

AUTHORITARIAN PRACTICES AND HUMANITARIAN NEGOTIATIONS

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Chapter 9

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9

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Ethical dilemmas in humanitarian negotiations
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*Kristoffer Lidén and Kristina Roepstorff*¹

Introduction

From the level of formal negotiations with governments to ad hoc negotiations at the frontlines of operations, humanitarian agencies face hard ethical choices on a daily basis: between whom to help and whom to let die, between ensuring the safety of staff and the safety of others, and between principled action and pragmatic compromises. When confronted with partisan demands from political authorities for serving their interests, favouring their supporters or keeping silent about atrocities, they are left with the question of where to draw their red lines beyond which they can no longer justify a deal.

Forced to choose between uncomfortable compromises and inaction, this often leaves agencies operating in normative grey zones. In addition to instrumental concerns of how to achieve one's objectives and legal concerns of how to do so in a lawful manner, these choices raise the ethical question of what is morally right and wrong to do, independent of whether it serves the interests of the agency. When forced to choose between two options that both seem ethically required but that cannot possibly be combined – like assisting victims of atrocities, on the one hand, and rejecting to compensate the perpetrators for access to the victims, on the other – it is an ethical dilemma. In these types of settings, 'doing no harm' (Anderson, 1999) may be easier said than done and turn into questions of the lesser evil when trying to do something morally good.

As seen from the preceding chapters of this book, these tough decisions are further aggravated when faced with authoritarian political actors and institutions (also ALNAP, 2022, 37, 38). Caught in a web of 'authoritarian practices' that actively undermine the accountability of authorities to their

citizens (Glasius, 2018, 525), humanitarian actors risk becoming political instruments for authoritarian rulers:

The difficult balancing act for an agency operating in such a context is defining at what point compliance turns into complicity. Humanitarian agencies are forced to balance pragmatism against principles in their relation with state power, and accept compromises set by sovereign states, including restrictions on geographic access, programmatic options, and modalities of work.

(del Valle and Healy, 2013, 198)

Or in the words of Fernando Politis in this book: ‘What is the right balance between containing authoritarianism and preserving its humanitarian policies?’ (Chapter 8). In effect, humanitarian agencies face an ‘authoritarian dilemma’ of either accepting a role as a prolonged arm of authoritarian rulers or withdrawing their helping hand from people under the rulers’ control. With the necessity of oversimplification, we suggest distinguishing this dilemma into three general types, where *helping people in dire need requires*: (1) *mopping up* after authorities that cause humanitarian problems; (2) *keeping down* minorities or political opposition; and (3) *propping up* the authorities by becoming an ad hoc part of the governance apparatus.² These may occur in isolation but usually appear in various combinations.

While the ultimate question for humanitarians is whether to withdraw under these circumstances, the dilemmas are reflected in pervasive questions of which tasks to take on and how to carry them out (del Valle and Healy, 2013; Walton, 2015). In practice, the authoritarian dilemma thus sets the stage for negotiations on compromises and alternatives at various levels, from international forums and government offices to local councils and roadblocks. Given a reliance on harmonising with the political interests of states, international humanitarian law (IHL) and humanitarian organisations have always had to balance between humanitarian ideals and the art of the possible (Barnett, 2011, 33). This has entailed continuous critiques of resorting to ‘band aid’ where more radical political solutions are needed (e.g., Keen, 2008; Rieff, 2002; Terry, 2002). The advantage of bringing ethical analysis into this equation is not so much to answer the ‘Hamlet question’ of ‘to be or not to be’ in a given setting but to help thinking about what exactly the ethical problems are and how they can be addressed in pursuit of humanitarian objectives.

As the previous chapters have also shown, humanitarians have little clout for changing the policies of authoritarian counterparts. It is nonetheless expected that they do whatever they can to uphold the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence and that they reduce their contribution to harm. As Healy and Cunningham argue in Chapter 1,

this is nearly impossible when relying on the collaboration of authorities wittingly committing atrocities and limiting access to their victims. Under such circumstances, compromising on one's principles and lending the authorities a hand in order to alleviate suffering does not automatically translate into moral blameworthiness, however. Exactly the fact that the authorities may have caused the harm in any case and that the agencies have no options but to strike 'dirty deals' in order to assist the victims can make their role ethically justified. As Healy and Cunningham also argue, authoritarian regulation of humanitarian work nonetheless comes on a spectrum from such egregious cases to situations where the authorities act upon reasonable security concerns or even justified resentments with humanitarian agencies. Handling the ethics of the humanitarian's authoritarian dilemmas thus requires considering them in concrete settings and distinguishing between their various components. The purpose of this chapter is to lay the foundation for such analysis. As such, we do not say much about the very negotiations with authoritarian regimes but about the ethical problems that international humanitarian agencies are confronted within these situations (be they non-governmental like MSF and Oxfam or governmental like the UN).

For this purpose, we begin this chapter by relating the authoritarian dilemmas to more general ethical problems in humanitarian action and to the problem of moral complicity in particular. We then introduce a set of ethical positions that place these ethical problems in different perspectives. These are *deontology*, concentrating on moral duties; *consequentialism*, focusing on effects rather than motives; *pluralism*, subjecting international ethics to the principle of state sovereignty; and *solidarism*, seeing state sovereignty as secondary to universal moral standards. Against this theoretical backdrop, we turn to the three types of authoritarian dilemmas identified above. First, we introduce them and relate them to prominent examples from the literature and to the preceding chapters of this book. Second, we analyse examples from the chapters on Venezuela, Syria and Ethiopia, respectively, regarding the question of moral complicity. Third, we discuss whether such complicity would be ethically justified by applying the four ethical positions.

Ethical problems in humanitarian action

Quoting a humanitarian negotiator par excellence, Jan Egeland: 'If you are there to help the victims from the depths of hell, you have to speak to the devil' (Hoge, 2004). As such, humanitarian negotiations exemplify what has elsewhere been discussed as moral dilemmas, tragic choices, 'dirty hands' problems, emergency ethics and non-ideal theory (Slim, 2015, 163–167). Recurrent dilemmas that were identified in a survey by the Centre of Competence on Humanitarian Negotiation (CCHN) in 2017 included: security rules vs. proximity to beneficiaries; denunciation/advocacy vs. silent cooperation;

impartial assistance vs. conditional assistance; how much to compromise on international humanitarian law and human rights; and whether to engage with ‘controversial’ stakeholders in the first place, putting one’s reputation at risk (CCHN, 2019, 11). All these dilemmas are relevant to negotiations with authoritarian rulers and when working under their rule. They reflect the familiar ethical quandary of how to do good without doing too much harm (Ahmad and Smith, 2018; Anderson, 1999; Slim, 1997). Meanwhile, international humanitarian organisations are themselves subject to ethical critique and soul-searching. Common themes include Western political dependencies, cultural biases and lacking impact, entailing calls for localising and decolonising aid and enhancing trust in humanitarian agencies (Lidén, 2019; Roepstorff, 2020).

