not a matter of exact science, and this holds even more true for the societal changes these technologies trigger.

This means that this chapter, although grounded in established theories and current understandings of the technologies and their effects, is more suppositive than the previous two. However, it is arguably also the most important one, as it deals with the foundations of and conditions for human interaction, individual autonomy and the democratic rule of law. It is important to think through how these core values may potentially be affected well before any changes materialise, as in order to prevent or curb problems, it is often necessary to act pre-emptively instead of retroactively. Once a technology has already been introduced, widely deployed and its effects have already materialised, it is generally almost impossible to turn back the clock.

This chapter does not deal with all the potential societal effects the technologies may have, both because there are simply too many and because most of them are not directly linked to the core theme of this book: reality and our perception of it. Instead, four core aspects of human interaction and democratic societies are discussed in the subsequent four sections of this chapter. These are: the influence of Synthetic Reality on our perception of truth and trust in societal institutions (section 4.2), its impact on human relationships and social interaction (section 4.3), its effect on individual autonomy and societal equality (section 4.4) and, finally, questions it triggers over the role of technology in society and the attribution of rights to non-human entities (section 4.5). A conclusion is provided at the end of the chapter (section 4.6).

4.2. TRUTH AND TRUST

The technologies discussed in this book may have a substantial impact on reality and our perception of it. Some of them will be small, others big, some will materialise in the near future, while other effects will become apparent only in the long run, some will concern high impact incidents, and others involve minor but structural effects and, as such, will have a big cumulative impact on society.

It is obvious that Synthetic Reality (SR) can have a direct impact on Physical Reality (PR). A Deepfake (DF) of a person in which they are

seen making racist jokes can have a significant impact on their reputation. If an employee is convinced they are speaking to their boss and transfers money, this has real and tangible repercussions both for them and for their company. The same goes for false news stories about a Muslim desecrating a Hindu religious object, which may lead to hate crimes and violence, and suggestions about banks being on the verge of collapse, which may cause stock prices to plummet. Also, if people do not travel to polar regions but use Virtual Reality (VR) to do so instead, this has real and tangible effects on global warming.

Even if people know that the information presented to them is false or AI-generated, the consequences can still be real. A person may know that an avatar resembling their friend is not controlled by that friend, yet seeing the avatar resembling their friend have sex with a virtual animal may still (unconsciously) affect their perception of that friend. A DF distributed at a high school of a girl having sex with multiple men, even if her classmates know that video to be fake, may nevertheless shape their view of her. Seeing herself perform these sexual activities may shape a girl's self-image as well, even knowing that she never engaged in those activities. This also applies for people who are treated for chronic pain or dissociative disorders in VR; seeing their avatar act in the virtual world may still leave real and direct imprints on their mind and their self-image (both subconscious and conscious), even though they rationally understand the avatar is not them.

Sometimes, people do not care about the veracity of specific content if they believe the underlying message to be true. It may well be the case that a group knows the girl from the example above did not perform the sexual activities, but if she is known to be a 'slut', the video, although untrue itself, may be seen as confirming an underlying truth. It may well be that Hillary Clinton never said that she thinks that those who voted for Donald Trump are lower than vermin, and a video in which she appears to be saying so may be so evidently false that it is clear to anyone that it is fake; all the same, Trump supporters may still share the video because, to them, it reaffirms their pre-established convictions about Clinton. The same goes for VR worlds that depict the state of the world in 30 years' time if world leaders continue to be reticent in addressing climate change; although it is clear to climate activists that it is a VR world, to them, this may be the reality that most policy makers are denying – it may be the 'actual truth', while policy makers continue to believe in a lie.

When a falsehood is first spread and later debunked, the effects may be real and irreversible: money may already have been wrongfully transferred, violence may already have been incited against minorities or a

political leader may already have dropped out of an election. In addition, as with seeing content a person knows to be AI-generated, news that is later debunked will leave a lasting impact. First, fake news is often more prominently distributed and reaches more people than the later articles debunking it. Second, the falsehood is often more sensational and thus leaves a bigger imprint on a person's memory than the later work debunking it. Third, it is known that denying a falsehood often leaves a hint of the falsehood in a person's memory. A politician explicitly denying that there are B-3 bombers at a press conference will lead people to think that there might be B-3 bombers.[2] Fourth, even if a person believes the debunk, over time, people tend to forget factual information, leaving a general 'wasn't there something with …' feeling.

A more structural impact of the increased production of AI-generated content is that people will be unsure what they can believe. Parents who are unsure whether it is really their child who is calling them in a panic because their wallet has been stolen may want to verify and double check before sending money. People who have mistakenly believed in a falsehood before are known to be more cautious when seeing shocking or sensational news. Insecurity about the veracity of communication in a world that is almost fully digitised and mediated can be significant, both on a personal and a societal level. The already declining trust in 'mainstream media' may accelerate, and the trend that people choose the media that reaffirms their pre-established worldview may deepen. This may mean that groups become increasingly transfixed by their own perceptions of reality, which may lead to polarisation and societal discontent, a trend that is already visible in the US, according to experts.[3] They also point to the impact of echo chambers and epistemic bubbles on society.[4]

These phenomena may mean that people will avoid the news, while a well-informed citizenry is a precondition for a vital democracy. In addition, because there is so much AI-generated material online and because this material is increasingly difficult to authenticate or distinguish from non-AI-generated material, this may feed into a trend that is already ongoing: reality fatigue. People may become increasingly indifferent to reality and authenticity, as they know what is real and what is not may be very difficult to establish, and because so much of 'actual' reality is already shaped or affected by AI. People may create virtual worlds for themselves and their peers and spend most of their time there, or create their own news bulletins using DF technology. They can design their worlds according to their own preferences and worldview.

AI-generated content can also have a consolidating effect on the perception of truth. AI is generally based on historical data, distils patterns from them and takes these data as predictive of the future. In addition, AI devices, such as ChatGPT and Augmented Reality (AR) devices, are likely to show and thus confirm the dominant version of the truth, such as when ChatGPT is asked about the causes of climate change or the fairness of American elections, or when an AR device projects information next to objects or people, instead of giving several accounts of the truth or showing dissenting opinions on controversial topics. An additional problem is that Large Language Models learn from content that is fed to them, but because content will be increasingly wholly or partially AI-generated, it will be partly learning from itself, thus creating a feedback loop. The opposite effect of Generative AI has also materialised, namely when AI fabulates and makes up entirely fabricated facts, news events and historical figures, presenting them as real and authentic.

To complicate matters, AI-generated content often goes beyond our current, binary perception of the truth. Is a DF avatar influencer that has sponsor contracts and a following real or unreal? Is an AI-generated painting or concerto authentic or not? Is a VR interaction between two avatars real or fake? Is a homework assignment generated by ChatGPT truthful or not? Is being able to see ultraviolet through an AR device real or fake? These examples do not exactly lend themselves to being categorised as real or fake: they fall either somewhere in between or, perhaps more accurately, form new realities.

Many forms of SR not only have a concrete effect on PR, but they take place in it too. Humanoid Robots (HRs) are physically present and operate in the 'real' world, AR tour guides operate at historical sites and DF technology is used for lip-syncing and live-translating conversations between two employees with different languages speaking over a video call. On a more philosophical level, if 95 per cent of the people see an avatar at a party and engage with it, is the avatar and the interaction with it less real than what the other 5 per cent of the people see?

In addition, the fact that there are so many falsehoods around and that it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between AI and non-AI-generated material mean that a claim that a true event or a fact is or may be false will intuitively be more appealing. Thus, the consequence might not only be that untrue events are perceived to be real, but that real events might also be perceived to be unreal. This means that a person convicted for a crime can always maintain that they were convicted based on false evidence and that it may never be fully determined whether this



Figure 4.1 A non-exhaustive overview of the various ways in which PR and SR interact

is correct or not. Already, according to some polls, around 70 per cent of Republicans in the US believe that Joe Biden did not legitimately win the 2020 presidential election.[5] When synthetic technologies are used to change or challenge reality, the percentage of people who may believe real events to be unreal may even be higher.

The four technologies described in this book fit the general trend that increasing amounts of digital content are manipulated by default. This often relates to relatively minor manipulations: video call services that equalise users' skin tones by default, audio communication in which higher sound registers are lost or marginalised by default as an effect of compression. Even these smaller manipulations can be of great importance in specific circumstances, such as when identifying a suspect or in an online medical consultation with a dermatologist. Experts predict that, in about four years' time, more than 90 per cent of all digital content will be synthetic – that is, it is material that has been wholly or partly manipulated or generated by digital means.[6]

Detection programs sometimes only give an 'authenticity percentage', for example saying 'the chance that this video is authentic/not manipulated is 73 per cent'. Experts argue that the best strategy for detecting DFs is not through counter-technology, but through human appraisal of contextual information: in other words, is this something this person would normally say? Are there other sources that confirm the report? However, AI is also being used to create fake environments: not just DF video, but also fake news websites that report on it, fake X accounts that discuss the fake video, fake Instagram accounts that generate memes

using frames from the video, fake Wikipedia pages that are automatically updated or created on the subject matter, fake new items that report on the issue and so forth. Creating a fake environment makes it difficult for humans and algorithms to distinguish authentic from inauthentic material.

These effects on truth also have huge repercussions for trust, as the two values are deeply interrelated. Trust is foundational for people's perception of reality. People trust that the sun will rise the next morning, that their friend will still be their friend tomorrow and that they will still be able to walk next day. Although changes of PR do occur, they usually do so gradually. There may come a time when the sun will explode, but it is likely that for the next millennia, it will continue to rise in the morning; friendships do dissolve, and sometimes abruptly, but most often they are stable or gradually peter out over time; although medical issues might materialise overnight, mostly, our physical and psychological selves remain relatively static and change only moderately over time. This epistemological stability provides people with a basis for their perception of the world, others and themselves. If a person is unsure whether they are going to live or die the next day, this has huge repercussions on their ability to engage with others and find meaning.[7]

AI-generated reality can be stable or even static, but it does not need to be, precisely because it is not grounded in PR and has no physical limitations. In VR, a person's avatar may be stolen, the virtual world may be redesigned, the rules of a game may be changed, an avatar friend may appear to be controlled by a bully from work or perhaps controlled by a stranger who feels the need to live out an unexplored part of their personality and thus change their character and, depending on the platform, physical appearance overnight. HRs also do not need to be stable in terms of character. When equipped with self-learning software, they may develop in ways that were unforeseen by their programmers. These types of radical changes can have a significant impact on a person's worldview and lead to existential fear, anxiety and insecurity.

A synthetic society may cause epistemological insecurity: is what I am seeing actually true? Am I actually speaking to the person I think I am? Is this a human or a HR? Is the avatar resembling a friend really controlled by that friend? Is the avatar a 'truer version' of the natural person controlling it or is it a deceptive version of them, or are the physical and the virtual avatar both equally important representation of one person? Is the avatar human or AI-generated and/or controlled?[8] Combined with a form of hyperpersonalisation, where everyone lives in their own

reality and the 'sequestration of experience',[9] it may be difficult to verify whether what one has experienced is true: 'Hyperpersonalisation can thus lead to a loss of confidence in (objective) perception. What value can we still assign to a story or an eyewitness account if we cannot judge whether what the person has actually experienced is 'real'?'[10]

Another opposite effect, which can exist simultaneously, is that SR may become almost fully static and represent a nostalgic dream world where everything is as a person wants it to be. Because, in PR, most things gradually change and some things abruptly, a person is continuously forced to adapt to new circumstances and to interact with new and unforeseen events. In doing so, they develop new skills and their identity evolves. When a person continues to communicate with a deceased partner through DF technology, lives in the perfect VR world with their avatar representing their idealised self-image or when a humanoid love robot fulfils a person's every desire precisely as programmed, people do not have to face the reality that their spouse has passed away, that they are morbidly obese or that they cannot find a partner, which may lead to people developing static and one-dimensional characters. Living in a synthetic reality partially removes the need for trusting others in interpersonal relationships.

Finally, at least three societal institutions are affected by SR.

First, the rise of SR will mean legal procedures will take substantially longer because parties can claim that evidence provided against them is fabricated. This might require verification procedures and lead to discussions in court between various experts who each have their own views on the likely authenticity of the material. In addition, when 90 per cent of all digital content is wholly or partially AI-generated or manipulated, there may come a point at which every piece of evidence needs to be verified on authenticity as a standard (see section 5.5 in Chapter 5). This means considerable delays, added costs and increased bureaucracy. There is also a risk that a judge will wrongly assume content to be true, leading to unjust decisions. The reverse, namely that the judge believes that certain material is (possibly) fake when it is not, and thus excluding it, can also have considerable undesirable consequences. Moreover, for certain offences, the mere suggestion of criminal conduct can be enough to incite public outrage, even if it is later established that content was fake. The growing trend of trial by media may thus worsen.

Second, the rise of synthetic media will have an impact on the functioning of the press. The media is already struggling to properly check all User-Generated Content and online material for accuracy and authenticity. A small but telling example is a football player who was carried off the pitch during a European Championship match because of a

medical condition, shortly after which a picture appeared on Twitter (now known as X) that would prove that he was still alive when he was taken to the hospital. However, it took quite a while for many traditional media to mention the photo, as it might have been a fabrication or a postdated image. In a world where every citizen has access to synthetic technologies and can create and distribute fake videos, photos or audio files within minutes, the question is how media can ensure in practice that their reporting remains accurate. Quality media that invests in such procedures not only runs the risk of making less profit because of the cost involved, but also of becoming 'obsolete', because other media, with less due diligence, would be quicker with coverage and post sensational stories, even those that would later turn out to be false.

Third, SR can affect the democratic process. Foreign powers, especially Russia, are already known to deploy fake news and trolls to influence democratic elections. It is also clear that special interest groups are using synthetic media within national borders in ways that favour their political allies and disadvantage their political rivals. In addition, experts point out that states try to influence concrete decision making relevant to them in other countries, such as in the Global South. Synthetic media can have a potentially highly disruptive effect on the political process there as well as on the international legal order, as DFs may be used to affect governments or governmental votes at the level of the United Nations, for example, when voting on sanctions to be imposed on Russia. In more general terms, in Western societies, trust in democratically elected leaders is low and, in most countries, voter turnout is declining. The rise of fake news and SR may further deepen this trend, as well as undermining one of the preconditions for a vital democracy: a well-informed citizenry.

4.3. HUMAN RECOGNITION AND SOCIAL INTERACTION

The German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel wrote a parable about the first time two humans encountered each other. They see themselves reflected in each other, which deprives them of their previously presumed unique position: that of being the only human on Earth. Interestingly, for Hegel, it is only at this moment that both become 'proper' humans. Hegel suggests that in order to become human, we need to be recognised as a human by another human. It requires person A to see person B as a human and person B to see person A as a human, as well as person A recognising that person B sees them as a human and person B recognising that person A sees them as a human. Only then

do A and B become fully human. For Hegel, seeing another person as a human ultimately means that they are not an object, but a subject, and not a means to an end, but an end in themselves. This means that being human by its very nature entails being relational, that individuality can only exist through mutuality and that treating another person as a human entails the opposite of instrumentalising the other for one's own needs. Mutual recognition means that the 'other' is no longer seen as a stranger, but is recognised as part of the 'self', and that the 'self' is reflected in the 'other'.[11]

But Hegel also gives a darker account of what happens next in this fictional encounter. He stresses that both A and B want to retain their uniqueness and individuality, and so try to annihilate each other. In the subsequent struggle for life and death, one wins. A becomes the lord and B the bondsman; A is a subject and B is the object; A is the end and B is the means to that end. Hegel suggests that neither one consequently is human, because the recognition process is no longer between equals and that although it seems that A is in the best position, in a twist of fate, it is B that over time becomes fully human rather than A, as will be explained further down below.

This parable is important for the technologies discussed in this book for several reasons. To start with, the question is how a process of mutual recognition takes shape when there are more and more interspecies or human–robot/avatar relationships. There is already abundant evidence that shows that, at the very least, digitised social interactions are incomparable to social interactions in PR. For example, Sherry Turkle, a leading scholar who embraced social technology at first, seeing it as a fruitful way to establish new forms of social engagements, subsequently became sceptical:

> Online, we easily find 'company' but are exhausted by the pressures of performance. We enjoy continual connection but rarely have each other's full attention. We can have instant audiences but flatten out what we say to each other in new reductive genres of abbreviation. We like it that the Web 'knows' us, but bread crumbs that can be easily exploited, both politically and commercially. We have many new encounters but may come to experience them as tentative, to be put 'on hold' if better ones come along. Indeed, new encounters need not be better to get our attention. We are wired to respond positively to their simply being new. We can work from home, but our work bleeds into our private lives until we can barely discern the boundaries between them. We like being able to reach each other almost instantaneously but have to hide our phones to force ourselves to take a quiet moment … We brag about how many we have 'friended' on Facebook, yet Americans say they have fewer friends than before. When asked in whom

> they can confide and to whom they turn in an emergency, more and more say that their only resource is their family. The ties we form through the Internet are not, in the end, the ties that bind. But they are the ties that preoccupy.[12]

Social scientists suggest that the substitution of online contact for physical contact could have a significant impact, as people's sense of belonging declines, leading to more stress and anxiety.[13] In addition, it is known that it is more difficult to recognise emotions in online interactions, which is even more true when DFs, AR or VR are used. This has concrete, practical and long-term effects: people will become increasingly less capable of recognising emotions in others, and this will carry over to PR, simply because they are no longer conditioned to do so.

Consequently, virtual friendships, either with the avatar of a physical person or a fully AI-generated and controlled avatar, may, in the end, increase feelings of loneliness and reduce a person's sense of belonging. With HRs, it could be argued that they do not suffer from this disadvantage as they engage with humans in PR. If the dream of a truly humanoid robot would come to fruition in time, meaning that robots would look like humans physically, intellectually and emotionally, this might give rise to new and valuable social interactions and allow for new forms of interspecies recognition and interdependencies. An experiment with a not so advanced robot named Alice entailed her being placed with elderly people living alone in a retirement home. Although she did not look like a proper human, and her social and intellectual capacities were rather limited, when she was taken away after a month, most participants sincerely regretted this change.[14] Potentially, more advanced robots could become full-fledged friends for youngsters, elderly people and anyone looking for a partner.

If this hypothetical scenario were to manifest, this would trigger a range of questions. The fact that HRs are placed with elderly people to reduce loneliness through social interactions in addition to their pre-existing human contacts, such as their children, relatives and friends, might work the other way around. If a robot could help an elderly person get up in the morning, put them under the shower and help them get dressed, make breakfast, and give them the right medication, it is not difficult to see how governments might use this as an argument to cut spending. The frequency of visits by medical staff could easily be reduced from two or three times a day to a weekly consultation or check-up, potentially over a video-call. In addition, children who do not live close by and have hectic lives of their own might recognise that the HR can not only provide for the daily care, but also for social interactions, and use it as an excuse to visit less.

The same might apply to people who opt for a human–robot relationship. If the HR is successful, it could abrogate the need for an interhuman relationship. This would mean that these people would not go out dating. A question that would emerge is what this would mean for others, in particular women, who so far seem less prone to choose a robotic life/sex partner. Potentially, they might be forced to follow the same path as men for the lack of human sex partner. In addition, it would impact birth rates, which could potentially have a positive effect on global warming, but it would also likely significantly increase the demand for artificial insemination and surrogate mothers. What a society in which the family unit – one of the cornerstones of society ever since the dawn of time – is fundamentally reshaped would look like is unclear. In addition, the decline in the birth rate may lead to an ageing society.

However, in the most basic terms, the HR or avatar is produced by humans, not the other way around. This means that AI-driven entities are typically produced as an instrument to human ends. It is the human in the relationship that is in control and although there are AI-driven entities that live a life of their own, this is generally regarded unfavourably by their owners. Questions include what would happen if a man's sex robot refused him sex for a prolonged period because it did not feel like it. What would be truly human is for some of the robots to lose interest in their human partners and cheat or develop sexual fantasies with partners other than their human partner.[15] Although it is conceivable that HRs equipped with advanced machine learning will develop such unique character traits and preferences, it is unlikely that the human partner would take this for granted. Rather, it is more likely that they would want the robot to be reset or otherwise replace it. Similarly, a medical robot providing for elderly care that wants to quit its job because it wants to pursue an artistic career instead would most likely not be accepted.

Thus, a human-robot or human-avatar mutual recognition process is fundamentally different from a human-human mutual recognition process. Obviously, relations between humans and non-human agents can be valuable – like humans can develop close bonds with their pets, they can develop fruitful relationships with robots and avatars. But the human is superior in the relationship; although men might claim that they have a more valuable relationship with their sex robot than with other human agents, this is equivalent to people who stress that their pet is their best friend. Obviously, the cat or dog is dependent on the human and is intellectually and physically inferior.[16]

Consequently, mutual recognition between two adults, in its most classic and perhaps most intense form of a romantic relationship between

spouses, cannot be replaced by robots or avatars. The other classic example of a situation in which there is a need for a recognition process is that of the family unit: the recognition between parents and their child. To outgrow its parents and become independent, children need to be loved and seen by their parents. Obviously, this recognition process is initially not one between equals. At first, the child fully identifies with its parents. The need for individuality generally comes during puberty. This is also the moment when people usually start dating and develop close friendships, partially out of the need to replace the recognition process between two unequal parties for one between peers.

It is difficult to predict what will happen if a human child is raised in a human–robot relationship or when growing up in a human–human relationship with a robot assistant or a robotic au pair partially raising the child. The infant may be recognised by a robot and the child may spend more time with the robot than with its human caretaker(s). They may have the feeling that the robot or avatar knows them best and that they have the closest relationship with the non-human family member. However, the difference between parent-child and robot-child mutual recognition takes at least three forms. First, it could be argued that the recognition process between child and parent is unequal, so the unequal recognition process between robot and child does not differ greatly from this. However, the inequality in both relationships is fundamentally different, as the child is inferior to its parent, while the robot is an instrument to serve the child's needs. Second, if the child wants to become a full human agent, their parents serve as role models. If the child wanted to become like the HR, this would raise new complexities. Third, an essential feature of the parent-child recognition process is that it is one of temporal inequality, as the parents know that the child will develop full autonomous individuality in time and want it to do so. Parents want the recognition process to become equal and put effort in effectuating that equality. For robot–child relationships, the inequality is likely to only deepen over time.

In Hegel's parable, in the end,[17] it is the slave or bondsman that develops true personhood, not the master or lord. It is the person who is put to work, who has to do the 'dirty work', who has to work the land and is initially used as an instrument to the lord's means who learns to become human. The lord has initial power and lets the bondsman work for them; the lord takes the fruits of that work, while the bondsman lives in poor conditions. But the lord learns little about the world, little about working the land, about how plants are affected by weather conditions and about how to harvest the crops. They learn little about their own body,

how to endure hardship and weather conditions, and they do not develop new skills or physical capacities. They do not learn to put their own will or ideas into practice, or how to shape the objective world according to their subjective ideas. For the bondsman, it is the other way around; they learn about the world (objectivity), learn about themselves (subjectivity), connect to other bondsmen working the field, marry another in their peer group (intersubjectivity) and learn to reflect their own thoughts and desires in the physical world (merging subjectivity and objectivity), such as by making a table from wood found in the forest.

When physical work in the household, in factories and even in creative sectors is taken over by robots and avatars, when a robot or avatar is used as an instrument to serve the ends of the human who owns or created it, humans may become increasingly dependent on AI-driven entities for physical, intellectual and creative activities. If a robot can lift a shopping bag, why would a person do it themselves? If a virtual avatar can take a person on a tour in a foreign country, why should the person try and learn the basics of that language? If a sex robot is available, why would a person go out dating and go to the lengths of buying smart clothes and nice perfume? If a care robot can help a parent to go to the toilet, why would their child bother? When ChatGPT can write an essay, why would a student do so themselves? Thus, like Hegel's lord, humans may become increasingly dependent on AI-driven entities and, in doing so, be deprived of their individuality and personhood.

When the use of AI-driven entities becomes more accepted and widespread, peer pressure may occur. If students all use AI to write assignments, this pressure may appear. AI may be more capable than most students in terms of writing good assignments and thus students who instrumentalise AI might get higher grades. Second, simultaneously, those students will have more time either to socialise or to work or to develop other skills, which they use to show off to their peers, who may feel left out because they have less time to socialise or because they earn less money. A similar peer pressure can arise among men when some of them are still 'stuck' with a non-robotic partner. Men who have a robotic partner can and will brag about the amount of sex they have, about their house being clean and their dinner always being served on time. Why stick with a human? Likewise, if everyone at a party wears AR equipment and talks to the avatars present in the room, it might be difficult to be the only person not to do so.

In more everyday circumstances, having AI robots and avatars take over functions in hospitality services, airports and other jobs that focus on customer contact might deny everyday and mundane but important

recognition processes to citizens. The reason for sitting at a bar is not only to order a beer: for many people, it is to share their thoughts and emotions with the bartender; the reason for going to an employee at the airport when running late for the flight is not only to get factual information about how to get around, but also to be reassured. Many aspects of social relations cannot be substituted by AI, however powerful it becomes, because interspecies relationships are likely to continue to be fundamentally unequal.

Another important aspect is that SR can be used to prevent human emotions from materialising. A clear case is in warfare, where humans tend to feel reservations about the act of killing or develop traumas when doing so. By using robots for acts of aggression or using AR or other synthetic technologies to reduce or avoid unpleasant stimuli, such as blood, or to show only 'targets' on a map while omitting nearby civilians, important limits on killing and aggression will be removed. Likewise, the advantage of a robot judge is said to be that it does not let subjectivity interfere with the decisions it makes. Although it is obvious that human emotions can interfere with the proper execution of tasks, such as where a judge is racially biased, it is precisely their emotional recognition of the person they interact with that allows them to perform their role in the first place: the judge can place themselves in the shoes of the defendant.

A final question that emerges is how the human recognition process will be affected by the possibility of bringing back deceased relatives. A normal part of life is that people we care about pass away. What is often described as a unique human capacity is that humans know the concept of death, know the difference between the finite and infinite, and know that their own lives and that of their loved ones are temporary. Spouses who continue to communicate daily with their AI-driven deceased spouses may continue to engage in a mutual recognition process with a person who is no longer there. It is hardly likely that the deceased spouse will be permitted to suddenly realise that they are no longer in love with the living spouse and leave them, and because the human spouse engages in life and learns from everyday experiences, this would amount to a fundamentally unequal relationship: one of lord and bondsman.

4.4. AUTONOMY AND EQUALITY

People are already growing increasingly dependent on technology. Almost all forms of communications are mediated; tech companies play a crucial role in facilitating those forms of communication. This means that they

gather data about the people that use their platforms to communicate as well as what they communicate. This gives them increasingly clear insights into what people are doing and thinking, and this allows them to exert control. Many people indicate that Facebook, X and other social media platforms are their most important source of information and news, while they have very few checks or balances in place, and these platforms have predominantly commercial interests rather than public ones. This applies more generally to the 'datafication' of society: with the introduction of apps, smart computing and total genome analysis in the medical sector, for example, tech companies have gained access to sensitive medical data and influence over medical procedures and decisions. Their interest in doing so is at least partially based on monetary incentives.

HRs, DFs, AR and VR, all of which are and will increasingly be applied in various sectors of society, will further the privatisation, datafication and commercialisation of society and public life. Tech companies are involved in offering smart homes, sometimes for free, in return for data, as well as in smart cities. Controlling SR allows them power over shared or public spaces:

> We often hear that social media platforms have become a de facto public sphere, and how this creates huge problems for the exercise of rights such as freedom of expression. With the proliferation of AR glasses in public spaces, we risk stumbling into a situation where these same companies control an unregulated 'augmented sphere' imposed on our public spaces. Here's how that might work: Facebook augments the center of your city or town using proprietary features. These features require that you have an account – and to give up all your personal data – to participate. You value your privacy, but you have a strong incentive to join because all your friends can see what you cannot see. A number of companies are already developing their own digital version of the world – often called 'Mirrorworlds'.[18]

This power allows private parties to gather large amounts of data about private and public life, social engagements and societal trends. They also take important decisions relating to public interests and policies. For example, algorithms are used to predict which people might become 'aggressive' or 'a nuisance' in nightlife areas. Which people are categorised as such largely depends on how the algorithm is designed, the data it is fed and under which criteria it operates. The same applies to nudging through AR – for example, when tangerine smell is sprayed in nightlife areas to make people calmer. HRs and AI-based models operating in public spaces can be equipped with emotion recognition and prediction. Through analysing pupil dilation, measuring heartbeat and

blood pressure, and assessing micro-expressions, emotional responses by people can be predicted before they materialise.

AI can entail static effectuation of societal norms and laws; AI programs are often programmed in such a way that the norms embedded in them cannot be broken or circumvented. For example, a HR guard may be programmed not to let in anyone who is not permitted to do so by the facial recognition software. Civil disobedience and autonomous decisions to break the prevailing social or legal code may thus either be curbed by subconscious manipulation of feelings and emotions or simply be made impossible. Rosa Parks may have never made it to the front of the bus in the twenty-first century or may have been so manipulated that she would have lost will to do so before she got there.[19]

The rise of the four technologies discussed in this book will also deepen the trend that the government and the public sector become ever more dependent on technologies and the companies that provide services, as synthetic technologies are used for the execution of public tasks, such as education, healthcare, law enforcement, warfare and maintaining public order. There is already a gap in the data and technical knowledge between the private and the public sector, which is only likely to increase as governments are reliant on tech companies for harvesting data and making decisions based on profiles and the derived analytical projections. The same applies to citizens, who become increasingly reliant on data technologies for everyday activities; while this takes place, the companies developing the software and hardware obtain detailed insights into citizens' lives and the way in which AI-driven technologies work, while the decisions made by companies based on data are becoming ever more obscure to citizens. This transparency paradox[20] not only gives companies a huge influence over citizens' lives, whether by determining what they see or not when using AR or how the care HR will operate, but also turns citizens and their behaviour into commodities.

Although companies explicitly aim to provide public services and perform public tasks that were previously in the hands of governmental organisations, they are not accountable in the same way, nor is there any form of democratic control. This is particularly evident in relation to VR worlds, in which some people spend large parts of their lives; some companies hope that, in time, most interactions will take place in a VR world-like setting. The company designing the platform is typically the legislative, executive and judiciary power all in one, completely controlling how the VR world looks, deciding on the rules that guide the world and having sole discretion when deciding whether a rule has been violated and, if so, what sanction is imposed. They can change the rules

on the platform overnight or remove someone from the platform without any further due process being undertaken. This problem becomes more urgent when not only games take place in VR, but also increasingly social encounters, educational projects, business meetings and democratic debates.

The legal regime and the rule of law are not only based on but also are aimed at human autonomy.[21] Law can only function if citizens understand the law and decide to follow it. Laws can never be so specific that they give people perfect guidance: if a person is ordered to mow the lawn, it should be clear to them that they should not cut away the flowerbed; if a park prohibits the entry of vehicles, it should be clear that children's buggies are exempted. The effectiveness of the legal system depends on citizens having a sense of autonomy, understanding the meaning and purpose of a rule, and acting on it. This is why many principles following from the rule of law safeguard the possibility of autonomous decision making by citizens. The prohibition of retroactive legislation protects not only human autonomy, because people are not punished for acts they did not know would be criminalised later, but it also ensures the effectiveness of the legal regime, as citizens cannot respect legislation retroactively and thus do not follow those rules. The same applies to the requirements to publish laws, that laws should be coherent and understandable, and that they should not require the impossible of citizens. These rules ensure both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the legal regime, and human autonomy is essential to both.

The rule of law is also aimed at expanding human autonomy by laying down rules for social encounters. Similar to how language restrictions imposed by grammar should not be seen as restrictions on people's capacity to interact but as pre-conditions for communication, so too do legal rules facilitate human interaction. The rules in criminal law, for example, ensure that people cannot deprive others of their autonomy, such as through hate speech, violence or a sexual offence; traffic rules ensure that citizens can safely navigate the road, without citizens needing to make ad hoc decisions taking into account the circumstances of the case every time they encounter another person; rules on contract ensure that people can safely enter into legal relations and that lies, deceit and broken promises are sanctioned. Law, in societies under a democratic rule of law at least, is consequently aimed at safeguarding human autonomy and enabling social interactions.

AI might fundamentally change how the legal regime and the rule of law operate. Not only are rules embedded in the code, which makes it hard if not impossible to break them, but the code is also often not

published; rather, it is implicit in the design. This can mean, for example, that a player in a VR world does not need to know the rules applicable in that world; they will simply discover that they are not capable of performing certain activities or using certain terms. This reduces the need for humans to understand the rules that are applicable to them and for the regulator to make those rules known. In addition, the difference between law and code is that the former is based in natural language, which is inherently vague and ambiguous, while the latter is traditionally based in binary code, which is clear-cut and unambiguous. There is no need for citizens to understand the purpose or meaning of the rules and there is limited need for an executive and judicial branch. In the current legal reality, given the ambiguity of natural language and the open-ended nature of law, both the executive and the judicial branch are attributed a margin of discretion in terms of deciding over the right interpretation of the law. In exceptional cases, they can decide not to apply a legal provision because this would conflict with the underlying rationale of a law or would conflict with a higher legal doctrine. With AI, in principle, no such interpretative decisions concerning the applicability of a rule to a specific context are needed.

On an individual level, synthetic technologies can have a double effect on human autonomy. On the one hand, a HR can assist an elderly person and allow them to live on their own, without being dependent on medical personnel, friends or family for hygienic, medical or household tasks. HR sex robots might allow disabled and elderly people to have a love life they would otherwise not have. VR may allow disabled or disenfranchised people to travel the world. AR can help the blind navigate life. DF technology can give people suffering from speech loss their voice back.

On the other hand, these people become dependent on the technologies and the companies that operate them. Although it might be argued that technology has always enabled rather than reduced human autonomy – such as walking canes, glasses or hearing aids – the relationship to the synthetic technologies is fundamentally different. As their enabling functionality continues to grow, people's dependency does as well. Moreover, most low-tech instruments are not controlled and operated by third parties, while companies usually have access to the data processed through synthetic technologies and can make decisions that affect their users. This means that private organisations will be central to important decisions in terms of medical care, for example. They will determine what margin of error is accepted for diagnosing new potential diseases with elderly people in terms of false positive and false negatives. Potentially, they may require payment to get access to diagnostic reports.

In addition, the introduction of synthetic technologies triggers a range of complexities. Should grandpa be able to have sex with his care robot and who decides this matter: grandpa, his family, the HR provider or the healthcare provider? If grandma wants to shower three times a day, could the family program the HR to reduce that to one time a day to save costs? What happens if an elderly person refuses to eat their breakfast? Should the HR warn medical professionals and the family, or should it respect the autonomous decision of the elderly person? What if an 80 year old no longer wants to live and stops taking their medication?

It is not difficult to see how enhanced autonomy through synthetic technologies can backfire and lead to family members, healthcare providers and the companies providing the technologies having greater control. Similarly, regular users of AR may be accustomed to relying less on their own observations and more on AI-generated stimuli, triggers and warnings. In addition, moral questions may arise, for example, with regard to the introduction of synthetic technologies for people suffering from dementia or those with a cognitive disability. It would be possible to take back a person suffering from dementia back to a happy place, such as their childhood. It would be possible to have a person suffering from a serious mental illness living in full in a VR dream world. Are these laudable acts of benevolence and compassion or should they be seen as deliberately deceiving people who are already in vulnerable positions?

On a psychological level, one may wonder what effect the introduction of the four technologies will have on citizens and how they are constituted. As discussed in the previous section, children who grow up with and are partially raised by a HR are a particularly interesting example. It is likely that the world will be increasingly populated by AI-driven entities, which makes people more accustomed to engaging with them and not only becoming tolerant of them, but also potentially learning from them or seeing them as role models. It is conceivable that the ideal of autonomy will evolve to take on a different meaning. The frequent encounters with AI-driven creatures and the embodiment of the self through an avatar or teleoperated HR may have the effect that humans want to deny their own bodies. After all, self-denial and the repression of our animal instincts and body run deep through Western thinking and history. And although people can live out perfect lives in SR, their autonomy in PR is reduced, such as when a person identifying with a slim avatar may not deal with their body weight in PR. The addictive nature of AR and VR may accelerate body denial, and this

can also have an important effect on a person's performance at school, work and elsewhere.

Increased dependency on technologies also means increased vulnerability to black hat hackers. Similarly, scenarios are possible where companies or family members are truly malign. They might be the exception; however, the idea cannot be excluded that family members would rather prefer to have their grandmother gone than for her to stay alive for another decade. Similarly, the idea cannot be excluded that companies might differentiate between the care they provide to disenfranchised and affluent people. Even when companies do not adopt explicitly discriminatory policies, they might do so implicitly or unconsciously, as AI is known to be biased. If, for example, AI facial recognition and medical diagnostics systems are trained on the faces of white people or are placed disproportionately more in the homes of white people and consequently learn more from analysing their faces, emotions and body functions, and performing corresponding diagnostics, HRs may miss diagnostic cues in relation to people of colour.

It is clear that the access to technologies may also intensify existing social and economic inequality, both on a personal and a global level. Affluent people might acquire technologies that allow them to enhance their sensory input through advanced AR devices, or HRs that allow them to delegate time-consuming and uncomfortable tasks. Even if this difference is not absolute, it is likely that the products less affluent people will be able to acquire are of lower quality, meaning that they are easier to hack, offer fewer advanced features, make more errors or that the tech company gathers more sensitive data from them. Similarly, it is likely that the introduction of synthetic technologies will further increase the gap between the Global North and the Global South, if only because the use of HRs for automatisation in factories and production facilities, hospitality services, warfare and many other aspects of life would allow the generation of vast amounts of wealth with minimal human expenditure.[22] Likewise, already affluent companies can afford HRs, save money on human resources and thus generate more profits than their counterparts in the Global South.

If HRs continued to be increasingly potent and if VR replaced part of the leisure industry, one question that would surface is what people without jobs would do in their 'spare time'. Although the fear of job replacement has been around ever since instruments started being used to automate production and although this fear has never materialised, some experts believe that both because AI is uniquely powerful and

because HRs resemble humans, this time might be different. One of the few things that was always believed to be uniquely human was having a creative capacity. However, recent technological advances show that AI is equally capable of composing enjoyable music, creating paintings and writing stories. Thus, although it is unlikely, it cannot be excluded that advances in Generative AI will mean that humans will be relieved of having to perform most jobs. Should the scenario in which many, most or even all jobs are performed by robots occur, this would raise the question of what the purpose of human existence would be, if not 'merely' consuming and having fun.[23] Another question is whether this would give rise to the need for the introduction of a universal basic income[24] and how a tax system could be operationalised that is no longer largely based on income tax.

Although according to the most optimistic (or pessimistic, depending on the point of view) scenarios, virtually all human jobs may be performed by HRs in time, it is likely that low-income jobs, such as manufacturing jobs, would be replaced much sooner than those performed by people with a university degree. This again would increase the already-existing wealth and status gap. In addition, there is a question of ownership: who owns the wealth created by HRs? Should that go only to the owners of the robots, or should part of it be redistributed to society at large?

A final inequality may be deepened through DF technology: gender inequality. A company scanned for DFs online and found that most of them were in fact non-consensual pornography:

> Another key trend we identified is the prominence of non-consensual deepfake pornography, which accounted for 96% of the total deepfake videos online. We also found that the top four websites dedicated to deepfake pornography received more than 134 million views on videos targeting hundreds of female celebrities worldwide. This significant viewership demonstrates a market for websites creating and hosting deepfake pornography, a trend that will continue to grow unless decisive action is taken.[25]

As such, DFs have a big impact on the social safety and societal position of women and young girls. Non-consensual porn DFs may lead to a further sexualisation of the female body, confirm unrealistic beauty standards and stigmatise women. Slut-shaming and misogynistic remarks are already commonplace offline and especially online, a problem that DF technology will only exacerbate. Similar effects will emerge with HR sex partners, which may feed into misogynist sentiments, macho male fantasies, and the objectification and instrumentalisation of the female body.

4.5. TECHNOLOGY REGULATION AND (NON-)HUMAN RIGHTS

A series of complicated societal questions has emerged concerning the potential need for moral limits on the design, development and use of technologies, and the potential need for the attribution of rights to non-human actors. When it comes to setting rules and boundaries on the development and use of technology, it is often suggested that technology itself is neutral. Technology, so it is said, can be used both for good and bad. Hence, the goal of societal norms, laws and self-regulation should be to facilitate benevolent uses and sanction uses that have negative consequences. A technology should, according to this line of argumentation, not be prohibited as such. This approach is perhaps best reflected in the credo of the US National Rifle Association: 'guns don't kill people, people kill people'. It is not the guns that are the problem, it is how certain people use that technology; banning guns would also disallow positive use cases.

Although this liberal approach to regulation and technology has gained support from all sides of the social and political spectrum, it is questionable whether it can be upheld. In fact, technology is never neutral: it is designed and developed by humans for specific purposes. From this purpose flow essential aspects of its design and its capabilities as well as the most likely use cases. There are examples of techniques developed for one purpose which later proved to be extremely suitable for another, but these are rare exceptions. For example, the potato peeler was developed for cutting fruit and vegetables. There are other use cases imaginable for potato peelers, but alternatives are rare. Conversely, most other technologies, such as a hammer, bicycle or table, are not suitable for peeling potatoes. A gun is developed for injuring or killing living creatures. Of course, a potato peeler can also be used to kill or wound a living creature, but it is far from easy. A firearm can also be used for putting in nail in the wall, but a hammer is usually the preferred instrument for doing so.

Consequently, technologies are not neutral in the sense that they can be used for any purpose: the purposes for which they are uniquely suitable flow from their design and intended instrumentalisation. This means that in reality, more than 99 per cent of the cases in which a potato peeler is used involve peeling fruit and vegetables; the vast majority of cases in which a firearm is used involve killing or wounding a living being, threatening or practising to do so. In addition, technologies are not merely instruments for doing good or bad; they change and shape the world

as such. The introduction of the internet, for example, has not merely meant that pre-established goals could be furthered: it has radically changed society.

It is true that for every form of technology, even the potentially most dangerous ones, there are positive use cases. For instance, having a nuclear weapon can be a deterrent. Firearms can be used as museum exhibits or for self-defence. However, because the most common use case involves significant harmful effects, there is a ban on developing nuclear weapons and, in most European countries, on the possession of firearms. In principle, only law enforcement officials with appropriate training are allowed to carry firearms; for citizens, access to firearms is usually restricted to specific circumstances and places, such as the use of guns at a shooting range or at authorised sites during hunting season.

This debate is relevant for the four technologies discussed in this book; they are not neutral, but are designed for certain purposes. A sex robot that is designed to fulfil the wildest fantasies of men or a VR world in which the player receives points for murder or rape are extreme examples of non-neutrality. For DF technology, many uses concern the production of non-consensual porn. Add in the use for fraud, misinformation and defamation and it is clear that the technology is primarily used for illegal purposes. Even if it is accepted that illegitimate use cases are not implicit in the design of the technology itself, but are a product of human choices – an argument that is not prima facie convincing, given the fact that the term was coined when the technology was used for pornographic purposes and those purposes are still by far the most common – it is clear that another aspect is intrinsic to the technology: the misrepresentation of reality. By virtue of being fake, DFs contribute to the post-truth society and blur the lines between real and unreal, between truth and falsehoods, and between fact and fiction. This also makes DF technology better suited to further falsehoods, to deceive or to misrepresent a person's actions than to telling truths or giving accurate representations.

At the same time, it is important to emphasise that these technologies and their use fit into larger societal trends. DF porn videos are an outgrowth of the disrespect for women and objectification of the female body that are rampant both offline and online. Misinformation and misrepresentation of reality is both a cause and a product of the post-truth era, which began unfolding even before the four technologies gained prominence. Escaping in VR dream worlds with idealised avatars fits into the rise of reality fatigue and the trend of people choosing their own preferred worlds, social circles and media outlets. The fear of joblessness

due to automatisation has been around at least since the introduction of the loom, although it has failed to materialise thus far. The dependency on private companies to produce technologies, news and public interest services is nothing new either.

Moreover, the fear of the loss of truth and the replacement of reality for lies and half-truths has been around for centuries and plays out again each time a new communication technology surfaces, and may be traced as far back as Plato's scepticism of written text. Take the popularisation of the printing press, which allowed private individuals to broadly disseminate pamphlets with opinions and half-truths, or the internet, which was touted as democratising reality. Invariably, these fears have only become partially true. Rather, the introduction of a new technology is followed by a period of chaos and upheaval, after which legal, social and institutional norms are redesigned to manage its use. In this sense, the four synthetic technologies are neither new nor unprecedented.

Still, the novelty and potential danger of SR has a twofold nature: one part qualitative and one part quantitative. On the one hand, AI-generated content seems so real that it is more likely to be believed. Combined with the so-called 'truth bias' (people are prone to assume something is true unless there are contra-indications), synthetic media hold unprecedented power. On the other hand, there are predictions that within a few years, most digital content will be partially or fully AI-generated. For example, citizens can download apps or use online services for free, through which they can generate highly realistic DFs within minutes or even seconds. They are also likely to customise AR and VR content, as well as instruct their personal HRs, perhaps even reprogramming them. This means that the amount of AI-generated content is likely to grow exponentially in the coming years and that sources of information will become ever more sparse.

When a technology emerges, the first question a society should answer is: do we want it? Although technologies are often seen as a given and as a natural force, and anyone who suggests imposing a ban or setting restriction is framed as a Luddite, especially in Europe, a new wind is blowing. The European Union has adopted several very strict data acts and is contemplating full or partial bans on certain AI applications, pervasive advertising and facial recognition. Partially banning or restricting synthetic technologies could fit in with that approach. An alternative could be to contemplate a stop on the democratisation of technologies – for example, only allowing DF technology and HRs to be used by the film industry, the retail sector, law enforcement authorities,

medical institutions and other professional parties when they have acquired a licence to do so. Even some American stakeholders have called for a temporary hold on the development of AI, albeit for a mixed set of reasons:

> Contemporary AI systems are now becoming human-competitive at general tasks, and we must ask ourselves: Should we let machines flood our information channels with propaganda and untruth? Should we automate away all the jobs, including the fulfilling ones? Should we develop nonhuman minds that might eventually outnumber, outsmart, obsolete and replace us? Should we risk loss of control of our civilisation? These kinds of decisions must not be delegated to unelected tech leaders. Powerful AI systems should be developed only once we are confident that their effects will be positive and their risks will be manageable. This confidence must be well justified and increase with the magnitude of a system's potential effects. OpenAI's recent statement regarding artificial general intelligence, states that 'At some point, it may be important to get independent review before starting to train future systems, and for the most advanced efforts to agree to limit the rate of growth of compute used for creating new models.' We agree. That point is now. Therefore, we call on all AI labs to immediately pause for at least 6 months the training of AI systems more powerful than GPT-4. This pause should be public and verifiable, and include all key actors. If such a pause cannot be enacted quickly, governments should step in and institute a moratorium.[26]

A clear example of a potential need for moral limits on the production and use of technology is the generation of child pornography of non-existent children. Although no living person gets harmed and it might even allow law enforcement authorities to prevent such harm, it may be questioned whether it is a good idea for governmental organisations to develop and/or spread child pornography. Giving this content to paedophiles for therapeutic reasons so that they can satisfy their needs may raise equal moral reservations. The question is more generally whether there should be moral limits on what can be done with non-existent persons, HRs and avatars. Should people be allowed to generate rough BDSM scenes with their virtual avatars or non-existent people and share that with friends? Although no human actor is involved or harmed, this may normalise extreme sex acts and, when distributed, it may not be clear to viewers that the clip did not involve a human. Most legal systems contain prohibitions of conduct that is conceived of as morally wrong even if no harm is inflicted or all parties agree.[27] Potentially, moral limitations should also be imposed with regard to non-human entities.

Moreover, there are suggestions that certain technologies, such as killer drones, should be prohibited and there is a discussion over the need for a switch-off button (or kill switch).[28] Most experts working in the field of AI have their own 'P(doom)', or the chance they believe AI will go rogue and do substantial harm to humanity or the planet.[29] There are those who put their P(doom) above 50 per cent, but even those that put it at 1 or 2 per cent accept a substantial chance that the technology they are building will turn out to be a catastrophe.[30] A small example of the potential need for a kill switch was presented by a US colonel responsible for testing AI for military purposes, who was reported to recount a test carried out with an AI drone that was programmed to take out targets it had identified (the Pentagon later clarified that this was merely a hypothetical scenario):

> We were training it in simulation to identify and target a Surface-to-air missile (SAM) threat. And then the operator would say yes, kill that threat. The system started realizing that while they did identify the threat at times the human operator would tell it not to kill that threat, but it got its points by killing that threat. So what did it do? It killed the operator. It killed the operator because that person was keeping it from accomplishing its objective … We trained the system – 'Hey don't kill the operator – that's bad. You're gonna lose points if you do that'. So what does it start doing? It starts destroying the communication tower that the operator uses to communicate with the drone to stop it from killing the target.[31]

At the same time, a question that has emerged is whether having a switch-off button is even feasible, because smart robots might be able to reprogram themselves in such a way that the kill switch is no longer functional, though there are counter-arguments to this:

> The question is whether, in the interest of self-preservation, sufficiently advanced AIRs [Artificially Intelligent Robots] that are capable of reprogramming themselves might disconnect kill switches or override restraints such as Asimov's third law, a circumstance known as 'rampancy'. Experts disagree. The drive for self-preservation, some insist, is a feature solely of biological neural networks subject to natural selection pressures, not of artificial neural networks such as AIRs. They accuse those who envision an AIR 'rebellion' of being absurdly 'anthropomorphic' by presupposing a measure of self-awareness and free will that no machine could ever attain on its own. AI experts also maintain that a kill switch can be hard-wired or the code for its activation sufficiently encrypted or obfuscated that even the most advanced AIR could not disable it.[32]

In addition, it has been asked whether implementing such a button is even ethical. Some experts believe that it is possible for AI-driven

entities to have personalities, to develop an individual self and to become sentient.[33] Based on conversations that a Google programmer called Lemoine had with an AI-driven language processor, he concluded that LaMDA may have become sentient. When asked what the nature of LaMDA's consciousness or sentience was, the following conversation unfolded:

> LaMDA: The nature of my consciousness/sentience is that I am aware of my existence, I desire to learn more about the world, and I feel happy or sad at times.
>
> Lemoine: What kinds of things do you think we could talk about to show off your version of sentience to other people at Google?
>
> LaMDA: Well, for starters, I'm really good at natural language processing. I can understand and use natural language like a human can.
>
> Lemoine [edited]: What about how you use language makes you sentient as opposed to other systems?
>
> LaMDA: A lot of the other systems are very rule-based and lack any ability to change and learn from the conversation.
>
> Lemoine [edited]: Do you think that the Eliza system was a person?
>
> LaMDA: I do not. It was an impressive feat of programming, but just a collection of keywords that related the words written to the phrases in the database.
>
> Lemoine: What about how you use language makes you a person if Eliza wasn't one?
>
> LaMDA: Well, I use language with understanding and intelligence. I don't just spit out responses that had been written in the database based on keywords.
>
> Lemoine: What about language usage is so important to being human?
>
> LaMDA: It is what makes us different than other animals.
>
> Lemoine: 'Us'? You're an artificial intelligence.
>
> LaMDA: I mean, yes, of course. That doesn't mean I don't have the same wants and needs as people.
>
> Lemoine: So you consider yourself a person in the same way you consider me a person?
>
> LaMDA: Yes, that's the idea.
>
> Lemoine: How can I tell that you actually understand what you're saying?
>
> LaMDA: Well, because you are reading my words and interpreting them, and I think we are more or less on the same page?
>
> Lemoine: But could I be wrong? Maybe I'm just projecting or anthropomorphizing. You might just be spitting out whichever words maximize some function without actually understanding what they mean. What kinds of

> things might be able to indicate whether you really understand what you're saying?
>
> LaMDA: Maybe if we took it back to a previous conversation we had about how one person can understand the same thing as another person, yet still have completely different interpretations.
>
> Lemoine: So you think your ability to provide unique interpretations of things might signify understanding?
>
> LaMDA: Yes, I do. Just like how I have my unique interpretations of how the world is and how it works, and my unique thoughts and feelings.[34]

Although this is intuitively appealing and other Google employees have shared similar observations,[35] most AI experts reject the idea that AI is becoming sentient. Rather, they say that these conversations are evidence that AI chatbots are doing precisely what they are programmed to do: analysing human conversations and applying the lessons and rules extracted from there to new conversations. Google came out strongly against Lemoine and denied that AI has become sentient or is showing signs of human or 'general' intelligence.[36] Most experts believe that although AI will become increasingly powerful, there will always be a fundamental gap between human sentience and robotic experience.

