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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE COLD WAR

Competition, Cooperation, and Convergence

Edited by Sandrine Kott, Eva-Maria Muschik & Elisabeth Roehrlich

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Sandrine Kott, Eva-Maria Muschik, and
Elisabeth Roehrlich
June 2024

Part I

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1

Introduction: International Organizations and the Cold War

Sandrine Kott, Eva-Maria Muschik, and Elisabeth Roehrlich

During the Covid-19 pandemic the World Health Organization (WHO)—an intergovernmental organization founded in 1948—received massive attention. In countries across the globe, both the WHO's shortcomings and its capacities became the subject of fierce public and political debate. The European Union (EU)—whose predecessor organization dates back to 1951—has long been the target of populist nationalism, of which the 2020 "Brexit" vote, which led to the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU, was perhaps the most salient result. At the same time, concerns about the emergence of a "new Cold War," which have increased with Russia's full-scale war on Ukraine since February 2022, have intensified calls for a strengthened role of the EU in military and defense cooperation. Fears of the destructive potential of new technologies, meanwhile, have led to calls for global governance approaches to artificial intelligence, including a proposal to establish a regulatory international organization modeled on the International Atomic Energy Agency, founded in 1957.

At a time of both growing distrust and renewed interest in international organizations, we argue, it is vital to better understand their various roles during the twentieth century, their potential limitations and capacities as well as their abilities to change over time. Most of the international organizations that are currently active emerged during the Cold War period (1940s to 1989/91). Yet scholars are only beginning to examine more closely how exactly international organizations were affected by, and in turn shaped, this period. To address this gap, this volume sets out to explore the intricate relationship between international organizations and the Cold War. While often presented as paralyzed or irrelevant, we argue that international organizations served as important sites of competition, cooperation, and convergence during the Cold War.

The aim of this volume is to showcase different functions that international organizations served during the Cold War period: as sites of conflict, mediation, and as bridges between various camps, states, networks, individuals, and agendas. In doing so, we aim to demonstrate the importance of international organizations

to both twentieth and twenty-first century history and to add nuance to traditional histories of the Cold War.

Cold War Internationalism: A Paradox?

One can broadly distinguish between two types of international organizations: 1) intergovernmental organizations that come into existence through formal agreements between states and in which governments are represented by national delegations, and 2) nongovernmental nonprofit organizations with international membership and/or aspirations.[1] While the origins of these new types of international institutions date back to the nineteenth century, the second half of the twentieth century saw a surge in numbers and fields of operation for international organizations.[2] This period is most commonly associated with the Cold War, which is typically defined as a time of antagonistic bloc politics of global proportions. The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as their respective allies, and the competing economic orders of capitalism and communism, affected economic and cultural relations, led to a global nuclear arms race, and created a climate of distrust in international relations.[3] Yet, this era also overlapped with a golden age of internationalism.

During the decades following the Second World War, internationalism—both wish and attempt to cooperate across national boundaries—became a feature of the Cold War as an ideology and as a practice. The Cold War as an ideological struggle was in itself truly internationalist: each bloc sought to promote an ostensibly universal model for organizing societies worldwide and thus its own path to modernity. International organizations offered themselves as spaces and means for this competition, for instance in the field of development aid.[4] But, as this volume demonstrates, they also facilitated cooperation among Cold War antagonists when they pursued shared interests, for example in the realm of nuclear nonproliferation. Finally, international organizations were also places for the circulation of expertise. This promoted a form of internationalization of knowledge, which could lead to convergences between seemingly antagonistic systems.

The Cold War itself, its struggles and concerns, prompted the creation of a vast number of new international organizations—global and regional, both Western and Eastern as well as non-aligned ones. Refugees in Europe after the Second World War were one such Cold War concern that resulted in international institution-building. The question of whether displaced persons would be "returned" to the Soviet realm against their will constituted an important, some have argued crucial element in the early struggle between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR). It brought into being the largely US-controlled and financed International Refugee Organization, a specialized agency of the premier postwar "world organization"—the United Nations (UN).[5] The US fear that overpopulation might aid the spread of communism, coupled with the disinclination to support organizations with communist membership, led

to the creation—and comparatively lavish funding—of the Western-sponsored International Organisation for Migration.[6] The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, by contrast, received a more limited budget and mandate. Cold War concerns also shaped the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, which defines both who is a refugee under international law and the responsibilities of asylum-granting states.[7] The above examples demonstrate how some international organizations and regulations were born out of and shaped by Cold War conflicts. In other cases, the United States and Soviet Union realized that they shared certain goals and used international organizations to pursue common interests—sometimes even against the wishes of some of their respective allies. One example is the superpowers' mutual interest in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to further states—including to friendly nations—which motivated them to collaborate in the International Atomic Energy Agency.[8]

Chronology matters here. Even though they supported the creation of the UN system, Eastern bloc countries were largely absent from the major international organizations until Stalin's death in 1953. Meanwhile, the division of the world into two blocs led to the creation of competing regional organizations such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (*1948) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (*1949) in the West, as well as the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (*1949) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (*1955) in the East.[9] While each bloc thus promoted a kind of regional internationalism in the first postwar decades, the UN soon provided a forum for "Third World" networking.[10] Early on, many states disapproved of what they perceived as outsized concern for and spending on Cold War issues to the detriment of more pressing common concerns, especially global prosperity.[11] This common cause led to the founding of the Group of 77, a voting bloc of self-described "developing countries," and the UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1964. It was here that a division of the world's countries into a (Global) North and South emerged. This division centered on disagreements about the campaign for a New International Economic Order (which the UN General Assembly officially approved in 1974).[12] Meanwhile starting in 1954, cooperation between Eastern and Western actors increased this process and culminated in the organization of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Helsinki Agreements of 1975.[13] During the 1980s, however, debt service spiraled out of control and countries in both East and South faced similar pressures from Western-dominated international financial organizations to "adjust" their economies. This pressure shifted the terrain of the superpower conflict: it made the politics of competing promises for a brighter future untenable and helped explain the end of the Cold War.[14]

The chapters in this volume emphasize organizations, events, and themes that are outside traditional Cold War narratives. Rather than focusing on military alliances and arms control, the volume showcases various roles international organizations played during this period, from presenting a stage and instrument for economic and ideological competition, to facilitating scientific and legal cooperation and convergence around shared goals. Studying the period through the lens of international organizations allows us to rethink Cold War

oppositions, the coherence of blocs, and even the centrality of these oppositions for the entire period. In doing so, however, the chapters in this volume do not ignore the many forms that the Cold War as an East–West conflict took in international organizations, from sanctions and embargoes to espionage activities.

Reassessing International Organizations and the Cold War

When talk of "globalization" increased following the collapse of the Soviet Union, historians, too, took a global turn.[15] In that context, international organizations increasingly started to interest scholars as sites for and agents of an imagined, contested "global community."[16] As the Cold War receded further from view, some proposed that it was a mere footnote in twentieth-century history when compared with more consequential processes, such as the end of empire (or its reconfiguration).[17] At the start of the new millennium, Matthew Connelly urged historians to "take off the Cold War lens" when examining international history of the past century to understand how the superpower competition had been overlaid and undermined by visions of a North–South conflict.[18] In his pioneering history of international organizations, Akira Iriye followed suit two years later, arguing against a Cold War-centered view of twentieth-century history. He pointed to European integration, for example, as a reflection of "globalizing trends" rather than a result of the US–USSR rivalry and argued that the same could be said of decolonization.[19]

Decolonization undoubtedly followed its own logic independent from the Cold War competition. Nevertheless, the context of the Cold War had an influence on the way in which decolonization unfolded, and conversely, the colonial question and decolonization became major issues that shaped Cold War oppositions. The history of decolonization thus cannot be entirely divorced from that of the Cold War.[20] The same complex interconnections are at play with regard to international organizations themselves. The histories of internationalism and international organizations go far beyond that of the Cold War, but the context created by Cold War oppositions had a major influence on the way that these organizations operated during the period. While the importance of the Cold War to the history of international organizations is to some degree reflected in handbooks and overviews on international institutions,[21] the role that international organizations have played in the Cold War is underrepresented in handbooks on Cold War history.[22] Some scholars have pushed back against the hegemonic discourse on the Cold War in the field of international relations: Akira Iriye, for example, suggested that international organizations were able to blossom despite the Cold War and even moved the world away from a bipolar division. Mathew Evangelista proposed a similarly optimistic view of the role of transnational organizations (i.e., NGOs) in the Cold War—though generally perceiving them as rather marginal actors. In his assessment, NGOs contributed to keeping the war from turning into an actual military conflict (which it did not, in many places) and

to a peaceful resolution of the conflict more generally and the nuclear arms race, in particular.[23]

This edited volume therefore suggests a more complicated history of international organizations and the Cold War: it rejects the idea that the Cold War was a mere footnote in twentieth-century history by highlighting the many battles that it shaped within international organizations, from topics as diverse as archival sovereignty, women's rights, industrial espionage, and rivalries over energy policies. As the example of refugee relief organizations demonstrates, internationalism often thrived not necessarily *despite* the Cold War, but in many cases *because* of it. This underlines that internationalism was a central feature of the Cold War. The book also questions the more recent and optimistic assumption that international organizations more or less automatically promoted convergence around shared goals and values, and demonstrates that they could also mirror and indeed help deepen divisions—e.g., on the issue of trusteeship and decolonization.

The history of international organizations can thus help us rethink the Cold War as a significant period in twentieth-century history. The chapters assembled in this volume resonate with recent trends in Cold War scholarship that question long-held assumptions about international bloc politics. Studying international organizations helps us see, the, in many ways, porous nature of the "Iron Curtain"—which some have therefore labeled the "nylon curtain"—and counter the idea of two sealed off spheres of influence, ended by a period of globalization from the 1990s onwards.[24] Furthermore, the international organization perspective allows us to observe convergences among the "Northern" superpowers—e.g., in terms of their developmental visions—vis-à-vis an increasingly assertive and unified "Global South," but also divisions within each bloc.[25] While these dynamics have long been studied through exchanges between two or more countries, international organizations, we argue, provide equally if not more fruitful observation points.

Competition, Cooperation, Convergence

What specific insights do the chapters of this edited volume provide about the Cold War and international organizations? They call attention to the fact that the availability and constitution of archival materials, which shape the histories we write about international organizations, may themselves be the result of Cold War dynamics and unequal power relationships (see Trudy Peterson's and Ioana Cîrstocea's contributions). Being mindful of this context, we seek to present international organizations in all their complexity and diversity.[26] This means studying Eastern (and Southern)-sponsored international organizations in addition to the "liberal internationalist" Western ones that have so far received the lion's share of scholarly attention. It also means studying intergovernmental organizations as much as nongovernmental organizations, and more importantly, acknowledging the fact that all international organizations are made up of various different entities and people—public forums for government representatives (diplomats), general and professional staff (international civil servants), volunteers,

expert communities, and so on—that do not necessarily share the same goals and visions.

Public debating forums of international organizations, such as the UN General Assembly, were the place where government representatives from East and West confronted one another in person and in public, formulating divergent visions of world order and rallying other nations to join their side. Yet, it was also where the understanding of a world divided into a capitalist and socialist camp was challenged early on by self-defined "developing countries,"[27] and where severe divisions showed even within certain camps (see Henning Türk's contribution in this volume).[28] In that sense, international organizations also provided a space—often skillfully used by medium-size and or neutral countries—for new transnational, cross-bloc networks, discussions and operations to emerge that were not necessarily defined by Cold War priorities, including, for instance, in the realm of disaster relief and prevention (see Lukas Schemper's chapter in this volume), human rights (see contribution by Debbie Sharnak), development (see the chapter by Yi-Tang Lin), norm-building (see Christian Methfessel's contribution), and peacekeeping (see Daniel Gorman's chapter).

International staff and expert communities associated with international organizations were crucial here, facilitating the exchange of people and knowledge across boundaries (on this see the contribution by Matthieu Gillabert, Lidia Lesnykh, and Mikuláš Pešta in this volume). Several chapters (by Sandrine Kott, Michel Christian, and Daniel Gorman) point to the importance of a shared history that predated the Cold War: anti-fascist activism, professional medical exchanges, but also colonialism. This early history facilitated cross-bloc exchanges and shaped the work of international organizations during the Cold War. Yet, it is important to recognize the limits of these epistemic and professional communities operating independently of Cold War battles, as the history of McCarthyist witch-hunts against US American staff members of international organizations or the Soviet proposal to replace the UN Secretary-General with a troika of officials in the wake of the Congo Crisis demonstrates. While American politicians portrayed the UN as a communist cesspool, Soviet officials viewed it as a political instrument of the West. Indeed, some Western staff members themselves saw their engagement in international organizations as a tool for winning the Cold War.[29] Cold War competition for hearts and minds was thus not confined to propaganda battles in public forums of international organizations, but also affected the ostensibly technical work of various organizations, for instance in the realm of global health (see Marek Eby's contribution).

Based on a diverse array of historical sources, the chapters collectively demonstrate that international organizations were sites of cooperation and convergence, but also—as the title suggests—forums for fierce competition and propaganda battles. (Indeed, they could be both at the same time, as Simon Graham and Elisabeth Roehrlich's chapter in this volume on nuclear diplomacy reveals.) International organizations could contribute to hardening Cold War fronts as they did, for example, on the matter of refugees discussed above. But they could also help de-escalate conflict, as evidenced most dramatically, perhaps, by

UN Secretary-General U Thant's underappreciated mediation during the Cuban missile crises.[30] More importantly, as the individual chapters show, the Cold War is not necessarily the only relevant interpretative framework for understanding the conflicting phenomena or events that took place during the Cold War period. The history of international organizations during the Cold War thus reveals and underlines what is crucial for the Cold War in general: not all ideological, economic, or political oppositions were Cold War issues. Depending on the context, the logic of the Cold War was at the forefront or in the background of events—or even masked other central issues of the period, such as the question of global inequalities.[31]

Notes

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24 See especially György Péteri, *Nylon Curtain: Transnational and Transsystemic Tendencies in the Cultural Life of State-Socialist Russia and East-Central Europe* (Trondheim: Trondheim Studies on East European Cultures & Societies, 2006); Sophie Coeuré and Sabine Dullin, eds., *Frontières du communisme: mythologies et réalités de la division de l'Europe de la Révolution d'octobre au mur de Berlin* (Paris: La Découverte, 2007); Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy, eds., *Reassessing Cold War Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2011); Romano and Romero, *European Socialist Regimes' Fateful Engagement with the West*; James Mark, Artemy Kalinovsky, and Steffi Marung, eds., *Alternative Globalizations: Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2020).

25 The term "Global South" has rightfully received pushback for implying homogeneity of a group of countries that are vastly diverse in terms of politics, culture, economics, and history. We use it here as a stand-in for the Group of 77, a caucus of now 134 self-described "developing countries" that was initially formed at the United Nations in 1964 and became a driving force of the North–South dialogue in the 1970s. Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*; Dinkel, Fiebrig, and Reichherzer, *Nord/Süd*; Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*.

26 Sandrine Kott, "International Organizations: A Field of Research for a Global History," *Zeithistorische Forschungen. Studies in Contemporary History*, 3 (2011): 445–53.

27 See e.g., "Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries made at the Conclusion of the Conference on Trade and Development," Geneva, June 15, 1964, https://www.g77.org/doc/Joint%20Declaration.html (accessed February 28, 2024).

28 Franck Petiteville and Simon Tordjman, eds., *L'Assemblée générale des Nations unies: une institution politique mondiale*, Collection Relations internationales (Paris: Les Presses Sciences Po, 2020).

29 Louis H. Porter, "Cold War Internationalisms: The USSR in UNESCO, 1945–1967" (Dissertation in History, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina, 2018); Alessandro Iandolo, "Beyond the Shoe: Rethinking Khrushchev at the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Diplomatic History* 41, no. 1 (2017): 128–54; Muschik, *Building States*.

30 Thant Myint-U, *Planetary Citizen: U Thant and the Lost Story of the 1960s* (New York: W. W. Norton, forthcoming).

31 Sandrine Kott, *A World More Equal: An Internationalist Perspective on the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).

Chapter 2

Dangerous Records: Controlling the Archives of the International Refugee Organization

Trudy Huskamp Peterson

In the beginning is the program, creating records as it operates. When operations end, the records remain.

The archives of international organizations formed during and immediately after the Second World War, as diverse as the World Bank and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), are crucial sources for understanding the Cold War period. The United Nations family of organizations has not developed a central archival facility, so researchers travel to the UN locations—New York and Geneva, Nairobi and Bangkok, et al.—to use the organization's records in the custody of the creating agency or its successor. All but one body of records, that is. The records of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) are not with the headquarters United Nations Archives in New York where the records of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA), IRO's predecessor, are housed, nor in Geneva with the League of Nations Archives where the records of the first high commissioner are maintained, nor with IRO's successor, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Instead, they are in France's *Archives Nationales*. Why? It is a Cold War story.

At the end of the Second World War Europe had more than 11 million displaced non-German people. Allied military authorities, UNRRA, governments in liberated countries, and voluntary agencies repatriated millions, some forcibly. By 1947, when the IRO assumed responsibility for refugee assistance, the continual flow of people meant that refugees and displaced persons still totaled between 10 and 12 million. IRO's mandate covered about 2 million of these people, including refugees in the Far East and the Middle East.[1] After four and a half years of IRO operations, by the end of 1951 the majority of these persons had been settled, although some 400,000 remained displaced.[2]

The IRO went into liquidation on March 1, 1952. The records of the IRO, an important source on the location of the current and former refugees and the agreements made with governments to assist them, needed to be deposited with an organization for preservation. The usual pattern would have the records of a

subordinate unit turned over to its hierarchical superior; for the International Refugee Organization that would have meant the records would go to the United Nations. But that presumed disposition provoked a controversy between UN officials and the representatives of the nation-states that created and funded the Organization, with the staff of the IRO in the middle. The struggle focused on who would have access to the records in the proximate years after IRO's closure, with the national representatives fearful of access by Soviet officials if the records were in UN custody. These early Cold War concerns were decisive, and over the repeated objections of UN officials, the IRO records were transferred to the national archives of France, where they remain. The interests of the United Nations and the IRO's successor UNHCR were ignored, a pattern demonstrating the primacy of the interests of nation-states over the interests of the international organizations they had created.

Historians are increasingly investigating the nature of the archival sources, the techniques of the archival enterprise, and, for government records, their management as examples of state power.[3] This "archival turn" argues that the control of access to archives by imperial governments is a fundamental element in the structure of governance. Researchers use the IRO records in the custody of the French national archives, but have not questioned why they are there.[4] Yet, allocating the records and transferring their control to France sharply reveals the structure of Cold War power, including over an international organization.

The essay traces the debate over the IRO records and its denouement through the archives of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations, the International Refugee Organization held by the *Archives Nationales* de France, and the *Archives diplomatiques, ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères* France. Organized roughly chronologically, the story follows the developing controversy, from an assumed routine transfer of records to a vigorous international argument involving foreign ministers and the UN Secretary-General.

International Refugee Relief: The Early Period

The early twentieth century's waves of refugees brought a series of international refugee relief organizations into being after the First World War. The League of Nations appointed commissioners and envoys to deal with specific groups of refugees; the most famous was polar explorer Fridtjof Nansen, who in 1921 was appointed High Commissioner for Russian Refugees, but whose mandate expanded (1921–30) to include protection and care of refugee groups from Asia Minor.[5] In July 1938, responding to the mass of refugees fleeing Germany and Austria, representatives from thirty nations met at Evian-les-Bains, France, and created the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) to "improve the present conditions of exodus and to replace them with conditions of orderly emigration."[6]

In wartime 1943 the Allied powers, including the Soviet Union, established the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to administer relief and help former prisoners of war and exiles return to their homes, while IGCR struggled

to work out a plan for the displaced persons who were unwilling to be repatriated. UNRRA operated an extensive network of field offices; however, the Soviet Union did not allow UNRRA to operate in areas under Soviet control. At the Allies' February 1945 Yalta Conference, the United States, the UK, and France signed bilateral agreements with the USSR that specified, in the US version, that "[a]ll Soviet citizens liberated by the forces operating under United States command and all United States citizens liberated by the forces operating under Soviet command" will be given special treatment "until they have been handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities."[7] These agreements led to virulent arguments as the war drew to an end. Although in the immediate postwar period the majority of Eastern European and Soviet nationals did return, Soviet officials continued to denounce the Allies for not repatriating every former Soviet citizen. Writing later about the occupation of Germany, the official US Army publication said bluntly, "From beginning to end, probably the least edifying aspect for SHAEF [the occupying Allied military authorities] of having Soviet citizens of any variety in its custody was the endless shower of carping complaints from the Soviet authorities."[8]

The United Nations Organization, created in May 1945, immediately became entangled in the refugee repatriation issue, "one of the most contentious issues before the UN Security Council during the first few years of its existence," prompting a debate that "went to the heart of the fundamental ideological conflicts dividing East and West at the time."[9] By that date the Allied nations had realized that having the responsibility for refugees and displaced persons divided between the military authorities of the UK, US, and France, the IGCR and the UNRRA was inefficient and forced repatriation by the militaries and UNRRA was increasingly controversial. A single civilian organization needed to be established that could deal with the whole panoply of refugee problems. The idea of creating such a refugee organization was raised at the UN's founding conference, and it remained a topic of discussion in the succeeding General Assembly sessions. Early in 1946 the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established a Special Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons, which recommended the "establishment of a specialized agency of a non-permanent character to deal with the problem of refugees," a proposal that led to the creation of the International Refugee Organization. Who would be helped by the new agency was contentious, with the Eastern European countries, led by the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Poland, arguing that only persons who wanted to return to their countries should be assisted as those refusing repatriation were "Fascist collaborators, war criminal, quislings, or traitors," while representatives of other nations insisted it was necessary to assist all refugees and displaced persons. The Soviet and Yugoslav delegates also asserted that the countries of origin of the refugees should take part in the screening of individuals for refugee status and that they should verify the information obtained. As IRO historian Louise Holborn summarized, "Thus it became apparent that the western countries were determined to secure UN protection for political dissidents among the refugees, while the minority aim was to seek out the dissidents and turn them over to the countries of origin for punishment."[10] Meanwhile, when the IGCR's Executive Committee decided in July

1946 that it supported including a resettlement program in the future IRO, the Soviet Union withdrew from the IGCR.[11]

After nearly a year of debates, the UN General Assembly approved the Constitution of the IRO on December 15, 1946, by a vote of thirty in favor, five opposed, and eighteen abstentions. All the Eastern European delegations (Byelorussian SSR, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, the USSR, and Yugoslavia) voted against. The Constitution needed ratification by fifteen member states to go into force, which happened when Denmark ratified on August 20, 1948. During the interim eighteen months a Preparatory Commission of the International Refugee Organization worked to plan the operation of the IRO and facilitate the transfer of responsibilities from UNRRA and IGCR to it. But the conflict over refugees did not end: as Georges Boris, chief of the French delegation to the ECOSOC, wrote to French foreign minister Robert Schuman, "[A]t each session of the Council, about the problem of refugees," the USSR, Poland, and Belarus delegates "repeat the same interminable speech" condemning "the action of the IRO, claiming the repatriation of all the Soviet citizens from their host states."[12]

The first session of the new IRO's governing body, the General Council, was held on September 13, 1948. The General Council consisted of one representative from each of the member states, a nine-member executive committee, and an appointed director general. The IRO constitution specified that no refugees or displaced persons with valid objections "shall be compelled to return to their country of origin," which meant they had to be resettled.[13] Eighteen countries became IRO member states;[14] Soviet bloc countries did not join, arguing that the answer to the refugee problem was not a new organization but instead enforcing existing bilateral agreements for repatriation.[15] The Soviet bloc saw IRO's emphasis on resettlement as "a means for Western countries to acquire a ready source of labor and of offering shelter to subversive groups that might threaten international peace."[16] Tellingly, between July 1, 1947 and December 31, 1951 only about 52,000 refugees of the approximately 1.6 million settled during the period chose to return to their former homes in Eastern Europe—and only 1,836 went to the USSR.[17]

As IRO neared the end of three years, a period that the member governments in 1946 had anticipated would be sufficient to complete the resettlement or repatriation of refugees and that the IRO's General Council had adopted as policy, thousands still remained to be placed.[18] The General Council told ECOSOC that there would be a continuing need to care for refugees whose placements had not been resolved and "there is every likelihood that in addition to these persons there will be new refugees for whom the very same problems will arise." The members urged the UN to continue unbroken international assistance,[19] and at its next session the General Council members resolved, "The IRO which is a non-permanent organization, is facing a problem which in certain aspects appears unfortunately to be of a permanent character." The eighteen governments of the IRO were anxious to reduce the amount of their financing to the refugee operation and to instead spread it to the more than fifty nations that were UN members. The General Council ended the IRO, after several extensions, and the United Nations

created the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, originally for three years but extended until the present.[20]

The new UNHCR's mandate was to focus on legal and administrative protection of refugees; it would not take over IRO's extensive network of field offices, from Argentina to Yugoslavia, which had to be closed. Refugees had provided information to the IRO field offices to qualify for immediate assistance and to obtain repatriation or resettlement, and the files contained highly personal information about health, skills, relatives, language, place of birth, etc., and assessments by the agency representative interviewing the refugee. A few field offices closed in 1948 and 1949; dozens closed in 1951. Some offices turned over their records to the host governments, a position endorsed by French officials who argued that these records either should be given to the host governments (except Germany) or, if the state did not want the files, they should be destroyed.[21] The remaining field offices records were to be sent to IRO headquarters.

Another matter to be settled was the disposition of the International Tracing Service. Established in 1948 based on previous work by governments, the International Committee of the Red Cross and UNRRA, it was responsible for searching for missing persons, establishing fates, and preserving records to assist in the tracing process. It was nominally under the IRO but operated independently in Arolsen, Germany. Tracing work would be far from finished by the expected date of IRO closure, so after much international consultation, the Service was transferred to the Allied High Commission of Germany on April 1, 1951.[22]

At the meeting of IRO's executive committee in October 1951, director general J. Donald Kingsley proposed transferring to UNHCR the IRO headquarters records and the remaining records of field operations. The committee agreed, requesting "the Director-General to take action appropriate to the Disposal of Records in accordance with the Director-General's recommendations."[23] The disposition seemed settled; in fact, so sure was UNHCR that it would take over the records that in April 1951 it had asked the International Labour Organization (ILO) for permission to hire Jacques Asscher, who had been the IRO chief documentation officer and had transferred recently to the ILO. In making the request, the UNHCR's executive director told the ILO that UNHCR was going to receive "the bulk of the documentation" from IRO by July 1. Asscher moved to UNHCR on June 1.[24]

Winding Up the IRO: First Steps

Winding up the IRO was neither swift nor simple. In February 1952, the IRO's General Council created a Board of Liquidation consisting of representatives from France, the UK, and Venezuela. The council then appointed Oliver E. Cound (US) as liquidator, UK Brigadier F.H. Dallison as deputy liquidator, and French ambassador Henri Ponsot as councillor.[25] The Board of Liquidation was authorized

to "dispose of any assets, property and records at its own discretion, insofar as there were no applicable directions from the General Council."[26]

At its March 1952 meeting, the council members had "considerable discussion on the subject of the ultimate custody" of the archives of the IRO Review Board for Eligibility Appeals, which heard the pleas of persons that the IRO had initially declared ineligible for resettlement. The council emphasized "the possible harm that might be done" to these persons "if their personal files were to fall into unauthorized hands."[27] As the French delegate advised the Quai d'Orsay, "given the very particular and very confidential information contained in many of the individual files" created during the appeals process, the records should be destroyed except those of refugees deemed ineligible. The chairman of the appeals board argued that the ineligibles could benefit from a review by the new UNHCR which might apply "a more liberal criteria" than the IRO.[28] Ultimately, the Council decided that only the record of the appeal decision and its justification would be transferred to UNHCR and even those documents would be destroyed when no longer needed for UNHCR's work.[29] The IRO's accounting records were to be sent to the firm Peat, Marwick, Mitchel & Co. in London, to hold for five years and then be destroyed. Privately, the French delegate told his ministry that the remainder of the archives would be destroyed unless an institution would hold them free of charge, as the cost of storing them at the United Nations would be, he said, "too expensive."[30] The Board announced that it hoped to complete the liquidation process by the end of July.[31]

When the Board was established, United Nations officials in New York and Geneva assumed that the IRO records would be kept in United Nations custody, as IRO's executive committee had decided. They had good reasons to believe this. First, the IRO had been created by the United Nations and records are the property of the creating agency, a principle respected in international archival practice. Second, UNRRA records had been transferred to the UN Archives in New York and the records of the IGCR to the IRO, establishing a precedent for keeping the archives in UN hands.[32] Third, the new UNHCR needed access to the records to carry out its protection responsibilities.

An unexpected complication came from the chief of the IRO's history unit, L. Michael Hacking.[33] Following the practice of the UNRRA, the IRO had decided to publish an official history, in two volumes of reportage and one volume of documents. A history unit was established in 1950, and part of its work was to organize the archives it needed. On February 29, 1952 I. Paul Schiller, UN Geneva registry section chief, wrote to his superior expressing concern about the attitude of the historian:

> the U.N. should try to guarantee, by some sort of mild intervention, with IRO liquidation authorities, that the destruction of historically valuable source material should be avoided at almost any cost. I say this because Mr. Hacking and others have indicated that, since a lot of the record material deals with politically sensitive matters, it might better be destroyed. They support this argument by saying that the historians will make the interpretation of such material in their definitive history.

Two weeks later Dallison, the British Deputy Liquidator, wrote to Schiller that although the financial records and personnel files should be ready for transfer shortly, he was "unable to say" how the historical records "will be disposed of as this decision will rest with the Board of Liquidation, it may be that the United Nations will not be requested to take them over."[34] Dallison's letter prompted the UN office in Geneva to write to UN New York for instructions. Should the UN press the issue of the historical records?[35]

Now the young UNHCR entered the debate, its views in accord with the position of UN New York and UN Geneva. UNHCR's Asscher told the UN Geneva library that both the IRO General Council and executive committee had discussed the disposal of the IRO records and talks had been held between the IRO, UNHCR, and governments during the past year. "As far as the transfer of IRO records to UNHCR is concerned, this has proved a difficult problem," he explained, in part over the cost to preserve and provide services on the materials, "which has only been partially solved." A "great number" of files had been destroyed in the IRO branch offices, he reported, while some IRO branch offices had transferred files to the host governments "upon their request." A "small portion" of the operational files, law library material and some individual case files had been transferred to UNHCR headquarters, but the main body of the IRO headquarters records, "re-arranged so as to fit the needs of the IRO History Unit," which contain "invaluable information, should in our opinion be preserved both for their interest as archives and for the work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees."[36]

David B. Vaughan, the UN Acting Assistant Secretary-General for administrative services, told UN Geneva on March 21, 1952 that "the Board of Liquidation of IRO and the United Nations have a mutual obligation to ensure preservation of at least selected parts of the IRO records; the method and conditions of such preservation being matters in my opinion in which the Board of Liquidation of IRO would take the initiative." He suggested using the UNRRA model, in which UNRRA provided "its own funds for arrangement and screening of records to be transferred" and the UN could selectively dispose of any files that it found no longer "desirable to retain."[37] UNHCR's executive director pressed the case, writing to the UN Geneva office again on April 21 that the "archives of the International Refugee Organization, or at least some parts of them, would be of great value for the work of this Office" and that it was important to keep them in Geneva "where this Office could have easy access to them."[38] UN Geneva forwarded the UN position to IRO deputy Dallison.[39] In June 1952 the deposit of the IRO records with the UN still seemed to be a possible if not likely outcome when IRO liquidator Cound wrote to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld: "In order to provide a basis for determination of final disposition of these records, the Liquidators would appreciate information as to what costs, if any, would be involved."[40]

Meanwhile, worries about the disposition of the records began floating through the international archival community. The International Council on Archives (ICA), the world's principal professional archival organization, asked Sir Hilary Jenkinson, the head of the UK Public Record Office and a distinguished archivist, to see if he could influence either the deputy liquidator or the chief historian, both of whom were British citizens, to prevent the possible destruction of the IRO

archives. Jenkinson wrote to IRO deputy Dallison, saying ICA's information was "that it is proposed to destroy [the IRO records] wholesale so soon as a History of the organization has been completed," a report he called "alarming." Jenkinson pointed out that just because a history had been prepared the records should not be destroyed: "[T]he uses to which later Research Workers put Archives bear, in the vast majority of cases, little or no relation to that history." He explained that if the IRO had

> been established by the British Government instead of U.N.O. its Archives, upon its liquidation, would probably have been taken over by the Foreign Office; and in any case the question which classes of them were to be destroyed would have been settled in a Schedule compiled by the Committee of Inspecting Officers, which is established under Rules made by the Master of the Rolls, and laid before Parliament.[41]

No reply from Dallison is in the files.

Schiller, the UN Geneva registry chief, attempted to figure out how much it would cost to transfer and provide reference services on the records. He told his superior that taking the IRO records "would mean the start of a professional archives programme for other records as well," with "long-range values accruing to this administration." He pointed out that the "main purpose of transferring the records to U.N. custody" was "to preserve and make available through a knowledgeable and professionally-minded administration the IRO story." The UN legal department began work on a legal agreement to accomplish the transfer, and by October 1 Adriaan Pelt, the UN Geneva office chief, told IRO liquidator Cound that he was ready to negotiate a transfer agreement. The UN asked the IRO to pay $6,300 as the cost of transferring the records and $8,500 for the two-year salary of a person to service the records.[42]

The Shift, from UN to French Custody

Then the disposition plans changed. On October 28, 1952 Cound wrote to Pelt that the Liquidation Board considered it "inadvisable" to store the IRO historical archives in Geneva. Instead, they were to be retained until the IRO member nations commented on the draft history, then, "having served their purpose, it may well be that they will be destroyed." Pelt asked for clarification. Cound answered firmly that the three Board members believed "that no necessity arises for the History archives to be available to all and sundry for research or other purposes—on the contrary they consider this to be undesirable." The Board was unwilling to agree to pay the salary cost, thought that "mere storage space" should be provided for a period of three years, and believed that access to the records should be confined to IRO member governments.[43]

UNHCR was stunned. A UNHCR senior advisor wrote to Victor Montoya, Venezuela's Liquidation Board member, that the "High Commissioner considers

that access to these files is of the greatest importance to the work of his Office." The UN is willing to store the records, he said, but "there appears to be some doubt as to whether the Board agrees that access to these files should be given to the Office of the High Commissioner." He pointed out "that it is in the interests of the refugees in several countries that this Office should be able to consult these files" and he hoped the Liquidation Board "will agree to some arrangements for the storage of them which will make this consultation possible."[44]

Worried by the escalating argument, a UN Geneva staff member telexed UN Geneva chief Pelt, who was at UN New York, saying the IRO "says files not available to HCR" and suggested that the storage space for IRO records be made available free of charge and UNHCR to provide staff without cost. Pelt told the staffer to tell Cound to suspend "the exchange of views, whether written or verbal" until he returned to Geneva whereupon Pelt "would like to settle whole question with him by personal discussion."[45]

Word of the Board's position spread throughout the UN system. Guillaume Georges-Picot, UN Assistant Secretary-General for the Departments of Economic Affairs and Social Affairs, wrote to Pelt on December 3, expressing his concern for the disposition of the records. He added new arguments for preserving the records: they are "an excellent source for sociological and related studies and research" in which the Department of Social Affairs was "greatly interested"; the IRO records include the records of the IGCR, not just those of IRO; the nongovernmental organizations in the social welfare field would find the records "of great value"; and the records have both "scientific and historical value."[46]

What had happened? In a confidential memo of January 30, 1953, Pelt told UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and others that he had learned that at a Liquidation Board meeting the "French and Venezuelan representatives, the former taking the initiative, expressed the view that the archives should not be entrusted to the custody of the UN" because of the cost. Pelt, however, thought that "the true reason was the fear that once the archives were in UN custody, access to them might be granted to representatives of governments from behind the Iron Curtain." The French representative had suggested that the records be given to the French *Archives Nationales*; the future access to them was not decided "but there is little doubt that anyway the HCR would be excluded." The UK representative, "while sharing the financial argument, made it clear that he could not share the views of his colleagues with regard to the other objection, and asked for time to enable him to refer the matter back to his Government." Pelt proposed dropping or reducing the cost quoted[47] and agreeing to a restriction limiting access to the representatives of the member governments of IRO, UNHCR, and the Secretary-General and their authorized representatives. Finally, Pelt observed "that apart from practical reasons in favour of UN custody over IRO archives … a matter of principle [is] involved." He was worried that if a UN organization was permitted to "dispose freely of its archives outside" the UN, it would set a "dangerous precedent for the disposition of the records of other UN bodies."[48]

Pelt's information was correct. In a message to its Geneva staff, the Quai d'Orsay's Directorate of Administrative and Social Affairs argued that the historical archives

of the IRO "have no relation" to the mission of UNHCR which is exclusively about "legal and administrative protection of refugees"; that storing the records in the United Nations would allow the correspondence between governments and IRO to be accessed by other IRO member states "without the agreement of the sending or receiving governments," contrary both to usual practice and the intent of the General Council; and that the committee had agreed in November that members would look for organizations that would host the archives. The French national archives would "comply exactly" with the guidelines of the Liquidation Board, including "very probably a clause prohibiting the use of the archives for a minimum of three years and then the constitution of a committee which would be consulted for each request."

Meanwhile, the Secretary-General was "strongly of the opinion that as a matter of principle, as well as of practical advantage for the work of the United Nations" the IRO records "should come to final rest in the archives of the United Nations." He agreed to waive the storage and staffing costs.[49] Pelt wrote twice to Cound proposing an agreement along the lines the Secretary-General had approved.[50] Cound coolly replied that "your offer will be presented for consideration" at the next meeting of the Board which was scheduled for late April.[51]

Sensing that the Venezuelan representative on the Board was the swing vote between the French advocacy for sending the IRO records to the *Archives Nationales* and the probable British support for depositing them with the UN, Vaughan of UN New York sent an aide-memoire to the Venezuelan government "setting out the views of the Secretary-General in regard to the question of the final disposition of the IRO archives." Hammarskjöld believed, wrote Vaughan, that "as a matter of principle and from the practical point of view of the work of the United Nations, the United Nations should be the depository of the archives of the IRO, a specialized agency of the United Nations, part of whose work has already been taken over by other United Nations organs." The Secretary-General personally sent a demarche to the Liquidation Board, assuring it that the UN "intended to meet fully the conditions you consider essential as to the servicing of the archives, access to them and security arrangements" as well as "to meet the objections of a financial nature."[52]

Now the draft official IRO history produced by Michael Hacking's unit became a complicating factor. During the first months of 1953 representatives of IRO member states reviewed the draft history; the US and UK representatives rejected it as fatally inaccurate and misleading. At the Board of Liquidation meeting on April 25 the US representative cited false statements, misinterpretations of events, and unrealistic critiques such as comparing the cost of transportation in IRO ships with the cost of commercial transport, while the UK representative, commenting in writing on the second volume, cited issues of fact, omission, interpretation, and emphasis.[53] At its next meeting, the Board noted the "formal opposition by two Member Governments to publication of the History as prepared" and resolved that "the present draft of the history shall not be published."[54] The history unit staff members were dismissed, and at the beginning of June 1953 Cound, at the suggestion of the US State Department, hired Louise Holborn, a political science

professor at the US Connecticut College for Women, to prepare a "condensed History." Rene Ristelhueber, a retired French diplomat, was hired to collaborate with Holborn and prepare a French translation of Holborn's text; and French ambassador Henri Ponsot was appointed "Counselor to the historians" and was to handle "administrative and budgetary matters." As Ristelhueber lived in Paris, the French representative proposed that the revision be done there.[55]

Also at the Board's April 25, 1953 meeting, Cound reported on the renewed UN proposals to deposit of the archives in the UN library in Geneva with guarantees of confidentiality. The archives, he warned, contain "information that can be used to the detriment of the IRO and its members."[56] The UK representative said Geneva would be the best place to guard the archives and that the UN offer was "perfectly satisfactory," to which Jean Serres, the French representative chairing the session, replied that the preparation of a revised history "implies" that the archives should be sent to Paris where the work will be undertaken and that the free storage there would be an "economic solution." Insisting with Cound on "the essential character of security," Serres reiterated the French position that the records should be used only by "people authorized by the government in question" and suggested a ten-year closure and a committee to vet requests for access. The UK representative said he had to refer the question of archives to his government; Serres said, rather presumptuously, that if the UK would agree to completing a revised history that will "imply its acceptance of sending the archives to Paris."[57]

All UN efforts to retain the archives failed. Apparently UN officials were not informed in advance that on June 10, 1953 IRO liquidator Cound signed an agreement with the director of the *Archives Nationales*, with an additional protocol signed on June 15.[58] Cound wrote to Secretary-General Hammarskjöld on June 30, reporting that at its recent meeting the Board of Liquidation "expressed the wish that the archives should be entrusted to a member government," and the "archives have been dispatched" to the French *Archives Nationales* "without cost and under conditions dictated by the Board." He told Hammarskjöld that he felt "sure you will agree that under the circumstances the decision of the Board is a wise one."[59] The Secretary-General did not agree. He made a "formal representation" to the Liquidation Board, protesting that the transfer should not be a permanent arrangement and that the United Nations should have final custody of the archives. Hammarskjöld also sent a strong letter of protest to the French minister of foreign affairs and considered sending a "confidential representation" to the US State Department because Cound, the liquidator, was American.[60]

By the time Hammarskjöld's letter to the Liquidation Board arrived in Geneva, Cound had closed his office and departed. The letter was passed to the French Foreign Ministry, which held the acting chairmanship of the board; the UN received no reply. On August 1, for internal use, Serres summarized the French position: the archives of the IRO must be preserved as the committee "did not want to leave the impression that the IRO would destroy all the traces of its activity and prevent a real understanding of what it had done"; to "avoid polemics" the archives would be available only to IRO member governments and not to the public until after a "long delay." Most importantly, the archives "certainly contain documents

to which access by the public is not desirable." Refugees from Eastern Europe, because of the surveillance of their families behind the Iron Curtain, "very strongly fear any threat of indiscretion" because the security of the families is at stake. The Liquidation Board believed, Serres said, that the presence in the United Nations of "civil servants belonging to the nations from which the refugees left" means that such "hazardous secret" information must be protected from UN use.[61]

Half a year later, the UN Director for Coordination for Specialised Agencies and Economic and Social Matters wrote to UN Geneva's Pelt saying Hammarskjöld had asked him to "take up the matter" of the custody of the IRO archives with the French delegation to the UN. Did Pelt have any light to shed on it? Would it be useful to sound out the Venezuelan minister in Geneva? Pelt advised against it because, despite "the pressure you have tried to exercise at Caracas," minister Montoya had supported the French position and if approached would likely inform Serres, the French member of the board, "that U.N. is once more on the war-path." The likely result would be, he thought, that Serres "would probably take his precautions so as to forestall the effect you might achieve through taking the matter up with the French Permanent Delegation in New York."[62]

A March 1954 internal Quai d'Orsay memo reviewing both the history of the IRO history project and the disposition of the archives provides insight into the opposition to UN custody of the documents. It argued "that these documents were owned by 16 [*sic*] member states of the IRO not the United Nations as a whole"; that the content of the records should not harm the refugees and therefore the preservation of the archives "should be surrounded by particular precautions." In addition to denying UN ownership, the memorandum argued that the Liquidation Board had "no power" over the archives as the correspondence of governments should not be made public without the consent of the originator. The records had not been screened and documents expunged, the writer complained; it was "certainly not desirable" to permit access by the public and by non-IRO member states. "We know the tendentious comments of the Soviets and Satellite States which thoroughly attack the 'slave traffic'" which the IRO was said to have facilitated; these states "are masters in manufacturing texts." It concluded, "It therefore seems that, if the United Nations began to get their hands on the historical archives to put them without discernment or control at the disposal of all the member states of the United Nations," then the member states of the IRO would have had to be consulted in advance and allowed to determine which of the records they would "desire to keep or destroy."[63]

The Denouement

The Board of Liquidation's agreement with the *Archives Nationales* transferred to it all the historical records of the IRO, with the exception of the small body of records transferred to UNHCR and an even smaller quantity to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, the predecessor to the UN's International Organization for Migration. The records in France were entirely closed for ten

years, from July 1, 1953. During the closed period the records could be used by the IRO historians and by IRO member governments if an "ad hoc Committee, consisting of a Member of the French Foreign Office, a Representative of the *Archives Nationales* and a Diplomatic Representative of the Government requesting the documents" would agree to the access by the government "for its own use only." If the document(s) requested concerned another IRO government, the ad hoc committee was required to include "a Diplomatic Representative of the Government concerned with the documents requested."[64] No access was permitted for the UN, UNHCR, or nongovernmental refugee organizations. After June 30, 1963 the records could be made available to the public "in such manner and under such rules as the *Archives Nationales* may determine in agreement with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

A little more than a year after the records were shipped to Paris, the UNHCR's US office obtained the records of the Washington office of the IRO and its Preparatory Commission. Instead of transferring them to the *Archives Nationales*, UNHCR sent them to the United Nations Archives in New York, with the restriction that access was limited to persons authorized in writing by the UNHCR Representative in the United States. Decades later, in 2001 the records of IRO's branch in Greece, including about 3,000 individual case files, were found in the UNHCR branch office in Athens and transferred to the UNHCR archives.[65] These transfers have left the IRO records divided between Paris, Geneva, and New York.

Conclusion

Why did the members of the Board of Liquidation feel so strongly that the Soviets had to be kept out of the files? And why did the board want to exclude the UN, to the point of even denying access to the staff of its UNHCR successor?

Clear motivation is not often found in records. What the international correspondence about the IRO archives shows is repeated references to "security." The chaos of the postwar period had crystallized a Western belief in the principle of non-refoulement—that there should be no forced repatriation to an area where the refugee would suffer persecution.[66] The fate of persons repatriated unhappily and the cases of returnees killed or sent to labor camps were known to representatives of all the IRO member states. Liquidation Board members appeared worried that Soviet agents would use the information in the files to locate persons who had fled from Eastern Europe and refused to return home, harass them or their families, blackmail them or worse. Ever since the end of the war, refugees had been "disappearing from streets," presumably kidnapped by Soviet agents. French minister Serres would have been aware of the incident in November 1947 when three French-born children had been kidnapped and held in the Soviet Union's camp near Paris; French police had freed the captives.[67] Unlike the US and UK zones of occupation, in the French zone the Soviet representatives remained until the very end of IRO's life, making the French acutely aware of the Soviet demands for repatriation.[68]

Understanding the fear of blackmail and forced repatriation, the desire to keep the records out of the hands of the United Nations staff is clearer. Although the Soviet Union did not participate in the IRO, it was a member of the UN and its nationals were UN staff members. Throughout the Cold War, the West harbored a suspicion that UN employees from the Soviet Union were Soviets first and international civil servants second. If the records of the IRO were available to the UN staff members, they would be available to its personnel from Eastern bloc countries. Furthermore, in 1952 it was as yet untested whether the ambassadors and ministers accredited to the United Nations could demand access to records of UN operations, both current and completed. Placing the IRO records with the UN would have opened the possibility that they could be scoured both by UN staff members from Eastern bloc countries and by those diplomatic delegations.

Two other factors seem to have been at play in the disposition decision. First, in their insistence on revising the draft history, the United States and UK were seriously concerned that the organization not be misunderstood. Soviet officials publicly charged that the IRO was preventing Soviet citizens from repatriating; IRO member states wanted to provide no opportunity for the Soviets to cherry-pick the records and find ones that could be misinterpreted to validate their argument. The draft history showed the representatives of the IRO member nations what might be misconstrued through a subjective reading of the records. As Serres of France observed, "The unfortunate affair of the history has emphasized the precautions that should be taken against improper use of the documents."[69] This was especially important, the United States said, because in the autumn of 1953 the UN General Assembly would be discussing the future of refugee work and it would be "unfortunate to have this discussion take place on the basis of interpretations of IRO's work which fail to reflect the common judgment of the Member Governments of the IRO. Only confusion would result."[70]

Second, France repeatedly argued that the documents sent to the IRO from a government remained the property of that government, which therefore was the only body that could decide whether the item could be seen by any others—in other words, sovereignty of the government over its documents. Although public belief in international organizations was at one of its highest points during the immediate postwar years, as demonstrated by the continued founding of those organizations after the war, the insistence on national control of the records trumped the authority given to an international organization to manage its records. The United Nations might have been created by the nations assembled, but it could not be trusted by the nations to protect their sovereign interests.

Put simply, distrust between the great powers East and West characterized the early Cold War, and the fate of the IRO archives was determined by it. The story of the IRO archives is a reminder that preservation of and access to archives reflects the times in which they were created, maintained, transferred to an archive, or destroyed. The fact that so many serious people were willing to destroy the IRO records and to prohibit access to them, ignoring the usual principles of succession of archives, should give us all pause. Members of the historical profession left no written record of having tried to influence the disposition of the IRO archives and

the attempts by archivists were ineffective. IRO records were dispersed; some were destroyed.

Did the placement of the records matter in the long run? UNHCR went about assisting refugees without access to the records, and there is no indication that the work was made appreciably harder. The records were opened at the *Archives Nationales* at the designated time, and researchers use them there. No other UN bodies created during the Cold War deposited their records outside the custody of the United Nations, so the IRO records disposition was not as precedent-setting as some UN officials feared. The deposit of the IRO records with the government of France is a lasting archival anomaly of the Cold War.

Notes

1 Louise W. Holborn, *The International Refugee Organization: A Specialized Agency of the United Nations: Its History and Work 1946–1952* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 20, 171 (hereafter Holborn, *IRO*).
2 Mark Cutts, ed., *The State of the World's Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 17.
3 See, for prominent examples, Ann Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Michel-Rolph Trouillot; *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1995); and articles in the special issue of Archival Science: "'To go beyond': Towards a Decolonial Archival Praxis," June 2019, https://link.springer.com/journal/10502/volumes-and-issues/19-2 (accessed February 26, 2024).
4 The literature on refugees during the Cold War is too voluminous to cite comprehensively, but see *Itinerarario* (2022) 46, Special issue 2, "Forced Migration and Refugee Resettlement in the Long 1940s: An Introduction to Its Connected and Global History"; Megan Bradley, Laura Madokoro, Merve Erdilment, and Christopher Chanco, "Whither the Refugees? International Organisations and 'Solutions' to Displacement, 1921–1960," *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 41 (2022): 159–95; and Gerard Daniel Cohen, *In War's Wake: Europe's Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
5 Holborn, *IRO,* 5–6.
6 "Chairman of the American Delegation ([Myron C.] Taylor) to the Secretary of State," July 14, 1938, *Foreign Relations of the United Sates Diplomatic Papers, 1938, General, Vol. 1,* https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1938v01/d736 (accessed November 27, 2023).
7 "Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union Concerning Liberated Prisoners of War and Civilians," February 11, 1945, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Conferences at Malta and Yalta,* https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv01/d526 (accessed November 26, 2023).
8 Earl F. Ziemke, *The US Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944–1946* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1990), 287–88.
9 Cutts, *The State of the World's Refugees*, 16.
10 Holborn, *IRO,* 38.
11 Ibid., 23.

12 Memorandum, Georges Boris to Robert Schuman, "No. 150 Rappot de'l Organization Internationale pour les Refugies," March 4, 1949, Nations Unies et Organisation Internationales, S.50.3.2 Organisation des Nations Unies, 2 Organisation international des refugies 1948–1952," box 296, Archives diplomatiques, ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères France (hereafter S.50.3.2, AD France).
13 Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, *United Nations—Treaty Series*. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b37810.html (accessed November 27, 2023).
14 The countries were the United States, Canada, Guatemala, France, the Dominican Republic, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, China, Belgium, Iceland, Australia, Venezuela, Luxembourg, Denmark, Italy, and Switzerland.
15 Louise Holborn, "The Problem of Refugees," *Current History* 38, no. 226 (June 1960): 342–46, https://www.jstor.org/stable/45310458?read-now=1&seq=2#page_scan_tab_contents (accessed July 30, 2023).
16 Cutts, *The State of the World's Refugees*, 17.
17 Holborn, *IRO*, 363.
18 Ibid., 171.
19 Memorandum from the General Council of the IRO to ECOSOC, General Council Third Session June 28–July 8, 1949, reprinted in Holborn, *IRO,* 727–29.
20 Resolutions, General Council Fourth Session October 11–20, 1949, reprinted in Holborn, *IRO,* 731.
21 Holborn, *IRO,* 493–514.
22 Ibid., 329–38.
23 Ibid., 754. UNHCR had planned to acquire approximately 15,000 ITS dossiers but had not isolated them by the time of transfer and ultimately did not get the files.
24 John Alexander to W. Caldwell, April 11, 1951, Jacques Asscher personnel file, Records of the High Commissioner for Refugees.
25 IRO Press Release No. 245, February 15, 1952, "Oliver E. Cound," Series 3 Individual Personnel Records, Fonds 3 Records of the International Refugee Organization, UNHCR Archives. Cound was a retired career army officer from El Paso, Texas, who had joined IRO in 1948 as director in Italy. "Statement of Service of Oliver E. Cound," February 23, 1943, and memorandum, "Legion of Merit," February 23, 1943, both at US Army Heritage and Education Center, https://www.armyheritage.org/programs/research/ (accessed November 27, 2023). "Compte-rendu de la 11 ème session du comite executive et de la IX ème session du conseil general de l'O.I.R.," February 1952, S.50.3.2 AD France.
26 "International Refugee Organization." *International Organization*.
27 "Compte-rendu de la 11 ème session du comite executive et de la IX ème session du conseil general de l'O.I.R.," February 1952, S.50.3.2 AD France.
28 Item no. 153, Stephane Hessel from French delegation in Geneva, February 21, 1952, S.50.3.2 AD France.
29 "Compte-rendu de la 11 ème session du comite executive et de la IX ème session du conseil general d l'O.I.R," February 1952.
30 Item no.153, Stephane Hessel.
31 I. Paul Schiller to F.R. Hapgood, "Preliminary Report on Transfer of IRO Records," February 29, 1952, GI 12/1/9, Fonds 4 Records of the United Nations office in Geneva, UNHCR Archives (hereafter GI 12/1/9 UNHCR 04).
32 "Transfer to the United Nations of the Residual Assets and Activities of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration: Report by the Secretary-General,"

A/665, October 4, 1948, https://www.unhcr.org/publications/transfer-united-nations-residual-assets-and-activities-united-nations-relief-and (accessed November 27, 2023); Holborn, *IRO*, 58–9.

33 Separately, R.L. Coigny, former director of the IRO health division, was hired in 1952 to write a "narrative on the medical aspects of the I.R.O. operations." The complicated publication story is found in "History Medical & History Unit," AJ43/1176, Records of the International Refugee Organization, *Archives nationales de France* (hereafter IRO AN).

34 I. Paul Schiller to F.R. Hapgood, "Preliminary Report on Transfer of IRO Records," February 29, 1952; F.H. Dallison to A.D. Meurig Evans, March 10, 1952, GI 12/1/9 UNHCR 04.

35 W. Moderow to D.B. Vaughan, March 12, 1952, ibid.

36 J. Asscher to Mr. Field, "Disposal of Records of the International Refugee Organization," n.d. but mid-March 1952, ibid.

37 D.B. Vaughan to W. Moderow, "Records of the International Refugee Organization," March 21, 1952; ibid.

38 J.A. Alexander to A.D. Meurig Evans, "Records of the International Refugee Organization," April 21, 1952, ibid.

39 A.D. Meurig Evans to F.H. Dallison, April 28, 1952, ibid.

40 Oliver E. Cound to the Secretary-General, June 24, 1952, ibid.

41 Hilary Jenkinson to Brigadier Dallison, July 14, 1952; Edward Carter to Sir Hilary Jenkinson, July 22, 1952, "Correspondence," ROAG-1 International Refugee Organization—Dead Files (Accession and Disposal Inventory and Other Finding Aids), Records of the Archives, United Nations Archives.

42 I. Paul Schiller to F.R. Hapgood, "Transfer of IRO Records," August 12, 1952, GI 12/1/9 UNHCR 04.
W. Moderow to S. Lall, August 27, 1952, "Records of the International Refugee Organization," S. Lall to A. Pelt, "Question of Agreement between the International Refugee Organization and the United Nations relating to the Transfer of IRO Archives," A. Pelt to The Secretary-General, "Arrangements for Transfer of Records of the International Refugee Organization," October 1, 1952, A. Pelt to Oliver E. Cound, October 2, 1952, all GI 12/1/9 UNHCR 04. IRO had the money. According to Holborn, at the end of liquidation there was $80,000 unspent in the personnel account, and the disposal of assets brought in over $5 million. Holborn, *IRO*, 566–67.

43 Letter, Oliver E. Cound to A. Pelt, October 28, 1952, A. Pelt to O.E. Cound, October 30, 1952; Oliver E. Cound to A. Pelt, November 12, 1952, GI 12/1/9 UNHCR 04.

44 M. Pages to Victor Montoya, November 20, 1952, ibid.

45 Lethbridge to Pelt, November 18, 1952, Pelt to Lethbridge, 21/11/1952, ibid.

46 Guillaume Georges-Picot to A. Pelt, "Archives of the International Refugee Organization," December 3, 1952, ibid.

47 Pelt's deputy objected to providing free service and space. Pelt answered, "As long as we were considering the problem on purely administrative grounds I fully share the arguments. However, we are now faced with an entirely new situation, viz. possible transfer of the IRO archives to the national archives of one particular government for the purpose of keeping them out of the hands of an U.N. agency. Thus the matter has become a political issue which requires to be handled in a very different way as compared to the one followed so far." A.D. Meurig Evans to Pelt, "I.R.O. Archives," February 9, 1953, with Pelt annotation, GI 12/1/9 UNHCR 04.

