Contested Airport Land

Social-Spatial Transformation and Environmental Injustice in Asia and Africa

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Introduction: Isiolo, a failed but conflict-stirring airport

The large-scale infrastructure of Isiolo International Airport has created contestation between the developers and nomadic pastoral communities. While these nomadic pastoralists (Borana, Turkana, Somali, and Samburu) are the principal inhabitants of Isiolo, some agriculturalists – the Meru ethnic communities – also live in the region. The airport project created controversy between these ethnic groups over land, giving rise to economic anticipation, land speculation, and alienation – selling of community land to private entities; this is despite the fact that land in Isiolo County is not yet registered as community land but still under the trust land owned by the national government. It led to competition between actors when the Kenyan government communicated its intention to upgrade the airport from an airstrip to an international airport in 2004. The Kenyan government believed that this upgrade became necessary because transporting meat products from the newly built abattoir in Isiolo to markets such as the Middle East needed to become quicker and easier. The government also planned to permit the transport of the khat plant (*miraa catha edulis*) to international markets, such as Somalia and the United Kingdom, and to reduce traffic congestion at the Wilson Airport in Nairobi (Owino 2019). However, the land allocation to the affected communities due to the airport's expansion has created grievances between the agricultural Meru communities and the nomadic pastoral Borana communities in Isiolo. This has lately been seen as a justification for the emergence of radical groups, such as community-based armed groups and violent extremist organisations (for example, Hansen et al. 2019; Okwany 2016, 2020a, 2023).

The contestation and competition over land are due to the government's neglect of the north. In some cases, the government upholds security laws in case of emergency (Okwany 2023; Okwany et al. 2023). We later demonstrate how the Kenyan government at times uplifts the law but also disregards it when it has insufficient capacity or follows certain state security advantages. In addition, the international airport promised economic benefits, such as an increase in tourism, an easier reach of markets for other products, and a reduction of road accidents. Isiolo airport is a critical case to study because it exemplifies the impact of development dynamics and conflicts and shows how the future of Isiolo may look like with the rapid

socioeconomic transformations taking place. Its expansion triggered contestation of property rights and landownership (Mkutu and Boru 2019). Isiolo is one of the most intense areas faced with speculation and anticipation; people predict, sell, and buy property, hoping for value addition of land due to the emerging large-scale or mega-infrastructure projects in Kenya (Enns 2019).

The upgraded Isiolo International Airport is built on an 815 ac site, and it is 283 km away from Nairobi City. It was established on disputed land between Wabera ward in Isiolo County and the Nyambene area bordering Tigania East and West constituencies in Meru County. Planned in three phases, the construction of the airport began in 2011, and in its completion, the Kenyan government spent USD12.82 million or 2.7 billion Kenya shillings on its renovation to an international standard airport (07.05.2019, *Business Daily*). It was commissioned to be part of the Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor development project and the Isiolo export-oriented abattoir.

The abattoir is envisioned to process an estimated 474,000 animals annually, a means of boosting and benefiting about 200,000 pastoral livelihoods, and it received 800 million Kenya shillings from the World Bank (19.07.2020 *Daily Nation*), yet after 17 years, the slaughterhouse is yet to be operational. Both the LAPSSET and the abattoir were envisioned in 2007, and the development of the abattoir began the same year. The airport is the fifth international airport in Kenya, joining Jomo Kenyatta, Moi International Airport in Mombasa, Kisumu, and Eldoret International Airports, and it is operated by the Kenya Airport Authority (KAA), a government-owned enterprise, and it was intended to handle a capacity of 125,000 passengers annually (Airport Technology 2017).

The airport was to boost the economy of the northern region, serving counties such as Isiolo, Marsabit, Meru, Laikipia, and part of Samburu. Although the airport was completed in 2017, two years later, some of its units were closed down, with certain aircraft companies citing the discontinuation of services due to a lack of passengers.[1] Transportation of flowers, khat, and meat was considered cheaper via road than by air.[2] However, the government maintained its rhetoric, contradicting the earlier claims of the 2017 completion, pointing out that the completion by September 2021 aims to boost the airport's usefulness.[3] Yet at the time of writing, the airport still had not re-opened the closed units; part of it is operating, but not as the earlier-envisioned international-standard airport.

Empirical research on the competing aspirations and contestations accompanying mega-infrastructure projects in pastoral rangelands is limited, leaving gaps in understanding their implications for the northern frontier. Here, it is important to note that despite large infrastructures such as Isiolo International Airport, the abattoir, the Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET, see later text) corridor, or the Crocodile Jaw Dam project, most of the land in Isiolo County remains unregistered. This study delves into the dynamics of conflict arising from infrastructural projects. Focusing on the pastoral corridor, we use empirical evidence to demonstrate the varying aspirations and contestations among stakeholders following the airport's expansion.

We conducted 36 qualitative interviews and eight focus group discussions (FGDs) that took place between 2017 and 2019 and follow-up discussions in 2020 and 2021, including a conference on the implementation of the Community Land Act in June 2022.[4] The interviews involved key informants, such as government security officers, local politicians such as members of the County Assembly, land registrars and adjudicators, ward administrators, court officers, as well as community members.

Our chapter begins with a brief history of the Northern Frontier District, ethnicity, and politics in Isiolo. Thereafter, we relate the concept of the frontier and the land tenure system before providing empirical evidence on how the airport-induced displacements, irregularities regarding compensation, challenges of land re-allocation, and local political struggle over land. Lastly, we demonstrate that Isiolo International Airport risks being an economically redundant project. We triangulated the interviews on the progress of LAPSSET, the airport land contestations, competitions, and the dynamics of violence in Isiolo with academic sources, showing the local perspectives on the airport and conflicts over land in Wabera and Ngaremara wards.

History of the Northern Frontier District, ethnicity, and politics in Isiolo

Arid areas in northern Kenya have been treated as unworthy land since the colonial British East Africa, for they could not serve agricultural production. These areas, also referred to as the northern frontier, were thus politically neglected by the colonial and national governments[5] and perceived as what Elliott (2016: 512) refers to as 'Kenya B'. Recently, they have become a hub for infrastructure developments, such as the airport, the highway, and the railway under LAPSSET.

Intra- and inter-pastoral conflicts over pasture and water, and cattle raiding, increased in Isiolo County. It also has become a hub for illegal arms trade (Mkutu 2019). Our field research from 2017 to 2021 confirms that banditry, cattle rustling, border grazing disputes, and community armed groups were the main contributors to conflict in Isiolo. Despite ongoing land disputes since the 1990s, infrastructural projects along the pastoral corridor are bringing development, making Isiolo the gateway link between the north and the southern parts of the state (Sharamo 2014).