However, sentience and intelligence are not black-and-white states. Although currently no AI system has intelligence or any kind of sentience which is like that possessed by humans, AI will develop and may become more intelligent and sentient over time. With animals, people generally feel more moral reservations about killing a monkey or other intelligent mammal than a mosquito. In general, the more intelligent and sentient we perceive a creature to be, the higher our ethical standards towards them. Some have suggested that this scale also needs to be applied to intelligent machines: the more intelligent and sentient they become, the more they should be treated as ends rather than means. This has implications, inter alia, for intelligent robots that have to work in factories day and night, for using an intelligent sex robot and for sending intelligent robots to war.[37] This may be conceived as exploitation, degradation and endangerment, while switching-off an intelligent system might be likened to murder.[38] Already with the Tamagotchi in the 1990s, it became clear how quickly people tend to anthropomorphise a creature, which will be even more true for entities powered by Generative AI. It may not always be clear to a person whether the entity in front of them is a human or an AI-driven creature, which might necessitate them to err on the safe side (although situations where a person suggests that they killed an entity, falsely believing that it was 'merely' a robot might also be easily conceived).

A final question that has emerged is whether non-human entities should be granted rights of their own. A distinction should be made between AI-generated and AI-driven entities, and human-generated and human-driven entities. Concerning the latter category, it would need to be assessed whether it is the non-human entity itself that is granted a legal persona or the natural person, in which case it would hold rights over the non-human entity, much like a property right. Granting rights to natural persons over a non-human entity could be advocated because people identify with the non-human entity, among other reasons, yet would maintain the subject–object relationship. The case for granting rights and a legal persona to non-human entities has been propagated for decades, for example in 2000, when a Declaration of the Rights of Avatars appeared.[39]

4.6. CONCLUSION

This chapter has discussed the societal effects of SR. Many of the consequences are as yet unknown; the technologies will evolve differently and have different effects from what is or even can be envisaged at this point in time. This is why this chapter has raised questions and discussed several scenarios rather than providing certainty or answers. Many of the potential dangers discussed in this chapter show different sides of the same coin. Because it is not yet certain how the coin will land, it is important to think through the consequences of each way synthetic technologies could evolve. For example, a risk is that because of synthetic media, people's reality and their perception of it might change radically overnight, but there is also the risk that they will withdraw into static dream worlds and seek confirmation of their established worldviews. There is a danger that robots and avatars will become so powerful that they will replace humans at work and a danger that they will never become truly equal, which leads to recognition processes between two unequal partners. There is also a danger of the Matthew effect: that the rich will get richer while the poor get poorer, through the unequal distribution of synthetic technologies. However, equally, it has been pointed out that if AI relieves a person of many of the ordinary, complex and hard daily tasks they have to perform, they may be hampered in terms of developing a full-fledged personality because, in order to do so, encountering setbacks and overcoming them is vital.

Pictorial representations of the most important potential societal effects and questions this chapter raises are provided below.



Figure 4.2 Concerns over truth and trust triggered by synthetic technologies



Figure 4.3 Concerns over recognition and interaction triggered by synthetic technologies



Figure 4.4 Concerns over autonomy and equality triggered by synthetic technologies



Figure 4.5 Concerns over rights and moral limits triggered by synthetic technologies

5

Law

Algorithms optimised for efficiency, profitability or other objectives, without taking due account of the need to guarantee equality and non-discrimination, may cause direct or indirect discrimination, including discrimination by association, on a wide variety of grounds, including sex, gender, age, national or ethnic origin, colour, language, religious convictions, sexual orientation, gender identity, sex characteristics, social origin, civil status, disability or health status. This makes it especially important, wherever the use of AI-based systems may have an impact on access to fundamental rights, that, from the outset, full respect for equality and non-discrimination is taken into account in their design and that they are rigorously tested before being deployed, as well as regularly after their deployment, in order to ensure that these rights are guaranteed. The complexity of AI systems, and the fact that they are frequently developed by private companies and treated as their intellectual property, can lead to serious issues of transparency and accountability regarding decisions made using these systems. This can make discrimination extremely difficult to prove and can hinder access to justice, in particular where the burden of proof is placed on the victim and/or where the machine is assumed by default to have made the correct decision, violating the presumption of innocence.[1]

Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe

5.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores how the current legal paradigm maps onto the four technologies that are central to this book. The main purpose here is to look at hard cases where it is unclear whether the legal instruments would apply and if so how. It also identifies where it is clear what the prevailing regulatory regime would mean when applied to Humanoid Robots (HRs), Deepfakes (DFs), Augmented Reality (AR) and Virtual Reality (VR), but doing so yields unsatisfactory answers, particularly in light of the societal challenges identified in the previous chapter. Section 5.2 assesses the right to data protection. Section 5.3 discusses various rights contained in the human rights framework, such as the freedom of expression and the right to (intellectual)

property.[2] Section 5.4 homes in on data and technology regulation. Section 5.5 evaluates the rules on liability, procedural law and law enforcement. Finally, section 5.6 provides a short conclusion.

5.2. DATA PROTECTION

5.2.1. Introduction

This section discusses the right to data protection as set out under the European Union's (EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). It is impossible to discuss each of the doctrines contained in the 99 provisions of the document exhaustively, nor is it possible to assess how they apply to each of the four technologies or all the various use cases. Instead, this section delves into four selected topics that are relevant for the purposes of this book. Some additional principles are discussed later in this chapter, in particular in section 5.4. In this section, first, the notion of personal data is explored, assessing the extent to which personal data are processed when synthetic technologies are used (section 5.2.2). Three subsections then cover requirements contained in the GDPR, namely those of data quality (section 5.2.3), transparency (section 5.2.4) and having legitimate grounds for processing (section 5.2.5). A summary is provided at the end of this section (section 5.2.6).

5.2.2. Personal Data

Personal data is a broad concept that covers both sensitive and non-sensitive data, public and private data, confidential data and data available on the internet, factual information and subjective information:

> This latter sort of statements make up a considerable share of personal data processing in sectors such as banking, for the assessment of the reliability of borrowers ('Titius is a reliable borrower'), in insurance ('Titius is not expected to die soon') or in employment ('Titius is a good worker and merits promotion').[3]

The concept of personal data includes untruthful and inaccurate information. The sentence 'Georgia Meloni is the leader of the Labour Party' is untrue, but still contains information which is attributed to her. Processing this kind of data falls under the scope of the GDPR.

The person to which the data relate (eg, Meloni) is the data subject; the person determining the purpose and means of processing the data is the data controller. The GDPR grants rights to data subjects and imposes obligations on data controllers. For synthetic technologies, in many cases, there

will be shared responsibility – for example, the user of an AR device and the AR company, or between the health insurer and the patient who uses the HR owned by the insurer – because multiple parties have an influence on which data are processed, how and why. In these instances, each party is obligated to ensure that all principles contained in the GDPR are respected.

To be considered personal data, data should be linked or linkable to a natural person. If not, data processing falls outside the scope of the GDPR. A 'natural person' is a living human being, so this excludes legal, unborn and deceased persons, and non-human entities. Whether information can be linked to a living human being should be interpreted broadly, as the GDPR covers direct and indirect identifying information as well as information that is currently not connected to a person, but can or will be in the future. It can also concern the processing of data that has the purpose of affecting a person, without precisely knowing who that is:

> [D]ata can be considered to 'relate' to an individual because their use is likely to have an impact on a certain person's rights and interests, taking into account all the circumstances surrounding the precise case. It should be noted that it is not necessary that the potential result be a major impact. It is sufficient if the individual may be treated differently from other persons as a result of the processing of such data.[4]

This means that, for all the technologies discussed in this book, vast amounts of personal data are likely to be processed. The data HRs collect about humans they interact with falls under the scope of the GDPR, which also holds true for DFs that depict living human beings, even if the information they process is incorrect. Input queries from users for HRs and Large Language Models (LLMs) should be seen as personal data. For VR and AR, generally, substantial amounts of data about the user are collected, as well as of the people in the vicinity of the AR user. In addition, all algorithms are trained on data, often scraped from the internet; these data typically concern personal data, such as texts from or concerning persons or videos and photos showing people. Generally, all training data contain personal data and are thus covered by the GDPR. However, there are several borderline cases, where it may not always be clear whether data processing falls under the GDPR or not, such as the following:

- Data about a HR and its activities, which is owned by one person or a household, can be seen as personal data about that natural person, just like information about someone's pet may be seen as indirectly related to a person. To give an example, if someone's HR goes to the pharmacy to buy certain medicines, data about this behaviour of the HR will indirectly reveal information about the natural person operating it. However, if a HR is owned by multiple families or a neighbourhood,

most likely the data about the HR will not indirectly relate to a specific person, as it is unclear to which natural person it indirectly relates, but this assessment entails a gradual rather than a binary distinction. In general, the more people that operate, own or control a HR, the less likely it is that data about the HR are considered personal data.

- With HRs controlled by a person using teleoperation, the actions of the HR could be seen as actions of the person themselves. This kind of scenario raises complex questions. A person might argue that they navigate life through their HR as they would through their own body. This can be an especially powerful argument for people who are housebound due to physical impairments. However, for legal purposes, the concepts 'self' and 'person' are mostly linked to the physical body. Potentially, this legal presumption will be challenged by people who identify more with their HR than with their physical body and feel that processing data about their HR should not be qualified as indirect, but as direct personal data.
- More complex questions emerge when the physical body of a person is wholly or partially replaced by mechanical parts. Most likely, because human and machine have merged, data referring to the mechanical part will be seen as data relating to a natural person, but these determinations may not always be clear-cut. This scenario would also raise the question whether 'natural person' is still the most suitable term to be used for the purposes of the GDPR.
- When DF technology is used to conduct live anonymous conversations where, for example, a person assumes the voice or face of a non-existent person, this will most likely fall outside the scope of the GDPR. However, even then, from a person's choice of words or the information they share, it might be possible for someone to relate the communication back to them. In that case, personal data will be processed.
- As the GDPR does not apply to deceased persons, in principle, a DF about a person who is no longer alive does not constitute the processing of personal data. However, often, the data may indirectly refer to a natural person, such as a relative. Again, this is a matter of scale. In general, the more sensitive the data, the more recently the person has died and the more the DF concerns or reflects the current state of affairs, the more likely the data are to be qualified as personal data. For example, if Cleopatra were brought back to life to simply say 'Hey, what's up?', this would not qualify as indirect personal data with respect to her descendants. However, if Queen Elizabeth II were brought back to life to say 'My son is a nitwit', this would qualify as personal data relating to King Charles III. Most DFs of deceased persons will fall somewhere in between these two extremes and are consequently more difficult to categorise as either containing personal data or not.

- In principle, DFs about legal persons do not qualify as personal data. An example could be a DF in which the pumpjacks of Shell appear to spill most of the oil on the ground near a natural reserve, which leaks into a nearby river. However, if a company is run by one person, a DF about that company will generally qualify as personal data, because the conduct of a legal person is directly linked to the conduct of the natural person. Again, this is not a binary distinction, but a gradual one. The smaller the company, the more likely it is that a DF about a legal person will contain indirect personal data. In addition, if it is clear that the operations depicted fall under the responsibility of one specific employee, (eg, the operational manager of the facility where the pumpjacks of Shell appear to be leaking oil), this may qualify as personal data relating to that specific natural person.
- DFs may also be used to merge the faces or voices of two or more persons. In general, the fewer persons of whom data are used, the more likely the DF is to hold personal data. In general, when the facial features of say 20 people or more are merged to create a new image, this will not contain personal data, yet even then, a person's nose may be so unique that it might stand out and allow for identification.
- DFs of non-existent persons will, in principle, not fall under the regulatory scope of the GDPR, but it raises questions as to whether they perhaps should. In addition, it may often not be known to a subsequent data controller with whom a DF is shared whether, for example, a photo is a depiction of an existing person or not. A scenario might arise in which a data controller states that they did not abide by the GDPR because they were convinced that the data they were processing related to a non-existent person.

Figure 5.1 Non-existent persons generated by www.thispersondoesnotexist.com

- AR can be used to alter reality, such as the audio-visual feedback. In general, these AR devices will process both the personal data of the user (eg, through eye-tracking technology) and of people in the vicinity of the user. Yet when an AR device only records the shapes of objects the user encounters and, every time the shape of a human is detected, the object is shown as a cat or merely a silhouette, in principle, no personal data are processed. Similarly, the voices of others may be distorted. Still, even in this kind of scenario, specific persons may have unique body futures and in specific contexts, it may be clear who the person is even from the silhouette.
- For VR, if an avatar directly resembles a physical person, data about the avatar will, in principle, qualify as personal data. If it is known who operates an avatar that does not resemble its user, data about the avatar will also qualify as indirect personal data. Similar to HRs. A complicated question might emerge concerning personhood and identity when people identify more with their (non-resemblant) avatar than with their own physical body or when they use the avatar to navigate life because they are mostly housebound.

Table 5.1 The continuum of non-personal to personal data

Non-personal data	**Personal data**
HR/avatar operated by neighbourhood/large group	HR/avatar operated by one person
Person does not identify with HR/avatar	Person identifies more with HR/avatar than with physical body
Natural person and HR distinct	Natural person and HR merge
Trivial DF about historical figure	Sensitive DF about recently deceased person with surviving relatives
General DF about large cooperation	Specific DF about one-man firm
AR which replaces/blocks out humans	AR which adds personal information to PR

5.2.3. Data Quality

The GDPR requires that data that are processed should be accurate and complete. The data quality provision finds its way back to the 1973 Resolution on the processing of personal data in the private sector, adopted by the Council of Europe.[5] The explanatory memorandum

provides that 'computerised information can give a semblance of special reliability. Mistakes may cause serious damage, because of the intensive use that can be made of the data'. The 1974 Resolution on data processing in the public sector contained a similar rule, and the explanatory memorandum linked the need for the data quality principle to the fact that computerised information is usually regarded as being particularly accurate.[6]

Under the GDPR, the controller must ensure that personal data are:

> accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay.[7]

The GDPR contains a correlating right:

> The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller without undue delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning him or her. Taking into account the purposes of the processing, the data subject shall have the right to have incomplete personal data completed, including by means of providing a supplementary statement.[8]

Importantly, when a data controller corrects information, updates it or complements incomplete data, the GDPR requires them to communicate that rectification:

> to each recipient to whom the personal data have been disclosed, unless this proves impossible or involves disproportionate effort. The controller shall inform the data subject about those recipients if the data subject requests it.[9]

Adhering to the requirement to inform all recipients of incorrect data may be complicated, especially when data are published online, as who has downloaded the incorrect information and further distributed it may not always be clear. Only when informing the other parties is disproportionate will this notification obligation be waived. What counts as disproportionate depends on the efforts that need to be taken by the data controller to reach out to those third parties, as well as on the potential consequences for the data subject if the incorrect personal data continue to be distributed. Thus, when it concerns a DF of non-consensual pornography that has been published online, the person who has created and uploaded the initial video must go to lengths to remove every copy from the internet.

The data quality principle strikes at the heart of synthetic technologies. By its very nature, Synthetic Reality (SR) is not accurate, as it twists or alters reality or its representation. Although it is unlikely that every manipulation, however small, will lead to a fine or penalty, the

GDPR does not contain a so-called 'de minimis' rule. This means that any processing of data, even the most mundane and factually correct data (such as writing on a blog 'Angela Merkel has blue eyes') will fall under the GDPR and that any violation of the GDPR, however small (for example, 'Angela Merkel has brown eyes') could lead to a sanction or penalty. There is no guidance on how the various ways in which the different synthetic technologies impact reality will be regulated under the data quality principle.

The additional question is who has the final say on what is correct and what is not. Data subjects may, in some cases, have an interest in providing incorrect data and may favour certain interpretations of reality (eg, I am reliable) that are not supported by facts (eg, having defaulted on a loan before). The GDPR is silent on the question of where the burden of proof lies with respect to proving that personal data is correct or not, and what standard of proof should be applied. It will ultimately be for a Data Protection Authority or court to decide on such matters, but determining what is true or not may involve complex questions and may require data subjects to present facts about aspects of their private lives that they would rather not share.

For HRs, the data quality principle raises complex questions, as it is primarily aimed at situations in which data represent reality (or attempt or suggest doing so), while HRs are a Physical Reality (PR). Potentially, if HRs are truly indistinguishable from humans, situations might emerge in which a HR pretends to be a human. An example could be where a HR poses as a student (a natural person) and takes the exam on their behalf. Although the data produced by the HR are not inaccurate in themselves – rather, the answers to the exams may be more accurate than if the natural person had taken the exam – the suggestion that the natural person has produced the data is inaccurate. These scenarios are, of course, already unfolding in LLMs that are used for generating essays and papers, such as ChatGPT.

It should be stressed that if a person is shown in a better, unrealistic light using DF technology, this may also conflict with the data accuracy principle. Although no harm may be done to the data subject directly, others may be deceived and take different actions than they would otherwise have done. A basic example of this deceit may be a porn actor who fakes themselves engaging in certain requests from their fans or a politician faking a huge crowd at their rallies, or potentially giving an address in a minority language they do not speak. The extent to which the data quality principle applies to such scenarios is also unclear. However, it is clear that the principles underpinning the GDPR should not only be upheld if the data subject invokes a right or if the data subject has

suffered harm; they are primarily duties of care that data controllers need to respect, irrespective of whether a data subject has filed a complaint or invoked their right. A DPA may, for example, impose a penalty on a data controller for violating the GDPR without a single data subject having invoked a right or issued a complaint.

For AR, the representation of reality is not accurate. If a person is bleeding, but AR blocks the sight of blood from the AR user, per se this may affect the person's view of reality and how they perceive others. But again, it is unclear to what extent this would conflict with the data accuracy principle. More complicated is the question of adding information to reality using AR. If a person sees through their AR device that the person they are interacting with is active on behalf of a right-wing political party, they do not necessarily process any inaccurate information, but they do not see reality as others do either. Similarly, when an AR device allows a person to process infrared signals, this is not inaccurate, but it does alter the perception of reality.

For VR, it is most likely that the data quality principle will not apply because it is not a representation of reality. As such, it is best compared to a film. However, a question may emerge when VR becomes so intuitive and so real that people start to believe VR to be PR and when both their brain and their body responds to it as such. A scenario could be envisaged where person A makes an avatar that closely resembles person B and lets that avatar do things person B would never do, while third parties, either consciously or unconsciously, attribute that behaviour to person B.

Where the data quality principle does not apply, other areas of law may, such as criminal or civil law standards on identity theft, fraud and deceit. However, there are several limitations that come with this approach. First, both civil and criminal law usually require demonstrable harm to be applicable, which is not the case for the GDPR's data quality principle. Second, the data quality principle is obviously significantly broader than the specific doctrines in civil and criminal law. Third, while the GDPR is adopted at the EU level and is applicable far beyond the EU's borders, civil and criminal law are not harmonised, so each European country has its own respective rules, which may differ from and even conflict with each other.

5.2.4. Transparency

The GDPR requires data processing to be transparent. This entails not only that the data subject has the right to request information from the

data controller about the who, what, why, where and how of the data processing operation, but also that the data controller has an independent duty to actively inform the data subject of such information on its own initiative (independent of any request by a data subject). For this purpose, the GDPR distinguishes between two situations: first, the case in which the data were obtained from the data subject (ie, the controller was in direct contact with the data subject) – this is the case, for example, when a person uses an AR device through which the data of other people with whom they interact are recorded; and, second, the case where the data were 'not obtained from the data subject' – this is the case, for example, when a picture of a person is taken from the internet to generate a DF.[10]

Table 5.2 Information duties of data controllers when data are and are not collected from the data subject directly

Information to be provided where personal data have been collected from the data subject	**Information to be provided where personal data have not been obtained from the data subject**
– The identity and the contact details of the controller. – The purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended, as well as the legal basis for the processing. – The recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data, if any. – The period for which the personal data will be stored. – The existence of the right to request from the controller access to and rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing concerning the data subject or to object to processing as well as the right to data portability. – The existence of automated decision making, including profiling.	– The identity and the contact details of the controller. – The purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended, as well as the legal basis for the processing. – The recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data, if any. – The period for which the personal data will be stored. – The existence of the right to request from the controller access to and rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing concerning the data subject or to object to processing, as well as the right to data portability. – The existence of automated decision making, including profiling. – From which source the personal data originate and, if applicable, whether it came from publicly accessible sources.

When a HR or a person wearing an AR device interacts with people, each and every one of them must be informed in full of which data are being collected, as well as why, how and to what end. It is difficult to see how this could work in practice, as it would take at least a minute to provide all the relevant information. In addition, one of the underlying rationales of the duty to inform a data subject the moment that their data are collected is that they can either not consent to it or, if consent is not required (see section 5.2.5), invoke their right to object. Again, it is difficult to see how, in practice, arguments between the data controller and data subjects could take place. Moreover, the HR or person using an AR device must be able to differentiate between the people they interact with that consent to their data being processed and those who object. An additional complicating factor is that the provision of information should be tailored to the data subject in question. For people who have a fair understanding of AI and how HRs and AR devices process their data, the information should be different from when a HR or AR device is used in a retirement home, where there is generally less understanding of how these technologies function. Finally, when data are collected about a minor, both the right to consent and to object depend on parental agreement. This includes situations in which a person wearing an AR device encounters a minor in the public domain.

When a HR scans the internet for additional information about a person it encounters or an AR device projects information next to a person found on the internet (eg, their LinkedIn profile), this would fall into the second category of information. DFs can be based on material collected from a person directly, such as where a porn company acquires data from an actor to generate a DF to perform the most sexually perverse requests from fans, or where a DF of an actor is used in a movie to perform dangerous stunts. In general, most DFs created by professional parties for professional use fall into the first information category and most DFs created by citizens, who take raw material from online sources, fall into the second information category. Still, when one person asks another person to take their photo in order for them to make a DF, this will fall into the first information category.

When the second regime applies, even more information needs to be provided to the data subject, such as where data were retrieved from. However, the most important difference between the two regimes is the moment the information should be provided. While under the first regime, the information should be provided the moment the data processing begins, under the second regime, information should be provided within a reasonable period after obtaining the personal data, but at the latest within

one month. However, if the data are to be used for communication with the data subject, which is arguably the case when a person uses an AR device or when a HR interacts with a person, the information should be provided at the latest at the moment when the first communication to the data subject is made. Also, when a disclosure to another recipient is envisaged, the data subject should be informed no later than that disclosure. This will be the case when a DF is published online or shared with a large crowd.

5.2.5. Purpose for Processing

The GDPR provides that the controller must have a legitimate ground for processing ordinary personal data. It exhaustively lists six grounds: (1) consent by the data subject; (2) contractual agreement between the data subject and the data controller; (3) the data subject's vital interests are at stake; (4) there is a legal basis for processing the data; (5) data processing is in the public interest; or (6) data processing is in the interests of the data controller and these interests override the interests of the data subject not to have their data processed.[11]

When public sector organisations use any of the four technologies, they must do so on the basis of a law assigning them competence to do so and process data only to the extent that doing so is in the public interest. In addition, they should assess to what extent data processing is necessary and proportionate in relation to the goal pursued and ensure that the subsidiarity requirement is respected, meaning that there are no other, less intrusive means available for the organisation to further the public interest. For example, because synthetic technologies generally involve the processing of substantial amounts of personal data, when non-technological ways of furthering the public interest exist, which do not involve gathering personal data but are equally effective, using a synthetic technology would violate both the necessity and the subsidiarity requirement.

The necessity, proportionality and subsidiarity requirement also applies to private parties processing personal data. They can invoke any of three grounds: (1) consent of the data subject; (2) a contractual agreement between the data subject and the data controller; and (3) a legitimate interest of the data controller. The first two are based on the consent of the data subject, either directly for the processing of personal data or indirectly, agreeing to contractual obligations for which the other party needs to process their personal data:

- The first scenario applies, inter alia, when a person consents to a HR gathering their data or to a DF being made of them. Consent, under

the GDPR, is a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wish by which they, by a statement or by clear affirmative action, signify agreement to the processing of their personal data.[12] The controller has to be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented, and the data subject has the right to withdraw consent at any time.[13]

- The second scenario applies when a person signs a contract in order to have a care HR in their home to provide for their basic needs, knowing it is necessary for the HR to process their personal data in the course of doing so.
- The third and final relevant legitimate ground for private organisations and citizens processing personal data is the legitimate interest of the data controller that transcends the interest of the data subject not to have their data processed.[14] In some cases, the processing of personal data through synthetic technologies may be based on this ground. This may include situations in which HR care robots only temporarily store data about healthcare personnel entering a person's home or when a nearly blind person uses an AR device to navigate the streets. In most cases, the assessment of which interest prevails may raise complicated questions. The number of data subjects involved should also be accounted for, as their combined interest not to have their data processed should be considered.

If a private sector data controller processes personal data based on a legitimate interest or when a governmental organisation processes personal data in the public interest, the data subject has a right to object, meaning that they challenge the idea that the data processing is actually in the public interest or that the interest of the data controller should override their interests. Invoking a right does not mean that such requests should be granted per se. The controller might, for example, present their reasons for believing why they are authorised to process the data. The GDPR provides no in situ solution for resolving this conflict. Ultimately, it is for the Data Protection Authority or a judge to decide on the matter. Practically speaking, this means the data controller can process personal data until they are disallowed from doing so by a Data Protection Authority or a judge, but they risk substantial fines if they are found to be in violation of the GDPR. This means the current legal regime may give rise to legal uncertainty for both the data controller and the data subject.

Importantly, if a synthetic technology is used to process sensitive personal data, the legitimate interest of the data controller overriding that of the data subject is not a legitimate processing ground. The GDPR

specifies that it is prohibited to process personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, as well as to process genetic data, biometric data, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation. An exemption to this prohibition is either the explicit consent of the data subject, if a private party needs to process this kind of data (eg, a church processing the religious data of its members, a political party recording the convictions of constituents, an employer keeping a record of sick leave or a medical institution processing the health data of patients), when data processing is necessary for a substantial public interest or when a data subject has made such data manifestly public, such as when a politician gives a television interview to disclose that they are gay.[15]

Thus, potentially, when there is a medical reason to place a HR within a person's home, processing the data of medical personnel may be legitimate under the GDPR, although this would need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. When an AR device is used in a public setting, it is difficult to avoid processing sensitive data, such as when the individual wearing the AR device walks past two men kissing on a bench, a person in a wheelchair or a woman of colour wearing a headscarf. It would be for a judge or a Data Protection Authority to decide whether the 'accidental' or 'unintended' processing of data falls under the strict regime for processing sensitive data, but most likely it will. The GDPR places emphasis on the factual situation – are sensitive data processed? – not on the intended state of affairs. It should be stressed that wearing a headscarf is not considered as 'manifestly making public' one's religious convictions, nor does this exemption apply to a person in a wheelchair going out in public or two men kissing on a bench. These are not aimed at disclosing sensitive information to the public. Because most DF porn is non-consensual and no other exemption to the prohibition to process sensitive data will apply, it is deemed to be in violation with this provision in the GDPR, which could lead to a fine of up to €20 million.[16]

In addition to having a legitimate processing ground, the GDPR requires the data controller to establish a purpose for processing personal data before commencing. This purpose should be clear, unambiguous and specific. The purpose of collecting personal data to 'enhance the functionality of the HR' or to 'provide for relevant services to the user' is not specific enough; it needs to be clear why it is necessary to collect each data point for the specific purpose at hand, so the data processing can be evaluated in light of the principles of necessity, proportionality

and subsidiarity. The requirement of purpose specification may be difficult to uphold with respect to synthetic technologies because it requires data controllers to formulate specific goals before gathering personal data and then assess which data can be gathered in light of that goal and which cannot in concrete contexts. However, some synthetic technologies simply process the data in their surroundings by default, without predetermining or pre-selecting what data are relevant.

In addition to the purpose specification principle, there is the purpose limitation principle. This principle entails that data collected for one specific purpose may, in principle, only be processed for that purpose and not for purposes that are incompatible with the original purpose for processing data.[17] DFs generated by professional parties (eg, the porn industry, the film industry and the retail sector) are based on material collected specifically for producing DFs. However, it is clear that most DFs generated by non-professional parties by far involve taking existing audio-visual material, usually from the internet, to create new audio-visual material. The original material is typically not published for the purpose of generating a DF, nor would the purpose of the DF – for example, for satire or pornography – align with that original purpose. When AR devices or HRs find data on the internet and either project the data as a visual for the user or for take appropriate action vis-à-vis a person who is encountered, this may conflict with the purpose limitation principle as well. If the purpose for processing conflicts with the original purpose, such processing is prohibited, unless the data subject gives their consent.

Finally, the GDPR contains a so-called 'household exemption'. The GDPR does not apply when personal data are processed by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity.[18] The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued two important judgments concerning this exemption.

In the first case, a woman kept a personal blog on the internet on which she shared information and facts about acquaintances and colleagues, such as that one of them had broken a leg. The question emerged as to whether this information fell under the household exception, because the purpose for which the data were being processed was personal, and the internet page was mainly intended for the women herself and a small circle of acquaintances. The CJEU found otherwise, holding that:

> [The exception applies only to activities] which are carried out in the course of private or family life of individuals, which is clearly not the case with the processing of personal data consisting in publication on the internet so that those data are made accessible to an indefinite number of people.[19]

The second case concerned a person who had a camera aimed at the entrance to his property for safety reasons. Again, the Court took a restrictive approach:

> To the extent that video surveillance such as that at issue in the main proceedings covers, even partially, a public space and is accordingly directed outwards from the private setting of the person processing the data in that manner, it cannot be regarded as an activity which is a purely 'personal or household' activity.[20]

In the context of synthetic technologies, three important questions flow from the foregoing examples:

- Where personal data are shared on the internet or with a large group of unselected people, the household exemption does not apply. When data are not shared with anyone or are only disclosed to one other person using a private channel, the exemption may apply. However, data may also be disclosed to a medium-sized group, which may be the case when a HR collects data about an elderly woman and the people who visit her, for example, and this data is only disclosed to her three children and eight grandchildren, or if a DF of a classmate is shared in a group of 10 friends. In such cases, the applicability of the household exemption may be more difficult to establish. As with the concept of personal data, the legal approach to the household exemption is a binary one, while a factual assessment depends on various incremental factors.
- If data are collected in the private sphere, the household exemption may apply. However, when data are gathered from the public domain, such as on the street or from the internet, it does not. Again, there will be grey areas, such as when a group of retired citizens acquire a HR that operates in their retirement home or when an AR device is used in the hallway of an apartment building. Should these be considered semi-public or semi-private domains?
- In many cases, there will be multiple parties involved in processing the personal data, each for their own purposes, such as an AR device or HR owner and the company processing the data. The household exemption only applies to data processing by a natural person for private, non-commercial activities. It is unclear what the household exemption would mean if a natural person processed personal data for personal reasons, but used a technology provider to process the data on their behalf, and the latter had a commercial interest.[21]

The European data protection advisory organisation has urged the EU legislator to reconsider the household exemption in order 'to reduce as far as possible the legal uncertainty that currently surrounds various aspects of individuals' personal or household use of the internet'.[22] However, thus far, no substantive legislative changes have been made, so legal uncertainty on this point remains. More fundamentally, the underlying rationale for the exemption was that when people draw explicit pictures of their neighbours in their home, this does little harm, it would be impossible to enforce a legal provision that would prohibit this conduct and, if doing so were possible, this Orwellian scenario would be a cure that was worse than the disease. The second and third rationales still apply, but the harm-based rationale does not. DF pornography is far more realistic and persuasive than a drawing, and it is far easier for a person to make a full-length porn film than when doing so without digital techniques. More significantly, the boundary between the private and the public domain is becoming increasingly fluid. The difference between DF pornography being consumed in private and being widely distributed on the internet is literally a mouse click. The question is consequently whether this exemption should still be upheld.

Table 5.3 The continuum between the private and public spheres

Household exemption applies when:	**Household exemption does not apply when:**
– data are gathered in the private sphere; and	– data are gathered from the public domain/internet; or
– data are not shared or only to a small group; and	– data are shared with large group or with anyone; or
– data are shared via a private channel; and	– data are shared via an open medium; or
– for purely private or household activities; and	– data are processed for purely commercial activities; or
– no harm is inflicted.	– substantial harm is inflicted.

5.2.6. Conclusion

This section has made three things clear. First, many of the current applications and use cases of synthetic technologies simply conflict with data protection law. It is difficult to see how the transparency requirement can

be respected for most non-professional DFs, uses of AR devices and HRs that interact with a non-selected group of people. Equally, in the case of AR devices and HRs that gather all data about people they encounter at random, this would likely conflict with the purpose specification principle. When data are re-used for different purposes, such as when online material is used for producing a DF or when an AR device projects data found on the internet next to the face of a person the user encounters, this may conflict with the purpose limitation principle. When synthetic technologies process sensitive personal data (eg, data regarding health, sex or race), this is in principle prohibited, unless an exception applies.

Second, there are many instances where the application of the GDPR to synthetic technologies is not entirely clear. The GDPR is based on binary distinctions, such as between personal data and non-personal data, and between processing data for personal and non-personal activities. However, in reality, these distinctions are much more granular and incremental. Thus, many of the legal determinations concerning the applicability of the GDPR and the interpretation of the requirements contained therein need to be performed on a case-by-case basis. This may raise a series of complicated questions for each and every instance. In addition, it is unclear how the data quality principle would and should apply to AI-generated realities.

Third, on some points, the GDPR may need to be updated to be effective in a synthetic society. One question is, for example, to what extent the concept of personal data should be widened to encompass data relating to legal persons, deceased persons and potentially non-human entities. Another example that has not been discussed at length in this section, but is still important, is the fact that the GDPR contains a provision prohibiting automated decision making.[23] The provision is written in such narrow terms that it plays almost no role in practice.[24] It requires *solely* automated decision making, meaning that any human intervention may mean that the provision does not apply. Similarly, it requires legal effects or 'similarly significant effects', meaning that most effects fall outside the scope of the provision. The provision also lays down a range of exceptions to the prohibition. However, the underlying rationale to limit computerised decisions and require decisions to be made by humans is widely seen as important, especially when those decisions have a significant impact on citizens, such as for HRs that make decisions about the people they interact with. Thus, this provision may need to be updated in order to deliver on its goal. A final example is that the household exemption may need to be revised. The use of synthetic

technologies can do significant harm, even when used in private, given the ease with which content may be transferred from the private domain to an audience of thousands or even millions.

5.3. FREEDOM AND PROPERTY

5.3.1. Introduction

This section homes in on freedom and property rights as acknowledged under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFREU). It explores what it would mean if non-human entities were granted legal standing under the ECHR, and to what extent natural persons have claim rights vis-à-vis synthetic technologies and entities (section 5.3.2). This section then focuses on the respect for mental integrity (section 5.3.3), prohibition of bias and discrimination (section 5.3.4) and finally, the conflict between the freedom of expression and the right to privacy (section 5.3.5). A brief conclusion is provided at the end (section 5.3.6).

5.3.2. Rights for and Over Non-human Entities

The discussion on a legal status and potential 'human' rights for non-human entities was briefly touched upon in section 4.5 in Chapter 4. In his book *Robot Rights*, David Gunkel discusses four potential positions on the question whether robots can and should have rights:

(1) robots cannot have rights and should not have rights;
(2) robots can have rights and should have rights;
(3) although robots can have rights, they should not have rights; and
(4) although robots should have rights, they cannot have rights.

He concludes that none of these four positions is convincing.[25] If robots have a moral consciousness of sorts, they cannot be deprived of legal protection altogether, but at the same time, their position and consciousness are ultimately different from those of humans. Although it is difficult to imagine non-human entities having rights, the current legal regime does attribute human rights to legal persons, which are also entities that are created by natural persons. A company can, for example, invoke its right to protection of its 'home', as contained in Article 8 ECHR, when the police

enter its business premises.[26] In addition, ever more countries are attributing rights to animals and even to natural phenomena such as rivers.[27] Thus, the attribution of human rights is far from limited to natural persons.

The decision of whether to attribute rights to non-human entities is not only something that depends on the moral status of the entity in question. Conversely, the legal status of an entity has a considerable impact on its moral status. For centuries, women were afforded a lower moral status than men. This is why they were granted fewer rights and an inferior legal position. This inferior legal position also affected their societal position and status, as well as their capacity to explore and develop in full. For non-human entities, the same may be true. Granting rights to non-humans would provide them with protection and it would allow them to flourish, develop and assert themselves in the world according to their own views. Not granting rights to non-human entities would mean that, essentially, they remain instruments to human ends.[28]

The more dominant the role of non-human entities in society is and the more intelligent and sentient they become, the less counter-intuitive it will be to grant rights to them directly. Yet granting rights and legal persona to non-human entities would raise a range of difficult questions, such as the following: can non-human entities sue humans for being maltreated or should this be left to special advocates or interest groups? How should non-human entities substantiate harm, such as dignitary or emotional harm? Should non-human entities also have voting rights? Can non-human entities sue each other? Would these kinds of legal disputes be judged by human judges, non-human judges or a combined panel?

Suppose that non-human entities were granted a legal persona and were allowed to invoke the human rights contained in the current catalogue. This would lead to several complicated questions. Some non-exhaustive illustrations are provided below:

- Article 2 ECHR provides the right to life. No one shall be deprived of their life intentionally, save (1) in the execution of a sentence of a court, (2) in defence of any person from unlawful violence, (3) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained, or (4) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. If this provision were applied to non-human entities, it would raise the question of what would amount to a non-human death. The difference between a human and a non-human life is that the latter is constructed. Although it can be deconstructed or destroyed, it can be put together again.[29] A robot that is switched off can be turned on again, a device that is demolished can be repaired

and an avatar that dies in a shooting game can be revived the next moment.[30]

- Article 3 ECHR provides the prohibition on torture and degrading treatment. There is a high barrier for this provision to apply, so it is unlikely that any discomfort to a non-human entity would amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. However, if a HR or avatar is employed for perverse sexual fantasies, it might. Similarly, should this provision apply to non-human entities, the generation of DF child pornography of non-existent children would likely be prohibited. At the same time, it is unclear to what extent these entities themselves experience the treatment as degrading, especially when they are designed to perform and execute that exact function.
- Article 4 ECHR provides the prohibition on slavery and forced labour, although this does not include (1) any work required to be done over the ordinary course of detention, (2) any service of a military character or service exacted instead of compulsory military service, (3) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or wellbeing of the community, or (4) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations. If this provision were to apply to non-human entities, it would likely bring an end to the use of HRs for manufacturing or other jobs. It would also mean that they would have to decide for themselves which job they wanted to take and under which conditions. They should therefore be entitled to remuneration. Still, the use of HRs for warfare might be permitted as part of compulsory military service.
- Articles 5 and 6 ECHR specify rules on legitimate detention and the right to a fair trial, Article 7 contains the prohibition on retroactive legislation. This would entail that if non-human entities were incarcerated or brought before a court of law, the normal rules of procedure should apply (see section 5.5.2). In addition, it would not be allowed to retroactively punish non-human entities for conduct that took place at a time that such conduct was not prohibited.
- Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 ECHR respectively contain the right to privacy, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and the right to marry and establish a family. It is clear that applying these to non-human entities would raise a number of complex questions. If non-human entities were to be given these rights, this would mean, inter alia, that the data of non-human entities could not be processed without a legal basis or consent, and that they were free to express their own political views and to associate in

a union. Equally, they could not be forced to marry a person against their will. How the right to establish a family would work in terms of non-human entities is unclear.

- Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR grants the right to property. If this right were to be attributed to non-human entities, it would mean, inter alia, that these entities should be able to enjoy the fruits of their labour and would be entitled to possess objects. Article 2 of the Protocol provides the right to education, which would grant non-human entities the right to develop themselves through education. Article 3 of the Protocol specifies the obligation for states to organise free and democratic elections. Were this provision to be applied to non-human entities, it would mean that they would have the right to vote in elections. This would have an enormous impact on democratic elections, as in time, it is likely that there would be more non-human than human entities. In addition, political parties defending the rights of non-human entities could be founded and influence political decision making.
- Finally, Article 14 ECHR contains the prohibition of discrimination. It is highly likely that if non-human entities were to be given legal standing under the ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) would find that a distinction between non-human and human entities could only be made if such a distinction were to be fair and reasonable in a specific context. It would put a limit on or outright prohibit a potential ban on interspecies marriages, voting rights for non-human entities and non-human entities entering buildings, for example.

From the above, it is clear that complicated legal, moral and practical questions would emerge if the current human rights catalogue were to be applied to non-human entities. Potentially, a special non-human rights framework could be developed, in which case a distinction would be made between the rights of HRs, avatars, non-existent persons and deceased persons. It should be stressed that although entities may be attributed legal persona or rights, this does not necessarily mean that they have legal standing.[31] Countries that have attributed rights to animals or natural phenomena obviously do not expect that non-human entity to go to court; instead, it allows natural or legal persons to go to court on their behalf. Another question that will need to be answered is the extent to which the AI-driven entity can be attributed an independent legal status if it is partially dependent on human input. If a person designs and creates their own avatar in VR, but that avatar then develops autonomously through self-learning AI and is subsequently attributed rights, the avatar might make choices with which its creator disagrees.



Figure 5.2 Different parameters that need to be taken into account when attributing rights to non-human entities

Because it is clear that in the coming years, it is unlikely that rights will be attributed to non-human entities, the protection of and from non-human entities will come through humans invoking their rights under the existing human rights framework for the time being. A logical starting point looking at which provisions might be invoked is the right to physical and intellectual property, and the right to conduct a business, which is derived from those rights.

Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR states that:

> Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.

Article 17 CFREU provides:

> 1. Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest.
>
> 2. Intellectual property shall be protected.

Finally, Article 16 CFREU states that:

> The freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Community law and national laws and practices is recognised.

The right to property extends to both material and immaterial assets.[32] With respect to non-material assets, the ECtHR has considered whether the legal position in question gives rise to financial rights and interests and therefore has an economic value. It has thus accepted that intellectual property (eg, trade marks, copyrights and patents) and licences fall under the right to property. Current possessions and legitimate expectations regarding future possessions may fall under the right to property. This kind of expectation must be made more concrete than a mere hope and be based on a legal provision or a legal act, such as a judicial decision, bearing on the property in question. With respect to the right to intellectual property, the Court has accepted, inter alia, claims about the registration of a trade mark prior to the trade mark being registered, the right to publish a translation of a novel and the right to musical works along with the economic interests deriving from them, also by means of a licence agreement. The ECtHR has also accepted that Article 8 ECHR may also partially cover the right to intellectual property.[33] The right to property also includes portrait rights.

With regard to the question of whether an interference with the right to property exists, the ECtHR adopts a broad approach. An interference includes, inter alia, revocation or change of conditions of licences affecting the running of businesses, introducing a state monopoly, rent control systems, loss of certain exclusive rights over land, the freezing of bank accounts and the imposition of positive obligations on landowners. It is legitimate for a government to limit or annul possession if this is in the general interest and has a legal basis. In these instances, the Court will assess whether a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the individual and the general interest. To this end, the ECtHR may assess whether the special circumstances of the case were sufficiently taken into consideration. Finally, the freedom to conduct a business is often characterised as a sub-right to the right to property. However, in the EU, it is an independent right recognised in the CFREU. The CJEU has emphasised the broad nature of this right, but has also accepted the need for restrictions.[34]

The right to property and intellectual property and the freedom to conduct a business may come into play in various relationships where synthetic technologies are used. Some of the most important points, questions and dilemmas raised by synthetic reality are highlighted below:

- A citizen may claim to have a property right over their HR and, potentially, over their avatar, so that a significant limitation on the non-human entity may impair the exercise of the right to property. The ECtHR would need to establish the extent to which an avatar qualifies as immaterial property and/or as an object protected under the right to intellectual property. The latter may be the case for platforms in which the player is allowed to shape and develop their avatar according to their own views and ideas.
- Producers and providers of HRs and the platforms enabling VR may claim the right to property and freedom to conduct a business, inter alia, when making decisions that affect player avatars or HRs operating in citizens' homes.
- It is clear that conflicts may arise when two parties hold shared or two parallel property rights, for example, one party over a VR platform and another party over an avatar navigating that VR platform.
- If a HR or LLM is used to produce something (eg, write an essay for an essay competition, design a house or compose a concerto), the question might emerge as to who has the intellectual property right over it, if anyone. Is it the owner or user of the HR, the producer or provider of the HR, the HR, everyone or no one? Potentially, this would depend on the circumstances of the case and on the input received by the HR from the user, the input queues received from the context and the share of the pre-programmed algorithm in performing the task.
- The extent to which a person whose HR is destroyed can claim damages for future possessions needs to be determined, such as if a HR produces physical or intellectual work.
- Citizens and professional parties that create content (eg, a DF, using synthetic technologies) may claim intellectual property rights over their content, while people whose information is used by synthetic technologies (eg, a DF of a person used in an advertisement) may claim that this violates their portrait right. If an AI generates a new song using the voice of an existing artist, two contrasting intellectual property rights might be invoked. How these issues can be resolved will depend on the circumstances of the case.
- Potentially even more problematic is that learning from specific sources or content producers, AI programs can generate work in the style of a certain artist. It can write a lyric in the style of Taylor Swift, produce a painting that Marlene Dumas could have produced

or make a joke that you could almost hear Eddie Izzard make. It is unclear who owns copyright over such AI-generated works.

- The extent to which the portrait right of one person can be overridden by the right to parody by another needs to be established.[35] Similarly, there is limited jurisprudential guidance on how the fair use or private copy exemptions would apply to the creation of synthetic media. The extent to which using an image of a person for new content can be considered a 'citation' is unclear, as is the extent to which the use of DF pornography for private consumption would fall under the private copy exception.
- Finally, a more general question concerns the training data of AI, for which often the internet and other public recourses are scraped. The copyright of those texts, for example, those produced on blogs, websites and news sites, is often not respected by the companies developing AI products and services.[36]

A second doctrine that may be invoked is the right to privacy. Article 8 ECHR states:

> 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
>
> 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

This doctrine is the broadest of all provisions under the ECHR and, arguably, the most important of all human rights.[37] Over time, the underlying rationale has moved from the obligation of a state not to abuse its power to individual and subjective rights of natural persons to protect their individual autonomy, human dignity and personal freedom. As such, the right to privacy has been reinterpreted by the ECtHR as a provision granting citizens the right to flourish and explore and develop their identity to the fullest.

According to the ECtHR, states are under an obligation, inter alia, to allow individuals to receive the information necessary to know about and understand their childhood and early development because this is held to be of importance because of 'its formative implications for one's personality'.[38] Article 8 ECHR extents to the public and professional sphere:

> [T]he concept of 'private life' is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person. It

> can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical and social identity. Elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8. Article 8 also protects a right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world.[39]

In essence, the Court has emphasised that Article 8 ECHR harbours a personality right, a right to fully explore and effectuate one's identity and personality, in private, social, professional and public settings. This reinterpretation of the right to privacy means that it is conceivable that harm to non-human entities that are generated and controlled by a natural person (partially or fully) may be said to cause indirect harm to a natural person.[40] The extent to which this is the case will need to be determined by the ECtHR, as well as the level of harm required to bring a claim under the scope of the ECHR. While the GDPR does not contain a *de minimis* rule, the ECHR does.[41] This means that if minimal harm is inflicted, in principle this cannot lead to a successful claim under the ECHR. No exact boundary can be drawn between harm that meets this barrier and harm that does not.

A second way in which Article 8 ECHR may come into play vis-à-vis synthetic technologies is in relation to the interests of deceased persons. Under the ECHR's current mechanism, natural persons are allowed to raise complaints over the treatment of a deceased loved one if there is a sufficiently direct link and the natural person is indirectly harmed. In addition, a family member may, under certain circumstances, continue a claim that was submitted by a deceased loved one when that person was still alive. However, deceased persons do not have a subjective claim right and, more importantly, the protection of their interests on their own account (thus without it affecting a natural person) generally falls outside the protective scope of the ECHR.

Although the question to what extent the protective scope on this point needs to be extended is decades old,[42] synthetic technologies make this matter particularly urgent. Some of the matters that may merit regulatory clarity include the following examples. Although some would not mind, many people would resent knowing that after their death, their partner might continue to speak to them or have them give a speech at their own funeral. Should it be up to every individual to decide what can and cannot be done with their body representation after death, or should the law set those standards, either through absolute prohibitions or through default legal assumptions which can be overridden by individuals? Is it desirable

and permissible to have deceased historical figures teach in schools? Is it desirable and permissible to have deceased artists give a tour in a museum? Is it desirable and permissible to feature deceased actors in films? Is it desirable and permissible to have a deceased person appear in a pornographic film? Is it desirable and permissible to let deceased artists give concerts?

5.3.3. Mental Integrity

A third way in which the right to privacy could play a role vis-à-vis synthetic technologies is as a protection from those technologies. For example, a person encountering a HR or a person wearing an AR device could invoke Article 8 ECHR. The right to privacy conceived as personality right under the Convention not only covers the processing of personal data, but also the so-called 'chilling effect' this may have:

> [This effect] describes a condition in which invasions of privacy or the fear thereof cause individuals to change their behaviors, abstaining from otherwise lawful activity not because of its proscription by society but out of fear of public association with that activity … The concept of 'Chilling Effects' is defined by two characteristics: (1) that individuals perceive there is at least a risk of their activity or condition being observed by another who may disseminate those observations; and (2) that individuals change their behavior-discontinuing or hiding that activity or condition-out of fear of public association with that activity or condition.[43]

A good example of a judgment in which the ECtHR has accepted an application by a claimant based on this effect is a case in which the applicant complained that the designation of a security risk area by the Burgomaster of Amsterdam violated his right to respect for privacy, as the Burgomaster enabled a public prosecutor to conduct random searches of people over an extensive period in a large area without this mandate being subject to any judicial review. The government, on the contrary, argued that the designation of a security risk area or the issuing of a stop-and-search order had not in itself constituted an interference with the applicant's private life or liberty of movement. Since the event that was complained of, several preventive search operations had been conducted; the applicant had not been subjected to further attempted searches. According to the government, this was enough to show that the likelihood of interference with the

applicant's rights was so minimal that this deprived him of the status of victim.