48 Confidential memo, A. Pelt to The Secretary-General, "I.R.O. Archives," January 30, 1953, GI 12/1/9 UNHCR 04.

49 David B. Vaughan to A. Pelt, "I.R.O. Archives," February 11, 1953, GI 12/1/9 UNHCR 04.
50 A. Pelt to O.E. Cound, March 17, 1953, with attached draft Aide-Memoire, ibid.
51 Oliver E. Cound to A. Pelt, March 19, 1953, ibid.
52 Martin Hill to Adrien Pelt, March 31, 1953, enclosing Guillaume Georges-Picot to Santiago Perez-Perez and aide-memoire, both of March 30, 1953; Dag Hammarskjöld to O.E. Cound, April 23, 1953, ibid.
53 For US and UK objections to the drafts, see George L. Warren to Victor Montoya, January 26, 1953, and J.C. Wardrop to Colonel O. Cound, May 20, 1953, AJ43/1176, IRO AN; minutes, Board of Liquidation, April 28, 1953, S.50.3.2 AD.
54 Resolution 12 of Terminating the Work of the History Unit, Seventh session, May 4, 1953, S.50.3.2 AD France. For a critical assessment of the US and UK opposition as "a fight about power, prestige, and the production of knowledge" in the context of the Cold War, see Sebastian Huhn, "Rethinking the Postwar International Migration Regime from the Global South: Venezuela in a Global History of White Immigration," *Itinerario* 46 (2022): 214–32, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/itinerario/article/rethinking-the-postwar-international-migration-regime-from-the-global-south-venezuela-in-a-global-history-of-white-immigration/A4B10F8571E2443AC868A7FA38135A64 (accessed February 21, 2024).
55 M. Serres to Oliver E. Cound, June 13, 1953, AJ43/1176, IRO AN.
56 "AS-Comitte de liquidation de l'OIR," May 8, 1953, S.50.3.2 AD France.
57 Ibid.
58 Agreement, Disposition of Archives, The *Archives Nationales of France*, and Protocol Additional, June 10, 12, and 15, 1953, GI 12/1/9 UNHCR 04. On June 10 Cound wrote to Serres that "as space is not limited all the files [will] be transferred." Cound to Serres, June 10, 1953, IRO AN.
59 Oliver E. Cound to Dag Hammarskjöld, June 30, 1953, GI 12/1/9 UNHCR 04.
60 Dag Hammarskjöld to Vincent Broustra, July 20, 1953; Dag Hammarskjöld to Oliver E. Cound, September 25, 1953; A. Pelt to The Secretary-General, July 9, 1953, all in GI 12/1/9 UNHCR 04.
61 Note pour Monsieur Broustra, a.a.—Archives de l'O.I.R., August 1, 1953, S.50.3.2 AD France. Serres also noted that UNHCR had been "incapable" of sorting out the dossiers of the displace at the International Tracing Service.
62 Martin Hill to Adriaan Pelt, February 2, 1954, and response, A. Pelt to Martin Hill, February 9, 1954, ibid.
63 "Note A.S.—Archives historiques de l'O.I.R.," March 22, 1954, S.50.3.2 AD France.
64 Agreement, Disposition of Archives, *The Archives Nationales of France*, and Protocol Additional, June 10, 12, and 15, 1953, GI 12/1/9 UNHCR 04.
65 UNHCR Archives, Description Fonds 3, Records of the International Refugee Organization, http://adlib-ras.unhcr.org/ais5/Details/archive/110000132 (accessed July 30, 2023).
66 W.R. Smyser, *Refugees: Extended Exile* (New York: Praeger and The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1987), 7.
67 Mark Wyman, *DPs: Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945–1951* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 75–6.
68 Holborn, *IRO,* 344.
69 "AS-Comitte de liquidation de l'OIR," May 8, 1953. S.59.3.2 AD France.
70 George L. Warren to Colonel Oliver E. Cound, January 30, 1953, S.59.3.2 AD France.

Part II

CONFLICT

Chapter 3

International Law and Order in 1946: John Foster Dulles, Ralph Bunche, and the "Propaganda Game" at the Trusteeship Subcommittee

Christopher R.W. Dietrich

"The prominent international lawyer" John Foster Dulles (as introduced to his own delegation) was becoming aggravated at his meeting on November 4, 1946.[1] The weather outside the reconverted Sperry Gyroscope war plant on Long Island was sunny and unseasonably mild, perfect for a walk. But inside, the proceedings of the UN General Assembly's Fourth Committee's Trusteeship Subcommittee were overheated.

The day's agenda considered controversial proposals for Trusteeship Agreements from Great Britain, France, and New Zealand, all of which included terms for military bases. When Indian diplomat Krishna Menon argued that bases made "trusteeship no different in essence from an old empire," Dulles had enough. Empire had nothing to do with it, he said. Bases safeguarded "international peace and security, and the maintenance of law and order." His logic looked back at the immediate past and peered into the future. The Second World War had revealed what could happen without collective defense, and neither the United States nor its allies could leave territories unprotected in the uncertain postwar world. The local right to self-defense supported the greater international good in this interpretation. The UN Charter's Chapter XII, which regulated trusteeship, included a clause on "international peace and security" for that very reason.[2]

Menon saw things differently. For him, bases made trust territories "block houses on the high roads of empire."[3] His argument failed. Indian and Soviet proposals to change New Zealand's Western Samoa proposal, for example, were defeated. The final Trusteeship Agreement described a "noteworthy difference between the principles of the mandates and those of trusteeship … dictated by the requirements of world security." Whereas the League of Nations outlawed naval bases in the interwar Mandate System, trusteeship allowed them. The Agreement stated that "the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international

peace and security." Moreover, it was "the maintenance of law and order" that allowed the territories to meet their "security obligations."[4]

That local-international conflation of "international peace" and "law and order" occurred amidst growing East–West tension. Days before debating Menon, Dulles told his State Department boss, Alger Hiss, that "the establishment of the trusteeship system is … really of less substantive importance than is the propaganda issue which the Russians are raising about what states are really the defenders of the dependent peoples."[5] He believed he was close to a victory on that front by depicting the United States as the champion of a viable Trusteeship Council. Trusteeship's story in late 1946, from that perspective, offers a real-time example of how international organizations became venues for debates about decolonization in the still-unnamed Cold War (also see contributions by Christian Methfessel and Daniel Gorman in this volume).[6] More than that, the trusteeship reveals one way that the Cold War was waged: over which superpower could better position itself in public international forums like the United Nations. The idea that Dulles could present the United States as a prime "defender of the dependent peoples" also reminds us that what historians now describe as North–South issues were not just a phenomenon of the 1960s or 1970s. Instead, they were intertwined with the Cold War from its very beginning.[7]

The 1946 trusteeship debates, in that complex way, became evidence of a growing divide between the Soviet Union and the United States. But the moment was even more complicated than that; many forces shaped the seventy-five meetings of the Fourth Committee and its Trusteeship Subcommittee. Before diving into a close reading of the records of those meetings, this chapter places trusteeship in the context of longer intellectual and political debates among Americans who thought carefully about imperialism and decolonization.[8] Crucial here is the experience of Ralph Johnson Bunche, the forty-three-year-old African American professor who first served with Dulles in the US Group on Trusteeship and then took a temporary appointment as the Fourth Committee's co-Secretary and chair of its Trusteeship Subcommittee. As this chapter shows by drawing on Bunche's personal papers, he shifted in the 1930s away from a left-leaning anti-colonialism that perceived global inequality through the overlapping lenses of colonial-imperial and labor-capital binaries. He would accommodate Dulles in November and December 1946 on the question of "nations directly concerned," as discussed below. At the same time, trusteeship's implications for the US image in the world also concerned Dulles enough, especially after South Africa's Jan Smuts visited the committee, that he agreed when Bunche requested a last-minute compromise with the Soviet delegation.

Annexation Thinly Disguised

Those twists and turns are emblematic of the disquiet that East–West tension caused in international affairs. Dulles felt gratified when the General Assembly approved the Trusteeship Agreements; the United States planned to use New

Zealand's bases and sought a precedent for islands it had wrested from Japan in the last year of the Second World War.[9] The base case also offers insight into another Fourth Committee debate. When Soviet and Indian delegates led a faction calling for more international oversight over trust territories, Dulles joined delegates from Great Britain, France, New Zealand, and Australia who stalled the creation of oversight machinery. In doing so, he took a side regarding one of decolonization's more controversial questions: would fast-paced self-determination leave important spots of the planet vulnerable to outside pressure or attack?[10]

When the State Department loaned Bunche's services to the UN in 1946, he knew that pro-colonial refrain on "premature independence" well.[11] It would not have surprised him to hear Dulles adapt it to postwar geopolitics either. But compromise did not come naturally to him. In the 1930s, he sharply criticized the League of Nation's Mandate System for allowing empires to prolong colonialism. From that perspective, the Fourth Committee's rich documentation reminds us that its meetings and other such moments are coordinates that help us plot longer political trajectories.[12] As Bunche's personal papers demonstrate, such long-lasting political discussions are intertwined with intimately involved intellectual projects. Those, of course, have detours of their own.

Bunche began mulling over trusteeship in 1931 as he planned the research for his Harvard dissertation, *French Administration in Togoland and Dahomey*.[13] His thesis was that colonialism limited African development, whether under the guise of the League's Mandate System, as in the case of Togoland, or not, as in the case of the Dahomey colony. French officials designed policy to perpetuate colonial rule in both cases, not to prepare inhabitants for independence. International governance was the context for his comparative analysis, and he dedicated long passages to the Permanent Mandates Commission.

Radical schools of thought shaped the questions Bunche asked. Of interest here, he followed British journalist Henry Noel Brailsford's interpretation of the League Covenant's Article 22, which established the Mandate System. It was "the worst fig leaf" in history, Bunche wrote in his notes, incapable of camouflaging colonial sins with vague guarantees of "wellbeing and development."[14] Brailsford's anti-colonial classic, *Rebel India*, joined books on Bunche's reading list for his first trip to the League library in Geneva in 1932, which formed the backbone of the international politics syllabi he taught and shared that decade: Padmore, *How Britain Rules Africa*; Barnes, *The Duty of Empire*; and Middleton, *The Rape of Africa*.[15] Such reading still is illuminating in many ways. For our purposes here, it is a reminder that Bunche joined Brailsford and others in the interwar era who understood the Mandates as sites of imperial justification. In one telling linguistic moment from his dissertation, he even analyzed the name "Mandates" as another "popular sentimental slogan" like the White Man's Burden, the *mission civilisatrice*, and trusteeship.[16]

The duty implied by those phrases—Bunche explicitly mentioned Article 22's description of the mandates as "sacred trusts of civilization"—didn't amount to much for him. Recalling US historian Ray Stannard Baker's popular eye-witness account of the forfeiture of Wilsonian idealism in the First World War peace

negotiations, he acidly called the Mandates "a compromise system." League-supervised rule was little more than "annexation thinly disguised."[17] The big problem, as he put it, was that the League exerted oversight only as a negative influence. The Permanent Mandates Commission had no power to independently verify rulers' claims and thus had to trust the reports of Mandatory rulers. The prominent commission member and former colonial official Lord Lugard presented the attendant belief system clearly enough. Mandatory rulers "naturally" wished to describe their "stewardship" in a way to "disarm criticism." Reports would "of course be … perhaps not quite the whole truth."[18]

Bunche agreed about the problem, but disagreed with Lugard's droll tone. The British imperialist thought newfangled proposals for League-appointed "consuls" to live in the Mandates were "dangerous." Why, Bunche asked, and for whom? Lugard feared "instability" if League officials and Mandate rulers disagreed. Bunche called instead for empowering League officials and creating an appeal process for inhabitants.

Bunche set that desire for oversight within a radical political-economic critique of imperialism. When he read Nikolai Bukharin's *Imperialism and the World Economy* at the League library, the young scholar found much to love in the Marxist theorist's division of the world into "great civilized powers" and a semi-agrarian periphery. Bukharin's idea that capital "rushes to find every vacuum" struck a chord, as did his argument that colonial policy meant to yield "a colossal income" for empires. Bunche jotted a line in his notebook that he would repeat often in his writing and teaching in the 1930s: "Imperialism is a policy of conquest."[19]

The potential value of a strong international organization became clearer in that context. If profit provided the colonial motive for conquest, Bunche believed, international oversight could mitigate exploitation. He structured his dissertation around a series of case studies, from education to health policy to infrastructure, each of which built parallel scaffoldings on that foundation. The chapter on labor is a telling example. He framed it around Bukharin's theory of "native labor supply" and its place in the "relentless" growth of "European commerce and industry," which he then linked to John Hobson's theory of "forced labor," what Bunche described as work undertaken upon "compulsion issuing from white masters." He then carefully established an evidentiary chain that confirmed the theories' joint conclusion that profit opportunity led to production expansion and forced labor. French rulers increased output through long-term contracts and work taxes, policies that sharpened wage work's inherent inequalities. Forced labor built the "public works" needed for trade, like the Togolese Railroad. Labor, commerce, and infrastructure thus formed a closed circle when Bunche returned to oversight. French administrators used their Mandate reports to defend Togo's "welfare provisions" as the best among colonies, as Lugard predicted. Bunche saw these instead as "anything but liberal." Rather, France's "mobile labor" regime was a textbook example of the inhumanity of forced labor. Workers were consigned and moved at the whim of French engineers; state-sanctioned private commissaries exploited them with low-quality and overpriced goods; and the Office of the Labor Inspector offered no support.[20]

Outside pressure was too weak to be effective. When the International Labor Conference condemned forced labor, for example, the French delegation argued that the group was better off suggesting principles than offering regulations. The French didn't even follow their own decrees regulating work taxes and continued compulsory military service afterward.[21]

"The distinguishing line between forced labor and slavery is very tenuous," Bunche said.[22]

Slogan Thinking

His fiercer critiques notwithstanding, Bunche thought some reform was better than none. The main impetus for change was "the spirit of international trusteeship," and Bunche openly admired the League on that count. "The mandate principle has operated generally to liberalize and humanize the policies of the colonial powers," he wrote. Some accountability existed through the requirement that rulers send periodic reports to "an impartial and international body." The Permanent Mandates Commission gave access to those reports people like him, who routinely challenged imperial claims of altruism.[23] Historians today affirm the mixed assessment that some transparency made rule somewhat less arbitrary. They largely agree that the League offered an alternative to the insulated imperial forums of the past.[24]

Bunche believed then in an even "truer internationalization" of oversight, in which inhabitants could appeal directly to League officials who lived in the Mandates. His personal politics were attuned to that forward-looking assessment. As a Howard University professor in Washington, DC in the early 1930s, he participated in movements for change alongside groups like the NAACP and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, whose local chapters he joined for sit-ins at the segregated House of Representatives grill. He contested attacks on Howard as a hotbed of "economic Marxists" and founded the DC chapter of the Committee for Ethiopia. In a decision that proved crucial, Bunche, his friend John Davis of the Affiliated Schools for Workers, and others founded the National Negro Congress in 1936.[25] Their Program of Action called for cross-racial "working class unity" on several topics: wages, unions, sharecroppers' debt burden, federal anti-lynching law, equal education, and the right of "Negro women, along with all women, to equal pay for equal work." It attacked anti-communist gag laws as "fascist legislation" and, in the same breath, condemned "the oppression of colonial nations throughout the world."[26]

Bunche came under little scrutiny for this activism until the McCarthyite witch-hunts of the 1950s.[27] But Texas Representative Thomas Blanton did send him a questionnaire in 1936. Aimed primarily at identifying radicals among DC schoolteachers, it captures political fault lines that would become more important within the next decade. Blanton asked questions like: "Do you believe in any of the doctrines of communism?" Or, "Do you approve of *Scholastic* as a school magazine for high school students?" Even, referring to the oft-maligned US historian, "Do

you approve of Dr. Charles A. Beard's writings?" Amidst laughter, congressional leadership cajoled Blanton for using official stationery and implying that non-responsive recipients might receive a subpoena.[28]

Bunche appears to have called the bluff, and he began to assign Beard to teach the Federalist Papers in his American Politics course.[29] He continued to hold views that someone like Blanton would consider radical. In a 1936 booklet entitled *A World View of Race*, he wrote that it made sense that the "principles of equality and humanitarianism advocated by the Soviet Union" attracted downtrodden groups from "the long-suffering Indian populations" of Central and South America to "Negro peoples across the world."[30]

But his politics were changing, and the National Negro Congress appears to be central to that process. Bunche attended the group's April 1940 meeting as a researcher for the Swedish scholar Gunnar Myrdal's landmark project on US race relations. It dismayed him when delegates walked out on the famous labor leader A. Philip Randolph's speech. For them, Randolph committed the sin of comparing the Soviet Union to "other imperialist and totalitarian nations." Bunche disagreed with such rigid criticism by Randolph's detractors. Randolph, who was the group's current president, had "merely cautioned the Negro that it would be foolish for him to tie up his own interests with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union or any other nation"—a view that Bunche had held since at least the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact. His old colleague John Davis and others were guilty of a "blind acceptance" of the Communist Party line. Just as bad, he told Myrdal, "Germany and Hitler were carefully ignored" while speakers attacked "imperialist undemocratic America." Bunche deplored the moment when Randolph passed the presidential gavel to "rank neophyte" (and, as Bunche later discovered, FBI stool pigeon) Max Yergan.[31] The once-promising group was "reduced to a Communist cell," Bunche wrote despondently. He and Davis stopped speaking.

The experience intensified his ongoing soul-searching about the conditions that led to war abroad and polarization at home.[32] He began drafting a report on American ideology for Myrdal right after. Pessimism, a minor key in any scholar's life, became major. He decried the national mindset as anti-intellectual, starting with its pioneering mythology. "The American population is one whose thinking is largely 'reflex,'" he said. All of society—"white, black, red, or yellow"—parroted clichés about the "land of opportunity." Instead of Bukharin's radicalism, American "guilelessness" fit within Karl Mannheim's concept of "total ideologies." He used the concept to collapse the era's fundamental geopolitical differences, lumping them together like he did the anti-colonial movements in *A World View of Race*. Germany and the Soviet Union barely outdid the United States in ready-made thinking, he said. Little distinguished so-called "slave" and "free" societies. If Stalin or Hitler banged ideas into their subjects' belfries, "ours have been wrapped in cellophane and 'voluntarily' taken, but, nevertheless, have been woven into the very warp and woof of our nation's conceptual fabric."[33]

Whether the result of cellophane-wrapped consumerism or totalitarian browbeating, Bunche deprecated "slogan thinking" because it burrowed so deeply into people's minds that it became dogma. Whether American mythmaking or

European colonialism, fascism or communism, dogma rendered other ideas impotent. It exiled criticism to "a realm beyond history and society" and ensured "the immunity of the status quo." It led to dormant thinking—"an ideological indolence and a consequent lack of application of intelligent thought to the problem, that is shocking."[34]

The distinguishing lines between different types of dogma were very tenuous indeed.

Winning the Peace

Like many, Bunche would accept a government post once the United States entered the Second World War. His wartime employment—"my new work with Uncle Sam," he told Myrdal—enhanced his distaste for dogma.[35] And when Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson petitioned Howard University president Mordecai Johnson to extend Bunche's wartime leave in the summer of 1946, he explained it in the pragmatic context of the General Assembly's failure to establish a Trusteeship Council in London that January.[36] Alger Hiss wrote from his perch at the Office of Special Political Affairs that "the work which Dr. Bunche is engaged in may be described as 'war work,' in the sense that it is concerned with the winning of the peace, a task which is right now in a very vital stage."[37] Johnson granted his professor leave to render "a service of great importance to the United States and to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations."[38]

A tight clock conditioned his service. A year had passed since the UN Charter's approval, and the Trusteeship Council could only exist once the General Assembly approved Trusteeship Agreements with three UN members. "The most urgent and important task" before the Fourth Committee, Bunche and his co-Secretary Wilfrid Benson wrote, was thus their approval.[39] If the Agreements failed to pass the General Assembly in December, some worried that trusteeship would die—that the charter's loftiest ideals might become "just paper," as the co-Secretaries put it.[40]

It was in that pressure cooker of a context that a Trusteeship Subcommittee formed under Bunche's leadership.[41] East–West tensions immediately made the job harder. After the subcommittee's first meeting, Soviet delegate Nikolai Novikov released a public statement blaming the former Mandate powers for the "continued failure of the United Nations." Their initial refusal to submit proposals proved their reluctance to yield power, and now their submissions revealed plans to "absorb the non-self-governing territories as an integral part of the mandatory power on a 'colonial basis.'" Britain's refusal to submit a Palestine proposal and South Africa's desire to annex South West Africa offered further evidence of imperial deceit.[42]

Bunche agreed with some of those points. But he also saw Novikov as a nuisance and likely agreed when John Foster Dulles responded by hurling a harpoon sharpened with proto-Cold War rhetoric. Dulles called a press conference to berate "the Russian," as US diplomats often referred to their Soviet counterparts. Novikov enjoyed "being able to make the complaint" about UN failings, Dulles

smirked, and now he wanted "to prolong that enjoyment." The Fourth Committee could not "fall into a morass," he warned. That would run "the great risk that the trusteeship system will never be established."[43]

Dulles aimed the public barb at Novikov but cast it with a sidelong look at Bunche. Both knew that blaming "Russians" for the potential failure of trusteeship favored the quick passage of the Agreements. Bunche already had streamlined committee rules to limit "eternal debates," bar new amendments, and curtail the Fourth Committee's discussion of problems already hashed out in his subcommittee.[44]

Nations Directly Concerned

The procedural upshot of those rules becomes plain when examining Soviet-American disagreement in the Fourth Committee that became the most likely culprit for delaying or even preventing the creation of a Trusteeship Council: the "direct concern" of nations besides administering authorities in trust territories. Dulles had argued with the Soviet diplomat Andrei Gromyko about that interpretation of international law earlier in 1946. To add new "states directly concerned" to a list of oversight nations would prevent the passage of an "adequate number of Trusteeship Agreements," he said. Gromyko responded that Moscow was "concerned in any major economic, political, or geographic question anywhere in the world," Dulles complained to the US Group on Trusteeship, an ad hoc State Department unit that then included Bunche.[45]

Bunche understood the problem. He had just completed a long report that tracked US decolonization policy during the Second World War. Part of it described the growing influence of people like Dulles. The Roosevelt administration agreed nearly unanimously in 1942 that colonies "should be granted progressive measures of self-government aimed at complete independence." When victory neared, the consensus splintered between those "idealists" and "realists" seeking cooperation with empires. The balance tipped in favor of the realists at the 1945 UN Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, when they resisted Soviet and others' calls to insert "independence" instead of "self-government" in the UN Charter's trusteeship provisions.[46]

Bunche disagreed and secretly gave a like-minded Australian delegate charter language with independence as the final goal.[47] It "thrilled" him that the charter included trusteeship at all, but realist influence within the US delegation caused another rupture between him and more radical African Americans leaders. W.E.B. Du Bois and Rayford Logan, who attended the San Francisco Conference as invited members of US domestic interest groups, accused Bunche of doing too little for colonial people or African Americans. Privately, they said his government role made him an imperial collaborator. "There were 'bandanna-handkerchief-headed Negroes', and 'silk-handkerchief-headed Negroes,' but Ralph is a cellophane-handkerchief-headed Negro," a friend told Logan. "You have to get off at a certain angle to see him." Here, the use of the popular product of cellophane was almost

the opposite of Bunche's earlier criticism of packaged dogma. Instead of implying blind acceptance, the emphasis is on the slippery, artificial, and reflective qualities of the material, all to say that Bunche's political views were malleable and departed from his earlier principles. Du Bois used much harsher and more hurtful racial language in criticizing Bunche for his membership of the official US delegation. It upset both men greatly, too, when Dulles wrote a "domestic jurisdiction" clause into the UN Charter in order to limit any international scrutiny of discrimination in the American South.[48]

Postwar geopolitics shaped the broader policy shift regarding trusteeship. The failure of the February 1945 Yalta conference between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin to agree on Germany's occupation, reparations, or Poland's future had escalated Soviet-American antagonism. Friction intensified in the following year over Greece, Romania, and Iran—when the "granite-faced" Gromyko walked out of the UN Security Council regarding the latter in March 1946, one journalist wrote that "the monkey wrench of reality clattered into the machinery of the new world organization."[49] The trusteeship dispute was, for many, further evidence of a widening divide—what the influential geographer Isaiah Bowman called in San Francisco "perhaps the inevitable struggle … between Russia and ourselves." Dulles agreed, and had begun to think about how that lens shaped UN policy. "The concept of independence might not assist in the establishment of future peace," he said in 1945, disputing idealist rejoinders that abandoning the principle "would play directly into Russian propaganda."[50]

In that broader context, the crucial disagreement in the Trusteeship Subcommittee came to revolve around the "nations directly concerned" question, which addressed some of the concerns Bunche and others had long raised about the League of Nations. This was not a propaganda matter for Indian delegate Maharaj Singh. Indian merchants had traded in the proposed Tanganyika trust for centuries, Indian troops "wrested the country from the Germans in the First War," and the 40,000-large Indian population far outnumbered Europeans. Dulles was unmoved. "Only the mandatory power is 'directly concerned,'" he said. A nation that was the "sole sovereign" under the Mandate System was the natural arbiter of trusteeship terms.[51]

Bunche disagreed with that interpretation. When he and Benson analyzed the Trusteeship Agreements, they latched onto the shortcoming that "an inquiry into the wishes of the people conducted *solely* by the administering authority could be considered satisfactory to the United Nations." They insisted on "alternative procedures" like petitions and site visits—ideas Bunche wrote about in his dissertation when analyzing the Mandate System. The two men specifically called for a UN "commission of inquiry" to visit South West Africa to review South African annexation plans.[52]

That recommendation reminds us that South West Africa was a flashpoint in early Cold War debates about race, decolonization, and international oversight.[53] Here, Bunche confronted an old antagonist: Field Marshall Jan Smuts, who arrived to defend annexation. Bunche had reserved a special venom in *French Administration* for Smuts, and his Geneva notebook again reveals his mindset.[54]

Bunche wrote then that Smuts argued that apartheid prevented "the debasement of" what he considered "the higher race and culture." He believed control over the "development of peoples not yet able to stand alone" led naturally to "separate parallel institutions." He justified apartheid through an additional cultural argument: It prevented the "disintegration of native life." Bunche abhorred that Smuts used culture as a red herring to shut "detribalized natives" out of government. For Bunche, dismissing political rights disproved any developmental benefits South Africans claimed for minority rule.[55]

More to Bunche's concern with international oversight, apartheid shaped a dangerous interpretation of Article 22 of the League Covenant, one that ran counter to the radical version he adapted from Brailsford and *Rebel India*. Smuts saw segregated settlement as a model and recommended its expansion in the Mandates. He sought the same baleful influence in the Fourth Committee in November 1946. He began by appealing to US history—a strategy meant to sweeten up Dulles. South West Africa's annexation was inevitable, no different from the United States acquiring Texas exactly a century earlier. In response to Singh, who had helped lead Indian opposition to apartheid laws like the Transvaal Asiatic Land Tenure Act in the 1930s, Smuts contrasted his nation's stability with "the clash of communities in India." Unlike the decolonizing subcontinent, South Africa was a "peaceful, well-behaved, well-ordered country."[56]

The South West Africa question had direct bearing on the nations directly concerned problem. Philippines delegate Lorenzo Sumulong, who attended Harvard Law at the same time as Bunche was in graduate school, responded. Sumulong already had accommodated the United States on military bases. In 1952, he even helped secure the US–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. For him, the bilateral agreement helped his nation bear its share of the "responsibility of the United Nations Organization to preserve peace and security throughout the world."[57] In 1946, he responded to Smuts by advocating greater international oversight. He employed a logic Bunche shared: if the charter conferred obligations to the administering authorities, there existed "a corresponding right" of the territories' peoples, including those in South West Africa, to demand their "due observance."[58]

It was the UN's duty to give a "full, instead of a one-sided, picture," he said. Bunche read an early draft of Sumulong's speech. His comments emphasized the place of the United States in the subsequent committee decisions. He encouraged Sumulong to describe American rule over the Philippines as proof that a "system of benevolent and progressive rule is practicable." He connected American empire to a successful trusteeship process: the United States should "assume the same leadership in the establishment of the Trusteeship System that she has already assumed, in practice by its record in the Philippines."[59]

We don't know what Sumulong thought of this advice. And one wonders how Dulles felt to hear these different nationalist invocations—the inevitable swallower of Texas and the progressive ruler of the Philippines. It seems unlikely that he even saw them as being in tension. To ask, though, reminds us that both men, Smuts and Sumulong, made their arguments with US power in mind. To

reflect on that also helps us remember the moment's contingency; neither man knew what position the US delegation would ultimately take when it came to trusteeship. Dulles already sided with Bunche on international oversight in one case, for example. When it came to international investment, he emphasized his long career representing US corporations that sought access to imperial markets and resources. "We should stick to our principles and vote for the prevention of monopolies" in the trust territories, he told the US Group. Eleanor Roosevelt, who often argued with him, agreed.[60] If the long US tradition of anti-monopoly could be couched in the framework of international oversight, what of annexation or "nations directly concerned"?

One thing we do know is that the Smuts visit left Dulles in an awkward position. The general inclination among US policy elites was to bend to South Africa. Dean Acheson, for example, described Smuts as "the respected elder statesman" of the British Empire and "the originator, with President Wilson of the League of Nations." However, apartheid and annexation were under constant attack by India, the Soviet Union, and domestic US groups like the Council on African Affairs.[61] Dulles, who continued to think about the importance of image in the new international institution, worried about the United States' reputation after the Smuts speech. "The United States was lined up with the colonial powers, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and South Africa," he informed the US Group. "On this side of the fence, the United States would not carry abroad."[62]

Dulles recommended small policy changes with international reputation in mind. When the US Group split on whether to support a bid by the Netherlands, which continued to exercise colonial rule in the Dutch East Indies, for a Trusteeship Council seat, he angrily telephoned Hiss. If "word got around" that the United States supported the Netherlands, it would empower "the Soviets, the Chinese, the Indians, and others" to depict Trusteeship Agreements as "merely devices by which the colonial powers will make the trust territories colonial dependencies." A Dutch seat "would completely destroy the chances of getting the Trusteeship Council established at this session."[63]

Dulles "felt so strongly about this point" that he threatened to quit. He got dramatic with Hiss, he said, because he had just finished negotiations regarding "nations directly concerned," and he believed his diplomacy gave a "newfound strength of our position" after the nadir of the Smuts visit. He reminded Hiss that he was no idealist, that he had remained firm throughout the Fourth Committee meetings that oversight could "only be accomplished" through an established Trusteeship Council. "There will be no international supervision" without Trusteeship Agreements, his formula went.[64] But just one week before the General Assembly deadline, the "nations directly concerned" argument had threatened an impasse.

That was when Bunche asked Dulles to "consult informally" with Novikov in a "committee of two." Bunche hoped the two men could resolve Soviet-American differences privately and avoid damaging UN credibility, Dulles told Hiss. Bunche hoped the quiet compromise in the subcommittee would prevent trusteeship from becoming a public emblem of discord. Dulles thus proposed a safety clause

that "no state has waived or prejudiced its right hereafter to claim to be 'a state directly concerned.'"[65] Alongside language allowing future amendments "in the light of changing circumstances," that small compromise helped the Trusteeship Agreements reach the General Assembly.[66]

Hiss hoped this meant the "explosive question" would "die out at least for some time."[67]

Conclusion: Propaganda, Dogma, Decolonization

Dulles expected the same. "There will be relatively little of substance which the Trusteeship Council will itself accomplish and, as in the case of the mandate system, the administering powers will be responsible in fact for what goes on in their territories," he assured Hiss.[68] Dulles made that prediction, which echoed Lord Lugard's dismissal of international oversight in the Mandates, halfway through six weeks of intense work. To recap: after twenty Fourth Committee meetings, the co-secretaries formed the Trusteeship Subcommittee. Under Bunche, that group met twenty-six times and "thoroughly explored" 229 proposed modifications to the eight Trusteeship Agreements, ending with the nations directly concerned compromise. The Fourth Committee then approved the Agreements, and the General Assembly passed them on December 13, 1946.[69] The US delegation considered the result a victory. In many ways, as historians have noted, the compromise worked as Dulles and Hiss wished. The new Trusteeship Council only "slightly revised" the Mandates System when it standardized petitions and site visits. Similarly, the approval of military bases prefigured the transformation of Japan's South Seas Mandate into the US-administered "Strategic" Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.[70]

Bunche understood the colonial origins of international law and order arguments, but he accommodated them. American diplomacy was shrewd in pressing that outcome. Dulles had a coherent vision of how trusteeship would and wouldn't work in the postwar world. While prepping for the Fourth Committee, he explained "the overall standpoint" to US Defense Secretary James Forrestal and President Truman: American UN policy needed to "demonstrate to the rest of the world its capacity to act decisively in relation to international affairs." People doubted that US postwar diplomacy could match its wartime might. "Indecision"—in this case over the Japanese mandate—"would, if prolonged, weaken our position in the world." Vacillating dangerously gave "the world the impression that in such matters our Government was unable to make up its mind." But as much as Dulles wanted "*some* decision," *any* decision needed to compromise with the forces of decolonization. A form of "strategic trusteeship," a phrase that could be applied to the debates in the Fourth Committee just as easily as it could to the Strategic Trust Territories in the Pacific Ocean, was undoubtedly better than the crass annexation Smuts proposed. "There was a long history beginning with the Atlantic Charter" in which the United States declared it would not "annex outright," he said. If the United States did, others might follow—"with a result that the entire trusteeship system might collapse."[71]

Dulles would be more combative in the future, but he focused on the US reputation in the world in 1946.[72] That focus on reputation and "propaganda" led, perhaps ironically for a man who was in the process of becoming a stalwart Cold Warrior, to compromise. When the Kremlin spotlighted US deployments in China, he described it to the US Group as "clearly … a propaganda effort" to discredit postwar American power. The Soviet strategy "was a subtle one to disarm the United States unilaterally" by turning a war-weary public against peacetime deployment. "If the American people were led to believe that the United States was militaristic, then we will disarm," he worried. If Moscow wanted "to show a militaristic picture of the world," though, Washington could use UN diplomacy to improve its nonmilitary image.[73]

Americans "had to play the propaganda game as skillfully as the Russians," Dulles said.[74] That the US government could do so in the Fourth Committee owed in part to Bunche. He moved the Trusteeship Agreements through committee and brokered compromise in ways that departed from his youthful appraisals of colonialism and forced labor. Bunche had mixed feelings about trusteeship's potential at the end of 1946, as he pondered leaving academia for national or international civil service. In truth, after he turned down a State Department job offer and joined the UN as the head of the new Trusteeship Division, he didn't engage much in those matters, even if trusteeship incorporated some of his oversight solutions. Still, the Fourth Committee's work found parallels as Global South elites expanded their activities and made other organizations more inclusive than the League of Nations ever had been.[75] The fact that Dulles cared about the international reputation of the United States—and his concern was premised on those very elites' opinions—is indicative of that generational change.

The painstaking work of international organizations in the early Cold War, marked by compromise and accommodation, may point to another historical claim. Bunche's 1940 deprecation of "slogan thinking" raises interesting questions here. Can we read it as part of one man's transition towards a certain pragmatism that was useful or even necessary for international organizations and civil servants to navigate the Cold War? Does his consideration of dogma help us understand the story of the Trusteeship Committee in the early days of East–West tension? Answers to those questions don't come easy. There is no doubt, though, that Bunche felt differently about trusteeship than he did about the ideologies of the emerging Cold War. Like others, he despaired that Soviet-American competition would make the UN "a hodge-podge of 'crisis,'" as one perceptive journalist wrote. He worried, no doubt, about the increasingly standard assumption that the "growing rift" between Moscow and Washington was becoming a permanent split—"an all-out-fight with neither side giving much quarter to the UN."[76]

Anti-colonialism, on the other hand, was not "ideologically indolent" dogma. Nor was it an obvious check in an early Cold War box, like Gromyko stalking out of the Security Council was. It didn't threaten to strip essential context and nuance like dogma did. For Bunche, anti-colonialism was a different type of belief, one in the near-inevitability of decolonization as an international political process. It may follow that Bunche understood that such a process required compromise when

navigating a propaganda duel shaped by the hardening dogmas of a bipolar world system. Perhaps, too, he found it prudent to accept some aspects of "international law and order" so that trusteeship could wedge another lever into what he had called "truer internationalization" a decade earlier—even if accommodation welded an older generation of imperialists like Smuts or Lugard to a new one of Cold Warriors like John Foster Dulles.

Notes

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2 Verbatim Record, Tenth Meeting of Sub-Committee 1, Fourth Committee, November 27, 1946, Ralph Bunche Papers, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library, box 45, folder 3 (hereafter BP-Schomburg-NYPL-45/3).
3 Ibid.
4 Verbatim Record, Eleventh Meeting, Sub-Committee 1, Fourth Committee, November 28, 1946, BP-Schomburg-NYPL-45/4. *Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Western Samoa* (Wellington: Government Printer, 1947), 4, 9.
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Chapter 4

Territorial Conflicts on the World Stage: International Organizations, the "Third World," and the Global Cold War

Christian Methfessel*

Broadly speaking, annexations and secessions rarely succeeded during the Cold War, and international borders remained surprisingly stable.[1] The territorial integrity norm, enshrined in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, has proven to be very robust—which is somewhat remarkable, as the UN Security Council, the organ originally expected to prevent breaches of the norm, was for the most part unable to act due to the antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union. Within Europe, this antagonism manifested itself in nuclear deterrence, preventing the outbreak of an open war between East and West, while the division of Europe and the integration of the rival camps into security alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—impeded the escalation of territorial disputes between members within each camp.[2] Yet in Africa and Asia, territorial conflicts repeatedly erupted in the wake of the waves of decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s.[3]

Existing explanations for the strength of the territorial integrity norm after the Second World War agree that border changes by violent means were indeed rare during this period, but views on which actors were responsible for this stability differ widely. Mark W. Zacher, building on democratic peace theory, emphasizes the role played by Western liberal democracies.[4] Malcolm Anderson argues that the superpowers "maintained an environment hostile to secessionist movements and to the acquisition of territory by violent means."[5] Studies on state borders on the African continent tend to focus on the desire of Africa's postcolonial elites to maintain the borders their states inherited when they became independent.[6] Congruently, historical studies on secessionist conflicts and the norm of self-determination have demonstrated that the leaders of the newly independent states predominantly agreed that only anti-colonial liberation movements could

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claim the right to independence in a given colony, while separatist demands from national movements within postcolonial states were perceived as illegitimate.[7]

This chapter situates the evolution of the territorial integrity norm in the context of the global Cold War and thus contributes to research examining the connections between superpower rivalries and regional conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.[8] It aims to shed light on how the interplay of the rise of Afro-Asian internationalism and the Cold War struggle over influence in the "Third World"[9] shaped debates at the United Nations and thereby facilitated the establishment of an international order of sovereign states with fixed borders on a global scale.

The Emergence of an Afro-Asian Consensus on the Inviolability of Postcolonial Borders and the Anti-imperialism of the 1960s

When the newly independent states in Africa and Asia started to forge links between each other, they regularly invoked the United Nations and its charter, particularly the territorial integrity norm. A defining moment in this regard was the Bandung Conference in April 1955, attended by representatives of twenty-nine Asian and African countries, including three countries still under colonial rule: Cyprus, Gold Coast (Ghana), and Sudan. The purpose of the conference was to further Afro-Asian cooperation and to discuss the problems of colonialism.[10] The conference's Final Communiqué lists "Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations" as one of the ten guiding principles forming the basis of peaceful relations between states.[11]

It was, however, the shared stance against colonialism that made the Bandung Conference a frame of reference for future initiatives for Afro-Asian cooperation,[12] as well as the pan-African activities of the Ghanian government under prime minister Kwame Nkrumah to further the cause of liberation and unity on the continent.[13] In this context, Ghana hosted the Conference of Independent African States in April 1958, inviting representatives from Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic (the short-lived union of Egypt and Syria) to Accra. In his opening speech, Nkrumah pledged his support for the principles of Bandung,[14] and at the final session, he described "the problem of how we can maintain our hard-won independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity" as a "central theme of our conference."[15] As a result, one resolution resolved to respect the "territorial integrity of one another" and to "co-operate with one another to safeguard their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity" as well as condemn "outside interference" against the "territorial integrity of the Independent African States."[16] The resolution shows that the newly independent states feared violations of the territorial integrity norm from two directions: conflicts among themselves and (neo-)colonial aggression by non-African states.

With the outbreak of the Congo Crisis in July 1960, the threat of (neo-) colonial aggression to the territorial integrity of newly independent states became inextricably linked to the risk of secessionism as the Katanga Province, supported by its former colonial ruler Belgium, attempted to secede from the newly

independent Republic of Congo. At least in the beginning, the United States had an interest in keeping the ostentatiously anti-communist government of Katanga intact as a counterweight to the central government of prime minister Patrice Lumumba. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and members of his administration even played with the thought of recognizing the secessionist province.[17] Conversely, the Soviet Union had provided military aid to Lumumba's government to fight the secessionists. In response, the United States backed Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu and military strongman Colonel Joseph-Désiré Mobutu in their struggle to seize and maintain the power of the central government.[18] Africa was divided in its response to the crisis: the so-called "Casablanca states" (Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic/Egypt), a group of "radical" states actively pursuing a non-aligned and anti-imperialist policy, backed Lumumba; the "Brazzaville states," a group of "conservative" Francophone states interested in cultivating close relations with their former colonial ruler, supported Kasavubu; and a third group of "moderate" states, including Ethiopia and Tunisia, hoped to reconcile the rivaling camps.[19]

The twelve Francophone states were also willing to enter into negotiations with Katanga's secessionist leader Moïse Tshombé; in December 1960, Kasavubu and Tshombé were invited to a conference in Brazzaville that gave the group its name. Yet, on the UN stage, the Brazzaville states at most supported negotiations between Kasavubu and Tshombé to transform the Congo into a confederation, never endorsing Katanga's independence.[20] In contrast, all other African states strongly condemned the secession. They found strong allies in Asian states like Indonesia and India that promoted a policy of non-alignment and anti-colonialism. Hence, Afro-Asian statements linking their opposition to the Katanga secession with a general commitment to the territorial integrity norm and the promotion of an anti-imperialist agenda dominated debates at the United Nations.[21]

The stance taken by the Afro-Asian states influenced wider reactions to the Katanga secession. The administration of President John F. Kennedy showed much more concern for American prestige in the Third World than had his predecessor and supported attempts to end the Katanga secession by diplomatic means.[22] In response to the demands made by Afro-Asian states, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld also attempted to restore the territorial unity of the Congo. His successor, U Thant, increased the pressure on Katanga, and eventually the secession was ended by military means in January 1963.[23]

At the United Nations, the reactions to the Congo Crisis shaped the anti-imperialist agenda advanced by the postcolonial states. Commitment to the territorial integrity norm had become an essential part of the Afro-Asian solidarity discourse. Consequently, the ground-breaking "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," adopted in December 1960, stipulated the territorial integrity of newly independent states in two separate paragraphs.[24] Even though all Afro-Asian states voted in support of the resolution, the consensus on the inviolability of borders was broad, but not unanimous. Afghanistan supported self-determination for the Pashtuns in Pakistan, hoping to integrate the Pakistani territory inhabited by Pashtuns into the Afghan state.[25]

Similarly, Somalia pursued an irredentist policy of uniting all ethnic Somalis in one state and thus made a claim for French Somaliland (later Djibouti) and parts of Ethiopia and Kenya.[26]

Moreover, in several cases concerning contested colonial territory, interpretation on the application of the territorial integrity norm differed widely. This was the case when postcolonial states argued that further territory still under colonial rule had historically belonged to them, because it was part of their territory in colonial or precolonial times.

In the Security Council debate on the crisis in the Congo on September 17, 1960, the permanent representative of Morocco, El Mehdi Ben Aboud, raised the question of Mauritania and argued that Morocco also faced "a threat of 'Katanganization,' the carving up of its national territory."[27] Yet it could not stop France from granting independence to Mauritania in November 1960. At the United Nations, France could count on the support of the Brazzaville group. Mauritania's admission to the UN was, however, vetoed by the Soviet Union; several Asian states, including India, hesitated to recognize Mauritania in light of the Moroccan claim. On the African continent, Morocco was able for a time to mobilize the support of its allies in the Casablanca group, but all other African states publicly endorsed Mauritanian independence. In October 1961, the Soviet Union gave up its resistance to Mauritania's UN admission as part of a package deal that also paved the way for the UN membership of its ally Mongolia. In 1963, Mauritania became a founding member of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU); by 1969, even Morocco recognized Mauritania.[28]

While Morocco's Mauritania policy had failed, India's succeeded with its claim on Goa, an enclave in India that remained under Portuguese rule after India's independence in 1947. The government in Lisbon argued that Goa was an integral part of Portugal, not a colonial territory, and rejected all Indian calls for negotiations on the question. In December 1961, India eventually annexed Goa within a few days by military means. At the UN Security Council, Western and Latin American states, in addition to the Republic of China (Taiwan), deplored the use of force by India (without backing Portugal's position), while the remaining Afro-Asian states and the Soviet Union sided with India.[29]

Indonesia similarly succeeded in framing its claim on West Papua, the Western half of the island of New Guinea, as part of the global anti-imperialist struggle, even though the outcome of that conflict was more controversial than in the case of Goa. After the outbreak of the Congo Crisis, the Indonesian government compared the West Papua question to the Katanga Crisis, arguing that in both cases a colonial power violated the territorial integrity and national unity of a postcolonial state.[30]

When, at the UN General Assembly debate in October 1961, Dutch foreign minister Joseph Luns presented a plan for West New Guinea that included transferring the administration of the territory to an international administration and a plebiscite under UN supervision, Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio rejected the proposal as "nothing else but neo-colonialism. Another Congo. Another Katanga."[31] Subsequently, the Brazzaville group submitted a resolution

that called on both parties to continue negotiating, but also envisaged an international administration in case the negotiations failed. The resolution was supported by most Western and Latin American countries, while the Soviet Union and its allies, most Asian countries, and all African countries except the Brazzaville group and Somalia opposed it. The resolution failed to achieve the necessary two-thirds majority.[32]

Shortly afterwards, India succeeded in its "liberation" of Goa. Encouraged, Indonesia threatened the use of force to solve the conflict. Worried that the Soviet Union—a steadfast supporter of Indonesia's claims—might profit from a violent escalation in Asia, and in line with the Kennedy administration's determination to woo non-aligned countries, the White House shifted its support from the Netherlands to Indonesia. The United States pressured the Netherlands into signing a treaty according to which authority over the territory was—after a short interim period under UN administration—transferred to Indonesia, which would then be responsible for organizing a vaguely defined "act of free choice" by the end of 1969. The treaty was submitted to the UN General Assembly on September 21, 1962.[33] In the end, the resolution was adopted by a large majority, with only twelve Francophone African countries, France, and Haiti abstaining (and no votes against).[34]

The "act of free choice" eventually organized by Indonesia in 1969 was in many ways a fraud: despite the fact that the members of the responsible assemblies were handpicked by Indonesia, intimidation was still necessary to achieve the desired outcome. Even though all informed outside observers estimated that in a free vote, the inhabitants of the territory would have opted for independence, the special representative of the Secretary-General, Fernando Ortiz Sanz, wrote a report that—with some reservations—concluded that the population had "expressed their wish to remain with Indonesia."[35] This time, Indonesia was met with more opposition from African countries than it had in 1962. In the meantime, West Papuan independence activists had increased their efforts: when addressing the United Nations, they stressed their right to self-determination; in their appeals to African countries and the OAU, they also framed the question in racial terms, arguing that, in West New Guinea, a Black population was fighting for its freedom against foreign Indonesian oppressors.[36]

As a result, when the UN General Assembly was asked in November 1969 to take note that the "act of free choice" had been completed, the Francophone states that had criticized the 1962 treaty were now joined by new voices. The Sierra Leonean permanent representative, Davidson S.H.W. Nicol, warned that white minority regimes in southern Africa could use this case as a precedent to adopt similar methods when consulting the will of the African population in their territories. Ghana's UN ambassador, Richard Maximilian Akwei, described the "act of free choice" as a "mockery of the democratic process and a breach of the principle of self-determination."[37] The overwhelming majority in the General Assembly, however, supported Indonesia.[38]

In the case of West Papua as in the case of Mauritania, the conservative Brazzaville states were among the first to support self-determination for the

territories. This policy can be attributed in part to power struggles on the African continent: Morocco was a leader of the rival Casablanca group, and the Brazzaville states regarded the interference of Asian non-aligned states like Indonesia and India during the Congo Crisis with hostility. But in both cases, more and more African states sided with the Brazzaville group. A growing majority of African states favored a strict interpretation of the territorial integrity norm that could not be harnessed to justify annexations of colonial territories.

Consequently, when the newly independent states in Africa founded the OAU in 1963, they once again endorsed the territorial integrity norm in its charter.[39] A resolution passed by the OAU in Cairo in the following year contains the most rigid formulation of the territorial integrity norm to this day, warning against "extra-African manoeuvres aimed at dividing African States," stating that "the borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality," and declaring "that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence."[40] Once more, threats to the inviolability of postcolonial borders were linked to imperialist influences from outside.

This consensus made it extremely difficult for separatist movements to find international support for their objectives.[41] When a war of secession broke out in Nigeria in 1967, an overwhelming majority of African states supported the federal government in Lagos against the secessionist authorities in Biafra. France publicly endorsed Biafran self-determination and secretly provided military assistance because it hoped to weaken Nigerian and British influence in Africa.[42] In this goal, it was supported by two conservative Francophone states, Ivory Coast and Gabon, which both recognized Biafra in May 1968. One month earlier, Tanzania had recognized Biafra in the hope of forcing the Nigerian government to the negotiation table. Zambia followed shortly afterwards, out of frustration with the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the secessionist region and Nigeria's unwillingness to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. Haiti officially recognized Biafra a year later.[43]

On the other side of the conflict, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union provided military equipment to the federal government of Nigeria. The Soviets did so "to burnish their image as the reliable allies of nationalist regimes facing the rise of ethnic particularisms" and to increase their influence in Nigeria.[44] The British government wanted to protect British oil investments; moreover, it feared that the Soviet position would be strengthened by a halt in British arms supplies to its former colony and that France would benefit from a break-up of Nigeria.[45] Thus, even though the Biafra Crisis was not a typical Cold War conflict in which the West supported one side while the socialist camp supported the other, Cold War ideas of prestige, influence, and containment still provided incentives to the governments in London and in Moscow to support the suppression of a secessionist rebellion.

On the diplomatic front, the OAU clearly sided with Nigeria.[46] Since the overwhelming majority of African states insisted on dealing with the Biafra War in an African context, the crisis was never inscribed on the UN agenda. Still, Biafra's supporters raised the issue during the general debates. On October 7, 1968,

the French minister of foreign affairs, Michel Debré, called for a solution of the conflict "which is consistent with the principle of self-determination."[47] However, even among Biafra's allies, such an open endorsement of the Biafran position was rare. Among the four African states that had recognized Biafra, only the Zambian minister of foreign affairs, Reuben Kamanga, mentioned his country's recognition of Biafra in the General Assembly on October 10, 1968 and justified it by stating that the "situation in Biafra has taken on the character of genocide" and "real unity between peoples cannot be achieved through mass and indiscriminate slaughter."[48]

The hesitancy of Biafra's allies to openly make a case for recognition indicates that support for secessionism was deeply unpopular in the General Assembly. This is particularly noteworthy as the Biafran crisis was the first time that a claim to independence was justified with grave human rights violations. Massacres committed by the Nigerian federal army and the starvation caused by the blockade of the secessionist region had caused an international outcry. In the West, solidarity activists accused the government of Nigeria of genocide and backed Biafran claims to self-determination.[49] Yet, at the United Nations, non-African countries at most expressed their concern over the humanitarian situation and supported the efforts of the OAU to settle the conflict peacefully.[50]

New Conflicts and the Evolution of the Territorial Integrity Norm in the 1970s

The Bangladesh War in 1971 reveals that the anti-secessionist consensus was not limited to conflicts on the African continent. The war erupted in March 1971, when the Pakistani military began to brutally suppress the Awami League, an autonomy movement in East Pakistan that had recently won the national elections in all of Pakistan. In response to the actions of the Pakistani military, the leader of the Awami League declared the independence of Bangladesh and its supporters began a guerrilla war against the Pakistani authorities. India supported the secessionist movement against its traditional rival Pakistan by providing military aid for the liberation movement fighting the Pakistani army and launching an international campaign to mobilize support for the Bangladeshi cause. Ostensibly, it appealed to governments around the world to convince Pakistan to settle the conflict peacefully; but by constantly accusing Pakistan of human rights violations and atrocities, it also hoped to create favorable conditions for military intervention.

As results of its efforts, India was able to secure Soviet support for its position. For the Soviet Union, however, concerns about the humanitarian situation in East Pakistan were not the decisive factor. Rather, the Soviet Union had long pursued a policy of forging closer links with India. Nonetheless, as the Bangladesh crisis unfolded over the course of 1971, the Soviet government repeatedly warned India against direct military intervention in the conflict. Soviet support for India showed itself mainly through appeals to Pakistan to settle the crisis by peaceful means.[51] Partly in response to the human rights violations of the Pakistani army, partly in the interest of keeping good relations with India, several West European

countries and the US Congress also showed a measure of understanding for the Indian position.[52]

On the other hand, US President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger's foreign policy clearly followed a Cold War logic: Pakistan was deemed an essential ally for US rapprochement with the People's Republic of China (PRC), a policy Nixon and Kissinger pursued to weaken the Soviet Union.[53] Besides the US White House, India faced its strongest opposition when it sought to mobilize support among Afro-Asian states. Even close allies in the Non-Aligned Movement opposed any political solution that could lead to the independence of East Pakistan.[54]

When the Bangladesh War escalated into a full-scale war between India and Pakistan at the end of 1971, the Security Council assembled to discuss the conflict. A resolution submitted by the US ambassador to the UN, George H.W. Bush, demanding a withdrawal of "armed forces present on the territory of the other to their own sides" (i.e., India's troops in East Pakistan), was supported by eleven members of the council, but vetoed by the Soviet Union on December 4, 1971. Poland voted with the Soviet Union; France and the United Kingdom abstained.[55] A similar resolution by the General Assembly three days later passed with 104 votes, with only eleven states voting against it (the Soviet Union and its closest socialist allies, India, and Bhutan), and ten countries abstaining (in addition to Britain, France, Denmark, and Chile, only six Afro-Asian states).[56]

Even though the secession of Bangladesh succeeded as a result of India's prompt military victory, the international reaction to it was characterized by a broad consensus at the United Nations to uphold the territorial integrity norm. In particular, the overwhelming majority of Afro-Asian states was keen not to set a precedent for future violations of the norm.

The Afro-Asian land grabs in the mid-1970s were more controversial. As with the struggles over West Papua, the disputed territories—the Western Sahara and East Timor, annexed by Morocco and Indonesia respectively in 1975–76—were colonies. But this time, the military occupation took place after the UN General Assembly had passed resolutions declaring the right of the populations of the respective territories to decide their own destiny in a referendum. However, interventions by Indonesia and Morocco (together with Mauritania) precluded the holding of any referenda. In both cases, the expansionist state could count on the support of the United States. In the 1970s, Indonesia and Morocco were both reliable allies of the West, and self-determination would almost certainly have resulted in the success of the leftist liberation movements Polisario (backed by Algeria) in the Western Sahara and FRETILIN (modeled after the pro-Soviet liberation movement in Mozambique, FRELIMO) in East Timor.[57]

Similar to Indonesia's course of action in West Papua in 1969, the occupying powers in both cases orchestrated statements by assemblies loyal to them in support of the annexation. This time, however, they faced significantly more international opposition: the General Assembly condemned the annexation of East Timor in a resolution on December 1, 1976. Invoking Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and asking member states to refrain from the "use of

force against the territorial integrity or national independence of any State," the resolution called for Indonesia to withdraw and for true self-determination for the people of East Timor. The resolution was adopted by sixty-eight votes to twenty, with forty-nine abstentions. Among its supporters were the Soviet Union and its allies as well as most African states; the United States, Turkey, Uruguay, Chile, and several Arab and Asian countries backed Indonesia.[58] Thus, even though the support for the territorial integrity of East Timor was higher than for that of West Papua seven years earlier, it was still lower than in cases where an independent state was threatened by secession as during the Congo, Biafra, and Bangladesh crises. In particular, Indonesia's neighbors, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) members, approved the annexation of East Timor, sharing Jakarta's concern over the destabilizing effect of an independent East Timor ruled by a leftist government on the region.[59]

In this regard, the regional response to the annexation of East Timor differed substantially from the OAU's reaction to Morocco's land grab. At the request of African states, the question of the Western Sahara was transferred from the UN to the OAU in December 1976. There, most African states demanded a real choice for the inhabitants of the Western Sahara; Morocco eventually agreed to a referendum. Calls for the admission of the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic (SARD, the state declared by Polisario, the guerrilla movement fighting the Moroccan occupation) to the OAU, however, caused deep cleavages among African states. Yet, due to the Moroccan tactic of repeatedly delaying the referendum demanded by the OAU, support for the SARD increased. By July 1980, more than half of the fifty OAU members had recognized the SARD, and in 1984 the SARD became a full member of the OAU while Morocco resigned in response.[60] Although both land grabs de facto had succeeded for the time being and international opposition was limited (especially in the case of East Timor), the annexations did not lead to a weakening of the territorial integrity norm. In both cases, the territory in question was still under colonial rule and UN and OAU members argued over the correct implementation of the self-determination norm. Thus, these interventions could not set a precedent for violations of the territorial integrity of sovereign states.

The ongoing strength of the territorial integrity norm was once again on display when Somalia invaded Ethiopia in the summer of 1977, aiming to annex the Ogaden region largely inhabited by ethnic Somalis. Ethiopia had broken with the West and joined the Soviet camp after a revolution in 1974. Conversely, Somalia, a Soviet ally since 1963, had indicated its willingness to switch sides if the West was ready to take over as its main arms supplier. Despite concerns over Somalia's expansionist policy, the United States promised military aid shortly before the outbreak of the war and even made this promise public after the Somali invasion. Still, partially in response to the opposition to this decision on the African continent, the administration of President Jimmy Carter soon declared that it would suspend all military aid while the war was ongoing and paid lip service to the territorial integrity of African states. But it also approached African states in the hope that they would denounce the drastic increase in Soviet military

aid and the presence of Cuban troops in Ethiopia. However, even pro-Western African states such as Nigeria were willing to tolerate the Soviet-Cuban military intervention as long as it served the purpose of protecting the territorial integrity of an OAU member. Consequently, American attempts to mobilize opposition against the Soviet Union among African states failed, and Ethiopia succeeded in expelling the Somali invasion.[61]

Conclusion: Afro-Asian Solidarity, the Cold War Competition for Prestige in the "Third World," and the Territorial Integrity Norm at the United Nations

Overall, Afro-Asian backing for the territorial integrity norm remained remarkably strong during the Cold War. Despite controversies over the status of legally contested colonial territories and the successful annexations of Goa and West Papua (framed as contributions to the global anti-imperialist struggle), more and more states, particularly African countries, took the position that the territorial integrity norm applied to all colonial territories and their integration into existing states was only legitimate when the population expressed their agreement in a free referendum. As a result, the annexations of the Western Sahara and East Timor were opposed in the OAU and the UN respectively.

The condemnations of annexations of colonial territory by postcolonial states were, however, never as strong as in cases when the territorial integrity of independent states was threatened. In those cases, a broad, but not always unanimous, consensus on upholding the inviolability of postcolonial borders had emerged in the OAU and among the Afro-Asian members of the UN, despite the fact that it was usually Afro-Asian states that violated the territorial integrity norm. Yet overall, annexations and open military support for secessionist movements were rare during the Cold War, occurring mainly in the wake of the waves of decolonization in the early 1960s and mid-1970s. After the Ogaden War, few new territorial conflicts erupted in Africa and Asia during the Cold War, and none resulted in border changes.[62] Considering the inability of the UN Security Council to punish violators of the territorial integrity norm, the fundamental transformation of the territorial order in Africa and Asia and the rapid increase in independent states after the end of empire, as well as the numerous "hot wars" that plagued the Third World during the Cold War, the Afro-Asian commitment to this principle is remarkable.