The west of Isiolo is the county's pastoral corridor and its most fertile part. The area is part of Oldonyiro and Burat wards, which border Samburu, Laikipia, and Meru, and is known as the livestock marketing division. Due to its fertile nature, the corridor has served as a major pastoral migration and grazing area during dry seasons, serving the Borana, Gabra, Meru, and Samburu in Isiolo County, the Sakuye and the Somalian community migrating from the east, and the Turkana migrating from the north-west. Already in colonial times, the governors of British East Africa built a slaughterhouse as a buffer zone. Müller-Mahn et al. (2021) point out that the purpose of the buffer zone was to protect the colonial settlers' cattle from livestock diseases.

Figure 8.1 Map of Isiolo showing the contested boundary along the international airport.

Source: Map by Okwany.

In 2006, the site was chosen to erect an international abattoir, extending over 1,242 km² (Republic of Kenya 2006). The facility is planned to process about 474,000 animals annually, creating around 80 jobs and impacting at least 20,000 households (Luke 2021). Still, 18 years down the line, the abattoir is not yet completed and is estimated to be opened in March 2024. However, the fertility of the area and the linkage of the abattoir to the airport and other LAPSSET infrastructure have created contestation and competition over pasture and land among various ethnic groups.

Theory: 'frontiers' and 'state of exception'

The concept of a frontier is 'a matter of political definition of a geographical space' (Korf et al. 2013: 29). For this chapter, we use the term in its connotation of a politically contested space. State control is limited in such areas; thus, different political dynamics shape the frontier (Kopytoff 1987). Frontier spaces are characterised by a state of exception – where the government firmly applies the law when there is an emergency but generally neglects such spaces due to limited governing capacity (Agamben 2008; Korf et al. 2013; Schetter and Müller-Koné 2021). A strong military presence demonstrates territoriality – a strong control by either the government or community-based armed groups (CBAGs). However, territoriality is not just a geographical space; it is also ideological, sociological, and psychological. It is a space where the existing powers win the hearts and minds of the populace (e.g. Sack 1986). Such spaces can be strongly controlled or ungoverned frontiers, creating the ground for CBAGs or violent extremist organisations (VEOs) (Cons 2016). More specifically, territoriality can be a space with either strong government

control or lack of it (Sack 1986), leading to what Okwany (2023); Okwany et al. (2023) calls semi-territoriality – the state having strong control but with limited capacity to govern, or ignoring such spaces. Thus, we adopt Agamben's (2008) thoughts of state neglect or firm exercise of force in the frontier. A strong government presence characterises such, but the state has limited security capacity or lacks interest to maintain security (Okwany 2020a, 2020b).

The limited capacity of the Kenyan government to provide security creates space for CBAGs and VEOs to operate and expand organised violence. This results in what Hansen (2013: 121–138) calls a 'win some, lose some game', where the government controls the territory in northern Kenya while militia groups exploit the state's limited capacity. Isiolo demonstrates such contestation and competition over territory and land, with new mega-infrastructure developments introducing new conflict challenges, making Isiolo a new frontier. The Kenyan state's allowance of diverse interests to create different forces, coupled with the government's dismissal of the rule of law, has enabled the exploitation and accumulation of more resources.

The government's security efforts are deficient, despite deploying the (unfit) Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs), poorly vetted militiamen employed to address the security situation in Isiolo. These KPRs were not properly renumerated and coordinated; some were involved in cattle rustling and illegal businesses. The lack of proper coordination led to the disbarment of the KPRs and the introduction of a new coordinated reservists under the National Police Service Act 2011, and the name was changed from KPRs to National Police Reservists (NPRs). Sharamo (2014) estimated that there were 4,000 NPRs in Isiolo. However, these numbers could be contested due to the untraceable recruitment and accounting processes for such NPRs and the government lacking control over their use of ammunition and movements. Consequently, the NPRs contribute to insecurity as they target and terrorise rival ethnic groups (Okwany 2023; 15.10.2022 *the Star*). Politicians also use these NPRs against their political rivals, and businesspersons and private companies hire them, while some of the NPRs join criminal networks, exacerbating insecurity (Okwany et al. 2023).

The failure of these KPRs/NPRs prompted the privatisation of security in Isiolo, which led to the establishment of the Northern Rangeland Trust (NRT), a non-governmental organisation collaborating with national and county governments in protecting conservancies. The NGO is based in pastoral land in Northern Kenya, particularly in Isiolo, and the neighbouring counties, such as Samburu and Marsabit, and it is also in the coastal Kenya, Lamu County. The NGO hires and coordinates with the National Police Service and Kenya Wildlife Service to train NPRs to protect the private conservancies in Isiolo, leading to what Lunstrum (2014: 817) calls 'green militarization'. Mkutu (2020) points out that such private security personnel (NPRs, given the name *rangers*) funded by private donors and enjoying Kenyan government support poses a risk to the county, for, if the funding ceases, the rangers would use their arms to seek other opportunities. In addition, NRT conservation aim is commercial, while pastoral communities' goal is to maintain their heritage and livelihood, this risk drawing the NGO into inter-communal conflict and local politics over the balancing and managing of pastoral grazing and conserving wildlife. Therefore, the militarisation of conservation areas and

mega-developments in Isiolo shrink communal and accessible pastoral land, leading to increased competition over it.

Pastoral militarism characterises northern Kenya, where the government employs hard-power strategies, deploying military and police units, to prevent cattle rustling and banditry. In explaining the contestation and competition over land in Isiolo, we emphasise hard power as territoriality (state controlling the frontier through militarisation) and organised violence. Such strategies, however, fail due to the state's limited security resources, resulting in a form of semi-territoriality that exposes the northern frontier to conflicts. This failure can be relegated to the state's limitations to provide security and authority in the north. Armed with sophisticated weapons, cattle rustlers, and bandits, exploit this vulnerability as a method to accumulate resources (Osamba 2000). Furthermore, cattle raiding attracts criminals, with some of the county commissioners and police leadership involved in the commercialisation of such raiding (Mkutu et al. n.d.). This exacerbates violence, and the presence of transport infrastructure facilitates easy access to weapons, as road networks provide entry to porous borders in neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, and South Sudan.

The land tenure system in Kenya

In tracing why things go to hell in a handbasket, we analyse land as a key variable that explains conflicts among pastoralists while sustaining their livelihoods. Historical state formation contributed to contestations and competition due to boundary-making and legal frameworks over land. The legal system governing the distribution of land in Africa, most of which is still under customary tenure, traces back to colonial administration, which introduced statutory tenure based on European property norms. Many African societies maintain their right to property without legal treatment or security (Alden Wily 2018). The rush for infrastructural development and individual property rights accelerates land grabbing and corruption (White et al. 2013). Isiolo, a hub of mega-infrastructure projects, exemplifies such dynamics.