Dilemmas like that of accepting political demands from oppressive regimes in order to gain access to people in desperate need are commonly experienced by humanitarian workers as truly ethical dilemmas (Broussard, et al., 2019; Grace, 2020). Indeed, the purposes of humanitarian organisations and the moral engagement of their staff may be closely intertwined (Malkki, 2015), meaning that it is often hard to distinguish instrumental calculations of operations from ethical arguments.³ Although being closely interconnected, these are nonetheless different types of questions: where instrumental reasoning is about what it takes to reach a particular goal, while ethical/moral reasoning is about whether this goal and the means to harmonise with fundamental values (cf. Korsgaard, 1997; Wolff, 2020, 10).⁴

In *Humanitarian Ethics* (2015, 183–230), Hugo Slim has provided a comprehensive overview of persistent ethical problems in humanitarian action that are helpful for analysing the authoritarian dilemmas that are discussed in this chapter. These general problems include risks of association with political and military representatives who are pursuing inhumane policies; risks of complicity by cooperating with perpetrators of wrongdoing in order to alleviate the effects of their wrongs; and the risk of silence about atrocities in order to assist the victims when one should rather have spoken out to alert the outside world to the need for concerted action. Classic examples include the collaboration of the Red Cross with Nazi authorities in concentration camps during the Second World War (Favez, 1999). Few doubt that such collaboration was the morally right thing to do if it genuinely helped a significant number of people without entailing too high political costs by lending the Nazis a hand (complicity) and a humanitarian touch of legitimacy (association). Yet, the question remains how they should have worked within these confines – a question that entailed substantial soul searching and resulted in the eventual codification of what is now known as the humanitarian principles. Indeed, the decision of the ICRC not to alert the world to early evidence of the Holocaust (silence) in order to maintain the trust of the authorities has been much criticised (Barnett, 2011, 157).

In *Complicity and Compromise* (2013), Chiara Lepora and Robert E. Goodin criticise the common conflation of phenomena like connivance, contiguity, collusion, collaboration, condoning, consortium, conspiring and full joint wrongdoing into the general label of complicity. They show how complicity – contributing to wrongs done by others – comes on a sliding scale where these various meanings have distinct roles:

At one end of the scale (indeed, ‘off the scale’: more than ‘complicit’ on our view) are people who act in unison. We call them ‘co-principals’. They are full partners in the wrongdoing. [...] At the other end of the scale are people whose actions are not at all causally connected to the wrongdoing, or people who had no way of knowing that what they were doing could have contributed to the wrongdoing of others. In between are various gradations of causal distance, knowledge, and contribution, and hence complicity.

(Lepora and Goodin, 2013, 8)

As we see from this quote, the degree of complicity relies on a range of factors: how bad the wrongdoing is, whether the actor *knows* about the wrongdoing and of their contribution to it, whether they act voluntarily, the extent of their causal contribution, and whether they share the purpose of the principal wrongdoer (Lepora and Goodin, 2013, 102–110). While legal complicity tends to concentrate on the most unison types where all these criteria are fulfilled, moral complicity concerns the whole spectrum. Although Slim’s distinction between association, complicity and silence is helpful in highlighting the element of causal contribution in ‘complicity’, the moral problems of ‘association’ and ‘silence’ also relate to their place in this broader scheme of moral complicity.

The reason why complicity is such a central concern and ‘a source of significant moral unease’ for humanitarian actors is evidently that they work in settings of extensive harm (Buth, et al., 2018, 299). When operating under the control of authoritarian regimes that neglect, repress and exploit their population, the problem is reinforced. Then the humanitarian agencies may not only get entangled in the responsibility of the authorities for the humanitarian problems but may be accused of contributing to their general wrongdoing as a harmful regime. This is where the distinction between the elements of mopping up, keeping down and propping up comes in – where the former relates to the reproduction of the humanitarian problem, while the latter two concern two aspects of the broader political effects of humanitarian action. With the above ‘complicity formula’, the extent to which this is morally problematic relies on how bad the regimes are, the significance of the agencies’ contribution, their awareness of the wrongs and of their contribution to it, the extent to which they have a choice to act otherwise, and whether

they actually share the political purpose of the regimes. The latter may be rare, but even without in any way endorsing the aims of the wrongdoing, humanitarians may ‘have to do things that they recognize will have the effect of furthering the aims of the bad in order to do any good’ (Lepora and Goodin, 2013, 9). In practice, authoritarian regimes may do whatever they can to preclude the knowledge of humanitarians thereof and snaring them into such situations of ‘moral entrapment’ where all options entail harmful effects for which they cannot be blamed (Slim, 2015, p. 206). Along these lines, Julian C. Sheather and colleagues characterise the designation of unwitting and unwilling contributions to harm as ‘complicity’ as an unhelpful form of ‘moral narcissism’ (Buth, et al., 2018). Moreover, it may well be that moral complicity is outweighed by the good that humanitarian agencies do. In addition to establishing whether and to what extent they are morally complicit, it is therefore necessary to consider whether such complicity is justified, all things considered.

Lepora and Goodin argue that even though certain compromises will often be ethically justified all things considered, it is still important to recognise that they do something partially (*pro tanto*) wrong and that they seek to address this problem. Again, this is where negotiations come in as a central measure for reducing the harmful effects of potentially justifiable complicity. It is therefore not just a question of whether the complicity was justified but also whether it could have been reduced and what agencies do to address its consequences. As Fiona Terry writes in the context of refugee camps in Zaire discussed below:

[T]here are often steps that could be taken to mitigate the badness of complicity when it is a necessary evil. Complicity can be minimised by careful planning and reflection. The separation of military and civilian populations from the outset in establishing the camps, for example, would have achieved that. But there might have been other ways even after that crucial error had been made. For example: through concerted action on the part of the international community consistently blocking arms-dealing and thus the rearmament of the FAR; through involvement of the civilian population in designing a safer return to their own country; and above all through faster and more equitable political processes in re-establishing security in the area.

