

# Internal migration and development planning in South Africa



ILSE EIGELAAR-MEETS

# **Internal migration and development planning in South Africa**



Published by AVARSITY Books, an imprint of AOSIS Scholarly Books, a division of AOSIS.


### **AOSIS Publishing**

15 Oxford Street, Durbanville, 7550, Cape Town, South Africa  
Postnet Suite 110, Private Bag X19, Durbanville, 7551, Cape Town, South Africa  
Tel: +27 21 975 2602  
Website: <https://www.aosis.co.za>

Copyright © Ilse Eigelaar-Meets. Licensee: AOSIS (Pty) Ltd  
The moral right of the editors and authors has been asserted.

Cover image: This cover was created by Natascha Olivier/Coco Design with the use of a photograph of an artwork by ©Kara Meets, obtained from Kara Meets, titled 'South Africa township', all rights reserved.

Published in 2024  
Impression: 1

ISBN: 978-1-991269-11-9 (print)  
ISBN: 978-1-991270-11-5 (epub)  
ISBN: 978-1-991271-11-2 (pdf) 

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4102/aosis.2024.BK463>

How to cite this work: Eigelaar-Meets, I 2024, *Internal migration and development planning in South Africa*, AVARSITY Books, Cape Town.

Printed and bound in South Africa.

Listed in OAPEN (<http://www.oapen.org>), DOAB (<http://www.doabooks.org/>) and indexed by Google Scholar. Some rights reserved.

This is an open-access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). A copy of this is available at <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>. Enquiries outside the terms of the Creative Commons license should be sent to the AOSIS Rights Department at the above address or to [publishing@aosis.co.za](mailto:publishing@aosis.co.za).



The publisher accepts no responsibility for any statement made or opinion expressed in this publication. Consequently, the publishers and copyright holders will not be liable for any loss or damage sustained by any reader as a result of their action upon any statement or opinion in this work. Links by third-party websites are provided by AOSIS in good faith and for information only. AOSIS disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third-party website referenced in this work.

Every effort has been made to protect the interest of copyright holders. Should any infringement have occurred inadvertently, the publisher apologises and undertakes to amend the omission in case of a reprint.

# Internal migration and development planning in South Africa

Ilse Eigelaar-Meets



# Social Sciences, Humanities, Education and Business Management domain editorial board at AOSIS

## Commissioning Editor: Scholarly Books

**Andries G van Aarde**, MA, DD, PhD, D Litt, South Africa

## Board members

**Anthony Turton**, Professor in the Centre for Environmental Management and Director TouchStone Resources (Pty) Ltd, University of the Free State, South Africa

**Charles O'Neill**, Associate Professor in the Department of Business Administration, The British University in Egypt, El Sherouk, Cairo Governorate, Egypt

**Christi van der Westhuizen**, Associate Professor and Head of the Centre for the Advancement of Non-Racialism and Democracy (CANRAD) research programme, Nelson Mandela University, South Africa

**Emmanuel O Adu**, Professor of Teacher Education and Curriculum Studies, Faculty of Education, University of Fort Hare, South Africa

**Elphinah N Cisse**, Professor of Nedbank Research Chair, Department of Continuing Professional Teacher Development, Faculty of Educational Sciences, Walter Sisulu University, South Africa

**Jayaluxmi Naidoo**, Associate Professor of Mathematics and Computer Science Education, College of Humanities, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

**Johann Tempelhoff**, Professor and Lead of the Cultural Dynamics of Water (CuDyWat) research niche and Head of the South African Water History Archival Repository, School of Basic Sciences, North-West University, South Africa

**Llewellyn Leonard**, Professor of Environmental Management and Chair of the Centre for Excellence (CoE) (Adaptation and Resilience), School of Ecological and Human Sustainability, University of South Africa, South Africa

**Piet Naudé**, Professor of Ethics related to Politics, Lead of the MBA programme in Business in Society and Leadership Development and Director of the University of Stellenbosch Business School, University of Stellenbosch Business School, South Africa

**Reina-Marie Loader**, Programme Lead of the MA programme in Producing Film and Television and Lecturer in Film Production, Faculty of Media and Communication, Bournemouth University, United Kingdom

**Siphamandla Zondi**, Professor of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, South Africa

**Stanley Murairwa**, Professor and Head of the Department of Business Sciences, College of Business, Peace, Leadership and Governance, Africa University, Zimbabwe

**Tembi Tichaawa**, Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Tourism, School of Tourism and Hospitality, University of Johannesburg, South Africa

**Vusiwana C Babane**, Department of Educational Psychology, Faculty of Education, University of the Western Cape, South Africa

**Zilungile Sosibo**, Professor of Education, Faculty of Education, Cape Peninsula University of Technology, South Africa

## Peer-review declaration

The publisher (AOSIS) endorses the South African 'National Scholarly Book Publishers Forum Best Practice for Peer-Review of Scholarly Books'. The book proposal form was evaluated by our Social Sciences, Humanities, Education and Business Management editorial board. The manuscript underwent an evaluation to compare the level of originality with other published works and was subjected to rigorous two-step peer-review before publication by two technical expert reviewers who did not include the author and were independent of the author, with the identities of the reviewers not revealed to the author. The reviewers were independent of the publisher and author. The publisher shared feedback on the similarity report and the reviewers' inputs with the manuscript's author to improve the manuscript. Where the reviewers recommended revision and improvements, the author responded adequately to such recommendations. The reviewers commented positively on the scholarly merits of the manuscript and recommended that the book be published.

## **Research justification**

The integration of internal migration in development planning initiatives and processes in post-apartheid South Africa is the primary focus of this book. Demographic data are at the heart of population dynamics. It provides the concrete basis that makes it possible to determine demographic trends in a country. Demographic change is essentially driven by three fundamental factors: mortality, fertility and migration. Although these three factors are important to incorporate in development planning initiatives, the focus of this book is on internal migration. Therefore, for development planning, understanding demographic trends is essential as it not only illustrates the outcome of past social change but also offers a future lens of both short-term and long-term social changes that can be expected, and this allows for better planning and preparation. To substantiate this argument, this publication draws on data from two provinces in South Africa. Data pertaining to internal migration flows in the Northern Cape and Western Cape provinces from three post-apartheid periods (1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011) are analysed, compared and presented to illustrate how current forces drive and direct migration flows and how this has an impact on the social dynamics within these provinces.

The data analysis presented in this book draws entirely on secondary data sources. Census data accessed by means of the Nesstar statistical package were employed for the data analysis performed utilising SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). Data for the two respective censuses were downloaded in SPSS and subsequent analysis was executed using this programme.

The book is a significant revision (more than 50%) of the Doctor of Philosophy degree (PhD) thesis titled 'Internal migration in post-apartheid South Africa: The cases of the Western and Northern Cape', submitted to obtain the degree of Doctor of Sociology from the Faculty of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Stellenbosch University in 2018, under the supervision of Prof. S.B. Bekker. This revised manuscript generates new knowledge for migration studies. When comparing pre- and post-1994 internal migration trends in the two provinces, the book illuminates three specific shifts: (1) a change in the political context within which mobility is framed, (2) a change in the type of internal migration flows that are sustaining urbanisation and (3) a change in the profile, specifically pertaining to population group, of migrants mobile in the two provinces. The book demonstrates both the influence of specifically political and economic forces in directing internal migration flows as well as the impact of such flows on the social dynamics within communities and thus argues for the standard practice of considering migration flows in development planning. The aim of such an approach is not to control internal migration but rather to facilitate proactive development planning. Thus, the book concludes by making a case for the adoption of a strategic and concerted approach by governments to accommodate the developmental constraints and challenges posed by internal migration.

The book represents an original and innovative contribution to sociology and contains no plagiarism. The target audience of the book is scholars in sociology and development planning.

**Ilse Eigelaar-Meets**, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa

# Acknowledgements

'Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think of anything as being from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God' 2 Corinthians 3:5 (NKJ).

To Mike, my best friend, partner in life and father of our three children, thank you for always cheering me on.

To our three children, you never know what you are capable of until you try.

To my mentors, Cornie Groenewald, Wynand Louw and Simon Bekker. Never have you made me walk in your shadows, but always alongside you. I am eternally grateful and count myself extremely fortunate to call you friends and colleagues.

The sole cause of man's unhappiness, quipped Pascal in the seventeenth century, 'is that he does not know to stay quietly in his room'. If this is so, unhappiness is enjoying unprecedented popularity as people are choosing to leave their rooms, so to speak, in record numbers. Sometimes, they are fleeing from unhappiness; sometimes they are producing it. Always they are responding to and, in their turn, creating change. (Weeks 2012, p. 261)





# Contents

Acknowledgements	vi
Biographical note	xiii
Abbreviations and acronyms, figures and tables appearing in the text and notes	xv
List of abbreviations and acronyms	xv
List of figures	xvi
List of tables	xvii
<b>Chapter 1: The relationship between internal migration and development planning in post-1994 South Africa</b>	<b>1</b>
The pre-1994 governance framework	6
The post-1994 governance framework	14
A contextual and historical overview of the two case studies	15
Western Cape province	16
1652-1994	16
1995-2022	18
Northern Cape province	23
1870-1994	23
1995-2022	26
Development and applied sociology: Theoretical points of departure	31
Conclusion	36
<b>Chapter 2: Motivations for international and internal migration behaviour: Theoretical perspectives</b>	<b>39</b>
Conceptualising migration	41
Evolution in migration thought	44
Equilibrium and neo-classical thought	47
Dual (segmented) labour market theory	49
Household based approaches	50
Strategic factors perpetuating migration	53
A synthesis of explanatory approaches	55
The migration and development nexus	56
Impacts on the migrant	61

Impact on receiving (urban) destinations	62
Impact on sending destinations	63
Conclusion	64
<b>Chapter 3: Exploring internal migration trends: Framing and structuring the analysis</b>	<b>67</b>
Conceptualising internal migration	68
Defining the theoretical framework	77
Analysing migration trends	80
Inter-provincial net migration rates	80
Intra-provincial net migration rates	81
Internal migration rates (the sum of inter-provincial and intra-provincial migrants)	81
Inter-provincial migration flows	81
Method	82
Intra-provincial migration flows	82
Mobility of inter-provincial migrants in terms of age and population group	83
Mobility of intra-provincial migrants in terms of age and population group	83
Status of data	84
Conclusion	87
<b>Chapter 4: Internal migration in the Western Cape (1996–2011)</b>	<b>89</b>
Migration trends (1996–2011)	90
Description of inter-provincial flows	90
Summary of inter-provincial migration trends	94
Contextualising inter-provincial migration trends	95
Description of intra-provincial migration flows	97
Contextualising intra-provincial migration trends	100
Urbanisation in the Western Cape	103
Conclusion	105
<b>Chapter 5: Internal migration in the Northern Cape (1996–2011)</b>	<b>109</b>
Migration trends (1996–2011)	110
Inter-provincial flows for the Northern Cape province (1996–2011)	110
In summary	115
Contextualising inter-provincial migration trends	116

Intra-provincial migration flows in the Northern Cape province (1996–2011)	118
Contextualising intra-provincial migration trends	121
District economy of the ZF Mgcawu District Municipality	122
District economy of the Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality	123
Urbanisation	125
Conclusion	126
<b>Chapter 6: Making sense of the data</b>	<b>129</b>
Post-apartheid internal migration: A synthesis of findings	130
Who are the migrants?	135
Population distribution and internal migration: An outcome driven by two forces	136
The relevance of migration in development planning	139
Dislocating impacts of migration on resident communities	140
Examples	141
Example 1: Three incidents pertaining to the Western Cape	141
Two incidences of service delivery conflict	142
Example 2 from the Northern Cape	144
Understanding the dislocating effects of migration	144
Migration and conflict: A theoretical framework	146
Conclusion	150
<b>Chapter 7: Integration of migration in development planning</b>	<b>153</b>
The transformation of local government in South Africa	153
National and provincial government	156
Local government (municipalities)	156
Migration and development planning: Current realities	163
Conclusion	176
<b>Chapter 8: Internal migration and development planning in post-1994 South Africa: Final deliberations</b>	<b>181</b>
The power of money in directing migration	182
The process of urbanisation sustained in both inter- and intra-provincial migration flows	183
Changes in black African migration, from oscillatory migration to gravity flow migration	184
Profile of migrants	184

Contents

Migration and development	184
Improve data on internal migration	185
Develop specialised academic curricula on migration and development	185
Include both inter- and intra-provincial migration flows in migration analysis	186
Include data on migration and urbanisation in the development of the planning processes of local authorities	186
Develop an institutional mechanism that ensures the collaborative involvement of the different spheres of government to allow for the comprehensive management of migration	187
Concluding remarks	187
<b>References</b>	<b>189</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>207</b>

# Biographical note

## **Ilse Eigelaar-Meets**

Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology,  
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Stellenbosch University,  
Stellenbosch, South Africa  
Email: [iem@sun.ac.za](mailto:iem@sun.ac.za)  
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4868-2165>

Ilse Eigelaar-Meets holds qualifications in Sociology, including a PhD in Sociology of Development from Stellenbosch University, received in 2018. She also received a Master of Philosophy degree (MPhil) in Social Research Methods from Stellenbosch University in 2001 and a Bachelor of Arts (BA) Hons in Sociology from Stellenbosch University in 1999. Throughout her career, Ilse has worked as a researcher and project manager in various institutions, including National and Provincial governments, such as the National Advisory Council for Innovation in 2001, the Department of Social Development Western Cape Provincial Government from 2002 to 2003, the University of Stellenbosch from 2004 to 2006 and as the deputy director for research at the Department of Local Government and Housing of the Western Cape Provincial Government from 2007 to 2009. From 2010 to 2021, she headed Soreaso, a social research consultancy, while teaching part-time at various tertiary institutions in South Africa. In 2022, she joined the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Stellenbosch University on a full-time basis as a lecturer.



# Abbreviations and acronyms, figures and tables appearing in the text and notes

## List of abbreviations and acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
CMA	Cape Metropolitan Area
CoCT	City of Cape Town
DCoG	Department of Cooperative Governance
DEDAT	Department of Economic Development and Tourism
DLGH	Department of Local Government and Housing
DM	district municipality
DPLG	Department of Provincial and Local Government
EA	enumerated area
ECSECC	Eastern Cape Socio Economic Consultative Council
ETU	Educational and Training Unit for Democracy and Development
EU	European Union
GDP	gross domestic product
GMG	Global Migration Group
GVA	gross value added
HDI	Human Development Index
HH	household
Hons	honours degree
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
KPI	key performance indicators
LED	local economic development
LGES	Local Government Equitable Share
LGNF	Local Government Negotiating Forum
LGTA	<i>Local Government Transition Act</i>
MEC	member of the executive council
MPhil	Master of Philosophy degree
NP	National Party
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development



PCAS	Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services
PGDS	Provincial Growth and Development Strategy
PhD	Doctor of Philosophy degree
RM	resource mobilisation
SAIRR	South African Institute for Race Relations
SANCO	South African National Civics Organisation
SDF	Spatial Development Framework
SPSS	Statistical Programme for Social Sciences
StatsSA	Statistics South Africa
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
WHO	World Health Organization

### List of figures

Figure 1.1:	Map illustrating the Eiselen line.	12
Figure 3.1:	Formula for measuring inter-provincial net migration rates.	80
Figure 3.2:	Formula for measuring intra-provincial net migration rates.	81
Figure 3.3:	Formula for measuring internal migration rates (the sum of inter-provincial and intra-provincial migrants).	82
Figure 3.4:	Formula for measuring the mobility of inter-provincial migrants in terms of age and population group.	83
Figure 3.5:	Formula for measuring the mobility of intra-provincial migrants in terms of age and population group.	84
Figure 4.1:	Net migration rates of Western Cape inter-provincial migrants (20+ years old) and population groups for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.	91
Figure 4.2:	Net migration rates of Western Cape inter-provincial migrants (20+ years old) and age cohort for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.	92
Figure 5.1:	Net migration rates of Northern Cape inter-provincial migrants (20+ years old) and population group for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.	111
Figure 5.2:	Net migration rates of Northern Cape inter-provincial migrants (20+ years old) and age cohort for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.	112

Figure 5.3: Intra-provincial net migration rates on the district level for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.	120
--	-----

## List of tables

Table 1.1: Surface area and population density data of the Western Cape province by district municipality for 1996, 2011 and 2022.	22
Table 1.2: Summary description of the five district municipalities in the Northern Cape (2011).	28
Table 1.3: Comparison of population size and growth for the Northern Cape and South Africa for 1996, 2001, 2007 and 2011.	30
Table 3.1: The data used in the analysis and how it was captured in the two respective censuses in measuring migration.	78
Table 4.1: Mobility rates (%) among population groups in the Western Cape for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011 (those 20 years old or older).	94
Table 4.2: Comparison of inter- and intra-provincial migration rates for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.	98
Table 4.3: Sending and receiving areas of intra-provincial migrants for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.	99
Table 4.4: Intra-provincial net migration rates on district and metro levels for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.	100
Table 4.5: Intra-provincial migration to Overberg municipalities for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.	102
Table 4.6: Intra-provincial migration to West Coast municipalities for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.	103
Table 5.1: Mobility rates among population groups in the Northern Cape for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011 (those 20 years old or older).	114
Table 5.2: Mobility rates within age cohorts in the Northern Cape population for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011 (those 20 years old or older).	115
Table 5.3: Comparison of inter- and intra-provincial migration rates for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.	119
Table 5.4: Sending and receiving districts of intra-provincial migrants in the Northern Cape for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.	120

Table 5.5:	Receiving municipalities of intra-provincial migrants to the ZF Mgcawu district for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.	123
Table 5.6:	Receiving municipalities of intra-provincial migrants to the Pixley Ka Seme district for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.	125
Table 6.1:	Comparison of Western Cape internal and intra-provincial net migration rates.	138
Table 6.2:	Comparison of Northern Cape internal and intra-provincial net migration rates.	138
Table 7.1:	Indicators included in the population profile of Western Cape district municipalities integrated development planning.	170
Table 7.2:	Indicators included in the population profile of Northern Cape district municipalities integrated development planning.	170

# The relationship between internal migration and development planning in post-1994 South Africa

The integration of internal migration in development planning initiatives in post-apartheid South Africa is the primary concern of this publication. Demographic data are at the heart of population dynamics. It provides the concrete basis that makes it possible to determine demographic trends in a country. As an era increasingly exhibiting the realities and scars of wars and the ever-impeding disaster of climate change, some, including myself, would argue that demographic challenges probably constitute the key challenges faced by the world today. These challenges include the realities of ageing populations together with declining fertility rates, large migration flows, and rapid growth of megacities, all of which have a direct impact on both challenges and possibilities that need to be incorporated into development planning processes and initiatives.

Generally, demographic data are associated with the field of demography, which refers to the academic discipline of studying populations, by focusing on the following aspects: (1) the size of a population and how it fluctuates over time, (2) geographic distribution of

**How to cite:** Eigelaar-Meets, I 2024, 'The relationship between internal migration and development planning in post-1994 South Africa', in *Internal migration and development planning in South Africa*, AVARSITY Books, Cape Town, pp. 1-38. <https://doi.org/10.4102/aosis.2024.BK463.01>

a population, (3) population structure – the number of males and females of each age and (4) population characteristics – a description of the people that live in a defined geographic space in terms of variables such as educational status, income, occupation, family and household structures and relationships, and citizen status.

For any individual interested in or responsible for development planning, taking note of demographic trends is essential as it not only illustrates the outcome of past social change but also offers a future lens through which both shorter and longer terms social changes can be anticipated and subsequently planned for. Demographic change is essentially driven by three fundamental factors: mortality, fertility, and migration. Although all three factors are important to incorporate in development planning initiatives, the focus of this book is on migration.

The motivation to write a book that focusses on internal migration and development planning stems directly from my own experiences and observations as both an academic, research and previously a development planning practitioner employed in the public sector. Acknowledging the active role and impact of this demographic indicator in driving swift and sometimes profound shifts in population dynamics, as well as its direct impact on affected communities, I am firmly convinced of this project's importance.

Of course, changes in fertility and mortality trends bring about population change. However, migration, even in the absence of a demographic transition, has been shown to have the potential to profoundly alter a community or an entire country within a short time. Even in the instance of zero-net migration, meaning an equal number of in- and out-migrants, the flow of people into and out of a defined geographic area can still have a significant impact on the social and economic structure of that community (Weeks 2012). It is this often rapid change in social and economic structure that is the cause of many tensions and challenges to development that confront local, national and international government structures and thus needs to be understood in order to be incorporated in development planning exercises and initiatives.

Migration, fertility and mortality do, of course, not stand as isolated factors to social change but generally behave in an interdependent relationship where migration, for example, both influences and is in turn influenced by mortality and fertility trends in both sending and receiving communities. Thus, social change is not only brought about by adding or subtracting individuals from an area through migration, but further change is facilitated through changes in fertility and mortality resulting from migration behaviour.

In South Africa, the impact of migration, particularly internal migration, has undeniably affected the nature of urbanisation and the characteristics of the urban population. The key question, however, is how we consider these trends in such a manner as to inform and contribute to development planning efforts. What indicators do we consider, and within what framework should we understand observed trends?

I attempt to answer these questions by using two case studies. In this publication, the internal migration trends of the Western Cape and Northern Cape are presented for the period 1996 to 2011. Selected demographic characteristics of migrants are described, and their application to and impact on development planning is illustrated. In making sense of current and past migration trends, it is important to understand the context in which these migration flows have been taking place. This is achieved by considering the political and socio-economic factors that underlie these moves generally to be found in the history of a specific geographic and political space as well as migration theory.

The Western and Northern Cape provinces were purposefully selected because of three shared geographical and historical characteristics as listed below.

1. These two provinces served as the first point of entry and settlement for European colonialists, marking the establishment of a long era of suppression of and discrimination against the indigenous people of the country.
2. The institutionalisation of the *Coloured Labour Preference Policy* – a specific control mechanism applied by the apartheid government and only relevant within a specific geographical space demarcated from the rest of the country by an artificial political borderline, the so-called Eiselen line. This demarcated area included the entire current Western Cape province as well as a large part of the Northern Cape. The *Coloured Labour Preference Policy* was a control mechanism implemented by the apartheid government to protect coloured labour within the defined geographical space by preventing the movement of black African persons into these areas. As a result of this policy, the black African population was mostly excluded from urbanisation in these two provinces, a trend that changed significantly in the post-1994 era. The observed changes in black African migration post-1994 and how it has resulted in observed shifts in the nature and composition of both residents and internal migrants in both provinces constitute the focus of the migration analysis in this publication.
3. In their efforts to manage and control black African urbanisation in the Western part of the Cape Province by means of the *Coloured*

*Labour Preference Policy*,<sup>1</sup> the apartheid government engineered a demographic composition that resulted in a coloured majority and a black African minority in this province. This outcome was still evident in the 2011 population census, with these two provinces being the only two provinces in the country where the coloured population group constituted a significant share of the population, as opposed to a strong black African majority in the other seven provinces.<sup>2</sup>

One aspect that still requires clarification in setting the context of this publication is the focus on internal migration as opposed to the more often discussed topic of international migration. The focus on internal migration in this book is deliberate, considering its dynamic and often disregarded nature and subsequent impact on socio-economic development. Given the general priority and, dare I say, preoccupation with international migration in research, policy and planning discussions, this publication is an effort to address this bias by illustrating the impact of these flows in facilitating drastic and rapid demographic changes in communities.

In the past decade, migration has somehow come to mean international migration, with a preoccupation with the international movement of individuals and households and very little attention to internal migration flows. Typically, discussions on migration focus on migration flows from developing countries to the rich and developed countries of Europe, North America and Australasia despite the fact that mobility in most cases does not refer to cross-border migration but rather internal or domestic movement. Compared to international migration, domestic mobility is far more significant in numeric terms, with most migrants moving within their own country rather than between countries. The 2020 World Migration Report estimates that there were approximately 281 million international migrants globally in 2020, which is 3.6% of the global population. Although recent data on the number of internal migrants is not available, the number was estimated at 740 million in 2009, which is 11% of the global population, with approximately 40% of urbanisation in the developing world of Asia, Africa and Latin America attributed to internal migration (IOM 2022). King et al. (2008) confirm this finding when they emphasise the era of migration

---

1. The *Coloured Labour Preference Policy* was implemented in 1955 by the apartheid government within specifically demarcated parts in the then Cape Province. Its objectives were described by scholars as threefold: (1) to prevent the movement of black African persons into this area; (2) to secure the labour market for the coloured population; and (3) to preserve the province as a part of South Africa where the white population would remain numerically dominant (Cilliers & Bekker 1980; Goldin 1984; ed. Horner 1983; Humphries 1992; Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 2008; Mountain 2003; Scanlon 2007; West 1982).

2. During the 1996, 2001 and 2011 Censuses, the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces were the only two provinces that had a coloured population majority at the time, compared to the remaining seven provinces that had a Black African majority.

to also be characterised by significant internal migration, particularly in less developed countries that are experiencing rapid growth.

A possible reason for the bias towards international migration despite its inferiority when compared to domestic mobility is the political nature thereof. In this context, a clear definition of the 'other' exists, and often, as is certainly the case in South Africa, there is a perception of the 'other' as a threat that deprives local citizens of economic and other resources.

Another aspect that needs to be noted in this regard is the *blurred* conceptualisations that often exist between internal and international migration. Illustrating this, King et al. (2008) consider the arbitrary nature of two typical indicators used to characterise these two mobility types, namely *distance* travelled and the crossing of international *borders*. Pointing out the insignificant nature of these two characteristics as defining criteria for the two respective migration streams, King et al. show the insignificance of distance as a defining criterion comparing a 10 km relocation from Geneva across the border into France with a 4,000 km move within one country, for example, moving from New York to California. In the South African context, this would compare to a relocation distance of 365 km from Botswana (Gaborone) to South Africa (Johannesburg) compared to a 1,825 km move from Makhado (Limpopo Province in South Africa) to Cape Town (Western Cape province in South Africa). The appropriateness of defining the characteristic of international migration as requiring a move across a defined international border has increasingly been questioned because of possible changes to and the fluidity of these borders, with the following quote eloquently discussing this (King et al. 2008):

[T]he European Union and its frontier-free 'Schengenland' create a borderless zone for mobility which is more akin to internal migration than 'traditional' international migration with its regime of passports, visas and border controls. Moreover, borders themselves can be mobile; they can appear or disappear, or move across people. German unification transformed international migrants into internal migrants. (p. 4)

Another point to consider, and specifically relevant to the African context, is the link between internal and international migration, with the latter being described as simply an extension of the former, with both migration streams driven by the same set of fundamental causes: inequalities in development, employment prospects, incomes and living conditions between and within countries. In such a context, internal and international migration function as complementary modes of mobility, where one can easily supplement or even substitute the other, depending on the changing political and economic circumstances.

Be it as it may, the fact remains that when considering the impact of migration on population characteristics and socio-economic dynamics, the



impact of internal migration is often neglected. Ironically, the impact of internal migration is generally not unnoticed, particularly in receiving areas. The rapidly increasing number of people is a stark reality that cannot be ignored. Developing strategic approaches to address the impact of internal migration on communities and incorporating these approaches into development planning structures, policies and initiatives is of utmost importance when considering the socio-economic well-being of communities.

Migration is, however, always firmly set within a context produced in both historic and current realities. With the latter addressed later in this publication, the former, key historic forces that are believed to have played a significant part in influencing post-apartheid internal migration flows in South Africa are addressed in this chapter.

## ■ The pre-1994 governance framework

A distinct feature of the apartheid government was the strict control it exerted over the mobility of individuals classified as black African, coloured and Indian, and Asian. An understanding of how national apartheid legislation sets out to manage and subsequently manipulate migration in South Africa is essential because it provides the necessary context for the interpretation and better understanding of post-apartheid migration trends. An overview of the historical context serves to locate and contextualise the findings by arguing that these measures had a definite impact on the characteristics of post-apartheid internal migration and urbanisation trends.

The victory of DF Malan's National Party in the election of 26 May 1948 introduced an era of institutionalised discrimination against so-called non-Europeans in South Africa (Lipton 1986; Giliomee & Mbenga 2007). The notion of what was to come was clearly implied by Malan after winning the election in the following quote (Giliomee & Mbenga 2007):

Today South Africa belongs to us [*white Afrikaner*]<sup>3</sup> once more. South Africa is our own for the first time since Union, and may God grant that it will always remain our own. (p. 310)

The enactment of apartheid laws in 1948 resulted in the institutionalisation of discrimination against specific groups of people based on their population group. Apartheid, a word that means separateness in Afrikaans and Dutch, is the name that was given to the policy of separating people by population group. Restricting all power to whites, apartheid as a political system constituted (Giliomee & Mbenga 2007):

---

3. Added by the author.

[R]acial classification, racial sex laws, group areas for each racial community, segregated schools and universities, the elimination of integrated public facilities and sport, protection for whites in the labour market, a system of influx control that stemmed the movement of blacks to cities, and designated 'homelands' for blacks as the basis for preventing them from demanding rights in the common era. (n.p.)

This political regime effectively influenced all aspects of social life, separating people with regard to residential area, schooling, workplace and even the graveyard in which they were laid to rest (Clark & Worger 2004; Institute of Justice and Reconciliation 2004; Lipton 1986; Mountain 2003).

The legislative policies and state actions of the apartheid government did not only work towards the physical and social separation of black and white citizens of the Republic but also enforced strong regulatory actions in the controlling of population movement or migration of specifically black African individuals. Social and physical segregation was enforced and secured by measures such as the *Immorality Act 5 of 1927*, which forbade sex between black African and white persons, and the *Native Urban Areas Act 27 of 1923*, which confined black African people to segregated townships or locations (Giliomee & Mbenga 2007; ed. Lemon 1991; Lipton 1986; Muthien 1994; Wentzel & Tlabela 2006 in eds. Kok et al. 2006; Turok 2012).

These regulatory actions represented a political initiative not only to curtail the economic rights and thus potential of the black African population but also to counter the strong urbanisation trend of this population group. The accelerated rate of urbanisation brought about a dramatic growth in the number of urban black African people, specifically males, and was a direct result of deteriorating economies in the African reserves on the one hand and on the other hand, a growth in the demand for employment in the urban-based manufacturing sector of South Africa (Goldin 1984; Lipton 1986; Wentzel & Tlabela 2006 in eds. Kok et al. 2006; Kurtok 2012).

In 1912, approximately 420,000 black individuals resided in towns and cities, accounting for one-third of the country's urban population and 13% of the black population, resulting in the rapid establishment of squatter camps on the outskirts of the cities (Giliomee & Mbenga 2007). This number grew to 28% in 1951 and 31% in 1960 (ed. Lemon 1991). This growing black urbanisation undermined the fundamental philosophy of separatism espoused by the Afrikaner nationalists, finally resulting in the implementation of strict legislative measures to regulate the conditions under which black African people were permitted to live and work in urban areas. Commonly known as the South African policy of influx control or pass laws, such measures required all black African males over sixteen years old to carry a

'pass' or reference book, which recorded their permission to work, live and move about in a particular designated white area (Lipton 1986; Wentzel & Tlabela 2006 in eds. Kok et al. 2006).

The apartheid government implemented the policy of influx control with two primary objectives. Firstly, it aimed at regulating the urbanisation of black Africans within the Republic by controlling their migration from rural and homeland areas into towns and cities classified as white areas. The rationale behind this regulatory system was the belief that uncontrolled urbanisation would lead to low welfare levels for both existing urban dwellers and new black African entrants. Secondly, the policy involved resettling as many black African communities as possible to so-called Bantustans, also known as homeland towns. By doing so, the process of black African urbanisation was redirected away from major metropolitan areas towards these 'independent' homelands. The justification for these resettlements was rooted in the geo-political ideology that underpinned the concept of separate development (Bekker & Humphries 1985).

In the early 1970s, it became evident that the apartheid government's efforts to eliminate a permanently settled black African population in urban areas were failing. Despite various laws aimed at managing and restricting black African migration, squatter camps on the outskirts of major metropolitan areas continued to grow rapidly. This population increase was not solely because of black African labour migration but also as a result of the natural growth of black African residents who were already settled in urban areas. The demographic trend and reality were not taken into account by the apartheid government (Gelderblom & Kok 1994; Olivier-Evans 1993; Wentzel & Tlabela 2006):

The additional population was accommodated through increased densities in the township houses as well as by extensive backyard squatting. At some stage in the 1970s an average of 14-15 people was estimated per four-roomed house in Soweto, but this was surpassed by the density of around 40 people per house that was recorded in some areas of the Eastern Cape. (p. 90)

Although the rapidly growing black African population in the urban centres was a concern for the apartheid government, it also realised the inevitable need for this urbanisation to meet the labour and workforce needs of a growing and changing economy. In addition, the settlement system that the government tried to build was proving unsustainable and impractical (Gelderblom & Kok 1994; Wentzel & Tlabela 2006 in eds. Kok et al. 2006).

In response to the growing influx of migrant workers settling in urban areas, the President's Council issued a report in 1985 advocating for the removal of discriminatory elements from influx control. Instead, they proposed a positive strategy that highlights the developmental significance

of 'orderly urbanisation' (Gelderblom & Kok 1994; Olivier-Evans 1993). The *White Paper on Urbanisation* (Republic of South Africa 1986), tabled in April 1986, described this notion of 'orderly urbanisation' as measures that assume the freedom of movement and management of economic and social dynamics. Furthermore, it was said to necessitate a structured approach, primarily relying on indirect controls, such as incentives and restrictive measures, alongside direct legislative and regulatory actions (Olivier-Evans 1993).

While on the one hand advocating the management of orderly migration and on the other hand constituting a number of indirect forms of control, this policy was deemed to serve as a means to distribute both population and economic activity more evenly on a national level (Olivier-Evans 1993). In reality, however, 'orderly urbanisation' simply involved the ordering and directing of black African urbanisation by means of numerous direct control measures through existing legislation, such as those applicable to group areas, squatting and slums, health services, immigration and security (Olivier-Evans 1993; Wentzel & Tlabela 2006 in eds. Kok et al. 2006). It should thus come as no surprise that many critics viewed this policy as simply a substantially more subtle form of control 'cloaked in an ostensibly racially neutral guise' (Olivier-Evans 1993, p. 2).

The deconcentration of the black African population clearly reflected a determination by the apartheid government to divert the urbanisation of this population group away from close contact with existing, white-controlled metropolitan areas. Ultimately, this policy caused grave disadvantages to major metropolitan areas, severely curtailing urban growth and industrial development (Olivier-Evans 1993). In terms of the application of the deconcentration programmes, the central government shifted major responsibilities to the local authorities (Regional Service Councils) by strategically delegating not only the responsibility for the delivery of low-income housing, transport, bulk and social services but also the financial burden and management of urbanisation. This caused local authorities to 'become the administrative buffer' between policy makers, central government and citizens directly affected by these policies on a daily level (City of Cape Town 1987, p. ii, cited in Olivier-Evans 1993, p. 6).

One such policy, designed as an influx control measure with specific relevance to the Western and Northern Cape provinces, is the 1962 *Coloured Labour Preference Policy*. This policy was a unique measure in that it (1) was only applicable in a specifically defined geographical space in the Republic and (2) was the only measure that offered political 'protection' and gain to another population group (in this case, the coloured population group) other than the white population group. This protection was partly offered to the coloured population because of their historical roots in the defined geographical space demarcated for the implementation of this policy.

The *Coloured Labour Preference Policy*, officially established in 1955 after persistent advocacy for preferential employment and housing for the coloured population, had two primary objectives. Firstly, it aimed to control the influx of black African individuals from the homelands/Bantustans into the western part of the Cape Province. Secondly, it sought to enhance the coloured population's participation in the labour market while safeguarding them from competition with black African workers. This was achieved by excluding black African individuals not born in South Africa from the area, capping the number of families with residence rights and limiting the recruitment of migrant workers (Cilliers & Bekker 1980; Goldin 1984; ed. Horner 1983; Humphries 1992; Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 2008; Mountain 2003; Scanlon 2007; West 1982). The policy, however, also served a third, hidden and implicit purpose, which was to maintain the Western Province as a region of South Africa where the white population would continue to be numerically dominant (Goldin 1984).

In 1954, during a parliamentary session, the then Minister of Native Affairs, Dr HF Verwoerd, officially proposed the idea of designating the western part of the Cape Province as a coloured labour preference area (Cole 2012; Goldin 1984; ed. Horner 1983; Humphries 1992; Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 2008; Mountain 2003). In his address, Eiselen offered two justifications for the new policy and the subsequent removal of all black African people from this vast section of the Cape Province (Snitcher 1957):

It was necessary, Dr Eiselen said, to remove all the Natives from this vast section of the Union because 'the Western Province was the natural home of the coloured people. And they had the right to be protected against the competition of Natives in the labour market'. After alleging that 'miscegenation took place between coloured people and Natives' and that 'coloured women preferred to live with Natives because they offered them better security', Dr Eiselen stated that 'the effect that Natives and Coloureds lived and worked together [...] was leading to the disappearance of social and cultural differences between the two groups' [*sic*]. (pp. 40–41)

The notion of protection of the coloured population was probably based on the observed growth in the number of black African people living in the Cape Province from 30,000 to 178,000 for the period 1921 to 1955. Dr Eiselen attributed this growth to the industrial development experienced within the province during that time, together with the preference of employers for black African labour. The preference for black African labour over coloured labour was justified by the belief that black African workers possessed greater physical strength and were less prone to alcohol addiction. Additionally, black African individuals were considered less 'city wise'. Consequently, proponents of this policy argued that to safeguard the social, cultural and economic interests of the coloured population, it was imperative to exclude the black African population from the province.


In this way reestablishing the traditional demographic balance of the Western Province (Snitcher 1957).

The origin of the *Coloured Labour Preference Policy* was, however, not an initiative to protect the coloured population but rather an additional attempt of the ruling class to deflect the challenge of mass opposition against the apartheid state (Goldin 1984).

Doctor WWM Eiselen, in defining this policy, contented that its primary objective was the gradual relocation of black African individuals from the western parts of the Cape Province, considered as the natural home of the coloured population, who consequently deserved market protection (Golding 1984). The policy was to be implemented in three stages, as described below.

1. Removal of the foreign black African population and freezing of the number of black African families, coupled with the limited importation of single migrant workers to meet the most urgent needs of industry.
2. Removal of the protectorate black African population and reduction of the number of black African families, with the gradual replacement of migrant workers by coloured workers.
3. Screening of the black African population and classifying them into two groups: The first group consists of black African persons 'who have remained Bantu' and who, in time, can be moved back to the reserves where they can play an important role in the building up of an urban economy. The second group comprises black African persons 'who have established relationships with coloured women and who, in all but colour, belong to the coloured community'. This category should obtain coloured citizenship and qualify for residential rights within the coloured community (ed. Horner 1983, p. 95; Lee-Warden 1957; Snitcher 1957, pp. 43-44).

In 1955, Dr Eiselen delivered a statement outlining the policy of *Coloured Labour Preference* in detail and the demarcated geographical space in which this policy was to be applied (ed. Horner 1983). Dr Eiselen demarcated an area south of the Orange River and west of a line stretching from the magisterial district of Gordonia (Upington), Hopetown, De Aar, Hanover, Richmond, Murraysburg, Aberdeen, Willowmore, Uniondale and Knysna, in all, approximately one-quarter of the province. Between 1955 and 1967, this line was adjusted to the east to include an even larger part of the province. This demarcation line would later be known as the Eiselen line (Cilliers & Bekker 1980; Cole 2012; ed. Horner 1983; Snitcher 1957; West 1982). In essence, this demarcated area (refer to Figure 1.1) referred to as the Western Province was to become the Coloured Labour Preference area, an area from which the government intended to remove all black African people (Cilliers & Bekker 1980; Cole 2012; ed. Horner 1983; Snitcher 1957; West 1982).



Source: Reproduced with permission from Cole, J 2012, *Behind and beyond the Eiselen line*, St George's Cathedral Crypt Memory and Witness Centre, Cape Town.<sup>4</sup>

**FIGURE 1.1:** Map illustrating the Eiselen line.

The policy, no matter how it was rationalised and defended by the ruling party, did not go unchallenged. Criticism was expressed by many sources, such as the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, members of all the opposition parties in Parliament, farmers and various employers' associations. Critics raised mostly economic objections to this policy, highlighting the futility of any attempt to impose an economic and social downgrade on the coloured population, arguing that such a downgrade would shift skilled or semi-skilled workers into the category of unskilled labourers. In addition, critics predicted severe economic repercussions in the Western Province if there were any restrictions on the flow of black African labour. In response, the government argued that because the significant increase in the black African population was primarily driven by industrial development in the region and would continue to demand more

4. Every effort has been made to protect the interest of copyright holders. Should any infringement have occurred inadvertently, the publisher apologises and undertakes to amend the omission in case of a reprint.

labour, it became crucial to meticulously manage this expansion (Snitcher 1957, p. 41). As expected, this response did nothing to dispel anxiety among major employers.

The migration history in South Africa is distinctly marked by racial divisions. Certain individuals faced significant constraints and strict regulation of their mobility based solely on their racial categorisation. While the apartheid government's efforts to control population influx for industrial and urban development were largely ineffective across the entire Republic, they had a profound impact on migration patterns in the former Cape Province. This impact was achieved by imposing stringent limitations on the movement of the black African population while simultaneously fostering a favourable living environment for the coloured population.

The history of migration in South Africa is clearly set along racial lines, with some individuals having experienced significant limitations and restrictive control of their movement based purely on their racial classification. Although the influx-control measures implemented by the apartheid government to curtail industrialisation and subsequent urbanisation did not prove successful throughout the country, it was very successful in shaping the migration landscape in the previous Cape Province. This was achieved by enforcing firm restrictions on the movement of the black African population while, at the same time, creating a favourable living environment for the coloured population.

In 1994, a new era dawned in South African history, with the first democratic elections in that year. The African National Congress (ANC) won the elections, and the old apartheid government was replaced by a new democratic dispensation led by Nelson Mandela, the first democratically elected president of South Africa. With the new dispensation came the abolishment of all legislation that restricted the movement and mobility of selected population groups. The legacy of the apartheid system in its attempt to alter the racial distribution of the population, however, had an important and pervasive impact on patterns of internal migration in South Africa as well as the demographic profiles of particularly the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces (Apartheid Museum 2008; Gelderblom & Kok 1994; eds. Kok et al. 2006). The legacy of the *Coloured Preference Labour Policy* was still evident in the 2011 census. Despite the substantial influx of black African individuals since democratisation, particularly in the Western Cape, the demographic composition of the Western and Northern Cape retained a notable coloured population in comparison to the other seven provinces (StatsSA 2012b).

Today, South Africans are highly mobile and move freely as economic migrants from rural to urban areas, urban to urban areas and within both rural and urban areas. However, post-1994, internal migration flows illustrate certain preferred destination areas, which are mainly associated



with urbanisation. Gauteng and the Western Cape, particularly Cape Town, consistently receive large influxes of internal migrants from all areas of the country (StatsSA 2023). These migration flows are not new and have been sustained since pre-democracy despite stringent controlling mechanisms. What do we learn from this? Firstly, it is impossible to stop migration. You might be able to limit it to some extent, but even that was found in history to be impossible to sustain. Secondly, it illustrates the power of policy and associated actions to direct and determine not just present realities but also the realities of future generations.

## ■ The post-1994 governance framework

The year 1994 saw the end of just more than four decades of the apartheid regime in South Africa, with one of its distinct features being the strict control exerted over the mobility and place of residence of individuals classified as black African, coloured and Indian/Asian<sup>5</sup> opposed to white individuals who enjoyed freedom and political support. Given this specific restrictive dynamic and history, the phenomenon of accelerated internal mobility or migration flows experienced by these population groups over the last two decades is to be expected. Unlike the tightly regulated nature of human mobility during the apartheid era, the new democratic dispensation has embraced an unregulated approach. The new political dispensation recognised free movement as a fundamental human right, a right that stands beyond its purview. This shift has fuelled urbanisation, with significant migration streams converging towards urban centres, particularly towards Gauteng and Cape Town.<sup>6</sup>

Unlike the exclusive and centralist development agenda of the apartheid government, the new democratically elected government has institutionalised an inclusive socio-economic development agenda. This agenda emphasises participatory democracy as a mechanism to engage citizens in governance structures. Additionally, a multi-level system of governance, negotiated in the 1990s between the old apartheid government and the ANC, was formally adopted in the new Constitution (Republic of South Africa [RSA] 1996) (Simeon & Murray 2008).

This multi-level system of governance was envisioned as the means through which an inclusive socio-economic development agenda

---

5. When referring to the different population groups, this publication follows the four classifications defined and used by Statistics South Africa (StatsSA).

6. It would, however, be simplistic and naïve to attribute the dynamic nature of post-apartheid South Africa's internal migration flows purely to the freedom of movement allowed under a democratic government. A multitude of variables regulate or influence the willingness, ability and finally the decision to migrate. This complexity is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 and will be revisited in subsequent chapters.

would be implemented. In this multi-level system, the Constitution (RSA 1996) provides for three spheres of government: national, provincial and local. The relationship between these three spheres is described in Article (40)1 of the Constitution (RSA 1996) to be cooperative, interdependent and interrelated, and each has particular assigned powers and is independently elected (RSA 1996; Simeon & Murray 2008; South African Government n.d.c). Collectively, the responsibilities of the government can be reduced to two tasks. Firstly, it oversees the regulatory function, which involves creating policies and laws related to citizens' rights, responsibilities and service delivery. Secondly, the government is responsible for providing infrastructure and services to its people. It achieves this by collecting revenue through taxes and utilising those funds to enhance the lives of all citizens, especially those in need (Educational and Training Unit for Democracy and Development [ETU] 2015; South African Government n.d.c).

The three spheres of government collaborate to fulfil the defined tasks, each with its specific responsibilities. The national government formulates policies, enacts laws, and coordinates with provinces and municipalities. Provincial governments, on the other hand, focus on economic and social development within their regions. These efforts align with their Provincial Growth and Development Strategies (PGDS) and Spatial Development Frameworks (SDF), all operating within the broader legislative and policy framework established by the national government (ETU 2015; Republic of South Africa 1996; South African Government n.d.b).

In every province, the Department of Local Government and provincial members of the executive council (MECs) oversee the co-ordination, monitoring and assistance to municipalities, which constitute the third level of governance. In this context, local government (municipalities), which is the closest to citizens, is tasked to focus on service delivery, guided by its integrated development plan (IDP) (ETU 2015; Republic of South Africa 1996).

## ■ A contextual and historical overview of the two case studies

'The post-1994 governance framework' section provides a concise overview of significant governance structures that are believed to have directly influenced both past and present migration patterns in South Africa. Now, we need to delve into the specific case studies, the Northern and Western Cape provinces, that are used in this book to demonstrate how migration data could inform development planning. The objective of this section is not to present a comprehensive historical overview of events that occurred in the two provinces but rather to highlight key historical and contemporary forces that are believed to have shaped post-apartheid migration in these

two case studies. The aim is to illustrate how past forces continue to shape population distribution and movement and thus highlight the importance of taking cognisance of such historical forces when trying to comprehend and understand contemporary trends and realities.

I will begin by describing key events that occurred in the Western Cape province, by again focusing only on key aspects within its historical context and current realities that are considered particularly relevant to contextualising current migration trends. Before concluding this chapter, this section will present key events relevant to contextualising current migration flows in the Western Cape province and the Northern Cape province.

## ■ Western Cape province

### □ 1652-1994

The political history of the Western Cape dates to 06 April 1652, when Jan van Riebeeck, under the direct orders of the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-indische Compagnie [OVC]), planted the Dutch flag on the shores of Table Bay to establish the Cape Colony. This occasion introduced the long and steady era of the 'official colonisation'<sup>7</sup> that marks the history of South Africa (Giliomee & Mbenga 2007; Mountain 2003; Oliver & Oliver 2017). Rule by the Dutch East Indian Company would continue in the Cape Colony until September 1795, when the Netherlands were conquered by the then newly founded Republic of France following the French Revolution. Following this victory, the Netherlands became known as the Batavian Republic and Prince Willem of Orange, the ruler of the Netherlands, had to flee to England. In an effort to prohibit the occupation of Dutch colonies by the French, the prince asked Britain for assistance, who obliged and subsequently occupied the Cape Colony. Britain returned the Cape Colony to the Netherlands in February 1803, in terms of the Treaty of Amiens signed in 1802 between England and France, whereafter it was renamed the Batavian Republic (Giliomee & Mbenga 2007; Howcroft n.d.).

The Dutch governed for only another three years when the Cape Colony was colonised for a second time by Britain during the 1803 war in Europe in an effort to secure trade between Britain and the East and the Cape offered an ideal place for ships to obtain fresh water and produce.

---

7. In their study, *The Colonisation of South Africa: A unique case*, Oliver and Oliver (2017) describe the colonisation of South Africa as occurring in two phases, that is the unofficial and official phase, with the former referring to the invasions and migrations of farmer and metalworker groups who left North Africa to eventually settle in the northern to north-eastern part of current day South Africa.

This resulted in the second occupation of the Cape by Britain in January 1806 (Giliomee & Mbenga 2007; SA History online n.d.).

The colonisation of the Cape had detrimental effects on the indigenous people who inhabited the southern part of South Africa. Long before the first white settlement began in 1652, the San people lived in the South-Western part of the African continent that is today known as the Western Cape (Adhikari 2010; Oliver & Oliver 2017). The claim of the San people to this land was first challenged by Khoekhoe pastoralists who moved into the South-Western Cape approximately 2,000 years ago, where they started to compete with the San for resources such as water and game. This inevitably gave rise to conflict between the two groups, but the low population numbers of both groups as well as some integration, combined with the relative vastness of the land they inhabited, meant that co-existence was possible. It was, however, the arrival of the first Europeans in the 17th century that posed a serious threat to the survival of both the San and Khoekhoe (Adhikari 2010; Mountain 2003).

The indigenous people, including both the San and Khoekhoe, also referred to as the Koe-San as a generic term for the two groups, were left with little room to continue their traditional way of life in the face of ever-increasing land-hungry colonists tightening their grip on the Cape. The European occupation of land evoked different responses from this group, with some fighting to retain their land and to defend their way of life, others moving deeper inward to remote areas in the hope of maintaining their freedom, and others deciding to cooperate with colonial forces in an effort to gain protection and improve their economic status. Ultimately, whatever their decision, both the Dutch and subsequent British colonisation of the Cape resulted in the disintegration and virtual disappearance of the indigenous Khoesan societies that lived here. Not only did the group suffer great impoverishment at the hands of the nomadic pastoral farmers, also known as the trekboers, as they moved deeper into the interior, but many died in clashes with the Europeans fighting for their cultural survival (Allen, Mngqolo & Swanepoel 2012; Giliomee & Mbenga 2007; Mountain 2003).

In 1899, the Boer republics waged war against the British government of Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, otherwise known as Lord Salisbury,<sup>8</sup> with the latter aiming to secure its hegemony in Southern Africa and the former to preserve their independence. The Anglo-Boer War, or, as it is also referred to, the South African War, ended in 1902 with the Peace of Vereeniging that was signed in Pretoria (Allen et al. 2012; Giliomee & Mbenga 2007). In 1909, the four South African colonies merged as a response to clashing economic interests, with the passing of the *South African Act 1909* and the election

---

8. See <https://www.gov.uk/government/history/past-prime-ministers/robert-gascoyne-cecil>.

of General Louis Botha as the first Prime Minister (Roberts 1976). This was followed by the unionisation of South Africa on 31 May 1910 (Giliomee & Mbenga 2007; Mountain 2003).

The 20th century not only marked the end of the colonial era in South Africa but also the institutionalisation of apartheid ideology. The year 1948 saw the enactment of apartheid laws that would result in the institutionalisation of discrimination against specific groups of people based on their race or ethnicity (Clark & Worger 2004; Giliomee & Mbenga 2007; Institute of Justice and Reconciliation 2004; Lipton 1986; Mountain 2003). The legislative policies and state actions of the apartheid government did not only work towards the physical and social separation of black and white citizens of the Republic but also enforced strong regulatory actions in the controlling of population movement or migration of specifically African individuals. This was achieved specifically by means of the policy on influx control designed to (1) regulate the process of African urbanisation and (2) resettle as many as possible African communities living in the Republic in the so-called homeland towns or Bantustans, thus redirecting African urbanisation away from the main metropolitan areas. The policy of influx control and how it influenced early and current urbanisation is discussed earlier in this chapter.

From 1910 to 1994, South Africa consisted of four provinces, including the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and the Orange Free State province, with six 'self-governing' homelands and four 'independent' homelands added from the late 1950s onwards. It was only in 1995, following the first democratic elections in South Africa, that the Western Cape with its current boundaries was formed when the previous Cape Province, or Cape Colony as it was known under Dutch and British rule, was divided into three separate provinces: the Northern Cape, Eastern Cape and Western Cape.

## □ 1995–2022

In its current geographic demarcation, the Western Cape is bordered in the north by the Northern Cape and in the east by the Eastern Cape. As the fourth largest province in the country, the province covers a total land area of 129,462 km<sup>2</sup> (Statistics South Africa [StatsSA] 2012d) and is characterised by a diverse biophysical landscape that consists roughly of (Bekker 2002, p. 5):

- a coastal plain that skirts the province between the coastline and the mountains
- mountain-valley landscapes that run broadly parallel to the coastline and produce much of the province's annual rainfall
- the plains of the semi-arid Great Karoo that stretch far beyond the boundaries of the province.

At the local level, the administration of the province is managed in terms of one metropolitan municipality, the City of Cape Town (CoCT)<sup>9</sup> and five district municipalities, namely Cape Winelands, Central Karoo, Eden, West Coast and Overberg. These five districts are, in turn, divided into 24 local municipalities.<sup>10</sup> The Central Karoo District Municipality comprises the largest surface area in this province. However, it boasts the smallest population and thus exhibits the lowest population density per km<sup>2</sup> (1.8 persons per km<sup>2</sup>).<sup>11</sup> The Cape Winelands district exhibits the highest population density (35.3 persons per km<sup>2</sup>) of the five districts, with the CoCT illustrating a high population density (1,520.3 persons per km<sup>2</sup>).

The Western Cape province has a (relatively) strong economy that continues to grow faster than the national economy and is the third largest provincial economy, trailing Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. In the third quarter of 2023, the province contributed approximately 14.2% to the national gross domestic product (GDP) (WESGRO 2023). Next to Gauteng, the Western Cape has the second-largest GDP per capita, contributing an estimated ZAR97,664 per person to the national GDP in 2017 (StatsSA 2019).

Considering the real economic growth rates of the respective provinces in South Africa for the period 2003–2014, the Western Cape, together with Gauteng, recorded an average growth rate of 4.2%, which was 0.5% higher than the national growth rate (StatsSA 2014). This stronger achievement continued in 2019, although it is a lower rate to be understood in the context of challenging national and global economic conditions following the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and the Russia and Ukrainian war. In fact, in 2019, the Western Cape (0.4%), Gauteng (0.6%) and KwaZulu-Natal (0.1%) were the only provinces that achieved economic growth, with all the other provinces either experiencing negative or

---

9. In South Africa, a metropolitan municipality or Category A municipality is a municipality that executes all the functions of local government for a city or conurbation. This contrasts with areas that are primarily rural in which the local government is divided into district municipalities and local municipalities. South Africa has eight metropolitan municipalities, including City of Cape Town, Buffalo City (Eastern Cape), City of Johannesburg (Gauteng), Ekurhuleni (Gauteng), City of Tshwane, eThekweni (KwaZulu-Natal), Mangaung (Free State) and Nelson Mandela Bay (Eastern Cape) (ETU 2015b).