Globally, community land is held by approximately 2.5 billion people, covering approximately 60,000,000 km² (Veit and Reytar 2017), with 20,000,000 km² located in Africa (Alden Wily 2011). This means that most African land is unregistered (Wily and Wily 2015) and under community administration. Africa's vast community land primarily includes swamplands, rangelands, or forests and are mostly neglected or considered unused (Alden Wily 2011). Only 12% of the African land is cultivated permanently (Alden Wily 2018). In Isiolo County, spanning 25,349 km² (KNBS 2019), most of the land remains unregistered and is still under communal land tenure.

Statutory tenure over Kenyan land started in colonial times with the Trust Land Act of 1938 and the African Land Development Organization of 1945. In addition, developments can be traced back to the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 and the Lennox–Boyd Constitution of 1958.[6] Kenya's law systems predominantly derive from English common law principles, demonstrating that Acts of Parliament fall under the constitution as the supreme law. These Acts are subject to the national legislative body, which reflects the constitutional framework on land tenure.[7] Kenya

has 47 counties and a national government, where counties serve as trustees over communal land, most of which is to be yet registered, with only a few undergoing the registration process. Counties can enact laws to protect communal land, but the neglect of northern Kenya has hindered the implementation of protractive land laws for the population of Isiolo. The hindrance has already led to boundary conflict between county governments, and the development of infrastructure and projects along the borderland of Isiolo and Meru counties affirms such facts.

The enactment of the National Land Commission Act 2012, within the constitutional framework, established the Land Commission as an independent authority responsible for solving land disputes and administering community and trust lands. Over the subsequent years, various Land Acts were introduced (see, Table 8.1),[8]

Table 8.1 The development and subsequent land Acts in Kenya

Year	*Name*	*Main aim of the Act*
1968	The Land (Group Representation) Act	This Act gave rights and ownership of land to groups (community leadership), particularly to communities that were not hostile to the post-colonial government. The Act was synchronised into Community Land Act 2016.
1968	Trust Land Act	This Act gave rights and ownership of land to the national government. Communities that were hostile to the post-colonial governments, such as Isiolo and north-eastern counties, were under Trust Land Act. The Act was repealed by the new Acts in 2012 and 2016.
2009	National Land Policy	The document aimed to secure land rights, promote land reforms, and improve livelihoods through transparent and accountable land laws. The document was synchronised to Chapter 5 of the Kenyan Constitution.
2012	Land Registration Act	The act gave effect to the objective and principles of devolved government in land registration. It repealed the Trust Land Act of 1968.
2012	National Land Commission Act	The Act created an authority, the National Land Commission (NLC), to solve land disputes.
2012	The Land Act	This act gave an effect to Article 68 of the Constitution; it consolidated, rationalised, and revised land laws in Kenya, and it was also synchronised to Community Land Act 2016.
2016	The Community Land Act (CLA) of 2016	The law gave effect to Article 63 of the Constitution; it stipulates community land rights. It repealed the Trust Lands Act (Chapter 288) and Land (Group Representatives) Act (Chapter 287). It gave county government rights as trustees of unregistered community land. It is in parliament for amendments since 2022, due to contestation over the registration of community land. Some communities such as Isiolo believe that it will create boundaries and kill pastoral livelihoods.

collectively forming the statutory framework of Kenyan land tenure and strengthening rights for both individual and group/community ownership. Despite these legislative advancements, most of Isiolo's land remained unregistered as of 2023, despite the planning and construction of LAPSSET mega-infrastructure since 2012.

Even though the Community Land Act 2016 stipulates collective titleship, groups or communities intending to register land must also adhere to other laws, such as the Forest Act 2005 and the Climate Change Act 2016. Both acts underscore the right to protect public lands, such as forests, mountains, lakes, and other water catchments, against environmental degradation. However, in Isiolo, climate change has led to competition over land, water sources, and pastures. The politicisation of communal relations, the emergence of wildlife conservancies, and increasing changes in traditional kinship structures, weakening the traditional governance system of elders, drive conflict and violence in Isiolo (Sharamo 2014). Since colonial times, the influx of other tribes to Isiolo has also fuelled conflict over land. Mkutu et al. (2021) report that the British brought the Turkana community to Isiolo as workers, Somalians later migrated to Isiolo as traders, and the Meru from Kinna and Garbatulla took advantage of the Borana displacement, subsequently migrating to Isiolo.

The contestation over land issues in northern Kenya, particularly in Isiolo, poses significant challenges. The county government of Isiolo lacks the capacity to address land irregularities, to re-allocate land, or to protect property rights. This stirs further conflicts. The Isiolo International Airport has exacerbated these conflicts. Sharamo (2014) points out that 2,900 people were displaced in this area, and 165 were killed from 2009 to 2013 following the Ngaremara ward boundary dispute between Borana and Turkana. Mkutu and Boru (2019) argue that the airport complicated ethnic relations between Isiolo and Meru because it fuelled land conflicts.

The rivalry over land escalated into conflicts involving both investors and communities, as well as the state and communities, evolving into a protracted ethnopolitical conflict. Nomadic pastoralists, such as Borana and Somalis, view Meru as the ethnic community favoured by the government for its claims over land in the project areas. This created speculation about favouritism, leading to ethnopolitical conflicts (Greiner et al. 2022). The bias is further evident from the outset of the project in 2012. Some members of LAPSSET's high-level authority belonged to the Meru ethnic community, while the pastoral communities lacked political representation to communicate their interests to the government.

Mkutu and Boru (2019) underline that both the Meru and Isiolo communities lost their land to the international airport, constructed on trust land – communal land under customary tenure before the enactment of the 2012 Land Act and the CLA of 2016, designed to protect the pastoral communities from land grabbing. Müller-Mahn et al. (2021) affirmed that there was a delay and slow implementation of these laws, coupled with the rapid changes brought by the mega-infrastructure projects, leading to contestation and competition over the land.

While the Meru community in the Nyambene area bordering Tigania East and West Subcounty was compensated, the pastoralists on the Isiolo side in Wabera ward were not compensated due to the lack of land titles in Isiolo County (Owino

2019). Consequently, the competing aspirations and contestations and assumed favouritism experienced by pastoral communities during the airport expansion triggered historical grievances of social injustices towards the northern frontier communities following the colonial legacy and past government policies. Exploiting this situation, the CBAGs and VEOs capitalised on recruitment efforts to address grievances, contributing to propaganda and radicalisation of Kenyan youth (Hansen et al. 2019; Okwany 2016, 2023). Since 2013, about 200 youths from Isiolo have been recruited to join the Somalia-based VEO (17.05.2019 *Reuters*). Al-Shabaab[9] has spread claims about land grabbing and grievances, and the 2019 Riverside Drive attack at the Dusit2 complex in Nairobi, which killed about 21 people, was planned by a former Isiolo resident, Ali Salim Gichunge, who was a son of a military officer of the Kenya Defence Forces (17.05.2019 *Reuters*).