(Terry, 2002, 149)

Moral complicity is a much-debated problem that pervades the humanitarian enterprise, but it has not been systematically studied in negotiation settings. By taking these settings into account, it becomes easier to determine exactly what the options in the hands of humanitarians actually were. As argued by Lepora and Goodin, moral complicity requires that the contribution to

harm could be anticipated: ‘The question is not “how much, in the end, the act contributed”, but rather how much, in prospect, it could have been expected to contribute’ (2013, 106). This makes retrospection on historical cases no less significant, however. Although the involved agencies could not necessarily anticipate what we now see as a pattern of contributions to harm, agencies have a moral responsibility for learning from these lessons when operating in ‘non-ideal’ settings like manipulative authoritarian regimes.

Dasandi and Erez (2019) point to a distinction between complicity, ‘double effect’ and ‘dirty hands’ that may help us understand why many would see certain cases where humanitarians contribute to harm as more problematic than others, even when they end up with the same ‘score’ in Lepora and Goodin’s scheme (see also Chapter 4 in Rubenstein, 2015). They define complicity as limited to action that has the *side-effect* of contributing to wrongdoing committed by others and where the wrongdoing would happen nonetheless, although potentially not to the same extent. *Double effect* is also about negative side effects but involves a situation where these are caused by the humanitarian actor. For instance, to grant legitimacy to an oppressive political regime through association is something that would not happen without the presence of the humanitarian agency. Third, they define *dirty hands* as a situation where an actor wittingly causes a negative effect in order to achieve a higher good. Suppose that an agency actively offers guarantees of non-disclosure of atrocities they might witness in order to gain the trust and cooperation of an armed group. Then, this is not a side effect of the deal they reach but an intended means to a higher end. While people who concentrate on the effects only would see these distinctions as insignificant, those who think about ethics in terms of norms and duties for moral behaviour might see the latter two types as more blameworthy than the former.

In his overview of ethical problems, Slim also brings up a range of problems that are not caused by harmful counterparts but by humanitarian agencies themselves. These are no less important to consider given the direct responsibility involved. The list is long and includes: humanitarian cruelty and disregard when aid workers treat people in inhumane ways; the risk of pity and paternalism by not seeing the problems from the perspectives of the persons they assist; and systemic moral risks of humanitarian power when taking disproportionate responsibility for governing people’s lives. Related problems include a negative footprint on communities (e.g., by disrupting local economies), hierarchies between international and local staff or between international and local partners, bureaucratisation that distances decision-making processes from the assisted populations, and excess of zeal when organisations pursue redundant ‘humanitarian solutions’ to humanitarian problems. As such, international organisations also face internally driven ‘authoritarian dilemmas’ of lacking representation and accountability when

turning into large professional apparatuses of humanitarian governance (Rubenstein, 2015; Stroup and Wong, 2017).

Hence, when considering the ethical justification of humanitarian action ‘all things considered’, it is insufficient to weigh problems of association, complicity and silence against the benefits. It is also necessary to include harms caused by the humanitarians themselves in the scale of the ‘moral costs’. When considering a compromise with an authoritarian regime it is thus equally important to ask whether the ensuing operations would involve paternalism, cultural biases or excessive humanitarian governance. Might other political options be more feasible and consequential in the long run?

Any answer to these ethical questions nonetheless relies on a set of underlying assumptions about the nature and justification of humanitarian action. Instead of taking a position on these descriptive and normative presuppositions and jumping to conclusions, we thus wish to highlight their role in moral reasoning on the authoritarian dilemmas. In this way, you are invited to make up your mind as a reader and apply the framework to analyses of normative debates and concrete cases of your own. The multiplicity of such underlying assumptions evades any neat categorisation, but it is still helpful to introduce some basic distinctions, resulting in a set of ‘ideal-typical’ positions from which the ethical problems are seen in different perspectives.

Ethical positions

A distinction is commonly made between ‘Dunantist’ and ‘Wilsonian’ or ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ approaches to humanitarian action (e.g., Gordon and Donini, 2015; Salomons, 2014). The Dunantist traditionalists insist on political neutrality, impartiality and independence, while the Wilsonians see humanitarianism as integral to a larger political picture to which these principles must adapt. In a more recent iteration, the ‘new’ alternatives to Dunantist approaches have emphasised ‘resilience’ through local capacities and ownership as a political priority rather than the Wilsonian integration in a global liberal political community (Hilhorst, et al., 2019). In his history of humanitarian action, Michael Barnett describes the gist of the Dunantist and Wilsonian positions as ‘emergency’ and ‘alchemist’ forms of humanitarianism. He writes: ‘Humanitarianism comes in many shapes and forms, but a critical difference is between a humanitarianism that largely limits itself to saving lives at risk – emergency humanitarianism – and a humanitarianism that adds a desire to remove the causes of suffering—alchemical humanitarianism’ (Barnett, 2011, 32). In order to gain access to victims and the cooperation of all parties, emergency humanitarians take no political stance. The alchemist, on the contrary, starts from a political analysis of the situation (be it in a religious or secular sense). Alchemists might still commit to political neutrality as a means for access and source of legitimacy, but the understanding of the

problem and its solutions – including the role of humanitarian action therein – remains explicitly political (although not necessarily openly formulated or justified as such).

Instead of juxtaposing these approaches as mutually exclusive, however, we propose to situate them along two dimensions of humanitarian ethics: *professional ethics* isolating humanitarian action from politics while drawing on aspects of medical ethics, social work ethics etc., and *political ethics* seeing humanitarian action as part of a larger political picture. While theories and policies may emphasise one dimension or the other, we would suggest that any humanitarian practice involves a combination of both (cf. Slim, 2015, 112, 113). This also means that designating the dimension of professional ethics as non-political or apolitical is misleading. It would be more precise to call it ‘extra-political’ in the sense of portraying itself as being ‘outside of’ normal politics and thereby becoming ‘extra political’ by turning humanitarian action into a political field of its own. In comparison, *political* humanitarian ethics may be characterised as ‘intra-political’ in integrating humanitarian action into more general political outlooks.