Admittedly, even aggressions against independent states were usually supported by a small number of Afro-Asian countries. Those states, however, usually kept a low profile on the stage of the United Nations. During the Biafra Crisis, only Zambia defended its recognition of the secessionist region. And although several countries, most importantly Egypt, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, supported Somalia during the Ogaden War, the US Mission at the United Nations reported that "there has been no open and almost no tacit support by anyone for Somalia during the General Debate." Overall, there existed "a strong undercurrent of sentiment for Ethiopia on the floor of the General Assembly, especially by the Africans."[63] This

way, the overwhelming majority of Afro-Asian states dominated the reactions to annexations and secessions in the United Nations, and adherence to the territorial integrity norm could be framed as an essential element of Afro-Asian solidarity and the advancement of an anti-imperialist agenda. The fact that Afro-Asian states often opposed violators of the norm even when it was against their usual geopolitical orientations—as with the support of pro-Western states like Nigeria for socialist Ethiopia during the Ogaden War or the stance taken by India's friends in the Non-Aligned Movement during the Bangladesh War—further attests to the Afro-Asian consensus on the inviolability of postcolonial borders.

Conversely, the policy decisions of the Cold War superpowers during territorial conflicts consistently followed a Cold War logic. The initial reaction of the United States (and many Western European countries) to the Congo Crisis demonstrated that the Eisenhower administration by no means took it for granted that the borders of postcolonial states were inviolable. The subsequent attempts of the Kennedy administration to end the Katanga secession were mainly motivated by its concern over its reputation in the Third World. During the Bangladesh crisis, Nixon and Kissinger did not support Pakistan out of strong commitment to international law, but rather because they needed Pakistan for their rapprochement with the PRC. And while the United States first backed the Netherlands in the conflict over West Papua, it changed tacks when the standing of the United States among non-aligned countries became a priority of the Kennedy administration. Similarly, the Ford administration supported Indonesia's annexation of East Timor and Morocco's annexation of Western Sahara because, in the mid-1970s, both states were reliable US allies. Later, the Carter administration agreed to arms deliveries to Somalia in 1977 even though its expansionist ambitions were well-known, but the benefits from extricating Somalia from the socialist camp seemed greater than the worries about the potential ramifications of military aid.

The Soviet Union expressed sympathy for the Afghan position on self-determination for the Pashtuns in Pakistan in 1955. At that time, the Soviet government disagreed with Pakistan's membership in the two anti-Soviet military alliances, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO).[64] In contrast, after the outbreak of the Congo Crisis, the Soviet Union harnessed the opportunity to pose as a staunch enemy of secessionism and champion of the anti-imperialist cause at the United Nations.[65] It continued this policy during the Biafra War; at the beginning of the Bangladesh War, it urged India not to militarily escalate the conflict. Yet once a full-scale war had broken out, Moscow still sided with India and backed it at the Security Council. And while the USSR had initially shown consideration for Morocco's position on Mauritania and vetoed the latter's UN admission, a year later it agreed to it in return for the admission of Mongolia—a goal it had long pursued. While it had committed itself to supporting Indonesia's claim on West Papua at a time when this position was widely supported by Afro-Asian states, it opposed the annexations of East Timor and the Western Sahara when Morocco and Indonesia were allies of the United States

Although neither the United States nor the Soviet Union were staunch adherents of the territorial integrity norm, Cold War rivalry provided a major incentive not

to back violators of the norm. Ultimately, the US government attempted to end the Katanga secession, even though its leader Tshombé professed his strong anti-communist convictions at every opportunity to win American support. Similarly, the Soviet Union backed Nigeria during the Biafra Crisis even though the secessionist leaders were ideologically closer to the socialist camp than the pro-Western government in Lagos. In both cases, it was concern over their reputation in the Third World rather than commitment to international law that guided policy. For this reason, the Soviet Union initially also tried to convince India not to escalate the conflict over Bangladesh into a full-scale war with Pakistan.

Similarly, the United States preferred to pursue a policy of caution when it sympathized with violators of the territorial integrity norm. Although the Ford administration supported Indonesia and Morocco during their land grabs in the mid-1970s, it mainly used its influence at the UN to weaken or thwart resolutions that condemned their actions, but did not *de jure* recognize the annexations of East Timor and the Western Sahara.[66] In response to African support for Ethiopia, the Carter administration changed its policy during the Ogaden War by suspending the arms deliveries to Somalia it had previously promised and by publicly declaring its support for the OAU principle of the inviolability of borders.

At the first Conference of Non-Aligned States in Belgrade in September 1961, the Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie argued that both superpowers were "highly sensitive to our reactions to their policies" and expressed the hope that, "if we remain faithful to the principles of Bandung and apply them in our international life, we will maximize the influence which we can bring to bear on world problems."[67] At least in regard to the strength of the territorial integrity norm during the Cold War, Haile Selassie was not wrong.[68] The broad Afro-Asian consensus on the inviolability of borders combined with the Cold War rivalry for prestige in the Third World enabled the strengthening of the territorial integrity norm in the United Nations every time it was challenged by annexations and secessions.

Notes

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3 For the United Nations' reaction to a territorial conflict during the early Cold War, see the chapter by Daniel Gorman on the Kashmir crisis in this volume.
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68 Not all Afro-Asian efforts at norm-building in the United Nations were this successful. Calls for a New International Economic Order were approved in the General Assembly in 1974, but pressure by Western-dominated international financial organizations shaped the economic development of the countries of the Global South in the 1980s; see the introduction by the editors.

Chapter 5

Intelligence Operations and Nuclear Diplomacy in Cold War Vienna: The Case of Stasi Espionage Against the International Atomic Energy Agency

Simon Graham and Elisabeth Roehrlich*

Introduction

In 2002, the German weekly news magazine *Der Spiegel* revealed that the East German Ministry of State Security (the so-called Stasi) had cultivated a spy known as "IM Martin" in the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) throughout the late 1980s. The exposé was significant because it alerted the public to the Stasi's intelligence gathering at the IAEA—a program that began in the late 1960s and is just one example of many similar programs run by intelligence services on both sides of the so-called Iron Curtain against the IAEA. In this chapter, we use the case of Stasi espionage at the IAEA to rethink how intelligence shaped the spaces, discourses, and practices of internationalism throughout the Cold War. We show how intelligence services leveraged international organizations like the IAEA—platforms intended for international cooperation and norm creation—to circumvent institutionalized diplomacy. The espionage of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) at the IAEA reminds us that the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact did not always form a united "monolithic bloc," but sometimes pursued contradictory interests when it came to international organizations.

It is mutually beneficial to bring together the histories of intelligence and of international organizations during the Cold War. However, this entails much more than working across secondary literatures and archives—although that is important. It also means building a dialogue between historical subfields that typically rely on differing assumptions about the nature of international order. The intelligence history of the Cold War has largely been written through the plethora of "service

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histories" that chart the development of individual organizations in relation to the governments that they served (or challenged). These histories often emulate traditional diplomatic history writing in form, methodological emphasis on state archives, and a broadly realist theoretical approach to international relations.[1] However, this interpretation struggles at times to fully contextualize espionage by overlooking the entanglement of allied intelligence services, struggling to account for intelligence cultures, and misunderstanding interactions between institutions, both domestically and at an international level.

In contrast to histories of intelligence, recent histories of international organizations typically formulate international organizations as rules-based, liberal, and cosmopolitan projects that prioritized global governance and development throughout the Cold War.[2] This new literature also reflects efforts by "global publics to systematize and contest the wider objectives and meaning of internationalism as a social and cultural force field" outside of the confines of the state.[3] Yet, such an interpretation risks overlooking the growing body of literature which suggests that conservative, and even authoritarian, forces valued the normative and organizational functions of the international order.[4] This absence in histories of international organizations and the disconnects in the histories of intelligence can be ameliorated by bringing the subfields into dialogue, a process which we hope to illustrate throughout this chapter.

Espionage against international organizations in general, and the IAEA as the world's nuclear authority in particular, is significant for the history of international organizations during the Cold War because it is an often overlooked aspect of these organizations' histories and challenges our assumptions about their degree of independence and integrity.[5] However, in what follows, we will use a more multidimensional analysis to tell the story of the relationship between intelligence and the IAEA while also highlighting some tropes in the way that intelligence related to international order throughout the Cold War. We try to reframe the IAEA, not only as a site of both superpower cooperation and competition but also as an actor whose efficacy made it a target worthy of espionage by member states. We have three key points of ingress into the history of the relationship between the East German intelligence service and the IAEA; namely, declassified Stasi records, the holdings of the archive of the IAEA, and recollections of former IAEA officials.

The Establishment of the IAEA and Vienna's Development into a Center of Nuclear Diplomacy

In 1957, the IAEA was the first international organization that opened its headquarters in postwar Vienna. Only two years earlier, in 1955, the country's four-power military occupation by the former allies had ended. The government of the newly independent, neutral Austria regarded international organizations as a promising pillar of its future foreign policy. Hosting such organizations on its territory had the potential to give the small state a better standing and prestige in international affairs. When first the Soviets—and only later—the Americans

supported Vienna as the future site of the IAEA, the Austrians were thrilled. The IAEA's mandate focused on the civilian uses of nuclear technology, a field that at the time was widely seen as a core technology of future global industrial and scientific development.[6]

While the creation of the IAEA can be traced back to an American initiative—President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech at the United Nations in 1953—the Soviet Union successfully cooperated with its Cold War rival in setting up the new nuclear agency. Despite recurring Cold War tensions, the superpowers' collaboration shaped both the agency's creation as well as its later institutional development.[7] For instance, the Americans and the Soviets found an understanding in jointly dominating and controlling the staffing of the IAEA.[8] The West German Dieter Goethel joined the agency in 1971 and was a longtime staff member in human resources (and later its director). He recalled this unique experience of working in the IAEA after the end of the Cold War. In his home country, the divided Germany, "there was the friend and the foe, the friend being the Americans and the foe being the Russians. When I came to the agency, I realized this black and white picture would not apply."[9] For many IAEA staff members like Goethel, their job at the agency brought them into contact with colleagues from "the other side" of the Iron Curtain for the first time. The suspicion that colleagues could work for, or be under observation by intelligence services was intrinsic to these working relationships and friendships among colleagues.

The IAEA's headquarters, and specifically its annual general conferences of all member states and the regular board of governors meetings, turned Vienna into a hub for nuclear diplomacy. In parallel, Vienna continued to be a center of international spy activities. This latter image of the city had received wide public attention with the 1949 movie *The Third Man*, which told the story of Vienna under four-power military occupation and starred Orson Welles. But activities of foreign intelligence services did not end with Austria's newly gained independence in 1955. For the Stasi, Vienna was a particularly promising site for conducting espionage activities. In addition to sharing a common language with East Germany and borders with both strategic blocs, Austrian neutrality led to the tacit acceptance of foreign espionage by successive Austrian governments.[10] This made Vienna a convenient and low-risk site for bringing Stasi spies from West Germany into contact with their respective handlers from East Germany. In 1972, the foreign intelligence arm of the Stasi, the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), opened a listening station in Vienna, the only one in Western Europe apart from Brussels, another site of internationalism.[11] Meanwhile, the West German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) maintained a similar presence in the West German Permanent Mission to the IAEA.[12]

The Context of East German Intelligence Gathering against the IAEA

The larger foreign policy context is critical to understanding why East Germany began to prioritize the infiltration of international organizations, and particularly

the IAEA, in the 1960s. The Stasi's efforts to infiltrate international organizations reflect a marked change in East German foreign policy imperatives. This change was driven by Nikita Khrushchev's "Two-State Theory" on Germany, which he first advanced at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, and East Berlin's belated realization that the reunification of Germany under the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) was improbable.[13] In his landmark study on the GDR's foreign policy, historian Hermann Wentker distills this significant change to the observation that once East Germany gave up the illusion of German reunification, recognition under international law became the focus of its foreign policy with regard to West Germany.[14] Wentker then goes on to explain how this kind of international recognition was seen as a counterweight to the impact of Bonn's Hallstein Doctrine on perceptions of East German legitimacy at home and abroad.[15] The Hallstein Doctrine was named after Walter Hallstein, who served as state secretary in the West German Foreign Ministry from 1951 and 1958, and who argued that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the GDR by any state would be seen as an unfriendly act toward the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Arguably, participation in international organizations—with assemblies increasingly comprising of representatives from non-aligned states which were likely to support the GDR—was the path of least resistance to breaking East Germany's international isolation. Consequently, the Stasi was tasked with helping to facilitate this participation.[16]

There were strong imperatives for East Germany to initially pursue recognition via membership of the IAEA and other international organizations rather than strictly relying on more traditional forms of constitutive statehood. Wentker explains that East Germany "was far more dependent than other states on the ups and downs of international politics because they not only determined the scope of its foreign policy but also its existence."[17] This meant that the GDR's campaign for accession to the IAEA, and later membership of the United Nations (UN), took on an existential dimension in the minds of many in East Berlin and easily justified the use of covert intelligence. For example, Willi Stoph, chairman of the East German Council of Ministers, went as far as identifying full membership of international organizations as corequisite with the end of the Hallstein Doctrine for the normalization of inter-German relations.[18] However, membership of the IAEA was also a pragmatic choice. The membership procedures of the IAEA were significantly less onerous than those of comparable international organizations in that they simply required prospective members to accept the statute of the IAEA and receive the majority endorsement of the IAEA Board of Governance and IAEA General Conference. This was because the regulatory body sought to minimize the barriers to membership and compliance in the face of rapid, largely unregulated, nuclear technology proliferation. In contrast, membership of the United Nations General Assembly required states to avoid veto by the Permanent Five members of the Security Council and receive a vote in favor of membership from two-thirds of the General Assembly.

The IAEA's specific field of activities—the global promotion of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes—was also of special interest to the GDR. It was very advanced in nuclear science and technology, not least due

to its rich reserves of natural uranium. East Germany began pursuing nuclear power in 1956.[19] A research reactor was constructed at the Zentralinstitut für Kernforschung (ZfK) in Rossendorf (Saxony) and by the late 1960s nuclear power reactors operated at Rheinsberg (Brandenburg) and Greifswald (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern).[20] This meant that a prima facie case for membership of the IAEA could be made on the basis of ensuring nuclear safety. Considerable work has been done over the past two decades on East German nuclear policy and the Stasi's technical and scientific espionage.[21] East German demand for electricity initially outstripped the generation capacity of its nuclear industry. Brown-coal (lignite) fired powerplants were seen as an inefficient stopgap measure and Soviet nuclear technologies developed at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna, near Moscow, were costly.[22] This meant that East German nuclear policy prioritized the expansion of nuclear energy production through locally developed and pilfered Western nuclear technologies.[23] The HVA played a central role in achieving the latter policy goal by obtaining the reports on nuclear sites that member states had lodged with the IAEA to meet their international nuclear verification obligations as well as by infiltrating manufacturers of nuclear components in Western Europe.[24] From the 1960s on, this included prominent businesses like IBM and the West German concern Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and from the 1970s on, the Austrian nuclear research center at Seiberdorf near Vienna, to name just a few victims of HVA espionage.[25] Thus, while foreign policy imperatives were central to East German espionage against the IAEA, the needs of the domestic nuclear industry are also important for understanding the motivations for, and the shape of, the Stasi's activities at the Vienna headquarters of the IAEA.

Cases of Stasi Espionage against the IAEA

Despite the GDR's interest in nuclear technologies, it had not joined the agency upon its creation. At the international conference on the IAEA statute, which took place at the UN headquarters in New York in 1956, the GDR had been the only European country that was excluded. While the FRG participated in the agency's work since its inception, the GDR, by contrast, only managed to enter the IAEA in 1973, when the two Germanys also joined the United Nations as regular member states as a result of the détente process. The first three staff members from East Germany entered the agency only in 1978.[26]

The Stasi's activities at the Vienna headquarters of the IAEA help to illustrate the scope of the intelligence gathering that states undertook at the IAEA. Stasi espionage against the IAEA began well before East Germany joined the organization, occurring on the sidelines of the IAEA General Conference from at least 1968 primarily via the delegations of Warsaw Pact states. The espionage program that had initially focused on achieving East German recognition was refocused and significantly expanded from the early 1970s onwards, once the objective of membership had been achieved, and seems to have taken three main forms.

Firstly, the HVA seconded officers to the East German delegation to the IAEA in order to engage in passive intelligence gathering on the side lines of the significant meetings, such as the IAEA General Conference, to evaluate the diplomatic maneuvers of member states, and to influence those maneuvers on the pretense of being East German diplomats. Secondly, the HVA recruited members of the East German delegation to the IAEA with specialist knowledge of nuclear regulation as unofficial collaborators ("IMs"). This practice proved its utility especially in those years in which East Germany gained a seat on the IAEA Board of Governors, the agency's most powerful policymaking organ. Thirdly, the HVA recruited at least 50 percent of the East German citizens working within the staff of the IAEA as IMs to appropriate IAEA safeguards inspections of nuclear facilities in member states for the purpose of industrial nuclear espionage.[27]

The General Conference of the IAEA in Vienna that took place from September 24 to October 1, 1968 provides us with an early example of how the Stasi sought to influence the diplomacy of IAEA member states via the delegations of Warsaw Pact states while also contesting the Hallstein Doctrine.[28] The conference took place at a decisive moment in the agency's history. The international community had just agreed on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which aimed to freeze the number of existing nuclear weapons states and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world. When the treaty entered into force in 1970, the IAEA received the mandate to verify states' compliance with it.[29] The HVA analysis of the 1968 general conference concluded that, "compared to the conferences of previous years, it was striking that the two great powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, suffered a reduction in their influence at this conference."[30] In particular, "the Soviet Union had been fairly isolated by the events in Czechoslovakia and was deliberately restrained" in its dealings with the IAEA, referring to the chilling effect of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 on East–West diplomacy.[31] Indeed, the author of the HVA report seems to make a concerted effort throughout the remainder of the document to emphasize East Germany's diplomatic independence from the Soviet Union in light of widespread criticism of the events of August 1968.[32] This was despite the fact that HVA analyses in early 1968 had advocated Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and that the Stasi provided covert support for both the Czechoslovak Security Service and KGB provocateurs stationed in Prague during the crisis.[33]

What appears to be a substantial change in the warmth of the HVA toward the Soviet Union is noteworthy but still should not be overstated. East German policy toward the world's nuclear authority, not to mention its covert involvement in the organization, needed to be highly nuanced because of tensions between the nuclear interests of the GDR and the Soviet Union.[34] The HVA understood that the IAEA's nuclear verification regime could help reduce nuclear weapons proliferation and the risk of a war between the superpowers; a war in which East Germany would be a battlefield. However, East Germany also relied on Soviet forward deployment of nuclear weapons supposedly to deter NATO aggression.[35] While this practice—adopted by both the Soviet Union and United States—was technically permitted under the NPT, it was widely condemned by non-nuclear, non-aligned states as contrary to the spirit of the agreement.[36]

This tension between East Germany's competing strategic interests is reflected in East Berlin's submission to the twelfth regular session of the General Conference of the IAEA on September 30, 1968 through the Hungarian Delegation. As the German Democratic Republic was not yet a member state of the IAEA, handing a letter to a friendly delegation was the only way to address the General Conference. The letter was carefully worded to express support for the NPT without criticizing Soviet forward deployment of nuclear weapons.[37] The GDR's effort to hedge both ways is also evident in the HVA's assessment of voting patterns during the 1968 conference. This assessment found that over the course of the conference the Soviet Union and the United States were increasingly willing to expand membership of the IAEA Board of Governors and thus lessen their influence over membership of the organization.[38] Indeed, the HVA went as far as describing the change as a "decisive breakthrough," and one that is reflective of the growing influence of states that were less advanced in nuclear technologies and developing states from the Global South on international order.[39] The breakthrough was particularly significant for East Germany because a slight shift in influence within the IAEA conference away from the superpowers, especially the United States, made East German membership of the IAEA a more viable proposition.

East German membership of the IAEA was a key step toward achieving the HVA's objective of using the IAEA as a theater for diplomatic maneuvering. On March 7, 1972, the East German deputy foreign minister, Ewald Moldt, and IAEA Director General Sigvard Eklund concluded an IAEA safeguards agreement in line with the NPT, which saw East Germany become an IAEA member state.[40] In the months that followed, the Stasi began an aggressive campaign to influence the composition of the new East German delegation to the IAEA and recruit its members as IMs.[41] Unofficial collaborators had a distinct status in the East German intelligence community, having a formal, ongoing relationship with the Stasi and often receiving training in intelligence "tradecraft" but not being an employee of or officer in the service. This provided the East German state with deniability (and ensured that the IM retained a level of expendability) while still establishing a continuous flow of information from the target institution.

Arguably, the most prolific Stasi collaborator in the East German delegation to the IAEA was its longtime chief delegate, Georg Sitzlack. Sitzlack served as East Germany's representative to the IAEA from 1974 to 1989, which included multiple terms on the IAEA Board of Governors and one term as deputy chairman of the board of governors from 1988 to 1989.[42] Over the same period, Sitzlack was the President of the State Office for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection of East Germany and a member of the Council of Ministers of East Germany. However, the content of the Stasi Records Archive tells us that Georg Sitzlack's involvement in the IAEA occurred in almost continuous dialogue with the Stasi. This dialogue saw Sitzlack contribute to HVA briefings on the negotiating positions that the East German delegation to the IAEA was expected to take and then advocate for those positions in Vienna. For example, on January 28, 1975, Sitzlack is recorded as having organized separate, private meetings with Georgy Arkadyev, the Soviet Ambassador to the IAEA and an unnamed member of the West German delegation to the IAEA, in order to convince them to support East

German proposals.[43] However, the HVA was skeptical of the efficacy of Sitzlack's tactics and concluded that: "The overall demeanor of the delegation, including the head of the delegation, demonstrated great inexperience at the diplomatic level."[44] In contrast, a more positive assessment was made of Sitzlack's efforts to provide the HVA with advance warning of decisions being made by the IAEA Board of Governors and commentary on tensions between the national delegates to the IAEA.[45]

The revelation that Georg Sitzlack performed these functions for the Stasi throughout his tenure as East German delegate to the IAEA is not necessarily surprising given the extent of the Stasi's role in East German diplomacy and Sitzlack's close association with the SED through the Council of Ministers. Moreover, it is consistent with what little we know about the relationships between the delegates of the other members of the IAEA and their respective intelligence services.[46] However, what is noteworthy about the case of Georg Sitzlack is the closeness of his relationship with the top echelons of the Stasi's leadership group and his openness in correspondence with these figures about how he deliberately influenced the IAEA Board of Governors to resolve questions in ways that favored East Germany. In addition to informing the Stasi of the agenda and priorities of the IAEA—actions consistent with those of other national delegates—Sitzlack appears to have been coached in his involvement with the IAEA over several decades by the Head of the East German intelligence service, Erich Mielke.[47] Sustained correspondence between Sitzlack and Mielke illustrates how Sitzlack regularly discusses intelligence-gathering priorities and potential targets at the IAEA with Mielke in addition to Mielke's preferred outcome for ongoing debates among the IAEA Board of Governors.

East Germany's official relationship with the IAEA was mediated by the East German delegation and so the delegation formed a focal point of Stasi espionage against the IAEA. However, the state and its intelligence service also related to the IAEA via a growing number of East German employees of the IAEA in Vienna between 1978 and 1989. Whether the IAEA secretariat was aware of their status as spies is unknown because personnel records remain exempt from the IAEA's declassification process. However, we do know that the IAEA's onboarding process at the time was limited to a declaration of intention to maintain confidentially and fealty to the IAEA by not taking direction from the governments of member states throughout the term of employment (the text of this "oath of office" was almost identical with the ones used at the UN). Statements by IAEA spokespersons following revelations of espionage in the media have confirmed that this trust-based approach to onboarding has continued.[48] Nevertheless, the IAEA Archive helps to detail the roles, levels of access, and authority of the Stasi's unofficial collaborators in the organization. It reveals a significant concentration of Stasi agents in the senior ranks of P-4 and P-5 professional officers assigned to the Department of Safeguards' Division of Operations A (responsible for nuclear verification in Australasia and East Asia) and B (Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and the Americas) as well as the Department of Technical Assistance.[49]

For example, between 1980 and 1984, the Stasi ran an operation known as "SOV Neutron" against an East German employee of the IAEA. This operation sought to ensure that the East German senior staff member (P-5 Professional Officer) named Peter Adler, who had joined the agency in 1979 and worked in the Department of Technical Assistance, was returned to East Germany along with his knowledge of the IAEA at the conclusion of his work for the organization. Adler's work entailed managing the tendering processes for acquisition of equipment related to geotechnical surveys and mining of radioactive materials as well as maintaining a registry of consultant engineering companies. While none of the information associated with Adler's position was politically sensitive in nature, it was provided to the IAEA by engineering companies and occasionally member states in confidence and included technical specifications for patented equipment and proprietary processes. Moreover, some responses to IAEA tenders by engineering companies included the details of works previously undertaken for the development of national nuclear industries in Britain, the United States, and West Germany as evidence of suitability to render services to the IAEA. This information contributed to the Stasi's evaluation of the state of the East German nuclear industry and provided a list of potential targets for technical espionage. The Stasi regarded Adler as a target for Western intelligence services and suspected him of working for the Bundesnachrichtendienst.

That said, the documents associated with "SOV Neutron" clearly indicate that Adler was resistant to returning to East Germany or providing confidential information to the Stasi.[50] The notes do suggest that Adler was aware of the conflict of interests that had emerged through his interactions with the Stasi and that he was not a willing participant in espionage by 1984. Indeed, the Stasi deliberately sought to establish leverage over Adler during 1984 with the goal of forcing him to remain an unofficial collaborator or resign from his job. This included identifying Adler's family members living within the territory of East Germany who could be threatened with exclusion from public life and access to state-run services unless he complied. Adler defected to the Federal Republic of Germany with his immediate family in 1985. This step was also driven by a family reason that was representative for people from socialist countries at the IAEA: after six years in Vienna, Adler's son was supposed to leave his parents and attend secondary school in the GDR (smaller children received class education at the embassy).[51]

Adler's story received coverage in several West German news outlets.[52] Once in West Germany, he was interviewed by the West German intelligence service for several weeks.[53] In 1986, he continued his career in international organizations by accepting a position as a senior technical advisor at the United Nations Development Program in Geneva. For security reasons, he had no name plate next to his office door.[54]

The Stasi seems to have understood the role of "IM Martin" in similar terms to what it initially intended for Adler. Although "IM Martin" was the unofficial collaborator at the center of the exposé by *Der Spiegel*, like Adler, he was also arguably much less influential than Sitzlack.[55] "IM Martin" served as a Professional

Officer in the IAEA Division of Operations from 1989 and participated in the inspection of nuclear sites in Iraq following the First Gulf War.[56] His role as an unofficial collaborator with the Stasi began in 1977 shortly after he completed studies in nuclear physics in Saxony-Anhalt and before beginning his work as a research assistant in the State Office for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection of East Germany.[57] He then joined the IAEA in February of 1989 on the direction of the Stasi in order to provide the Stasi with technical information obtained in the course of conducting IAEA safeguards inspections of nuclear facilities.[58] It is worth pausing at this point to note that throughout the 1970s and 1980s a so-called rotating door seemed to exist between the State Office for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, headed by Georg Sitzlack, the East German delegation to the IAEA, and the cadre of East German citizens employed at the IAEA in Vienna. Moreover, as the case of IM Martin illustrates, these close relationships were used by the Stasi for two decades to facilitate the training, deployment, and redeployment of unofficial collaborators throughout the IAEA and IAEA-adjacent institutions.

Throughout his time working at the IAEA, IM Martin's role was focused on pilfering technical intelligence related to the civilian nuclear programs of IAEA member states. This intelligence-gathering role was coupled with a counter-intelligence function: he was tasked with using the resources of the IAEA to evaluate the proficiency of scientists within in the East German nuclear industry.[59] He was also responsible for alerting the Stasi in the event that an East German whistle-blower approached the IAEA to expose safety deficiencies in the East German nuclear industry and, critically, using his privileged position to disclose the identity of the whistle-blower to the Stasi.[60] IM Martin's secondary function in Vienna was to provide the Stasi with background information on those colleagues in the IAEA Division of Operations who were assigned to conduct nuclear safeguards inspections in East Germany.[61] This information was then used by the Stasi to assess the risk of incoming inspectors acting covertly on behalf of a foreign power, much as the Stasi was doing with IM Martin, and plan for their surveillance.[62]

Yet, it is essential to note that the contents of the Stasi Records Archive do contradict some of IM Martin's own reflections on his decision to spy for East Germany at the IAEA. In 2002, he confirmed to reporters from *Der Spiegel* that he "always had the feeling and the inner conviction that I was doing exactly the right thing [by spying at the IAEA]" and any sense of embarrassment at the deception was purely felt in retrospect.[63] However, IM Martin's Stasi file suggests that he was ill at ease with his role in the IAEA.[64] His file is replete with indications that his handler had to coax and coerce him into fulfilling the role of unofficial collaborator.[65] Moreover, the contents of the record dedicated to IM Martin's wife and wider family implies that their educational and vocational futures in East Germany were contingent on compliance during his time in Vienna.[66] Ultimately, as *Der Spiegel* noted, this became a moot point because his employment with the IAEA significantly outlasted both the institution of the Stasi and the state of East Germany.[67] Indeed, as of 2002, the former "IM Martin" remained in the employ of

the IAEA Division of Operations and was reportedly preparing to deploy to Iraq under the direction of Hans Blix in order to conduct another series of safeguards inspections of now decommissioned nuclear facilities.[68]

Conclusion: East German Intelligence and Cold War International Order

The case of IM Martin, along with HVA intelligence gathering in the early 1970s, the work of Georg Sitzlack and Stasi operation SOV Neutron, illustrates the broad scope of the intelligence gathering that East Germany undertook against the IAEA. The HVA not only seconded officers to the East German delegation to the IAEA but also recruited members of the East German delegation to the IAEA and East German citizens working within the staff of the IAEA as unofficial collaborators. These East German approaches to penetrating the IAEA are consistent with what little we know of Soviet, American, and other states' intelligence gathering against the organization.[69] However, it is essential to acknowledge that the wider history of the relationship between intelligence, the IAEA, and international order is in desperate need of systematic examination. Rather than attempt to achieve such a lofty goal, this chapter aims to begin the process of explaining that interaction, with a particular emphasis on the role of the Stasi's foreign intelligence directorate, the HVA, during the 1970s and the 1980s. Moreover, it aims to highlight how espionage represents a largely unresolved area of strategic and reputational risk for international organizations, and prompt discussion about how institutions responsible for international order can better steward that responsibility insofar as it applies to espionage.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Stasi's espionage against the IAEA served a range of diplomatic and technical objectives. It sharpened East German efforts to undermine the key impediment to international recognition, the Hallstein Doctrine, and it enabled the East German delegation to the IAEA to call for greater scrutiny of West German nuclear policy. It also enabled East Germany to siphon technical data from materially dominant Western European states and thus prop up its faltering nuclear industry while suppressing criticism of the failure to fully implement nuclear safeguards.[70] Moreover, the espionage program provides us with several insights into the spy service's relationship with international order. For the Stasi, international organizations not only formed an additional theater in which to play out traditional Cold War antagonisms—like that with West Germany over the Hallstein Doctrine—but also formed a leveler that worked against the asymmetries in power and influence between East Germany and the Soviet Union. It was in this context that the Stasi chose not to reject the hallmarks of liberal global governance under the auspices of organizations like the IAEA. Instead, the Stasi sought to appropriate diplomatic norms and international rule of law for the benefit of East German policymakers and, occasionally, the wider "non-nuclear" international community. This created a somewhat paradoxical relationship given the transgressive nature of the espionage that animated it.

Notes

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8 Interview by Elisabeth Roehrlich with Diether Goethel, Vienna, August 18, 2016.
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14 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, 170–72, 557.
15 Ibid.
16 Ingrid Muth and Siegfried Bock, *DDR-Außenpolitik: ein Überblick: Daten, Fakten, Personen (III)* (Münster: Lit, 2010), 247.
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Part III

MEDIATION

Chapter 6

International Organizations as Mediators in the Western Camp: The International Energy Agency and United States Gas Pipeline Sanctions, 1981–1984

Henning Türk*

Introduction

The 1970s saw a remarkable growth of international organizations and programs, with an increase in the number of intergovernmental organizations from 280 to 1,530 between 1972 and 1984.[1] The historian Akira Iriye has therefore described the 1970s as a decisive transitional phase toward a "global community."[2] Some of these new intergovernmental organizations and programs were part of the UN system, in which the capitalist West and the communist East were linked in competition and cooperation.[3] However, we can also find new regional multilateral organizations that fostered separate identities apart from the "global community."

The International Energy Agency (IEA), founded in 1974, is an important example of this proliferation of international and multilateral institutions during the 1970s. It was founded by the most important industrialized countries of the time (except for France): Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway (under a special agreement), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. A brainchild of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the IEA was a response of the West to the first oil crisis of 1973.[4] While the United States hoped to use the new intergovernmental organization to harmonize the different Western European responses to this crisis, France decided to remain outside the IEA and pursued bilateral energy negotiations with the Arab oil producers instead.[5] However, Paris served as the site of the IEA headquarters.[6] The IEA was established as an autonomous agency of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and aimed to prevent the further use of the so-called "oil weapon" by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

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(OPEC). The IEA established a crisis mechanism that would be triggered if one or more IEA member states suffered a loss of 7 percent in oil imports. The IEA and its member states also developed a long-term common program to reduce the share of oil in the energy mix. The main alternatives to oil, pushed by the IEA, were coal and nuclear energy. Additionally, its member states aimed to conserve energy.

Given this agenda, the IEA's inception in the early 1970s clearly originated in the Middle East conflict and the North–South conflict more generally. The new organization was expected to strengthen the position of the Western industrialized countries in the fight against OPEC, which was perceived as the spearhead of the "developing countries" in the North–South conflict.

But did the IEA also play a role in the other large conflict of the period, the Cold War? How did the end of détente and the beginning of a new East–West confrontation after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the NATO dual-track decision in late 1979 affect the work of the IEA? Was the IEA able to facilitate coherence within the Western bloc? This chapter aims to shed new light on the role of intergovernmental organizations in managing the East–West conflict by analyzing the discussions between the United States and its Western European allies over European imports of Soviet natural gas. It argues that the IEA was both a platform for heated controversies over energy issues between the United States and Western Europe as well as a successful mediator between different states within the Western bloc.

The guiding questions will be examined in three sections. First, the IEA's early history will be briefly summarized against the backdrop of the larger geopolitical context of the time. The second section focuses on the European interest in Soviet natural gas supplies and the resulting American embargo measures against Western companies in the era of revived superpower confrontation. The third examines how an energy study conducted by the IEA helped lifting the embargo measures in the early 1980s. The transatlantic disputes over the gas pipeline deals have been scrutinized again and again in the research literature with varying emphases.[7] Interestingly, however, these accounts mostly end with the lifting of the US sanctions in fall 1982. What became of the IEA study and what role it played in shaping transatlantic relations in the Cold War is not addressed at all. In this respect, the analysis of the energy study's drafting process promises new insights. The chapter is based on the personal papers of the IEA's first executive director, the West German energy law expert Ulf Lantzke, on records from the archives of the IEA and the West German Foreign Ministry, as well as documents from the Reagan Library and the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) series.

From the North–South Conflict to the Cold War: The IEA and International Order in the 1970s

When we place the IEA in the context of the 1970s international order, we see that it was primarily founded as a response to the North–South conflict. The

oil-producing countries presented the 1973 oil embargo and the parallel oil price increases as part of an overall strategy to bring about a New International Economic Order that would support the needs of "developing countries."[8] The industrialized countries tried to counter the developing countries' challenge with the establishment of the World Economic Summits (The Group of Seven, G7) and via international organizations like the OECD or the IEA.[9] The IEA's early focus on the North–South conflict was reflected in the US State Department's assessment of the agency in July 1976, two years after its establishment: "In political terms the agency has been an unqualified success in forging a cooperative [oil] consumer approach under U.S. leadership and in formulating an integrated strategy on energy which responds to the challenge posed by the Third World."[10] This assessment also underlined the American aim to execute a tight influence on the IEA.

In contrast to the relevance of the North–South divide, the East–West conflict, which had entered a phase of détente in the 1960s, was mostly irrelevant to the agency's work in these early years of its existence.[11] Initially, even the Soviet Union's rise as an important producer and exporter of natural gas since the late 1960s did not change this.[12] The Soviet Union's economic development was closely connected to the so-called "gas pipeline deals" with Western consortia of companies and banks from the end of the 1960s onwards.[13] The deals provided for Western deliveries of pipes and technical equipment, which the Soviet Union paid with gas deliveries. These economic agreements fitted well into the climate of détente fostered in particular by West Germany's *Ostpolitik*, which sought a normalization of relations with the Warsaw Pact states.[14]

Natural gas initially played only a minor role in the IEA's energy strategy, because the IEA pursued a so-called premium-use approach.[15] According to this approach, natural gas was to be used primarily as a basic material for the petrochemical industry, where it could replace oil in certain areas. Natural gas appeared too valuable to be burnt for heating or electricity generation in power plants. This view did not change until the second oil crisis in 1979, when the IEA ministers for the first time described natural gas as "the most readily available alternative fuel [to oil]."[16] The IEA thus became interested in natural gas at the very moment that the Cold War was intensifying again, in the late 1970s. Energy turned into a central issue of the East–West conflict, as the following intra-alliance quarrels about Euro-Soviet gas pipeline deals demonstrated. The work of the IEA shifted its attention from North–South issues to East–West affairs.

The European Gas Pipeline Deals and the Opposition of the Reagan Administration[17]

While the US government under President Jimmy Carter (1977–81) had critically questioned the European gas pipeline deals with the Soviet Union, it had not reacted to these deals with political measures. When the new president

Ronald Reagan entered office in January 1981, the tone toward US allies in Western Europe became harsher because of their close economic ties with the Soviet Union. During the G7 summit in Montebello, Canada, in July 1981, Reagan tried to persuade especially West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French President François Mitterrand (whose country still was not an IEA member) to postpone any new gas pipeline deals with the Soviet Union and to consider alternatives to their countries' dependence on Soviet gas.[18] On November 12, 1981, Deputy Secretary of Defense Richard N. Perle emphasized before the US Congress that European-Soviet gas relations threatened the security of the West.[19] There were several reasons for this concern: with the help of natural gas supplies, the USSR would earn hard currency and exert influence on US allies in Europe. Moreover, Western Europe would be vulnerable to willful disruptions in Soviet energy supplies. Rhetorically, Perle asked the members of Congress: "Is there any doubt that our allies listen more carefully to kings and rulers who supply them with energy than to those who do not?"

The largest gas pipeline deal up until today, concluded in November 1981, particularly worried the Americans. The deal envisaged the further development of the Siberian Urengoy gas field, which would become connected to Western European countries via a 5,000 kilometer-long pipeline.[20] Several companies from the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and non-IEA member France were involved in this project.[21] The governments of the involved European countries defended the conclusion of the deal with the Soviet Union and argued that economic and political contacts that had been built during the phase of détente should not be given up. Instead, they explained that it was necessary to exert influence on the Eastern bloc through economic contacts and to remain in dialogue with the rulers in the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Moreover, Western European gas production in West Germany and the Netherlands was expected to decline in the coming years, and it would be important to develop alternatives at an early stage. The West German government emphasized that the gas pipeline business was part of an "away-from-oil" strategy of the Western industrialized countries, which had originated in the first oil crisis. The new deal with the Soviet Union would further diversify the energy supply and relieve the oil market.[22] With regard to the issue of energy dependency, the West German government did not see the deal as endangering the upper limit of 30 percent for the share of Soviet natural gas in the Federal Republic's total natural gas imports, a limit that had been set by the government on May 21, 1980.[23]

However, developments in Poland threatened the plans of the group of Western European countries. In December 1981, the situation escalated when the Polish government imposed martial law with the backing of the Soviet Union in the fight against the anti-government trade union "Solidarność." The United States then put Poland and the USSR under pressure with sanctions. The controversial natural gas relations of Western Europe with the Soviet Union were finally put to the test and corresponding countermeasures put in place. On December 30, 1981, Reagan imposed sanctions on US companies involved in the gas pipeline deal. On June 18, 1982, he extended the sanctions to US subsidiaries in Europe as

well as to European companies working with US licenses.[24] The Western European countries reacted with sharp protest to the American action and ordered the involved companies to fulfill their contracts despite US sanctions.[25] This further escalated the conflict between the United States and its Western European allies. The US government counter-reacted by drawing up blacklists of products needed for the gas and oil business that could now no longer be exported to the respective Western European countries. The US government's sanctions against its close allies thus put an enormous strain on transatlantic relations.[26]

Politicians on both sides of the Atlantic began to look for solutions to the intra-alliance conflict. US Secretary of State George Shultz in particular tried to reach an understanding by initiating discussions on different levels. The talks resulted in an agreement between the foreign ministers of the parties to the conflict in fall 1982. The Western Europeans and the United States agreed to have several intergovernmental organizations carry out studies on East–West economic relations. For example, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) was to prepare a study on technology transfer and the handling of strategically important goods. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would analyze the economic development of the USSR and its impact on the armament sector. The OECD was responsible for studying business credits to the Soviet Union and Eastern European states. Finally, the OECD/IEA was in charge of studying the energy supply of the OECD countries. These supposedly technical, data-oriented studies produced by intergovernmental organizations would then serve as starting points for the political development of a common economic strategy of the West vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The Europeans promised to refrain from negotiating new gas pipeline deals with the Soviets as long as the studies were under preparation.[27] In return, the US government lifted its sanctions.[28]

A Transatlantic "Clearing House": The IEA and the Energy Security Study

The starting point for the IEA's study on energy supply was an agreement reached by the foreign ministers of the member states in November 1982.[29] Rather than focusing solely on natural gas, the various energy sources were to be evaluated in an overall approach toward the security of supply. The work began quickly, because the US government wanted the studies to be completed before the next G7 summit, scheduled to take place in May 1983 in Williamsburg, Virginia.[30] There, the G7 countries should demonstrate a unified stance on East–West issues in a way that allowed for positive publicity.

The US government was worried about the outcomes of the IEA's energy study. A CIA study on Europe's gas relations with the Soviet Union, finalized in October 1982, was alarming.[31] The CIA analysis assumed that if the existing trend continued, the Soviet Union would monopolize supplies to Europe in the 1990s due to its enormous gas deposits. Alternative gas deposits, such as the Norwegian

Troll field, would then have no chance of being developed. Only if the Soviet-European cooperation would be halted as soon as possible, these alternatives had a realistic chance of being developed. In a memorandum to Reagan, National Security Advisor William P. Clark argued that it was "absolutely essential" to get "concrete results out of the energy studies."[32]

Based on these expectations, Reagan and his advisors saw the main goal of the OECD/IEA study to help cutting off European-Soviet energy relations and having the European partners "participate in the accelerated development of alternative Western energy resources."[33] The rapid start to the study, pushed by the United States, was no problem for the IEA secretariat under Ulf Lantzke, which immediately began its work.

The United States strictly monitored the drafting process of the OECD/IEA study. It proposed certain "terms of reference" to structure the analysis.[34] These "terms of reference" focused on the future of energy supply and expected demands for the various energy sources oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy, but also for electricity. Subsequently, the energy flows were to be calculated and assessed on the basis of energy security aspects. Separate calculations should be carried out for the three IEA regions North America, Asia, and Europe, with a focus on the scenarios for Europe. The different regions' dependency on oil imports from the Middle East as well as on natural gas from the Soviet Union should then be analyzed. In addition, the United States proposed that the study should detail how to deal with future supply disruptions of oil and gas and show existing alternatives to imports from the Middle East and the Soviet Union.

In order to discuss the further process of the study, Ulf Lantzke invited high-ranking representatives of the G7 summit countries, the European Community (EC) Commission as well as the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Australia, and Norway to a meeting in the small town of Dourdan, southwest of Paris, on February 23 and 24, 1983.[35] According to these discussions, the energy study should present the current state of energy supply in the three geographical regions of the IEA; a scenario of the expected situation in the year 2000; and potential solutions for energy interruptions.

The participating states' perceptions of the Dourdan meeting varied. The West German representatives regarded it as very constructive, while their US counterparts were rather cautious. Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Norway—the three European countries with the largest oil and gas reserves—made it clear that they would be prepared to expand energy supplies in the event of a crisis. The government representatives also agreed that the IEA secretariat should only prepare the relevant data but not interpret or draw conclusions from it—echoing a prevailing notion of secretariats as mere servants to its member states. The political conclusions would be made by the government representatives in the OECD/IEA.

However, the IEA secretariat did not stick to the agreement reached at Dourdan. In mid-March, Lantzke presented a draft of the study to the member states that was structured according to the Dourdan guidelines but also drew conclusions (rather than just providing data).[36] In addition, rumors had it that Lantzke had written a letter to Shultz shortly before the presentation of the draft study, in

which he had outlined what he personally considered to be the central points for the conclusions.[37] After the other countries became aware of this, Lantzke sent his take-aways mentioned in the letter also to some other delegations to prevent further controversy. He stressed that these were based on informal consultations and should not be considered a formal submission.[38]

What conclusions did Lantzke draw from the IEA study?[39] The study foresaw an increased Western European vulnerability to supply disruptions in oil and gas for the end of the 1980s. These risks for the Western European countries had to be reduced. This could not be regulated by the market alone, but the member countries had to "aim at a reduction of energy imports from 'unsafe [*sic*] sources'" through their energy policies. This should be monitored by the EC, the IEA, and the High-Level Energy Monitoring Group of the G7 countries.[40] To ensure energy security, Lantzke concluded, member states must be prepared to pay prices above market prices for the production of certain energy sources. This applied to the development of the Norwegian Troll gas field and the extraction of US coal. "Powerful national and international policies" would be necessary to overcome the resistance, especially of environmentalists, against the increasing extraction of coal. With regard to natural gas, the study considered the limit of 30 percent of gas imports from one country as key. In addition, governments should build national gas reserves and increase oil reserves above the usual average of ninety days of consumption that had so far been applied in the IEA.

The West German government was infuriated by Lantzke's actions, which had not been coordinated with the IEA member states. The Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Economic Affairs believed that the executive director's conclusions were inspired by the United States. The impression of strong US influence on Lantzke was justified. The close connection between Lantzke and the US government ran, among others, through William Flynn Martin, who had worked as Lantzke's special assistant from 1977 to 1980. Martin then joined the US National Security Council and was promoted to special assistant to Reagan in 1983. Martin boasted to his boss, National Security Advisor Clark, about his influence on the IEA's head. He emphasized: "Lantzke knows what he must provide us in the way of conclusions (i.e., getting Troll going), and he will work hard for this objective."[41] In addition to Martin, James Wallace Hopkins, the IEA's Deputy Executive Director and former US State Department member, was responsible for the IEA secretariat's close ties to the US government. Ever since the IEA's establishment, the post of deputy executive director has always been occupied by a former high-ranking employee of the US government (usually the State Department or the National Security Council). The United States thus permanently occupied a crucial post in the IEA, so that it was able to secure a strong influence on the work of the energy organization.[42]

The IEA secretariat was interested in keeping a particularly close alignment with the US government during this phase because of the prevailing uncertainty about the Reagan administration's approach toward the IEA. Despite official US assurances in different IEA bodies that the organization remained central to the American international energy policy, the secretariat feared a decline in US

support. During his election campaign, Reagan had made no secret of his aversion to the sprawling bureaucracy in the energy sector and was generally skeptical about strong US involvement in international organizations. Therefore, the IEA secretariat sought to maintain close contacts with the US government and tried to demonstrate the IEA's benefits for US international energy policy with its involvement in the gas study.[43]

Lantzke was apparently prepared to ignore West German wishes to keep the Americans close. The West German Ministry of Economic Affairs presented itself as an advocate of free markets in the oil and gas sector in the IEA. It saw Lantzke's conclusions as completely "incompatible with our free market economy."[44] When the US government promoted the conclusions in direct talks with the West German government, the head of the Energy Policy Department in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ulrich Engelmann, tried to water down the proposals.[45] Engelmann made it clear that West Germany would stick to its politically agreed limit of a maximum of 30 percent gas imports per country, but that it made no sense to set this target globally, as the situation in different countries had to be assessed individually. He said that it was more important to make provisions for emergencies and to decide on appropriate measures than setting fixed figures.

After critical feedback from its member states, the IEA secretariat revised the draft and weakened it in some points. Overall, however, three core American demands remained central for the continuing negotiations: Firstly, to increase oil reserves beyond the average consumption of ninety days and to introduce a gas reserve; secondly, to keep the 30 percent threshold for natural gas imports from a single country, above which mandatory consultations should be set in motion; thirdly, the willingness to pay "political prices" for the development of certain energy sources in order to reduce dependence on oil and gas. The other IEA member states strongly resisted these three demands, leaving the US delegation isolated in the negotiations.

The member states reacted particularly angrily to an "executive summary" of the study presented by the secretariat on April 14, 1983. According to the West German Foreign Ministry, this summary contained "all the objectionable points of the first draft of the study, as if no negotiations had taken place."[46] The West German government found the actions of the United States and the secretariat in the negotiations opaque. In the multilateral talks, the US delegation regularly kept a very low profile and instead left the field to the secretariat. This left other member states with the impression that the secretariat was acting as a proxy for the United States.

Reagan intervened personally to increase the pressure on the other IEA member states. On April 26, 1983, he wrote a letter to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU), who had been in office since October 1, 1982, and demanded that the issue of East–West economic relations be dealt with as harmoniously as possible at the next G7 summit. Reagan's plan was to adopt and make public key findings of all studies at high-level meetings before Williamsburg, such as the IEA ministerial meeting on May 8 or the OECD Ministerial Council on May 10. The G7 summit then only had to take positive note of the studies' results and encourage further

multilateral cooperation. In this respect, it was important that all intergovernmental organizations entrusted with the diverse studies—NATO, OECD, and IEA—would make tangible progress in the next few days. With regard to the IEA energy study, Reagan outlined the US goals very clearly. He called Lantzke's conclusions "fully satisfactory" and emphasized the relevance of the development of major Western alternatives to "prevent incremental Soviet advances in the European gas market" as this would lead to Soviet domination in the 1990s.[47]

In order to reach concrete results at the IEA ministerial meeting on May 8, the US delegation presented a proposal for compromise at the meeting of the governing board, the highest policymaking body of the IEA. This had been discussed with representatives of the West German Ministry of Economic Affairs, on April 27, and mainly concerned the conclusions on the gas part. It provided that the 30 percent threshold should no longer be mentioned and that instead "vulnerability should be defined only qualitatively."[48] In addition, it was to be stipulated that no monopoly in gas supply should be created by a single country. IEA member states would also pledge to seek additional development of indigenous resources. The gas supply situation should not be reviewed separately by other bodies, but would be integrated into the already existing, regular IEA energy policy peer reviews of member states. The governing board approved this compromise and the IEA member state ministers adopted the text on May 8, 1983.

In addition to the IEA, the broader OECD Council then also agreed on May 10 despite some resistance.[49] The study was completed on time. In the first part, it provided an overview of the extraction and consumption of energy resources at the global level as well as in the OECD area. This was followed by a chapter on energy flows, which already pointed to critical aspects. In the last part, the study then listed possible measures to improve energy security and made recommendations on how supply disruptions could be mitigated. The IEA classified the study as confidential and did not publish it.[50]

In contrast to this, the previously prepared conclusions for the ministerial meeting of May 8, which formulated the essence of the study, were published with the communiqué.[51] The ministers stated that the work of the IEA had contributed to the currently relaxed situation on the oil market. However, they expected a newly increased energy demand toward the end of the 1980s, with oil's share in the energy mix having decreased significantly since 1973, but still remaining the most important energy source. The member states should be prepared for the stronger demand toward the end of the decade. On one hand, they would have to use market forces. On the other hand, strong government action would also be necessary. They then recommended a strengthening of the measures that had already been mentioned again and again in the IEA, i.e., energy saving, the promotion of own sources, and the stronger use of coal and nuclear energy as alternatives to oil. What was new was the extensive presentation of the supply situation for natural gas. It was described as an important alternative source of energy that could reduce dependency on oil. However, care should be taken not to establish new dependency structures, for example, if one country in particular supplied the gas, a clear reference to the Soviet Union. States should therefore

diversify their gas supplies and give preference to reliable supplier countries, such as those in the OECD region. In addition, governments should encourage gas companies operating in their countries to take precautions for emergencies, for example by building gas storage facilities. The ministers recommended that particularly concerned countries should encourage their companies to participate in the development of the Norwegian Troll gas field.[52] In addition, the ministers expanded the IEA peer reviews of member states' energy policies to include the topic of natural gas and the related supply structures.

The US government was very pleased with the results. The European member states' promises seemed to make future Soviet pipeline connections with Europe unlikely. This would give the gas reserves available in Europe a chance to be expanded. It would also prevent a further growth of Europe's dependence on the Soviet Union. As a consequence, the Soviet Union would lose large revenues. Triumphantly, National Security Advisor Clark summarized to Reagan: "The Soviet master plan of European gas market domination has been quietly destroyed. Their energy money machine will run out of gas in the 1990s as large-scale alternatives come on stream."[53]

The participants of the G7 Summit in Williamsburg were able to state unanimously that they took "note with approval of the work of the multilateral organizations which have in recent months analyzed and drawn conclusions regarding the key aspects of East-West economic relations."[54] Since not only the study in the OECD/IEA was completed, but also the other multilateral studies (with the exception of the highly complex study in CoCom), the US government was satisfied.

Conclusion

With the end of détente, the geopolitical orientation of the IEA turned from a main focus on North–South relations to East–West affairs. It then addressed energy security issues in the context of the East–West conflict. A major contributing factor was that, in the context of the transatlantic disputes over the European-Soviet natural gas pipe deals, the IEA was given the task of preparing a study of energy flows of its member countries. This focused in particular on natural gas.

During the preparation of the study, it became apparent that the IEA secretariat under executive director Ulf Lantzke was primarily concerned with emphasizing its importance as an institution vis-à-vis the new Reagan administration which had come into office in 1981. The secretariat adopted mainly US positions in the negotiation process on the energy study and tried to push them through. This met with resistance from several Western European countries. Compromises were therefore worked out mostly on the diplomatic level between representatives from member states rather than by the leadership in the secretariat. The final study urged countries not to create new energy dependencies and to develop European gas resources, such as the Norwegian Troll field.

In the context of intra-alliance relations, it proved to be a great advantage that the Western countries had means of coordinating their policies through several

intergovernmental organizations, and specifically the IEA. These organizations could be used to resolve conflicts within the West. They also allowed the US government to withdraw the internal alliance embargo measures—which were increasingly recognized as burdensome—in a face-saving manner. Neither party could feel like a winner or a loser. In this respect, the IEA served as a very helpful mediator in the Western camp. However, while the IEA energy study was a success, the secretariat's reputation had suffered. Lantzke had not missed an opportunity to promote the IEA and its secretariat as key actors in the regulation of the energy sector. At the same time, the secretariat was not able to take a "neutral position" but coordinated its action mainly with the United States.

The agreement on a compromise text between the IEA countries nevertheless succeeded in defusing the transatlantic conflict over the natural gas pipeline business. The IEA was also able to strengthen its position in international energy policy. Gas now belonged to its sphere of activities, for example through the regular peer review processes. These new competencies were important for the IEA, because in a phase of significantly falling oil prices since 1981, caused by an oversupply of oil, the raison d'être of an international organization whose main problem seemed to have been solved was also at stake.

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Chapter 7

Experiments in Conciliation: The United Nations, Kashmir, and Decolonization, 1948–1950

Daniel Gorman

The territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is nearly as old as the United Nations, and the histories of the conflict and UN peacekeeping are intricately intertwined. While the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was deployed in 1949, the second such peacekeeping operation after the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) which was created to monitor the Armistice between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the UN's involvement in the Kashmir dispute began a year earlier. The United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 39 in January 1948 to determine the causes of the dispute over control of Kashmir (technically the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir), offer meditation, and help restore order on the ground. As a dual mediation/peace-enforcement mission, UNCIP is one example of how the UN sought to uphold the charter's injunction to "maintain international peace and security" (Article 1) in the charged political context of the early Cold War and intensified decolonization. UNCIP was a site of conflict, especially between the two states disputing sovereignty over Kashmir, and of cooperation and convergence, as it provided an institutionalized space within which all parties could agree to some compromises.

An analysis of UNCIP and its relationship with Indian, Pakistani, Kashmiri, and Azad Kashmiri (the semi-autonomous region in Pakistan along the contested border with India) populations provides insight into several of this book's themes. It shows how an international visiting mission could shape the course of an inter-state conflict. It reveals the opportunities and limitations of UN security and refugee aid in postcolonial contexts. It demonstrates the agency of international civil servants, appointees, and their local interlocutors. Finally, UNCIP illustrates how postwar international organizations served as venues for negotiation and mediation in crisis situations.

Despite emergent Cold War tensions after 1945, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union initially took a firm position on the Kashmir question. Washington had not yet drawn Pakistan into the anti-communist Southeast Asia

Treaty Organization (SEATO). Moscow believed that both India and Pakistan were incipient capitalist states, and thus remained aloof from both—it was absent or abstained from Security Council discussions and votes on Kashmir in 1948.[1] Ideological rivalry would soon shape both camp's approaches to South Asia, whose geopolitical significance grew by the 1950s, but competition was tempered by their shared anti-colonial ideology in this brief window before the Korean War turned the Cold War hot. The Cold War was thus a background, rather than central, factor in the UN's engagement with the Kashmir question. The history of UNCIP is instead predominantly a story of decolonization.

The Partition of British India in 1947 into India and Pakistan created territorial disputes, mass communal violence, and the forced migration of approximately 14.5 million people. One of the crisis's flashpoints was in the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, whose Maharaja, Hari Singh, equivocated as to whether the Muslim majority state should join Pakistan or India, or claim independence. The Maharaja's Dogra dynasty had historic ties to Hindus, but the state's Muslim majority favored accession to Pakistan. Pakistan agreed to the Maharaja's request for a Standstill Agreement, which would maintain existing arrangements between the two new states pending their renegotiation. India refused to sign. On October 22, 1948 Pakistani-aided tribal warriors swept from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) into Kashmir to stake Pakistan's sovereign claim. The invasion pushed the Maharaja to sign the Instrument of Accession to India on October 27, 1947. India sent troops to Srinagar to repel the raiders, precipitating the first Indo-Pakistani war.

Kashmir's size and demographic heterogeneity made the dispute particularly fraught. It is the largest former Indian state at 84,471 square miles. The 1941 British Raj census showed a population of 4,021,616. There was a Muslim majority in Kashmir, but a Hindu majority in Jammu District (a component of the larger, and Muslim majority, Jammu Division), as well as communities of Buddhists, Sikhs, Anglo-Indians, Christians, and Parsis. The region was also strategically important, sharing a border with Afghanistan, China, Russia, and Tibet.[2]

India and Pakistan each pressed the Security Council to validate its claim to Kashmir. The Security Council responded by creating UNCIP. It was to be comprised of diplomatic representatives from UN member states whose goal was to gather information on the ground, mediate discussions between the combatants, and negotiate a plebiscite through which sovereignty could be popularly determined. UNCIP facilitated a ceasefire agreement in August 1948, which came into effect in January 1949. After the two countries signed the Karachi Accord in July 1949, establishing the ceasefire line, UNCIP provided military observers. That most of these were Americans, Canadians, Belgians, and Norwegians illustrates the Soviets' relative indifference to the UN's intervention in Kashmir. UNMOGIP thenceforth became the guarantor of the military ceasefire through Security Council Resolution 91 in March 1951, and remains in place today.