LAPSSET and its connection to the airport

LAPSSET includes roads, railways, ports (32 berths), pipelines, fibre-optic connections, and mega dams, connecting to international airports in Isiolo, Lake Turkana, and Lamu County. The transport corridor is anticipated to connect Kenya's international waters of Lamu, passing the arid areas from Garsen in Tana River County to Isiolo. Upon completion, Isiolo will be situated at the LAPSSET junction, connecting Ethiopia through Marsabit-Moyale to Addis Ababa. It aims to link Isiolo International Airport to these areas (see Figure 8.1), extending to Samburu to the Turkana Nakodok border via Lodwar and ending in Juba, South Sudan (Okwany 2020c). A shift in development focus towards northern Kenya emerged in the 1990s, when Isiolo's land and town ownership started evolving along the pastoral corridor. In 2012, the launch of the LAPPSET triggered the international transportation corridor, with the anticipation of improved regional connectivity transforming Isiolo from an unworthy or unproductive region to a more developed municipality. The expectation of a well-connected and spatially integrated region created speculation of land and led to land grabbing (see later text; also Elliott 2016; Owino 2019). In February 2012, a land office was established in Isiolo for the first time since Kenya's independence to facilitate the land use processes in relation to the anticipated LAPSSET. One month later, a LAPSSET proposal meeting was arranged between the late president Mwai Kibaki of Kenya, former Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi, and South Sudan's president, Salva Kiir Mayardit (Browne 2015).

The LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority (LCDA) report affirmed that the mega-infrastructure is expected to boost 2–3% of Kenya's gross domestic product (GDP), supporting the government's ambition of an 8–10% economic boost when completed (LCDA 2016). By 2010, LAPSSET speculations had already attracted international contractors and donors, such as China, through its Exim Bank's rural electrification initiative (Okwany 2020c). In this initial stage, LAPSSET was promising to attract a US$12 million grant to the corridor, while the Chinese engineering firm CAMC also committed to upgrading the power plants in Lamu from a single-circuit phase of 33 kV to 220 kV (Bremner 2013). However,

LAPSSET's envisioned multilateral partnership was facing challenges. Initially attracting countries such as India, Brazil, Qatar, South Korea, and China, as well as the European Union, these partners pulled out due to the drop in global oil prices in 2013–2014 and uncertainties surrounding oil in South Sudan and Turkana in Kenya. Consequently, the Chinese government became the sole international partner (Okwany 2020c). In addition, LAPSSET faces competition from other regional mega-infrastructure, such as the Djibouti–Ethiopia road, port, and railway project and the pipeline from coastal Tanga in Tanzania to Hoima in Uganda (Okwany 2020c).

   After the completion of the airport, economic aspirations and political ambitions fanned by the LAPSSET corridor, as outlined in the Kenya Vision 2030 reports (2018, 2020), faced controversies on the ground. The airport is operating below its intended capacity of handling 125,000 passengers annually, has encroached upon the pastoral grazing corridor, and is showing little economic value to pastoral livelihoods. The airport was expected to boost the pastoral meat market economy through streamlined and faster transportation (04.07.2021 *Daily Nation*). However, this intended use has stalled because of the delay in the abattoir's development.

   Furthermore, the UK government's ban of khat imports in 2014 was another factor that led to the economic failure of the airport, and the flights from Isiolo to Nairobi are expensive in comparison to those from Nairobi to Lodwar or Nairobi to Kisumu, which cover larger distances than the flight from Nairobi to Isiolo (Owino 2019). The airport's slow operation is also linked to the politics of anticipation, which overshadow the LAPSSET corridor. The LCDA affirms that the airport land has been expanded from 1.5 km² to occupying 2.59 km² of contested land between fertile Meru County and the arid part of Isiolo (LCDA 2017).

Findings on the local consequences of airport expansion

Airport-induced displacements, irregular compensations, and challenging land re-allocation

The expansion of the international airport began in 2004 with the construction of a 1,400 m runway. The plan was to expand it to 3,000 m. The Kenya Airport Authority (KAA) and a village council of elders from Meru and Isiolo passed an agreement to expand the airport and to assess impacts on the local population prior to compensation.[10] Both councils and the KAA agreed to resettle people affected by airport expansion.[11] Resettlement began in July 2008 in the Mwangaza area (Wabera ward) close to the airport. The resettlement resulted in many legal land-owners losing their land due to land fraud in the Kiwanjani and Mwangaza areas, such as double allocation of allotment letters (titles in trust land), and those with power, influence, and money manipulated the system to get land, while community members with no influence lost their land.[12] Issues such as the delay and slow implementation of land policies and legislation led to the flouting of the agreement.[13] For example, a National Land Commission officer in Nairobi indicated that resettlement was stopped because the new Kenyan Constitution from 2010

overruled the 2004 agreement between the KAA and the councils of elders. The officer told the authors:

> *A new county government is in place with new laws . . . , and such land complaints are difficult to solve without land registration. Furthermore, the airport was already approved and completed, and flights are in operation.*
> (National Land Commission officer, 21 February 2019)

The agreement with the nomadic pastoralists was dismissed on the premise of a new Isiolo County administration that had introduced new land laws. The land in the Nyambene area, Meru County, is privatised land and not communally owned, like in Isiolo County. Community Land Act (CLA) 2016, for example, deals with land laws that are not older than 2010. Therefore, agreements with the airport authority, such as that of resettlement, are deemed not legally binding.[14] Consequently, airport expansion displaced people, many of whom were forcefully evicted. While the KAA claimed to have compensated the affected communities, some dispute this claim. In addition, the airport expansion led to the unequal destruction of private properties and loss of livelihoods due to territoriality – state control of the airport land area. Organised violence – state monopolising the use of force or ethnic communities – also legitimised the use of force due to eviction from their land. For example, a public school was demolished. Pupils had to attend schools much farther away, disrupting their learning activities. Over 1,300 evicted people lost their land and property.[15]