Rather than explaining the difference between emergency and alchemist practices with the distinction between apolitical and political, we thus see them as the result of more or less conflicting variations within each of these dimensions. Focusing on opposites within each dimension, the extra-political dimension of professional humanitarian ethics may be divided into *deontological* (duty oriented) and *consequentialist* (goal oriented) approaches, where deontologists see adherence to the humanitarian principles as an aim in itself while consequentialists see them as a means to producing humanitarian effects (saving lives and reducing suffering) (Baron, et al., 1997; Slim, 1997). In practice, most approaches involve a combination of these two forms of moral reasoning, but it is still helpful to highlight the difference.

The (intra-)political dimension, with its multitude of political strands, invites a series of distinctions, like between political realists, liberalists, socialists, conservatives, Islamists, Confucians and other strands of political thought. However, in this chapter, we suggest to distinguish all these into *pluralist* and *solidarist* variations, relating to the fundamental question of state sovereignty and international norms (Brown, 1992; Buzan, 2004; Lidén, 2019; Roepstorff, 2013; Wheeler and Dunne, 1996). Pluralists see politics as a largely internal affair of states where the task for international politics is to support self-determined government and uphold an international order of sovereign states (e.g., Jackson, 2000). This is because they see norms and values as relative to bounded political communities, usually defined as states or nations, meaning that there is little moral scope for external political interference. Solidarists, to the contrary, subject political communities to universal norms and ideals, like human rights or material equality (cf. Clark, 2007; Cohen, 2012). As exemplified in the next sections, the solidarist prescriptions

TABLE 9.1 Positions in the Ethics of Humanitarian Action

	<i>Professional Ethics</i>		<i>Political Ethics</i>	
	<i>Deontological</i>	<i>Consequentialist</i>	<i>Pluralist</i>	<i>Solidarist</i>
Contribution to authoritarian rule	Justified if humanitarian principles are upheld	Justified if the benefits outweigh the costs	Justified if the regime is the lawful sovereign authority	Depending on an ethical assessment of the regime

for humanitarian operations in a country will thus rely on their assessment of the political order in question and the prospects for influencing it through humanitarian action. We have summarised these positions in Table 9.1.

The distinction between pluralist and solidarist approaches is for instance key for understanding the origins of the MSF, distancing itself from the ICRC's pluralist commitment to state sovereignty. As recounted by Barnett, MSF combined an ICRC-like (deontological) pledge to apolitical medical ethics with a (solidarist) critique of *raison d'état* and commitment to human rights (Barnett, 2011, 166, 167). OXFAM, with its emphasis on justice, equality and international solidarity, shared this solidarism but in a more consequentialist development oriented variation (Barnett, 2011, 164).

In practice, pluralist and solidarist positions thus come in deontological and consequentialist variations, and vice versa. As with the latter, they are rarely held in their purest 'ideal-typical' forms but may be conceived as opposites on a continuum that intersects with the continuum between deontological and consequentialist positions. In the following, however, we will isolate the four positions that define the opposites of the continuums in order to develop a framework for a more nuanced analysis. We do so by applying them to the three general authoritarian dilemmas of: (1) *mopping up* after authorities that cause humanitarian problems; (2) *keeping down* minorities or political opposition; and (3) *propping up* the authorities by becoming an ad hoc part of the governance apparatus.

Mopping up

Authoritarian rulers that are responsible for humanitarian problems might not only remain unaffected by humanitarian responses but also benefit from and strategically calculate with them. If keeping a war going or keeping their people in disarray secures their grip on power, then humanitarian agencies may thus paradoxically contribute to prolonging the problem they set out to resolve when 'mopping up' after them. In *Condemned to Repeat*, Fiona Terry

identifies four ways in which refugee camps may not only make warfare less costly but provide incentives for its continuation: by providing protection to combatants and affiliated civilians (sanctuary and the provision of food and other necessities); by contributing to the economy (through taxation, trade, aid to public services, subcontracting, employment, black market economy, bribes and being subject to looting); by lending legitimacy to armed groups and political leaders (through collaboration and access to international organisations); and as in instrument for population control (through the steering of migration and the distribution of aid to certain groups and regions) (Terry, 2002, 27–51).

These four dimensions are also relevant when analysing the uses of humanitarian action to authoritarian rulers more broadly. If they can steer the security, revenues, legitimacy and population control that result from humanitarian governance, then their incentives for ending the emergency may at least be weakened. In *The Neutrality Trap* (2021, 90–99), for instance, Carsten Wieland documents how the Assad regime has manipulated humanitarian aid to support its war economy and strategic interests. And in Chapter 1 of this book, Healy and Cunningham recount how the MSF criticised the authoritarian Ethiopian Derg government in 1984 for using famine and the resultant relief efforts as a deliberate war-fighting strategy. The strategic uses by governments of famine against own citizens in settings of civil conflict have been systematically documented, and authors like Alex de Waal, Mark Duffield, David Rieff and David Keen have demonstrated how relief sometimes becomes an integral part of the problem (de Waal, 1997, 2015, 2017; Duffield, 2014; Keen, 2008; Rieff, 2002). As they all recognise, however, the extent to which this is the case remains an empirical question to be considered on a case-by-case basis, and as Slim (2015) emphasises, the causal contribution of humanitarians to war or famine can easily be exaggerated. Moreover, it often appears in these debates like if any causal contribution by humanitarians to harm translates into moral blameworthiness and a reason for withdrawal (Buth, et al., 2018). However, as we have seen, causal contribution alone does not entail complicity, and complicity does not necessarily entail blameworthiness. A more nuanced analysis of their contribution, knowledge and will is therefore required, combined with a consideration of the alternatives and the overall nature and effects of their engagement.

In this book, we have seen several traces of the problem of mopping up. In addition to the above mentioned example of the Ethiopian Derg government, the chapter on MSF experiences with authoritarian regimes includes the story of collaboration of humanitarian agencies with the Sri Lankan authorities when defeating the LTTE. Although the government was democratically elected, its co-optation of international agencies in a military strategy that involved serious war crimes clearly qualifies as ‘authoritarian practices’ (see also ICG, 2010; Weissman in Magone, et al., 2011). As mentioned, the

case of Syria, discussed in Chapter 3, might be the most egregious example of ‘mopping up’ from recent history – forcing humanitarians into an asset in inhumane warfare by the regime that caused the problem in the first place. This case, however, ticks all the boxes of the authoritarian dilemmas, and we will discuss it in the next section on ‘keeping down’.