10. The local municipalities and associated seats are: (1) *Cape Winelands District*: Witzenberg (Ceres), Drakenstein (Paarl), Stellenbosch (Stellenbosch), Breede valley (Worcester) and Langeberg (Ashton); (2) *Central Karoo*: Laingsburg (Laingsburg), Prince Albert (Prince Albert) and Beaufort West (Beaufort West); (3) *Garden Route*: Kannaland (Ladismith), Hessequa (Riversdale) and Mossel Bay (Mossel Bay); (4) *Overberg*: Theewaterskloof (Caledon), Overstrand (Hermanus), Cape Agulhas (Bredasdorp) and Swellendam (Swellendam); (5) *West Coast*: Matzikama (Vredendal), Cederberg (Clanwilliam), Bergrivier (Piketberg), Saldanha (Vredenburg) and Swartland (Malmesbury); (6) City of Cape Town (Cape Town) (Source: Republic of South Africa 2017b).

11. Population density refers to the number of permanent inhabitants per square kilometre (km<sup>2</sup>).

no growth. The national growth rate for the same period was 0.2% (Stats SA 2021).

In the third quarter of 2020, the Western Cape economy grew by 1.9%, with an achieved GDP of R659.79 billion, exceeding pre-pandemic levels. This positive economic growth continued in 2021, driven by growth in Gross Value Added (GVA) in mining and quarrying (19.07%), agriculture, fishing and forestry (8.17%), and trade, hotels and restaurants (6.83%) as the top three performing industries (WESGRO 2022).

The economy of the Western Cape is concentrated in the Cape Metro, with 80% of the sector involving the province's leading finance, insurance, real estate and business services residing here. This sector reveals comparative advantages in the Cape Metro and the Cape Winelands district. Eighty-four per cent of real value added is generated in the Cape Metropolitan Area (CMA) and the adjacent Cape Winelands district. The manufacturing sector, the second-largest in the province, accounts for 14% of the GDP (WESGRO 2022). This sector has a stronger presence in the economy of the Cape Winelands, accounting for one-quarter of economic activity in this district. In all the other districts, manufacturing activity accounts for approximately 16% to 18% of real GDP, with the Central Karoo being the only exception, offering a contribution below 11%. Almost 92% of manufacturing is located in the metro, Cape Winelands and Garden Route districts combined (Western Cape Provincial Treasury 2013).

The retail, wholesale, catering and accommodation sectors constitute the third largest sector, with a contribution of 13% to the Western Cape GDP in 2021 (WESGRO 2022). The tourism sector plays a key role in stimulating the growth of the internal trade sector, accounting for almost 18% of the economy in the Garden Route district. In all the other districts, retail, wholesale, catering and accommodation account for approximately 13% to 15% of real GDP (Western Cape Provincial Treasury 2013).

Two smaller economic sectors that play a key role in the economy of this province are the agricultural and construction sectors, contributing 4.5% and 2.3% to the GDP, respectively, in 2021 (WESGRO 2022). The agricultural sector provides employment for approximately 3% of the Western Cape population and is the most vital element in most of the non-metro district economies (Western Cape Provincial Treasury 2013) and showed an increase in the sector's share in total Western Cape employment, from 7.4% in 2018 to 8% in 2019. Nearly 50% of all farm employees are in the Cape Winelands district, with the West Coast and Overberg together accounting for an additional third (Partridge, Morokong & Sibulali 2020). In 2020, the national share of the agricultural sector in the Western Cape reached the 20% mark, with this sector accounting for 23.4% of the

national agricultural output and contributing 20% to the national GVA in the food, beverage and tobacco sectors (Morokong et al. 2021). With a contribution of 14% in 2021 to the national GDP, the competitive advantage of this province in agriculture is clear (Trade and Industry Policy Strategies [TIPS] 2022).

The favourable economic conditions prevalent in the province are also reflected in its Human Development Index (HDI), with all the districts in the Western Cape and the CoCT achieving improved HDIs from 2001 to 2011. The HDIs ranged from 0.71 to 0.65 across the districts, with the highest HDI levels recorded in the CoCT (Western Cape Provincial Treasury 2014).

At the time of the 2022 census, the population of the Western Cape was estimated at 7,433,020, with the majority (64.21%) residing in the CoCT, the urban centre of this province (StatsSA 2023). Although the population had increased consistently since the 1996 census, the distribution of the population across the province remained the same, with an increase in population density across all municipal districts. An interesting observation when analysing the annual population growth rates between the two censuses, that is, 1996–2011 and 2011–2022, is that it is not the CoCT that shows the largest growth rates during these periods. Although the CoCT grew the most in real numbers in both these defined periods, stronger growth rates are noted for other districts.

At the time of the 2011 census, the West Coast experienced the largest annual population growth rate since 1996 (2.67%), followed by the Overberg and Garden Route Districts, which experienced annual growth rates of 2.56% and 2.25%, respectively, over the same period, compared to the CoCT that experienced an annual population growth rate of 2.10%. The lowest growth rate was experienced in the Central Karoo (1.40%). For the period 2011–2022, it was again not the CoCT that experienced the largest growth rates, but this time, it was the Garden Route (2.86% per annum) followed by the Central Karoo (2.77% per annum) and the Overberg (2.56% per annum). For the same period, the CoCT experienced an annual growth rate of 1.97 per annum.

As the function of the real number of people per square kilometre, it is to be expected that population growth would have the greatest impact on the CoCT given the geographic realities and large number of people that have been added to the population. This is followed by the Cape Winelands, Garden Route and Overberg. The smallest impact is noted for the West Coast and Central Karoo, which can be directly related to the larger land spaces and rural character of these two districts together compared to the actual number of people that have been added to these districts over time (refer to Table 1.1).



**TABLE 1.1:** Surface area and population density data of the Western Cape province by district municipality for 1996, 2011 and 2022.

District municipality	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Population size			Population density <sup>a</sup>			Annual population growth rates	
		1996	2011	2022	1996	2011	2022	1996–2011	2011–2022
City of Cape Town	2,502	2,563,095	3,740,026	4,772,846	1,024.42	1,494.81	1,097.61	2.10	1.97
West Coast	31,141	234,608	391,766	497,394	7.53	12.58	15.97	2.67	1.93
Cape Winelands	22,298	563,176	787,490	862,703	25.26	35.32	38.69	1.90	0.79
Overberg	11,395	159,006	258,176	359,446	13.95	22.66	31.54	2.56	2.56
Garden Route	23,332	380,880	574,265	838,457	16.32	24.61	35.94	2.25	2.86
Central Karoo	38,873	56,111	71,011	102,173	1.44	1.83	2.63	1.40	2.77
Western Cape	129,307	3,956,876	5,822,734	7,433,020	30.60	45.03	57.48	2.14	1.97
South Africa	-	4,058,357	51,770,560	62,027,503	-	-	-	0.41	1.50

a. Population density refers to the number of people per square kilometre.

Source: StatsSA (n.d., 2012, 2023; author's own analysis).

For the period 1996–2011,<sup>12</sup> amid some variation, the noted overall population growth in the province was positive across all population groups and age cohorts. The most prominent growth in both periods was noted among the black African population (9.21% for 1996–2001 and 5.84% for 2001–2011), with the slowest growth rate within the white population (0.27% and 0.99%). The coloured and Indian population groups noted growth rates of 2.73% and 2.3%, respectively, for the 1996–2001 period. For the period 2001–2011, slower growth rates were noted within the black African and coloured populations, with an increase in growth rates among the Indian and Asian and white population groups. In fact, the stronger growth rate observed among the Indian and Asian population groups, together with the decline in population growth noted among the coloured group in the 2001–2011 period, left the former group with the second-strongest growth rate in the province during this period, a position held by the coloured population in the 1996–2001 period.

Growth within the defined age cohorts,<sup>13</sup> that is (1) 19 years old or younger, (2) 20–29 years old, (3) 30–60 years old and (4) 61+ years old, provided some interesting observations. Firstly, the most obvious observation was the consistent dominant growth rate of senior citizens (61 years old or older) during both defined periods, that is, 3.44% and 4.75%, respectively. Secondly, a comparison between the two periods showed a slower growth rate for the 19 years old or younger age cohort in the 2001–2011 period compared with the 1996–2001 period (2.54% compared to 1.55%). Both the 20–29 year old and 30–60 year old age cohorts illustrated stronger growth rates in the latter period compared with the former (0.21% compared to 3.37%).

## ■ Northern Cape province

### □ 1870–1994

The Northern Cape, a province of striking contrasts, features vast semi-desert expanses, vineyards and irrigated farmlands nestled near two major rivers in South Africa. Every September, the province dazzles visitors with its extravagant perennial spring flower displays, drawing many visitors who wish to witness this floral spectacle. Its most renowned feature, however, lies in its diamond mining industry, epitomised by the iconic Big Hole in Kimberly, a well-known historical relic.

---

12. Unfortunately, a breakdown of population numbers as per population group for the 2022 census was not available at the time this publication was submitted for print and is thus not included.

13. Age data for self-manipulation was also not available for the 2022 census data to allow for analysis to match the age categories. Thus 2022 census data is not included here.

The origins of the Northern Cape are closely linked to the history of the Western Cape. The trekboers, who were colonial farmers driven by the need for more land, played a crucial role. Around 1750, these farmers ventured through Namaqualand, settling in the region nearly a century before the formal extension of the northern border of the Cape Colony (Penn 1995, 2005). By 1778, they reached the Orange River, where they clashed violently with indigenous groups (ed. Swanepoel 2012).

The intrusion and seizure of land by the colonial farmers came at a great cost for the indigenous groups living on and off the seized land. The Khoesan's livelihood depended on the land for grazing and hunting, and the hunting methods of the colonial farmers led to a decrease in game, disrupting the Khoesan's traditional way of life. As a result, hostile relations emerged between the indigenous Khoesan and the trekboers (Giliomee & Mbenga 2007; ed. Swanepoel 2012).

It was specifically the San that retaliated by attacking colonial farms, burning homes, killing herdsmen, and stealing cattle and sheep. Towards the end of the 18th century, farmers responded by mounting commandos against the San. Tragically, many San lost their lives, with those who survived often enslaved as 'apprentices' on colonial farms. A similar fate befell the Khoekhoe, who were similarly subdued by commando strikes and subsequently integrated into trekboer households as servants and farmworkers (Giliomee & Mbenga 2007; ed. Swanepoel 2012).

In December 1847, the recently appointed Governor of the Cape, Sir Harry Smith, declared the expansion of the northern border of the Cape Colony. This extension reached the southern bank of the Orange River, effectively enlarging the colony's boundaries by an additional 115,000 km (Allen et al. 2012; Penn 1995, 2005). On 14 July 1798, the northern boundaries of the colony were officially defined for the first time. The primary objective of this declaration was to establish limits beyond which no colonist could hunt, settle or graze livestock, aimed at safeguarding the historical inhabitants of the area (Penn 1995, 2005).

Before 1847, a significant number of unauthorised colonial farmers had already been migrating to the northwestern Cape. However, the true influx begins after annexation. The 1850s saw a significant surge in copper mining in Namaqualand, leading to better infrastructure connecting the Cape to the copper field. As a result, of course, more colonists arrived. During this time several new mining companies emerged, although most of them vanished before 1860. It was, however, the discovery of diamonds in the Northern Cape towns of Hopetown, Barkley West and Kimberley during the 1860s that truly sparked South Africa's mineral and industrial revolution (Allen et al. 2012).

Jacobus Erasmus found the first small, brilliant pebble on the banks of the Orange River in 1866 on his father's farm, De Kalk, leased from local Griquas near Hopetown. His father, Schalk van Niekerk sold this brilliant pebble that proved to be a 21.25-carat (4.25 g) diamond, later known as the Eureka. Three years later, Schalk van Niekerk sold another diamond, also found in the De Kalk vicinity, for £11,200.00. The second diamond was resold in the London market for £25,000.00 (Meredith 2007).

In 1871, the cook for prospector Fleetwood Rawstone's 'Red Cap Party' unearthed an even larger diamond weighing 83.50 carat (equivalent to 16.7 g) when sent to dig for punishment on the slopes of the Colesberg Kopje on the farm Vooruitzigt belonging to the De Beers brothers. Rawstone carried the news to the nearby diggings of the De Beers brothers, igniting the famous 'New Rush', described by historian Brian Roberts as a stampede. Within a mere month, 800 claims were carved into the hillock, the site buzzing with the frenetic activity of two to three thousand men. The hill was gradually transformed into a full-fledged mine, eventually gaining global acclaim as the world-renowned Kimberley Mine (Roberts 1976).

Throughout the colonial expansion, local resistance remained a constant force. Traditional leaders persisted in countering the destabilising impact and fragmentation of their indigenous way of life caused by colonisation. This local resistance to colonial expansion grew more pronounced between 1850 and 1900. The mineral and industrial revolution, set off by the discovery of diamonds in the Northern Cape, intensified the contest and the subsequent conflict over land driven by indigenous groups' experience of the distinct loss of personal and cultural freedom. For these indigenous groups, freedom was intricately tied to their historical relationship with land. Despite their determined efforts to preserve their traditional lifestyle, the conflict over land led to significant erosion of their freedom as they lost control and ownership of their ancestral territories. Indigenous groups such as the San, Korana, Batlhaping and Batlharo fought valiantly to maintain their independence but were systematically dispossessed of their land and freedom (ed. Swanepoel 2012).

The loss of freedom for the indigenous people is well illustrated in the contest for the land where the Kimberly mine stands today. This contest involved the three colonies (the Cape, Transvaal and Orange Free State) and the Griqua leader Nikolaas Waterboer at the time of the 'new rush'. Initially, Waterboer emerged as the victor in the contest when Governor Keate, who oversaw the mediation, awarded the land to him (Allen et al. 2012; Ralph 1900). The initial victory was, however, short-lived, with Sir Henry Barkley, British Governor at the Cape, later allowed to annex the land as the British Crown Colony of Griqualand West on 27 October 1871 (Allen et al. 2012).

In September 1872, Governor Barkley visited *New Rush* in response to objections from diggers and minor riots in the area. During his visit, he unveiled his plan to declare Griqualand West a Crown Colony by January 1873. This process, however, encountered some obstacles in London. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Kimberley, insisted that before defining subdivisions, the places had to be awarded names that were decent and intelligible. 'His Lordship declined to be in any way connected with such a vulgarism as New Rush and as for the Dutch name, Vooruitzig, he could neither spell nor pronounce it' (Roberts 1976, p. 115). The matter was passed to J.B. Currey, Colonial Secretary of Sir Richardt Southey<sup>14</sup>, who acted as a true diplomat. In the words of Roberts, 'when it came to renaming New Rush, [Currey] proved himself a worthy diplomat. He made quite sure that Lord Kimberley would be able both to spell and pronounce the name of the main electoral division by, as he says, calling it "after His Lordship"' (Roberts 1976, p. 115).

On 05 July 1873, the New Rush was proclaimed Kimberley. Digger sentiment was expressed in an editorial in the *Diamond Field* newspaper when it stated, 'we went to sleep in New Rush and waked up in Kimberley, and so our dream was gone' (Roberts 1976, p. 115). Following an agreement by the British government on compensation to the Orange Free State for its competing land claims, Griqualand West was annexed to the Cape Colony in the passing of the *Griqualand West Annexation Act* on 27 July 1877 (Roberts 1976).

Following the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) was the unionisation of South Africa on 31 May 1910. From 1910 to 1994, South Africa consisted of four provinces, including the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and the Orange Free State province, with six 'self-governing' homelands and four 'independent' homelands added from the late 1950s onwards. The Northern Cape was established as a province in 1995 when the newly democratically elected ANC government divided the then Cape Province into three separate provinces, namely the Northern Cape, Eastern Cape and Western Cape provinces (Giliomee & Mbenga 2007).

## □ 1995–2022

Since the declaration of the Northern Cape as a province in 1995, Kimberley, the official capital, has witnessed significant development in its governance structures. Before 2001, the Northern Cape incorporated separate urban and rural local governments that fell within one of several district councils. Aiming to promote a more effective and equitably financed local

---

14. Sir Richard Southey was the Colonial Secretary of the Cape Colony from 1864 to 1872. In 1873, he was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Griqualand-West, a position he held till 1875 (Alex Wilmot 1904).

government, demarcation in 2001 created new boundaries and amalgamated urban and rural municipalities into 'back-to-back' local municipal areas (of which there are 24) and established and named five provincial districts. At that time, the provincial districts included Frances Baard, Kgalagadi, Namakwa, Pixley Ka Seme<sup>15</sup> and ZF Mgcawu.<sup>16</sup>

The district council, Kgalagadi, was defined as 'cross-border'<sup>17</sup> as it comprised two local municipalities within the Northern Cape province and one within the North West province. In 2006, the boundaries of this district were demarcated to include the former northwestern regions and the district was renamed John Taolo Gaetsewe<sup>18</sup> District Municipality on 06 December 2008 (John Taolo Gaetsewe District Municipality n.d.).

The major towns of the Northern Cape typically form the commercial and administrative centres of these districts. Accordingly, the Frances Baard district incorporates Kimberley, which is also the provincial capital. The district capital of the ZF Mgcawu district is Upington, and the district capital of the Namakwa district is Springbok. Kuruman is the district capital of the John Taolo Gaetsewe District. Pixley Ka Seme includes the towns of De Aar and Calvinia.

The five districts in the province are divided into 26 local municipalities.<sup>19</sup> The Namakwa district is the largest in surface area but hosts the smallest population size and thus exhibits the lowest population density per square kilometre (1.17 persons per km<sup>2</sup>). The Frances Baard district is also home to the urban centre of the province and thus exhibits the highest population density (32.13 persons per km<sup>2</sup>) of the five districts (see Table 1.2).

Compared to the other eight provinces in South Africa, the Northern Cape has one of the smallest economies in South Africa, recording the

15. Previously known as the Karoo district.

16. Previously known as the Siyanda district.

17. Provincial governments in 2000 were authorised to establish cross-border district municipalities, allowing for district areas to extend across provincial boundaries (see *Local Government: Cross-boundary Municipalities Act, No. 29 of 2000*).

18. The late John Taolo Gaetsewe was a freedom fighter during the apartheid regime in South Africa and former trade unionist (for further information, see <https://taologaeetsewe.gov.za/john-taolo-gaetsewe/>).

19. The municipalities that constituted the five districts and the seats at the time of the 2011 Census are: (1) *Frances Baard*: Dikgatlong (Barkley West), Magareng (Warrenton), Phokwane (Hartswater) and Sol Plaatjie (Kimberley); (2) *Johan Taoloa Gaetsewe*: Ga-Segonyana (Kuruman), Gamagara (Kathu) and Joe Morolong (Mothibistad); (3) *Namakwa*: Hantam (Calvinia), Kamiesberg (Garies), Karoo Hoogland (Williston), Khai-Ma (Pofadder), Nama Khoi (Springbok) and Richtersveld (Port Nolloth); (4) *Pixley Ka Seme*: Kareeberg (Carnarvon), Renosterberg (Petrusville), Siyancuma (Douglas), Thembelihle (Hopetown), Ubuntu (Victoria Wes) and Umsobomvu (Colesberg); and (5) *ZF Mgcawu*: !Kheis (Groblershoop), Dawid Kruijer (Mier), Ka!Garib (Kakamas), Kgatelopele (Daniëlskuils) and Tsantsabane (Postmasburg) (Republic of South Africa 2017a).

**TABLE 1.2:** Summary description of the five district municipalities in the Northern Cape (2011).

District municipality	District capital	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Population (2022)	Population density (per km <sup>2</sup> )
Frances Baard DM	Kimberley	13,518	434,343	32.13
John Taolo Gaetsewe DM	Kuruman	27,283	272,454	9.99
Namakwa DM	Springbok	126,836	148,935	1.17
Pixley Ka Seme DM	De Aar	102,727	216,589	2.11
ZF Mgcawu DM	Upington	102,524	283,624	2.77

Source: StatsSA (2023b).  
Key: DM, district municipality.

lowest contribution to the national GDP (Department of Economic Development and Tourism [DEDAT] 2012, p. 3; StatsSA 2021). Although the province recorded the highest expansion rate in GDP (2.8%), it remained the weakest contributor to the national economy, accounting for 2.2% of the national GDP (TIPS 2022). In terms of employment contribution, the province is also the lowest employer in South Africa, employing only 2.1% of the total South African workforce (Eastern Cape Socio Economic Consultative Council [ECSECC] 2012).

The two primary industries in the Northern Cape are mining and agriculture, with the latter contributing 24.6% and the former 8.3% to the provincial GDP (TIPS 2022). The Northern Cape is rich in minerals, with the country's major diamond pipes found in the Kimberley area in the Frances Baard DM. Alluvial diamonds are found on the western side of the province, washed westwards by the Orange River into the Atlantic Ocean, where they are extracted from the beaches and the sea between Alexander Bay and Port Nolloth. The province accounts for 7% of global diamond exports, 13% of all zinc and lead exports and more than 25% of the world's manganese exports. The region also supplies most of the country's iron ore needs. Other important natural deposits include copper, limestone, gypsum, rose quartz, mica, verdite, tiger's eye and other semi-precious stones (SouthAfrica.info, n.d.). Important mining companies such as Mittal Steel, Samancor, Gold Fields, PPC Lime, Alpha and Assmang operate in the Northern Cape.

The Northern Cape is generally more arid than the rest of South Africa, but it has fertile soil and several rivers and is well known for its high-quality agricultural products. In the Orange River Valley, especially in Upington, Kakamas and Keimoes, grapes and fruit are cultivated intensively. Wheat, fruit, peanuts, maize and cotton are produced at the Vaalharts Irrigation Scheme near Warrenton (SouthAfrica.info n.d.).

A significant exporter of table grapes, raisins and meat, the province is also a large producer of sheep and goats, with production of specialist

products such as ostrich meat on the rise. There is also significant growth in value-added activities in the province, including game farming and food production and processing for the local and export markets (SouthAfrica.info n.d.). Many of the aforementioned economic activities are labour-intensive, especially those relating to the table grape and raisin industries.

The economy of a large part of the Northern Cape, the interior Karoo, depends on extensive sheep farming, while the karakul-pelt industry is one of the most important in the Gordonia district of Upington. These industries are typically not labour-intensive (SouthAfrica.info n.d.).

Comparing the 2011 census data for the Northern Cape with previous censuses (1996 and 2001) requires the alignment of data for the two censuses to 2011 municipal and provincial boundaries. This is necessary because of the re-demarcation of a number of municipal boundaries, resulting in the subsequent demarcation of the provincial border.<sup>20</sup> Provincial boundary changes for the Northern Cape included changes in three municipalities, as outlined below.

- Ga-Segonayna and Phokwane municipalities, previously cross-boundary municipalities between the Northern Cape and North West provinces, were allocated in full to the Northern Cape.
- Kagisano Municipality was divided into Kagisano-Molopo and Joe Morolong municipalities, with the former allocated to the North West province and the latter to the Northern Cape.
- Moshaweng Municipality, previously in the North West province, was amalgamated with the Joe Morolong Municipality and thus, it is now part of the Northern Cape.

These changes resulted in an increase in the land area comprising the Northern Cape from 362,599 km<sup>2</sup> in 1996 to 372,889 km<sup>2</sup> in 2011. In order to allow for comparison, the analysis presented here for both census periods represents the Northern Cape as it was demarcated in 2011.

At the time of the 2022 census, the population size of the Northern Cape was estimated at 1,355,945, with the majority (32.03%) residing in the Frances Baard district. As was observed in the Western Cape, the population in the Northern Cape has also increased, though at both lower rates and actual numbers. When comparing the annual population growth rates for the two census periods, that is 1996–2011 and 2011–2022, the highest annual growth rates were experienced in the Frances Baard district (1.0%) followed by the ZF Mgcawu district (0.94% per annum). For the period 2011–2022,

---

20. All provinces except the Western Cape and Free State were affected by provincial boundary changes enacted in 2006. The provincial boundary changes were mainly the result of eight cross-boundary municipalities being absorbed in full into the respective provinces.



**TABLE 1.3:** Comparison of population size and growth for the Northern Cape and South Africa for 1996, 2001, 2007 and 2011.

Year	Population size		Northern Cape share of total population (%)	Average population growth per annum (%)	
	Northern Cape	South Africa		Northern Cape	South Africa
1996	1,011,864	40,583,573	1.95	-	-
2001	991,919	44,819,778	1.92	-0.39	2.09
2006	1,094,500	47,390,900	2.11	2.07	1.15
2011	1,145,861	51,770,560	2.21	0.94	1.85
2022	1,335,945	62,027,503	2.15	1.29	1.50

Source: StatsSA (2012a) and own calculations.

the highest annual population growth rates were noted for the Namakwa district (2.02%). Not only did this district experience the highest annual population growth rates for this period but also the highest increase compared to 1996–2011 rates (+1.66%). This was followed by the John Taolo Gaetsewe district (1.59% per annum), which also experienced the second-highest annual increase (+0.75%) compared to the 1996–2011 census period (see Table 1.3).

The calculations presented in Table 1.3 illustrate varying trends in population growth when the four periods: 1996–2001, 2001–2006, 2006–2011 and 2011–2022 were compared. During the first period, the province is shown to have experienced an annual net loss in population numbers compared with a net gain in the two subsequent periods. However, the annual growth rate, which increased in the period 2001–2006 compared with 1996–2001, decreased again in the third period (2006–2011) but sustained a positive net growth. This positive net growth increased again in the subsequent period (2011–2022) at an annual growth rate of 1.29%. Compared to the national annual population growth, the Northern Cape exceeded the national growth rate for the period 2001–2006 but fell below the national average again in the periods 2006–2011 and 2011–2022.

The annual net loss in population numbers experienced in the province from 1996 to 2001 was characterised by a loss of individuals across population groups, except for the black African population.<sup>21</sup> This group experienced a net gain in population size of 0.55% per annum within this period amid a general net loss experienced by the other population groups, with the white population group exhibiting the largest net loss per annum (-1.6%) in numbers. The period 2001–2011 showed a general net gain in all population groups, apart from the white population group, which maintained a net loss; however, this loss was shown to have

21. Unfortunately, a breakdown of population numbers as per population group for the 2022 census was not available at the time this publication was submitted for print and is thus not included.

increased from the previous period at -2.62 per annum. For the 2001–2011 period, the Indian and Asian population experienced the largest annual net growth at 7.5%, with an annual growth in the black African population of 2.0%.<sup>22</sup>

Regarding the growth trends evident in the province for the period 1996–2011 in terms of the defined age cohorts,<sup>23</sup> the net loss experienced in the province in population numbers for the period 1996–2001 was because of the net loss of particularly young school-going children (19 years old or younger) and young adults (20–29 years old). During the subsequent period, 2001 to 2011, the province experienced an annual net gain within all the age groups, particularly in the young adult group, illustrated the strongest annual net growth (2.54%) compared with an annual net loss during (-0.8%) the previous period. Both the mature and senior adult cohorts were shown to have experienced increasing net gains annually within the last period (2.02% and 2.27%, respectively).<sup>24</sup>

## ■ Development and applied sociology: Theoretical points of departure

State bureaucrats are oriented to its [development] achievement. Multilateral agencies spend huge sums of money trying to produce it. Non-governmental organizations are set up to deliver it. Millions of people eagerly await its arrival. Some worry about its adverse consequences. Development policies are formulated and development plans are drawn up. There are development programmes and development projects. Industrial development, rural development, urban development, institutional development, social development and a host of other developments are in evidence. There are developing countries, less developed countries, least developed countries and underdeveloped countries. Academics write countless words on it, run courses about it and advise governments on it. (Hulme & Turner 1991, p. 3)

What is development? What does it look like? What does development consist of? If development is an ideal state, what is the opposite? How do we recognise it, and how do we decide on the required intervention? These are all very relevant questions that demand a direct answer. The conundrum in offering an answer to this question is of course, that a single direct answer does not exist. As the saying goes, 'it is complicated'.

---

22. SuperCross, census 1996–2011 dataset and own calculations.

23. Age data for self-manipulation was also not available for the 2022 census data to allow for analysis to match the age categories. Thus 2022 census data are not included here.

24. Source: StatsSA (2012c, p. 47) and own calculations.

Since the 1950s, the perception of what constitutes development and, thus, what the focus of interventions should be has seen numerous theoretical shifts driven by both political and theoretical contestations. Following the Second World War, the primary objective of development during the 1950s and early 1960s was the development of non-Western European countries such as Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and the South Pacific (Hulme & Turner 1991). Development during this time was viewed as the transfer of economic institutions, political, social, and cultural values and institutions that characterised industrialising Western Europe. Modernisation through Westernisation and national economic growth was viewed as the single and decisive indicator of development.

With growing evidence of the failure of some countries to develop socio-economically, evident in the growing inequality between so-called developed and undeveloped countries, as well as high inequality, unemployment, and a growing gap between rich and poor in countries subjected to being developed, opposition to modernisation as a development theory arose. The recognition that countries were not modernising as expected, coupled with the disappointment in the outcome of the so-called trickle-down effect, led to a reevaluation of the concept of development. This resulted in the redefining of this concept in terms of progress towards a multi-faceted set of welfare objectives. Subsequently, from the late 1960s to the 1990s, the development debate introduced forces beyond national economic growth, of which national GDP is the primary indicator. From these debates, indicators of, or requirements for, development now placed greater emphasis on employment, more equitable distribution of economic growth, and access to and the realisation of basic needs and equality.

The work of one such thinker, Mahbub ul Haq, an economist, was particularly influential in the four decades of the 1960s to 1990s. Observing and coming to accept that the 'trickle-down' to the poor amid a high aggregate income growth experienced in Pakistan at the time did not occur as anticipated, ul Haq realised the failure of development programmes that focus on national economic growth and the assumed subsequent economic empowerment of the poor. This epiphany moved him to advocate for a shift in the focus of development discourse from national income growth to people and their well-being (Gaser 2011). In his work, Haq stated the pre-conditions for a viable strategy of sustainable development include (ul Haq 1995):

- a major restructuring of the world's income and consumption trends, specifically the current lifestyles of rich nations
- protection of vulnerable people and nations
- free resources for development spending

- transparent and ethical governance
- a compassionate society.

The Human Development Framework is constituted by three dimensions: (1) people, (2) opportunities and (3) choices (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2015).

- *People*: focusing on improving the lives people lead rather than assuming that economic growth will lead inevitably and automatically to greater opportunities for all. Income growth is an important means to development rather than an end in itself.
- *Opportunities*: the focus is on giving people more freedom and opportunities to live lives they value. This is achieved by developing people's abilities and providing them with opportunities to utilise them.
- *Choices*: fundamentally, human development advocates for more choices, providing people with opportunities, though not insisting that they make use of these. The process of development – human development – should at least create an environment for people, individually and collectively, to develop to their full potential and to have a reasonable chance of leading productive and creative lives that they value.

Another prominent thinker who had a profound impact on development thinking during this same period is the Indian economist and philosopher Amartya Sen. Well known for his work on famines, human development theory, welfare economics and underlying mechanisms of poverty, Sen argued development to entail the removal of major sources of what he construed as unfreedoms. In his book *Development as Freedom* (1999), Sen defines the major sources of unfreedoms as poverty, tyranny, poor economic opportunities and systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over-activity of a repressive state, and states:

Sometimes the lack of substantive freedoms relates directly to economic poverty, which robs people of the freedom to satisfy hunger, or to achieve sufficient nutrition, or to obtain remedies for treatable illnesses, or the opportunity to be adequately clothed or sheltered, or to enjoy clean water or sanitary facilities. In other cases the unfreedom links closely to the lack of public facilities and social care, such as the absence of epidemiological programs, or of effective institutions for the maintenance of local peace and order. In still other cases, the violations of freedom results directly from a denial of political and civil liberties by authoritarian regimes and from imposed restrictions on the freedom to participate in the social, political and economic life of the community. (pp. 3–4)

It is through transitions to development thought and theory that the many dimensions of development are illustrated by linking development to an array of descriptives which individually typically refer to the anticipated

outcomes or ideal end state to be achieved for the target group through the developmental process. Economic development, social development, political development, infrastructural development, sustainable development and human development are all concepts that in their name encapsulate and suggest the nature of intervention supposedly required, the type of agent/actor required to facilitate this intervention and the nature of the desired end state. The latter, of course, is necessary to declare the intervention as either a failure or a success.

It is within this complex net of dimensions that social scientists have to enter the practice of development as agents or actors in planning or implementing development. As implied in the title of this book, *Development Planning*, it is not surprising that the philosophical principle and theoretical framework underlying this publication directly relate to the idea of sociologists playing a more practical role in development interventions. Such a notion aligns well with the principles of applied sociology. Applied sociology involves applying sociological knowledge and research principles to acquire empirically based insights, which are in turn used to inform decision-makers, civil society and the general public about social issues, processes and conditions, enabling them to make informed decisions that would ultimately improve the quality of life. In its most expansive sense, applied sociology covers various domains such as evaluation research, needs assessment, market research, social indicators, and demographics and extends to focus sociological inquiries covering areas such as medicine, mental health, complex organisations, work, education and the military (Perlstadt 2007).

The principles of applied sociology date back to the 1800s through the writings of the founder of sociology, August Comte (1798–1857). Comte divided sociology into social statistics, defining the discipline as the study of the conditions and pre-conditions of social order, social dynamics, the study of human progress and evolution. These studies, Comte envisioned would function to provide informed direction to public opinion by imparting useful scientific knowledge and social advice to all aspects of civil life. The term *applied sociology* was, however, used for the first time in 1982 in the title of a book published by the Brooklyn Ethical Association, *Man and the State: Studies in Applied Sociology* and in 1983, *Factors in American Civilisation: Studies in Applied Sociology*. Following the school of thought established by Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) and William Graham Sumner (1840–1910), the Brooklyn Ethical Association considered sociology as the science of social evolution. In step with their predecessors, the association remained advocates of *laissez-faire* with a focus on individual freedom, limited government interference and free market principles (Perlstadt 2007).

It was, however, Lester F Ward (1841–1913) who introduced the concept of *applied sociology* into the discipline of sociology. Unlike Spencer and

Summer, who advocated for *laissez-faire* individualism, Ward advocated for government intervention to facilitate social reform. He argued that if the government could operate from a scientific basis and eliminate corruption and inefficiency, it would be able to directly enhance societal conditions. Drawing inspiration from Comte's concept of sociocrats, Ward envisioned legislators as social scientists who could effectively control social forces and apply their knowledge to improve society through conscious effort (Perlstadt 2007). This vision is probably best illustrated by the actions of Michael M. Cernea, a Romanian-born Sociologist and Anthropologist. Cernea was revered for his significant efforts in embedding the use of social sciences knowledge in World Bank policies and philosophy while employed as the Senior Adviser for the Sociology and Social Policy unit from 1982 to 1997 (Bebbingtong 2021). In his report *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development* (1985), Cernea notes the increased recognition of social science knowledge in development programmes in response to repeated failures in development programmes because of being 'sociologically ill-informed and ill-conceived' (Cernea 1985, p. 1). Arguing for the transformation of social sciences that will enable the social scientist to produce products that are usable by development practitioners, Cernea is clear that such products should not be seen as replacements for the traditional products of research such as taxonomies, explanatory hypotheses, concepts and theories, but rather as supplementing these with methodologies for social action (Cernea 1985):

To sum up, putting people first is not simply a fashionable slogan but is a formidable work program for social sciences. It is also a heuristic device demanding always that we identify, in every seemingly 'technical', 'financial', or 'administrative' intervention, the sociological angle and the variables pertinent to the social organization affected or targeted by the intervention. Sociologists have to face the nuts and bolts of development activities, to roll up their sleeves and deal with the mundane, pragmatic questions of translating plans into realities in a sociologically sound manner. They need to link data generation, action-oriented research, social analysis, design for social action, and evaluation into a continuum, and thus stretch sociology's contributions far beyond simple pronouncements. (p. 36)

There are some who might argue that by involving themselves with policymaking and planning, social scientists are set to lose their intellectual integrity and freedom by normative and ideological constraints imposed by their clients (Hunter 1969). Such a view is, in my opinion, rather restrictive and sterile, leaving the social scientist with no other mandate than reflecting on, analysing and explaining social phenomena. Surely, there is an obligation, if not at least the drive of academic curiosity, to explore the possibilities of positively influencing non-desirable contexts and realities. Facing the nuts and bolts of development activities allows the social scientist the opportunity to add value to society rather than just merely engaging them

as subjects for data extraction as part of 'idle academicism' (Hunter 1969, p. 27). Of course, engagement with the view of adding value to a society also offers the opportunity to expand theoretical frameworks and practical methodologies through persistent interaction with applied approaches. After all, practice requires the generation of theory and theory is nourished by the findings of practice (Hulme & Turner 1990).

I will close this section with a final statement spoken by Nelson Mandela, 'Poverty is no accident. Like slavery and apartheid, it is man-made and can be removed by the actions of human beings' (Nelson Mandela 2005).

## ■ Conclusion

As the preamble to this publication, this chapter set out to define the primary concern of this publication, the integration of internal migration trends in development planning initiatives in post-apartheid South Africa. Migration, one of the three demographic indicators driving population change, has had an undeniable impact on the nature of urbanisation and the characteristics of urban and rural populations in South Africa. How such changes could be analysed and interpreted with the aim of guiding development planning is illustrated here at the hand of two provinces selected as specific case studies to illustrate the impact of opposing trends while sharing a political historical context.

An overview of the political history of the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces, with a specific focus on mechanisms implemented to control internal migration, is presented in this chapter. This was deemed important as it was argued to continue current-day migration trends, illustrated in the overview of general population dynamics and associated population change observed for the period. The chapter concludes with a statement of the theoretical departure that grounds this publication. That is, firstly, how development as a concept is applied and, secondly, how the role of sociology as an academic discipline in development planning is understood.

Before we can embark on applying data describing migration trends to inform and guide development planning, we need to have in place a clarificatory framework that provides a context in which we can interpret and understand these trends. Such a framework is found in migration theory, which constitutes the content of Chapter 2 in this book, devoted to presenting an overview of main streams in migration thought. In this chapter, migration as a social concept is conceptualised with a particular focus on how it applies to the South African context. This is followed by a brief overview of migration theory, whereafter a discussion follows pertaining to the link between migration and development. The chapter

concludes by presenting and justifying the analytical framework underlying and guiding the analysis presented in this book to explain and compare the respective migration flows described for the two provinces.

Chapter 3 presents an illustration of how the contextual, theoretical and conceptual frameworks can be defined when embarking on migration analysis. The data source and its reliability and validity are assessed as an example of what needs to be considered when reflecting on the quality of data sources and how this can be reported to ensure transparency and adherence to academic principles. Towards this end, this chapter defined the conceptual framework applied to define and operationalise internal migration as well as define the research population of whom the migration trends will be considered in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The chapter concludes by defining the method by which migration data are analysed as well as setting the theoretical framework applied to guide the analysis presented in the subsequent chapters.

Chapters 4 and 5 represent the empirical component of the publication. These two chapters, each dedicated to one of the two provinces, present a detailed description of the internal migration flows into and within these two provinces for the periods 1996–2006, 2006–2001 and 2001–2011. Following these two descriptive chapters, Chapter 6 presents a synthesis of these findings and reflects on how post-apartheid mobility has been realised in the two provinces. Confirming the nature of migration to bring about social change, the chapter continues to consider the possible dislocating impact on communities and how to consider this in development planning. Finally, the chapter concludes by offering two explanatory frameworks: the theory of relative deprivation and the resource mobilisation approach, to shine some light on why such dislocating effects occur in reaction to specifically rapid population change.

Having established internal migration trends and how these direct urbanisation and population change, as well as the possible reaction to these changes by communities, Chapter 7 brings us to the necessary next objective. This objective is to consider the structural nature of development planning in terms of its institutional placing as well as to assess the degree to which internal migration is indeed considered and integrated into development planning initiatives. Again, the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces are drawn on as case studies in assessing the degree to which data on internal migration is included in the Integrated Development Plans of district municipalities in these provinces as well as the metro of Cape Town. To achieve this, the discussion provides some context by (1) reflecting on the transformation of local government in the transition to a post-1994 democratic governance sphere; (2) considering the mandates and structure of the three spheres of government; (3) pondering the notion



of developmental local government and (4) the IDP as a strategic development planning tool in speaking to the developmental mandate of local government. Chapter 8, the final chapter of this publication, concludes the book by presenting a final discussion and recommendations. It aims to emphasise the importance of integrating internal migration into development planning initiatives in the post-1994 political era. The goal is to avoid the pitfalls of reactive planning and instead adopt a proactive approach to development planning.

# Motivations for international and internal migration behaviour: Theoretical perspectives

*Why people move* is, at face value, a rather simple question; that is, of course, until the moment you undertake the task of trying to formulate an answer to this question. Before answering this question, there is, however, another preceding matter that needs to be clarified, as it determines the lens through which findings to the question of why people move will be interpreted and used. Thus, before we venture into understanding why people move, it is important to determine the motivation that underlies this question, that is, *why is it important to understand migration?* Generally, there are two clusters of responses to this question. The first with the aim, or shall I say illusion, of controlling migration flows; the second with the aim to manage the impact of migration, which falls within the ambit and objectives of planning for human development. If history has taught us anything regarding migration behaviour, it is that it cannot be controlled. At the same time, history and current reality have also shown us the detrimental effect of not considering migration, particularly internal migration flows and the impact on human development goals and objectives in development planning initiatives and structures.

**How to cite:** Eigelaar-Meets, I 2024, 'Motivations for international and internal migration behaviour: Theoretical perspectives', in *Internal migration and development planning in South Africa*, AVARSITY Books, Cape Town, pp. 39–65. <https://doi.org/10.4102/aosis.2024.BK463.02>

In South Africa, the most notable illustration of this is probably the large number of townships that have sprung up in both urban and non-urban centres in the past 30 years.

The answer to this question from the perspective of this book should be clear from the title. Understanding migration is essential in development planning for two reasons. The first relates to the effect of migration in altering the population composition of both receiving and sending locations. Migration, as one of the three demographic processes, is different to fertility and mortality in that it does not have any biological components that determine how it affects population change. Subsequently, migration has the potential to profoundly alter a community or an entire country within a short time, even if there is no demographic transition or if all demographic transitions have been completed. In fact, both in- and out-migration can increase or decrease population size far more quickly than either fertility or mortality (Weeks 2012). It is exactly this inherent ability of migration to alter population size and composition that makes it not only worthy but necessary for our attention and study. It is also important to note that change in population composition is not necessarily dependent on any change in population size because of migration. Even in the case of a neutral net migration – where the number of in-migrants equals the number of out-migrants – the flow of people in and out of a geographic space will affect the social and economic structure of the society inhabiting that geographic space (Weeks 2012).

The second reason migration is important to incorporate in development planning lies with the so-called migration-development nexus, defined as ‘the totality of mechanisms through which migration and development dynamics affect each other’ (Carling in Laczko et al. 2024; Vidal & Rango 2024, p. 105). Understanding the nature of migration and the context in which it takes place is vital not only to mitigate its negative consequences but also to harness its beneficial effects. Although generally obvious, the relationship between development and migration is often ignored in development planning. Human mobility has always been part of social transformation. When society and economies change, so do the ways people move, which in turn has a direct impact on the opportunities for growth and progress for both sending and receiving locations (ed. Bakewell 2012; International Organisation for Migration [IOM] 2018; Nonnenmacher 2010).

Understanding why people move and how these migrants are changing the population characteristics of both sending and receiving locations presents valuable information to inform sustainable development planning initiatives and processes. It is towards this end that theories on migration present useful insight as they offer guidelines on how to conceptualise

migration and what indicators and methods of analysis to consider towards understanding human mobility. Through rigorous testing and confirmation, theories also present the opportunity for prediction and planning. Knowledge pertaining to migration theories is thus essential in development planning in that it both provides a framework for the analysis and interpretation of results and presents an opportunity for prediction and proactive planning (IOM 2018; Skeldon 2021). It is this rationale that guides the focus of this chapter, to present an overview of migration theories by first conceptualising the concept and defining concepts inherent to this social phenomenon, particularly in how it applies in a South African context. This chapter presents an overview of migration theories, specifically in how they relate to broad processes of development associated with economic and social transformation.

## ■ Conceptualising migration

What is migration? Simply put, we could define migration as the change in location of where people live. But is it really as simple as that? Well, it is not. The vibrant debate surrounding the concept of ‘migration’ is noted by scholars, acknowledging the definitional complexity of the concept (Kok et al. 2003; eds. McAuliffe & Khadria 2020, Moore 2015). A definition that simply defines migration as a change in location obscures several technical issues, of which the most important would be the extent of the move, measured in terms of the spatial units, referring to boundaries a person must cross and the time a person needs to remain at a destination in order to be defined as a migrant (eds. Bastia & Skeldon 2020). Even these two seemingly essential aspects are not consistently considered in efforts to define migration. The IOM defines migration as the movement of persons away from their place of usual residence, either across an international border or within a state (Sironi, Bauloz & Emmanuel 2019). Statistics South Africa, the national statistical service of South Africa, defines migration as a change in a person’s permanent or usual place of residence (StatsSA 2011). Whereas both these definitions define migration as a move away from a place of usual residence, the latter does not define the spatial dimension involved in migration. In addition, neither of these definitions specifies the time dimension associated with the relocation, that is, the time a person is required to remain in the receiving destination to be considered a migrant. An example of how the latter is encapsulated in a definition is found in the United Nations (UN) definition for international migrants, where international migrants are defined as persons who have moved across an international boundary (spatial dimension) for 12 months or more (spatial dimension) (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [UNDESA] 2020).

Another aspect not noted in any of the above-stated definitions includes the rationale that underlies the move, be it *forced* or *voluntary*, or any reference to the *legality* of the move. Of course, any definition that ventures to address all these aspects in one statement is sure to find itself trapped in a landslide of dimensions and concepts. Acknowledging the complexity of defining migration, it does, however, remain necessary to include crucial characteristics and variables. Within the context of development in South Africa, three key dimensions of migration are of central importance, namely space, time and intentionality. These dimensions allow for the recognition of different types of human mobility as an action that involves diverse intentions as well as different distances and time dimensions, thus allowing for the consideration of a host of short-term, circular and cyclical forms of movement, a mode of migration suggested by some analysts as much more prevalent than permanent migration (Parnwell 1993).

There exist three models that often appear in analyses of migration in South Africa – circulatory migration, oscillating migration and gravity flow migration. Each of these is closely tied to the notion of urbanisation and to the fact that employment opportunities and the associated income dominate people’s reasons for moving (Agunias & Newland 2007; Bekker & Swart 2002).

*Circular migration* typically refers to a person who moves to a city or town fairly early in adult life, either with a family or to establish a family soon after arrival (Bekker & Swart 2002). Wickramasekara (in Castles & Ozul 2014, p. 27; [*author’s added emphasis*]) defines this form of migration as ‘repeated migration experiences involving more than one (*em*) migration and return’. Circulatory migration thus refers to a situation where migrants are able to move between the place of origin towards one or more destination areas repeatedly for stays of varying duration (Castles & Ozul 2014). Oucho and Gould (eds. 1993) present a useful definition of this form of migration, subdividing it into three categories based on the length of the period of absence of the migrant. Periodic movements refer to mostly short-term circulatory migration, with seasonal movements presenting a regular rhythm. Long-term circulation involves an absence of more than one year but with an expectation to return. Circulatory migration is often seen as a win-win-win proposition, providing gains to areas of both origin and destination, as well as to the migrants themselves (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe [UNECA] 2016). Typical examples of circulatory migration in the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces would include the historically-set practice of seasonal agri-workers who move between their place of origin and farms during typical season times when employment opportunities are rife.

*Oscillatory migration* typically refers to labour migration and a shorter-term movement as a result of a short period of employment. An adult worker moves in search of an employment opportunity, returns to the rural home after its completion, and then repeats the cycle in the future (Bekker & Swart 2002).

The third model of migration is *Gravity flow or step-wise migration*, where people migrate permanently and move, typically, towards urban places (Bekker & Swart 2002). A 2001 migration study in the Western Cape confirmed the occurrence of step-wise migration when migrants tracked their migration route to start in the Eastern Cape, typically to stay in either Knysna or George for a few months and then to continue along the N2 with a number of stops in towns along this route until they reach Cape Town (Bekker & Swart 2002).

Intentionality presents the migrant as a rational individual who makes a decision to change their residence on either a permanent or temporary basis. This decision is based on the full awareness of the ramifications of following the decision to migrate (Chou 2012). The intention to migrate follows a process whereby migrants compare their present location to a potential destination and the rewards to be gained as well as evaluate the process of getting there. Intentions to migrate are often dependent on the migrant's level of being embedded in socio-institutional environments that continuously affect their social capital, risk perceptions and coping strategies (Skeldon 2021; Wissink, Düvel & Van Eerdewijk 2013).

A further distinction in conceptualising migration defines the moves of migrants in terms of spatial boundaries, namely international migration and internal migration. International migration refers to movement from one national state to another, whereas internal migration refers to movement within a national state. The latter includes movement between different provinces, areas or cities, as well as movement from rural to urban areas (IOM 2022; Mostert, Oosthuizen & Hofmeyer 1991; Skeldon 2021).

Considering the status of a migrant as either an in- or out-migrant moving within the boundary of the same country, Shryock, Siegel and Associates (1980) write:

Every move is an out-migration with respect to the area of origin and an in-migration with respect to the area of destination. Every migrant is an out-migrant with respect to the area of departure and an in-migrant with respect to the area of arrival. (p. 617)

An *in-migrant* thus refers to a person who moves to a defined geographical area by crossing its boundary from some point outside the area, whereas an *out-migrant* refers to a person who departs from a defined geographical area by crossing its boundary to a point outside of it – both with the intention to change residence. A *migration stream* or *migration flow* refers

to a group of migrants with a common origin and destination in a given migration period (Shryock et al. 1980).

One of the processes and consequences often closely associated with internal migration is that of urbanisation. At the beginning of the 21st century, for the first time in human history, the majority of the world's population lived in urban environments (World Health Organization [WHO] 2012). In sharp contrast to the developed world, where the process of urbanisation has been largely completed, the process of urbanisation is rapid and enduring on the African continent (UN 2012). In South Africa, these urbanisation trends are no different from the rest of Africa. In 2019, more than 66% of the total South African population was living in urban areas and cities, with a large proportion of migrants settling in the two most urbanised provinces, Gauteng and the Western Cape (O'Neil 2024; StatsSA 2023).

Another dimension of migration relates to the nature of moves being either due to voluntary action or forced action. Voluntary migration refers to movement initiated by free will or as a result of a person's own initiative, as opposed to forced migration, where the person is left with no choice but to move. Evidently, these divergent types of moves are informed by different push and pull factors deciding on the viability or necessity of moving and the choice of a place of destination. Whereas voluntary migration is driven by either economic or non-economic forces – or, in some instances, both – forced migration is essentially not a result of choice but rather a consequence of various circumstances. Some examples of this would include war, political pressures, housing evictions, urban renewal projects, occupational transfers or sudden changes in social, economic or environmental conditions such as drought, flood or famine (De Jong & Fawcett 1981).

## ■ Evolution in migration thought

As noted earlier in this chapter, the answer to the question of *why people move* is all but a simple one, with migration generally being the outcome of a complex interplay of realities. This is confirmed in data on migration behaviour, illustrating the decisions to inform the migration intention and ultimate action to be, more often than not, determined by a complex interplay of reasons. With this as the backdrop, we are left with an important decision when embarking on the quest of understanding human mobility, and that is to decide on the theoretical approach to applying as the framework to guide data analysis and define the indicators to be considered as well as the unit of analysis or unit of focus for the analysis. To understand why people migrate and how large-scale migration flows are formed, we need to apply different methods and interrogate different data sources.

This, then, is the function of migration theories, to guide us to know which methods to apply and which sources to investigate.

At specific moments in people's lives, a number of factors come together and stimulate migration intentions, which may or may not result in temporary or permanent moves. Important to note is that not all intentions to migrate result in an actual move. The question then arises: If migration intent does not always cause migration, what are the driving forces of migration, and how do these operate to realise in an actual move in time and space? Czaika and Reinprecht (2022) offer a useful discussion in this regard where they comment on the usefulness of different terms when wanting to explain such forces. The first is the term *migration determinants*, which suggests a causal relationship between some external factors and migration. The authors aptly note how this term can be misleading as it ignores the central role of human agency and contextual factors in the migration process. Another widely used term is *root causes*, which is understood to refer to the social and political conditions that push people from their usual place of residence. The narrow description offered by this concept is noted by the authors, commenting that it is rarely a single or specific fundamental causal factor that sets off migration but rather several factors that conjointly shape migration decisions, broader dynamics and trends. It is within this context that the authors then continue to present the concept of *migration drivers* as their preferred term, referring to 'structural elements that enable and constrain the exercise of agency by social actors' and make 'certain decisions, routes or destinations more likely' (Van Hear et al. 2019, cited in Czaika & Reinprecht 2022, p. 50). Such migration drivers are explained to consist of two dimensions clustering, on the one hand, explanations that cluster macro-level drivers and, on the other hand, the meso- and micro-level. The two dimensions are (1) structural or spatial disparities between two geographically defined areas (macro-level) and (2) perceptions relating to spatial opportunity gaps (meso- and micro-level). Acknowledging the multi-faceted nature of migration, the authors refer to the concept of *complex driver environments*, which acknowledges 'the time-space-dependant configuration of multi-dimensional drives that define people's willingness and ability to change life situations through migration' (Czaika & Reinprecht 2022, p. 50).

The flow of terms noted by Cziaka and Reinprecht is in many ways illustrative of the evolution of migration theory, moving from one-dimensional causal explanations of migration to a realisation and acknowledgement of the multi-dimensional and complex relationship between different sets of drivers that ultimately inform migration decision-making and behaviour. The recognition of the intricate factors influencing migration decisions and subsequent actions has significantly shaped the evolution of migration theory. While this discussion does not aim to provide



an exhaustive overview of theories, it serves to highlight the progression of philosophical and empirical understanding of the factors that drive and direct migration.

Attempts at theorising about the phenomenon of migration have, since the 19th century, seen extensive development because of a growing realisation of the complex nature of this social trend and acceleration in this phenomenon as a result of advancement in diverse modes of travel and some instances relaxing of borders. Considering the broader pool of migration theory in how it developed since the 19th century, attempts at theorising about migration are driven by the following objectives: (1) to develop an understanding of the underlying determinants that result in and influence migration behaviour; (2) to translate identified factors into quantifiable data to allow for the measurement of migration behaviour; (3) to understand how migration is sustained over time; and (4) to consider the impact of migration on the migrant and migrant households, as well as the impact on both the sending and receiving areas of migrants.

The systematic study of internal migration has brought general agreement regarding the causes and impacts of migration. In general, there is consensus that although prevalent economic, social and political conditions may be useful and able to explain macro trends in migration, the analysis of individual cases presents a complex interplay of numerous and diverse variables.

Orthodox migration theory expects migrants to move from rural and small towns to large cities. Explanations of migration have, for the most part, been wrapped in two conceptual frameworks: economic and non-economic explanatory frameworks. While the economic framework focuses its predictions and explanations of migration on economic considerations, realities and perceptions, the non-economic framework considers characteristics of the individual that act as selectivity and differentials to migration (age, gender, educational status, career pattern and socio-demographic profile of migrants); spatial aspects that inform the decision to move (distance, directional aspects and stage migration and the gravity concept); and subjective considerations in the decision to migrate (the mover-stayer framework and residence duration) (Czaika & Reinprecht 2022; Sarjehpeyma 1984; Shaw 1975; Skeldon 2021).