There are court orders over land adjudication in contested boundaries, and a parliamentary commission is expected to look into these disputes. For example, Mwangaza village has land cases pending in court to know who should be compensated.[16] The most contested land areas are Mwangaza, Kambi Juu, Kambi Gabra, Chechelesi, and Kiwanjani. These regions are characterised by double registration of land and tribal conflict caused by infrastructural developments.[17] In addition, our investigation of the court cases at the Isiolo Court demonstrates that land claims increased from 10 cases in 2016 to 30 cases in 2017 and 92 cases in 2018.[18] The sudden increase was due to the expansion of the airport since 2011, and the anticipation of the proposed mega road since 2012, and the rush to create the land office in the same year. According to the Isiolo Town Council's report of 2005, the airport's expansion displaced 1,337 people in Kiwanja-Ndege and Mwangaza.[19] However, data from the National Land Commission, the KAA, and the Isiolo County Commissioner's Offices list the number of displaced persons at 64. This official list, therefore, is contested. Our evidence indicates a much larger number of squatters in Mwangaza and Kiwanja-Ndege, estimating, indeed, more than 1,300 displaced people.[20]

Consequently, communities in Isiolo claim that the Meru communities do not respect such processes and that the Meru County government is adjudicating the contested land in favour of its population.[21] As mentioned earlier, in Kenya, rural landownership is primarily regulated by customary law, and these communal lands were registered under the trust land. However, the contention lies in the trustee

issues, which have been associated with corruption cases. Before the promulgation of the Kenyan Constitution, trustees (custodians) of unregistered community land were town councils who sold land to private entities and accumulated private land for their own benefits.[22] However, since the Community Land Act of 2016, there has been progress in some counties in community land registration, but this process faces challenges due to customary practices.

In Isiolo County, the titleship for community land started in 2018, after the parliamentary legislation on land regulation in 2016 and executive order No. 1 of 2018 mandating the Ministry of Lands and Physical Planning to adjudicate and register land under community membership.[23] The year 2022 demonstrated the highest land registration of Isiolo land under the national titling program.[24] The Constitution of Kenya stipulates that there should be no discrimination over land registration. Article 63 of the Constitution and Community Land Act 2016 stipulate community land rights.[25] Communities in Isiolo have experienced conflicting debates over land despite a clear legal framework of such land laws; there is limited engagement and consultation between the communities in Isiolo and the national/county government over community land administration.[26]

People in Kiwanjani and Mwangaza were not compensated because they lacked land title deeds, as their land became subject to the Trust Land Act under the custodianship of the former Isiolo Town Council, now Isiolo County. These lands were not registered before the Community Land Act of 2016, and with the law in place, registration is still due at the time of writing. The land victims from Tigania East and West in Meru had title deeds; thus, their compensation was easy.[27] The pastoral communities have grievances over compensation and reported the Meru communities demarcating and claiming pastoral land to the chiefs, security teams, and county commissioner, yet little action was taken to ease the tension.[28] When we wrote this chapter, Isiolo County had no land registrar, and most of the land was not registered.[29] However, under the national titling program, the government, through its National Treasury's cabinet secretary, Ukur Yatani, issued 6,000 title deeds to residents in Odonyiro, the location of the abattoir, and Ngaremara, the proposed area for the LAPSSET junction.[30]

In July 2019, the parliamentary senate committee claimed that the international airport was idle. Yet the government spent 2.7 billion Kenya shillings on its upgrading, and the National Land Commission failed to compensate individuals whose lands were taken by the government to upgrade the airport.[31] Residents near the airport claim such irregularities and a lack of the Kenyan government's commitment to compensate those who lost their land.[32] Due to corruption allegation, land conflict, and double allocation of land, the national government created a balloting exercise to solve land grievances in the Wabera ward. However, the exercise faced numerous irregularities, including a corrupt deal because of unregistered pastoral land. Half of Wabera ward's land lacked titles, as it is communally owned, rendering it vulnerable to appropriation by state and county politicians.[33] Such irregularities intensify ethnopolitical conflicts, because unkept government promises, lack of or skewed compensation attract political rhetoric, particularly during election campaigns.[34]

More so, locals claim that government officials, including county commissioners and senior police officers in the region, have been allocated plots, anticipating the LAPSSET and the operation of the airport.[35] As such, only the elites can acquire substantial land portions, leading to practices such as land banking, manipulation, and speculation, while for local communities, obtaining titles and claiming their land have become a challenge.[36] Land grabbing became a prominent political issue for opposition parties seeking voters in the 2017 election year. However, the political handshake between the president and the opposition leader slowed the land-grabbing debate.[37]

Local political struggles

As mentioned earlier, ongoing contestation and competition over land persist around the airport ground, leading to escalating ethnopolitical conflicts and insecurity in the LAPSSET region. Land is viewed as state territory, and this view can sometimes conflict with traditional community and individual landownership, particularly when the state's economic interests clash with communal or individual land use. Even though the Community Land Act of 2016 registered about 32 plots of community land, the registration is not entirely new, because these community lands were registered under the Trust Lands Act and the Land Group Representation Act.[38]

Mistrust between the state and the community over land use and development prevails, with the state being viewed as exerting its power over the community. The contestation over the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) land exemplifies community scepticism when the state acquires communal land for development projects.[39] In 1981, the military and the Isiolo communities' leadership had an agreement on a military training space, allocating 106.53 km² of training land in Isiolo to the military. However, the military has been territorialising, that is, controlling, the space and applying organised violence, legitimising the use of force to expand and fence more land. This has caused conflict between nomadic pastoralists and KDF over grazing rights. Furthermore, the disposal of hazardous military waste is a risk to the community's well-being.

The airport was established on disputed land between Wabera ward in Isiolo and the Nyambene area bordering Tigania East and West constituencies in Meru County. This led to border conflicts between the Meru and Isiolo,[40] as the airport occupies 20% of Wabera land, with 80% of its runway situated in the Nyambene area, claimed by Meru County.[41] Wabera ward, under Isiolo Town municipality, has a history of land conflicts between Borana and Samburu, Borana and Meru, Somali and Samburu, Turkana and Meru, as well as Turkana and Samburu communities. The area where the airport stretches is not only a disputed land between Meru farmers and Isiolo pastoralist but is also characterised by the county boundary dispute and is prone to cattle rustling.[42]

The extension of the airport resulted in Isiolo nomadic pastoralist communities becoming landless squatters on their own land. This exacerbated their situation, as they perceived that the agriculturalist and Christian Meru had been favoured.[43]

Thus, the future of the airport has triggered community resistance, leading to various consequences, including boundary issues.[44] Such perceived favouritism led to the marginalisation of some communities, making Isiolo a prime target for VEOs, such as al-Shabaab, to find recruits. These VEOs, but also community-based armed groups (CBAGs), exploit these land and religious grievances to radicalise the already-vulnerable youth.[45] Such radicalisation and recruitment are common and increasing in the Wabera ward.[46] The expanded road network poses an increased risk of small and light weapons trafficking and the likelihood of future insurgency threats.[47]