Both India and Pakistan viewed the Kashmir question through the prism of decolonization. When India's prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru hosted the All-Asian conference in Delhi in 1949 to assert himself as an international

anti-colonial leader, he was notably silent about Dutch police action in Indonesia to avoid attracting criticism of India's own aggression in Hyderabad (which it forcibly annexed in 1948) and Kashmir. As the *Sind Observer* acidly observed, Nehru's hosting of the conference was like "the devil quoting the scriptures."[3] For Pakistan, control over Kashmir was important as a means of strengthening national identity, ensuring national security, and minimizing internal divisions between the new country's Muslim, secular, and ethnic communities.

UNCIP was thus tasked with mediating one of the first sovereignty disputes between postcolonial states. Unlike in postwar Europe, where Winston Churchill's "iron curtain" was evident in the United States' provision of Marshall Aid funds to Western European states, the Soviets' installation of communist governments across Eastern Europe, and the physical division of Berlin, the Cold War was not yet a major factor in South Asia. There Britain remained the regional power until it proved itself an ineffectual intermediary between India and Pakistan by the early 1950s.[4] At that point Washington took a more robust role in the region, as part of its broader fight against global communism after the Korean War. For their part, the Soviets adopted a position of strategic hedging between India and Pakistan until 1955, when Pakistan's accession to SEATO and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) drew Moscow and Delhi closer together. Nehru visited Moscow in June 1955, and Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party, visited India later in the year. In the late 1940s the UN thus found itself in South Asia with significant autonomy to assume the role of honest broker.

This chapter draws upon UNCIP reports and correspondence, Indian and Pakistan press coverage, and government files from both countries. It first assesses UNCIP's creation and activities, which demonstrate that the UN's early approach to crisis intervention focused on the deployment of fact-finding and military observer missions as a means of facilitating a political settlement. The complexities of sovereignty generated by decolonization at the UN soon undermined this hybrid military/political approach to peacekeeping, and stymied UNCIP from establishing its legitimacy as a neutral mediator. Instead, it was the successor mission UNMOGIP through which emerged the peacekeeping principles of neutrality, minimum use of force, and the consent of disputants subsequently established by the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) that secured the end of the Suez Crisis in 1956.[5] UNCIP thus foreshadowed the multi-valanced evolution of peacekeeping in the 1950s and 1960s as a practice that simultaneously imposed liberal internationalist values and interests, perpetuated neo-colonial racial hierarchies (see also Chris Dietrich's chapter on how Cold War tensions shaped the paternalist discourse of UN trusteeship in this era), imposed a technocratic vision of global governance, mitigated violence and protected civilians in conflict zones, and created intermediaries through whom Global South actors could voice their interests in the international community.[6]

The chapter next uses the Kashmir case to consider how postcolonial states deployed the emerging postwar language of internationalism to assert their claims to territorial sovereignty. In public, Pakistan, India, and the Azad Kashmiri regime presented these claims through politically rhetorical language that was as much

for domestic as international audiences. In private, they used UNCIP as a political space within which to share information, defuse escalating conflicts, and establish the framework for their developing foreign policies in an international system divided between emergent Cold War blocs. In so doing, the chapter reveals the role international organizations played as sites of engagement in the early postwar period. While the contemporaneous Berlin crisis in 1948–49 demonstrated the centrality of the Cold War in Europe, in the Kashmir case it was decolonization that was the primary factor in shaping events.

The Origins of UN Fact-finding Missions: The United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan

UNCIP was created by Security Council Resolution 39 as a response to the complaint and counter-complaint by Pakistan and India on the question of sovereignty over Kashmir. It was originally to be a three-member committee, and subsequently expanded to five members under Security Council Resolution 47 three months later. The representatives chosen were Ricardo J. Siri (Argentina; nominated by Pakistan), Egbert Graeffe (Belgium; selected by the Security Council), Alfredo Lozano (Colombia; selected by the Security Council), Josef Korbel (Czechoslovakia; nominated by India), and J. Klahr Huddle (United States; nominated by the Security Council President).[7] While UNCIP thus technically included representatives from both sides of the Iron Curtain (the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia seized power through a coup in February 1948), Korbel had been an advisor to the now deposed Czech President Edvard Beneš, and soon fled to the United States. The Soviet Union had abstained in the vote on Resolution 39 as part of its broader opposition to UN military interventions at that time, and thus contributed no representative.

The Norwegian diplomat Erik Colban, a former director of the League of Nations Minorities Section, was the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General on UNCIP. The British civil servant Richard Symonds, a veteran of relief work in India during and immediately after the war, and with the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in Vienna, served as Colban's personal advisor. They are two of the many figures whose contributions to the early work of the UN remind us of the agency of individuals in building the institution.[8] Symonds had built good faith with political figures across the region generated by his wartime voluntary aid work. UNCIP had two goals: to perform the Security Council's duty to maintain international peace and security under Article 24 of the UN Charter; and to exercise "any mediatory influence likely to smooth away difficulties" in the crisis.[9] Its work unfolded in three stages. During the first half of 1948 it conducted fact-finding missions in the region. It then moved to Paris to mediate a ceasefire agreement between Pakistan and India. Finally, its members returned to the field in 1949 through early 1950 to negotiate a truce and prepare for a planned plebiscite, aided by the deployment of UN military observers. UNCIP was thus one of the UN's nascent forays into what Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld would in

1960 term "preventive diplomacy." While peacekeeping eventually evolved as a means of circumventing regional conflicts from provoking superpower conflict, UNCIP's work most closely resembled that of interwar conciliation commissions. These bodies combined fact-finding and mediation. They developed from the principles of the two Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) and were authorized by the League of Nations (such as the Lytton Commission in 1932 which investigated Japanese aggression in Manchuria) and other international organizations such as the International Labour Organization.[10] UNCIP was thus a bridge between an older tradition of legalistic intervention and the later classical peacekeeping model of conflict prevention.

UNCIP differed from these earlier commissions in presenting itself as a neutral arbiter rather than an oversight authority. UNCIP appealed to the Gandhian principles of non-violence, truth, and conciliation, which helped it establish legitimacy with actors on all sides. Gandhi was assassinated on January 30, 1948, just before commission members arrived in the subcontinent, and UNCIP publicized its members' subsequent visit to his memorial at Raj Ghat in Delhi.[11] Colban shared the belief that the "amelioration of problems like Kashmir was possible with discussion and patience,"[12] drawing on his decades of international service in the UN and League of Nations. This spirit of conciliation guided UNCIP's negotiations with its key official interlocuters, Sir Girjashankar Bajpai, Secretary General of the Indian Department of External Affairs, Pakistan's prime minister Liaqat Ali Khan, and Pakistan's foreign minister Zafarullah Khan.

UNCIP established two fact-finding delegations: Ricardo Siri (Argentina's alternate delegate), Korbel, and Lozano traveled to Srinagar in Pakistan-controlled eastern Kashmir, while Huddle and Graeffe toured Indian-held western Kashmir. Symonds drew upon his regional experience to facilitate the delegates' travels and coordinate interpreters, drivers, and other logistical supports.[13] He also accompanied UNCIP's Military Advisor, the Belgian Lt. Gen. Maurice Delvoie, on cross-border visits to Rawalpindi and Azad territory,[14] demonstrating the trust in which he was held by actors on all sides. When Siri, Korbel, and Lozano visited areas where tribesmen had invaded, civilians told them of violence and looting against Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus alike. In Baramula, hundreds of people had been shot, civilians' crops and livestock had been destroyed or driven away, and people were dependent on supplies from the Jammu and Kashmir government in Srinagar. In Bandipora, refugees reported being subjected to forced labor and having their cattle stolen by tribesmen.

The commission noted that Kashmiri civilians had few organizational means of expressing their interests. Political parties were loosely organized among elites, while the trade union movement, led by Ghulam Mohi Ud-Din, whose political sympathies were with Pakistan, had under 100,000 members, was poorly organized, and had negligible connections with the international labor movement.[15] When Graeffe and Huddle visited Rawalpindi and Azad Kashmir, meanwhile, they were greeted by peasants with calls of "May Free Kashmir Live! May Pakistan Live!" Officials in these agriculturally unproductive regions had difficulty maintaining government services due to Indian bombing raids. Azad Kashmir had less than

1.5 million people, with approximately 100,000 Muslim tribesmen occupying the north of the territory. Graeffe described the Azad regime as little more than "a sort of guerilla government" in his report on his and Huddle's trip.[16]

After completing its fact-finding tours, UNCIP presented the governments of India and Pakistan with a ceasefire proposal on August 13, 1948. It had three components. First, a ceasefire binding on troops under each state's control. Second, the withdrawal of Pakistani troops and tribesmen from Kashmir (to be administered by local authorities), the withdrawal of most Indian troops from Kashmir, and a guarantee by Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah's interim government of Jammu and Kashmir (the latter had been appointed interim prime minister of the state by Maharaja Hari Singh on March 5, 1948) to uphold the human and political rights of people living in Indian-held Kashmir territory. Third, an agreement by both countries that a future plebiscite would determine the region's sovereignty.[17]

The Security Dilemma: UNCIP and UN Military Observation

Both countries had resisted the terms of the earlier Security Council Resolution 47 (April 21, 1948) which set out the proposed terms of a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops, and an eventual plebiscite. India objected to the requirement to begin withdrawing its troops once the withdrawal of tribesmen had begun, as it wanted to maintain troops in Jammu and Kashmir for defensive purpose. Pakistan wanted representatives from Abdullah's government, the Muslim conference, and the Azad Kashmir regime added to the coalition government proposed to govern the region in the interregnum before the plebiscite could be held.[18] The balance of 1948 was devoted to political negotiations concerning the implementation of Security Council Resolution 47.[19] UNCIP returned to the subcontinent in early 1949 to assume the role of military observer, a task it performed until spring 1950, when it was dissolved and replaced by UNMOGIP.

The Kashmir dispute was a prototypical security dilemma situation.[20] The regional anarchy created by Partition led to military and rhetorical escalation on all sides. Unsure of each other's goals and military capacities, an environment of mutual fear threatened to spiral into a hot war neither side wanted. While Delhi and Karachi spoke provocatively in public, accusing each other of pre-emptive provocations in advance of the ceasefire's implementation, they displayed an awareness of the danger of unintended escalation in their respective private correspondence with UNCIP and the Security Council.

The UN designed the practice of military observation to prevent ceasefire violations, prevent armed escalation, and encourage the resettlement of migrants and refugees. It had a humanitarian purpose in protecting civilians, and a political one in creating a stable environment in which a negotiated settlement to the crisis could be achieved. Colban told UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie it was imperative that military observers be prepared for immediate deployment when the ceasefire was signed. UNCIP proposed twenty observer teams of three to four members, with contributions suggested from Belgium, Canada, Mexico or other

Latin American states, Norway, Sweden, and the United States.[21] With the Soviets abstaining from Security Council deliberations on Kashmir, there was not yet opposition to the participation of superpower representatives in UN missions. UNCIP also urged Pakistan and India to refrain from trying to sway people in contested regions to vote for their side in the proposed plebiscite before the ceasefine agreement was finalized.[22]

Pakistan Major General Mohammad Ayub Khan accused India of preparing an offensive to seize territory in western and northern Kashmir before the ceasefire agreement froze territorial possession. As he told Colban, Pakistan "cannot be expected to submit passively … to further encroachments by India."[23] Meanwhile, Bajpai forwarded Colban intelligence from the Indian High Commissioner in Karachi that Pakistan intended to intensify its attack on Kashmir before the ceasefire came into effect. Colban sent urgent letters to both sides urging restraint.[24] While some of this rhetoric was saber-rattling, both countries enacted the security dilemma by seeking to secure their holdings before the ceasefire line was settled.

Confronting Misinformation and Propaganda

UNCIP's fact-finding and mediation endeavors were frustrated by Indian, Pakistani, Kashmiri, and Azad Kashmiri political, military, and press actors to use the UN and UNCIP as means to pursue their respective interests. Pakistan and India sent a steady stream of complaints and appeals to UNCIP and Colban. Each depicted its own military escalations as self-defense measures and felt that UNCIP was taking the other's side. Nehru accused Pakistan of using each concession India made "as a springboard for further demands," and criticized UNCIP for ignoring India's demands to disband and disarm Azad troops and to establish garrisons in the north of Kashmir.[25] Indian papers featured exaggerated reports of Pakistani abuses in Kashmir, while UNCIP was unable to publicize its work through Pakistani newspapers, which Abdullah had banned from Jammu and Kashmir as part of his campaign to resist Pakistan's claims to the region.[26] The propaganda problem was especially acute by early 1949 in Azad territory, where posters and rumor denounced the UN and India, and *Azad Kashmir* radio featured satirical programs mocking Nehru and other Indian leaders.[27] Bajpai complained directly to Colban about anti-Indian diatribes by Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, Supreme Head of the Azad Movement.[28]

India launched a fulsome propaganda campaign. Its Information Service described Pakistani and tribal forces as "invaders," implying India's "natural" sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir, and highlighted the "atrocities" and "horrors" the "invaders" inflicted on villages in disputed areas such as Rajauri in Jammu province. While Indian troops heroically created a "steel ring around the Kashmir Valley" in the summer of 1948, "the invaders enjoyed themselves by marauding in the Buddhist province of Ladakh, desecrating and looting monasteries and villages in their path."[29] Such publicity portrayed the conflict as one of civilization versus barbarism. Similar themes were present in Indian press

coverage of the fighting, and in official Indian government complaints to the UN. India's Kashmir minister, Vishnu Sahay, protested to Colban in April 1950 that Pakistan's troop increases violated the ceasefire terms, and argued that villagers in border regions should be armed in response for their protection.[30]

Meanwhile, Pakistani government and press commentary stressed two themes: that the UN favored India, and that Pakistan was defending the rights of Muslims in both Kashmir and the broader Islamic world. Zafarullah Khan objected to American and British support for India's 1949 bid for a seat on the Security Council, given that the latter was the very body tasked with adjudicating the Kashmir dispute.[31] Chaudri Ghulam Abbas was even more scathing: "By allowing a culprit [his view of India in the Kashmir conflict] to sit as a judge, UNO has lost the confidence and faith of the Muslims … the Kashmir issue can be solved by the sword alone."[32] These concerns were exacerbated when India won the Commonwealth non-permanent Security Council seat in 1950.

Pakistan received staunch support from other Muslim states, another indication that the politics of decolonization was a central influence on the Kashmir situation. The Tunisian educationalist Sheikh Saeed Sinnu, visiting Karachi in February 1949, proclaimed that "Pakistan is the heart of the Muslim world … You [Pakistan] have many problems. To build everything from scratch is one of them … You have to guard a long frontier, but God has given your nation some of the best fighting material in the world."[33] Pakistani papers publicized Hindu attacks on Muslims across the subcontinent, and the World Muslim Conference held in Karachi in February 1949 condemned India for the "aggressive military invasion and occupation of Hyderabad and Junagadh and for perpetrating atrocities" on Indian Muslims.[34] Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, President of the Azad Kashmir Government, expressed similar concerns: "The Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir know that Indian Muslims are not safe in India. How can they then vote against their security for the State's accession to India. They cannot vote for their complete extinction, butchery of their children and molestation of their honour."[35] An editorial in *Jadid Nizam* channeled Cold War rhetoric when it argued that only Islam can repel the "communist" influence of India in Pakistan.[36]

While such provocative rhetoric on all sides demonstrated the highly politicized nature of the crisis, there were measures of restraint. The Indian and Pakistani Newspaper Editors Associations mutually pledged to ban propaganda in their papers in April 1950 in the interest of a peaceful Kashmir settlement. Pakistan lifted the country's ban on the *Hindustan Times* in early May 1950, in advance of the bilateral Nehru–Liaquat negotiations between the two country's leaders that secured an agreement on refugee and migrant rights following riots in East Bengal earlier that year.[37] UNCIP itself was able to facilitate open dialogue between Delhi and Karachi because key players on both sides had close relations before Partition. Zafarullah Khan and Bajpai had sat on the Viceroy's Council together, while Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani (Pakistan's Minister for Kashmir Affairs) and Sahay had been neighbors in Delhi. Key military leaders on each side had served together in the British army; there were approximately 700 high-ranking British officers in the Pakistan army, and 300 in the Indian army. Korbel

recalled in his memoir of the Kashmir crisis that many British officers would have stopped the fighting immediately if it had been up to them.[38] As India's Chief of Army Staff, Field Marshal K.M. Cariappa, told Canadian Brigadier H.H. Angle, UNCIP's Chief Military Observer, "We were all serving in the same army a few years ago. Most of the commanders there are all friends of ours." General Rozza, a commander of a Pakistani Division, told Angle that "we do not want to go to war with India. We know each other too well. We've served in the same units."[39] If one also considers the early Indus waters negotiations and the Liaquat–Nehru Pact, it's clear why actors in both countries saw the potential for a settlement on Kashmir's sovereignty.[40] UNCIP thus demonstrated the potential value of a UN mission in a crisis where the disputants had preexisting relationships and shared experiences.

Nonetheless, UNCIP had to confront a cycle of mutual blame inflamed by the very real magnitude of communal violence in South Asia. This context of mass violence explains why each side monitored each other for the slightest provocation, real or imagined. *Lahore Radio* declared on January 27, 1949 that "the people of Kashmir know what happened to Muslims in the East Punjab and the States. If Dogra [Abdullah's] rule continues for some time more in Jammu, then all the Muslims will be exterminated forever."[41] The Pakistan Students Federation besieged UNCIP to "please [not] throw innocent millions at [the] mercy of these barbarians [Indians]."[42] The Indian Press Information Bureau, meanwhile, was full of reports the following month of alleged Pakistani perfidy. Delhi highlighted claims by Lahore Radio that Abdullah's government was encouraging Muslims to swear an oath on the Quran to vote for accession to India, and reports in the *Pakistan Times* that the Mahsud leader of Waziristan claimed tribesmen would restart jihad if the plebiscite is not fair.[43] Given this backdrop of potential violence, UNCIP had little room to maneuver in recommending plebiscite terms that would be accepted by all parties.

Shifting Realities: Political Mediator to Ceasefire Observance

Trust was necessary to ensure cooperation and engagement from all parties. Symonds and Colban drafted communiques in 1948 that publicized the ceasefire terms, and in 1949 UNCIP's return to the region to monitor its terms under the Karachi Agreement.[44] UNCIP also highlighted its trust-building initiatives, such as village tours, and its utility as a means of providing all sides neutral, legitimate, and practical aid and mediation. The importance of trust-building for international observer and mediation missions became an essential consideration for subsequent international peacekeeping and security operations.

UNCIP developed strong enough relationships with Delhi and Karachi for its Truce Sub-committee to mediate a conference from July 18–27, 1949 with military delegations from India (headed by Lt. Gen. S.M. Shrinagesh) and Pakistan (headed by Major Gen. W.S. Cawthorn).[45] It produced the Karachi Agreement, which established a ceasefire line stretching "from Manawar in the south, north to Keran and from Keran east to the [Siachen] glacier area." India and Pakistan disputed the

line in a stretch east of Keran in Gurais and the Burzil Pass, where minor border incidents occurred. UNCIP positioned observers where it deemed necessary to monitor each country's adherence to the Agreement.[46] Each side had thirty days after the Agreement was ratified to vacate areas they occupied behind the new ceasefire line, and any forward movement was prohibited. They were both allowed to adjust their defensive positions behind the ceasefire line, so long as neither laid wire nor mines.

UNCIP's prime challenge was to manage the sequencing of each country's troop withdrawal. Neither wanted to begin withdrawing first, lest the other renege on the agreement and seize additional territory. Withdrawals had begun in March 1949 while the ceasefire terms were still under negotiation, with two battalions of regular Pakistan troops pulled back and approximately 8,000 tribesmen retreating from Kashmir to NWFP. Meanwhile, some Indian air force units also withdrew, and the International Red Cross brokered the final exchange of prisoners of war.[47] The withdrawal of the bulk of each side's regular forces was the key sticking point in the summer of 1949.[48] Partly because of these tensions, UNCIP representatives had negotiated the truce terms separately with Pakistan and India.[49] Pakistan supported UNCIP's proposal that the demobilization of Azad Kashmiri troops be settled through arbitration. In response, Bajpai complained to UNCIP that Kashmir would be in "great jeopardy" in the interim between the withdrawal of Indian forces and the disbanding of Azad Kashmiri troops, foreshadowing the deadlock that subsequently scuppered the security settlement necessary to hold a plebiscite.[50]

UNCIP's key success was in minimizing violence. By April 1949 it had thirty-six observers monitoring the ceasefire line.[51] Angle, UNCIP's Chief Military Observer, was sanguine about ceasefire violations, which he believed were inevitable. Both sides were guilty of technical ceasefire breaches, such as building bridges, roads, and other infrastructure in contested territories which aided their respective militaries, and thus canceled each other out.[52] While Angle asserted that "the mere presence of the observers alone curtails the number of violations of the Cease-Fire agreement,"[53] he also recognized the limitations of the UN's observer role given that it only had forty observers by May 1950, working in teams of three or four on each side of the border.[54]

While UNCIP's military observation helped prevent an escalation of violence, it was insufficient to facilitate a political settlement. This limitation was evident in the collapse of the plebiscite plan. Internationally mandated plebiscites were not new. The Treaty of Versailles established International Commissions that supervised plebiscites concerning the sovereign status of Schleswig and parts of East Prussia in 1920, and Upper Silesia in 1921, while the Treaty of St. Germain mandated a plebiscite for Sopron on the Austria-Hungarian border. In 1935 the League conducted a plebiscite in the Saar Basin.[55] The UN-mediated plebiscite for Kashmir was to be free of coercion or victimization, and members of all religions, castes, and political parties would have a vote. Prisoners on each side were also to be released, and minorities across the region would be provided with protection. While UNCIP was officially discontinued in March 1950, its work had effectively

ended in December 1949 when it recommended to the Security Council that given its failure to negotiate a truce between India and Pakistan, "a single person with broad authority and undivided responsibility offers a more practical means of finding the balance and compromise necessary to advance settlement of the dispute."[56] This person turned out to be American Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who was appointed on UNCIP's unanimous recommendation as UN Plebiscite Administrator for Kashmir.[57] Pakistan accepted his appointment, a signal of its developing military alliance with Washington, as did Abdullah.[58]

India, however, rejected Nimitz's appointment and equivocated on the plebiscite. It believed a plebiscite would reward what it perceived as Pakistan's and Azad Kashmir's unlawful landgrab.[59] The Azad Kashmir government also opposed the plebiscite plan. It criticized Indian defense minister Sardar Baldev Singh for declaring that Pakistan must withdraw from occupied Kashmir before the plebiscite, arguing that this amounted to the intimidation of Kashmiris in those regions to vote to join India in the plebiscite.[60] At the UN, Colban understood Azad troops' reluctance to accept the ceasefire, but feared Pakistan's framing of the dispute as Muslim versus Hindu (and Sikh) could prevent the plebiscite from occurring.[61]

These fears were valid. Abdurrahman Butt, Secretary of the City Muslim League in Rawalpindi, warned UN officials that Muslims there would reluctantly use violence to liberate Jammu and Kashmir if the plebiscite were perceived to be unfair. If no plebiscite was held at all, he asserted that other small UN member states would question the organization's commitment to the principle of popular sovereignty (see also Christian Methfessel's chapter on international organizations' role in establishing norms of territorial integrity).[62] Meanwhile, as India dragged its feet in 1949 on whether to agree to the plebiscite, China annexed the neighboring region of Xinjiang,[63] and the next year Tibet. The security situation in the "roof of the world" thus became even more precarious, with border tensions between India and China eventually breaking out into war in 1962 over sovereignty of the Aksai Chin region on the Jammu and Kashmir-Xinjiang border. With the Kashmir crisis devolving into stasis by the summer of 1949, the UN shifted from an intermediary seeking to facilitate a settlement through UNCIP, to an oversight role of managing the status quo through UNMOGIP.

Conclusion

UNCIP's work in Kashmir demonstrates the intersection of the history of international organizations and decolonization after the Second World War. It established new security and regulatory practices under the auspices of a fact-finding and observer mission sanctioned by the Security Council. UNCIP had a public-facing and an internal-facing side. All actors in the crisis (including the UN itself) used the former to advance their respective interests and speak to domestic and institutional audiences. The latter consisted of private and semi-private spaces wherein the actors could negotiate compromises that were not possible in

public. UNCIP exercised a great degree of autonomy, enabled by both its embrace of Gandhi's spirit of tolerance and the contacts Symonds had in the region. As was the case with other international organizations and operations, UNCIP enabled the circulation of expertise and knowledge among actors in different parts of the globe. British military leaders also remained active in both countries' armed forces, and Pakistani, Indian, and tribal leaders' familiarity with the British facilitated negotiation and compromise. It was thus the legacies of British imperial rule and the dynamics of decolonization, rather than superpower competition, that shaped UNCIP's operations. The relative absence of Cold War rivalries in the Kashmir crisis is evident in the fact that the United States participated in UNCIP without being blocked by the Soviet Union, which at that point remained aloof from the Kashmir question. Cold War divisions were more apparent concerning the UN General Assembly's November 1948 recommendation that the Secretary-General create a permanent UN Field Service and Panel of Field Observers. This UN Guard would provide a standing force of technical and military staff that the UN could deploy in future observer missions. The Soviets, Czechoslovakia, and Poland argued that any UN service that carried protective weapons, held observer status in truce situations, and supervised polling during plebiscites would contravene the principle of state sovereignty, and were "not within the competence of the Secretary General and is illegal." They further asserted that a UN Field Service would "serve as a handy pretext for interference in the internal affairs of various States."[64] The Soviets had pushed instead at the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations for the UN to have its own military capacity, and Article 47 of the UN Charter created a UN Military Staff Committee to provide "strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council." The committee proved stillborn, however, as P5 members could not agree on its composition.[65] The prospective UN Field Service suffered a similar fate. UN peacekeeping through mediation proved more palatable to the P5. This approach emerged first in an ad hoc fashion through UNCIP's work in Kashmir, where superpower interests were not (yet) directly involved. It subsequently evolved through UNEF and afterwards as a means of stabilizing regional conflicts that threatened to spark direct armed superpower conflict.

UNCIP's measured success lay in providing political and rhetorical space where all sides could "blow off steam" and speak to their domestic audiences to save face, and in brokering an agreement that led to de-escalation. Its weakness was one shared by many postwar international organizations and initiatives: it mirrored the international community's struggle to recognize the political and moral realities of decolonization. India and Pakistan may have disagreed over Kashmir, but like colonial and postcolonial societies around the world, they used the UN and other international to advance their national interests, and also as spaces to network with other "Third World" actors. While the plebiscite in Kashmir has never occurred, UNCIP's settlement has become permanent under the auspices of UNMOGIP. It has weathered three Indo-Pakistan wars and a continued armed standoff, made evermore dangerous by that fact that since 1998 both countries are nuclear powers. UNCIP helped craft new international

paradigms, especially regarding state territorial disputes and international intervention. Its members were optimistic that a settlement of the Kashmir crisis would provide a model for the peaceful solution of other international disputes.[66] While the UN was unable to secure a political settlement to the crisis, UNCIP was successful in deescalating armed conflict. It was an important first step in the UN's history of peacekeeping.

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Part IV

BRIDGE BUILDING

Chapter 8

The Paris International Centre for the Child Between East and West, 1949–1980s

Michel Christian

The International Centre for the Child (Centre international de l'enfance or CIE/ICC) was established in 1949 and operated until 1997. A unique international agency dedicated to children's health and welfare, the ICC was created in the aftermath of the Second World War along with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) as a result of a French diplomatic initiative in response to the strong influence of the United States and Great Britain in the newly created UN agencies.[1] Initially funded jointly by UNICEF and the French government, but increasingly by the French government alone, the ICC had an international "Executive Board," comprising leading pediatricians from various countries who met once in a year, and a "Technical advisory board" with representatives from the WHO, the UNICEF, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the International Organization of Labour (ILO), which expressed the needs and determined the line of action for the ICC. However, the staff of the ICC, numbering 61 in 1951 and 97 in 1961,[2] remained French from the Secretary to the Executive Director. The ICC was thus a kind of French international organization.

The French physician and pediatrician Robert Debré was instrumental in establishing and chairing the ICC until his death in 1978. A figure of the French Résistance and the father of de Gaulle's prime minister Michel Debré,[3] Robert Debré was widely recognized in France and was a strong advocate of "social pediatrics." Social pediatrics was not a medical specialization, but rather a cross-disciplinary viewpoint; a "spirit"[4] that advocated for children to be regarded "as a whole," including in regards to medical, pedagogical, and social dimensions.[5] Social pediatrics logically emphasized the role of environmental factors, such as family, community, and living conditions. It drew on public hygiene and social medicine as they developed in the interwar period but without taking up heredity theories. The main activity of the ICC was research and training. Every year, several international courses were organized at the ICC to train and raise awareness of all the various specialists working with children. Between the 1940s and the 1970s,

thousands of physicians, pediatricians, child welfare and healthcare managers, social workers, juvenile judges, and educators participated in those international courses which covered a variety of subjects.

The ICC worked in the field of public health mainly in French-speaking African countries, first in the colonies,[6] then later in the newly independent countries and in other developing countries from the 1970s onwards.[7] However, Eastern European countries were not absent in the ICC's vision. They played a crucial role in its birth and from aid recipients they gradually moved to partners despite the context of the Cold War, which hindered relations between East and West. Drawing on the already existing research that has stressed the agency of Eastern European medical experts[8] and using the ICC's sources (course material and correspondence) and Debré's memoirs,[9] this chapter will assess how the Cold War impacted the ICC's effort to build its international network, particularly at a European level but also how the ICC to a certain extent managed to use the specific context of the Cold War to carve out a niche by playing a role as a bridge between East and West.

Eastern European Countries and the Creation of the ICC

The ICC was officially established in December 1949 after two years of challenging negotiations involving the WHO, UNICEF, and the French government. Robert Debré played a key role in its creation. Born in 1892 in a Jewish bourgeois family that had fled Alsace after the Franco-Prussian War, he graduated in medicine in Paris in 1910 and subsequently worked in several hospitals before being appointed Director of the prestigious Hôpital des enfants malades in the 1930s. Considered in France the most significant pediatrician of his generation,[10] he was also respected internationally. In fact, he took an early interest in building an international network in pediatrics, working in particular for the newly created League of Nation's Health Office (LNHO) where he formed a close bond with the Polish doctor and international figure Ludwik Rajchman.[11] Following a conference of the Social and Health Sections of the LNHO in 1926, Debré was appointed to a "Reporting Committee on Maternal Welfare and the Hygiene of Infants and Children of Pre-Schools Age," which conducted the first comprehensive, international survey of infant mortality and its causes in Europe.[12] Again in 1928 he undertook a study tour abroad to determine children's immunization status, visiting laboratories in Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan, as well as Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania.[13] During this time, he made numerous contacts that proved to be long-lasting. In his memoirs Debré recounts his meetings with Clemens von Pirquet in Austria, György Szent, Karola Papp and János von Bökay in Hungary, and Marta Erlich, Franciszek von Gröer, and Ludwik and Anna Hirszfeld in Poland.[14] All of them held or would hold significant positions after the Second World War. Debré developed an interest in social medicine, which was shared by many LNHO experts[15] especially those from Central European countries.[16]

Debré encountered significant resistance when pushing for the creation of an international "center for pediatrics" in September 1947. However, he also

received support from several prominent figures he knew from his pre-war time in Central Europe. In his memoirs, he mentions that "the creation of the International Children's Centre was extremely difficult, not to say painful."[17] The WHO, which was still being established at the time, had regarded the initiative unfavorably as it seemed to encroach on its competence on universal health matters, although Debré did his best to explain that the future center would cover not only health but also psychological, pedagogical, and social aspects.[18] Furthermore, social medicine, which had been dominant in the LNHO before the war, was increasingly losing ground in the new WHO in favor of the so-called "eradication campaigns approach" supported by the US government and the Rockefeller Foundation, drawing on its pre-war experience.[19] Debré's idea on social pediatrics were more in line not only with those of Eastern Europe but also with Soviet views on social medicine (see Marek Eby's chapter in this volume). The International Child Centre was ultimately established with the support of UNICEF, which had begun to shift its focus from humanitarian aid to welfare and development.[20] The founder of UNICEF and its chairman until 1950, Rajchman guaranteed that the UNICEF Executive Board adopted Debré's proposal, with Soviet Union abstaining.[21] And Debré stated in a note for the Foreign Affairs Ministry in June 1949 that he could count on "the voices of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia" in addition to other support in Europe and Latin America.[22]

At a time when Central European countries were withdrawing from the WHO due to the Cold War's growing polarization, Debré emphasized in a 1950 report that the ICC should "establish links with countries on the other side of the 'Iron Curtain', which, for the medical world at least, is a precious asset." Debré's initiative was most likely seen by Eastern European actors as an opportunity to participate in global healthcare despite the withdrawal of their country from the WHO.[23] In addition, both sides had been advocating for social medicine since the 1920s and were interested in an alternative to the WHO's vision. Debré himself in the same report hoped the ICC could "prevent excessive influence from the World Health Organization, where, as you know, despite all our efforts at collaboration and goodwill, we are far from being completely satisfied."[24]

Eastern European Participation in the ICC's International Courses (1948–1977)

The ICC had a primary focus on research and teaching, including the "international social pediatrics course," which had already started in 1948 and 1949, prior to the Centre being officially established, with the goal to influence the expected decision. The two initial sessions saw over 100 participants from 13 countries in 1948 and 93 participants from 36 countries in 1949, including Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia and were deemed successful.[25] Overall, from 1950 to 1980, the international social pediatrics courses had 28 sessions with 943 participants. The ICC established various international courses for physicians, pediatricians, child welfare and healthcare managers, social workers, juvenile

judges, and educators, leading to 302 courses held in Paris and worldwide between 1950 and 1970, attended by 15,207 participants from all continents.[26]

However, the Cold War divide affected the participation of the Eastern European countries, resulting in a significant drop after the first two sessions of 1948 and 1949. Between 1949 and 1952, the average attendance (calculated by dividing the number of participants from Eastern Europe by the number of offered courses) amounted to a mere 1.1.[27] Attendance by Eastern European experts slightly increased again between 1953 and 1958, averaging 1.5, primarily due to Polish and Czechoslovak participation. During this period, the ICC provided them with grants from its own budget, since Poland and Czechoslovakia were not yet officially WHO members, whereas Yugoslavia could enjoy ICC and WHO grants. Thus, the ICC may have helped to maintain a common scientific space during the Stalinist and immediate post-Stalinist period. From 1958 onward attendance by Eastern European actors continued to increase, this time with the financial support of the WHO, which Eastern European countries had rejoined. At the 1958 social pediatrics course session, all Eastern European countries were represented for the first time. On average, 3.3 Eastern European countries participated in each course between 1958 and 1977. Thus, the ICC was affected by the Cold War diplomatic evolution but it never ceased to serve as a bridge between East and West.

Different levels of involvement in the ICC were apparent among Eastern European countries. Yugoslavia sent participants to attend 127 of the 145 international courses offered from 1948 to 1977, Poland 117, Czechoslovakia 85, Romania 65, Bulgaria 64, Hungary 66, USSR 17, and the GDR only one. In 1957, the ICC organized its first study trip to Poland and Czechoslovakia. The progress made by these countries after the Second World War, as well as of the significance of their national pediatrics shaped by their pre-war experience, was recognized. During this event, Franciszek Gröer, who had met with Debré in the 1920s and was currently the Director of the Institute of Mother and Child, delivered a lecture in Warsaw.[28] More study trips were also organized in Yugoslavia in 1958 and 1967, Romania in 1966, Bulgaria in 1971 and 1977, Hungary in 1973, and Czechoslovakia in 1976. However, the majority of the courses took place at the Centre in Paris and the study trip merely served as a basis for discussion. Only on two occasions were international courses really co-organized and fully conducted abroad, such as in Poland in 1962 and Romania in 1972. Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia were also the only countries that sent nationals as members of the ICC's Executive Board.[29]

These various levels of cooperation reflected the increasingly acknowledged status of Eastern European countries as "developed countries" worthy of emulation. This indicated a shift in the ICC's actors' perception. In 1954, a report written by the ICC Director Etienne Berthet categorized "Eastern Europe" ("Europe orientale") as a "semi-developed" region, grouping it with countries of South America and Asia.[30] This vision clearly changed in the 1960s along with the significant recognition that Eastern European countries were now recognized as "developed" given their success against malaria both at home and internationally.[31]

However, involvement and acknowledgment were not uniformly distributed and varied over time. Early involved countries, such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, were recognized as partners already in the 1950s and profited from the network already established during the interwar era. In the 1970s, Poland enhanced cooperation levels by signing a governmental agreement between the ICC and the Institute of Mother and Child in Warsaw. In this way, it sought to exert a kind of leadership among other Eastern European countries.[32] Hungary and Bulgaria, being latecomers, received less recognition, but Romania managed to establish an accelerated cooperation after 1964. Romania, which had not been represented in the courses' audience at all until 1958 and had sent very few participants since then, significantly increased its involvement from 1964 onwards. It systematically sent participants on courses, hosted a study trip in 1966, and co-organized the international course in 1972, which was held entirely in Bucharest. This change in Romania's interest towards the ICC corresponded with Ceausescu's rise to power and a new foreign policy, which emphasized the "Latin" identity of Romania, and which might have made cooperation with the French ICC especially relevant.

Consequently, the ICC contributed to French scientific soft power while providing opportunities for Eastern European countries to pursue their scientific diplomacy, as Poland and Romania did. Nevertheless, not every Eastern bloc country showed the same level of interest, as evidenced by the Soviet Union and the GDR's meager participation in courses and the absence of any study trip, which stood in clear contrast especially with the Soviet Union's involvement at the WHO (see Marek Eby's chapter in this volume). These disparities suggest that the ICC successfully used the differences within the Eastern bloc, largely drawing on a pre-war network. Looking at the Eastern European countries merely as a bloc does not account for older differences that continued to exist.

Building Network and Contributing to an Epistemic Community

The ICC's international courses not only had diplomatic implications but above all a scientific dimension. Even though the term "course" may suggest a top-down pedagogical approach, the ICC's international courses were based on the principle that every participant was equal and had to be ready to contribute personally to the course using his or her own experiences. Participants were specialists in the same field and shared the same scientific questions.[33] During a study trip in Czechoslovakia in 1957, Czech pediatrician Marie Damborská presented her research on the "Problems of collective education of children under three in Czechoslovak sanitary institutions."[34] She focused on the issue of "hospitalism," a topic which had just been highlighted by the Bowlby Report two years prior[35] and was at the same time undergoing research by the French pediatrician Jenny Aubry with the support of the ICC.[36] Participants, who were regarded as equals and personally contributed to the courses, formed what can be referred to as an epistemic community.

The ICC maintained this spirit throughout the 1970s. Michel Manciaux, former General Director, recalled in an interview conducted long after he had left the ICC that their approach was "low-key and modest." They did not provide "ready-made solutions" but rather offered "an equal partnership to people who were confronted with problems that were also our own."[37] That statement is confirmed by written sources, as evidenced by the file documenting the organization of the international course on maternal care held in Sofia in 1977. The file contains a number of typewritten contributions brought up for discussion by every national participant.[38] Manciaux also mentioned that some of the numerous contacts he gained among Eastern European pediatricians via the ICC "took a friendly turn," allowing him to casually address "some very serious problems concerning the fate of children in popular democracies," including the situation of children in Romania.[39]

Alongside the scientific aspect, the ICC's international courses also offered a human experience, which the ICC captured in the form of "albums souvenir" during the 1950s, apparently on the request of the participants themselves.[40] An array of people from different countries traveled to Paris to attend the two–four-month course and resided there for its entire duration. The event was a break in their daily, busy lives, as highlighted in various accounts:

> Most of us have dreamed of being able to stop once in our careers to take stock of a job that certainly fascinates us, but absorbs us too much to leave us time for very fertile reflection.[41]

This extended stay abroad helped to foster a sense of camaraderie and allowed for the development of meaningful interpersonal connections. This was achieved not only during the courses themselves, which were often held in intimate settings, but also "in the intimacy of evenings in the petit salon," where the participants "found each other."[42] The group's cohesion was further reinforced through study trips, which not only served to further their education but also provided opportunities for leisure and relaxation. During a study trip to Portugal and Spain in 1956, the participants even composed a group song inspired by the renowned melody "There was once a little boat."[43]

Over time, the ICC developed a global network of experts and diligently sustained it. In 1970, it even held three brief, specialized sessions for alumni of courses between 1955 and 1965.[44] This included numerous specialists from Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. However, the ICC apparently did not favor direct contact between Eastern European and developing countries. Eastern European specialists were never invited to contribute to courses taking place outside Europe, which indicates that the ICC had no particular interest in transferring the acquired experience from the East to the South as some UN agencies did at the time.[45]

Eastern European and the French Soft Power of the ICC

The creation of the ICC in 1949 was driven by Debré's goal of maintaining France's position in world pediatrics, a priority that aligned with the broader goals of French diplomacy. Debré himself saw the ICC as an instrument for a French soft power, stating in his memoirs that its creation was intended "to restore France's prestige and contribute to the renewal of its intellectual influence in the world."[46] In this vision, Eastern Europe represented only one part of the ICC's scope of interest. International courses welcomed participants from many different countries and were held (or study trips were organized) not only in Eastern Europe (sixteen courses) but also in Western Europe (twenty-six courses) or outside Europe, mainly in Latin America and Africa (twenty-five courses).

Still, the ICC's activities exhibited a characteristic pattern, demonstrated by the mapping of its "teaching and research activities" during the 1950s and 1960s presented to the Executive Board in 1969.[47] These activities centered on Europe, Latin America, and the former French colonies in Africa and the Middle East. In contrast, the ICC's activity was less developed or almost non-existent in North America and in other English-speaking countries including Australia, New Zealand, as well as in former recent British colonies in Africa and Asia. Similarly, they were also weak or absent in the Soviet Union as well as in China. Various factors account for this pattern. In Europe, the ICC, which operated entirely in French, had numerous connections in French-speaking countries such as Belgium and Switzerland or in Romance-language-speaking countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Latin America. In Western Europe, cooperation with the UK or Germany stayed surprisingly low, despite their significance for world pediatrics. British and German pediatricians played a marginal role for the ICC. The situation was similar for other English-speaking countries beyond Europe (the United States, Australia, New Zealand), although Debré had visited the United States on several occasions and had made connections with various pediatricians.[48] There were few activities not only in the United States but also in the USSR. The ICC seemed to favor cooperation with middle-sized European or "developing" countries.

There was a strong continuity of the ICC's work in French-speaking Africa from the colonial era to the newly independent states. In the 1950s, French political leaders had been very reluctant to allow the WHO to address public health issues in Africa, which they considered a purely domestic issue.[49] The establishment of a WHO office for Africa in Brazzaville, albeit closely monitored by the French government, facilitated the gathering of data on a regional scale, indirectly challenging empires' structures and bolstering anti-colonial claims. The ICC's work in Africa should prove that France was capable of improving and securing public health within its colonial empire without assistance from the UN. Social medicine, a fundamental principal of the ICC, paradoxically provided the framework to describe "poor health outcomes and social instability as unfortunate yet inevitable products of industrialization, urbanization, and economic development,"[50] without addressing the political question of structural inequalities resulting from

colonialism. The ICC, nonetheless, carried on promoting social pediatrics and collaborating with the governments of the newly independent African countries after the end of the colonial empire. The social medicine approach gained even greater relevance when the effectiveness of "eradication policies" was questioned. Furthermore, social medicine's attention to cultural particularities proved to be an asset when the ICC collaborated with African countries' governments who demanded respect for their specific cultures.[51]

One remarkable observation is that despite the role of the ICC in maintaining and justifying French colonial rule, Eastern European actors continued cooperating, while Eastern European communist leaders were fiercely backing anti-colonial efforts, specifically targeting the French Empire in Indochina and Algeria. The paradox, however, was only apparent. At the level of health experts, personal contacts, often dating back to the interwar period, were crucial in developing working relations, securing governmental approval, and choosing participants. These pediatricians shared a common view on social pediatrics that was informed by the pre-war social medicine formulated in the LNHO. In the 1950s and early 1960s, they likely preferred to collaborate with Debré's Centre, despite its involvement in colonialism, than with the WHO, which was more vocal on colonialism but had dismissed social medicine as "Communist" at the onset of the Cold War. Moreover, the ICC, even more than UN agencies, had a specific focus on "technical" aspects. It did not have any assembly with national representatives engaging in public discussions. Rather, its main function was to deliver training and carry out research. This fact to a certain extent prevented the ICC from the Cold War as well as from anti-colonial politicization.

The French influence in pediatrics worldwide was a key factor in Debré's vision for the ICC. This implied the consistent use of French as the working language. Debré was fascinated by the French language and sought to promote its use in all circumstances. In his memoirs, he mentioned his lecture at the first congress of the International Association for Pediatrics after the Second World War in 1947, where "the international audience had spoken exclusively English." He recounted how he thought the "melody of the French language" had "drawn" listeners and "stirred up memories that touched them," although he was uncertain whether the audience had really understood him.[52]

At the ICC, French was the language of teaching, research, and correspondence. In everyday work and interactions, it was taken for granted. There was no explicit policy in favor of French and at the same time, its use was never questioned. With few exceptions, all courses were conducted in French, even when they took place abroad, including Eastern European countries. This meant that all participants had to master the language sufficiently to understand, but also to contribute to courses that included small-sized workshops and a lot of direct interactions. It also meant that French was still a scientific language among large groups of doctors and pediatricians, not only in Poland and Romania, which had a strong Francophile tradition, but also in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, despite the strong influence of German in these countries.[53] At the 1957 course in social pediatrics, which included a study trip to Poland and Czechoslovakia, Polish and Czech participants produced a volume of written courses for the participants,

with each contribution written in French.[54] Even more surprising, the ICC had participants from Eastern Europe speaking French until the 1970s, meaning that a second generation of pediatricians had grown and learnt French. The ICC's international course held in Sofia in 1977 was conducted entirely in French, including written national reports by each participant and correspondence with the Health Ministry before and after the course.[55] Only in the 1980s were letters from the ICC written in French or in English, depending on the language used by their Eastern European recipients.

The ICC's Influence "on the Other Side of the Iron Curtain"

The primary outcome of the ICC's engagement with Eastern European participants was the dissemination of knowledge which was not only transferred from the West to the East but was also shared among the countries of the Eastern bloc. An instance of that knowledge circulation is the longitudinal study method, which consisted of surveying a group of children over time until they became adults. In 1952, the ICC adopted an international research project to study "the growth and the development of the normal child" in eight countries across Western Europe and North America. In 1955, the Czech physician at the Hygiene Institute in Prague, V. Kapalín, who had completed a course for pediatricians at the ICC, assembled a team to work on a longitudinal study "according to the ICC's directives."[56] The results of the "group of Prague" were included into the overall 1964 report on the study.[57] Meanwhile, Kapalín had already shared those findings not just in Paris in 1960 but also in Berlin and Dresden in 1961 and Erfurt in 1964. This demonstrates that the knowledge gained at the ICC was also disseminated among Eastern bloc countries, including the GDR, which had limited access to international organizations during the period, due to the FRG claiming to represent all Germans and denying any international acknowledgment of the GDR.

The ICC's international courses have contributed to the development of public healthcare and child welfare systems in Eastern European countries. A 1959 evaluation of the courses delivered over nine years highlighted the good results achieved in Yugoslavia, in contrast to other countries evaluated (Portugal, Brazil, and Canada).[58] Similarly, a 1972 evaluation commended Romania's progress, this time in comparison to Algeria.[59] Both evaluations stressed that the governments sent "well selected" students with alumni sometimes "helping them to be prepared." The evaluations also noted that most of the participants had in the meantime achieved higher positions. In Romania's case, the process even appeared to be planned "at the central level." The emphasis on "civil servants destined for a career in government service" was viewed as a guarantee that "the acquired skills [were] then put to good use."[60] Furthermore, the ICC observers noted that, upon returning to their respective countries, participants to international courses tended to "consciously or unconsciously apply ideas and principles discussed in the ICC." This could be observed during the study trips, which were an opportunity to "see on the spot and at their workplace the work of a number of participants."[61] Finally, the ICC observers regarded positively the fact that "public healthcare and child

welfare are centralized under State authority."[62] The high level of centralization was not viewed as a communist but an objectively beneficial feature for child welfare, which reflected a vision in which the Cold War divide was heavily minimized.

However, the ICC's impact and network appeared to have declined from the end of the 1970s onwards, due to the waning interest of pediatricians from Eastern Europe. In 1970, "four enthusiastic university professors in pediatrics interested in teaching, coming from every part of Europe" founded the Association for Paediatric Education in Europe (APEE).[63] Manciaux, the future General Director of the ICC, was among them and established APEE's secretariat in the ICC's building in Paris. Although officially separate from the ICC, the APEE maintained a close relationship to it. The APEE had approximately seventy members and was officially bilingual with French and English as its working languages.[64] However, as recognized in 1983, it was known "that [language] has been an everlasting problem which possibly [hampered] the satisfaction of the members at the meetings."[65] Another issue was the fact that "after the first five years, attendance of members from Eastern Europe at the meetings dwindled, save for those held in Prague and Cracow."[66] The only regular members from Eastern Europe came from Poland and Yugoslavia.

Poland, however, was an exception. In the 1980s, it remained the only country where the ICC still had a robust network, as evidenced by the cooperation existing between the ICC and the Institute of Mother and Child in Warsaw. This collaboration was established on the basis of strong personal ties between the ICC's Scientific Director Lucien Houllemare and the director of the institute Krystyna Bożkowa. It was formalized by an agreement signed between the French and the Polish governments in 1979 and renewed in July 1989.[67] However, the ICC's contribution in Eastern Europe in the period of reforms following the fall of the communist regimes was minimal, except for two missions, one in Poland and the other in Czechoslovakia. In Warsaw, the agreement with the Institute of Mother and Child was discontinued in 1990 due to a change in the institute's direction.[68] In Prague, Houllemare provided training to prepare Czech physicians for private practice medicine and for "the creation and operation of local health insurance funds, based on the French experience."[69] However, it appears that the training did not yield any significant outcomes.

One potential reason for the ICC decline in Eastern Europe was the crisis it confronted at the end of the 1970s. In 1979, just a year after Debré's passing, the ICC shifted from the Ministry of Cooperation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had an impact in terms of mission and funding. According to its General Director Manciaux, the ICC lacked support from the WHO and UNICEF during the same period.[70] The Alma-Ata Declaration of 1978, which, under Soviet influence, placed universal primary healthcare at the heart of the WHO's concerns (see Marek Eby's chapter in this volume), undoubtedly encouraged the countries of Eastern Europe to commit themselves more fully to this organization. At the same time, this shift in focus also decreased the ICC uniqueness since it had been advocating for such universal services in relative isolation for years.

Conclusion

The ICC established its international network by targeting countries with a strong interest in social medicine. Pediatricians in the ICC as well as in Eastern European countries had a clear pan-European vision that drew from the experiences of the interwar period. This network was of course challenged by the Cold War divide. However, despite the "Iron Curtain," the ICC managed to work with Eastern European partners even during the height of the Cold War in the early 1950s, although at a low level. From the mid-1950s, it developed cooperation specifically with each country in Eastern Europe. The ICC thus invites us to look at the Cold War as a complex process depending on a changing context and allowing room for maneuver for middle-size of small powers in the West as well as in the East.

The ICC in particular developed its own perspective of Eastern European countries. They were never labeled "Communist," which implicitly expressed a rejection of the Cold War categories. Neither was the term "Eastern European countries" officially used. Instead, those countries appeared in leaflets and course presentations in alphabetical order among other countries. However, the term "Eastern European countries" did appear in correspondence and other informal sources, suggesting a meaningful category in the ICC's vision, though not because of their ideology, but rather certain features (state centralism, well-trained personnel) that were generally positively assessed. Thus, the ICC objectively and deliberately acted as a bridge between East and West in the Cold War context.

Finally, the context of the Cold War also presented an opportunity for the ICC and the "French school" of pediatrics. By fostering a special relationship with Eastern European countries, the ICC was able to establish a niche in the international knowledge circulation, which gradually eroded in the 1970s. In that circulation, the ICC tried to keep France at the center. Interestingly, it did not explicitly put Eastern European countries in the position of model for developing countries as some UN agencies did at the same time, trying to transfer the Eastern developmental experience to the South. Unlike them, the ICC's aim was not predominantly to overcome the Cold War divide in order to help global development, but rather to promote social pediatrics while working for the French soft power in a context clearly dominated by the two superpowers.

Notes

1 Patrice Marcilloux, "La Création du Centre international de l'enfance," in Yves Denéchère and Patrice Marcilloux (eds.), *Le Centre international de l'enfance (1949–1997). Des archives à l'histoire* (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2016), 35–72.

2 1 Centre international de l'enfance et de la famille (hereafter CIDEF) 14: Rapport présenté par le Directeur Général à la réunion du Conseil d'Administration, June 7–9, 1972, 27.

3 Michel Debré (1912–96) was De Gaulle's prime minister (1959–62) as well as minister of the economy, of foreign affairs and defense minister between 1965 and 1973.
4 1 CIDEF 02: Dr Etienne Berthet, La pédiatrie sociale. Tâches actuelles, orientations nouvelles, 1962, 1.
5 Pascale Quincy-Lefèbvre, "'L'Enfant est un tout'. Le cours international de pédiatrie sociale dans l'histoire du Centre international de l'Enfance," in Denéchère and Marcilloux, *Le Centre international de l'enfance*, 89–112.
6 Jessica Pearson, *The Colonial Politics of Global Health: France and the United Nations in Postwar Africa* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 113–41.
7 Yves Denéchère, "L'Action du Centre international de l'enfance dans l'espace colonial français en Afrique (1949–1960)," in Denéchère and Marcilloux, *Le Centre international de l'enfance*, 141–54.
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9 Robert Debré, *L'Honneur de vivre. Témoignage* (Paris: Hermann/Stock, 1974).
10 His handbook *Traité de pathologie infantile* (written with Paul Rohmer) has become a classic, at least four French children's hospitals have been named after him, and a stamp with his name has been issued in 1982.
11 Debré, *L'Honneur de vivre*, 136, 138. On the role of Rajchman in the LNHO, see Siverstein, *Reinventing International Health*.
12 Ines Borowy, *Coming to Terms with World Health: The League of Nations Health Organization 1921–1946* (Frankfort: Peter Lang, 2014), 184. The inquiry took place in France, Austria, Great Britain, Netherlands, and Norway.
13 Ibid., 186, 207.
14 Debré, *L'Honneur de vivre*, 301–2, 309.
15 On social medicine in the LNHO, see Borowy, "International Social Medicine between the Wars: Positioning a Volatile Concept," *Hygiea Internationalis*, 6, no. 2 (2007) and Paul Weindling "Social Medicine at the League of Nations Health Organisation and the International Labour Office Compared," in Paul Weindling (ed.), *International Health Organisations and Movements, 1918–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 134–53.
16 Jacob, "Malariology and Decolonization."
17 Debré, *L'Honneur de vivre*, 336.
18 Marcilloux, "La Création du Centre international de l'enfance," 52, 58.
19 Thomas Zimmer, *Welt ohne Krankheit. Geschichte der internationalen Gesundheitspolitik 1940–1970* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2017); Randall M. Packard, *A History of Global Health: Interventions into the Lives of Other Peoples* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), 89–132; John Farley, *Brock Chisholm, the World Health Organization, and the Cold War* (Toronto; Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 111–23.

20 Richard Jolly, *UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund): Global Governance that Works* (London; New York: Routledge, 2014), 24–6.
21 Marcilloux, "La Création du Centre international de l'enfance," 65.
22 Ibid.
23 Eastern European countries, while no members of the WHO, remained informed and closely adhered to WHO norms and recommendations, particularly in their efforts to combat infant mortality. See Kateřina Lišková et al., "Saving Newborns, Defining Livebirth: The Struggle to Reduce Infant Mortality in East-Central Europe in Comparative and Transnational Perspectives, 1945–1965," *History of Science* (September 2023). I thank José Aguilar López-Barajas for the reference.
24 Quoted in Marcilloux, "La Création du Centre international de l'enfance," 72.
25 1 CIDEF 233: Cours de pédiatrie sociale, 1.3–30.6.1950, 4.
26 Michel Péchevis, "Les Formations et les méthodes pédagogiques au Centre international de l'enfance," in Denéchère and Marcilloux, *Le Centre international de* l'enfance, 120.
27 Not counting Yugoslavia, which had not withdrawn from UN organizations. These figures come from the leaflets published for each course between 1950 and 1977 (see 1 CIDEF 233, 234, 235, 308).
28 1 CIDEF 234: Cours de pédiatrie sociale, 8.4-30.6.1957, 23.
29 Ludwik Rajchman in the 1950s and Tysarowski in the 1970s and 1980s for Poland, Alfred Rusescu for Romania, and Milivoje Sarvan for Yugoslavia in the 1960s.
30 1 CIDEF 02, Etienne Berthet, Les conditions sanitaires et sociales dans les pays sous-développés, 1954, 3.
31 Jacob, "Malariology and Decolonization."
32 1 CIDEF 45: Relations avec l'Institut national de la mère et de l'enfant en Pologne, 1979–1991.
33 There was in particular a common social-medical interest on mother health, see Kateřina Lišková et al., "Work, Marriage and Premature Birth: The Socio-Medicalisation of Pregnancy in State Socialist East-Central Europe," *Medical History*, 67, no. 4 (2023): 285–306. I thank José Aguilar López-Barajas for the reference.
34 1 CIDEF 308: Cours de pédiatrie sociale. Voyage d'étude en Tchécoslovaquie 20 mai—4 juin 1957, 31–7.
35 John Bowlby, *Maternal Care and Mental Health* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1952).
36 Jenny Aubry, *La Carence de soins maternels* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, Centre international de l'enfance, 1955).
37 David Niget and Angélique Martin, "Entretien avec Michel Manciaux, directeur général du Centre international de l'enfance de 1974 à 1983," in Denéchère and Marcilloux, *Le Centre international de l'enfance*, 77.
38 1 CIDEF 324: folder "Cours Bulgarie."
39 Niget and Martin, "Entretien avec Michel Manciaux," 83.
40 1 CIDEF 233: Social pediatrics course; 1 CIDEF 235: Mother and infant welfare course.
41 1 CIDEF 234: *Cours de perfectionnement destiné à des travailleurs sociaux pour enfants, 8 novembre–18 décembre*, 6.
42 Ibid., 16.
43 1 CIDEF 234: Cours de pédiatrie sociale, 9.4–1.7.1956, 16.
44 1 CIDEF 235: Problèmes sanitaires et sociaux du nourrisson et du petit enfant Session spéciale pour les anciens participants aux Cours de Pédiatrie sociale du CIE, 13.4–1.5.1970; 1 CIDEF 233: Problèmes sanitaires et sociaux de l'écolier et de l'adolescent,

Session spéciale pour les anciens participants aux cours de Pédiatrie sociale du CIE, 28.5–17.6; 1 CIDEF 235: Problèmes sanitaires et sociaux de l'écolier et de l'adolescent. Session spéciale pour les anciens participants aux Cours de Pédiatrie sociale du CIE, 28.5–17.6.1970.