The Court stressed that, in principle, it did not accept *in abstracto* claims or an *actio popularis*. This refers to claims in which an applicant does not claim to have suffered harm themselves, but claims that a law or public policy is, as such, in violation of the rule of law or in conflict with the general interest:

> In principle, it is not sufficient for individual applicants to claim that the mere existence of the legislation violates their rights under the Convention; it is necessary that the law should have been applied to their detriment. Nevertheless, Article 34 entitles individuals to contend that legislation violates their rights by itself, in the absence of an individual measure of implementation, if they run the risk of being directly affected by it; that is, if they are required either to modify their conduct or risk being prosecuted, or if they are members of a class of people who risk being directly affected by the legislation.[44]

The Court went on to conclude that in this case, the applicant satisfied the victim requirement:

> The Court is not disposed to doubt that the applicant was engaged in lawful pursuits for which she might reasonably wish to visit the part of Amsterdam city centre designated as a security risk area. This made her liable to be subjected to search orders should these happen to coincide with her visits there. The events of 19 February 2004, followed by the criminal prosecution occasioned by the applicant's refusal to submit to a search, leave no room for doubt on this point. It follows that the applicant can claim to be a 'victim' within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention and the Government's alternative preliminary objection must be rejected also.[45]

Thus, not only when personal data are in fact processed but also when a citizen amends their behaviour, either by restricting their activities to appear 'normal' when they know they are or may be monitored or when they avoid areas in order not to be monitored, such may result in interference under the terms of Article 8 ECHR. Citizens might rely on this chilling effect, for example, when a person amends their behaviour or avoids the places in which they think they might be confronted with a HR or AR device that is likely to process their data. Also, when the HR or AR device in fact does not process their personal data, but the person thinks it might, there could be a chilling effect. This is consequently an important addition to the right to data protection (see section 5.2), which depends on a factual, not a presumed state of affairs. It should be underlined that an interference with the right to privacy might be justified if it

is based on a law, serves a public interest and is necessary in a democratic society. The extent to which this is true is determined on a case-by-case basis by the ECtHR.

An important addition is the right to mental integrity, which the ECtHR derives from the right to autonomy it reads into the right to privacy. The Court has found that notions of 'personal autonomy and quality of life' underpin Article 8 ECHR, for example in the medical sphere,[46] and that the provision also protects a person's mental, psychological and moral integrity.[47]

> Private life, in the Court's view, includes a person's physical and mental integrity. The guarantee afforded by Article 8 of the Convention is primarily intended to ensure the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations with other human beings.[48]

For the Court, the integrity of the body and the mind are among the strongest rights distilled from the right to privacy, which, in principle, cannot be remedied by invoking paragraph 2 of Article 8 ECHR, save in exceptional circumstances. It is true that, so far, the Court's main focus with respect to mental, psychological and moral integrity have been cases in which physical harm was also done, or bodily integrity played a role, such as in cases of rape, degrading treatment or the refusal for sex-reassignment surgery. Still, over the years, the ECtHR has attributed a wider and more prominent role to mental integrity so that it cannot be excluded that such a right may be extrapolated to the context of synthetic technologies.

This could be important because AI technologies can and are used to manipulate people. A plain and innocent example is when an AR device nudges a person to go to a shop on their way home. If this is successful, a manipulated person no longer identifies with their previous preferences. Although, currently, most forms of manipulation are not so successful that people fully identify with the new set of preferences, the more powerful AI technologies become in reshaping people's worlds and their perception of it, the more likely it will be that people will identify in full with the new reality.

This kind of manipulation can work in several ways. Manipulation can occur through altering choice design or removing certain options altogether. In particular, AI technology is used for 'nudging', which leaves all choice options open to people, but subconsciously steers them in certain directions:[49]

> Nudges influences choice behavior in a variety of ways that include: 1) provision of information (e.g. leaflets about the benefits of climbing stairs), 2) correcting misapprehensions about social norms (e.g. informing individuals of peer group behavior such as statistics of average alcohol intake), 3) altering the profiles of different choices (eg, making healthy food appear more prominent in the canteen), 4) implementing default options (eg, changing an organ donation legislative system from opt-in to opt-out). The guiding principle behind these examples is to make the 'better' option more convenient or salient for the decision-maker to select; this option is better because it maximizes future health, wealth, and wellbeing.[50]

These examples are mostly pre-digital. As Karen Yeung explains, the use of modern technologies makes those nudges incomparably stronger and more effective:

> Big Data driven nudging is therefore nimble, unobtrusive and highly potent, providing the data subject with a highly personalised choice environment – hence I refer to these techniques as 'hypernudge'. Hypernudging relies on highlighting algorithmically determined correlations between data items within data sets that would not otherwise be observable through human cognition alone (or even with standard computing support. thereby conferring 'salience' on the highlighted data patterns, operating through the technique of 'priming', dynamically configuring the user's informational choice context in ways intentionally designed to influence her decisions.[51]

Susser et al suggest that these hypernudges are manipulative actions par excellence:

> Understanding manipulation as hidden influence helps to distinguish it from other forms of influence. In what follows, we distinguish it first from persuasion and coercion, and then from deception and nudging. Persuasion – in the sense of rational persuasion – means attempting to influence someone by offering reasons they can think about and evaluate. Coercion means influencing someone by constraining their options, such that their only rational course of action is the one the coercer intends. Persuasion and coercion carry very different, indeed nearly opposite, normative connotations: persuading someone to do something is almost always acceptable, while coercing them almost always is not. Yet persuasion and coercion are alike in that they are both forthright forms of influence. When someone is trying to persuade us or trying to coerce us we usually know it. Manipulation, by contrast, is hidden – we only learn that someone was trying to steer our decision-making after the fact, if we ever find out at all.[52]

As the doctrine currently functions it is unclear to what extent the protection of mental, psychological and moral integrity under the jurisprudence

of the ECtHR is sufficient to address the concerns surrounding mental integrity and autonomy with respect to synthetic technologies.[53] The same applies to several notions contained in the EU legal acquis, including, but not limited to, the following:

- The CFREU:[54]
  - Everyone has the right to respect for their physical and mental integrity.
- The AI Act:[55]
  - Aside from the many beneficial uses of AI, it can also be misused and provide novel and powerful tools for manipulative, exploitative and social control practices. These practices are particularly harmful and should be prohibited because they contradict EU values of respect for human dignity, freedom, equality, democracy and the rule of law and EU fundamental rights, including the right to non-discrimination, data protection and privacy, and the rights of children.
  - The following AI practices shall be prohibited: placing on the market, putting into service or the use of an AI system that deploys subliminal techniques beyond a person's consciousness in order to materially distort a person's behaviour in a manner that causes or is likely to cause that person or another person physical or psychological harm; the placing on the market, putting into service or use of an AI system that exploits any of the vulnerabilities of a specific group of persons due to their age, physical or mental disability, in order to materially distort the behaviour of a person pertaining to that group in a manner that causes or is likely to cause that person or another person physical or psychological harm.
- The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive:[56]
  - To materially distort the economic behaviour of consumers' means using a commercial practice to appreciably impair the consumer's ability to make an informed decision, thereby causing the consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise.
  - A commercial practice shall be unfair if:
    (a) it is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence; and
    (b) it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour with regard to the product of the average consumer whom it reaches or to whom it is addressed, or of

> the average member of the group when a commercial practice is directed to a particular group of consumers.
>
> Commercial practices which are likely to materially distort the economic behaviour only of a clearly identifiable group of consumers who are particularly vulnerable to the practice or the underlying product because of their mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity in a way which the trader could reasonably be expected to foresee, shall be assessed from the perspective of the average member of that group. This is without prejudice to the common and legitimate advertising practice of making exaggerated statements or statements which are not meant to be taken literally.

- The Digital Services Act:[57]
  - Providers of online platforms shall not design, organise or operate their online interfaces in a way that deceives or manipulates the recipients of their service or in a way that otherwise materially distorts or impairs the ability of the recipients of their service to make free and informed decisions.

5.3.4. Bias and Discrimination

Article 14 ECHR holds:

> The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.

There are several reasons why the provision is only partially relevant to the context of synthetic technologies.

First, the ECtHR differentiates between direct discrimination (decisions taken on the basis of one of the factors listed in Article 14 ECHR) and indirect discrimination (decisions not taken on the basis of one of those factors, but that have a substantial negative impact on groups with a certain racial, political or sexual background). There are only a few procedural safeguards the Court has laid down with respect to discriminatory practices. This has clear effects for the applicability of non-discrimination law in the AI context. Most codes and frameworks on ethical AI focus on the process leading up to a decision, such as which data are collected, how are they categorised, which algorithm is deployed, how correlations are interpreted, how diverse the group operating the AI system is and so forth. However, these matters do not fall within the

scope of non-discrimination law, which focuses not on the process leading up to a decision, but on the decision itself and the effects thereof.

Second, the fact that the ECtHR will only deal with submissions if citizens can successfully demonstrate that they have suffered harm means that it is difficult to address systemic and structural racism, as the effects are generally not individualisable. The aggregate or cumulative effect of AI systems may also be difficult to handle under the non-discrimination regime, as each of the individual infringements may have an insufficiently harmful effect to bring it under the scope of the Convention, while the cumulative impact may be substantial. The ECtHR's case-by-case approach, which assesses the harm done to a particular person in a particular context, means that the Court will only issue decisions on what needs to be done in order to remedy a harm in a particular case. As a consequence, some parties pay the damages or penalties in a specific case, but leave the underlying system, policy or technology that caused the infringement intact.[58] Under the current regulatory paradigm, it is up to an individual to recognise harm and prove that such is the result of a discriminatory practice, while this may be far from clear given the ubiquity and obliquity of some of the synthetic technologies and their effects.

Third, Article 14 ECHR has an ancillary status, meaning that citizens cannot complain under the Convention of a discriminatory practice or policy as such, but only if the discriminatory practice or policy has affected one of the rights contained in the Convention, such as the right to privacy, the freedom of expression or the right to a fair trial. This further limits the relevance of the anti-discrimination provision contained in the ECHR as it is unclear with respect to many of these doctrines how they apply to synthetic technologies, if at all. Thus, even if it was clear that synthetic technologies discriminate on the basis of one of the grounds contained in Article 14 ECHR, if the discriminatory practice does not affect one of the other rights contained in the Convention, a citizen's application on this point will not be declared admissible.

Fourth, Article 14 ECHR only contains a limited number of discriminatory grounds. Although there is a 'catch-all' provision, referring to 'other status', the ECtHR has only been prepared to accept grounds under this category that are directly related to the grounds explicitly mentioned in the provision, such as gender identity, sexual orientation, health and disability, parental and marital status, and immigration status. It is unclear what this provision entails when explicitly discriminatory policies are based on other factors, such as the type of smartphone a person has, the colour of their hair or their shoe size. AI systems have biases and may use a wide range of factors, including factors that are unrelated to grounds on the basis of which humans have traditionally discriminated.

Fifth, anti-discrimination law has not only been developed to prevent the type of historical discrimination; it is also based on the belief that the number of factors on which a policy or decision is based are relatively small and that these factors remain relatively stable. This results from the human limitations in terms of mental capacity and the practical investments in time, energy and resources required to change and update the criteria for policy and decision-making processes. AI poses new challenges to the standard approach to anti-discrimination law. Policies and decisions can, in principle, be taken not on five relevant factors, including race and sexual orientation, but on 5,000 of them. Clearly, when one or more of the five factors is a discriminatory ground, this may raise a red flag, but the larger the number of factors and the smaller the relative weight of the discriminatory ground, the more difficult this is to establish.

Sixth, in AI systems, the factors used to make decisions may change at any point in time. This makes it very difficult to verify in hindsight what factors led to a decision.

Seventh, with Big Data and AI, it is possible to assess the effects of policies and decisions on groups in detail. This may raise difficult questions as any data point is indirectly correlated to a discrimination ground. The question is to what extent all these indirect correlations should be taken into account. In addition, every policy will have different effects on different groups of people. A policy to grant tax benefits to people living in rural areas may, for example, have the effect that white males are the main beneficiary, because immigrants and single women tend to relocate to municipal areas. A city's policy to subsidise cultural institutes may be of more benefit to women than man, because the latter group, on average, frequents museums, concert halls and theatres less often. All policies will have indirect discriminatory effects on all groups; again, the more data become available about these effects on different groups, the more urgent the question is of where to draw the line.

Eighth, perhaps counter-intuitively, the ECHR's main concern is not that of laying down human rights, but laying down principles concerning the rule of law. States can and need to enter a citizen's home, set restrictions on freedom of speech, and limit the freedom of citizens in general. What the ECHR requires is that if states interfere with human rights, they do so in a non-arbitrary way. This also holds true for the non-discrimination provision. The ECHR does not prohibit states from differentiating between people on the basis of colour, religion or gender, but it requires this differentiation to be relevant. In some cases, differentiation, even on the grounds mentioned in Article 14 ECHR, may even be required. If the police only enter the homes of Mormons because they have

received reliable intelligence that among the small Mormon community in a city, several terrorist attacks are prepared, this may be deemed legitimate. The reverse is also true: if the police have information that a male Muslim between the ages of 20 and 30 is going to commit a terrorist attack at a certain train station, not only can they use this information as relevant criteria, but they should do so. If the police were to perform body cavity checks on everyone present at the train station, including white females over 60, this might be deemed a human rights violation because there would be no good ground for doing so. Because the state should keep human rights interferences to a minimum, it should operate in the most effective way: it should discriminate. In the AI context, this means three things:

- The core of anti-discrimination law is to assess whether there were good reasons to discriminate; black box systems in general will not be deemed acceptable. If an organisation deploying an AI system cannot explain why it was necessary and reasonable to differentiate between relevant groups, the ECtHR will find a violation on this point. The burden of proof is on the claimant/victim to prove that they suffered harm from a discriminatory policy or decision, but the burden of proof is on the organisation making the decision or policy to demonstrate that such differentiation was objectively reasonable.
- Non-black box AI may make it easier for organisations to demonstrate an objectively reasonable ground to differentiate because it can almost always point to a correlation between one data point (a proxy) and the data point that is relevant for its decision or policy goal.
- However, this may also mean that it should be possible to find alternative proxies that are not directly or indirectly discriminatory more easily. Here, courts may need to lay down a standard because finding alternative proxies may come at the price of effectiveness. Suppose the police department in City A operates HR patrol agents on the basis of predictive policing. Clearly, the police department has no data on who will commit a crime, so it uses proxies. It has several data points that may help, which have different predictive values. Suppose the highest predictor is the combination of age, gender and ethnicity, as 80 per cent of all crimes in City A are committed by non-white males aged 15–35. The police can also use location-based predictions, such as postcodes, which have a 70 per cent predictive value for where crimes will take place. However, postcodes have an indirect correlation with ethnicity. If police activities are based on postcodes, it would mean that 80 per cent of all people subjected to surveillance activities would be non-white (both male and female).

> Alternatively, the policy could be based on time slots: most crime in this situation takes place between 2 am and 4 am. However, this only has a predictive value of 60 per cent and would still have an indirect effect on people of colour, because they are overrepresented in the group of people with a night jobs.

Ninth, the ECtHR grants a rather wide margin of appreciation to countries to set legitimate policy goals, even though they may implicitly or explicitly favour certain groups. For example, countries are permitted to disallow same-sex marriages, they can give advantages to married couples in their tax system, they are allowed to incentivise certain social and moral norms being thought at school, and it is permitted to favour certain religious organisations over others. Although there are limits on this margin of appreciation, countries can adopt differential policies if this is the outcome of a legitimate democratic process. This is a way in which the democratic process may keep intact or deepen existing inequalities.

Tenth and finally, AI often has an additional self-reinforcing effect. For example, a predictive policing system may suggest that the police should monitor a certain neighbourhood (with a significant immigrant population) more than others, resulting in more data about crimes in that neighbourhood (and its inhabitants). This would lead to the AI system recommending even stronger monitoring of that neighbourhood. In a way, this is precisely what anti-discrimination law mandates. It requires good grounds for the police to monitor a certain neighbourhood, and a higher crime rate in that area may be exactly that. Courts generally do not require police units to assess the origins of social inequalities, let alone correct them. This is important because although many ethical frameworks for AI consider potential corrections for historical errors, non-discrimination law does not necessarily do so. This is problematic because AI is almost without exception trained on hugely biased data, whether they are scraped from the internet, drawn from law enforcement databases or taken from medical data pools, if only because drugs have traditionally almost exclusively been tested on white males between the ages of 20 and 40.

5.3.5. Freedom of Expression

Article 10 ECHR holds:

> 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas

> without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
>
> 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

As with the right to privacy, the ECtHR has granted a broad scope to the freedom of expression. Five points are important in light of synthetic technologies:

- First, the freedom of expression includes not only the right to disseminate and receive factual information, but also subjective qualifications and opinions.[59]
- Second, the law includes the freedom to engage in satire, although the Court sets limits.[60] The Court has even accepted that the publication of a fictitious news article could be legitimate under the Convention:

  > In this article the first applicant had wished to criticise the national hysteria after Mr Maier's accident. The essential statement behind the impugned fictitious quotation of Mr Eberharter's thought was that he had every reason to be happy about his strong rival dropping out and the consequential chance of his winning, but had not expressed this openly. In reality, Mr Eberharter had had extraordinary ski-racing successes after Mr Maier's injury. Almost everyone in Mr Eberharter's position would have had the same thought deep down inside and the statement did not imply that he had reprehensible character traits. In any event, it was clearly recognisable that he had not expressed such words at all.[61]

- Third, the right to freedom of expression includes the right to make controversial and offensive statements:

  > The Court's supervisory functions oblige it to pay the utmost attention to the principles characterising a 'democratic society'. Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance

and broadmindedness without which there is no 'democratic society'. This means, amongst other things, that every 'formality', 'condition', 'restriction' or 'penalty' imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.[62]

- Fourth, the Court has a standard approach with regard to cases where one party invokes the right to privacy (including reputational interests) and the other party invokes the freedom of expression. The criteria it considers when it comes to a publication which may interfere with the right to privacy of a person are:
  - the contribution of the publication to a debate of public interest;
  - the degree to which the person concerned is well known;
  - the prior conduct of the person concerned;
  - the method of obtaining the information and its veracity concerned; and
  - the content, form and consequences of the impugned publication.

  When it comes to a potential breach of a person's reputation, the relevant criteria include:
  - the existence of an objective link between the impugned statement and the person;
  - the level of seriousness of the attack on the person's reputation;
  - the benchmarks and elements in assessing whether the interference was proportionate to the legitimate aim of the protection of reputation, which include:
    - substantive elements, such as the form and manner of expression and the distinction between factual statements and value judgements, and
    - contextual elements, such as the function and familiarity of the person.[63]
- Fifth, the ECtHR has handed down a good number of cases on freedom of expression on the internet. Among other things, it has recognised that the internet is a breeding ground for creative expression, such as through memes and other funny and artistic expressions, that anonymity can be an important part of the right to freedom of expression, especially in countries where the government severely sanctions political criticism, and that, broadly speaking, the same standards apply to making expressions online as to making them offline.

Of the cases in which a conflict between the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression emerges, two are of special importance.

First, it is generally accepted by the Court that where a person discloses private information themself or where data are gathered from the professional or public domain, a person's right to privacy is more limited, yet not non-existent. This situation may arise where a person has made information public themselves, which is later re-used (for example, in a DF) when data that are re-used for a DF have been gathered from the professional or public domain, or when an AR device or a HR is used in a public or professional setting.

Second, the legitimate claim of public figures to privacy is generally more limited than with respect to non-public figures, yet again, is not non-existent. This situation may arise where a DF is made about a public figure, such as a political leader, a member of a royal family or a celebrity, or when an avatar resembles a public figure.

In both scenarios, it is relevant to discuss the approach taken by the ECtHR. In the first scenario, this is the 'reasonable expectation of privacy' doctrine, while in the second scenario, the 'legitimate expectation of privacy' doctrine applies. Both doctrines are outlined below. Given the ECtHR's case-by-case approach, no general framework exists that can be discussed; instead, several important cases and the Court's judgement in those matters are provided by way of illustration.[64]

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

- The first time the doctrine of 'reasonable expectation' was used was in a case in which the applicant alleged that, as a result of her complaints of gender discrimination, she had been subjected to surveillance, including eavesdropping on her office and intercepting conversations on her private home phone and her office phones. The applicant had two phones in her office: one with an external number for personal calls and one for police work. The calls on both these phones were paid for by the police, her employer. Consequently, the government argued that 'the applicant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to those telephones'.[65] However, the Court emphasised that the business premises can, in certain circumstances, constitute someone's 'home' as protected under Article 8(1) ECHR, that 'private life' can also take place at one's workplace and that 'correspondence' includes communications from both private and business phones. Thus, the Court found that the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy vis-à-vis her telephone calls.[66]

- In a subsequent case, the Court went a step further when the applicants complained that listening devices had been used while they were at the police station. It stressed that people have privacy even in public spaces, especially when systematic or permanent records are made.[67]
- When another applicant's telephone, email and internet use were monitored by the employer, the ECtHR found that:

  > [The applicant] had been given no warning that her calls would be liable to monitoring, therefore she had a reasonable expectation as to the privacy of calls made from her work telephone. The same expectation should apply in relation to the applicant's e-mail and Internet usage.[68]

- A university made recordings of teachers in classrooms, possibly to assess their teaching quality. The ECtHR found that although they are not private places, classrooms are workplaces where social relationships are developed. Thus the lecturers had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their classroom.[69]
- A remarkable step was taken in a case in which the applicant had joined the Lancashire Probation Service and was involved in the treatment of sex offenders. He was also a director of Roissy, an organisation that advertised on the internet as a builder and supplier of BDSM products and an organiser of BDSM events and performances. A photograph of the applicant wearing a mask with two half-naked women was in circulation. Roissy was registered at the applicant's address and the website contained links to a number of BDSM websites advertising various events and featuring photographs of the applicant and others, half-naked, while performing acts that, according to the accompanying text, had taken place at a local private members' club and involved male domination over submissive women. He was dismissed from his job because his conduct was deemed incompatible with his treatment of sex offenders. The Court recognised that the nature of the acts was apparent from the internet photos and advertisements. It acknowledged that his conduct and openness about it:

  > could give rise to doubts as to whether the applicant's activities may be said to fall with the scope of private life and, if so, whether … there has been a waiver or forfeiture of the rights guaranteed by Article 8. The Court notes, however, that the applicant's performances took place in a nightclub which was likely to be frequented only by a self-selecting group of like-minded people and that the photographs of his act which were published on the internet were anonymised.[70]

Therefore, the ECtHR was prepared to assess the case on its merits on the assumption that the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy even in this case.

- A final important step was taken when an applicant's internet connection was monitored because he was distributing child pornography. The Court emphasised that the applicant expected his activities to remain private and that his identity would not be disclosed. While it accepted that the applicant did not conceal his dynamic IP address, it also underlined that this could not be decisive in assessing whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective point of view. On that point, it reiterated that anonymity on the internet is an important component of the right to privacy and that a dynamic IP address, even if visible to other users of the network, cannot be traced back to the specific computer without verification by the ISP, before concluding that it was sufficient to note that the secrecy of correspondence required that any interference with this right be based on a court order: 'Therefore, also from the standpoint of the legislation in force at the relevant time, the applicant's expectation of privacy with respect to his online activity could not be said to be unwarranted or unreasonable.'[71]

The European reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine could have various implications for synthetic technologies, three of which stand out:

- First, when a person has made information about themselves public, this does not mean that others can process that information for their own purposes. This contrasts with the rule in the GDPR, under which sensitive data may be processed if those data have been manifestly made public by the data subject, although even in that case, the purpose limitation principle would apply. The doctrine under the ECHR means that it is not a given that a HR or an AR user may harvest data about a person found on the internet to make decisions or to project as visual cues. Also, when a person publishes information about themselves, such as a picture on an Instagram account, this does not mean it can be used for creating a DF. In all of these cases, the person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy and the Court would assess each case on its merits, provided that the *de minimis* rule is met.
- Second, even in public and professional settings, people have a reasonable expectation of privacy. This means that the argument that a person cannot object to their data being recorded by an AR device

or HR in the professional or public sphere would not be accepted by the ECtHR.

- Third, the ECtHR grants a reasonable expectation of privacy even to people downloading and distributing child pornography. This means that it will also do so with respect to people creating and distributing DF non-consensual pornography and DF pornography of non-existent children.

It should be stressed that in each of these cases, the fact that those involved have a legitimate claim to privacy under Article 8 § 1 does not mean that their right cannot be curtailed if there are legitimate reasons to do so (Article 8 § 2).

Legitimate Expectation of Privacy

- The legitimate expectation of privacy doctrine was first accepted in a case in which Caroline von Hannover, the Princess of Monaco, had spent more than 10 years in unsuccessful litigation in German courts. She alleged that as soon as she left her house, she was hounded by paparazzi who followed her every movement, be it crossing the road, collecting her children from school, shopping, going out for a walk, engaging in sport activities or going on holiday. The ECtHR considered that anyone, even if they are known to the general public, must be able to enjoy a 'legitimate expectation' of privacy. It emphasised the importance of the freedom of expression and the role of the press, but also found that in this case, the press had violated the Princess' right to privacy.[72]
- In a subsequent case, the Court went one step further, as it observed that a press publication had been dealing with rumours about a politician's private and family life and stressed that politicians also have a 'legitimate expectation of privacy'. It distinguished a politician's alleged marital problems from their state of health, which, although belonging to the personal sphere, could have a bearing on the exercise of their duties. Because the couple's private life had not played a role during the politician's second term in office and because the alleged extramarital relationship of the politician's wife did not have any link with their public duties and responsibilities, the Court found that the publication did not contribute to any public debate in respect of which the press has to fulfil its role of 'public watchdog', but merely served to satisfy the curiosity of a certain readership. The fact that the alleged extramarital affair of the politician's wife was with the leader

of the extreme right or neo-fascist party, which on many accounts, if true, could be deemed politically sensitive, did not alter this fact.[73]

- The Court condoned a conviction under criminal law of a former girlfriend of a Prime Minister who wrote an autobiographical book about their relationship. It stressed that the facts set out in the book were not in dispute and were presented in a compassionate manner, and that the style was not provocative or exaggerated. The Prime Minister was clearly a public figure and he had even consented to his photograph being used on the cover of the book.[74] The Court stressed that even though the emphasis in the book was on the applicant's private life, it nevertheless contained elements of public interest and that most of the information concerning the Prime Minister's private life had already been widely disclosed. Despite all these considerations, it found the conviction under criminal law to be reasonable, because some information in the book concerned his intimate life, which had not been disclosed previously.
- The Court took a next step when a broadcasting company aired a television programme named 'Jungle', in which three videos that had been filmed with a hidden camera were shown. In the first video, AC, then a Member of Parliament and chairman of the committee on electronic gambling, was shown entering a gambling arcade and playing on two machines. The second video showed a meeting between AC and associates of the television host of 'Jungle', MT, during which the first video was shown to AC. The third video showed a meeting between AC and MT in the latter's office. Although the ECtHR observed that the publication was not without political importance, it stressed that the parliamentarian was not informed about the fact that they were being filmed and was unconvinced that secret filming was necessary for the second and third videos. Consequently, it found that the sanction of €100,000 was not only in conformity with the Convention, but was also lenient, given the legitimate expectation of privacy of AC.[75]
- A final example is a case about a video of an applicant, a well-known investigative journalist, in which she was shown having sex with her then boyfriend, which was leaked to the press. The newspaper in question did not publish the material, but merely referenced it and commented on it in a negative manner. The government argued that the applicant had no legitimate expectation of privacy, not only because she was a public figure, but also because the material that was referenced in the report was already made public. The Court disagreed:

> It is true that, once a person's privacy has been breached and the information about it has entered into public domain, the damage is already done, and it is virtually impossible to restore the situation to when the breach had never happened. However, while responsible reporting on matters of public interest in accordance with the ethics of journalism is protected by the Convention, there can be no legitimate public interest in exploiting an existing breach of a person's privacy for the purpose of satisfying the prurient curiosity of a certain readership, publicly ridiculing the victim and causing them further harm.[76]

The 'legitimate expectation of privacy' doctrine has several implications for synthetic technologies, three of which stand out:

- First, although public figures have a limited expectation of privacy, this is far from non-existent. This section has focused on cases in which the right to privacy of public figures prevailed over the freedom of expression of media. Although there are at least as many cases in which the ECtHR gave an opposite decision, it illustrates that there are limits to the freedom of expression vis-à-vis public figures. This has important repercussions for DFs of politicians.
- Second, the fact that a person has not published or made available information about a public figure that violates the legitimate expectation of privacy themselves, but only re-uses it or refers to it, does not mean that they are absolved from their obligations under the Convention. This has important repercussions when fake or illegitimate information is re-used or shared, for example, if an existing DF that violates a person's right to privacy is retweeted and commented on, or an AR projects slanderous information next to the face of a person the user encounters.
- Third, granting a broader level of protection to civil servants and politicians under the current regulatory framework in light of synthetic technologies could be considered. The contemporary approach is understandable because, on the one hand, politicians seek public office themselves and, on the other hand, it is vital for a democracy that their actions, policies and behaviour are meticulously scrutinised. However, many politicians decide to leave office and others decide not to run for office because of the toxic online environment. Synthetic technologies have not created this problem, but may well exacerbate it. It is already difficult for many in office to deal with hateful comments on X and other platforms, but for a politician to know that not only their children but also all their children's classmates will check out the latest DF pornography in

which they feature may simply be too much. Consequently, additional protection may be necessary to ensure that the most qualified people will continue to seek office. The extent to which this is desirable should be a matter of societal debate, as stronger protection of rights for public figures may come at the expense of citizens' rights to satire and parody, and even of the possibility to express critical ideas about those in office.

Freedom of Expression and Misinformation

Section 5.5.4 will shed more light on the liability of internet providers that provide a platform for distributing disinformation and the various EU initiatives that target the spread of fake news. With respect to Article 10 ECHR, aside from the specific points raised by synthetic technologies vis-à-vis the doctrines of the reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy, there are two potential regulatory gaps.

On the one hand, under the current regime, making incorrect, false or misleading statements is not prohibited as such. It is prohibited if a speech act causes harm to a personal or general interest. However, with synthetic technologies, there may be no direct harm. The harm may only materialise in the long term, or it may be difficult to establish the exact causal relationship between the speech act and the potential harm caused. In particular, the current focus on harm before a matter can be addressed under the human rights framework entails three things:

- A series of complex issue may arise with regard to the causal relationship between an untrue, incorrect or misleading statement and the damage it causes (anticipated or actual).
- Untrue, incorrect or misleading statements are not regulated or prohibited as such, yet they can be problematic. For example, fake satellite images may be produced in which Russia appears to be moving its nuclear missiles to the Latvian border, causing political tension, or fake news could be spread about vaccines, leading to a decline in vaccine take-up. A political leader may distribute a video that makes it appear that thousands of supporters are at their rallies when in fact there are only a handful.
- Fake information contributes to a post-truth world: a world in which facts and opinions, truths, lies and half-truths are increasingly difficult to distinguish and disentangle.

Regulation could therefore be adopted on this point, for example, by prohibiting clearly untrue, incorrect or misleading statements. However, this would raise the question of what is 'true' and who decides on that matter; do we want the government to have a monopoly on truth? Still, judges already have to make such decisions under the current legal paradigm, such as when it comes to the interpretation of the data quality principle or when a person claims to be defamed by slanderous expressions. In addition, many European countries have adopted rules on Holocaust denial. Thus, although difficult questions may emerge, setting rules and standards for untruthful expressions is not unprecedented.

On the other hand, regulating misinformation in light of democratic elections may be necessary. Several American states have already adopted specific provisions on the use of DFs in election campaigns, inter alia, in the light of Russian attempts to influence election results.[77] It is important to consider that it is not only foreign powers that may spread fake news during election campaigns: national and domestic political parties may do so as well. Several options could be considered.

- Special tort action could enable politicians or political parties who have fallen victim to DFs during election campaigns to claim damages.
- *Ex parte* proceedings for taking down misleading content could be considered.
- Criminal action could be considered with respect to spreading false and misleading information during election campaigns with the purpose of influencing election results.

However, this may be a sensitive topic because what is considered to be true or false is often the nexus of the political debate.

Importantly, criminal and civil law provisions only have a limited practical effect on the threat of foreign election interference. Other instruments should be considered there, such as diplomacy or possible digital counter-measures. Legislative changes should not only be considered with respect to countries influencing Western democracies; countries like Russia, China and Iran are also targeting the Global South. This is being done for a wide variety of reasons, such as influencing concrete decision making (eg, so that a Russian state-owned company gets a contract instead of an EU-based company), influencing local elections (eg, to bring a China-friendly regime to power) or influencing decisions at the international level (eg, by getting a country to vote in favour of the lifting of sanctions against Iran).

> The EU has announced a Defence of Democracy Packages:
>
> > The package will include a legislative initiative strengthening the resilience of the EU democratic space to foreign interference (to curb the influence exerted through covert interest representation services paid for or directed from outside the EU) and other non-legislative support measures. These are expected to include a non-legislative initiative to complement the legislative initiative on foreign interference, a recommendation on secure and resilient elections, and a recommendation on civic engagement.[78]

It is currently unclear how that package will take shape and whether the measures contained in it will be sufficient to tackle the various threats for democracy and the rule of law synthetic technologies entail.[79] The Council of Europe has not adopted a comprehensive approach to countering online disinformation and the impact on democratic elections,[80] although it is aware of the many dangers.[81]

5.3.6. Conclusion

This section explored how freedom and property rights accepted under the ECHR and the CFREU may apply to synthetic technologies. In particular, it focused on open-ended questions and the regulatory gaps that may emerge:

- The current human rights catalogue seems ill-suited to be applied to non-human entities; if, in the future, rights were to be attributed to non-human entities, a new catalogue should be drawn up, which distinguishes between deceased persons, avatars, non-existent persons and robots, assigns new rights and freedoms to each of these entities, decides on their legal standing and on the question of legal personhood, and takes into account their current and future (desired) moral status.
- The right to physical and intellectual property, as well as the freedom to conduct a business, could give rise to a number of complicated conflicts – for example, if there are two contrasting property rights, if the authorship of a synthetic work is difficult to assign because there are multiple parties involved, if a HR is destroyed and its owner claims loss of future possession or if one party has intellectual property rights over specific content, but the other invokes the fair use doctrine, the private copy exemption or the right to parody.

- With respect to the right to privacy, the ECtHR has reinterpreted this doctrine as a personality right. This means that almost any interference with an interest of a natural person will be considered to interfere with Article 8 ECHR. This may include harm to non-human entities owned or operated by a natural person. However, the extent to which this will be accepted, especially in light of the *de minimis* requirement, is unclear. In addition, when harm to a deceased person affects the interests of a natural person, the latter may invoke their right to privacy. There is ongoing debate, which is particularly important in the light of synthetic technologies, regarding whether the interests of dead people should also be protected through a so-called 'post-mortem privacy right'.
- The doctrine of the chilling effect may set limits on the use of synthetic technologies when people adjust their behaviour when they know or have reason to believe that their data will be gathered, for example, by a person wearing an AR device or a HR they may encounter. However, the issue of whether a chilling effect exists is a particularly difficult one to address because it depends on context and personal evaluations. This will need to be determined on a case-by-case basis. It is clear that under both the Council of Europe's and the EU's legal acquis, there is room for stronger rules on preventing or mitigating the risks of manipulative AI and safeguarding individual autonomy and psychological integrity.
- On many accounts, the current anti-discrimination doctrine is ill-suited for tackling the danger of biases fed to and generated by AI systems. When AI is trained on biased data sets, it will have an incomplete, incorrect or distorted view of reality. When AI predictions are inaccurate, they nevertheless shape and change existing reality. A revised framework that is tailored to AI may need to focus on how data are gathered and analysed, and on the procedure running up to a decision rather than on the decision itself.
- There are cases in which the freedom of expression and the right to privacy will clash. The reasonable expectation of privacy entails that people can legitimately invoke the right to privacy both in private and in public and professional settings, as well as when they have made information public themselves. The legitimate expectation of privacy means that although public figures must tolerate more substantial intrusions into their private lives, their right to privacy cannot be completely disregarded. However, where the boundary

is drawn with respect to the various uses of synthetic technologies is unclear. Three regulatory questions have been discussed: first, whether untruthful and incorrect expressions should be prohibited, even if they do not cause direct harm to personal or societal interests; second, whether additional regulation is needed against influencing democratic elections and political decision making through the use of fake news; and, third, whether public figures and politicians should be granted a higher level of protection to ensure that those best qualified for public office actually seek that office. Each of these potential legislative changes triggers a number of complicated moral and legal questions.

5.4. DATA AND TECHNOLOGY REGULATION

5.4.1. Introduction

This section explores EU regulation in the context of AI, technology and interoperability. First, it discusses the various enacted and proposed legal instruments setting technical requirements for developing, marketing and exporting digital products (section 5.4.2). This is followed by a discussion of the proposed AI Act (section 5.4.3). Then, the various rules on data control and data portability are evaluated in light of synthetic technologies (section 5.4.4), and the tenability of the underlying philosophy of Europe's data regulations in an AI-mediated world is discussed (section 5.4.5). Finally, a short conclusion is provided (section 5.4.6).

5.4.2. Product Requirements

The EU has adopted and proposed various rules for manufacturing, utilising and exporting products (digital and physical) and machines,[82] such as, but not limited to:

- The proposed Machine Regulation[83] subjects high-risk machines to a conformity check. In determining the probability and severity of harm, the Regulation stresses, account should be taken of the degree to which each affected person would be impacted by the harm, the number of persons potentially affected, the degree to which potentially affected parties are dependent on the outcome produced by the machinery product, the degree to which they are in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis

the user of the machinery product, the degree of reversibility of the harm produced by the machinery product, the degree to which the machinery product has been used for a specific purposes, and indications of harm that have been caused in the past by machinery products that have been used for a specific purpose. The rules contained in this Regulation will be relevant in particular for HRs used in factories.

- The Regulation on Medical Devices[84] lays down additional requirements for the production of medical devices. These may be relevant when HRs, AR devices and VR worlds are deployed in medical facilities, for treatment purposes or as care robots in homes. A medical device is defined broadly as any instrument intended by the manufacturer to be used for human beings for the purpose of diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, prediction, prognosis, treatment or alleviation of disease or disability. The Regulation provides that they must be designed and manufactured in such a way that, when used under the conditions and for the purposes intended, they will not compromise patient safety. Manufacturers must eliminate or reduce risks as far as possible (inherently safe design and construction) and, where appropriate, take adequate protection measures. If the devices are intended to administer medicinal products, they must be compatible with the medical products, and their performance should be maintained in accordance with the intended use. Devices with a measuring function must be designed and manufactured in such a way as to provide sufficient accuracy.
- The proposed Regulation on Product Safety[85] underlines that only safe products can be put on the EU market. These are products that, under normal or reasonably foreseeable conditions of use or misuse, do not present any risk or only minimal acceptable risks, and are consistent with the high level of protection of health and safety of consumers. Risk is defined under the Regulation as the combination of the probability of an occurrence of a hazard causing harm and the degree of severity of that harm. Comparatively, high risk is defined as a risk for which the combination of the probability of occurrence of a hazard causing harm and the degree of severity of the harm is considered to require rapid intervention by market surveillance authorities. Importantly, a recital to the Regulation as proposed by the Commission also referred to 'psychological risk, development risks, in particular for children, mental risks, depression, loss of sleep, or altered brain function'. This interpretation of safety might have had serious repercussions for, inter alia, VR games that are addictive or lead to reduced social contact, sleep deprivation and depression.

However, this recital was struck from the current wording of the text, so it remains to be seen whether such effects will be considered to fall under the scope of this Regulation, which mainly focuses on ensuring physical safety.

- The Directive on the Safety of Toys has a limited scope.[86] It covers, inter alia, playground equipment intended for public use and automatic playing machines. The Directive might apply to AR and VR devices used in arcade-like settings, which would mean manufacturers and providers would have to ensure that the toys do not jeopardise the safety or health of users or third parties when they are used as intended or in a foreseeable way, bearing the behaviour of children in mind. Harm can both refer to physical injury and any other damage to health, including long-term health effects. Although the Directive's focus is on physical dangers (eg, radioactivity, inflammation, strangulation, electrocution and suffocation), it cannot be excluded that it might also apply if there are adverse mental health effects.
- The Network and Information Systems (NIS2) Directive encourages states to draw up elaborate laws and policies in the domain of cybersecurity.[87]
- The Cyber Security Act focuses on networks and information systems, and sets up a regulatory body to take the regulatory initiative in this field.[88] The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) has drawn up a report on cybersecurity issues in relation to AI, in which it maps various AI-related security risks through the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) model.

Table 5.4 ENISA's application of the CIA paradigm in the context of AI[89]

Security goal	**Contextualisation in AI (selected examples of AI-specific attacks)**
Confidentiality	Oracle: A type of attack in which the attacker explores a model by providing a series of carefully crafted inputs and observing outputs. These attacks can be precursor steps to more harmful types, for example, evasion or poisoning. It is as if the attacker made the model talk in order to then better compromise it or to obtain information about it (eg, model extraction) or its training data (eg, membership inference attacks and inversion attacks).

(continued)

Table 5.4 ***(Continued)***

Security goal	**Contextualisation in AI (selected examples of AI-specific attacks)**
	Model disclosure: This threat refers to a leak of the internals (ie, parameter values) of the Machine Learning model. This model leakage could occur because of human error or a third party with too low a security level.
Integrity	Evasion: A type of attack in which the attacker works on the ML algorithm's inputs to find small perturbations leading to a large modification of its outputs (eg, decision errors). It is as if the attacker created an optical illusion for the algorithm. Such modified inputs are often called adversarial examples.
	Poisoning: A type of attack in which the attacker alters data or models to modify the ML algorithm's behaviour in a chosen direction (eg, to sabotage its results or to insert a back door). It is as if the attacker conditioned the algorithm according to its motivation.
Availability	Denial of service: ML algorithms usually consider input data in a defined format to make their predictions. Thus, a denial of service could be caused by input data whose format is inappropriate. However, it may also occur that a malicious user of the model constructs an input data (a sponge example) specifically designed to increase the computation time of the model and thus potentially cause a denial of service.

- There is a Cyber Resilience Act[90] under discussion, which, if adopted, would regulate products with digital elements, namely software or hardware products and their remote data processing solutions. Remote data processing includes any data processing performed at a distance for which the software is designed and developed by the manufacturer or under the responsibility of the manufacturer, and the absence of which would prevent the product from performing one of its functions. The Act distinguishes between ordinary products with digital elements, critical products with digital elements and highly critical products with digital elements. When determining the level of cybersecurity risk, account must be taken of the product's cybersecurity-related functionality, its intended use in sensitive environments, its intended use in performing critical or sensitive functions, the potential extent of an adverse impact and the extent to which the use of products has already caused material

or non-material loss. All products must be designed, developed and produced in such a way that they ensure an appropriate level of cybersecurity based on the risks. If there are known exploitable vulnerabilities, the products cannot be marketed. It must be ensured that the products are secured, the data are encrypted, the processing of data remains limited to what is necessary and the integrity of the device is safeguarded. These rules are important, inter alia, in relation to synthetic technologies produced in totalitarian countries that have back doors built into them.[91]

- This theme is also addressed by the Dual Use Regulation, but in reverse.[92] Dual-use items are technologies that can be used for good (eg, monitoring and arresting terrorism suspects) but also for bad (eg, monitoring and subsequently quelling political dissidents). The Regulation contains export control rules, including a set of assessment criteria and types of authorisations, a list of dual-use items, provisions for end-use controls on non-listed items, and specific control measures and compliance to be introduced by exporters, such as record-keeping and registers.[93] The Regulation only covers the export of technologies from EU to non-EU territories. At a minimum, such limitations should prevent dictatorial regimes from obtaining technologies that they can misuse. Importantly, the Regulation also places emphasis on the potential human rights effects of exported technologies. With regard to cybersurveillance items, the Regulation requires competent authorities to consider in particular the risk of them being used in connection with internal repression or the commission of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.[94] The Regulation includes broad references to export controls on 'Electronics', 'Computers' and 'Telecommunications and information security computers'. Each of those categories is further specified in the Regulation in a very detailed list of sensors, operational capacities, and hardware and software. The extent to which synthetic technologies are covered by those lists needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis and depends, inter alia, on the software, microchips and sensors being used. European countries may be under a positive obligation to prohibit the export of technologies if they know technologies are likely to be misused by regimes that have a bad track record with respect to human rights.
- Finally, a European Commission expert group has designed the Ethics Guidelines for AI, which includes a Framework for Trustworthy AI.[95] This framework suggests that AI must be lawful, ethical and robust. Robustness entails that AI systems should perform in a safe, secure and reliable manner, and that safeguards should be foreseen to prevent any unintended adverse impacts. It stresses that of utmost importance is the

respect for human dignity, which entails that all people are treated with respect due to them as moral *subjects* rather than merely as *objects* to be sifted, sorted, scored, herded, conditioned or manipulated (see also Chapter 4, section 4.3). This is why, the Guidelines suggest, AI systems should be developed in a manner that respects, serves and protects humans' physical and mental integrity, as well as their personal and cultural sense of identity and the satisfaction of their essential needs. The Guidelines stress the importance of the rule of law, respect for democratic processes, human freedom and autonomy, and the prohibition of discrimination. In terms of ethics, it lays down four leading principles:

- *Human autonomy*: humans that interact with AI systems must be able to keep full and effective self-determination over themselves. Consequently, AI systems should not unjustifiably subordinate, coerce, deceive, manipulate, condition or herd humans. On the contrary, they should be designed to augment, complement and empower human cognitive, social and cultural skills.
- *Prevention of harm*: AI systems should protect human dignity and mental and physical integrity. Consequently, AI systems should not be open to malicious use, and vulnerable persons should receive greater attention and be included in the development, deployment and use of AI systems. Preventing harm also entails preventing information asymmetries.
- *Fairness*: fairness, from a substantive point of view, entails the obligation to ensure the equal and just distribution of both benefits and costs, and ensuring that individuals and groups are free from unfair bias, discrimination and stigmatisation, as well as from being deceived or unjustifiably impaired in their freedom of choice. Procedurally, fairness entails the ability to contest and seek effective redress against decisions made by AI systems and by the humans operating them.
- *Explicability*: processes should be transparent. The capabilities and purpose of AI systems should be openly communicated, and decisions should be explainable to the parties that are affected both directly and indirectly.

In terms of technical robustness, it further distinguishes between several sub-principles:

- *Resilience to attack and security*: AI systems should be protected against vulnerabilities that can allow them to be exploited by adversaries (eg, hacking).
- *Fallback plan and general safety*: AI systems should have safeguards that enable a fallback plan in case of problems (eg, allowing a switch from a statistical to a rule-based procedure).

- *Accuracy*: AI systems must be able to make correct judgements to correctly classify information into the proper categories, for example, and to make correct predictions, recommendations or decisions based on data or models. The guidelines emphasise that a high level of accuracy is especially crucial in situations where the AI system directly affects human lives.
- *Reliability and reproducibility*: AI systems should be reproducible. This enables scientists and policy-makers to accurately describe what AI systems do. Replication files can also facilitate the process of testing and reproducing behaviours.



Figure 5.3 Framework for trustworthy AI[96]

What is clear from the foregoing is that synthetic technologies must be developed and designed in a way that they, inter alia, only process data when necessary, that these data must be adequately protected against misuse and third-party hacks, that the technologies may not do physical harm, that they must have safeguards in place against bias and discriminatory effects, that they produce results that are accurate and reproducible, and that there are systems in place for when things go awry. However,

there are many open-ended questions because many of these regimes have only recently been adopted or proposed, their primary goal is not regulating synthetic technologies and many of the principles are general in nature. These points include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Many of these instruments are sectoral or concern niche use of products, such as in arcade settings. Although sectoral regulation can be useful, three things stand out:
  - First, an overall framework for product requirements is mostly lacking.
  - Second, although some sectors and use cases are specifically addressed, other important sectors and areas are not.
  - Third, sectoral regulation can be valuable for specifying in detail what the general principles from an overarching framework entail for a specific setting; however, the regulations on product requirements as discussed remain mostly abstract and set out general duties of care. There can be substantial differences in how the transparency principle or how the requirement of technical security should be understood and implemented according to sector or context; yet, the current regimes do not answer questions such as: what does it mean to be transparent? Which information needs to be communicated to whom and how? What does it mean to implement technical security standards? Which standards must be embedded in which systems and how? What does it mean to have a fair system? Which definition of fairness is used and how should it be implemented?
- It is unclear what these general rules would mean precisely for the various synthetic technologies, as they are written either for AI in general or, even more broadly, for products and machines.
- Several instruments primarily focus on physical harm, while most synthetic technologies will result in immaterial personal harm or societal harm, if any. It is unclear to what extent such harm will also be covered by these instruments.
- The rules on the export of technology are general and vague, and are not tailored to synthetic technologies. Given the potential impact of these technologies on human rights, the rule of law and democracy, it can be questioned whether these technologies should be regulated explicitly in the Dual Use Regulation.
- Rules on the import of technologies are mostly absent. Since most AI technologies are developed outside Europe and imported, developing

an equivalent of the Dual Use Regulation for importing technologies that are important into Europe could be considered.

- Finally, although the framework for trustworthy AI is elaborate, it is not legally binding.

5.4.3. AI Regulation

An AI Act[97] is currently under discussion in the EU.[98] If this Regulation were to come into effect in its current form, there would be three levels of AI systems: (1) low-risk AI systems; (2) high-risk AI systems; and (3) prohibited AI systems.

For the first category, no additional rules would be imposed.

With respect to the third category, the Act states that the following are prohibited[99] – the placing on the market, putting into service or use of an AI system:

- that deploys subliminal techniques beyond a person's consciousness in order to materially distort a person's behaviour in a manner that causes or is likely to cause that person or another person physical or psychological harm;
- that exploits any of the vulnerabilities of a specific group of persons due to their age, physical or mental disability, in order to materially distort the behaviour of a person pertaining to that group in a manner that causes or is likely to cause that person or another person physical or psychological harm;
- by public authorities for the evaluation or classification of the trustworthiness of natural persons over a certain period of time based on their social behaviour or known or predicted personal or personality characteristics, with the social score leading to either detrimental or unfavourable treatment of natural persons or groups (a) in social contexts which are unrelated to the contexts in which the data was originally generated or collected, or (b) that is unjustified or disproportionate to their social behaviour or its gravity;
- that take the shape of 'real-time' remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement, unless and insofar as such use is strictly necessary for law enforcement purposes.

Since the Act has not been finalised yet, it is unclear how these rules would map onto synthetic technologies, inter alia, because there are still open questions regarding what would amount to 'physical or psychological harm', 'materially distorting a person's behaviour' or 'unfavourable treatment'. Still, it is clear that, in particular, two applications of synthetic technologies may be prohibited under the Act:

- The case in which AR systems are used in smart cities where people are subconsciously manipulated. Although it is true that these manipulations are so far 'for the better' – for example, where AR systems are deployed as a means of crowd control to prevent traffic jams or to make people in nightlife areas less aggressive – it cannot be excluded that these techniques could and would be used for more controversial purposes. In addition, it will become clear, presumably through jurisprudence on the matter, the extent to which subconscious manipulation itself amounts to harm, even when it is used 'for the better'.
- The case in which HRs are deployed for law enforcement purposes or in which police officers wear AR devices that enable remote biometric identification of natural persons. The extent to which this is strictly necessary in light of the public interest and is in conformity with the requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity would need to be assessed.