Our research in 2018 and 2019 demonstrates that al-Shabaab has recruited more than 200 youths from Isiolo. The VEO exploits the land-related grievances experienced by the pastoralists in Isiolo, the majority of whom are Muslim. It also takes advantage of Isiolo's semi-territoriality, where the state exerts strong control but has limited capacity or overlooks some spaces. This situation becomes advantageous to al-Shabaab, leveraging land grievances and religious propaganda to win and recruit youth in Isiolo County.[48]

Similar to the conflicts in the Wabera ward, the Ngaremara ward also faces contestation and competition over LAPSSET. This ward is home to Turkana and Borana nomadic pastoralists, while the Gare clan from Somalia migrates to the area for business. Meanwhile, the Meru ethnic group claims that the ward is Meru communal land and falls under Meru County's jurisdiction. These dynamics lead to inter-ethnic conflicts. The Turkana pastoralists reside in the Nakuprat location, and the Borana inhabits the Gotu area, which is part of the Ngaremara ward. The Gare clan are a business community, purchasing land in Gotu, hoping to profit from anticipated future development opportunities, thus causing land conflict with the Borana. Ngaremara ward also hosts a community conservancy, Nakuprat-Gotu, where both Turkana and Borana ethnic communities share the conservancy.

The Northern Rangeland Trust (NRT) protects the conservancy with the help of about 16 rangers, 8 from Turkana and 9 from Borana. The community conservancy was created as a buffer zone to prevent the Turkana and Borana from raiding each other.[49] Thus, the conservancy stands as one of the NRT's successful models of community conservation and policing, engaging both Turkana and Borana in peace initiatives and sharing resources with the Nakuprat-Gotu community conservancy.[50] However, there is still contestation over land in this conservancy: the Meru community claims ownership, evident through painted stones and trees demarcating conservancy areas as their territory.[51] Land disputes revolve around cattle rustling, business competition, and land grabbing in anticipation of the upcoming LAPSSET project. Both the Borana and Meru political elites are also additional actors in the contestation, claiming part of the conservancy.

With NRT rangers being well trained and equipped, there is a concern that they might use their sophisticated arms for economic purposes if faced with a cessation of donor funding. National Police Reservists (NPRs) are also present in Ngaremara ward. There are about 17, and they help in community policing. Distinctively, NPRs focus on safeguarding the community against livestock theft and poaching, while NRT rangers are tasked with protecting community conservancies.[52]

However, there are also risks of these groups joining criminal groups or supporting their ethnic groups during ethnic clashes, because of poor remuneration and a lack of government accountability.[53]

Over the years, Kachuru and Kula Mawe/Kulamawe areas have also experienced boundary conflicts.[54] Kachuru and Kulamawe are located approximately 60 km and 73 km from Isiolo airport, respectively. A majority of Borana, Somali, and Meru ethnic communities occupy these areas.[55] The LAPPSET road is estimated to pass both Kachuru and Kulamawe, and there is limited security in these areas, leading to conflict among the Meru and Borana, and the VEO could take advantage of such insecurity. Administratively, Kachuru and Kulamawe are in Meru County but claimed by the Borana; more so, since the implementation of devolved government in Kenya, boundary conflict between Meru and Isiolo counties has escalated in these areas. The proposed resort city, another component of the LAPSSET project, will be located in the Kipsing gap region. Previously, the Kenyan government had proposed the Oldonyiro area for the city but later dismissed it. The Meru are pursuing and claiming the Kulamawe and Kachuru area (see Figure 8.1) because of the proposed resort city. This is leading to yet further land contestation and competition.

Discussion and conclusion

Since the Kibaki administration's second term in 2008, the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya in 2010, and the introduction of devolution in 2013, development projects in Isiolo have blossomed. Interviews with county government officials confirmed that Isiolo and the northern frontier had indeed been the neglected 'Kenya B' – an unproductive or unworthy region. But this perception is changing. The funds allocated to the Isiolo government in six years (2013–2019) through devolution is more than what the region received in nearly 50 years (1963–2012).[56] But despite the increased focus on the north due to projects like the airport and LAPSSET, some developments, such as the international airport, have not fully realised their promised impact.

Some Isiolo County officials and politicians claim that local communities were not involved in public participation during project planning,[57] and communities interviewed in this chapter confirmed the same. In addition, they argue that most communities in Isiolo and nearby areas are poor and cannot afford to transport their horticultural products and meat from Isiolo to Nairobi. The communities' needs and economic progress were not considered in the planning. This shows that there is a disconnect between community interests and the national government's concept of development.[58] Similar to the British colonial government, the Kenyan government officials from Nairobi are subjecting rural communities to development projects that are economically redundant, thus leading to conflicts over differing visions of development.

The future of Isiolo is uncertain despite the Kenyan government's exaggerated development plans. The county is poised to experience exacerbated ethno-political conflict and violence, including contestation between government development

projects that shrink pastoral grazing land, leading to armed conflict over pasture and water[59] due to unmet community needs. The international airport's economic projection has stalled, with fewer flights than expected. Yet there are still speculations and anticipation over land because of the proposed LAPSSET (Enns 2019). While these projects aim to shape Isiolo with increased tourism and easier transportation of khat to Nairobi and other international markets (Mkutu and Boru 2019; Owino 2019), such development also means an uncertain future marked by land disputes, turning Isiolo into a new frontier of conflicts. The airport, which is expected to serve as the transportation hub of meat from the proposed abattoir and khat from Meru, is facing economic challenges because the transportation of flowers, khat, and meat is cheaper via road than by air.[60] In addition, flights from Isiolo to Nairobi are expensive in comparison to other distance, such as Nairobi to Lodwar or Nairobi to Kisumu (Owino 2019).

The Kenyan government has faced delays in the progress of its large-scale projects in Isiolo. Yet the hyped development creates speculations and anticipation, with people still buying land, hoping to reap economic benefits when the projects are completed, and Isiolo undergoes development. A newspaper report (19.07.2020 *Daily Nation*) affirms that even after receiving 800 million Kenyan shillings from the World Bank, the Isiolo abattoir faced several delays, pushing its completion deadline from December 2016 to February 2021. And in December 2023, the abattoir was yet to be operational. The slaughterhouse is envisioned to process about 474,000 animals yearly to boost the pastoral economy, aiming at markets such as the Middle East. It was also to breathe new economic life into Isiolo International Airport. However, the delays signify future uncertainties for the abattoir and the international airport. Such uncertainties are also evident in the proposed LAPSSET project, which has faced challenges of international partnerships (Okwany 2020a). Yet the Kenyan government had high ambitions over LAPSSET, aiming at an 8–10% increase in the country's GDP (LCDA 2016), and such hopes are still maintained. Essentially, it should be noted that even with these ambitions, the future of the nomadic pastoral communities is uncertain as government initiatives on compensation appear to favour the Meru ethnic community and marginalise the pastoralists.[61] As such, their grievances over government marginalisation and the Meru background of some top officials in the LAPSSET authority continue to exacerbate the relationship between the state and society (Greiner et al. 2022; Owino 2019). The number of court cases over land in Isiolo has risen recently, especially within the Wabera ward, where the Meru community that continues to claim land in Ngaremara, Kulamawe, and Kachuru areas keeps ignoring complaints of the pastoral communities.