The early focus on *economics in migration theory*, that is, *income* and *employment* factors as the sole drivers of migration, had its origin in Europe in the post-World War II era. This was a period characterised by rapid industrialisation marked by rapid economic growth and accompanying social transformation. Theories that developed within this school of thought are the neo-classical theory, push-pull theory of migration, new

(household) economics of migration, dual labour market theory and the world systems theory. In this chapter, we will provide a brief overview of each of these theories.

## ■ Equilibrium and neo-classical thought

The neo-classical theory of migration is both the oldest and most dominant theory to explain migration. Developed as an explanation for labour migration during a time of economic development, this theory is based on the underlying assumption that migration is stimulated primarily by rational economic considerations of relative benefits and costs (Kurekova 2011). Within this broad school of thought, the initiation of migration is explained in terms of macro- and micro-economic models. On the macro-economic level, migration is attributed to the uneven spatial distribution of labour compared to other factors of production, above all capital. Thus, mobility is directed away from deficit (rural) towns towards areas of surplus (towns and cities) (Skeldon 2021). In essence, macro-economic models explain migration as an outcome of labour differentiation, whereas micro-economic models postulate migration to be an outcome of a rational decision-making process by individuals (King 2012; Massey et al. 1998).

Neo-classical theories of migration, departing from a macro-economic perspective, understand migration as a phenomenon driven by differences in returns to labour across markets. Developed in the work of Hicks (1932), Lewis (1954) and Todaro (1980), these theorists argue that migration results from actual wage differentials across markets or countries, driven by geographic differences in labour supply and demand. With the central focus on wages, the assumption is that under full employment, there would exist a linear relationship between wage differentials and migration flows (Kurekova 2011; Todaro 1980). Thus, as employment positions in urban settings get saturated, wage levels would stabilise or even decline while, at the same time, labour surplus in the rural sector would lessen because of out-migration. This would ultimately slow rural-to-urban migration, and a new equilibrium would be reached (Skeldon 2021).

Two theories that fall within the ambit of neo-classical theory are the human capital of migration and push-pull explanatory frameworks. In response to the macro-economic focus of neo-classical models, human capital migration theory emphasises the importance of individual choice and ascribes migration to an individual decision based on a cost-benefit calculation that leads migrants to expect a positive net return, usually monetary, from movement (Massey et al. 1993). Introduced by Sjaadstad (1962), this explanatory framework incorporates the socio-demographic characteristics of the individual migrant as an important determinant of migration. Thus, the decision to migrate purely depends on an individual

perception of the anticipated net gain from the move. Migrants as individual actors are, consequently, assumed to estimate the costs and benefits of moving to alternative locations and migrating to the area where they can expect the greatest (monetary) net return (Kok et al. 2003; Massey et al. 1993; Sarjehpeyma 1984). This school of thought further explains the decision to migrate as determined by human capital endowments, skills, age, marital status, gender, occupation and labour markets, and preferences and expectations (Sarjehpeyma 1984).

The push–pull explanatory framework can be traced back to Ravenstein’s laws of migration (1885) that implicitly combined individual rational-choice theory with the broader structures of rural–urban and developmental inequalities. This model perceives migration as driven by a set of push factors operating from the country or area of origin and pull factors present in the country of the area of destination (Czaika & Reinprecht 2022; De Haas 2010b; King 2012; ed. Lindsay 1985).

The push–pull theory of migration argues that there are certain factors that push and pull migrants from their areas of origin towards areas of destination (Moses & Yu 2009). Push factors refer to the forces that drive a migrant to leave an area (as a result of, for example, poverty, unemployment, landlessness, rapid population growth, political instability and repression, low social status, poor marriage prospects, high crime rates, etc.), whereas pull factors refer to those forces that drive and attract a migrant towards a specific area (better income and employment prospects, better education and welfare systems, land to settle and farm, good environmental and living conditions, political stability and freedom, etc.) (De Haas 2010b; King 2012; ed. Lindsay 1985).

This model resonates with views regarding the substitute nature of development and migration, which is nestled in the assumption of an inversely proportional relationship between income and other opportunity differentials and migration rates (De Haas 2010b):

The idea that migration is a function of spatial disequilibria constitutes the cornerstone assumption of so-called ‘push–pull’ models which still dominate much gravity-based migration modelling as well as commonsensical and non-specialist academic thinking about migration. (p. 4)

In revising Ravenstein’s migration laws, Lee (1996) states that migration decisions are determined by ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ factors in locations of origin and destination. These factors include intervening obstacles (such as distance, physical barriers, immigration laws, etc.) and personal factors. Although Lee (1996) does not use the term himself, his analytical framework became commonly referred to as the push–pull model (Passaris in De Haas 2010b; King 2012). Although the push–pull model of migration was successful in explaining overall migration flows quite well, it failed to explain

why many people do not migrate despite severe income differentials. This, of course, is indicative of the ignorant position this theory takes in relation to the role of individual agency and self-determination in determining migration outcomes. Overall, neo-classical thought was criticised for suffering from methodological individualism, ignoring the impact of households and communities in the migration decision (Czaika & Reinprecht 2022).

In spite of these criticisms, the simplistic explanation of migration offered by neo-classical macro-economics has had a strong impact on public thinking pertaining to both internal and international migration and has provided the intellectual foundation for a substantial portion of immigration policy. This perspective contains five implicit propositions and assumptions (Massey et al. 1993, p. 434), as described below.

1. The migration of workers is caused by differences between countries in wage rates.
2. The elimination of wage differentials will end the movement of labour, and migration will not occur in the absence of such differentials.
3. The flow of human capital – that is, highly skilled workers – responds to differences in the rate of return to human capital, which may be different from the overall wage rate, yielding a distinct pattern of migration that may be opposite to that of unskilled workers.
4. Labour markets are the primary mechanisms responsible for the inducement of international flows of labour; other kinds of markets do not have important effects on migration.
5. The way for governments to control migration flows is to regulate or influence labour markets in sending and receiving places.

## ■ Dual (segmented) labour market theory

Both the neo-classical theory and the new-economics theory define migration as a rational choice made on a micro level by either the individual actor or a group of actors, that is, the family or household. Dual labour market theory puts itself distinctly apart from these two models, arguing that migration is in fact the result of labour demands within modern industrial societies rather than a result of rational choices (Massey et al. 1993).

A salient feature of industrial economies is a differentiated and segmented labour market consisting of primary and secondary labour sectors. Local workers, that is, non-migrant workers, are typically more inclined to seek employment in the primary sector, where security and income levels are typically higher and more stable. Usually, the primary sector has no difficulty recruiting people; however, the secondary sector is

mostly perceived as being less attractive. It is in this sector that migrants provide a solution to the employer operating in the secondary sector in that they provide the necessary alternative labour (Weeks 1996 in Moses & Yu 2009).

The dual labour market theory thus perceives labour migration as demand-driven, and because the demand for migrant workers results from the structural needs of the industrial economy, wage differentials are neither necessary nor sufficient to cause labour migration. In other words, it is argued that in-migration is caused by pull factors in receiving regions (a continuous need for a cohort of workers of a specific level of skills) and not by push factors in the sending areas (low wages or high unemployment).

Although not in inherent conflict with neo-classical economics, dual labour market theory does carry implications quite different from those emanating from micro-level decision models (Massey et al. 1993, p. 444).

1. Labour migration is largely demand-based and is initiated by recruitment on the part of employers in developed societies.
2. Because the demand for migrant workers is determined by the structural needs of the economy and is expressed through recruitment practices rather than wage offers, wage differentials are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for labour migration to occur.
3. Low-level wages in migrant-receiving societies do not rise in response to a decrease in the supply of migrant workers; they are rather held down by social and institutional mechanisms and are not free to respond to shifts in supply and demand.
4. Existing low-level wages may fall further as a result of an increase in the supply of immigrant workers because the social and institutional checks that keep low-level wages from rising do not prevent them from falling.
5. Governments are unlikely to influence migration through policies that produce small changes in wages or employment rates; migrants fill a demand for labour that is structurally built into modern, post-industrial economies, and influencing this demand requires major changes in economic organisation.

## ■ Household based approaches

As noted, dissatisfaction with neo-classical economic explanations and the push-pull framework led to the emergence of new theoretical perspectives challenging the many assumptions and conclusions of neo-classical theory (Massey et al. 1998; Kurekova 2011). In the 1970s, alternative approaches to neo-classical thought began to emerge with the key insight that migration decisions are not made by isolated individual actors but rather by larger units or collectives of related people, typically families and households.

In this context, migration is a collective act to maximise expected income, minimise risk and loosen constraints associated with a variety of market failures (Massey et al. 1993, 1999; Moses & Yu 2009; Skeldon 2021). Therefore (Massey 1999):

In developed countries, risks to household income are generally minimized through private insurance markets or governmental programs, but in developing countries these institutional mechanisms for managing risk are imperfect, absent, or inaccessible to poor families, giving them incentives to diversify risks through migration. In developed countries, moreover, credit markets are relatively well-developed to enable families to finance new projects, such as the adoption of new production technology. In most developing areas, in contrast, credit is usually not available or is procurable only at high cost. In the absence of accessible public or affordable private insurance and credit programs, market failures create strong pressure for international movement. (p. 436)

A model that treats the household as the unit of analysis when analysing migration is the value expectancy model. This model is based on the proposition that the strength of a tendency to act in a certain way will depend on the expectation that the act will be followed by a given consequence or goals and the beneficial impact of that consequence or goal on the individual (or household). Applied to migration, this approach calls for the specification of individually valued goals that might be met by moving and the perceived link between migration behaviour and the attainment of these goals (De Jong & Fawcett 1981). The model analyses migration from a micro-level causal framework and treats the household as a unit. Migration moves by individual members and that of the family unit are measured separately (Kok et al. 2003).

The theory seeks the integration of multi-level determinants when analysing migration behaviour and decision-making. Migration behaviour and decision-making are considered to be influenced not only by motivational factors but also by environmental and cultural factors. Migration is thus the result of (1) the strength of the value-expectancy-derived intentions to move, (2) the indirect influences of background individual and area factors and (3) the modifying effects of constraints and facilitators that become salient during the process of migration-making (De Jong & Fawcett 1981, p. 56, cited in Kok et al. 2003, p. 21).

The model depicts a number of economic and non-economic variables that could contribute to explaining migration behaviour, which include (Kok et al. 2003):

- individual and household demographic characteristics including factors such as life-cycle variables, socio-economic status, employment-unemployment differentials, etc.
- societal and cultural norms regarding migration

- personal traits of the migrant, such as risk-taking appetite and ability, adaptability to change and the ability to produce the desired result
- opportunity differentials, such as educational opportunities, entertainment and amenities
- information about receiving areas
- unanticipated constraints and facilitators such as marriage, divorce, death, etc.
- in situ adjustments, such as changing the environment to better serve the needs of the individual or household
- residential satisfaction.

The new (household) economics of migration present a set of propositions and hypotheses that differ markedly from those presented by the neo-classical theory and lead to a different set of policy prescriptions (Massey et al. 1993, pp. 439-440).

1. Families, households or other culturally defined units of production and consumption are the appropriate units of analysis for migration research, not the autonomous individual.
2. Wage differentials are not a necessary condition for migration to occur. Households may have incentives to diversify risks through migration, even in the absence of wage differentials.
3. Migration and local employment or local production are not mutually exclusive possibilities. There are indeed strong incentives for households to engage both in migration and local activities. In fact, an increase in the returns of local economic activities may heighten the attractiveness of migration as a means of overcoming capital and risk constraints by investing in those activities. Thus, (favourable) economic development and conditions within sending regions need not reduce the pressures for migration.
4. Migration does not necessarily stop when wage differentials have been eliminated across national boundaries. Incentives for migration may continue to exist if other markets within sending destinations are absent, imperfect or in disequilibria.
5. The same expected gain in income will not have the same effect on the probability of migration for households located at different points in the income distribution or among those located in communities with different income distributions.
6. Governments can influence migration rates not only through policies that influence labour markets but also through those that shape insurance, capital and futures markets.
7. Government policies and economic changes that shape income distributions will change the relative deprivation of some households and thus alter their incentives to migrate.

8. Government policies and economic changes that affect the distribution of income will influence migration independent of their effects on mean income. In fact, government policies that produce a higher mean income in migrant-sending areas may increase migration if relatively poor households do not share in the income gain.

The theory has, however, received some criticism because of its rather simplistic treatment of the household as a unitary decision-making entity. Not only is there the possibility of power shifts because of migrants' remittances, but the theory also assumes that the household makes decisions as a unit, which is not necessarily the case as household members may have different preferences and expectations. In addition, the household structure might also change over time (Kok et al. 2003; Spiegel 1997 in Moses & Yu 2009).

## ■ Strategic factors perpetuating migration

The above theories presented explanations of both economic and non-economic strategic factors pivotal in the onset of migration. Another aspect of theoretical deliberation, however, pertains to the consideration of strategic factors that contribute to the indefinite perpetuation of migration. This consideration is addressed in the theories presented in this section.

*Institutional theory* attributes the perpetuation of migration to the development of private institutions and voluntary organisations that arise in order to satisfy the demand created by an imbalance between the large number of people who seek entry into capital-rich countries and the limited number of immigrant visas these countries typically offer (Massey et al. 1993; Moses & Yu 2009). Although this theory primarily applies to international migration, it could also play a role in some internal migration flows, especially where closed-city measures apply, as was practised under South Africa's influx control policy and *Coloured Labour Preference Policy* under apartheid (eds. Kok et al. 2006; Moses & Yu 2009).

*Network theory* attributes the perpetuation of migration to 'sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship and shared community origin' (Massey et al. 1993, p. 448). Migrant networks that often evolve into institutional frameworks are used to explain how migration is continuous even when wage differentials or recruitment policies cease to exist (Kurekova 2011). Migrants develop interpersonal relationships (networks) with individuals who are former, current or potential migrants, as well as non-migrants, in both the sending and receiving areas. These relationships are built on friendship, kinship and shared community origins.



Over time, these relationships lead to strong networks that make it possible for those who wish to migrate to do so relatively comfortably because of a decline in risk and cost for the migrant (Massey et al. 1993; Moses & Yu 2009).

*Cumulative causation theory* argues that migration is a self-perpetuating and self-sustaining phenomenon (Kurekova 2011). Each migration-related act reflects the probability of subsequent decisions about migration in that it changes the social context within which subsequent migration decisions are made, normally in ways that enable more movement (Massey et al. 1993; Moses & Yu 2009). On the one hand, migration results in the change experienced in the social context, with the latter in turn perpetuating migration because of the expansion of networks, relative deprivation, the development of a culture of migration, a perverse distribution of human capital and the stigmatisation of jobs as usually being performed by migrants (Arango 2000).

*Migration systems theory* states that (Massey et al. 1993):

[M]igration flows acquire a measure of stability and structure of space and time, allowing for the identification of stable international migration systems. These systems are characterised by relatively intense exchange of goods, capital and people between certain countries and less intense exchange between others. (p. 454)

It further describes this system as generally including a core receiving region and a set of specific sending countries or regions linked to it by an unusually large flow of migrants. The stable association between two regions or countries results not only from migration flows but is supported by connections and links of a varied nature. It is then these linkages and their multiple interactions that constitute the most appropriate context for migration analysis (Arango 2000; Massey et al. 1993). With regard to internal migration, this theory assumes migration flows to be from low-wage, rural hinterlands to urban heartlands (Kok et al. 2003).

*Network theory: Social networks* and the availability and access to *social capital networks* not only cause migration but strongly influence the perpetuation of migration. According to Massey et al. (1993), network theory contributes significantly to a better understanding of why (international) migration persists despite changes in the factors believed to have caused it. 'Migrant networks are sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin' (Massey et al. 1993, p. 448).

These networks form a very important source of social capital, lowering the risk of movement while increasing the expected net returns of migration (Massey et al. 1993):

Once the number of migrants reaches a critical threshold, the expansion of networks reduces the costs and risks of movement, which causes the probability of migration to rise, which causes additional movement, which further expands the networks, and so on. (p. 449).

## ■ A synthesis of explanatory approaches

The decision to migrate is informed and ultimately executed in the context of one's own needs, challenges, possibilities, and urgency, as well as with uncertainty and incomplete information about migration prospects and possible consequences of migration. The configuration of complex driver environments is particular to the time and place in which migration ambitions and decisions are formed and acted on. The opportunity, willingness and ability to migrate are generally not determined by a single driver but rather by a complex interplay of drivers. The consideration of either exclusively economic – although often the dominating factor – or non-economic factors do subsequently not allow for a comprehensive understanding of decision-making regarding migration and resulting migration flows. Migration behaviour clearly involves the interrogation and analysis of multi-dimensional factors and aspects of human behaviour in order to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of how these factors and aspects of human behaviour converse towards tipping-point situations that set in motion larger population movements. With an increasing awareness among scholars of this prerequisite, an initiative emerged to develop a more *synthesised approach*, resulting in an overarching theory of migration.

On a theoretical level, this would require the combining of different theoretical approaches to migration into a single model with the aim of pursuing and applying one-sided theories (Gelderblom 2006). An example of such an endeavour is provided in the work of Gelderblom (2006), where he identifies the causal factors involved in the different theories and specifies their mutual relationships. He further attempts to uncover the assumptions underlying the different theories and to link these as far as possible. The model proposes relationships between the following factors (Gelderblom 2006):

- spatial reward structure based on (a) the ability to address human needs and (b) the interaction between individual characteristics and the perception of personal or individualised reward
- individual characteristics such as gender, income level, education and occupation
- individual reward structure open to an individual that is dependent on both the individual characteristics of the migrant and the economic and political characteristics of a specific area or country

- structural variables inherent in the household arrangement of that individual that ultimately determine decision-making
- information sources providing knowledge regarding migration opportunities
- perceptions regarding migration, motivations and the decision to migrate based on an evaluation of the probability of attaining an increase in present values (income, comfort, services, etc.) in the destination area
- the impact of norms pertaining to migration and its impact on the decision-making process by both the migrant and migrant households, resulting in a clear intention to either move or stay
- filters that act as either obstacles or facilitators of migration, of which the most important are the cost of migration, legal restrictions around in-migration within a country and social, structural inhibitors and restrictions (i.e. established gender and cultural roles); the most important facilitators of migration are defined as recruitment agencies and social networks.

Integrating all these variables is, of course, no small feat and, indeed, very complicated, and the level of success of such a project could, in all fairness, be questioned. However, we need to also consider the alternative, that is, the continued use and application of unsatisfying, one-sided theories, of which the limitations have been illustrated over and over again. It seems apt to conclude this discussion with the following quote by Gelderblom (2006), wherein he states:

There seems to be a strong current of opinion that an overarching theory of migration would not be very useful, given the high level of abstraction that such a theory would involve. Yet, despite the legitimate problem of level of abstraction, the alternative of continuing to pursue one-sided theories is not very attractive either. It seems perverse to continue with the exclusive pursuit of partial theories when we know very well that they are indeed partial. (p. 268)

## ■ The migration and development nexus

The final aspect that needs to be dealt with in this chapter, given the focus of this book, is the relationship between migration and development. Carling (2017) defines the migration-development nexus as ‘the totality of mechanisms through which migration and development dynamics affect each other’ (Carling 2017 in Lazsco et al. 2024). The reciprocal relationship between these two aspects is generally accepted in migration theory, with development accepted as a key factor in facilitating both the onset and perpetuation of migration. Migration, on the other hand, is also known to facilitate development. The reciprocal relationship between migration and development is, however, not straightforward and can result in negative,

positive, neutral or mixed impacts. It can also be realised in different ways on different levels, that is, individual, community, national and international, as well as for all those involved, for example, for the migrants themselves and the sending or receiving community. Furthermore, it would also be important to acknowledge the fluidity of how development is defined and understood, with its meaning fluctuating depending on the theoretical and political debate that drives the development agenda or discussion (De Haas 2009, p. 53; Lazsco et al. 2024; Skeldon 2021).

The demographic transition theory has evolved from initially only describing demographic changes observed in advanced nations over time to include the process of modernisation, thus development, and its impact on observed demographic changes (Skeldon 2021; Weeks 2012). In this theory, the growth rate of any population is understood as a direct function of the fertility, mortality and migration rates within that population. The classical demographic transition model defines four stages of transition (United Nations Population Fund [UNFPA] 2017; Weeks 2012):

1. pre-transition, characterised by high birth rates and high fluctuating death rates
2. early transition, during which the death rate begins to decline; however, birth rates remain high and the population starts to grow rapidly
3. late transition, where birth rates start to decline and the rate of population growth decelerates
4. post-transition societies, characterised by low birth and death rates, with a negligible population growth or even decline.

The relationship of these four demographic indicators to population change is probably best illustrated in the transition models: demographic transition, urban transition and migration transition (Stellenbosch University 2000).

The *demographic transition* model describes population change over time through temporary changes in the balance between death and birth rates. This demographic model is based on an interpretation of observed changes in 1929 of transitions in birth and death rates in industrialised societies over the past 200 years by American demographer Warren Thompson. In a typically developed country, four stages of transition are evident, of which the first two are probably best summarised in the following excerpt (Zelinsky 1971):

The first is the assertion that, on attaining certain thresholds of socio-economic development, every community will pass from a pre-modern near-equilibrium, in which high levels of mortality tend to cancel out high levels of fertility, to a modern near-equilibrium, in which low fertility almost matches low mortality but with the decline in births lagging far enough behind the decline in deaths to ensure a substantial growth in numbers during the transitional phase. (p. 219)

During stage three of the demographic transition, the population enters a phase where the drop in death rates is associated with a drop in birth rates, resulting in a decelerated population growth and an ageing population. In some instances, the fertility rate falls well below what is required to balance out the mortality rate, causing rapid population decline, which is evident in contemporary Europe (De Haas 2010a; Stellenbosch University 2000).

The second transition, characteristic of an advanced society, is the *urban transition*, and refers to the process whereby a population changes from being essentially rural to being urban. This transition is caused by economic and developmental forces, resulting in people leaving rural areas and migrating to urban areas in large numbers. Urban transition does, however, involve more than just merely moving to an urban settlement. It also involves a socio-economic transition, which offers the opportunity and ability to all urban citizens to participate in the urban economy. This is, however, only possible if an individual has the requisite education, capacity and know-how to access opportunities and available resources necessary to attain and sustain an urban lifestyle. Finally, a population enters the third transition, characteristic of the so-called 'superadvanced' society (De Haas 2010a; Stellenbosch University 2000).

The third and final transition to be discussed here is the *migration or mobility transition*. This transition is based on Zelinsky's 'hypothesis of the mobility transition' developed in 1971 (Zelinsky 1971). In response to theories on migration, including both macro and micro models explaining the onset of migration flows, Zelinsky (1971) offered a geographical perspective considering how the principle of spatial diffusion can be applied to particularly neo-classical theories on migration. In his hypothesis, Zelinsky (1971) links changes in migration and mobility behaviour to different stages in the modernisation process (King 2012, p. 15). 'There are definite, patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space-time during recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernization process' (Zelinsky 1971, p. 221).

Zelinsky (1971, cited in De Haas 2010a) argued that not only has there been:

[A] general and spectacular expansion of individual mobility in modernizing societies, but also that the specific character of migration processes tends to change over the course of this vital transition. (p. 6)

These changes in migration and mobility were expressed through a five-stage model based on the historical experience of Europe (King 2012, p. 15).

1. *Pre-modern traditional society*: very limited migration, only local movements related, for example, to marriage or to marketing agricultural produce.

2. *Early transitional society*: mass rural-urban migration, emigration to attractive foreign destinations for settlement and colonisation.
3. *Late transitional society*: slackening of both rural-urban migration and emigration; growth in various kinds of circulation, for example, commuting.
4. *Advanced society*: rural-urban migration replaced by inter-urban migration and mass immigration of low-skilled workers from less developed countries; international circulation of high-skilled migrants and professionals; and intense internal circulation, both economic and pleasure-related.
5. *Future super advanced society*: better communication and delivery systems may lead to a decline in some forms of human circulation; internal migration is inter- or intra-urban; continued immigration of low-skilled labour from less developed countries; and the possibility of strict controls over immigration.

Thus, in summary, Zelinsky's model argues that migration is a normal and inevitable feature of development, with migration rates tending to rise as development occurs. This development-induced mobility specifically involves rural-to-urban movement and is further strongly associated with changes in birth and death rates. As a society develops and thus moves from a pre-modern to a modern society, greater mobility is observed, primarily towards the urban centre. In turn, an increase in mobility is associated with a decrease in fertility rates, with the urbanisation transition specifically associated with lower fertility and mortality rates. It is clear that fertility, mortality and migration trends, which are often treated as three independent demographic indicators, are actually influenced by economic and development changes (Stellenbosch University 2000; Zelinsky 1971).

Having established the impact of migration on demographic and population transitions and how these transitions are tied to economic development, we now shift the focus of this discussion to the inverse relationship between these two processes, that is, how migration affects development. The impact of development on migration flows and trends has received increased attention from scholars with a growing call for the integration of migration in development planning and policy development (Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty 2009; De Wind & Holdaway 2005; Faist 2008; Global Migration Group [GMG] 2010; IOM 2005, 2016, 2018; Sinatti & Alverez Tinajero 2011). Though the association between migration and development is relevant to both international and internal migration, the discussion in this section will focus mainly on internal migration, given the focus of this book.

Although the migration process is of strategic importance to understand in successful and sustainable development planning initiatives, the

discussion to follow aims to illustrate that the significance of the migration phenomenon is more than the migration process itself. Its real significance is to be sought in the enduring effect it has on human resource allocation and how it facilitates the bridging of the economic divide evident between poorer (often rural) and richer (often urban) settings and households.

The migration process influences both economic growth in general and the nature of that growth, its distributional manifestations in particular. It is important to recognise migration as both a symptom of and a factor contributing to (under)development. In advocating this significance, Todaro (1980) concludes:

Understanding the causes, determinants, and consequences of internal migration is thus central to a better understanding of the nature and character of the development process. It is also essential for formulating appropriate policies to influence this process in socially desirable ways. A simple yet crucial step in underlining the centrality of the migration phenomenon is to recognize that any economic and social policy that affects rural and urban real incomes will directly or indirectly influence the migration process. (p. 363)

Migration is the principal demographic process shaping patterns of human settlement, which in turn serves an essential role in human development (Bell et al. 2015; Weeks 2012). The impact of migration reaches further than the individual migrant because it has the potential to significantly affect the lives of those directly linked to the migrant. This includes those who are left behind as well as the sending and receiving communities linked to migrants (Findley 1977; GMG 2010; Hickey 2016; IOM 2016; Lazsco et al. 2024; Skeldon 2021; Weeks 2012).

Depending on the size of the migration flows over time, migration also has the immediate potential to dramatically alter the demographic structure of a community as well the social structure over time as migrants not only add their children to the community stock but could also bring about changes in the age and gender distribution of both sending and receiving communities (Weeks 2012). These changes have a direct impact on particularly service delivery as the needs of a population closely match the demographic structure of a community (i.e. the growing need for old age homes, hospitals and clinics in a greying society as opposed to the need for schools and crèches in societies with a younger age profile).

The most widely observed and reported impact of, particularly, internal migration has been its contribution to the growth of urban areas (Deshingkar & Grimm 2005; Rees et al. 2017; Weeks 2012). Migration, moreover, has a number of less visible and obvious impacts on the economic, social, demographic and spatial spheres of both the sending and receiving areas. These impacts may vary according to the type of migrant, the extent of migration and the nature of the receiving destinations involved (Todaro 1980).

The impact of migration may be discussed within three categories: (1) the migrant, (2) the receiving area and (3) the sending area. In the context of growing global urbanisation, migrants mostly choose destination areas that are either characterised as an urban centre within a country or (in the case of this publication) a province or a settlement in a rural area that displays urban characteristics and, thus, potential employment opportunities.

## ■ Impacts on the migrant

The impacts of migration on the migrant and the migrant household are both economic and social in nature. Social impacts refer to a subjective or reflective measurement, whereas economic impacts include more concrete or quantifiable measures pertaining to socio-economic indicators. Subjective measurements relate to the question of how satisfied the migrant is with the quality of his or her life in the new environment (Findley 1977). Has the quality of life improved because of migrating from the previous locality? In a recent housing study for the Overstrand Municipality, testing internal migrant's satisfaction with their new locality, the perception of these migrants on their quality of life was found to firstly be determined by their employment and income status, followed by their relative satisfaction with housing conditions, including access to basic services at the dwelling (electricity, water and sanitation). Other aspects noted were access to transport and educational opportunities for children (Eigelaar-Meets, Louw & Groenewald 2016). These findings clearly suggest the strong association between quality of life and the economic reality confronting the migrant at the chosen destination compared to facilities and overall quality of life used in the sending area.

The economic and developmental consequences of migration have enjoyed extended focus from scholars and are considered in most studies on migration. The economic impact on the migrant is, of course, dependant on several aspects, with, among others, the educational status and age of the migrant, the status of the economy of the receiving area, and the fit between the type of employment opportunities available at the receiving location and the educational status or skills set of the migrants. In addition, the economic impact on the migrant also relates to the ability of the migrant to successfully access the economic sectors active in the receiving area (Findley 1977; Hickey 2016; Laczko et al. 2024).

The economic impacts for the individual migrant are primarily determined by assessing differences in various economic indicators before and after migration. These measures mostly include changes in employment levels, occupational hierarchy, income levels, industry mix, savings and capital accumulation levels, and government revenue and expenditure levels (Cornelius & Rosenblum 2005; Findley 1977).



## ■ Impact on receiving (urban) destinations

As mentioned earlier, the most obvious impact of internal migration on (urban) destinations is probably on the population size of these receiving areas. Growing population size has a direct impact on the population density of urban areas. The increase in population can be attributed to two main factors. Firstly, there is the actual growth in population numbers. Secondly, there is an increase in fertility rates, especially when faced with a young migrant population (Findley 1977; Weeks 2012). Internal migration, in sufficient numbers, can also have demographic impacts. With a predisposition of especially young adults to migrate, internal migrants could disproportionately increase the share of persons in their early working years, swelling the younger, less experienced and often less skilled portion of the labour force. Furthermore, provided that migration is not heavily male-selective, young migrant women may also increase the city's proportion of women in the childbearing years, adding to the existing fertility rates (Findley 1977; Weeks 2012). These are all aspects that have a direct impact on the need and demand for basic and indispensable services.

Another impact of internal migration is its effect on the physical landscape of destinations. One method of coping with life in a new urban setting is to minimise expenditure on housing. For many migrants, this means squatting or occupying a piece of land without purchase, payment or rent. Proof of this settlement strategy is seen in the excessive growth in the size and number of informal settlements in urban centres and rural towns. In 2023, there were an estimated 4,297 informal settlements countrywide, with the majority concentrated in the major metropolitan areas of Johannesburg, Cape Town and eThekweni. These informal settlements are estimated to accommodate approximately 2 million households in total (Comins 2023). These are not all migrant households, but informal areas do function as important reception areas or gateways for migrant populations, offering cheap entry points to the urban labour market. Informal areas act as attractive, low-cost, accessible locations to initially settle and to use as a base to search for work opportunities (Comins 2023; Cross 2010; Findley 1977; Turok 2012).

The impact of internal migration on local economic well-being represents two sides of a coin. On the one side, the in-migrant has the potential to positively impact economic growth in the destination area through greater labour productivity, higher incomes and wages, generation of capital, diversification of industry and services, and increased demand for consumer goods. The other side of the coin is, however, equally relevant where migrants may burden the local economy of the destination area, adding to unemployment rates, lower productivity, greater demand for municipal facilities and services, lower per capita tax revenues and higher city budget

deficits (Cornelius & Rosenblum 2005; Findley 1977; Todaro 1980; UNDP 2009).

The net economic impact of migration, however, depends largely on the ability of migrants to be assimilated into the local economy, that is, the capacity of destination areas to absorb migrants sustainably as labour, and partly on characteristics held by migrants of which educational status is probably the most important. Because of various factors, including individual characteristics, as well as the socio-economic and political environment of the new host environment, migrants experience different levels of access to employment, certain types of occupations and income (Cornelius & Rosenblum 2005; Findley 1977; Martine 1975; Weeks 2012).

## ■ Impact on sending destinations

Similar to the impact of migration on receiving areas, perspectives pertaining to the relative impact on sending areas are also mixed. Scholars stressing the positive economic impacts of migration on the sending area mostly present the case of remittances and how this practice provides income support to the migrant household that stays behind. It is argued that this source of income trickles down to the benefit of the broader area as a result of mostly an enhanced spending and consumption power that ultimately impacts the local economy of the broader mostly rural community. Although broad consensus prevails regarding the impact of remittances to relieve poverty on the household level, some scholars contest its ability to affect broader community and local economic development (Casale & Posel 2006; Garip 2014; Yeboah 2016). Another positive outcome of out-migration is the possibility that migrants may stimulate change within their areas of origin, particularly if it represents a rural setting, by creating new sustainable linkages between the (rural) area and destination areas (Findley 1977; Pan & Sun 2024; UNDP 2009).

The economic success and development of the migrant also have the potential to positively influence the prevailing economic conditions of the migrant's household that remained in the sending area. The important and often crucial role of regular remittances in securing as well as improving the economic status of the migrant household has been elaborately argued and documented (Casale & Posel 2006; Castaldo, Deshingkar & McKay 2012; Olowa & Awoyemi 2012; UNDP 2009; Yeboah 2016). Various studies have shown that remittances play a significant role in reducing poverty and establishing sustainable security for the households of the migrants who stayed behind in the sending area. Some scholars argue that this source of income carries significant potential to increase the economic development and sustainability of the migrant's hometown (Deshingkar & Grimm 2005; Pan & Sun 2024; UNDP 2009; Yeboah 2016).

Those who hold a more pessimistic view of the impact on main sending, mostly rural areas of out-migration accentuate the loss of human capital experienced by these main areas. They point to the often higher educational status and associated stronger skills – sets of out-migrants who, when they leave, take with them the investment made in their education in their places of origin. Unless the migrant returns or sends money back to the household(s) remaining in the place of origin, the investment and skills are lost. Furthermore, the age structure of out-migrants can also determine the effect of migration on the labour force. When young working persons consistently leave an area, the dependency ratios rise. This effect is exacerbated if there is no accompanying decrease in the birth rate, resulting in the income of the remaining workers having to support more people (Findley 1977). Another negative impact of out-migration formulated by Massey (1990) is the hypothesis that large-scale out-migration of the most productive members within the community will, in most instances, negatively impact the economic structures and productivity in migrant-sending communities and regions.

## ■ Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to present a theoretical framework to comprehensively approach, analyse and understand the multi-faceted and often complex nature of migration. This was accomplished by firstly illustrating how theoretical thinking regarding migration and reflection on this phenomenon has evolved over time and secondly presenting the migration-development nexus. The rationale for this approach is set in the belief that a proper understanding of migration as both a concept and a process is essential before embarking on integrating it into development planning initiatives and processes. Although the relationship between migration and development is generally accepted, it is often ignored in development planning. Understanding the nature of migration as well as the context in which it takes place is vital not only to mitigate its negative consequences but also to harness its beneficial effects.

The aspiration to explain and predict human migration behaviour has existed since the dawn of the age of mass migration, dating back to more than a century ago. Towards this end, a variety of theoretical models have been proposed by, primarily – although not exclusively – the disciplines of economics, sociology and geography. The preceding brief selection and discussion of various theories within existing migration literature suggest that the decision to migrate is always set in specific cultural, economic and social environments. This implies that migration is not only influenced by the constraints imposed by those environments but also that it is dependent on the expectations, perceptions, attitudes, opinions and values of

individual migrants. The overview of migration theories presented the phenomenon of migration as a complex and multi-faceted process with different factors and forces resulting in the initiation and perpetuation of migration flows.

In recent years, migration theory has progressed beyond merely venturing to explain the initiation and perpetuation of migration. There has been substantial theoretical deliberation on the significant impact of migration on development and how it should be integrated into development planning. This chapter considered such impacts on three levels: (1) the migrant and migrant household; (2) the impact on sending (mostly rural) areas; and (3) the impact on receiving (mostly urban) areas.



# Exploring internal migration trends: Framing and structuring the analysis

How do we structure an investigation into migration trends? What do we need to consider, and how do we structure such an investigation? The first task would certainly be to refine your focus to ensure that you know exactly what you want to analyse, by answering the following questions. Where is the geographic location that you intend to focus your investigation? Who are the people whose mobility you intend to understand and describe? What indicators and analytical methods will you use? How will you go about to interpret your findings?

Defining the geographic area and units of focus (research population), you set the parameters for both the investigation and analysis. Any geographic space is set within a specific contextual framework that is the result of the particular cultural, political and socio-economic environment that characterises this space. Furthermore, the unit(s) of focus always stand in direct relation to the contextual framework in which they make their migration decisions. It is thus of the utmost importance to clarify these two aspects as it will guide your contextual analysis (literature overview), which is, of course, required for interpreting and contextualising the data analysis. Having defined these two aspects will assist you in defining your rationale for the investigation, that is, your reason and motives

**How to cite:** Eigelaar-Meets, I 2024, 'Exploring internal migration trends: Framing and structuring the analysis', in *Internal migration and development planning in South Africa*, AVARSITY Books, Cape Town, pp. 67-87. <https://doi.org/10.4102/aosis.2024.BK463.03>

for focusing on this geographic area and target group and what you aim to achieve with its findings.

The next task of framing your migration investigation and analysis is to decide on the theoretical framework you will apply. The overview of migration theory presented in Chapter 2 was not simply carried out to fill the pages of this book but is indeed a deliberate exercise to illustrate the complexity of migration behaviour and the range of variables that could and should be considered in describing this phenomenon. It is also to illustrate the interrelated nature of context and theory. One aspect shared in all migration theories is the agreement that migration, as both individual behaviour and broader collective action, is always highly context-dependent (Czaika & Reinprecht 2022). Because of this interrelated relationship, migration theory effectively guides your investigation, enabling you to connect the facts and assess and interpret the findings contextually.

Once the geographic space and unit of focus of your investigation have been defined, the context of the geographic space(s) has been determined, and the theoretical framework defined, you are left with a well-structured framework within which to conduct your research. The defined framework will focus your attention on the specific aspects (variables) to consider in the data collection (if you are collecting primary data), analysis and interpretation of the findings. Finally, it is always important to reflect on the reliability and validity of the data source(s) used in the investigation, acknowledging the strengths but also the limitations.

Having developed a conceptual framework for approaching the investigation and comprehension of migration, the next step is to determine the most effective practical methods for carrying out this task. The aim of this chapter is to address this practical question by demonstrating how the task of migration analysis could be framed and approached to ensure a clear focus and guide. This is illustrated by two case studies, the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces. Firstly, the rationale for selecting these two geographic spaces is presented. This is followed by a description of the theoretical and analysis frameworks to be applied in Chapters 4 and 5. Considering the strengths and weaknesses of the data drawn on for the analysis, the chapter concludes with a brief reflection on the validity and reliability of the secondary data sources used for the analysis presented in Chapters 6 and 7.

## ■ Conceptualising internal migration

The significance of the two provinces that constitute the focus of this book, the Western Cape and Northern Cape, lies in their respective histories, demographic composition and demographic characteristics. Their shared

geographical and historical characteristics refer to (1) their colonial past, (2) the Coloured Labour Preference Policy, an influx control mechanism implemented exclusively in the largest part of these two provinces and (3) the large historical representation of the coloured population group of the total provincial population of these provinces.

These two provinces are further noteworthy in that they exhibit divergent demographic characteristics within the period of study defined for this publication (1996–2011). The Western Cape province, a net-receiving province of migrants since democratisation, is characterised by a densely populated and mostly urban population. In contrast, the Northern Cape province exhibits negative net migration rates and has a strong rural character and low population density. These divergent internal migration and demographic trends present an opportunity to, firstly, determine the nature of internal migration flows and, secondly, to assess how these different contexts impact migration decisions.

Developing an enhanced understanding of internal migration flows requires a specific research methodology and design to structure this enquiry. The nature of the defined methodology and design is dictated by the research objective designed for such an enquiry. Because the internal migration flows presented in this publication compare two historical periods – that is, pre- and post-1994 – it is further necessary to situate the objectives in their appropriate historical context. Before 1994, apartheid government policies deeply influenced the nature and direction of various internal migration streams, particularly in the two provinces selected for analysis. This historical imperative informed the formulation of the research objectives directing the analysis and discussions offered. The objectives are to:

1. identify internal migration streams in the two provinces at (1) provincial level [inter-provincial migration] and (2) sub-provincial levels [intra-provincial migration] for the periods 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011
2. compare these post-apartheid migration streams by employing migration theory
3. consider the nature and impact of urbanisation in the two provinces.

With the research objectives clearly defined the next step is to define the appropriate research design. The research design of a research study is directly informed and determined by the defined scientific research problem and involves a set of decisions, including the purpose of the study (research question), the study population and a decision on the most appropriate research method to address and answer the research problem (eds. Babbie & Mouton 2001).



As illustrated in the defined research objectives, the research design that guides the operationalisation and subsequent analysis of data presented here is both descriptive and explanatory in nature. The analysis is descriptive in that it aims to describe post-apartheid internal migration flows within and across the provincial borders of the two provinces, as well as the nature of urbanisation in the two provinces. The explanatory nature of the study is evident in the second research objective, where the publication aims to offer some explanations for the observed internal migration flows at the hand of migration theory.

The primary aim of a descriptive analysis is to provide an accurate depiction of a social phenomenon, trend and the characteristics of the actors involved. This is achieved through the analysis of empirical data employed to generate a valid description of the phenomena studied. The primary objective of data analysis within an explanatory framework is to examine the causal relationship between variables or events. To show that a causal relationship exists between two variables, three requirements need to be met:

1. the cause has to precede the effect in time
2. the two variables must be empirically correlated with one another
3. the observed empirical correlation between two variables cannot be explained in terms of some third variable that causes both.

To prove the causal relationship between two variables, a perfect correlation does not have to be established. Phrased differently, exceptions, although they do not prove the rule, do not necessarily deny the rule either. 'In probabilistic models, there are almost always exceptions to the posited relationships' (eds. Babbie & Mouton 2001, p. 82). It is within this probabilistic model that a useful distinction is made between two types of causes: necessary causes and sufficient causes. A necessary cause represents a condition that must be present for the effect to follow, with a sufficient cause representing a condition that, if present, will most likely result in the effect in question (Babbie & Mouton 2001).

With the research objectives clearly defined as well as the appropriate research design, the next step would be to clearly define the study population. The *study population* is defined by means of the defined units of analysis. The *unit of analysis* refers to the unit of observation and measurement, which in this case is an individual. For the purpose of this study, the study population is defined as: Individual adult internal migrants who are South African citizens and who lived in one of the nine provinces in South Africa at the time of data collection and who have moved into, out of or within the Western Cape or Northern Cape provinces between 1996 and 2011.

Describing migration flows, reference is made to two divergent streams constituting the in- and outflow of individuals to and from a defined area. Those persons who migrate from a particular district or province are called out-migrants from that area, whereas persons who migrate to (settle in) a particular province or district are called in-migrants to that area of destination.

Given the specific political context in which the analysis presented in this book is set, that is pre- and post-apartheid, it was decided to only focus on the internal migration of South African citizens. Furthermore, data on international migrants are often unrepresented in census data, and thus, it is probable that the primary use of these data would not provide a reliable account of the post-1994 internal migration flows of this migrant group. For these two reasons, it was decided to exclude this group from the analysis.

The descriptive analysis pertaining to the profile of migrants explores two specific characteristics of migrants, namely, age and population group. For the purpose of this study, adult internal migrants are defined as those migrants aged 20 years or older. For the sake of analysis, the age of migrants was defined to constitute three categories: young adults (20–29 years), mature adults (30–60 years) and senior adults (61 years or older). The population group classifications referred to here and throughout this book follow the classification of South African citizens as defined and used by StatsSA.<sup>25</sup> These classifications are black African, coloured, Indian, Asian and white.

Internal migration trends within the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces were analysed along two dimensions.

- *Dimension 1*: movement across provincial boundaries (inter-provincial migration)
- *Dimension 2*: movement across municipal district and metro boundaries within the provincial boundaries of the two provinces (intra-provincial migration)

The basic *unit of spatial analysis* is called a *settlement area* and is defined on two levels: firstly, on a district municipal level and secondly, on a provincial level. A district municipality is defined as an administrative entity comprising a clearly defined territory. In South Africa, a district municipality, or Category C municipality, executes some of the functions of local

---

25. Statistics South Africa, frequently shortened to StatsSA, is the national statistical service of South Africa. Functioning under the auspices of the *Statistics Act*, this organisation under the leadership of a Statistician General is, among others, responsible for the collection, production and dissemination of official and other statistics, including the conducting of a census of the population.

government for a district. The district municipality, in turn, is comprised of several local municipalities with which it shares the functions of local government.

The rationale for confining the analysis of intra-provincial migration flows to movement across municipal district boundaries lies in the comparability of data. Since 1996, local municipal boundaries have been re-demarcated by the Demarcation Board in an effort to enable local municipalities to provide equitable and efficient service delivery. Because administrative boundaries are used and captured by StatsSA as they were defined at the time of a particular census, the re-demarcation of boundaries had an impact on the comparability of data collected during the respective censuses since 1996. Because of the volatility of local municipal boundaries since 1996 and the subsequent implications for comparability of trends over time, this administration level was not considered in this publication. Rather, municipal district boundaries have remained mostly stable since 1996 in both provinces. Therefore, these boundaries have been included in this study, with the few shifts that did occur incorporated into the analysis. Data pertaining to local municipalities will be used for illustrative purposes in a number of cases.

A province refers to a territory governed as an administrative or political unit of a country, and in the case of South Africa it refers to the provincial boundaries as set by the post-1994 South African Government. Changes made to the provincial boundaries as a consequence of the 12th amendment of the Constitution in December 2005 were also incorporated in the data analysis. These boundary changes are specifically relevant in the case of the Northern Cape, where the provincial boundaries were extended to incorporate municipalities previously part of the North West into the province.

Lastly, movement is also measured in terms of urban, rural and peri-urban areas. Although defining urban areas as opposed to rural might seem simple, a body of academic literature exists that is critical of the dichotomy 'urban' versus 'rural' because many areas cannot unambiguously be defined as belonging to either one or the other category (Tacoli & Satterthwaite 2003; UN 2004). Consequently, an increasingly influential school of thought argues for and insists on the use of a rural-urban continuum instead of the rural/urban dichotomy. In addition, urban and rural parts of countries are increasingly becoming integrated as a result of better transport and communication, rural-urban and return migration, urban economic activities spreading to rural areas (rural industrialisation) and rural economic activities pursued in urban areas (urban agriculture). Consequently, the distinction between urban and rural areas has become increasingly artificial and quite blurred (Kok & Collison 2006; Todes et al. 2010).

This complexity in definition allowing for a clear discernment between rural and urban areas is also noted by the World Bank, highlighting how this negatively impacts its ability to meaningfully compare the UN Sustainability Development Goals' indicators for urban and rural areas across countries. Towards this end, the UN Statistical Commission endorsed the *Degree of Urbanisation* as a recommended method for international comparisons. The *Degree of Urbanisation* classifies an entire territory of a country along the urban-rural continuum in terms of three classes: cities, towns and semi-dense areas, and rural areas. Classification of areas is based on population density, population size and contiguity using 1 km<sup>2</sup> grid cells (Statistical Commission 2020). Applying this method, the three types of settlements are defined as either cities, towns or rural areas.

- *Cities*: population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous grid cells (>1,500 inhabits per km<sup>2</sup>)
- *Towns and semi-dense areas*: population of at least 5,000 inhabitants in contiguous grid cells with a density of at least 300 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>
- *Rural areas*: consist mostly of low-density grid cells (<300 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>)

Kok and Collison (2006) offer another approach to defining 'urban' and 'rural' by employing several factors extending population statistics. According to the authors, factors to be considered should include: (1) *economic criteria*, for example, the majority of the labour force in the area engaged in non-agricultural pursuits (for urban and vice versa for rural); (2) *demographic indicators*, for example, minimum population density; and (3) *urban characteristics*, for example, residential areas with formally aligned (but not necessarily tarred) streets close to commercial enterprises and educational, health and other services. The latter factor is clearly difficult to standardise effectively, but is important to consider as the first two do not deal effectively with higher-density settlements in the former homelands of South Africa that lack the important characteristics to justify their classification as 'urban' (Kok & Collison 2006).

In this book, the definition of rural and urban, as suggested by Kok and Collison (2006), is followed, referring to districts in a threefold classification: urban, peri-urban and rural. Urban districts here refer to districts that are characterised by a majority labour force engaged in non-agricultural pursuits, high population density and exhibiting urban characteristics in its highly diversified structural make-up. Rural districts, on the other hand, are characterised by an economy driven primarily by agricultural pursuits, low population density and, for example, exhibit rural characteristics in its monolithic structural make-up. Peri-urban districts refer to those areas that exhibit both urban and rural characteristics but do not exhibit an exact fit to either of the two descriptions.

The data analysis presented in this book draws entirely on secondary data sources. Secondary data refer to the use of existing data as opposed to primary data, where the researcher generates new data. The availability of secondary data sources is very valuable as it allows access to data researchers would otherwise not have access to (Babbie 2021; Dale, Wathan & Higgins 2008). The secondary data sources used in this publication are national census data (1996, 2001 and 2011) and the Community Survey of 2007, for which data were collected and made available by StatsSA.

Census data are made available by StatsSA in two statistical packages: *Nesstar* and *SuperWeb*. Census data in the *SuperWeb* format allows for basic analysis within organised categories, such as descriptive data, labour force data, data on dwellings, etc. This data set allows for frequency tables and the cross-tabulation of data organised within each category. Cross-analysis between categories is not possible. In contrast, census data made available through the *Nesstar* statistical package allows for the downloading of data in its raw format in Statistical Programme for Social Sciences (SPSS), which allows for more in-depth analysis of the data. Census data accessed by means of the *Nesstar* statistical package was employed for the data analysis presented in this book, with data manipulation and analysis performed utilising SPSS.

The focus on census data as the primary data source in addressing Research Objectives 1 and 2 lies in the fact that these data constitute the most comprehensive dataset on internal migration as it occurs on a national level. Although other data collection efforts by StatsSA, such as household surveys, also include a limited number of questions on migration, the data collected during census drives proved sufficient to address the objectives stated for this publication.

Although census data constitute cross-sectional data collected at a specific point in time, the comparison of successive census data sets presents an opportunity for trend studies. Trend studies present a longitudinal approach that allows for the observation of changes within a general population (Babbie 2021), in this case, internal migrants in the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces.

A national census is a *de facto* census, which means that all people of a country are enumerated at the location where they are staying during the four-week period the census is conducted. Each national census is conducted in the month of October of the census year (StatsSA n.d., 2003, 2012a).

Each census is preceded by a pre-enumeration phase that includes the mapping and demarcation of the country, listing, questionnaire development, and finalising the logistics and procurement. The demarcation

of provinces is a critical input into all census activities and produces the enumerated area (EA) frame, a major determinant in the planning and provision of all allocated and required resources. The demarcation process involves subdividing the country into place names and EAs based on specifications of its administrative boundaries, size and population density (StatsSA n.d., 2003, 2012a).

For the 2011 census, the data used for demarcation were derived from StatsSA (Dwelling Frame data) and service providers (External Data Source). The data included imagery, address data (place names), dwelling frames, gated communities, sectional title dwellings (unit counts and cadastre), etc. Sub-place spatial boundaries are created first to form the basis for main place and EA demarcation. The demarcation process is guided by specific demarcation rules and guidelines (StatsSA n.d., 2003, 2012a).

During the enumeration phase, fieldworkers, called enumerators, visit households organised within EAs throughout the country to complete the designed household questionnaire, collecting information from all people living within that household. Although households are encouraged to allow the completion of a questionnaire by the enumerator, provision is made for respondents who prefer to complete the questionnaire themselves for later collection by the enumerator. Although questionnaires are presented in English, enumerators carry versions of translations into the other ten official languages to refer to when necessary (StatsSA n.d., 2003, 2012a).

To manage the data quality, the work of enumerators is monitored by supervisors who are, in turn, monitored by fieldwork coordinators. Regional managers are appointed to monitor the entire process within their respective regions (StatsSA, n.d., 2003, 2012a).

The questionnaires used for the different censuses can be obtained from the StatsSA website.<sup>26</sup>

As previously mentioned, data analysis was directed by the research objective and defined research questions developed for this research initiative. As indicated, census data (2001 and 2011) obtained by means of the *Nesstar* statistical package available from StatsSA was utilised for the migration analysis. This is dealt with later in this book. Data for the two respective censuses were downloaded in SPSS, and subsequent data manipulation and analysis were executed using this programme. The trends analysis of internal migration flows in the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces is based on data collected during two census occasions, that is, the 2001 and 2011 censuses.

---

26. See [www.statssa.gov.za](http://www.statssa.gov.za).

Internal migrants were selected and separate datasets were developed for each province for the sake of comparative analysis. The analytical framework for the analysis and definition of the demarcated research population constitutes the parameters listed below.

1. Persons who indicated to have moved within the boundaries of South Africa (internal migrants) between 1996 and 2011. This move only refers to the last move in reference to the place the person stayed at the time of either the 2001 or the 2011 census.<sup>27</sup>
2. Persons who were 20 years or older at the time of their move. This focus was deliberate to exclude school-going youth and thus exclude the complexity of short-term migration in this age group because of school attendance.
3. Only the migration of South African citizens was considered in this analysis, and foreigners are excluded.
4. For in-migration, if the usual province of residence is either the Western Cape or Northern Cape at the time of the respective censuses and the previous place of residence was another province in South Africa.
5. For out-migration, if the previous province of residence was either the Western Cape or Northern Cape and the usual province of residence is another province in South Africa.
6. For intra-provincial migration, if a person indicated to have moved because the previous census and this move was within the provincial boundaries of either the Western Cape or Northern Cape.

In analysing and presenting migration trends for the period 1996–2011, three periods were defined: 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011. To create these categories, the date a person moved to his or her current location was used. Because there was no formal census in 2006, migration data collected during the 2011 census was recoded to constitute migration moves during two periods, namely, 2001 to 2006 and 2006 to 2011.

Since censuses in South Africa have been conducted in the month of October, each defined migration period was defined to start in October of the onset year and end in September of the concluding year. In this way, it was possible to define three periods of 5 years, namely, October 1996 to September 2001 (1996–2001), October 2001 to September 2006 (2001–2006) and October 2006 to September 2011 (2006–2011). For ease of discussion, these periods are consistently referred to as 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.

As indicated earlier, internal migrants are defined to constitute two groups: inter- and intra-provincial migrants. Inter-provincial migrants refer

---

27. See the section on the limitations of the study.

to those migrants who have moved across provincial boundaries within the national borders. An individual migrant is thus defined as an inter-provincial migrant if their province of usual residence is different from the province of previous residence.

Intra-provincial migrants, on the other hand, refer to those migrants who have moved within provincial boundaries but moved either within or across municipal district boundaries. An individual migrant is thus defined as an intra-provincial migrant if the province of usual residence is the same as the province of previous residence. A distinction is then made between those intra-provincial migrants that (1) moved across municipal districts and (2) moved within a municipal district.