45 Michel Christian, Sandrine Kott and Ondřej Matějka, "International Organizations in the Cold War: The Circulation of Experts beyond the East-West Divide," *Studia Territorialia*, no. 1 (2017): 35–60.

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47 1 CIDEF 14: Rapports d'activitié's 1968: Rapport présenté par le Directeur général à réunion du conseil d'administration, Paris, 7–8.3, 1969.

48 Ibid., 318–24.

49 This is the central argument developed by Pearson, *The Colonial Politics of Global Health*.

50 Ibid., 140.

51 "Le Centre international de l'enfance et le développement de l'éducation préscolaire au Bénin: expérimentation et limites (années 1970–1980)," in Pierre Guidi, Jean-Luc Martineau, and Florence Wenzek (eds.), *L'École en mutation: politiques et dynamiques scolaires en Afrique (années 1940–1980)*, 23–49 (Toulouse: Presses universitaires du Midi, 2024).

52 Debré, *L'Honneur de vivre*, 319.

53 I thank José Aguilar López-Barajas and Annina Gagyova for those indications about languages.

54 1 CIDEF 308*: Cours de pédiatrie sociale. Voyage d'étude en Tchécoslovaquie (10 mai–4 juin 1957)*.

55 See 1 CIDEF 324, "Cours Bulgarie," entirely typewritten in French.

56 1 CIDEF 384: Compte rendu de la réunion annuelle des équipes chargées des études sur la croissance et le développement de l'enfant normal Paris, 1964, 120.

57 Ibid.

58 1 CIDEF 13: Rapport présenté par le Directeur Général à la réunion du Conseil d'Administration tenue à Paris les 30 et 31 mai 1960, 48–9.

59 1 CIDEF 237: Rapport d'évaluation de l'enseignement du Centre international de l'enfance pendant la période 1961–1970, 1ère partie, Rapport préliminaire.

60 Ibid.

61 1 CIDEF 13: Rapport présenté par le Directeur Général, 49

62 Ibid.

63 1 CIDEF 434: Some note on middle-term planning for the benefit of APEE, mai 1983, 2.

64 1 CIDEF 104: Constitution, 1970.

65 1 CIDEF 434: Some note on middle-term planning for the benefit of APEE, mai 1983, 4

66 Ibid., 2.

67 I CIDE 100: Accord de collaboration, 29.7.1989.

68 1 CIDEF 45 Direction scientifique: Relations avec l'Institut national de la mère et de l'enfant en Pologne, 1979–1991.

69 1 CIDEF 565: Mission d'évaluation des besoins de formation professionnelle des médecins en Tchécoslovaquie sur "la mère et l'enfant," 1990, 15.

70 Niget and Martin, "Entretien avec Michel Manciaux," 84.

Chapter 9

Student Internationalism in the Global Cold War: The Foundation and Split of the International Union of Students

Matthieu Gillabert, Lidia Lesnykh, and Mikuláš Pešta*

Introduction

In November 1945, a young medical student named Tom Madden arrived at Victoria Station in London. He got his typhus vaccination and boarded the train with a group of other British students to go to the first postwar student congress in Prague, on the initiative of the National Union of Students in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Since 1944, this latter organization had been responsible for federating the national unions of the Allied countries to create a new, large international student organization.[1] Madden himself almost did not go; he was a last-minute replacement for another student leader who was refused a leave of absence because of the upcoming final exams. The delegation was headed to Czechoslovakia, arriving after a four-and-a-half-day journey through war-torn Europe.[2] The congress in Prague was a massive gathering of students strongly marked by their war experience. In their victorious, anti-fascist enthusiasm, they looked to the future and reconstruction. During the congress it was decided to build a new student organization to replace the interwar and wartime student federations, and an international preparatory committee was established. Tom Madden was there again as chairman of the International Preparatory Committee; such was his commitment to the cause that he ran for the general secretary of the new "universal" student federation. He stayed in Prague for five years heading the newly established International Union of Students (IUS). At the height of the Cold War in the early 1950s, he had to leave Prague as his home student union

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withdrew from the IUS; only after the death of Stalin did the student unions from the East and West carefully start to come into contact again.

The postwar era was characterized by a growing number of international organizations, both intergovernmental and nongovernmental.[3] Based on a broad anti-fascist paradigm,[4] many new international organizations emerged to unite and support different professional, gender, class, or interest groups. These organizations often defended internationalism with a universal vocation.[5] Nevertheless, many of them were soon thereafter marked by the Cold War divisions; some, including organizations as high profile as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), were boycotted by the Soviet Union during Stalinist times for allegedly serving Western interests. Similarly, the West was gradually adopting a critical position toward the socialist-oriented international organizations,[6] up to the point that most of them left. As a result, there were often two versions among the specialized and sectoral organizations, one in the "East" and one in the "West." In the image painted in the West, the "Eastern" organizations were labeled as "Soviet fronts," their representatives directly as communists or at least "fellow travellers."[7]

The International Union of Students (IUS) was one of the most significant postwar organizations in the field of education—as such, it has drawn the attention of scholars before. Most scholarship, however, was articulated during the Cold War, which limits the interpretative framework.[8] The most notable scholarly archive-based contribution to the IUS's historiography was written by Belgian historian Joël Kotek, whose view, however, stems from traditional Cold War narratives and focuses the history mainly on the role of power politics and secret services.[9] Approaching the IUS as an international nongovernmental organization with global networking and not only as a propagandist tool allows us refocus on student internationalism, the students' daily needs and the articulation between the Cold War context and the global scope of the IUS's activities.

We attempt to establish a basis for new perspectives on postwar international organizations and student internationalism beyond the emphasis on the Cold War dichotomies. In this chapter, we look at the raison d'être of the IUS and its strategies for self-legitimization. By this term, we understand the tools the IUS employed to establish itself as a respected, universal organization defending student rights, but also a broader "symbolic world" that formed the ideas, language, and self-conception of the IUS. These coincided to some extent with the symbolic world of the state-socialist countries, but not entirely and not in all cases.

When we envisage the IUS as an actor, we usually mean its official stances represented in publications and actions performed by its elected bodies and general congresses, bearing in mind that the IUS was a federation of diverse national unions with different levels of representativeness and unity among its ranks. The documents of the IUS archival collection in the Czech National Archives in Prague and the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, allow us to nuance the positions of the organization. In a more limited way, they help us understand the internal interactions. We also draw from the archive of the *Cité des mémoires étudiantes* in Paris-Aubervilliers, most notably from its collection

of the IUS first general secretary Tom Madden's personal documentation. These recollections, conceived mainly as a counter-argument to Joël Kotek's account on the history of the early Cold War student internationals, also became important for our interpretation.[10]

While the IUS existed throughout the Cold War and beyond and continued to play a significant role in the circulation of information and in the formation of networks on a global scale, we focus here primarily on the first postwar years. During these times of the high Cold War and Stalinism, we can observe best the emerging division of the student movement, the struggles for legitimacy, and the efforts to maintain the IUS's universalist character. The person of Tom Madden represents these bridge building efforts here—even though they were ultimately unsuccessful in the sense that they could not prevent the split, we look at the work in the field of expertise and the organization of student life to see the functioning of the IUS beyond the Cold War conflict.

The IUS and its Functioning

Established in 1946, the International Union of Students was meant to become the universal representative federation of national student unions. In accordance with the IUS Constitution and the legacy of the International Student Confederation active between the wars, one national student union was supposed to represent the students of each country.[11] In the beginning, the IUS was composed mainly of student organizations from European countries with other delegates from North and South America. The first World Student Congress, held in Prague in 1946, was attended by delegates from thirty-eight countries, out of which only five were from Africa or Asia (China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mongolia).[12] Only throughout the 1950s with the continuing decolonization, did the organization enlist more unions from Asia and Africa. The member organizations' contributions also made up most of the budget.

The superior organ was the World Student Congress, first held in Prague in 1946 and then at least once every three years. The IUS Council and Executive Committee met once and twice a year, respectively. The secretariat ran day-to-day operations. Like many other organizations, the IUS, too, had a dual leadership, composed of the president (with vice presidents) and the general secretary (with secretaries). At first, the officials were really students, but soon it was deemed more practical for them to be young graduates, as the jobs were demanding. For almost the whole history of the IUS, the presidency was held by the student union of the host country of Czechoslovakia, with Josef Grohman elected as the first president. One of the vice president posts was assigned to the students of the United States who nominated Bill Ellis as their representative; the US National Student Association, established in 1947, however, chose not to affiliate with the IUS at its first convention in Madison because of fears of communist influence, and Ellis' position became peculiar.[13]

Prague was selected to host the secretariat in commemorating the brutal Nazi shutdown of Czech universities in November 1939, which gave grounds to establishing International Student Day on November 17th during the war. There was a discussion about whether the secretariat should sit in Paris to continue in the tradition of the interwar International Student Confederation, built as a liberal organization associated with the League of Nations.[14] However, Paris was already hosting the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), established in November 1945 as an organization with a broader agenda than the IUS (not only students but the whole youth) and which was more socialist-oriented from the start. While Joël Kotek claimed that the Soviets imposed the choice of Prague, Tom Madden argued against this statement. According to him, Prague was considered a city with a long democratic tradition, with the prospect of being a bridge between the East and West, especially with the legacy of November 17th.[15] The Prague team provided the impetus in the early years. As Madden notes, it received few directives but was highly dependent on the national unions to reach the student world.[16] Some of the national unions aspired to take part in a vast international movement, but they also had their own agenda, including in their relations with each other. For example, at the Fourth Congress in 1956, the Danish union wanted to develop exchanges with other partners, without going through Prague.[17]

The IUS engaged in a wide array of activities from the very start. Influenced by the organizational chart of any socialist-leaning organization, the IUS comprised several departments supervised by a committee. A heavy task that the IUS took on was also the World Festival of Youth and Students, held for the first time in Prague in 1947 and then once every two years touring the capital cities of the socialist world up until 1957 when the efforts culminated in a mega-event that was the Festival in Moscow.[18] However, the event's principal partner and main organizer was the WFDY.

The constitution was not easily drafted, as Tom Madden recalled. In the emerging discord between the Soviet Union and the United States, the student representatives argued about every line of the text.[19] Karen Paget described how the US delegates were mandated to obstruct the constitution committee, while the Soviets' approach was more subtle; the delegates were supposed to encourage a British draft, should it be similar to theirs.[20]

Legitimacy Problems and the Emerging Cold War

In a context marked by the material and moral trauma of war, as well as by the need for reconstruction, the challenge for international organizations was to defend universal values incompatible with war. The IUS's basic ideology and source of legitimacy were anti-fascism, around which the organization constructed its whole mythology—the IUS Constitution's Preamble reminded that the organization was founded to follow "the example of the best of us who died in the fight of the democratic people for liberty."[21] The student resistance and exile alliances were

built on an anti-fascist popular front blueprint. The IUS drew its continuity from the wartime student organizations (such as the International Student Council in London). It started to celebrate November 17th as International Student Day, which later became one of the symbolic dates for the IUS.[22] Many leaders based their personal legitimacy on the war exploits or suffering inflicted by Nazism. Over fifty years after the events, Tom Madden almost systematically characterized former student officials by their wartime past. Josef Grohman, the first IUS president, joined the Resistance and was imprisoned in a concentration camp, just like the influential French delegate Pierre Rostini. Freek Driessen, a Dachau camp survivor, was responsible for the design of the first IUS publications.[23]

The aspiration of students to renew student internationalism, to transform the role of students in society, and to insert them fully in the reconstruction was widely shared. All anti-fascist student forces were welcome, recalling not only wartime alliances but also the interwar anti-fascist internationalism going back to the Spanish Civil War. Anti-fascism was interpreted as an inherently democratic, peaceful current and democracy as an inherently socialist characteristic.[24] However, this universalist discourse was gradually captured by the organization, which linked it to philocommunist propaganda. Another such element of the IUS discourse was friendship—a classic concept for communist representation of international relations in socialist circles and an important value within the student social milieu. Beyond words, friendship went through the organization of exchanges and a reinforcement of the circulation of students during international meetings and even festivals. Nevertheless, the IUS had several weaknesses that limited its ability to establish itself as a globally representative organization of the student cause in the first postwar years.

With international tensions rising over the years 1946–48, the Cold War impacted the IUS, too. The organization was always essentially pro-socialist in a broad sense of the word, as much as a diverse federation comprised of member unions from all over the world can be. Initially, the national student unions decided to create the IUS in order to have a more representative organization than the World Federation of Democratic Youth, which was considered pro-Soviet from the beginning.[25] Progressively, however, the IUS leadership also tended to adopt Soviet stances in most international disputes of the time; the most flagrant evidence of subordination came with the excommunication of the Yugoslav student union from the IUS after the Stalin–Tito split.[26]

A second weakness of the organization was the young age and lack of experience from national student unions; they did not have well-developed international networks. Another problem connected to student status was that the organization's officials could only stay for a relatively short time—the time of their studies. This was later partially resolved by the socialist countries who nominated people to executive functions at the IUS only after they graduated and let them stay for up to ten years.

Thirdly, the financial means of the organization, largely dependent on the contributions of the national unions, were limited—compared to other

better-endowed organizations like the World University Service or the International Student Service based in Geneva. The visibility acquired thanks to its collaboration with the World Federation of Democratic Youth to organize the World Festivals of Youth and Students masked these difficulties.[27]

Finally, the IUS struggled to be recognized as the universal student organization. This became particularly visible in negotiations with UNESCO, the affiliation to which was seen by the IUS as a source of legitimacy. However, the IUS competed with other organizations, particularly religious ones.[28] André de Blonay, who was in charge of student affairs at UNESCO, envisaged a committee dealing with various student organizations. This was unacceptable to the IUS, which, as an umbrella organization, saw no need for such an intermediary committee between UNESCO and the organizations, but UNESCO did not comply.[29] The galaxy of student organizations was complex, and here too we must beware of viewing this nexus solely through the prism of the Cold War divide. By playing the card of universal representativeness, the IUS tried to distinguish itself from faith-based organizations (Pax Romana, World Student Christian Federation). However, the Cold War polarization problematized the IUS in this role and even led to the creation of a competing organization. While the executive committee aligned itself more and more precisely with the Moscow line, the Western student unions expressed their discontent with the IUS's course. Eventually, most of them left the organization to start their own union, the International Student Conference (ISC) in 1950, with the coordinating secretariat seated in Leiden since 1952. Until 1967, when the ISC dissolved after an international scandal revealing the organization's funding by the CIA, the two student federations competed, often plotted against each other and sometimes collaborated.

The secession from the IUS challenged its universalist claims. Some of the most influential unions had left and the ISC kept mockingly reminding of the IUS's problems with representation; in some cases, the IUS member union represented only minor, partisan factions of their countries' studentship after the split of the student movement.[30] In order to defend its legitimacy, the IUS stuck to its rhetoric promoting anti-fascism, peace, democracy, and decolonization. In addition, cooperation with universally recognized international organizations, and UNESCO in particular, was supposed to contribute to the IUS's image.

Despite this marginalization and inherent weaknesses, the IUS continued to exist, sporadically moving beyond the ideological framework of the Cold War. But even despite the Cold War division in 1948, it took some of the Western unions up to three more years to finally abandon the idea of a universalist organization and to disaffiliate. Their delegates continued to work in the secretariat to preserve the universalist principles. Madden himself as the general secretary claimed not to have represented only the British students, but all students, and insisted that the decisions were his own until he resigned.[31] Two areas of activity in particular allowed the IUS to acquire a stature going beyond the socialist bloc: the support of daily student needs and the concern for students from the colonial world.

Tourism, Sport, and Daily Student Needs

Although it might be tempting to interpret the history of the IUS mainly in the framing of the Cold War dichotomies and political struggles, it is necessary to focus on the efforts the IUS made to promote solidarity between students, support their interests and daily needs, as well as grant them access to quality leisure. There were few explicit references to the class struggle in the IUS's published production, as the organization tended to call for reconstruction, international peace, and friendship between peoples.

For the student community, reconstruction meant developing student housing and improving sanitary conditions, which was a vital necessity. On the one hand, the IUS was a platform for discussion, seminars, and circulation of student housing models and education reforms. The secretariat made a constant effort to gather documentation from the national unions, to find out about the varying situations of students, and mobilizing local partners. The French participants had a major influence, inspired by the student unionism born of the Grenoble Charter in 1946. Called "Declaration of Students' rights and responsibilities," this document defined students as "young intellectual workers"—or in other words as a specific social group.[32] This mobilization of local organizations also led to solidarity actions with the "Global South." The IUS offered scholarship programs to study at universities that were part of the program, i.e., mostly Eastern bloc countries and organized fund-raising campaigns via *World Student News*. In order to fight against tuberculosis—a disease considered the most widespread in this environment—the IUS created new student sanatoria in Czechoslovakia and China and supported the work of the already existing ones in France and Switzerland.

This social action of the IUS translated into an important activism to develop an "international student card" that would allow multiple discounts on transportation and cultural institutions. This strategy of uniting the student world through access to tourism is not new; the IUS's interwar predecessor International Student Confederation had already created an international card in the late 1920s, also in the face of recalcitrant railway companies.[33] A student travel office was even set up by the IUS, which tried to facilitate travel by reducing or waiving visas. This office would also be a new source of income besides the membership fees.[34] It negotiated with transport companies, some of which refused to grant discounts, as in Belgium and Norway. The IUS saw the potential for direct international recognition by students in this card:

> It is clear that if the card will give to the bearer the facilities expected, it will be perhaps better propaganda for the IUS than anything else.[35]

General secretary Madden regretted that some of the national unions hindered direct contact between the executive committee and the students themselves. The international card, according to him, was one of the ways for the IUS to get

closer to the student base.[36] Therefore, all national member unions were called upon to approach hostels, transport companies, and various cultural institutions to offer capacities and discounts for traveling students in many countries. With the secession of the Western member unions, however, the scope of the card's benefits was largely limited to socialist countries.

Physical education and sport were among the domains of activity privileged by the IUS from its foundation and maintained until 1991. At the World Student Congress in Prague in 1946, a special commission dedicated to sport gathered to elaborate "a sports doctrine to conform with the general aims of [the IUS]."[37] In Europe, morally and physically devastated by the war, developing mass sport as a form of socialization and healthy leisure was the first step in improving students' living conditions. Physical education, considered part of the harmonious development of youth, had particular importance in the academic environment. In addition to this social and hygienic dimension, sports exchanges were one of the ways of establishing cooperation with national student organizations and sports associations overseeing sports activities on different scales. The IUS attributed the central role to the organization of World University Games, an international multi-sport event, which represented a crucial cultural heritage of pre-war internationalism. Since the first postwar edition of the Games hosted in Paris in 1947, the IUS benefited from a supposedly apolitical character of sport, demonstrating its desire to build bridges between students.

However, it was crucial for the IUS leadership to establish political control over sports on the institutional level. The Physical Education and Sport Department (PESD) was founded in August 1947 to set up its headquarters in Prague under the leadership of Jaroslav Šilhavý, the future head of the secretariat of the Ministry of Interior in 1968. The limited involvement of Western Europeans, despite their expertise in international sports administration, seemingly illogical, made it clear that student sport would be used for ideological ends.[38] It was unclear how the IUS could set up large-scale events without the aid of experienced Western sports leaders who started expressing concerns about the situation.[39] Incomprehension and conflict of interests reinforced by the emerging Cold War tensions and the deterioration of the relationships between the major Western European national student unions with the IUS on a broader scale had an irreversible effect. In June 1949, a group of student sports leaders, most of them from small and neutral European countries (Luxembourg, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Monaco, Italy, and Austria) established the International University Sports Federation (FISU). Following this institutional split in sports, the ISC appeared more than one year later to counterbalance the IUS's action on a broader scale.

The IUS included the 1949 and 1951 World University Summer Games in the World Festival of Youth and Students in Budapest and Berlin. The loss of the IUS's monopoly on student sport since 1949 meant that the competitions were now almost wholly deprived of the participation of the Western teams. It was crucial for Prague to maintain the prestige of the World University Games, diversify its sports offer, and attract participants from other continents. In parallel, the IUS did not resign in its struggle for total control of university sports, covering its intentions by the abundant discourse of unity. Even during the Second World Student Congress

in Prague in 1950, a sports tournament was organized to emphasize the efforts made by the IUS to spread mass sport and, thereby, student friendship. As the IUS integrated its peace and friendship rhetoric into sports, its executive committee gathered in Budapest in March 1952 noted in the resolutions that

> the development of culture and sport relations among students and their organisations in different countries [was] an important means of strengthening friendship and mutual understanding among students and thereby a contribution to the cause of peace among nations.[40]

The program of sporting activities for 1952 highlighted the IUS's ambition to expand its presence through sporting exchanges outside Europe.[41] To promote mass sport and, probably, to advertise itself in other regions, the organization introduced a sports badge and diversified its program. Interestingly, an international chess tournament launched in 1952 on the suggestion of British students would be organized almost in all parts of the world during the following forty years. Finally, another regular activity created in 1948 and organized during university holidays was winter camps, which allowed students to practice alpine skiing almost for free. While the camps proposed compulsory cultural and social activities (musical, dancing, cinema evenings, etc.), staying in direct contact with nature helped improve students' health. Finally, sharing the same space for one week fostered friendly connections between students having different social and geographical origins, political sights, domain of studies, and levels of sport performance.

Decolonization and the IUS as the Global Organization

European colonial empires became one of the most frequent objects of criticism by socialist countries after the Second World War. It was the support of the anti-colonial struggle that won over the sympathies of many newly decolonized countries of the Soviet model of development and that also enabled broader anti-colonial alliances with the anti-imperialist opposition in Western Europe. Alongside anti-fascism, anti-colonialism was seen as another universal value and in fact a part of the same struggle. Tom Madden also observed the similarities of the anti-colonial and anti-fascist experiences: "Those emerging from the Resistance in areas of Nazi and Fascist occupation would find themselves sitting down with students seeking freedom from colonialism and dependency, demands which were at the time universal."[42]

The anti-colonialism was a part of the IUS's genetic information since the beginning, well before the Khrushchevian turn of the Soviet policy towards the "Third World"—and in Madden's words, "a part of the post-war *zeitgeist*."[43] As early as 1947, the IUS established a permanent body that was supposed to deal with colonial matters—the Bureau of Students Fighting against Colonialism, having a specialized agenda and publishing its bulletin *Students against Colonialism*. The organization was trying to reach out directly to the student organizations in the colonial and dependent countries, facilitate access to education, promote literacy

campaigns, and address other educational issues in the colonial world.[44] In a 2002 letter to Madden, a former member of the Bureau and British student activist Carmel Brickman Budiardjo complained that in the late 1940s the Bureau was far more radically anti-imperialist than the secretariat, and its initiatives were toned down because more moderate stances of the Western member unions had to be still taken into consideration.[45]

Despite the Bureau's dissatisfaction, with the growing breach with the West, the IUS as a whole was increasingly anti-colonial. Delegates from the colonies' national liberation movements were invited to the IUS's gatherings and activities. Representatives of student movements from Iraq, Egypt, Vietnam, India, Madagascar, and Iran spoke at congresses and council meetings, presenting education-related problems of their countries (literacy, state of universities, student movement) as well as the liberation struggles.[46] Moreover, as in the case of Vimla Dang from India, they also visited schools in Czechoslovakia to explain their political situation to children.[47] In the opposite direction, IUS secretariat members sometimes engaged in anti-colonial activism in the colonies—for example, the above-mentioned Carmel Brickman Budiardjo who took part in the liberation struggle in Indonesia.[48]

In the late 1940s, the IUS focused on the anti-colonial struggle in South-East Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Indochina, and India. The situation in the Middle East and North Africa was also carefully monitored; Egypt was represented in the executive committee from the beginning[49] and the events and conditions in Algeria, Iraq, and Palestine were discussed thoroughly. The decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa did not start until the late 1950s, but delegates from African student unions attended already the second IUS Congress in 1950—representatives from Madagascar, Nigeria, South Africa, and the West Africa Student Union presented their issues.[50]

To Brickman Budiardjo's accusation of not being anti-imperialist enough, Madden responded with the argument of representativeness. Before most Western student unions left the IUS, their voice had to be heard, should universal representation be claimed. Decolonization created new divides. At the executive committee meeting in January 1948, Pierre Trouvat called for a more moderate stance toward the colonizing countries, as he felt that "many students who disagree with the IUS on questions like Vietnam or Indonesia still wish to work for peace." Trouvat clashed on this with Indian Vimla Bakaya, who argued that it was impossible to be indifferent to these questions, and "if the IUS is to stand by its Constitution, it must take a firm stand."[51] Even though Western students were often opposed to colonialism, they were more reluctant to criticize their governments' policies openly. At times, they hid their unwillingness to commit to anti-colonial campaigns under the principle of "students as such," meaning that the IUS should remain apolitical and stick to strictly student matters—like the Norwegian student union, which decided not to condemn the Dutch military intervention in Indonesia in 1948 to stay apolitical.[52]

Even though the anti-colonial rhetoric was to a certain extent honest and authentic, it was also instrumentalized to criticize the Western European colonial powers and to divert attention from their own problems. In this interpretation, it was the Western unions that were culpable for the split for defending controversial policies of their governments and not the Eastern European delegations for abiding to the USSR in the Yugoslav or Czechoslovak crises. Linking the issues of colonialism and racism also provided ammunition to target the United States. Criticism of racist realities in the United States was further legitimized by the presence of prominent anti-racist thinkers from the West at the IUS congresses, such as W.E.B. Du Bois in 1950.[53]

Action in this new "Third World" was also aimed at limiting the influence of the International Student Service, which was based in Geneva and had become much stronger during the war. The means used were missions mainly to East Asia in the late 1940s by members of the Prague direction team. Several dozen scholarships were also awarded, either directly by the IUS, which was experiencing financial difficulties at the time or by national unions in socialist Europe, via the IUS.

Conclusion

The president Tom Madden wanted the IUS to be a bridge between the East and the West—just as Czechoslovakia was supposed to be. He admitted that his efforts ultimately failed, but not because the IUS was doomed from the start—according to him, it rather fell victim to Cold Warriors on both sides.

This chapter goes beyond a conventional understanding of the IUS as a purely propaganda organization in the postwar student world. A focus on the people who made up the first committees and on the concrete actions of this socialist-oriented organization shows that, in the aftermath of the war, the conditions were favorable for creating a more universal movement, with an "engagement of a limited democratic process."[54] With the onset of the Cold War, it clearly appears that the East–West conflict undermined this aspiration for unity, but in certain areas, trans-bloc solidarity and uninterrupted exchanges between different organizations were still emerging at the turn of the 1950s. In this specific context, international student organizations have sought their legitimacy in their ability to bring people together across ideological divides. In the case of the IUS, this has been a partial failure, but no other student organization has managed to supplant it.

The Cold War undoubtedly formed the history of the IUS. The organization became strongly attached to the Soviet orbit and adopted pro-Soviet positions on all important international matters. The ongoing Cold War division marked even such issues as student sports or tourism. And yet, from scholarship schemes to literacy campaigns in the Third World to treatment in sanatoria, the IUS actively helped the students as a transnational social group.

Notes

1 Joël Kotek, *La Jeune Garde: La jeunesse entre KGB et CIA (1917–1989)* (Paris: Seuil, 1998), 133.
2 Interview with Tom Madden by Mikuláš Pešta, December 9, 2021, online Prague-Chicago.
3 Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002).
4 See the contribution of Sandrine Kott in this volume.
5 Sandrine Kott, "Cold War Internationalism," in Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin (eds.), *Internationalisms: A Twentieth-Century History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
6 Among these organizations are often listed the World Federation of Democratic Youth, World Peace Council, Women's International Democratic Federation, International Union of Students, and others.
7 In 1978, for the CIA, the IUS was one of the eleven front organizations serving Soviet propaganda. See CIA's study on Soviet propaganda following the hearings "The CIA and the Media," July 7, 1978, Central Intelligence Agency, box 4, folder 1, Blackwell Files, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Digital Library Collection, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/135840735 (accessed August 10, 2023).
8 Philip G. Altbach, *The Student Internationals: An Analysis of International and Regional Student Organizations* (Madison: University of Wisconsin and Washington DC: Office of Education, 1970); John Jay Barr, "Communist International Front Organizations: An Analysis of the International Union of Students" (MA diss., University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1965); Witold Nawrocki and Leszek Kamiński, *Za lepszy świat, za lepszy uniwersytet. Szkice z dziejów Miedzynarodowego Zwiazku Studentów* (Warszawa: Młodziezowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1985).
9 Joël Kotek, *Students and the Cold War* (London: Macmillan, 1996).
10 For the complex account of Tom Madden's interpretation, see Tom Madden's Unpublished Memoirs on the History of the IUS, written in Chicago, 2004, box Recueils—Tom Madden, Cité des mémoires étudiantes, Aubervilliers.
11 Constitution of the IUS, Materials on Creating it, 1946, f. Mezinárodní svaz studentstva, box 35, file 578, National Archive of the Czech Republic (hereafter cited as NAČR), Prague.
12 Lists of participants, delegates, and student organizations at the World Student Congress Prague, 1946, f. Mezinárodní svaz studentstva, box 35, file 577, NAČR, Prague.
13 Karen M. Paget, *Patriotic Betrayal: The Inside Story of the CIA's Secret Campaign to Enroll American Students in the Crusade against Communism* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2015), 59.
14 Daniel Laqua, "Activism in the 'Students' League of Nations': International Student Politics and the Confédération Internationale des Étudiants, 1919–1939," *The English Historical Review* 132, no. 556 (2017): 605–37.
15 Tom Madden said that he himself preferred Paris at the time. Tom Madden's Unpublished Memoirs on the History of the IUS, Cité des mémoires étudiantes, 40–42.

Kotek argued that the choice of Prague was a result of the Soviets' machinations. See Kotek, *Students and the Cold War*, 93–4.

16 Tom Madden's Unpublished Memoirs on the History of the IUS, Cité des mémoires étudiantes, 13.

17 Hans Dall's letter to IUS, Copenhagen, June 15, 1956, IUS collection, International Institute of Social History (hereafter cited IISH), Amsterdam, 10–14.

18 After Moscow, the festivals were organized not so regularly anymore, with also neutral European cities and Third World capitals as hosts. Pia Koivunen, *Performing Peace and Friendship: The World Youth Festivals and Soviet Cultural Diplomacy* (Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2023).

19 Interview with Tom Madden by Mikuláš Pešta, December 9, 2021, online Prague-Chicago.

20 Paget, *Patriotic Betrayal*, 5; CK VLKSM to CK VKPb, January 30, 1946, Department of Foreign Policy, f. 17, op. 128, d. 71, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (hereafter cited RGASPI), Moscow.

21 Constitution of the IUS, Materials on Creating it, 1946, f. Mezinárodní svaz studentstva, box 35, file 578, NAČR, Prague.

22 Mikuláš Pešta, "Polozapomenutý Listopad. Mezinárodní den studentstva a jeho překrývaná pamě," *Paměť a dějiny* 15, no. 3 (2021): 90–100.

23 Tom Madden's Unpublished Memoirs on the History of the IUS, Cité des mémoires étudiantes, 8.

24 See for example Letter on April 14, Day of international solidarity with anti-fascist youth and students of Spain fighting against Franco tyranny, February 1950, f. Mezinárodní svaz studentstva, box 31, file 529, NAČR, Prague.

25 Robi Morder, "D'une génération à l'autre: internationales et Internationalismes en témoignage," in Robi Morder and Caroline Rolland-Diamond (eds.), *Etudiant(e)s du monde en mouvement* (Paris: Syllepse, 2012), 152.

26 The IUS and the People's Students Youth of Yugoslavia, 1950, f. Mezinárodní svaz studentstva, box 127, file 2135, NAČR, Prague.

27 Executive Committee minutes, January 1948, f. Mezinárodní svaz studentstva, box 8, file 173, NAČR, Prague.

28 Acebez and Trouvat report on UNESCO conference, February 6, 1947, f. Mezinárodní svaz studentstva, box 6, file 141, NAČR, Prague.

29 Circular from Kuo UNESCO's Education Section, February 26, 1948, 378.18 A 01 ACISO, UNESCO Archive, Paris.

30 A fact constantly brought up and even ridiculed by Western critics. See for example Analysis of Membership in the International Union of Students, British National Union of Students, 1953, IUS collection, IISH, Amsterdam, 134–44.

31 Tom Madden's Unpublished Memoirs on the History of the IUS**,** Cité des mémoires étudiantes, 5, 11.

32 In French, "Déclaration des droits et devoirs des étudiants," adopted at the 35th Congress of the National Union of Students of France, Grenoble, 1946.

33 Margaret Black's letter, October 7, 1938, R4263/9A/32268/32268, League of Nations Archive, Geneva. Daniel Laqua, "Student Activists and International Cooperation in a Changing World, 1919–60," in Jessica Reinisch and David Brydan (eds.), *Internationalists in European History* (London: Bloomsbury, 2021), 165.

34 Resolution of the Commission of Central Travel and Exchange Department, August 6, 1947, f. Mezinárodní svaz studentstva, box 2, file 12, NAČR, Prague.

35 Report of the Central Travel and Exchange Department, May 1948, f. Mezinárodní svaz studentstva, box 10, file 200, NAČR, Prague.
36 Other means were for example the IUS publications such as the *World Student News* journal or poster campaigns.
37 Organisation and coordination of student activities, 1946, 1–9 (IUS Congress), IUS collection, IISH, Amsterdam.
38 A detailed analysis on the IUS sports policies is provided in Lidia Lesnykh, "Le Sport universitaire international au défi de l'autonomie (1919–1961)" (PhD diss., University of Lausanne, Lausanne, 2021).
39 Report to the IUS Executive, March 1948, f. 17, op. 128, d. 430, RGASPI, Moscow.
40 Reports and Resolutions. International Union of Students Executive Meeting, March 1952, Executive Committee Meetings, IUS Collection, IIHS, Amsterdam, 95.
41 IUS cultural exchange, faculty, and sports program for understanding, friendship and peace, 1952, Executive Committee Meetings, IUS Collection, IIHS, Amsterdam, 95.
42 Tom Madden's Unpublished Memoirs on the History of the IUS**,** Cité des mémoires étudiantes, 185.
43 Ibid., 45.
44 Report of the Colonial Bureau + other papers on Problems of the Colonial World, December 1, 1947, f. Mezinárodní svaz studentstva, box 8, file 172, NAČR, Prague.
45 Tom Madden's Unpublished Memoirs on the History of the IUS**,** Cité des mémoires étudiantes, 45.
46 Speeches at the 2nd IUS Congress, f. Mezinárodní svaz studentstva, box 44, file 683-700, NAČR, Prague.
47 Vimla Dang, *Fragments of an Autobiography* (Delhi: Kuknas, 2007).
48 Carmel Brickman was an English activist who married Indonesian student leader Suwondo Budiardjo. She spent years in Indonesia fighting for liberation and democratization. After Suharto's coup, she was imprisoned for three years. Carmel Budiardjo, *Surviving Indonesia's Gulag: A Western Woman Tells Her Story* (London: Cassell, 1996).
49 Members of the EC, 1947, f. Mezinárodní svaz studentstva, box 6, file 142, NAČR, Prague.
50 2nd IUS Congress, 1950, f. Mezinárodní svaz studentstva, box 44, file 683–690, NAČR, Prague.
51 Executive Committee minutes, January 1948, f. Mezinárodní svaz studentstva, box 8, file 173, NAČR, Prague.
52 See for example Report of the Colonial Bureau of the IUS, f. Mezinárodní svaz studentstva, box 9, file 190, NAČR, Prague.
53 2nd IUS Congress. Speech of Dr Du Bois on War and Colonies, August 21, 1950, f. Mezinárodní svaz studentstva, box 47, file 733, NAČR, Prague.
54 Morder, *Etudiant(e)s du monde en mouvement*, 156.

Chapter 10

Cold War Form, International Content?: The Martsinovskii Institute, the World Health Organization, and the Wider Networks of International Malariology, 1950s–1980s

Marek Eby

From the late 1950s, the World Health Organization (WHO) served as a stage for superpower conflicts over scientific authority and Third World influence. It also created connections that transcended these Cold War logics, fostering "a global network of scientists, physicians, and health policy makers" spanning the Iron Curtain.[1] Medical experts from state-socialist countries played important roles in both the competitive and cooperative sides of the WHO. Whether from inside or outside the organization, they frequently leveled critiques of its policies that reflected the political stakes and ideological divergences of the Cold War. At the same time, their presence served as a bridge between socialist and international networks, carrying WHO ideas and practices beyond the reach of the organization itself. Ultimately, histories of state-socialist experts can demonstrate how deeply the structures of the Cold War shaped the work of international organizations, not only in terms of the political competition they hosted but also the cooperation and convergence they produced.

Scholarship on the WHO has recognized how its technical projects intersected with the political imperatives of the Cold War. Eradication campaigns aimed at malaria and smallpox in particular have been seen through a Cold War lens: the former as an example of geopolitical competition and the latter as one of "superpower collaboration" or even "legitimate international authority."[2] Recent scholarship has emphasized the complex and evolving nature of state-socialist engagement with the Western-led project of world health.[3] After participating in the founding of the WHO, most state-socialist countries left the organization in 1949–50 and remained absent for almost a decade. Dóra Vargha argues compellingly that these withdrawals were not a matter of pure geopolitics, but rather reflected divergent "expectations of the tasks and responsibilities of international health organizations." Vargha contrasts the WHO model of

seemingly neutral "technical assistance" with socialist visions of a true *politics* of world health—"international interventions addressing local needs, providing material and technical assistance," and couched in a language of rights and obligations.[4] In the 1950s, this alternative found expression outside the WHO, in multilateral socialist health projects in countries like North Korea and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.[5]

Differences in vision persisted after the return of state-socialist countries to the WHO in the late 1950s. The renewal of their participation occurred in the context of a turn toward the Third World in Soviet foreign policy, and was framed in terms of an anti-colonial political agenda to which different countries related in different ways.[6] Yet even as socialist experts continued to offer distinct perspectives, involvement in the WHO changed the nature of their international presence. Medical experts on both sides of the Iron Curtain shared a common scientific language, and similar modernist, developmentalist, and even civilizational assumptions.[7] By the 1970s and the era of Détente—and arguably even earlier—shared understandings produced spaces of "common ground" in the WHO.[8] The "socialist" and "international" domains of health tended to overlap and intermesh. State-socialist actors became vectors for the spread of international paradigms, while the WHO eventually adapted certain socialist approaches for its own programs (see Yi-Tang Lin in this volume).

In this chapter, I explore the international history of the E.I. Martsinovskii Institute of Medical Parasitology and Tropical Medicine, a Soviet research center in Moscow.[9] Founded in 1920, the institute played a central role in Soviet malaria control programs during the interwar period and developed substantial connections to the League of Nations Health Organisation. Through foreign encounters, the institute's experts articulated a self-consciously socialist vision of malariology, rejecting technocratic methods in favor of social-medical approaches embedded in the broader projects of (revolutionary) development and state-building. Although they disappeared from the international scene during the Second World War, the same experts re-emerged in the late 1950s, amid the WHO's Global Malaria Eradication Programme (1955–69).[10] They continued to contrast their "horizontal" vision of malariology with the "vertical" strategy of the WHO, based narrowly on indoor residual spraying of insecticides like dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT).

However, in the process of contesting international expertise, the Martsinovskii experts were slowly integrated into its networks and epistemic frameworks. In WHO scientific bodies, their positions reflected Cold War political imperatives and alternative socialist medical visions, but also underwent a slow convergence. Meanwhile, their travel and work between socialist and non-socialist contexts produced indirect networks and circulations that broadened the reach of the WHO in unexpected ways. Over time, the Martsinovskii Institute was embedded in the structures and projects of the WHO, becoming a quasi-international scientific space. This didn't mean that the divisions of the Cold War had somehow been overcome. Rather, it suggested the central role that Cold War structures played in constituting a domain of world health.

"Liquidation of the American Monopoly": The Soviet Politics of Malaria Eradication

The Martsinovskii experts' re-entry into the international sphere in the late 1950s was framed by politics. The WHO's Global Malaria Eradication Programme was largely devised by the United States. It blended a postwar faith in "self-contained technological solutions" with the American geopolitical imperative to "repel 'enslaving' Soviet influence via 'liberating wars' or 'crusades' against disease."[11] Soviet contributions to the project were a frank effort to counter US influence, yet they cannot be reduced to Cold War politics alone. While they often criticized the WHO's strategy, Soviet experts endorsed "the possibility and necessity of the liquidation of malaria in the whole world" and argued that they "[could] not but participate" in the drive to realize it.[12] Their criticism was aimed at the scientific and political frameworks of the WHO campaign, not its American backing. The Soviet position ultimately reflected the deeper ideological differences underlying the Cold War—yet the shared idiom of science offered a path to bridging the divide.

Cold War imperatives were clear in Soviet discussions of funding and material support for the malaria eradication campaign. Lobbying the Communist Party Central Committee for an increase in Soviet contributions in 1959, the Soviet Ministry of Health warned that US funding for the initiative already totaled at least $7–8 million. By contrast, the sole Soviet donation—1,000 tons of DDT—was valued at $82,000, a sum that failed to match even Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Ministry called for Soviet in-kind contributions worth "3–4 million rubles" over several years. This would allow the "liquidation of the American monopoly in deciding a whole range of questions in the work of the WHO." The Central Committee agreed, approving 1 million rubles in 1959 and further sums in later years.[13] To ensure the propaganda value of Soviet contributions, they required donated goods be of high quality and clearly labeled as Soviet in origin.[14]

Discussions of the role of Soviet experts and institutions were similarly political. Soviet officials complained that Western countries leveraged their "numerical predominance" in the WHO apparatus to send "brigades and detachments of specialists … to developing countries," spreading capitalist propaganda at the expense of the organization.[15] Worse, Western institutions dominated the WHO fellowship program, attracting students from decolonizing countries and teaching them "not only medical subjects, but also those like theology, sociology, psychology, economics, and more"—in short, "bourgeois ideology."[16] Only full Soviet participation in these programs could counter Western propaganda and properly influence the "worldview" of experts from developing countries.[17]

In fact, the WHO was eager to recruit Soviet specialists. This was clear when director-general Marcolino Candau visited Moscow in April 1956 to discuss Soviet re-entry into the organization. A Brazilian physician who had worked on the Rockefeller Foundation's pioneering disease control campaigns in the interwar period, Candau was a strong supporter of eradication schemes.[18] In Moscow, he

encouraged Soviet involvement in WHO programs and met Petr Grigor'evich Sergiev, director of the Martsinovskii Institute, impressing him with his "very considerable knowledge of parasitology."[19] This meeting apparently served as a catalyst for the development of further relations. Sergiev and other Soviet delegates participated in the WHO's Second Conference on Malaria Eradication in Southeast Europe in Belgrade in 1957. The WHO then nominated Soviet scientists (including Sergiev) to its Expert Committees and advisory bodies.[20] Beginning in 1960, Martsinovskii experts became regular participants in WHO scientific fora.

Soviet work in these settings was couched in the seemingly neutral languages of science and technology. This did not mean it was apolitical. Rather, the experts took their contributions as an occasion to promote "the achievements of Soviet science" and seek recognition for Soviet innovations.[21] Perhaps the most famous of these was the work of Tat'iana Sergeevna Detinova on the population biology of mosquitoes. Detinova was a longtime member of the Martsinovskii Institute. She had begun as a laboratory assistant in the Medical Entomology Department in the 1930s, before rising through the ranks and attaining leadership positions. Detinova had devised a method for determining the age composition of mosquito populations, building on a painstaking Soviet technique for determining the age of female mosquitoes through dissection. When this method was applied consistently and correctly, the resulting information could be used to gauge the effectiveness of vector control measures. For this reason, Detinova's work aroused intense interest from international malariologists. She was invited several times by the WHO to share her methods, teaching a course in London in 1959 and traveling to Africa in 1962.[22]

Few Western entomologists proved capable of learning Detinova's subtle techniques of dissection and observation, honed over decades of laboratory work. Some might have denied the validity of the method entirely, had not a single British expert—the entomologist T.J. Wilkes—mastered it.[23] The struggles of senior Western experts may have enhanced the pride of Soviet scientists, yet the apparent inapplicability of the Soviet technique in Western conditions pointed to deeper divergences between Soviet and Western approaches. These emerged more clearly in Soviet activities on WHO scientific bodies like the Malaria Expert Committee.

Beyond their patriotic posturing, Soviet experts pursued a genuine effort to reshape WHO malariology in their own image. Joined by colleagues from other state-socialist countries, they offered "critiques" aimed at addressing "the most obvious errors" in the "strategy and tactics of WHO malaria control."[24] Their main target was DDT. Against the undifferentiated strategy of DDT-spraying, Soviet experts promoted their own "complex" system of measures, which used careful epidemiological research to tailor measures to local conditions and generally combined DDT with mass case detection and treatment. This multifaceted approach was seen as part of a wider process of state-building and development, in which targeted medical interventions would be reinforced by rising health-system capacity and population welfare. The "horizontality" of the vision stood in contrast to the "vertical" WHO program and its bracketing of development. The distinction was clear in debates over mass case detection and treatment, measures de-emphasized in WHO policy and supported by Soviet experts for virtually the

same reason—because they required public health infrastructure.[25] WHO policy reflected a fusion of technocratic science and American geopolitics. Yet the Soviet alternative was not politically innocent, fitting within the promotion of a "non-capitalist path of development" for decolonizing countries.[26]

On the Malaria Expert Committees, convened to offer recommendations on scientific and policy questions, Soviet experts promoted this viewpoint clearly, although without overt political grandstanding. The 10th Malaria Expert Committee in 1963, devoted to "problem areas" where DDT alone failed to interrupt malaria transmission, was a perfect opportunity to apply the Soviet perspective. The Soviet expert at the meeting was Nataliia Nikolaevna Dukhanina, head of the Epidemiological Department of the Martsinovskii Institute and, as far as I can determine, the first woman to ever sit on a Malaria Expert Committee. Dukhanina was a senior Soviet malariologist with over thirty years' experience in health campaigns. Known for her work on the intricate epidemiology of *Plasmodium vivax* malaria, she was an ideal bearer for the message that complex epidemiological problems required comprehensive solutions.[27] She heartily endorsed proposals for detailed epidemiological research in "problem areas" and added a suggestion that mass case treatment should also be adopted (both standard Soviet practice). This would "enable the number of 'problem areas' to be reduced."[28] In effect, she implied—without actually saying—that the real "problem area" was the narrowness of the WHO strategy itself.

This position was also clear at the 11th Malaria Expert Committee in 1964, devoted to the role of entomology in malaria eradication. Tat'iana Detinova participated as a special consultant, providing valuable information on her mosquito age-grouping method and Soviet entomological training.[29] She also contributed to debates over WHO policy, proposing (among other items) that the program of detailed entomological research associated with the preparatory phase of eradication campaigns should be continued during later phases. This proposal reflected the well-established Soviet approach, yet Western experts doubted its feasibility, given the permanent expertise and infrastructure it would require. Their doubts arose from precisely what Detinova assumed—that development of permanent public health capacity would occur alongside eradication campaigns. In a revealing compromise, Detinova's proposal for thorough entomological research was adopted with one caveat: it would apply only "in places where it [was] possible."[30]

The Soviet campaign to reshape WHO malariology lasted until the mid-1960s when it ended, ostensibly, with a victory for the Soviet position. At the 12th Malaria Expert Committee in 1965 (notably chaired by Sergiev) mass treatment was adopted as a core measure in eradication campaigns, a shift Soviet experts took as a vindication of their overall approach.[31] More broadly, the WHO's slow turn toward "horizontal" health approaches, culminating in its embrace of primary healthcare at the Alma-Ata Conference in 1978, suggested that the organization had evolved in the Soviet direction.[32] In fact, Soviet ideas had long found support among certain WHO experts (for a similar case, see Michel Christian's chapter in this volume). Leonard Jan Bruce-Chwatt, head of Research and Technical Intelligence in the WHO Malaria Eradication Division, served for years as an informal facilitator for

Soviet experts. Born in Russian-ruled Poland and educated in St. Petersburg, he supported attempts to transmit "the magnificent effort of Soviet public health in the field of malariology" to the world.[33] By the end of the 1960s, Soviet experts felt that "many basic principles of the struggle against malaria in the USSR" were reflected in WHO policy.[34] Some even claimed that the "Soviet complex method" had become the official WHO strategy.[35]

But the Soviet victory—if it was such a thing—proved pyrrhic. The adoption of complex strategies heralded not a bold new approach for the Global Malaria Eradication Programme, but rather its demise. If the Soviet perspective no longer aroused opposition, this was partly because the political stakes were lower. US support for eradication as a Cold War measure was flagging by the mid-1960s. At the WHO, the goal of eradication was finally abandoned in 1969.[36] Still, the process helped to reconcile Soviet and Western views. The Soviet "victory" produced few meaningful changes in international health work, but it did serve to draw Soviet experts into the universe of the WHO. By the 1970s, the socioeconomic—if not revolutionary—implications of the original Soviet vision were little in evidence. Martsinovskii experts' international work was expressed in an increasingly technocratic mode. As in the later history of Chinese participation in UN specialized agencies, examined in Yi-Tang Lin's chapter in this volume, the international integration of socialist expertise came at the expense of its original *political* significance. It was not only the WHO that had changed.

Expert Networks: Interfacing Socialist and WHO Malariology

The activities of Martsinovskii experts were not confined to WHO Expert Committees and other official bodies. From the 1950s to the 1980s, they traveled to more than sixty countries, moving easily between the health networks of the WHO, the socialist bloc, and the decolonizing world.[37] These travels created informal networks and circulations of knowledge that linked disparate political contexts in surprising ways. By the early 1960s, Martsinovskii experts had carried WHO intellectual frameworks and practices far beyond the reach of the organization itself, globalizing malariology despite the blockages of Cold War politics. This effect was most evident in countries disconnected from the WHO at this time, like the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).

The Martsinovskii Institute's engagement with North Vietnam dated from the mid-1950s, before the Soviet Union returned to active participation in the WHO. Although Martsinovskii experts also launched projects in the People's Republic of China in the same period, relations with North Vietnam proved more enduring, involving technical assistance, significant material support, major training initiatives, and joint research. The Soviet program in the country was coordinated through the Martsinovskii Institute and overseen by Sergiev personally.[38] A series of Soviet teams led an effort that drew resources and personnel from several socialist countries (notably Romania and Czechoslovakia) and functioned at least partly under the auspices of Comecon.[39]

In 1955–57, a Soviet group led by Gleb Alekseevich Pravikov conducted malariological surveys, treated patients, and trained personnel across North Vietnam.[40] In 1957, Martsinovskii expert Andrei Iakovlevich Lysenko was sent to the Institute of Malariology in Hanoi, working with director Đặng Văn Ngữ on several initiatives. The most important was a pilot project in Thái Nguyên province, which became the basis for a national malaria eradication plan approved in 1958.[41] In 1960, the USSR pledged to supply the material resources and specialists required for the plan—a commitment of 20 million (pre-1961) rubles. The main effort began in 1962, and over the next three years Soviet experts supported a campaign that expended 1,000 tons of DDT and 15–20 million antimalarial tablets per year.[42] The work stalled in the mid-1960s, when the "destructive war with American imperialism" drove foreign experts from the country.[43] In 1967, Đặng Văn Ngữ himself was killed in an American airstrike.[44] But by the end of the 1960s, Soviet experts returned.[45] Cooperation continued into the 1980s.

The eradication campaign in North Vietnam was all the more notable for the fact that it unfolded in isolation from similar efforts in South Vietnam. The WHO began cooperation with the South Vietnamese government on malaria eradication in 1958—the same year as the North Vietnamese plan—but there is little evidence of mutual awareness. As the war intensified, WHO documents often spoke of how rural "insecurity" hampered work—despite the fact that at least some DDT-spraying and mass treatment occurred in Viet Cong-controlled areas.[46] North Vietnamese officials gave no credence to the "puppet administration of Saigon" or its Western-oriented malaria campaign.[47] In this context, Soviet and other East European experts formed the sole bridge between North Vietnam and the WHO. Some Martsinovskii experts worked in both settings—most notably, Sergiev and Detinova. Small in number, these experts created traceable connections. The clearest such example is Andrei Lysenko, who became a conduit for passing information between the WHO and North Vietnam.

Lysenko's own biography revealed how the experts of the Martsinovskii Institute linked the multiple contexts of Soviet malariology, socialist internationalism, and world health. His work from the 1930s to the 1950s involved constant travel between Moscow and Soviet Central Asia. In 1954–57, immediately before his posting to North Vietnam, he played a leading role in the malaria eradication campaign in Soviet Tajikistan. After, he spent a full year working at the Hanoi Institute of Malariology (1957–58), returning regularly until 1960. He was next sent to the WHO Malaria Eradication Division.[48] He spent the next two years (1960–61) in Geneva, and traveling on assignment in the Americas, the Middle East, and Europe.[49]

Although Vietnam in general was striking for its absence from Lysenko's travel itinerary at the WHO, knowledge of his work in North Vietnam nonetheless spread. A series of Russian-language articles, co-authored with Vietnamese colleagues and published in the Martsinovskii Institute's journal, found their way into the WHO library, from whence they circulated.[50] One was requested by the Western Pacific Regional office and delivered in English translation in 1966.[51] Lysenko also shared his experience in a paper on "landscape-malariological zonation," submitted to

the 8th Malaria Expert Committee in 1960. A method originally developed for the Tajik eradication campaign, Lysenko had adapted it to Vietnam during the pilot project at Thái Nguyên. His paper included discussion of both efforts.[52] WHO records indicate that Lysenko's publications were the organization's main source of knowledge about malaria in North Vietnam. Indeed, virtually all information about the country came from works published in the USSR or Eastern Europe.[53]

If Lysenko's work provided the WHO with a window into North Vietnam, the opposite was also true. The country was still on Lysenko's mind during his time in Geneva. In 1961, he wrote to the USSR Health Ministry to express "serious anxiety" over the "poverty of literature on malaria in Hanoi and especially of WHO publications." With this problem in mind, he gathered a "small selection" of WHO materials to be forwarded in "the next shipment to the North Vietnamese [DRV] Malaria Institute." His initiative was approved by Sergiev in Moscow and the materials were sent to North Vietnam.[54]

Soviet experts seemed to view their work in North Vietnam and the WHO as elements of a common project. The Soviet minister of health raised the idea of WHO accession to his North Vietnamese counterparts as early as 1959. It was the latter who resisted, fearing that membership might bring an influx of "specialists from capitalist countries."[55] By 1961, Soviet officials could countenance bringing their Vietnamese work directly under WHO auspices. Lysenko discussed reducing Soviet financial obligations to the WHO by "somehow register[ing] the 20 mln. [ruble] donation of the USSR to the Vietnamese Democratic Republic … as one sort of Soviet participation in the world malaria eradication campaign."[56] The next year, Soviet representatives were apparently inquiring whether the WHO might directly finance some of their work in the country.[57]

Countries like North Vietnam were—literally—blanks spots on the WHO's map of the world.[58] This did not mean they existed outside the influence of the organization. Using socialist aid programs originally developed as *alternatives* to Western-dominated world health, Martsinovskii experts tied North Vietnam into networks defined by the ideas and strategies of WHO malariology. As the USSR re-engaged with the WHO in the late 1950s, North Vietnamese malariology also converged with international models. The North Vietnamese eradication plan in 1958 coincided with the adoption of WHO-supported plans in almost all its neighbors in 1957–58.[59] Although the first group of Soviet experts had advised a program focused on mass use of synthetic antimalarial drugs, Lysenko's visit led to the adoption of DDT as a core measure.[60] By the early 1960s, North Vietnam had also adopted the terminology of the WHO: "pilot projects" (*opytno-pokazatel'nye raboty*) and "malaria eradication programs" divided into distinct phases—"preparatory," "attack," "consolidation," and so on.[61]

Institutional Integration: The Martsinovskii Institute within the WHO

Over time, the relationship between the Martsinovskii Institute and the WHO came to include direct, formalized cooperation between the two organizations.

This process began modestly yet expanded significantly over time, bolstered by the gradual convergence of Soviet and WHO methods. By the late 1970s, the institute was deeply engaged with international initiatives. Its goals were closely aligned with those of the WHO. In the last decades of the Soviet Union, it emerged as a quasi-international space that aspired to coordinate the work of medical institutes across the USSR and the socialist world, integrating socialist science into a global system led from Geneva with Soviet support.

The Martsinovskii Institute had long sought cooperation with medical institutes in other socialist countries. In the 1950s, it helped to establish Soviet-model medical systems in Eastern Europe.[62] It played a similar role in North Vietnam, as I have described. Cooperation between the Martsinovskii Institute and the Hanoi Institute of Malariology began in 1960. Bilateral relationships were later established with institutes in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.[63] Such links did not exist between the Martsinovskii Institute and Western peer institutes, however.[64] Connections to Western tropical medicine ran through the WHO. From the early 1960s, formal relations grew along several tracks.

The most basic form of cooperation was individual research grants. The first agreements were signed between the Martsinovskii Institute and the WHO in 1962, after a lengthy series of complications that likely reflected bureaucratic hurdles to foreign funding on the Soviet side.[65] Once established, however, the grants continued largely without interruption for over a decade. The amount of each was small, but they totaled a substantial sum over time—$32,300 between 1962 and 1976.[66] But the importance of the grants likely lay less in their amount than the fact that they could be taken in-kind, in the form of equipment purchased from Western companies on behalf of the institute. In the case of a grant from 1970, for which the relevant documents are preserved, the entire $3,000 was allocated for purchases from Japan, Switzerland, West Germany, and the United Kingdom.[67] Besides providing access to foreign goods, grants familiarized Soviet researchers with the practices of the WHO—the rhythm of applications, reports, and correspondence that came along with international research.

WHO training initiatives provided another site for administrative learning and epistemic integration. In 1962, the institute hosted a series of WHO malariology courses. The preparation involved close cooperation—facilitated by Lysenko's tenure at the WHO—on questions of organization, financing, and course content.[68] In the end, the effort was successful. Two three-month courses (in English and French) produced thirty-three graduates from seventeen countries.[69] At the height of their campaign to influence WHO malaria policy, the same Soviet scientists who sat on Expert Committees delivered lectures described by one WHO official as "of a very high standard but, at the same time, very realistic, thought-provoking and in line with WHO policies."[70] Another noted that students "were unanimous in their opinion that no political views were ever injected into the discussions." The Soviet side was eager to repeat the course, but WHO officials preferred to focus on training in tropical regions.[71] Nevertheless, the Martsinovskii Institute became integrated into WHO educational schemes. From 1962 to 1971, at least fifteen foreign specialists—including WHO fellows—trained every year at the institute.[72]

It also frequently hosted WHO traveling seminars on malaria and other themes. These occurred every year between 1964 and 1967, as well as in 1969 and 1971.[73]

This slow integration into international research and training systems accelerated greatly in the 1970s. Between 1974 and 1978, with support from the USSR and other socialist countries, the WHO launched a Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases. This new program emerged amid the failure of malaria eradication and the turn to horizontal health approaches tied to development.[74] Its goal was to coordinate and expand research on six tropical diseases—malaria first among them—and to involve the scientific centers and health systems of developing countries in this work.[75] To foster Soviet participation, the USSR Health Ministry created a Coordination Center for Tropical Diseases within the Martsinovskii Institute in 1978. The goal of the Center was to organize Soviet research "within the framework" of the Special Programme, leveraging Martsinovskii experts' experience in WHO grantmaking to help other institutes submit proposals.[76] A flurry of activity followed. By the early 1980s, the Coordinating Center had submitted twenty-seven proposals to the Special Programme, of which seven had been approved.[77] It had also helped to revive WHO malariology training, which had flagged in the 1970s.[78] During 1978–1980, the institute's experts were involved in at least two roving seminars and organized two international malariology courses.[79]

The Coordinating Center was also intended to organize a wider multilateral network of state-socialist health actors for participation in the Special Programme. Efforts to develop socialist multilateralism in tropical medicine dated back to the 1950s.[80] The Coordinating Center was to reinforce this work by taking responsibility for "cooperation with scientific institutions of socialist and developing countries" in this area.[81] In the early 1980s, it played a key role in an ambitious Comecon initiative for tropical medicine, which included a "temporary international scientific team" at the Hanoi Institute of Malariology studying antimalarial drug resistance.[82] These many converging networks made the institute an obvious site to pursue further integration. The organization's role in coordinating research among "the countries of socialist friendship," Martsinovskii experts argued, would "accelerate and heighten the effectiveness of work" and "have a huge influence on the realization of the Special Programme."[83] In other words, the institute was to bridge the divide between international and socialist health—and in doing so, gain an important position for itself within the broader domain of world health.