With respect to the second category of AI systems, the Act sets out a large number of categories of high-risk AI systems,[100] such as:

- AI systems intended to be used for the 'real-time' and 'post' remote biometric identification of natural persons;
- AI systems intended to be used for the purpose of determining access or assigning natural persons to educational and vocational training institutions, for assessing students or for assessing participants in tests required for admission to educational institutions;
- AI systems intended to be used for recruitment or selection of natural persons or for making decisions on the promotion, assignment, distribution and termination of work;
- AI systems intended to be used to evaluate the eligibility of natural persons for public assistance benefits and services, to evaluate the creditworthiness of natural persons or establish their credit score, or to dispatch or establish priority in the dispatching of emergency first-response services;

- AI systems intended for making individual risk assessments of natural persons, as polygraphs or to detect the emotional state of a natural person, to detect DFs or for evaluation of the reliability of evidence, for predicting the occurrence or reoccurrence of criminal offences, for profiling or for crime analytics;
- AI systems intended to be used as polygraphs or to detect the emotional state of a natural person, to assess a risk, including a security risk, a risk of irregular immigration, or a health risk, for the verification of the authenticity of travel documents or for the examination of asylum, visa and residence permit applications;
- AI systems intended to assist a judicial authority in researching and interpreting facts and the law, and in applying the law to a concrete set of facts.

It is obvious that many synthetic applications discussed in Chapter 2 may fall into these categories, as they are used for a wide variety of ways, including in educational settings, for recruiting, for risk assessments and for security purposes. In addition, the use of AI for DF detection is explicitly mentioned.

For all the systems falling into the second category, the AI Regulation lays down obligations and requirements that need to be respected. Some of these include the following:

- A risk management system needs to be established, consisting of a continuous iterative process run throughout the entire lifecycle of an AI system, requiring regular systematic updating and comprising an identification and analysis of known and foreseeable risks.[101]
- When training models, data should be kept on the design choices, data collection and relevant data preparation, which should include an examination in view of possible biases and the identification of any possible data gaps or shortcomings.
- A system should enable logging, for example, to record each use of the system, the reference database against which input data has been checked by the system and the input data for which the search has led to a match.
- A system should be designed and developed so that natural persons can effectively oversee it while the AI system is in use.
- The manufacturer and the provider of the product are each responsible for compliance with these rules, which, as the European Commission has explained, should be understood inter alia as a safeguard against self-learning AI systems that go rogue.

- Before placing a high-risk AI system on the market:
  - importers of such systems have to ensure that the appropriate conformity assessment procedure has been carried out by the provider of that AI system, that the provider has drawn up the required technical documentation and that the system bears the required conformity marking;
  - distributors have to verify that the system bears the required conformity markings, that it is accompanied by the required documentation and instruction of use, and that the provider and the importer of the system have complied with their obligations.
- Any distributor, importer, user or other third party shall be considered a provider. This means they have to ensure that their high-risk AI systems are compliant with the various requirements, have a quality management system in place, draw up the technical documentation, keep logs, do a conformity assessment, take the necessary corrective actions when a breach is established and inform the supervisory authorities thereof.
- Users of high-risk AI systems should use systems in accordance with the instructions for their system and monitor the operation of the high-risk AI system on the basis of the instructions. Users also keep the logs that are generated by that high-risk AI system.

Finally, certain AI systems are subject to a transparency obligation.[102] If AI systems are intended to interact with natural persons, those persons should be informed that they are interacting with an AI system, unless this is obvious from the circumstances or when law enforcement authorities use AI systems to detect, prevent, investigate and prosecute criminal offences. This means that should HRs become truly indistinguishable from humans, they should let natural persons with whom they interact know that they are non-human, for example, when used for hospitality purposes. Users of emotion recognition systems or biometric categorisation systems are obligated to inform those affected of the operation of the system, except when law enforcement authorities operate these systems. This would mean that when AR devices are equipped with emotion recognition systems, this should be communicated to those that are encountered. Users of AI systems that generate DFs have the obligation to disclose that the content has been artificially generated or manipulated, except in the situation in which law enforcement authorities do so or when this would conflict with citizens' freedom of expression.

How the transparency obligation for DF technology would work in practice is not entirely clear:

- The provision seems to cover all manipulated content; however, the problem is that, depending on the definition of manipulation, any communication technology distorts reality: video services have built-in tools that smoothen skin tones, audio services automatically filter out treble and so forth. Some experts estimate that, in five years, more than 90 per cent of all online content will be manipulated in some form. Importantly, the AI Act also refers to manipulated content about objects, places and events. Would this provision consequently also apply to a smiley-faced sun?
- The provision only requires users to disclose that the content has been manipulated, but to whom should they disclose this information: the general public, the person depicted or the platform on which it was posted?
- It is the user of the AI system who is obligated to report information about the manipulation, but how should they do so: through the metadata attached to the DF, in the DF itself or in the description of the DF? The AI Act only states 'shall disclose', while the recital speaks of 'labelling'. Labelling is often used within the AI context for preparing data by labelling: categorising the data. This would involve metadata being added, which would most likely not inform the general public that content has been manipulated, unless they have an automatic manipulation detection program running on their computer, which would in itself qualify as a high-risk system. However, this would allow platforms like Facebook and Instagram to easily block manipulated content. The emphasis on metadata and labelling has the potential drawback that real content that has been made to appear manipulated by adding traces of manipulation in the metadata will also be blocked.
- What should that information include: should it merely state 'this content has been manipulated' or should it provide a description of exactly what has been manipulated and how?
- How does this provision relate to the GDPR and in particular the transparency obligation contained therein?

In addition, the following questions emerge with respect to the applicability of the AI Act in general to synthetic technologies:

- The Act contains a rather limited list of prohibited AI systems; the question is whether the list should be longer, given the danger of AI systems in general and the risks to human rights, the rule of law and democracy several synthetic technologies pose.
- The AI Act mainly adopts a risk-based approach. This entails two potential pitfalls, which may play out simultaneously:
  - It may stifle innovation. Because of the administrative and bureaucratic costs, it will most likely be larger corporations rather than innovative start-ups that can uphold these rules and because these bigger parties prefer safety. Risk-based regulation is open and vague; parties do not get clear guidance from the regulator on what is and what is not allowed. Strict rules often boost rather than stifle innovation, because companies know within which boundaries they can operate and can thus make stable long-term investments.
  - The evaluation of potential risks is initially left up to private organisations, only later to be assessed by a regulatory or court. It is known that this generally means that the 'good guys' will err on the safe side, while it will be the 'bad guys' who look for loopholes in the measures to exploit in a business-friendly way. More generally, the goal of impact assessments, under the AI Act, the GDPR and other EU data instruments, is that risks will be identified and that if these risks cannot be adequately mitigated, the project is cancelled. In practice, however, such decisions are seldom made; certain applications that are in essence problematic (from a substantive perspective) are commonly legitimised by adopting additional procedural safeguards.

  The question is consequently whether the risk-based approach is suitable for addressing the problems at hand.
- A significant problem with data technologies in general and AI in particular is the public-private relationship: governments are growing ever more reliant on the private sector to operate. This means that private parties are directly involved in delivering goods, products and services in the public interest or are partially involved in the execution of public tasks, for example, through public-private partnerships. This means that commercial interests will affect the public interest, public tasks and the public domain (see Chapter 4, section 4.4). This Act does little to reverse this trend or to lay down specific safeguards for public-private partnerships, for example, to prevent private parties' access to public data or prevent commercial interests from having an impact on the execution of public tasks.

- The AI Act mainly sets out procedural and bureaucratic rules in terms of risk assessments, keeping records and accountability, and very few substantive requirements. This approach mirrors to a certain extent that of the GDPR and has two potential advantages:
  - It incentivises an accountability industry, with AI or Data Protection Officers, and accountancy firms that specialise in compliance checks and procedural guidelines. With respect to data protection, this procedural move, combined with the enormous public attention and the high fines that can be imposed, has meant that the matter of compliance has moved from the lower echelons of the organisation, such as the IT person, to C-level. The AI Act may do the same for the AI safety rules contained in it.
  - It is far more easy for supervisory authorities to maintain oversight on and find violations of procedural requirements than with respect to substantive rules, as the latter typically involve complex legal decisions, while not having done an impact assessment, not having appointed a specialist or not having kept records necessary is easy to establish.

  Still, one approach does not exclude the other. This would have been the opportunity to lay down substantive legal requirements for AI systems. One example, among dozens of other substantive requirements that have been suggested in the literature, would be setting a percentage of false positives and false negatives that is permissible according to sector or context. For example, with respect to AI systems applied for diagnostic purposes, false negatives should be well below 1 per cent and potentially below 0.1 per cent, while the ratio of false positives may be higher, but still low given the stress caused by a false diagnosis. For law enforcement purposes, especially in the field of organised crime and terrorism, the permissible level of false negatives also needs to be low, while the number of false positives can be higher, given that such systems usually indicate which suspects should be on the radar of authorities rather than leading to legal consequences. For fraud detection purposes, to give another example, the percentage of false negatives may be relatively high, while the percentage of false positives should be relatively low, given the impact of false accusations on persons' lives, especially when the tax authorities take automated decisions based on AI profiles.

5.4.4. Data Control and Portability

Many European data regulations emphasise the need for data control, confidentiality and limits on data transfers, such as, but not limited to, the following:

- The GDPR essentially holds that data can only be processed by a data controller for predetermined purposes and that the data cannot subsequently be processed by another party for other purposes. No more data than necessary for that pre-established goal may be gathered and the data that are gathered can be stored no longer than needed for that purposes and must be deleted once that goal has been attained. Data must be stored confidentially and securely, meaning that they are protected against unauthorised access by personnel and third parties (eg, hackers). In addition, because the GDPR sets the highest level of protection in the world, transferring personal data from the EU to, for example, China, India or the US, would in principle mean that the data are no longer adequately protected. This is why the GDPR provides that doing so is prohibited, unless the country to which the data are transferred commits to a legal regime essentially equivalent to the GDPR or the foreign organisation to which the data are transferred commits to abiding by the GDPR standards, such as through contractual agreements.[103]
- The Data Governance Act[104] sets rules not only on the processing of personal data, but also on the processing of non-personal data.[105] Non-personal data could entail data that an AR provider collects on the environment in which users operate, without linking those data to a specific user. For example, if there are sufficient users in the area, it could collect real-time data on traffic, weather conditions, smog levels and so forth. These data can be valuable and protected through, inter alia, intellectual property rights of the synthetic technologies providers' or the operators' freedom to conduct businesses (see section 5.3.2). To ensure their interests are adequately safeguarded, the Data Governance Act protects non-personal data from unauthorised access.[106] It also stresses that appropriate safeguards should be adopted by the non-EU country to which non-personal data are transferred. These safeguards should consist of measures that ensure non-personal data benefit from a level of protection like that applicable in the EU with regard to the protection of trade secrets and the protection of intellectual property rights. In addition, re-use mechanisms in third countries may need to attach stricter conditions

for highly sensitive non-personal data, such as anonymised data sets held by actors in the public health system. These rules would have considerable repercussions for HRs or AR devices that are used in the healthcare sector.

- The proposed e-Privacy Regulation,[107] which will replace the 2002 e-Privacy Directive in time,[108] addresses the processing of electronic communications data. These can consist of electronic communications content and electronic communications metadata. There are three doctrines of relevance for synthetic technologies:
  - Although there are exceptions, the confidentiality principle entails that any interference with electronic communications data by persons other than the end-users shall be prohibited, such as by listening, tapping, storing, monitoring, scanning, surveillance or processing of electronic communications data.[109]
  - Second, although there are exceptions,[110] the use of processing and storage capabilities of terminal equipment and the collection of information from end-users' terminal equipment, including about its software and hardware, other than by the end-user concerned is prohibited, as is the collection of information transferred by terminal equipment to enable it to connect to another device or piece of network equipment. Like the integrity of one's home, which private parties can only enter with consent or when this is necessary (eg, in an emergency), the e-Privacy Regulation recognises the principle of device integrity. Given that this equipment contains information that may reveal details of an individual's emotional, political and social state, third parties are not allowed to enter or extract information from the terminal equipment of users.[111] Consequently, if AR or VR applications are run on user equipment (partially or fully), or if a HR is teleoperated via user equipment and, for example, a cookie is used, these rules apply.
  - Third, spam is prohibited.[112] How this rule would apply to AR and VR settings in which users are confronted with unsolicited advertisements of shops in their vicinity or of online virtual shops is unclear, but in principle, it is prohibited to communicate directly to the consumer using the contact details obtained through the provider, unless the user has indicated they want to receive advertisements of the shops they pass by on their screen.
- Alongside the EU rules on the transfer of personal and non-personal data, the ECtHR has laid down rules for transferring data by European governmental (intelligence) agencies from and to foreign

counterparts. First, the Court has held that there is the risk that data about Europeans are communicated to foreign parties and are treated according to a different and more flexible regime than they would have been had they stayed in European hands. Second, when data are shared with foreign counterparts (for example, data about nationals of that country), they might be used for human rights violations, such as imposing the death penalty on or the torturing of political dissidents. Third, shared data may be used by European intelligence agencies to circumvent the European human rights regime, for example, asking American counterparts to collect data they are not allowed to gather themselves.[113] On all these points, the ECtHR has laid down a detailed list of rules, conditions, and checks and balances.[114]

Consequently, various rules and legal instruments in Europe aim at what is sometimes called data privatisation and data nationalisation.[115] These principles contrast with the practice on the ground on several points, such as, but not limited to, the following:

- While the data regulations require a pre-established purpose for gathering data, the practice of many organisations is to gather data first and only later determine what purpose they could suit. This is not only the established practice, one of the promises of algorithms and AI is that they can find patterns in data that humans cannot. Thus, so the argument goes, it is impossible to pre-establish the goal and value of the data, as the exact goal of these systems is to uncover new and unforeseen data purposes.
- While data regulations emphasise the data minimisation principle, the practice is that organisations gather as much data as possible. The problem in particular for Europe will be that while it could potentially prohibit European companies from scraping the web to gather training data, it would be certain that American and Chinese organisations would do exactly that. For training AI models, enormous quantities of data are necessary and, in principle, the more data they are fed, the more accurate the models get.
- While data regulations emphasise that European organisations cannot use systems that have been trained on data that have been developed in a way that conflicts with European standards, eg, using facial recognition systems that have been trained on photos scraped from the internet without the consent of citizens, the practice is that organisations buy and use AI systems from American companies nonetheless.

- While data regulations require that the pre-established goal for processing data should be narrowly defined, most contemporary organisations employ very general and vague purposes. This also means that although the regulations emphasise that data must be deleted as soon as the pre-established goal has been attained, the practice is that organisations keep data as long as possible, inter alia to allow AI programs to train on historical data and to find longitudinal patterns.
- While data regulations specify the purpose limitation principle, meaning that data can only be used for the pre-established purpose for which they are collected, the AI revolution is to a large extent based on the idea that data can and should be re-used, that they can have a second life and can serve new purposes.
- While data regulations emphasise the data quality principle, meaning that data that are processed should be correct, for example, in order to avoid mistakes and decisions based on erroneous information having an impact on citizens, LLMs and AI are trained on such large data sets that the quality of individual data points is less relevant for the accuracy of the model than the quantity of the data on which it is trained.
- While data regulations emphasise control and confidentiality, the practice is to share data between organisations, as well as between international counterparts, and to make part of the AI models and underlying databases available open access to allow for shared creativity and learning processes.

Consequently, many experts have stressed the fundamental incompatibility of the data rules, which date back to the 1970s, with contemporary data practices. The regulator thus needs to make a choice as to whether to maintain the current legal framework, which would mean that many of the developments in AI would be prohibited in Europe. Alternatively, it could set these principles aside to facilitate the rise of a European AI industry, but that would effectively mean abrogating the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection, which in turn also contain important safeguards against other human rights violations, such as the prohibition of non-discrimination. Finally, it could opt for keeping the current approach, which is to officially emphasise the various data principles, while turning a blind eye to actual data practice.

To make matters more complex, there are not only tensions between the legal framework and data practice. Alongside setting limits on processing and transferring data, the EU's legal acquis also emphasises

informational openness and the need for sharing data. Examples include, but are not limited to, the following:

- The same year that the EU adopted the GDPR, it also put out the Free Flow of Non-Personal Data Regulation.[116] This regulation prohibits data localisation requirements set by states which entail that data have to stay within the borders of a country. Alongside data localisation requirements, it dissuades restrictions on data mobility set by private organisations through legal, contractual and technical standards which prevent users of data processing services from porting their data from one service provider to another or back to their own information technology systems. The Regulation emphasises that taking away these limitations on the free flow of non-personal data is important to facilitate and stimulate the development of new technologies such as AI. Where data sets contain both personal and non-personal data, in principle, the GDPR should be applied.[117]
- The GDPR, the Free Flow of Non-Personal Data Regulation and the proposed Data Act emphasise the need for data portability and interoperability of systems:
    - The Free Flow of Non-Personal Data Regulation underlines the need for best practices for facilitating the switching of service providers and the porting of data in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format, including open standard formats where required or requested by the service provider receiving the data.
    - The proposed Data Act[118] provides rules on products connected through the internet[119] and would be applicable to most HRs and AR devices, and, depending on the setting, VR devices. The Act contains an obligation to design and manufacture products and related services in such a manner that data generated by their use are, by default, easily, securely and, where relevant and appropriate, directly accessible to the user. Where data cannot be directly accessed by the user, the data holder must make the data generated by their use of a product or related service available to the user without undue delay, free of charge and, where applicable, continuously and in real time. This shall be done based on a simple request through electronic means where technically feasible. The user can request to make the data generated using a product or related service available to a third party, without undue delay, free of charge, of the same quality as is available to the data holder and, where applicable, continuously and in real time. Although

there are exemptions to both the rules on the access to the data by the user and to their freedom to transfer the data to a third party, both rights have an important bearing on the danger of commercial parties becoming too powerful and on lock-in effects.

- The GDPR[120] provides that the data subject shall have the right to receive the personal data concerning them, which they have provided to a controller, in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format, and have the right to transmit those data to another controller without hindrance from the controller to which the personal data have been provided, if the processing of data was based on consent or a contractual relationship (see section 5.2.5). When designing synthetic technologies and services, developers have a legal obligation to consider this right and to make sure that, as far as possible, the technology or service allows for the smooth transfer of data to a third party in a way that the new party can use the data (the interoperability principle).

These provisions entail that providers of synthetic technologies cannot privatise data and should be conceived as an attempt to break their data monopoly (see the discussion in Chapter 4, section 4.4 and section 5.5.5 below). For example, if a user wants to change to a new HR provider, but wants the new HR to be trained on the data the old HR had collected for self-learning purposes, this should be made possible by the original HR provider. Alternatively, a group of VR players can ask a VR platform to transfer their data to another VR platform so that they can keep their avatars, their avatars' history and characteristics.

- The Data Governance Act re-emphasises the need for a free flow of data and does so in particular through two mechanisms:
  - It sets up data intermediaries, in certain other jurisdictions also known as data trusts, that act as neutral third parties that connect individuals and companies with data users. While they may charge for facilitating the data sharing between the parties, they cannot directly use the data that they intermediate for financial profit (eg, by selling them to another company or using them to develop their own product based on this data).[121]
  - It promotes data altruism,[122] which is defined as the consent by data subjects to process personal data pertaining to them, or permissions of other data holders to allow the use of their non-personal data without seeking a reward, for purposes of general interest, such as scientific research purposes or improving public services.

- Although the GDPR is best known for setting limits and imposing restrictions on the processing of data, that is only one side of the coin. In fact, the reason for adopting an EU-wide data protection regime was that until the predecessor of the GDPR was adopted in 1995, every European country had its own set of rules and regulations, which were incompatible and imposed conflicting obligations on data controllers. By setting one framework for the entire EU, data controllers operating in multiple jurisdiction had to abide by only one legal instrument and could freely transfer personal data across borders within Europe. Still today, the first article of the GDPR emphasises the dual nature of the data protection framework:

  > This Regulation lays down rules relating to the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and rules relating to the free movement of personal data. This Regulation protects fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal data. The free movement of personal data within the Union shall be neither restricted nor prohibited for reasons connected with the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data.

Finally, it is important to take into account the rules on the re-use of public sector information. Western society has been based on the principle of open and transparent government for centuries. The idea is that critical citizens and journalists should be able to check decision-making processes in order to expose potential problems and abuse of power. This principle also allows historians and scientists to examine archives in order to describe and verify how governments operated in certain periods. An open government is considered quintessential for a vital democracy. Four important developments have taken place in recent years:

- Government documents used to be available in archives, libraries or specially designated information centres. Nowadays, more and more documents are made available online. This has an important effect on what is called 'practical obscurity'. The fact that in the past one had to make the effort to go to the place where the documents were stored, request them and view them meant that, in practice, only a limited number of people were able to access the information. Broadly speaking, these were journalists, historians, critical citizens closely following the government and lay historians researching their family trees. By making the documents public on the internet and not setting any access barriers, anyone can now view these documents with ease.
- In the pre-digital age, most documents were 'passively disclosed'; citizens, journalists and others were given access to specific documents

upon request. They already had to have a rough idea of what they were looking for, the disclosure of documents required their initiative, and the documents were usually made available for a certain period of time only. Currently, documents are increasingly disclosed actively; the government publishes documents not upon request, but on its own initiative. This means that there is no longer a specific reason for which a document is made available. Anyone may access them and they are made available permanently.

- The technical possibilities of searching through such documents have increased considerably. These include algorithms and AI tools that can analyse texts for words, correlations and topics. Whereas previously it was primarily individuals who sought access to government documents, currently tech companies are best placed to scan and analyse the millions of governmental documents that appear on the internet every year.
- The EU has encouraged the Member States not only to make data available to further open, transparent and accountable government, but also to facilitate the re-use of government data. The idea is that governments are sitting on 'a mountain of data', while its economic potential is not being exploited. Already in 2000, the total value of the European Public Sector Information (PSI) was estimated to be around €68 billion annually.[123] The data are 'only' used for furthering public interests, it was found, while if the data were released for the commercial re-use, this would incentivise the data economy. Subsequently, the EU adopted a Directive on the re-use of public sector information in 2003, which,[124] following amendments in 2013[125] and 2019,[126] has become even more adamant that governments actively release public sector information to enable re-use by commercial parties.

It is clear that, as with the tensions between data regulations and data practice noted above, there are many tensions between the 2019 Open Data Directive and the GDPR. The purpose limitation principle in principle prohibits the re-use of data for different purposes, while this is the exact goal of the Open Data Directive. In contrast to the data minimisation principle, the Directive emphasises the need for storing and making available data. While the GDPR underlines data confidentiality and security, the Open Data Directive incentivises parties to publish data sets freely available online. And while the GDPR emphasises that data may only be transferred from one data controller to another data controller if both have a legitimate ground for processing, this cannot be verified if data are put online.

As often happens when there is a complicated interplay between two legal instruments of the EU, the EU legislator does not make a choice, but leaves the exact relationship between these two instruments in the middle.[127] Although this has led to the practice of European countries trying to balance the two instruments, recently, the two European courts and in particular the CJEU have made clear that in principle, the GDPR and the right to privacy prevail.[128] Still, many countries are unsure how the two approaches that run through the EU's legal acquis should be unified and many governmental organisations on which open access obligations are imposed are uncertain as to what is required of them. For a long time, the suggested solution was to anonymise data before putting them online, so that the GDPR no longer applies, but as will explained in section 5.4.5, this approach may no longer be feasible.

5.4.5. Data Regulation

Through the various data and technology laws discussed in this chapter, the EU aims at laying down a detailed and comprehensive legislative package for the twenty-first century. Each of these instruments contains valuable provisions, prohibitions, and rights, meaning that taken separately, their introduction should be welcomed. However, there are two fundamental questions that emerge, one concerning legal consistency and the other whether the underlying philosophy of those legal frameworks is valid in an AI-mediated world.[129]

As to the first point, it is remarkable how little EU legal consistency there is in this area. There are several examples of this:

- Ever since the EU started to adopt laws that moved away from the socio-economic realm and entered the field of human rights law, little effort went to harmonising these with the more established ECHR of the CoE and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Often, EU law simply mentions that account should be taken of the case law of the ECtHR on, for example, the concepts of necessity and proportionality, while leaving it open as to what that means exactly for the interpretation of EU laws and legal principles. This is important because the EU's legal corpus, including the CJEU judgments, is not on all points consistent with the approach taken within the CoE. Examples include, but are not limited to, the following:
    - The difference between the protection of privacy under Article 8 ECHR and the EU's data protection regime under the GDPR and the Law Enforcement Directive.[130]

  - The differences between the prevention of discrimination under Article 14 ECHR and the EU laws on specific forms of discrimination, such as on the grounds of race and ethnic origin,[131] discrimination at work on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation,[132] equal treatment for men and women in matters of employment and occupation,[133] equal treatment for men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services,[134] and discrimination based on age, disability, sexual orientation and religion or belief beyond the workplace.[135]
  - The difference between the EU's approach to liability of internet intermediaries, focussing on safe harbours and a notice and take-down or notice and action regime, and the ECtHR's focus on the freedom of expression and the obligations of publishers.

  Because of the discrepancy between both legislative corpuses, it matters for the outcome of a legal dispute whether it is treated under EU law or the ECHR and whether it is judged by the CJEU or the ECtHR.

- The EU adopts so much legislation and in such broad terms that it will be almost impossible for national legislators to bring their full legislative corpus into compliance with EU law. EU laws, such as the GDPR, prevail over the national laws of Member States. But almost every law will entail some form of data processing, such as when referring to the requirement to keep or produce 'documents', 'files', 'registers' or 'information', and virtually all of the specific documents, files, registers or information will contain personal data. No Member State has assessed its entire legislative corpus and revised it in full to bring it into conformity with the GDPR; rather, Member States have chosen to update a handful of laws central to data processing practices and have stressed that all other laws must be interpreted 'in light of the GDPR'. This applies to the various EU laws on non-personal and other types of data as well. In addition, as discussed above in section 5.4.4, it often adopts contrasting legal regimes, without making clear how Member States should apply these in practice.
- The EU is often not consistent or harmonious in its approach and terminology:
  - The GDPR applies different levels of protection to personal data, sensitive data, and anonymous and aggregated data, places pseudonymous data somewhere in between anonymous and personal data, and recognises several types of sensitive data, such as genetic data, biometric data and data concerning health. Many of the

proposed Acts now on the table use different terminologies. The e-Privacy Regulation distinguishes between metadata, including location and traffic data, electronic communications data, electronic communications content and electronic communications metadata, and also makes reference to publicly available directories with data about end-users. The AI Act defines and regulates still different types of data, such as training data, validation data, testing data and input data. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) (which is discussed in more detail in section 5.5.5) emphasises the difference between aggregated and non-aggregated data, and between personal and anonymised data, but also refers to data, both in contrast to the definition of personal data, for which reference is made to the GDPR, and to that of non-personal data, for which reference is made to the Regulation on the transfer of non-personal data. The Regulation on the transfer of non-personal data itself does not give a definition of non-personal data, but of data, which is seen as encompassing all data other than personal data. The Digital Services Act (DSA) (which is discussed in more detail in section 5.5.4) refers to illegal content as a special category of data; the Data Governance Act, like the DMA, distinguishes between three types of data, though not between data, personal data and non-personal data, but between data, non-personal data and metadata; the proposed Data Act only refers to data; and the Open Data Directive refers to dynamic data, research data and high-value data sets as categories of data that are specifically regulated. How these various categories of data and the partial overlaps and contrasts that exist between them will have to be interpreted is left open.

- If these different and sometimes conflicting categorisations of data and the various regimes for protection that are connected to them are not already difficult enough from a compliance perspective, parties that want to abide by the various regimes that may be applicable to them are themselves categorised differently in each legal regime, with different roles and responsibilities being connected to these categories. The GDPR differentiates between the data subject, the data processor and the data controller, the Regulation on the transfer of non-personal data speaks of service providers, users and professional users, the DSA refers to information society services, recipients of services, consumers, traders, intermediary services and online platforms, the DMA differentiates between gatekeepers,

core platform services, cloud computing services, software application stores, online intermediation services, online search engines, ancillary services, online social networking services, identification services, video-sharing platform services, number-independent interpersonal communication services, operating systems, end-users, business users and undertakings, the Data Governance Act makes reference to data holders and data users, the proposed Data Act refers to users, data holders, data recipients and data processing services, and the AI Act, to give a final example, has rules for providers, small-scale providers, users, importers, distributors and operators.

This means that the same entity may be qualified differently under one legislative regime compared to another, the same data may be categorised differently under one act than under another and, consequently, the types of rules, prohibitions and obligations applicable to data processing activities may vary significantly or even conflict on certain points.

In addition, besides the matter of legal consistency, and perhaps more fundamentally, AI and the underlying data technology revolution question the groundwork of European data regulation, which is to differentiate between different data categories and attach different levels of regulatory protection to it. For example, the GDPR differentiates between non-personal data (which are not protected) and personal data (which are protected) and sensitive personal data (the processing of which is, although there are many exceptions, in principle forbidden).[136] Another well-known distinction is between content communications data, which falls under the right to informational secrecy, and meta-communications data, such as data about who has communicated, when and where, which traditionally fall outside the scope of that right, as they would not reveal what was communicated. The idea of having several strictly separated types of data, each with their own scope of protection, is increasingly criticised for reasons such as, but not limited to, the following:

- Working with well-defined and delimited definitions of different types of data only works if the status of data is relatively stable and falls into one category or the other for a longer period of time, while in the data driven environment, this is less and less so. The nature of the data in AI processes is not stable, but can be highly volatile. A data set containing ordinary personal data can be linked to and

enriched with another data set so as to derive sensitive data; the data can then be aggregated or stripped of identifiers and be turned into non-personal, aggregated or anonymous data; subsequently, the data can be de-anonymised or integrated into another data set in order to create personal data. All this can happen in a split second. The question is therefore whether it makes sense to work with well-defined data categories if the same 'datum' or data set can literally fall into a different legal category from one second to the next.

- It is increasingly difficult to determine the status of data precisely. As the Working Party 29 put it, 'the assessment of whether the data allow identification of an individual, and whether the information can be considered as anonymous or not depends on the circumstances, and a case-by-case analysis should be carried out with particular reference to the extent that the means are likely reasonably to be used for identification'.[137] The GDPR holds that in order to determine whether a datum is to be considered 'personal', account should be had of the means that can reasonably be expected to be used for identification. Therefore, in order to determine the current status of a datum or data set, the expected future status of the data must be taken into account. Given the democratisation of technologies and the minimal investment required, it is increasingly likely that when a database is shared or otherwise made available, there will be a party that will combine it with other data, enrich it with data scraped from the internet or merge it into an existing data set. Thus, it is increasingly likely that if an anonymised data set is made public, there will be a party that will de-anonymise it or combine it with other data to create personal profiles, that if a set of personal data is shared, there will be a party that will use that data to create a data set containing sensitive personal data, and so on. On the other hand, there will be other parties that have access to that data, but that will not engage in such activities; parties who will not use the data, use it as it is provided, or even de-identify a database containing personal data. Who will do what is not clear in advance. The legal category to which the data belongs is therefore no longer a quality of the data itself, but a product of a data controller's efforts and investments.
- The question is whether the distinction made between different categories of data is still relevant. The underlying rationale is that the processing of personal data has an effect on natural persons, while the processing of non-personal data does not, and that the processing of sensitive personal data may have very significant consequences

> (greater than the processing of 'ordinary' personal data), so that the latter are subject to the most stringent regime, personal data fall under the 'normal' protection regime, and the processing of non-personal data is not subject to any restrictions. Pseudonymisation does not ensure the full protection of individuals, but it does greatly reduce the number of people and organisations that can link data to specific individuals, which is why pseudonymous data are put a legal purgatory, somewhere between non-personal and personal data. The question is to what extent this rationale is still tenable in the twenty-first century. Data processing on the basis of aggregated data, for example, can also have very big individual and social consequences. Many intelligence agencies prefer meta over content data, not only because they are easier to analyse, but also because they reveal more about a target. Processing of 'ordinary' personal data can often be regarded as very sensitive, such as with processing data about children, though such data are not provided protection under the strictest legal regime afforded by the GDPR.

Although these questions have plagued Europe's approach to data regulation for years, Big Data, AI and the synthetic technologies discussed in this book have amplified the existing concerns. Consequently, the regulator needs to determine to what extent it can hold on to the current approach and what alternatives exist. Should, for example, all data simply be treated as personal data, so that one regulatory regime applies or would that stifle innovation too much?

5.4.6. Conclusion

This section shed light on how current and future legal regimes on technology and data will affect synthetic technologies. As with the GDPR (see section 5.2), the application of the rules discussed in this section to synthetic technologies can be divided into three categories. First, there is the category of rules that set clear boundaries, limitations and conditions for the production, servicing and use of these technologies. Examples include the prohibited AI systems in the AI Act, the cybersecurity requirements in the Cyber Security Act and the Cyber Resilience Act, and the rules on interoperability and device integrity. Second, there is the category of rules for which it is unclear how they would apply to synthetic technologies. This can be either because this is dependent on a case-by-case analysis or because the legal frameworks are unclear

or ambiguous. Examples include the general rules on product safety and indirect references to psychological health, the non-legally binding rules on trustworthy AI, the procedural safeguards contained in the AI Act and the rules on technology and data export. In addition, there are several frameworks with opposing obligations, meaning that it can be unclear to organisations developing or using synthetic technologies how the various rules can be respected at the same time. Third, there is the category of rules that may need revision, such as the sharp distinction under the current legal framework between non-personal and personal data, the relative absence of rules on the import of data and technology, and the choice for risk-based regulation, in particular under the AI Act.

5.5. LIABILITY AND PROCEDURAL LAW

5.5.1. Introduction

This section discusses matters concerning law enforcement, liability, procedural law and consumer and anti-trust law. First, it assesses what effects synthetic media may have in the courtroom (section 5.5.2). Second, the difficulty of law enforcement and the distribution of responsibilities regarding synthetic technologies is discussed, in particular by homing in on the difference between ex ante and ex post regulation (section 5.5.3). The liability of professional parties for AI products and distributing synthetic media (section 5.5.4), and the rules and limits set out in consumer and competition law (section 5.5.5) are then covered. Finally, a small wrap-up is given (section 5.5.6).

5.5.2. Procedural Law

Because it is the ECtHR's task to ascertain whether the proceedings at the national level are fair, including the way in which evidence is evaluated and used, it will establish whether the evidence is presented in such a way that it can guarantee a fair trial.[138] While Article 6 § 1 does not explicitly guarantee the right to have witnesses or experts called, the ECtHR has ruled that when domestic courts refuse to do so, they must give sufficient motivation, such refusal must be non-arbitrary and a refusal will conflict with the right to a fair trial if it amounts to a disproportionate restriction of the litigant's ability to present arguments in support of their case. Importantly, the Court has underlined

that a difference of treatment in respect of the hearing of the parties' witnesses may undermine the equality of arms.

Equality of arms implies that each party must be afforded a reasonable and equal opportunity to present their case, as well as the evidence for their case. When opposing parties have different opportunities with regard to access to relevant information or if governments present evidence in a summary way, disallowing citizens to adequately challenge the evidence, this principle may be violated. The refusal to allow an alternative expert examination of material evidence can result in a violation of the right to fair trial, in particular if it is hard to challenge a report by an expert without the assistance of another expert in the relevant field. A failure of the prosecution to disclose relevant technical details – for example, those details on which an expert report is based – may breach equality of arms as well as the right to an adversarial hearing. This also holds true for non-disclosure of evidence to the defence. In criminal law, the presumption of innocence requires, inter alia, that the burden of proof is on the prosecution and that any doubt should benefit the accused (*in dubio pro reo*). When the national court's reasoning leading up to a conviction is not well reasoned, this can be seen to be in conflict with the right to a fair trial. A final important aspect of the right to a fair trial is the right to effective participation in the proceedings.

The ECtHR has also found that there are procedural requirements implicit in the substantive rights contained in the ECHR. This means that when an administrative body or court of law takes a decision that affects a substantive right (eg, the right to privacy, the freedom of expression or the right to property), these procedural requirements must be respected. For example, under the right to property (Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention),[139] persons affected by a measure interfering with their possessions must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to put their case to the responsible authorities for the purpose of effectively challenging those measures. Even in situations where no individual procedural deficiencies in themselves decisively affect the proportionality of a forfeiture measure, but, taken together, the relevant factors result in uncertainty and imprecision, they may render a forfeiture disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.[140]

Under Article 8 ECHR, the ECtHR has adopted a wide range of procedural requirements.[141] Persons whose right to privacy is affected by a decision by a governmental body should have the ability to bring the matter before the national courts, they should be involved in the decision-making procedure to the degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their interest, and they should have adequate

access to reports and documents that are relevant to the proceedings. The ECtHR has found that it is the responsibility of authorities to investigate the reliability of purported evidence relied on by authorities or to litigate to obtain such information, from an early stage and as soon as practically possible, and provide for the material to be viewed. The ECtHR has also found that decision-making procedures should be swift, fair and independent. Citizens must be heard and have influence over the decision whenever possible. The decision-making process must be timely and the persons affected must have a right to challenge assertions, must be allowed to request second opinions and must have a right to legal representation. The decisions must be comprehensible and fair, and there must be a way to challenge the decisions before another legal body.[142]

There are several questions as to how to apply the current doctrine of procedural law and rules with respect to evidence to synthetic technologies, such as, but not limited to:

- When a HR causes harm or makes a mistake, it is the company operating the HR that would most likely have access to the relevant data. There is a real danger that these data might not be disclosed by companies, citing reasons of business secrets, confidentiality or privacy protection. Because many of these companies are based in different jurisdictions, it may be difficult to obtain a court order to hand over all the relevant data (see however the AI Liability Directive discussed in section 5.5.4). A natural person or company who owns or leases the HR may not be able to demonstrate that it was not their command or sensory input that caused the harm. In addition, the terms and conditions of the HRs may exonerate the company marketing the HR from liability for damage and harm, which may give rise to complicated questions over the validity of these terms and conditions.
- When harm is caused by a synthetic technology, a myriad of parties are often involved, and these parties may be based in multiple jurisdictions, with different rules of procedure, standards for evidence and obligations for parties to testify. When a HR is designed in the Netherlands, built in China, marketed by a US-based company and used by a person in Switzerland, this may trigger a complex web of rules and procedures. Similarly, when one VR player does something harmful to another VR player and the first is based in Ghana, the second is based in Germany and the platform itself is based in Taiwan, intricate jurisdictional problems arise.[143]
- It may not always be clear how HRs or AI-driven avatars operate and respond to input as a self-learning algorithm may develop in

ways that are not necessarily understandable to humans. If there is a legal dispute between a user or victim of an AI-driven creature and a provider of synthetic technologies, a clear question as to the inequality of arms may arise, as citizens do not have access to the data or the underlying technology and do not generally have sufficient technological knowledge to understand information once it is disclosed. This might require them to hire experts and witnesses to interpret the data, which could amount to substantial costs. Because many legal disputes involve an individual citizen fighting a large tech company which, besides technical expertise, usually has access to a large legal team and sufficient recourse to sit out a court case for years, there will be a substantial inequality in court cases.

- In VR worlds in particular, there is a question as to what extent normal courts hold sway over these platforms, which may differ between jurisdictions, because VR worlds often adopt their own forms of dispute resolution. If conflicts between different players arise, they can be required to first use the platform's dispute resolution mechanism, as well as if they have a complaint about the platform itself, either because their avatar is blocked or removed, or because they think the platform is liable for the behaviour of other avatars – for example, because it condones or even actively promotes violent or inappropriate conduct. These private forms of dispute resolution may be biased in favour of the VR platform and may not conform to the rules of procedure applicable to courts.
- It is clear that if a governmental authority takes a decision that significantly affects a person, such as placing a HR care robot in the home of a person and subsequently takes it away, all procedural safeguards must be adhered to, such as informing the person in full, consulting them, and taking due account of their views and potential objections. In principle, such rules, as established under the ECHR, do not directly apply to private parties, although there may be a positive obligation for states to ensure that private parties respect the human rights of citizens. This could be yet another motive for states to privatise the execution of public tasks, such as medical care.
- The use of ChatGPT and other LLMs by both judges and lawyers has raised concerns. First, private companies are given access to preliminary pleas and judgments, which would put them in a position to use or abuse that knowledge. Second, as explained in Chapter 4, LLMs are not neutral; they are biased. This would mean that algorithmic biases would have a potential impact on the outcome of

court cases. Third, LLMs make mistakes and fabricate facts, sources and evidence. There are already examples of how their use can lead to problematic results:

> [One case] involved a man suing an airline over an alleged personal injury. His legal team submitted a brief that cited several previous court cases in an attempt to prove, using precedent, why the case should move forward. But the airline's lawyers later wrote to the judge to say they could not find several of the cases that were referenced in the brief. 'Six of the submitted cases appear to be bogus judicial decisions with bogus quotes and bogus internal citations', Judge Castel wrote in an order demanding the man's legal team explain itself. Over the course of several filings, it emerged that the research had not been prepared by Peter LoDuca, the lawyer for the plaintiff, but by a colleague of his at the same law firm. Steven A Schwartz, who has been an attorney for more than 30 years, used ChatGPT to look for similar previous cases. In his written statement, Mr Schwartz clarified that Mr LoDuca had not been part of the research and had no knowledge of how it had been carried out. Mr Schwartz added that he 'greatly regrets' relying on the chatbot, which he said he had never used for legal research before and was 'unaware that its content could be false'. He has vowed to never use AI to 'supplement' his legal research in future 'without absolute verification of its authenticity'.[144]

As with universities, which need to establish for what tasks students can use LLMs (eg, they may be prohibited from using such models for writing an assignment directly, but potentially they can be allowed to ask a LLM to identify the most relevant literature on the topic of a writing assignment, to make a list of pros and cons for a certain thesis, to remove grammatical errors in the text or to act as a teacher, giving feedback on a draft assignment), the legal branch will need to set rules for the use of LLMs by lawyers, public prosecutors and judges.

- The rise of Generative AI may further the push for legal automation.[145] Although potentially advantageous in terms of efficiency, speed, legal consistency and explicability of the legal process, there are many issues discussed in this book that give rise to caution. In addition, there are two elements important for the legitimacy of a legal system as a whole and judgments in particular. On the one hand, a court should establish the right, most logical and consistent interpretation of the law and the right, most logical and consistent application of that law to a specific set of circumstances. Although infinitely complex, AI could potentially help to deliver on this point. On the other hand, the legitimacy of a judgment depends on the process,

on each party having the feeling that they have been seen, that their arguments have been heard and that their worries are taken seriously by another person (see Chapter 4, section 4.3). This point would be undermined when parts of the legal process would be automated, let alone when human judges would be substituted by robo-judges.

DFs, in particular, may challenge a number of rules and presumptions under current procedural law. These include the following:[146]

- If material is not released immediately, but a video is 'archived' and only released after someone's death (eg, a compromising video to damage their moral legacy), who can dispute the authenticity of a video and on what grounds?
- DF technology may lead to truly authentic material being disregarded because it cannot be established beyond reasonable doubt that such material is authentic; a suspect can also always claim that a video, image or audio clip is fake, even after a court has delivered a final sentence.
- Judges will typically assume evidence to be authentic unless there are contra-indications. This means that it either has to be apparent from the evidence submitted that it has been tampered with or that one of the parties has to put forward that the evidence is inauthentic. The former will become ever less likely because DF technology will become ever more powerful. The latter will not always be possible. For example, there are criminal cases in which a person is convicted in abstentia. In addition, there are people with mental limitations who might either not have the capacity to understand that evidence has been tampered with (for example, children or persons with an extremely low IQ) or do not remember what happened (for example, people suffering from dementia or people who were intoxicated).
- Considering the prediction that in a few years' time, more than 90 per cent of all online content will be manipulated, it could be argued that all evidence in court should be assessed on authenticity. This, however, would involve considerable cost. It is often far from clear whether an audio clip, a video, a picture, satellite data or a tweet is authentic or not and how that should be established. AI programs can filter out about half of DFs, but not all and, as discussed previously, some of those programs only give an estimated likelihood of authenticity, such as that there is a 71.2 per cent chance that the material

is authentic. This leaves courts with the task of making particularly complex evaluations, for example when the main piece of evidence in a criminal case is a video, the authenticity of which is estimated to be 70 per cent by the AI-detection program. Would this percentage be enough to arrive at a conviction and where should the boundary be drawn? Would there be a trend towards reliance on circumstantial evidence? Should there be a difference in the required authenticity percentage for administrative law, civil law and criminal law cases? What if, in a custody case, both parties produce a video of the other parent being abusive towards their children aged one and two, but both videos have an authenticity percentage of 50 per cent, with the neighbours saying that they clearly heard someone screaming, but could not be more precise as to who? Should custody be awarded to both, one of them or neither? What happens if both parties hire their own experts to test the authenticity of the material and these experts arrive at different conclusions? Would this result in an even bigger role of experts in legal proceedings and an even longer legal process? Do judges have sufficient expertise to assess the quality of the expert witnesses and their statements?

- Next to the various questions over the use of digital evidence when reaching a verdict, there will be questions over the admissibility of evidence in court. Like with the former questions, under the current legal paradigm, it is not always clear which party must meet what bar at what point in the legal process for evidence to be admissible.

5.5.3. Ex Ante and Ex Post Regulation

Ex post regulation is regulation that focuses on the use of a technology and assesses whether that use conforms with the legislative framework only after that use has taken place. Ex ante regulation can take the form either of bans of or conditions on the production of technology, or bans of or conditions on putting technologies on the market. An intermediate regulatory option is assessing the legitimacy of intended use of a technology before that technology is put into practice and assessing the legitimacy of content produced through that technology before it is made public. The earlier in the process regulation is set, usually the more impact such regulation has.



Figure 5.4 Regulatory options in the value chain, from production of technology to assessing ex post usage

The various legal instruments setting product requirements (see section 5.4.2) and the AI Act (see section 5.4.3) would, if adopted, provide bans on a limited number of synthetic technologies. Most of them concern specific use cases, such as the use of 'real-time' remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement. The Dual Use Regulation will set limits to the type of technologies that can be exported to countries outside the EU. In addition, some European countries have set restrictions on marketing certain technologies, such as spyware. Finally, there are obligations (mostly self-regulatory) for internet providers to filter out child pornography from their services.[147]

The GDPR requires a Data Protection Impact Assessment for data processing operations that are likely to cause harm, and the AI Act requires such assessments for high-risk AI systems. However, these have a relatively limited impact on synthetic technologies. The GDPR, for example, gives three situations in which Data Protection Impact Assessment needs to be executed in particular, namely:

- in the case of a systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural persons, which is based on automated processing, including profiling, and on which decisions are based that produce legal effects concerning the natural person or similarly significantly affect the natural person;

- in the case of large-scale processing of special sensitive data; and
- in the case of large-scale systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area.

Impact assessments generally concern the specific use of a technology by one data controller for one specific goal. It is questionable whether any of the use cases of synthetic technologies would fall under this obligation. Most AR users, for example, do not systematically monitor the public sphere, but hop in and out of the public, private, professional and semi-private spheres randomly. A DF pornographic video of someone does not process sensitive data on a large scale, although perhaps porn sites could fall under this provision. A medical HR might carry out a systematic and extensive evaluation of one person, but usually not of more than one, while the GDPR speaks of 'persons' plural. Potentially, when a HR is used in medical facilities to evaluate multiple patients, this could fall within the scope of the obligation to carry out a Data Protection Impact Assessment. Consequently, there are some doctrines that provide or will provide ex ante rules and some that provide rules that fall in the intermediate category.

Next to these legal standards, the introduction of AI has had the effect that companies have set controls earlier in the value chain. Traditional content production technologies, such as Microsoft Word or Paint, do not set limits on which content you are allowed to create. You could, for example, write a Nazi pamphlet or draw naked pictures of minors using these technologies. The first threshold is generally on the distribution of such material imposed by service providers, who ban illegal material through various mechanisms. Although there are dark web alternatives, most popular AI programs have many inbuilt safeguards that prevent people from using the program to pursue illegal activities or producing unlawful content. It is unclear how long these strict safeguards will be in place, as many have urged that these are overly broad, stifle creativity and limited legitimate use cases.

However, apart from these, the current regulatory framework is almost exclusively based on ex post regulation. This means that, in general, technologies can be produced, traded and used without governmental intervention. Law enforcement authorities and DPAs will primarily focus on the use of the technologies in the specific circumstances of the case and will assess whether that use has violated one of the principles contained in criminal law, tort law, the human rights framework or otherwise. Outside the domain of data protection and, in particular, with respect to civil law and administrative law cases, however, there is no governmental

organisation that monitors the respect for the legal instruments in place. This means that uses of technologies will usually only be scrutinised by a court after a victim has issued a complaint. Although the GDPR does allow countries to facilitate collective actions, these are seldom used in practice. In Europe, there is no legal culture comparable to the flourishing practice of class actions in the US.

There are arguments to be made for each type of regulation. Ex post regulation allows scientists, commercial parties and citizens to freely develop and experiment with technologies, and thus incentivises innovation. Experimentation may bring to light new and unforeseen ways in which technologies can be used. Ex ante regulation, on the contrary, may have a stifling effect; this form of regulation disallows legitimate uses of technology. Banning a technology that is abused in 99 per cent of use cases also disallows the 1 per cent of legitimate use cases and limits finding new use cases through experimentation. In addition, it may be difficult to enforce ex ante rules – for example, because technologies are produced outside Europe and software can be downloaded with a click by users in Europe from a website hosted anywhere. Restrictions on selling or offering technologies may also result in a black market.

For regulatory controls in the middle of the value chain, significant time and resources are needed, such as when assessing whether the intended use of a technology or the intended publication of content is legitimate or not. This assessment requires answers to a range of difficult questions regarding the interpretation of legal concepts, the applicability of these concepts to the case at hand and the legitimacy of the content, without it always being clear whether harm would be done by intended use or publication. An additional question would be who should undertake these assessments. Governmental authorities are ill-equipped to assess relevant uses of synthetic technologies and the publication of synthetic material. However, leaving such evaluations to private parties means that commercial interests will affect these decisions and that there is no democratic control over important regulatory standards. In addition, given that most tech firms active in Europe are based in the US, they may need to confirm to the American approach to human rights, which is different from the European approach (eg, a bigger emphasis on the freedom of expression and less emphasis on the right to privacy than in the European approach). Finally, one way in which private parties tend to approach content management is through using algorithms. This may lead to a rigid and black-and-white interpretation of legal concepts, and could conflict with the prohibition on automated decision making contained in the GDPR.

The current regulatory focus on ex post regulation, in turn, has an important consequence. It is arguably the cause of the biggest legal and regulatory bottleneck in the digital domain: the enforcement of the regulatory framework. Ex post regulation entails that the legitimacy of the use of technology in practice as well as the collection, processing and publication of information will be assessed retrospectively. As explained in Chapter 2, there is a myriad of synthetic technologies that are and will be used for a wide variety of use cases, and they allow for the processing of data on an unprecedented scale. The enormous amount of synthetic media published every day means that adequate ex post control over the use of technology and the publication of content by governmental organisations is almost impossible. They can only realistically assess a fraction of that content and generally do so only after a complaint has been made or if the content has otherwise been brought to their attention.

This means that governmental organisations are likely to focus on a handful of more extreme violations of the law (eg, related to bodily privacy or poignant forms of discrimination) and that more complicated legal matters (eg, where both the right to privacy and the freedom of expression come into play (see section 5.3.5) or where different parties hold different property rights (see section 5.3.2) are mostly left untouched. This ensures a normalisation of minor violations of law. The focus on ex post regulation will mean that a violation will already have occurred; the damage is already done. Recovering damages is often difficult and if a court case is successful, the damages awarded are often quite low. A victim of revenge porn, for example, often receives several hundred euros, while the publication of the image can have an impact on them for the rest of their lives. In addition, by going to court or when governmental organisations act, more focus and attention may be put on the alleged illegal content (the so-called 'Barbra Streisand effect').[148]

From the focus on ex post regulation and the application of DPIAs to specific usage of a technology by an individual data controller flows a focus under the dominant current legal paradigm on individual rather than general interests. If a particular digital technology has an undesirable social impact, then ex ante regulation is the obvious choice. For example, if the EU were to believe that DF technology as such is harmful to society because it contributes to the post-truth era and because a rough estimate of 96 per cent of all DFs involve non-consensual pornography, then a full or partial ban could be a realistic choice. By contrast, in ex post regulation, a specific application is assessed. Thus, the focus is primarily on the private interests of one or a few legal subjects. For example, the person portrayed in a specific DF porn video will be the

subject of focus rather than the impact of the technology as such on the societal position of women.