Table 3.1 presents the data used in the analysis and shows how it was captured in the two respective censuses in measuring migration. In those cases where data were not directly captured during the census, an explanation is offered about how data were recorded or computed to create the needed data for analysis.

## ■ Defining the theoretical framework

The overview of migration theory presented in Chapter 2 illustrated how scholarly thinking about the onset of migration in particular has evolved over time. Starting from a rather simplistic explanation presenting economic factors as the only catalysts for migration, migration theory has expanded and has grown in complexity, illustrating the multi-faceted nature of factors, both economic and non-economic, that inform and shape decisions and actions regarding migration. It is against this background of this complex and multi-faceted nature of migration that this publication interrogates post-apartheid migration trends in the Northern Cape and Western Cape provinces.

The contextual framework of the analysis to be presented in Chapters 4 and 5 to follow, departs from the premise that a successful analysis of migration trends in a post-apartheid setting and concomitant development of an explanatory framework for the observed trends is impossible without considering and capturing both economic and non-economic factors. Only if due recognition is given to both these sets of factors and how these combine is a comprehensive analysis and understanding of the migration phenomenon in South Africa possible and valid, both in the current and historical context of this country.

The history of South Africa can be roughly divided into five political eras: (1) pre-colonial; (2) colonial; (3) post-colonial; (4) apartheid; and (5) post-apartheid.



**TABLE 3.1:** The data used in the analysis and how it was captured in the two respective censuses in measuring migration.

Item	2001	2011
Citizenship	Is (the person) a South African citizen [Yes/No]	Is (the person) a South African citizen [Yes/No]
Age at the time of moving	Since this question was not asked, the age of the migrant at the time of the move was calculated by subtracting the migration year from the person's birth year. It was then recorded to constitute the three categories	
Migrant status	Five years ago (at the time of census 1996), was (the person) living in this place (i.e. suburb, ward, village, farm or informal settlement)? [Yes/No/Born after October 1996]	Has (name) been living in this place since October 2001? [Yes/No/Born after 2001 but never moved/Born after 2001 and moved]
Year moved	In which year did (this person) move to this place?	When did (name) move to this place? [recorded in terms of month and year of the move to constitute the two periods 2001-2006 and 2006-2011]
Usual residence	Does (this person) usually live in this household for at least four nights a week? [Yes/No]	Does (this person) usually live in this household for at least four nights a week and has done so for the last six months? [Yes/No]
Province of usual residence	This question was not included in the 2001 Census. These data were obtained by recording administrative data included in the dataset	In which province does (name) usually live?  [list of provinces provided for selection]
Municipal district of usual residence	This question was not included in the 2001 Census. These data were obtained from administrative data included in the dataset and recorded. Data were recorded to ensure comparability of district councils between the two censuses	Municipality/Magisterial District of usual Residence [These responses were recorded in the Magisterial district]
Province of the previous residence	Where did (this person) move from? [Province, main place and sub-place]	In which province did (name) live before moving to this place [list of provinces provided]
Municipal district of the previous residence	Main place data provided to the previous question was recorded to represent municipal districts	In which municipality or magisterial district did (name) live before moving to this place?  [These responses were recorded in the Magisterial district]

Source: Author's own work, based on data from the StatsSA website.

The colonial era saw the beginning of the political exclusion and socio-economic marginalisation of groups of people because of their race and ethnicity, a practice that reached its ultimate sophistication and formalisation during the apartheid era. This exclusion and marginalisation had a direct impact on the mobility of the largest part of the South African population (i.e. the black African population) because of the strictly controlled movement enforced by draconian political policies and practices.

The Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces present a special case as these two provinces were the only provinces where a specific population

group, the coloured population, experienced some sort of protection (from apartheid legislation and the black African population) in terms of labour law legislation by means of the so-called *Coloured Labour Preference Policy*. The contextual framework presented here departs from the premise that the nature of the changes observed in migration trends evident in these two provinces in the post-1994 era is a direct outcome of the abolishment of apartheid laws implemented that significantly controlled mobility during the pre-1994 period. The end of apartheid not only resulted in free movement for all, thus ensuring unfettered mobility irrespective of the population group, but also established free participation in the South African economy. It is the interaction of these two aspects that has had a distinct impact on migration trends and particularly urbanisation in the country (*Rand Daily Mail* 2015; South African Institute for Race Relations [SAIRR] 2013; Turok & Borel-Saladin 2014).

Given the critical role racial and ethnic classification has played in the manner in which mobility and economic participation were controlled (and limited) in pre-1994 South Africa, it is, as previously discussed, imperative to draw on both economic and non-economic factors in order to adequately describe post-apartheid migration trends in these two provinces. Non-economic factors are framed within the value expectancy model and focus on two specific demographic attributes of migrants, namely, population group and age, whereas economic factors will be considered within the push-pull theoretical framework of migration.

Non-economic factors are framed within the proposed synthesised model of migration presented by Gelderblom (ed. 2006) in Kok et al. (2006). In this model, an attempt is made to explain migration as a phenomenon caused and motivated by multi-dimensional factors and aspects of human behaviour. The model proposes the migration decision as the outcome of the relationship between five factors, namely, the spatial reward structure, individual characteristics, individual reward structure, structural variables within the household arrangement, information sources and perceptions regarding migration.

This synthesised model of migration is applied in this publication to provide a construct of who is more prone to migrate (age and population group attributes of individual migrants). As illustrated, an individual's population group has particular historical relevance in the South African context, given its previous role as a controlling agent of people mobility within the country (Posel 2003, 2010).

Age is an important indicator to consider in migration, given its impact on the services needed by different age cohorts and the relative speed of possible future population growth given the different fertility potential inherent in different age cohorts (Weeks 2012).

The push-pull theory of migration falls within the economic explanatory framework of migration theories. As illustrated in the discussion of neo-classical migration theory, the push-pull theory departs from the premise that migration is initiated and perpetuated by a specific set of factors that pushes migrants from a previous location and pulls them towards a new and specific location. Although the push-pull theory of migration infers economic factors to be the primary driving agent for migration, this model also acknowledges the role of additional variables, such as environmental and demographic dimensions, that serve to push migrants from localities of origin towards destination places (De Haas 2010a; Hunter & Nawrotzki 2016; ed. Lindsay 1985; Moses & Yu 2009). This theory will be employed to determine the main economic characteristics associated with both the primary sending and receiving areas linked with the two provinces.

## ■ Analysing migration trends

This section presents the formulas used in the different calculations presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 to describe and determine internal migration flows in the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces.

### ■ Inter-provincial net migration rates

- *Objective*: to determine net migration rates as it applies to migration across provincial boundaries
- *Denominator*: inter-provincial migrants
- *Units of spatial analysis*: province

Analysing the net migration rates for the respective population groups and the defined age cohorts, the same formula (Figure 3.1) was applied and the results were compared.

Formula:  $N = (IM-OM)/P_{\text{year}} \times 1,000$

Where:

N - Net migration rate

IM - In-migrant

OM - Out-migrant

$P_{\text{year}}$  - Population size as at the end of the particular period

Source: Author's own work.

**FIGURE 3.1:** Formula for measuring inter-provincial net migration rates.

## ■ Intra-provincial net migration rates

- *Objective*: to determine net migration rates as they apply to migration across municipal district boundaries but within the provincial boundaries of the respective provinces
- *Denominator*: intra-provincial migrants that crossed a municipal district or metro boundary; mobility within municipal districts or metro borders is not included here
- *Units of spatial analysis*: municipal district or metro

## ■ Internal migration rates (the sum of inter-provincial and intra-provincial migrants)

- *Objective*: to determine net migration rates as they apply to internal migration (thus both inter- and intra-provincial migration across municipal district boundaries) for administrative entities within a province, in this case, municipal districts
- *Denominator*: internal migrants (the sum of inter-provincial and intra-provincial migrants that moved across municipal district and metro boundaries)
- *Units of spatial analysis*: municipal district and metro

## ■ Inter-provincial migration flows

- *Objective*: to describe inter-provincial migration flows in terms of sending and receiving provinces
- *Denominator*: inter-provincial migrant population (both in- and out-migrants)

Formula:  $N = (IM-OM)/P_{\text{year}} \times 1,000$

Where:

N - Net migration rate

IM - In-migrant (individual that moved within the particular province but crossed a municipal district or metro boundary)

OM - Out-migrant

P<sub>year</sub> - Population size as at the end of the particular period

Source: Author's own work.

**FIGURE 3.2:** Formula for measuring intra-provincial net migration rates.

Formula:  $IN = \frac{[IM_{(inter+intra-provincial\ mobility\ across\ DM\ and\ metro\ borders)} - OM_{(inter+intra-provincial\ mobility\ across\ DM\ and\ metro\ borders)}]}{P_{year}} \times 1,000$

Where:

IN - Net migration rate

IM - n-migrants (inter-provincial in-migrants + intra-provincial in-migrants that crossed DM borders)

OM - Out-migrant (inter-provincial out-migrants + intra-provincial out-migrants that moved across DM borders)

P<sub>year</sub> - Population size of the municipal district as at the end of the particular period

Source: Author's own work.  
Key: DM, district municipality.

**FIGURE 3.3:** Formula for measuring internal migration rates (the sum of inter-provincial and intra-provincial migrants).

## ■ Method

Inter-provincial migration flows were measured on two levels: provincial and municipal district levels. Firstly, the sending and receiving provinces are calculated referring to census data where respondents noted their previous province of residence (sending provinces) in the case of in-migrants to the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces and migrants who left the two provinces and indicated their usual province of residence (receiving provinces).

Migration flows on the district level are measured using census data, with out-migrants reporting their previous district of residence (sending districts) and in-migrants reporting their usual district of residence (receiving district).

## ■ Intra-provincial migration flows

- *Objective:* to describe intra-provincial migration flows in terms of sending and receiving districts
- *Denominator:* intra-provincial migrant population (both those moving within and across municipal district boundaries); the two migration streams that constitute intra-provincial migration are respectively analysed and compared for a comprehensive overview of this migration flow

The inclusion of this particular migration flow in a discussion on internal migration has direct relevance for the third objective, which is to consider the nature and impact of urbanisation in the two provinces. It is argued here that the outcome and subsequent impact of migration do not only involve mobility across provincial boundaries but also mobility within the boundaries of a province.

$$\text{Formula: } M = (N_{(\text{in/out migrant})} / P_{(\text{year})}) * 100$$

Where:

M - Mobility

N - Migrant count within category

P<sub>year</sub> - Population size as at the end of the particular period

Source: Author's own work.

**FIGURE 3.4:** Formula for measuring the mobility of inter-provincial migrants in terms of age and population group.

Two types of moves are considered in intra-provincial migration flows: (1) migrants who remain within the boundaries of a municipal district and (2) migrants who move across municipal district boundaries. In the tables presenting the trends pertaining to this migration flow, intra-provincial migration is used as a single descriptive for movement across municipal districts or metro boundaries. Where both mobility flows that constitute intra-provincial migration are discussed, a clear distinction is made.

For those who move across municipal district boundaries, migration flows are illustrated in terms of sending and receiving districts. Sending districts refer to those districts from which these migrants moved and receiving districts to the districts in which migrants choose to settle.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the characteristics of migrants are reflected in terms of two variables in this publication, namely, population group and age. The analysis is presented as a proportion of the total provincial population size of the two provinces at the time of the respective censuses.

### ■ Mobility of inter-provincial migrants in terms of age and population group

- *Objective:* to describe the mobility of inter-provincial migrants in terms of age and population group
- *Denominator:* inter-provincial migrant population (in- and out-migrants)

### ■ Mobility of intra-provincial migrants in terms of age and population group

- *Objective:* to describe the mobility of intra-provincial migrants in terms of age and population group
- *Denominator:* intra-provincial migrant population moving across district boundaries (in- and out-migrants)

$$\text{Formula: } M = (N_{(\text{in/out migrant})} / P_{(\text{year})}) * 100$$

Where:

M - Mobility

N - Migrant count within category

P<sub>year</sub> - Population size as at the end of the particular period

Source: Author's own work.

**FIGURE 3.5:** Formula for measuring the mobility of intra-provincial migrants in terms of age and population group.

## ■ Status of data

This study is based on the analysis of secondary data; in other words, the analysis of already existing data. This excluded the collection of primary data. This approach was followed as it would allow for the comparison of information on both national and provincial levels. The collection of primary data would not have been possible, given the prohibitive cost and practical implications associated with such an exercise.

Quantitative research into migration streams over selected time periods always faces limitations. Six such recognised limitations will be identified. The first relates to the quality of South African census data; the second to provincial boundary changes and the implications these hold for provincial comparisons; the third to the use of the StatsSA statistical package – the *Nesstar* dataset – and the fourth to the calculation of net migration trends. The fifth limitation relates to the reliability of mobility data for the 2001–2006 period, resulting from the manner adopted for the calculation of migration in this census and the sixth relates to the exclusion of foreign migrants in the analysis.

Critique of South African census data is common, and for the sake of a thorough presentation of limitations to this study, criticism regarding the 2011 census, specifically, is included here. Some of the main issues are (Berkowitz 2012)<sup>28</sup> listed below.

1. Unexpected and difficult-to-explain features in the population figures per age cohort suggest a sharp increase in the national fertility rate that appears to be demographically improbable and not supported by other evidence over the previous decade. What made this finding even more

---

28. The critique towards the 2011 Census data was reported on in an article published in the *Mail & Guardian* and is based on a (confidential) report submitted by Professors Moultrie and Dorrington to the South African Statistical Council and subsequent interview by the *Mail and Guardian* with Professor Moultrie. Both academics are demographers associated with the Centre for Actuarial Research at the University of Cape Town. Both served on the evaluation team appointed by the South African Statistical Council to determine the accuracy of the 2011 Census data.

questionable is the increase noted in the fertility rates of, specifically, the white, more affluent part of the population.

2. Provincial population estimates proved to be inconsistent when compared with 2001 census data and were significantly different from estimated population distributions in the 2010 mid-year population estimates.
3. The undercount for the 2011 census was 14.6% compared to 17.6% in 2001. Although this is a slight improvement, the undercount remains significantly higher than that recorded for other developing countries, where the undercounts typically range between 2% and 5% of the total population.

Firstly, in response to these criticisms, the South African Statistical Council publicly declared that the 2011 census data results were accurate. Referring specifically to the surprising trends pertaining to fertility rates, a member of the evaluation committee noted, 'Indeed that pattern in the age distribution is real. It is surprising, certainly not what we expected' (Griffith Feeney 2012, cited in De Wet 2012).

Secondly, the shifts that have taken place in provincial boundaries since 1996 are important to acknowledge and consider in the analysis. Although not affecting the Western Cape, this is of particular relevance to the Northern Cape, where three cross-boundary municipalities have been absorbed into the province.<sup>29</sup> Although these shifts have been incorporated into the analysis, the ability to do so was in some instances limited because of empty data fields in the respective datasets. The probability that respondents may, in some cases, have reported their migration moves in terms of the previous demarcation of their province (either current or past place of residence) should also be considered.

Thirdly, the reliability of census data within the *Nesstar* dataset is sometimes questionable. In this dataset, data quality is occasionally compromised by incomplete records (thus empty data fields) and, in some instances, data capturing errors. These were addressed as far as the data allowed by cross-referencing related data fields. For the sake of accuracy, incomplete records were excluded from the analysis presented in this publication.

In the fourth instance, a limitation relates to the calculation of net migration flows at inter-provincial and intra-provincial levels. In Chapters 4

---

29. Ga Segonyana and Phokwane municipalities were cross-boundary municipalities between the Northern Cape and North West in 2001 and were allocated to the Northern Cape in full - based on the current provincial boundaries. Kagisano municipality (2001) was split into Kagisano-Molopo municipality and Joe Morolong municipality, with the former portion now in North West province and the latter now in the Northern Cape province. Moshaweng municipality (now part of Joe Morolong municipality) was incorporated in full in the Northern Cape province based on the current provincial boundaries (StatsSA 2014b).



and 5, which deal separately with each selected province, the calculations have focused exclusively on cross-border and intra-provincial flows – signalling an interest in comparing these two sets of flows between provinces. As discussed in Chapter 6, a calculation of net intra-provincial flows incorporating cross-border moves reveals a different set of flow dynamics.

Finally, the census only captures a person's last move in reference to the place of residence at the time of the selected census. This presents a particular dilemma in the analysis of migration trends for the 2001–2006 period. As indicated earlier, migration trends for the periods 2001–2006 and 2006–2011 were both derived from 2011 census data, specifically census data from the *Nesstar* dataset. Thus, because the census only measures the last move, no prior moves are captured and are thus excluded from the analysis. This is particularly problematic if a person moved during both defined periods: 2001–2006 and 2006–2011. In such an event, the respondent will only be defined as a migrant for the 2006–2011 period and as a non-migrant for the 2001–2006 period. Such cases will ultimately result in an undercount of migrants for 2001–2006. This implies that the most reliable account of migration trends as captured in the census data, is in fact presented in the 1996–2001 and 2006–2011 periods.

Because it is not possible to determine the extent of a possible undercount of migrants in the 2001–2006 period with data made available for analysis, it was decided to continue with the trends analysis obtained from the *Nesstar* data and to rather remind the reader of this limitation with footnotes. This approach is also reflected in the final chapter.

Finally, the migration trends analysed in this book exclude the moves of foreign migrants. It was decided to exclude foreigners from this analysis because the manner in which such information was collected and captured in the 2001 and 2011 Censuses would not allow reliable comparison.

These limitations notwithstanding, it is maintained that quantitative analyses spelt out in subsequent chapters reveal empirically legitimate and innovative conclusions. The claim is not fully valid, but it holds value for both academics and practitioners.

## ■ Conclusion

This chapter presents an illustration of how the contextual, theoretical and conceptual framework can be defined when embarking on migration analysis. The data source and associated data reliability and validity are presented as an example of what needs to be considered and how this can be reported to ensure transparency and adherence to academic scrutiny and standards. Towards this end, this chapter defined the contextual framework relevant to the geographic space as well as the research population used to establish migration trends considered in this publication. The objective and method of data analysis used in this study were discussed, as well as the theoretical framework that will guide the analysis presented in the subsequent chapters.

In conclusion, it is important to reiterate that the data sources employed for this study consisted of secondary data sources, particularly official national census data collected by StatsSA in 2001 and 2011. The chapter concludes with a reflection on some limitations inherent to the data. These limitations, however, do not detract from the important and reasonably accurate results presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Measures to improve data collection efforts, particularly pertaining to migration, are presented in Chapter 8 of this publication.



# Internal migration in the Western Cape (1996–2011)

This chapter is the first of two chapters dedicated to describing the nature of internal migration during the post-apartheid period in the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces. Both Chapters 4 and 5 have a dual purpose in that they offer (1) a summary of and reflection on post-apartheid internal migration trends for two provinces in South Africa, which in itself will be of value for readers who are interested in following and understanding such trends, and (2) an illustration of how data on migration is analysed, which variables to consider, how it can be presented and how to apply a theoretical framework in interpreting and understanding findings on migration trends.

Chapters 4 and 5, however, also have a larger purpose towards achieving the aim of this book. Both chapters are structured in such a manner as to present a context, at the hand of two case studies, in which to argue for the standard consideration of internal migration trends in development planning in specifically South African local government structures. This is accomplished by illustrating how migration, at the hand of the two case studies, acts and is realised as a very strong and real force in facilitating population change. Establishing and illustrating this fact is important as it provides the *raison d'être* for the key argument presented later in this book, where internal migration trends and associated population change are argued as not only relevant on a larger provincial level but that it is essential that this demographic phenomenon is measured and understood on local municipal and town levels to effectively inform development planning. This argument

**How to cite:** Eigelaar-Meets, I 2024, 'Internal migration in the Western Cape (1996–2011)', in *Internal migration and development planning in South Africa*, AVARSITY Books, Cape Town, pp. 89–107. <https://doi.org/10.4102/aosis.2024.BK463.04>

is supported in the analysis and findings presented in this chapter where internal migration is not only measured in terms of movement across provincial borders (inter-provincial migration) but also in terms of movement within and across municipal district boundaries (intra-provincial migration).

## ■ Migration trends (1996–2011)

This section describes the significant migration trends in the Western Cape during the period 1996–2011. Migration trends for the Western Cape are presented by comparing data collected during the two census occasions, that is, the 2001 and 2011 censuses. To allow for the analysis of trends over time, the data were organised into three periods of five years: 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011. Since there was no formal census in 2006, migration data collected during the 2011 census was recorded in order to constitute the two periods 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.<sup>30</sup> As noted in Chapter 3, this method, although unavoidable and necessary when undertaking a trends analysis from census data, is potentially problematic given the likely undercount of migrants for the 2001–2006 period. Accordingly, migration trends for 1996–2001 and 2006–2011 are probably more reliable and thus the focus on these two periods in the discussion of migration trends to follow. Population figures for 2006 were retrieved from estimated figures published by StatsSA (2006).

The analysis of internal migration within the Western Cape considered both inter-provincial and intra-provincial migration trends. Whereas the analysis of inter-provincial migration focused on population movement across the provincial boundaries of the province, the intra-provincial migration analysis considered population movement within the provincial borders across municipal district boundaries. In addition to a description of the migration flows, this section further determines the typical profile of migrants for both internal and intra-provincial migration flows. The indicators explored for this analysis were the population and the age groups of migrants and included only migrants aged 20 years old or older.

## ■ Description of inter-provincial flows

For the periods 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011, the Western Cape experienced the second-highest net migration rates<sup>31</sup> across all three periods (4.05%, 3.20% and 2.64%, respectively), with Gauteng demonstrating the largest (4.30%, 9.75% and 4.02%, respectively). Although the Western

---


30. See Chapter 3 for a discussion pertaining to the methodology applied in recoding data to constitute the three periods defined here.

31. Net migration refers to the change in population measured by subtracting the number of people who have left from those that have moved into a defined space.

Cape experienced decreasing net migration rates for the defined periods, implying slower in-migration rates to the province, it continued to exhibit significant net gain in migrants.

Considering the demographic characteristics of migrants, specifically age and population group, Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 illustrate the net migration rates of Western Cape migrants aged 20 years old or older. The consistent positive net migration rates since 1996, albeit amid a general decrease and fluctuating trends between periods, have been confirmed for all four population groups and the age cohorts defined for analysis (20–29 years old, 30–60 years old and 61+ years old).


With reference to the main sending and receiving provinces of inter-provincial migrants that either entered or left the Western Cape, the analysis of census data illustrates a strong relationship between the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Gauteng provinces. Not only were the Eastern Cape and Gauteng the two main sending provinces of migrants to the Western Cape province, but these two provinces also acted as the two main receiving provinces of migrants leaving the Western Cape. The Eastern Cape, however, remained the main sending province of migrants to the Western Cape, accounting for approximately 50% of all migrants that entered the province within the three periods. In addition, Gauteng remained the main receiving province for migrants leaving the Western Cape.



Source: Author's own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2012).

**FIGURE 4.1:** Net migration rates of Western Cape inter-provincial migrants (20+ years old) and population groups for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.<sup>32</sup>

32. Calculations per 1,000.



Source: Author's own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2012).

**FIGURE 4.2:** Net migration rates of Western Cape inter-provincial migrants (20+ years old) and age cohort for 1996-2001, 2001-2006 and 2006-2011.<sup>33</sup>

Considering a possible correlation between sending province and population group of inter-provincial migrants, population groups were found to illustrate strong primary and secondary sending provinces across the three defined periods. Since 1996, the Eastern Cape has acted as the primary sending province for black African migrants, accounting for 80% of black African migrants for the periods 1996-2001 and 2001-2006. During these periods, Gauteng consistently acted as the sending province from where the second-largest group of black African migrants, although a much smaller percentage (7%), entered the Western Cape. For the period 2006-2011, the Eastern Cape remained the primary sending province of black African in-migrants (71%), with the North West province replacing Gauteng as the second most prominent sending province of black African migrants at an increasing rate from 1.2% for the period 2001-2006 to 13% for the period 2006-2011.

For the coloured population, the trends remained consistent, with the Northern Cape acting as the main sending province of coloured in-migrants to the Western Cape and the Eastern Cape as a strong secondary sending province. What is noteworthy regarding coloured in-migration over the 1996-2011 period is the increase (of approximately 5%) from coloured migrants entering from the Gauteng province to a non-equivalent percentage decrease from the Northern Cape.

33. Calculations per 1,000.

Most Indian and Asian in-migrants entered the province from KwaZulu-Natal, with the second-largest group entering from Gauteng. A slight decrease in the number of migrants moving from this province was indicated, with a consistent increase in numbers moving from Gauteng to the Western Cape. Almost 50% of white in-migrants moved from Gauteng to the Western Cape, while a smaller group entered from the Eastern Cape.

Regarding the main sending and receiving districts of inter-provincial migrants, the data showed a consistent trend in migrant behaviour across all three periods. The Cape Metro consistently served as both the main receiving and main sending area for migrants entering the province, with Garden Route and the Cape Winelands serving as the second and third-most preferred receiving districts for in-migrants as well as sending districts from where migrants left the province.

Pertaining to the characteristics of migrants entering and leaving the Western Cape province, descriptive data about the population group and age of migrants were considered. Black African and white population groups constituted the largest portions of both in- and out-migration. In the analysis of the mobility of the four population groups, the analysis clearly showed that all four population groups exhibited decreasing in-migration mobility rates since 1996. What is interesting to note here is that white in-migrants illustrated the largest in-migration rates for the 1996–2001 and 2006–2011 periods, followed by in-migrants from the Indian, Asian and black African populations (Table 4.1).

Pertaining to the age distribution among migrants, analysis of census data shows young adults (20–29 years old) across all four population groups as the most mobile in both entering and leaving the province. Black African young adults enter the province at the highest rates (0.98), followed by Indian or Asian (0.82) and white young adults (0.58). The latter population group, however, illustrated the highest in-migration rates (0.43) for senior adults (61+ years old).

The findings pertaining to the age distribution of inter-provincial migrants across the three periods for the four population groups are significant in that it confirms the tendency of stronger mobility among young adults in both in- and out-migration compared with the other age cohorts. This trend applied to all four population groups. Regarding out-migrants, some deviation to this trend is, however, evident, with relatively even rates presented for young and mature out-migrants within the black African and coloured population groups. In the case of senior adults, the highest rates of in-migrants were noted in the white population group, who were also shown to exhibit the lowest out-migration rates in comparison to the other population groups. In fact, Indian and Asian senior adults showed the highest out-migration rates (0.29) compared to the other population groups, followed by black African senior adults (0.22).



**TABLE 4.1:** Mobility rates (%) among population groups in the Western Cape for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011 (those 20 years old or older).<sup>34</sup>

Population group	In-migration as a proportion of population groups (20+ years old)			Out-migration as a proportion of population groups (20+ years old)		
	1996–2001	2001–2006	2006–2011	1996–2001	2001–2006	2006–2011
Black African	0.64	0.37	0.38	0.19	0.08	0.15
Coloured	0.08	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.03
Indian or Asian	0.50	0.20	0.42	0.30	0.12	0.31
White	0.69	0.24	0.45	0.25	0.10	0.23
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.35</b>	<b>0.17</b>	<b>0.22</b>	<b>0.12</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.10</b>

Source: Author's own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2006, 2012).

## □ Summary of inter-provincial migration trends

Although net migration rates for the Western Cape have declined somewhat for the period under review, statistics showed that a positive net migration rate has been maintained since 1996. The comparison of the rates for the three periods, 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011, clearly indicates that of the nine provinces in South Africa, the Western Cape is the second-largest net receiver of internal migrants, following Gauteng. The analysis of the sending and receiving provinces of migrants entering and leaving the Western Cape established a strong relationship between the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Gauteng. In this relationship, the Eastern Cape and Gauteng are not only the two main sending areas of migrants to the Western Cape but also the two main receiving areas of those internal migrants that leave the province. The data further illustrated the relationship of the Western Cape with both the Eastern Cape and Gauteng as primarily a receiving rather than a sending partner.

The three most preferred municipal districts migrants choose to settle in upon entering the Western Cape are: (1) the Cape Metro, (2) the Garden Route districts and (3) the Cape Winelands district. Notable is that analysis of population change experienced in the province found these three districts to also have exhibited the highest population densities for the period 1996–2011 (see Chapter 1).

With regard to the profile of inter-provincial migrants, in-migration among black African migrants was the strongest among young adults (20–29 years old), whereas mature adults within this population group were the most mobile in out-migration flows. For the other three population groups, young adults constituted the majority of migrants both entering and leaving the Western Cape.

34. Denominator: population group, those 20 years or older.

## □ Contextualising inter-provincial migration trends

Moving towards an explanation for the continuously strong positive net migration experienced by the Western Cape since 1996, reference to the push-pull theory on migration is of particular relevance. Departing from the premise that migration is initiated and perpetuated by certain factors that push migrants from and pull them to a specific location, it is argued that the two strongest forces that pull migrants towards the province relate firstly to economic factors and secondly to the relatively efficient provision and accessibility of services compared with the main sending provinces.

As stated earlier in Chapter 1, the Western Cape economy boasts a growing economy that consistently outperforms the national economy. Classified as one of the 'three power houses', together with KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, these three provinces collectively contribute over 60% to the country's value added (Bouwer n.d.). For the period 2001-2011, the Western Cape, together with KwaZulu-Natal, achieved an average real annual economic growth of 3.6%, second to the 4.0% achieved by Gauteng for the same period (StatsSA 2015). In a report by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) (2014) for the National Development Agency, a profile on poverty in South Africa showed only three provinces have a poverty incidence below the national average for all defined poverty lines. These were Gauteng, Western Cape and the Free State, in order of increasing poverty incidence. The poorest provinces were Limpopo, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, in order of decreasing poverty incidence<sup>35</sup> (HSRC 2014; StatsSA 2017).

The Eastern Cape, as the primary sending province of migrants to the Western Cape, is clearly in a much poorer economic position compared to the Western Cape. Most social and economic indicators show the Eastern Cape to be one of the poorest provinces in the country, with very low socio-economic status and one of the highest unemployment rates compared with the other provinces (Makiwane & Chimere-Dan 2010). According to the 2011 census key results publication, 49.4% of the households in the Eastern Cape Province had access to piped water inside their dwelling or yard, 43% had access to a flush toilet and 75% used electricity for lighting. These statistics are in stark contrast to the Western Cape in which 88.4% of households had access to piped water inside their dwelling or yard, 89.6% had access to a flush toilet and 93.4% used electricity for lighting (StatsSA 2012a).

The statistics stated strongly confirm the Western Cape as a destination province that presents strong pull factors in terms of both economic

---

35. A poverty line of R577 was used as absolute poverty line for analysis.

opportunity and access to basic services. Given the poor state of the Eastern Cape, the Western Cape clearly presents strong pull factors to Eastern Cape migrants in particular. The strong pull factor in regard to the specifically favourable economic conditions that are present in the Western Cape is confirmed in a study conducted by the Fort Hare Institute for Economic and Social Research in 2006 (Makiwane & Chimere-Dan 2010). According to this study, population movement out of the Eastern Cape is, in the majority of cases, directly related to personal and household income. The survey found that most people (74%) moved either for confirmed employment or because they were searching for jobs. Education was indicated as another important motivation for migration (Ford Hare Institute for Economic and Social Research 2006, cited in Makiwane & Chimere-Dan 2010). The search for better economic conditions as a primary driver for migration to the Western Cape was also confirmed in a Western Cape migration study conducted in 2001 in which the majority of migrant household heads indicated economic considerations as the main reason for their move (Bekker & Swart 2002).

The favourable economic environment offered to in-migrants to the Western Cape is further illustrated in the growth experienced in the construction sector, typically a labour-intensive enterprise, for the period 2007–2011. During this period, this sector achieved the highest average growth per annum compared with the other economic sectors within the province (Western Cape Provincial Treasury 2013). Furthermore, the Western Cape also accounted for 22.6% of the value added to the national economy in the industries of agriculture, forestry and fishing (Western Cape Provincial Treasury 2013). The relevance of the experienced growth in these two sectors (i.e. construction and fishing and agriculture) can be sought in the fact that these sectors provide abundant employment opportunities for (primarily) semi-skilled individuals.

The preferred destination areas of in-migrants to the province were the Cape Metro, which served as the main receiving area, followed by the districts of Garden Route and the Cape Winelands. This trend was consistent for both census periods. Important to note that these are the same areas that were found to have experienced the largest increase in population density since 1996 (see Table 1.1 in Chapter 1). It would thus seem probable to attribute the increase in population numbers, and thus population density, in these three districts to particularly the arrival of internal migrants. The preferred status enjoyed by these three areas is not coincidental but rather is underpinned by certain distinct characteristics associated with each of these areas.

As one of the eight urban centres in South Africa, the large migration flow towards the Cape Metro is not surprising because the metro offers not

only a large infrastructure and variety of services but also, perhaps more importantly, a more promising opportunity (if only by perception) of financial benefit in terms of the availability of employment opportunities.

In regard to the Garden Route district, it is probably more the favourable location together with the availability of extended basic services (e.g. housing, health and education) than the perceived economic opportunity that acts as the main pull factor for migrants (Bekker & Swart 2002). In terms of its geographical location, the two largest towns in the Garden Route district, George and Knysna, are situated along the N2, the main route linking the Eastern Cape to Cape Town. This important artery can be described as the main 'migration route' between the Eastern Cape and the Western Cape, specifically towards Cape Town. Hence, it is not unexpected that the majority of migrants who settled in the Garden Route district indicated the Eastern Cape as their previous place of residence (Bekker & Swart 2002).

## ■ Description of intra-provincial migration flows

Intra-provincial migration refers to the movement of individuals within provincial boundaries. In describing this migration stream, only persons aged 20 years or older at the time of their last move and who indicated to have moved within the provincial boundaries of the Western Cape were considered. As indicated in the analysis of inter-provincial migration trends, migration rates calculated and presented for the period 2001–2006 should be viewed with caution. It is important to note that the consistently lower rates in migration noted within this period are more likely to be a factor of a possible undercount of migrants within this period than an actual decrease in rates.

In exploring intra-provincial migration trends, two flows need to be distinguished: intra-provincial migration across municipal district boundaries and intra-provincial migration within municipal district boundaries. In regard to intra-provincial movement, specifically in terms of movement *within* compared with movement *across* municipal districts, migrants tend to remain within a specific municipal district rather than move across district boundaries. This was confirmed in the analysis of census data across all three defined periods (1996–2001; 2001–2006; 2006–2011), with 79% of intra-provincial migrants remaining within a municipal district for the period 1996–2001 compared with 89% in the periods 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.

When intra- and inter-provincial migration rates were compared, intra-provincial migration within municipal district boundaries demonstrated a larger participation of individuals aged 20 years old or older compared to

both inter-provincial migration and intra-provincial migration across municipal districts. In fact, the latter migration flow was found to be the weakest of the three migration flows illustrated here. The analysis further presented divergent trends for the three migration streams, with the growing participation of migrants in intra-provincial migration within municipal district boundaries. In comparison, both inter-provincial migration and intra-provincial migration across municipal district boundaries noted lower participation over the three periods studied (Table 4.2).<sup>36</sup> The prominence of movement within the boundaries of a municipal district was found to be consistent across all four population groups and the three defined age groups (20–29 years old, 31–60 years old and 61+ years old).

Analysing intra-provincial net migration rates for the respective districts within the Western Cape allowed for an assessment of how migrants move within the province. Such analysis offered information regarding the impact of intra-provincial migration (the net gain or loss in the total population size in the respective districts in the province because of intra-migration behaviour). From the net migration rates presented in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, the deductions outlined below can be made.<sup>37</sup>

- The most preferred receiving areas for intra-provincial migrants since 1996 are the CoCT, the Cape Winelands and the West Coast districts.
- The main sending areas of intra-provincial migrants are the CoCT, Cape Winelands and Garden Route districts.
- The CoCT consistently experienced a net loss in intra-provincial migrants from 1996, with more of these migrants moving out than moving into the metro, opting rather to migrate to one of the five districts.

**TABLE 4.2:** Comparison of inter- and intra-provincial migration rates for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.<sup>38</sup>

Migration flow	Migration rates		
	1996–2001	2001–2006	2006–2011
Inter-provincial migration	4.05	3.20	2.64
Intra-provincial migration: Across DM boundaries	1.45	0.32	0.70
Intra-provincial migration: Within DM boundaries	5.33	2.58	5.48

Source: Author's own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2006, 2012).

Key: DM, district municipality.

36. Lower migration rates for the 2001–2006 period should be considered within the context of a possible undercount in migrants for this period.

37. Migration rates for the 2001–2006 period should be considered within the context of a possible undercount in migrants for this period.

38. Calculated per 1,000.

- During the first two periods, the Central Karoo showed a net loss to intra-provincial migrants. This trend, however, changed to a net gain of migrants within this migration stream in the third period (2006–2011).
- Both Garden Route and the Cape Winelands districts experienced a net loss in intra-provincial migrants during the first period (1996–2001), with a subsequent net gain for the periods 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.
- Since 1996, the West Coast and Overberg districts consistently experienced a net gain in intra-provincial migrants. These net gains were further consistently higher compared to net gains experienced in the metro and the other three districts. The Overberg experienced higher gains than the West Coast during the first two periods, with the two districts showing near-equal gains during the 2006–2011 period.
- Assessing the local municipalities within the West Coast and Overberg districts to which intra-provincial migrants move, the majority of intra-provincial migrants moving to the West Coast district settled in either the Saldanha or the Swartland Municipalities. Of those who moved to the Overberg district, the majority settled in the Overstrand or Theewaterskloof municipalities.

If one considers the sending and receiving rates of intra-provincial migrants, it will seem that migration movement to the Overberg and West Coast districts is more stable, with these districts illustrated as much stronger receiving areas than sending areas. This implies that intra-provincial migrants to these districts are more prone to remain there over an extended period as opposed to intra-provincial migrants to the CoCT, which serves as a stronger sender of intra-provincial migrants than a receiver. Both the Garden Route and Central Karoo districts are illustrated as receiving and sending intra-provincial migrants at equal rates.

**TABLE 4.3:** Sending and receiving areas of intra-provincial migrants for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.

District municipalities and metro	Receiving areas (%)			Sending areas (%)		
	1996–2001	2001–2006	2006–2011	1996–2001	2001–2006	2006–2011
West Coast DM	15.6	19.7	18.7	10.9	9.2	8.0
Cape Winelands DM	19.7	22.4	24.6	23.1	14.8	16.9
Overberg DM	13.8	17.1	11.8	9.7	5.6	4.9
Garden Route DM	11.1	15.2	14.8	12.4	13.7	13.5
Central Karoo DM	2.3	2.0	2.3	2.8	3.0	2.2
City of Cape Town	37.4	23.6	27.8	40.9	53.7	54.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Author's own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2006, 2012; author's own calculations).

Key: DM, district municipality.

**TABLE 4.4:** Intra-provincial net migration rates on district and metro levels for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.<sup>39</sup>

District municipalities and metro	Net migration rates (%)		
	1996–2001	2001–2006	2006–2011
West Coast DM	0.65	0.54	1.11
Cape Winelands DM	–0.60	0.16	0.40
Overberg DM	0.79	0.81	1.09
Garden Route DM	–0.38	0.04	0.09
Central Karoo DM	–8.65	–0.27	0.06
City of Cape Town	–0.18	–0.13	–0.29

Source: Author's own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2006, 2012).

Key: DM, district municipality.

If one considers the intra-provincial migration flows between the district borders of provinces, it will seem a natural inference that these migration flows would match the population distribution within the province. This assumption is partly confirmed when exploring the main receiving districts of intra-provincial migrants, with both the CoCT and Cape Winelands district illustrated as the main receiving districts of migrants within this migration stream (Table 4.3). The CoCT is, however, also the main sending area for intra-provincial migrants, evidenced by the consistent negative (intra-provincial) net migration rates since 1996 (Table 4.4). Although the Cape Winelands district was shown as a net-receiving district of intra-provincial migrants, the strongest gains of intra-provincial migrants were noted within the West Coast and Overberg municipal districts, a trend persisting since 1996. Thus, considering the impact of intra-provincial migration on population growth trends, the higher net migration rates for these two districts illustrate a stronger and sustaining impact of positive net- intra-provincial migration rates on the population numbers of these two districts compared with the CoCT and the other three districts.

## ■ Contextualising intra-provincial migration trends

In explaining the continuous and strong positive intra-provincial net migration illustrated for the West Coast and Overberg municipal districts since 1996, reference to the push-pull theory on migration is again particularly relevant. According to the push-pull theory of migration, migrants select receiving areas and remain there depending on specific characteristics that present favourable options for migrants. I present the argument here, which is supported by a substantial body of literature on

39. To determine the net-migration rates for the period 2001–2006, the total district population size as it was at the time of the 2007 Community Survey was used since these were the only verified numbers available on district level. Although the actual rate might differ slightly, it is the opinion of the author that the general trends remained valid for the 2006 period.

migration, that such characteristics primarily refer to economic opportunities offered (Bekker & Swart 2002; Cox, Hemson & Todes 2004; Cross 2006; Department of Social Development [DSD] 2015; Kok & Collisson 2006; Sachikonye 1998). To support this premise, two short summaries of the local economies of the Overberg and West Coast districts will assist in illustrating how economic factors affect the mobility of intra-provincial migrants.

The *Overberg Municipal District* is situated south-east of Cape Town and covers an area of 12,241 km<sup>2</sup>. The district is divided into four local municipalities: Theewaterskloof, Overstrand, Cape Agulhas and Swellendam. For the period 2001–2011, all municipalities within the Overstrand Municipality experienced economic growth, with the two largest contributing sectors being finance, insurance, real estate and business service (11% growth) and the construction industry (10% growth). Industries that have contributed the largest employment share over the same period are (1) the agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing sectors (27%),<sup>40</sup> (2) the community, social and personal services sectors (14.21%) and (3) the *construction* sector (13.51%)<sup>41</sup> (Overberg District Municipality 2015, p. 21).

The prominence of economic opportunity in seeking a receiving place is supported by these trends. Within the Overberg Municipal District, the Overstrand and Theewaterskloof municipalities were the main receiving areas for intra-provincial migrants (Table 4.5).<sup>42</sup> It should be noted that these two municipalities largely host two of the main industries in the district, that is, the agricultural sector in the Theewaterskloof Municipality and the construction sector in the Overstrand Municipality. These two sectors are particularly important in that they offer unskilled and semi-skilled employment opportunities to a large contingent of workers with a modest level of skills. Both these sectors traditionally employ a majority of black African and coloured workers, with the former being the only population group to have grown since 2001. It would thus seem probable to argue that these two employment sectors present the strongest pull factors for intra-provincial migration, offering the promise of appropriate employment opportunities and, thus, economic improvement.

---

40. This sector is predominately located in the Theewaterskloof Municipality.

41. The construction sector is most pronounced in the Overstrand Municipality.

42. Migration rates for the 2001–2006 period should be considered within the context of a possible undercount in migrants for this period.



**TABLE 4.5:** Intra-provincial migration to Overberg municipalities for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.

Receiving municipalities	Intra-provincial migration (%)		
	1996–2001	2001–2006	2006–2011
Theewaterskloof	29.3	20.4	24.73
Overstrand	49.4	50.4	44.73
Cape Agulhas	11.5	14.0	17.85
Swellendam	9.8	15.2	12.69
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Author's own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2012).

The *West Coast municipal district* is located along the Atlantic coast of the Western Cape province and extends approximately 350 km from north to south. The area covers 31,119 km<sup>2</sup> and is divided into five local municipalities: Matsikama, Cederberg, Bergrivier, Saldanha and Swartland. Between 1995 and 2005, the economic growth within the West Coast District Municipality averaged 2.6%, with expansion largely driven by the Swartland and Saldanha Bay areas. Economic growth within the other areas of the district remained largely stagnant during the same period.

For the period 2005–2010, the largest contributing sectors to the GDP of the district were the finance, insurance, real estate and *business services* sectors (20.7%), the *manufacturing sector* (20.1%), the agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing<sup>43</sup> sector (16.7%) and the wholesale and retail trade, catering and accommodation sector (12%) (West Coast District Municipality 2012).

As is the case for the Overberg District Municipality presented in this section, the prominence of economic opportunity in seeking a receiving place seems to be supported in the data presented here. Within this DM, both the Swartland and Saldanha Bay municipalities have served as the main receiving areas for intra-provincial migrants since 1996 (Table 4.6).<sup>44</sup> The importance of the Swartland and Saldanha Bay areas as economic contributors to the district is embedded in the concentration of manufacturing activity in these two areas. This is because of the spatial proximity of these two areas to Cape Town's economic and industrial complex in general and the Cape Town container terminal in particular, as well as their proximity to the Port of Saldanha Bay. In addition, the majority of new economic growth was experienced within these two areas between 1995 and 2005 (Silimela Development Services Consortium 2007).

43. Economic activity within this sector refers mainly to activities within the agriculture and fishing industries. There are no forestry activities within this district and a very limited hunting industry.

44. Migration rates for the 2001–2006 period should be considered within the context of a possible undercount in migrants for this period.

**TABLE 4.6:** Intra-provincial migration to West Coast municipalities for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.

Receiving municipalities	Intra-provincial migration (%)		
	1996–2001	2001–2006	2006–2011
Matzikama	10.0	4.8	10.5
Cederberg	8.7	8.3	8.1
Bergrivier	21.3	16.6	20.8
Saldanha Bay	24.2	33.1	31.2
Swartland	35.8	37.2	29.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Author's own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2006, 2012).

## ■ Urbanisation in the Western Cape

The description of inter- and intra-provincial migration presented in the preceding analyses illustrates two definite trends in mobility associated with the two mobility types within the Western Cape province. The first type of mobility, consisting of inter-provincial migrants entering the province, had its main route towards the urban and peri-urban centres of the province, particularly towards the CoCT and, to a lesser extent, towards the Garden Route and Cape Winelands districts. This migration flow was primarily driven by young adult, black African migrants moving from the Eastern Cape, and, to a lesser extent, mature adults moving from Gauteng.

The second type of mobility was sustained by intra-provincial migrants and was driven primarily by mature adult migrants within the coloured and white population groups. Although the CoCT and the Cape Winelands district acted as the most preferred destination areas for these migrants, the West Coast and Overberg have been experiencing the highest net migration rates for this migration flow since 1996. With net migration rates demonstrating the number of migrants both entering and leaving a defined geographical area, the higher net migration rates for these two districts illustrated a stronger and sustaining impact of positive net migration rates on the population numbers of these two districts compared with the CoCT and the other three districts.

The observed deceleration in migration flows, together with an increasing flow of both inter- and intra-provincial migrants towards peri-urban areas and rural towns, suggest the onset of a migration transition in the Western Cape. This transition suggests that the Western Cape community is in the process of advancing from a primarily 'early transition society' towards a 'late transition society'. In effect, this shift entails a slacking of both rural-urban migration, the appearance of new non-urban receiving areas and growth in various kinds of circulation (i.e. intra-provincial migration) (King 2012; Stellenbosch University 2000).

In the case of in-migration flows, this migration transition was most apparent in the black African population, with the suggested emergence of a new rural black African population alongside the metro-urban population. On the one hand, there seemed to be a distinct split in migration destinations for this population group upon entering the Western Cape, with the largest group moving to the Cape Metro and the smaller group towards non-metro and rural districts. On the other hand, the data also suggested a slower flow of black African migrants in the intra-provincial migration flows moving out of the Cape Metro towards rural districts.

In terms of numbers, coloured and white migrants constituted the majority of intra-provincial migrants that moved across district boundaries. According to a 2001 Western Cape migration study (Bekker & Swart 2002), coloured rural-to-rural migration is attributed to labour shedding in the agricultural sector – traditionally one of the largest employment sectors in the Western Cape. The study notes that generally, the coloured metro-urban population does not illustrate significant growth because of migration, whereas the rural coloured population does, in fact, seem to be increasing as a result of migration, resulting in a population shift (Bekker & Swart 2002). The analysis presented here in this chapter shows this migration to consist specifically of intra-provincial migration and thus supports this notion of a population shift, constated specifically of rural-to-rural migration.

This observation was further confirmed in a study by Bekker and Cramer (2003) that investigated the changes in the pattern of coloured migration. This study found one of the contributing factors of rural-rural migration to be the significant number of farmworker households leaving their on-farm dwellings. These farm workers generally chose not to move to the metro, a process that requires prior knowledge (and established networks) of the urban landscape and available resources but rather chose to move to the nearest rural town with which they had become familiar and which formed part of their lives and travel patterns while employed on the farm. They had probably also established a social network and support system within the town (Bekker & Cramer 2003).

With regard to mobility within the white population, the analysis showed white intra-provincial migrants to settle primarily in the metro, followed by the Cape Winelands and then other non-metro districts. This trend is also confirmed in the study by Bekker and Swart (2002), which established this group to be more mobile in the metro than in the non-metro sector, with a significant flow of white migrants moving from non-metro districts within the province into the metro. Bekker and Swart (2002), however, state that this migration flow within the white population group from rural districts into the metro should not be interpreted as an outflow without any

replacement flow. Instead, they argue that the migration of the white population seems fairly stable, with enough inflow from the countryside from outside the province to balance rural-to-urban ratios (Bekker & Swart 2002).

In summary, urbanisation trends are set to continue in the province and will be sustained by two sets of mobility flows, with the first constituting inter-provincial migrants finding their way to the Cape Metro as the primary receiving area and the second constituting both inter- and intra-provincial migrants as part of both urban in-migration and rural-rural migration flows moving to rural town centres within the non-urban districts of the province.

## ■ Conclusion

The history of the Western Cape dates back to 1652 and is situated firmly in the colonial, apartheid and democratic political history of South Africa. Home to one of the eight metropolitan municipalities in South Africa, the Western Cape province is also characterised by a vibrant economy that demonstrates consistently faster growth than the national economy. According to the population statistics of the 2001 and 2011 censuses, the population of the Western Cape has increased by 16.67%, growing from an estimated 4,524,335 to 5,278,584 within this period. This growth continued, and at the time of the 2022 census the population size of the Western Cape was estimated at 7,433,019. The population distribution within the province is primarily urban, with the majority (64.23%) living in the CoCT, 13.52% in the Cape Winelands district and 9.86% in the Garden Route district.

Macro-economic data and employment statistics on employment suggest that since 1996, the Western Cape province has been an appealing environment for in-migrants. In both 1996 and 2011, approximately one-half of the economically active population (51%) was employed. This means that despite a growing population that is consistently higher than the national average, the Western Cape province has continued in its ability to absorb this increasing population successfully and to provide employment opportunities. This positive trend continued in 2002 and 2023, with more jobs created in this province compared to any of the other eight provinces between the second quarter of 2022 and the second quarter of 2023. Economic growth and the consequent growth in employment opportunities do, however, seem to be biased towards skilled employment, with an observed decrease in the number of workers employed in low- and semi-skilled occupations (specifically in the agricultural sector) and an observed increase in the number of workers employed in the manufacturing sector in 2011 compared with 1996.

The suggested relationship between an attractive and inviting economic environment and in-migration flows into the Western Cape seems to exist when considering the net migration flows for the various provinces since 1996. For the periods 1996–2001 and 2001–2011, the Western Cape, following Gauteng, experienced the second-largest net migration rate per annum. The net migration rates for the Western Cape illustrated decreased rates, suggesting a slowdown in the in-migration rates in this period to this province. Similar trends were, however, evident in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. Both these provinces, similar to the Western Cape, are experiencing significant urban development, which represents a strong pull factor because in-migration is strongly associated with urbanisation.

In regard to the main sending and receiving provinces of inter-provincial migrants that either enter or leave the Western Cape, the data illustrated a strong relationship between the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Gauteng provinces. Not only were the latter two provinces the two main sending provinces of migrants to the Western Cape province, but they were also the main receiving areas of migrants leaving the Western Cape. Migration flows into the Western Cape were directed primarily, although not exclusively, towards the Cape Metro, with the majority of all migrants entering the province across all three periods settling there. The Garden Route and Cape Winelands districts were identified as the two districts that attract the majority of migrants who do not settle in the metro.

The Western Cape represented dynamic intra-provincial migration flows, with the majority of these migrants moving within the boundaries of municipal districts. Concerning migration across municipal district boundaries, the Overstrand and West Coast municipal districts exhibited the highest net-migration rates compared with the other districts and the metro.

The population group and age profiles of migrants were explored as important demographic variables of migrants. In regard to the age of migrants, different trends were noted for inter- and intra-provincial migrants, with young adults (20–29 years old) shown as the most mobile in inter-provincial migration flows and mature adults (30–60 years old) the most mobile in intra-provincial migration flows. With regard to mobility in the province in terms of population group, the black African population group presented the highest inter-provincial migration rates compared to the other three population groups. The white population group was found to present the second strongest mobility rates as in-migrants in inter-provincial flows, with the Indian and Asian population groups exhibiting the second strongest out-migration rates. In turn, coloured and white migrants were found to exhibit the highest intra-provincial migration rates compared to the black African and Indian/Asian migrants.

Pertaining to aspects that act as primary pull factors for both inter- and intra-provincial migration, this chapter presents a strong case for the strategically important role that macro-economic indicators play as pull factors underpinning migration behaviour. The Western Cape has a strong and growing economy that is illustrated partly by its consistent ability to provide employment to slightly more than one-half of the economically active population in spite of the increase in population size. Intra-provincial flows are also mostly influenced by economic factors, with an increasing migrant flow towards districts that offer (better) economic opportunities to migrants.



# Internal migration in the Northern Cape (1996–2011)

This chapter is the second of two chapters that discuss the identification, explanation and comparison of the changing nature of internal migration as it occurred in the Northern Cape province during the post-apartheid period. As noted in Chapter 4, this chapter has a dual purpose in that it offers (1) a summary of and reflection on post-apartheid internal migration trends for two provinces in South Africa, which will be of value for readers who are interested in following and understanding such trends and (2) an illustration of how data on migration is analysed, which variables to consider, how it can be presented and how to apply a theoretical framework in interpreting and understanding findings on migration trends.

This chapter is intended to support the larger purpose of this publication, to argue for the standard consideration of internal migration trends in development planning, specifically in South African local government structures. This is achieved by illustrating the dynamic nature of internal migration and how it functions as a real and strong force in facilitating rapid population change. As noted in the introduction of Chapter 4, illustrating this power of migration is important as it provides the *raison d'être* for the key argument presented later in this book pertaining to the incorporation of migration in development planning. In Chapter 6, it is argued that internal migration trends and associated population change are not only relevant to consider on a larger provincial level but that it is essential to measure and understand the impact of this demographic phenomenon on local municipal and town levels to effectively inform

**How to cite:** Eigelaar-Meets, I 2024, 'Internal migration in the Northern Cape (1996–2011)', in *Internal migration and development planning in South Africa*, AVARSITY Books, Cape Town, pp. 109–128. <https://doi.org/10.4102/aosis.2024.BK463.05>



development planning. To substantiate this argument, internal migration is analysed in this chapter by considering both movement across provincial borders (inter-provincial migration) as well as in terms of movement within and across municipal district boundaries (intra-provincial migration).