By the early 1980s, the Martsinovskii Institute was deeply integrated within the wider administrative networks, personnel exchanges, and epistemic frameworks of the WHO. The Special Programme's research planning structure seemed the perfect vehicle to align Soviet and international malariology. Martsinovskii experts were "actively including [themselves] in the fulfillment of the Special Programme," coordinating with scientific institutes across the socialist world. They were also aligning their own organization with international needs by creating "centers for collaboration with the WHO […] on the basis of the institute's departments."[84] They aimed to "coordinate [their] research with works in western countries and integrate the results into a global system of targeted planning developed under the

auspices of the WHO."[85] It was no longer clear where Soviet malariology ended, and international expertise began.

Conclusion

The Martsinovskii Institute's role in WHO malariology seemed to transcend the divisions of the Cold War even as the international work of its experts—especially before the 1970s—was framed by the political and ideological stakes of the conflict. This was partly due to the multiple settings in which international engagement occurred. As Sandrine Kott argues, historians must be attentive to the different positions available within international organizations and their structural possibilities. She perceives two "enclosures" or domains. The first is defined by "groups with divergent interests"—member states, within the UN system. The second is comprised by permanent secretariats where "international knowledge and *savoir-faire* is developed, where epistemic communities gathered around the sharing of knowledge and experience meet and are even constituted."[86] Aspects of both these "enclosures" can be seen in venues like the WHO Expert Committees, which fostered both political contestation and epistemic agreement. Soviet work within them shows how inseparable the processes of competition, cooperation, and convergence could be in the context of the Cold War.

I have also emphasized a third element in my analysis: the "wider networks" of the WHO that developed beyond its official institutional structures—yet were crucial to its claim to represent "world" health. Such networks structured the circulations of people and knowledge that international organizations required—as Kott notes—if they were to exist as anything more than "deserted palaces."[87] These networks were also deeply structured by the Cold War order; it was for this reason that WHO malariology arrived in North Vietnam via socialist health networks rather than the organization itself. Not all of these "wider networks" were visible from Geneva. As Trudy Huskamp Peterson reminds us in this volume, the archives of the Cold War were shaped by the boundaries and dynamics of the conflict itself. For this reason, a "national" organization like the Martsinovskii Institute can reveal how international health was established in a divided world.

Notes

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14 RGANI f. 3, op. 29, d. 49, l. 95.
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Part V

GLOBAL CAUSES

Chapter 11

International Organizations and the Issue of Natural Disasters During the Cold War

Lukas Schemper*

Introduction

When natural hazards such as cyclones, earthquakes, or locust invasions hit particular regions of the globe, they do not consider geopolitical constellations. During the Cold War (1947–91), when such hazards turned into "natural" disasters,[1] they could easily transcend the East–West dichotomy that decisively shaped the world in the second half of the twentieth century. For instance, in July 1954, abnormally intense rainfall in Europe led to severe flooding of the Danube and Elbe Rivers, affecting a million individuals on either side of the Iron Curtain.[2] Other disasters also affected both parties, albeit not in equal measures. For example, in 1988, an earthquake in Soviet Armenia also resulted in deaths, injuries, and building damage in neighboring Turkey.[3] These events remain rare examples of natural hazards affecting both the Eastern and Western blocs. More frequently, they were of local nature or only concerned states on one side of the Iron Curtain. However, even in those cases, the causes and effects of disasters resembled each other, hence any form of disaster prevention or preparedness would have benefited from truly international, trans-bloc scientific cooperation. Indeed, considerable scientific and technical advancement occurred in the period discussed here, requiring such cooperation. Much of this scientific advancement was a result of Cold War necessities, fitting the pattern of a close connection, intended and unintended, of military confrontations with technological and scientific transformations.[4] By the same token, even during the Cold War, disasters

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were likely to elicit international solidarity on both sides of the global conflict, a solidarity that needed to be directed internationally.

Assuming the existence of the above situation during the Cold War, how did the global conflict affect the way in which international organizations framed the issue of disaster on their agendas? Did international cooperation in the field of disaster management emerge in the way that it did in spite of or because of the Cold War context? As this chapter will show, the realization that disasters were a transnational or even global problem requiring multilateral responses through international institutions only emerged with great difficulty in the minds of Cold War diplomats and politicians, while experts and international bureaucrats had been advocating for international cooperation in this field since the interwar period. The institutionalization of the topic of disaster was slow and irregular during the time in question, but the form it took, both structurally and thematically, was nevertheless firmly shaped by the Cold War context in several ways and determined the international landscape of disaster management in the decades that followed the end of the global conflict. Considering the history of international organizations, the topic of natural hazards and their consequences was not a central concern during the Cold War period, compared to more prominent issues such as economic development and culture; but, as Perrin Selcer argued, "margins matter" during the Cold War, because "they determine the realm of the possible." Seldom serving as a positive source of motivation, the Cold War supplied essential "context and counterpoint."[5] This meant that in some cases the global conflict was an obstacle to multilateral disaster cooperation by accentuating bilateral approaches, while in others it was a facilitator of political cooperation within blocs. It was even possible to reinvigorate ambitions to overcome world division by adhering to older ideals (of scientific cosmopolitanism, for example) and it allowed for international cooperation on single issues across blocs. Evidently, this multifaceted Cold War context was not the only one. For instance, the fact that natural disaster preparedness was a topic that was increasingly discussed at UN forums in the 1960s such as the ECOSOC and ECLA, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and the fact that states of the Global South sponsored most resolutions demanding a greater role of the UN in disaster management, can be explained as a byproduct of decolonization. Gaining leverage in newly decolonized countries by providing disaster relief or expertise of prevention could also be part of bloc-thinking.

The discipline of disaster studies has devoted much attention to defining what constitutes a disaster and distinguishing between "natural" and manmade types.[6] These questions of definition may be rewarding from an epistemological and taxonomic standpoint, but in the practical world of international organizations, disaster management intersects with issues as varied as engineering, entomology, development, and global health. In light of this fragmentation, anthropologist Sandrine Revet proposed a potential solution to the perplexity surrounding the delimitation of international disaster governance. She suggested recognizing as participants in the realm of disasters those individuals who self-identified as important members of this unique social world; hence, the world of disasters

was constructed by its actors.[7] In the Cold War period, experts and policymakers who worked in or with international organizations usually understood natural disasters as sudden disruptive events related to natural hazards of geological, hydrological, meteorological, or climatological origin. These types of disasters could be responded to in the form of relief after the occurrence or before in the form of prevention and preparedness. Based on research from relevant United Nations and Foreign Ministry archives combined with recent historical disaster scholarship, this chapter is structured around these two distinct but interrelated policy fields, which had their own opportunities and limitations within the context of the Cold War. The chapter aims to contribute to research on the role of international organizations during the Cold War in dealing with global risks and the instrumentalization of the responses to these risks by governments under Cold War logic, be it to further superpower collaboration or competition.[8] While the role of humanitarian and developmental aid during the Cold War has been explored in the literature,[9] the exigencies of disaster aid have remained understudied by historians.[10] They have left the topic of disaster diplomacy and the question of how disasters affect conflict or cooperation to political scientists.[11] This chapter repositions disaster diplomacy in the history of the Cold War and represents international organizations as both instruments and stakeholders at the center of this analysis.

Bilateral and Multilateral Approaches to Disaster Relief during the Cold War

The 1920s saw diplomatic discussions on how to deal with disasters on an international scale, and even the creation of an international governmental organization, the International Relief Union (IRU), devoted to this issue at an international conference in Geneva in 1927. The IRU received varying degrees of support from governments such as Italy and Switzerland, and humanitarian organizations within the International Red Cross movement and the League of Nations secretariat; but the United States and the Soviet Union never joined this scheme, arguing that it was not required. American and Soviet skepticism about multilateral forms of disaster relief dates back to this period. By the interwar period, the United States had the best developed disaster relief capability in the world and it saw no advantage to channeling aid through an international organization or to creating international obligations.[12] The Soviet government also objected to the scheme on the grounds that disasters of any kind would immediately receive empathetic support from fellow workers, who composed all parts of the state.[13] As new research shows, the outcome of this "friendship of the peoples" varied from disaster to disaster,[14] but the rhetoric remained essentially the same and opposition to multilateral cooperation did not change after 1945.

After the Second World War, the issue of natural disaster was not a preoccupation of governments and humanitarian organizations. International relief was mainly devoted to addressing postwar suffering and reconstruction. Nevertheless, the creation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Association (UNRRA)

in 1943 to deliver relief to war victims and their states in Europe and Asia raised high hopes for those who favored a strong international organization to deal with disaster, among whom were the staff and supporters of the IRU.[15] The UNRRA was proof that multilateral relief could be organized effectively with the support of the United States, which provided over 70 percent of its budget.[16] In addition to Italy, it was mainly Eastern and Southeastern Europe that benefited from UNRRA-distributed emergency relief in the form of medication, food, and clothing, and reconstruction efforts in the fields of agriculture, transport, and industry. UNRRA relief thus constituted a bridge between East and West (a fragile bridge as it turned out).[17] Emerging Cold War politics prevented the creation of a permanent, global relief system at that time. A Republican-led US Congress deplored the fact that UNRRA, headed by a Democrat (Herbert H. Lehmann), delivered aid to communist Eastern Europe and China. UNRRA staff were even accused of communist sympathies.[18] At the UNRRA council session that voted to disband the organization, a decision opposed by Eastern European countries, US Assistant Secretary of State, William Clayton, expressed the view that the future of relief was in bilateral agreements and targeted projects.[19] In addition, development rather than emergency disaster relief was at the forefront of American foreign policy priorities beginning at the end of the 1940s.

Although several international organizations inherited some of UNRRA's functions after its dissolution, none except WHO had a clear mandate for emergency assistance in situations classified as natural disasters. Most emergency programs of the postwar era ended around 1950 or were transformed into long-term development programs. Those relief organizations that were not disbanded once the objective of rehabilitation in Europe was "completed," turned increasingly toward the Third World and became interested in development as a new raison d'être.[20] Consequently, disaster relief was neglected.

In contrast to the interwar period, it was impossible after 1945 to conceive of an international disaster relief mechanism that excluded the United States, the most important provider of disaster relief.[21] The US was only slowly challenged in this domain by other states such as France and the UK, which established their own spheres of influence for disaster relief, particularly in their former colonies. The Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc did provide disaster relief of varying quantity and quality as well, but to states with whom they wanted to build strong alliances.[22] For example, the Soviet Union in 1971 and 1972 provided considerable aid to Bangladesh, which was oriented toward India and the USSR rather than toward Pakistan and the United States.[23] A similar situation was encountered in the West. For instance, the West German government of Konrad Adenauer saw the Chilean Valdivia earthquake of May 22, 1960 as an opportunity to deliver relief to a friendly nation, underpinned by a growing consciousness of the use of foreign aid as an instrument to contain the spread of communism.[24] Policymakers on both sides of the Iron Curtain were aware of the symbolic power of disaster relief. As a former US diplomat recalled, his government considered the sending of bilateral relief as "great political PR."[25] Hence, while all these disasters were non-Cold War events per se, the actors who provided bilateral relief in their aftermath

were guided by Cold War rationale. However, both the United States and the Soviet Union initially opposed supranational mechanisms of disaster relief.[26]

When in 1963, a devastating earthquake struck Skopje in non-aligned Yugoslavia, the disaster was also perceived by several countries as an opportunity to use disaster aid to further good diplomatic relations—disaster diplomacy. The United States dispatched a 120-bed hospital through the US Air Force only one day after the disaster. The Soviet Union provided a battalion of Soviet military engineers, and the British, Polish, and Japanese governments sent experts in urban planning and reconstruction.[27] The US State Department justified its provision of disaster relief as a "unique opportunity to make a major contribution to reconstruction at no real economic cost to the US with side benefits to us." It noted positively that the Yugoslav press had given ample publicity to American support, but it then added with a note of frustration, that the Yugoslav government had at the same time "carefully sought to maintain some balance in reporting aid from East and West."[28]

While each bloc tried to gain leverage over Yugoslavia, what distinguished this disaster from previous ones was that a considerable part of the relief effort was coordinated by the UN. Following the earthquake, UN Secretary-General U Thant had immediately taken the initiative and requested organizations within the UN system to provide assistance. They in turn had issued appeals to member governments, to which an impressive number had responded affirmatively.[29] A UN General Assembly resolution of October 1963 recognized "with satisfaction that the spirit of international solidarity demonstrated on this occasion has transformed the reconstruction of Skopje into a real symbol of friendship and brotherhood among peoples."[30] The "bipolar neutralism" exercised by Yugoslavia between state-socialist East and industrialized West on the one hand, and Yugoslavia's own active and visible role in international cooperation and development on the other provided a unique constellation that allowed for this trans-bloc and trans-ideological solidarity under the leadership of the UN to emerge. In this particular case, international institutions such as the General Assembly, UNESCO, the UNDP, and an International Board of Consultants, with help from the UN Special Fund for Technical Assistance, allowed different types of technological, scientific, developmental, and cultural internationalisms to find some common ground, as evidenced by the physical reconstruction of the city. As Ljubica Spaskovska argued, a "post-war consensus" of "welfare-state modernism" by countries from both blocs can be recognized in the reconstruction of schools, hospitals, museums, and theaters.[31]

What was possible in the case of non-aligned Yugoslavia was more delicate when disasters happened in the Eastern bloc, where nongovernmental actors were usually the preferred channel for Western powers to transport aid across the Iron Curtain. For example, several disasters in Romania, floods in 1970 and 1975, and the Vrancea earthquake of 1977, which killed over 1,500 people in Bucharest and other towns, led to international solidarity in both blocs. Despite a cautious opening of Romania to the West in the 1970s, only select Western nongovernmental organizations such as the Swiss or the West German Red

Cross as well as private German-speaking diaspora community organizations were permitted to deliver aid or assist in reconstruction efforts, serving partly as intermediaries of Western governments. Limited access was granted only through complex negotiations that were entangled with political issues such as trade agreements, credit commitments, and migration. The Romanian authorities were careful not to request aid publicly or to allow undue interference.[32] Such a reaction by a government toward an offer of disaster relief was neither a socialist nor a Cold War attribute. In fact, disaster management, which is essentially about the protection of life and property as well as the maintenance of order in state of emergency, touches on the core functions of all sovereign states, which they will defend against intervention. In this particular case, it would have reflected badly on the capacity of a socialist country to help itself and of the socialist bloc to provide mutual support. Disasters had the potential to reveal weaknesses in socialist systems as well as inequalities in the distribution of aid.[33]

To avoid the appearance of undue interference, international organizations can be employed as suitable channels. In 1954, when flooding of the Danube and Elbe Rivers affected 1 million people on both sides of the Iron Curtain (Austria, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia), the United States used the League of Red Cross Societies to deliver aid to communist countries, mainly agricultural products under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act. It could only do so, because the aid was disguised as coming from the Red Cross rather than a particular country. Nevertheless, when people opened food packages, they clearly recognized their American origin.[34]

The use of international organizations for disaster-related activities in the ideological battle of the Cold War also happened in the opposite direction. As a continuing research project is aiming to demonstrate, the USSR and its Soviet Red Cross and Crescent Society used the International Red Cross movement of the 1950s through the 1980s as a platform to promote ideas of socialist modernity around the globe, and in particular to Red Cross and Crescent Societies of newly decolonized countries. These exchanges took place on other occasions at the Red Cross International Film Festival in Varna, Bulgaria, established in 1965 for films on disaster relief and health issues, that featured contributions mainly from the Eastern bloc and Third World countries.[35]

In addition to these two examples, another occurrence that showed governments the usefulness of international organizations in disaster relief was that disaster scenes were becoming increasingly crowded with a growing number of NGOs and other humanitarian actors, which produced redundancies in aid deliveries, sometimes from East and West. For example, after the Nicaraguan earthquake of 1972, the United States sent two field hospitals costing $500,000 each, while Cuba and France did the same, leading to a combined waste of about $1 million on the American side.[36] This uncoordinated relief happened in the context of an accumulation of deadly disasters such as the 1970s earthquake in Peru and the 1970s Bhola cyclone in East Pakistan, which surpassed the capacity of bilateral aid.

In the face of these problems, the late 1960s and early 1970s saw a switch in the American position on multilateral disaster relief, which was perhaps also owing to the necessity for the United States to reallocate funding for the Vietnam War and to offset the negative commercial balance.[37] The US government suddenly began to support initiatives to put disaster relief on the agenda of not only the UN but also NATO. The latter initiative was launched by the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) within the context of détente and an attempted rebranding of the international security organization by the Nixon administration. Co-piloted by the United States, Italy, and Turkey, this included the launch, in 1970, of preliminary studies on flood mitigation, earthquake hazard reduction, and disaster relief. However, after several years of discussion, European member states were hesitant to make disaster management a NATO responsibility. Besides concern for the cost, there was fear of the imposition of policies on sovereign members by an intergovernmental organization.[38]

At the UN, the American position toward the multilateralization of disaster work also changed and became supportive. While the USSR still declared that disaster relief made available through the UN would "violate national sovereignty and prerogatives"[39] and could be used for political purposes, quite similar to the criticism of European states toward the NATO initiatives, it did not block the creation of an international mechanism.[40] Only ten socialist states abstained, and none voted against the measure, when in 1972 the UN General Assembly resolution 2816 (XXVI) established the United Nations Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO).[41] This more cooperative stance on multilateral disaster management occurred in the context of the détente period between 1965 and 1975, which facilitated a general rapprochement of the Eastern and Western blocs, allowing for the establishment of new international institutions, such as the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), based on a common trust in modernity and progress to tackle the world's problems.[42]

While UNDRO did not become an effective coordination mechanism and was repeatedly criticized by governments, international bureaucrats, and journalists as a failure, it did manage to become a useful clearinghouse for the exchange of information on disaster.[43] This also happened across the Iron Curtain during the above-mentioned Romanian floods of 1975, when the Federal Republic of Germany informed UNDRO that it was prepared to finance a certain amount of medicines, while UNDRO possessed the information that WHO had already purchased these drugs, thus avoiding an expensive duplication of expenses.[44] However, the Cold War environment continued to limit the work that UNDRO could achieve. For fear of losing political leverage in the developing world, states did not abandon their preference for the bilateral use of disaster relief.[45] Furthermore, UNDRO's operational capacity with regard to the Communist Bloc was limited. Its first operation in the Soviet Union (the first international humanitarian operation in the USSR since the Second World War) happened following the Spitak earthquake of 1988 in Armenia.[46]

Trans-bloc Disaster Expertise in International Organizations

While cooperation in the provision of humanitarian disaster relief was politically complex during the Cold War, cooperation on the scientific aspects of disaster management, necessary for achieving prevention and preparedness, were sometimes more easily achieved. However, the Cold War context also had a number of implications for the nature of *ex ante* disaster management in many ways. The threat of a nuclear war and its potential for unprecedented destruction produced historically unique dangers and requirements for medical care that shaped the practice of civil protection and disaster medicine. These practices were then tested by national militaries in the aftermath of disasters in the Global South.[47] In the West, social science research on how populations and organizations reacted to catastrophes was also influenced by Cold War priorities. Although their utility for military purposes was often not immediately evident, the initial impetus to study these topics came from the military, which financed much of the psychological and sociological research in the United States assuming that "catastrophic knowledge" could be easily transferred into "war knowledge."[48] However, the circulation of this knowledge was largely confined to the Western Bloc. For example, the Geneva-based International Civil Defense Organization, founded in 1958 to serve as a hub for the circulation of such knowledge through the creation of a documentation center and the organization of international conferences did not count any members from the Eastern bloc.[49] In fact, as Katja Dose has argued, civil protection in relation to natural hazards was a largely neglected field in the Soviet Union until the 1977 earthquake of Ashgabat revealed how insufficiently prepared Soviet authorities were for handling large magnitude disasters.[50]

While civil defense and social science disaster research did not lend themselves well to international cooperation in a global ideological conflict, other types of expertise relied on trans-bloc exchanges to advance—to the strategic benefit of both the Eastern and the Western bloc. Among other reasons, Cold War related security concerns motivated governments across the East–West divide to collaborate in studying the earth's physical environment, to put the entire earth "under surveillance," and to create a planetary understanding of disaster-related factors such as the weather, climate, and seismicity.[51]

It is well documented that funding for the earth sciences and seismology in particular, rose sharply in the late 1950s into the 1960s owing to their utility for Cold War related purposes. It was again the military that directly funded this research and shaped its directions, whether physical oceanography for anti-submarine warfare or ionospheric physics for advanced radio communications.[52] Earthquake-related research in fields such as seismology and engineering were particularly pertinent examples. For instance, in 1951 the Stanford vibration laboratory was repurposed to switch from earthquake engineering to blast testing, sponsored by the Office of Naval Research. In return, blast-related military research on nuclear weapons yielded useful results for earthquake engineering, while the seismological detection of underground nuclear explosions was based on technology that earthquake seismologists could also use.

The advancements in seismological methods over the course of the Cold War helped to slow the pace of nuclear proliferation and the nuclear arms race, as can be seen with the coming into force of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PNTBT) after ratification of the treaty by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom in 1963. Its success relied on the capability that was developed in the United States by the Department of Defense project Vela (1963–71) to detect nuclear detonations outside national borders where on-site inspections were forbidden. As a project crucial for national security, its basis was laid down during the 1957–58 International Geophysical Year (IGY). This global observance, which marked the end of a period when scientific interchange between the Eastern and Western blocs had been seriously interrupted, rested to a large extent on the international cooperation of seismologists.[53] Despite the applicability of the earth sciences for military purposes, they were framed by practitioners as a "non-political form of peaceful universalism," allowing for the collaboration of tens of thousands of researchers in more than sixty countries during that international observance. Beyond the study of natural occurrences, as Benjamin Goossen has shown, this cooperative global research endeavor also provided a template for studying anthropogenic geophysical phenomena (such as radioactive fallout and greenhouse gas emissions), interest in which would gain traction in future decades. While the People's Republic of China stayed out of the IGY because of Taiwan's participation, many socialist countries including the Soviet Union joined, facilitated by the process of de-Stalinization after 1953. As a form of science diplomacy, socialist countries saw participation as advantageous to improve their bargaining power over the West and to obtain resources for research.[54]

The trans-bloc cooperation of experts went beyond the institutional framework of the IGY, however. Notably in the field of seismology, American scientists and engineers successfully built new global networks through the regular organization of international conferences such as the First World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, which met in Berkeley in 1956. Following discussions at the second conference in Tokyo in 1960, the International Association for Earthquake Engineering (IAEE) was established. Each forum included scientists from both blocs. Fifteen Soviet scientists participated in the 1960 conference, a Soviet delegate was part of the preparatory committee that created the association, and the Soviet delegate Kiriak S. Zavriev from the Research Institute of Construction of the Georgian Academy of Sciences was one of several directors of the association's executive committee. The founders included members of Western countries, Eastern countries such as East Germany and Romania, non-aligned and neutral states.[55] The aim of the association was to promote international cooperation among scientists and engineers through the organization of international meetings, the exchange of information, and the provision of technical cooperation. The last occurred through the sending of emergency inspection teams in the aftermath of strong earthquakes, an activity in which it soon started to cooperate with UNESCO.[56]

In fact, in the first decades after the Second World War, UNESCO was the first and only UN institution to develop an interest in disaster prevention, and it

became an important hub and catalyst for disaster research in the earth sciences, assigning a particular importance to the field of seismology for disaster prevention. This took into account the above-mentioned growing international importance of earthquake research, but also created certain path dependencies centered on purely technical approaches to the reduction of disaster risk.[57] One could argue that confidence in new scientific and technical progress, some of which was spurred on by the Cold War, led UN agencies to assume that technology and science were the only means for preventing disasters. In the promotion of certain theories such as plate tectonics or technologies such as hazard mapping and the modeling of earthquake-resistant structures, this approach proved to be fertile. In other fields, such as earthquake prediction, which was popular among Soviet and US scientists in the first half of the 1970s and led to exchanges between researchers of both countries, they proved to be erroneous and even counterproductive.[58] Overall, however, this hazard-centered approach that framed those parts of the world that did not have the necessary technology as vulnerable, ignored socio-political factors of vulnerability such as poverty. As wrong as this assumption has proven to be, it did permit greater cooperation across the blocs. Experts and scientists from the Eastern bloc were frequently part of UN commissions and reconnaissance missions dealing with natural hazards, and cities in socialist countries were sites of international meetings or research projects related to issues of disaster prevention. For example, from 1970 to 1984, UNESCO and the UNDP oversaw three regional projects dealing with seismic risk in the Balkans, based on the cooperation between Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Albania. After the Vrancea earthquake of 1977, UNESCO dispatched an earthquake reconnaissance mission to Romania.[59]

Disaster risk reduction became a major priority at the UN in the 1990s, which were designated as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). However, this chapter demonstrates that the grounds for much of the UN's disaster work, its epistemic networks and thematic orientation, were laid down in the context of the Cold War. The role of the American geophysicist and president of the US National Academy of Sciences, Frank Press, in rallying support for the IDNDR was emblematic of the Cold War imprint on disaster risk reduction. He launched a campaign for the IDNDR at the eighth gathering of the International Congress of Earthquake Engineering in San Francisco in 1984 in a keynote address to the International Association of Earthquake Engineering, which included participants from East and West. Press had a long history of using Cold War military confrontation as an opportunity to foster growth of the earth sciences and to foster international cooperation. As director of the seismological laboratory of the California Institute of Technology, he participated in 1958 in the Geneva expert group and in the Berkner Panel, both of which helped articulate the content of the PTBT of 1963. Moreover, Press contributed to project Vela and was instrumental in the creation of the World-Wide Standard Seismograph Network. He also participated in the IGY as a member of its Glaciology and Seismology Panel, which might have inspired him with the idea of another, even more ambitious, global observance of scientific cooperation, which was the IDNDR.[60]

The Eastern bloc, in the last years before its disintegration, actively participated in the establishment of the IDNDR. The Soviet Union was one of several countries in which UNDRO planned to implement its disaster mitigation activities within the scope of the decade.[61] The country hosted the Twelfth Session of the International Coordination Group for the Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific, organized by UNESCO's International Oceanographic Commission, headed by the Russian Albert Y. Tolkachev, in August 1989 in Novosibirsk, which proposed a project on tsunami disaster mitigation as a contribution to the IDNDR. In addition to seismology, oceanography was another scientific issue that encouraged collaboration across the blocs. In 1971, the Soviet Union had already hosted a meeting of the group in Moscow.[62]

The growing Soviet involvement in multilateral disaster management can be seen in the context of a general realization that interdependence in certain common challenges faced by humanity was inevitable—the "new thinking." In his famous speech to the UN General Assembly in December 1988, Gorbachev emphasized the need for international cooperation on issues of ecological disasters as well as epidemics.[63] Gorbachev's new preoccupation with global disaster management echoed the belated domestic focus on emergency management of the late 1980s. This was evidenced by the creation of the State Commission for Emergency Situations, a governmental agency formed in July 1989 to react to industrial, natural, ecological, and social disasters. Both the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 and the Spitak earthquake of 1988 among other catastrophic events embodied the political failures of the Soviet Union and demonstrated the necessity for the creation of an effective emergency system. By the same token, as the Cold War was coming to an end, priorities could be shifted from military threats to peacetime disaster, which in the late Soviet Union was then perceived as a new and coherent category.[64]

Conclusion

The end of the Cold War significantly widened the scope of international disaster management. The disintegration of Cold War blocs opened up more humanitarian space, and a newfound consensus allowed the United Nations to become the platform of all sorts of humanitarian interventions. The clear separation between war-related and natural disasters that had governed UNDRO's modus operandi, partly dictated by the limitations of the Cold War, was abandoned. In fact, the creation of UNDRO's institutional successor, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, within the UN Secretariat in 1991, acknowledged the existence of complex emergencies. In the field of disaster prevention and preparedness, the IDNDR stimulated the launch of a new agenda for disaster risk reduction and the creation of new institutions after the end of the Cold War, which increasingly incorporated the concept of social vulnerability. Surpassing the Cold War focus on the earth sciences for disaster prevention, the Yokohama Strategy for a Safe World, adopted in 1994 at the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, accordingly emphasized that the path to a "global culture of prevention" could only be reached

through an integrated approach to preparedness that combined technological solutions with analyses of the accompanying social circumstances and strategies for reducing vulnerabilities.[65]

These fundamental changes should not hide the fact that these new initiatives were built on institutions and networks that had been shaped in the Cold War era. Notably the UN provided a forum and hub, where the kernel of a coordinated international relief system and a coherent, common approach to disaster risk reduction was developed, which presented an alternative to the dominant bilateral and regional approaches dictated by the strategic necessities of cultivating relations with potential Cold War allies. A number of common standards and expert opinions, shared disciplinary lenses and epistemological interpretations of disasters that dominated discourse and the practices around the issue of disaster at the end of the twentieth century, were also a product of the Cold War period. This conclusion does not imply that there was continuously well-functioning multilateral cooperation in the field of disaster management across the East–West divide. Relief crossed the Iron Curtain with great difficulty, but international institutions could serve as facilitators for the transport of aid or the exchange of information in the instances where it did. Despite their operational limits, international institutions and exchanges represented a counterfactual and a basis for reforms of international disaster management in the decades after the Cold War. The difficulties faced by international organizations in implementing their mandates during the Cold War period, however, are a dire warning of what can happen when geopolitical divisions hamper international cooperation on a global problem. In the twenty-first century, this prompts inquiries into how nations can collectively confront the escalating array of climate-change-induced and other human-aggravated disasters within the framework of a repolarized global landscape.

Notes

1 Social scientists increasingly avoid using the term "natural disaster" and put "natural" under quotes to emphasize the social, political, and economic causes that render a society vulnerable to a natural hazard, thus enabling the transition from risk to disaster. Nevertheless, natural disaster is a historical category and was treated as distinct from manmade disaster throughout the twentieth century (and frequently as such even today). The manner in which this distinction was made influenced the policies implemented to deal with disaster. When the term "natural disaster" is used in this chapter, it is for the purpose of reflecting this historical reality.

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Chapter 12

The Curious Case of Uruguay: The Role of State Actors and Victims' Voices at the United Nations Human Rights Commission, 1976–1980

Debbie Sharnak*

This chapter explores the curious case of Uruguay at the United Nations Human Rights Commission in the late 1970s. The country entered the Human Rights Commission's 1503 review procedure in 1976. Under this process, a complaint filed against a country triggers the commission to investigate specific allegations of human rights violations and decide whether to remove the country from its review because of an unwarranted complaint, keep it under review for further monitoring, send an emissary to the country, or "throw the case open" and publicize consistent patterns of abuse.[1] When Uruguay entered this procedure, it was three years after the official start of the country's military dictatorship on June 27, 1973. The *autogolpe* (self-coup) there ushered in a period of dramatic human rights abuses in the small Southern Cone country, characterized most acutely by political imprisonment, torture, and disappearances as part of the military's broader war against perceived "subversives" and the broadly defined left. After several years under review, the commission reached a key juncture point when UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim sent his under-secretary-general for political affairs (and the future Secretary-General) Javier Pérez de Cuéllar to Uruguay in 1979 for an in-depth investigation. Under pressure from the commission to move beyond the holding pattern of "under review," Waldheim hoped that Pérez de Cuéllar would be able to recommend a course of action.

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Yet, Pérez de Cuéllar's visit took place under the careful watch of his military host. Because the dictatorship presented a highly sanitized version of the country, and also in part due to Pérez de Cuéllar's own beliefs about the limited role of the UN with respect to human rights, he produced a glowing report on conditions in Uruguay. He urged respect for national sovereignty as opposed to either keeping the country under review or indicting it. In essence, Pérez de Cuéllar recommended that the country be removed from any scrutiny or investigation of the UN Human Rights Commission. The report stood in direct contradiction to human rights groups' documentation of massive and continuing human rights violations in the country. However, due to advocacy from other UN officials, as well as victim testimony and lobbying, the UN Human Rights Commission ultimately overruled the high-level emissary by keeping the country under review but not taking any strong action or stance against the abuses. The end result was thus a bit of a stalemate, a middle ground wherein neither human rights activists nor the military regime fully achieved their objective.

Analyzing Uruguay's appearance before this UN body is particularly compelling as an area of study for two main reasons. First, Uruguay had been an outlier in the region as a particularly strong and stable democracy throughout the first half of the twentieth century, and the country was a major contributor and promoter of the UN Human Rights system at its inception. In fact, delegates from Uruguay advocated for some of the strongest provisions for the protection of human rights during the 1945 San Francisco conference, many of which were not fully realized or weakened in their final adoption. Therefore, when the country fell to dictatorship in the 1970s, the very mechanisms the country had once tried to strengthen, but had not always achieved, were exploited by the military regime. Second, Uruguay's review at the Human Rights Commission demonstrates the ways that limited action which privileged state sovereignty was built into the UN system and, even at a time of increasing human rights prominence it the 1970s, these limits continued to structure the range of responses. The country's experience exposes larger conflicts that were particularly apparent during the Cold War over notions of the UN's responsibility in addressing human rights versus fostering dialogue, over the increasing function of victims' voices within UN bodies versus official state actors, and over the primacy of sovereignty versus concerted human rights action.

This chapter uses documents and archives from the UN, the Uruguayan Foreign Ministry, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), international human rights groups, and the US State Department to explore the tensions within different branches of the UN system.[2] As human rights grew in importance internationally during the 1970s, military governments and victims of them tried to use the UN Human Rights Commission for diverging purposes—either to override increasing criticism of their regimes or to bring attention to horrific violations.[3] The Uruguayan case explores these conflicts, as well as the evolving paradigms and debates over human rights, particularly focusing on its implications for both the UN Human Rights Commission as well as the UN at large during this critical phase of the late Cold War. Indeed, while scholars have pointed

out that by the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, the UN began to make strides in beginning to address human rights issues more thoroughly within its various entities, this particular case is especially attuned to the limits of these changes.[4] In many ways, despite human rights' prominence in this period, the Uruguayan example demonstrates the intractability of these inherent contradictions and the continuity of the UN system's limits to address human rights that extended both prior to this period and beyond the Cold War. Especially since this case focuses on an anti-communist regime where much of the criticism came from other Western governments, it is an example of these limits transcending the bipolarity of Cold War considerations.

From the Switzerland of South America to the Torture Chamber of Latin America

Uruguay gained its reputation as the "Switzerland of South America" in the first half of the twentieth century for its high literacy rates, advanced health system, and strong political democracy that began under the presidency of José Batlle y Ordóñez (1903–07 and 1911–15). A strong belief in social, political, and economic rights domestically translated abroad when Uruguayan delegates were prominent members of the Latin American delegation to the San Francisco conference organizing the United Nations, and eventually the writing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).[5] For example, at the UN organizing conference, Uruguayan delegates proposed that the promotion of human rights be listed among the purposes of the organization. Further, Uruguayan foreign minister Alberto Rodríguez Larreta submitted a draft proposal for the UN Charter to include a Declaration of Rights rather than produce one as a separate document. He sought for nations to be expelled from the organization should they fail to follow these standards.[6] Uruguayan officials at the UN continued to promote these principles in the early years of the organization as well. In 1951, for example, they proposed a plan for the creation of an Attorney General for human rights. The proposal sought to embed the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights into the central functioning of the United Nations, rather than proceed through a lengthy treaty ratification process.[7] While these proposals were ultimately not approved, they highlight Uruguay's leadership on human rights within international forums from its earliest stages due to its longstanding commitment to democracy and human rights, as well as shortcomings in the human rights setup of the UN that the military dictatorship ultimately exploited.

Indeed, despite a strong history of rights promotion in the domestic and international spheres, Uruguay's commitment to its democratic principles began to falter amid the economic crises of the late 1950s and 1960s. An increasingly repressive government in Uruguay, supported by the United States, ultimately chipped away at long-held rights until the military took over full control of the country and shut down Parliament in 1973. Over the next twelve years, the military utilized torture, political imprisonment, censorship, and disappearances as

a means to wage war on the left as part of its perceived struggle for the soul of the country within the context of the larger Cold War environment. During this period, Uruguay obtained the dubious distinction as having the highest rate of political incarceration in the world, and politicians and news outlets began to call the country the "Torture Chamber of Latin America."[8]

As a result of this repression, Uruguayans fled into exile at enormous rates, reaching almost 10 percent of the population. These exiles lobbied the US government, human rights groups, and the UN to put pressure on the government to stop violations. At first, the UN was mostly involved in Uruguay from a refugee perspective, helping those fleeing the dictatorship to find asylum countries and provide immediate materials to help the exiles.[9] Over time though, various bodies within the UN system grew more interested in trying to address human rights violations within the country.[10]

The UN Human Rights Commission Responds

One body within the UN system that addressed the violations taking place in Uruguay was the Human Rights Commission. During the UN's early years, the commission was "content to promote rights by setting standards rather than trying to protect them."[11] Scholars Thomas Weiss, David Forsythe, and Roger Coate explain that during those first few decades, the commission believed it lacked the authority to inquire about the behavior taking place in specific states, and any direct complaints were buried in "an elaborate process leading nowhere, one of the most complicated trash baskets ever devised."[12] Indeed, the limited nature of the commission stemmed from its very design, as the superpowers often expressed disinterest or disdain towards international human rights in the context of its broader Cold War realist objectives.[13] When superpowers did engage with rights issues in the early years of the commission, as historian Mark Mazower attests, it most often originated from their goal of using "human rights as a weapon to be deployed against each other" as opposed to a real commitment to investigating abuses taking place.[14] As a result, the Human Rights Commission operated in its early years under a conservative course of action and privileged claims of state sovereignty.[15]

The work of the Human Rights Commission began to change in 1970 when an Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) resolution allowed the commission to investigate complaints that "show[ed] consistent or widespread patterns of gross or reliably attested human rights abuse."[16] Importantly, what paved the way for this expanded mandate was the influx of new members that joined the UN throughout the 1960s from newly independent Asian and African states which had a more vested interest in strong rights procedures.[17] Yet, even this resolution to enable investigations was structured as a Cold War decision wherein the entire procedure would be kept confidential in the hopes that it would encourage governments to work with the UN apparatus and keep superpower politics removed from initial investigations.[18] In some ways though, the confidential nature of these

investigations served to embolden military governments who sought to establish some contact with the UN but who painted a whitewashed picture of events and utilized the secretive nature of the proceedings to protect their governments from naming and shaming. The tensions inherent within the procedure's origins ultimately produced limits and politicized the process, as the case of Uruguay demonstrates.

Indeed, the UN Human Rights Commission placed Uruguay under the 1503 procedure in 1976.[19] The case was brought to the commission by Cuba, but ultimately the commission heard testimony and was aided by efforts from Uruguayan exiles and even the US Representative to the Commission, Brady Tyson, showing how in many ways the situation in Uruguay transcended bipolar Cold War dynamics. In addition, 1976 was a particularly propitious time for Uruguay to come under review as it was a key moment in the international human rights movement's effort to bring attention to the human rights plight in the country. For example, in February 1976, Uruguay became the first nation that London-based Amnesty International launched a country-wide campaign against, moving away from its individual prisoner-of-conscience approach. A year later, US President Jimmy Carter also made Uruguay one of his administration's key cases to push a concerted international human rights effort in a variety of forums.[20] From a Cold War perspective, the Carter administration's indictment of the regime was particularly important given the historic support from the United States towards anti-communist regimes, regardless of their human rights abuses. As such, the shift towards criticizing a supposed ally was a significant factor in compelling action as it no longer had the potential to be blocked solely on a bipolar worldview basis.

The Uruguayan government initially tried to counter the wave of international human rights pressure by taking an offensive stance towards those documenting and calling the government out for its abuses. First, the government accused Amnesty International of being "directed by Communist sympathizers."[21] It further complained of Carter unfairly targeting the country.[22] Yet, the counteroffensive did not just include lobbing complaints in the press and in governmental meetings; the government also changed its strategy towards international monitoring bodies that were increasingly bringing its abuses to light.[23]

In the early years of the dictatorship, Uruguay vehemently opposed any requests for foreign observers to come and examine the human rights situation in Uruguay. Yet, under the wave of pressure in the late 1970s, it attempted to show the world that conditions were not as bad as organizations like Amnesty were making them out to be. As a result, it decided to showcase a highly staged picture of the prisons and allow very selective international observers to examine them, which included the International Committee on the Red Cross and the UN's Human Rights Commission.

Letting the commission send an observer was particularly important because until 1979, the commission had kept Uruguay under review without making any significant progress in its investigation there. By 1979, however, the committee decided to ask the Secretary-General to "establish direct contacts with the Government of Uruguay, with a view to better inform the Commission about

any improvements of the human rights situation" by the time of the next review session.[24] This measure indicated that the commission believed the extent of human rights abuses in the country merited further action by their body.

Another important factor in analyzing the commission's action is to note that this entire process occurred when Kurt Waldheim was Secretary-General (1972–81). Scholars describe his time in the position as managerial in style, with him as "a plodding bureaucrat" who was careful not to upset the great powers of the time.[25] In addition, after he left the post and ran for president of Austria in 1986, new details about his service during the Second World War and participation in Nazi atrocities surfaced. While he was able to keep this information a secret during his entire tenure at the UN, his participation in Jewish deportations in Greece and the Balkans demonstrates a broader acquiescence towards political power and lack of commitment to human rights.[26] Thus, despite the rising concern about human rights internationally, Waldheim was certainly not at the forefront of pushing the UN overall in the direction of pursuing bold reforms. Instead, shifts towards human rights often occurred within individual bodies and organs, dependent on the commitment by the leaders of divisions.

In establishing contacts with the Uruguayan government, Waldheim selected Javier Pérez de Cuéllar to serve as his emissary.[27] Pérez de Cuéllar had been born in Peru, and his entire career was dedicated to diplomatic service. He first interned in the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1940, when he was still working on his law degree from Pontifical Catholic University of Peru, and he was part of the first Peruvian delegation ever sent to the United Nations General Assembly in 1946. While lacking in personal charisma, over the following decades, he gained vast experience in elite diplomacy that ranged from being a high-level ambassador from Peru to numerous countries around Latin America and Europe, and then at various missions within the UN.[28] His career ultimately came to fit very much within the Waldheim bureaucratic model wherein part of his ability to reach such diplomatic heights was due to his tolerance of all types of governments, including military rule. For instance, he officiated the inauguration of Peruvian military president Juan Velasco Alvarado in 1968 who took over because of a coup.[29] In all these roles, he was hardly known for taking any pioneering human rights stances. His report on Uruguay reflected that perspective. In it, he listed the conditions and priorities of his visit as having "a) exclusive dealings with the authorities, b) respect for the sovereignty of the State, c) a cautious and flexible approach to the problem, and d) confidentiality of the contacts."[30]

Overall, Pérez de Cuéllar's report praised members of the government and military, and ultimately reflected a regurgitation of the government line. He took it at face value that authorities had given "their assurance that they always acted within the constitutional and legal framework." He consistently repeated the government's belief that Uruguay was the victim of a campaign "being engineered by exiled or fugitive opposition politicians, with the support of foreign political groups interested in projecting an image of inhuman repression in Uruguay." In the end, after what can only appear as complete lack of attempt at an independent

assessment, he concluded that "the Uruguay government, according to the personal observations of the representative of the Secretary-General, is holding persons arrested for offences detrimental to the nation and related offences under normal detention conditions."[31]

Supported by hundreds of testimonies and thousands of pages of human rights groups' documents, scholar Iain Guest attests that Pérez de Cuéllar wrote a "majestically misleading report."[32] Indeed, while the Uruguayan government had sought to manage the Secretary-General emissary's visit, the report still reflected a lack of effort on behalf of Pérez de Cuéllar to verify the claims or to seek any additional perspective beyond what the government was willing to offer. As such, it demonstrated the Secretary-General office's willingness to satisfy the UN Commission on Human Right's inquiry, but only insofar as it furthered the priorities of surface level dialogue and respect for sovereignty over explicit human rights aims.

Despite these shortcomings from the UN, the Red Cross conducted a much more impartial visit in 1979 and was willing to challenge the government's propaganda. The Uruguayan government allowed them to visit the country and the organization insisted on speaking privately with political prisoners, in direct contrast to the UN's willingness to have "exclusive dealings with the authorities."[33] Even with political prisoners being under threat of punishment and limited communication, the ICRC was still able to write an appalling report about conditions, chronicling physical torture and mental abuse that included the banning of radios and newspapers, the lack of freedom to walk, shower, or even get up, which were all aimed at breaking the prisoners. As just one example of the contrast between the reports, Pérez de Cuéllar reported that "visits to prisoners were normal and regular."[34] Meanwhile, the Red Cross report noted that any visits with children of prisoners in Libertad prison were "stopped as soon as the father makes an affectionate gesture. The punishment will be one or two months of disciplinary cell, with no visits." It also catalogued how "even in visits where no contact was made between child and parent, following each visit the child is interrogated by a guard."[35] International human rights groups, such as the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), amplified the ICRC report, issuing press releases that highlighted the most atrocious findings, including the physical and mental anguish prisoners had to endure.[36]

Both reports were leaked to the press at approximately the same time, highlighting the contrast between the Red Cross's more independent investigation and the UN's acceptance of the highly staged visit. There were further implications of the UN leak. While the 1503 procedure was supposed to be confidential, its public airing allowed exiles to lobby against its falsehoods before the commission made a decision on the case. As a result, led by Uruguayan exiles and the director of the UN's Division for Human Rights Theo van Boven, these actors made sure that information about abuses were also presented to the commission. Most poignantly, Pérez de Cuéllar had attested that he spoke to some of the more prominent prisoners to make sure they were being treated well. One of them included Miguel Estrella, a famous pianist, who was in prison during de Cuéllar's

visit, but by the time the report leaked, had since been released from prison and was in exile in Europe. He was able to attest to the horrible treatment he received, and that he had never met or spoke to Pérez de Cuéllar, undermining the emissary's report.[37]

In the aftermath of the leaks, the Commission for Human Rights still had to decide how to proceed. Its options included whether to take Uruguay off the review list because of the report or to ignore the report (and thus ignore a high-level report from a representative of the Secretary-General's office) and either condemn the regime or to keep it on the list. The final decision offered a middle-of-the-road response.[38] Due to the lobbying by the UN Division for Human Rights and exiles, it kept Uruguay on the list under review. On the one hand, this move indeed ignored Pérez de Cuéllar's report that endorsed the government's position that it committed no violations. On the other hand, the commission refused to indict the Uruguayan government and went so far as to even commend it for the "direct contact and willingness [the government] has shown to cooperate with the Commission by submitting its replies."[39] The commission also asked Pérez de Cuéllar to continue dialoguing with the Uruguayan government because he had "established useful contacts within both governments [Uruguay and Paraguay] last year."[40] Therefore, despite de Cuéllar's reports' proven falsehoods, the commission continued working with him.

Aftermath of Reports

This decision ultimately produced somewhat divergent outcomes. Uruguay displayed satisfaction with the result. For example, Uruguay's ambassador to the UN during the mission, Edmundo Narancio, wrote to Secretary-General Waldheim in December 1980. In the letter, he explained he was "confident in [Pérez de Cuéllar's] proverbial intelligence, tact and objectivity will enable you to submit to the Commission on Human Rights a report which, like the previous report, is consistent with the truth. My country, beset by an international campaign of falsehoods, asks for nothing more."[41] Indeed, Pérez de Cuéllar had reproduced claims of Uruguayan victimhood and avoided any direct criticism or sanction. The United States, in internal memos about the commission decision, noted the "ineffectiveness of the direct contacts approach" because of these contradictions.[42] Yet, when the commission sought to continue direct contacts with the Uruguayan government the following year, Uruguay replied that they would "accept the visit of Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar alone, for if he were to be accompanied by an official from the Human Rights Division in Geneva, that would constitute a "Commission of Inquiry," which would not be acceptable to his government.[43] Of course, these conditions were not so much about a commission of inquiry as they were influenced by the criticism that Theo van Boven had lobbied against the regime from the Division for Human Rights. In the end, the Uruguayan government sought to control the UN process by only allowing specific and pre-approved UN representatives to monitor the country that would be most amenable to privileging state sovereignty and accepting the government's line, while refusing future visits

from investigators representing other, more critical UN divisions and human rights organizations such as the ICRC.[44]

As a result, clever diplomats such as Narancio and Carlos Giambruno—two Uruguayan ambassadors to the UN during the military dictatorship—sought to maneuver and manipulate the 1503 procedure, a strategy that Argentina also attempted to utilize in its dealings with the 1503 procedure very soon thereafter.[45] Meanwhile, human rights groups such as the International Commission of Jurists continued to lobby the Human Rights Commission to either urge further investigating Uruguay under 1503 or discuss the case publicly, but without gaining much traction.[46] Ultimately, despite vast pressure from various governments and human rights groups during Uruguay's dictatorship, the UN Human Rights Commission proved to be a forum where activists found limited success in advocating against the country's human rights abuses.

Conclusion

Uruguay's case at the commission demonstrates the multiple tensions within the UN system over the direction and role of human rights within the international body. The Uruguayan experience displayed the policy preferences of the Secretary-General's office, wherein keeping dialogue going became more important than addressing violations. In this case, it proved unwilling to push human rights issues into open areas of confrontation. Thus, in a battle between the Secretary-General's office, the UN Commission on Human Rights, and the UN's Division for Human Rights, the fight and direction over human rights at the UN was beset by internal conflicts. Various UN actors continued longstanding debates over sovereignty or the primacy of human rights, and over the role of engaging state actors versus privileging victims' voices.

Indeed, the aftermath of Uruguay's experience also demonstrates some of these conflicts. For example, Pérez de Cuéllar became Secretary-General in 1982, clearly not hindered by a report that supported Uruguay's repressive military government. If anything, the incident was either ignored or viewed as a positive for his "quiet diplomatic" skills and respect for state actors by those voting on his candidacy. It is notable, however, that soon after Pérez de Cuéllar took over as Secretary-General, Theo van Boven was forced out of his position as the director of the Division for Human Rights, over "major policy differences with the leadership of the organization in New York."[47] While initially vague on the reasons for leaving, Pérez de Cuéllar ultimately argued that van Boven "had spoken out of turn."[48] The conflict between the two men just two years earlier made van Boven's departure a continuation of a deeper battle over the role of human rights at UN, demonstrating the contested direction of human rights more broadly at that moment within the UN system and the long shelf life of interpersonal dynamics.[49]

The implications of this one case also demonstrate the politicization of the UN Human Rights machinery in both the Cold War and post-Cold War context. The Cold War as a historically bounded period does not fully explain the shortcomings of various cases before its human rights apparatus. Indeed, the Human Rights

Commission dissolved in 2006 and was replaced by the Human Rights Council, which has similar politicization issues.[50] Further, beyond this one commission/council, Uruguay's experience is emblematic of the conflicted understandings of the role of human rights at the UN that began during its very founding and continued well past the Cold War's conclusion to this day.[51] As such, Uruguay is an example of a site of contestation over power between states and civil servants who did not view the UN as a human rights apparatus but rather as an institution that reproduced Great Power maneuvering, and the victims and advocates who perpetually strove to make the system more responsive to abuses with varying degrees of success.

The Uruguayan case further demonstrates the UN as an international organization with built-in limits.[52] Despite Uruguay's initial attempts to compel more systematic ways for the UN system to deal with human rights abuses around the globe, the UN's very failure in the 1940s and early 1950s to develop stronger mechanisms to address human rights are what allowed various states, including Uruguay's own military dictatorship, to exploit the institution and evade real censure in following decades. Therefore, while the UN's lack of response to massive human rights violations in the Southern Cone in 1970s demonstrated fundamental contrasts between its actions and those of the rapidly growing international human rights organizations, in some ways, the bright glare of that disparity says more about the growing importance of human rights at a transnational level during this period than it does about the UN's inaction, which was relatively consistent since its origins.[53] As such, Uruguay's experience with the Human Rights Commission is an example of what the introduction to this volume emphasizes—that international organizations do not automatically promote convergence around shared values, but rather oftentimes reflect or deepen preexisting divisions and limits.[54]

This chapter also suggests that Uruguay offers an opportunity to examine the role of small states in exposing conflicts within the UN system. While, for example, Carter and Amnesty International saw the country's small size as an advantage in advancing new policies, the UN was far more tepid in its human rights stance towards the state. There is an emerging effort by scholars to shed light on whether a state's size and perceived importance impacts how the international system approaches it.[55] Indeed, this study is an examination of how the international system dealt with human rights in small states at critical moments of international and geopolitical events to expose certain contradictions. Certainly, Uruguay's small size made it particularly sensitive to criticism by the commission in a way perhaps larger states can just ignore, but research that further studies these issues is still needed.

Ultimately, the curious case of Uruguay before the Human Rights Commission in 1979–80 is a striking example of the failure of the UN system to take a strong human rights stance in a country with a very repressive government, and proved to be a forum that the Uruguayan military regime was able to effectively present an alternative and distorted vision of the human rights abuses in the country. Unfortunately, its success is far from an outlier, but demonstrative of the limits of the human rights breakthrough of the period and the deep continuities in the UN's inability to effectively harness its apparatus in support of even clear-cut human rights cases.

Notes

1 Ron Wheeler, "The United Nations Commission on Human Rights: A Study of 'Targeted' Resolutions," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 32 (1999): 75–101; Iain Guest, *Behind the Disappearances: Argentina's Dirty War and the United Nations* (Philadelphia: Penn Press, 1990), 141.

2 Other scholars have explored the how UN policy towards Southern Cone dictatorships in the late Cold War shifted over the course of the military regimes. For example, Iain Guest has traced the relationship between the UN and Argentina. He argues that the UN system initially sought to catalog and protest human rights violations taking place in the region, but by the 1980s, the UN fell victim to politicization and pressure from the US government to play a much more conciliatory role towards to right wing military regimes. Guest, *Behind the Disappearance*. Uruguay's case was perhaps not so clear cut during a similar time period, as this chapter explores.

3 Scholars have examined the politicization of the Human Rights Commission and the presence of violators that ultimately led to its replacement by the UN Human Rights Council in 2006, for example see Nazila Ghanea, "UN Commission on Human Rights to UN Human Rights Council: One Step Forwards or Two Steps Sideways?" *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 55, no. 3 (July 2006): 695–705; Nadia Sarwar, "Evolution of the UN Human Rights Council," *Strategic Studies* 27, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 127–53.

4 David Forsythe, "The United Nations and Human Rights, 1945–1985," *Political Science Quarterly*, 100, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 248–69; Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

5 Kathryn Sikkink, "Latin American Countries as Norm Protagonists of the Idea of International Human Rights," *Global Governance* 20, no. 3 (July–Sept 2014), 391; Mary Ann Glendon, "The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the Universal Human Rights Idea," *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 16 (Spring 2003): 27–39; Paolo G. Carozza, "From Conquest to Constitutions: Retrieving a Latin American Tradition of the Idea of Human Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (May 2003): 281–313; Kathryn Sikkink, *Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 21st Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 57–79.

6 "The Uruguayan proposal for intervention in the affairs of states through multilateral action in cases of flagrant violation of human rights or non-fulfillment of freely contracted obligations," *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The American Republics, Volume IX,* documents 126–57; Sikkink, "Latin American Countries," 394–96.

7 Janet Lord, "The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Challenges and Opportunities," *Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review* 17 (1995): 331; Bases of Proposal to Establish a United Nations Attorney-General for Human Rights, Memorandum submitted by Uruguay, 1951, A/C.3/564, United National Online Archive.

8 Ed Koch, "Uruguay: Torture Chamber of Latin America," *Congressional Record-House*, March 25, 1976, 8013; Franch Church, "Halting Military Assistance to Uruguay," *Congressional Record-Senate*, September 22, 1976, 31807; Andrew Graham-Yooll, "Birthday Celebrations in the 'Torture Chamber'," *The Guardian*, June 27, 1979, 7.

9 AI Mission to Uruguay and Paraguay Memo, June 12, 1974, Amnesty International Secretariat Collections, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam,

Netherlands. Interestingly, Uruguay had also repeatedly been elected to serve on the commission in its early years due to its previous support of human rights within the UN. Letter from Uruguay to John Foster Dulles, May 24, 1954, Box 35, Folder 7, Archivo Histórico-Diplomático, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Montevideo, Uruguay.

10 Memo, Buffum to SecGen, October 4, 1978, Folder Human Rights General 1977–1980, File 4, Box 23, Series S-0913, United Nations Archive, New York, NY [hereinafter UN Archives]. The memo details cases where "Since 1975, Uruguay has been increasingly cited for wide-spread violations of human rights, both by governmental and regional inter-governmental organizations."

11 Thomas Weiss, David Forsythe, and Roger Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, 4th edn. (Boulder: Westview, 2004), 169–70.

12 Ibid., 170. For more on the Commission's early standard setting work, see Rose Freedman, *The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Critique and Early Assessment* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 13–17.

13 Forsythe, "The United Nations and Human Rights," 251–53; Moyn, *The Last Utopia,* 46.

14 Mark Mazower, "The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950," *The Historical Journal* 47, no. 2 (June 2004): 395. An early example of this dynamic is when W.E.B. du Bois presented complaints by the NAACP to the UN on the US's history of racial discrimination, which the Soviet Union brought to the commission to investigate.

15 Philip Alston, "The Commission on Human Rights," in Philip Alston (ed.), *The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal* (New York: Oxford, 1995), 130–1. As Alston later goes on to explain, during the early years, both powers did not want the commission to turn its gaze on their own domestic violations and therefore had a vested interest in limiting the action of the body.

16 "UN Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-commission on the promotion and protection of Human Rights," *Human Rights Library, University of Minnesota*, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/svaw/law/un/enforcement/1503.htm#:~:text=The%201503%20Procedure%2C%20as%20amended,not%20revealed%20to%20the%20government (accessed August 23, 2024).

17 Alston, "The Commission on Human Rights," 143.

18 Part of the worry with initial proposals that would have made this process transparent and public was that investigations would bring scrutiny to the superpowers who were giving aid or allies of various regimes, and thus veto or find a way to shut down these investigations before they even got off the ground.

19 Vania Markarian, *Left in Transformation: Uruguayan Exiles and the Latin American Human Rights Network, 1967–1984* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 128.