The recent history of international humanitarian engagement in Afghanistan, both under the Taliban and the Western backed regimes in between, also involves elements of mopping up. Currently, international agencies mop up after the mess since the Taliban regained control of a state reliant on international budget support. When this support stopped and the banking system was sanctioned, millions of Afghans were left in disarray. Humanitarian aid has been the tool for international donors to alleviate the worst human costs of these policies. The Taliban, on its side, has not been willing to accept the political conditions of donors in order to save its people from this humanitarian crisis. Again, the humanitarian assistance may further reduce its incentives for giving in. But does this make the assistance complicit to harm? During the NATO operations in the country, international agencies were co-opted into a role of relieving suffering in support for a counterinsurgency strategy with high civilian costs (Donini, 2012). Again, the agencies may also be accused of keeping down political opposition and propping up the regimes by providing essential social services. In distinction from these, the question of mopping up is concerned with their contribution to policies causing humanitarian problems. Indeed, these three elements may be intricately linked, but evaluating their ethical significance requires that each problem is considered in its own right.

The example we will concentrate on here in this respect is the account by Politis in Chapter 8 of humanitarian operations in Venezuela under the Maduro regime since 2018. In line with the authoritarian playbook of ‘sabotaging accountability’, the regime denies the existence of a humanitarian crisis in spite of massive migration into neighbouring countries and an estimate of 7–13 million with humanitarian needs. Politis describes how international agencies have to adjust to the regime’s priorities and refrain from referring to the situation as a crisis. Provided that the emergency does not result from war or natural disaster but the policies of the regime and the international responses thereto, the collaboration of the agencies with the regime has the effect of not only propping it up but thereby reinforcing humanitarian problem. Indeed, the regime and its supporters would deny that they are to blame and point to the international sanctions as the cause of the problems. While the sanctions have reinforced the economic collapse, the regime’s unwillingness to acknowledge it as a crisis and take the necessary measures to address it is nonetheless testament to its authoritarian disregard for the suffering of its people for a higher political cause.

Are international agencies to blame for their subservient collaboration in this situation? Regarding the nature of their contribution, they are both reducing the costs for the regime in continuing its harmful policies and letting the regime take the credits for their efforts by not voicing their disagreement. In addition to these problems of association and silence, this implies a causal contribution to the regime's wrongdoing. One might expect that the agencies are fully aware of this problem and that they may experience it as a problem of (justified) complicity themselves. They are not forced by the regime to engage, so while they do not share in the purpose of the regime as 'co-principals' they can not claim it was not of their choosing. The question nonetheless remains of whether this partial complicity is outweighed by the moral benefits of their engagement. This is where the different ethical positions that were introduced in the former section enter the picture. There is simply no theoretically neutral answer to the question of its ethical justification all things considered, as different professional and political ethical perspectives render these things differently.

According to the deontological perspective, the agencies are justified in mopping up if they can do so without compromising the humanitarian principles. Keeping silent about the crisis and the wrongdoings of the regime is acceptable from this perspective if required for gaining unhindered access to the victims and treating them impartially. Indeed, the classical case of treating victims of war on the battlefield is literally a matter of 'mopping up', becoming an integral component of the war machinery. To Dunantists, this will always be an acceptable cost compared to letting wounded soldiers die in order to potentially reduce future warfare. However, to the extent that the Maduro regime interferes with their work in order to serve its own political interests, it collides with the principles of neutrality and independence. Irrespective of the effects of their work, this would make their work unjustified, all things considered.

Humanitarian consequentialists would rather focus on the overall effects of the engagement: Do the agencies reduce more humanitarian problems than they cause? In this spirit, Terry questions the argument (ascribed to Mary Anderson) that abstaining from alleviating harm will never be an option to humanitarians. If producing more harm than it alleviates, then alleviating the harm is actually harmful (Terry, 2002, 25). That said, consequentialists are even less sceptical than deontologists to compromising with wrongdoers and mopping up after them if necessary for reducing the suffering of their victims. They may also see a longer-term benefit in doing so in order to influence future decisions of the perpetrators on humanitarian matters and maintain a presence in the country in case of future emergencies. On the other hand, consequentialists may also see the humanitarian principles as key to achieving humanitarian outcomes. Without conceiving the principles as moral duties to be respected in their own right, they may therefore see their violation

by the Maduro regime as a significant negative effect to be reckoned with in the larger calculus.

As pluralists do not see it as a task for international humanitarian agencies to judge the actions of regimes, they would see the subjection of assistance to the sovereign dictates of the Maduro government as a necessary condition. As such, they are still committed to the principle of neutrality, but in a different reading than that of solidarists. However, they would also not want the agencies to make a qualitative difference to the internal distribution of power in a country – meaning that there is a limit to how much the Maduro regime could benefit from humanitarian assistance. This is more relevant to the problems of keeping down and propping up however – both of which are also at play in this case of Venezuela.

The solidarist position on this matter relies on the political type of solidarism involved. If we are speaking of a liberal orientation opposed to the authoritarianism of Maduro's regime, then mopping up after it is highly problematic. Mopping up after efforts to pressure the Maduro regime in a liberal direction through international sanctions, however, might be justified in this view. As such, a liberal solidarist might also support efforts by international humanitarian agencies to join forces with the Venezuelan opposition instead of either mopping up after the regime or withdrawing. Such engagement may come in the form of subversive 'resistance humanitarianism' working under the radar or outside the reach of a regime, or it may entail support of coercive international 'humanitarian intervention'. A solidarist supporting the political ideology of the Maduro regime would evidently reach the opposite conclusion.

From this analysis, we see that different ethical positions do not only assess the problem of complicity differently but that they also render the 'internal' problems of humanitarian action in different light. From a pluralist perspective, any resemblance of 'humanitarian governance' beyond the control of sovereign authorities will be looked upon with suspicion, while solidarists might want *more* governance of particular sorts. Indeed, the combination of consequentialism and solidarism opens for the most activist forms of 'new humanitarianism', while any resemblance thereof is morally problematic to deontological pluralists.

Keeping down

Humanitarian agencies are expected to align with the laws and regulations of the countries in which they operate. When these are designed to keep marginalised groups and political opposition down, the humanitarian agencies become entangled in repressive political strategies. This is most evident in settings of civil war where the authorities restrict aid to opposition controlled territories, like in the formative example of the Biafra war (Barnett, 2011, 153).