## ■ Migration trends (1996–2011)

This section describes internal migration trends for the Northern Cape province for the period 1996–2011. Migration trends for this province were determined by comparing data collected during the two census occasions, that is, the 2001 and 2011 censuses. To allow for the analysis of trends over time, the data were organised into three periods of five years. Since censuses in South Africa are conducted in the month of October, each defined period starts in October of the onset year and ends in September of the concluding year. The defined periods were subsequently defined as October 1996 to September 2001 (1996–2001), October 2001 to September 2006 (2001–2006) and October 2006 to September 2011 (2006–2011).<sup>45</sup> As noted in Chapter 3, this method, although unavoidable and necessary when undertaking a trends analysis from census data, is potentially problematic given the likely undercount of migration rates for the 2001–2006 period. Accordingly, migration trends for 1996–2001 and 2006–2011 are probably more reliable and thus the focus on these two periods in the discussion of migration trends to follow. Population figures for 2006 were retrieved from estimated figures published by StatsSA (2006).

The analysis of internal migration in the Northern Cape considered both inter-provincial and intra-provincial migration trends. Whereas inter-provincial migration considers population movement across provincial boundaries, intra-provincial migration considers migration within the borders of the province but across municipal district boundaries. Following the description of migration trends, the analysis considered the characteristics of migrants partaking in both migration types. To achieve this, indicators pertaining to the population and age groups of migrants were explored; only migrants 20 years old or older were included.

## ■ Inter-provincial flows for the Northern Cape province (1996–2011)


Since 1996, the Northern Cape province has demonstrated a persistent negative net migration and thus a consistent net loss in population size because of migrants leaving the province. The Northern Cape was not the only South African province to exhibit this trend. A similar trend was observed in the Eastern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo provinces. Within this

---

45. See Chapter 3 for a discussion pertaining to the methodology applied in recoding data to constitute the three periods defined here.

group of provinces, the Eastern Cape was, however, the only province that experienced a growing net loss, with all the other provinces exhibiting lower net loss rates in the 2006–2011 period compared with the 1996–2001 period.

Pertaining to the demographic characteristics of migrants, Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 illustrate the net migration rates of Northern Cape migrants aged 20 years old or older in terms of the four population groups and the three defined age cohorts. The general net loss of migrants across the three periods noted above is shown to occur in all population groups except the black African population group. This population group was the only group to exhibit a net gain in migrants, but only for the 1996–2001 and 2006–2011 periods. For the 2001–2006 period, the black African population group showed the second-largest net loss in migrants, following the white population that exhibited the highest net loss for that period.<sup>46</sup> Although consistent since 1996, more migrants from the white population were leaving the province than entering. However, the net loss decreased in the latter two periods. Coloured migrants presented a similar trend to white migrants, demonstrating a consistent net loss, although at a decreasing rate when comparing the net-migration rates for this population group for the three periods. Out-migration of individuals within the Indian and Asian population continued at a steady rate, illustrated by the persistent negative net rate for all three periods.




Source: Author's own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2006, 2012).

**FIGURE 5.1:** Net migration rates of Northern Cape inter-provincial migrants (20+ years old) and population group for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.<sup>47</sup>

46. This sharp decrease in net-migration rates and subsequent sharp rise should be viewed within the context of a possible undercount in migrants for the 2001–2006 period.

47. Calculations per 1,000.

Regarding the net migration rates for migrants aged 20 years old or older, the analysis illustrated a consistent net loss since 1996 in young adult migrants (20–29 years old) and senior adult migrants (61 years old or older). Although remaining negative, the net loss in young adult migrants has slowed since 1996, with the net loss in senior adult migrants remaining steady. Net migration rates among mature adults were the only rates that varied between the three different periods, moving between a net gain and a net loss of migrants in this age cohort. The net gain in mature adult migrants experienced during the 1996–2001 period (0.03%) was followed by a net loss in migrants from this age group of –0.20% in 2001–2006. This rather dramatic drop in the net migration rate is illustrated in the steep downward slope between the two periods illustrated in Figure 5.3.<sup>48</sup> The period 2006–2011 experienced a return to a net gain in mature adult migrants to the Northern Cape at a near similar rate as the 1996–2001 period.



Source: Author’s own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2006, 2012).

**FIGURE 5.2:** Net migration rates of Northern Cape inter-provincial migrants (20+ years old) and age cohort for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.<sup>49</sup>

48. This sharp decrease in net migration rates and subsequent sharp rise should be viewed within the context of a possible undercount in migrants for the 2001–2006 period.

49. Calculations per 1,000.

Considering the main sending and receiving provinces of inter-provincial migrants either entering or leaving the province, the analysis found a persistent interaction between the Northern Cape, the North West, the Western Cape, Gauteng and the Free State provinces. Of these provinces, the North West consistently acted as the main sending province of migrants to the Northern Cape across all three periods. The Western Cape and Gauteng provinces presented a dual role in their relationship with the Northern Cape. Both these provinces acted as significant sending and receiving provinces of migrants entering and leaving the province.

Considering a possible correlation between sending province and population group of inter-provincial migrants, population groups were found to illustrate strong primary and secondary sending provinces across the three defined periods. The North West province persisted as the strongest sending province of black African migrants to the Northern Cape since 1996, despite a decrease in migration flows. In the period 1996–2001, this province accounted for 59% of black African migrants, followed by 37% in the period 2001–2006 and 44% in the period 2006–2011. The Eastern Cape, Free State and Gauteng functioned mostly as equal partners in acting as sending provinces of black African migrants and presented similar shares across the three periods.

The Western Cape persisted as the primary sending province of coloured migrants to the Northern Cape across the three periods, with approximately 50% of the coloured migrants being sent from this province since 1996. As was the case with black African migrants, the Eastern Cape and Gauteng acted as secondary contributing provinces of coloured migrants to the Northern Cape during all three defined periods. Considering overall migration trends for the 1996–2011 period, coloured migration from the Eastern Cape, similar to black African migration to this province, was found to have increased as opposed to a decline in in-migration rates of members identifying with this population group from Gauteng, Free State and the North West provinces.

The sending province of the majority of Indian and Asian migrants was shown to have changed since 1996, with KwaZulu-Natal the primary sending province of migrants of this population group for the period 1996–2001. During this time, 54% of migrants within this population group moved from KwaZulu-Natal to the Northern Cape, with an additional 23% moving from the Eastern Cape. During the 2001–2006 and 2006–2011 periods, the majority of Indian and Asian migrants entering the Northern Cape entered from Gauteng (56%). From 2006 to 2011, Gauteng remained the primary sending province of migrants belonging to the Indian and Asian population group, with an increased number coming from the Western Cape.

The share of white inter-provincial migrants to the Northern Cape has increased from both the Western Cape and Gauteng provinces since 1996. Gauteng, Western Cape and Free State provinces persisted as the primary sending areas of migrants associated with this population group.

In regard to the main sending and receiving districts of inter-provincial migrants, the data showed a consistent trend in migrant behaviour across all three periods. The Frances Baard district remained the main receiving and sending district of migrants either entering or leaving the Northern Cape, with the ZF Mgcawu and John Taolo Gaetsewe districts serving as the second and third-most preferred receiving districts for in-migrants. For the period 1996–2011, the Frances Baard and Pixley ka Seme districts remained the primary sending districts of migrants leaving the provinces, with the Frances Baard district contributing the largest share, albeit at a slightly decreasing portion across the three periods.

Regarding the characteristics of adult migrants entering and leaving the province, descriptive data pertaining to the population group and age distribution among these migrants are considered. For the period under review, analysis of census data illustrates the black African population as the most mobile, followed by migrants from the coloured population (20 years or older). Both in- and out-migration rates do, however, illustrate lower mobility rates (considering both in- and out-migration) for both these population groups from 1996 to 2011 (Table 5.1).

**TABLE 5.1:** Mobility rates among population groups in the Northern Cape for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011 (those 20 years old or older).<sup>50</sup>

Population group	In-migration as a proportion of population groups (20+ years old)			Out-migration as a proportion of population groups (20+ years old)		
	1996–2001	2001–2006	2006–2011	1996–2001	2001–2006	2006–2011
Black African	0.59	0.13	0.45	0.44	0.17	0.38
Coloured	0.26	0.05	0.13	0.39	0.08	0.16
Indian and Asian	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
White	0.06	0.02	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.06
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.28</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>0.19</b>	<b>0.31</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.20</b>

Source: Author's own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2006, 2012).

50. Denominator: Population group, those 20 years old or older.

**TABLE 5.2:** Mobility rates within age cohorts in the Northern Cape population for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011 (those 20 years old or older).

Age cohort	In-migrants (%) proportion within age cohorts (20+ years old)			Out-migrants (%) proportion within age cohorts (20+ years old)		
	1996–2001	2001–2006	2006–2011	1996–2001	2001–2006	2006–2011
	20–29 years old	0.72	0.14	1.34	0.86	0.23
30–60 years old	0.46	0.12	0.02	0.46	0.18	0.66
61+ years old	0.22	0.01	0.22	0.28	0.01	0.38
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.72</b>	<b>0.14</b>	<b>1.34</b>	<b>0.86</b>	<b>0.23</b>	<b>1.40</b>

Source: StatsSA (2001, 2006, 2012).

The age distribution of migrants both entering and leaving the Northern Cape showed a consistent trend, with young adults (20–29 years old) the most mobile in both migration streams. The older age cohorts illustrate opposing trends with mobility rates related to migration into the province, which were found to have either stabilised (61 years old or older) or declined (30–60 years old). Out-migration, however, is shown to have increased since 1996 for all three age groups (Table 5.2).<sup>51</sup>

## □ In summary

Net migration in the Northern Cape has consistently shown a negative rate since 1996, indicating that more people are leaving the province than moving into it. Considering the sending and receiving provinces of migrants entering and leaving, the Northern Cape established a strong relationship between the Northern Cape, North West, Western Cape, Gauteng and Free State provinces. In this relationship, the North West has been acting as the primary sending area of migrants to the Northern Cape. The Western Cape and Gauteng provinces, however, presented a dual role in their relationship with the Northern Cape, acting as both significant sending and receiving provinces of migrants entering and leaving the province.

Considering the main sending and receiving provinces of inter-provincial migrants either entering or leaving the province, the analysis found a persistent interaction between the Northern Cape, North West, Western Cape, Gauteng and Free State provinces. Of these provinces, North West consistently acted as the main sending province of migrants to the Northern Cape across all three periods. The Western Cape and Gauteng provinces presented a dual role in their relationship with the Northern Cape. Both these provinces acted as significant sending and receiving provinces of migrants entering and leaving the province.

Since 1996, the France Baard district has persisted in a dual role, remaining the most preferred municipal district for migrants to settle upon

51. Denominator: Defined age cohort, excluding those younger than 20 years old.

entering the Northern Cape as well as the district from which most migrants exit. The ZF Mgcawu and John Taolo Gaetsewe districts served as the second- and third-most preferred receiving districts with the Frances Baard and Pixley ka Seme districts as the primary sending districts of migrants leaving the provinces.

The profile of inter-provincial migrants showed black African youth (20–29 years old) as the most mobile and active in both migration streams, followed by migrants from the coloured population. In general, however, migration out of the Northern Cape province has increased since 1996 accompanied by declining and stabilising mobility rates among those 30–60 years old and 61 years old, respectively.

### □ Contextualising inter-provincial migration trends

Of course, migration trends do not simply develop in a vacuum but are rather a result of social, political and institutional-economic factors. Therefore, we need to move beyond the numbers and place the trends within a context to tell the full story of the observed mobility. Since 1996, the Northern Cape has experienced a persistent negative net migration rate. In other words, this province has lost a greater number of individuals to migration than it has been able to attract. The Western Cape and Gauteng have consistently acted as the main receiving provinces for out-migrants from the Northern Cape since 1996. This is not surprising given the strong economic stature of these provinces and their general status as favourable net-receiving provinces of migrants.

Migration streams in the Northern Cape matched the economic character of both the respective sending and receiving districts and that of the province in the context of the national economy. The Frances Baard and ZF Mgcawu districts were the receiving provinces of the majority of migrants entering the province. The Frances Baard district is home to the provincial capital and represents the urban centre of the province. This naturally renders it a preferred receiving area because it presents access to an urban economy, infrastructure and a broader range of services compared with the other mainly rural districts. In turn, large parts of the economy of the ZF Mgcawu district are driven by agricultural activities along the banks of the Orange River. Producing mostly table and wine grapes, this area presents the strong pull factor of availability of elementary and unskilled employment.

Following the Frances Baard district, the Pixley Ka Seme district was the area from which the second-largest group of migrants moved out of the province. This district is the second-largest district in the province but comprises almost one-third of its geographical area. Intense crop farming activities occur along the banks of the Orange River and the Vaal River that

flow through the heart of the district. The advantages that these two rivers bring in terms of employment and water supply are, however, limited to the towns situated directly alongside the rivers. The towns that are situated only a few kilometres away from the rivers lack access to sufficient water supply, thus adversely affecting economic opportunities and development in these towns (Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality 2015). With limited economic and developmental potential, out-migration of individuals seeking better opportunities to other, more suitable locations can be expected.

Concerning the general net loss in inter-provincial migrants experienced by the province since 1996, the provincial economic context provides insight into this continuous trend. With this province constituting one of the weakest economies in the country, the prospect of limited economic development of opportunities in terms of employment acts as a factor that pushes migrants to provinces with stronger economies and thus employment opportunities. In 2011, the Northern Cape province, together with the Limpopo province, demonstrated the smallest economic growth (2.2%) when compared with the other provinces in South Africa. This growth rate is substantially lower than the national growth rate of 3.5% achieved at the same time. In a comparison of the real economic growth for the different provinces for the period 2001–2011, the Northern Cape illustrated the lowest growth at 2.4% compared with a 4% national growth (StatsSA 2012a). In terms of employment, the Northern Cape has not performed well, achieving the highest unemployment rate in the country in 2011 (31.3%) compared with the other South African provinces (Department of Labour 2011).

The nature of the economic sectors that mostly contribute to the Northern Cape economy is another aspect that affects migration trends. The two main economic sectors in the Northern Cape are the mining and agricultural sectors. These two industries assume the largest share of employment in the province, typically employing an unskilled and semi-skilled labour force. This appears to have had some impact on the educational profile of migrants who leave the province. A study conducted by Kok and Aliber (2005) revealed that migrants leaving the Northern Cape province were found to exhibit a higher educational status than those who remained in the province (Kok & Aliber 2005). The study further reported that in most cases, the general income of Northern Cape out-migrants was higher than that of the individuals who remained in the province. Thus, migrants leaving the province found themselves overall to be in a better economic position in their new place of residence compared with their economic position while in the Northern Cape (Kok & Aliber 2005). The apparent outflow of skilled and highly educated individuals portrays a challenging economic landscape for the province if not addressed in some way.



The assertion that economic conditions, real or perceived, act as the primary factors either pushing or pulling migrants to or from the Northern Cape was confirmed in a migration study conducted in the province in 2004 (Bekker & Eigelaar-Meets 2004). When probing the reasons that served as motivation for out-migrants to leave the province, the study found the majority of out-migrants, especially those with higher educational attainment, left the province because of the lure of better economic opportunities offered elsewhere (Bekker & Eigelaar-Meets 2004). Moreover, when probing in-migrants on the motivating factors underlying their move to the province, the same response was given, with the majority of these migrants indicating to have moved to the province because of the perception of better economic opportunities or because of a secured employment position (Bekker & Eigelaar-Meets 2004).

### ■ Intra-provincial migration flows in the Northern Cape province (1996–2011)

Inter-provincial migration is only one dimension of migration that has an impact on the distribution of the population within a province. Migration that occurs within the provincial boundaries, that is intra-provincial migration, is another dimension of internal migration that requires investigation. To analyse this migration stream, only persons who had moved within the provincial boundaries of the Northern Cape within the defined periods (1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011) and were aged 20 years or older at the time of their last move were considered.<sup>52</sup>

Comparing inter-provincial migration (across provincial boundaries) to intra-provincial migration, analysis showed the latter to have exhibited higher rates for the period under investigation. Considering intra-provincial migration a distinction is made between movement *across* and movement *within* municipal district boundaries. Applying this distinction, intra-provincial migrants were found to rather move within a specific municipal district (above 70% across all three defined periods) than to move across district boundaries. This trend is further supported by comparing the respective internal migration rates for the defined periods (Table 5.3).

---

52. As indicated in the analysis of inter-provincial migration trends, migration rates calculated and presented for the period 2001–2006 should be viewed with caution. It is important to note that the consistent lower rates in migration observed during this period could be due to a possible undercount of migrants, rather than an actual decrease in rates.

**TABLE 5.3:** Comparison of inter- and intra-provincial migration rates for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.<sup>53</sup>

<b>Migration flow</b>	<b>1996–2001</b>	<b>2001–2006</b>	<b>2006–2011</b>
Inter-provincial migration	-0.74	-0.21	-0.23
Intra-provincial migration: Across municipal district boundaries	1.04	0.39	1.01
Intra-provincial migration: Within municipal district boundaries	3.06	0.95	2.93

Source: Author's own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2006, 2012).


In the investigation regarding the contribution of individuals to intra-provincial migration in terms of the four population groups, a consistent trend among all adult intra-provincial migrants was demonstrated. The analysis found intra-provincial migrants from all four population groups to exhibit a preference to move within a municipal district boundary rather than across. This trend was also confirmed across age groups, with migrants within all three age cohorts (20–29 years old, 30–60 years old and 60+ years old) found to move primarily within a district border rather than move across such borders to settle in another district within the province. Mature adults (30–60 years old) were found to be the most active in intra-provincial migration compared to young adults (20–29 years old) and mature adults (61+ years old).

Analysing intra-provincial net migration rates for the respective districts together with sending and receiving districts within the province allowed for an assessment of how intra-provincial migrants were relocating within the province. Such data have relevance in that they present information on the impact of intra-provincial migration on the net gain or loss to the total population size of the respective districts resulting from migration behaviour. Analysing intra-provincial net migration rates analysis illustrates respective districts to have experienced different net migration trends across the three defined periods, with the impact ranging between net gains and losses. The deductions listed below can be made from net migration rates presented in Figure 5.3 and Table 5.4.

- The ZF Mgcau and Pixley ka Seme districts presented similar trends, with both districts experiencing an overall net gain in intra-provincial migrants.
- The Frances Baard district illustrated divergent trends to the Pixley Ka Seme and the ZF Mgcau districts in that it experienced an overall net loss in intra-provincial net migration rates, implying that more intra-provincial migrants were leaving than moving to this district.

---

53. Calculations per 1,000.



Source: Author's own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2006, 2012).  
 Key: NC, Northern Cape; DM, district municipality.

**FIGURE 5.3:** Intra-provincial net migration rates on the district level for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.<sup>54</sup>

**TABLE 5.4:** Sending and receiving districts of intra-provincial migrants in the Northern Cape for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.

District municipalities	Receiving districts (%)			Sending districts (%)		
	1996-2001	2001-2006	2006-2011	1996-2001	2001-2006	2006-2011
Namakwa DM	11.1	10.2	7.7	7.5	3.8	13.4
Pixley Ka Seme DM	15.9	15.8	22.2	14.6	39.2	7.4
ZF Mgcawu DM	33.6	17.8	40.9	26.3	18.7	12.4
Frances Baard DM	18.3	38.6	7.2	48.0	26.0	39.1
John Taolo Gaetsewe DM	21.1	17.5	22.0	3.5	12.3	27.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Author's own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2006, 2012; author's own calculations).  
 Key: DM, district municipality.

- If one considers, specifically, the 1996–2001 and 2006–2011 sending and receiving rates of intra-provincial migrants, migration movement to the ZF Mgcawu and Pixley ka Seme districts is illustrated as more stable, with these districts behaving as stronger receiving areas than sending areas. This implies that these two districts are gaining in population size

54. To determine the net-migration rates for the period 2001–2006, the total district population size as it was at the time of the 2007 Community Survey was used since these were the only verified numbers available on district level. Although the actual rate may differ slightly, it is the opinion of the author that the general trends remain valid for the 2006 period.

because of more intra-provincial migrants choosing to settle as opposed to leaving the district. The opposite is true in the case of Frances Baard and John Taolo Gaetsewe districts, where these districts are losing in population size because of more intra-provincial migrants choosing to leave the district as opposed to moving there.

- The Namakwa and John Taolo Gaetsewe districts were the only two districts that consistently exhibited lower intra-provincial migration rates, implying that people are continuously choosing to leave these districts and move to other districts in the Northern Cape.

Exploring the local municipalities within the ZF Mgcawu and Pixley ka Seme districts to which intra-provincial migrants moved, it was found that the majority of intra-provincial migrants that moved to the ZF Mgcawu district settled in either the Dawid Kruiper local municipality or the Kai !Garib local municipality. Of those who moved to the Pixley Ka Seme district, the majority moved to the Emtanjeni local municipality or the Siyacuma local municipality.

A characteristic shared by these four local municipal areas is the existence of a dominant economic sector that holds employment potential for semi-skilled and unskilled individuals. The Dawid Kruiper and Kai !Garib municipalities located in the ZF Mgcawu district are both home to a strong agricultural sector that particularly offers both permanent and seasonal employment to unskilled and semi-skilled individuals. Mining and agriculture are the primary economic activities in the Siyacuma local municipality. The Emtanjeni local municipality is well known for its central location on the main railway line to Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Namibia, presenting access to employment in the transport industry.

If one considers the intra-provincial migration flows between the district borders of the provinces, it would seem a natural inference to expect these migration flows to match the population distribution within the province. Despite the earlier description of intra-provincial migration flows within a province, a different scenario emerged in regard to the ZF Mgcawu and Pixley ka Seme districts, which demonstrated the strongest intra-provincial net migration rates compared with the other districts. These higher net migration rates illustrate a stronger impact of positive net migration on the population numbers of these two districts and thus the focus on these two districts in the subsequent discussion.

## □ Contextualising intra-provincial migration trends

What is it that makes the ZF Mgcawu and Pixley ka Seme districts so appealing for intra-provincial migrants? A response to this question is

presented by, firstly, considering the flow of migrants as they enter the respective districts and, secondly, by considering these flows in terms of the economy of the districts. This discussion aims to illustrate how economic opportunities presented by the districts act as the main pull factors in the migration decision. This premise is based on the argument presented by the push-pull theory on migration, in which migrants are stated to select a receiving area and remain there depending on the specific characteristics of the area that are perceived as favourable options for migrants. It is argued here that such characteristics primarily refer to economic opportunities offered. To support this premise, the sections 'District economy of the ZF Mgcawu District Municipality' and 'District economy of the Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality' are dedicated to two short summaries of the economies of the two districts, illustrating how the primary economic factors within the district affect the mobility of intra-provincial migrants to the respective districts.

## □ District economy of the ZF Mgcawu District Municipality

The ZF Mgcawu District Municipality, previously known as the Lower Orange River region, forms the mid-northern section of the Northern Cape province on the frontier of Botswana. Straddling the Orange River, this district, with an area of 65,000 km<sup>2</sup> covers almost 30% of the entire province and includes the vast Kalahari Desert, Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park and the former Bushman Land (ITS Engineers 2007; CoGTA 2020). The district consists of six local authorities, namely Mier Local Municipality, Kai !Garib Municipality, //Khara Hais Municipality, !Kheis Municipality, Tsantsebane Municipality and Kgatelopele Municipality, with the DM based in Upington (Atkinson & Marais 2007; ITS Engineers 2007).

The Orange River represents the artery of agricultural activity in this district. The economy of the district is dominated by agricultural production and farming, with the area known for its extensive livestock farming, some game farming and extensive irrigation farming along the Orange River. The wine and grape industry also contributes greatly to the local economy, with the area becoming a major exporter of table grapes and raisins (Atkinson & Marais 2007; ITS Engineers 2007). The mining sector is the single largest employer of labour and contributes 21.3% to the GVA of the district's economy (Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 2016). Other economic activities include tourism,<sup>55</sup> with various popular national parks and reserves

---

55. The various national parks and reserves in this region include the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, Spitskop Nature Reserve and Augrabies National Park (Atkinson & Marais 2007; ITS Engineers 2007).

in the region, as well as mining and mineral exploitation.<sup>56</sup> Upington hosts an international airport that is mainly used for the export of agricultural products to international destinations (Atkinson & Marais 2007; ITS Engineers 2007).

The agricultural sector, seasonal by nature because of the type of crops grown,<sup>57</sup> is predominantly labour-intensive and attracts workers from across the province, the country and neighbouring countries<sup>58</sup> to work on the irrigation farms along the Orange River (Atkinson & Marais 2007). Intensive agricultural farming mainly includes the cultivation of grapes and fruit in the Upington, Kakamas and Keimoes areas, which are zoned within the Dawid Kruiper and Kai !Garib local authorities.

In the analysis of intra-provincial migration into the ZF Mgcawu district regarding the main receiving municipalities of these migrants, the Kai !Garib and Dawid Kruiper local municipal areas were illustrated to receive the largest and second-largest flow of intra-provincial migrants across the three defined periods (Table 5.5), respectively. Viewing these trends in the context of the district economy presented earlier, the link between economic growth and employment opportunities, particularly within the agricultural sector and the main receiving municipalities of intra-provincial migrants, is evident.

## □ District economy of the Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality

The Pixley Ka Seme district lies in the south-east of the Northern Cape province, sharing its borders with three other provinces, namely the

**TABLE 5.5:** Receiving municipalities of intra-provincial migrants to the ZF Mgcawu district for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.

ZF Mgcawu district	Percentage		
	1996–2001	2001–2006	2006–2011
!Kheis	6.41	1.41	2.88
Dawid Kruiper	<b>31.20</b>	<b>15.49</b>	<b>14.41</b>
Kai !Garib	<b>44.31</b>	<b>35.21</b>	<b>49.22</b>
Kgatelopele	7.58	22.54	10.42
Tsantsabane	10.50	25.35	23.06
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Author's own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2006, 2012).

Note: Numbers set in bold indicate the two municipalities with the highest in-migration rates from intra-provincial migrants.

56. Diamonds, iron, lime and salt are mined in the eastern parts of the district, with two large salt pans being situated slightly north of Upington. These activities also greatly contribute to the district's economy (Atkinson & Marais 2007; ITS Engineers 2007).

57. Grapes and fruit are intensively cultivated in the Orange River Valley, specifically in the Upington, Kakamas and Keimoes areas (South African Business 2021)

58. //Khara Hais borders Namibia, and Kai !Garib shares its northern borders with Botswana.

Free State province to the east, the Eastern Cape Province to the south-east and the Western Cape province to the south-west. The district constitutes the second-largest in the province, covering a total surface area of 102,727 km<sup>2</sup> and consists of eight local municipalities, namely Ubuntu, Emthanjeni, Siyancuma, Siyathemba, Kareeberg, Renosterberg, Thembelihle and Umsobomvu. Ubuntu is the largest, and Renosterberg is the smallest of these municipalities (Municipalities of South Africa n.d.).

Pixley Ka Seme is ideally located, with certain key major routes passing through the area such as the N1 that stretches from the Northern Province through Pretoria and Johannesburg to Cape Town. In addition, the N9 route from Colesberg that joins the N10 to Port Elizabeth and the rest of the Eastern Cape, the N12 route from Johannesburg via Kimberley to Cape Town and the N10 from Namibia via Upington that links Namibia to the Eastern Cape all pass through the region. The railway network around De Aar is one of the largest in South Africa (Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality 2015).

In De Aar, the mighty Orange and Vaal rivers allow for extensive, intensive crop farming on their banks. These activities are unfortunately limited to those towns situated along these rivers because water is a scarce commodity in the towns only a few kilometres away. There are also three major dams within the municipal area, namely the Gariep Dam, Vanderkloof Dam and Boegoeberg Dam. The economy of this district is centred mainly on the railway network around De Aar (in the Emthanjeni Local Municipality) and on agriculture, particularly the irrigation farming along the banks of the Vaal and Orange rivers, which involves towns in the Emthanjeni and Siyancuma local municipalities. Products from irrigation farming include maize, peanuts, lucerne, grapes, dry beans, soya beans, potatoes, olives, popcorn, pecan nuts, pistachio nuts and cotton (Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality 2015).

Stock farming is also practised throughout the district, with the focus mainly on small stock consisting of goats and sheep. From the sheep farming, mutton and wool are produced. Several abattoirs are found in the region of which the largest is in the Emthanjeni Municipality and has a capacity of 2,000 slaughtered sheep per day (Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality 2015).

In an analysis of intra-provincial migration into the Pixley Ka Seme district following the main receiving municipalities of these migrants, the Siyancuma and Emthanjeni local municipal areas received the largest and the second-largest flow of intra-provincial migrants across the three defined periods, respectively (Table 5.6). The link between economic growth and employment opportunities, particularly within the agricultural sector, and the main receiving municipalities of intra-provincial migrants is again evident when viewing these trends in the context of the district economy presented here.

**TABLE 5.6:** Receiving municipalities of intra-provincial migrants to the Pixley Ka Seme district for 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.

Pixley Ka Seme district	Percentage		
	1996–2001	2001–2006	2006–2011
Emthanjeni	14.29	21.21	15.92
Kareeberg	3.43	13.64	12.74
Renosterberg	2.29	12.12	3.82
Siyancuma	41.71	21.21	28.66
Siyathemba	7.43	12.12	9.55
Thembelihle	1.71	3.03	11.46
Ubuntu	14.29	13.64	12.74
Umsobumvu	14.86	3.03	5.10
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Author's own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2006, 2012).

## ■ Urbanisation

The Northern Cape population is mostly urban in nature. In a province that consists of largely rural areas, the majority of its population has, for a long time, been urban-based. The 1996 census estimated that 77% of this population was urban, while estimates in 2001 were at the 80% level (StatsSA 2004, p. 23). The population of each of the five districts comprised more than 75% urban residents in the same year (StatsSA 2004, p. 23). The 2011 census showed the largest part of the Northern Cape population to be concentrated in the Frances Baard and ZF Mgcawu districts. These two districts house the two largest urban centres: Kimberley, the provincial capital in Frances Baard, and Upington, well known for its strong agricultural sector surrounding a strong peri-urban town centre.

The description of inter- and intra-provincial migration presented in the preceding analyses illustrated two definite trends in mobility associated with the two mobility types within the province. The first type of mobility that consisted of inter-provincial migrants entering the province had its main route towards the urban and peri-urban centres of the province, particularly the Frances Baard and ZF Mgcawu districts. This migration flow was mostly driven by mature adults, with the respective population groups illustrating different main routes entering the province. Black African migrants entering the province were shown to enter mostly from the North West province, coloured in-migrants mostly moved into the province from the Western Cape and white in-migrants primarily entered from Gauteng. The status of the North West province as the main sending province of black African migrants is possibly questionable, given the probable impact of boundary changes on these findings.

The second type of mobility was sustained by intra-provincial migrants, driven primarily by mature adult migrants within the coloured and black African population. Although the John Taolo Gaetsewe district has acted



as a main receiving place of intra-provincial migrants together with the ZF Mgcawu district since 1996, the John Taolo Gaetsewe district has continuously lost a growing number of these migrants to the other districts within the province. This is evident from the declining net migration rate experienced by this district for the period 1996–2011. On the contrary, the ZF Mgcawu and Pixley ka Seme districts experienced growing net migration rates because of intra-provincial migrants for the same period. With net migration rates being a function of the number of migrants both entering and leaving a defined geographical area, the higher net migration rates for these two districts illustrated a stronger and sustaining impact of positive net migration rates on the population numbers of these two districts.

The movement of both inter- and intra-provincial migrants towards the economic centres of the province is a strong contributor to the current urbanisation of the province. Similar to the Western Cape, the process of urban transition in the Northern Cape is still clearly in process, with a steady annual increase in the urban population because of the migration dynamics of the province. Here, too, the data suggest the onset of a migration transition, illustrated in the decreasing annual migration flows that suggest a more stable population and increasingly stable population dynamics. This transition, however, does not include a change in migration flows, with flows continuing towards the economic centre of the province. It is expected to continue in this manner, considering that the province's economy has historically been strongly based on agricultural activities and, to a lesser extent, mining activities that are foreseen to continue. Thus, it is argued that for the period under review here, the agricultural economy, in particular, acts as the greatest pull factor for deciding a destination area.

If both the inter- and intra-provincial migration trends are viewed in the context of the provincial economy and the local economies of the respective receiving districts, it would be reasonable to assert economic considerations as the primary pull factors influencing migration flows and, thus, urbanisation in the province. This seems evident in the light of employment opportunities provided, particularly and primarily within the agricultural sector in the respective receiving districts.

## ■ Conclusion

The Northern Cape is a province of dramatic contrast that is associated with extensive semi-desert areas, vineyards and irrigated farmlands located close to two of South Africa's major rivers, extravagant perennial spring flower displays and mining. Demarcated as a province in 1994, the Northern Cape comprises the largest provincial land mass in South Africa (372,889 km<sup>2</sup>), which is ten times larger than Gauteng, and is home to the smallest provincial population (1,145,861 persons in 2011).

The history of the Northern Cape dates back to the early years of colonisation, with *trekboers* venturing further inland in search of more land for cultivation. As early as the 1750s, nearly a century before the formal extension of the northern border of the Cape Colony, these farmers made their way to the Orange River via Namaqualand. It was, however, at the time of annexation in 1847 that the real influx of colonists to the then northwestern Cape began.

Today, the population distribution of the Northern Cape can, at best, be described as mixed, with the majority (33.34%) of the population residing in the Frances Baard district. Also home to the provincial capital, Kimberley, this district comprises the urban centre of the province. The second-largest district, the ZF Mgcawu district (home to 20.63% of the provincial population), can be described as peri-urban in nature with a relatively large urban centre and an economy mostly based on agricultural activity and agri-processing. The remaining 46.03% of the population resides in the other three municipal districts, which are all rural in character.

With regard to the net migration rates evident in the province for the three defined periods, inter-provincial migration was consistently characterised by a net loss in migrants that was evident in the continuous negative net migration rates since 1996. This trend, however, declined somewhat over the study period.

A possible contributing factor to the persistent net out-migration experienced in the province could include the declining employment sector within the province. In a comparison of the employment figures of the 1996 and 2011 censuses, the data showed a decline in the number of employed citizens. This was in spite of an overall increase in the general educational status of individuals 20 years old or older since 1996. It would thus seem that the improvement in educational status has not filtered through to the economy of the province and, thus, its workforce, resulting in the majority of the Northern Cape employed sector continuing to work in elementary occupations and craft-related trades. There was, however, some movement towards more skilled occupation types, with a slight decline in the number of black African and coloured individuals employed in elementary occupations, although this sector still constituted the majority (2001 and 2011 census data).

Regarding the characteristics of migrants, as they relate to the different migration flows, the one consistent quality of migrants is related to their age distribution. The majority of inter-provincial migrants were defined as young adults (20–29 years old), with mature adults (30–60 years old) constituting a second stream. In turn, mature adults were found to be the most mobile in intra-provincial, with young adults constituting a second stream. A migration study conducted in the Northern Cape in 2004 found

that young people who left the province were more highly qualified than those who remained in the province (Bekker & Eigelaar-Meets 2004). Young adults with skills that they believed would enable them to find well-remunerated work opportunities consequently decided to leave the province in search of both further training and work opportunities, particularly in South Africa's primary urban areas of Cape Town, Bloemfontein and Gauteng (Bekker & Eigelaar-Meets 2004). The province thus seemed to experience a loss of skills and human capital that was not balanced by an equivalent provincial inflow. However, the national government recognised this issue, which was illustrated by the announcement of the national Minister of Higher Education in 2012 that a university would be established in the provincial capital of Kimberley by 2014 (Bathembu 2013).

Pertaining to mobility among the different population groups, the black African population was shown to exhibit the strongest inter-provincial mobility rates, followed by the coloured population group. Participation in intra-provincial migration flows showed some shifts, with an increase in black African participation in movement within municipal district boundaries, compared to a decrease in participation noted for the coloured population. Mobility across municipal district boundaries was shown to have remained consistent since 1996 for the four population groups.

A limited economy, driven mostly by the agricultural and mining sectors, is probably the main driver of the continuous net loss in the inter-provincial migration of the Northern Cape. Because the bulk of the Northern Cape economy depends on sectors that mainly require elementary and semi-skilled employees, few employment opportunities are available for those possessing higher educational training. Consequently, individuals with higher educational attainment leave the province in search of more promising economic environments. The province's economic character is thus acting as the main factor pushing migrants out of the province, particularly those with higher qualifications and those who hold specialised skills.

# Making sense of the data

Chapters 4 and 5 offered a detailed description of internal migration, constituted by both inter-provincial and intra-provincial flows, as it occurred in the Western Cape and Northern Cape from 1996 to 2011. The purpose of these chapters was to present an arithmetic account and quantitative description of post-apartheid internal migration trends within two purposefully selected provinces as case studies. The use of case studies, in this case, carries relevance as it allows for the contextualisation of findings, which is required to facilitate and guide reflection towards understanding the findings. As noted in both preceding chapters, these analyses also aim at supporting the larger purpose of this publication, and that is to build a case to support the view that internal migration, considering both defined flows that constitute this form of migration, should be included as a standard consideration in development planning processes, specifically as it applies to South African local government structures.

Towards achieving these aims, this chapter has three objectives, the first of which is to synthesise the findings presented in Chapters 4 and 5 with the objective of reflecting on how post-apartheid mobility has been realised in these two provinces. The second objective is to confirm the nature of migration, as one of the three pillars of demographic theory, in bringing about rapid population change and to illustrate the possible impact of such rapid change on communities and how to consider this in development planning. Finally, the chapter concludes by offering two explanatory

**How to cite:** Eigelaar-Meets, I 2024, 'Making sense of the data', in *Internal migration and development planning in South Africa*, AVARSITY Books, Cape Town, pp. 129–152. <https://doi.org/10.4102/aosis.2024.BK463.06>

frameworks, the theory of relative deprivation and the resource mobilisation approach, in an effort to shine some explanatory light on the destabilising effects of migration.

## ■ **Post-apartheid internal migration: A synthesis of findings**

In stark contrast to the apartheid dispensation, the democratic era offered free movement and opportunities to all South Africans irrespective of race. The analysis offered in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 illustrates how urbanisation in the post-apartheid era intensified with the populations in the two provinces now largely urban and semi-urban-based. This process of urbanisation was illustrated as an outcome of both inter- and intra-provincial migration flows, a premise illustrated and substantiated in the presentation of the inter- and intra-provincial migration flows for the periods 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011.

Comparing the inter-provincial migration flows between the two provinces for the period 1996–2011, the first obvious observation related to net migration rates. Consistently over the three defined periods of analysis, the Western Cape noted a persistent positive net migration rate, with the Northern Cape, in contrast, exhibiting a persistent negative net migration for the same periods. The Western Cape has thus been consistently experiencing population growth because of in-migration (evident in the positive net migration rates), and the Northern Cape has consistently lost members of its population as a result of greater out-migration (evident in persistent negative net migration rates). This observation is important as it provides insight into the role that migration played in the population change noted for both provinces since 1996.

Considering the factors that have performed as possible catalysts to these migration trends, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 argued that economic drivers within the respective provinces are the main factors sustaining the observed mobility trends. The contrasting net migration rates present a clear reflection of the economic realities within each province. Described as one of the three powerhouses of the South African economy, the Western Cape economy has consistently shown higher growth than the national economy, with a poverty incidence below the national average. This economic environment presents the Western Cape as a very favourable destination place for migrants hoping to better their economic status and reality (Writer 2014).

The Western Cape province has further experienced continued growth in employment opportunities, specifically within the construction and agricultural sectors – both sectors that provide employment to primarily

semi-skilled individuals. This is important, seeing that the educational status of in-migrants to the Western Cape was found to be lower compared with those leaving the province,<sup>59</sup> suggesting that the employment opportunities offered in these two sectors, supported by a growing economy, probably act as significant pull factors to migrants.

In contrast, the Northern Cape exhibited limited economic growth for the period 2001–2011. The province further presented limited employment opportunities, not only because of limited economic growth adding to high unemployment but also because of the nature of the industries that drive the provincial economy (Department of Labour 2011; StatsSA 2012b). With mining and agriculture the main industries in the province, the majority of employment opportunities available in the province seem to focus on unskilled or semi-skilled work seekers. The impact of this is evident in the outflow of skilled young adults towards provinces that hold better economic opportunities, specifically the Western Cape and Gauteng. This observation was supported by the comparison of the educational status between in- and out-migrants to the province, in which in-migrants generally illustrated a lower educational status compared with migrants leaving the province. A comparison of the absolute numbers of adult in- and out-migrants in the Northern Cape, overall as well as in each educational category, reveals a profile different to that of the Western Cape: a gain in low-skilled and a loss in higher-skilled adults over the 2001–2011 period.<sup>60</sup>

In regard to the sending and receiving provinces of migrants to and from the two provinces, both provinces exhibited reciprocal relationships with specific provinces. The Western Cape province illustrated strong relationships with the Eastern Cape and Gauteng provinces, with these provinces acting as both the main sending and receiving provinces in the internal migration flows of the Western Cape. However, the provinces have somewhat different roles in this relationship, with the Eastern Cape acting as the primary sending province of in-migrants to the Western Cape and Gauteng as the main receiving province of out-migrants.

The Northern Cape province, in turn, presented a strong reciprocal relationship with the Western Cape and Gauteng. Both these provinces acted as the main sending and receiving provinces in inter-provincial migration of the Northern Cape. In this relationship, the Western Cape acted as the primary sending and receiving area of mostly coloured

---

59. Educational level of in- and out-migrants in the Western Cape (20+ years old) 2001–2011, data provided by StatsSA on request of the author.

60. Educational level of internal migrants in the Northern Cape (20+ years old) 2001–2011, data provided by StatsSA on request of the author.

migrants, and Gauteng acted as the main receiving area for black out-migrants from the Northern Cape and the main sending province of white in-migrants to the province.

The power of economic forces in directing migration flows was further illustrated in the destination districts preferred by migrants in both provinces. In the Western Cape, the Cape Metro received the bulk of internal migrants, followed by the Cape Winelands and Garden Route districts. In the Northern Cape, migrants were shown to move towards the Frances Baard and ZF Mgcawu (previously Siyanda) districts. All five of these areas present similar characteristics in that they represent the urban centres of the two provinces (Cape Metro and Frances Baard district), they are districts that have experienced economic growth, and they offer employment within sectors that provide employment for the unskilled and semi-skilled workforce.

Considering who is migrating, the analysis continued to present similar trends. Both provinces illustrated the black African and the white populations to be the most mobile, with the black African population illustrated as the most mobile. The age profile of internal migrants for the two provinces showed somewhat divergent trends, with internal migrants in the Western Cape mostly classified as young adults (20–29 years old) compared to the Northern Cape, where mature adults (30–59 years old) were found to be the most mobile.

Though both provinces illustrated dynamic intra-provincial migration activity, inter-provincial migration rates were illustrated as dominant. Comparing the two intra-provincial migration flows, movement within district boundaries was found to be more prevalent than movement across district borders in both provinces. The interesting observation here is that for both provinces, the net gains in migrants to central urban centres, namely the CoCT in the Western Cape and the Frances Baard district in the Northern Cape, were mostly sustained in inter-provincial migration, whereas net gains because of movement within the province (intra-provincial migration) were found mostly towards rural towns.

This growing movement towards rural towns can be attributed to the increasing difficulty in securing employment in cities, coupled with low agricultural returns in rural areas (South African Cities Network 2004). These two realities compel many individuals to relocate to urban or peri-urban towns, which serve as the economic hubs of their immediate vicinity, rather than opting for larger urban centres. Additional three factors contribute to the preference for rural towns over urban centres (Roux 2009).

1. *Lower costs*: migrating to these smaller towns often requires lower migration costs and a more affordable cost of living compared to the bustling urban centres within their respective provinces.
2. *Easier access to services*: residents in rural towns frequently enjoy easier access to government-provided welfare, services and national transportation. This accessibility is often crucial for their well-being.
3. *Retaining links at home*: migration to areas closer to their places of origin allows migrants to maintain connections with their home communities, providing a safety net of support from family and friends in times of unemployment or illness.

Economic forces are argued as the primary drivers for migration in both provinces underlying not only the primary push or pull factors for migration but also acting as the decisive factors in determining the direction of migration flows. In South Africa, migration studies are typically framed in economic terms, with migration seen as an effective means of accessing better jobs and dealing with limited (local) economic prospects. Thus, high migration rates are not only an index of social dislocation but also an efficient means of meeting opportunities offered by the employment market (Kok, O'Donovan & Miles 2000). The importance of economic considerations in migration is supported by Bekker (2006) when he discusses the main responses offered by migrants when asked about their reasons for migrating. In these responses, migrants, more often than not, attributed their decision to migrate as an action driven by the need for income and employment. This need acts as the 'primary engine of migration' by first pushing people out of the poorer regions while pulling them towards better-resourced areas (Bekker 2006, p. 54).

The more favourable economic environment presented by the Western and Northern Cape provinces compared to their main sending areas is illustrated in lower unemployment rates, higher labour force participation<sup>61</sup> and individual income levels.

The illustrated migration patterns indicate a departure from traditional norms. Historically, black African migrants engaged in circulatory migration – moving back and forth between rural sending areas and urban receiving centres because of their rural ties. However, available data now suggest a shift towards gravity flow migration. In this new paradigm, rural migrants increasingly opt for permanent settlement in their new regions or homes rather than returning to their rural origins. This change is driven by the

---

61. The labour force participation rate is the percentage of working-age persons in an economy who are either employed or unemployed but looking for a job. Those who have no interest in working are not included in the participation rate but are included in the unemployment rate (OECD Data 2024).



perception, whether real or not, that their household will benefit from enhanced economic opportunities and improved services in these destinations. People are making these choices voluntarily, seeking better circumstances for themselves and their families (Bekker & Swart 2002; Kok & Aliber 2005; UNDP 2009).

The observed shift to gravity-flow migration from circulatory migration is supported by Atkinson and Marais (2007), who attribute the strong growth in the black African population within the ZF Mgcawu district in the Northern Cape primarily to seasonal workers (the majority from the North West province) who are attracted to the mainly seasonal employment opportunities available on the irrigation farms (mostly grape farms) along the Orange River. These migrants seem to choose to remain in the district rather than return to their area of origin because of economic considerations (Atkinson & Marais 2007).

Another influential factor that affects migrants' decisions to either return to their rural origins or remain in their current locations is the length of time they have resided in predominantly urban areas. It appears that the longer migrants reside in a specific location, the less likely they are to intend on returning to their rural place of origin. A study conducted in the CoCT examining the intent of black Capetonians on returning to their rural homes confirmed this trend, establishing that as the period of residence in the CMA increased, the likelihood of migrants returning to their place of origin diminished significantly (Bekker 2006).

These migration trends align with Zelinsky's 1971 mobility theory, illustrating how a population's mobility shifts from being fundamentally rural to predominantly urban. In both provinces, this process of mobility transition is ongoing, transforming from a strong rural base to a primarily urban one. With development, specifically economic and infrastructure development, being centred mainly within urban spaces, the movement towards these areas is encouraged and subsequently sustained. Because of the limited nature and prospects for development of these aspects in rural areas, the sustaining of circulatory migration becomes consistently weaker as individuals become entrenched in and dependent upon urban areas.

This is specifically true for the poor, for whom urbanisation has become a survival strategy because urban life provides (1) the opportunity to access essential services that function well, (2) more and diverse employment opportunities, if only on an ad hoc basis and (3) the benefits of decent infrastructure delivery (Cross et al. 2005). With only a recent effort by the government to realise and advance rural development as stipulated in the *New Growth Path: Framework* (DEDAT 2012) and the lack of, as yet, an accepted and successfully implemented rural development policy,

urbanisation is set to continue together with a weakening of circulatory migration.

## ■ Who are the migrants?

Not everyone in a population who shares similar socio-economic conditions, however, has the same probability of migrating during a given period. Some are more inclined to migrate than others, with the implication that people with certain characteristics are more migration-prone, a phenomenon called 'migration selectivity' (Kok 2003; eds. Kok et al. 2006). This assertion is supported by the value expectancy model, which identifies a number of both economic and non-economic variables that could contribute to the decision to migrate. Population group and age were the two non-economic variables tested here.

The general assertion in migration studies, both nationally and internationally, is that young individuals are more prone to migrate than people within the older cohorts (Bouare 2001; eds. Kok et al. 2006; Mostert et al. 1991). In the analyses presented in this publication, this assumption was illustrated as true for black African in-migrants to the Western Cape. However, mature adults (30–60 years old) were found to present the highest mobility rates as both inter-provincial out-migrants and intra-provincial migration in general.

Black African migrants most frequently moved across provincial borders and also showed increased mobility within the boundaries of the two provinces. The strong participation of the black African population in migration in the two provinces is significant in post-apartheid South Africa. The Western Cape and large parts of the Northern Cape were 'protected' by the pre-1994 dispensation that permitted only restricted movement for the black African population. The strong participation in migration, particularly in these two provinces, in the post-apartheid dispensation is a clear indication of (1) the unsuccessful nature of the pre-1994 measures to direct and control migration and (2) how in a post-apartheid South Africa, the black African population has successfully been integrated into the dynamics and economic structures of the two provinces to which they previously experienced limited access.

Another aspect identified by some migration scholars as a determining factor for the likelihood of persons migrating relates to their educational level. In a study discussing the causes and economic impact of migration in the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape and Limpopo, Kok et al. (2005) found that migrants leaving the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape and Limpopo provinces were substantially better educated than those that remained. The propensity of these individuals to migrate compared with their less

educated counterparts can probably be attributed to their higher probability of securing employment in their new destination areas because of their superior educational status.

## ■ Population distribution and internal migration: An outcome driven by two forces

Throughout this book, internal migration is treated as two separate types of movement: inter-provincial and intra-provincial migration flows. These two migration flows were analysed and consistently presented as two types of movements occurring parallel, though independent of each other. The question as to why such a conceptualisation of migration is necessary, if at all useful, might have occurred to the reader. This is, of course, a valid question that deserves a clear response. The conceptualisation of internal migration to consist of two parallel but independent migration flows is necessary to gain a full picture of how the population within a province is distributed, moving and urbanising. If we only consider inter-provincial migration, that is, movement across provincial boundaries, we are missing half of the reality. The other half is presented through movement within the province, illustrated in the analysis as a more dynamic force compared to intra-provincial migration in determining population distribution and urbanisation trends.

It is because of the independent nature of the two manifestations of human mobility that the joint impact of these two migration streams on the distribution of populations within administrative boundaries within provinces (i.e. district or local municipalities) should be considered. In this book, the analysis of migration within the two provinces was consistently performed in terms of municipal *district* boundaries. Limiting the analysis to movement across and within district boundaries rather than local municipal boundaries was carried out because of the predominant consistency in these district boundaries since 1996 as opposed to the volatile nature of local municipal boundaries, which significantly complicates trend analysis.

Internal migration refers to migration moves across larger administrative constituencies, such as provincial boundaries in the South African context. In this context, internal net-migration rates act as an indicator of the net gain or net loss in migrants that constitute inter-provincial migration flows. Although this measure is sufficient to understand the impact of net migration rates at a provincial level, it does not account for the impact of internal movement on population change. This oversight leaves a gap in

the data required for development planning, resulting in a lack of crucial information. Comprehensive and accurate planning is not possible if only half the picture is known.

Because intra-provincial migrants remain within a provincial boundary, migration flows constituted by these migrants carry no significance when calculating inter-provincial net migration rates. In this way, movement to rural towns could be entirely understated or overlooked by planning authorities as the overall numbers for a district might remain the same, but the distribution becomes more concentrated, causing infrastructural and socio-economic challenges for receiving centres. A similar scenario applies to migrants leaving a particular district, with some crossing the district boundary to settle in another district while others leave the province altogether. It is because of such dynamics that data on both intra- and inter-provincial migration should be included when calculating the net migration rates for a particular district. This scenario could be circumvented when calculating net migration rates effective for smaller administrative sectors (i.e. municipal districts).

Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 compare the net migration rates calculated for the respective districts within the two provinces by employing (1) only migration moves across provincial boundaries (referred to as inter-provincial net-migration rates in tables and discussion) and (2) both migration moves, thus inter- and intra-provincial migration across provincial and municipal district boundaries as they apply to a specific district (referred to as internal net-migration rates in tables and discussion). In both provinces, the two calculation methods presented different rates, thus suggesting either higher or lower net losses or gains and, in some cases, even different trends are observed if the rates are compared over time.

In the Western Cape, the inter-provincial migration rates for the Central Karoo illustrated a consistent net gain in migrants since 1996. However, a different trend emerged when intra-provincial migration was included in the calculation. In this calculation, internal net migration rates illustrated a net loss in migrants for the periods 1996–2001 and 2001–2006, followed by a higher net gain in 2006–2011 compared with the inter-provincial rate during the same period. Internal net-migration rates calculated for the CoCT consistently showed lower net gains for all three periods compared with the inter-provincial rates.

In the Northern Cape, internal migration rates showed that the net loss of migrants in the Namakwa district has intensified since 1996. This contrasts with the inter-provincial net migration rates that showed a lower net loss in

**TABLE 6.1:** Comparison of Western Cape internal and intra-provincial net migration rates.<sup>a</sup>

Western Cape districts and metro	Western Cape					
	Internal net migration rates <sup>b</sup>			Inter-provincial net migration rates		
	1996-2001	2001-2006	2006-2011	1996-2001	2001-2006	2006-2011
West Coast	3.15	1.69	2.83	2.50	1.15	1.72
Overberg	4.48	2.43	3.59	3.69	1.62	3.63
Cape Winelands	1.14	0.63	1.60	1.75	0.46	1.21
Garden Route	2.61	2.11	1.72	2.99	1.27	1.63
Central Karoo	-0.61	-0.21	0.31	0.28	0.04	0.25
City of Cape Town	2.37	0.55	0.97	2.55	0.68	1.26

a. The lower migration rates noted for the 2001-2006 period should be treated with caution and viewed within the context of a possible undercount of migrants during this period.

b. See Chapter 3 for calculation method.

Source: Author's own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2006, 2012).

**TABLE 6.2:** Comparison of Northern Cape internal and intra-provincial net migration rates.<sup>a</sup>

Northern Cape districts	Northern Cape					
	Internal net migration rates			Inter-provincial net migration rates		
	1996-2001	2001-2006	2006-2011	1996-2001	2001-2006	2006-2011
Namakwa	-0.48	-2.65	-1.13	-0.81	-2.80	-0.60
Pixley Ka Seme	-1.45	-0.61	1.07	-1.52	0.13	0.17
ZF Mgcau	2.10	-0.17	1.88	1.75	-0.18	0.54
Frances Baard	-1.95	0.33	0.07	-1.03	0.12	1.03
John Taolo Gaetsewe	1.83	0.02	-2.35	0.90	-0.13	-2.11

a. The lower migration rates noted for the 2001-2006 period should be treated with caution and viewed within the context of a possible undercount of migrants during this period.

Source: Author's own work based on data from StatsSA (2001, 2006, 2012).

the 2006-2011 period compared with the 2001-2006 period. In the case of Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality, the internal net migration rates showed a net loss in migrants for the 2001-2006 period compared with the inter-provincial rates that showed a net gain in migrants for the corresponding period. The subsequent net gains in the period 2006-2011 also presented different rates, with higher internal net migration rates than inter-provincial net migration rates.

From the differences observed between these two rates (i.e. internal and inter-provincial net migration rates) as described in this section, it is clear how the inclusion of intra-provincial migration in the calculation of net migration rates affected trends and subsequent consequences. Thus, to develop an accurate description and understanding of internal net migration rates and thus the net losses or gains in migrants experienced by municipal districts (and local municipalities), it is essential that both inter- and intra-provincial flows are considered. This becomes even more important in the context of development planning and how migration trends are incorporated into development planning initiatives.