Just as the colonial British ignored the Northern Frontier District, the Kenyan government ignored northern Kenya, considering it unworthy of attention, until the 1990s (Elliott 2016). The Land Act of 2012 and the Community Land Act of 2016 changed this and protect communities and individuals from land grabbing. However, implementation is slow, while development projects are advancing rapidly (Müller-Mahn et al. 2021). Despite the constitutional framework of land rights, the Kenyan government exhibits a disregard for the rule of law, with land laws not

being respected and compensation favouring some elites and the Meru ethnic community.[62] Such dismissal of the rule of law is what Agamben (2008) and Korf et al. (2013) call a state of exception, where the state has the power to apply or suspend the law, has limited capacity, or ignores the law due to some interests, leading to conflict and violence in the frontier (also see Kopytoff 1987). Despite the state of exception in Isiolo, where the government allows the military to use land and subject the Isiolo communities to conflict and violence but also applies the law in case of conflict among the ethnic tribes in Isiolo, there has been increased insecurity due to what we describe as territoriality, the use of hard power/control, and organised violence, and thus military legitimizing the use of force. Also, there has been a rush to have an administrative land office put in place. Such a rush has led to land disputes in court, some people having their names on the same land but different titles, while government officials acquire land in strategic positions, speculating and anticipating development that is yet to be realised.[63]

Essentially, Isiolo has a history of land disputes, cattle rustling, and pastoral and ethnic conflicts. Land disputes arising from development projects such as the international airport and LAPSSET lead to future contestation, conflict, and dynamics of violence. The future of Isiolo's security is uncertain, and there is the concern that new actors such as VEO and CBAGs that take advantage of the land grievances, recruiting and radicalizing young people, will contribute to future insecurity and the risk of insurgency (Okwany 2016, 2023).[64] Our fieldwork research in 2018 and 2019 demonstrated that al-Shabaab recruited more than 200 youth from Isiolo County using land grabbing and grievances in their recruitment propaganda.[65] Even though the road network in Isiolo is advantageous to the county because of movements of goods and services, Mkutu and Boru (2019) point out that the porous borders in the north towards Moyale and the long border with Somalia risk the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

The contestation and competing aspirations over land in Isiolo are not new; the county is characterised by ethnic and boundary conflict, land disputes, and cattle rustling. However, the hyped mega-infrastructure projects escalate existing conflicts due to further fragmentation of pastoral rangelands. Isiolo International Airport was completed in 2017; however, some renovations and its development into an international standard airport are yet to take shape. In addition, the airport faces economic challenges as aircraft companies withdrew from flying to Isiolo due to limited traffic, low demand, and expensive travel tickets. At the time of writing, the airport project is not viable to the local economy, and it is yet to achieve its primary goal of transporting horticultural products, such as flowers and khat, including livestock products, from the proposed modern abattoir. The international airport is facing land disputes; pastoralists who were evicted from their land in Wabera ward, some of whom have become squatters, are yet to receive compensation. In contrast, the Meru community members evicted from their land in the Nyambene area have been compensated. This state of affairs leads to ethnopolitical contestations.

Based on our findings, the completed airport and the abattoir, which were expected to upgrade pastoral livelihoods and boost the country's economy; the proposed resort city; and other LAPSSET projects, such as roads and the proposed

mega-dam, create speculations and politics of anticipation. The Meru community is claiming the land in Ngaremara, Kulamawe, and Kachuru areas, which have been identified to benefit from the corridor. The elites are also securing land in these areas, with the anticipation of commercialisation of land, while the local nomadic pastoralists have no titles due to their nature of migration and search for pasture. Furthermore, the airport, abattoir, resort city, and road are supposed to boost Isiolo's economy, yet the community is not involved in such projects. With the state applying a top-down approach towards development in the northern frontier, these affected communities in Isiolo are resisting the projects, leading to different dynamics of conflict and violence. The history of militarisation, violence, and marginalisation in Isiolo risks passing the county's future to CBAGs and VEOs. Therefore, Isiolo has emerged as the new frontier of contestations and competing aspirations.

Acknowledgments

Notes

1 Aircraft company management team member, 04.02.2019, interview.
2 Businesspersons in Isiolo and Meru, 27.09.2028/16.02.2019, interviews.
3 Kenyan government rhetoric through the spokesperson, Rtd Col. Cyrus Oguna, to the Kenyan mainstream media in 2021.
4 The conference was organized by the Kenyan Ministry of Land and Physical Planning, French Institute for Research in Africa, and Food Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 13-14.06.2022.
5 See, for example, session papers No. 10 of 1965, and No. 1 of 1986 Republic of Kenya (1965). *Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*. Nairobi: Government Printers. Retrieved from https://repository.kippra.or.ke/handle/123456789/2345, Republic of Kenya (1986). *Sessional Paper No. 01 of 1986 on Economic Management for Renewed Growth*. Nairobi: Republic of Kenya. Retrieved from https://repository.kippra.or.ke/handle/123456789/2679.
6 The Lyttleton Constitution 1954 and Lennox–Boyd Constitution of 1958 mainly focused on adding the African race to the Legislative Council (LegCo). The main debate for the LegCo was African property and land; thus, community representation and property rights were key (see The Round Table. (1958). A constitution for Kenya: Mr. Lennox-Boyd's visit. *Taylor and Francis* 48(190). https://doi.org/10.1080/00358535808452115. However, the post-independence government further developed such a statutory framework by enacting the Land Group Representation Act 1968, Trust Land Act 1968, Land Consolidation Act 1977, Land Adjudication Act 2010, and the 2009 land policy, which was synchronized into the Constitution of Kenya. (2010). Nairobi: Government Printers Retrieved from http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=398.