However, authoritarian regimes also use humanitarian assistance as a tool for upholding hierarchies, rewarding their followers and punishing opponents in times of peace, making it equally relevant to settings of natural disaster and ‘low-intensity conflict’. In Chapter 1, this was highlighted by Healy and Cunningham as one of the key difficulties for the MSF when dealing with authoritarian regimes:

[T]he difficulty of negotiating with a government on the terms for access to particular population groups that a government considers to be ‘enemy’ or at least suspect in some way. This might mean areas outright controlled by armed opposition groups (such as in Darfur, Sudan) or simply the home of discriminated-against communities (such as in Rakhine, Myanmar, the Tamils in the north of Sr Lanka, or the Chechens in Chechnya).

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In their study of disaster governance in Ethiopia, Myanmar and Zimbabwe, Isabelle Desportes and Dorothea Hilhorst (2020) document how political interests of state authorities, rather than humanitarian needs assessments, tend to steer who and what will be protected from disaster impacts in such authoritarian settings of ‘low-intensity conflict’. Having analysed how this is done through a combination of bureaucratic restrictions, monopolising data and instilling uncertainty and fear, they argue that ethical questions are raised when ‘gaining acceptance’ [by state authorities] takes precedence over acting in accordance with humanitarian principles’ (Desportes and Hilhorst, 2020, 351). Likewise, Duffield has analysed how the international humanitarian management of Dinka ‘IDPs’ in Sudan was manipulated by the regime in Khartoum, allowing for their systematic repression and exploitation (Duffield, 2014, 248). Cunningham (2018) has similarly explored how regimes may compromise humanitarian action in accordance with a logic (or discourse) of security rather than necessarily seeing it as a matter of ignoring needs or repressing the opposition. The effect may nonetheless be the same, and the contribution of humanitarians thereto warrants ethical consideration as another type of complicity.

In this book, dynamics of authoritarian repression have been well documented, including in Russia and China where humanitarian agencies are not welcome. The chapter on MSF experience (Chapter 1) mentions the disruptions by the Ethiopian authorities on aid to the Tigray region during the recent war, including attacks on aid workers. In the case of Venezuela discussed above, appeals of the opposition to seeing the situation as a humanitarian crisis in 2019 further politicised the regime’s response—making sure that it did not in any way align with opposition interests. The most evident example of ‘keeping down’, however, is the barring by the Assad regime and accomplices of aid to opposition controlled territories in Syria. As described by

Bertamini in Chapter 3, this was reflected in UN Security Council debates on cross-border assistance in areas outside regime control. With first hand expertise on how assistance could be manipulated to support the war effort, the regime had good political reasons to prevent their enemies from this asset, but this does not justify their position from an ethical perspective. Worse still, withholding aid was integral to a regime strategy of laying sieges to opposition strongholds while allowing aid to neighbouring districts and promising access to aid in return for capitulation (Whittall, 2021, 153).

The cooperation of UN agencies and international NGOs with the Assad regime for the provision of humanitarian assistance under these conditions remains highly controversial. Indeed, the combination of supporting the regime's war economy, mopping up after its atrocities and keeping down the opposition by withholding humanitarian aid implies a massive case for complicity. In spite of continuous negotiations with the regime for access and protection, this may hardly be characterised as a compromise at all. At least since the high-profile report *Taking Sides: The United Nations' Loss Of Impartiality, Independence And Neutrality In Syria* (2016) by The Syria Campaign, the humanitarian community could be expected to be aware not only of the wrongdoing of the regime but also of their potential role therein. It is nonetheless hard to see what the alternatives for the agencies were. There was no other 'space' for humanitarians to occupy in government-controlled areas, although they could carve out 'micro-spaces' where they could operate more or less outside regime interference (Kool, et al., 2021). The alternative was to withdraw to opposition-controlled areas without the regime's blessing. In spite of opposition from the regime, this option became lawful under international law with the mandate carved out by UNSC Resolution 2165 in 2014 – the mandate that was eventually shrunken regarding cross-border aid. In terms of other alternatives in regime-controlled areas, Wieland (2021, 132–136) suggests the combination of concerted diplomatic pressure and united red lines among international agencies as a way in which their complicity could have been reduced. Still, this is clearly a case in which at least the humanitarian NGOs were 'morally entrapped' against their will in a contributory role, and where they presumably did what they could to mitigate it provided the Assad regime's manifest atrociousness. The question, then, is whether this is enough to tip the scale of ethical justification in their favour, all things considered.

The deontological position is put to the test in this setting, given the regime's blatant violations of the humanitarian principles. With the suffering of millions of Syrians in government-controlled areas in the balance and the clear responsibility of the regime for the violations, only the most extreme deontologist would insist that humanitarians should withdraw from such a scene. The question, then, is whether the agencies did enough to resist the violations by forming a concerted alliance and mitigating the effects of their

complicity. According to Wieland and other critics, they did not, while others insist that they did what they could and strategically balanced between official compliance and unofficial resistance (Lidén, et al., 2023). In distinction from consequentialism, intentions or motives are key to deontologists, and if the intentions to uphold the principles in any way possible remain pure, adjusting to such ‘non-ideal’ circumstances may be excused. While the case of Venezuela also constituted a serious humanitarian crisis, the Maduro regime and local communities still had a capacity for responding to some of the most immediate needs, as described by Garlin Politis in Chapter 8. The choice to compromise in Syria was not really a choice if the principle of humanity was not to be fundamentally forfeited.

The consequentialist approach apparently has a much easier time in this setting. It just needs to calculate the costs of keeping the opposition down against the benefits and other costs of the aid. Presumably, the partial and politicised provision of assistance to communities in desperate need is better than withholding the aid from a consequentialist perspective, even if there are others who need it even more. Yet, this calculation gets more complicated when thinking of the longer-term effects of allowing a regime to manipulate assistance for openly political purposes in this way. How will such acceptance of keeping down opposition affect the ability to produce humanitarian outcomes elsewhere? In addition to actively withholding assistance, it undermined the legitimacy of humanitarians in the eyes of the opposition, with similar repercussions as when humanitarians colluded with NATO forces in their fight against the Taliban. Perhaps this larger calculus would make some consequentialists more, not less, open for drawing a thick red line in the face of the Assad regime’s violations in spite of the significant humanitarian costs. In a less profiled situation where the principles could be violated without much notice, consequentialists would have no quandaries with accepting it, however. That said, it seems like the public opinion in Western donor countries understood that the humanitarians were not to blame for the violations and that the Assad regime rather than unprincipled aid was the problem.