## ■ The relevance of migration in development planning

Before answering this question, it is essential to understand the context of migration within its core discipline. Migration, along with fertility and mortality, forms the three fundamental pillars of demography. The purpose of demography is to study the elements and consequences of population change and concerns virtually everything that can influence population size, population growth or decline, population processes (levels and trends in fertility, mortality and migration), population distribution, population structure and characteristics.

The focus of this publication is to examine migration. The data summarised in this chapter, as well as in Chapters 4 and 5, is presented in a way that (1) demonstrates how this demographic process has caused population changes in the two provinces analysed as case studies in this publication and (2) explores potential factors that have influenced or directed migration behaviours. Understanding the change that is brought about by migration (or any of the three demographic processes, for that matter) is important as it requires adjustment. Whether migration adds to or takes from a community, the people in that community must adjust, resulting in numerous changes to how that community operates.

Acknowledging and understanding the extent and nature of population change in itself is indeed important and interesting; however, the value of this knowledge is limited if not applied in particular development planning processes. Understanding population change, in both arithmetic and descriptive terms, can assist in improved development planning, in that it presents the ability to inform priorities, resource needs and types of public and private sector investment. Furthermore, understanding the nature of population change does present development planners and residents of affected communities with the required information that will help them understand or foresee possible implications of these changes on their neighbourhoods. This presents the opportunity for proactive planning as opposed to reactive planning by putting in place community structures and processes to cushion and possibly prevent possible negative consequences (Magni & Mcmanus 2017; Weeks 2012).

Charting population movement, as was performed in Chapters 4 and 5 in this publication, is one method that allows for proactive planning for social change. In these chapters, three elements of migration were considered: (1) how migration impacts population size; (2) how migration impacts the age distribution of the receiving provinces and districts; and (3) how migration changes the dynamics pertaining to the presentation of population groups in receiving provinces and districts. Let us consider

how these elements can inform and guide development planning at the hand of a few examples. Let us consider the age distribution within a community. The age structure of a community has a direct impact on two key services to be provided to communities: education and health care. Pertaining to education, the age structure determines the level of current and future schooling that is required and the expected enrolment numbers. The characteristics of the students, that is language proficiency, provide another clue that it can affect resource demands, such as the language proficiencies of teachers. Consider the impact of age and sex structures of a community on health services. The nature of this structure will determine if health services focus on birthing and childhood illnesses or rather on chronic diseases brought on by old age (Magni & Mcmanus 2017; Weeks 2012).

Similarly, understanding migration trends, such as the origin and destination of migrants, migration rates, demographic information (e.g. age, sex, educational status) of migrants, and reasons for moving, is vital for future planning. The present data provide valuable insights into the expected nature and pace of population change. Demographic change, irrespective of whether the primary driver is mortality, fertility or migration, always demands a societal response. Although the nature of such responses is not certain, certain structural characteristics do provide hints about the type of responses communities might choose from. For example, areas experiencing a high influx of young people need social, economic and political mechanisms to cope with this influx. Should such an affected community be unable to cope with the rapid change brought about by the increasing number of young people, a likely outcome is social, economic and political instability (Weeks 2012). It is specifically this possible dislocating effect of migration that is explored in the remainder of this chapter.

## ■ Dislocating impacts of migration on resident communities

The ability of demographic processes to bring about instability and dislocating effects has been noted in the section. As one of the demographic processes noted to exhibit the potential to bring about rapid population change, migration has been shown to lead to conflict between locals and migrants. Communities, as opposed to policymakers, administrations and public service providers, often experience the tangible impact of migration in that they now have to share often already meagre and inadequate existing social services and facilities with migrants. The impact of migration specifically affects poor, under-resourced communities who find themselves in an increasingly desperate

and competitive social and economic environment because of a growing demand for and pressure on services, infrastructure and economic resources and opportunities. This pressure presents itself in both migration contexts, causing either rapid and continuous growth, as is evident in the Western Cape, or a decline in community numbers, as is the case in certain areas of the Northern Cape.

To illustrate this point, the discussion in this section is divided into two parts. The first part presents examples of events in both the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces that were caused by instability in communities because of migration, involving local residents and internal migrants. The second part of the discussion presents an explanatory framework, offering some possible explanations for the destabilising effect of migration, illustrated in the presented case studies. To this end, two theories are employed: the theory of relative deprivation and the resource mobilisation approach.

## ■ Examples

### □ Example 1: Three incidents pertaining to the Western Cape

An analysis of recent migration trends within this province points to interesting competition and tension over resources. The large in-migration streams of Black Xhosa speakers resulted in them almost exclusively settling in urban areas in general and the metropolitan area of Cape Town in particular. The majority of these migrants are young adults of rural origin with few skills appropriate to urban economic labour markets. Coloured migrants, who have made up the majority of rural residents and farm workers in the province over the past 50 years, continue to urbanise. The urbanisation stream until the 1990s was clearly oriented towards Cape Town. Today, however, though urbanisation remains high, destinations are more often regional towns in the province rather than Cape Town itself (Bekker & Cramer 2003).

A study by Bekker and Cramer (2003) identifies the following factors that have led to this shift in destination:

Large migration in-flows of unskilled black households into Cape Town have taken place during the 1990s. As a result, income differentials (between the coloured and black labour forces) as well as control over housing opportunities in informal settlements point to a much more difficult environment to access for unskilled coloured households than was the case during the 1960–1980 period. Large municipal-led housing projects (in the city) alleviated the massive housing shortage of that time. Today, the shortage is of the same proportion and relates in particular to the lowest income stratum of the metropolitan population and accordingly overwhelmingly to black migrant households. (p. 113)



Competition for resources creates migrating individuals and households belonging to these two ethnolinguistic groupings, creating tensions that may spill over into conflict. This sentiment is confirmed in a report by the Department of the Premier in the Western Cape (March 2006) reporting on the prevention and reduction of intra and inter-state conflicts (Department of the Premier, Western Cape Government 2006):

[T]ensions also arise from factors internal to South Africa and the Western Cape province. For example, xenophobic conflict arise when South Africans migrate between provinces as is the case with movements from the Eastern Cape to the Western Cape. Another source of local community-based conflict includes conflicts over access to housing provided by the provincial government and infrastructure and service delivery provided by the city and local municipalities. (p. 29)

Three incidences in the Western Cape are worthy of note. Two took place within a peri-urban setting, where the local economy is dominated by the agricultural sector, with farm labour providing the bulk of employment opportunities for a large, primarily unskilled labour force. The third occurred in an urban setting in the Cape Metro.

## □ Two incidences of service delivery conflict

In September 2004, conflict erupted between two groupings in an informal settlement in Clanwilliam, where the groups clashed over work opportunities on farms in the area. During harvesting season, contract labour is recruited from the informal settlement while others who have been informed of work opportunities arrive from the Eastern Cape. At meetings called to resolve the conflict, one group demanded that the other group be ordered to leave the area and return to the Eastern Cape, claiming that the group was there illegally (Ministry of Community Safety, Western Cape Government 2004).

The first days of March 2012 saw violent protests in Grabouw, another small peri-urban town in the vicinity of Cape Town. Conflict erupted in response to overcrowding in schools in the area. In this case, Black seasonal workers who used to return to the Eastern Cape after harvesting season started to settle permanently in the area and accordingly began to demand that they and their families receive satisfactory state services.

Approximately 3,000 black African community members and pupils took to the streets in protest against 'broken promises' to end serious overcrowding at the local Umyezo Wama Apile school. Some were armed with pangas, sjamboks and hammers. According to the school principal, the school was under pressure because of overcrowding and was not able to function properly anymore because of broken promises made by the Department of Education (Williams & Fredeicks 2012):

The children and parents are striking for three reasons. Firstly, our classrooms are overcrowded, secondly, we do not have benches and desks, and thirdly, we want a high school. We have learners from Grade R up to matric using the same school premises. We can't have children in a Grade 1 class mixing with a learner in Grade 12, it's wrong. (n.p.)

The protests turned violent when some members of the crowd started throwing rocks and chairs at the school building while others tried to break locks off the periphery gate (Isaacs 2012; Williams & Fredericks 2012).

In response to the protest actions of black African residents, coloured community members started to protest against these actions and organised protection from vandalism of school property. This resulted in clashes between these two population groups, with a clear sentiment from coloured community members that black African community members are not 'locals' and are, in fact, a threat to their community (Williams & Fredericks 2012).

With no relocation plan for the evicted families at the time and following a strong public and political outcry in reaction to the manner in which the evictions were conducted, considering, on the one hand, the destructive manner that characterised the eviction, and on the other, the inconsiderate timing has given that at the time of the evictions, the Western Cape was in the grips of a very cold and wet cold front, and evicted families were provided with temporary shelter in a community hall in Nomzamo (Weekend Argus 2014).

It was then decided to move the evicted Nomzamo residents to Blackheath, a nearby area, home to primarily coloured households. This relocation was slammed by Blackheath residents, who were outraged by the intention to relocate the evicted residents to their area, indicating that they were not informed nor considered in the decision to 'give the land to the Nomzamo community'. A Blackheath resident, who has been living in the area for 30 years, indicated that they were angry and against the proposed resettlement as their own community needed the land: 'We have people staying in backyards, unemployed people and people sleeping on stoops' (Felix 2014, n.p.). The reaction to the relocation later resulted in racial tension between the Nomzamo and Blackheath residents, with the two groups standing across a road from each other and starting to trade racist insults.

Following the unsuccessful relocation to Blackheath, the Nomzamo evictees were then moved to vacant land in Macassar, another area in proximity and again home to primarily coloured households. Macassar residents reacted in anger with violent protests characterised by the torching of a council building and the pelting of CoCT vehicles with stones. Various streets in the area were blocked off with rocks and burning tyres.

The 'deep-rooted anger' of Macassar residents to the possible allocation of land to the Nomzamo residents was attributed to locals' perception that they deserved the housing more than the displaced informal settlers, being already residents in the area (Times Live 2014).

## ■ Example 2 from the Northern Cape

The Northern Cape has very few service delivery protests compared to the rest of the country. This can possibly be ascribed to the lower population density characteristic of the province and the stronger outflow of migrants from the province than those entering. The Northern Cape is the province with the lowest population density in South Africa, partly because of a negative net migration rate. It should not be assumed, however, that resources are thus distributed in an equitable fashion and, as a consequence, that there will be no contestation for land and resources in this province. Although 2012 was the year that recorded the highest number of service delivery protests in South Africa since 2004 (22% of all service delivery protests that took place in the period 2004–2012 were recorded in 2012), only 5% of these protests were recorded in the Northern Cape (Municipal IQ 2012).

One specific incident worth discussing occurred in September 2012 in the John Taolo Gaetsewe district. During this time, learners in the district found themselves amid frustrated community members aggrieved by poor service delivery to the area. Approximately 16,000 learners were forced out of school for a period of more than four months by protesters who enforced the closure of some 60 schools in the district. Protesters burnt down several schools, homes and public libraries in an ongoing public demonstration that the South African Police Services struggled to contain. In this incident, the conflict and associated violence were directed against the government in a desperate plea for resources promised but not delivered (Nkosi 2012), and as one individual commented:

We were promised freedom, but we remain in bondage because Olifantshoek is not developing. All other communities in Gamagara are developing but we're a town stuck in history. (n.p.)

## ■ Understanding the dislocating effects of migration

Three of the presented case studies and their associated resource-based conflicts are illustrative of the importance of understanding the impact of the presence of migrant groupings in destination areas often characterised by poor socio-economic conditions. The Northern Cape case study

illustrates the impact of large out-migration flows, leaving these sending areas less resourced and as lower priority areas for the government's socio-economic development programmes. Although it is not argued here that these cases are representative of the spectrum of all such conflicts – particularly because these cases are not located within the northern mining heartland of South Africa, which continues to be a primary private employer – the argument does move from the premise that these case studies are characteristic of a semi-industrialised urbanising middle-income country like South Africa.

In Chapters 4 and 5, it was argued that economic considerations and access to service delivery, respectively, are the primary and secondary drivers of migration. The violent public protests described within the Western Cape and Northern Cape case studies should be read against this background. The case studies reveal how conflict can arise when expectations regarding state delivery of public goods are not met and when different groups or communities perceive themselves as in competition for these resources.

How do we understand the conflict caused by the dislocating effect of rapid population change brought about by migration? Atkinson (2007) addresses a similar question when she discusses possible contributing factors to popular protests:

Ordinary residents' frustration can be due to a variety of problems: the unavailability of infrastructure, particularly if other communities are seen to have access; poor maintenance of infrastructure; the high price of services (particularly water and electricity); the erratic provision of infrastructure (power and water outages); rudeness and shoddy treatment by front-end municipal staff; and resentment at the sight of rapid financial privileges enjoyed by councillors and senior officials. Generally, a public protest is the result of a culmination of numerous frustrations, often building up over a long period of time. (p. 58)

Acknowledging that each town and municipality is likely to present its unique combination of causative factors leading to public protests, Atkinson (2007) identified three broad themes pivotal to the understanding of the frustrations experienced by residents:

- insufficient (and erratic) service delivery by municipalities
- unresponsive or undemocratic nature of decision-making undermining people's livelihoods and interests
- reaction against perceived corruption, sudden enrichment and conspicuous consumption by municipal councillors and staff.

These aspects raise serious questions pertaining to the institutional capacity of municipalities to meet and sustain their constitutional and developmental responsibilities.

Although the latter two categories might have had some cumulative impact on the examples of violent protests as described in the 'Dislocating impacts of migration on resident communities' section, the central role played by insufficient and erratic service delivery as a central theme and driver of civil protests was highlighted in all the examples described in this chapter. The government accepted as part of its mandate the principle that every South African citizen has the right to at least a basic minimum level of services within certain affordability parameters. This is translated into a clear constitutional responsibility placed on municipalities to provide free basic services to households earning less than ZAR1,100 per month – so-called indigent households. These infrastructure programmes have had real achievements in the past years, supported by an ever-increasing funding base, with allocations showing an annual increase of 15% (Atkinson 2007b).

Given this clear commitment by the government to provide for the basic service needs of South African citizens, the pertinent question now arises as to why residents retreat to such collective behaviour.

A Markinor survey conducted in 2006 showed an inherent paradox in the service delivery protests. It established that the provinces where protests occurred (Gauteng, Eastern Cape, Western Cape and Free State) were *not* the provinces where the majority of respondents were most critical of service delivery. In measuring the level of service delivery, the survey recorded that only 11% of respondents in the Free State had stated that there had been 'no improvement in service delivery'; other figures worth noting are 17% in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, 16% in the Eastern Cape and 13% in the Western Cape who shared this opinion. This stands in contrast to the 40% of respondents in the Northern Cape and 26% in Mpumalanga who complained that there had been no improvement in service delivery. From these findings, together with the government's clear effort to address service delivery, the lack of a neat correlation between popular discontent and government failure is evident. It is clearly not always the most aggrieved citizens who take to the streets (Atkinson 2007b).

In an attempt to explain this paradox, the 'Migration and conflict: A theoretical framework' section presents a theoretical framework to interpret the public violent protests. This section discusses the institutional capacity of municipalities, examining the current governance structure of South Africa, and explores how migration is integrated and managed as a crucial aspect of local government's developmental role.

## ■ Migration and conflict: A theoretical framework

Two theories will be employed to arrive at a better understanding of the series of civil outbursts described in this chapter. The first is the theory of

relative deprivation. The notion of relative deprivation has been extensively used in social psychology, sociology and other adjacent social science disciplines as a useful construct to explain numerous paradoxes in how different groups will react in similar conditions. A common theme in answering these questions is that people's reaction to objective circumstances depends on their subjective comparisons. Relative deprivation theory typically asserts that social and/or temporal comparisons are an essential component in assessing whether one is deprived (eds. Walker & Smith 2002).

Essentially, relative deprivation refers to the feelings 'that one is deprived "relative" to what is socially and culturally deemed to be a reasonable standard' (Mentzel 2010). According to Mentzel (2010), relative deprivation can produce two conditions that later can contribute to conflict escalation. The first condition creates the perception of incompatible interest, and the second is the reaction to this perception in an effort to regain what is perceived as rightfully theirs. Therefore (Pruitt, cited in Mentzel 2010):

The first condition creates the perception of incompatible interests by leading one party to identify the source of its experienced deprivation. Upon identification of the source, the party may in turn assume one of two conclusions, either that the reason they are deprived while others are not is due to a simple lack of resources or that there is an unequal and unfair distribution of said resources. Under both conclusions, the assumption is likely to lead to frustration, anger, or hopelessness. The second condition spawned from relative deprivation follows the previously mentioned reaction. Once anger and frustration are focused on a perceived source, individuals and groups often seek to regain or gain what is deemed to be 'rightfully' or 'justifiably' theirs' (p. 2).

Given scarce and inadequate resources in a specific context, the relative deprivation experienced by those viewing themselves as the rightful beneficiaries of these resources relates to the frustration they develop resulting from their expectations in these regards not being realised. These sentiments are converted into either or both passive aggression and violent aggression against those they perceive as competitors of these resources because they appear to be better off than themselves. Their targets, accordingly, are often the 'foreigner' and the 'stranger' in their neighbourhoods (HSRC 2008).

The critique against the theory of relative deprivation leads to the introduction of the second theory used to better understand the described outbursts, namely resource mobilisation. Although relative deprivation theory does well to provide some answers to the conditions causing community actions, it does little to explain the link between condition and action. In this respect, Canel (1997) argues that:

[R]elative deprivation studies assumed that collective action resulted from perceived conditions of deprivation and the feelings of frustration associated

with these perceptions. Resource Mobilisation [RM] pointed out that grievances and inequalities could only be considered a precondition for the occurrence of social movements. (p. 191)

The critique pointed to the fact that links between inequality and domination are:

[F]ound at every level of social life. [*It is, however,*] only in some instances where the legitimacy of these links is questioned, and even when this does occur, the formation of organised movements aiming to change these relations is only one possible outcome. The [*mere*] existence of inequalities and/or the subjective perception of these inequalities [*are*] not enough to explain why social movements emerge. [*This*] theory [*argues*] that the passage from condition to action is dependent upon the availability of resources and changes in the opportunities for collective action (Tilly in Canel 1997).

Given this point of departure, as postulated by RM theory, the focus in explaining social movements should rather be on a set of contextual processes that condition the realisation of the structural potential for action. The contextual processes involved here would include resource management decisions, organisational dynamics and political changes (Canel 1997):

It takes the issues, the actors, and the constraints as given, and focuses instead on how the actors develop strategies and interact with their environment in order to pursue their interests. (p. 206).

Defined differently, Jenkins describes the approach of RM theory as an approach where social movements are interpreted by means of a multi-factored model that emphasises resources, organisation and political opportunities in addition to traditional discontent hypotheses (1983).

In explaining social action (Canel 1997):

RM theory [thus] employs a 'purposive model' of social action and explains social movements in reference to the strategic-instrumental level of action. Subsequently, the emergence of social movements and the outcomes of their actions are treated as contingent open processes resulting from specific decisions, tactics and strategies adopted by the actors within a context of power relations and conflictual interaction. (n.p.)

Although traditionally, analyses of social movement utilised resource mobilisation at the expense of relative deprivation perspectives, Kent argues the complementary nature of these two theories. Employing both the theories of relative deprivation and resource mobilisation in a study of early Quakerism, Kent (1982) writes:

If data allow researchers to determine a motivating deprivation or frustration among a sect's founding members, then resource mobilisation perspectives can identify the extent to which the initial deprivation affects subsequent allocation decisions. (p. 529)

Lindström and Moore (1995) support this argument in a study that sets out to test the relation between relative deprivation and resource mobilisation models of political conflict. They use the same data set previously used by Ted Robert Gurr in 1993 to construct a theoretical synthesis of the relative deprivation and resource mobilisation models of political conflict. Although Gurr in his study did not find any direct impact of deprivation on ethnic conflict, Lindström and Moore replicated this study, arguing that Gurr's statistical analysis did not adequately test the theoretical model he proposed. In replicating the study, they concluded deprivation does in fact have a positive impact on mobilisation, which in turn influences ethnic conflict behaviour.

Freeman (2005), in her study *An Explanation of Conflict: Ethnicity, Deprivation, and Rationalization*, argues:

[T]hat the overlapping of ethnic divisions and patterns of relative deprivation creates an environment primed for conflict. The transformation from potential strife into actual strife, however, only occurs following a period of rationalisation, when the actors involved weigh the costs and benefits of resorting to violent measures. (p. 1)

'Ultimately, relative deprivation is the root cause of conflict and ethnicity acts to mobilize a group for common political or economic objectives' (Freeman 2005, p. 1).

Explaining that ethnicity in its nature is not problematic, Freeman states that it can influence the instance and nature of conflict. Ethnicity, following the definition of Max Weber, is defined as a real but constructed concept (Freeman 2005):

Real biological differences exist that demonstrate ethnicity, but ethnic identity is based on perceived (or constructed) notions of the group community. Leaders can use ethnicity to effectively mobilise people because of this balance between real and ethnic differences and their manifestation in imagined communities. (p. 4)

The author explains ethnic diversity as an instrument for mobilisation and not as a characteristic that necessitates conflict. 'Ethnicity only becomes salient when it overlaps with patterns of relative deprivation' (Freeman 2005, p. 5).

The theories presented here seem to fit well with the various events discussed in the three case studies presented earlier. In all these case studies, actors attributed their anger to frustration caused by a lack of access to resources, specifically pertaining to infrastructure (proper schools in the case of Grabouw, housing in the case of Blackheath and Macassar and road infrastructure in the Northern Cape) and economic opportunity (access to employment by the farmworkers in Clanwilliam). Except for the



case of the Northern Cape where action was directed towards the local administration (local municipality), communities reacted from a comparative assessment of their circumstances, that is, the relative lack of resources compared to the 'other'. They were thus comparing their position as locals relative to that of the 'other', in this case, the in-migrant. Relative deprivation caused by the comparison of their [locals'] reality to that of the 'other' in these cases acted as the causal factor that would ultimately result in the conflict situation.

As a theoretical tool to understand the mobilising of the communities, resource mobilisation offers a comprehensive *raison d'être* illuminating the combined role of resources, organisation, political opportunities and a shared identity (here presented as ethnicity) in activating a social movement or collective behaviour. The mobilisation process involves actively strategising and making decisions about the tactics that will be used to maximise impact in order to extract benefits from those who control or own resources (Misago, Landau & Monson 2009):

[/]n almost all cases where violence occurred, it was organised and led by local groups and individuals in an effort to claim or consolidate the authority and power needed to further their political and economic interests. (p. 2)

It is clear that the relationship between migration and conflict over resources is potentially two-way in causality; that is, migration streams may be a cause for resource conflict in receiving areas, but correspondingly, resource scarcity and conflict may be a cause for migration in sending areas. This clearly has implications at the policy level and cognisance has to be taken of the importance of appropriate migration policy being developed. This involves explicitly recognising and taking into account migration (both international and internal) as a crucial aspect of policymaking in general, and especially in resource conflict 'hotspots' (UNDP 2009).

## ■ Conclusion

This chapter defined three objectives of which the first was to synthesise the findings presented in Chapters 4 and 5, with the aim of reflecting on post-apartheid mobility in the two provinces selected as case studies for this publication. The second objective was to confirm the nature of migration, as one of the three pillars of demographic theory, as a force to bring about rapid population change and illustrate the possible impact of such rapid change on affected communities and how this should be approached in development planning.

We can never fully comprehend the possible impact of post-apartheid mobility if we do not understand how the pre-democratic dispensation

actively applied measures to control and engineered mobility and population change. However, even in this context of active control, economic considerations still acted as a strong driving force for migration, albeit secondary to political forces. Even though the political environment, characterised by stark movement control in the form of influx-control measures, acted as the strongest driver of inter-provincial migration, the power of economic considerations cannot be ignored (see Chapter 1). In spite of the influx-control measures, black African urbanisation continued in the apartheid years, albeit curtailed, driven by a growing urban economy in contrast to a declining rural economy, specifically in the Bantustans 'allocated' to the black African population. Cape Town, in spite of additional 'protection' from black African urbanisation by means of the *Coloured Preference Labour Policy* was no exception to this trend (Cleminshaw 1985):

Pressures of rural poverty brought many workseekers illegally to Cape Town, and combined with the natural increase among the legal residents, overcrowding soon created many squatter camps the best know [*sic*] being Cross Roads. (p. 11)

In fact, economic considerations seem to have influenced migration behaviour to such an extent that for a very large part of the black African population, such considerations countered the oppressive political reality of the day. The starkest evidence of this trend is probably found in the growing size and number of shanty towns that developed on the periphery of city boundaries (ed. Horner 1983; Maylam 1990, 1995), thereby (Maylam 1990):

There is evidence of considerable out-migration from the reserves to urban areas. Between 1936 and 1946 the total population of the reserves increased annually by only 0.9 per cent, the small increase suggesting substantial out-migration. Between 1921 and 1951 the total size of the African urban population rose from 587200 to 23291100; and during the same period urbanised Africans as percentage of the total African population almost doubled from 14 per cent to 27.9 per cent. (p. 64)

Current trends in internal migration for the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces illustrate a continuation of urbanisation trends, however, at a declining rate. This is sustained by both inter- and intra-provincial migration flows, with the former directed mainly towards the main urban centres and the latter towards urban districts that have a strong urban economy relative to the other districts within the respective provinces.

With regard to the profile of migrants in the two provinces, the black African population was illustrated consistently to constitute the largest part of inter-provincial migration and was strongly represented as both in- and out-migrants. In the case of intra-provincial migration, different trends emerged, with the coloured population constituting the largest participation

in the Western Cape across the three periods. Although the coloured population was illustrated as the most active in Northern Cape intra-provincial flows in 1996–2001, black African intra-provincial migration was found to have increased in activity to the extent that it surpassed coloured participation in the periods 2001–2006 and 2006–2011. For the most part, both inter- and intra-provincial migrants comprised mostly young adults (30–60-year-old cohort), except for in-migrants to the Western Cape, who were mostly young adults (20–29 years old).

Economic considerations are argued to be the primary drivers or pull factors for migration. This is confirmed in the shared economic characteristics of the main receiving areas of both provinces fed by inter- and intra-provincial migration. The economic characteristics of the receiving districts of inter-provincial migrants were mainly found in their urban characters that constituted extended industrial and highly skilled economies. This stands in contrast to the economic characteristic of the receiving districts of intra-provincial migrants, which were mostly rural and constituted limited industrial and extended agricultural economies.

Finally, the chapter considered the transformative potential of migration in bringing about population change, the possible impacts of such change and how we could explain such impacts. This was illustrated at the hand of several case studies, where the possible dislocating effect of this demographic force to cause social, economic and political instability was shown. The chapter concludes by offering two explanatory frameworks, the theory of relative deprivation and the resource mobilisation approach, as possible approaches to better understand possible destabilising effects of migration with the ultimate hope of influencing development planning processes.

# Integration of migration in development planning

The analysis and interpretation of findings pertaining to trends in internal migration in the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces clearly demonstrate how this demographic phenomenon has influenced urbanisation since 1996. In addition, the value of incorporating internal migration trends in guiding development planning, considering its ability to bring about population change as well as its inherent potential to bring about dislocating effects in communities, was also illustrated. This then brings us to the next objective, and that is to consider the structural nature of development planning in terms of its institutional placing, as well as to assess the degree to which internal migration is indeed considered in development planning initiatives. Again, the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces will be presented as case studies.

## ■ The transformation of local government in South Africa

Since 1994, South Africa has seen some positive democratic changes in the country, including a new constitution that is inclusive and promulgates equal opportunities and development. Today, South Africa is a constitutional democracy founded upon the values of, among others, human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism (Republic of South Africa [RSA])

**How to cite:** Eigelaar-Meets, I 2024, 'Integration of migration in development planning', in *Internal migration and development planning in South Africa*, AVARSITY Books, Cape Town, pp. 153-179. <https://doi.org/10.4102/aosis.2024.BK463.07>

1996, p. 3). However, although the country has significantly advanced socially and economically since democratisation in 1994, the remnants of the colonial and apartheid policies of racial segregation have left a daunting legacy. This is evident in the significant differences in levels of economic activity and income, in the distribution of poverty, in the inequitable access to capital and quality social infrastructure, and in inequity in the patterns of land settlement and ownership (Fast & Kallis 2004; Rauch 2002; Roux 2009; Turok 2012).

The impact of segregation policies resulted in an elite white class that lived in well-developed and serviced areas, maintained by their privileged revenue base. In contrast, black Africans, subject to a set of discriminatory laws limiting their access to the labour market, thus preserving their subordinate living standard, lived in underdeveloped urban spaces. These black townships (locations) were spatially separated from the main (white populated) towns and central business districts and characterised by insufficient land, overcrowded housing, minimal service delivery or investment in infrastructure, lack of access to social services and facilities and a lack of formal economic activity. When the government abandoned its previous role of direct housing provider to black townships, shack settlements expanded around South African cities, with peri-urban settlements growing rapidly (Cross et al. 1997; Fast & Kallis 2004; Wentzel & Tlabela 2006).

The philosophy of discriminatory development practised during the colonial and apartheid eras left the newly democratically elected ANC government in 1994 with a raft of daunting developmental challenges. One of the main strategies implemented by the government in its post-apartheid onslaught on underdevelopment and poverty was the transformation of local government. This transformation institutionalised three aspects: (1) a cooperative government, (2) public participative governance and (3) developmental local government (Turok 2012).

The transformation of local government was initiated in 1992 with an agreement between the National Party and ANC to form the Local Government Negotiation Forum (LGNF). This forum represented both statutory structures (national, provincial and local) and non-statutory structures and functioned entirely separately from the main negotiating body, known as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, which focused on national transformation. The non-statutory structures were led by the ANC-aligned South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO). On 22 March 1993, the LGNF was launched in order to reach an agreement on the procedure for, and substance of, the restructuring of local government (Bekker et al. 1997; De Visser 2005).

The agreements reached within the LGNF were threefold: an agreement on local government finances, a *Local Government Transition Act* (LGTA) and a chapter in the interim Constitution. The LGTA stipulated the route towards the completion of the transformation of local government and provided for three phases: a pre-interim, interim and final phase (Bekker et al. 1997; De Visser 2005).

The pre-interim phase commenced with the promulgation of the LGTA in February 1994 and ended with the establishment of local governments by democratic elections. The LGTA provided for the disbanding of race-based municipalities and the establishment of transitional councils which governed local authorities until 1996/97, when all South Africans were, for the first time in the history of this country, entitled to vote for their local government.

The election and establishment of these democratically elected local governments introduced the interim phase. During this phase, councils were elected based on the amalgamation of previously white, black and coloured areas. Although this development was an improvement compared to the previous dispensation, these councils did not yet constitute democratically elected councils and were still based on the previous racially demarcated wards. This phase came to an end on 05 December 2000, which marked the first local government elections based on the new and final Constitution (1996). Subsequent to these elections, the final phase commenced, during which a new mandate and status for local government could be defined and institutionalised (De Visser 2005).

The negotiation of the transformation of local government was a process that occurred in parallel with national negotiations. The negotiations resulted in the current governance structure of the South African state, which consists of three spheres of government: national, provincial and local. These spheres function within a single system of cooperative governance. The reference to spheres rather than tiers of government is significant in that it confirms the equal footing of the three spheres, with none subordinate to the others. In fact, the three spheres have legislative and executive authority within their own spheres, and as such, they function as autonomous entities and not in a hierarchical fashion. This stands in strong contrast to the previous dispensation, where the South African state was characterised as a strong unitarian state with all levels (or tiers) subject to central state authority (Cameron 1988; Carrim 2011; De Visser 2005).

Each of the three spheres of the South African government has legislative and executive authority in its own domain. The main functions of the three spheres are briefly summarised here.

## ■ National and provincial government

The national government is responsible for the co-ordination of provinces guided by national laws and policies. The national government is further responsible for the co-ordination and allocation of funds to the respective Provincial Governments via the National Department of Treasury (ETU 2015). Similar to the national government, the provincial government also finds its mandate in specific legislative and executive powers. Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution list the main functional areas of provincial competence. Schedule 4 provides the list of functional areas that the provinces exercise concurrently with the national government, whereas Section 5(A) lists the province's exclusive competencies. According to Part B of Schedules 4 and 5, delineating the functional areas of provinces, this sphere of government only has limited supervisory authority over local authorities. These powers can be exercised to the extent that Provincial Governments have the administrative capacity to assume effective responsibility. Although a province is able to develop its own constitution, it must always correspond with the national Constitution (South African Government n.d.a; Steytler & Fessha 2005).

In terms of economic and infrastructural development, each provincial government is responsible for the development of a PGDS as well as a SDF. The PGDS sets out the overall framework and plan of implementation for developing its economy and improving provincial services within the framework of the SDF that serves to indicate where and how residential and business development should occur and how the environment should be protected. It is also the responsibility of the MEC of local government and the Department of Local Government to coordinate, monitor and support the local authorities within its province (South African Government n.d.a).

## ■ Local government (municipalities)

The third sphere of government (the local government sphere) is, in essence, the sphere that brings governance to the people of the country. This sphere is granted executive and legislative powers to autonomously govern the local government affairs of their communities. The authority assigned to municipalities is, however, subject to national and provincial legislation, which determines the extent of their authority. In addition, their authority and scope of governance also depend on their categorisation, based on their functional areas, as prescribed in the *Local Government:*

*Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998* and the Constitution 1996<sup>62</sup> (Mello & Maserumule 2010).

Currently, the local government sphere of South Africa consists of 278 municipalities comprising eight metropolitan, 44 districts and 226 local municipalities.<sup>63</sup> The primary functions of these municipalities are to provide infrastructure and services and to facilitate the expansion and development of their local economies (South African Government n.d.b; ETU 2015b).

The three spheres of government, although independent and distinctive in nature, are set to function within a single system of cooperative government. The principle of co-operation between the three spheres is essential to achieve efficiency and effectiveness in government service delivery and public administration. Defined in the *Intergovernmental Relations Act 13 of 2005* (RSA 2005), intergovernmental relations, in essence, refer to the relationships between the different spheres of government in the conduct of their affairs.

Cameron and Makhanya (cited in Mello 2010, p. 96) define intergovernmental relations as ‘the geographical division of power among the various spheres of government’. Another definition describes intergovernmental relations as constituting all the interdependent relations between the different spheres of government. These relations include the co-ordination of policies determined by different legislative and executive institutions of the different governmental structures at both political and administrative levels (Thornton et al., cited in Mello 2010, p. 96).

Naturally, given the nature of intergovernmental relations, the success of such relations is a direct function of the level of participation and co-operation by the key role-players in the system (Malan 2005). In Chapter 3 of the Constitution of 1996, cooperative governance is placed as the conceptual framework that will give fruition to the aim of promoting a development-oriented state. This framework, as defined in the *Intergovernmental Relations Act*, requires each government sphere to

---

62. Local government consists of three categories: (1) Category A municipalities (metropolitan areas) which have exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority in their areas of jurisdiction; (2) Category B municipalities (local municipality) that have municipal executive and legislative authority in their areas of jurisdiction with Category C municipalities; and (3) Category C municipalities (district municipality) that have municipal executive and legislative authority in the areas that include more than one Category B municipality (Mello & Maserumule 2010).

63. Considering the two provinces that constitute the focus of this publication, the Western Cape consists of 24 municipalities, five district municipalities and one metro, whereas the Northern Cape consists of 27 municipalities and five districts municipalities (ed. Main 2020).



fulfil a specific role in the understanding that no sphere can function effectively without the co-operation of the other. This interdependency between the three spheres of government stems from the interrelatedness of some governmental functions, spill-over in service delivery as mandated to the respective areas of scarce resources and poor economic conditions, population accountability and grassroots pressure for development (Malan 2005).

Prior to the democratic elections in 1994, South Africa comprised four provinces: Cape Province, Orange Free State, Transvaal and Natal. Subsequent to the first democratic elections in 1994, the number of provinces was increased to nine. This re-demarcation of provincial boundaries was the result of an attempt by the newly democratically elected government to overcome the residual racial and ethnic divisions from the apartheid order with its dysfunctional administration and political boundaries. Another reason for the establishment of nine provinces was to decentralise government and administration into the three-sphere system discussed earlier in order to facilitate greater public participation in democratic processes governing the country (Nzimakwe & Pillay 2014).

As aforementioned, the second democratic local government elections of 05 December 2000 marked the end of the 'transition' phase of post-apartheid local government and initiated a new era in municipal administration. Whereas local governments in the past were primarily tasked with service delivery, their new role is to act as the key actor in the development of South Africa. The new ANC government had a clear agenda for this sphere of government, with local government coined as the 'arms and legs' of local socio-economic transformation in the resolutions of the 49th ANC National Conference in Bloemfontein in December 1994 (Penderis 2012).

The development role of local government was not only a political vision but also set within a legal framework informed by the Constitution of South Africa (1996) and subsequently translated into practice by legislation.<sup>64</sup> The notion of a developmental local government was formally introduced in the White Paper on local government of 1998 (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 1998). The White Paper defined developmental local government as:

[L]ocal government committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives. (p. 17)

---

64. Legislation directing the functions of Local Government includes: *The Municipal Structure Act 117 of 1998*; *Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000*; *Municipal Finance Act 56 of 2003*; *Local Government Laws Amendment Act 51 of 2002*; and the *Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005*.

This objective is to be achieved by:

- maximising social development and economic growth
- contributing to the local economic and social conditions to support the creation of employment opportunities
- initiating and leading community participation
- building social capital and social cohesion to generate a sense of common purpose towards finding local, sustainable solutions.

Given the political vision of the role of local government in South Africa, together with its legal obligation as defined in the 1996 Constitution and various other legislations, this sphere of government has been placed at the front line of development to act at the interface between government and citizens. Subsequently, local government has increasingly been tasked with a prominent role in economic development and employment creation (Buhlungu & Atkinson 2007). Furthermore, on an institutional level, this sphere of government has been strategically placed to allow more active participation of the citizenry in the democratic governance of the country. This participation is primarily facilitated by means of structured public participation processes (DPLG 2002a; Mello & Maserumule 2010; Nel & Binns 2001; Penderis 2014).

Thus, local government, as informed by its legal mandate, is to provide for a (Republic of South Africa 1996):

[D]emocratic and accountable government for local communities; to ensure the provision of services to the communities in a sustainable manner; to promote social and economic development; and to encourage the involvement of the communities and community organisations in matters of local government. (Section 152[1]).

All of this happens at the grassroots level while local government facilitates public participation in order 'to create an opportunity for the inhabitants of a local area to deal with matters particular to their municipality' and thus 'promote(ing) the interest (quality of life) of the community concerned' (Van der Waldt 2002, p. 24).

A key process in which local government has to engage towards fulfilling its development mandate, including both economic and democratic objectives, is the institutionalisation of an integrated development planning process. Public participation is a key aspect, and an IDP document is the final outcome or product (Penderis & Tapscott 2014). The IDP process comprises three key activities (DPLG 2002b):

1. identification and integration of needs and priorities by means of broad participation by various sectors in the IDP process
2. identification of projects in the context of limited resources

3. alignment of projects to national, provincial and local policies and strategies.

The IDP is a strategic five-year development plan and is linked to the term of office of councillors. Given the participatory nature of the integrated development planning process, it takes approximately 6 to 9 months to complete an IDP. The planning process is closely related to the municipal budgeting cycle and consists of five phases (DPLG 2002b):

- *Phase 1: Analysis*—information is collected on the existing conditions within the municipality. The focus of this phase is to assess the types of problems faced by the people in the area and the causes of these problems.
- *Phase 2: Strategies*—the municipality works on finding solutions to the problems assessed in phase 1 by (1) developing a vision, (2) defining development objectives, (3) defining development strategies and (4) identifying projects.
- *Phase 3: Projects*—the municipality works on the design and content of the projects identified in Phase 2.
- *Phase 4: Integration*—all the development plans must be integrated and evaluated against the development objectives defined in Phase 2.
- *Phase 5: Approval*—the IDP is presented to the council for consideration and adoption. The council may adopt a draft for public comment before approving a finalised IDP.

The *Local Government Laws Amendment Act 51 of 2002* describes an IDP as a single inclusive plan of a municipality that links, integrates and coordinates service delivery; forms the basis for the annual budget and is adopted by the municipal council as the principal strategic planning instrument (Carrim 2001; Mello & Maserumule 2010; Municipal Systems Act 2000; Nel & Binns 2001; Phago 2009; Penderis 2012, 2014). The IDP is strategic in the sense that its facilitation is based on the principle of participatory democracy that, in essence, promotes citizen participation in decision-making and policy formulation (Carrim 2001; CoGTA 2012; Penderis 2012, 2014; Penderis & Tapscott 2014).

In order to ensure the development of relevant and realistic development priorities, the IDP process should include the meaningful contributions of a broad spectrum of participants, including the broader community, all spheres of government, traditional authorities where relevant, business, labour and other non-state actors. Development priorities are then translated into objectives, which are again converted into strategies, plans, projects and activities, which are then tracked and monitored (Carrim 2001; CoGTA 2012; Penderis 2012, 2014; Penderis & Tapscott 2014). Thereby, CoGTA (2012) states:

The IDP integrates the needs of communities with the programmes of local, provincial and national government. It ought to also integrate the national and provincial programmes in the local space, thus becoming the expression of all of government plans. It serves as an integrating agent of all differing needs of business, community organisations, the indigent, and mediates the tensions between these needs and the resources available to meet them. The IDP further integrates the various departments within a municipality for effective implementation (p. 2).

The IDP is a legislative requirement and thus carries a superior status to any other planning document within the municipality (Phago 2009, IDP Guide Pack). The Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (35a) offers the following definition of the status of the IDP:

An integrated development plan adopted by the council of a municipality is the primary strategic planning instrument which guides and informs all planning and development, and all decisions with regard to planning, management and development in the municipality (p.7).

It is important to note, however, that although the IDP carries a legislative status, it is always subject to any development strategies, objectives and programmes set by the national and provincial governments. In fact, the government places a high premium on coordinated government priority setting, resource allocation and implementation – all part of the approach of intergovernmental co-operation and relations (7.3). Such co-ordination and integrated action among and between the three spheres of government work towards the institutionalisation of common objectives, resulting in a stronger development impact. In a context where there are many needs and limited resources, such alignment is important in that it (*Municipal Systems Act 2000; The Presidency 2004*):

- works towards focused and decisive development strategies across the various organs of government
- allows the different organs of government to make strategic choices in the face of competing demands
- results in the different state organs developing and implementing consistent strategies and programmes
- ensures that the plans of the different organs of the state reflect a shared vision.

In order for such alignment to succeed, a central organising body is needed to provide a focal point as well as a strategic basis for focusing government action, weighing up trade-offs, and linking strategies and plans. Firstly, such direction is provided by the national government, which sets the national development objectives, and secondly, by the provincial government, which, based on the national directives, develops provincial development strategies and plans (The Presidency 2004).

The IDP, which contains the development objectives, plans, strategies and projects derived from the integrated development planning process, can be summarised as outlined below (DPLG 2008, p. 2).

1. It is the principal strategic planning instrument that guides and informs all planning and development and all decisions with regard to planning, management, and development in the municipality.
2. It binds the municipality in the exercise of its executive authority, except to the extent of any inconsistency between a municipality's IDP and national or provincial legislation, in which case such legislation prevails.
3. It binds all other persons to the extent that those parts of the IDP that impose duties or affect the rights of those persons have been passed as a by-law.
4. It should be a product of intergovernmental and inter-sphere planning.

The IDP, in both its development process and implementation cycle, should show the following impacts: integrated sustainable human settlement; stimulating the growth of a robust local economy; social inclusion, social cohesion and nation building; non-racism, non-sexism, democratic and accountable practices, equity, etc.; and environment sustainability (CoGTA 2012).

Thus, in essence, an IDP sets out the vision, needs, priorities, goals and strategies of a municipal council as part of its (long-term) vision and strategic plan for the development of the municipality. The integrated development process, of which an IDP is the outcome, provides for the participation of the community, ensuring that the needs of the community are heard, incorporated and subsequently addressed in planning. The IDP furthermore provides the framework for developing the budget of a municipality and is closely linked to the performance management system thereof (Carrim 2001).

The IDP is, however, not just a development plan designed to set specific goals over a five-year period, structuring budget allocation and management performance. It is, in totality, a strategic plan set to guide the management of a municipality. In the words of Carrim (2001)

The IDP is not only a plan. It is also a strategic instrument, a management tool and a method of running a municipality. The IDP provides a framework for all the activities of a municipality. (p. 25)

It is from this premise that the third objective of this publication begins. The objective is to determine the extent to which internal migration data are captured, reported, integrated and acted upon in the IDPs of district municipalities in the two provinces of focus in this study. However, before the discussion can turn to such an analysis, it is important to first briefly consider why the local government should take cognisance of this social phenomenon in its development planning.

## □ Migration and development planning: Current realities

What makes migration, as one of the three demographic processes, so important to consider within the context of development planning? The response to this question relates to two aspects: (1) the official mandate of local government as defined in the Constitution and legislation, and (2) the inherent ability of migration to counteract socio-economic development efforts and act as a destabilising agent (see Chapter 6).

Although the Constitution does not specifically mandate a role for municipal authorities in managing migration, the roles and responsibilities of local government as defined in the Constitution do communicate its responsibility indirectly. Section 153 (a) of the Constitution (RSA 1996) explicitly demands that local government:

[S]tructure and manage its administration, budgeting and planning process to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic development of the community. (Section 153[a]).

The 'development duty' bestowed upon local government stipulated in Section 152(1) contains various objects and purposes, including the promotion of social and economic development, establishing a safe and healthy environment, and other responsibilities that clearly suggest some responsibility regarding human mobility (Landau 2009; Landau, Segatti & Misago 2011; Republic of South Africa, 1996).

Despite being constitutionally tasked and empowered as a primary local facilitator of development, particularly local economic development (LED), local governments have been wary of addressing migration or of considering movement as a fundamental driver of socio-economic development. The hesitation to address migration *per se* is primarily because of (1) the perception among many policymakers that immigration and migration are exclusively matters of national policy and thus national government concern and (2) a negative perception that migration constitutes more of a social problem and inhibiting factor to development rather than a positive driver thereof (Landau 2008):

[H]owever, it is evident that many cities' leaders and citizens feel overwhelmed – if not threatened – by migration, especially the movement of people south from the rest of the continent. These tensions are reflected in Johannesburg's Executive Mayor's 2004 'State of the City Speech' in which he argued that 'while migrancy contributes to the rich tapestry of the cosmopolitan city, it also places a severe strain on employment levels, housing and public services. [...] In other places, the out-migration of the cities' skilled and affluent residents threatens economic decline and an ever-expanding underclass. (pp. 167-168)

The popular perception of migration as inherently constituting a threat to development and directly responsible for, or related to, the expansion of drug syndicates, prostitution, human trafficking, unemployment, crime and

other social and economic ills has been shown to be a fallacious one. Research shows that both domestic and international migration positively correlate with economic growth and development because of the arrival of new skills, investments and trading connections. Whatever the perception of officials and urban planners, the reality is that, as is the case in the rest of the world, urban populations in South Africa are set to grow, and they have little choice other than to prepare for this growing number of people (Ahmed et al. 2016; Landau 2009; Landau et al. 2011; OECD 2018).

Mobilisation, however, is more than just urbanisation towards bigger rural towns and cities. Although employment opportunities remain the primary pulling factor for migrants, high unemployment in urban settings has pushed large numbers of migrants into smaller towns close to their place of origin, dense peri-urban or even rural settlements. These areas do, in the absence of employment, offer the promise of access to housing and services as well as easier ties with areas of origin (Department of Social Development 2010).

Whatever the nature and dynamics associated with migration, population mobility in all its manifestations is inevitable, although not officially, an important component of local governments' official mandate to protect, provide services and manage the development of all people within their constituency. If local authorities do not decide to get involved in the management of migration, there is little chance of maximising the developmental potential of mobility. 'Where local authorities ignore mobility or are poorly equipped to address it, their worst fears about migration are likely to be realised' (Landau et al. 2011, p. 82).

If the impact of the previous apartheid government has to be distilled into one primary aspect, the legacy of an economic landscape offering different population groups largely unequal access would probably offer the best description. The control of internal migration and specifically urbanisation through political mechanisms of influx control has greatly added to this reality, leaving the post-1994 democratic government to address not only inequalities of the past but also growing inequalities because of drastically increased rates of urbanisation.

The various influx measures applied by the apartheid government slowed down the urbanisation that would otherwise have occurred. The freedom to move to any place of choice within the country caused a significant increase in people, specifically black Africans, residing in urban areas. This newly found freedom and subsequent urban growth resulted in significant pressure, specifically on urban townships (previously referred to as locations) because of rapid growth in shack settlements because the majority of migrant households and individuals did not have the means to

access formal housing opportunities (Fast & Kallis 2004; Pycroft 2000; Rauch 2002; Turok 2012).

In contrast to the draconian mechanisms implemented by the apartheid government to control and manage internal migration, and more specifically urbanisation, in South Africa, the newly democratically elected government opted for an entirely 'hands-off' approach. Subsequent to the removal of all repressive controls to manage and direct people's movement with the abolishment of apartheid, the post-1994 government aimed at fair and even-handed management of cities, towns and rural areas. Because of a socio-political sensitivity about the control and management of migration, the management of cities, towns and rural areas operated in a context void of explicit policy directives to either support or discourage migration. Although this sensitivity to migration management is probably to be expected given the country's past, the neutral stance has achieved little in addressing the serious social and economic damage caused by the past, of which the persisting segregation of urban areas is but one result (Turok 2012).

Communities, as opposed to policymakers, administrations and public service providers, often experience the tangible impact of migration in that they have to share already meagre and inadequate services and facilities with an ever-growing number of people. The impact of migration affects poor communities specifically, who find themselves in an increasingly desperate and increasingly competitive social and economic environment caused by a growing demand for, and pressure on, services, infrastructure, economic resources and opportunities. These development pressures emerge in a migration environment, causing both rapid and continuous growth, as is evident in the Western Cape, and a decline in community numbers is evident in certain areas in the Northern Cape.

It is in a context such as that described here that migration has shown the ability to act as a destabilising agent in communities. Considering the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces specifically, this destabilising ability of migration has found expression in clashes between local residents and internal migrants.<sup>65</sup> A central theme noted in these clashes is the discontent that arose among local residents within the context of limited resources and a perception that internal migrants are adding pressure on

---

65. These refer to specific incidents reported for both provinces discussed in Chapter 6. In the Western Cape, these incidents refer to clashes between locals and internal migrants in Clanwilliam (September 2004), Grabouw (March 2012) and June (2014). In the Northern Cape, a similar incident took place in the John Taolo Gaetsewe district (September 2012).



these resources, further disadvantaging locals. These perceptions finally culminated in violent 'standoffs' between the two groups.

Another outcome of the mostly 'hands-off' approach to migration by the current government is the persistence of the apartheid geographic and socio-economic landscape. Similar to other provinces in the country, the Northern and Western Cape provinces reveal visible evidence of this. Nearly 30 years after apartheid black African households still constitute the majority of the poor and are mostly resident in townships on the urban and peri-urban periphery with large sections poorly serviced and densely populated. Current backlogs in service infrastructure in these historically underdeveloped areas require municipal expenditure far in excess of the revenue currently available within the local government system (Fast & Kallis 2004).

Given the impact of the past oppressive policy regulating the mobility of people on the current socio-economic landscape of South Africa, it is indefensible, even in the light of the sensitive nature of migration control, that the government, 21 years after democratisation, persists with economic development planning that excludes an informed internal migration policy. The analysis of migration trends in Chapters 4 and 5 clearly shows that South Africa has been on the path of urban transition since 1994. Landau (2005b) supports this view when he writes:

Migration into South Africa's major cities is neither a temporary outcome of the transition to democracy, nor a fading legacy of migrant labour system of the old mining economy. Spontaneous and predictable population movements have already become a feature of the country's social and political landscape. (p. 1130)

If migration is then predictable, an assertion which is supported by the analysis of internal migration trends in Chapters 4 and 5 and discussions offered in Chapter 6, then a policy framework to manage such movement for the social and economic well-being of all South Africans is possible and can be argued as a requirement for the successful management of migration and urbanisation.

In his study titled 'Urbanisation in South Africa: A critical review of policy, planning and practice', Ruhiiga (2014) writes:

Planning by necessity translates policy guidelines into the actual practice of land use allocation. But such an allocation has to be sensitive to key elements of urban theory on one hand and the changing characteristics of the urban population on the other hand (p. 611)

The analysis of internal migration in this publication unequivocally confirms the role of internal as well as intra-provincial migration in population growth. In addition, migration, in the absence of structural interventions such as provincial boundary changes, was also confirmed to play a

significant role in altering the characteristics of a population because of the typical profile of migrants. It would thus seem self-evident that any policy designed to frame and direct urban and rural development must be set within a policy framework that directs and guides the management of migration. Note management, *NOT* control.

Since democratisation, there has been no clear government position on the desirability of urbanisation, nor have government policies been based on clear spatial assumptions or arguments (Atkinson & Marais 2006). In fact, it appeared that the government expected the abolishment of influx control to lead to a slow but certain process of rural people moving to and staying in urban areas. The only urbanisation policies they apparently thought were necessary were those that addressed the short-term housing demands of rural migrants (Crankshaw & Parnell in Atkinson & Marais 2006).

Although several governmental programmes and strategies do make mention of rural and urban development, an overarching focus on urbanisation and migration dynamics is clearly lacking (Atkinson & Marais 2006). This is of great concern as the dynamics associated with urbanisation and migration are closely linked to rural and urban development dynamics. There exists considerable evidence internationally, as well as in South Africa, that large-scale urbanisation without economic growth and development can cause enormous social dislocation and intractable problems in overcrowded settlements that lack basic services. This is a recipe for disaster, as population influx that fails to gain a foothold in urban labour markets causes escalating hardship and frustration in marginalised communities that are likely to spark social disorder and conflict (Turok 2014).

The IDP is a strategic planning document with the primary objective to set out the vision, needs, priorities, goals and strategies of a municipal council towards developing its municipality. In assisting municipalities to realise the aims and objectives of their IDP, the IDP Guide Pack provides a detailed layout of the components of an IDP, consisting of five elements (DPLG 2002).

1. The analysis, which entails:
  - an assessment of the existing level of development, which includes identification of communities with no access to basic services.
2. Development strategies, including:
  - the municipality's vision (including internal transformation needs)
  - the council's development priorities and objectives
  - the council's development strategies.

### 3. Projects

#### 4. Integration, consisting of:

- an SDF
- disaster management plan
- integrated financial plan (both capital and operational budget)
- other integrated programmes
- key performance indicators (KPIs) and performance targets.

#### 5. Approval

The aim of the IDP is twofold. On the one hand, the document has to convey community needs as communicated by the community members themselves in their participation in the integrated development planning process, and on the other hand, it has to focus on sustainable development, which suggests the inclusion of socio-economic and demographic trend data in the defining of development objectives and priorities. Where socio-economic indicators are important to illustrate the poverty levels and development opportunities in a community, demographic data, primarily by means of projections, offers insight into how a population grows and the associated future demands in terms of services and amenities (Von Hofsten 1977; Weeks 2012).