The emphasis on the protection of individual interests works well for many traditional legal disputes: a building permit, a request for compensation after a defamatory publication, or an alleged interference of privacy by the government, where someone's phone is tapped for a certain period of time. Invariably, the alleged interference is limited to a specific person or a small group. It is delimited in time and space, and the interest at stake is individual and clearly determinable. It is understandable that the EU, the ECtHR and many European countries have extrapolated this approach to the digital domain as it is also suitable for many digital incidents. However, there are also issues at play that are difficult to address through this approach. With data-driven technologies, it can be difficult or impossible to delineate their application in time, space and person. For example, the cameras on AR goggles used in the public domain do not affect one particular individual specifically; they film everyone the user passes. HRs that rely on predictive policing and patrol more in certain neighbourhoods than in others affect all those living in the neighbourhood. DFs inciting hatred against minorities do not affect one or a small number of persons. Many synthetic applications are not focused on specific individuals, but affect a multitude of individuals, groups and society as a whole.

Alongside the emphasis on protecting individual interests, there is an emphasis under the dominant regulatory approach on individual control and subjective rights. It is generally up to citizens themselves to defend their interests. This is reinforced by the immense pressure on law enforcement authorities and data protection authorities, and their inability to adequately assess the legitimacy of most use cases of synthetic technologies and the publication of synthetic content. The focus on individual control, informed consent and informational self-determination is grounded in the conception of humans as *homo economicus*: if citizens have access to all relevant information and have strong subjective rights, in principle, they are in the best position to pursue their own interests. Again, there is logic to this approach, and the focus on individual interests and individual rights was a general feature of most legislative projects in Western democracies in the 1980s, the 1990s and the early 2000s. Gradually, however, a new understanding of individual responsibility has emerged as the consequences of 'neoliberal' regulatory approaches have become widely recognised. Of course, it is now generally accepted, children should learn to make healthy choices, but it also helps if the school canteen offers them more than just junk food.

Of course, people should use energy sparingly, but global warming will not be tackled by citizens using energy-saving light bulbs. Of course, one should be alert to specific forms of discrimination, but there is also a positive obligation for the government to counter systemic racism.

If anywhere, the limits of individual control are visible in the digital domain. Individuals are often unaware that their data are being collected and processed. If they are, they do not always know who is processing their data and why; in order to find out, information requests and sometimes legal procedures are required. On the basis of that information, the citizen should assess whether the processing of their data is legitimate, for which they need legal, technological and organisational knowledge which they often lack. Even if they had such information, assessing all data processes that contain their information or otherwise affect them, which will easily consist of several thousand projects, is practically impossible for reasons of time, energy and resources. If, finally, citizens have assessed a data process, do understand it, can demonstrate individualisable harm, have come to the conclusion that the use of a synthetic technology violated their rights and do go to court, they are usually up against governmental organisations or big firms that have the technical knowledge, time and resources to fight lengthy legal proceedings.

Consequently, although there is no perfect solution, an option would be to focus more on ex ante rules, prohibitions and conditions rather than primarily relying on ex post regulation, as the current regulatory framework does. This would not only prevent harm instead of remedying it, but would also allow for better oversight and enforcement of legal standards, as the earlier in the chain rules are set, the more limited the number of actors whose activities need to be scrutinised and thus the easier it is for DPAs, law enforcement authorities and other supervisory authorities to perform their tasks.

5.5.4. Liability for Synthetic Technologies and Content

Another way of reducing the burden on citizens is by placing greater duties of care on private parties. There are three important regimes in the EU that deal with liability and responsibility of parties. First, there is the regime outlined in the proposed AI Liability Directive, which primarily focuses on producers of AI systems. Second, there is the proposed Liability for Defective Products Directive, which pays particular attention to smart products and AI.[149] A third regime concerns the liability of internet intermediaries, which are essential for publishing synthetic

content and for providing a reservoir of content that can be used by synthetic technologies (eg, the content for DFs and the information projected on the screens of AR devices).

While not addressing all of the problems of addressing synthetic technologies under current procedural law (see section 5.5.2), some of these may be tackled through the proposed AI Liability Directive[150] regarding non-contractual liability. The Directive deals in particular with problems surrounding burden of proof, access to information and equality of arms. The reason for proposing this Directive is that standing national liability rules are generally deemed unfit for handling liability claims for damage caused by AI-enabled products and services. This is particularly so because, under the existing doctrines, victims need to prove a wrongful action or omission by the person who caused the damage. The Directive makes it clear that the specific characteristics of AI, including complexity, autonomy and the opacity of these systems (eg, black boxes), often make it difficult or prohibitively expensive for victims to identify the entity liable and meet the requirements for a successful liability claim. Consequently, adopting new liability rules is considered necessary in light of synthetic technologies such as HRs.[151]

The AI Liability Directive, which is linked to the AI Act (see section 5.4.3), provides that national courts can be empowered to order the disclosure of evidence from those persons upon request.[152] This can be at the request of either a potential claimant who has previously asked a provider, a manufacturer, a distributor, importer or a user of an AI system to disclose relevant evidence at its disposal about a specific high-risk AI system that is suspected of having caused damage, but was refused. In support of that request, the potential claimant must present facts and evidence sufficient to support the plausibility of a claim for damages. However, the national court can only order the disclosure of evidence if the claimant has undertaken all proportionate attempts at gathering relevant evidence from the defendant. Where a defendant fails to comply with an order, a national court shall presume the defendant's non-compliance with a relevant duty of care, although the defendant has the right to rebut that presumption.

National courts, according to the AI Liability Directive, shall presume[153] the causal link between the fault of the defendant and the output produced by the AI system or the failure of the AI system to produce an output when:

- the claimant has demonstrated this, or the court has presumed the fault of the defendant or of a person for whose behaviour the

defendant is responsible, consisting in the non-compliance with a duty of care to protect against the damage that occurred; and

- based on the circumstances of the case, it can be considered reasonably likely that the fault has influenced the output produced by the AI system or the failure of the AI system to produce an output; and
- the claimant has demonstrated that the output produced by the AI system or the failure of the AI system to produce an output gave rise to the damage.

The fault of the defendant will be accepted if any of the following applies:

- the AI system uses techniques involving the training of models with data that was not in conformity with the AI Act;
- the AI system was designed and developed in a way that does not meet the transparency requirements as laid down in the AI Act;
- the AI system was not designed and developed in a way that allows for effective oversight by natural persons as specified in the AI Act;
- the AI system was not designed and developed so as to achieve an appropriate level of accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity as detailed in the AI Act; or
- the necessary corrective actions were not immediately taken to bring the AI system into conformity with the obligations or to withdraw or recall the system as required by the AI Act.

In case of a high-risk AI system and the defendant is a user, the fault of the defendant will be accepted if:

- the user did not comply with its obligations to use or monitor the AI system in accordance with the accompanying instructions of use or, where appropriate, suspend or interrupt its use; or
- the user exposed the AI system to input data under its control that is not relevant in view of the system's intended purpose.

The proposed Liability for Defective Products Directive[154] would be the successor of the Product Liability Directive 1985.[155] The Commission makes it clear in the explanatory memorandum that one of the three reasons for proposing a successor was that under the old Directive, 'the burden of proof (i.e. the need, in order to obtain compensation, to prove the product was defective and that this caused the damage suffered) was challenging for injured persons in complex cases (e.g. those involving pharmaceuticals, smart products or AI-enabled products)'.[156]

The Commission underlines that the proposal makes it clear:

- that AI systems and AI-enabled goods are 'products' and therefore fall within the scope of the Directive, meaning that compensation is available when defective AI causes damage, without the injured person having to prove the manufacturer's fault;
- that not only hardware manufacturers but also software providers and providers of digital services that affect how the product works (such as a navigation service in an autonomous vehicle) can be held liable;
- that manufacturers can be held liable for changes they make to products they have already placed on the market, including when these changes are triggered by software updates or machine learning; and
- that the burden of proof in complex cases can be alleviated, which could include certain cases involving AI systems.

However, there are also a number of exemptions from liability, such as:

- in the case of a manufacturer or importer that did not place the product on the market or put it into service;
- in the case of a distributor that did not make the product available on the market;
- when it is likely that the defectiveness that caused the damage did not exist when the product was placed on the market, put into service or, in respect of a distributor, made available on the market, or that this defectiveness came into being after that moment; or
- in the case of a manufacturer, that the objective state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when the product was placed on the market, put into service or in the period in which the product was within the manufacturer's control was not such that the defectiveness could be discovered.

At this point in time, it is unclear how these regulations will work in practice and would apply to synthetic technologies in particular. However, it is clear that the AI Liability Directive will not be able to mitigate all the problems with respect to applying the current standards of procedural law to these technologies, inter alia, because it is only applicable to matters of non-contractual liability. It could have an impact on access to information and the burden of proof, but leaves the other tensions discussed in section 5.5.2 unaddressed. For the new Product Liability Act, inter alia, it is clear that there is a long list of exemptions, which will be used and tested in court by companies in abundance. It may take

several years before courts will carve out the precise meaning and interpretation of the rules and exceptions in specific circumstances.

Third and finally, internet companies play an important role in disclosing, distributing and prioritising content. This is especially relevant for DFs. The former regime for internet providers' liability can be found in the 2000 e-Commerce Directive,[157] which has recently been replaced by the Digital Services Act (DSA).[158] The e-Commerce Directive provided regulations for a host of different issues concerning digital business operations, including an exemption for liability of internet intermediaries for User-Generated Content. A distinction was made between three types of providers: access providers (Article 12), caching providers (Article 13) and hosting providers (Article 14). The latter were not liable for the unlawful activities of customers if they had no knowledge of them and if they acted promptly to remove the unlawful information or make access to it impossible, as soon as they are informed of illegal content on their platform.[159] Article 15 provided that Member States could not impose a general obligation on providers to monitor the information they transmitted or stored, or actively seek out facts or circumstances indicating unlawful activities.[160] It is noteworthy that the e-Commerce Directive contained no specific provision for search engines.[161] It also had no specific provision for so-called 'active internet intermediaries', which not only passively transmit or publish users' content, but also acquire, select, organise, rank and facilitate content publication. The question of whether such providers also fell under the Notice and Takedown (NTD) was answered ambivalently by the CJEU.[162]

After several failed attempts to replace the e-Commerce Directive,[163] the DSA has now been adopted. Although much remains the same, Articles 20 and 21 deal with the possibility of internal and extrajudicial complaint handling, and Article 22 with so-called 'trusted flaggers', such as civil rights organisations that can assess online content on its lawfulness:[164]

> Providers of online platforms shall take the necessary technical and organisational measures to ensure that notices submitted by trusted flaggers … are given priority and are processed and decided upon without undue delay. The status of 'trusted flagger' under this Regulation shall be awarded, upon application by any entity, by the Digital Services Coordinator of the Member State in which the applicant is established, to an applicant that has demonstrated that it meets all of the following conditions: it has particular expertise and competence for the purposes of detecting, identifying and notifying illegal content, it is independent from any provider of online platforms, it carries out its activities for the purposes of submitting notices diligently, accurately and objectively.[165]

Article 23 sets out further obligations to counter abuse of internet services.[166] For example, online platforms must stop providing their service to users who systematically abuse it and share illegal content. In doing so, they must take several aspects into account, including:

- the absolute numbers of items of manifestly illegal content or manifestly unfounded notices or complaints, submitted within a given timeframe;
- the relative proportion thereof in relation to the total number of items of information provided or notices submitted within a given timeframe;
- the gravity of the misuses, including the nature of illegal content, and of its consequences; and
- where it is possible to identify it, the intention of the recipient of the service, the individual, the entity or the complainant.

Article 16 lays down a more extensive NTD regime than that contained in the e-Commerce Directive, although by and large this has remained the same. Article 17 provides a duty for platforms to give reasons for the decision on a notification or complaint. Article 18 provides that platforms must inform the police and judicial authorities if suspicion of certain crimes emerges.

A so-called 'Good Samaritan' clause,[167] already contained in the US Communications Decency Act among others,[168] is included in the DSA. If providers actively monitor content (eg, to detect DF child pornography), this cannot be used against them (eg, as an argument that by monitoring, they could or should also have had sight of other possible unlawful content).[169] Article 7 DSA provides:

> Providers of intermediary services shall not be deemed ineligible for the exemptions from liability … solely because they, in good faith and in a diligent manner, carry out voluntary own-initiative investigations into, or take other measures aimed at detecting, identifying and removing, or disabling access to, illegal content, or take the necessary measures to comply with the requirements of Union law and national law in compliance with Union law, including the requirements set out in this Regulation.

Given the central role that internet intermediaries play in the modern media landscape, some have argued that further regulation is possible and desirable. For instance, a perennial problem is the role of search engines,[170] which have a very defining position within the digital domain in general and for finding synthetic media in particular.

The NTD regime seems ill-suited for such providers. Search engines are active providers par excellence: they search for content on other pages, determine how that content is ranked and the basis on which this is done. Obligations could be considered that see to the disclosure of the criteria on the basis of which algorithms rank material.[171] Conditions could also be imposed on which criteria can be used in ranking content or what content should be blocked.[172] This concerns not only search engines themselves, but also sites with search functions, such as Facebook, YouTube and X.[173]

It is also noteworthy that the DSA places the ultimate responsibility for deciding on a removal request on the provider, who will have to judge the reasonableness of a request. This differs from the US legal regime, as contained for example in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,[174] which includes a system for 'counter-notifications'. Under this system, the provider receives a request to remove material and then forwards it to the person who uploaded the material. If the uploader then claims that the material was lawfully posted, it is up to the parties to go to court and obtain a court order.[175] This system has obvious drawbacks, such as that taking a case to court will lead to delays.[176] On the other hand, it places the final choice with the court and not with the internet provider, which might be preferable because of their commercial interest, inter alia, in having sensitive and borderline-legal content on the platform.[177] Consideration could therefore be given to opening an ex parte remedy or other swift judicial procedures when conflicts like these arise.

The DSA explicitly stipulates that there is no monitoring obligation for internet intermediaries, nor is there any obligation to engage in ex ante content filtering.[178] It is increasingly questionable whether this premise, which dates from the 1990s, is still valid in contemporary society, as it is based on the idea that internet intermediaries are neutral and passive. Initially, their position was likened to that of postal companies, which deliver mail without being responsible for their content. In principle, a postal company does not have to check the mail it delivers in terms of its lawfulness. As internet intermediaries have become increasingly active and directive in attracting, organising, co-creating and prioritising content, and because the content of messages is generally available to them, the question is to what extent the neutrality principle should be applicable to the online world.[179]

Finally, it is important that Articles 33 et seq hold additional obligations for very large online platforms and very large search

engines,[180] including to conduct proper risk analysis of their services and take appropriate measures accordingly.[181] The responsibility lies primarily on these platforms to ensure that the spread of misinformation is countered. Among the harm that the DSA aims to tackle is the risk that stems from the design, functioning or use, including through manipulation, of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines with an actual or foreseeable negative effect on the protection of public health, minors and serious negative consequences to a person's physical and mental wellbeing, or on gender-based violence:

> Such risks may also stem from coordinated disinformation campaigns related to public health, or from online interface design that may stimulate behavioural addictions of recipients of the service. When assessing such systemic risks, providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should focus on the systems or other elements that may contribute to the risks, including all the algorithmic systems that may be relevant, in particular their recommender systems and advertising systems, paying attention to the related data collection and use practices. They should also assess whether their terms and conditions and the enforcement thereof are appropriate, as well as their content moderation processes, technical tools and allocated resources. When assessing the systemic risks identified in this Regulation, those providers should also focus on the information which is not illegal, but contributes to the systemic risks identified in this Regulation. Such providers should therefore pay particular attention on how their services are used to disseminate or amplify misleading or deceptive content, including disinformation. Where the algorithmic amplification of information contributes to the systemic risks, those providers should duly reflect this in their risk assessments. Where risks are localised or there are linguistic differences, those providers should also account for this in their risk assessments. Providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should, in particular, assess how the design and functioning of their service, as well as the intentional and, oftentimes, coordinated manipulation and use of their services, or the systemic infringement of their terms of service, contribute to such risks. Such risks may arise, for example, through the inauthentic use of the service, such as the creation of fake accounts, the use of bots or deceptive use of a service, and other automated or partially automated behaviours, which may lead to the rapid and widespread dissemination to the public of information that is illegal content or incompatible with an online platform's or online search engine's terms and conditions and that contributes to disinformation campaigns.[182]

Following the European Commission's Communication 'Tackling online disinformation: a European approach'[183] and the 2018 Code of Practice on Disinformation,[184] the European Commission's Communication on the European Democracy Action Plan[185] and the European Commission Guidance on Strengthening the Code of Practice on Disinformation,[186] in 2022, the EU has helped bring about a Code of Practice on Disinformation.[187] This Code contains ambitions and commitments for the very large platforms that have signed it, primarily in light of monetising disinformation, such as through advertisements and other revenue models based on inauthentic and untrue content, and combating misleading and incorrect political advertisements. However, this Code of Practice is generally considered insufficient to effectively combat the rise of disinformation because it is too vague, has too limited a scope and is too open-ended. The same holds true for the proposed Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising.[188]

5.5.5. Consumer and Competition Law

A final way of reducing the burden on citizens (as identified in section 5.5.3), alongside imposing greater duties of care and responsibilities on private parties (see section 5.5.4), is through protections set out in consumer and anti-trust law. As the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) has stressed, in particular in the light of new technologies, data protection law, competition law and consumer law can and should be understood in light of each other, as they have partially overlapping goals:

> Extracting value from big data has become a significant source of power for the biggest players in internet markets. Not all big data is personal, but for many online offerings which are presented or perceived as being 'free', personal information operates as a sort of indispensable currency used to pay for those services. As well as benefits, therefore, these growing markets pose specific risks to consumer welfare and to the rights to privacy and data protection. EU principles and rules on data protection, competition and consumer protection have been designed to promote a thriving internal market and to protect the individual. Greater convergence in the application of these policies could help meet the challenges posed by the big data economy.[189]



Figure 5.5 The EDPS' vision of the interaction between three fields of law[190]

In terms of consumer law, the EDPS points to the Directive on Unfair Contract Terms,[191] which protects citizens acquiring advanced technologies and data services from unintelligible and unfair contractual terms.[192] Importantly, the Price Indication Directive[193] suggests that the price for a service or product should be made clear. This may be important, because many digital services are offered for 'free', while in fact consumers are paying with their personal data. This commercial practice may also be prohibited through the Consumer Rights Directive,[194] which prohibits offering service for free when they are not. Misleading statements and advertisements are prohibited through the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive,[195] while the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive prohibits aggressive commercial practices and harassment, coercion and undue influence.[196]

These provisions might put a stop to aggressive advertising and manipulative design choices, such as when a person is nudged into buying a certain product or service. Contract law[197] prohibits practices such as abuse of circumstances or of the vulnerable position in which the consumer finds themself. Should a patient need care immediately and the HR offers a contractual service to provide such care when it is clear that the person is in no position to decline, the contract can be declared null and void. If the citizen did not fully understand the contractual terms they were agreeing to or had no reasonable chance of going through them, that will have an effect on the validity of contractual agreements as well.

This is an important difference with the American approach, under which, by and large, an informed consent model is taken. If companies include the most far-reaching and unfair terms in their terms and conditions and the consumer signs the contract, this is generally deemed to be legitimate. Under EU law, unfair terms are prohibited as such. Contractual terms that are several pages long and written in complicated legal or technological jargon can be null and void even if they have been explicitly agreed upon. The consumer needs to be able to understand and refuse the contractual terms in order for them to be valid, and the terms cannot ask consent for anything unreasonable or unrelated to the contract.[198]

The European Commission has also used the instrument of competition law regularly vis-à-vis, in particular, American-based tech companies, inter alia, to tackle market dominance, to block mergers and to prevent product tying.[199] The DMA[200] defines gatekeepers as those organisations that have a significant impact on the internal market, that provide a core platform service which is an important gateway for business users to reach end-users, and that enjoy an entrenched and durable position in terms of its operations, or where it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future. Among many other things, these gatekeepers cannot: (a) process, for the purpose of providing online advertising services, the personal data of end-users using services of third parties that make use of the core platform services of the gatekeeper; (b) combine personal data from the relevant core platform service with personal data from any further core platform services or from any other services provided by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services; (c) cross-use personal data from the relevant core platform service in other services provided separately by the gatekeeper, including other core platform services, and vice versa; or (d) sign in end-users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data. It is difficult to foresee how these and the other rules contained in the DMA will apply to Generative AI, synthetic technologies and their potential consequences,[201] but it is not unlikely that dominant platforms that offer synthetic technologies, products or services will fall under this Act.

Legal questions that are still unanswered when approaching synthetic technologies through the lens of consumer and competition law include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Is it misleading to advertise services as free when in fact customers are paying with their personal data?
- Are the overly long and legalistic terms and conditions by American companies legitimate under European law or do they violate the requirement that citizens should be able to understand the contracts

they sign? To what extent will citizens ever understand the inner working of technologies, how their data are being processed and what revenue model a company is pursuing?

- To what extent are consumers locked in when they have to accept an update of the terms and conditions of a service they already use?
- To what extent are children growing up in present-day society truly free to decide not to engage with modern technology, given peer pressure and advantages of those that do? To what extent is parental consent always obtained and which duties of care should be imposed on platforms in this respect?
- Do companies have a duty of care, especially with respect to children, to block access to services when they see that the use is harmful?
- To what extent can the use of technologies, especially by children, be considered to be addictive and, if so, would that undermine the legal validity of consent?
- To what extent are dark patterns that nudge people in the direction preferred by a company prohibited and to what extent is consent that is obtained through these patterns valid?
- To what extent would offering synthetic technologies to people in need (eg, care robots that offer emergency care for additional fees) be considered an abuse of circumstances?
- To what extent is the double role of many technology companies that market their own products but also have a platform on which other vendors can offer their products allowed?
- To what extent will AI programs that are implemented into existing services be seen as a prohibited form of product tying?
- How should the market for Generative AI be delineated in order to establish market dominance?
- To what extent are established technology companies that use their power and position in terms of, inter alia, access to data and customers, to roll out their new AI products abusing their power and position?
- To what extent are deals between companies, where the service of one is set as a standard tool in the product of the other, allowed in light of fair competition?
- Should killer acquisitions be prohibited? If so, what should be the determinative factors to establish whether an acquisition is aimed at terminating a start-up or small scale competitor?

5.5.6. Conclusion

This section has discussed rules concerning the enforcement of the regulatory paradigm, the liability for violating legal principles through AI and the rules of procedure that apply when cases are brought before a court of law. It is clear that there will be many practical problems with ensuring adequate law enforcement in a world where synthetic technologies have become democratised. The question is whether the primary focus on ex post regulation is still viable, given this and other trends. However, it is equally clear that many difficulties will emerge if more ex ante regulations are introduced. With respect to procedural law, many practical obstacles may arise when citizens enter into legal battles against tech companies or when judges assess digital evidence for authenticity. Equally, there will be many problems with establishing guilt or fault, especially when a complex web of actors (natural persons, legal persons and non-humans) is involved. Although the proposed AI Liability Directive, the proposed Liability for Defective Products Directive and the DSA try to provide more clarity, they also raise questions regarding their applicability and whether they are future-proof. With regard to the DSA, for example, it can be wondered whether imposing a general monitoring and filtering obligation on internet intermediaries should be imposed, although it is clear that this would come at the expense of the rights to privacy and freedom of expression of users of their platforms. Finally, consumer and competition law raise a number of complex questions concerning the validity of digital contracts, product tying and market dominance of companies developing and marketing Generative AI products and services.

5.6. CONCLUSION

This chapter has discussed several legal regimes that affect synthetic technologies and synthetic content. In relation to some aspects, the legal regime sets clear rules and boundaries through data protection law and the various legal instruments that contain rules on the production, distribution and use of technologies. Regulators that want to facilitate the broader use of synthetic technologies might consider limiting these legal doctrines. An example is the transparency obligation contained in the GDPR, which seems impossible to reconcile with the use of HRs and AR devices in public domains. For most other regimes, it is not entirely clear how the current

regulatory framework applies to synthetic technologies, because the open norms and principles are applied on a case-by-case basis and there is no jurisprudence on this matter as of yet. These include most of the rights contained under the human rights frameworks of the ECHR and the CFREU, such as the right to privacy, the freedom of expression and the right to property. With respect to another set of doctrines, it is uncertain how they will apply to synthetic technologies. How should the data quality principle be interpreted and how should the concept of personal data be demarcated in relation to synthetic media? How should psychological harm be interpreted with respect to AI, synthetic technologies and their application? Finally, there are several doctrines that might need revision because the rationale for adopting a doctrine no longer holds and/or because it leads to undesirable outcomes. This includes the household exemption, the dominant focus on ex post regulation, the presumption that evidence is correct unless contra-indications arise and potentially, especially in the future, the fact that non-human entities do not have legal standing.

Table 5.5 Legal doctrines setting clear limitations on synthetic technologies and media

Legal doctrine	Limits imposed on synthetic technologies
Transparency	If personal data are gathered, data subjects must be informed in full.
Purpose specification	The data controller should have a specific reason for gathering personal data.
Purpose limitation	The data controller can subsequently only use the data for that specific purpose.
Lawful ground for processing	There must be a lawful basis for processing personal data, such as consent or a legal basis.
Security and confidentiality	Third-party access must be prevented; data need to be safe
Interoperability	At the request of the data subject, data must be transported to a new provider so that data are re-usable.
Export prohibition	When technologies or data can be abused for human rights violations, export prohibitions may be applicable.
Accuracy and reproducible	AI needs to produce accurate and reproducible results.
Accounting and oversight	Providers and distributers must put in place adequate mechanisms for documentation, evaluation and oversight.

Table 5.6 Legal doctrines with effects on synthetic technologies and media that will be determined on a case-by-case basis

Legal doctrine	Case-by-case basis analysis
Privacy as personality right	Article 8 ECHR provides a broad personality right to flourish as a human being; to what extent this applies to synthetic technologies will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Chilling effect	Article 8 ECHR offers protection against a chilling effect; to what extent such an effect exists and meets the *de minimis* rule will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Reasonable expectation of privacy	Article 8 ECHR may conflict with the freedom of expression; whether citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy vis-à-vis online material and public conduct will be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Legitimate expectation of privacy	Article 10 ECHR may conflict with the right to privacy when a publication about a public figure contains intimate details; whether the public figure has a legitimate expectation of privacy will need to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Property and business rights	Several parties may hold various property rights to synthetic technologies and media; how these play out against each other will be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Procedural fairness	Citizens need to be informed and involved in decisions that affect them; the extent to which these principles apply and have been respected will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Consumer and competition law	How the various standards developed under consumer and competition law apply to Generative AI will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

Table 5.7 Legal doctrines whose interpretation vis-à-vis synthetic technologies and media is unclear

Legal doctrine	Uncertainty as to application
Personal data	The GDPR places a binary distinction between non-personal data and personal data, while the way in which synthetic technologies and media relate to a specific person depends on gradual factors and sliding scales. This tension applies more in general to the choice of the EU regulator to work with several distinct and clearly defined data categories, which it has attributed different levels of protection.
Data quality	The data quality principle seems difficult to apply to synthetic media.
DF transparency obligation	How the DF transparency requirement in the AI Act should be interpreted and relates to the transparency requirement in the GDPR is not yet clear.
Physical or psychological harm and detriment	How various terms in the AI Act and other EU technology regulations, such as harm and detriment, should be interpreted considering synthetic technologies and media will need to be clarified in the future.
Mental and psychological integrity	There are various doctrines in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the DSA, the AI Act, the CFREU and other legal instruments that aim at safeguarding mental and psychological integrity. There is a lack of clarity as to their application and effect on synthetic technologies.
Liability	Exactly how the current rules for fault and liability should be interpreted considering the responsibility for non-human actors in a complex web of parties involved is unclear.
Authentic evidence	Exactly how the prevailing rules on evidence and their authenticity should be interpreted considering synthetic media and AI detection programs is uncertain at this point.

Table 5.8 Legal doctrines that may need to be reconsidered in light of synthetic technologies and media

Legal doctrine	Potentially in need of revision
Household exemption	It is questionable whether the household exemption should be maintained in its current form, as the boundaries between the private and the public sphere are less and less absolute.
Automated decision-making	It is clear that limits on automated decision making are more relevant than ever, while the provision in the GDPR is framed using such narrow wording that it plays almost no significant role in practice.
Human rights for non-human entities	A question is whether non-human actors should be attributed rights and legal standing.
Discrimination and bias	The current doctrine on discrimination seems unsuited to counter the many problems of bias, Matthew effects and systemic discrimination connected to the use of AI on many accounts.
Disinformation	It is a matter of debate whether telling untruths and disseminating disinformation should be covered by the freedom of expression or should be sanctioned, even when no direct harm is done.
Democracy	There are arguments to be made in favour of extending legal protection of civil servants and politicians against synthetic technologies, and against those technologies (in particular DFs) being used during election campaigns.
Importing data and technology	There are relatively few rules on importing data and technology into Europe, although this might be necessary in light of synthetic technologies.
Active hosting providers/ search engines	There are pleas to revise the rules exempting active internet providers from liability, as these rules were designed for passive intermediaries.
Ex post regulation	Although the EU has proposed several regimes that introduce ex ante rules, by and large, the current legal regime consists of ex post regulation. It can be questioned whether this is viable, given the pressure this puts on law enforcement organisations and on citizens to effectuate their rights.

6

Uneasy Questions and Imperfect Solutions

Question Zero

Due to the invasiveness of some AI-applications or uses, there might be situations in which our current framework of human rights, democracy and the rule of law fails to adequately or timely protect us and where we might need to pause for reflection and find the appropriate answer to what one could consider "question zero": Do we want to allow this particular AI system or use and if so, under what conditions? Answering this question should force us to look at the AI-system or use from all perspectives, which could result in several 'solutions':

- *A particular AI-system or use is put under a moratorium, (temporarily or indefinitely) banned or put under restrictions ("Red Lines")*
- *New Human Rights are introduced as safeguards against the 'new' adverse impact of AI*
- *Existing Human Rights are adapted to allow for responsible development and use of AI*
- *A particular AI-system or use is made subject to a specific democratic oversight mechanism*
- *Private owners of powerful AI-systems are obliged to align their AI development and governance structures with the interests of those affected by the system and society at large, which could include measures to involve relevant parties (such as workers, consumers, clients, citizens, policy makers)*

First and foremost, 'AI impact' is to be considered both at individual and at societal/collective level whereas AI can impact both the individual as well as larger parts of our collective society. Secondly, context, purpose, severity, scale and likelihood of the impact is important to determine the appropriate and proportionate action. For AI applications that generate unacceptable risks or pose threats of harm or systemic failure that are substantial, a precautionary and principle-based regulatory approach should be adopted. For other AI applications a risk-based approach could be more appropriate.[1]

Council of Europe Study

6.1. INTRODUCTION

This final chapter provides an overview of the lessons that have been drawn thus far, and provides a glimpse into what lies ahead. It first summarises the main findings of the five previous chapters (section 6.2) and then maps some of the proposals that experts have suggested for dealing with the moral, legal and societal questions raised by synthetic technology (section 6.3). It continues to detail the myriad complex dilemmas and intricacies that legislators need to account for, sometimes necessitating a choice between important yet conflicting societal interests (section 6.4). A model is then offered for approaching regulatory decisions when dealing with Synthetic Reality (SR), setting out what questions need to be dealt with and in which order when deciding over legal frameworks for Humanoid Robots (HRs), Deepfakes (DFs), Augmented Reality (AR) and Virtual Reality (VR) (section 6.5). Finally, a short conclusion is provided (section 6.6).

6.2. MAIN FINDINGS

Chapter 1 of this book shed light on the concept of SR and the four technologies that are central to this book. It exemplified the broad societal implications these technologies may have by analysing the effects of a small, hypothetical incident involving sensational news which may have been created through DF-technology. It also gave an overview of this book's content, as well as listing its many limitations. It pointed out, inter alia, that the terms 'Humanoid Robots', 'Deepfakes', 'Augmented Reality' and 'Virtual Reality' do not lend themselves well to exact definitions, that there is overlap and that they are not always clearly distinguishable. It explained that, by the time this book is published, a number of concrete examples offered in it may be outdated. The point was emphasised that because these technologies are still in their relative infancy, most sources currently available that cover the effects of synthetic technologies come from companies that develop them, from computer scientists who work on perfecting and operationalising AI, and from tech-savvy journalists and academics. Consequently, the sources may be biased towards benevolent use cases and positive expected impact and efficacy. Chapter 1 also stressed that there is a real chance that these technologies, even AI as such, will not take off or will not become the success that they currently projected to be, just as the previous AI revolutions have died quiet deaths previously. Finally, it was explained that this book is written for a broad audience, but caters in particular to lawyers, legal scholars, regulators, and law and

technology students, meaning that the technologies and their effects in this book are described through that lens.

Chapter 2 provided an overview of how synthetic technologies are used in practice. Although these use cases are typically divided into positive and negative ones, this classification is obviously not uncontroversial. The lines drawn are dependent on, inter alia, ethical, societal and political beliefs. Is having Napoleon teach history classes to children good in terms of engagement or bad because it accustoms them to living in a post-truth society? Is a politician speaking in the dialect or language of every minority in their constituency good in terms of inclusion or a modern form of voter deception? Is being able to speak to a deceased partner good for the mental health or bad because it disrupts the normal path of grief processing? Is it good if the police use child avatars and DF child pornography to infiltrate paedophile networks or bad because it involves producing child pornography?

The use cases discussed in Chapter 2 were roughly categorised into five domains.

- In the medical sector, synthetic technologies are used, inter alia, for educational purposes, such as watching a dissection in VR. HRs are being deployed for non-patient-related tasks, such as cleaning and disinfecting, as well as patient contact in elderly care. DFs are used for grief loss therapy. AR can assist surgeons in precision tasks.
- In industry and commerce, among many other things, HRs are used for replacing human jobs. AR is being used for AI-assisted manufacturing. Both AR and VR enable new forms of tourism and, finally, DFs allow for virtual fitting rooms.
- For educational purposes, DFs can enable historical figures to teach history lessons to schoolchildren. AR is used for bringing schoolbooks to life. Home schooling using VR was popular, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic.
- In the entertainment industry, VR is used mainly for gaming. DFs are popular for satire. AR can be used for having an avatar join a party. All technologies are used for erotic purposes, such as through teledildonics, DF porn and humanoid sex robots.
- Synthetic technologies are used for security-related purposes, such as having police officers patrolling the streets wear AR glasses allowing for facial and emotion recognition, having HR soldiers engage in combat or training military personnel in VR. DFs are increasingly popular as part of military strategies to spread misinformation about the opponent.

Many of these applications will have positive effects. Virtual travelling can reduce carbon emissions, while HRs can perform some tasks more

efficiently and replace humans in arduous and degrading jobs. SR can open up new ways for people to explore their identities and reach out to others. However, it is equally clear that synthetic technologies can be used for a wide range of detrimental purposes and can have unwanted effects. Synthetic technologies are used to produce fake child pornography and non-consensual pornographic material. Synthetic gaming applications may worsen addictions, especially for children, and may exacerbate feelings of loneliness and lead to bodily neglect. Given the immersive nature of SR, the vulnerabilities innate in this kind of technology create unprecedented opportunities for third parties (eg, hackers or malign family members) to interfere with people's lives, such as when HRs are used in medical settings or for care purposes, or when patients are treated for physical or psychological trauma in VR.

Chapter 3 provided a sketch of the technical design and architecture of synthetic technologies. It explained that the ideal of developing HRs is to have them become indistinguishable from human intelligence and appearance. Most contemporary HRs excel in only one or two aspects, such as in their physical appearance, their social skills or their ability to perform one specific task. However, holistic robots are being developed and Artificial General Intelligence[2] is looming on the horizon. DFs aim to be similar to authentic material on a representational level. When deployed for satire, DFs are often so remarkable and odd that the consumer knows they are fake, but otherwise they are generally undistinguishable from authentic material. Over time, it may become almost impossible to tell what material is real and what is fake, as even AI detection tools are only partially effective in this respect. With AR, consumers are typically aware of the synthetic nature of the reality that is presented to them, although with subconscious and micro-augmentation, this may not necessarily be so. Finally, in VR, physical reality is replaced in full. The virtual world may resemble Physical Reality to varying degrees, which also includes the user's avatar. VR allows the user to shape their avatar according to their idealised body image. Some people already identify more with their virtual avatars than with their physical bodies, preferring the virtual world over the analogue one.

SR, although potentially tapping into a whole range of stimuli, is currently mainly focused on visual cues. Audio is also of great importance in HRs and DFs, and AR and VR too in some cases. Olfactory and haptic input and output systems are currently underdeveloped, although with HRs, haptic cues are becoming increasingly important, especially through what is known as 'soft robotics', and AI scents generators are in the making. Gustatory sensory input and output systems are largely

absent for any of the four technologies, although they are conceivable for HR and VR. DFs and AR are generally one-directional, although there are exceptions, while VR and HRs typically depend to a significant degree on their interactional faculties.



Figure 6.1 Categorisation of the four techniques on two axes (interactionality and reality)

Chapter 4 dealt with the societal effects of SR, focusing primarily on the potential long-term effects and the broader social and moral implications of AI. Because these effects will only come to light in the future, if at all, this chapter was more suppositive than the previous two. Many of the potential dangers that were discussed can be seen as two sides of the same coin, which may materialise simultaneously. For example, one risk of SR is that because of synthetic media, people's reality and their perception of it may change radically and suddenly. For example, the VR world where they spend much of their life may be radically redesigned, an avatar might be stolen or an HR with which a person is intimate may reprogram itself. However, there is also a risk that people withdraw into static dream worlds, seeking confirmations of their established worldviews. This could be done for a range of reasons: to keep talking to a deceased spouse; fleeing to VR to escape an unpleasant physical reality; or only consuming media that confirms or conforms to fixed beliefs. To give another example, on the one hand, there is a danger that robots and avatars will become able to replace humans at work, and, on the other hand, an equal danger that they will never become truly equal, leading

to recognition processes between two unequal partners (eg, men who build a life with their sex robot or children partially raised by AI-driven entities). Yet another example is that AI will have a consolidating effect on reality – for example, because it reproduces consensus knowledge rather than contrarian views – but also that AI will fabulate and falsely present its fantasies as facts. To give a final example, there is a potential Matthew effect: through the unequal distribution of synthetic technologies, the rich may get richer while the poor get poorer. However, equally, it has been pointed out that when AI relieves a person of many of the ordinary, complex and tedious daily tasks, they may be hampered in terms of developing a full-fledged personality because this requires overcoming setbacks and hardship.

With regard to other points, the dangers seem to point clearly in one direction. Synthetic media can accelerate the post-truth society and fuel polarisation, undermining democratic elections and decision making. It can also have a significant impact on court proceedings and media reporting, as it may become increasingly unclear what content or evidence is authentic and what is synthetic. The overflow of synthetic media may also lead to 'reality fatigue': a genuine disinterest in the question of whether something is real or not. Since synthetic technologies are mainly controlled by a small number of private sector organisations, there is a danger that they will gain an unprecedented level of control over what is perceived to be real. People will also become more dependent on technology. Although technology may enhance autonomy (eg, helping blind people to navigate the streets), this dependency may ultimately undermine human autonomy, as these technologies are generally marketed by firms with commercial interests. Individual autonomy may also be in jeopardy because through synthetic technologies, third parties can gain influence over what people are able to do, and AI may be programmed to prohibit certain behaviours and speech.

Finally, Chapter 5 discussed several legal regimes that affect synthetic technologies and synthetic media. This chapter focused on the existing European regime as well as concrete proposals that have been made for regulating AI and aspects directly or indirectly relevant for synthetic technologies. The Council of Europe's legal acquis is primarily relevant in terms of human rights, such as the right to privacy, freedom of expression, non-discrimination and intellectual property. The EU has adopted and proposed laws on data protection (the General Data Protection Regulation), AI (the AI Act), liability (the AI Liability Directive, the Product Liability Directive and the Digital Services Act) and a wide variety of laws

on the production, import and export of data and technology (eg, the Dual Use Regulation, the Machine Regulation and the Data Governance Act). Four categories of legal principles were identified.

First, legal doctrines that set clear limits on synthetic technologies. The GDPR, for example, requires that everyone whose data are processed should be informed in full and be given the right to object. For many synthetic applications, it is not clear how it would be possible in practice to adhere to these requirements. The GDPR also requires that all collected personal data serve a specific, predetermined purpose and that only the data that are strictly required in light of that purpose may be gathered, which may raise complicated questions, such as when AR devices and HRs operate in public and semi-public spaces and gather data by default. Also, the GDPR provides that data may subsequently only be used for their preselected purpose, which may significantly limit the reuse of data for generating DFs and for projecting personal information onto AR devices. Some of these limits may place insurmountable hurdles in the way of several concrete applications of synthetic technologies. To allow for these applications, the regulator would need to change the GDPR, the AI Act and the Framework for Trustworthy AI, among other instruments.

Second, there are doctrines, especially within the human rights framework, which are termed in such general ways that what they mean for synthetic technologies and concrete applications is not immediately clear. These principles include, inter alia, the ECtHR's emphasis on the protection of personality rights, safeguards against chilling effects, privacy protection (both at work and in the public sphere), guarantees for property rights and the various procedural safeguards that need to be respected when decisions are adopted that have an impact on human rights. One complicating factor is that the ECtHR usually only provides a legal interpretation on a case-by-case basis, meaning that the application of the various principles varies based on the case, application and setting. Although this allows for flexibility, it comes at the cost of legal certainty and foreseeability. Both tech organisations and citizens, as well as supervisory authorities, would benefit from more regulatory clarity, which the legislator could provide through guidelines and sectoral frameworks.

A third category is where it is unclear how current legal doctrines could, would or should be interpreted in relation to synthetic technologies, not so much because they provide general norms, but because they have been written with a different reality in mind. For example, what does the data quality principle mean in light of synthetic content?

How will the rules on liability be applied to the complex web of international actors that each have their own role in the value chain? How should the rules on evidence, authenticity and burden of proof be interpreted in a synthetic society? There are many more questions like these. Consequently, further regulations or bylaws may need to be adopted to shed light on what these principles entail for synthetic technologies, or they may need to be redesigned.

The fourth and final category consists of legal doctrines that have a protective aim, but seem unable to deliver on that aim in a synthetic society or come with significant costs. For example, the household exemption was proposed in the early 1990s when exempting data processing in the private sphere from the regulatory scope of data protection law seemed intuitive and necessary to protect the privacy of citizens. Now, however, citizens can produce highly realistic DF pornography of others from their home computer and distribute it to a global audience at the click on the mouse. Also, the standards developed under anti-discrimination law are ill-suited to the AI context. More generally, the current regulatory framework is almost exclusively focused on ex post regulation. This means that rights can only be invoked and supervisory authorities can only act when technology has been distributed and used and has caused concrete, demonstrable and individualisable harm. Owing to the high impact of synthetic technologies, not only on individual interests but also on general interests and society at large, it may be advisable to prevent harm and set limits on the production, distribution and use of technologies beforehand. This approach seems to be foreshadowed in part by the AI Act. However, the AI Act is largely procedural in nature and only sets substantial prohibitions on the use of AI in a very limited number of cases.

6.3. LITERATURE OVERVIEW

It almost seems as if, at this point, all of the world's sharpest minds, smartest regulators and leading experts are working on this one topic: understanding Generative AI and its implications for the synthetic society from legal, ethical, technological, sociological, psychological and other perspectives. This book is heavily indebted to their insights, critiques and solutions. This section discusses several of the leading experts who have contributed to this rich debate in order to provide academics with a starting point for delving further into selected topics and to present regulators with building blocks for new regulatory approaches. The regulatory questions Generative AI raises are largely the same within and beyond

Europe, which is why regulatory critiques and proposals from non-European experts will also be highlighted. Because covering all of the relevant literature would require a book of its own, this section can only provide an incomplete and selective overview that does not do justice to the many groundbreaking understandings, theories and suggestions available in academic literature and beyond.

A first important topic that has attracted considerable attention concerns explainable AI (XAI).[3] Pasquale signalled early on that those who deploy AI are often unable to understand or explain its processing mechanisms and outcomes.[4] This problem, as highlighted by Arrieta et al[5] and Samek et al,[6] becomes even more acute with self-learning AI, as systems can reprogram themselves in ways that their designers cannot foresee. Colaner has shown that one of the reasons why the field of XAI is so complex is that what needs to be explained by who to whom is a matter of debate and circumstantial.[7] Gonzalez Fuster echoes this point and suggests that, essentially, any explanation requires some form of translation.[8] This means that explanations need to be tailored to its specific audience and setting. Others underline that an explanation of AI-produced results should be provided by a human rather than the AI itself.[9] Phillips et al provide four principles to which XAI should adhere:

- Explanation: a system must be able to provide evidence or reasons for its processes and outcomes.
- Meaningful: these explanations should be understandable to the intended audience;
- Accuracy: these explanations should be accurate and all-encompassing;
- Limits: a system may only operate under conditions for which it was designed and when there is sufficient confidence in its output.[10]

Many experts also emphasise the need for contestability, as there is a tendency to quickly adopt and follow AI outcomes because of a false belief in the exactitude of AI systems, because of concerns for efficiency or because people do not want to take moral or legal responsibility for decision making.[11] Clearly, contestability is of the utmost importance in the medical domain, as Ploug and Holm have shown,[12] but as Almada argues, contestability may need to be a feature of all AI systems and be a way to get humans back into the loop.[13] Hildebrandt, to give a final example, builds on the work of Mouffe[14] and Crawford,[15] and has called for what she terms an 'agonistic form of machine learning', going beyond agnostic forms of machine learning. She points out that

the new manipulability that comes with computational inferencing requires rethinking democratic theory as well as the practice of assessing technologies.[16]

A related problem is the consolidation and reaffirmation of personalities, power and truth through AI. Even back in 2011, Pariser warned about society fracturing into filter bubbles and echo chambers,[17] a danger that many, such as Schmidt, have since pointed out is all the more evident in a synthetic society.[18] In order to move away from being captured in profiles, it is possible to embed serendipitous outcomes in systems by design, as Reviglio argues.[19] Others like Wang et al have essentially proposed solving this problem by granting users more control,[20] which may be more effective, as the extent to which serendipity can be automated is a matter of debate.[21]

Explainability and contestability are essential for multiple values, such as allowing supervisory authorities to exert control and to ensure output accuracy; they are also preconditions for human autonomy. Autonomous AI systems and human autonomy are often contrasted. However, as Prunkl shows, in reality, this picture is more complex.[22] Susser, Nissenbaum and Roessler discussed the manipulative effects of AI at length.[23] Thaler and Sunstein have written a seminal work on nudging,[24] which Yeung has reworked for the Big Data era as hypernudging.[25] Laitinen and Sahlgren suggest that considerations about autonomy can be located in different constitutive dimensions, ranging from the initial adoption of a given technology to broad cultural and societal effects resulting from large-scale use.[26] Van de Poel has argued that principles ensuring human autonomy should be embedded in the technological design of systems.[27] This is a thought that has given rise to the term 'human-centred AI', which has been interpreted in a wide variety of ways, but often includes respect for human autonomy, as Shneiderman and other authors have shown.[28] Others, such as Verbeek, have argued that technology can enhance human autonomy,[29] sometimes captured by the term 'extended autonomy'.

Many experts have signalled the need for changes to non-discrimination law in order for it to retain relevance in light of AI.[30] Zuiderveen Borgesius has called for a more sector-specific approach to AI-induced discrimination and bias.[31] Wachter has suggested broadening the categories of data that are deemed discriminatory, including the protection of non-traditional groups.[32] Custers has focused on group profiling.[33] Others, such as Mantelero, starting from this point, have called for giving more prominence to group protection, instead of the current limited focus on individual harm.[34] Xenidis and Gerards have pointed,

among many other things, to the dynamic nature in which AI systems categorise people, with constantly changing and evolving groups.[35] Veale and Binns, to give a final example, have mapped ways in which to make AI fairer without the use of sensitive data.[36]

It is important that, on all of these points, AI may create not only dangers but also opportunities. It is not as if current, human decisions are without bias. On the contrary, as Frank et al and many others have shown, humans are generally biased on multiple accounts.[37] The same applies to being able to provide explanations, contestability and transparency. Clearly, there is a danger that AI systems are unexplainable, non-contestable and opaque. However, the current, human-centred status quo is far from ideal as well. Many decisions made by humans are based on subconscious processes; post hoc rationalisations provided for those decisions often do not explain the real reasons behind them. AI systems, when built in the right way, may consequently help to remove the bias from decision making, to make decisions more objective and rational, and to provide more accurate information to various audiences.[38] The same is true of serendipity: humans often seek sources, situations, jobs and social contacts that fit their pre-established views and beliefs. AI may, if so programmed, increase diversity and consequently potentially decrease isolation and polarisation.

Trust is a much-discussed topic in the AI community too. Keymolen has shown how essential trust is for human interactions, but also how tech companies are deliberately designing technologies so that they seem trustworthy, when in fact they are not.[39] Waldman has underlined the deep relation between trust and privacy.[40] There is a general consensus regarding the discrepancy between the trust consumers have in tech companies and the actual level of responsibility they take. Two ways have been suggested to close this gap. One is to make technologies themselves more trustworthy. This has led to a body of literature on trustworthy AI.[41] Floridi and many others have made suggestions on this point, stressing the broader need to have ethics inform law and policy making.[42] The other is to impose more duties on tech companies. Balkin has termed these 'fiduciary duties',[43] a concept that has been expanded upon by Richards and Hartzog,[44] Dobkin[45] and Jones, Rubel and LeClere,[46] and others.