7 See Article 63 of the Constitution of Kenya on community land.
8 See Land Registration Act 2012, the Land Act 2012, and the Community Land Act (CLA) of 2016; this legislation repealed the Trust Land Act of 1968, while the Land (group representation) Act 1968 and Land Act 2012 were synchronized into CLA in 2016.
9 A Somalia-based VEO and concentrating its attacks in the Horn of Africa and affiliated to Al-Qaeda, a Salafists jihadists group, associating to the Sunni Islamist ideology.
10 Letter written by the KAA to the Meru and Isiolo council, 17.09.2004.
11 Three representatives, Wabera Ward Administration, 24.01.2019, interview.
12 Squatters in Kiwanjani Zone G, 10.09.2018; ward administrator, 23.01.2019, interviews.
13 People displaced by the airport expansion, 25.01.2019, FDG.
14 A national land commissioner and a lawyer, Ministry of Land and Physical Planning, 14.06.2022, interviews.
15 A county government officer and a county executive commissioner of tourism, Isiolo, 27./28.08.2018, interview.
16 Chief of Mwangaza, 09.09.2018 and 14.03.2019, interviews.
17 Ward administrator affected by the airport expansion, 25.01.2019, interview.
18 Executive officer, Isiolo law court, 25.01.2029, interview.
19 Isiolo senior national government administrators, 28.10.2018 and 24/25.01.2019, interviews.
20 The numbers of displaced people were retrieved from unpublished documents during our interview with Wabera Ward Administration, 24.01.2019. Leaders of displaced people in Mwangaza also confirmed the numbers, 24.01.2019 and 14.03.2019, interviews.
21 Isiolo County official, 11.02.2019, interview.
22 A ward administrator and three members of County Assembly demonstrating land corruption in Isiolo before dispensation of devolved governance, 09. and 17.09.2018, interview. A land commissioner and two land administrators at the conference on Community Land Act 2016, 13.06.2022, conversation.
23 See executive order no. 1 available at https://lands.go.ke/about-us/.
24 A land registrar from Laikipia and a land adjudicator from Samburu, 17.08.2022, interview.
25 Laikipia land registrar and Samburu land adjudicator, 13/14.06.2022, interviews.
26 Secretary of Pastoralist Parliamentary Group and chief executive officer of the Drylands Learning and Capacity Building Initiative, 15.06.2022, interview.
27 FGDs in Chechelesi, 08.09.2018; Kiwanjani, 18.10.2018; Kambi juu, 19.10.2018.; Kambi Gabra, 12.03.2019; Mwangaza, 25.01.2019.
28 Chairman of Mwangaza, from where people were displaced, 22.01.2019, interview.
29 A land registrar from Laikipia and a land adjudicator from Samburu, 17.08.2011, interview.
30 The National Treasury cabinet secretary, Ukur Yatani, issued 6,000 land titles publicly on 11 July 2022 to Ngaremara and Odonyiro residents, increasing the number of land titles registered in Isiolo to 6,300.
31 KTN News, *New Roundup, Isiolo idle after shs.2.7billion used to upgrade it*. Available at https://youtu.be/-sg2gcqzzxc.
32 Isiolo County officer, 12.03.2019, interview.
33 Chief in Wabera ward, 15.09.2018, interview.
34 Fieldwork evidence on the electioneering period over the land conflict from April to July 2022; politicians used the land conflict as a campaign tool in Isiolo.
35 Villagers in Mwangaza, 13.09.2018, interview.
36 Habiba, Wabera ward, 19.09.2018, interview.
37 The opposition leader, Hon. Raila Amollo Odinga, claimed that powerful figures from the ruling party, Jubilee, were grabbing land in Ngaremara, speculating on the emergence of the proposed LAPSSET junction and its connection to the airport. However,

in 2018, after Raila was appointed the African Union high representative for infrastructure development in Africa, he changed his opinion on land grabbing in Isiolo, now claiming it would attract donors to the LAPSSET initiative locally and internationally, 13.02.2019, interview.

38 A national land commissioner and a lawyer at the Ministry of Land and Physical Planning, DATE, interview.
39 Information shared during the conference on Community Land Act, 13/14.06.2022.
40 Residents in Mwangaza, 17.09.2018, interview.
41 Residents in Mwangaza, 18.09.2018, interview.
42 Chief in Wabera ward, 20.09.2018, interview.
43 Security fraternity and communities in Isiolo town, 16.-21.04.2018, interviews/FGDs, ICT4COP project.
44 Elders in Ngaremara ward, 07.09.2018, interview.
45 Mr Maiyo, deputy county commissioner, 28.08.2018, interview.
46 Habiba, the Wabera ward administrator, 19.09.2018, interview.
47 Isiolo Peace Committee, 19.10.2018, FDG; assistant county commissioner Isiolo, 28.08.2018, interview.
48 Residents in Ngaremara, and Wabera ward, 02.2018; 11.2019, interviews, ICT4COP project.
49 Nakuprat-Gotu community wildlife conservancy rangers, 18.09.2018, interview.
50 Mrs Ekiru, the NRT peacebuilding coordinator (northern Kenya), 06.09.2018, interview.
51 Observation, 09.2018 and 02.2019.
52 NTR council of Elders, 06.09.2018, interview.
53 Five NPRs in Ngaremara, 02.02.2018, interview.
54 Isiolo county officer, 22.02.2019, interview.
55 Elders in Ngaremara ward, 07.09.2018, interview.
56 Isiolo county officer, 22.01.2019, interview.
57 Mrs Habiba, Wabera ward administrator, 19.09.2018; Isiolo County officer, 22.01.2019, interviews.
58 Mr Akall, board member of the Dry Drylands Learning and Capacity Building Initiative, 14.06.2022, interview.
59 Ngaremara and Wabera wards, 02.02.2018/23.01.2019, interviews demonstrating concerns over LAPSSET, compensation, and Isiolo International Airport shrinking pastoral land.
60 Businesspeople in Isiolo and Meru, 09.2018, 02.2019, interviews.
61 Mwangaza Chief, 14.03.2019, interview; Mwangaza community members and chairperson and Isiolo county officials, 15.03.2019, interviews.
62 Mwangaza community members and chairperson and Isiolo county officials, 15.03.2019, interviews.
63 Mwangaza chief, 14.03.2019; Isiolo County officials and an executive officer at the Isiolo law court, 25.01.2019, interviews.
64 Mr Maiyo, deputy county commissioner, community members, and police in Isiolo central in 2017, 2018 and 2019, interviews, ICT4COP project.
65 Residents in Ngaremara, and Wabera ward, 02.2018, 11.2019, interviews, ICT4COP project.
66 Norwegian University of Life Science. "Community-Based Policing and Post-Conflict Police Reform: A European Commission Horizon 2020 Research & Innovation Project, Ict4cop Research Project." 2020. https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/653909/results. Accessed 07.12.2020.

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