Information of this kind is obviously very useful to the administrator in the planning of the future number of schools and teachers, the number of jobs required, the number of hospital beds and similar matters. (p. 101)

Thus, where socio-economic indicators offer information on the existing development status of a community, demographic indicators provide information that presents a future perspective on needs and challenges. Demographic indicators include not only data on births, deaths and migration (dynamic elements) but also characteristics such as age, sex, marital status, and economic and education data (structural elements). Together, these indicators provide information on how population processes, that is, fertility, mortality and migration, interact and thus impact population size and distribution. Understanding this, it is clear that when the objective of development planning is sustainable development, the attention has to be directed to both sets of indicators (dynamic and structural) to ensure a comprehensive development strategy.

However, because the focus of this publication is on internal migration trends and how this demographic determinant impacts population growth patterns, specifically in the Western and Northern Cape provinces, the remainder of this section will consider the extent to which the respective district municipalities (DMs) and the Cape Metro have successfully integrated migration trends in their development strategies. Towards this goal, two sources of information were drawn on (1) the IDP documents of

the respective DMs within the Western and Northern Cape provinces as well as the metro CoCT (2016) and (2) information solicited from the IDP managers of the respective DMs and Provincial IDP coordinators in response to a structured electronic interview conducted in 2016. The analysis had two objectives:

1. to assess the extent to which analyses pertaining to migration trends are included in the IDP documents of the respective district municipalities
2. to determine the degree to which the respective district municipalities of the two provinces consider migration as a distinctive population determinant that has an impact on the current and future development needs of their respective communities.

Information pertaining to socio-economic and demographic trends in the IDPs is typically included in the description of the situational analysis of the respective district municipalities. In pursuing objective one, the analysis found the typical indicators included in these situational analyses to include the five categories described below.

1. *Demographic profile* includes descriptive statistics on the population. These would include information on the size of the population, population growth, gender and age distribution, and household size.
2. *Health profile* relates, among others, to data on HIV, AIDS and tuberculosis prevalence and treatment, anti-natal treatment and child immunisation.
3. *Economic profile* includes the data focused firstly on the macro-economic status of the district (considering variables such as GDP, the economic contribution of different industries and trade) and secondly, the socio-economic status of the community (considering variables such as educational level, employment status, income levels and poverty indicators).
4. *Crime profile* includes mostly statistics on murder and substance abuse-related crime.
5. *Service delivery profile* focuses here on the level of access to municipal water, sanitation, sewerage, electricity and housing.

From this analysis, it became apparent that the two demographic variables or indicators most commonly included in the situational analysis are population size (as at the time of the 2011 census) and population growth (population growth was measured for the period 2001–2011, except in the case of one IDP where the defined period was 2001–2007) (Table 7.1 and Table 7.2).

Although population growth trends were included by most district municipalities, no data were presented on demographic determinants (fertility, mortality and migration rates) directly responsible for population growth trends. The only analysis providing some description of migration

**TABLE 7.1:** Indicators included in the population profile of Western Cape district municipalities integrated development planning.

Western Cape	WCDM	ODM	EDM	CWDM	CKDM	CPT
Pop size	x	x	-	x	x	-
Pop growth	x	x	-	x	x	x
Pop density	-	x	-	-	-	-
Male/female distribution	-	-	-	x	x	-
Pop group distribution	x	-	-	-	-	-
Age distribution	-	-	-	x	-	-
HH size	-	-	-	-	-	-
Migration/urbanisation	Impact mentioned but no analysis	-	Impact mentioned but no analysis	-	-	Impact mentioned but no analysis

Source: IDP documents for the respective municipalities (2017).

Key: DM, district municipality; HH, household; WCDM, West Coast DM; ODM, Overberg DM; EDM, Eden DM; CWDM, Cape Winelands DM; CKDM, Central Karoo DM; CPT, City of Cape Town.

**TABLE 7.2:** Indicators included in the population profile of Northern Cape district municipalities integrated development planning.

Northern Cape	SDM	NDM	FBDM	JTGDM	PKDM
Pop size	x	x	x	-	x
Pop growth	x	-	x	-	x
Pop density	-	x	-	-	x
Male/female distribution	-	x	-	x	-
Pop group distribution	-	x	-	x	-
Age distribution	-	x	-	x	-
HH size	-	-	x	x	x
Migration/urbanisation	-	Impact mentioned, but no analysis	Impact mentioned, but no analysis	Impact mentioned, but no analysis	% of people who have never moved

Source: IDP documents for the respective municipalities (2017).

Key: DM, district municipality; HH, household; SDM, Siyanda DM; NDM, Namakwa DM; FBDM, Frances Baard DM; JTGDM, John Toala Gaetsewe DM; PKDM, Pixley Ka Seme DM.

was included in the IDP of a Northern Cape district that presented the percentage of people that have never moved within the respective local municipalities within its boundaries.

The second objective of the analysis is to determine the degree to which the respective district municipalities of both the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces consider migration as a distinctive population determinant that has an impact on the current and future development needs of their respective communities. The focus here thus shifts from establishing whether migration data are included in the situational analysis as a descriptive variable to ascertaining whether migration is acknowledged as a development determinant. Subsequently, the analysis explores the degree to which migration is strategically accommodated as a distinctive population determinant that has an impact on the socio-economic context of a community which then impacts the service delivery and socio-economic development planning of the DM.

In the Western Cape province, two DMs (West Coast and Garden Route) and the CoCT did refer to the impact of migration, identifying migration as affecting the socio-economic status of the district. No statistical analysis nor statistical exploration and interpretation of migration trends were, however, included in the associated IDP documents. The West Coast DM listed migration, among others, as a risk. The IDP of this DM mentioned urbanisation as a risk to be managed, with migration flows noted towards the towns of Malmesbury and Saldanha (West Coast DM 2015/2016, p. 37). Exactly what the risks associated with this urbanisation trend were, however, was not elaborated upon.

The IDP of Garden Route DM remarked on the impact of migration on the majority of its local municipalities and its contribution to population growth: 'Due to its location most municipalities within the Garden Route district are affected by the migration of residents from the poorly developed Eastern Cape to the Western Cape province'. The document goes further to note the negative impact of this in-migration on unemployment rates and increased demand for service delivery within the district (Garden Route DM 2015/2016, p. 43).

The CoCT, as the only metro in the two provinces, notes the global nature of urbanisation and the role of in-migration in its rapid population growth, commenting on the risks involved in the management thereof (CoCT 2015/2016):

As urbanisation accelerates, the size and power of cities will only increase. That growth, however, brings with it a concomitant growth in needs. As a city, Cape Town must position itself to embrace these twin realities and maximise growth, while providing services to a growing population. As economic growth shifts to the more dynamic developing world, we must do all we can to ensure that we are part of the economic shift. Only innovative and dynamic policies that make us a flexible city can help us in that task. The plans articulated in this IDP will go some way towards helping us position ourselves for the opportunities of the future, and will guide us as we work to build the African city of the future, today. (p. 18)

In perusing the IDPs of the Northern Cape district municipalities, a trend similar to that observed in the IDPs of the Western Cape district municipalities emerged. Although there is a higher frequency of reports on migration in the IDP documents of the Northern Cape district municipalities (four out of the five IDPs of the Northern Cape referred to migration as an impacting factor on their areas as opposed to two out of the five Western Cape district municipalities and Cape Town Metro), these reports are also characterised by statements only and void of any statistical support, analysis or interpretation regarding possible impacts.

The Namakwa district presents in their IDP a description of the population in terms of its age and gender distribution, for each of the seven local

municipalities within its area of jurisdiction with the aid of population pyramids. The population pyramids of all the municipalities clearly show a moving population, also reported as such in the IDP. Migration of the population is evident in the case of two groups, that is, school-age youth (10–19 years old) and a young economically active group (20–35 years old). Their movement is primarily explained by two factors: educational and employment needs and opportunities.

In the IDP of the Frances Baard DM, migration is referred to as a possible factor contributing to the population growth experienced in this district, which could impact demand for meeting economic and infrastructural needs. The IDP (2015/2016, p. 7) notes that:

- '[*Population*] growth statistics can be seen as a key indicator for possible demand within the economic as well as infrastructure [*needs*]'.
- '[*Population*] growth statistics can also be an indication of migration patterns which will have a direct impact on LED'.

Providing a description of the population within its district, the John Taolo Gaetsewe district starts by presenting its population dynamics in terms of population growth and decline trends for the respective municipalities within the district. Although reference is only made to population growth and decline trends, the IDP does note the impact of migration on these.

The IDP of the Pixley Ka Seme district is the only document that provides some statistical analysis on migration. Following a discussion on migration trends in the district, a bar chart is included illustrating the percentage of people in the district who have never moved. Noting a primarily stable community, the following is stated regarding migration flows within the district (Pixley Ka Seme district 2006–2011):

Migration is also a determinant of population growth. Both urban to urban migration and rural to urban migration are relevant in Pixley Ka Seme. Rural to urban migration is perceived as the dominant migration stream at present. A rapid decline in net migration into the province is predicted. With declining economies, Pixley Ka Seme is unlikely to attract immigrants. However, while the Pixley Ka Seme population may appear to be stagnant, the towns are growing as rural households move to towns to access better facilities and services. This trend is expected to continue with access to health and education facilities as major pull factors. (pp. 62–63)

There are, however, no statistics offered in the IDP that describe or confirm the mentioned migration trends.

In spite of the lack of statistics contained in the IDPs of the Northern Cape district municipalities, there was, in general, a stronger acknowledgement of the impact of migration on the communities and, thus, on service delivery and development planning than was the case in the IDP documents of the Western Cape DMs. There was, however, an

acknowledgement by all Western Cape DMs that, although their IDP did not include migration data in its IDPs, a need does exist to include such data, and this will be carried out in the next generation of IDPs.

Invariably, where migration was discussed in IDPs, it was in relation to population growth trends. Interestingly, though, not one DM, including the Cape Metro, considered net migration rates in their discussions on migration. Thus, although migration was, in all cases, acknowledged as a causal (important) factor to population growth, no reference was made to the exact (statistical) contribution of this population determinant to total population growth. Furthermore, except for the IDP of Namakwa DM in the Northern Cape, no data were provided on the profile of migrants in any of the IDPs of the DMs in the two provinces, including the CoCT.

In contextualising either population growth or decline, migration was, in all cases, highlighted as the primary causal factor to explain this change. It was viewed as a risk within the context of service delivery and economic development. The risk relating to service delivery is consistently associated with population growth, whereas the risk for economic development is associated with an expected increase in unemployment and in some cases, an associated rise in crime rates that would negatively influence and undermine initiatives towards socio-economic development. In the Northern Cape, the risk for economic development, where noted, was also associated with declining population size and the outflow of young adults.

An interesting observation was the absence of descriptive data on migrants, that is, gender, age and educational status in the IDPs of DMs and the CoCT, with the exception of the IDP of the Namakwa district. This implies that no detailed information on migration trends and characteristics of migrants was used to inform the planning and programmes as part of their development objectives, leaving a gap in terms of specific needs and services that might arise from this information. In the cases where migration was identified as a risk to development (CoCT, West Coast DM and Garden Route), no specific strategy was included in the IDP as to how this risk would be managed.

From the aforementioned analysis, it is clear that although the DMs and the CoCT do, in most instances, acknowledge migration as a social and demographic factor that has a direct influence on service delivery and economic development, the IDP documents analysed here suggest limited understanding and integration of migration. Why must this omission be viewed as a glaring shortcoming in development planning? Why is it important to include data on migration in IDPs?

Local government is clearly defined by the South African Constitution and a variety of related legislation as the primary development agent within



the South African Government. Given the impact of migration on (1) the characteristics of communities and (2) the specific needs of the community regarding service delivery, it is essential that this is taken into account in development planning initiatives. In order to plan effectively for the impact of migration, or, put differently, to manage the possible impact of migration within a given social context, it is crucial that there is some understanding on the local government level of, firstly, the demographic profile of migrants, and secondly, the pace at which migration is changing the socio-economic development landscape.

The specific needs that require intervention in the context of socio-economic development of a community are directly linked to the context and characteristics of that community. It is essential that there is an understanding (at both district and local municipality levels) of the dynamics of migration and how it is changing the characteristics of communities within their jurisdiction. The profile of individuals entering or leaving a district is pertinent and highly relevant information in discovering the risks and opportunities for development in a specific geographical area. Understanding the age, gender and educational profile of migrants already provides key information which is clearly relevant for sustainable development planning.

Apart from attaining an accurate profile of migrants, it is also important to understand the pace at which this change is taking place. Calculating the net migration of a district will give a DM a good sense of how imminent the impact of migration is and at what level, in terms of urgency, it must be addressed in development planning. It is not sufficient to simply attribute population growth to migration. It is necessary to understand the extent to which migration is responsible for rapid population growth as opposed to fertility and mortality rates, as each assumes different needs and different development priorities.

Is it possible to plan for future migration trends? Indeed, it is. Migration flows, under normal conditions, are mostly predictable and, in most cases, are reactions to socio-economic forces. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this publication argue the predictive nature of migration as a force primarily driven by considerations related to economic opportunities and, referring to the selective nature of migration, particular individual characteristics, making some more prone to migrate than others. Thus, if a district or metro municipality understands the profile of its migrants (whether leaving or entering), if it understands the pace of migration (of which net migration rates are the indicator), if it is able to relate the trends to its local socio-economic conditions and if it understands the demands and constraints of its district that act as primary push and pull factors that sustain migration flows, then it will be in a position to predict future migration flows accurately.

This ability will enable districts or the metro municipality to manage migration trends effectively by developing and implementing applicable socio-economic strategies and programmes. Such a management strategy should be incorporated in both the immediate and long-term development planning initiatives of local government.

Another question that may arise relates to the relevance of including migration data in the IDP. Why is it important to include migration data in the IDP document specifically? Why is it not sufficient to consider the impact in other mostly internal documents that inform planning? The response to this question relates to the credibility of not only the integrated development planning process and IDP as an outcome but also the legitimacy of local government as the primary development agent.

Penderis (2012) writes the following on this subject: 'The rationale behind the emergence of participatory development is that grassroots support provides the valuable insights into local conditions, facilitates the implementation planning process and improves development outcomes' (Penderis 2012, p. 2). Thus, because of the public and participatory nature of the IDP process of which the IDP document is the final product, it is essential that local government portrays the social realities in their demarcated areas accurately in order to inform the community. This is of particular relevance to migration, which, as a social reality, has a physical presence that has the power to change the physical appearance of a community. The absence of migration data and an associated strategic migration management plan in the IDP document could portray the message that the local government stands ignorant of the realities experienced by its communities.

Furthermore, insights into local conditions as a consequence of participatory development are not, however, intended for local government only. The IDP process, if managed and implemented correctly should, and will, serve the establishment of insights into local conditions and realities within the community. Put differently, participation is more than a means to achieve developmental objectives. It also serves to 'awaken levels of consciousness, constitutes self-transformation and develops and strengthens the capacity of beneficiary groups in development initiatives' (Penderis 2012, p. 3). This holds particular relevance towards the reality and perceptions of migration flows and their impact.

Because of the physical expression of migration in the arrival and presence of new members in a community competing for finite resources and amenities, be it of the same or different population or ethnic group as local residents, the real manifestation and impact of migration can easily be overstated (Crush & Williams 2001; Duffy & Frere-Smith 2014; IOM 2009). The result of such generalised perceptions has often been

shown to hold detrimental and tragic consequences in South Africa's recent past. This has been specifically evident in service delivery protests that have increasingly become part of the South African socio-political landscape. Communities are often portrayed in the media as clashing violently with local residents, accusing the others (migrants) of taking what is claimed to be rightfully theirs (Blench 1996; Brooks & Winkels 2011; Freeman 2005; Guite 2012; IOM 2009; Lindström & Moore 1995; Mentzel 2010; SALGA, undated). Existing perceptions, often unfounded and exaggerated, regarding the influx of the 'other' often result in tension between groups and, ultimately, social instability.

Some respondents commented that migration data are not really relevant at the district level and that it is really only a concern of local municipalities because it is at this level that service delivery is impacted by migration. A counterargument for this view is that, given the supervision and supportive role district municipalities are mandated to play regarding local municipalities, it is of the utmost importance that this level of local government has a thorough understanding of the dynamics within their district and furthermore how these dynamics influence and impact their respective local municipalities. This is important in order to ensure that relevant and comprehensive guidance can be provided to municipalities by DM as mandated by the *Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000*.

## ■ Conclusion

This chapter assesses the degree to which data on internal migration are included in the IDPs, specifically of DMs in the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces as well as the metro of Cape Town. To achieve this aim, the discussion presented some context by means of the following themes: (1) the transformation of local government in the transition to a post-1994 democratic governance sphere; (2) the mandates and structure of the three spheres of government; (3) the notion of developmental local government; and (4) the IDP as a strategic development planning tool in speaking to the developmental mandate of local government.

The transformation of local government was one of the main strategies implemented by the new democratically elected ANC government to address the apartheid government's legacy of underdevelopment and poverty for large parts of South African society. This transformation broadly entailed three aspects: the institutionalisation of (1) a cooperative government, (2) public participative governance and (3) developmental local government.

The notion of cooperative government stems from the newly developed three-sphere government system implemented post-1994. Discarding the Unitary state for a three-sphere governance system where all three spheres are independent and distinctive in nature, the notion of cooperative government became the vehicle by which efficiency and effectiveness in government service delivery and public administration are to be achieved. Framed by *Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005*, cooperative government is the conceptual framework giving fruition to the aim of promoting a development-oriented state.

Within the three-sphere governance structure, it is the task of local government to directly engage and facilitate public participative governance in its capacity as a key role player in the developmental process of the country. One of the key methods by which this objective is to be realised is by means of the integrated development planning process of which the IDP is the final outcome or product. The IDP is a strategic planning document and the only planning document on the local government level that carries a legal mandate. It is strategic in that its facilitation is based on the principle of participatory democracy that, in essence, promotes public participation in decision-making and policy formulation.

At this point in the chapter, a strategic question is posed, referring to the relevance and importance of migration in development planning. In responding to the posed question, two main arguments are presented. Firstly, the discussion alludes to the ability of migration to act as a driver of socio-economic development. Considering the developmental mandate of local government as instructed by the South African Constitution and *Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000*, the chapter argues the importance of this sphere of government to manage and plan for human mobility. An unwillingness or inability to do so will not only leave this sphere of governance vulnerable to the socio-economic impact of migration but will also inadvertently leave little chance for this sphere to maximise the developmental potential of mobility.

Secondly, the argument in the answer builds on the first, illustrating the power of migration to negatively impact socio-economic development initiatives and social stability. The discussion illustrates how the current 'hands-off' approach to migration by the post-1994 government has accomplished little to address the socio-economic legacies of the past. Persisting segregation is presented as but one example of the current neutral stance taken by the post-1994 government on migration. The discussion further presents the ability of migration to cause social instability because of a growing populace finding itself in an increasingly desperate and competitive social and economic environment caused by a growing

demand for, and pressure on, services, infrastructure, economic resources and opportunities.

In light of (1) the developmental mandate of the local government sphere and (2) the aims and objectives inherent to the IDP process and the final planning document, the chapter continues to present a case for the inclusion of migration in the development planning efforts of local government. Considering the strategic nature of the IDP and its focus on sustainable development, it is imperative that aspects focusing on socio-economic as well as demographic data are included in the planning process in order to understand both current and future needs. The inclusion of migration data and trends, together with other relevant socio-economic variables bears testimony of the appropriate acknowledgement afforded by the local government of the complex and comprehensive package of social factors that is shown to impact the experience (true or perceived) of South African communities on a daily basis.

Finally, the chapter addresses its main objective, which is to determine the extent to which migration data are included in the IDPs of DMs in the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces as well as the CoCT. The subsequent analysis had two objectives: (1) to assess the extent to which analysis pertaining to migration trends is included in the IDP documents of the respective DMs and (2) to determine the degree to which the respective DMs of the two provinces consider migration as a distinctive population determinant that has an impact on the current and future development needs of their respective communities. Relating to the first objective, the analysis revealed limited analysis and presentation of migration trends.

Considering the second objective, the focus of the analysis shifted from establishing the extent to which statistical analysis of migration trends is included in the IDP to ascertaining the extent to which migration is acknowledged as a development determinant. In this analysis, the following trends emerged:

1. limited reference to migration as a definite aspect impacting the socio-economic context of a community
2. when mentioned, migration mostly referred to as a risk to economic development and service delivery
3. a general lack of statistical analysis or support in substantiating claims on the (negative) impact of migration
4. when contextualising population growth or decline, migration in all cases highlighted as the primary causal factor
5. a general lack of descriptive data in describing the characteristics of migrants (i.e. age, gender and educational status).

From these analyses, it is clear that although the DMs and CoCT do generally acknowledge migration as a social and demographic factor that has a direct influence on service delivery and economic development, the IDP documents analysed provide very little evidence that the exact impact of this demographic determinant is fully understood and accommodated.

The chapter then considers the implications of the lack of integration of migration in the IDP process and final document. The discussion highlights two aspects, with the first relating to the credibility of the IDP process and the legitimacy of local government as the primary development agent and the second to the role of the IDP process in informing and educating local residents about social dynamics in their actual contexts.

The IDP process, a learning and information process for both local government and communities because of its participative nature, is argued to constitute an important and convenient tool to convey an informed picture of the migration realities affecting a community. Because of the physical expression of migration in the addition of new members to a community, be it of the same or different population or ethnic groups, the real manifestation of migration in a community can easily be exaggerated. Given the often emotional and subsequently violent reaction to these perceptions in the light of socio-economic adversity and deprivation, government, including all three spheres of government but specifically the local government sphere, cannot afford to ignore or underestimate the existence and impact of this demographic determinant.



# Internal migration and development planning in post-1994 South Africa: Final deliberations

This book aims to achieve three primary objectives. Firstly, it advocates for the inclusion of internal migration trends in development planning initiatives within South Africa. Towards this goal, it illustrates internal migration to consist of two distinct streams, both of which must be considered to fully comprehend people's movement across and within administrative boundaries. Secondly, the book demonstrates the importance of analysing, comprehending and interpreting internal migration trends by applying migration theory and an understanding of historical context and present socio-economic realities. This approach is argued to ensure the development of relevant strategies derived from planning processes and initiatives. Finally, the publication emphasises the significance of internal migration as a crucial variable to consider in development planning. By illustrating the inherent capacity of this demographic process to drive substantial population shifts and subsequent possible social instability in affected communities, it underscores the need for consideration in planning efforts.

In analysing, describing and comparing the internal migration trends for the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces for the period 1996–2011, the publication illustrated three key shifts that have occurred since

**How to cite:** Eigelaar-Meets, I 2024, 'Internal migration and development planning in post-1994 South Africa: Final deliberations', in *Internal migration and development planning in South Africa*, AVARSITY Books, Cape Town, pp. 181-188. <https://doi.org/10.4102/aosis.2024.BK463.08>



democratisation. These shifts specifically relate to the following three dimensions:

1. the political context within which mobility is framed
2. the type of internal migration flows that are sustaining urbanisation
3. the profile of the populations in the migration streams.

The political landscape governing migration in South Africa has undergone significant shifts. Previously characterised by stringent and restrictive influx control policies, the post-1994 era has given way to a predominantly politically neutral approach to migration. While this natural stance is justified from a political and human rights standpoint, it also carries the risk of overlooking the impact of migration as a tangible demographic force. When this occurs, the detrimental effects of unchecked migration on development initiatives and subsequent human well-being will be realised, albeit from a point of crisis.

At this point, it is important that I qualify what I mean by ‘unchecked migration’. By no means am I suggesting a return to control measures seen during the apartheid era. Such an approach would not only be ethically questionable and contrary to human rights conventions, but it would also run counter to the freedoms guaranteed by the South African Constitution. In addition, as demonstrated in the historical overview in Chapter 1, achieving complete control over migration is an unattainable goal. If people have a desire to move, they will find a way. What I am arguing, however, is that cognisance should be taken of migration, specifically internal migration, by planning authorities situated within the governance structures of South Africa. Understanding and taking cognisance of migration trends will empower development agencies to follow population change and will assist in proactive human development planning.

What specific pieces of knowledge does this publication offer in relation to internal migration that can be applied in development planning for the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces, specifically?

## ■ The power of money in directing migration

The migration relationship illustrated for the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces was shown to be generally shaped by economic forces as the main driving force of migration between the main sending and receiving areas. Strongly set in the push-pull theory of migration, such movement is argued to constitute factors that push migrants from one area to another because of certain persistent factors. Although this theory considers both economic and non-economic push and pull factors, the respective economic context of the sending and receiving areas, be it real or perceived, is presented as the strongest driving force for migration (De Haas 2010b;

King 2012; ed. Lindsay 1985). The overarching assumption here is that migration is initiated because of an inversely proportional relationship between income (economic opportunity) and other opportunity differentials (De Haas 2010b). Within these considerations, migrants are rational decision-makers who weigh the gains and losses associated with migrating to a specific location and subsequently act upon the cost evaluation by either remaining or migrating.

The stated assumptions are confirmed in this publication, with the analysis illustrating how migration trends follow the economic opportunities and needs that prevail in a given society. The economies of both the Northern Cape and Western Cape are strongly dependent on and significantly influenced by non-industrial and semi-industrial activities, particularly agricultural activities in the rural districts (both provinces), mining in the Northern Cape and the fishing industry in both the Western Cape and Northern Cape. The labour-intensive nature of these activities, albeit mostly seasonal, and the general lower skill set necessary to access these labour markets present appropriate employment opportunities to those desperate to access economic opportunities.

## ■ The process of urbanisation sustained in both inter- and intra-provincial migration flows

In this context, urbanisation does not only constitute movement to large economic centres or metropolitan areas in the case of Cape Town but also rural towns. The extent of such urbanisation can easily be underestimated if internal migration flows, that is, both intra-provincial and inter-provincial movements, are not considered, with the potential to place severe stress on infrastructure and human well-being.

Although the analyses presented evidence that rural-urban migration is not being replaced by inter-urban migration, it did find that intra-provincial migration flows of particularly black African migrants increased in urban-rural migration, with significant migration towards rural towns rather than to large urban centres. The rural towns preferred by the majority of migrants in both provinces displayed strong similarities in that they presented stronger economies relative to the other prospective receiving districts. Furthermore, the economic sectors of the chosen rural destinations in these districts were dominated by the agricultural and mining sectors that offered large-scale, unskilled and semi-skilled employment opportunities that resonated with the general competency levels of most migrants.

## ■ Changes in black African migration, from oscillatory migration to gravity flow migration

This is an important observation, illustrative of the long-term intentions of migrants. The dynamics of internal migration prior to 1994 were directly influenced by political forces and individual characteristics. A crucial aspect of the pre-1994 political era involved the managing of internal migration based on an individual's population group classification and simultaneously institutionalised labour migration practices, particularly affecting black African males. The movement of people between rural and urban areas became deeply embedded in the economic system through state interventions aimed at mobilisation and controlling labour. These measures effectively made permanent urban settlements unattainable for most migrants. In addition, because of restrictions on permanent residence and the inability to bring spouses and families to their workplaces, black African males found themselves caught in a cycle of oscillatory migration between urban workstations and rural homesteads. With the lifting of these oppressive measures in the late 1980s, these previously restricted population groups started to experience freedom of movement, which continued with the transition to a democratic society and has grown since (Posel 2003).

The freedom of movement and settlement resulted in changes in migration patterns, particularly pertaining to the participation in migration flows and settlement by the black African population that was previously bound to rural areas (Cox, Hemson & Todes 2004; Todes et al. 2010). This new freedom enabled them to move to urban settings as competing participants in the urban economy. From the analysis presented in this publication, this trend has persisted in both the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces, particularly pertaining to inter-provincial migration flows.

## ■ Profile of migrants

Younger individuals, particularly those between the ages of 20–24 years old, are generally accepted to be more prone to migrate than older individuals. Regardless of overall mobility patterns, the inclination to migrate tends to be highest during young adulthood, gradually decreasing with age. It then rises once more among young children and occasionally around retirement age (Bernard, Bell & Charles-Edwards 2017; Oucho & Gould 1993). These trends were confirmed in the analysis presented in this publication.

## ■ Migration and development

Urbanisation and human mobility are set to continue, with migrants moving to destinations offering more promising economic possibilities and

increased prospects for access to basic services compared with those available in their areas of origin. Therefore, migration as a social phenomenon has significant development potential, bringing people closer to services and economic opportunities, reducing poverty and addressing inequality in South Africa. It is, however, only possible to harness this development potential if there is deliberate intent. This intent should be focused on three aspects: (1) understanding the effect of migration in altering the population size and composition, (2) understanding the context of migration and (3) understanding the profile of the migrant. Together, these aspects provide valuable information to inform sustainable and proactive development planning initiatives and processes.

The following recommendations arise from analyses in this publication.

### **□ Improve data on internal migration**

The only comprehensive migration dataset currently accessible is compiled and maintained by StatsSA, the national statistical service of the country. Between 1996 and 2011, a national census was conducted every five years. However, since 2011, this interval has been extended to every ten years. This frequency remains grossly inadequate, considering the dynamic nature of migration. Another concern is the type of migration data that is collected in the national census. Since 1996, questions were only included to measure lifetime migration with a complete gap in information on migration behaviour from birth to the date of the interview or on causal factors underlying the migration decision. Given these limitations, it is recommended that funding is allocated to provinces to conduct more regular migration surveys, possibly at five-year intervals, allowing for a focused analysis of household migration to allow for a comprehensive overview of this demographic factor for routine integration in development planning processes. Better information on migration and how it aids poverty reduction is valuable in developing an understanding of how policy can support migration and respond to its effects (IOM 2005).

### **□ Develop specialised academic curricula on migration and development**

Creating specialised academic curricula focused on migration and development holds significance on two distinctive levels. Let me elaborate:

1. Knowledge base expansion:
  - to enrich our understanding of the intricate and multi-faceted relationship between migration and development
  - by establishing an academic institutional framework dedicated to this topic, facilitating the further development of a theoretical foundation that is grounded in research and rigorously validated

- ensures that our comprehension of migration's impact on development is informed and robust.

## 2. Policy sensitisation and practical application

- The second level involves the influence and impact of such curriculum serving to sensitise both current and future policymakers and development agents.
- Such sensitisation should aim to develop insights into how migration and development interact and, subsequently, teach participants how to consider these dynamics in their practical work.

### **□ Include both inter- and intra-provincial migration flows in migration analysis**

Traditionally, internal net-migration rates only consider migrants that migrate across provincial boundaries. Although this is sufficient to calculate the net loss or gain at the provincial level, it does not present a comprehensive view of population change and distribution in lower-level administrative areas (local and district municipalities). Working with only half the picture does dilute the level of real experienced change and thus the pressures experienced on both sending and receiving areas within a province. Acknowledging such moves is important, given the responsibility of smaller administrative constituents to plan accurately and successfully deliver a range of services that support the general development of the communities for which they are responsible.

### **□ Include data on migration and urbanisation in the development of the planning processes of local authorities**

In planning initiatives, it is important to consider both socio-economic and demographic indicators. While socio-economic indicators are necessary to illustrate the poverty levels and development opportunities in a community, demographic data offer insight into how populations grow and decline, the reasons for these fluctuations, probable future population trends and the associated future demands in terms of services, amenities and economic development. Socio-economic indicators offer information on the current development status of a community, whereas demographic indicators provide a future perspective on the needs and challenges that have the potential to affect the developmental status of communities significantly. Subsequently, the inclusion of data on migration and urbanisation in development planning processes at the local municipal level is essential to ensure timely and appropriate planning at the local government level. This is particularly relevant, given the role of the local government tier as the

primary development agent responsible for facilitating and enhancing socio-economic development within the respective boundaries of its constituencies.

### □ **Develop an institutional mechanism that ensures the collaborative involvement of the different spheres of government to allow for the comprehensive management of migration**

Local governments operate within legal boundaries set by both provincial and national authorities. However, because of the absence of a comprehensive national framework that formally acknowledges and institutionalises migration and urbanisation processes, collaboration between different departments and levels of government remains challenging. Population mobility, if not strategically addressed, can destabilise communities and reveal local governments' lack of preparedness, indirectly contributing to social fragmentation and instability. To tackle this issue, it is recommended to establish mechanisms that foster collaboration among interdepartmental and intergovernmental structures during the process of integrating migration into development planning.

Such an approach involves balancing migration considerations, taking into account their potential impact on development, policy design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation related to poverty reduction. By integrating migration in this manner, a framework is created that recognises migration not only as a demographic factor but also as a critical determinant of development. With support from the national government, intergovernmental and interdepartmental collaboration can be structured and operationalised within this framework. Additionally, systematic documentation and policy review at national, provincial and local levels can help authorities understand how policies influence migration patterns and guide policymakers in addressing migration-related consequences and impacts.

## ■ **Concluding remarks**

There has been a growing interest in internal migration and how this form of migration affects the human resource and population distribution within a country. This publication is my small effort (though it did not feel so small when I was trying to get this ready for print) to add value to this discussion. Having worked as a sociologist in various communities across the country, encompassing all socio-economic levels and residing in urban, peri-urban and rural areas, I have become convinced that the integration of data on internal migration as a key and standard factor in development planning is imperative when proactive planning is the objective.

It is within this conviction and building on my work completed for my PhD that I compiled this book to not only argue the point but to go one step further – to illustrate how to think about internal migration, how to measure it and how to consider its origins and consequences, particularly for development planning considerations. In a country still grappling with the legacies of the past, fighting the not-so-silent violence of poverty and underdevelopment, I truly hope that this book will make a positive contribution to the country and her people. A country and a people I choose to call my own.

I close in the words of Ban Ki-Moon (2013):

Migration is an expression of the human aspiration for dignity, safety, and a better future. It is part of the social fabric, part of our very make-up as a human family. (n.p.)

# References

## Chapter 1

- Adhikari, M 2010, 'A total extinction confidently hoped for: The destruction of Cape San society under Dutch colonial rule, 1700-1795', *Journal of Genocide Research*, vol. 12, nos. 1&2, pp. 19-44. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2010.508274>
- Allen, V, Mngqolo, S & Swanepoel, S 2012, *The struggle for liberation and freedom in the Northern Cape, 1850-1994*, McGregor Museum, Kimberley.
- Apartheid Museum 2008, 'From apartheid to democracy', in Apartheid Museum (ed.), *Understanding apartheid: Learner's book*, Oxford University Press Southern Africa, Cape Town, pp. 133-160.
- Bebbingtong, A 2021, 'A retrospective: Michael M. Cernea (1934 - )', in M Koch-Weser & S Guggenheim (eds.), *Social development in the World Bank: Essays in Honor of Michael M. Cernea*, Springer, Cham, pp. 347-354.
- Bekker, SB 2002, 'Diminishing returns: Circulatory migration linking Cape Town to the Eastern Cape', *Southern African Journal of Demography*, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 1-8.
- Bekker, SB & Humphries, R 1985, *From control to confusion: The changing role of administration boards in South Africa, 1971-1983*, Natal Witness Printing & Publishing Co., Pietermaritzburg.
- Cernea, MM (ed.) 1985, *Putting people first: Sociological variables in rural development*, World Bank, New York, viewed 25 April 2024. <<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/161691468765016390/Putting-people-first-sociological-variables-in-rural-development>>
- Cilliers, SP & Bekker, SB 1980, 'Die Arbeidsituasie van die swartman in die Wes Kaap, met besondere aandag aan die toestand in die Kaapse Skiereiland', *Geleentheidstuk*, no. 4, Department of Sociology, Stellenbosch University.
- City of Cape Town (CoCT) 2015, *Integrated development plan (IDP) 2015-2016*, City of Cape Town, Cape Town.
- Clark, N & Worger, WH 2004, *South Africa: The rise and fall of apartheid*, Routledge, London.
- Cole, J 2012, *Behind and beyond the Eiselen line*, St George's Cathedral Crypt Memory and Witness Centre, Cape Town.
- Department of Economic Development and Tourism (DEDAT) 2012, *Northern Cape province economic potential and investment profile*, Provincial Government of the Northern Cape, Kimberly.
- Eastern Cape Socio Economic Consultative Council (ECSECC) 2012, *Quarterly economic update*, ECSECC, viewed 08 June 2015. <<https://www.ecsecc.org/publication-details/2041/Quarterly-economic-update-2nd-quarter-2012>>
- Educational and Training Unit for Democracy and Development (ETU) 2015, *Understanding Local Government*, viewed 20 August 2015. <<https://www.etu.org.za/toolbox/docs/localgov/webundrstdlogov.html>>
- Gaser, D 2011, 'Pioneering the human development revolution: Analysing the trajectory of Mahbud ul Haq', *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 433-456. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2011.576660>
- Gelderblom, D & Kok, P 1994, *Urbanisation: South Africa's challenge*, vol. 1, HSRC Press, Pretoria.
- Giliomee, H & Mbenga, B 2007, *New history of South Africa*, Tafelberg, Cape Town.



## References

- Goldin, I 1984, 'The coloured labour preference policy: Co-option and contradiction', Collected Seminar Papers, vol. 33, University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, pp. 108-120.
- Horner, D (ed.) 1983, 'Labour preference, influx control and squatters: Cape Town entering the 1980s', Working Paper, No. 50, SALDRU, Cape Town.
- Howcroft, P n.d., *South Africa encyclopaedia: Prehistory to the year 2000*, viewed 25 September 2015. <<http://www.sahistory.org.za/south-africa-1652-1806/batavian-republic-1803-1806>>
- Hulme, T & Turner, M 1990, *Sociology and development: Theories, policies and practices*, Billing and Sons Limited, Worcester.
- Humphries, R 1992, 'Administrative politics and the coloured labour preference policy', in W James & M Simons (eds.), *Caste, class and colour: A social and economic history of the South African Western Cape*, UCT Press, Cape Town, pp. 169-180.
- Hunter, G 1969, *Modernising peasant societies: A comparative study in Asia and Africa*, Oxford University Press, London.
- Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 2004, *Migration, land and minerals in the making of South Africa, Turning Points in History Book 3*, STE Publishers, Sunnyside Ridge, Johannesburg.
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2022, *World Migration Educator's Toolkit: A set of resources for educators for teaching about migration, migrants and human geography*, Migration Research Division, viewed 29 April 2024. <[https://worldmigrationreport.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11691/files/2023-06/wmr-toolkit\\_feb\\_2022.pdf](https://worldmigrationreport.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11691/files/2023-06/wmr-toolkit_feb_2022.pdf)>
- John Taolo Gaetsewe District Municipality n.d., viewed 10 July 2015. <<http://www.taologaetsewe.gov.za>>
- King, R, Skeldon, R & Vullnetari, J 2008, 'Internal and international migration: Bridging the theoretical divide. Sussex Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex', paper presented at the *International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion (IMISCOE) Conference: 'Theories of migration and social change'*, 01-03 July, St Anne's College, Oxford.
- Kok, P, Gelderblom, D, Oucho, JO & Van Zyl, J (eds.) 2006, *Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and determinants*, HSRC Press, Cape Town.
- Kurtok, I 2012, 'Urbanisation and development in South Africa: Economic imperatives, spatial distortions and strategic responses. Urbanization and Emerging Population Studies', Working Paper 8, International Institute for Environment and Development, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Population and Development Branch, New York.
- Lee-Warden, MP 1957, 'The crime of Langa', *Africa South*, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 46-51.
- Lemon, A (ed.) 1991, *Homes apart: South Africa's segregated cities*, David Philip Publishers, Cape Town.
- Lipton, M 1986, *Capitalism and apartheid: South Africa, 1910-1986*, David Philip Publishers, Cape Town.
- Mandela, N 2005, *Address by Nelson Mandela for the 'Make Poverty History' Campaign, London - United Kingdom*, viewed 29 March 2024. <[http://www.mandela.gov.za/mandela\\_speeches/2005/050203\\_poverty.htm#:~:text=Like%20slavery%20and%20apartheid%2C%20poverty,is%20an%20act%20of%20justice](http://www.mandela.gov.za/mandela_speeches/2005/050203_poverty.htm#:~:text=Like%20slavery%20and%20apartheid%2C%20poverty,is%20an%20act%20of%20justice)>
- Meredith, M 2007, *Diamonds, gold and war: The British, the Boers, and the making of South Africa*, PublicAffairs, New York.
- Morokong, T, Sibulali, A, Murdoch, J & Barends-Jones, V 2021, *Western Cape Agricultural Sector Profile: 2021*, Western Cape Department of Agriculture, Division for Macro & Resource Economics, Elsenburg.
- Mountain, A 2003, *The first people of the Cape: A look at their history and the impact of colonialism on the Cape's indigenous people*, David Philip Publishers, Cape Town.
- Muthien, Y 1994, *State and resistance in South Africa, 1939-1965*, Avebury Publishing, Aldershot.

- Oliver, E & Oliver, WH 2017, 'The Colonisation of South Africa: A unique case', *HTS Theological Studies*, vol. 73, no. 3, a4498. <https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v73i3.4498>
- Olivier-Evans, C 1993, Employment and urbanisation: The impact of the abolition of influx control in the Western Cape, Working Paper No. 84, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, Cape Town.
- Partridge, A, Morokong, T & Sibulali, A 2020, *Western Cape agricultural sector profile*, Western Cape Department of Agriculture for Macro & Resource Economics, Cape Town.
- Penn, N 1995, *The Northern Cape frontier zone, 1700–c.1815*, University of Cape Town, Cape Town.
- Penn, N 2005, *The forgotten frontier: Colonists and Khoisan on the Cape's northern frontier in the 18th Century*, ABC Press, Epping, Cape Town.
- Perlstadt, H 2007, *Applied sociology*, Michigan State University, East Lansing, pp. 342–352, viewed 26 April 2024. <<https://www.academia.edu/21643324>>
- Ralph, J 1900, *Towards Pretoria: A record of the war between Briton and Boer, to the relief of Kimberley*, Frederick A. Stokes Company, New York.
- Republic of South Africa (RSA) 1986, *W.P.: White paper on urbanisation*, Government Printing Works, Pretoria.
- Republic of South Africa (RSA) 1996, *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Government Gazette, No. 17678, Vol. 378 (Act No. 108, 1996) (December)*, Government Printing Works, Pretoria.
- Roberts, B 1976, *Kimberley: Turbulent city*, David Philip Publishers, Cape Town.
- SA History Online n.d., *The Dutch settlement*, viewed 25 March 2024. <<https://sahistory.org.za/article/dutch-settlement>>
- Scanlon, S 2007, *Representation & reality: Portraits of women's lives in the Western Cape 1948–1976*, HSRC Press, Cape Town.
- Sen, A 1999, *Development as freedom*, Oxford University Press, London.
- Snitcher, F 1957, 'The Eiselen scheme', *Africa South*, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 40–45.
- South African Government n.d.a, *Provincial government*, viewed 20 September 2015. <<http://www.gov.za/about-government/government-system/provincial-government>>
- South African Government n.d.b, *Structure and functions of the South African Government*, viewed 20 September 2015. <<http://www.gov.za/about-government/government-system/structure-and-functions-south-african-government>>
- SouthAfrica.info n.d., *Investing in the Northern Cape*, viewed 10 May 2015. <<http://www.southafrica.info/business/investing/opportunities/ncape.htm#.UpdZSsQW3vo>>
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2012a, *Statistical Release Census 2011*, Report No. 0301.4, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2012b, *Census 2011: How the count was done*, Report No. 03-01-45, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2012c, *Census 2011: Provinces at a glance*, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2012d, *Regional growth estimates*, viewed 05 April 2015. <[http://www.statssa.gov.za/economic\\_growth/16%20Regional%20estimates.pdf](http://www.statssa.gov.za/economic_growth/16%20Regional%20estimates.pdf)>
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2014, *Annual estimates 2004–2013. Regional estimates 2004–2013. Third quarter*, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria, viewed 10 April 2015. <<http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0441/P04413rdQuarter2014.pdf>>
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2019, *Four facts about our provincial economies*, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2021, *When talking economics, consider the provinces*, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.

- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2023a, *Census 2022 provinces at a glance*, viewed 19 February 2014. <[https://census.statssa.gov.za/assets/documents/2022/Provinces\\_at\\_a\\_Glance.pdf](https://census.statssa.gov.za/assets/documents/2022/Provinces_at_a_Glance.pdf)>
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2023b, *Statistical release P0301.4: Census 2022*, viewed 24 November 2023. <[https://census.statssa.gov.za/assets/documents/2022/P03014\\_Census\\_2022\\_Statistical\\_Release.pdfgov.za](https://census.statssa.gov.za/assets/documents/2022/P03014_Census_2022_Statistical_Release.pdfgov.za)>
- Swanepoel, S (ed.) 2012, *Resistance in the Northern Cape in the nineteenth century: History and commemoration*, Archival Platform, McGregor Museum, Kimberley.
- Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) 2022, *Provincial review 2022: Northern Cape, the real economy bulletin. Trend, developments and data*, viewed 29 March 2024. <[The\\_REB\\_Provincial\\_Review\\_2022\\_Northern\\_Cape.pdf](#)>
- Turok, I 2012, 'Urbanisation and development in South Africa: Economic imperatives, spatial distortions and strategic responses. Urbanizing and Emerging Population Issues', Working Paper No. 8, International Institute for Environment and Development, United Nations Population Fund, New York.
- Ul Haq, M 1995, *Reflections on human development*, Oxford University Press, London.
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2015, *What is human development*, viewed 26 April 2024. <<https://hdr.undp.org/content/what-human-development>>
- Weeks, JR 2012, *An introduction to population*, 11th edn., Cengage Learning, Boston.
- Wentzel, M & Tlabela, K 2006, 'Historical background to South African migration', in P Kok, J Gelderblom, JO Oucho & J Van Zyl (eds.), *Migration in South and Southern Africa*, HSRC Publishers, Cape Town, pp. 71-96.
- WESGRO 2022, *An overview of the key economic indicators of the Western Cape: An inspiring place to know*, viewed 24 November 2023. <[https://www.wesgro.co.za/uploads/files/Wesgro-Research\\_WC-key-economic-indicators\\_2022.03\\_2022-05-26-213012.pdf](https://www.wesgro.co.za/uploads/files/Wesgro-Research_WC-key-economic-indicators_2022.03_2022-05-26-213012.pdf)>
- WESGRO 2023, *An economic overview of the Western Cape: Cape Town and the Western Cape - A leading regional economy, an economic overview of the Western Cape - 2022Q3*, WESGRO, Cape Town.
- West, M 1982, 'From pass courts to deportation: Changing patterns of influx control in Cape Town', *African Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 325, pp. 463-477. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a097450>
- Western Cape Provincial Treasury 2013, *Provincial economic review and outlook (PERO)*, Western Cape Government, Cape Town.
- Western Cape Provincial Treasury 2014, *Provincial economic review and outlook (PERO)*, Provincial Treasury, Cape Town.
- Wilmot, A 1904, *The life and times of Sir Richard Southey K.C.M.G. etc. Formerly Colonial Secretary of the Cape Colony, and Lieut.-Governor of Griqualand West*, Sampson Low, Marston & Company, London.

## Chapter 2

- Agunias, DR & Newland, K 2007, *Circular migration and development: Trends, policy routes, and ways forward*, Migration Policy Institute, Washington.
- Arango, J 2000, *Explaining migration: A critical view*, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.
- Bakewell, O (ed.) 2012, *Migration and development*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham.
- Bastia, T & Skeldon, R (eds.) 2020, *Routledge handbook of migration and development*, Routledge, New York.
- Bekker, SB & Swart, K 2002, *Migration study in the Western Cape 2001*, Provincial Government of the Western Cape, Cape Town.
- Bell, M, Charles-Edwards, E, Stillwell, J, Kupiszewski, M & Kupiszewska, D 2015, 'Internal migration and development: Comparing migration intensities around the world', *Population and Development Review*, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 33-58. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2015.00025.x>

- Casale, D & Posel, D 2006, *Migration and remittances in South Africa. Background document on migration and first set of draft questions for inclusion in the National Income Dynamics Study*, Department of Economics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban.
- Castaldo, A, Deshingkar, P & McKay, A 2012, *Internal migration, remittances and poverty: Evidence from Ghana and India*, Migrating out of Poverty Working Paper, No. 7, Research Programme Consortium, University of Sussex, Falmer.
- Castles, S & Ozkul, D 2014, 'Circular migration: Triple win, or a new label for temporary migration?', in G Battistella (ed.), *Global and Asian perspectives on international migration. International Organization for Migration*, Springer, Cham, pp. 27–36.
- Chou, MH 2012, 'EU mobility partnerships and gender: Origin and implications', in R Sollund (ed.), *Transnational migration, gender and rights*, Emerald Publishing, Bingley, pp. 11–31.
- Comins, L 2023, 'The shifting landscape of South Africa's informal settlements', *Mail & Guardian*, 30 October, viewed 30 April 2023. <<https://mg.co.za/news/2023-10-30-the-shifting-landscape-of-south-africas-informal-settlements/>>
- Cornelius, WA & Rosenblum, MR 2005, 'Immigration and politics', *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 8, pp. 99–199. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104854>
- Cross, C 2010, 'Shack settlements as entry to the labour market: Towards testing upgrading paradigms', paper presented at the *Urban LandMark Conference: Rethinking emerging land markets in rapidly growing Southern African cities*, 01–02 November, Johannesburg.
- Czaika, M & Reinprecht, C 2022, 'Migration drivers: Why do people migrate?', in P Scholten (ed.), *Introduction to migration studies*, IMISCOE Research Series, Springer, Cham, viewed 24 November 2023. <[https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92377-8\\_3](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92377-8_3)>
- De Haas, H 2009, *Mobility and human development*, International Migration Institute (IMI), University of Oxford, Oxford.
- De Haas, H 2010a, 'Migration transitions: A theoretical and empirical inquiry into the developmental drivers of international migration', DEMIG (Determinants of International Migration) Project Paper No. 1, Working Paper 24, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford.
- De Haas, H 2010b, 'The internal dynamics of migration processes: A theoretical inquiry', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 36, no. 10, pp. 227–264. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2010.489361>
- De Jong, GF & Fawcett, JT 1981, 'Motivations for migration: An assessment and a value-expectancy research model', in FG De Jong & RW Gardner (eds.), *Migration decision making: Multidisciplinary approaches to microlevel studies in developed and developing countries*, Pergamon Press, New York, pp. 13–58.
- De Wind, J & Holdaway, J 2005, 'Internal and international migration in economic development', paper presented at *Fourth Coordination Meeting on International Migration*, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, 26–27 October, New York.
- Deshingkar, P & Grimm, S 2005, *Internal migration and development: A global perspective*, IOM Migration Research Series, No. 19, United Nations Publications, Geneva.
- Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty 2009, *Making migration work for development*, University of Sussex, Falmer.
- Eigelaar-Meets, I, Louw, W & Groenewald, C 2016, *A study into the needs and demand of affordable housing in the Overstrand Local Municipality*, Final report for the Overstrand Local Municipality and Western Cape Provincial Department of Human Settlements, Soreaso, Somerset West.
- Faist, T 2008, 'Migrants as transnational development agents: An enquiry into the newest round of the migration-development nexus', *Population Space and Place*, vol. 14, pp. 21–42. <https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.471>
- Findley, S 1977, *Planning for internal migration: A review of issues and policies in developing countries. U.S. Bureau of the Census*, US Government Printing Office, Washington.

## References

- Garip, F 2014, 'The impact of migration and remittances on wealth accumulation and distribution in rural Thailand', *Demography*, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 673–698. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-013-0260-y>
- Gelderblom, P 2006, 'A synthetic model of migration', in P Kok, D Gelderblom, J Oucho & J Van Zyl (eds.), *Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and determinants*, HSRC Press, Cape Town, pp. 268–290.
- Global Migration Group (GMG) 2010, *Mainstreaming migration into development planning: A handbook for policy-makers and practitioners*, Global Migration Group, Cape Town.
- Hickey, M 2016, 'Modernisation, migration, and mobilisation: Relinking internal and international migrations in the "migration and development nexus"', *Population, Space and Place*, vol. 22, no. 7, pp. 681–692. <https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.1952>
- Hicks, JR 1932, *The theory of wages*, Macmillian, London.
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2005, *Internal migration and development: A global perspective*, IOM Migration Research Series, No. 19, International Organization for Migration, Grand-Saconnex.
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2016, *IOM – UNDP global joint programme: Mainstreaming migration into national development strategies*, IOM Namibia Newsletter, Issue 1, January 2016, Department of Migration Management, Migration and Development, International Organization for Migration, Grand-Saconnex.
- International Organization of Migration (IOM) 2018, *World migration report*, International Organization for Migration, Grand-Saconnex.
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2022, *World Migration Educator's Toolkit: A set of resources for educators for teaching about migration, migrants and human geography*, Migration Research Division, viewed 29 April 2024. <[https://worldmigrationreport.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11691/files/2023-06/wmr-toolkit\\_feb\\_2022.pdf](https://worldmigrationreport.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11691/files/2023-06/wmr-toolkit_feb_2022.pdf)>
- King, R 2012, 'Theories and typologies of migration: An overview and a primer', *Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethic Relations*, vol. 3, no. 12, n.p.
- Kok, P, Gelderblom, D, Oucho, JO & Van Zyl, J (eds.) 2006, *Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and determinants*, HSRC Press, Cape Town.
- Kok, P, O'Donovan, M, Bouare, O & Van Zyl, J 2003, *Post-apartheid patterns of internal migration in South Africa*, HSRC Press, Cape Town.
- Kurekova, L 2011, 'Theories on migration: Conceptual review and empirical testing in the context of the EU East-West flows', paper presented at the *Interdisciplinary Conference on Migration: Economic Change, Social Challenge*, 06–09 April, University College London, London.
- Laczko, F, Mosler Vidal, E & Rango, M 2024, *Measuring global migration: Towards better data for all*, Routledge, London.
- Lee, ES 1996, 'A theory of migration', *Demography*, vol. 3, pp. 47–57. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2060063>
- Lewis, WA 1954, 'Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour', *The Manchester School*, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 139–192. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.1954.tb00021.x>
- Lindsay, B (ed.) 1985, *African migration and national development*, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, pp. 1–14.
- Martine, G 1975, 'Volume, characteristics and consequences of internal migration in Colombia', *Demography*, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 193–208. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2060760>
- Massey, DS 1990, 'Social structure, household strategies, and the cumulative causation of migration', *Population Index*, vol. 56, pp. 3–26. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3644186>
- Massey, DS 1999, 'Why does immigration occur? A theoretical synthesis', in C Hirschman, P Kasinitz & J DeWind (eds.), *The handbook of international migration*, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, pp. 34–52.