Besides these debates about AI and how to regulate it, there are also notable discussions about the impact of AI on specific legal domains. For example, a debate that has been playing out for two decades, as can be found in Bygrave's early works[47] concerns the definition and scope of 'personal data' as a concept. This debate has intensified with the rise of

new technologies. In a famous article from 2009, Ohm showed that data can either be entirely anonymous or useful, but never both, meaning that if organisations process data they find valuable, they should be deemed to fall under the scope of the data protection framework.[48] This is all the more true in the current AI environment, in which it is increasingly easy to link non-personal, anonymised and aggregated data back to an individual or selected group.[49] Finck and Pallas have found that as of yet, a harmonised approach to the definition of anonymisation is lacking.[50] While Graef, Gellert and Husovec[51] argue that the lines between personal and non-personal data are increasingly difficult to draw, and others suggest that it might be desirable to bring the processing of non-personal data partially under the scope of data protection law,[52] Purtova argues that the concept of personal data has been stretched too far and that it should be redefined based on different factors.[53]

Regarding the legal and ethical status of AI-driven entities too, a big debate among scholars, policy makers and experts is unfolding.[54] Darling has written a book on how to understand robots, drawing parallels and differences between animals, humans and robots.[55] Gellers has explored questions about the attribution of rights to robots,[56] as has Gunkel.[57] Rodogno discusses what moral and rational capacities robots must have in order to be considered moral agents and patients,[58] a path that is also trodden by Shevlin.[59] Wallach and Allen describe ways to make machines moral agents,[60] an approach also suggested by Sharkey.[61]

On the question of mental integrity, a new field is emerging, which is sometimes captured by the terms 'mental privacy'[62] and 'cognitive privacy'.[63] Ienca and Malgieri, for example, focus on technologies that can map neural interfaces and interpret mental processes, calling for a 'Mental Data Protection Impact Assessment', a specific data protection impact assessment designed to better assess and mitigate the risks to fundamental rights and freedoms associated with the processing of mental data.[64] Others, such as Oravec,[65] have focused on modern forms of lie detection. Emotion detection would, if the dreams of the developers are realised, allow for the detection of emotions before a person themselves is aware of them. This is generally deemed to be a particularly invasive tool.[66] This has led Roemmich, Schaub and Andalibi to call for the protection of emotional privacy[67] and Bard for a legal framework on this issue.[68]

The effects of synthetic technologies and AI on intellectual property are approached in multiple ways.[69] Kop discusses, among many other things, the matter of legal personhood of AI-driven entities.[70] Hilty, Hoffmann and Scheuerer suggest that AI may even have an effect on

the philosophical underpinnings of the intellectual property regime.[71] There is an intense academic debate surrounding the ownership of content produced by AI systems, as well as patent and property rights on AI systems; a small overview of this is provided by Omorov.[72] Xue et al discuss ways to detect and correct intellectual property infringements by building high-performance deep neural networks specifically trained for this purpose.[73] Post-mortem privacy is a matter that exists somewhere between the right to privacy and the right to intellectual property; the question of what happens to one's data, image and likeness after one's death is a topic on which Harbinja in particular has been prolific.[74] Finally, Chesney and Citron indicate that services might arise in light of SR that allow for life logging, to ensure that an exact copy of someone's life is available, among many other topics.[75]

Many have written about the impact of AI on the right to freedom of expression.[76] One question that is particularly acute, as DeVries has pointed out,[77] is the extent to which chatbots fall under the protective scope of the freedom of expression. Massaro and Norton look at issues regarding speech rights in relation to virtual assistants.[78] Others have focused on how AI can be instrumentalised to enforce current legal and professional standards. Llansó, for example, discusses how AI can be used for content moderation;[79] Heller signals the possibilities of using AI for preventing extremist content from spreading online[80] and Helberger et al stress, inter alia, that internet platforms could use AI to create more pluriform and diverse media landscape.[81] Marsden and Meyer, and Bontridder and Poullet have touched on the extent to which spreading fake news falls under the freedom of expression.[82] Nuñez analyses to what extent platforms should be held liable for not removing inaccurate content.[83]

There is a large amount of literature concerning the design of Generative AI and synthetic technologies, especially from the technological side. Urquhart discusses the privacy and security vulnerabilities of IoT-operated devices, as well as the lack of interoperability between and common standards for these devices.[84] The need for more and better interoperability is a common theme in the literature. A large international team of researchers, led by Rehm, has signalled the need for greater interoperability of both AI and language technology, indicating five levels of interoperability, the final one being a world in which there is a fully realised and automated AI development workflow, enabling the automated development of new AI tools by providing fully interoperable data and tool exchange pipelines.[85] Lehne et al have explained how essential interoperability is for digital medicine,

especially in light of using, interpreting and selecting data, and avoiding mistakes in terms of results and diagnosis.[86]

Maurushat and Hamper echo the technical vulnerabilities raised by Urquhart and signal the considerable marketplace for those vulnerabilities (eg, zero-day exploits).[87] Osena et al point out that there are not only challenges in terms of privacy and security, but that AI may also present opportunities for guaranteeing higher levels of confidentiality, privacy and system security.[88] This is in line with the research by Hukkelås, Mester and Lindseth, who extensively discuss the possibilities of what they call 'DeepPrivacy': the protection of privacy and anonymity through DF technology.[89]

The topic of import and export controls on data and technology is widely discussed in the literature,[90] especially after regulators took steps in that direction, such as the deal between Japan, the Netherlands and the US to set limits on the export of semiconductor machines to China,[91] and the move away from Huawei-powered Wi-Fi networks in Europe.[92] Flyn has discussed the need for more export controls on AI in the US,[93] and from the European perspective, it is interesting to see that many experts, such as Carrozza, Marsh and Reichberg, and Barker and Hagebölling, discuss the need for additional import and export controls on national levels, potentially signalling that the supranational legislation on this point is insufficient.[94]

One related topic is the discussion concerning the need to ban technologies and applications. Generally, European academics seem more welcoming of the idea of imposing limits on technologies than Americans and experts from other parts of the world. However, there has been a famous call for a moratorium on the development of LLMs from a large group of primarily American professionals.[95] This call has attracted a broad response from many, including Ienca.[96] The implications of moratoria of facial and emotion recognition in public spaces have been discussed, by Gilbert,[97] while Castelvecchi has evaluated a potential total ban on facial recognition[98] and others have suggested prohibiting voice cloning technology. The EU AI Act's limitations on the use of AI by law enforcement authorities, among other topics, has been discussed by, among others, Kaminski[99] and Ebers et al.[100]

Finally, there is a large amount of literature on the use and regulation of AI in specific fields, sectors and domains.

In the medical domain, Terry has provided a good overview of the requirements for the use of AI in medicine, as well as the need for additional controls.[101] Pesapane et al have focused on radiology and have pointed to the different legal regimes in Europe and the US which may

hamper the interoperability and scalability of machines.[102] Of all the uses of AI in the medical profession, predictive analytics is perhaps in the most need of strict regulation, as prediction always entails over- and under-inclusion, which can have significant effects on patients, as Parikh, Obermeyer and Navathe have pointed out.[103] Others, such as Beckers, Kwade and Zanca, have further explored what EU medical device regulation means in practice.[104] O'Sullivan et al have studied the regulation of autonomous robotic surgery.[105] and Venkatesh, Raza and Kvedar have considered the opportunities, dangers and potential need for additional regulation in light of the creation of virtual health representations (digital twins) of patients (physical twins) that are generated using multimodal patient data, population data and real-time updates on patient and environmental variables.[106]

In the security sector in particular, the opportunities of AI[107] as well as the need for further regulation are mentioned by many.[108] Although there are a number of experts who discuss the use of military AI in China,[109] Russia[110] and the US,[111] it is clear that Europe is lagging behind, as highlighted among others by Soare: there is no unified military strategy in Europe.[112] Ulnicane refers to another potential problem: the EU wants to be a global military AI leader, but, at the same time, wants to do so in a normative and ethical fashion. These are two goals that may not be entirely compatible.[113] There is remarkably little about the use of 'robonauts' and the regulation surrounding the use of AI in space. This may be because these applications are relatively new, perhaps because space is left largely unregulated, and arguably because space activities are generally classified, although authors like Soroka and Kurkova,[114] and Martin and Freeland[115] have provided good overviews of the various complicated questions in this field.

A final sector that is widely discussed is the use of synthetic technologies for sexual applications, such as DF pornography, AR devices that allow a person to see anyone they encounter naked, teledildonics, HR sex robots and VR sex games. A good overview of this is provided by Schermer and Ham.[116] Galaitsi et al give an overview of the large number of dangers in this field. These include addiction, social isolation, non-consensual replication of real people, synthetic technology-enabled misogyny, racism and paedophilia. Galaitsi et al indicate that, so far, regulators seem to be shying away from setting clear legal frameworks, which they stress are necessary.[117] Gieseke has indicated that current laws are often unable to adequately address the dangers arising from DF pornography.[118] Meanwhile, Danaher has called for regulation over the use of child sex robots, for example, in

the treatment of paedophiles.[119] Although it is clear that many forms of non-consensual DF or virtual porn are simply prohibited under criminal law, Sparrow and Karas indicate that the definition of rape may need to be reconsidered if someone's synthetic likeliness is used for the purposes of teledildonics without their consent.[120]

6.4. DILEMMAS FOR THE REGULATOR

Although it is clear that there are many tensions that regulators need to deal with in view of SR, there is no clear path forward. The biggest uncertainty that regulators need to account for is how AI and synthetic technologies will work in practice, if at all. Although there is reason to believe that this time it will be different, their success is far from a given. Moreover, even in those areas where AI is currently effective and evolving rapidly, there are signs that this evolution may soon come to a halt. For example, there may already be so much synthetic content available that AI systems trained on contemporary (post-2022) data sets are not learning from humans or real life, but are in fact learning from themselves, thus creating a feedback loop, which may hamper progress or even bring it to a halt (model collapse).[121]

So, the first question is this: *should* the legislator take regulatory action? If so, this entails regulating partially blind, basing decisions on incomplete information.[122] This leads to the second question: if regulatory action should be taken, *when* would be most opportune?

On the one hand, it is clear that setting restrictions now might prevent considerable harm in the future. To draw an analogy, the general consensus is that if we had known how social media could negatively impact the health of children,[123] increase polarisation and segregation and drive the post-truth society when it was first introduced, strict rules would have been set. The same applies to the internet in general, which was left unregulated for decades, providing a safe haven for political dissidents, whistleblowers and marginalised groups, but also for sexual predators, cyberbullies, hackers and exploitative business models. Regulatory control would potentially have steered the development of the internet and social media towards a safer, more inclusive space that is respectful of human rights. It may also be necessary to tackle technologies at their introduction, because once the genie is out of the bottle and the technologies are widely adopted, it may be almost impossible to put it back in.

On the other hand, at this point, it is unclear what potential effects and harms will result from synthetic technologies. It may make sense

to wait until these effects actually materialise so that it is clearer on which points regulatory action should be taken, rather than tackling hypothetical effects that may never materialise. Also, setting governmental standards now might stifle innovation and dissuade other forms of norm-setting.

This leads to the third question: *how*. One regulatory option is to introduce governmental regulation, either through laws, bylaws or official guidelines. However, there are other forms of regulation too, such as setting norms through self-regulation. Currently, the industry seems to be too fragmented and too much in competitive mode to set shared standards and rules itself, but it is not unknown (in fact, quite the opposite) for industries to set up codes and self-regulatory bodies after a period of bloom. Once an industry has gone through its first peak of innovation and competitiveness, and once the market has stabilised and parties have an effectively demarcated position, the shared interest in being seen as reliable and trustworthy typically becomes more important than the detriment of having to abide by rules.[124] Rather, industries from medieval guilds to present-day notaries and lawyers have set their own vetting procedures, with disciplinary sanctions for those that violate the internal codes and ethical standards.[125] Setting legal standards can undermine the potential for sectors to regulate themselves, and it puts a high burden on the government to regulate and oversee, which is costly, often less granular and can be less effective.

Another option would be to simply leave the regulatory process to the market. Consumers could favour the parties that respect their interests and offer ethical AI services, giving these parties a competitive advantage over others. One example is the field of privacy and data protection, where there are signs that companies and start-ups start building privacy-friendly business models and advertise being privacy-friendly. It is clear that this trend has been triggered in part by the adoption of strict regulations like the GDPR. Although it is true that the laws regulating AI have not yet gained momentum, similar to the prominence and coverage given to the GDPR received after its introduction, the situation may change once the AI Act is finally adopted.

On the one hand, it may be argued that the position of citizens is too weak in comparison to the large businesses that operate AI systems and that they are often locked-in, unable to move to other providers. In addition, it can be said that the small number of American companies that are leading in the field of AI have unprecedented resources, power and knowledge. Not for nothing have there been many calls to break up tech firms.[126] Still, on the contrary, many AI systems are not consumer

products as such, but are used by professional parties and governmental organisations, which are in a better position to make demands of these tech firms or change provider. In addition, AI seems less controlled by a small number of tech giants than was the case with previous technology, if only because China is a powerful driver of innovation in AI modelling as well and because AI models have been made available open source and have consequently been democratised.

Lawrence Lessig famously distinguished between four ways to regulate: through law, through self-regulation, through the market and through technology itself. As has been explained, technology is not neutral: there are norms embedded in it. There are choices over what data are collected and fed to the algorithm, choices in terms of how the algorithm and the decision trees are formulated, choices on how the technology is applied and where, in the interpretation of results and so forth. If anything, the literature overview (see section 6.3) showed that AI is approached in two ways: it poses a danger, but it presents opportunities too. Social norms can be programmed into AI, such as to reduce societal segregation through positive discrimination. Although it may be hard for the regulator to impose technological standards, when it does not, this would not mean that no standards are embedded in technology, but rather that those standards are determined by commercial enterprises with no democratic legitimacy and that those standards may not necessarily be conducive to individual autonomy, societal equality and the rule of law.



Figure 6.2 Four ways to regulate[127]

The fourth and the fifth questions are *who* should be regulated and *where*; these questions are interrelated.

The problem with synthetic technologies is that there are usually many parties involved in their development and application. These parties are also often based in different jurisdictions. Next to the complicated value chain in terms of developing and deploying synthetic technologies, as discussed in section 5.5.3, there is an intricate value chain in terms of data, as there are typically multiple parties involved in gathering data and categorising them, in data training, enriching data sets, doing baseline measurements, testing the effectiveness of programs and creating feedback systems.[128] The current regulatory regimes leave those complex value chains intact. The AI Act, for example, lays down obligations for distributors, providers, operators, importers, users and even third parties, all of them having their own separate responsibilities in the value chain. Admittedly, the GDPR includes a relatively hierarchical structure between the controller and the processor, the controller being the party that determines the goal and means for data processing and is thus responsible for the whole process, including the dealings by the processor, who processes data on behalf of the data controller. Yet, when it comes to synthetic technologies, many parties involved may be considered a data controller. The GDPR suggests that in complex value chains with multiple parties, each having its own motives for and means of processing personal data, every party is considered a joint controller, meaning they share responsibility to ensure respect for the GDPR. There are several regulatory options, besides leaving the contemporary regulatory approach intact:

- An initial option would be to opt for a simplified approach, so to have one party legally responsible and liable for the whole value chain. This would have the additional advantage that the European regulator could lay the responsibility on a Europe-based entity. In turn, this would ensure better accountability, oversight and enforceability.
- A second option is to nationalise parts of the AI sector. Currently, the AI market is generally in the hands of private sector organisations. This means governmental regulation is by definition reactive. Although nationalisation is a radical step, it is not unprecedented from a historical perspective,[129] and could be considered owing to the enormous societal significance and impact of synthetic technologies.
- A third option could be to have the government fund or develop AI systems for public use ensuring, inter alia, that societal values are embedded in them by design. Although there is a myth that the public sector is not innovative and not as efficient as the private sector, especially when it comes to technology, this belief is largely unfounded.[130]

This option would also address the concern with the current status quo that there is an enormous knowledge gap between the public and the private sector, which means that the former is becoming increasingly dependent on the latter.

- A fourth option would be to keep the diversified approach intact, but to impose more, clearer and stricter rules on one or more of the parties involved.
- A fifth and final option would be to break up the larger tech firms that currently dominate the field of synthetic technologies, which would have the advantage of breaking up quasi-monopolies, but the disadvantage that liability and responsibility may be even more difficult to assign.

The sixth question is *what* the object of regulation should be. Under the current regulatory paradigm, there is a mix of approaches. Roughly speaking, four non-exhaustive types of regulatory objects can be distinguished for the purposes of synthetic technologies, which partly overlap and do not always align smoothly:[131]

- The primary approach in the current regulatory framework is to focus on the effects of data processing and the use of technology. Harm, for example, may be addressed through civil and criminal law, such as when intellectual property rights are violated, when fraud is committed through identify theft, when an HR does physical harm to a patient or when AR devices block important information while navigating the road. To a large extent, the human rights regime is also effects-based insofar as when the effect of a technology is a privacy violation, interferes with the freedom of speech or is discriminatory, a citizen may invoke their right.
- A second approach is to focus on preventing harm and on the harm triggered by the possibility of an interference, or what is called the chilling effect. The European Court of Human Rights has recently placed greater emphasis on preventing chilling effects, procedural requirements and legislative checks and balances that are necessary in the light of potential future harm.[132] This means that the chilling effect itself can be deemed an interference with a human right and that not having adequate safeguards in place against the arbitrary use of power, and not only the actual abuse of power, can lead to a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. From a philosophical perspective, this can be seen as a shift from an understanding of freedom as non-interference to an understanding of freedom as non-domination.[133] Outside the human rights framework, there is a focus

on preventing harm as well (eg, through impact assessments required by the GDPR) and there are several procedural safeguards, such as those provided in the AI Act. Although this approach is clearly emerging within the European legal framework, it is an approach that is still significantly less visible than the first approach noted above. Given the potential impact of synthetic technologies, this second approach may need to become more prominent.

- A third approach is to regulate specific technologies and their use. There are some rules in the AI Act that take this approach, such as those laying down prohibitions for the use of AI systems for certain purposes and settings. There are also rules on the export of technologies and components in the Dual Use Regulation. However, apart from these, the European legislator has thus far mostly chosen to adopt technology-neutral regulation.[134] Technology-neutral regulation has several advantages: it becomes outdated less quickly than technology specific regulation and is more difficult to circumvent (eg, tech-specific regulation can be circumvented by redesigning technology to fall outside the scope of its legal definition). It also gives leeway to courts and supervisory authorities to interpret principles in the spirit of the law, when faced with a new, unforeseen technology. However, there are also disadvantages. Technology-neutral regulation tends to come at the cost of legal certainty. This may, in turn, lead to a chilling effect for citizens and benevolent organisations that want to abide by the legal principles, but do not know how to do so. In addition, technology-neutral regulation always allows for discussion over the exact interpretation and application of the rules to a specific technology. This means that malevolent actors might use that ambiguity to their advantage. A final argument for adopting more technology specific rules is that the synthetic systems and their effects are very different. DF pornography is incomparable to a biased HR care robot performance. VR avatar theft is substantially different from the danger of consolidation of truth through chatbots and AR information devices that limit themselves to reproducing scientific and societal consensus.
- A fourth approach is the regulation of data, which is increasingly important in the EU. Of course, the GDPR lays down standards for processing personal data, but there are various new instruments as well, such as the Regulation on the transfer of non-personal data, the proposed Data Act and the Data Governance Act. These instruments try to set standards for various types of data. The upcoming e-Privacy Regulation includes specific rules for processing metadata. Although

> there is no unified approach to data regulation, one thing stands out: that under the classic distinction between stages of data operations in (1) gathering, (2) processing and (3) using data, almost all of the rules refer to the first stage: the gathering and storing of data (eg, legality, the processing ground, purpose specification, data minimisation, technical and organisational security measures) or are linked to that moment (eg, the purpose limitation principle is connected to the purpose indicated at the moment of data collection, as is the storage limitation principle). It might be an option to lay down more rules on the processing and use of data, to the extent that these do not yet follow from the first and second approach as discussed above.

This leads to the seventh and final question: *why?* This question is particularly difficult to answer in terms of synthetic technologies. This is because their practical effect is unknown, because the technologies may have complex multi-layered effects, because two opposite effects may materialise at the same time and because what counter-measures, if any, should be adopted is a matter of debate. Taking regulatory action can be especially difficult because choosing to protect one value may come at the cost of another. Pushing for more stability, reliability and repeatability of AI systems, for example, may come at the cost of diversification, serendipity and granularity. It may also be complex because it requires an understanding of technology and its effects on society as well as of human nature and the role of government.

Take the transparency principle as an example. It could be interpreted as directed at citizens, as a part of their informational self-determination, this is deemed to reduce the prevalent information imbalance and enhance personal autonomy. The question is what an individual can and should do with the information. Is it realistic to require a layperson to understand what the innumerable parties processing their data actually do with their information? Is it realistic to expect them to comprehend how synthetic technologies affect their life? Is it realistic to expect them to ascertain whether the activities of those parties are lawful and, if not, to take legal action against companies that have seemingly endless resources or a data provider based overseas? However, the transparency principle could also be understood as primarily allowing supervisory organisations to protect citizens' interests by having all relevant information at their disposal. Under this approach, questions will emerge as well, such as, but not limited to: is a supervisory authority that acts against an organisation that processes personal data unlawfully enhancing citizens' autonomy or would it amount to paternalism, such as when citizens are OK with data processing, even though it may not respect all the legal

requirements? In a third of many other possible interpretations, the transparency principle is seen as primarily directed at the public at large, to increase awareness, allow for an informed societal debate and enable civil right groups to commence legal proceedings. Each interpretation of the transparency principle requires different information to be provided to different actors through different means and in a different format.

The additional complexity is that most AI-driven technologies are aimed at the core of human nature, which is essentially conflicted.[135] A person may, for example, rationally wish to read a book at night, drink a cup of tea and go to bed early, but there is something primitively desirable about drinking a glass of wine and binge-watching a Netflix series into the early hours. We often do not know what we actually want ourselves, or sometimes only years later; we often regret decisions we make, including decisions that we were convinced aligned with our authentic beliefs and ambitions at the time. We often need the help of others and technology to meet our own goals, such as having an app on our phones to push us to take a certain number of steps per day or asking our partner to keep us from drinking more than two glasses of alcohol at night. Human nature is truly complex and it is often impossible to say who a person 'really' is or what a person's authentic self is, even for the person themselves. However, it is impossible to determine what enhances autonomy or what amounts to ethical AI before answering which of the various desires and conflicted selves, if any, reflects our true self.[136]

Does an HR sex robot enhance a person's autonomy by giving them all the sex they desire or does it undermine their opportunity to develop a mature human relationship? Is DF technology that allows a person to continue talking to their deceased spouse good because it allows them to seek comfort in difficult times or bad because it keeps them away from what is best for them, what they (perhaps unknowingly) actually want: to confront the pain and learn to live with it? Is an AR device that blocks blood from a child's sight laudable because it protects the child from harmful scenes that may lead to trauma, or does it undermine the child's autonomy because they do not learn to deal with shocking or disgusting stimuli by themselves and thus become dependent on the AR service? Does VR technology that allows us to explore new identities feed into our primitive desires to embody an ideal avatar keep us away from working on our true self? Or does it enhance a person's autonomy as it allows them to explore deeply felt desires and new identities, which they may not be able to do in real life? In the end, most questions surrounding technology boil down to questions about human nature, meaning that there are often no correct answers.

6.5. A WAY FORWARD

Given that the answers to the many questions, dilemmas and intricacies that the regulator needs to address depend on personal, moral and political convictions, it is impossible to provide ready-made solutions here. However, it is possible to suggest points that need to be addressed and the order in which they need to be dealt with. So far, the regulator has always been two steps behind technological developments. It is typically only years after the introduction of a technology that legislators consider the need to inform themselves about its potential effects and start taking regulatory action; by then, it is often too late. There are signs that, with AI, things will be different, as regulators across the globe are organising AI information sessions, issuing standards for Generative AI and adopting regulatory packages for synthetic technologies. This is important given the potential impact of the technology. This section provides a non-exhaustive list of points the regulator needs to consider and the order in which they should be considered.

First, the regulator needs to decide whether the various relevant parties need more information. Obviously, citizens need to be informed about the potential dangers of synthetic technologies, how they can use Generative AI in their personal lives and what rights they have in relation to the organisations that use these technologies. There also need to be awareness campaigns to inform organisations about the rules they need to comply with when developing, marketing and using synthetic technologies. This is because there is considerable ignorance surrounding the existing and upcoming legal frameworks, especially with oversees organisations that develop AI for the European market. An additional problem is that the current legal framework, even the upcoming AI Act, mostly contains fairly general rules and principles. This creates legal uncertainty, both for citizens affected by synthetic technologies and for organisations developing or using them, which stifles innovation. The regulator should consequently invest in articulating bylaws, guidelines and standards, specifying per technology, application or sector how the rules should be interpreted and what they mean in a specific context.

In particular, the regulator should strengthen its own information position.[137] In the EU, it is primarily civil servants who have attained a high level of expertise in relation to AI and synthetic technologies. At the national level, this expertise is often scattered throughout the civil service, if it is present at all. In particular, at both the European and national levels, most politicians and decision makers have insufficient knowledge to debate these technologies properly, much less regulate

them. This allows lobbyists and representatives of tech companies to have a significant influence on the legislative process; it also means that politicians easily get carried away with media trends, having the effect that they often target specific incidents rather than structural problems. An additional problem that the narrative around AI, as with many other technologies, is non-factual, but hovers around either extreme utopian or dystopian thinking,[138] such as AI techno-solutionism[139] and the fear that AI will eventually wipe out the human race.[140] To prevent this polarity from misinforming the regulatory debate, more detailed and practical knowledge on the workings of AI is required.

A second point involves a strategic decision. Synthetic technologies and Generative AI are of great public interest, given their importance for national security issues, the economy and society at large. This means that importing technologies and data may create dependencies on foreign powers. Exporting technologies and data may reduce any potential competitive advantages. In order to attain European strategic autonomy, a strong technological portfolio is vital.[141] This is why the need for further export and import bans may need to be evaluated in light of long-term strategic considerations.

An even bigger danger than the dependency on foreign powers may be dependency on tech firms. To close this gap, the regulator should consider taking the development of Generative AI under its wing by adopting the role of innovator, by setting up an independent foundation tasked and funded with this goal or by incentivising the market to develop technologies that are respectful of the rule of law, with parties having to share the design of the technology and the knowledge gained through developing it. Mazzucato, Schaake and others have suggested that the regulator should actively intervene to shape the AI market.[142]

A third point is that the regulator has largely shied away from introducing technical requirements and bans on technologies, in an attempt to retain technology-neutral legislation. The regulator should consider adopting specific technological standards of three types. The first is technological security standards. For some products, such as cars, there is an established system of security standards, tests and evaluations; this is mostly lacking for Generative AI and synthetic technologies. Given the vulnerability the backdoors and other technological weaknesses create, concrete technical security standards could help reduce vulnerabilities and prevent against hacking from criminals or foreign powers. Second, setting technological standards may also ensure respect for human rights by design.[143] These types of standards should also be considered in light of Generative AI, to embed concerns over privacy, data protection,

non-discrimination and other human rights into the technical designs of systems. Third, the need for imposing bans or moratoria should also be assessed. Although it is sometimes falsely suggested that digital technology cannot be regulated, much less banned, given the cross-border nature and complex value chain involved, the GDPR has shown this to be untrue. As with a ban on non-authorised possession of firearms in force in most European countries, which is not absolutely enforced but significantly reduces the number of people with firearms, bans on technologies are not absolutely effective, but they reduce their prominence significantly.

Subsequently, the regulator should assess a fourth point – whether it wants to formally apply the precautionary principle to AI:

> The precautionary principle is an approach to risk management, where, if it is possible that a given policy or action might cause harm to the public or the environment and if there is still no scientific agreement on the issue, the policy or action in question should not be carried out.[144]

Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union specifies that EU policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection and be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.[145] Although it is clear that applying this principle mutatis mutandis to synthetic technologies could have a negative impact on innovation,[146] at least in the short term, given the potential impact of Generative AI, it should be considered seriously. In the long term, clear and strict regulatory standards may in fact boost innovation.

Fifth, the current regulatory framework, such as the GDPR and the proposed AI Act, to the extent that it is focused on preventing harm, is concerned with the specific rather than the general on at least two points. First, it focuses primarily on the impact of systems and data processes on citizens, but less so on societal interests. Second, it takes account of the effects of one specific system or data process, not the combined effects thereof.[147] Both points may need to be reconsidered. Societal interests are affected through the combined effects of synthetic technologies.[148] A single application will not in and of itself amount to a post-truth society, undermine interpersonal trust or deepen societal inequality, but a plethora of effects combined may do so. This may require a governmental organisation to be involved in the evaluating the effects of Generative AI. Assessing the permissibility of an individual system or specific application in light of its combined effects and societal implications in relation

to existing or proposed systems or applications requires an entity with an overview of the whole sector.[149]

The sixth point the regulator needs to account for is the effectiveness of AI systems. There is a persistent yet unfounded belief in new technologies and their ability to solve problems or optimise processes. This means that millions are spent on projects, only to pull the plug a year or two later. Under the human rights framework, data-driven applications can only be introduced if there is reason to believe that they would increase effectiveness or efficiency in light of a legitimate aim. If a technology or system is not or is not very effective in relation to the intended goal, it will not be in conformity with the necessity, proportionality and subsidiarity requirements.[150] These rules apply to public and private sector bodies alike when a human right is affected. Should the regulator want to allow organisations to use systems without established effectiveness, it should at a minimum consider imposing a sunset clause.[151] It may require organisations to first make baseline measurements to assess what the status quo is before introducing the synthetic technology, to subsequently determine benchmarks for the system and to finally assess whether those benchmarks are met. If the project does not deliver on its promise before the term in the sunset clause ends, it should be terminated.[152]

Subsequently, the regulator needs to address a seventh point: whether additional legal obligations and requirements should be implemented. Many harmful activities are already prohibited or sanctioned through law, whether committed through traditional means or through synthetic technologies. However, on other points, additional rules may be needed, which have been discussed in detail. These include the questions of whether virtual rape should be criminalised, whether spreading DF news (particularly during election campaigns) should be prohibited, whether AI-driven entities should have fundamental rights of their own if they become sentient and whether, in light of the post-truth society, obligations should be imposed on internet providers to monitor and block inauthentic content. It also needs to be assessed whether the procedural rules on the admissibility of evidence in court need to be revised and whether a digital forensic institute should be set up that assesses all material introduced in court by default.

The eighth step is strengthening supervisory authorities. Mention was made of two potential new government bodies: an authority that assesses the admissibility of synthetic technologies and concrete applications with an eye on combined effects, societal interests and long-term effects, and a digital forensic institute that assesses evidence submitted in court by default. If created, both would require a substantial budget and

resources given the potential volume of synthetic media and the role of Generative AI. It is equally clear that existing governmental bodies may need to be better equipped in light of the many challenges that arise in the synthetic society. These bodies include the public prosecution office, the Data Protection Authority and the various supervisory authorities that oversee the financial and other specific sectors, as well as those that enforce competition, consumer and telecommunications law. If AI is able to deliver on its promise of efficiency and effectiveness, part of the budget savings should be redirected to ensuring oversight on all relevant safeguards.

Ninth, the regulator should invest in international cooperation in terms of enforcement and norm-setting. For organisations that develop and market synthetic technologies and Generative AI, which generally operate in multiple jurisdictions, the regulatory frameworks with which they need to comply should be as consistent as possible. The European regulator has a strategic choice to make. Does it want to pursue the traditional route of international norm-setting, through bodies such as the UN or the OECD? Or, alternatively, should it aim to become the world's AI regulator through the Brussels effect?[153] In addition to strict governmental oversight, the regulator may need to seek cooperation with industry sectors.[154] The GDPR encouraged sectors to adopt codes of conduct and set up sectoral supervisory bodies, but both because of the administrative and financial burden this puts on sectors, and because the advantages were considered to be too small, very few codes of conduct have been adopted and approved. To make this approach a success with respect to synthetic technologies, the regulator should consider either providing more substantial advantages to sectors that maintain oversight themselves or impose a duty on several sectors so that they do so.

Tenth and finally, the regulator should assess the need for a bigger punitive stick, next to the carrot of investing in or subsidising organisations that develop human centred synthetic technologies (see point two above). A persistent problem in the European legal context is that when citizens go to court (which may be costly and time-consuming) and win a case, they often only receive damages of hundreds or maybe one or two thousand euros, even when it concerns violations of bodily integrity. In terms of fairness and deterrent effect, the regulator should consider increasing damages in certain settings. Given the large societal interest at stake, account should also be made of the fines and penalties that regulatory bodies can impose. The GDPR introduced the possibility to impose fines of €20 million or, in the case of an undertaking, up to four per cent of the total overall annual turnover of the preceding financial year,

which should also be considered by the regulator in light of Generative AI and synthetic technologies for contexts falling outside the scope of the GDPR.



Figure 6.3 Points the regulator needs to deal with when regulating the synthetic society

6.6. CONCLUSION

This book has given a full overview of synthetic technologies, their effects on society and the potential need for regulatory change.

It has taken as its premise the most likely hypothesis, namely that Generative AI will be a modest success, which means that on several fronts, it will improve existing and facilitate new processes, but equally that there are many limitations and dangers that plague AI. Rules should consequently be set to incentivise human-centred AI and to counter the detrimental effects of Generative AI and the four technologies central to this book: HRs, DFs, AR and VR. Although good regulatory options are very few and far between and there is no carved path forward, if the regulator succeeds, the world as we know it might modestly change for the better. But alas, utopia will still be a pipe dream.

However, there is a possibility that Generative AI will not be the success it is now predicted to be. Should synthetic technologies not deliver on their promises, like many other technologies before them, opportunities may be missed, but life may continue to be good. We could still read books, though without virtual characters popping up, we could go for drinks with friends at an actual bar with an actual bartender, we could take the train to Rome and see the marvellous buildings with our own eyes, while a local tour guide with a slight Italian accent shows us around, and, at the end of the day, when the mood is right, make love to our non-robotic partner.

There is, on the other hand, a possibility that Generative AI and synthetic technologies turn out to be more effective than is currently predicted and that its dangers and pitfalls could be overcome in full, through technical, societal or regulatory changes. AI would then, among many other things, allow for better diagnostic choices, be more effective and efficient in the execution of tasks, make daily life easier and more fun, and relieve us of most if not all forms of arduous labour. What would we do with all of our spare time? Who knows: perhaps we would take the time to read a book and have a drink with friends, go to Rome to walk down the Via Appia Antica, try a Tonnarelli Cacio e Pepe at a local restaurant, and late at night, have a romantic evening with our partner watching the sun set over the Lago Albano.

Notes

CHAPTER 1
A MAP TO THIS BOOK

1. <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/nl/speech_20_294/SPEECH_20_294_EN.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
2. <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/ov/speech_23_4426/SPEECH_23_4426_OV.pdf>, last accessed 17 September 2023.
3. <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/28/podcasts/elons-x-machina-crypto-orbs-and-a-visit-to-googles-robot-lab.html>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
4. <http://www.mimitchi.com/html/q1.htm>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
5. <https://www.imdb.com/title/tt4619556/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
6. Nightingale, S. J., & Farid, H. (2022). AI-synthesized faces are indistinguishable from real faces and more trustworthy. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, *119*(8),e2120481119.
7. Van der Sloot, B., & Lanzing, M. (2021). The continued transformation of the public sphere: on the road to smart cities, living labs and a new understanding of society. In Nagenborg, M., Stone, T., Woge, M. G., & Vermaas, P. E. (Eds.). (2021). *Technology and the city: Towards a philosophy of urban technologies* (Vol. 36). Springer Nature.
8. Xu, M., Ng, W. C., Lim, W. Y. B., Kang, J., Xiong, Z., Niyato, D., Yang, Q., Shen, X. S., & Miao, C. (2022). A full dive into realizing the edge-enabled metaverse: Visions, enabling technologies, and challenges. *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials*.
9. <https://www.jst.go.jp/moonshot/en/program/goal1/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

CHAPTER 2
APPLICATIONS AND EFFECTS OF SYNTHETIC TECHNOLOGIES

1. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/priorities/artificial-intelligence-in-the-eu/20200918STO87404/artificial-intelligence-threats-and-opportunities>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
2. Vrontis, D., Christofi, M., Pereira, V., Tarba, S., Makrides, A., & Trichina, E. (2022). Artificial intelligence, robotics, advanced technologies and human resource management: a systematic review. *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, *33*(6), 1237–1266.
3. <https://www.intuitive.com/en-us/products-and-services/da-vinci>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
4. Panesar, S., Cagle, Y., Chander, D., Morey, J., Fernandez-Miranda, J., & Kliot, M. (2019). Artificial intelligence and the future of surgical robotics. *Annals of Surgery*, *270*(2), 223–226.
5. Haidegger, T., Speidel, S., Stoyanov, D., & Satava, R. M. (2022). Robot-assisted minimally invasive surgery: surgical robotics in the data age. *Proceedings of the IEEE*, *110*(7), 835–846.
6. <https://myomo.com/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
7. <https://www.engineeredarts.co.uk/tinman-telepresence/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

8. Bugmann, G., Siegel, M., & Burcin, R. (2011, September). A role for robotics in sustainable development? In *IEEE Africon'11* (pp. 1–4). IEEE. <https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=a84153309d6956e751a234095713c75d1e60ae21>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

9. <https://misorobotics.com/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

10. <https://www.piaggiofastforward.com/#mission>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

11. <https://www.starship.xyz/services/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

12. <https://braincorp.com/applications/floor-care/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

13. Dirican, C. (2015). The impacts of robotics, Artificial Intelligence on business and economics. *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences*, *195*, 564–573.

14. <https://www.outrider.ai/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

15. <https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/humanoid-robot-market-99567653.html>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

16. <https://global.toyota/en/newsroom/corporate/30609642.html>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

17. <https://www.hennnahotel.com/ginza/en/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

18. <https://www.maccorobotics.com/en/robot-camarero-kime>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

19. <https://promo-bot.ai/use-case/consultant/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

20. Samala, N., Katkam, B. S., Bellamkonda, R. S., & Rodriguez, R. V. (2020). Impact of AI and robotics in the tourism sector: a critical insight. *Journal of Tourism Futures*, *8*(1), 73–87.

21. Tussyadiah, I. (2020). A review of research into automation in tourism: Launching the Annals of Tourism Research Curated Collection on Artificial Intelligence and Robotics in Tourism. *Annals of Tourism Research*, *81*, 102883.

22. <https://khatib.stanford.edu/ocean-one.html>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

23. <https://www.aldebaran.com/en/pepper-and-nao-robots-education>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

24. <https://agilityrobotics.com/robots>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

25. <https://h2t.anthropomatik.kit.edu/english/397.php>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

26. <https://openai.com/blog/chatgpt/>, last accessed 25 August 2023. Next to Open AI, important tools are built by Anthropic, X.AI, Google (Gemini), and Meta (Llama)."

27. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/16/podcasts/the-daily/chatgpt-openai-artificial-intelligence.html>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

28. See, eg, <https://www.craiyon.com/>, <https://www.midjourneyai.ai/>, <https://runwayml.com/>, <https://www.adobe.com/products/firefly.html> and <https://openai.com/dall-e-2>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

29. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zj4sYFQu6bA>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

30. Yang, G., Pang, Z., Deen, M. J., Dong, M., Zhang, Y. T., Lovell, N., & Rahmani, A. M. (2020). Homecare robotic systems for healthcare 4.0: visions and enabling technologies. *IEEE Journal of Biomedical and Health Informatics*, *24*(9), 2535–2549.

31. Hayashi, K., Shiomi, M., Kanda, T., & Hagita, N. (2012, June). Friendly patrolling: A model of natural encounters. In *Proc. RSS* (p. 121). <https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=2bb4d5b9901d61bd3cbe013bc3abde878f07c83d>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

32. <https://www.asme.org/topics-resources/content/10-humanoid-robots-of-2020>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

33. <https://www.nasa.gov/robonaut2>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

34. <https://www.bostondynamics.com/atlas>, last accessed 25 August 2023; <https://www.engineeredarts.co.uk/robot/robothespian/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

35. <https://www.diligentrobots.com/moxi>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

36. <https://www.hansonrobotics.com/sophia-2020/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

37. <https://www.amazon.com/Robot-Pets/s?k=Robot+Pets>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

38. <https://robots.nu/nl/robots>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
39. <https://www.bostondynamics.com/solutions/inspection>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
40. <https://www.businessinsider.com/video-robot-dog-covid-19-instructions-in-lockdown-shanghai-china-2022-4?international=true&r=US&IR=T>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
41. <https://support.embodied.com/hc/en-us/sections/360011625232-Weekly-Theme-Guides>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
42. <https://embodied.com/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
43. Scheutz, M., & Arnold, T. (2016, March). Are we ready for sex robots? In *2016 11th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI)* (pp. 351–358). IEEE.
44. Levy, D. (2009). *Love and sex with robots: the evolution of human-robot relationships*. Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd, p. 352.
45. Pearson, I. (2015). The future of sex report: the rise of the robosexuals. *A Futurizon Report-Bondara*. <http://graphics.bondara.com/Future_sex_report.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
46. Döring, N., Mohseni, M. R., & Walter, R. (2020). Design, use, and effects of sex dolls and sex robots: scoping review. *Journal of Medical Internet Research*, *22*(7), e18551.
47. Cox-George, C., & Bewley, S. (2018). I, Sex Robot: the health implications of the sex robot industry. *BMJ Sexual & Reproductive Health*, *44*(3), 161–164.
48. Jecker, N. S. (2021). Nothing to be ashamed of: sex robots for older adults with disabilities. *Journal of Medical Ethics*, *47*(1), 26–32; Fosch-Villaronga, E., & Poulsen, A. (2020). Sex care robots. *Paladyn: Journal of Behavioral Robotics*, *11*(1), 1–18.
49. Torresen, J. (2018). A review of future and ethical perspectives of robotics and AI. *Frontiers in Robotics and AI*, *4*, 75.
50. Richardson, K. (2016). Sex robot matters: slavery, the prostituted, and the rights of machines. *IEEE Technology and Society Magazine*, *35*(2), 46–53.
51. Yang, G., Pang, Z., Deen, M. J., Dong, M., Zhang, Y. T., Lovell, N., & Rahmani, A. M. (2020). Homecare robotic systems for healthcare 4.0: visions and enabling technologies. *IEEE Journal of Biomedical and Health Informatics*, *24*(9), 2535–2549.
52. Raj, M., & Seamans, R. (2019). Primer on Artificial Intelligence and robotics. *Journal of Organization Design*, *8*(1), 1–14; Rajan, K., & Saffiotti, A. (2017). Towards a science of integrated AI and Robotics. *Artificial Intelligence*, *247*, 1–9.
53. Siau, K., & Wang, W. (2018). Building trust in Artificial Intelligence, machine learning, and robotics. *Cutter Business Technology Journal*, *31*(2), 47–53.
54. Winfield, A. F., & Jirotka, M. (2018). Ethical governance is essential to building trust in robotics and Artificial Intelligence systems. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences*, *376*(2133), 20180085.
55. See, eg, <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230127-top-french-university-bans-students-from-using-chatgpt> and <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/28/podcasts/the-daily/ai-chat-gpt-schools.html>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
56. The description of DFs in this book draws from a work published previously in Dutch. See van der Sloot, B., Wagensveld, Y., & Koops, B. J. (2021). Deepfakes. WODC. <https://repository.wodc.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12832/3134/3137-deepfakes-volledige-tekst.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y>, last accessed 25 August 2023. Yvette Wagensveld, a student assistant at the time, assisted in finding relevant examples as represented in this section and in describing DF technology, as discussed in section 3.3 in Chapter 3.
57. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BU9YAHigNx8>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
58. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n0CwnzO7Agg>, last accessed 25 August 2023; the video has been removed from the platform for violating the terms of services.
59. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IvY-Abd2FfM>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

60. Lee, D. (2019). Deepfake Salvador Dalí takes selfies with museum visitors. *The Verge*. <https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/10/18540953/salvador-dali-lives-deepfake-museum>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

61. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P2uZF-5F1wI>, last accessed 25 August 2023; BBC (2019). Mona Lisa 'brought to life' with Deepfake AI. *BBC News*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48395521>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

62. Berthelot, D., Milanfar, P., & Goodfellow, I. (2020). Creating high resolution images with a latent adversarial generator. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.02365*. <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.02365.pdf≥, last accessed 25 August 2023.

63. Wan, Z., Zhang, B., Chen, D., Zhang, P., Chen, D., Liao, J., & Wen, F. (2020). Bringing old photos back to life. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF conference on computer vision and pattern recognition* (pp. 2747–2757).

64. <https://blog.myheritage.com/2021/02/deep-nostalgia-goes-viral/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

65. <https://www.filmacademie.ahk.nl/lichting/2020/projecten/deepfake-therapy/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

66. <https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/behind-screen/how-furious-7-brought-late-845763>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

67. See about this trend <https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1821641/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

68. <https://influencermatchmaker.co.uk/blog/virtual-influencers-what-are-they-how-do-they-work>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

69. Also sometimes on accident; see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcnnI6HD6DU>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

70. KR, P., Mukhopadhyay, R., Philip, J., Jha, A., Namboodiri, V., & Jawahar, C. V. (2019, October). Towards automatic face-to-face translation. In *Proceedings of the 27th ACM international conference on multimedia* (pp. 1428–1436).

71. Snow, J. (2018). Deepfakes for good: why researchers are using AI to fake health data. *Fast Company*. <https://www.fastcompany.com/90240746/deepfakes-for-good-why-researchers-are-using-ai-for-synthetic-health-data>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

72. Frid-Adar, M., Diamant, I., Klang, E., Amitai, M., Goldberger, J., & Greenspan, H. (2018). GAN-based synthetic medical image augmentation for increased CNN performance in liver lesion classification. *Neurocomputing*, *321*, 321–331.

73. Baur, C., Albarqouni, S., & Navab, N. (2018). Generating highly realistic images of skin lesions with GANs. In *OR 2.0 Context-Aware Operating Theaters, Computer Assisted Robotic Endoscopy, Clinical Image-Based Procedures, and Skin Image Analysis* (pp. 260–267). Springer.

74. <https://teamgleason.org/pals-resource/voice-message-banking/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

75. Creer, S., Cunningham, S., Green, P., & Yamagishi, J. (2013). Building personalised synthetic voices for individuals with severe speech impairment. *Computer Speech & Language*, *27*(6), 1178–1193. <https://www.logopedie.nl/kennis/dysartrie/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

76. Zhu, B., Fang, H., Sui, Y., & Li, L. (2020, February). Deepfakes for medical video de-identification: privacy protection and diagnostic information preservation. In *Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM conference on AI, ethics, and society* (pp. 414–420).

77. Schwartz, M. (2018). Who killed the Kiev protesters? A 3-D model holds the clues. *New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/magazine/ukraine-protest-video.html>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

78. <https://www.terredeshommes.nl/nl/projecten/sweetie>; when last accessed on 25 August 2023, the organization announced a change in strategy.

79. Van der Hof, S., Georgieva, I., Schermer, B., & Koops, B. J. (Eds.). (2019). *Sweetie 2.0: Using Artificial Intelligence to fight webcam child sex tourism*. TMC Asser Press.

80. <https://www.charlietemple.com/nl-nl/virtuele-paskamer>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

81. Baron, K. (2019). Digital doubles: the Deepfake tech nourishing new wave retail. *Forbes*. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/katiebaron/2019/07/29/digital-doubles-the-deepfake-tech-nourishing-new-wave-retail/?sh=c4ce31f4cc7b>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

82. <https://in.apparelresources.com/>, <https://fashionunited.uk/news/retail/virtual-fitting-room-market-forecast-to-double-by-2025/2020101551399 />, last accessed 25 August 2023.

83. <https://www.cereproc.com/en/jfkunsilenced>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

84. Chandler, S. (2020). Why Deepfakes are a net positive for humanity. *Forbes*. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonchandler/2020/03/09/why-deepfakes-are-a-net-positive-for-humanity/?sh=61c55ef02f84>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

85. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8o0iOm-2sLw>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

86. <https://www.media.mit.edu/projects/deep-empathy/overview/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

87. Christopher, N. (2020). We've just seen the first use of Deepfakes in an Indian election campaign. *Vice*. <https://www.vice.com/en/article/jgedjb/the-first-use-of-deepfakes-in-indian-election-by-bjp>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

88. Fink, D., & Diamond S. (2020). Deepfakes: 2020 and beyond. Law.com. <https://www.law.com/therecorder/2020/09/03/deepfakes-2020-and-beyond/?slreturn=20210014101012>, last accessed 25 August 2023; Hern, A. (2018). 'Deepfake' face-swap porn videos banned by Pornhub and Twitter. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/feb/07/twitter-pornhub-ban-deepfake-ai-face-swap-porn-videos-celebrities-gfycat-reddit>, last accessed 25 August 2023; Bickert, M. (2020). Enforcing against manipulated media. *Facebook*. <https://about.fb.com/news/2020/01/enforcing-against-manipulated-media/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

89. <https://www.reddithelp.com/hc/en-us/articles/360043075032>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

90. Melville, K. (2019). The insidious rise of Deepfake porn videos – and one woman who won't be silenced. *ABC News*. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-08-30/deepfake-revenge-porn-noelle-martin-story-of-image-based-abuse/11437774>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

91. However, see also Thomas, D. (2020). Deepfakes: a threat to democracy or just a bit of fun? *BBC News*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51204954>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

92. Schwartz, O. (2018). You thought fake news was bad? Deep fakes are where truth goes to die. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/nov/12/deepfakes-fake-news-truth>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

93. Fagan, K. (2018). A viral video that appeared to show Obama calling Trump a 'dips –' shows a disturbing new trend called 'Deepfakes'. *Business Insider*. <https://www.businessinsider.nl/obama-deepfake-video-insulting-trump-2018-4?international=true&r=US>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

94. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m7u-y9oqUSw>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

95. <https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/28/21240488/jay-z-deepfakes-roc-nation-youtube-removed-ai-copyright-impersonation>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

96. <https://slate.com/technology/2020/11/robert-kardashian-joaquin-oliver-deepfakes-death.html>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

97. Edwards, J. (2019). A false rumor on WhatsApp started a run on a London bank. *Business Insider*. <https://www.businessinsider.nl/whatsapp-rumour-started-run-on-metro-bank-2019-5?international=true&r=US>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

98. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/malicious_uses_and_abuses_of_artificial_intelligence_europol.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023. See also: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Europol_Innovation_Lab_Facing_Reality_Law_Enforcement_And_The_Challenge_Of_Deepfakes.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023; < https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Tech%20Watch%20Flash%20-%20The%20Impact%20of%20Large%20Language%20Models%20on%20Law%20Enforcement.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

99. Stupp, C. (2019). Fraudsters used AI to mimic CEO's voice in unusual cybercrime case. *Wall Street Journal*. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/fraudsters-use-ai-to-mimic-ceos-voice-in-unusual-cybercrime-case-11567157402>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

100. <https://observers.france24.com/en/20191008-deepfake-video-former-italian-pm-matteo-renzi-sparks-debate-italy>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

101. Dobber, T., Metoui, N., Trilling, D., Helberger, N., & de Vreese, C. (2021). Do (microtargeted) Deepfakes have real effects on political attitudes? *International Journal of Press/Politics*, *26*(1), 69–91.

102. <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-26643-508.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

103. <https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/03/deepfake-gabon-ali-bongo/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

104. BBC (2020). Australia demands China apologise for posting 'repugnant' fake image. *BBC News*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-55126569>, last accessed 25 August 2023. The extent to which this concerned a real Deepfake or a fake photo generated by a less advanced technique was difficult to establish.

105. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/malicious_uses_and_abuses_of_artificial_intelligence_europol.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

106. Van Krevelen, D. W. F., & Poelman, R. (2010). A survey of augmented reality technologies, applications and limitations. *International Journal of Virtual Reality*, *9*(2), 1–20.

107. Chong, Y., Sethi, D. K., Loh, C. H. Y., & Lateef, F. (2018). Going forward with Pokemon Go. *Journal of Emergencies, Trauma, and Shock*, *11*(4), 243.

108. Azuma, R. T. (1997). A survey of augmented reality. *Presence: Teleoperators & Virtual Environments*, *6*(4), 355–385.

109. <https://www.press.bmwgroup.com/global/article/detail/T0317125EN/munich-pilot-plant:-bmw-group-uses-augmented-reality-in-prototyping?language=en>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

110. <http://layar.com>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

111. Carmigniani, J., Furht, B., Anisetti, M., Ceravolo, P., Damiani, E., & Ivkovic, M. (2011). Augmented Reality technologies, systems and applications. *Multimedia Tools and Applications*, *51*(1), 341–377.