20 Debbie Sharnak, *Of Light and Struggle: Social Justice, Human Rights, and Accountability in Uruguay* (Philadelphia: Penn Press, 2023), see chs. 2 and 3.

21 See Howard Handelman, "Uruguayan Journal," July 7, 1976, *Worldview,* Folder: Background Press, Box 279, WOLA Collection, Human Rights Archive, Duke University, Durham, NC [hereinafter WOLA].

22 Memorandum Prepared in the CIA, March 21, 1977, *FRUS, 1977–1980: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs*, Document 25; "Nota Respuesta al Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica con Relación al Informe sobre Derechos Humanos en el Uruguay," nd, 11–12, Folder 4, Álvaro Barros Lémez Colección, Centro de Estudios Interdisciplinarios Uruguayos (CEIU), Montevideo, Uruguay; Memo, Santiago Embassy to DOS, "Visit by Uruguayan Army Chief," August 7, 1980, Department of State Virtual Reading Room (hereinafter DOSVRR); Memorandum

Prepared in the CIA, May 11, 1977, *FRUS, 1977–1980: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs,* Document 42; Action Memorandum from the Lake to Vance, January 20, 1978, *FRUS, 1977–1980: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs,* Document 105.

23 Memo, Lake and Bowdler to Christopher, "FY82 Goals and Objectives: Review of Ambassador's Policy Assessment on Uruguay," April 15, 1980, Folder: TL 4/1-4/15/80, Box 6, Records of Anthony Lake, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. As noted in the memo, while allowing the ICRC and the UN, Uruguay continued to adamantly refuse to receive a visit from the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.

24 Décision confidentielle concernant l'Uruguay, March 9, 1979, E/CN.4/R.49, UN Archives. The same meeting also saw votes to establish or maintain contacts with Ethiopia and Paraguay with a "view to keeping the Commission informed and to improving the human rights situations in those countries." See: Memo, Buffum to Waldheim, May 3, 1979, Folder: Commission on Human Rights 1974–1979, File 1, Box 24, Series S-0913, UN Archives.

25 Seymour Maxwell Finger, *Bending with the Winds: Kurt Waldheim and the United Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1990); K. Kile, *From Manager to Visionary: The Secretary-General of the United Nations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 125.

26 Richard Mitten, *The Politics of Antisemitic Prejudice: The Waldheim Phenomenon in Austria* (New York: Routledge, 2019); David Ian Klein, "75 Years after Nuremberg, America's Top Nazi Hunter Looks Back," *The Forward*, June 3, 2021, https://forward.com/news/470833/nazi-hunter-eli-rosenbaum-nuremberg/ (accessed August 23, 2024); George Lankevich, *The United Nations under Javier Pérez de Cuéllar 1982–1991* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2001), 78–83. Lankevich calls the Waldheim affairs "the most embarrassing of all UN scandals," 83.

27 Memo from William Buffum to SecGen, "Implementation of Decisions adopted by the Commission on Human Rights regarding Ethiopia, Paraguay, and Uruguay," May 3, 1979, Folder: SGKW Commission on Human Rights 1974–1979, File 1, Box 24, Series 2-0913, UN Archives.

28 Lankevich, *The United Nations under Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.*

29 Guest, *Behind the Disappearances,* 141–42.

30 "Human Rights in Uruguay," Folder Uruguay 1980–1984, File 4, Box 14, Series 347, UN Archives.

31 Ibid. While Pérez de Cuéllar had been in New York immediately prior to his trip, he largely evaded attempts to discuss human rights issues with his more strident colleagues. For example, when Theo van Boven, the director of the Division for Human Rights at the United Nations, had tried to meet with him to give him information about known prisoners in the Uruguayan jails so that Pérez Cuéllar could obtain information about them on his trip. Yet, as Iain Guest outlines, Pérez Cuéllar avoided the topic during the meeting. Also see Buffum to Pérez de Cuéllar, April 19, 1979, Folder: Commission on Human Rights, 1974–79, File 1, Box 24, Series S-0913, UN Archives.

32 Guest, *Behind the Disappearances,* 143. The vast documentation by human rights groups included groups such as WOLA, Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, among others. For more on this movement in the 1970s, see Sharnak, *Of Light and Struggle*, ch. 2, and Vania Markarian, *Left in Transformation.*

33 "Human Rights in Uruguay," Folder Uruguay 1980–1984, File 4, Box 14, Series 347, UN Archives.

34 Ibid.
35 Jean François Labarthe, Informe de Misión Brasil-Argentina-Uruguay, Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja, March 1980, File 4, Box 14, Series 347, UN Archives.
36 Press Release, "Confidential Report Documents Brutal Conditions in Uruguayan 'Libertad' Prison," November 5, 1980, Folder Press Releases, Box 282, WOLA.
37 Letter, Estrella to Said, February 27, 1980, and February 25, 1980 annex, File 4, Box 14, Series 347, UN Archives.
38 As the US report on the working group noted, Pérez de Cuéllar's report was "merely a repeating of the government denial of any violations." Helman Memo, "36th UN Human Rights Commission," March 3, 1980, DOSVRR.
39 Décision confidentielle concernant l'Uruguay, March 6, 1980, E/CN.4/R.64, UN Archives.
40 Memo, Buffum to SecGen, Implementation of decisions adopted at 36th session of the Commission on Human Rights concerning Paraguay and Uruguay, June 9, 1980, Folder Commission on Human Rights 1980–1981, File 8, Box 24, Series S-0913, UN Archives.
41 Letter, Narancio to Waldheim, December 23, 1980, File 20, Uruguay 1980, Box 88, Series S-0904, Correspondence Files of the SG Waldheim, UN Archives.
42 Helman Memo, "Debate and Decision on Uruguay," March 12, 1980, DOSVRR.
43 Note to Secretary-General, January 14, 1981, Folder Uruguay 1980–1984, File 4, Box 14, Series 347, UN Archives.
44 See "Notas sobre la reunión sostenida entre el Secretario General y el Encargado de Negocios del Uruguay," February 26, 1982, Folder Uruguay 1980–1984, File 4, Box 14, Series 347, UN Archives. For future reports though, the Secretary-General advised that the representative also "contact a wide range of 'other sources' so to add credibility to his report." Note for the Record by Diego Cordovez, January 12, 1982, Folder Uruguay 1980–1984, File 4, Box 14, Series 347, UN Archives. However, in the following year, the Uruguayan government suggested that "contacts" be conducted in New York, a recommendation the UN adhered to, making any report by Pérez de Cuéllar that much more subject to only intergovernmental discussions, not even being able to see or talk to anyone in Uruguay.
45 Guest, *Behind the Disappearances,* 141.
46 International Commission of Jurists, "ICJ Newsletter no. 8," January to March 1981, Folder: Human Rights, Box 4, Papers of Shepard Forman, Ford Foundation Reports, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY.
47 "UN Rights Official Steps Down, Citing 'Policy Differences'," *New York Times,* February 11, 1982.
48 "How the UN lost interest in human rights," *The Guardian,* May 12, 1982, 8.
49 It should be noted, as well, that the Human Rights Commission also continued to adapt and revise its own proceedings. See Alston, "The Commission on Human Rights."
50 Bertrand G. Ramcharan, *The UN Human Rights Council* (New York: Routledge, 2011), xvi. As Ramcharan wrote soon after the council was formed, "In many respects, the nascent Human Rights Council is very much like its forerunner, the Commission on Human Rights—politicized and ineffective at tangibly improving human rights conditions in some of the worst offending states."
51 Moyn, for example, writes about the UN's struggle with human rights in its early years as Cold War politics forced the body to drop the cause as a key area of investment. Moyn, *The Last Utopia*. Forsythe looks at the evolution of a "few vague

references" in the charter to "numerous obligations of increasing salience." Forsythe, "The United Nations and Human Rights, 1945–1985." Mark Mazower also explains that rhetoric on rights often provided a veil to the Great Power dynamics of the body. Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Place: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 3. For an evaluation of these continued challenges in the post-Cold War era, see, for example, Stephen Marks, "The United Nations and Human Rights," in Richard Pierre Claude and Burns H. Weston (eds.), *Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action* (Philadelphia: Penn Press, 2006), 341–55.

52 Louis Henkin writes poignantly about these structural limits, explaining that disappointment towards human rights at the UN "may reflect unwarranted expectations" wherein "optimism about national respect for human rights was not solidly founded." See Louis Henkin, "The United Nations and Human Rights," *International Organization* 19, no. 3 (Summer 1965): 507.

53 This is not to say that the UN has not made progress with respect to human rights over its eight decades of existence. Indeed, there have been significant advances in the aftermath of the Cold War. For example, see the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. However, all these projects were highly contested, and many similar issues from the Cold War plague their functioning. Yet, when there were successes both during and after the Cold War, they can largely be attributed to nongovernmental organizations' consistent pressure and advocacy. Theo van Boven, "The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: The History of a Contested Project," *Leiden Journal of International Law* 20 (2007): 767–84.

54 Eva-Maria Muschik, Sandrine Kott, and Elisabeth Roehrlich, "Introduction," 6.

55 Tom Long, *A Small State's Guide to Influence in World Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022) has even focused specifically on small states' role in human rights (see pages 151–7 in particular); Andrea O Súilleabháin, *Small States at the United Nations: Diverse Perspective, Shared Opportunities* (New York: World Peace, 2014); Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson, eds., *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe: The Influence of Smaller Powers* (London: Routledge, 2020).

Chapter 13

Getting Rid of Geopolitics: International Women's Rights in the Late Cold War

Ioana Cîrstocea*

Scholarship on international women's rights norms prizes the UN's role in a dual process of globalization and expert professionalization of feminism.[1] Launched with the International Women's Year (IWY) and the Mexico City Conference (1975), this process includes the UN Decade for Women (1976–85), as well as the Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi (1985), and Beijing (1995) world conferences on women. Through a series of declarations, conventions, and actions plans, it enshrined the contemporary repertory of "women's human rights" and "gender mainstreaming." Commonly seen as a continuum of successful struggle for incorporating activist references into international law, the period 1975–95 includes the Cold War's end, which was a major historical disruption. Given the contrasting framing of social issues—and especially of gender[2]—in liberal and socialist settings, the geopolitical confrontation must have impacted the thinking on women's rights in international venues. Yet, activist testimonies, institutional documents, and the majority of publications in history and sociology of transnational feminist mobilizations of the years under scrutiny silence or minimize ideological divisions.

Only a scarce body of the literature reflects the grip of geopolitics on post-Second World War women's movements and reveals the ethnocentric biases of mainstream studies. Indeed, the "global feminism" narrative overlooks both the perspective of women from socialist countries on UN conferences and the internationalist projects supported by the Eastern bloc.[3] In the wake of pioneering scholarship by Francisca de Haan, a few recent works have notably scrutinized the activities of the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), a communist-oriented organization, founded in 1945 in Paris by anti-fascist women.

* My gratitude goes to the book editors for comments and to Sébastien Le Pipec for editing work.

Present in dozens of countries where it was one of the driving forces of left women's political activism, the USSR-supported WIDF organized regular congresses and issued multilingual publications that circulated worldwide. It was the very initiator of IWY and lobbied for UN norms such as the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (DEDAW, 1967) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1979). It took pacifist, anti-imperialist and anti-racist stances and advocated the writing of gender equality into law, the institutional promotion of women in the public sphere, and welfare-oriented measures for mothers and children.

Acknowledging the contrasting framings of women's rights during the Cold War, my chapter uncovers those initiatives that legitimized the universalizing paradigm of "global feminism." References such as "women's human rights" and "gender mainstreaming" stem from socially and historically situated transnational synergies that must be studied apart from both activist and institutional perspectives. By focusing on the profiles, practices, and resources of individuals and groups, a sociological approach allows for uncovering the entanglements between international gender politics and Cold War diplomacy.

My research set out by investigating the mainsprings of an international petition drive calling for recognizing "women's human rights." Launched in the early 1990s at an American university (Rutgers, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Center for Women's Global Leadership—CWGL) and coordinated by US feminist organizer and expert Charlotte Bunch, it was widely echoed at the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, it led to the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW, 1993), and formulated terminology for the final document of the Beijing 1995 conference. By following the biographic trajectory and the sociability groups of the campaign's coordinator, as well as the circulation of the material means that allowed for its organization, I have, in previous work, drawn the perimeter of groups and institutions involved in building the ideological paradigm of "global feminism," a process that started in the late 1970s.[4]

The sources of my investigation[5] include the CWGL collection (Rutgers University); C. Bunch's personal archives (Schlesinger Library, Harvard University); records of grants awarded by US philanthropic foundations to women's groups involved in international activism after IWY (Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC), Sleepy Hollow, New York); the collection of the International Women's Tribune Centre (Sophia Smith Collection of Women's History, Northampton, Massachusetts); feminist periodicals; digitized documents from the UN conferences on women available in the database "Women and Social Movements, International—1840 to Present" (WSMI, Alexander Street); interviews, publications and biographical documents of the most visible actors of "global feminism"; secondary literature on Cold War transnational activism.

Based on this material, the present chapter discusses IWY's echoes in the United States, before considering various solidarity-building strategies aimed at overcoming North–South ideological dissent in preparation of the two conferences

of the UN Decade for Women (1980 and 1985). Eventually, it exposes the affirmation in Beijing 1995 of an international consensus that erased the specific Eastern bloc's position on gender politics.

Proliferating Networks after the IWY "Shock"

In addition to governmental assemblies, world conferences on women have included gatherings ("Tribune" in 1975, later "Forum") prepared by a committee of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in consultative status with the UN (CONGO). Already tested in 1972 and 1974 (UN Conference on Environment in Stockholm and UN population summit in Bucharest), such "civil society meetings" did not adopt resolutions and were praised by their organizers as "authentic" political arenas, compared to the official conferences dominated by male leaders, formal rules, and geopolitical concerns.

The Mexico City Tribune was chaired by Mildred Persinger of the United Sates (US) Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) and supported by a committee comprising, among others, representatives of the International Alliance of Women, the International Council of Women, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the World YWCA. One of them was Rosalind W. Harris, the ex-coordinator of the Bucharest 1974 activist gathering and a former member of the Committee of Correspondence, a US organization created in 1952 and disbanded in 1969 after revelations of its CIA backing for surveillance of women's mobilizations in the decolonized world.[6] Third World guests at the Mexico City Tribune were women recommended by US foundations and the Agency for International Development (USAID). As "cosmopolitan subalterns,"[7] they had studied in the metropolises and held bureaucratic positions in their countries or in UN agencies. Among them, two women who would later write on "global feminism," namely Caribbean Peggy Antrobus, advisor to the Jamaican government, and Indian Devaki Jain, researcher at the New Delhi Institute for Social Studies Trust.

Several recent publications expose the geopolitical tensions surrounding the IWY-related events.[8] For instance, competition between liberal organizations and the WIDF was critical to the very decision to hold a world conference on women in 1975. Indeed, when the Federation announced an international congress in Berlin to celebrate its thirtieth anniversary together with IWY, a lobby based in New York mobilized to have a UN-labeled IWY conference as well, and it managed to assume the leadership for the organization of this event that took place in Mexico City.[9] Beyond the East–West confrontation, the geopolitical context comprised the "counter-hegemonic offensive" of decolonized countries within the international venues.[10] Allied under the G77, they had succeeded in dominating the UN General Assembly thanks to their number and to socialist states' support. These tensions were also reflected in the UN IWY conference's debates and documents. If in the institutional history and mainstream historiography the final World

Plan of Action has lived on, the "Declaration of Mexico," less known nowadays but also issued at the end of the conference, sounded a radical critique of global economic relations. Reclaiming national sovereignty over natural resources, it called for a "New International Economic Order" and stressed women's "enormous revolutionary potential for economic and social change."[11]

During the event in Mexico City, US witnesses were "shocked"[12] by the extent and vehemence of anti-capitalist stances expressed by numerous Third World actors and sought to refocus debates on "genuine" women's issues. At the Tribune, liberal feminists such as Betty Friedan condemned the official meeting as an expression of "male politics" and attempted to rally the attendees by stressing their "specific," gendered oppression. At the governmental meeting, Elizabeth Reid, advisor to the Australian prime minister, urged (unsuccessfully) that the word "sexism" be introduced into the final conference documents.[13]

The soundtrack of Cold War "politicization" of debates versus "refocusing" them on "genuine" women's issues was played anew during the two gatherings of the UN Decade for Women in Copenhagen and Nairobi. The double format comprising both governmental summits and informal encounters was also maintained. US-based women's groups planned the latter and appointed women from decolonized countries to prominent positions.

As early as 1976, initiatives emerged in the United States aimed at anticipating conflict and "pacifying" the exchanges with Third World women. One of the first attempts of this kind was a 1976 international event at Wellesley College, supported by the Ford Foundation and focusing on "women and development."[14] Bringing together IWY conference attendees from the South, representatives of Western development agencies, and area-studies scholars based in North American universities, the meeting led to fierce controversies, as several African participants denounced the neo-colonial mechanisms of international development cooperation.[15] Organized merely a few days later,[16] a second event enabled the US hosts to re-establish a consensual framework, which would be consolidated and institutionalized in the years to come as an expertise sector known as "women in development" (WID).

WID built on perspectives advanced by Danish economist Ester Boserup, whose criticism of the gendered biases of development programs was echoed by Western aid agencies.[17] In 1978, USAID set up a Women in Development office under the leadership of political campaigner Arvonne Fraser; soon after, a working group organized on US initiative within the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, and an Association for Women in Development was established in the United States. Among the latter's partners was the International Women's Tribune Center, a body stemming from the Mexico City Tribune. Anne S. Walker, a UK- and US-trained education and communication specialist from Australia,[18] coordinated International Women's Tribune Center activities, while Mildred Persinger was its president until 1983. With funding from European development agencies, the United Methodist Church, as well as the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie Foundations, this center organized the 1980, 1985, and 1995 NGO Forums paralleling the UN world conferences on women and kept their archives.[19]

The International Women's Tribune Center was geographically located in New York next to the UN building and its staff members were also socially close to international organizations, US private foundations, and governmental employees, who briefed them on the geopolitical concerns of the day and offered advice prior to submitting funding applications. The center defined itself as "a network of networks"[20] and a hub for North–South exchanges. Managing a directory of WID-related resource persons, they assembled information on women's activism, published newsletters, issued books on structuring and funding NGO work, offered them to women's groups based in developing countries.[21] While the international label was displayed in the very name of the center and in the composition of its steering committee,[22] achieving and maintaining such a reach were a matter of intensive mobilization and hard work. In the 1980s, internal debates and external evaluations identified difficulties with broadening the collaborators' pool and the range of activities outside the United States.[23] However, by the turn of the 1980s, the donors stressed International Women's Tribune Center's instrumental role in building "global women's movement" and increased their funding offer in preparation for Beijing.[24]

Omnipresent in the Tribune Center grant proposals, the "networking" objective encompassed both practical and symbolic matters and enabled the center to be aware of political activities around the world, to share information about them with their institutional partners, and also to occupy discursive and physical spaces during international events on women. During the 1980 second world conference on women in Copenhagen, the International Women's Tribune Center hosted workshops and exhibitions in an area they managed under the name of "*Vivencia!*"[25] In its turn, the USAID offered networking sessions under the label "The Exchange," which were prepared jointly by a Carnegie Foundation officer and by P. Antrobus and were closely observed and reported upon in writing.

The daily newspapers of the forums, managed by CONGO and International Women's Tribune Center, recorded numerous US-based efforts and initiatives to promote networking across borders, likely to quell political controversies by fostering collaboration with individuals from decolonized countries. Organized around the theme of credit for women's groups, such a network originated in an international seminar held in Mexico City a few days before the IWY conference, under the aegis of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. It was incorporated in 1979 as Women's World Banking and collaborated with various UN agencies.[26] Another network, focused on teaching and research in women's studies,[27] was formed in May 1980 at a UNESCO expert meeting. It organized workshops during the Decade conferences, helped establish women's studies programs in developing countries, issued publications, and organized international congresses.[28] In 1980 as well, the Tribune Center strategized for a group of women journalists[29] to monitor the activities of the Inter-Press Service, a media consortium set up by decolonized states calling for "New International Information and Communication Order" to resist Western agencies' news control. That same year, a network against women's international trafficking and sexual exploitation emerged as well, hosted by the Women's Tribune Center and supported by the Ford Foundation.[30] Other transnational women's groups structured after the

Nairobi conference with financial help and know-how from the US foundations. They include (among others) Developing Alternatives with Women for a New Era, the International Women's Rights Action Watch, the International Women's Health Coalition, and Women Living Under Muslim Law.[31]

"Sisterhood" and "Global Feminism" versus Geopolitical Antagonism

By the mid-UN Decade for Women, Western actors used references to "sisterhood" for overcoming Cold War divisions and for countering anti-hegemonic discourses that appealed to women as "revolutionary reserve."[32] The UN venues were not the unique arena where such initiatives took shape.

In March 1976 in Brussels, an International Tribunal on Crimes against Women criticized the IWY-related events as attempts to confiscate women's issues and proclaimed feminist solidarity against common gender oppression and sexist violence.[33] The event was organized by the "International Feminist Network," a gathering of North-American and Western European activists, of which some were attached to ISIS International.[34] Claiming the power of "sisterhood" and of "international sisterhood" in capital letters, the tribunal's report co-authored by US-based sociologist Diana Russell records the participation of more than 2,000 women from about forty countries, stresses the power of feminism as an "independent" political idea, and makes the wish of "global feminism."[35]

The production of a volume published in the United States to reclaim "global sisterhood"[36] supports the hypothesis that asserting women's solidarity based on common gender oppression, beyond borders and across opposing political systems, was a Cold War concern. Edited by Robin Morgan, a radical feminist and journalist working for the US *Ms.* magazine, the book responds to political tensions expressed during the UN Decade for Women. In 1980, the volume's coordinator welcomed dissident women expelled from the USSR, featured their portraits on the cover of her magazine, and organized press conferences with them in the United States.[37] She then launched her collection of contributions to document the condition of women around the world in partnership with some of the organizations and individuals already mentioned here. The Ford Foundation and the United Methodist Church funded the project; C. Bunch, B. Friedan, D. Russell, A. Fraser, and E. Reid (among others) partnered it, while P. Antrobus and D. Jain wrote contributions to the volume; guest writers also include several exiles who criticized socialist regimes.

Besides, in the US political-bureaucratic circles, the preparations for the 1985 UN Nairobi conference on women focused on strategies for "de-politicizing" international debates on women's status and for highlighting their "commonalities."[38] For instance, a document submitted to the United States Information Agency (USIA) by the National Advisory Committee for the preparation of the event envisages the Nairobi conference as an opportunity to disseminate American cultural values while advancing the country's foreign policy objectives. It also lists measures such as raising future participants' awareness of

"intercultural" issues through training and exchanges with people who had first-hand experience of the Mexico City and Copenhagen conferences, role-plays, and distribution of fact sheets exposing the distinction between geopolitical problems and "real" women's issues.[39]

It was, eventually, C. Bunch who formulated an effective "prospect" for potentially "global" framing of women's politics in international venues. By the time she became visible in the forums related to the UN Decade for Women, Bunch was in her mid-thirties.[40] In 1978, an issue of her co-edited *Quest. A Feminist Quarterly* on the theme of "international feminism"[41] featured contributions by D. Jain ("Can feminism be a global ideology?") and E. Reid ("Women, economic development, and the UN"), as well as commentaries on the Brussels Tribunal (by organizer D. Russell) and the Wellesley Conference (by participants Nawal El Saadawi, Fatima Mernissi, and Mallica Vajrathon).

In June 1979 Bunch took part in a workshop organized in Bangkok by the Asian and Pacific Center for Women and Development (APCWD), a UN office set up in 1977 and initially headed by E. Reid, with whom A.S. Walker of the International Women's Tribune Center also collaborated. The meeting was co-organized by the Women and Development Unit of the University of the West Indies (WAND, coordinated by P. Antrobus) with the support of the Ford and Carnegie Foundations. It resulted in the production of a video entitled "World Feminists" to be screened in *Vivencia!* during the 1980 Copenhagen conference on women. In April 1980, a second workshop took place in Stony Point (New York) and produced a document that fostered the "operational" definition of feminism with a "global" scope. In order to overcome Cold War conflicting framings of gender politics, Bunch defined feminism as a transformative political perspective applying to all aspects of human life and reflecting the full awareness of the roots of women's subordination, as well as the commitment to abolishing it.[42] This flexible definition and references to the encounters in Bangkok and Stony Point, understood as the living proofs that women from Third World and Western countries could find "a measure of agreement on issues despite different background,"[43] appeared in activist texts throughout the 1980s and even later on.

At the 1980 Copenhagen Forum, the International Women's Tribune Center offered seminars that C. Bunch designed and coordinated with Shirley Castley, a collaborator of E. Reid and a participant in the two workshops mentioned above. Under the umbrella "International Feminist Networking," they invited the attendees to discuss operational framings of feminism and took issue with a quip penned by the press, according to which talking feminism "to a woman who has no water, no food, and no home is to talk nonsense."[44] Bunch subsequently published several texts in support of her "global" perspective and presented it for debate during the Nairobi NGO Forum, as part of a roundtable she chaired in the name of the "International Feminist Networking Coordinating Project."[45] The context-sensitive definition of feminism she had worked out since the late 1970s—namely a locally rooted political perspective and struggle guided by criticism of male domination—was circulated in numerous publications and discussed in international settings with women from the Global South.

Despite the preparations designed to defuse ideological debates, in Copenhagen, as in Mexico City, Third World women often spoke out not against male domination, as expected by their Western counterparts, but against imperial mechanisms and international economic rule exerted by capitalist countries in the name of development cooperation. By the end of the decade, however, a group of feminists from the South made themselves known under the name Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN). Once again, the International Women's Center and the US private foundations facilitated its blossoming. Organized from 1983 onwards, the Development Alternatives counted among its founders several women internationally active since the IWY conference, including P. Antrobus and D. Jain.[46] Numerous Western activists and experts (among them C. Bunch) consulted the group prior to their manifesto's launch in 1985 and were invited to their thematic sessions in Nairobi.

Often described as the herald of a Southern feminist critique of development economics, and even as an actor of Cold War left-wing internationalism,[47] this group has been regularly cited to illustrate the diversification, and even the "globalization," of feminism. Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era nevertheless remained strongly attached to liberal practices and ideologies. For instance, their activities did not include partners from the Eastern European countries, while their meetings with "socialists of color"[48] were prepared with behavioral psychology experts who taught techniques to prevent conflicts. Finally, the Development Alternatives maintained a close working relationship with Western-based WID experts and US private foundations, with whom they were connected through funding and professional collaborations, as indicated by various biographical accounts.[49]

Post-Cold War Endgame: Eastern Europeans Going "Global"

During the events of the UN Decade for Women, people affiliated with the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) and identified with the Eastern bloc's side in the Cold War proposed debates on women's work, education, and health, organized workshops on peace and disarmament, affirmed their support for revolutionary and anti-racist struggles, and painted laudatory yet nuanced pictures of the socialist states' women-friendly measures. Activists of international stature, prominent WIDF figures such as Fanny Edelman (Argentina), Freda Brown (Australia), Mirjam Vire-Tuominen (Finland), as well as Vilma Espín (president of the Federation of Cuban Women), Elena Lagadinova (leader of the Committee of Bulgarian Women), and Valentina Tereshkova (president of the Soviet Women's Committee)[50] were featured in conference-related publications. In 1985 in Nairobi the WIDF proposed a fourth summit to be held before the year 2000, and, in order to concretely assess progress since IWY, called for systematic collection of statistical data and information on gender-equality law adopted by each state.[51]

Privileging the perspective of Cold War victors, scholarship on the "global movement for women's rights" left the WIDF, its agenda, and its accomplishments

aside, while the conflicts that marked the UN Decade for Women have been obscured by the success-stories of activism "beyond borders." Discrete but steady support offered since the late 1970s to WID-related "global feminism" by US private foundations and Western development cooperation agencies has been rarely acknowledged and even more rarely analyzed. As for the women in the socialist states, documents from the early 1990s record the end of their "isolation" and praise them finally joining those political struggles (i.e., "feminist") that had been "beyond their reach" in the past.[52]

The Vienna 1993 UN conference on human rights consecrated "global feminism" due to the efforts deployed by the Center for Women's Global Leadership[53] under C. Bunch's direction. Besides coordinating the petition drive that called for proscribing violence against women in international humanitarian law, Bunch also published an article which made the case for "women's human rights" as the basic concept of a feminism with universal reach.[54]

Enshrined in the UN Charter, the idea of human rights was submitted to various ideological interpretations during the Cold War. For instance, it was used as a tool to condemn authoritarian regimes—particularly the communist ones—as part of US foreign policy after the Helsinki Accords (1975). On the other hand, activists from decolonized countries mobilized it to denounce racism and economic domination.[55] Research has also shown the constant tension, within international organizations, between the liberal understanding emphasizing individual rights and the interpretation of human rights in the socialist countries and the Global South, highlighting the indivisibility of political, economic, and social entitlements.[56]

Launched in the United States in 1990, the violence against women campaign favored the liberal interpretation of human rights, and so did the "global tribunals on crimes against women" held during the 1993 Vienna and the 1995 Beijing UN conferences.[57] Assisted by skilled media workers and supported by US foundations (notably Ford), the international movement claiming "women's human rights" aspired to conflate the ideological currents that had competed during the Cold War.[58] The former Eastern European socialist countries were included in the scope of this initiative from the narrow angle of the Yugoslav wars and of a new, restrictive Polish law on abortion. The achievements of several decades of state-promoted gender equality were hence silenced by post-Cold War "global feminism."

At the beginning of the 1990s, a new generation of women's rights activists organized in Eastern Europe in the frame of the Network of East–West Women, a transatlantic grouping led by New York-based radical feminists.[59] Breaking away from state-socialism's ideology and institutions, young and highly educated women, members of cultural professions, endowed with international resources and often with anti-communist dispositions, surfed the liberalization wave to assert themselves as experts on "gender." Making a clean sweep of the communist "woman's question," they seized "women's human rights" as a rallying slogan, founded gender studies programs, and managed professionalized NGOs supported by international donors of which they endorsed the preoccupations.[60]

My sources bear witness to the entry of these Eastern European feminist "pioneers" into the fold of Center for Women's Global Leadership (CWGL) activities. Some of them testified in the "global tribunals" while C. Bunch joined the Network of East–West Women coordinating committee in 1993 encouraging her Eastern European counterparts to commit to the preparation of the Beijing conference and to structure their "agenda."[61] Common positions were then expected on issues and priorities such as violence against women, refugees, and reproductive health. It should be stressed at this point that, within the framework of the preparations for Beijing—which were bureaucratic gatherings organized by "regions"—the former socialist countries were grouped together with the liberal states of Europe and North America.

The "global feminism" discourses enshrined by the Vienna and Beijing UN conferences canceled women's emancipation promoted by socialist states, whose model was delegitimized in the 1990s. Although they attended the meetings in relatively large numbers,[62] feminists from Eastern Europe did not have a separate voice there, in the sense that their representation as citizens of former socialist countries, with their own historical experience of emancipatory gender-equality politics, was not envisaged. They were thus expected to endorse the concerns formulated "from New York"[63] and silence the loss occasioned by the liberalization processes. A coalition of Eastern Europeans denounced their invisibility in a "Statement from Non-Region" propelled at the last minute into the program of the Beijing conference.[64] Their emerging counter-hegemonic critique was yet to be "contained" within a Soros Foundation's Network Women's Program channeling women's initiatives in the former socialist countries.

Conclusion

Supported by Western countries' international agencies programs and promoted through conference publications, the watchwords of WID-assisted "global feminism" (such as denouncing "violence against women," defending "women's human rights," reclaiming women's "empowerment," and "mainstreaming" gender into policymaking) have fully risen in the UN venues in the early 1990s. In historiographical accounts, they eventually obscured competing political visions and especially the WIDF's one, that advocated state support for women, economic justice, and legal solutions to gender inequalities.

Sociological lenses, triangulated primary sources and secondary literature, as well as a methodology based on following the actors producing and circulating those discourses that fostered an allegedly "global"—yet selective, politically and socially marked—agenda reveal aspects invisible until now from both the narratives of the post-IWY transnational women's movements and the Cold War historiography. In the light of the arguments exposed above, "global feminism" appears as a historically situated, geopolitically produced, and highly contentious ideological paradigm. Set off since the late 1970s in close connection with women-in-development expertise and initiatives, its emergence was deeply shaped by

Cold War dynamics. To reverse Eastern bloc supported internationalism, US-coordinated efforts featured North–South solidarities and struggles in which the bone of contention was patriarchy and not systemic, economic inequalities.

Coupled with anti-imperialist and anti-racist stances amplified by the non-aligned Group of 77 at the UN, the women's rights agenda promoted by the Women's International Democratic Federation through the world pushed the West to formulate counter-strategies and to build alliances in the decolonized countries. The repertory of "global feminism" stems from converging trans-local activist and bureaucratic performances driven primarily by US cultural diplomacy after the 1975 "shock," and it only succeeded in becoming universal after the geopolitical demise of the Eastern bloc, when liberal concepts of women's rights fully occupied the floor in international venues. Involving soft-power techniques deployed through private and public funding for "networking," Western influence built on thinking, commitment, organizing and the expert skills of feminist activists such as C. Bunch, E. Reid, and many others.

As shown by the International Women's Tribune Center and the Center for Women's Global Leadership cases, structuring intermediary spaces for discursive and geopolitical intervention was critical. Such hybrid organizations displayed an "unofficial" NGO identity but worked based on the resources and in the proximity of governmental and international bodies to which they had privileged access thanks to informal and professional relationships. They allowed circulations of people and knowledge between activist and bureaucratic circles, and therefore made possible a continuum of methods promoting liberal discourses in UN venues, while advancing US foreign policy goals through collaboration with development-cooperation actors based in the Global South. Building on transnational mobilizations of committed activists, the "global cause" under study has been strategically consolidated through Cold War channels. Indeed, know-how and funding allocated by US private foundations for organizing effective networks within the forums paralleling the UN conferences have been instrumental. Despite its focus on aspects that were apparently not on the central stage of international relations, such a case study illuminates the powerful hold of the Cold War geopolitics over both international organizations and transnational activism.

Notes

1 Peggy Antrobus, *The Global Women's Movement: Origins, Issues, and Strategies* (London: Zed Books, 2004; Devaki Jain, *Women, Development, and the UN: A Sixty-Year Quest for Equality and Justice* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005); Margaret Snyder, "Unlikely Godmother: UN and the Global Women's Movement," in Myra Marx Ferree and Aili Mari Tripp (eds.), *Global Feminism: Transnational Women's Activism, Organizing, and Human Rights* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 24–50; Rawwida Baksh and Wendy Harcourt, (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Transnational Feminist Movements* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

2 Socialist states have included women's emancipation in law and praised themselves as "forerunners" of gender equality and social justice in international venues, while the Cold War West promoted consumer choice for women together with free speech and independent political organizing, cf. Ioana Cîrstocea and Françoise Thébaud, "Le genre, un enjeu central de la guerre froide," *Clio. Femmes, genre, histoire* 57 (2023): 7–22.
3 Kristen Ghodsee, *Second World, Second Sex: Socialist Women's Activism and Global Solidarity during the Cold War* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019); Yulia Gradskova, *The Women's International Democratic Federation, the Global South and the Cold War: Defending the Rights of Women of the "Whole World"?* (New York: Routledge, 2020). For a detailed literature review see Ioana Cîrstocea, "Avant le *gender mainstreaming*. Relire les travaux autour du féminisme global," *Clio. Femmes, genre, histoire* 57 (2023): 209–33.
4 Ioana Cîrstocea, "'Global Feminism' as a Transnational Assemblage: Geopolitics of Women's Rights in the (post)Cold War (1975–1995)," in Janet M. Conway, Pascale Dufour, and Dominique Masson (eds.), *Cross-Border Solidarities in 21st Century Contexts: Feminist Perspectives and Activist Practices* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021), 3–28.
5 In progress since 2013, this work has been supported by CESSP, Paris, the French Agence nationale de la recherche, the CNRS "Soutien à la mobilité internationale" program, the New York University "CIRHUS-RAC Fellowship" program, the LabEx "TEPSIS" (EHESS), the University of Warsaw, the Sophia Smith Special Collections, and SAGE, Strasbourg.
6 Helen Laville, *Cold War Women: The International Activities of American Women's Organizations* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2002).
7 Jocelyn Olcott, *International Women's Year: The Greatest Consciousness-Raising Event in History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
8 Chiara Bonfiglioli, "The First UN World Conference on Women (1975) as a Cold War Encounter: Recovering Anti-imperialist, Non-Aligned and Socialist Genealogies," *Filozofija i društvo* 27: 3 (2016): 521–41; Chiara Bonfiglioli, "Women's Internationalism and Yugoslav-Indian Connections: From the Non-Aligned Movement to the UN Decade for Women," *Nationalities Papers* 49, no. 3 (2021): 446–61; Olcott, *International Women's Year*; Ghodsee, *Second World, Second Sex*.
9 Olcott, *International Women's Year* (especially ch. 1).
10 Sandrine Kott, *Organiser le monde. Une autre histoire de la guerre froide* (Paris: Seuil, 2021). Also the chapter by Christian Methfessel in the present volume.
11 Quoted in Olcott, *International Women's Year*, 220. In his speech opening the conference, the Mexican president named women "an enormous revolutionary reserve" and coupled their "true liberation" with the "transformation of the world economic order" ("UN Starts—With Call to Arms," *Xilonen*, June 20 (1975): 1, 4).
12 Echoes in interviews quoted in Ghodsee, *Second World, Second Sex* and in many archival sources: RAC, Ford Foundation Records, Catalogued Reports, Box 347, folder 008157: Inter-office memorandum, July 23, 1980; Mildred Persinger, "Background on Copenhagen—Suggested Meeting for Women Going to Conference" (WSMI); RAC, Ford Foundation Records, Program Action 755-0658: internal correspondence, July 1980.
13 Olcott, *International Women's Year*, 234.
14 RAC, Ford Foundation Records, Program Action 755-0658.
15 Some of them founded the Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD) in 1977. Jocelyn Olcott, "Solidarity Struggles: Transnational

Feminisms and Cold War Lefts in the Global South," in Michele Di Donato and Mathieu Fulla (eds.), *Leftist Internationalisms: A Transnational Political History* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023), 173–88.

16 About 60 people out of the original 505 Wellesley Conference participants were invited to the second meeting.

17 Ester Boserup, *Woman's Role in Economic Development* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970); Arvonne Fraser and Irene Tinker, (eds.), *Developing Power: How Women Transformed International Development* (New York: The Feminist Press at CUNY, 2004); Irene Tinker, *Visioning an Equitable World: Reflections on Women, Democracy, Education, and Economic Development* (Portland: Inkwater Press, 2016).

18 Born in 1937 and holder of a PhD in communication studies from Indiana University (1976), she joined and organized the International Women's Tribune Center after having studied and worked in the United Kingdom, traveled extensively in Europe and North America, co-organized Fiji YWCA, and participated in the IWY and Wellesley conferences. She quit her position at the IWTC in 2002. Anne S. Walker, *A World of Change: My Life in the Global Women's Rights Movement* (North Melbourne: Arcadia, 2018).

19 See the chapter by Trudy Huskamp Peterson on archival collections of international entities as Cold War history products in this volume.

20 RAC, Ford Foundation Records, Program Action 895-1286.

21 Both the international correspondents and the members of the International Women's Tribune Center acknowledged similarities and continuities with the Committee of Correspondence's activities (cf. Oral History of Rosalind W. Harris, Sophia Smith Collection, Committee of Correspondence Records, Box 55).

22 Devaki Jain and Peggy Antrobus belonged to it.

23 RAC, Ford Foundation Records, Grant 0810-0241.

24 RAC, Ford Foundation Records, Program Action 940-0827.

25 "Living experience" (Spanish).

26 Michela Walsh, *Founding a Movement: Women's World Banking 1975–1990* (New York: Cosimo Books, 2012); Margaret Snyder, *Transforming Development: Women, Poverty and Politics* (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1995).

27 Supported by the Ford Foundation, it was coordinated by Florence Howe (1929–2020, US literature professor and series director at Feminist Press).

28 *International Supplement* to *Women's Studies Quarterly* 1 (1982); C.S. Rupprecht, "Third International Interdisciplinary Congress on Women," *Signs* 14, no. 1 (1988): 235–42.

29 Charlotte Bunch was consultant for the project.

30 Charlotte Bunch co-led this network, organized an international workshop, and co-edited its report: Kathleen Barry, Charlotte Bunch, and Shirley Castley, *International Feminism: Networking against Female Sexual Slavery. Report of the Global Feminist Workshop to Organize against Traffic in Women*, *Rotterdam, the Netherlands*, *April 6–15, 1983* (New York: IWTC, 1984).

31 Valentine Moghadam, *Globalizing Women: Transnational Feminist Networks* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Mathieu Caulier, *De la population au genre. Philanthropie, ONG et biopolitique dans la globalisation* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014).

32 Meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement on women's issues were organized in Baghdad in 1979, Havana in 1981, and Cairo previously to the Nairobi conference; see Devaki Jain, "A View from the South: A Story of Intersections," in Fraser and Tinker, *Developing Power*, 128–37.

33 Diana E.H. Russell and Nicole Van de Ven, *Crimes against Women: Proceedings of the International Tribunal*, 3rd edn. (Berkeley: Russell Publications, 1990). The tribunal was intended as an alternative to both the UN IWY conference and the 1975 WIDF congress.
34 Then based in Rome, ISIS collected and archived women's groups publications worldwide since the mid-1970s and was one of the IWTC's main collaborators.
35 Russell and Van de Ven, *Crimes against Women,* 7, 198–201. The first issue of *ISIS International Bulletin* was dedicated to the tribunal as well. The event's report was republished in 1984 (prefaced by Charlotte Bunch) and 1990.
36 Robin Morgan, (ed.), *Sisterhood is Global: The International Women's Movement Anthology* (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1984).
37 Carol Ann Douglas, "Interview: Russian Feminists Challenge Phallocracy," *Off Our Backs* 10, no. 11 (1980): 2–3, 20.
38 *Looking to the Future. Equal Partnership between Women and Men in the 21st Century*, Women, Public Policy and Development Project, Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, 1983, quote 6 (WSMI).
39 *The Challenge of Nairobi: Learning from the Past to Build a Better Future. The Report of the National Consultative Committee: Planning for Nairobi, March 1985* (WSMI).
40 For more on her social trajectory, see Cîrstocea, "Avant le *gender mainstreaming*" and Cîrstocea, "'Global Feminism.'"
41 *Quest* IV: 2 (1978).
42 Charlotte Bunch, "Developing Strategies for the United Nations Decade for Women," in Charlotte Bunch, *Passionate Politics: Feminist Theory in Action. Essays, 1968–1986* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 283–300, quote 286.
43 *Developing Strategies for the Future. Feminist Perspectives. Report of the International Feminist Workshop Held at Stony Point, New York, April 20–25, 1980*; *Feminist Ideologies and Structures in the First Decade for Women. Report from the Bangkok Workshop Held June 23–30 1979*, IWTC (1980), quote 5 (WSMI).
44 *Forum '80*, July 23 (1980), "The Media Image": 5 (text endorsed by "a subcommittee of the Feminist Theory and Activism workshop of the International Feminist Networking section of *Vivencia!*").
45 Seona Martin and Ruth Seligman, "What is Feminism?," *Forum '85*, July 18 (1985): 2; Bunch, *Passionate Politics*.
46 On January 26, 1983, Jain gave a lecture at the OECD under the title "Development as if Women Mattered. Or Can Women Build a New Paradigm?" (WSMI).
47 Olcott, "Solidarity Struggles."
48 Letter by Carmen Barroso (Fundación Carlos Chagas) to Charlotte Bunch (IWTC, International Feminist Networking Coordination Project), May 29, 1985 (Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Additional Papers of Charlotte Bunch, 1944-2010, MC 708, Box 46, Folder 9).
49 Fraser and Tinker, *Developing Power*. Also Cîrstocea, "'Global Feminism'"; Olcott, "Solidarity Struggles."
50 See Francisca de Haan, ed., *The Palgrave Handbook of Communist Women Activists around the World* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023) and Ghodsee, *Second World, Second Sex* for some of their trajectories.
51 On the US side of the Cold War, the International Women's Tribune Center collected information on the constituencies and local activities of women's groups in the Global South, while the International Women's Rights Action Watch led by Arvonne Fraser monitored the application of the CEDAW.

52 "Fostering the participation of women from East and Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union: Beijing 1995," grant proposal submitted by the Network of East–West Women to the Soros Foundation (Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Additional Papers of Charlotte Bunch, 1944–2010, MC 708, Box 91, Folder 2).

53 The coordinating committee includes Peggy Antrobus, cf. *Women's Leadership Institute Report: Women, Violence and Human Rights*, CWGL, Douglas College, Rutgers University, 1991. This document refers to the Bangkok 1979 workshop and to the definition of feminism formulated then (p. 58).

54 Charlotte Bunch, "Women's Rights are Human Rights: Towards a Revision of Human Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (1990): 486–98.

55 Nicolas Guilhot, *The Democracy Makers. Human Rights and International Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Sarah Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Sylvanna M. Falcón, *Power Interrupted: Antiracist and Feminist Activism inside the United Nations* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016); Raluca Grosescu and Ned-Richardson Little, (eds.), "The Socialist World and Post-War International Criminal and Humanitarian Law," *Journal of the History of International Law* 2 (2019). Also the chapter by Debbie Sharnak in this volume.

56 Kott, *Organiser le monde*, 137–43.

57 Celia Donert, "Women's Rights as Human Rights after the End of History," *Gender & History* 35 (2023): 862–80.

58 According to the strategists based at the Center for Women's Global Leadership, "women's human rights" were meant as "universal and holistic," cf. Niamh Reilly, ed., *Without Reservation: The Beijing Tribunal on Accountability for Women's Human Rights*, CWGL, Douglas College, Rutgers University, 1996, 12.

59 Ioana Cîrstocea, *Learning Gender after the Cold War: Contentious Feminisms* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).

60 The Ford and Soros Foundations were the most visible.

61 Schlesinger Library, Harvard University, Additional Papers of Charlotte Bunch, 1944–2010, MC 708, Box 91, folder 2 (NEWW Advisory Committee, 1993–1995). Also, document quoted in note 52.

62 Sophia Smith Collection, IWTC Records, Box 75, "Vienna Austria Meeting Participants, October 1994"; Rutgers University, Special Collections and University Archives, Alexander Library, Center for Women's Global Leadership Papers, Beijing 1995, Box 4.

63 Letter by Julie Mertus to Charlotte Bunch, September 21, 1994 (Rutgers University, Special Collections and University Archives, Alexander Library, Center for Women's Global Leadership Papers, Beijing 1995, Box 4).

64 "Our group of countries is a Non-Region because there is no recognizable political or geographic definition for the region composed of countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. We are bound by the common problems associated with the transition to democracy. In this difficult and uneven transition, the most serious problem is the consistent and drastic decline in the status of women" (Statement from Non-Region. Countries in Transition in ECE Region, East-East European Caucus, Plenary Session of the IV World Conference on Women, September 13, 1995, Beijing, http://www.astra.org.pl/?statement-from-the-non-region, 137 (accessed August 4, 2009).

Part VI

SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE AND NETWORKS

Chapter 14

From Political to Technological Leader of the Third World: Chinese Exchanges with United Nations Specialized Agencies in the 1970s and 1980s

Yi-Tang Lin*

In a special session of the United Nations General Assembly in April 1974, Deng Xiaoping, Chinese Vice Premier and Chairman of the Chinese delegation to the United Nations, left a mark by confirming the Mao government's stance concerning China's position within the international system. It was the first high-level Chinese delegation to the UN General Assembly after the People's Republic of China assumed Chinese representation within the UN from Republic of China (Taiwan) following the passage of UN Resolution 2758 in October 1971 with seventy-six countries voting in favor.[1] Deng stated:

> China is a socialist country, and a developing country as well. China belongs to the Third World. Consistently following Chairman Mao's teachings, the Chinese Government and people firmly support all oppressed peoples and oppressed nations in their struggle to win or defend national independence, develop the national economy and oppose colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism. This is our bounden internationalist duty.[2]

Deng's speech employed terminology to classify countries during the Cold War. By designating China as part of the "Third World," Deng indicated that the country was politically non-aligned with either the Western or Eastern bloc and

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committed to supporting other oppressed peoples and countries. Additionally, by using the term "developing country," he implicitly conveyed the idea that China had a lower standard of living and therefore required the support of the United Nations.[3]

Although the People's Republic of China was relatively young within the UN; it had been a longtime Cold War belligerent. Deng's speech was aligned with China's government's stance towards the international system before its admission to the UN. The speech brought China's Cold War ideological struggle, which was internationalist by nature (see Introduction), to the UN.[4] He denounced the unequal international economic system within which developing countries, including China, were exploited because of the low cost of their raw materials and lack of technologies with which to produce commodities of high market value. In the early 1970s, with its admission to the UN, China used UN as a springboard to advocate for a fair share in the global economy for Third World countries.[5]

In the same speech, Deng endorsed the items of the future New International Economic Order Declaration (thereafter NIEO) that denounced the unjust economic disparity between rich and poor countries. This declaration was set to be passed by the United Nations General Assembly less than a month later. Adopted in May of 1974, the NIEO ushered in what Nils Gilman called "a moment of disjunction and openness" in international politics. During this period, a series of economic proposals, international law interventions, and political projects were carried out, with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development serving as the primary organization of action.[6] To remedy the inequality brought by the internationalization of trade, the NIEO envisioned comprehensive technological transfers among countries. As part of the "global redistribution," technology, often enlisted alongside finances and resources, was included in a package of assets that rich countries should transfer to poor countries without strings attached.[7]

Deng's speech might seem in line with the NIEO in general,[8] but the views he expressed regarding technological transfers differed from what the NIEO envisioned. He followed Mao's teaching regarding science and technology, emphasizing the need to identify alternatives to Western science and technology that were more adapted to local contexts. In his speech, Deng defined that the technology to be transferred to poor countries as "practical, efficient, economical, and convenient for use."[9]

The divergence between Deng and the NIEO is the central enigma of the present chapter. The following pages investigate how such divergence evolved over the subsequent two decades, focusing on the People's Republic of China's interactions with UN specialized agencies. The 1970s marked the advent "Global Science Diplomacy," a term coined by a collective of historians.[10] During this period, the UN became a prominent player in the realm of science and technology transfer as the spectrum of actors expanded, reflecting an increasing number of countries vying to exert their influence on the global stage.[11] This diversification of participants within the UN and its specialized agencies witnessed the coexistence of competing ideologies concerning the transfer of technology

among nations with varying capacities. The present chapter explores the Chinese government's positioning within the Global Science Diplomacy moment while the regime was itself facing political changes. Notably, Mao's passing in 1976 officially ended the Cultural Revolution, and the subsequent opening-up policy in 1978 marked a new era. The 1970s were a time when US scientists sought inspiration from China in areas such as ecological insect control and acupuncture as potential alternatives to US models.[12] Historians have also documented China's barefoot doctors, healthcare providers who underwent basic medical training to offer first aid in remote rural areas, were cited by the World Health Organization (WHO) in its landmark Alma-Ata Conference. This conference underlined the importance of primary healthcare over single-technological approach.[13] The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) pursued similar attempts,[14] drawing inspiration from China for economically feasible development program for poor countries. Ideological issues were often marginalized, if not completely ignored.

This chapter contributes to a stream of literature analyzing China's efforts in exporting its ideology, military practices, and technology against the evolving Cold War backdrop beyond the UN system. Jeremy Friedman's landmark book from 2015 detailed the diplomatic competition between China and the Soviet Union in Africa between 1956 and the 1970s. Focusing on geopolitical mechanisms, his analysis has offered important context of China's positioning at the international level against the 1970s Cold War détente.[15] Julia Lovell placed her analytical focus on China's persisting efforts to diffuse Maoist ideologies as well as military practices since its early years of existence.[16] Lovell's book, published in 2019, debunked the Chinese government's efforts to erase China's international meddling during the Cold War, attempting to portray itself as a new, fresh player at the international level.[17] Moreover, emerging publications have presented narratives depicting the Chinese government offering medical facilities and healing practices to its allied countries, whether it was the USSR before the split or Algeria in the 1970s.[18] Such exchanges were not limited to allied countries. As demonstrated by Gordon Barrett's book, the Chinese Communist Party organized scientific outreach through a left-leaning network of scientists during the early Mao period. The Chinese government strategically approached its scientific outreach and relations with Western scientists in a distinctive manner amidst the dynamics of the Cold War.[19] The present chapter innovates by incorporating the UN specialized agencies into the story of the Chinese Communist Party's scientific outreach. It illustrates UN specialized agencies provided China with infrastructures to promote its political, scientific, and technological projects.

Mobilizing archival materials collected from UN and WHO archives and Chinese contemporary newspaper outlets, this chapter sketches out Chinese technical exchanges with United Nations specialized agencies, specifically FAO and WHO. These accounts are not exhaustive, but they demonstrate China's diplomatic strategies since the 1960s have been inserted into the UN specialized agencies. That is, emphasizing solidarity and exchanges with other countries considered to be neither part of the Western and Eastern blocs. Through three sections, in loose chronological order, I further illustrate that the country's

engagement with the UN specialized agencies was gradually transformed from using them as diplomatic, politically led discourse battlegrounds into scientific and technological collaboration in nature. The first shift happened with the NIEO and the second consolidated the country's opening-up policy in 1978. Specifically, riding the high tide of the NIEO, UN agencies explored ideas of "appropriate technology" to define and disseminate Chinese models. With the opening-up policy in 1978, the Chinese government collaborated with the UN to acquire science and technology, while offering training to countries mostly with low income and in Asia on its agricultural and public health policies. This chapter, focusing on China, illuminates the roles of UN specialized agencies in facilitating science and technology exchanges among financial resource-poor countries in the 1970s. It explores how these agencies became a platform for China, newly entered into the UN scene, to share Mao-era science and technology designed for local sourcing and self-sufficiency. The UN specialized agencies sought inspirations from Mao era science and technology to benefit other countries with limited financial resources.

From Diplomatic Platform to the Springboard for Science and Technology

China emerged on the West-led global scene following the normalization of the US–China relations, resulting in the assumption of the UN seat in 1971. The People's Republic of China's admission to the United Nations in 1971, however, did not immediately lead to the abandonment of "ideological radicalism for pragmatic foreign and economic politics,"[20] as Cold War historian Lorenz Lüthi mentioned in passing, at least at the domestic discursive terms. The initial appearances of UN specialized agencies in the *People's Daily*, the official mouthpiece of the People's Republic, remained predominantly political and were not connected to the technical specialties of the respective agencies. In November 1973, the newspaper extensively covered the People's Republic's participation in an FAO meeting for the first time after the organization accepted China's membership during a special session in 1972.[21] The article elucidated that China attracted much attention, with Chinese vice minister of agriculture Hao Zhongshi, also the director of the Chinese delegation, elected as a vice president of the FAO Assembly.[22] The official newspaper reported Albania, Mongolia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bangladesh being admitted as FAO members, while the Chinese delegate showed support for the position of the Pakistani delegation by opposing the acceptance of Bangladesh into the FAO prior to the repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war.[23] The situation was similar with the WHO: the director of the Chinese delegation to the World Health Assembly made a speech in support of North Korea's request to join the WHO[24] and this received a more detailed description in comparison to the WHO sending expert delegation to China as early as 1972.[25]

The FAO was a platform from which the Chinese government could denounce the global economy system and seek solidarity among the so-called developing countries. The *People's Daily* detailed the Chinese delegation's concluding speech

to the FAO, which appealed to countries to "eliminate the invasions, interferences, and controls of imperialism and old and new colonialisms, and to set up food policies that are based on the country's contexts."[26] The above quote reflects China's longstanding diplomatic stance to lead new countries that found themselves between the Western and Eastern blocs. The delegation tailored its discourse by adding that "through strengthening mutual support and cooperation among developing countries, these countries' agricultural sectors will develop rapidly and solve their own food problems."[27] The PRC's official discourse towards the FAO appealed to the solidarity among poor countries and applied this general political stance to food production issues.

The Chinese Communist Party's discursive strategy vis-à-vis the FAO shifted in 1974 as the UN institutionalized the position by the adoption of resolution 3201(S-VI) Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in May of 1974. The NIEO aimed to create a new world order in which rich countries would better integrate with poor nations. It stipulated that rich countries should share their science and technology with poor countries.[28] China was one of the first countries to support the NIEO. Deng Xiaoping's speech to the UN General Assembly, given on April 10 of that year, and which opened this chapter, endorsed the NIEO agenda.[29] With the passing of the NIEO, science and technology emerged as elements in China's relationship with the FAO in 1975. Chinese representatives spoke to the FAO meeting in 1975 on agricultural science and technology for developing countries, and the importance of establishing national instances. International agricultural research, they stated, should be at the service of developing countries to increase food and agricultural production.[30] Similar to the 1973 speech, this address focused on assisting the so-called developing countries, with China notably considering itself a part of this category. However, the emphasis of this speech was on science and technology.

Such discourse was synchronized across UN specialized agencies. Nine days after the passing of the NIEO at the UN level, Huang Jiasi, director of the Chinese delegation, spoke in front of the WHA, expressing that the Third World public health enterprises of the WHO should be anti-imperial, anti-colonial, and anti-hegemonic. Huang supported the WHO listening to the need of Third World countries making maximum effort to satisfy their wishes and requests.

> Many countries in the Third World have asked the World Health Organization to assist them in changing the existing medical and health situation as soon as possible, based on the specific situation of each country and on the basis of the self-reliance of each country … These requests are legitimate and reasonable. The World Health Organization should study them carefully and take effective measures to meet them.[31]

The sixty-seven-year-old cardiothoracic surgeon confirmed the self-reliance of Third World public health systems, but did not define the relevant strategies. In the final paragraphs, he introduced China's rural health services, speaking about aspects including the barefoot doctors and the cooperative medical system.

The Chinese government had a firm idea about positioning itself in the global health science and technology ladder. Halfdan Mahler, the director general of the WHO, invited China to organize visits to the WHO and its collaborating centers for parasite diseases, vector biology, cancer, immunology, and human reproduction. The PRC vice minister of health Huang Shuze (Shu-tse) replied favorably.[32] Mahler met with Huang in Beijing three months later, and expressed a wish for China to share its experiences in public health, acupuncture, the construction of a hospital in Burundi, and supply of pharmaceutical and vaccines. The first two requests were met with agreement, but the Chinese vice-minister refused the last two requests, stating that China was a developing country and the medical material was only for domestic use.[33] The Chinese government was ready to provide healing organizations and techniques in which the country had a niche but passed on sharing Western medical supplies and resources with other countries. In the following section, I will show that Chinese government's strategies in promoting its science and technology will meet with close examinations of the UN specialized agencies' staff.