- Massey, DS, Arango, J, Hugo, G, Kouaouchi, A, Pellegrino, A & Taylor, JE 1993, 'Theories of international migration: A review and appraisal', *Population and Development Review*, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 431-466. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2938462>
- Massey, DS, Arango, JHG, Kouaouchi, A, Pellegrino, A & Taylor, JE 1998, *Worlds in motion. Understanding international migration at the end of the millennium*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- McAuliffe, M & Khadria, B (eds.) 2020, *World Migration Report*, International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Geneva.
- Moore, K 2015, 'Editorial: The Meaning of Migration', *JOMEC Journal*, Issue 7, n.p. <https://doi.org/10.18573/j.2015.10001>
- Moses, E & Yu, D 2009, Migration from the Northern Cape. Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, Working Paper Number 32, SALDRU, University of Cape Town, Cape Town.
- Mostert, WP, Oosthuizen, JS & Hofmeyer, BE 1991, *Demografie: Die studie van menslike bevolkings. Raad vir Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing*, University of Pretoria, Pretoria.
- Nonnenmacher, S 2010, *Mainstreaming migration into development planning: A handbook for policy-makers and practitioners*, International Organization for Migration, Grand-Saconnex.
- O'Neil, A 2024, *Urbanisation in South Africa 2022*, STATISTA, viewed 10 February 2024. <<https://www.statista.com/statistics/455931/urbanization-in-south-africa/>>
- Olowa, OW & Awoyemi, TT 2012, 'Determinants of migration and remittances in rural Nigeria', *Journal of Development and Agricultural Economics*, vol. 4, no. 7, pp. 191-198. <https://doi.org/10.5897/JDAE11.053>
- Oucho, JO & Gould, WTS 1993, 'Internal migration, urbanization, and population distribution', in KA Foote, H Hill & LG Martin (eds.), *Demographic change in sub-Saharan Africa*, National Academies Press, Washington, pp. 256-289.
- Pan, X & Sun, C 2024, 'Internal migration, remittances and economic development', *Journal of International Economics*, vol. 147, a103845. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2023.103845>
- Parnwell, M 1993, *Population movements and the third world*, Routledge, London.
- Ravenstein, EG 1885, *The laws of migration*, Blackwell Publishing, Hoboken.
- Rees, P, Bell, M, Kupiszweski, M, Kupiszweska, D, Ueffing, P, Bernarnd, A, Charles-Edwards, E & Stillwell, J 2017, 'The impact of internal migration on population redistribution: An international comparison', *Population Space and Place*, vol. 23, a2036. <https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2036>
- Sarjehpeyma, N 1984, *The economic impact of internal migration: Iran as a special case: Unpublished publication*, Department of Economics, University of Oklahoma Graduate College, Norman.
- Shaw, RP 1975, *Migration theory and fact: A review and bibliography of current literature*, Regional Science Research Institute, s.l.
- Shryock, HS, Siegel, JS & Associates 1980, *The methods and materials of demography*, US Bureau of the Census, US Government Publishing Office, Washington.
- Sinatti, G & Alvarez Tinajero, SP 2011, *Migration for development: A bottom-up approach. A handbook for practitioners and policy makers*, ISS Staff Group O, Joint Migration and Development Initiative, United Nations, Geneva.
- Sironi, A, Bauloz, C & Emmanuel, M (eds.) 2019, *Glossary on migration*, International Migration Law, No. 34, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Geneva.
- Sjaastad, LA 1962, 'The cost and returns of human migration', *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 70, no. 5, pp. 80-93. <https://doi.org/10.1086/258726>
- Skeldon, R 2021, *Advanced introduction to migration studies*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham.
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2012, *Statistical Release Census 2011*, Report No. 0301.4, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria

- Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) 2023, *Census 2022 Provinces at a glance*, viewed 19 February 2014. <[https://census.statssa.gov.za/assets/documents/2022/Provinces\\_at\\_a\\_Glance.pdf](https://census.statssa.gov.za/assets/documents/2022/Provinces_at_a_Glance.pdf)>
- Stellenbosch University 2000, *Proceedings of a graduate workshop on internal migration*, Occasional Paper No. 11, Department of Sociology, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch.
- Todaro, M 1980, 'Internal migration in developing countries: A survey', in RA Easterling (ed.), *Population and economic change in developing countries*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 361-402.
- Turok, I 2012, *Urbanisation and development in South Africa: Economic imperatives, spatial distortions and strategic responses*, Urbanizing and Emerging Population Issues, Working Paper No. 8, International Institute for Environment and Development, United Nations Population Fund, New York.
- United Nations (UN) 2012, *World urbanization prospects: The 2011 revision*, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, United Nations Publications, New York.
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2009, *Human development report. Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- United Nations Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) 2020, *International migration 2019 Report*, United Nations, New York.
- United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECA) 2016, *Defining and measuring circular migration*, United Nations, New York, viewed 25 July 2017. <[https://unece.org/DAM/stats/publications/2016/ECECESSTAT20165\\_E.pdf](https://unece.org/DAM/stats/publications/2016/ECECESSTAT20165_E.pdf)>
- United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 2017, *The demographic transition: Demography on the world stage*, viewed 25 July 2017. <[http://papp.iussp.org/sessions/papp101\\_s01/PAPP101\\_s01\\_090\\_010.html](http://papp.iussp.org/sessions/papp101_s01/PAPP101_s01_090_010.html)>
- Weeks, JR 2012, *An Introduction to population*, 11th edn., Cengage Learning, Boston.
- Wissink, M, Düvel, F & Van Eerdewijk, A 2013, 'Dynamic migration intentions and the impact of socio-institutional environments: A transit migration hub in Turkey', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 39, no. 7, pp. 1087-1105. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.778026>
- World Health Organization (WHO) 2012, *Urban population growth*, viewed 20 June 2015. <[http://www.who.int/gho/urban\\_health/situation\\_trends/urban\\_population\\_growth\\_text/en/index.html](http://www.who.int/gho/urban_health/situation_trends/urban_population_growth_text/en/index.html)>
- Yeboah, C 2016, 'Internal migration, remittances and welfare impacts: A case study in Dormaa Municipality, Ghana', *African Human Mobility Review*, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 567-595. <https://doi.org/10.14426/ahmr.v2i3.773>
- Zelinsky, W 1971, 'The hypothesis of the mobility transition', *Geographical Review*, vol. 61, no. 2, pp. 219-249. <https://doi.org/10.2307/213996>

### Chapter 3

- Babbie, E 2021, *The practice of social research*, 15th edn., Cengage Learning, Boston.
- Babbie, E & Mouton, J (eds.) 2001, *The practice of social research*, Oxford University Press, Cape Town.
- Berkowitz, P 2012, 'Census 2011: The (incomplete) (probably inaccurate) sum of us', *Daily Maverick*, 31 October, viewed 21 October 2017. <<https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-10-31-census-2011-the-incomplete-probably-inaccurate-sum-of-us/>>
- Czaika, M & Reinprecht, C 2022, 'Migration drivers: Why do people migrate?', in P Scholten (ed.), *Introduction to migration studies*, IMISCOE Research Series, Springer, Cham, pp. 49-82.
- Dale, A, Wathan, J & Higgins, V 2008, 'Secondary analysis of quantitative data sources', in P Alasuutari, L Bickman & J Branne (eds.), *The Sage handbook of social research methods*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, n.p.

- De Haas, H 2010a, 'Migration transitions: A theoretical and empirical inquiry into the developmental drivers of international migration', DEMIG (Determinants of International Migration) Project Paper No. 1, Working Paper 24, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford.
- De Wet, P 2012, 'Is Census 2011 accurate? Still depends on who you ask', *Mail & Guardian*, 01 November, viewed 01 November 2012. <<http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-01-is-census-2011-accurate-still-depends-who-you-ask>>
- Gelderblom, P 2006, 'A synthetic model of migration', in P Kok, D Gelderblom, J Oucho & J van Zyl (eds.), *Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and determinants*, HSRC Press, Cape Town, pp. 268–290.
- Hunter, LM & Nawrotzki, RJ 2016, 'Migration and the environment', in MJ White (ed.), *Handbook of migration and population distribution*, Springer, Cham, pp. 465–484.
- Kok, P & Collison, M 2006, *Migration and urbanisation in South Africa*, Report No. 03-04-02, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.
- Kok, P, Gelderblom, D, Oucho, JO & Van Zyl, J (eds.) 2006, *Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and determinants*, HSRC Press, Cape Town.
- Lindsay, B (ed.) 1985, *African migration and national development*, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park.
- Moses, E & Yu, D 2009, Migration from the Northern Cape. Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, Working Paper Number 32, SALDRU, University of Cape Town, Cape Town.
- Posel, D 2003, 'Have migration patterns in the post-apartheid South Africa changed?', paper presented at the *African Migration in Comparative Perspective Conference*, 04–07 June, Johannesburg.
- Posel, D 2010, 'Households and labour migration in post-apartheid South Africa', *Studies in Economics and Econometrics*, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 129–141. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10800379.2010.12097213>
- Rand Daily Mail 2015, 'New figures show staggering rate of urbanisation in SA', *Rand Daily Mail*, 26 May, viewed 29 February 2016. <<http://www.rdm.co.za/politics/2015/05/26/new-figures-show-staggering-rate-of-urbanisation-in-sa>>
- South African Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR) 2013, *South Africa goes with the urbanisation flow*, Press Release, South African Institute of Race Relations, 22 January, viewed 20 June 2015. <[http://irr.org.za/reports-and-publications/media-releases/Urbanisation%20-%2022\\_Jan\\_2013.pdf/](http://irr.org.za/reports-and-publications/media-releases/Urbanisation%20-%2022_Jan_2013.pdf/)>
- Statistical Commission 2020, 'A recommendation on the method to delineate cities, urban and rural areas for international statistical comparisons', paper prepared by the European Commission (Eurostat and DG for Regional and Urban Policy – ILO, FAO, OECD, UN-Habitat, World Bank), 03–06 March, Washington.
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) n.d., *Population census 1996: The count and how it was done*, viewed 10 July 2015. <<http://www.statssa.gov.za/census01/Census96/HTML/default.htm>>
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2003, *Census 2001: How the count was done*, Report No. 03-02-02 (2001), Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2012, *Census 2011. Highlights of key results*, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2014, *Census 2011 provincial profile: Northern Cape*, Report No. 03-01-72 (2011), Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.
- Tacoli, C & Satterthwaite, D 2003, *The urban part of rural development: The role of small and intermediate urban centres in rural and regional development*, International Institute for Environment and Development, London.
- Todes, A, Kok, P, Wentzel, M, Van Zyl, J & Cross, C 2010, 'Contemporary South African urbanization dynamics', *Urban Forum*, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 331–348. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12132-010-9094-5>



Turok, I & Borel-Saladin, J 2014, 'Is urbanisation in South Africa on a sustainable trajectory?', *Development Southern Africa*, vol. 31, no. 5, pp. 675–691. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2014.937524>

United Nations (UN) 2004, *World urbanization prospects: The 2003 revision*, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Publications, New York.

Weeks, JR 2012, *An introduction to population*, 11th edn., Cengage Learning, Boston.

## Chapter 4

Bekker, SB & Cramer, J 2003, 'Coloured migration in the Cape region at the beginning of the 21st century', *Acta Academica*, no. Suppl. 3, pp. 105–129.

Bekker, SB & Swart, K 2002, *Migration study in the Western Cape 2001: Report for the Provincial Government of the Western Cape*, Provincial Government of the Western Cape, Cape Town.

Bouwer, G n.d., *Regional economic growth*, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria, viewed 20 September 2015. <[http://www.statssa.gov.za/economic\\_growth/16%20Regional%20estimates.pdf](http://www.statssa.gov.za/economic_growth/16%20Regional%20estimates.pdf)>

Cox, KR, Hemson, D & Todes, A 2004, 'Urbanization in South Africa and the changing character of migrant labour', *South African Geographical Journal*, vol. 86, no. 1, pp. 7–16. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03736245.2004.9713802>

Cross, C 2006, 'Migrant motivations and capacities in relation to key migration streams', in P Kok, D Gelderblom, JO Oucho & J Van Zyl (eds.), *Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and determinants*, HSRC Press, Pretoria, pp. 205–226.

Department of Social Development (DSD) 2015, *Fifteen-year progress review of the implementation of the population policy for South Africa (1998) and the international conference on population and development (ICPD) programme of action (1994) @20*, Population Unit, DSD, Government Printing Works, Pretoria.

Human Science Research Council (HSRC) 2014, *State of poverty in South Africa*, Report for the National Development Agency, Economic Performance and Development Unit, HSRC Press, Cape Town.

King, R 2012, 'Theories and typologies of migration: An overview and a primer', *Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethic Relations*, vol. 3, no. 12, n.p.

Kok, P & Collison, M 2006, *Migration and urbanisation in South Africa*, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.

Makiwane, MB & Chimere-Dan, DOD 2010, *The people matter: The state of the population in the Eastern Cape*, Eastern Cape Department of Social Development, Research and Population Unit, King William's Town.

Overberg District Municipality 2015, *Integrated development plan. Review for 2015/16. [3rd. Review of 2012/17 Plan]*, Overberg District Municipality, viewed 10 August 2015. <<https://www.overstrand.gov.za/en/documents/strategic-documents/integrated-development-plan/1848-final-idp-review-2015-16-24-may-2015/file>>

Sachikonye, L 1998, 'Rethinking about labour markets and migration in Southern Africa', *Southern African Political and Economic Monthly*, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 14–20.

Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2001, *Census 2001: Census in brief*, Report No. 03-02-03, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.

Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2006, *Mid-year population estimates, South Africa*, Report No. P0302, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.

Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2012, *Census 2011: Highlights of key results*, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.

Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2015, *Economic growth*, viewed 05 April 2015. <[http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page\\_id=735&id=1](http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=735&id=1)>

- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2017, *Poverty trends in South Africa: An examination of absolute poverty between 2006 and 2015*, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.
- Stellenbosch University (SUN) 2000, *Proceedings of a graduate workshop on internal migration*, Occasional Paper No. 11, Department of Sociology, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch.
- West Coast District Municipality 2007, *Regional economic development strategy*, prepared by Silimela Development Services Consortium, West Coast District Municipality, Moorreesburg.
- West Coast District Municipality 2012, *Integrated development plan (IDP) 2012–2016 review 2 –Draft*, West Coast District Municipality, Moorreesburg.
- Western Cape Provincial Treasury 2013, *Provincial economic review and outlook (PERO)*, Western Cape Government, Cape Town.

## Chapter 5

- Atkinson, D & Marais, L 2007, *District socio-economic profile and development plans: Arid Areas Research Programme*, vol. 1, Centre for Development and Support, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein.
- Bathembu, C 2013, 'New SA universities named: South African Government News Agency', *SANews*, 25 July, viewed 12 August 2015. <[SANews.gov.za](http://SANews.gov.za)>
- BBC News 2005, 'In full: Mandela's poverty speech', *BBC News*, 03 February, viewed 29 April 2024. <[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk\\_politics/4232603.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4232603.stm)>
- Bekker, SB & Eigelaar-Meets, I 2004, *Migration patterns in the Northern Cape*, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch.
- Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) 2016, *ZF Mgcawu district Northern Cape: Profile and analysis*, District Development Model, viewed 05 May 2024. <[https://www.cogta.gov.za/cgta\\_2016/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ZF-MGCAWU-PROFILE-24062020.pdf](https://www.cogta.gov.za/cgta_2016/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ZF-MGCAWU-PROFILE-24062020.pdf)>
- Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA), 2020, *ZF Mgcawu District Northern Cape: Profile and analysis*, District Development Model, viewed 05 May 2024. <[https://www.cogta.gov.za/cgta\\_2016/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ZF-MGCAWU-PROFILE-24062020.pdf](https://www.cogta.gov.za/cgta_2016/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ZF-MGCAWU-PROFILE-24062020.pdf)>
- Department of Labour 2011, *Annual labour market bulletin – April 2010–March 2011*, Government Printing Works, Pretoria.
- ITS Engineers 2007, *Special development project: Siyanda District Municipality. Community Empowerment Impact Assessment Report: Phase 1*, Executive Summary, February 2007, South African National Roads Agency, s.l.
- Kok, P & Aliber, M 2005, *The causes and economic impact of human migration: Case studies of migration from the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape and Limpopo to the nine major cities in South Africa. Report to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) by the Human Research Council (HSRC)*, HSRC and DTI, Pretoria.
- Municipalities of South Africa n.d. *Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality (DC7)*, viewed 28 July 2024. <<https://municipalities.co.za/overview/137/pixley-ka-seme-district-municipality>>
- Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality 2006, *Pixley Ka Seme District growth and development strategy, 2006–2016*, Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality, s.l.
- Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality 2015, *Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality: Integrated development plan (IDP) 2015/2016 review*, Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality, s.l.
- South African Business 2021, *Food security and the vital role of agriculture in the Northern Cape*, 08 July, viewed 05 May 2024. <<https://www.southafricanbusiness.co.za/07/2021/agriculture-forestry-fishing/food-security-and-the-vital-role-of-agriculture-in-the-northern-cape/>>
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2001, *Census 2001: Census in brief*, Report No. 03-02-03, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.

- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2004, *Provincial profile 2004: Northern Cape*, Report No. 1: 00-09-03 (2004), Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2006, *Mid-year population estimates, South Africa*, Report No. P0302, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2012, *Census 2011. Highlights of key results*, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.

## Chapter 6

- 'Eviction despair: 850 remain in limbo', 2014, *Weekend Argus*, 07 June, viewed 26 May 2024. <<https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/eviction-despair-850-remain-in-limbo-1699985>>
- 'Macassar residents protest', 2014, *Times live*, 25 June, viewed 26 May 2024. <<https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2014-06-25-macassar-residents-protest/>>
- Atkinson, D 2007a, *District socio-economic profile and development plans*, vol. 1, The Arid Areas Programme, Centre for Development and Support, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein.
- Atkinson, D 2007b, 'Taking to the streets: Has developmental local government failed in South Africa', in S Buhlungu, J Daniel, R Southall & J Lutchman (eds.), *State of the Nation, South Africa 2007*, HSRC Press, Cape Town, pp. 53-77.
- Atkinson, D & Marais, L 2007, *District socio-economic profile and development plans: Arid Areas Research Programme*, vol. 1, Centre for Development and Support, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein.
- Bekker, SB 2006, 'Migration from South Africa's rural sending areas: Changing policies and changing destinations', in S Gallo-Mosala (ed.), *Migration to South Africa within international migration trends*, The Scalabrini Centre, Cape Town, pp. 51-62.
- Bekker, SB & Cramer, J 2003, 'Coloured migration in the Cape region at the beginning of the 21st century', *Acta Academica*, no. suppl. 3, pp. 105-129.
- Bekker, SB & Swart, K 2002, *Migration study in the Western Cape 2001: Report for the Provincial Government of the Western Cape*, Provincial Government of the Western Cape, Cape Town.
- Bouare, O 2001, 'Determinants of internal migration in South Africa', *Southern African Journal of Demography*, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 23-28.
- Canel, E 1997, 'New social movement and resource mobilization: The need for integration', in M Kaufman & H Dilla (eds.), *Community power and grassroots democracy*, Zed Books, London, pp. 189-221.
- Cleminshaw, D 1985, 'From Crossroads to Khayelitsha ... ?', *Reality: A Journal of Liberal and Radical Opinion*, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 11-14, viewed 12 May 2016. <[http://disa.ukzn.ac.za/sites/default/files/pdf\\_files/remar85.4.pdf](http://disa.ukzn.ac.za/sites/default/files/pdf_files/remar85.4.pdf)>
- Cross, C, Kok, P, Wentzel, M, Tlabela, K, Wier-Smith, G & Mafukidze, J 2005, *Poverty pockets in Gauteng: How poverty impacts migration*, Report to the Gauteng Inter-sectoral Development Unit, Urban, Rural and Economic Development, Human Science Research Council, Pretoria.
- Department of Economic Development and Tourism (DEDAT) 2012, *Northern Cape province economic potential and investment profile*, Provincial Government of the Northern Cape, s.l.
- Department of Labour 2011, *Annual labour market bulletin - April 2010-March 2011*, Government Printing Works, Pretoria.
- Department of the Premier, Western Cape Government 2006, *African Peer Review Mechanism: Provincial report Western Cape*, viewed 05 May 2024. <[https://repository.hsrc.ac.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.11910/6762/3873\\_Hadland\\_Africanpeerreviewmechanism.pdf?sequence=1](https://repository.hsrc.ac.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.11910/6762/3873_Hadland_Africanpeerreviewmechanism.pdf?sequence=1)>

- Felix, J 2014, 'Go back to the Eastern Cape – Residents', *IOL News for South Africa*, 10 June, viewed 24 May 2024. <<https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/go-back-to-eastern-cape-residents-1701056>>
- Freeman, D 2005, 'An explanation of conflict: Ethnicity, deprivation, and rationalization', paper presented at the *Kentucky Political Science Association 48th Annual Meeting*, 06–07 March, Louisville.
- Horner, D (ed.) 1983, *Labour preference, influx control and squatters: Cape Town entering the 1980s*, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) Working Paper, No. 50, SALDRU, Cape Town.
- Human Science Research Council (HSRC) 2008, *Citizenship, violence and xenophobia in South Africa: Perceptions from South African communities*, HSRC Press, Pretoria.
- Isaacs, L 2012, 'Violent protest over school in Grabouw', *IOL News for South Africa*, 06 March 2012, viewed 24 May 2024. <<https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2014-06-25-macassar-residents-protest/>>
- Jenkins, JC 1983, 'Resource mobilisation theory and the study of social movements', *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 9, pp. 527–553. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.09.080183.002523>
- Kent, G 1982, 'Meanings of development', *Human Systems Management*, vol. 3, pp. 188–194. <https://doi.org/10.3233/HSM-1982-3305>
- Kok, P, Gelderblom, D, Oucho, JO & Van Zyl, J (eds.) 2006, *Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and determinants*, HSRC Press, Cape Town.
- Kok, P 2003, 'Migration in Southern Africa: Theoretical, methodological and policy issues', paper presented at the *Joint Population Conference on Urban and Rural Sustainable Development*, 15–17 October, Potchefstroom.
- Kok, P & Aliber, M 2005, *The causes and economic impact of human migration: Case studies of migration from the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape and Limpopo to the nine major cities in South Africa*, Report to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) by the Human Research Council (HSRC), HSRC and DTI, Pretoria.
- Kok, P, O'Donovan, M & Miles, M 2000, 'Migration and unemployment', in *The state of South Africa's population 2000*, National Population Unit, Department of Social Development, Government Printing Works, Pretoria, n.p.
- Lindström, R & Moore, WH 1995, 'Deprived, rational or both? "Why minorities rebel" revisited', *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 23, no. 2, p. 167.
- Magni, P & Mcmanus, S 2017, 'Better demographic data for improved planning and problem solving South African cities', paper prepared for *Lightning Talk at the 2017 World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty*, 20–24 March, The World Bank, Washington DC.
- Maylam, P 1990, 'The rise and decline of urban apartheid in South Africa', *African Affairs*, vol. 89, no. 354, pp. 57–84. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a098280>
- Maylam, P 1995, 'Explaining the apartheid city: 20 Years of South African urban historiography', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 19–38.
- Mentzel, J 2010, 'Globalization, poverty, and conflict', *Social Dialogue*, vol. 3, no. 1, University of Utah e-Publication, viewed 20 June 2015. <<https://epubs.utah.edu/index.php/socialdialogue/article/view/328>>
- Ministry of Community Safety: Western Cape Government 2004, *Conflict between residents in Clanwilliam*, viewed 28 June 2024. <<https://www.westerncape.gov.za/news/conflict-between-residents-clanwilliam>>
- Misago, JP, Landau, LB & Monson, T 2009, *Towards tolerance, law, and dignity: Addressing violence against foreign nationals in South Africa*, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Pretoria.
- Mostert, WP, Oosthuizen, JS & Hofmeyer, BE 1991, *Demografie: Die studie van menslike bevolkings. Raad vir Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing*, University of Pretoria, Pretoria.

## References

- Municipal IQ 2012, *Municipal IQ's Municipal Hotspots results*, Press Release, 06 August, viewed 19 June 2018, <<https://www.municipaliq.co.za/publications/press/201208061008296873.docx>>
- Nkosi, B 2012, 'Children held to ransom for services', *Mail & Guardian*, 21 September, viewed 24 May 2024. <<https://mg.co.za/article/2012-09-21-children-held-to-ransom-for-services/>>
- OECD Data 2024, *Labour force participation date*, viewed 05 May 2024. <<https://data.oecd.org/emp/labour-force-participation-rate.htm#:~:text=Definition%20of%20Labour%20force%20participation%20rate%20The%20labour,measured%20as%20a%20percentage%20of%20each%20age%20group>>
- Roux, N 2009, *Towards a 10-year review of the population policy implementation in South Africa (1998-2008): Migration and urbanisation*, Department of Social Development, Pretoria.
- South African Cities Network (SACN) 2004, *State of the cities report*, South African Cities Network, Johannesburg.
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2001, *Census 2001: Census in brief*, Report No. 03-02-03, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2006, *Mid-year population estimates*, Report No. P0302, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.
- Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2012, *Census 2011: How the count was done*, Report No. 03-01-45, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2009, *Human development report. Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Walker, I & Smith, HJ (eds.) 2002, *Relative deprivation: Specification, development and integration*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Weeks, JR 2012, *An Introduction to population*, 11th edn., Cengage Learning, Boston.
- Williams, M & Fredericks, I 2012, 'Cape's day of race shame', *IOL News for South Africa*, 20 March, viewed 20 June 2018 <<https://www.iol.co.za/news/capes-day-of-race-shame-1260118>>
- Writer, S 2014, 'South Africa's economic champion', *BusinessTech*, 18 May, viewed 20 June 2018. <<http://businesstech.co.za/news/banking/57837/south-africas-economic-champion/>>
- Zelinsky, W 1971, 'The hypothesis of the mobility transition', *Geographical Review*, vol. 61, no. 2, pp. 219-249. <https://doi.org/10.2307/213996>

## Chapter 7

- Ahmed, SA, Cruz, M, Quillin, B & Schellekens, P, 2016, *Demographic change and development. A global typology*, Development Prospects Group, World Bank, Washington.
- Atkinson, D & Marais, L 2006, 'Urbanisation and the future urban agenda in South Africa', in R Tomlinson, U Pillay & J Du Toit (eds.), *Democracy and delivery: Urban policy in South Africa*, HSRC Press, Cape Town, pp. 22-49.
- Bekker, SB, Buthelezi, S, Manona, C, Mlambo, B & Van Zyl, A 1997, 'Local government transition in five eastern seaboard South African towns', *Politicon*, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 38-56. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02589349708705040>
- Blench, R 1996, 'Aspects of resource conflicts in semi-arid Africa', *Natural Resource Perspective*, vol. 16, pp. 2-9.
- Brooks, N & Winkels, A 2011, *Moving on: Towards a policy framework for addressing climate change and migration*, Unpublished report prepared for UNDP, February 2011.
- Buhlungu, S & Atkinson, D 2007, 'Politics: Introduction', in S Buhlungu, J Daniel, R Southall & J Lutchman (eds.), *State of the nation: South Africa 2007*, HSRC Press, Cape Town, pp. 27-34.
- Cameron, R 1988, 'The institutionalisation parameters of local government restructuring in South Africa', in C Heymans & G Töttemeyer (eds.), *Government by the people*, Chelsea Press, Cape Town, pp. 49-62.

- Cape Winelands District Municipality 2015/2016, *Integrated Development Plan (IDP)*, Cape Winelands District Municipality, s.l.
- Carrim, Y 2001, 'Bridging the gap between ideas and practice: Challenges of the new local government system', *Umbrabulo*, vol. 10, viewed 12 January 2010. <[www.anc.org.za//umrabulo10c.html](http://www.anc.org.za//umrabulo10c.html)>
- Carrim, Y 2011, 'Participatory planning in local government in South Africa: Policy, legislation and practice', *International Conference on Emerging Experiences in Decentralised Planning*, 24–25 March, Anand.
- Central Karoo District Municipality 2012/2017, *Integrated Development Plan (IDP)*, Central Karoo District Municipality, s.l.
- City of Cape Town (CoCT) 2015/2016. *Integrated Development Plan (IDP)*, City of Cape Town, Cape Town
- Cross, C, Mngadi, T, Mlambo, N, Pretorius, H, Mbhele, T & Bekker, S 1997, *Locating productive small farmers: Population shifts & land reform on the Eastern Seaboard*, Summary interim report to the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), Halfway House: DBSA, Johannesburg.
- Crush, J & Williams, V 2001, *Making up the numbers: Measuring 'illegal immigration' to South Africa*, Migration Policy Brief No. 3, Southern African Migration Project, Cape Town.
- De Visser, JW 2005, *Developmental local government: A case study of South Africa*, Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape and Institute of Constitutional and Administrative Law, Utrecht University, Intersentia nv, Antwerp.
- Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) 1998, *White Paper on Local Government*, 09 March, viewed 15 July 2024. <[https://www.cogta.gov.za/cgta\\_2016/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/whitepaper\\_on\\_Local-Gov\\_1998.pdf](https://www.cogta.gov.za/cgta_2016/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/whitepaper_on_Local-Gov_1998.pdf)>
- Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) 2012, *Revised IDP framework for municipalities outside metros and secondary cities*, Government Printing Works, Pretoria.
- Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) 2002a, *Integrated development plan (IDP) format guide*, Government Printing Works, Pretoria.
- Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) 2002b, *IDP guide pack: General overview*, Government Printing Works, Pretoria.
- Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) 2008, *Integrated development plan (IDP) format guide*, Government Printing Works, Pretoria, viewed 08 June 2015. <<https://www.westerncape.gov.za/general-publication/integrated-development-planning-idp-guide-pack>>
- Department of Social Development (DSD) 2010, *Progress review of the implementation of the white paper on population policy for South Africa (1998) and the ICPD programme of action (1994)*, Government Printing Works, Pretoria.
- Duffy, B & Frere-Smith, T 2014, *Perceptions and reality: Public attitudes to immigration*, Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute, London.
- Eden District Municipality 2015/2016, *Integrated Development Plan (IDP)*, Eden District Municipality, s.l.
- Educational and Training Unit for Democracy and Development (ETU) 2015b, *Understanding Local Government*, viewed 20 August 2015. <<https://www.etu.org.za/toolbox/docs/localgov/webundrstdlocgov.html>>
- Fast, H & Kallis, D 2004, 'Local government asymmetry and the intergovernmental fiscal system in South Africa', Panel on the evolving role of local government in the IGFR system, paper presented at the *2004 Financial and Fiscal Commission Conference*, 10–12 August, Cape Town.
- Freeman, D 2005, 'An explanation of conflict: Ethnicity, deprivation, and rationalization', paper presented at the *Kentucky Political Science Association 48th Annual Meeting*, 06–07 March, Louisville.

## References

- Guite, LTS 2012, 'Internal migration and conflict among ethnic groups of Northeast India', *International Journal of Social Science Tomorrow*, vol. 1, no. 9, n.p.
- International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 2009, *Towards tolerance, law, and dignity: Addressing violence against foreign nationals in South Africa*, Arcadia, Pretoria.
- Ki-Moon, B 2013, *Secretary-General's remarks to high-level dialogue on international migration and development*, 03 October, viewed 24 May 2024. <<https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2013-10-03/secretary-generals-remarks-high-level-dialogue-international-migration-and-development>>
- Landau, LB 2005a, *Migration, urbanisation and sustainable livelihoods in South Africa*, Migration Policy Brief, No. 15, Southern African Migration Project, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
- Landau, LB 2005b, 'Urbanisation, nativism, and the rule of law in South Africa's "forbidden" cities', *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 26, no. 7, pp. 1115-1134.
- Landau, LB 2008, 'Decentralisation, migration and development in South Africa's primary cities', in A Wa Kabwe-Segatti & LB Landau (eds.), *Migration in post-apartheid South Africa: Challenges and questions to policy-makers*, Agence Française de Développement (AFD), Département de la Recherche, Paris, pp. 163-211.
- Landau, LB 2009, 'Changing local government responses to migration in South Africa', workshop input for conference *Urban-rural Linkages and Migration: A Potential for Poverty Alleviation in Developing Countries?*, 16-17 September, Dortmund.
- Landau, LB, Segatti, A & Misago, JP 2011, *Governing migration & urbanisation in South African municipalities: Developing approaches to counter poverty and social fragmentation*, Report for the South African Local Government Association (SALGA), South African Local Government Association, Pretoria.
- Lindström, R & Moore, WH 1995, 'Deprived, rational or both? "Why minorities rebel" revisited', *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 23, no. 2, p. 167.
- Main, E (ed.) 2020, *The local government handbook South Africa 2020: A complete guide to municipalities in South Africa*, Yes!Media, Cape Town.
- Malan, L 2005, 'Intergovernmental relations and co-operative government in South Africa: The ten-year review', *Politeia*, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 226-243.
- Mello, DM 2010, 'Governmental relations in a maturing South African democracy', in MK Kwandiwe & HM Moshypye (eds.), *The Zuma administration: Critical challenges*, HSRC Press, Pretoria, pp. 95-106.
- Mello, DM & Maserumule, MH 2010, 'Intergovernmental relations and integrated development planning (IDP) in South Africa', *Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 45, no. special issue 1, pp. 283-294.
- Mentzel, J 2010, 'Globalization, poverty, and conflict', *Social Dialogue*, vol. 3, no. 1, viewed 20 June 2015. <<https://epubs.utah.edu/index.php/socialdialogue/article/view/328>>
- Municipal IQ 2012, *Municipal IQ's Municipal Hotspots results*, Press Release, *Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000)*, Municipal IQ, Johannesburg.
- Nel, E & Binns, T 2001, 'Initiating "developmental local government" in South Africa: Evolving local economic development policy', *Regional Studies*, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 355-370. <https://doi.org/10.1080/713693816>
- Nzimakwe, TI & Pillay, P 214, 'Enhancing service delivery through decentralisation: A South African experience', *African Journal of Public Affairs*, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 16-29.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2018, *How immigrants contribute to South Africa's economy*, OECD Development Centre, Paris.
- Overstrand Municipality 2013/214, *Integrated Development Plan (IDP)*, Overstrand Municipality, s.l.
- Penderis, S 2012, 'Theorizing participation: From tyranny to emancipation', *Journal of African and Asian Local Government Studies*, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 1-28.

- Penderis, S 2014, *Participatory governance and the politics of space in Delft*, African Centre for Citizenship & Democracy (ACCED), University of the Western Cape, Cape Town.
- Penderis, S & Tapscott, C 2014, 'The establishment of a developmental local state in South Africa: Between rhetoric and reality', paper presented at the *23rd World Congress of Political Science*, 19–24 July, Montreal.
- Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality, 2006-2011, *Integrated Development Plan (IDP)*, Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality, s.l.
- Phago, K 2009, 'The integrated development plan (IDP) in South African local government: The case of the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality', *Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 483–491.
- Pycroft 2000, 'Democracy and delivery: The rationalization of local government in South Africa', *International Review of Administration Sciences*, vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 143–159. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852300661011>
- Rauch, T 2002, *Principles of integrated development planning and assessment of the process: 2001/2002*, Democracy Development Programme, Pretoria.
- Republic of South Africa (RSA) 1996, *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996*, Government Gazette, No. 17678, Vol. 378 (Act No. 108, 1996) (December), Government Printing Works, Pretoria.
- Republic of South Africa (RSA) 2005, *Intergovernmental Relations Act, 2005 (Act 13)*, viewed 15 July 2024. <<https://www.gov.za/documents/intergovernmental-relations-framework-act>>
- Roux, N 2009, *Towards a 10-year review of the population policy implementation in South Africa (1998/2008): Migration and urbanisation*, Department of Social Development, Republic of South Africa, Pretoria.
- Ruhiiga, TM 2014, 'Urbanisation in South Africa: A critical review of policy, planning and practice', *Supplement on Population Issues in South Africa*, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 610–622.
- Steytler, N & Fessha, Y 2005, *Defining provincial and local government powers and functions: The management of concurrency*, Unpublished, Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town.
- The Presidency 2004, *Harmonising and aligning: The national spatial development perspective, provincial growth and development strategies and municipal integrated development plans*, Report prepared by the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services, Government Printing Works, Pretoria.
- Turok, I 2012, *Urbanisation and development in South Africa: Economic imperatives, spatial distortions and strategic responses*, Urbanizing and Emerging Population Issues, Working Paper No. 8, International Institute for Environment and Development, United Nations Population Fund, London
- Turok, I 2014, 'The urbanization-development nexus in the RICS', in S Parnell & S Oldfield (eds.), *The Routledge handbook on cities in the global south*, Routledge, London, pp. 122–138.
- Van Der Waldt, G 2002, 'Key challenges for local government – The road whereto?', *Word in Action*, vol. 42, no. 382, pp. 24–27.
- Von Hofsten, EAG 1977, *Demography and development*, Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm.
- Weeks, JR 2012, *An Introduction to population*, 11th edn., Cengage Learning, Boston.
- Wentzel, M & Tlabela, K 2006, 'Historical background to South African migration', in P Kok, J Gelderblom, JO Oucho & J Van Zyl (eds.) 2006, *Migration in South and Southern Africa*, HSRC Publishers, Cape Town, pp. 71–96.
- West Coast District Municipality 2015/2016, *Integrated Development Plan (IDP)*, West Coast District Municipality, s.l.
- West Coast District Municipality 2015/2016, *West Coast District Municipality Annual Report*, viewed 23 June 2018. <<http://westcoastdm.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Annual-Report-2015-2016-final-3.pdf>>



## Chapter 8

- Bernard, A, Bell, M & Charles-Edwards, C 2017, 'Life course transitions and the age profile of internal migration', *Population and Development Review*, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 213–239.
- Cox, KR, Hemson, D & Todes, A 2004, 'Urbanization in South Africa and the changing character of migrant labour', *South African Geographical Journal*, vol. 86, no. 1, pp. 7–16. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03736245.2004.9713802>
- De Haas, H 2010b, 'The internal dynamics of migration processes: A theoretical inquiry', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 36, no. 10, pp. 227–264.
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2005, *Internal migration and development: A global perspective*, IOM Migration Research Series, No. 19, International Organization for Migration, Geneva.
- Ki-Moon, B 2013, 'Secretary-General's remarks to high-level dialogue on international migration and development', 03 October 2013, viewed 30 May 2024. <<https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2013-10-03/secretary-generals-remarks-high-level-dialogue-international-migration-and-development>>
- King, R 2012, 'Theories and typologies of migration: An overview and a primer', *Willy Brandt series of working papers in international migration and ethnic Relations*, vol. 3, no. 12, pp. 2–15.
- Lindsay, B (ed.) 1985, *African migration and national development*, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, pp. 1–14.
- Oucho, JO & Gould, WTS 1993, 'Internal migration, urbanization, and population distribution', in KA Foote, H Hill & LG Martin (eds.), *Demographic change in sub-Saharan Africa*, National Academies Press, Washington, pp. 256–289.
- Posel, D 2003, 'Have migration patterns in the post-apartheid South Africa changed?', paper presented at the *African Migration in Comparative Perspective Conference*, 04–07 June, Johannesburg.
- Todes, A, Kok, P, Wentzel, M, Van Zyl, J & Cross, C 2010, 'Contemporary South African urbanization dynamics', *Urban Forum*, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 331–348. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12132-010-9094-5>

# Index

## A

abolishment, 13, 79, 165, 167  
administration, 19, 72, 140, 150, 157–158, 163, 165, 177  
administrative, 9, 27, 35, 71–72, 75, 78, 81, 136–137, 156–157, 181, 186  
administrator, 168  
agricultural, 20–21, 28, 58, 73, 101, 104–105, 116–117, 121–128, 130, 132, 142, 152, 183  
agriculture, 20–21, 28, 72, 96, 101–102, 121, 124, 131  
Agulhas, 19, 101–102  
analysis, 3, 22–23, 29, 31, 35, 37, 41, 44, 46, 51–52, 54–55, 67–72, 74–78, 80–81, 83–87, 90–91, 93–95, 97–98, 104, 110, 112–115, 118–119, 123–124, 130, 132, 136, 141, 149, 153, 162, 166–167, 169–173, 178, 183–186  
ANC, 13–14, 26, 154, 158, 176  
annexation, 24, 26, 127  
apartheid, 1, 3–4, 6–9, 11, 13–15, 18, 27, 36–37, 53, 69–71, 77–79, 89, 105, 109, 129–130, 135, 150–151, 154, 158, 164–166, 176, 182  
applied sociology, 31, 34  
area, 2–4, 6–11, 13–14, 17–20, 22, 24, 26–29, 34, 42–48, 50–56, 60–65, 67–68, 71–73, 75, 80, 93–94, 96, 98–103, 105–106, 114–116, 122, 120–126, 128, 131–134, 136, 140–145, 150–152, 154–160, 171–172, 174–175, 182–187

## B

Bantustans, 8, 10, 18, 151  
Bergrivier, 19, 102–103  
boundaries, 18, 24, 27, 29, 41, 43, 52, 71–72, 75–77, 80–85, 90, 97–98, 104, 106, 110, 118–119, 125, 128, 132, 135–137, 151, 158, 166, 170, 181, 186–187

## C

Cederberg, 19, 102–103  
census, 4, 13, 21, 23, 29–31, 71–72, 74–78, 82–87, 90–91, 93, 95–97, 105, 110, 114, 125, 127, 169, 185  
Clanwilliam, 19, 142, 149, 165  
classification, 6–8, 11, 13, 14, 71, 73, 79, 95, 132, 184

Colesberg, 25, 27, 124  
colonial, 17–18, 24–26, 69, 77–78, 105, 154  
colonialists, 3, 17, 24, 127  
colonisation, 16–17, 25, 59, 127  
colony, 16–18, 24–26, 127  
coloured, 3–4, 6, 10–14, 23, 53, 69, 71, 79, 91–94, 101, 103–104, 106, 111, 113–114, 116, 125, 127–128, 131, 141, 143, 151–152, 155  
communities, 2, 4, 6–8, 11, 18, 33, 37, 40, 49, 52–54, 57, 60, 63–64, 74–75, 100–101, 103, 120, 129, 133, 139–147, 149–150, 153, 156, 158–163, 165, 167–170, 172, 174–176, 178–179, 181, 186–187  
conceptualisation, 136  
conflict, 17, 25, 50, 140, 142, 144–147, 149–150, 167  
Constitution, 14–15, 72, 155–159, 163, 173, 177, 182  
contextualising, 16, 67, 100, 116, 121, 173, 178

## D

data, 1, 4, 15, 22–23, 29, 31, 35–37, 44, 46, 67–68, 70–72, 74–78, 82, 84–87, 89–94, 97–100, 102–106, 109–112, 114, 119–120, 123, 125–127, 129–134, 136–140, 142, 144, 146, 148–150, 152, 162, 168–170, 173, 175–176, 178, 185–187  
dataset, 31, 74, 76, 78, 84–86, 185  
democracy, 14–15, 153–154, 160, 166, 177  
democratic, 13–14, 18, 26, 37, 105, 130, 150, 153–155, 158–159, 162, 164–165, 176, 184  
democratisation, 13, 69, 154, 166–167, 182  
demographic, 1–4, 8, 11, 13, 36, 40, 47, 51, 57–60, 62, 68–69, 73, 79–80, 89, 91, 106, 109, 111, 129, 139–140, 150, 152–153, 163, 168–169, 173–174, 178–179, 181–182, 185–187  
demographic data, 1, 168, 178, 186  
development, 1–6, 8–10, 12–16, 18, 20–22, 24, 26, 28, 30–42, 46–48, 52–54, 56–57, 59–60, 63–65, 67, 73–74, 77, 89, 95, 101–102, 106, 109–110, 117, 129, 134, 137–140, 145, 150, 152–170, 172–179, 181–182, 184–188

development planning, 1-4, 6, 8, 10, 12,  
14-16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34,  
36-41, 59, 64-65, 67, 89, 109-110, 129,  
137-140, 150, 152-154, 156, 158-160,  
162-164, 166, 168, 170, 172-178, 181-182,  
184-188

dislocating effects, 37, 140, 144, 153

distribution, 1, 13, 16, 21, 32, 47, 52-54, 60,  
85, 93, 100, 105, 114-115, 118, 121, 127,  
136-137, 139-140, 147, 154, 168-171,  
186-187

district, 11, 19-22, 26-30, 37, 71-73, 77-78,  
81-83, 90, 93-94, 96-107, 110, 114-128,  
132, 134, 136-139, 144, 151-152, 154, 157,  
162, 165, 168-176, 183, 186

## E

economic, 2-7, 9, 11-15, 17, 19-21, 28-29,  
32-34, 40-42, 44, 46-47, 50-53, 55,  
58-64, 67, 72-73, 77, 79-80, 95-97,  
101-102, 105-107, 116-118, 121-124, 126,  
128, 130-135, 137, 140-141, 144-145,  
149-152, 154, 156, 158-159, 163-175,  
177-179, 181-187

economically, 105, 107, 154, 172

economics, 33, 46-47, 49-50, 52, 64

economy, 7, 8, 11, 19-20, 27-29, 40, 49-50,  
58, 61-63, 73, 79, 95-96, 101, 105, 107,  
116-117, 122-124, 126-128, 130-131, 133,  
142, 151-152, 156-157, 162, 166, 172,  
183-184

education, 34, 48, 55, 58, 64, 96-97, 128,  
140, 142, 168, 172

employment, 5, 7, 10, 20, 28, 32, 42-43,  
46-50, 52, 61, 63, 96-97, 101, 104-105,  
107, 116-118, 121, 123-124, 126-128,  
130-134, 136, 142, 149, 159, 163-164,  
169, 172, 183

environment, 13, 33, 43-45, 52, 55, 61,  
63-64, 67, 96, 105-106, 128, 130,  
133, 141, 148-149, 151, 156, 162-163,  
165, 177

environmental, 44, 48, 51, 80

Europe, 4, 16, 32, 42, 46, 58

## F

farm, 20, 23-25, 42, 48, 78, 104, 123, 126,  
134, 141-142

farmer, 12, 16, 17, 24, 127

farming, 29, 116, 122-124

fertility, 1-2, 40, 57-59, 62, 79, 84-85,  
139-140, 168-169, 174

findings, 4, 6, 36-37, 39, 61, 67-68, 84,  
89-90, 93, 105, 109, 125, 129-130, 146,  
150, 153, 159-160, 177

## G

Gaetsewe, 27-28, 30, 114, 116, 120-121,  
125-126, 138, 144, 165, 170, 172

Gauteng, 14, 19, 44, 90-95, 103, 106, 113-116,  
125-126, 128, 131-132, 146

GDP, 19-21, 28, 32, 102, 169

governance, 6, 14-15, 26, 33, 37, 122, 146,  
154-159, 176-177, 182

governance framework, 6, 14-15

government, 2-4, 6-9, 12-15, 17-19, 26-27, 31,  
34-35, 37-38, 49-50, 51-53, 61, 69, 72,  
89, 109, 128-129, 133-134, 142, 144-146,  
153-167, 173-179, 186-187

## H

homelands, 7-8, 10, 18, 26, 73

Hopetown, 11, 24-25, 27

household, 2, 4, 24, 46-47, 49-53, 56,  
60-65, 74-75, 78-79, 95-96, 104, 134,  
141-143, 146, 164, 166, 169-170, 172, 185

hypothesis, 35, 52, 58, 64, 148

## I

immigration, 9, 48-49, 59, 163

indigenous, 3, 17, 24-25

infrastructure, 15, 24, 34, 97, 116, 134, 137,  
141-142, 145-146, 149, 154, 156-157,  
165-166, 172, 178, 183

integrated development planning (IDP), 15,  
38, 159-162, 167-173, 175-179

internal migration, 1-6, 8, 10, 12-14, 16, 18,  
20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36-40,  
42-44, 46, 48, 50, 52-54, 56, 58-60,  
62, 64, 67-72, 74-76, 78, 80-82, 84,  
86, 86-90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 100, 102,  
104, 106, 109-110, 112, 114, 116, 118, 120,  
122, 124, 126, 128-131, 136-137, 151, 153,  
162, 164-166, 168, 176, 181-188

internal migration and development  
planning, 1-2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16,  
18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36,  
38-39, 67, 89, 109, 129, 153, 181-182,  
184, 186, 188

international migration, 4-5, 43, 49,  
53-54, 164

inter-provincial flows, 90, 11

intra-provincial flows, 86, 107, 129, 138

## K

Kakamas, 27-28, 123

Kareeberg, 27, 124-125

Karoo, 18-22, 27, 29, 99-100, 137-138, 170

Keimoes, 28, 123

Kgalagadi, 27, 122

Kgatelopele, 27, 122-123

- Khara, 122-123  
 Kheis, 27, 122-123  
 Khoekhoe, 17, 24  
 Khoesan, 17, 24  
 Kimberley, 23 24-28, 124-125, 127-128
- L**  
 land, 17-18, 21, 24-26, 29, 48, 62, 122,  
 126-127, 143-144, 154, 166  
 legislative framework, 155-159, 161-163,  
 173-174  
 local government, 15, 19, 27, 37-38, 72, 89,  
 109, 129, 146, 153-160, 162-163, 166,  
 173-179, 186
- M**  
 migrants, 2-5, 8, 10-11, 13-14, 40-44, 46-48,  
 50, 52-57, 59-65, 69-71, 74, 76-84,  
 86, 90-107, 110-128, 130-138, 140-141,  
 144, 150-152, 164-167, 173-174, 176, 178,  
 182-185, 186  
 migration, 1-10, 12-16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26,  
 28, 30, 32, 34, 36-65, 67-72, 74-87,  
 89-107, 109-141, 144-146, 150-154, 156,  
 158, 160, 162-179, 181-188  
 migration and development planning in  
 practice, 163-176  
 migration trends, 3, 6, 16, 36-37, 59, 67-68,  
 70-72, 74, 76-80, 82, 84, 86-87, 89-90,  
 94-95, 97, 100, 109-110, 113, 116-119, 121,  
 126, 129-130, 134, 138, 140-141, 153, 166,  
 168-169, 171-175, 178, 181-183
- N**  
 Namakwa, 27-28, 30, 120-121, 137-138,  
 170-171, 173  
 Namaqualand, 24, 127  
 Namibia, 121, 123-124  
 Natal, 18-19, 26, 93, 95, 106, 110, 113, 146, 158  
 Northern Cape, 3-4, 9, 13, 16, 18, 23-30,  
 36-37, 42, 68-72, 74-78, 80, 82, 85,  
 89, 92, 109-118, 120-135, 137-138, 141,  
 144-146, 149-153, 157, 165, 168-173,  
 176, 178, 181-184
- O**  
 outmigrants, 43, 81, 93, 132  
 outmigration, 111, 40, 151  
 Overberg, 19-22, 99-103, 138, 170  
 Overstrand, 19, 61, 99, 101-102, 106
- P**  
 policies, 3-4, 6-12, 13-15, 18, 21, 31, 35,  
 49-50, 52-53, 59-60, 69, 78-79, 134,  
 150-151, 154, 156-157, 160, 163, 165-167,  
 171, 177, 182, 185-187  
 population, 1-14, 16-23, 27-31, 36-37, 40, 44,  
 48, 55, 57-60, 62, 67, 69-71, 73-76,  
 78-85, 87, 89-94, 96, 98, 100-101,  
 103-107, 109-111, 113-116, 118-121,  
 125-130, 132, 134-136, 139-141, 143-145,  
 150-153, 158, 164, 166-175, 178-179,  
 181-182, 184-187  
 population distribution, 16, 100, 105, 121, 127,  
 136, 139, 187  
 post-apartheid, 1, 6, 14-15, 36-37, 69-71, 77,  
 79, 89, 109, 129-130, 135, 150, 154  
 poverty, 33, 36, 48, 59, 63, 95, 130, 151, 154,  
 168-169, 176, 185-188
- R**  
 recommendations, 38, 185  
 Renosterberg, 27, 124-125  
 rural, 8, 13, 19, 21, 26-27, 31, 35-36, 43,  
 46-48, 54, 58-65, 69, 72-73, 103-105,  
 116, 125, 127, 132-134, 137, 141, 151-152,  
 164-165, 167, 172, 183-184, 187
- S**  
 Saldanha, 19, 99, 102-103, 171  
 San, 17, 24-25  
 Seme, 27-28, 114, 116-117, 119-126, 138,  
 170, 172  
 Siyancuma, 27, 121, 124-125  
 Siyanda, 27, 132, 170  
 socioeconomic, 32, 57, 78, 95, 168, 170,  
 174, 178  
 sociology, 31, 34-36, 64, 147  
 South Africa, 1, 3-7, 9-10, 13-19, 22-24,  
 26-28, 30, 36, 39-42, 44, 53, 67,  
 70-73, 76-77, 79, 89, 94-96, 105,  
 109-110, 117, 124, 126, 128-129, 133, 135,  
 142, 144-146, 153-154, 157-159, 163-167,  
 176, 181-182, 184-186, 188  
 spatial, 15, 41, 43, 45-48, 55, 58, 60, 71, 75,  
 79-81, 102, 154, 167  
 statistical, 41, 71-75, 84-85, 149, 171-173,  
 178, 185  
 statistics, 14, 18, 20, 34, 41, 71, 73, 94-95,  
 105, 169, 172  
 StatsSA, 13-14, 18-19, 21-22, 28, 30-31,  
 41, 44, 71-72, 74-75, 78, 84-85, 87,  
 90-92, 94-95, 98-100, 102-103,  
 110-112, 114-115, 117, 119-120, 123, 125,  
 131, 138, 185  
 Stellenbosch, 19, 57-59, 103  
 Swartland, 19, 99, 102-103  
 Swellendam, 19, 101-102
- T**  
 theoretical framework, 34, 37, 64, 68, 77, 79,  
 87, 89, 109, 146

## Index

trends, 1-3, 6-8, 16, 30-32, 36-37, 44-46, 59, 67-72, 74-80, 82-87, 89-101, 103-106, 109-111, 113-121, 123-127, 129-130, 132, 134, 136-141, 151, 153, 166, 168-169, 171-175, 178, 181-184, 186

## U

Ubuntu, 27, 124-125  
undercount, 85-86, 90, 97-98, 101-102, 110-112, 118, 138  
underdevelopment, 31, 154, 166, 176, 188  
UNDP, 33, 63, 134, 150  
unemployment, 32, 48, 50, 62, 95, 117, 131, 133, 143, 163-164, 171, 173  
Upington, 11, 27-29, 122-125  
urbanisation, 3-4, 6-9, 13-14, 18, 36-37, 42, 44, 59, 61, 69-70, 73, 79, 82, 103,

105-106, 125-126, 130, 134-136, 141, 151, 153, 164-167, 170-171, 182-184, 186-187

## V

variables, 2, 14, 35, 42, 46, 51, 56, 68, 70, 79-80, 83, 89, 106, 109, 135, 169-170, 178, 181

## W


Western Cape, 3-5, 13-22, 24, 26, 29, 36-37, 42-44, 68-71, 74-78, 80, 82, 85, 89-98, 100, 102-107, 113-116, 124-126, 129-132, 135, 137-138, 141-143, 145-146, 151-153, 157, 165-166, 170-173, 176, 178, 181-184  
Winelands, 19-22, 93-94, 96, 98-100, 103-106, 132, 138, 170

This scholarly book aims to illustrate the importance of incorporating internal migration data into development planning initiatives and processes to gain insight into both short- and long-term social changes.

This publication draws on census data pertaining to internal migration flows in the Northern Cape and Western Cape provinces of South Africa. The author analyses, compares and presents data across three post-apartheid periods ranging from 1996–2001, 2001–2006 and 2006–2011 to illustrate how current forces drive and direct migration flows and how this impacts the social dynamics within the two provinces.

This book highlights three significant shifts when comparing the two provinces' pre- and post-1994 internal migration trends. First, it examines the change in the political context framing mobility. Second, it explores the change in the types of internal migration flows sustaining urbanisation. Third, and lastly, it analyses the changing profile of mobile migrants in the Northern Cape and Western Cape.

*Internal migration and development planning in South Africa* makes a compelling case for a strategic and coordinated approach by governments by demonstrating the influence of political and economic forces on internal migration flows and their impact on community social dynamics. Such an approach is essential to address the increasing developmental constraints and challenges posed by internal migration in post-apartheid South Africa.



Open access at  
[https://doi.org/10.4102/  
aosis.2024.BK463](https://doi.org/10.4102/aosis.2024.BK463)



ISBN: 978-1-991269-11-9