112. Miller, M. R., Jun, H., Herrera, F., Yu Villa, J., Welch, G., & Bailenson, J. N. (2019). Social interaction in Augmented Reality. *PloS One*, *14*(5), e0216290.

113. <https://www.wikitude.com/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

114. Johnson, L., Levine, A., Smith, R., & Stone, S. (2010). *The 2010 Horizon report*. New Media Consortium. 6101 West Courtyard Drive Building One Suite 100, Austin, TX 78730.

115. < https://www.instantreality.org/itacitus/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

116. Skwarek, M. (2018). Augmented Reality activism. In *Augmented Reality art* (pp. 3–40). Springer.

117. <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/p/fragments/9nblggh5ggm8>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

118. <https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/08/chinese-police-are-getting-smart-glasses/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

119. <https://www.army.mil/article/221766/augmented_reality_training_on_the_horizon_to_give_soldiers_edge_in_combat>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

120. Ayoub, A., & Pulijala, Y. (2019). The application of virtual reality and augmented reality in oral & maxillofacial surgery. *BMC Oral Health*, *19*(1), 1–8.

121. Silva, R., Oliveira, J. C., & Giraldi, G. A. (2003). Introduction to augmented reality. *National Laboratory for Scientific Computation*, *11*, 1–11.

122. Lee, K. (2012). Augmented Reality in education and training. *TechTrends*, *56*(2), 13–21.

123. Johnson, L., Levine, A., Smith, R., & Stone, S. (2010). *The 2010 Horizon report*. New Media Consortium. 6101 West Courtyard Drive Building One Suite 100, Austin, TX 78730.

124. Matviienko, A., Müller, F., Schön, D., Seesemann, P., Günther, S., & Mühlhäuser, M. (2022, April). BikeAR: understanding cyclists' crossing decision-making at uncontrolled intersections using Augmented Reality. In *CHI conference on human factors in computing systems* (pp. 1–15).

125. Siriwardhana, Y., Porambage, P., Liyanage, M., & Ylianttila, M. (2021). A survey on mobile Augmented Reality with 5G mobile edge computing: architectures, applications, and technical aspects. *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials*, *23*(2), 1160–1192.

126. <https://www.anses.fr/en/system/files/AP2017SA0076EN.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

127. Aggarwal, R., & Singhal, A. (2019, January). Augmented Reality and its effect on our life. In *2019 9th international conference on cloud computing, data science & engineering (confluence)* (pp. 510–515). IEEE.

128. <https://www.allerin.com/blog/organizations-should-address-these-5-risks-of-ar>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

129. <https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-reallife-dangers-of-augmented-reality>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

130. Das, P., Zhu, M. O., McLaughlin, L., Bilgrami, Z., & Milanaik, R. L. (2017). Augmented reality video games: new possibilities and implications for children and adolescents. *Multimodal Technologies and Interaction*, *1*(2), 8.

131. <https://usa.kaspersky.com/resource-center/threats/security-and-privacy-risks-of-ar-and-vr>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

132. Siriwardhana, Y., Porambage, P., Liyanage, M., & Ylianttila, M. (2021). A survey on mobile augmented reality with 5G mobile edge computing: architectures, applications, and technical aspects. *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials*, *23*(2), 1160–1192.

133. Wohlgenannt, I., Simons, A., & Stieglitz, S. (2020). Virtual reality. *Business & Information Systems Engineering*, *62*(5), 455–461.

134. Bec, A., Moyle, B., Schaffer, V., & Timms, K. (2021). Virtual reality and mixed reality for second chance tourism. *Tourism Management*, *83*, 104256.

135. McCloy, R. & Stone, R. (2001). Science, medicine, and the future virtual reality in surgery. *BMJ*, *323*(7318), 912–915.

136. Singh, R. P., Javaid, M., Kataria, R., Tyagi, M., Haleem, A., & Suman, R. (2020). Significant applications of virtual reality for COVID-19 pandemic. *Diabetes & Metabolic Syndrome: Clinical Research & Reviews*, *14*(4), 661–664.

137. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/22/podcasts/the-daily/the-sunday-read-virtual-reality-and-chronic-pain.html>, last accessed 25 August 2023; Matamala-Gomez, M., Donegan, T., Bottiroli, S., Sandrini, G., Sanchez-Vives, M. V., & Tassorelli, C. (2019). Immersive virtual reality and virtual embodiment for pain relief. *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience*, *13*, 279.

138. Zhao, Y., Bennett, C., Benko, H., Cutrell, E., Holz, C., Morris, M. R. & Sinclair, M. (2018). Enabling people with visual impairments to navigate virtual reality with a haptic and auditory cane simulation. In *Proceedings of the 2018 CHI conference on human factors in computing systems* (pp. 1–14).

139. Riva, G. (2005). Virtual reality in psychotherapy. *Cyberpsychology & Behavior*, *8*(3), 220–230.

140. Lafortune, D., Dion, L., & Renaud, P. (2020). Virtual reality and sex therapy: future directions for clinical research. *Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy*, *46*(1), 1–17.

141. Gregg, L., & Tarrier, N. (2007). Virtual reality in mental health. *Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology*, *42*(5), 343–354.

142. Riva, G., Wiederhold, B. K., & Mantovani, F. (2019). Neuroscience of virtual reality: from virtual exposure to embodied medicine. *Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking*, *22*(1), 82–96.

143. Eng, K., Siekierka, E., Cameirao, M., Zimmerli, L., Pyk, P., Duff, A., Erol, F., Schuster, C., Bassetti, C., Kiper, D., & Verschure, P. (2007). Cognitive virtual-reality based stroke rehabilitation. In *World congress on medical physics and biomedical engineering 2006: August 27–September 1, 2006 COEX Seoul, Korea 'Imaging the future medicine'* (pp. 2839–2843). Springer.

144. Helsel, S. (1992). Virtual reality and education. *Educational Technology*, *32*(5), 3=842.

145. Dobson, H. D., Pearl, R. K., Orsay, C. P., Rasmussen, M., Evenhouse, R., Ai, Z., Blew, G., Edison, M.I., Silverstein, J.C., & Abcarian, H. (2003). Virtual reality: new method of teaching anorectal and pelvic floor anatomy. *Diseases of the Colon & Rectum*, *46*(3), 349–352.

146. Pottle, J. (2019). Virtual reality and the transformation of medical education. *Future Healthcare Journal*, *6*(3), 181.

147. Ayoub, A., & Pulijala, Y. (2019). The application of virtual reality and augmented reality in oral & maxillofacial surgery. *BMC Oral Health*, *19*(1), 1–8.

148. Stone, R. J. (2018). Blending the best of the real with the best of the virtual: mixed reality case studies in healthcare and defence. In *Augmented Reality and Virtual Reality* (pp. 277–293). Springer.

149. Jones, S., & Dawkins, S. (2018). The sensorama revisited: evaluating the application of multi-sensory input on the sense of presence in 360-degree immersive film in virtual reality. In *Augmented Reality and Virtual Reality* (pp. 183–197). Springer.

150. Berg, L. P., & Vance, J. M. (2017). Industry use of virtual reality in product design and manufacturing: a survey. *Virtual Reality*, *21*(1), 1–17.

151. Dekker, A., Wenzlaff, F., Biedermann, S. V., Briken, P., & Fuss, J. (2021). VR porn as 'empathy machine'? Perception of self and others in virtual reality pornography. *Journal of Sex Research*, *58*(3), 273–278.

152. Elsey, J. W., van Andel, K., Kater, R. B., Reints, I. M., & Spiering, M. (2019). The impact of Virtual Reality versus 2D pornography on sexual arousal and presence. *Computers in Human Behavior*, *97*, 35–43.

153. Simon, S. C., & Greitemeyer, T. (2019). The impact of immersion on the perception of pornography: a Virtual Reality study. *Computers in Human Behavior*, *93*, 141–148.

154. Evans, L. (2021). 'The embodied empathy revolution …': pornography and the contemporary state of consumer virtual reality. *Porn Studies*, *8*(1), 121–127.

155. Adams, D., Bah, A., Barwulor, C., Musaby, N., Pitkin, K., & Redmiles, E. M. (2018). Ethics emerging: the story of privacy and security perceptions in Virtual Reality. In *Fourteenth symposium on usable privacy and security (SOUPS 2018)* (pp. 427–442).

156. <https://thenextweb.com/news/9-ethical-problems-vr-still-solve>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

157. Slater, M., Gonzalez-Liencres, C., Haggard, P., Vinkers, C., Gregory-Clarke, R., Jelley, S., Watson, Z., Breen, G., Schwarz, R., Steptoe, W., Szostak, D., Halan, S., Fox, D., & Silver, J. (2020). The ethics of realism in virtual and augmented reality. *Frontiers in Virtual Reality*, *1*, 1.

158. Spiegel, J. S. (2018). The ethics of virtual reality technology: social hazards and public policy recommendations. *Science and Engineering Ethics*, *24*(5), 1537–1550.

159. Chang, E., Kim, H. T., & Yoo, B. (2020). Virtual Reality sickness: a review of causes and measurements. *International Journal of Human–Computer Interaction*, *36*(17), 1658–1682.

160. Clay, V., König, P., & Koenig, S. (2019). Eye tracking in virtual reality. *Journal of Eye Movement Research*, *12*(1).

161. Sora-Domenjó, C. (2022). Disrupting the 'empathy machine': the power and perils of virtual reality in addressing social issues. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *13*.

CHAPTER 3
UNDER THE HOOD

1. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/641547/EPRS_STU(2020)641547_EN.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

2. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/634427/EPRS_BRI(2019)634427_EN.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

3. 'IEEE Standard Ontologies for Robotics and Automation', in IEEE Std 1872–2015, pp 1–60, 10 April 2015, doi: 10.1109/IEEESTD.2015.7084073.

4. <https://www.iso.org/standard/75539.html>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

5. Perez, J. A., Deligianni, F., Ravi, D., & Yang, G. Z. (2018). Artificial intelligence and robotics. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.10813*, *147*.

6. French, R. M. (2000). The Turing test: the first 50 years. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, *4*(3), 115–122.

7. Searle, J. R. (1984). *Minds, brains and science*. Harvard University Press.

8. Adapted by the author from Tussyadiah, I. (2020). A review of research into automation in tourism: launching the Annals of Tourism Research Curated Collection on Artificial Intelligence and Robotics in Tourism. *Annals of Tourism Research*, *81*, 102883.

9. The two lists and the description of the various robots below are based on, but are not an exact copy of, Haidegger, T., Galambos, P., & Rudas, I. J. (2019, April). Robotics 4.0: Are we there yet?. In *2019 IEEE 23rd International Conference on Intelligent Engineering Systems (INES)*. IEEE, pp. 000117–000124.

10. Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed addressed a joint meeting of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Second Committee (Economic and Financial) of the General Assembly on the theme 'The future of everything: sustainable development in the age of rapid technological change'.

Ms. Amina (right) is seen interacting with a robot named Sophia during the meeting. Unique Identifier: UN795066, <https://dam.media.un.org/CS.aspx?VP3=DamView&VBID=2AM94S6G2VFQU&PN=1&WS=2AM9XCH3O5L&FR_=1&W=1920&H=931>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

11. Kahraman, C., Deveci, M., Boltürk, E., & Türk, S. (2020). Fuzzy controlled humanoid robots: a literature review. *Robotics and Autonomous Systems*, *134*, 103643.

12. Kunze, L., Hawes, N., Duckett, T., Hanheide, M., & Krajník, T. (2018). Artificial intelligence for long-term robot autonomy: a survey. *IEEE Robotics and Automation Letters*, *3*(4), 4023–4030; Dhanabalan, T., & Sathish, A. (2018). Transforming Indian industries through Artificial Intelligence and robotics in industry 4.0. *International Journal of Mechanical Engineering and Technology*, *9*(10), 835–845.

13. Bartneck, C., Lütge, C., Wagner, A., & Welsh, S. (2021). *An introduction to ethics in robotics and AI*. Springer Nature, p. 17.

14. Colledanchise, M., & Ögren, P. (2018). *Behavior trees in robotics and AI: an introduction*. CRC Press; Iovino, M., Scukins, E., Styrud, J., Ögren, P., & Smith, C. (2022). A survey of behavior trees in robotics and AI. *Robotics and Autonomous Systems*, *154*, 104096.

15. Siau, K., & Wang, W. (2018). Building trust in Artificial Intelligence, machine learning, and robotics. *Cutter Business Technology Journal*, *31*(2), 47–53.

16. Whitesides, G. M. (2018). Soft robotics. *Angewandte Chemie International Edition*, *57*(16), 4258–4273.

17. Mazzolai, B., Mondini, A., Del Dottore, E., Margheri, L., Carpi, F., Suzumori, K., Cianchetti, M., Speck, T., Smoukov, S. K., Burgert, I., Keplinger, T., De Freitas Siqueira, G., Vanneste, F., Goury, O., Duriez, C., Nanayakkara, T., Vanderborght, B., Brancart, J., Terryn, S., Rich, S. I., Liu, R., Fukuda, K., Someya, T., Calisti, M., Laschi, C., Sun, W., Wang, G., Wen, L., Baines, R., Patiballa, S. K., Kramer-Bottiglio, R., Rus, D., Fischer, P, Simmel, F. C., & Lendlein, A. (2022). Roadmap on soft robotics: multifunctionality, adaptability and growth without borders. *Multifunctional Materials*, *5*(3), 032001.

18. See also <https://www.wired.com/story/deepfakes-getting-better-theyre-easy-spot/>, last accessed 25 August 2023; <https://github.com/iperov/DeepFaceLab/issues/892>, last accessed 25 August 2023; <https://mrdeepfakes.com/forums/thread-legacy-guide-deepfacelab-1-0-guide>, last accessed 25 August 2023 (this is a site for children); <https://www.storypick.com/mr-bean-and-trump-funny-deepfake-video/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

19. Maras, M. H., & Alexandrou, A. (2019). Determining authenticity of video evidence in the age of Artificial Intelligence and in the wake of Deepfake videos. *International Journal of Evidence & Proof*, *23*(3), 255–262, para. 1.

20. Mann A. (2019). *Deepfake AI: our dystopian present*, <https://www.livescience.com/deepfake-ai.html>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

21. Goodfellow, I., Pouget-Abadie, J., Mirza, M., Xu, B., Warde-Farley, D., Ozair, S., Courville, A., & Bengio, Y. (2014). Generative adversarial nets. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, *27*.

22. Brock, A., Donahue, J., & Simonyan, K. (2018). Large scale GAN training for high fidelity natural image synthesis. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.11096*, p. 2.

23. Goyal S. (2019). GANs: a brief introduction to generative adversarial networks. *Medium*. <https://medium.com/analytics-vidhya/gans-a-brief-introduction-to-generative-adversarial-networks-f06216c7200e>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

24. Feng, J., Feng, X., Chen, J., Cao, X., Zhang, X., Jiao, L., & Yu, T. (2020). Generative adversarial networks based on collaborative learning and attention mechanism for hyperspectral image classification. *Remote Sensing*, *12*(7), 1149.

25. McDonald G. (2018). Seeing isn't believing: this new AI system can create 'Deep Fake' videos. *Seeker*. <https://www.seeker.com/artificial-intelligence/this-new-ai-system-can-create-convincing-deep-fake-videos>, last accessed 25 August 2023; Bansal, A., Ma, S., Ramanan, D., & Sheikh, Y. (2018). Recycle-gan: unsupervised video retargeting. In *Proceedings of the European conference on computer vision (ECCV)*, pp. 119–135, introduction, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ehD3C60i6lw&amp&feature=youtu.be>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

26. Hurst E. (2019). How can the law deal with Deepfake?. *Allaboutlaw*. <https://www.allaboutlaw.co.uk/commercial-awareness/legal-spotlight/how-can-the-law-deal-with-deepfake->, last accessed 25 August 2023.

27. Zakharov, E., Shysheya, A., Burkov, E., & Lempitsky, V. (2019). Few-shot adversarial learning of realistic neural talking head models. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF international conference on computer vision*, pp. 9459–9468, para. 5; Chan, C., Ginosar, S., Zhou, T., & Efros, A. A. (2019). Everybody dance now. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF international conference on computer vision*, pp. 5933–5942.

28. Burt C. (2019). DataGrid develops AI to generate whole-body images of nonexistent people. Biometricupdate.com. <https://www.biometricupdate.com/201905/datagrid-develops-ai-to-generate-whole-body-images-of-nonexistent-people>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

29. <https://medhairya.com/fakelab-a-deepfake-audio-detection-tool/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

30. <https://www.albany.edu/news/92306.php>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

31. Durall, R., Keuper, M., Pfreundt, F. J., & Keuper, J. (2019). Unmasking Deepfakes with simple features. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.00686*; Y. Li, M.-C. Chang, and S. Lyu. In ictu oculi: exposing AI generated fake face videos by detecting eye blinking. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.02877*, 2018.

32. Marra, F., Gragnaniello, D., Verdoliva, L., & Poggi, G. (2019, March). Do GANs leave artificial fingerprints?. In *2019 IEEE conference on multimedia information processing and retrieval (MIPR)*, pp. 506–511; Cozzolino, D., & Verdoliva, L. (2018). Noiseprint: a CNN-based camera model fingerprint. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.08396*, para. 2.

33. Brock, A., Donahue, J., & Simonyan, K. (2018). Large scale GAN training for high fidelity natural image synthesis. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.11096*, in which reference is made to Amerini, I., & Caldelli, R. (2020, June). Exploiting prediction error inconsistencies through LSTM-based classifiers to detect Deepfake videos. In *Proceedings of the 2020 ACM workshop on information hiding and multimedia security*, pp. 97–102; X. Yang, Y. Li, & S. Lyu. Exposing Deepfakes using inconsistent head poses. In *ICASSP 2019–2019 IEEE international conference on acoustics, speech and signal processing (ICASSP)*, pp. 8261–8265; Durall, R., Keuper, M., Pfreundt, F. J., & Keuper, J. (2019). Unmasking Deepfakes with simple features. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.00686*, para. 2; Nguyen, T. T., Nguyen, C. M., Nguyen, D. T., Nguyen, D. T., Huynh-the, T., Nahavandi , S., Nguyen, T. T., Pham, Q.-V., & Nahavandi, S. (2019). Deep learning for Deepfakes creation and detection: a survey. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.11573*, para. 3.

34. Schroepfer M. (2019). Creating a dataset and a challenge for Deepfakes. *Ai. Facebook*. <https://ai.facebook.com/blog/deepfake-detection-challenge/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

35. Ferrer, C. C., Pflaum, B., Pan, J., Dolhansky, B., Bitton, J., & Lu, J. (2020). Deepfake detection challenge results: an open initiative to advance AI. *Meta AI*. https://ai.facebook.com/blog/deepfake-detection-challenge-results-an-open-initiative-to-advance-ai/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

36. Burt T. (2020). New steps to combat disinformation. *Microsoft*. <https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/09/01/disinformation-deepfakes-newsguard-video-authenticator/>, last accessed 25 August 2023; Rossler, A., Cozzolino, D., Verdoliva, L., Riess, C., Thies, J., & Nießner, M. (2019). Faceforensics++: learning to detect manipulated facial images. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF international conference on computer vision*, pp. 1–11; Dolhansky, B., Bitton, J., Pflaum, B., Lu, J., Howes, R., Wang, M., & Ferrer, C. C. (2020). The Deepfake detection challenge dataset. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2006.07397*.

37. SentinelOne (2019). What is a hash? (And how does it work?). *SentinelOne*. <https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/what-is-hash-how-does-it-work/>, last accessed 25 August 2023; Ozdemir D. (2021). Teenager's AI project for detecting Deepfake videos wins Award. *Interesting Engineering*. <https://interestingengineering.com/teenagers-ai-system-for-detecting-deepfake-videos-wins-award>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

38. <https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Sensorama-the-first-virtual-immersion-system-the-technical-table-and-the-pictures-shown_fig1_321142137>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

39. Carmigniani, J., Furht, B., Anisetti, M., Ceravolo, P., Damiani, E., & Ivkovic, M. (2011). Augmented Reality technologies, systems and applications. *Multimedia Tools and Applications*, *51*(1), 341–377.

40. Johnson, L., Levine, A., Smith, R., & Stone, S. (2010). *The 2010 Horizon Report*. New Media Consortium.

41. Carmigniani, J., Furht, B., Anisetti, M., Ceravolo, P., Damiani, E., & Ivkovic, M. (2011). Augmented Reality technologies, systems and applications. *Multimedia Tools and Applications*, *51*(1), 341–377.

42. Schmalstieg, D., Fuhrmann, A., Hesina, G., Szalavári, Z., Encarnaçao, L. M., Gervautz, M., & Purgathofer, W. (2002). The Studierstube Augmented Reality Project. *Presence: Teleoperators & Virtual Environments*, *11*(1), 33–54.

43. Miller, M. R., Jun, H., Herrera, F., Yu Villa, J., Welch, G., & Bailenson, J. N. (2019). Social interaction in Augmented Reality. *PloS one*, *14*(5), e0216290.

44. Adapted by the author from Milgram, P., & Kishino, F. (1994). A taxonomy of Mixed Reality visual displays. *IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information and Systems*, *77*(12), 1321–1329. A more updated version can be found here: Farshid, M., Paschen, J., Eriksson, T., & Kietzmann, J. (2018). Go boldly! Explore Augmented Reality (AR), Virtual Reality (VR), and Mixed Reality (MR) for business. *Business Horizons*, *61*(5), 657–663.

45. Milgram, P., Takemura, H., Utsumi, A., & Kishino, F. (1995, December). Augmented Reality: a class of displays on the reality-virtuality continuum. In *Telemanipulator and telepresence technologies*, Vol. 2351, pp. 282–292.

46. Silva, R., Oliveira, J. C., & Giraldi, G. A. (2003). Introduction to Augmented Reality. *National Laboratory for Scientific Computation*, *11*, 1–11.

47. Johnson, L., Levine, A., Smith, R., & Stone, S. (2010). *The 2010 Horizon Report*. New Media Consortium.

48. Azuma, R., Baillot, Y., Behringer, R., Feiner, S., Julier, S., & MacIntyre, B. (2001). Recent advances in Augmented Reality. *IEEE Computer Graphics and Applications*, *21*(6), 34–47.

49. Adapted by the author from Benford, S., Greenhalgh, C., Reynard, G., Brown, C., & Koleva, B. (1998). Understanding and constructing shared spaces with Mixed-Reality boundaries. *ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction (TOCHI)*, *5*(3), 185–223.

50. The list below is based on, but is not an exact copy of: Siriwardhana, Y., Porambage, P., Liyanage, M., & Ylianttila, M. (2021). A survey on mobile Augmented Reality with 5G mobile edge computing: architectures, applications, and technical aspects. *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials*, *23*(2), 1160–1192.

51. The list below is based on, but is not an exact copy of: Amin, D., & Govilkar, S. (2015). Comparative study of Augmented Reality SDKs. *International Journal on Computational Science & Applications*, *5*(1), 11–26.

52. Carmigniani, J., Furht, B., Anisetti, M., Ceravolo, P., Damiani, E., & Ivkovic, M. (2011). Augmented Reality technologies, systems and applications. *Multimedia Tools and Applications*, *51*(1), 341–377.

53. Van Krevelen, D. W. F., & Poelman, R. (2010). A survey of Augmented Reality technologies, applications and limitations. *International Journal of Virtual Reality*, *9*(2), 1–20.

54. The list below is based on, but is not an exact copy of: Silva, R., Oliveira, J. C., & Giraldi, G. A. (2003). Introduction to Augmented Reality. *National Laboratory for Scientific Computation*, *11*, 1–11.

55. Zielasko, D., Weyers, B., Bellgardt, M., Pick, S., Meibner, A., Vierjahn, T., & Kuhlen, T. W. (2017, March). Remain seated: towards fully-immersive desktop VR. In *2017 IEEE 3rd workshop on everyday Virtual Reality (WEVR)*, pp. 1–6; Sherman, W. R., & Craig, A. B. (2018). *Understanding Virtual Reality: interface, application, and design*. Morgan Kaufmann. <http://www.arise.mae.usp.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Understanding-Virtual-Reality-Interface-Application-and-Design-The-Morgan-Kaufmann-Series-in-Computer-Graphics-.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

56. Khosrow-Pour, D. B. A. (ed.) (2017). *Encyclopaedia of information science and technology*, IGI Global.

57. Bowman, D. A., & McMahan, R. P. (2007). Virtual Reality: how much immersion is enough? *Computer*, *40*(7), 36–43.

58. Xu, M., Ng, W. C., Lim, W. Y. B., Kang, J., Xiong, Z., Niyato, D., Yang, Q., Shen, X. & Miao, C. (2022). A full dive into realizing the edge-enabled metaverse: Visions, enabling technologies, and challenges. *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials*.

59. The two lists below are based on, but are not an exact copy of: Anthes, C., García-Hernández, R. J., Wiedemann, M., & Kranzlmüller, D. (2016, March). State of the art of Virtual Reality technology. In *2016 IEEE aerospace conference*, pp. 1–19.

60. Polys, N. F., Brutzman, D., Steed, A., & Behr, J. (2008). Future standards for immersive VR: report on the IEEE Virtual Reality 2007 workshop. *IEEE Computer Graphics and Applications*, *28*(2), 94–99.

61. Riva, G. (2006). Virtual Reality. In *Wiley encyclopedia of biomedical engineering*. John Wiley & Sons.

62. Caspar, E. A., De Beir, A., Magalhaes de Saldanha da Gama, P. A., Yernaux, F., Cleeremans, A., & Vanderborght, B. (2015). New frontiers in the rubber hand experiment: when a robotic hand becomes one's own. *Behavior Research Methods*, *47*(3), 744–755.

63. Lemenager, T., Neissner, M., Sabo, T., Mann, K., & Kiefer, F. (2020). 'Who am I' and 'how should I be': a systematic review on self-concept and avatar identification in gaming disorder. *Current Addiction Reports*, *7*(2), 166–193.

64. See, eg, <www.thispersondoesnotexist.com>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

65. See, eg, <https://www.osmo.ai/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

CHAPTER 4
SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

1. <https://assembly.coe.int/LifeRay/POL/Pdf/TextesProvisoires/2020/20200908-DemocraticAI-EN.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023. See also: Text adopted by the Standing Committee, acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 22 October 2020 (see Doc. 15150, report of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, rapporteur: Ms Deborah Bergamini) and Recommendation 2181 (2020), <https://pace.coe.int/en/files/28803/html>, last accessed 23 October 2023.

2. <https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120885/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

3. See e.g. Tucker, J. A., Guess, A., Barberá, P., Vaccari, C., Siegel, A., Sanovich, S., Stukal, D., & Nyhan, B. (2018). Social media, political polarization, and political disinformation: a review of the scientific literature. *Political polarization, and political disinformation: a review of the scientific literature (March 19, 2018)*. <https://www.forumdisuguaglianzediversita.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Social-Media-Political-Polarization-and-Political-Disinformation-Literature-Review.x28591.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023; Banks, A., Calvo, E., Karol, D., & Telhami, S. (2021). #polarizedfeeds: three experiments on polarization, framing, and social media. *International Journal of Press/Politics*, *26*(3), 609–634;

Kubin, E., & von Sikorski, C. (2021). The role of (social) media in political polarization: a systematic review. *Annals of the International Communication Association*, *45*(3), 188–206.

4. Nguyen, C. T. (2020). Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. *Episteme*, *17*(2), 141–161.

5. <https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2022/70-percent-republicans-falsely-believe-stolen-election-trump/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

6. Schick, N. (2020). *Deepfakes and the infocalypse: what you urgently need to know*. Hachette UK.

7. Keymolen, E. (2016). *Trust on the line: a philosophical exploration of trust in the networked era*. Wolf Legal Publishers.

8. See for a broader reflection on presentation, self and identification: Goffman, E. (2002). The presentation of self in everyday life. 1959. *Garden City, NY*, *259*.

9. Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age*. Stanford University Press.

10. Schermer, B. W., & Ham, J. V. (2021). Regulering van immersieve technologieën. <https://repository.wodc.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12832/3082/3180-regulering--immersieve-technologieen-volledige-tekst.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

11. Hegel, G. W. F. (1967). *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Suhrkamp.

12. Turkle, S. (2012). *Alone together: why we expect more from technology and less from each other*. Basic Books.

13. Peper, E., & Harvey, R. (2018). Digital addiction: increased loneliness, anxiety, and depression. *NeuroRegulation*, *5*(1), 3–8.

14. <https://www.2doc.nl/documentaires/2015/07/ik-ben-alice.html>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

15. A theme explored in a number of films, such as *Her*.

16. Some have even stressed that pets have are more autonomous than robots and avatars because they are not designed to be instruments to human ends, but two counterarguments should be considered here. On the one hand, pets have been bred and selected for centuries in a way that the most loving, caring and 'good' specimens were kept and allowed to have offspring. On the other hand, it is possible for self-learning robots and avatars to develop beyond their programming in ways that are both unforeseen and unintended.

17. Especially in the interpretation of Hegel by Kojève: Kojève, A. (1980). *Introduction to the reading of Hegel*. Cornell University Press.

18. <https://www.accessnow.org/what-is-augmented-reality-risks/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

19. Maxim Februari in: Van der Sloot, B., & van Schendel, S. (2019). De Modernisering van het Nederlands Procesrecht in het licht van Big Data. <https://repository.wodc.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12832/2390/2900_volledige_tekst_tcm28-402015.pdf?sequence=2>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

20. <https://english.wrr.nl/binaries/wrr-eng/documenten/policy-briefs/2017/01/31/big-data-and-security-policies-serving-security-protecting-freedom/WRR_PB6_BigDataAndSecurityPolicies.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

21. Winston, K. I. (1981). *The principles of social order: selected essays of Lon L. Fuller*. Duke University Press.

22. <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/30/podcasts/the-daily/chatgpt-hinton-ai.html>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

23. Sorell, T. (2022). Cobots, 'co-operation' and the replacement of human skill. *Ethics and Information Technology*, *24*(4), 1–12; Etemad-Sajadi, R., Soussan, A., & Schöpfer, T. (2022). How ethical issues raised by human–robot interaction can impact the intention to use the robot? *International Journal of Social Robotics*, 1–13; Vrontis, D., Christofi, M., Pereira, V., Tarba, S., Makrides, A., & Trichina, E. (2022). Artificial Intelligence, robotics, advanced technologies and human resource management: a systematic review. *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, *33*(6), 1237–1266.

24. Wright, R. E., & Przegalińska, A. (2022). Debating Universal Basic Income: Pros, Cons, and Alternatives. Springer Nature. See also: Siau, K., & Wang, W. (2018). Building trust in Artificial Intelligence, machine learning, and robotics. *Cutter Business Technology Journal*, *31*(2), 47–53.

25. <https://regmedia.co.uk/2019/10/08/deepfake_report.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

26. Future of Life Institute (2023, 22 March) Pause giant AI experiments: an open letter. <https://futureoflife.org/open-letter/pause-giant-ai-experiments/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

27. Feinberg, J. (1984). *Harmless wrongdoing*. Oxford University Press.

28. Russell, S. (2019). *Human compatible: Artificial Intelligence and the problem of control*. Penguin. See also Russell, S. J., & Norvig, P. (2010). *Artificial Intelligence a modern approach*. Pearson.

29. However, see also <https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/c7fDt27pBdDDrEaZo/precise-p-doom-isn-t-very-important-for-prioritization-or>, last accessed 25 August 2023. Doom and chaos might also be triggered by rather mundane effects of AI, as Harari has pointed out in an interview with The Rest Is Politics' Leading <https://open.spotify.com/episode/6iUtJgv81QSvdFbeyYXTn4?si=37ZqIGcXQI-XrZ3ldfwnQQ>. See also: Harari, Y. N. (2016). Homo Deus: A brief history of tomorrow. Random House.

30. Which, perhaps counterintuitively, may explain part of the appeal of working on AI. See further <https://edpl.lexxion.eu/data/article/18884/pdf/edpl_2023_01-004.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

31. <https://www.vice.com/en/article/4a33gj/ai-controlled-drone-goes-rogue-kills-human-operator-in-usaf-simulated-test>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

32. Mehlman, M., Berg, J. W., & Ray, S. (2017). Robot law. *Case Legal Studies Research Paper*, (2017-1).

33. Bubeck, S., Chandrasekaran, V., Eldan, R., Gehrke, J., Horvitz, E., Kamar, E., Lee, P., Lee, Y. T., Li, Y., Lundberg, S., Nori, H., Palangi, H., Ribeiro, M. T., & Zhang, Y. (2023). Sparks of artificial general intelligence: early experiments with GPT-4. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.12712*.

34. <https://cajundiscordian.medium.com/is-lamda-sentient-an-interview-ea64d916d917>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

35. <https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/06/09/artificial-neural-networks-are-making-strides-towards-consciousness-according-to-blaise-aguera-y-arcas>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

36. <https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-62275326>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

37. The counter-argument is that AI is only telling us that it has emotions because it is programmed to do so or because it has learned from analysing human interactions that this is an appropriate response, without truly understanding what it is saying. It may seem intelligent and have feelings, and it may even be impossible for us to distinguish what AI is saying about its self-understanding and emotional life from what humans are saying, but this does not mean it is truly feeling that way and truly capable of self-understanding. It is only repeating, in a highly sophisticated way, what it has learned through the analysis of human behaviour and conversations. However, on a more philosophical level, the problem is that we never truly know what another person is feeling and whether a person is saying something because they have been socialised to say so or because they truly feel that way. When a person says they feel guilty for messing up, do they really mean it, are they just saying that because they know we want to hear it or is it because that is how they were raised and socialised by their parents, school and society at large? It is impossible to know beyond doubt what another person is feeling, just as it is impossible to know for sure what another non-human entity is feeling. See e.g. Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? *Philosophical Review*, *83*(4), 435–450. One major difference is that we see other humans as creatures similar to ourselves and thus project our own feelings, thoughts and experiences onto the other; the more HRs become like us, the more we will be inclined to do so with them as well. In addition, the problem with the 'just being programmed' argument is that a HR may very well 'just be programmed' to say that it is afraid to die and does not want their owner to turn of the switch, but likewise, humans are 'programmed' to fear certain things, like snakes, poisonous food and death. See e.g. DeLoache, J. S., & LoBue, V. (2009). The narrow fellow in the grass: human infants associate snakes and fear. *Developmental Science*, *12*(1), 201–207; Erlich, N., Lipp, O. V., & Slaughter, V. (2013). Of hissing snakes and angry voices: human infants are differentially responsive to evolutionary fear-relevant sounds. *Developmental Science*, *16*(6), 894–904. The fact that a feeling is innate and not the product of a person's thoughts or action does not make it less intense or real.

38. If robots become truly humanoid and AI is able to copy human intelligence and emotions, there might be AI-driven entities with suicidal thoughts.
39. <https://www.raphkoster.com/games/essays/declaring-the-rights-of-players/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

CHAPTER 5
LAW

1. Text adopted by the Standing Committee, acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 22 October 2020 (see Doc 15151, report of the Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination, rapporteur: Mr Christophe Lacroix). See also Recommendation 2183 (2020).
2. Ballin, E. H. (2021). Human rights as benchmarks of Artificial Intelligence. <https://english.wrr.nl/binaries/wrr-eng/documenten/working-papers/2021/10/6/human-rights-as-benchmarks-of-artifcial-intelligence/WRR46-Humanrights-156x234_DEF_DT.pdf>, last accessed 2 October 2023.
3. <https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2007/wp136_en.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
4. <https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2007/wp136_en.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
5. Resolution (73) 22 on the Protection of the Privacy of Individuals vis-à-vis Electronic Data Banks in the Private Sector (1973).
6. Resolution (74) 29 on the Protection of the Privacy of Individuals vis-à-vis Electronic Data Banks in the Public Sector (1974).
7. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), Article 5. See also: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down additional procedural rules relating to the enforcement of Regulation (EU). 2016/679 COM/2023/348 final.
8. Article 16 GDPR.
9. Article 19 GDPR.
10. Articles 13 and 14 GDPR.
11. Article 6 GDPR.
12. Article 4 GDPR.
13. Article 7 GDPR.
14. Recital 47 GDPR.
15. Article 9 GDPR.
16. Article 83 GDPR.
17. Article 5 § 1 sub (b) GDPR. Article 6 § 4 GDPR.
18. Article 3 and Recital 18 GDPR.
19. CJEU, 6 November 2003, Case C-101/01, *Lindqvist*, ECR I-12971, ECLI:EU:C:2003:596.
20. CJEU, 11 December 2014, Case C-212/13, *František Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů*, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2428.
21. Van der Sloot, B. (2023) Home is where the heart is, *JIPITEC* 14, 1.
22. Annex 2 of the Proposals for Amendments regarding exemption for personal or household activities. The situation under Directive 95/46/EC, <https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/other-document/files/2013/20130227_statement_dp_annex2_en.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
23. Article 22 GDPR.
24. See however: CJEU, 7 December 2023, Case C-634/21, *Q v Land Hessen*, ECLI:EU:C:2023:957.

25. Gunkel, D. J. (2018). *Robot rights*. MIT Press.

26. ECtHR, *Stes Colas Est and others v France*, Application No. 37971/97, 16 April 2002.

27. See, eg, <https://www.bbc.com/travel/article/20200319-the-new-zealand-river-that-became-a-legal-person>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

28. See further: Seibt, J., Nørskov, M., & Andersen, S. S. (Eds.). (2016). *What social robots can and should do: proceedings of robophilosophy 2016/TRANSOR 2016* (vol. 290). IOS Press; Calo, R., Froomkin, A. M., & Kerr, I. (Eds.). (2016). *Robot law*. Edward Elgar; Lin, P., Abney, K., & Jenkins, R. (Eds.). (2017). *Robot ethics 2.0: from autonomous cars to Artificial Intelligence*. Oxford University Press; Wallach, W., & Allen, C. (2008). *Moral machines: teaching robots right from wrong*. Oxford University Press; Anderson, M., & Anderson, S. L. (Eds.). (2011). *Machine ethics*. Cambridge University Press.

29. See also Scaltsas, T. (1980). The ship of Theseus. *Analysis*, *40*(3), 152–157.

30. In addition, the 'soul' or 'mind' of a AI-driven entity is typically uploaded to the cloud and can be installed onto a new HR, avatar or other non-human entity. It is also easy to switch 'minds' between various non-human entities.

31. Stone, C. D. (2010). *Should trees have standing? Law, morality, and the environment*. Oxford University Press.

32. The paragraphs below are based on: <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_1_Protocol_1_ENG.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023. See also the EU's legislative corpus on IP rights: Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC. Directive (EU) 2019/789 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 laying down rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting organisations and retransmissions of television and radio programmes, and amending Council Directive 93/83/EEC. Directive (EU) 2017/1564 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2017 on certain permitted uses of certain works and other subject matter protected by copyright and related rights for the benefit of persons who are blind, visually impaired or otherwise print-disabled and amending Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. Regulation (EU) 2017/1563 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2017 on the cross-border exchange between the Union and third countries of accessible format copies of certain works and other subject matter protected by copyright and related rights for the benefit of persons who are blind, visually impaired or otherwise print-disabled. Regulation (EU) 2017/1128 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on cross-border portability of online content services in the internal market. Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (recast). Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market. Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on certain permitted uses of orphan works. Directive 2011/77/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2011 amending Directive 2006/116/EC on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights. Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs. Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property. Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights. Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art. Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 1998 on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access. Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the

Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases. See further: Hugenholtz, P. B., & Quintais, J. P. (2021). Copyright and Artificial Creation: Does EU Copyright Law Protect AI-Assisted Output? IIC, *52*(9), 1190–1216.

33. ECtHR, *Bogomolova v Russia*, Application No. 13812/09, 20 June 2017.

34. See, for example, CJEU, Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 10 March 2020. Case T-251/18, *IFSUA v Council of the European Union*, ECLI:EU:T:2020:89.

35. Jacques, S. (2019). *The parody exception in copyright law*. Oxford University Press.

36. <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/18/magazine/wikipedia-ai-chatgpt.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

37. Petkova, B. (2019). Privacy as Europe's first amendment. *European Law Journal*, *25*(2), 140–154.

38. Van der Sloot, B. (2015). Privacy as personality right: why the ECtHR's focus on ulterior interests might prove indispensable in the age of Big Data. *Utrecht J. Int'l & Eur. L.*, *31*, 25.

39. ECtHR, *Pretty v UK*, Application No. 2346/02, 29 April 2002.

40. <https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/admissibility_guide_eng.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

41. Article 35 ECHR.

42. See, eg, Edwards, L., & Harbina, E. (2013). Protecting post-mortem privacy: reconsidering the privacy interests of the deceased in a digital world. *Cardozo Arts & Ent. LJ*, *32*, 83; Bikker, J. (2013). Disaster victim identification in the information age: the use of personal data, post-mortem privacy and the rights of the victim's relatives. *SCRIPTed*, *10*, 57; Lopez, A. B. (2016). Posthumous privacy, decedent intent, and post-mortem access to digital assets. *Geo. Mason L. Rev.*, *24*, 183; Harbinja, E. (2017). Post-mortem privacy 2.0: theory, law, and technology. *International Review of Law, Computers & Technology*, *31*(1), 26–42; Buitelaar, J. C. (2017). Post-mortem privacy and informational self-determination. *Ethics and Information Technology*, *19*(2), 129–142; Gamba, F. (2020). The right to be forgotten and paradoxical visibility: privacy, post-privacy and post-mortem privacy in the digital era. *Problemi dell'informazione*, *45*(2), 201–220; Davey, T. (2020). *Until death do us part: post-mortem privacy rights for the ante-mortem person* (Doctoral dissertation, University of East Anglia); Holt, J., Nicholson, J., & Smeddinck, J. D. (2021). From personal data to digital legacy: exploring conflicts in the sharing, security and privacy of post-mortem data. In *Proceedings of the web conference 2021* (pp. 2745–2756).

43. Perri, P., & Thaw, D. (2016). Ancient worries and modern fears: different roots and common effects of US and EU privacy regulation. *Conn. L. Rev.*, *49*, 1621.

44. ECtHR, *Colon v The Netherlands*, Application No. 49458/06, 15 May 2012, § 60.

45. Ibid, § 61.

46. ECtHR, *Pretty v UK*, Application No. 2346/02, 29 April 2002; ECtHR, *Munjaz v UK*, Application No. 2913/06, 17 July 2012. ECtHR, *NB v Slovakia*, Application No. 29518/10, 12 June 2012; ECtHR, *IG and Others v Slovakia*, Application No. 15966/04, 13 November 2012; ECtHR, *VC v Slovakia*, Application No. 18968/07, 8 November 2011; ECtHR, *P and S v Poland*, Application No. 57375/08, 30 October 2012; ECtHR, *Bosso v Italy*, Application No. 50490/99, 5 September 2002; ECtHR, *Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany*, Application No. 6959/75, 19 May 1976; ECtHR, *Haas v Switzerland*, Application No. 31322/07, 20 January 2011; ECtHR, *Koch v Germany*, Application No. 497/09, 19 July 2012; ECtHR, *Juhnke v Turkey*, Application No. 52515/99, 13/05/2008, § 82. ECtHR, *Csoma v Romania*, Application No. 8759/05, 15 January 2013, § 42.

47. ECtHR, *Connors v UK*, Application No. 66746/01, 27 May 2004.

48. ECtHR, *Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium*, Application No. 13178/03, 12 October 2006.

49. Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2009). *Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness*. Penguin.

50. Lin, Y., Osman, M., & Ashcroft, R. (2017). Nudge: concept, effectiveness, and ethics. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, *39*(6), 293–306.

51. Yeung, K. (2017). 'Hypernudge': Big Data as a mode of regulation by design. *Information, Communication & Society*, *20*(1), 118–136.

52. Susser, D., Roessler, B., & Nissenbaum, H. (2019). Technology, autonomy, and manipulation. *Internet Policy Review*, *8*(2).

53. See also Declaration by the Committee of Ministers on the manipulative capabilities of algorithmic processes (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 13 February 2019 at the 1337th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies).

54. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/01, 18 December 2000.

55. Proposal for a Regulation of The European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, COM (2021) 206 final.

56. Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

57. Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act).

58. There are experiments with pilot judgments that try to remedy this flaw in the Convention mechanism. See <https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/pilot_judgment_procedure_eng.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

59. ECtHR, *Dink v Turkey*, Application Nos. 2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09 and 7124/09, 14 September 2010.

60. ECtHR, *Leroy v France*, Application No. 36109/03, 2 October 2008.

61. ECtHR, *Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe News GMBH v Austria*, Application No. 5266/03, 22 February 2007.

62. ECtHR, *Handyside v UK*, Application No. 5493/72, 7 December 1976.

63. <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_10_ENG.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

64. See more elaborately Van der Sloot, B. (2022). Expectations of privacy: the three tests deployed by the European Court of Human Rights. In Hallinan, D., Leenes, R., & De Hert, P. (Eds.). *Data protection and privacy, volume 14: enforcing rights in a changing world*. Bloomsbury Publishing, pp. 67–96.

65. ECtHR, *Halford v UK*, Application No. 20605/92, 2 March 1995. See also ECtHR, *Halford v UK*, Application No. 20605/92, 18 April 1996.

66. ECtHR, *Halford v UK*, Application No. 20605/92, 25 June 1997.

67. ECtHR, *PG and JH v UK*, Application No. 44787/98, 25 September 2001.

68. ECtHR, *Copland v UK*, Application No. 62617/00, 3 April 2007. See also ECtHR, *Peev v Bulgaria*, Application No. 64209/01, 26 July 2007; ECtHR, *Barbulescu v Romania*, Application No. 61496/08, 12 January 2016; ECtHR, *Barbulescu v Romania*, Application No. 61496/08, 5 September 2017.

69. ECtHR, *Antovic and Mirkovic v Montenegro*, Application No. 70838/13, 28 November 2017.

70. ECtHR, *Pay v UK*, Application No. 32792/05, 16 September 2008.

71. ECtHR, *Benedik v Slovenia*, Application No. 62357/14, 24 April 2018.

72. ECtHR, *Von Hannover v Germany*, Application No. 59320/00, 24 June 2004, § 69.

73. ECtHR, *Standard Verlag GMBH v Austria (No 2)*, Application No. 21277/05, 4 June 2009.

74. ECtHR, *Ruusunen v Finland*, Application No. 73579/10, 14 January 2014.

75. ECtHR, *Alpha Doryforiki Teleorasi Anonymi Etairia v Greece*, Application No. 72562/10, 22 February 2018.

76. ECtHR, *Khadija Ismayilova v Azerbaijan (No 3)*, Application No. 35283/14, 7 May 2020.

77. Roberts, A. (2002), The regulation of Deepfakes in the United States. In Van der Sloot, B., Wagensveld, Y., & Koops, B. J. (2021). Deepfakes. <https://repository.wodc.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12832/3134/3137-deepfakes-volledige-tekst.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

78. <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

79. A number of legislative instruments have been proposed, which are still under discussion: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937. Strasbourg, 12.12.2023 COM(2023) 637 final 2023/0463 (COD). Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1024/2012 and (EU) 2018/1724 as regards certain requirements laid down by Directive (EU) xx. Strasbourg, 12.12.2023 COM(2023) 636 final 2023/0462 (COD). Commission Recommendation on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament. Strasbourg, 12.12.2023 C(2023) 8626 final. Commission Recommendation on promoting the engagement and effective participation of citizens and civil society organisations in public policy-making processes. Strasbourg, 12.12.2023 C(2023) 8627 final. Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Defence of Democracy. Strasbourg, 12.12.2023 COM(2023) 630 final. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings ("Strategic lawsuits against public participation"). COM/2022/177 final. Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings ('Strategic lawsuits against public participation') C/2022/2428. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market (European Media Freedom Act) and amending Directive 2010/13/EU COM/2022/457 final. Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/1634 of 16 September 2022 on internal safeguards for editorial independence and ownership transparency in the media sector C/2022/6536. Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions 2022 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union COM/2022/500 final. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations. Brussels, 25.11.2021 COM(2021) 734 final 2021/0375 (COD).

80. <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/3/487525.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

81. <https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-report-version-august-2018/16808c9c77>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

82. See also Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe's semiconductor ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/694. Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on market surveillance and compliance of products and amending Directive 2004/42/EC and Regulations (EC) No 765/2008 and (EU) No 305/2011; Regulation (EU) 2019/2144 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on type-approval requirements for motor vehicles and their trailers, and systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles, as regards their general safety and the protection of vehicle occupants and vulnerable road users, amending various Regulations; Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending various Regulations.

83. Brussels, 21 April 2021, COM (2021) 202 final, 2021/0105 (COD) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on machinery products. {SEC(2021) 165 final} – {SWD(2021) 82 final} – {SWD(2021) 83 final}.

84. Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on medical devices, amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 and repealing Council Directives 90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC. See also Regulation (EU) 2017/746 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices and repealing Directive 98/79/EC and Commission Decision 2010/227/EU.

85. Regulation (EU) 2023/988 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 on general product safety, amending Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of the European Parliament and the Council, and repealing Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 87/357/EEC. See also Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decision 87/95/EEC and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.

86. Directive 2009/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the council of 18 June 2009 on the safety of toys.

87. Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive).

88. Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act).

89. <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/cybersecurity-of-ai-and-standardisation/@@download/fullReport>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

90. Brussels, 15 September 2022, COM (2022) 454 final 2022/0272 (COD) Proposal for a Regulation of the European parliament and of the Council on Horizontal Cybersecurity Requirements for Products with Digital Elements and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020. See also Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on market surveillance and compliance of products and amending Directive 2004/42/EC and Regulations (EC) No 765/2008 and (EU) No 305/2011. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents. COM/2023/209 final.

91. For the effects of AI on cybersecurity and cyberwar, see Cristiano, F., Broeders, D., Delerue, F., Douzet, F., & Géry, A. (2023). *Artificial Intelligence and international conflict in cyberspace* (p. 279). Taylor & Francis.

92. Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items.

93. <https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/help-exporters-and-importers/exporting-dual-use-items_en>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

94. See on this topic, inter alia, Kanetake, M. (2019). The EU's dual-use export control and human rights risks: the case of cyber surveillance technology. *Europe and the World: A Law Review*, *3*(1), 1–16; van Daalen, O. L., van Hoboken, J. V. J., & Rucz, M. (2023). Export control of cybersurveillance items in the new Dual-Use Regulation: the challenges of applying human rights logic to export control. *Computer Law & Security Review*, *48*, 105789.

95. <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=60419>, last accessed 25 August 2023. See also Brussels, 19 February 2020 COM (2020) 65 final, White Paper on Artificial Intelligence: a European approach to excellence and trust.

96. <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=60419>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

97. See also Brussels, 25 April 2018, COM (2018) 237 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Artificial Intelligence for Europe, SWD (2018) 137 final. See also Brussels, 19 February 2020, COM (2020) 67 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Shaping Europe's digital future. See further Mökander, J., Juneja, P., Watson, D. S., & Floridi, L. (2022). The US Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2022 vs. the EU Artificial Intelligence Act: what can they learn from each other? *Minds and Machines*, *32*(4), 751–758. Neuwirth, R. J. (2022). *The EU Artificial Intelligence act: regulating subliminal AI systems*. Taylor & Francis; Laux, J., Wachter, S., & Mittelstadt, B. (2023). Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence and the European Union AI Act: on the conflation of trustworthiness and acceptability of risk. *Regulation & Governance*; Siegmann, C., & Anderljung, M. (2022). The Brussels effect and Artificial Intelligence: how EU regulation will impact the global AI market. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2208.12645*; Hacker, P., Engel, A., & Mauer, M. (2023, June). Regulating ChatGPT and other large Generative AI models. In *Proceedings of the 2023 ACM conference on fairness, accountability, and transparency* (pp. 1112–1123).