Provided that pluralists require humanitarian action to adjust to the laws and decrees of the sovereign authorities, this is also a hard case for pluralists to stomach. Indeed, the regulation by the Assad regime of the aid was rooted in well-established rules and bureaucratic procedures that generally preceded the war. To the extent that keeping down the opposition by humanitarian means thus reflected the established political order, it has the support of pluralist humanitarians. The problem, however, arises if the dynamics of the war turns the humanitarian assistance into a political weapon that tips this established order in favour of the regime. Then the assistance should be limited to activities that avoid such political interference. In Bertamini’s chapter (Chapter 3), we see how these nuances are reflected in different stances on

the principle of sovereignty. Where some pluralists (here used in a different meaning than Bertamini's notion of legal pluralism) would see all forms of 'keeping down' as acceptable as long as the regime remains the legally recognised ('de jure') authorities of Syria, others would see any international contribution to affecting the actual ('de facto') sovereignty of the regime as problematic. Pluralists will be divided on this matter.

Like with the question of mopping up, solidarists who are opposed to the Assad regime will be opposed to assistance that keeps more legitimate opposition down. If it is impossible to avoid this effect and it outweighs the humanitarian benefits in their view (be it based on deontological or consequentialist reasoning), then international agencies should have halted their operations and left with a call for political intervention. Presumably, consequentialist solidarists would thus have supported a military humanitarian intervention if it was expected to solve the problem, which was clearly not the case. In the absence thereof, solidarists have been left searching for lessons from Syria for future situations where authoritarian regimes tie their hands to partisan political and military objectives.

Propping up

The problem of propping up political authorities is closely related to the concerns of mopping up and keeping down, but it is still of a different kind. In the case of Syria discussed above, humanitarian agencies have not only contributed to the warfare and withheld aid from communities but also helped the regime carry out essential governmental services like the provision of food, housing, health care and education. Moreover, agencies have been required to buy all commercial services from domestic companies within the regime's fold, and they have paid taxes on their operations, among several other ways in which their presence has strengthened the economy of the regime. Although Western countries that are opposed to the regime have drawn a line at 'humanitarianism plus' and 'early recovery' to distinguish it from 'development aid' and 'reconstruction', the Assad regime still relies on foreign assistance for keeping a resemblance of responsive government (Wieland, 2021, 111–119). When The Syria Campaign (2016) criticised the UN and its associates for compromising on the humanitarian principles, its ultimate concern was not the persistence of the humanitarian crisis but how these activities were keeping the regime in power.

While the dilemma of propping up authoritarian regimes thus typically occurs together with the dilemmas of mopping up and keeping down, there are also examples where it occurs alone. As Healy and Cunningham write in Chapter 1, there are times when 'authoritarian regimes' have engaged in 'non-authoritarian' practices and been open, welcoming and facilitative towards humanitarian INGOs when it suits their perceived needs for their

nations. They mention longstanding MSF operations in Russia, Sri Lanka and Belarus as examples and write that:

When interests between MSF and these governments have coincided, such as when these governments have wanted MSF's medical capacities to meet a particular public health need (for example in Belarus), then successful programmes have resulted. While the eye might be drawn to those moments when MSF publicly spoke of matters of grand humanitarian principle, the daily reality has been a much more pragmatic one.

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This is by no means exclusive for the MSF but a well-known feature of contemporary humanitarian action (e.g., Keen, 2008; Rubenstein, 2015). The extent to which it amounts to the propping up of authoritarian regimes at the expense of political change has nonetheless received less attention, not to speak of its ethical implications. Throughout this book, we have seen numerous examples of how this is done: by withholding official approvals, introduce laws and decrees to regulate their work and interfere directly with their operations (see also Kahn and Cunningham, 2013). As Healy and Cunningham write, this happens not only at the level of formal requests for state consent to operations, 'but at the level of practice, as in hundreds of different, daily ways, humanitarians need the cooperation of government officials – for customs clearance, tax matters, travel permissions, visas, work permits, registration, international bank transfers and so on'. This is not limited to authoritarian states, however, but when done to align operations with partisan political agendas to tighten a regime's grip on power, it becomes an ethical problem of complicity.

The account by Imri Schattner-Ornan (Chapter 5) of how these dynamics played out in a refugee camp in Western Ethiopia is a case in point. He shows how the authorities kept tight control of the operations of international NGOs through a combination of formal MoUs with agencies, permits for individual staff and continuous negotiations with local authorities and camp management. In the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation, the regime had tightened its control of NGOs, assuring that their work would align with their priorities and be a partner of the government (see also Cunningham, 2018, 113). Being challenged by opposition parties, the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) saw the recent upsurge of international agencies advocating for human rights as a political problem and demanded that they forfeited such political aims. Kendra Dupuy et al., (2015) document how most international agencies adapted to these conditions and stayed on because they wanted to keep addressing the humanitarian needs of the Ethiopian people. Meanwhile, the authorities exercised tight control on what they could do and say about the situation through the

continuous threat of withholding permits or withdrawing agreements that Schattner-Ornan describes in detail. In effect, this turned international agencies into the type of support function that defines the ethical problem of ‘propping up’ authoritarian regimes.

Let us see this problem from the perspective of the agency that Schattner-Ornan describes in Chapter 5. It can hardly be argued that this agency alone contributed to the repressive rule and human rights violations of the regime in any significant way. Indeed, he commends the regime for its refugee policies, and being part of the implementation of these in refugee camps thus seems unproblematic. Yet, by accepting the dictates of the regime as part of a tightly controlled apparatus of international NGOs, testing their neutrality and independence, lending the regime legitimacy and ignoring the regime’s abuses elsewhere, one may still argue that the agency contributed to keeping the regime in power. With extensive attention to the challenges for international agencies in Ethiopia since they entered the scene in the 1980s, it could also be expected that they were aware of the regime’s authoritarian character and the problem of complicity that follows. In the absence of an instant emergency, they also do not have the excuse of being there against their will in the name of humanity. The engagement was clearly one of pragmatic engagement, testing out the chances for operating with sufficient autonomy for making an expanded presence in Ethiopian camps justifiable for the agency.