China as a Source of Appropriate Technology for Other Resource-Poor Countries

In *Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered*, published in 1973, E.F. Schumacher defined the concept "intermediate technology." He argued that technology should be affordable and accessible to most people, suitable for small-scale applications, and environmentally friendly.[34] Schumacher advocated for technology that complements rather than replaces human labor, thereby supporting local economies. Against the backdrop of budget cuts to the United States foreign aid agency in the late 1960s, Schumacher's book became a bestseller, and the concept of "intermediate technology" was subsequently replaced by the more frequently used term "appropriate technology."[35] Despite the semantic flexibility of "intermediate technology" and "appropriate technology," the awareness of the different levels of technology these terms implied set the tone for how the FAO and WHO, each in their own way, interacted with the PRC's science and technology. As I will demonstrate in the following, the technology that is intermediate, appropriate to countries with lower income was the core topic defining the UN specialized agencies' interactions with China between 1971 and 1978, the year when the country reformed and opened up its economy under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. Both agencies sought to spread Chinese technology to other financial resource-poor countries; however, as the following paragraphs will elaborate, the FAO and the WHO defined the concept differently. I will begin with the FAO's story before moving on to the WHO's timeline.

Significantly, two years after *Small is Beautiful*'s publication FAO visitors to China concluded their reports with the concept, stating that China's experience helped to define a concept of "appropriate" or "intermediate technology."[36] The

FAO's mentions of China and appropriate or intermediate technology were conclusions drawn from its staff visiting China, during which the staff expressed reservations about China's technology. In September 1975, the FAO sent a one-month mission (followed by another two in the coming months) to learn about "Chinese approaches to agriculture and the Chinese people's communes as an example of integrated rural development."[37] Specifically, the FAO's 1975 mission's goal was to seek inspiration for other financial resource-poor countries and to assess the transferability of China's agricultural science and technology. It is unclear whether it was the Chinese government or the FAO that took the first step in arranging this set of visits. These visits, however, must be understood against the backdrop that the country had cut its foreign aid budget five months ago, showing disengagement towards the Third World.[38] The FAO visits incorporated elements of the country's previous diplomatic strategy, wherein it positioned itself as the leader of the Third World, but with a specific emphasis on agricultural science and technology.

The mission report conveyed Mao's "self-reliance" teaching on science and technology during the Cultural Revolution, underscoring that the Chinese did not rely on imported or sophisticated technology, nor on highly trained scientists, but on low and middle-level technicians who had acquired considerable experience and knowledge.[39] The report found that, what may appear at first to be purely technical approaches, on close examination, often turn out to be functionally and organically part of the Chinese system.[40] This observation explained why the report's section on science and technology discussed mainly organizational aspects, such as the deployment of workers. It also mentioned locally developed insecticide and a traditional wheelbarrow,[41] while occasionally implicitly criticizing China's agricultural techniques, such as steel hullers, stating, "most Asian countries have stopped using steel hullers. They feel grain breakage is excessive with such hullers."[42]

The FAO mentioned "appropriate" and "intermediate" technology together, without specifying how these might differ, which corresponded closely to Morefield's observation of the mixing of meanings between the two concepts.[43] Underneath this blending of terms was the common ground that technologies occupied different places in the hierarchy of development and societies at different levels of development needed different technologies to ensure further upward progress in the hierarchy.[44] The report pointed to the limits of the traditional trickle-down model, from rich to poor.[45] It suggested that countries needed a temporary and selective moratorium on current plans for the comprehensive diffusion or transfer of technology. The moratorium would slowly prepare them for what they considered as modern technology. Clearly, the authors considered Chinese science and technology to be intermediate. The report also pointed to the capitalist implications of modern technology adaptations, mentioning that, since the Yan'an period (1936–47) China had boasted capitalist elements and that it was necessary to train peasants in entrepreneurship.[46] It was not until the country began opening up after Mao's passing that the FAO selectively chose specific technologies for organizing training sessions, as I will mention in the next section.

The FAO's interpretation of Chinese agricultural science and technology in the 1970s was not unique. China has been cited on multiple occasions by the WHO as a source of alternative health technology for countries lacking financial resources.[47] China's interaction with the WHO followed a separate timeline. Specifically, the country's entry into the UN coincided with the WHO's search for alternatives for its earlier failed flagship Global Malaria Eradication Program.[48] The WHO showed interest in China's barefoot doctor system, using trained rural inhabitants as basic healthcare providers so as to increase the health service's coverage in distanced areas.[49] In 1974, the WHO sent staff to learn human manpower management, and the year after, the WHO enlisted China, among other countries stripped of economic resources, as a place for observation, from which to learn their health approaches.[50]

The focus on the barefoot doctor system dovetailed with the organization's evolving interpretation of the NIEO's call for science and technology transfer, as the meaning was still in flux in the 1970s.[51] This shift also aimed to circumvent potential conflicts with developed countries to safeguard commercial interests. The WHO first extended the meaning of technology into its broadest sense. Any action that was health-related could qualify as a technology, including administrative methods. Second, the technological transfer was no longer conceived of as flowing from Global North to Global South, but between Southern countries. The WHO director general's 1976 report expressed that the UN system would assist the implementation of the NIEO through supporting cooperative technological collaboration among themselves, in view of achieving regional self-reliance.[52] By shifting the meaning and directions of technology transfers, the WHO constructed a safe space for implementing NIEO quests without risking losing the support of rich member countries.[53]

China became a source of technological exports for the WHO early on. In 1975, the WHO, the Chinese Ministry of Health, and the UNDP organized acupuncture training for foreign doctors in Beijing. Participants included doctors from Afghanistan, Myanmar, Iran, Laos, Nepal, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. This training continued, and trainees were not limited to Asian countries. Until 1981, 23 sessions were organized with 350 trainees coming from 88 countries.[54] In the 1976 WHA, barefoot doctor Guo Shanhu from the Dazhai People's Commune presented her life story and the barefoot doctor system, which is based on agricultural mass mobilization, farming, and healing. The vice director of the Chinese delegation Chen Kequan further presented China's self-reliance in the medical field, attempting to explore the legacy of traditional Chinese medicine.[55] The WHO experts seem to make no distinction between socialist China and capitalist, financially resource-poor countries. In 1977, the WHO visited twenty-nine members from developing countries, among which China was cited as using traditional medicine for rural populations, and combining traditional and Western agricultural, irrigation, and housing projects.[56]

The divergence of meanings of appropriate technology led to differences between the FAO and the WHO in their timelines for incorporating China's science and

technology into their programs—With a broad definition of technology, the WHO acted as early as 1972, whereas the FAO conducted its first study visit to China in 1975. Before China's opening up in 1978, the two organizations each conducted studies on Chinese practices in health and agriculture, driven by the concept of "appropriate technology." Whereas the WHO organized acupuncture training for other countries in the region as early as 1975, the FAO was not convinced by Chinese agricultural practices, deeming them highly dependent on social organization. The FAO, nonetheless, refrained from expressing preferences regarding private property or collectivization, aligning with the organization's policy. The FAO held back from expressing opinions on food systems since its early attempts to control food prices faced a series of contestations during its first decade.[57]

Chinese government likely did not harbor significant ambitions of disseminating its technology through the UN framework in the 1970s. During this time, the country even declined to send a representative to the United Nations University (UNU), an organization inaugurated in 1973 with the aim of being "an international community of scholars, engaged in research, post-graduate training and dissemination of knowledge."[58] The University sought to maintain a unique status as an apolitical entity among other UN agencies, addressing "pressing global problems of human survival, development, and welfare."[59] Initially, the Japanese government was the sole financial sponsor, but soon after, countries from various economic strata contributed. Notably, the proportion of funding from Third World countries was more significant than other UN agencies, highlighting the organization's distinctive character. The UNU could have served as an ideal platform for the People's Republic if it had prioritized to share its technology with Third World countries. However, despite the alignment between the UNU's goals and the Chinese government's rhetorical support for Third World countries within the UN, China's involvement with the UNU remained minimal until the 1980s.

Fusions between Chinese Technology and the UN Specialized Agencies' System

In 1978 Deng Xiaoping led a series of economic reforms that decollectivized agriculture and opened up China to foreign investment. Although there were ebbs and flows of the level of openness in the following decade,[60] the general trend since 1978 is that the country became proactive in collaborating with international organizations to learn about international norms across various domains.[61] The government contacted UN agencies for technical assistance that very year. In a meeting with the Secretary-General of the UN on December 4, 1978, in the Secretary-General's office, the Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN, Chen Chu, made it clear that China was not hostile to foreigners and reasserted the country's willingness to cooperate with the UN.[62] The relationship between the country and the UN was ready to transcend sending and welcoming each other's delegations and groups of experts.

The 1978 WHA speech illustrated China's decision to align with Western health systems. As countries took turns in presenting their national public health initiatives, the vice minister of health, Qian Xinzhong, and the director of the Chinese delegation mentioned that Chinese medical personnel had been attempting to make creative achievements in combining Chinese and Western medicine. This tone reflected post-Mao politics. The Mao era signature programs such as mass mobilization and the barefoot doctors were absent from the speech.[63] Conversely, several months later that year, at the International Conference on Primary Health Care in Alma-Ata, the "Health for All" declaration was passed. This declaration emphasized a primary healthcare system that was partially inspired by Chinese barefoot doctors. The health system from the Mao era, therefore, had an afterlife while the country was rapidly seeking to align with the liberalized health system. This trend continued into the 1980s, where the WHO also became an authoritative source for medical-related information in the *People's Daily*. The newspaper reported the WHO policy statements, including those on smoking, coronary artery disease, tuberculosis, and AIDS.[64]

Although Chinese official discourse omitted Mao health system, the WHO continued to showcase the barefoot doctors to other countries. A month after the WHA in 1978, the WHO and health ministers from six African countries visited the People's Commune of Dazhai.[65] The WHO continued to value Chinese health practices elaborated during the Mao era as the country seemingly shifted towards Western health, science, and research. The exchange between China and the WHO was mutual. They signed a memorandum in 1979. With an item concerning appropriate technology,[66] in the following years China would provide training in areas such as primary healthcare and traditional medicine, whereas the WHO would offer technical assistance in a wide range of topics ranging from maternal and child health to cancer.[67]

China become part of the global science infrastructure of the UN. The technology elaborated during the Mao period intersected with various WHO programs. For example, barefoot doctors in China were involved in health research strengthening and cancer research programs in 1979.[68] The WHO hired Jong-Chol Cyong, based in Japan, to visit China and make recommendations on the management of herbal medicine.[69] This intersection also expanded to laboratory research. The WHO funded a select group of Chinese research institutes to be its collaborating centers for specific research projects in areas such as insecticides, human reproduction, and cancer. Being selected by the WHO helped centers to attract supplementary governmental funding.[70] Under this system, Chinese technology such as anti-malaria drugs were tested scientifically.[71] Liu Wi-teh, the director of Shanghai Entomology Institute, one of the WHO collaborating centers, tested Chinese insecticides' impact on Chinese mosquitoes, alongside other insecticides. In his task sheet signed by the WHO, Liu oversaw developing appropriate technology. Liu discovered that although local Chinese products had shortcomings, they cost one-third of their foreign equivalents. The researcher thus concluded that Chinese pesticides were worth developing for countries with low revenues.[72]

During the late 1970s to the 1980s, Chinese technologies were extracted from its socioeconomic context and transferred through the FAO, WHO, and other agencies via training sessions.[73] Stretching into the early 1980s, China provided short courses and workshops in primary healthcare for other WHO member countries.[74] The country also co-organized freshwater fishery training with the FAO in Guangzhou in 1977 and 1978, recruiting participants from Southeast Asia;[75] in 1981, China and FAO established an integrated Asian-Pacific training center for aquaculture in Wuxi.[76] Another example is biogas. The FAO organized training for twenty-seven countries, and in 1980, an international seminar with UNDP on biogas.[77] The *People's Daily* presented a flourishing, fruitful collaboration between China and the WHO in the 1980s. While the WHO continued to emphasize China's primary healthcare and traditional medicine, giving these practices an international platform by organizing conferences in China and establishing traditional medical collaborative centers in Beijing,[78] the organization also invested in other programs in China, such as children's mental health.[79]

It is nonetheless noteworthy that the collaboration between China and agencies such as the WHO and FAO has been financially more significant in the direction from the UN to China. Between 1978 and 1980, the WHO provided research training abroad for 50 Chinese experts; another 123 embarked on study missions; 18 international experts visited China to give lectures; and a 28-person expert panel of the WHO received recommendation on Chinese experts.[80] The FAO's World Food Program ran more than seventy projects in China between 1979 to 2009, reaching over 30 million beneficiaries in China.[81] These exchanges, along with those from China to other places, were under the control of the Chinese government as they were co-determined with Chinese Ministry of Health officers and the WHO in their Joint Coordination Committee.

From 1978 onwards, the UN specialized organizations became sources of information and facilitators for China to be connected to the rest of the world. Despite the turn of the tide of neoliberalism and the ensuing budget cuts, the science and technologies developed during the Mao period were disseminated and scientifically tested, thanks to the UN system and its attempts to provide appropriate technology for countries lacking financial resources.

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed China's relations with UN specialized agencies in the 1970s and 1980s, which started with the sending of delegations and developed to the intensified collaboration from 1978 onwards. Over the two decades under study, China's diplomatic strategy has gradually shifted from aspiring to lead countries not allied with either capitalist or socialist camps and being hostile towards the UN, to becoming a pragmatic and eager apprentice of international regulations and standards, mostly managed and mediated by international organizations.

Significantly, as the country scaled back its individual efforts in implementing aid programs for Third World countries in 1975, the FAO and the WHO, to

some extent, adopted China's previous political standing on the Third World but with a narrow focus on science and technology. Both organizations provided infrastructure to globalize China's technologies. They allocated resources to examine China's technologies developed during the Mao era and conducted training sessions attended by experts from other Third World countries. The concepts of appropriate and intermediate technology persisted, despite evolving definitions, in these collaborations. Before 1978 these concepts motivated the staff of UN specialized agencies to Mao's China seeking for inspirations. After 1978, this concept continued to be cited, driving UN agencies to disseminate Chinese technologies and conduct scientific tests on them whereas the country became an eager student of Western science. The UN staff devised that China would export knowledge to other financially resource-poor countries, while receiving technical assistance from developed countries. This imaginary of a global technology ladder granted the technologies ranging from barefoot doctors to aquaculture and biogas developed during Mao's period an afterlife, as the UN specialized agencies sought alternative development technology for "developing countries," to use their own term.

More than fifty years have passed since China's admission to the United Nations. With its nationals having served or still serving as the director general of the UN specialized agencies,[82] China's influence within the UN has far surpassed the Mao era technologies. However, China's early financial and technical support for Third World countries in those moments has become an oft-cited element of the country's diplomatic discourses, justifying its leadership within the international system.

Notes

1 UN General Assembly (26th Sess.: 1971), "Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations," 1972, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054 (accessed August 23, 2024).

2 Deng Xiaoping, transcript of "Speech by Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping, At the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly," April 10, 1974, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/deng-xiaoping/1974/04/10.htm (accessed September 14, 2022).

3 There was little consensus on how to define the level of development of countries, despite the pervasive presence of the concept of development within the UN system, especially in the 1960s. Throughout the period under study and wildly used by the historical stakeholders at that time, the term was often associated with the economic status of a country. By the 1990s, the Human Development Report published by the UN defined development as the extension of people's choices across various aspects, including income, employment, education, health, and the physical environment. Very often, historical actors used the term "developing countries" interchangeably with the term "Third World countries," although the latter had more of a political aspect in its original use. Both terms were frequently employed by historical actors from these countries to empower and emancipate themselves for a more equitable redistribution of resources at the global level.

Readers will find such attitudes expressed through quotes from Chinese actors in this chapter. However, the term is increasingly criticized for its literal meaning, as the term "developing" implies a hierarchy of development among countries. For the ever-changing nature of the meaning of development, see, e.g., Gilbert Rist, *Le Développement: histoire d'une croyance occidentale* (Paris: Les Presses Sciences Po, 2007)

4 For general discussions on China's diplomatic and military efforts at the international level, see, e.g., Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Julia Lovell, *Maoism: A Global History*, illustrated edn. (New York: Knopf, 2019).

5 One of the telling gestures is that the PRC refused to pay for UN peacekeeping in North Vietnam.

6 Nils Gilman, "The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 6, no. 1 (2015): 1, https://doi.org/10.1353/hum.2015.0008.

7 Gilman, "The New International Economic Order," 2–3.

8 Friedman, *Shadow Cold War*, 207.

9 Xiaoping, "Speech by Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China."

10 Sam Robinson et al., "The Globalization of Science Diplomacy in the Early 1970s: A Historical Exploration," *Science and Public Policy*, 2023, 1–10.

11 Ibid.

12 Sigrid Schmalzer, "On the Appropriate Use of Rose-Colored Glasses: Reflections on Science in Socialist China," *Isis* 98, no. 3 (2007): 571–83, https://doi.org/10.1086/521159; Sigrid Schmalzer, "Insect Control in Socialist China and the Corporate United States: The Act of Comparison, the Tendency to Forget, and the Construction of Difference in 1970s U.S.–Chinese Scientific Exchange," *Isis* 104 (2013): 303–29, https://doi.org/10.1086/670949; Pete Millwood, "An 'Exceedingly Delicate Undertaking': Sino-American Science Diplomacy, 1966–78," *Journal of Contemporary History* 56, no. 1 (2021): 166–90, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009419888273; Emily Baum, "Acupuncture Anesthesia on American Bodies: Communism, Race, and the Cold War in the Making of 'Legitimate' Medical Science," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 95, no. 4 (2021): 497–527, https://doi.org/10.1353/bhm.2021.0055.

13 Marcos Cueto, "The Origins of Primary Health Care and Selective Primary Health Care," *American Journal of Public Health* 94, no. 11 (November 2004): 1864–74; Xun Zhou, "From China's 'Barefoot Doctor' to Alma Ata: The Primary Health Care Movement in the Long 1970s," in Priscilla Roberts and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *China, Hong Kong, and the Long 1970s: Global Perspectives* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 135–57.

14 Sigrid Schmalzer, *Red Revolution, Green Revolution: Scientific Farming in Socialist China* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2016), specifically 66.

15 Friedman, *Shadow Cold War*.

16 Lovell, *Maoism*.

17 See introduction in Lovell for this argument.

18 Jingjing Su, "Diplomatie de la médecine traditionnelle chinoise en République populaire de Chine: un atout dans la Guerre froide," trans. Joseph Ciaudo, *Monde(s)* 20, no. 2 (2021): 141–61; Dongxin Zou, "Economizing Socialist Aid: China's Failed Surgical Plant in Algeria, 1973–80," *Technology and Culture* 63, no. 3 (2022): 718–48, https://doi.org/10.1353/tech.2022.0107.

19 Gorden Barrett, *China's Cold War Science Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022).
20 Lorenz M. Lüthi, *Cold Wars: Asia, the Middle East, Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 118.
21 Specifically, the entry of China within the FAO was relatively straightforward in comparison to other UN specialized agencies as the Republic of China (Taiwan) retired from the organization in 1951. There were therefore no issues regarding finalizing programs in Taiwan while having People's Republic seated as the Chinese representative, which was the case of United Nations Industrial Development Organization. ("Volume 1–1971–1972," January 1, 1971, S-0372-0001-01, United Nations Archives.)
22 "Lianheguo liangnong zuzhi juxing dishiqijie dahui wo daibiao shouci canjia shoudao huanying Aerbani ya deng guo bei jiena wei huiyuanguo" [The 17th Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), in which I was welcomed as a first-time participant, and in which Albania and other countries were admitted as members], *People's Daily*, November 14, 1973.
23 "Lianheguo liangnong zuzhi juxing dishiqijie dahui wo daibiao shouci canjia shoudao huanying Aerbani ya deng guo bei jiena wei huiyuanguo" [The 17th Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), in which I was welcomed as a first-time participant, and in which Albania and other countries were admitted as members].
24 "Woguo daibiao tuan tuanzhang Huang Shu Ze zai shijie weisheng dahui quanti huiyi shang fayan zhiyou shixian zhengzhi jingji duli caineng fazhan minzu weisheng shiye jianjue zhichi chaoxian minzhu zhuyi renmingongheguo shenqing canjia shijie weisheng zuzhi de zhengdang yaoqiu" [Huang Shuze, head of our delegation, speaking at the plenary meeting of the World Health Assembly, said that the development of national health could be achieved only through the realization of political and economic independence, and that we firmly supported the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's legitimate request to apply for membership in the World Health Organization], *People's Daily*, May 11, 1973.
25 "Shijie weisheng zuzhi zongganshi Mahler deng lijing qu Shanghai canguan fangwen" [WHO Director-General Halfdan Mahler and his team left Beijing and went to Shanghai for visit], *People's Daily*, November 16, 1973; "Shijie weisheng zuzhi kaocha zu lijing" [The WHO delegation left Beijing], *People's Daily*, December 9, 1973.
26 "Lianheguo liangshi he nongye zuzhi di shiqi jie huiyi bimu dahui tongguo guanyu lianheguo mingnian zhaokai shijie liangshi dahui de jianyi deng jueyi wo daibiaotuan chanshu dui jingji yuanzhu, guoji nongye diaozheng he liangshi anquan deng wenti de lichang" [The Closing Assembly of the 17th Session of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Adopted Resolutions on Proposals for the United Nations to Convene the World Food Conference Next Year and Other Resolutions. Our delegate stated our position on issues such as economic aid, international agricultural adjustment and food security], *People's Daily*, December 4, 1973.
27 "Lianheguo liangshi he nongye zuzhi di shiqi jie huiyi bimu dahui tongguo guanyu lianheguo mingnian zhaokai shijie liangshi dahui de jianyi deng jueyi wo daibiaotuan chanshu dui jingji yuanzhu, guoji nongye diaozheng he liangshi anquan deng wenti de lichang" [The Closing Assembly of the 17th Session of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Adopted Resolutions on Proposals for the United Nations to Convene the World Food Conference Next Year and Other Resolutions. Our delegate stated our position on issues such as economic aid, international agricultural adjustment and food security].

28 Gilman, "The New International Economic Order," 3.
29 Xiaoping, "Speech by Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China." On the China's role onto the NIEO, see Friedman, *Shadow Cold War*, 207.
30 "Yang Ligong tuanzhang zai Lianheguo liangnong zuzhi dahui shang fayan disan shijie huode zhengzhi jingji duli caineng baozheng liangnong fazhan" [Yang Ligong, head of the delegation, made a speech at the UN FAO Conference. Only when the Third World achieves political and economic independence can the development of food and agriculture be guaranteed], *People's Daily*, November 15,1975.
31 "Wo daibiao zai di ershiqi jie shijie weisheng dahui shang fayan zhichu disan shijie fazhan weisheng shiye bixu jianchi fandi fanzhi fanba shijie weisheng zuzhi yinggai nuli manzu disan shijie geguo renmin de yuanwang he yaoqiu" [On WHA27, our delegate indicated that the Third World must adhere to the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemony in order to develop healthcare. The WHO should strive to meet the wishes and demands of the people of the Third World], *People's Daily*, May 1, 1974.
32 Huang Shu-tse, "[Letter to Dr. Halfdan Mahler, the Director General of the WHO]," October 28, 1975, N52-180-2CHN(3), Jacket1, WHO Archives.
33 Hsueh Kung-cho, the director of Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Health, was firm in his refusal as he wrote a correctum to Mahler after receiving the minutes of that meeting, in which he again underlined China's limited capacity to provide medical supplies. (Hsueh Kung-cho, "[Letter to Dr. Halfdan Mahler, the Director General of the WHO]," February 25, 1975, N52-180-2CHN(2), Jacket1, WHO Archives.)
34 E.F. Schumacher, *Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered* (London: Blond & Briggs, 1973).
35 Heidi Morefield, *Developing to Scale: Technology and the Making of Global Health* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2023).
36 FAO Study Mission 9 September–5 October 1975, *Learning from China: A Report on Agriculture and the Chinese People's Communes* (Bangkok: Erawan Printing, 1977), 87.
37 *Learning from China: A Report on Agriculture and the Chinese People's Communes* (Bangkok: Erawan Printing, 1977). 9 FAO officers, September 9–October 5 1975. The focus of their visit was about Chinese approaches to agriculture and the Chinese people's communes as an example of integrated rural development April 21–May 12, 1976, on Chinese experience in aquaculture; and the other started from September 8, 1976 for four weeks, on forestry.
38 Friedman, *Shadow Cold War*, 211.
39 FAO Study Mission September 9–October 5, 1975, 29.
40 Ibid., 80.
41 Ibid., 40.
42 Ibid., 40.
43 Ibid., 29.
44 Gilbert Rist provides a thorough discussion on the premises of development. Gilbert Rist, *Le Développement: Histoire d'une Croyance Occidentale*, Références. Monde et Sociétés (Paris: Les Presses Sciences Po, 2007).
45 FAO Study Mission 9 September–5 October 1975, *Learning from China: A Report on Agriculture and the Chinese People's Communes*, 88.
46 Ibid., 91.
47 See, e.g., Zhou, "From China's 'Barefoot Doctor' to Alma Ata: The Primary Health Care Movement in the Long 1970s."

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49 On the evolvement of this system, see Xiaoping Fang, *Barefoot Doctors and Western Medicine in China* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2012), http://muse.jhu.edu/book/73631 (accessed August 23, 2024).
50 World Health Organization and Halfdan Mahler, "The Work of WHO, 1974: Annual Report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the United Nations" (World Health Organization, 1975), 24 and 25, https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/85882 (accessed August 23, 2024).
51 Morefield, *Developing to Scale*, ch. 5.
52 30 World Health Assembly, "Report of the Director-General on the Work of WHO in 1976" (World Health Organization, 1977), 5–6, https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/148982 (accessed August 23, 2024).
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54 "Shijie weisheng dahui taolun 'dao 2000nian renren xiangyou weisheng baojian' Qian Xinzhong fayan zhichi shijie weisheng zuzhi wei ci suozuo de gexiang nuli" [World Health Assembly discusses "Health for All by 2000," Qian Xinzhong speaks in support of WHO's efforts to this end], *People's Daily*, May 9, 1981.
55 "Shijie wei heng zuzhi di ershijiu jie dahui bimu disan shijie guojia daibiao biaoda fazhan minzu weisheng shiye de qianglie yuanwang woguo daibiao jieshao zhongxi yijie he deng fangmian qingkuang he suo qude de chengjiu" [Closing of the twenty-ninth session of the WHA Representatives from Third World countries expressed their strong desire to develop the cause of national health Our country representatives introduced the integration of traditional Chinese and Western medicine and other aspects and their achievements], *People's Daily*, May 28, 1976.
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58 "United Nations University (UNU)," January 14, 1976. S-0911-0010-03. United Nations Archives. p. 13.
59 Ibid., 13
60 Regarding the evolving changes of policies in the 1980s, see Ziyang Zhao, *Gai ge li cheng = the secret journal of Zhao Ziyang*, 1st edn. (Xianggang: Xin shi ji chu ban she, 2009).
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Chamber of Commerce," *Modern Asian Studies* 57, no. 4 (July 2023): 1387–414, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X22000579.

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66 The document in question is Memorandum Between the World Health Organization and the Ministry of Public Health of the People's Republic of China Governing Technical Cooperation in Health Activities (found in "Report on a Technical Visit to the People's Republic of China by the Western Pacific Advisory Committee on Medical Research," July 6, 1979, 39, B9-441-10, Jacket1, WHO Archives).

67 32 World Health Assembly, "Report of the Director-General on the Work of WHO in 1978." World Health Organization, 1979. https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/153124 (accessed August 23, 2024).

68 World Health Organization, "The Work of WHO 1978-1979: Biennial Report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the United Nations." World Health Organization, 1980. https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/204174 (accessed August 23, 2024). To be clear, China was not the only country that the WHO searched for inspiration. The WHO's 1978 Alma-Ata "Health for All" meeting also cited traditional medicine in African countries, and the studies of zoonoses in Bueno Aires. The idea was to implement appropriate exchanges of information among countries for the possibility of technical cooperation among themselves. World Health Assembly, "Collaboration with the United Nations System: Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries: Report by the Director-General" (World Health Organization, 1979), https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/153155 [accessed August 23, 2024].)

69 WHO-57, p. 38.

70 The WHO was aware of the prestige it brings, see e.g., DDR, WPRO, "WPRO-Memorandum: The Institute of Entomology, Shanghai—WHO Collaborating Centre for Insect Toxicology and Physiology," June 2, 1980, V2-286-6(4), Jacket1, WHO Archives.
71 "Agreement with Shanghai Institute of Materia Medica, PRC: Physiological Disposition and Pharmacokinetics of Antimalarial Drugs; Artemisinine Derivatives (Project ID: 800554)," January 16, 1983, T16-181-M2-61(A), Jacket 01, WHO Archives.
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79 "Nanjing ertong xinli weisheng yanjiu zhongxin chengji feiran shou pin wei shijie weisheng zuzhi diyige peixun jidi" [Nanjing Children's Mental Health Research Center achieved remarkable results and was hired as the first training base of the World Health Organization], *People's Daily*, August 3, 1986.
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81 "The World Food Programme in China: A Partnership to End Global Hunger," World Food Programme, 2017, https://cdn.wfp.org/wfp.org/publications/9.0_fact_sheet_wfp_in_china_2017.pdf (accessed September 4, 2024).
82 Margaret Chan was the WHO director general between 2012 and 2017; Qu Dongyu took office at the FAO in 2019 and is carrying out the second mandate from July 2023.

Chapter 15

Anti-fascist Networks in International Organizations: Beyond the Cold War

Sandrine Kott

The United Nations (UN) started as a war alliance against fascism. However, the growing ideological opposition between the Soviet Union and the United States and their respective allies or blocs, the so-called Cold War, has gradually obscured this reality.[1] This chapter looks at the persistence of European anti-fascist networks and commitment until the early 1970s. These networks enabled links to be maintained between actors who, although separated by the "Iron Curtain," shared common convictions.[2] These actors have influenced the choices and orientations of the United Nations system in favor of greater cooperation and even solidarity between the three Cold War worlds. Focusing on the persistence of this anti-fascist commitment in the UN adds nuances to the dominant interpretative framework of the period, according to which Cold War confrontations are central to explain the history of the postwar decades.

From the late 1940s onwards, anti-fascism became an ideological weapon appropriated by the Soviet Union and the communists against their enemies. It was therefore gradually delegitimized in the West, while former Nazis and fascists were reintegrated and even used in the anti-communist crusade.[3] Historians themselves tended until the 1990s to associate anti-fascism with communist propaganda.[4] With the fall of the communist regimes, however, historians reopened the issue of anti-fascism and brought it out of the communist "ghetto" in which it had been confined. They now emphasize its diversity, and stress the importance of taking liberal, Christian and above all socialist anti-fascism into account.[5] They also stress the international dimension of this movement, and even the cosmopolitanism of its representatives, who committed themselves to causes that went beyond their respective national space.[6] These new studies on the history of anti-fascism generally focus on the period of the anti-fascist mobilizations in the 1930s as well as on the memory of anti-fascism after 1990, but they tend to neglect the persistence of anti-fascism in the immediate postwar period.[7] Although they emphasize the international character of the movement, they generally do not look at international organizations as spaces for the continuation of this commitment. The aim of this chapter is not to exhume an anti-fascist discourse of the UN, but rather to identify the permanence of anti-fascist convictions within the UN. These

convictions came from national delegates, international officials, and experts who had fought directly or indirectly against fascism before and during the war and for whom fascism and the war it inevitably brought remained an unsurpassable danger. In what follows, I will focus mainly—but not exclusively—on the UN Department of Economic Affairs (DEA), becoming the Department of Economic and Social Affairs after 1959 (DESA), the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), and the International Labour Organization (ILO) as the main sites where these anti-fascist convictions persisted, especially among social-democratic leaning officials, experts, and delegates.

In the absence of a complete prosopography of the UN staff it is impossible to establish the relative numerical importance of this group of anti-fascists under study, but this chapter argues that their convictions were able to exert an important influence on the UN's orientations and to "color" its activities until the mid-1970s, which marks the disappearance of this anti-fascist generation. The UN economist Ignacy Sachs, himself an anti-fascist, stated that the first UN generation was "extremely motivated, politically involved" and "shared a certain number of strong convictions: full employment, planning, priority for social issues, anticolonialism."[8] This self-description should not be taken uncritically, but it points to political orientations that were indeed pursued during the first three decades of the UN's history and which were rooted largely in the reflection of the causes of fascism and the remedies which should be developed to avoid its return.

This chapter does not aim to overstate the value of anti-fascism, nor to idealize the UN, whose activities and orientations also reflect the global balance of power and which, for this reason, did not remain aloof from Cold War conflicts. However, by focusing on the activities of these anti-fascist officials and experts, this chapter aims to highlight another aspect of the history of the period and other players, often neglected in a history focused on the United Nations as a Cold War arena.

Before the Cold War 1943–1947[9]

The United Nations was first a war alliance against fascism. Its founding text was the Atlantic Charter of August 1941. Drawn up by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and adopted by British prime minister Winston Churchill, it was endorsed by the states entering the war alongside the Allies, including Stalin for the Soviet Union in October 1943. The charter promised the right of peoples to self-determination, economic cooperation between nations, and social security for all.[10] In 1945, the amended charter became the founding text of the United Nations as an organization and continued to carry the message of the advent of a better world. The promises expressed in the charter were in line with the reconstruction plans drawn up by the US and British administrations as early as 1940. In 1943, the Royal Institute for International Affairs in Great Britain held a seminar led by the Polish economist Paul Rosenstein-Rodan to identify economic recovery projects and to help bring the Eastern part of Europe out of its state of "underdevelopment." Indeed, a more harmonious economic development of Europe was seen as a

precondition for a lasting peace.[11] The same aim was also clearly stated in October 1941 at the international conference organized in New York by the ILO with the support of the US government.[12] The ILO, which was housed at McGill University in 1941, was one of the few international organizations of the League of Nations (LON) system still in operation and the conference brought together thirty-five heads of government, including eight representatives of European governments in exile.[13] In his opening speech, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proclaimed the solidarity of the United States with the countries hardest hit by the war, and pledged his commitment to a fairer world in which peace would be preserved.

The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) which can be considered as the first UN agency, was an expression of this promise. It operated between 1943 and 1948 and was financed by unoccupied warring countries in proportion to their gross domestic product, with the United States providing 70 percent of the funds. Its aim was to help liberated populations by providing emergency aid, but also by promoting the reconstruction of war-torn countries. It also dealt with the difficult issue of refugee management and return. UNRRA intervened in seventeen countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, which was hard hit by the destruction. In December 1946, it employed over 21,000 people.[14] UNRRA acted as a bridge between the LON and the UN systems as well as between Western and Eastern Europe. Some of its employees had worked directly for the League of Nations, and many would join the UN after its dissolution. UNRRA helped to rebuild the countries of Eastern Europe and to maintain the pan-European networks that had developed within the LON.[15] The Polish socialist Ludwik Rajchman who founded and directed the Health Section of the LON joined UNRRA as a representative of the Polish government before founding UNICEF.[16] Vaclav Kostelecký was an UNRRA officer in Prague before joining the Economic Commission for Europe.[17] The Polish economist Władysław Malinowski was an UNRRA economic officer before holding the same position at the UN in various commissions, and then took charge of the Regional Commissions Section between 1952 and 1959.[18]

Malinowski met the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal during the war in the International Group of Democratic Socialists founded in Stockholm in 1942. The group brought together social-democratic resistance fighters in exile and drew up an international plan for the postwar period, presented as an alternative to that of the Allies.[19] The members of the group, or those linked to it in one way or another, remained faithful to this internationalist ideal. Among them were later prominent national politicians such as Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky who, became involved in UN activities. Many others joined the UN Secretariat after the war. Myrdal became the first secretary of the ECE in 1947 where he was assisted by the Czechoslovak economist Kostelecký and the French socialist and resistance fighter Robert Mossé. Władysław Malinowski joined the UN Secretariat at the invitation of the British socialist David Owen who had been a Liaison Officer in Stockholm during the war.[20] David Owen became assistant secretary-general for the UN Department of Economic Affairs in April 1946. In this position, he pushed for the recruitment of the Polish socialist economist Michał Kalecki as

deputy director of the same department.[21] These committed internationalist social democrats were united in a common anti-fascism and continued to meet regularly at the UN.[22]

To this first circle of anti-fascist internationalists, we must add many Central European early communists or socialists, some of whom had to join the communist parties at the time of the forced merger in 1946–47, while others went into exile. Both groups played an important role in maintaining relations between the two parts of Europe within the UN system. The Czechoslovak Arnošt Tauber who had been deported to Dachau, Auschwitz, and Terezin, where he joined the Resistance, became vice Chairman of the ECE Commission in 1947 and advocated strongly for the continuation of the economic exchange between East and West.[23] Anton Zelenka, social security expert, joined the International Labour Office (Office)—the organization's permanent secretariat—in the interwar years and was the representative of the Czechoslovak government at the 28th International Labour Conference in 1946. He later returned to the office as a civil servant, but this time with Austrian nationality.[24] With Leo Wildmann, another social security expert, he was part of a large group of exiled Czechoslovak Social Democrats who maintained close contact with their colleagues who had remained in Czechoslovakia.[25] The ergonomist Jan Rosner, the secretary of the Polish delegation to the International Labour Conference between 1930 and 1933 and later a civil servant at the office in 1933 played an equivalent role for Poland.

Rosner was the ILO's correspondent in Warsaw between 1946 and 1950 and therefore organized the visit of David Morse, director-general of the office in Poland and Czechoslovakia at the beginning of 1949.[26] This visit may seem surprising, as the Soviet authorities had always been hostile to the ILO which was created in 1919 as an alternative to revolutions. Moreover, David Morse, who was close to Roosevelt, was a US citizen.[27] However, the long accounts of David Morse's visit in the ILO archives, and the echoes in the local press of both countries, testify to the great cordiality of relations. The ILO officials as well as their Eastern Europe counterparts, were all pointing to strong similarities and shared convictions, of which social justice and, above all, anti-fascism were the main pillars. It is true that David Morse himself enlisted in the US Army to fight Nazism and, for his communist interlocutors, he was also one of the liberators of the Mauthausen camp, reserved for enemies of the Nazi regime and in which many communists had been detained. Polish prime minister and former socialist Jozef Cyrankiewicz claimed to have met David Morse at Mauthausen, where he had been deported. This meeting is undocumented, but it testifies to the power of anti-fascism as a common value to establish and maintain cordial relations between US politicians and communist leaders in the postwar period.[28] The archives also reveal the intense emotions connected to these war memories. In 1949, when Myrdal met with the Polish delegation of the Coal committee set up in the ECE one of the delegates told him "that he had been liberated after many years in a German concentration camp by the Swedish rescue action … he had become a human being again in Sweden … "[29]

Beyond the Cold War: Bridging East and West

The biographical backgrounds and political commitments of these international actors made them sensitive to the economic complementarity between the "two" Europes, and to the political need to maintain and even develop pan-European relations. At the root of this conviction was the fear of the re-establishment of German economic imperialism in the East.[30] Additionally, representatives of both Eastern and Western European countries saw it as a means of freeing themselves from economic dependence on the two great powers, and of avoiding to be trapped in the Cold War ideological oppositions and conflicts between the USSR and the United States.[31]

Between 1949 and 1953, during the period of Stalinism in the USSR and McCarthyism in the United States, mistrust between the two great powers became nevertheless a real obstacle to economic and technical exchanges within international organizations. In 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy claimed that the secretariat of the United Nations and its agencies had been infiltrated by communists. The FBI stepped up its surveillance of US international civil servants and engaged in a veritable witch-hunt against those considered progressive. Former UNRRA members were the first target. Some of them had to defend themselves before the various commissions of inquiry set up to assess the loyalty of civil servants under the Truman administration. Several of them even had to resign their positions in the US administration.[32] The UN Secretary-General, Norwegian Trygve Lie (1946–52), agreed to systematic investigations of US personnel and had nine permanent staff members dismissed.[33] Some twenty US UNESCO officials were investigated by the FBI and, in 1954, seven of them were dismissed. Swedish social-democrat sociologist Alva Myrdal, head of the Social Sciences Department, was refused entry to the United States in March 1953.[34] Sociologist and physician Milton I. Roemer, a renowned specialist in public hygiene who became medical advisor to the WHO in Geneva in 1951, was deprived of his US passport and had to take refuge in Canada.[35] In the Eastern bloc, several officials, among them Kostelecký, lost their passports, while others preferred to go into exile to escape repression. The economist Adam Rosé, a member of the ILO during the interwar period who was very active at the ECE coal commission between 1947 and 1949, left Poland in 1949. In January 1950 Alexander W. Rudzinski, a Polish diplomat to the UN, sought asylum in the United States expressing deep concerns of internationalized Eastern elites about the growing Soviet hegemony, and the Stalinization of communist parties and people's democracies.[36]

The ECE was directly affected by these conflicts. The famous Polish economist Oskar Lange could not take part in the first meeting of European Economists organized by Gunnar Myrdal in September 1949 because he did not receive a passport from his government.[37] Myrdal had to deal with innumerable passport problems, it was very complicated to get visas for both Eastern and Western Europeans on mission in the East.[38] In this atmosphere of mistrust, several projects could not be completed. In 1949–50, the ECE supported a plan to connect the

electricity grids of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and southern Germany. However, this ran up against the blocking of shipments of US and Western European electrical equipment to Central European countries which were embargoed by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls.[39]

Nevertheless, even during these years between 1949 and 1953, Poles and Czechoslovaks continued to sit on ECE technical committees. Poles remained very active in transport and coal committees; and Czechoslovak delegates attended the electricity, steel, transport, and timber committee meetings, where they even managed to negotiate a steel agreement with the Belgian government.[40] Except for a short period in 1950–51, most of the committees remained active and were able to operate with representatives from both parts of Europe. Some, such as timber, coal, and transport, continued to play an important role and in December 1949, Myrdal in a letter to Owen even stated: "from all point of view it has been … one of the best Committee meeting we have ever had … Intense desire of cooperation."[41] In 1954, relations between Yugoslavia and Austria began to grow again, with an initial agreement to control the waters of the Drava River, the first step towards the development of joint hydroelectric power.[42] In fact, throughout the period, the ECE was the place par excellence for this trans-European commitment. This had economic reasons, but can also be attributed to the persistence of the personnel ties forged during the war and the convictions on which they were based.[43] Before becoming the first General secretary of the ECE, Myrdal was a minister of commerce of Sweden between 1945 and 1947 and encouraged trade relations with the USSR.[44] At the ECE, he was strongly committed to maintain the links between both parts of Europe and largely succeeded in doing so with the support of Owen and Malinowski. They were united by their wartime experience and their desire to create the conditions for a better Europe.

This orientation was continued by the next two secretaries of the ECE, both former Yugoslav resistance fighters, after a short interlude with Finnish Sakari Tuomioja (1957–60). Vladimir Velebit (1960–67) was a former supreme commander of the Yugoslav resistance who negotiated with the British and American allies, and Janez Stanovnik (1967–82) a former Slovenian Christian Socialist joined the Communist Party during the Resistance; he became the first President of Slovenia after the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

From the outset, Myrdal and the other members of his secretariat believed in the possibility of overcoming political prejudices and oppositions through the technicalization of issues. The meetings of the Technical Committees on Coal, Wood, Transport and Housing provided a forum in which a real common language could be developed over the course of the meetings.[45] The Coal Committee was thus able to establish an international classification and typology for coke, still in use today. The economic aspect of the second basket of the Helsinki Conference of 1975, which aimed to promote economic exchanges between the two parts of Europe, was closely linked to the previous activities of the ECE which was made responsible for overseeing the Helsinki economic agreements.[46] Cold War competition was not entirely absent, though. For Western actors this cooperation was also based on the idea that their model was superior and that cooperation would undermine communism from the inside.

At the ILO, social security became a privileged topic area for this East–West dialogue. It was based on personal links forged during the interwar period, as well as shared know-how and convictions in the field. Anton Zelenka, head of the Social Security Department, a former Czechoslovak citizen and social democrat, now an Austrian, played a central role here. It was thanks to his relations with his former comrades from the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, who had joined the Communist Party, that Czechoslovakia remained a member of the ILO at a time when the more Stalinist communists were considering withdrawing from the organization.[47] Zelenka also undertook several technical missions to Prague in 1947 and 1948 to support the reform of the social insurance system. In his opinion, the Czechoslovak plan, which was truly universal and guaranteed satisfactory benefits, was much better than the French social security system and could serve as an international model.[48] After repeated requests, and with Zelenka's support, Evžen Erban, minister of social affairs in the Czechoslovak government, a former left-wing socialist, succeeded in organizing a seminar on social security in Prague, partly funded by the ILO. Representatives from several Middle and Far Eastern countries attended, and Czechoslovak experts presented their state-organized but trade-union-managed social insurance system that was perfectly in line with the model promoted by ILO officials in the decades following the Second World War.[49]

From the 1950s onwards, Vienna, a socialist-ruled city, became a sort of platform for these East–West relations. The influence of the socialist politician Bruno Kreisky who, between 1953 and 1966, had served as state secretary and minister of foreign affairs and became chancellor in 1970 is worth mentioning here.[50] During the war, like the West German Chancellor Willy Brandt or the ECE Secretary Myrdal, he was active in the Group of Democratic Socialists. Like Brandt, Kreisky never hid his opposition to the communist regimes of Eastern Europe, but they both wished to preserve ties between the two parts of Europe.[51] During these years Vienna hosted several organizations that explicitly sought to create spaces for dialogue between East and West. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an autonomous organization linked to the UN system, was officially founded in 1957.[52] The European Coordination Centre for Research and Documentation in the Social Sciences of UNESCO established in 1962 under the auspices of the International Social Science Council, sought to promote comparative research in the social sciences in Europe by establishing international teams consisting of researchers from the East and the West.[53] The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) was founded in Vienna 1972.[54] Its funding was provided in equal parts by the Soviet and US institutions participating in the project. Its director was Howard Raiffa, a professor of managerial economics at Harvard University, while the chairman of the board of directors was Djhermen Gvishiani, a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, who had been highly involved in East–West dialogue since the 1960s. In 1974, Vienna also became home to the International Council for New Initiatives in East–West Cooperation, which developed in the wake of the Helsinki process, and aimed to promote economic relations between the two parts of Europe, and to work on a certain number of common problems, especially in environmental matters.[55]

The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, founded in 1973, was a private institute in the service of companies that published an annual report on the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), organized symposia, and produced numerous studies on East–West economic relations in the 1970s. The Vienna Institute worked in close synergy with the ECE in Geneva. This institute, like many other private economic initiatives that existed during this period, also reminds us that efforts to preserve pan-European relations were not the sole preserve of anti-fascist networks, and that certain economic players, in search of new markets, were heavily involved in this process.[56]

A Better World for All

Most of the UN officials mentioned above belonged to a group of Keynesian economists or, like Oskar Lange, advocated the possibility of market socialism with human face. It was a small group whose coherence was based on the shared convictions inspired by their analysis of the economic crisis of the 1930s, its terrible political consequences, and their commitment to fighting fascism. They believed in the importance of dialogue and saw modernity as a promise for more prosperity for all within each nation state and throughout the world. In their view the fight against inequality nationally and globally was a prerequisite for peace.

Gunnar Myrdal sought to solidify this community by organizing meetings and exchanges of views between Eastern and Western economists. The first was scheduled for 1949, but in the end the Eastern actors were prevented from attending by their government. Later, a fellowship program funded by the Rockefeller Foundation enabled economists from the East to travel to the West. This program was designed to encourage the exchange of ideas, but it was not without the afterthought that these exchanges might convince Eastern economists of the superiority of the Western model of welfare capitalism.[57]

Economic planning played an important role in these exchanges and planning models circulated in both directions during the 1950s and 1960s.[58] The ECE was one of the places where these circulations took place and where the Western model of indicative planning was promoted with some success to the point that in the 1950s Polish economists applied to the commission for funding to develop their knowledge on planning.[59]

One of the aims of planning was to put an end to unemployment, seen, in both blocs as the ultimate expression of the social imbalances engendered by capitalism, and a generator of war. Therefore, unemployment became an important topic in the UN; together with Hungarian-born economist Nicholas Kaldor, head of the ECE's research and planning sector, Kalecki drafted a report to ECOSOC on full employment which paved the way for a resolution in favor of the quest for full employment in 1950.[60]

Beyond Europe, unemployment was also seen by these economists as a consequence and sign of what was interpreted as "economic underdevelopment." The World Employment Program (WEP) launched by the ILO in 1969 became the channel through which this new thinking was disseminated.[61] The WEP was

co-chaired by Hans Singer, who had been driven out of Germany by Nazism in 1933 and had completed his doctoral thesis on unemployment under Keynes. He joined Owen in the United Nations Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) in 1947. In 1949, Owen and Singer have been instrumental in setting up the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, which, in 1964, gave birth to the United Nations Development Programme.[62]

Since the 1940s, the fight against inequality in development has been a priority for this group of socialist-leaning economists.[63] Among them were Rosenstein-Rodan at the World Bank, Kaldor at UNECE, Malinowski, and Kalecki at the DEA, all émigrés from Eastern Europe who, following Rosenstein-Rodan, had established this first European periphery as a space for experimentation and for building models, from which development policies could be exported to Latin America, Asia, and later Africa. The regional economic commissions of the United Nations became key forums for this development thinking. In 1948, Myrdal was already stressing the need to extricate Eastern Europe from its semi-colonial position, without which there could be no lasting peace on the continent.[64] Malinowski was strongly committed to the creation of other regional commissions; the Latin American one was set up in 1948, followed by the African one in 1958. Each of these commissions developed its own development models,[65] however, their existence was based on a common criticism of the secular deterioration in the terms of trade. According to the hypothesis formulated by Singer and then Prebisch this deterioration was made at the detriment of the commodity-producing countries of the South.[66] While pushing for holding a United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Malinowski hoped that it could provide a collective answer to this deterioration and the neo-colonial situation it engendered. Malinowski managed to convince the Argentinian economist Raúl Prebisch, who had been chairing the Economic Commission for Latin America and was recognized as a Third World advocate to serve as conference secretary.[67] After the first meeting in Geneva in 1964, the conference became a permanent body under the supervision of the UN General Assembly, with a General Secretariat headed by Prebisch.[68] For about ten years, UNCTAD could be seen as an instrument for achieving a more equitable reorganization of the world economy. This hope culminated in the UN General Assembly's vote on the Declaration of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), proposed by the G77 group of Third World countries.[69] In the same year, on the occasion of his "Nobel Prize" in economics, Myrdal gave a lecture entitled "The Equality Issue in World Development," in which he argued for redistribution of global wealth through increased aid to "underdeveloped" countries.[70]

The Brandt Report, or *North–South Report*, represented the latest moment in the commitment of these anti-fascist socialists to greater global justice. The report was intended as a positive response to the Declaration of a New International Economic Order. In 1976, at the request of World Bank Director McNamara, the former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, winner of the 1971 Nobel Peace Prize for its "Ostpolitik" (opening to the East) and chair of the Socialist International, established a commission on underdevelopment and poverty. Its

heterogeneous composition included numerous "progressive" politicians, such as Olaf Palme of Sweden and Edgard Pisani of France. It issued a consensus report proposing a transfer of resources to the countries of the Global South via taxes on armaments and better regulation of world trade but remained very cautious on the question of nationalization.[71] In 1982, at the Socialist International Conference in Vienna, Kreisky called for a "Marshall Plan for the South."[72] Brandt's and Kreisky's declarations on rebalancing the world in favor of the countries of the South illustrate their commitment to a more just world, but they were not entirely devoid of Cold War strategic concerns. These initiatives sought to make up for the lost time by the Socialist International vis-à-vis the communists, who had given their full support to decolonization much earlier.[73]

Without disappearing, this internationalist discourse was marginalized in the 1980s.[74] The gradual disappearance of the anti-fascist generations certainly played a role. Meanwhile the global context had changed and plans to reorganize the world economy had been progressively abandoned following the powerful backlash generated by concerns surrounding the NIEO. At the same time, the need to protect social rights threatened by globalization led national leaders of Western European social-democratic parties and trade unions to abandon international solidarity in favor of national programs in order to protect the short-term interests of their members and voters within the nation state.

Conclusion

By following the anti-fascist networks from the 1940s, we can see how the United Nations, founded as a wartime alliance, was able to constitute a space in which the Cold War oppositions did not always prevail. It was a space where a pan-European internationalism was pursued and continued to exist in parallel with the establishment of the blocs. This internationalism was based on projects for the reconstruction and organization of the world which were rooted in the years of struggle against the crisis of the 1930s, and found concrete expression in the plans drawn up during the war. It was underpinned by the existence of networks of actors, among which the socialist/social-democratic movement in both Eastern and Western Europe played an essential role.

On both sides of Europe, but especially in the East, these actors sought to escape the domination of the hegemonic powers, and the models they proposed: poorly regulated capitalism on the one hand, authoritarian state socialism on the other. They believed in a possible third way: in a regulated and embedded capitalism for the benefit of all, or in a market socialism with human face.

They were first to be found in large numbers in UNRRA, in the Department of Economic Affairs of the UN Secretariat and in various UN agencies: the regional commissions, the ILO, and UNESCO. Representatives of this broad socialist and progressive movement, often Keynesian economists, were united in their belief in the need to organize a more harmonious and united world in order to preserve peace. As we have seen, their commitments were not entirely free of Cold War calculations. Development projects also aimed to integrate the newly decolonized

countries into the Western economic space. Social Democrats clearly aspired to undermine communism. Nevertheless, their projects should not be reduced to these calculations and until the 1970s, they left their mark on the organization's choices in favor of a better and more equal world.

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Christian, Michel

Michel Christian is a Senior Research Associate at the University of Geneva, Switzerland. His research interests focus on the history of early childhood in France, Switzerland and Germany and international organizations in the twentieth century. He is the author of the award-winning article: "Un printemps des crèches à l'Est: le développement des crèches est-allemandes des années 1950 aux années 1980" (2019).

Cîrstocea, Ioana

Ioana Cîrstocea is Senior Researcher in Sociology at the French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), member of CESSP (Paris) and CEFRES (Prague, Czechia). Her research topics include the liberalization of higher education and the genesis of gender expertise in the former socialist Eastern Europe; the social production of knowledge about (post-)socialism and transnational feminist thinking. Her latest publications are *Learning Gender after the Cold War: Contentious Feminisms* (2022) and (co-edited with Françoise Thébaud) the special issue "Le genre de la guerre froide" (2023).

Dietrich, Christopher R.W.

Christopher R.W. Dietrich is an Associate Professor of History at Fordham University, New York City, USA. He is the author of *Oil Revolution* (2017) and the editor of *Diplomacy and Capitalism* (2022). A graduate of Grinnell College and the University of Texas at Austin, he is also an editor of the *Power, Politics, and the World* series at Penn Press.

Eby, Marek

Marek Eby is a PhD candidate at the Department of History at New York University, USA. His dissertation explores the history of Soviet malaria control programs from the 1920s to 1950s. His broader research interests include transnational medical science, international public health institutions, and socialist state-building in the twentieth century. He recently published "Global Tashkent: Transnational Visions of a Soviet City in the Postcolonial World, 1953–1966" (2021).

Gillabert, Matthieu

Matthieu Gillabert is Professor at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland in the Department of Contemporary History. His research interests focus on academic and youth mobility in Europe, East-South relations during the Cold War and the colonial past in Switzerland and in Poland.

Gorman, Daniel

Daniel Gorman is Professor of History at the University of Waterloo and the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Canada. His most recent books are *Uniting Nations: Britons and Internationalism, 1945–1970* (2022) and *Before the UN Sustainable Development Goals* (coedited with Martin Gutmann, 2022).

Graham, Simon

Simon Graham is a Sessional Lecturer at the University of Sydney, Australia in the Discipline of History. His research interests focus on the intersection between intelligence, security, and international order during the Cold War. He has published on the intelligence services of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, threat perception, and espionage against the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Huskamp Peterson, Trudy

Trudy Huskamp Peterson is a certified archivist and consultant. She was the Acting Archivist of the United States 1993–95; founding Executive Director of the Open Society Archives, Budapest, 1995–99; and head of archives United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 1999–2002. Her publications include *Final Acts: A Guide to Preserving the Records of Truth Commissions* (2005) and *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: An Archival Commentary* (2020).

Kott, Sandrine

Sandrine Kott is Professor of Modern European History at the University of Geneva, Switzerland and a Visiting Professor at New York University. Her research interests include standard setting and expert knowledge exchange in international organizations during the Cold War. Her latest book, *A World More Equal: An Internationalist Perspective on the Cold War*, was published in 2024.

Lesnykh, Lidia

Lidia Lesnykh is Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland in the Department of

Contemporary History. Her current project focuses on the international student organizations' cooperation in Cold War Europe. In 2021, she defended a PhD dissertation on university sport as an instrument of student internationalism during the twentieth century. Her research interests also include youth and tourist exchanges.

Lin, Yi-Tang

Yi-Tang Lin is a SNSF Assistant Professor in the Department of History at the University of Zurich, Switzerland. Her research interests lie at the crossroads of international history, politics, and the history of science, technology, and medicine. She investigates how international programs, whether launched by international organizations or national foreign aid agencies, have influenced the trajectories of science, technology, and policymaking. Her first book, *Statistics and the Language of Global Health: Institutions and Experts in China, Taiwan, and the World (1917–1960)*, was published in 2022.

Methfessel, Christian

Christian Methfessel is a postdoctoral Researcher at the Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History Munich-Berlin, Germany. His research interests include Transimperial History, International History, and Global History. His current work focuses on territorial conflicts during the Cold War and the Yugoslav Wars in the early 1990s.

Muschik, Eva-Maria

Eva-Maria Muschik is a historian and Assistant Professor in Development Studies at the University of Vienna, Austria. She is the author of *Building States: The United Nations, Development, and Decolonization, 1945–1965* (2022) and convened a special issue on the "Global History of International Organizations and Decolonization" (2022).

Pešta, Mikuláš

Mikuláš Pešta is a Researcher at the Institute of Contemporary History, Czech Academy of Science and an Assistant Professor at the Institute of World History at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Prague, Czechia. He focuses on the contacts between Czechoslovakia and the African and Asian countries and national liberation movements in the field of education, cultural diplomacy, ideology, and secret services. Currently, he studies the role of Prague-based international organizations and student internationalism during the Cold War and beyond.

Roehrlich, Elisabeth

Elisabeth Roehrlich is an Associate Professor at the University of Vienna's Department of History, Austria. Her research interests focus on the history of the Cold War, the history of international organizations, and the evolution of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Her most recent book is *Inspectors for Peace: A History of the International Atomic Energy Agency* (2022).

Schemper, Lukas

Lukas Schemper is a Research Associate in the ERC project "Archipelagic Imperatives. Shipwreck and Lifesaving in European Societies since 1800" at the Leibniz Center for Literary and Cultural Research in Berlin, Germany. His research interests include the history of disaster, humanitarianism, and international organizations.

Sharnak, Debbie

Debbie Sharnak is Assistant Professor in History and International Studies at Rowan University, New Jersey, USA. Her research focuses on human rights, transitional justice, and transnational social movements in Latin American and US history. She published *Of Light and Struggle: Social Justice, Human Rights, and Accountability in Uruguay* (2023), is the coeditor of *Uruguay in Transnational Perspective* (2023), and has several other chapters and journal articles in *Journal of Iberian and Latin America Studies*, *NACLA*, and *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, among others.

Türk, Henning

Henning Türk is Head of the History Department at the LVR-Institute for Regional Studies and Regional History at Bonn, Germany. His research interests are energy history and the history of international organizations. His latest book is *Energiesicherheit nach der Ölkrise. Die Internationale Energieagentur 1974–1985* (2023).

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