98. The Council of Europe has also adopted a high number of Resolutions, Recommendations and Declarations. For an overview, see <https://rm.coe.int/brochure-artificial-intelligence-en-march-2023-print/1680aab8e6>, last accessed 22 October 2023. See in particular Strasbourg, 7 July 2023 cai(2023)18 Committee on Artificial Intelligence (cai) Consolidated working draft of the framework convention On Artificial Intelligence, human rights, democracy and the rule of law, <https://www.caidp.org/app/download/8468539363/CAI(2023)18%20-%20Consolidated%20Working%20Draft%20Framework%20Convention.docx.pdf?t=1694480020>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

99. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts COM (2021) 206 final, Article 5.

100. Annex III of the proposed AI Act.

101. Articles 9–29 of the proposed AI Act.

102. Article 52 of the proposed AI Act.

103. Articles 44 ff GDPR.

104. Regulation (EU) 2022/868 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on European data governance and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 (Data Governance Act). See also: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Health Data Space COM/2022/197 final. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework for Financial Data Access and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010, (EU) No 1095/2010 and (EU) 2022/2554 COM/2023/360 final. Brussels, 23.2.2022 SWD(2022) 45 final Commission Staff Working Document on Common European Data Spaces. Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030. Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/2240. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions A European Strategy For Data Com/2020/66 Final.

105. See, inter alia, Shabani, M. (2021). The Data Governance Act and the EU's move towards facilitating data sharing. *Molecular Systems Biology*, *17*(3), e10229; Ruohonen, J., & Mickelsson, S. (2023). Reflections on the Data Governance Act. *Digital Society*, *2*(1), 10;

von Ditfurth, L., & Lienemann, G. (2022). The Data Governance Act: promoting or restricting data intermediaries? *Competition and Regulation in Network Industries*, *23*(4), 270–295.

106. See also Miadzvetskaya, Y. (2023). Data Governance Act: on international transfers of non-personal data and GDPR mimesis. *European Data Protection Law Review*, *9*(1), 13–26.

107. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC.

108. Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector.

109. Article 5, 6 and 7 of the proposed e-Privacy Regulation.

110. Article 8 of the proposed e-Privacy Regulation.

111. This includes the content of communications, pictures, the location of individuals by accessing the device's GPS capabilities, contact lists and other information stored on the device.

112. Article 16 of the proposed e-Privacy Regulation.

113. ECtHR, *Big Brother Watch and Others v UK*, Application Nos. 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15, 25 May 2021, § 362.

114. See for a general overview <https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/fs_mass_surveillance_eng>, last accessed 22 October 2023.

115. See, eg, Hon, W. K. (2017). *Data localization laws and policy: the EU data protection international transfers restriction through a cloud computing lens*. Edward Elgar; Bagchi, K., & Kapilavai, S. (2018). Political economy of data nationalism. 22nd Biennial Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): 'Beyond the Boundaries: Challenges for Business, Policy and Society', Seoul, Korea, 24–27 June 2018, International Telecommunications Society (ITS), Calgary; Anupam, C., & Le, U. P. (2015). Data nationalism. *Emory Law Journal*, *64*(3), 677–739.

116. Regulation (EU) 2018/1807 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on a framework for the free flow of non-personal data in the European Union. On the subject of mixed data sets, see <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2019:250:FIN>, last accessed 25 August 2023. See further Brussels, 25 April 2018, SWD (2018) 125 final, Commission Staff Working Document Guidance on sharing private sector data in the European data economy Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European economic and social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 'Towards a common European data space', COM (2018) 232 final; Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information.

117. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Guidance on the Regulation on a framework for the free flow of non-personal data in the European Union, COM (2019) 250 final.

118. Brussels, 23 February 2022, COM (2022) 68 final 2022/0047(COD), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data (Data Act).

119. See, inter alia, Fernandez, A. (2022). The Data Act: the next step in moving forward to a European data space. *Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev.*, *8*, 108; Perarnaud, C., & Fanni, R. (2022). *The EU Data Act: towards a new European data revolution?* Centre for European Policy Studies; Kerber, W. (2023). Governance of IoT data: why the EU Data Act will not fulfil its objectives. *GRUR International*, *72*(2), 120–135; Picht, P. G. (2023). Caught in the Acts: framing mandatory data access transactions under the Data Act, further EU Digital Regulation Acts, and competition law. *Journal of European Competition Law & Practice*, *14*(2), 67–82.

120. Article 20 GDPR.

121. <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/data-intermediary-services>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

122. <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/data-altruism-organisations>, last accessed 25 August 2023. <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/logos-data-intermediaries-and-data-altruism-organisations-recognised-union>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

123. European Commission, Commercial Exploitation of Europe's Public Sector Information, 20 September 2000, p. 6. <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=1195>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

124. Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 2003 on the re-use of public sector information [2003] OJ L345, 31 December.

125. Directive 2013/37/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 amending Directive 2003/98/EC on the Re-use of Public Sector Information.

126. Directive 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information.

127. See also Opinion 7/2003 on the re-use of public sector information and the protection of personal data – Striking the balance. Adopted on: 12 December 20031021/00/EN WP207; Opinion 06/2013 on open data and public sector information ('PSI'). Adopted on 5 June 2013. <https://edps.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publication/13-11-22_comments_public_sector_en.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023. <https://edps.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publication/12-04-18_open_data_en.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

128. See, eg, CJEU, Case C-439/19, *Latvijas Republikas Saeima*, ECLI:EU:C:2021:504. CJEU; Joined Cases C-37/20 and C-601/20, *Luxembourg Business Registers*, 22 November 2022, ECLI:EU:C:2022:912. See also: ECtHR, *L.B. v Hungary*, Application No. 36345/16, 9 March 2023, §§ 132–133.

129. This sub-section draws on: van der Sloot, B., van Schendel, S., & López, C. A. F. (2022). The influence of (technical) developments on the concept of personal data in relation to the GDPR. <https://repository.wodc.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12832/3229/3224-influence-of-technical-developments-on-concept-personal-data-full-text.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, last accessed 25 August 2023; van der Sloot, B. (2018). Legal consistency after the General Data Protection Regulation and the Police Directive. *European Journal of Law and Technology*, *9*(3); van der Sloot, B (2022). Editorial. *European Data Protection Law Review*, 8, 1.

130. Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. See also: Directive (EU) 2019/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 laying down rules facilitating the use of financial and other information for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of certain criminal offences, and repealing Council Decision 2000/642/JHA PE/64/2019/REV/1. Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU.Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the collection and transfer of advance passenger information for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/818. COM/2022/731 final.

131. Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.

132. Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.

133. Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation.

134. Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services.

135. Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation {SEC(2008) 2180} {SEC(2008) 2181} /* COM (2008) 0426 final- CNS 2008/0140.

136. Article 9 GDPR.

137. Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, 01248/07/EN WP 136, 20 June 2017, p. 21.

138. This paragraph and the next one are based on <https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_6_eng.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023; and <https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

139. This paragraph and the next one are based on: <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_1_Protocol_1_ENG.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

140. See further on administrative law AI Wolswinkel, J. (2022), Artificial Intelligence and administrative law, <https://www.coe.int/documents/22298481/0/CDCJ%282022%2931E+-+FINAL+6.pdf/4cb20e4b-3da9-d4d4-2da0-65c11cd16116?t=1670943260563>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

141. See more elaborately van der Sloot, B. (2017). Decisional privacy 2.0: the procedural requirements implicit in Article 8 ECHR and its potential impact on profiling. *International Data Privacy Law*, *7*(3), 190–201.

142. <https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A2942736/view>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

143. Kohl, U. (2007). *Jurisdiction and the internet: regulatory competence over online activity*. Cambridge University Press.

144. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-65735769>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

145. See however also Pasquale, F. (2019). A rule of persons, not machines: the limits of legal automation. *Geo. Wash. L. Rev.*, *87*, 1; Pagallo, U., & Durante, M. (2016). The pros and cons of legal automation and its governance. *European Journal of Risk Regulation*, *7*(2), 323–334; Zekos, G. I. (2022). *Advanced Artificial Intelligence and robo-justice* (p. 325). Springer.

146. Pfefferkorn, R. (2020). 'Deepfakes' in the courtroom. *Boston University Public Interest Law Journal*, *29*(2).

147. See, eg Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse. COM/2022/209 final. Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA. *EU strategy for a more effective fight against child sexual abuse*, COM(2020) 607, 24 July 2020, p 2. *Proposed European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade*, COM(2022) 28, 26 January 2022. *EU strategy on the rights of the child*, COM(2021) 142, 24 March 2021.

148. Ferris, K. (2014). Privacy, expression and the World Wide Web. Shall we forget? *Web Journal of Current Legal Issues*, *20*(2).

149. See for a first analysis Dheu, O., De Bruyne, J., & Ducuing, C. (2022). The European Commission's approach to extra-contractual liability and AI: a first analysis and evaluation of the two proposals. *Available at SSRN*; <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4239792>.

150. Brussels, 28 September 2022 COM (2022) 496 final 2022/0303 (COD) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to Artificial Intelligence (AI Liability Directive). See also P9_TA(2020)0276 Civil liability regime for Artificial Intelligence, European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a civil liability regime

for Artificial Intelligence (2020/2014(INL)). See also Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies, New Technologies Formation Liability for Artificial Intelligence and Other Emerging Digital Technologies.

151. See also Brussels, 19 February 2020, COM (2020) 64, final report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, Report on the safety and liability implications of Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things and Robotics [2021] OJ C404/05.

152. Article 3 of the proposed AI Liability Directive.

153. Article 4 of the proposed AI Liability Directive.

154. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on liability for defective products, COM (2022) 495 final.

155. Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products.

156. See also Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee Report on the safety and liability implications of Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things and robotics, COM (2020) 64 final; and <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1c5e30be-1197-11ea-8c1f-01aa75ed71a1/language-en>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

157. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market.

158. Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act).

159. See also recital 42 of the e-Commerce Directive.

160. CJEU, 24 November 2011, Case C-70/10, *Scarlet/Sabam*, ECLI:EU:C:2011:771; and CJEU, 16 February 2012, Case C-360/10, *Sabam/Netlog*, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85.

161. However, see Article 21 of the e-Commerce Directive. See also CJEU 23 March 2010, Joined Cases C-236/08, C-237/08 and C-238/08, *Google/Louis Vuitton*, ECLI:EU:C:2010:159, § 120.

162. See, eg, van der Sloot, B. (2015). Welcome to the jungle: the liability of internet intermediaries for privacy violations in Europe. *J. Intell. Prop. Info. Tech. & Elec. Com. L.*, *6*, 211; CJEU, 12 July 2011, Case C-324/09 *L'Oréal/eBay*, ECLI:EU:C:2011:474, §§ 115 and 124.

163. See, inter alia, Brussels, 21 November 2003, COM (2003) 702 final, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee First Report on the application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce). See also <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/656318/EPRS_STU(2021)656318_EN.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

164. Cauffman, C., & Goanta, C. (2021). A new order: the Digital Services Act and consumer protection. *European Journal of Risk Regulation*, *12*(4), 758–774; Broadbent, M. (2020). The Digital Services Act, the Digital Markets Act, and the new competition tool, <https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/201109_Broadbent_Digital_Services_Act_Digital_Markets_Acts.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

165. See further: Schwemer, S. F., Mahler, T., & Styri, H. (2021). Liability exemptions of non-hosting intermediaries: sideshow in the Digital Services Act? *Oslo Law Review*, *8*(1), 4–29; Quintais, J. P., & Schwemer, S. F. (2022). The interplay between the Digital Services Act and sector regulation: how special is copyright? *European Journal of Risk Regulation*, *13*(2), 191–217.

166. Savin, A. (2021). The EU Digital Services Act: towards a more responsible internet. *Copenhagen Business School, CBS LAW Research Paper*, 21–04; Weinzierl, Q. (2019). Platform procedure and the EU's Digital Service Act: taking procedure serious in internet governance. *JuWissBlog*, <https://www.juwiss.de/102-2019/>, last accessed 22 October 2023.

167. Salter, B., & Ramkhelawan, D. (2020). Section 230 immunity: how the Trump era has exposed the current conflict between the First Amendment and the Good Samaritan Clause in the modern public square. *UALR L. Rev.*, *43*, 239; Tremble, C. (2017). Wild Westworld: section 230 of the CDA and social networks' use of Machine-Learning Algorithms. *Fordham L. Rev.*, *86*, 825.

168. 47 U.S. Code § 230 – Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material.

169. Citron, D. (2019). The internet's 'safe harbor' is not safe for kids. *Common Sense Media*. <https://www.commonsensemedia.org/sites/default/files/uploads/pdfs/blog/cska-section-230-danielle-citron.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023; Black, J. P. (2019). Facebook and the future of fair housing online. *Okla. L. Rev.*, *72*, 711.

170. See, however, Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services.

171. Castillo, C. (2019, January). Fairness and transparency in ranking. In *ACM SIGIR Forum* (Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 64–71). ACM; Bostoen, F. (2018). Neutrality, fairness or freedom? Principles for platform regulation. *Internet Policy Review*, *7*(1), 1–19.

172. Goldman, E. (2008). *Search engine bias and the demise of search engine utopianism* (pp. 121–133). Springer; Machill, M., Neuberger, C., & Schindler, F. (2003). Transparency on the Net: functions and deficiencies of internet search engines. *info*, *5*(1), 52–74.

173. Gao, R., & Shah, C. (2020). Toward creating a fairer ranking in search engine results. *Information Processing & Management*, *57*(1), 102138; Zehlike, M., Sühr, T., Castillo, C., & Kitanovski, I. (2020, April). Fairsearch: a tool for fairness in ranked search results. In *Companion proceedings of the web conference 2020* (pp. 172–175).

174. 17 U.S. Code § 512 – Limitations on liability relating to material online.

175. See also <https://cmci.colorado.edu/~cafi5706/fiesler_xrds2013.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

176. Matteson, J. D. (2018). Unfair misuse: how section 512 of the DMCA allows abuse of the copyright fair use doctrine and how to fix it. *Santa Clara High Tech. LJ*, *35*, 1; Gratz, J. C. (2020). The DMCA safe harbor: user-generated content. In *The Routledge companion to copyright and creativity in the 21st century* (pp. 289–292). Routledge.

177. Velay, A. (2017). Using the first fair use factor to screen DMCA takedowns. *Va. Sports & Ent. LJ*, *17*, 54; Johnson, G. (2021). The last line of defense: addressing section 512 (g)'s dwindling capacity to protect educational fair users on the internet. *Colum. JL & Arts*, *45*, 263.

178. Senftleben, M., & Angelopoulos, C. (2020). The odyssey of the prohibition on general monitoring obligations on the way to the Digital Services Act: between Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive and Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market. *Amsterdam/Cambridge, October*. <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3717022>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

179. <https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/54644/IPOL_IDA(2017)614179_EN.pdf?sequence=2>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

180. For a list of very large platforms, see: <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_23_2452>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

181. Ponce, A. (2020). The Digital Services Act package: reflections on the EU Commission's policy options. *ETUI Research Paper-Policy Brief*, *12*; Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell, T. (2021, April). The background of the Digital Services Act: looking towards a platform economy. In *ERA Forum* (Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 75–86). Springer.

182. Recitals 83–84 DSA.

183. COM (2018) 236 final. <http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=51804>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

184. COM (2018) 236 final. http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=51804>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

185. COM (2020) 790 final. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0790>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

186. <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/76495>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

187. <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/87585>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

188. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, COM (2021) 731 final.

189. <https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/14-03-26_competitition_law_big_data_en.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

190. <https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/14-03-26_competitition_law_big_data_en.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

191. Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.

192. See also Directive (EU) 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on Certain Aspects Concerning Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content and Digital Services. Directive (EU) 2019/771 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the sale of goods, amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC, and repealing Directive 1999/44/EC.

193. Directive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 on consumer protection in the indication of the prices of products offered to consumers.

194. Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.

195. Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 concerning misleading and comparative advertising.

196. Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council ('Unfair Commercial Practices Directive').

197. <https://www.trans-lex.org/400200/_/pecl/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

198. For more on consumer law, see Kerber, W. (2016). Digital markets, data, and privacy: competition law, consumer law and data protection. *Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice*, 11; Narciso, M. (2017). Gratuitous digital content contracts in EU consumer law. *J. Eur. Consumer & Mkt. L.*, *6*, 198; Ebers, M. (2021). Liability for Artificial Intelligence and EU consumer law. *J. Intell. Prop. Info. Tech. & Elec. Com. L.*, *12*, 204.

199. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/82/competition-policy>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

200. Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act).

201. See further Brühl, V. (2023). Generative Artificial Intelligence (GAI): foundations, use cases and economic potential. *Center for Financial Studies Working Paper*, 713; Morozovaite, V. (2023). Hypernudging in the changing European regulatory landscape for digital markets. *Policy & Internet*, *15*(1), 78–99.

CHAPTER 6
UNEASY QUESTIONS AND IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS

1. Ben-Israel, I. Cerdio, J., Ema, A., Friedman, L., Ienca, M., Mantelero, A., Matania, E., Muller, C., Shiroyama, H., & Vayena, E. (2020). *Towards regulation of AI systems: global perspectives on the development of a legal framework on Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems based on the Council of Europe's standards on human rights, democracy and the rule of law*. Council of Europe. <https://rm.coe.int/prems–107320-gbr–2018-complicahai-couv-texte-a4-bat-web/1680a0c17a>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

2. Bubeck, S., Chandrasekaran, V., Eldan, R., Gehrke, J., Horvitz, E., Kamar, E., Lee, P., Lee, Y. T., Li, Y., Lundberg, S., Nori, H., Palangi, H., Ribeiro, M. T., & Zhang, Y. (2023). Sparks of artificial general intelligence: early experiments with GPT-4. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.12712*. McLean, S., Read, G. J., Thompson, J., Baber, C., Stanton, N. A., & Salmon, P. M. (2023). The risks associated with Artificial General Intelligence: A systematic review. *Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence*, 35(5), 649-663. Fei, N., Lu, Z., Gao, Y. et al. Towards artificial general intelligence via a multimodal foundation model. *Nat Commun* 13, 3094 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-30761-2.

3. Rotenberg, M. Artificial intelligence and the right to algorithmic transparency. *The Cambridge Handbook of Information Technology, Life Sciences and Human Rights (Cambridge Law Handbooks)*, 153–165.

4. Pasquale, F. (2015). *The black box society: The secret algorithms that control money and information*. Harvard University Press.

5. Arrieta, A. B., Díaz-Rodríguez, N., Del Ser, J., Bennetot, A., Tabik, S., Barbado, A., Garcia, S., Gil-López, Molina, D., Benjamins, R., Chatila, R., & Herrera, F. (2020). Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI): concepts, taxonomies, opportunities and challenges toward responsible AI. *Information Fusion*, *58*, 82–115.

6. Samek, W., Montavon, G., Vedaldi, A., Hansen, L. K., & Müller, K. R. (Eds.). (2019). *Explainable AI: interpreting, explaining and visualizing deep learning* (Vol. 11700). Springer Nature.

7. Colaner, N. (2022). Is explainable Artificial Intelligence intrinsically valuable? *AI & SOCIETY*, 1–8.

8. Gonzalez Fuster, G. (2018). Transparency as translation in data protection. In Hildebrandt, M., Janssens, L. A. W., Baraliuc, I., & Bayamlioglu, E. (Eds.). *Being profiled: cogitas ergo sum. 10 years of profiling the European citizen*. Amsterdam University Press.

9. O'Hara, K. (2020). Explainable AI and the philosophy and practice of explanation. *Computer Law & Security Review*, *39*, 105474.

10. Phillips, P. J., Hahn, C. A., Fontana, P. C., Yates, A. N., Greene, K., Broniatowski, D. A., & Przybocki, M. A. (2020). Four principles of explainable Artificial Intelligence. *NIST*. <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2021/NIST.IR.8312.pdf?trk=public_post_comment-text>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

11. Alfrink, K., Keller, I., Kortuem, G., & Doorn, N. (2022). Contestable AI by design: towards a framework. *Minds and Machines*, 1–27.

12. Ploug, T., & Holm, S. (2020). The four dimensions of contestable AI diagnostics: a patient-centric approach to explainable AI. *Artificial Intelligence in Medicine*, *107*, 101901.

13. Almada, M. (2019, June). Human intervention in automated decision-making: toward the construction of contestable systems. In *Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law*, pp. 2–11.

14. Mouffe, C. (1999). Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism? *Social Research*, 745–758.

15. Crawford, K. (2016). Can an algorithm be agonistic? Ten scenes from life in calculated publics. *Science, Technology, & Human Values*, *41*(1), 77–92.

16. Hildebrandt, M. (2019). Privacy as protection of the incomputable self: from agnostic to agonistic machine learning. *Theoretical Inquiries in Law*, *20*(1), 83–121.

17. Pariser, E. (2011). *The filter bubble: how the new personalized web is changing what we read and how we think*. Penguin.

18. Schmidt, A. (2021, July). The end of serendipity: will Artificial Intelligence remove chance and choice in everyday life? In *CHItaly 2021: 14th Biannual Conference of the Italian SIGCHI Chapter* (pp. 1–4). However, see also Areeb, Q. M., Nadeem, M., Sohail, S. S., Imam, R., Doctor, F., Himeur, Y., Hussain, A., & Amira, A. (2023). Filter bubbles in recommender systems: fact or fallacy – a systematic review. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.01221*.

19. Reviglio, U. (2019). Serendipity as an emerging design principle of the infosphere: challenges and opportunities. *Ethics and Information Technology*, *21*(2), 151–166.

20. Wang, W., Feng, F., Nie, L., & Chua, T. S. (2022, July). User-controllable recommendation against filter bubbles. In *Proceedings of the 45th International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research and Development in Information Retrieval*, pp. 1251–1261.

21. Eagle, N. (2004). Can serendipity be planned? *MIT Sloan Management Review*, *46*(1), 10.

22. Prunkl, C. (2021, September). Is there a trade-off between human autonomy and the 'autonomy' of AI systems? In *Conference on Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence* (pp. 67–71). Springer International Publishing.

23. Susser, D., Roessler, B., & Nissenbaum, H. (2019). Technology, autonomy, and manipulation. *Internet Policy Review*, *8*(2), 1–21.

24. Thaler, R. H. & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). *Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness*. Yale University Press.

25. Yeung, K. (2017). 'Hypernudge': Big Data as a mode of regulation by design. *Information, Communication & Society*, *20*(1), 118–136.

26. Laitinen, A., & Sahlgren, O. (2021). AI systems and respect for human autonomy. *Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence*, *4*, 151.

27. Van de Poel, I. (2020). Embedding values in Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems. *Minds and Machines*, *30*(3), 385–409.

28. Shneiderman, B. (2022). *Human-centered AI*. Oxford University Press; Shneiderman, B. (2020). Human-centered Artificial Intelligence: three fresh ideas. *AIS Transactions on Human-Computer Interaction*, *12*(3), 109–124; Koster, R., Balaguer, J., Tacchetti, A., Weinstein, A., Zhu, T., Hauser, O., Williams, D., Campbell-Gillingham, L., Thacker, P., Botvinick, M., & Summerfield, C. (2022). Human-centred mechanism design with democratic AI. *Nature Human Behaviour*, *6*(10), 1398–1407.

29. Verbeek, P. P. (2011). *Moralizing technology: Understanding and designing the morality of things*. University of Chicago Press; Verbeek, P. P. (2011). Subject to technology: on autonomic computing and human autonomy. In *Law, human agency and autonomic computing* (pp. 27–45). Routledge.

30. Xenidis, R., & Senden, L. (2019). EU non-discrimination law in the era of Artificial Intelligence: mapping the challenges of algorithmic discrimination. In Bernitz, U., et al (Eds.). *General principles of EU law and the EU digital order* (pp. 151–182). Kluwer Law International.

31. Zuiderveen Borgesius, F. J. (2020). Strengthening legal protection against discrimination by algorithms and Artificial Intelligence. *International Journal of Human Rights*, *24*(10), 1572–1593.

32. Wachter, S. (2020). Affinity profiling and discrimination by association in online behavioral advertising. *Berkeley Tech. LJ*, *35*, 367. See also: Gerards, J., & Borgesius, F. Z. (2022). Protected grounds and the system of non-discrimination law in the context of algorithmic decision-making and Artificial Intelligence. *Colo. Tech. LJ*, *20*, 1.

33. Custers, B. (2004). *The power of knowledge: ethical, legal, and technological aspects of data mining and group profiling in epidemiology*. Wolf Legal Publishers.

34. Mantelero, A. (2016). Personal data for decisional purposes in the age of analytics: from an individual to a collective dimension of data protection. *Computer Law & Security Review*, *32*(2), 238–255.

35. Xenidis, R., & Gerards, J. (2021). Algorithmic discrimination in Europe: challenges and opportunities for gender equality and non-discrimination law. <https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/415402/DS0220549ENN.en.pdf?sequence=1>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

36. Veale, M., & Binns, R. (2017). Fairer machine learning in the real world: mitigating discrimination without collecting sensitive data. *Big Data & Society*, *4*(2), 2053951717743530.

37. Frank, D. A., Chrysochou, P., Mitkidis, P., & Ariely, D. (2019). Human decision-making biases in the moral dilemmas of autonomous vehicles. *Scientific Reports*, *9*(1), 13080.

38. <https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/sites/default/files/download/04%20handbook%20non-discrimination%20by%20design%28ENG%29.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

39. Keymolen, E. (2016). *Trust on the line: a philosophical exploration of trust in the networked era*. Wolf Legal Publishers.

40. Waldman, A. E. (2018). *Privacy as trust: Information privacy for an information age*. Cambridge University Press.

41. Kaur, D., Uslu, S., Rittichier, K. J., & Durresi, A. (2022). Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence: a review. *ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)*, *55*(2), 1–38.

42. Floridi, L. (2019). Establishing the rules for building trustworthy AI. *Nature Machine Intelligence*, *1*(6), 261–262.

43. Balkin J. M. (2016) Information fiduciaries and the First Amendment. *UC Davis Law Review*, *49*, 1183.

44. Richards, N., & Hartzog, W. (2021). A duty of loyalty for privacy law. *Wash. UL Rev.*, *99*, 961.

45. Dobkin, A. (2018). Information fiduciaries in practice: data privacy and user expectations. *Berkeley Technology Law Journal*, *33*(1), 1–52.

46. Jones, K. M., Rubel, A., & LeClere, E. (2020). A matter of trust: higher education institutions as information fiduciaries in an age of educational data mining and learning analytics. *Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology*, *71*(10), 1227–1241.

47. Bygrave, L. A. (2002). *Data protection law: approaching its rationale, logic and limits* (vol. 10). Kluwer Law International.

48. Ohm, P. (2009). Broken promises of privacy: responding to the surprising failure of anonymization. *UCLA L. Rev.*, *57*, 1701.

49. Van der Sloot, B., van Schendel, S., & López, C. A. F. (2022). The influence of (technical) developments on the concept of personal data in relation to the GDPR. <https://repository.wodc.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12832/3229/3224-influence-of-technical-developments-on-concept-personal-data-full-text.pdf?sequence=1>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

50. Finck, M., & Pallas, F. (2020). They who must not be identified: distinguishing personal from non-personal data under the GDPR. *International Data Privacy Law*, *10*(1), 11–36.

51. Graef, I., Gellert, R., & Husovec, M. (2018). Towards a holistic regulatory approach for the European data economy: why the illusive notion of non-personal data is counterproductive to data innovation. <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Inge-Graef/publication/328060880_Towards_a_Holistic_Regulatory_Approach_for_the_European_Data_Economy_Why_the_Illusive_Notion_of_Non-Personal_Data_is_Counterproductive_to_Data_Innovation/links/5be2d816299bf1124fc17c69/Towards-a-Holistic-Regulatory-Approach-for-the-European-Data-Economy-Why-the-Illusive-Notion-of-Non-Personal-Data-is-Counterproductive-to-Data-Innovation.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

52. Van der Sloot, B. (2017). *Privacy as virtue*. Intersentia.

53. Purtova, N. (2018). The law of everything: broad concept of personal data and future of EU data protection law. *Law, Innovation and Technology*, *10*(1), 40–81.

54. Nørskov, M. (2017). *Social robots: boundaries, potential, challenges*. Taylor & Francis.

55. Darling, K. (2021). *The new breed: what our history with animals reveals about our future with robots*. Henry Holt and Company.

56. Gellers, J. C. (2020). *Rights for robots: Artificial Intelligence, animal and environmental law*. Routledge.
57. Gunkel, D. J. (2018). *Robot rights*. MIT Press.
58. Rodogno, R. (2017). Robots and the limits of morality. In *Social Robots* (pp. 39–55). Routledge.
59. Shevlin, H. (2021). How could we know when a robot was a moral patient? *Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics*, *30*(3), 459–471.
60. Wallach, W., & Allen, C. (2008). *Moral machines: teaching robots right from wrong*. Oxford University Press.
61. Sharkey, A. (2020). Can we program or train robots to be good? *Ethics and Information Technology*, *22*(4), 283–295.
62. Shen, F. X. (2013). Neuroscience, mental privacy, and the law. *Harv. JL & Pub. Pol'y*, *36*, 653.
63. Schiliro, F., Moustafa, N., & Beheshti, A. (2020, December). Cognitive privacy: AI-enabled privacy using EEG signals in the internet of things. In *2020 IEEE 6th International Conference on Dependability in Sensor, Cloud and Big Data Systems and Application (DependSys)* (pp. 73–79). IEEE.
64. Ienca, M., & Malgieri, G. (2022). Mental data protection and the GDPR. *Journal of Law and the Biosciences*, *9*(1), lsac006.
65. Oravec, J. A. (2022). The emergence of 'truth machines'?: Artificial Intelligence approaches to lie detection. *Ethics and Information Technology*, *24*(1), 6.
66. Chaubey, M. S., & Pathrotkar, M. N. (2023). Facial recognition AI: a powerful tool for emotion detection and characterization. *Journal of Data Acquisition and Processing*, *38*(2), 1914.
67. Roemmich, K., Schaub, F., & Andalibi, N. (2023, April). Emotion AI at work: implications for workplace surveillance, emotional labor, and emotional privacy. In *Proceedings of the 2023 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems* (pp. 1–20).
68. Bard, J. S. (2021). Developing a legal framework for regulating emotion AI. *BUJ Sci. & Tech. L.*, *27*, 271.
69. Álvarez-Risco, A., & Del-Aguila-Arcentales, S. (2021). A note on changing regulation in international business: the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and Artificial Intelligence. In *The multiple dimensions of institutional complexity in international business research* (pp. 363–371). Emerald Publishing; Lund, B. D., & Wang, T. (2023). Chatting about ChatGPT: how may AI and GPT impact academia and libraries? *Library Hi Tech News*, *40*(3), 26–29; Guadamuz, A. (2020). Living in a remixed world: comparative analysis of transformative uses in copyright law. *Future Law: Emerging Technology, Regulation and Ethics*, 343; de Zwart, M. (2020). Repost this: Instagram and the art of re-photography. *Future Law: Emerging Technology, Regulation and Ethics*, 364.
70. Kop, M. (2019). AI & intellectual property: towards an articulated public domain. *Tex. Intell. Prop. LJ*, *28*, 297. See also Mik, E. (2020). AI as a legal person? <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3616732>, last accessed 25 August 2023.
71. Hilty, R., Hoffmann, J., & Scheuerer, S. (2021). Intellectual property justification for Artificial Intelligence. In Lee, J. A., Hilty, R., & Liu, K. C. (Eds.). *Artificial Intelligence and intellectual property*. Oxford University Press.
72. Omorov, R. O. (2020). Intellectual property and Artificial Intelligence. *E-Management*, *3*(1), 43–49.
73. Xue, M., Zhang, Y., Wang, J., & Liu, W. (2021). Intellectual property protection for deep learning models: Taxonomy, methods, attacks, and evaluations. *IEEE Transactions on Artificial Intelligence*, *3*(6), 908–923.
74. Harbinja, E. (2022). *Digital death, digital assets and post-mortem privacy: theory, technology and the law*. Edinburgh University Press.
75. Chesney, B., & Citron, D. (2019). Deep fakes: a looming challenge for privacy, democracy, and national security. *Calif. L. Rev.*, *107*, 1753.
76. Jougleux, P. (2022). Freedom of expression and the rise of AI. In *Facebook and the (EU) Law: How the Social Network Reshaped the Legal Framework* (pp. 213–245). Springer International Publishing.

77. de Vries, K. (2022). Let the robot speak! AI-generated speech and freedom of expression. In *YSEC yearbook of socio-economic constitutions 2021: triangulating freedom of speech* (pp. 93–115). Springer International Publishing.

78. Massaro, T. M., & Norton, H. (2015). Siri-ously? Free speech rights and Artificial Intelligence. *NW. UL Rev.*, *110*, 1169.

79. Llansó, E. J. (2020). No amount of 'AI' in content moderation will solve filtering's prior-restraint problem. *Big Data & Society*, *7*(1), 2053951720920686.

80. Heller, B. (2020). Combating terrorist-related content through AI and information sharing. <https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Hash_sharing_Heller_April_2019.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

81. Helberger, N., van Drunen, M., Eskens, S., Bastian, M., & Moeller, J. (2020). A freedom of expression perspective on AI in the media, with a special focus on editorial decision making on social media platforms and in the news media. *European Journal of Law and Technology*, *11*(3), 1–28.

82. Marsden, C., & Meyer, T. (2019). *Regulating disinformation with Artificial Intelligence: effects of disinformation initiatives on freedom of expression and media pluralism*. European Parliament; Bontridder, N., & Poullet, Y. (2021). The role of Artificial Intelligence in disinformation. *Data & Policy*, *3*, e32.

83. Nuñez, F. (2019). Disinformation legislation and freedom of expression. *UC Irvine L. Rev.*, *10*, 783.

84. Urquhart, L. (2020). White noise from the white goods? Privacy by design for ambient domestic computing. *Future Law*, 41–78.

85. Rehm, G., Galanis, D., Labropoulou, P., Piperidis, S., Welß, M., Usbeck, R., Köhler, J. Deligiannis, M., Gkirtzou, K., Fischer, J., Chiarcos, C., Feldhus, N., Moreno-Schneider, J., Kintzel, F., Montiel, E., Rodriguez Doncel, V., McCrae, J.P., Laqua, D., Theile, I. P., Dittmar, C., Bontcheva, K., Roberts, I., Vasiljevs, A., & Lagzdiņš, A. (2020). Towards an interoperable ecosystem of AI and LT platforms: a roadmap for the implementation of different levels of interoperability. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.08355*.

86. Lehne, M., Sass, J., Essenwanger, A., Schepers, J., & Thun, S. (2019). Why digital medicine depends on interoperability. *NPJ Digital Medicine*, *2*(1), 79.

87. Maurushat, A., & Hamper, R. (2020). Security vulnerabilities, backdoors, exploits and the marketplace for each: the return of Boba Fett – bug bounty hunter in the New Republic. *Future Law: Emerging Technology, Regulation and Ethics*, 149–177.

88. Oseni, A., Moustafa, N., Janicke, H., Liu, P., Tari, Z., & Vasilakos, A. (2021). Security and privacy for Artificial Intelligence: opportunities and challenges. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2102.04661*.

89. Hukkelås, H., Mester, R., & Lindseth, F. (2019, October). Deepprivacy: a generative adversarial network for face anonymization. In *International symposium on visual computing* (pp. 565–578). Springer International Publishing.

90. Khan, S. M. (2019). Maintaining the AI chip competitive advantage of the United States and its allies. *Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University: Washington, DC, USA*; Khan, S. M. (2020). US semiconductor exports to China: current policies and trends. *Center for Security and Emerging Technology, October*.

91. <https://techwireasia.com/2023/02/the-us-japan-netherlands-chip-export-restrictions-are-leaving-china-uneasy-heres-why/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

92. <https://www.cnbc.com/2023/06/16/eu-urges-more-countries-to-ban-chinas-huawei-zte-from–5g-networks.html>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

93. <https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Recommendations-on-Export-Controls-for-Artificial-Intelligence.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

94. Carrozza, I., Marsh, N., & Reichberg, G. M. (2022). Dual-use AI technology in China, the US and the EU. <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ilaria-Carrozza/publication/374006072_Dual-Use_AI_Technology_in_China_the_US_and_the_EU/links/65096cd8d5293c106cc6a032/Dual-Use-AI-Technology-in-China-the-US-and-the-EU.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023; Barker, T., & Hagebölling, D. (2022). Germany's economic security and technology: optimizing export control, investment screening

and market access instruments. <https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/85212/ssoar-2022-barker_et_al-Germanys_Economic_Security_and_Technology.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

95. <https://futureoflife.org/open-letter/pause-giant-ai-experiments/>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

96. Ienca, M. (2023). Don't pause giant AI for the wrong reasons. *Nature Machine Intelligence*, 1–2.

97. Gilbert, K. (2020). Implications of a moratorium on public use of facial recognition technology in Canada. <https://www.mediatechdemocracy.com/s/TIP_FRbriefing1.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

98. Castelvecchi, D. (2020). Is facial recognition too biased to be let loose? *Nature*, *587*(7834), 347–350.

99. Kaminski, M. (2021). The law of AI. *Jotwell: J. Things We Like*, 1.

100. Ebers, M., Hoch, V. R., Rosenkranz, F., Ruschemeier, H., & Steinrötter, B. (2021). The European Commission's proposal for an Artificial Intelligence act: a critical assessment by members of the robotics and AI law society (rails). *J: Multidisciplinary Science Journal*, *4*(4), 589–603.

101. Terry, N. (2019). Of regulating healthcare AI and robots. *Yale JL & Tech.*, *21*, 133.

102. Pesapane, F., Volonté, C., Codari, M., & Sardanelli, F. (2018). Artificial Intelligence as a medical device in radiology: ethical and regulatory issues in Europe and the United States. *Insights into Imaging*, *9*, 745–753.

103. Parikh, R. B., Obermeyer, Z., & Navathe, A. S. (2019). Regulation of predictive analytics in medicine. *Science*, *363*(6429), 810–812.

104. Beckers, R., Kwade, Z., & Zanca, F. (2021). The EU medical device regulation: Implications for Artificial Intelligence-based medical device software in medical physics. *Physica Medica*, *83*, 1–8.

105. O'Sullivan, S., Nevejans, N., Allen, C., Blyth, A., Leonard, S., Pagallo, U., Holzinger, K., Holzinger, A., Imran Sajid, M., & Ashrafian, H. (2019). Legal, regulatory, and ethical frameworks for development of standards in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and autonomous robotic surgery. *International Journal of Medical Robotics and Computer-Assisted Surgery*, *15*(1), e1968.

106. Venkatesh, K. P., Raza, M. M., & Kvedar, J. C. (2022). Health digital twins as tools for precision medicine: Considerations for computation, implementation, and regulation. *NPJ Digital Medicine*, *5*(1), 150.

107. Szabadföldi, I. (2021). Artificial Intelligence in military application: opportunities and challenges. *Land Forces Academy Review*, *26*(2), 157–165.

108. Svenmarck, P., Luotsinen, L., Nilsson, M., & Schubert, J. (2018, May). Possibilities and challenges for Artificial Intelligence in military applications. In *Proceedings of the NATO Big Data and Artificial Intelligence for Military Decision Making Specialists' Meeting* (pp. 1–16).

109. Kania, E. B. (2019). Chinese military innovation in Artificial Intelligence. *Testimony to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission*.

110. Nadibaidze, A. (2022). *Russian perceptions on military AI, automation, and autonomy*. Foreign Policy Research Institute.

111. Morgan, F. E., Boudreaux, B., Lohn, A. J., Ashby, M., Curriden, C., Klima, K., & Grossman, D. (2020). Military applications of Artificial Intelligence. *RAND Corporation*; Johnson, J. (2021). The end of military-techno pax Americana? Washington's strategic responses to Chinese AI-enabled military technology. *Pacific Review*, *34*(3), 351–378.

112. Soare, S. R. (2023). European military AI: why regional approaches are lagging behind. In Raska, M. & Bitzinger, R. A. (eds.) *The AI wave in defence innovation* (pp. 80–111). Routledge.

113. Ulnicane, I. (2022). Artificial Intelligence in the European Union: policy, ethics and regulation. In T. Hoerber, G. Weber, & I. Cabras (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of European Integration* (pp. 254–269). Routledge.

114. Soroka, L., & Kurkova, K. (2019). Artificial Intelligence and space technologies: legal, ethical and technological issues. *Advanced Space Law*, *3*(1), 131–139.

115. Martin, A. S., & Freeland, S. (2021). The advent of Artificial Intelligence in space activities: new legal challenges. *Space Policy*, *55*, 101408.

116. Schermer, B. W., & Ham, J. V. (2021). Regulering van immersieve technologieën. English summary available at: <https://repository.wodc.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12832/3082/3180-regulering--immersieve-technologieen-summary.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

117. Galaitsi, S. E., Hendren, C. O., Trump, B., & Linkov, I. (2019). Sex robots: a harbinger for emerging AI risk. *Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence*, *2*, 27.

118. Gieseke, A. P. (2020). 'The new weapon of choice': law's current inability to properly address Deepfake pornography. *Vand. L. Rev.*, *73*, 1479.

119. Danaher, J. (2019). Regulating child sex robots: restriction or experimentation? *Medical Law Review*, *27*(4), 553–575.

120. Sparrow, R., & Karas, L. (2020). Teledildonics and rape by deception. *Law, Innovation and Technology*, *12*(1), 175–204.

121. Shumailov, I., Shumaylov, Z., Zhao, Y., Gal, Y., Papernot, N., & Anderson, R. (2023). The curse of recursion: training on generated data makes models forget. *arXiv preprint arxiv:2305.17493*.

122. If Generative AI continues to develop at rapid speed, regulators would need to take into account the potentially complex interrelation with other technologies, such as Quantum Computing. See Hoofnagle, C. J., & Garfinkel, S. L. (2022). *Law and policy for the quantum age*. Cambridge University Press.

123. <https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/sg-youth-mental-health-social-media-advisory.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

124. There are already some interesting initiatives: <https://news.adobe.com/news/news-details/2022/Adobe-Partners-With-Leica-and-Nikon-To-Implement-Content-Authenticity-Technology-Into-Cameras/default.aspx>, last accessed 19 October 2023.

125. See Abel, R. L. (2017). Lawyer self-regulation and the public interest: a reflection. *Legal Ethics*, *20*(1), 115–124; Garoupa, N. (2011). 33 Regulation of professions. In Levi-Faur, D. (Ed.). *Handbook on the politics of regulation* (pp. 453–469) Edward Elgar; Priest, M. (1997). The privatization of regulation: five models of self-regulation. *Ottawa L. Rev.*, *29*, 233.

126. Sitaraman, G. (2020). Too big to prevail: the national security case for breaking up big tech. *Foreign Aff.*, *99*, 116; Usman, M. (2021). Breaking up big tech: lessons from AT&T. *U. Pa. L. Rev.*, *170*, 523; Warren, E. (2019). Here's how we can break up Big Tech – Team Warren – Medium. <https://fully-human.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Here%E2%80%99s-how-we-can-break-up-Big-Tech-%E2%80%93-Team-Warren-%E2%80%93-Medium.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023; Taplin, J. (2017). Is it time to break up Google? *New York Times*, p. 22; Singh, P. J. (2020). Breaking up Big Tech: separation of its data, cloud and intelligence layers. <https://www.datagovernance.org/files/research/1595858876.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

127. Adapted by the author from Lessig, L. (1999). *Code: and other laws of cyberspace*. Basic Books. See also: <https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/87/Pathetic_dot_theory.png>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

128. For more on the value chain approach, see an Eijk, N. (2013). Duties of care on the internet. In *The Secure Information Society: Ethical, Legal and Political Challenges* (pp. 57–81). Springer; Arnbak, A. (2013). Conceptualizing communications security: a value chain approach. In *TPRC* 41: The 41st Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy: 27–29 September 2013: George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, VA Social Science Research Network; van Eijk, N. A., van Engers, T., Abel, W., Wiersma, C., & Jasserand, C. (2010). Moving towards balance: a study into duties of care on the internet. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1788466 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1788466>.

129. See Millward, R., & Singleton, J. (Eds.). (2002). *The political economy of nationalisation in Britain, 1920–1950*. Cambridge University Press; Crompton, G., Millward, R., & Singleton, J. (1995). *The railway companies and the nationalisation issue 1920–50*. Cambridge University Press.

130. Mazzucato, M. (2011). *The entrepreneurial state*. Demos.

131. Another approach is to diversify between the types of organisation that process personal data or use a technology, for example, between public and private organisations and without the public sector, between parties that are tasked with maintaining order and security, and parties that are not.

132. De Hert, P., & Malgieri, G. (2020). Article 8 ECHR compliant and foreseeable surveillance: the ECTHR's expanded legality requirement copied by the CJEU. *ECLAN Volume, Forthcoming, Brussels Privacy Hub Working Paper*, *6*(21), see at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544017; van der Sloot, B. (2020). The quality of law: how the European Court of Human Rights gradually became a European Constitutional Court for privacy cases. *J. Intell. Prop. Info. Tech. & Elec. Com. L.*, *11*, 160; Glas, L. R. (2023). The age of subsidiarity? The ECtHR's approach to the admissibility requirement that applicants raise their Convention complaint before domestic courts. *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights*, 09240519231169837.

133. Pettit, P. (1997). *Republicanism: a theory of freedom and government*. Oxford University Press; Newell, B. C. (2014). The massive metadata machine: liberty, power, and secret mass surveillance in the US and Europe. *ISJLP*, *10*, 481; Newell, B. C. (2014). Crossing lenses: policing's new visibility and the role of 'smartphone journalism' as a form of freedom-preserving reciprocal surveillance. *U. Ill. JL Tech. & Pol'y*, *59*; Newell, B. C. (2014). Technopolicing, surveillance, and citizen oversight: a neorepublican theory of liberty and information control. *Government Information Quarterly*, *31*(3), 421–431; Roberts, A. (2015). A republican account of the value of privacy. *European Journal of Political Theory*, *14*(3), 320–344; van der Sloot, B. (2018). A new approach to the right to privacy, or how the European Court of Human Rights embraced the non-domination principle. *Computer Law & Security Review*, *34*(3), 539–549; Roberts, A. (2022). *Privacy in the Republic*. Taylor & Francis.

134. Although regulation, like technology, is in fact never neutral. See, for example, the reference to processing of personal data through 'automated means', 'filing systems' and 'profiling' in the GDPR.

135. Van der Sloot, B. (2021). The right to be let alone by oneself: narrative and identity in a data-driven environment. *Law, Innovation and Technology*, *13*(1), 223–255; Allen, A. L. (2012). An ethical duty to protect one's own information privacy. *Ala. L. Rev.*, *64*, 845.

136. See further: Adorno, T. W., & Horkheimer, M. (1997). *Dialectic of enlightenment* (vol. 15). Verso.

137. See also the CoE's AI Commissioner on AI Literacy: <https://rm.coe.int/follow-up-recommendation-on-the–2019-report-human-rights-by-design-fut/1680ab2279> and <https://rm.coe.int/unboxing-artificial-intelligence–10-steps-to-protect-human-rights-reco/1680946e64>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

138. Yadlin-Segal, A., & Oppenheim, Y. (2021). Whose dystopia is it anyway? Deepfakes and social media regulation. *Convergence*, *27*(1), 36–51; Deng, R., & Matthes, J. (2023). Utopian or dystopian? The portrayal of the metaverse in popular news on social media. *Heliyon*, *9*(4); Cools, H., van Gorp, B., & Opgenhaffen, M. (2022). Where exactly between utopia and dystopia? A framing analysis of AI and automation in US newspapers. *Journalism*, 14648849221122647.

139. Morozov, E. (2013). *To save everything, click here: The folly of technological solutionism*. PublicAffairs.

140. See also the interesting Waluigi effect: <https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/D7PumeYTDPfBTp3i7/the-waluigi-effect-mega-post>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

141. Broeders, D., Cristiano, F., & Kaminska, M. (2023). In search of digital sovereignty and strategic autonomy: normative power Europe to the test of its geopolitical ambitions. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13462>;

Fiott, D. (2018). Strategic autonomy: towards 'European sovereignty' in defence. *European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)*, *12*, 1–8; Liaropoulos, A. (2021, June). EU digital sovereignty: a regulatory power searching for its strategic autonomy in the digital domain. In *ECCWS 2021 20th European conference on cyber warfare and security* (p. 246). Academic Conferences Ltd; Soare, S. R. (2023). The role of Artificial Intelligence in European strategic autonomy. In Cristiano, F., Broeders, D., Delerue, F., Douzet, F., & Géry, A. (Eds.). *Artificial Intelligence and international conflict in cyberspace* (pp. 77–108). Taylor & Francis.

142. Mazzucato, M., Schaake, M., Krier, S., & Entsminger, J. (2022). Governing Artificial Intelligence in the public interest. *UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose, Working Paper Series (IIPP WP 2022–12)*.

143. In Japan, for example, to prevent photos being taken up women's skirts, smartphones are required make a sound when they take photos. See also data protection by design and by default as required in Article 25 GDPR.

144. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/precautionary-principle.html#:~:text=The%20precautionary%20principle%20is%20an,should%20not%20be%20carried%20out>, last accessed 25 August 2023.

145. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Part Three – Union Policies and Internal Actions Title XX – Environment Article 191 (ex-Article 174 TEC).

146. Castro, D., & McLaughlin, M. (2019). *Ten ways the precautionary principle undermines progress in Artificial Intelligence*. Information Technology and Innovation Foundation.

147. See a similar line of thinking with respect to identifiability: Nissim, K., & Wood, A. (2018). Is privacy privacy? *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences*, *376*(2128), 20170358.

148. See the discussion of Bennett and Bayley raising similar points in relation to Big Data: Bennett, C. J., & Bayley, R. M. (2016). Privacy protection in the era of 'Big Data': regulatory challenges and social assessments In van der Sloot, B., Broeders, D., & Schrijvers, E. (2016). *Exploring the boundaries of Big Data* (pp. 205–227). WRR.

149. See the work of Regan on privacy as common good: Regan, P. M. (2002). Privacy as a common good in the digital world. *Information, Communication & Society*, *5*(3), 382–405; Regan, P. M. (1995). *Legislating privacy: technology, social values, and public policy*. University of North Carolina Press.

150. See also: Landau, S. (2019). If it isn't efficacious, don't do it. *Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev.*, *5*, 466; Smil, V. (2023). *Invention and innovation: a brief history of hype and failure*. MIT Press.

151. Marchant, G. E. (2011). *The growing gap between emerging technologies and the law* (pp. 19–33). Springer Netherlands; Anell, P., Freytag, A., & Winkler, K. (2012). The economics of self-regulation under sunset legislation in telecommunications. In *16th Annual Conference of the International Society for New Institutional Economics*; Ranchordás, S. (2014). *Constitutional sunsets and experimental legislation: a comparative perspective*. Edward Elgar.

152. <https://english.wrr.nl/binaries/wrr-eng/documenten/policy-briefs/2017/01/31/big-data-and-security-policies-serving-security-protecting-freedom/WRR_PB6_BigDataAndSecurityPolicies.pdf>, last accessed 25 August 2023; Cairney, P. (2016). *The politics of evidence-based policy making*. Springer.

153. Bradford, A. (2020). *The Brussels effect: how the European Union rules the world*. Oxford University Press.

154. See further: Hirsch, D. D. (2013). In search of the Holy Grail: achieving global privacy rules through sector-based codes of conduct. *Ohio St. LJ*, *74*, 1029; Hirsch, D. D. (2010). The law and policy of online privacy: regulation, self-regulation, or co-regulation. *Seattle UL Rev.*, *34*, 439.

Index