Provided that the agency could make a substantial difference under these circumstances, the verdict of the deontological position relies on whether the interference by the authorities qualifies as a violation of the principles of neutrality and independence. It seems from Schattner-Ornan’s account that the agency shared the general humanitarian objectives of the refugee authority that it dealt with and that the problem was one of operating effectively rather than of being compromised politically. If this is the case, then the eventual contribution to propping up the regime is acceptable from the deontological perspective. It belongs to the type of political concerns that humanitarians should not concern themselves with. The same goes for the consequentialist perspective, as long as propping up the regime does not entail reproducing the humanitarian problem. If so, it would fall within the category of ‘mopping up’ instead.

Propping up authoritarian regimes is also not a problem for the pluralist position, as long as it does not radically eschew the domestic political order in the regime’s favour. The agency’s work in an Ethiopian refugee camp would thus be unproblematic from this perspective. There are pluralists who would see any foreign presence with political effects as ethically problematic, but here we are thinking of pluralists who accept the need for humanitarian assistance in troubled countries. As we have seen, adding the problems of giving in and mopping up to this equation does not necessarily change their position.

This is thus where the solidarist position stands out most starkly. Propping up regimes that are perceived as illegitimate is a serious ethical problem for solidarists that requires substantial humanitarian gains for being justified. To liberal solidarists, this goes for all authoritarian regimes, although the degree of their illegitimacy will still vary between semi-democracies and totalitarian states. The worldwide subjection of humanitarian agencies to the dictates of dictators thus amounts to a significant political problem. To socialist or Islamist solidarists, it is not the authoritarianism itself that would be the problem but the propping up of any state that conflicts with their ideologies, be it authoritarian or not.

The solidarist alternative of withholding aid to people in dire need for political reasons is evidently highly controversial, as seen in the debates on halting aid to Afghanistan, Syria, Ethiopia, Yemen or Myanmar. If doing so would likely result in the replacement of an illegitimate regime with a more legitimate government, then at least some solidarist consequentialists would see the sacrifice of people in immediate need as worthwhile. In practice, however, it is hard to imagine a situation where such withholding of aid could be decisive for generating a political transition. On the other hand, one might question the terminology of ‘abstaining’ and ‘withholding’ aid. Does the principle of humanity imply that humanitarian aid should be provided under all political circumstances, or is it more coherent to combine a professional and political perspective when deciding on where and how to use the limited resources available? Indeed, the solidarist position seems to harmonise with widespread demands for humanitarians to consider the wider political effects of their work. As such, the ethics of humanitarian action in authoritarian regimes actualises a major tension between pluralist and solidarist approaches that may have been mistaken as a tension between ‘apolitical’ and ‘political’ humanitarianism.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined the ethical problems that humanitarian agencies are confronted with when working under authoritarian rule. These were categorised as:

- *Mopping up* after the humanitarian problems caused by regimes, reducing the costs of their policies, and facilitating their continuation
- *Keeping down* marginalised groups and political opposition by distributing aid in line with partial dictates from the authorities
- *Propping up* the authorities by aligning with their general political interests and strategies (beyond mopping up or keeping down) and thereby undermining the prospects for political change

These problems entail ethical dilemmas in humanitarian negotiations to the extent that they present humanitarian agencies with a choice between the principled concerns of avoiding moral complicity and failing to assist people in dire need. In practice, however, we have seen how these dilemmas set the stage for compromises and alternatives at multiple levels, from the UN Security Council to the office of a local camp manager.

In the literature on humanitarian action, discussions on the problem of complicity have tended to assume that as long as a causal contribution to authoritarian governance can be documented empirically it involves an ethical problem. We also often get the impression that as long as responsibility for an ethical problem can be established, the agencies are doing something fundamentally wrong. We have nonetheless demonstrated that (1) the presence of the authoritarian dilemmas does not necessarily involve complicity, (2) that complicity does not always entail moral blameworthiness, and (3) that such moral blameworthiness may be ethically justified all things considered. Meanwhile, the question of complicity must be seen in connection with potential wrongs committed by humanitarian agencies themselves (beyond their contribution to the wrongs of others), including problems of paternalism, hierarchy and excessive interference.

In effect, we applied this framework of analysis to the three ethical problems and discussed examples of mopping up after the Maduro regime in Venezuela, keeping down political opposition in Syria and propping up the EPRDF regime in Ethiopia. In all cases, we started out by applying the ‘complicity formula’ of Lepora and Goodin, analysing the badness of the wrongdoing committed by a regime, the nature of the causal contribution of the humanitarian agency, the extent to which the agency could know about the wrongdoing and their causal contribution, and whether the contribution was voluntary or even based on a shared purpose with the wrongdoer. We did not include a proper consideration of their own potential wrongdoing, but took the first steps towards such a comprehensive ethical analysis.

We then demonstrated how the assessment of moral complicity and its ethical justification relies on one’s ethical perspective. Having distinguished between professional and political dimensions of humanitarian ethics, we constructed a field stretched out between four positions: deontological and consequentialist professional ethics and pluralist and solidarist political ethics. These are not the only relevant positions to these questions, but proved relevant to disentangle the prescriptive debate between Dunantist and Wilsonian approaches. In addition to exemplifying the application of the positions to the authoritarian dilemmas, we showed how they may lead to different prescriptions in different types of cases.

While the distinction between the three authoritarian dilemmas proposed here may be new, the associated problems are familiar from critical literatures on humanitarian action. The ways in which they represent ethical problems at various levels of humanitarian action, from international forums and

government offices to the frontlines, nonetheless remain to be systematically studied. Provided that they confront agencies with the question of ethical red lines and grey zones to be settled through negotiations with authoritarian counterparts, this also serves as a contribution to an exploration of the ethics of humanitarian negotiations in general.

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Notes

- 1 Lidén is first author and wrote the text based on joint research and discussions with Roepstorff and her eventual comments and suggestions.
- 2 These labels were partly suggested to us by Hugo Slim.
- 3 There are multiple definitions of ethics and morality in the literature, and the two concepts are often used interchangeably. In this chapter we use ‘morality/moral’ for convictions about what is right and wrong, good and bad, according to fundamental values, and ‘ethics/ethical’ about the consideration of such convictions.
- 4 In *The Good Project* (2014), for instance, Monika Krause shows how humanitarian efforts that are motivated by ethical objectives tend to end up in instrumental organisational and market logics that divert them from these objectives (see also Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).

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