HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY AND CULTURE OF THE BLACK SEA REGION

Edited by Ninja Bumann, Kerstin S. Jobst, Stefan Rohdewald and Stefan Troebst

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Fig. 1: Physical Map of the Black Sea.

Fig. 2: Contemporary Map of the Black Sea Region.

Acknowledgements

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A Note on Transliteration and Spelling

The Black Sea region is a place of various cultures, peoples, and religions. As a consequence, the area has been characterized by a multitude of civilizations and languages, which is also reflected in different variations of designations for places, names, and terms.

The present handbook uses English forms of the most common place names (e. g., Moscow, St. Petersburg, Istanbul). In the case of places without any common English designation, the name in the administrative language of the time is used, in the original language. However, names whose "standardized English form" is a direct derivative of a specific (imperial) administrative language (such as Kiev, Odessa, Bakhchisarai, or the Dnieper) are problematic here. This is because many English place names originated in the nineteenth century, when most parts of the Black Sea region and its surrounding lands were under Russian or Ottoman imperial rule, making English names often a direct transliteration of Russian names. In the editors' view, the use of such names no longer seems justified in light of the Russian aggression towards Ukraine. Therefore, in the Ukrainian historical context, the handbook generally favors Ukrainian designations for landscapes and locations, such as Kyiv, Odesa, or the Dnipro.[1]

Otherwise, this handbook renders place names in their different forms according to time and perspective to reflect the linguistic diversity of the Black Sea area. Consequently, Feodosiia, for example, can appear in the Ukrainian or Russian form, in the Crimean Tatar (Kefe), or in the common name in the Middle Ages, Caffa, depending on the context. For better comprehensibility and classification, other forms relevant to the context or, in the case of strongly divergent names, the present-day versions are indicated in parentheses. Given the extremely large geographic and temporal area covered here, such a flexible approach cannot, of course, preclude a certain blurring and trade-offs in terms of uniformity and consistency. Especially in contexts where the question of the administrative language of the time cannot be answered unambiguously from today's perspective, or where it changed several times within a larger period, the decision ultimately depends on the focus. The same holds for personal names.

Non-Latin names are transliterated according to following systems: Russian names are transliterated following the Passport 2013 system, Ukrainian names following Passport 2007,[2] and Bulgarian names following Official Bulgarian 2006. Arabic and Persian names are transliterated following the third edition of the *Brill Encyclopaedia of Islam*,

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1 However, complete consistency could not be achieved, especially since the handbook seeks to adequately represent linguistic diversity, and waters and landscapes often cross state and language borders. In this sense, for example, the name of the River Dniester, which rises in what is now western Ukraine and flows through both Ukrainian and Moldovan territory, is not fully Ukrainianized and is predominantly rendered with the standard English variant Dniester.

2 However, an exception is made here for the relevant distinction between the letters "г" and "ґ," which, contrary to this scheme, are transliterated as "h" and "g."

and Ottoman names are transliterated in line with Redhouse transliteration.[3] Exceptions are made for renowned rulers' names for which an English counterpart is commonly used (as in the case of Catherine II or Nicholas I).

In terms of spelling and transliteration, pre-modern names and designations, which for a long time did not undergo strict linguistic codification, and more specifically Turkic personal and place names, which have been documented in various scripts (Arabic, Cyrillic, and Latin), pose a particular challenge. In addition, the linguistic peculiarities of small minorities have often not been reflected in the literature, and Crimean Tatar terms, for example, have frequently been consistently rendered according to modern Turkish spelling. Yet various spelling and pronunciation variants were used by Crimean Tatars, and from around the seventeenth century on, a preference for the Oghuz variants is evident in southern Crimea, while in the north the Kipchak spellings were more commonly used. In addition, some Oghuz forms are commonly used in English, such as the dynastic name Giray (which in modern Crimean Tatar is spelled Geray). The present volume generally renders Tatar names according to the modern Crimean Tatar Latin alphabet, which in contrast to the modern Turkish alphabet entails some additional letters reflecting specific sounds encountered in Tatar (such as q or ñ). Exceptions are made to forms already domesticated in English based on the Oghuz form, such as Giray, or names found exclusively or predominantly in sources written in non-Turkic languages.[4] For names and designations concerning the Golden Horde, common English forms (such as Genghis Khan or Tokhtamysh) are used. In the case of Seljuk rulers' names, which are rendered in various spellings in English, the book uses the transliteration as indicated in the third edition of the *Brill Encyclopaedia of Islam.* Accordingly, the Seljuk rulers are referred to here as ʿIzz al-Dīn Kaykāʾūs, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kaykhusraw, or ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Kayqubad.

This approach, of course, cannot satisfy all tastes. However, the editors hope that the linguistic diversity and complexity can be presented here without confusing the reader too much. Certainly, it was not the intention of the editors to engage in linguistic revisionism, nationalistic appropriation, or to offend anyone's sensibilities in any other way.

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3 An exception is made for the indication of an *izafet* compound, which is here not adapted to the vowel harmony and is consistently rendered as an appended "-i."

4 The editors would like to thank Dariusz Kołodziejczyk and Arkadiusz Blaszczyk for their insightful comments on the complexities of Crimean Tatar spelling, even if the different views did not agree on all points. In the end, the handbook's approach was heavily inspired by Dariusz Kołodziejczyk's meticulous articulation of these complexities as found in: Dariusz Kołodziejczyk's, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania: International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (15th–18th Century). A Study of Peace Treaties Followed by an Annotated Edition of Relevant Documents* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), xxxi–xxxv.

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Part I: **Conceptualizing the Black Sea Region**

Ninja Bumann, Kerstin S. Jobst, Stefan Rohdewald and Stefan Troebst

Introduction:
Historical and Cultural Perspectives on the
Black Sea Region

When the idea of publishing a handbook on the history and culture of the Black Sea was born, no one had any idea that at the time of publication the region would be at the very center of global security concerns. The annexation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation in 2014 brought the Black Sea into the focus of the media for some time. And in hindsight, the much-vaunted *Zeitenwende* had already begun to take shape at this moment. However, when the preparations for this handbook began in 2016, the editorial team did not expect the region to become the battlefield for future world history that is has been since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The idea to publish a Black Sea Handbook was mainly based on an increased scholarly interest in the region among historians and area specialists that had developed a few years earlier. In 1995, the journalist and writer Neal Ascherson published the bestseller *Black Sea*, which provides an overview of three millennia of history on the Black Sea coasts and includes anecdotes and personal stories.[1] In 2004, Charles King published another popular monograph entitled *The Black Sea: A History*. Similar to Ascherson, King recounts the history of the lands surrounding the Black Sea from the Ancient Greeks to the 1990s on the basis of sources in multiple languages.[2]

Besides these two popular monographs, the essay "A Framework for the Study of the Black Sea World, 1789–1915" published in 1997 by the economic historian Eyüp Özveren was groundbreaking for the study of the Black Sea region as a historically constituted unit of analysis. Özveren characterized his so-called "Black Sea World" mainly on trans-maritime trade and commerce, which formed a cohesive unit.[3] These findings were further developed in Özveren's 2001 essay "The Black Sea World as a Unit of Analysis," in which he proposed to conceptualize the Black Sea region as a historical meso-region.[4] This ultimately inspired one of the handbook's editors, Stefan Troebst, to reflect on the conception of the Black Sea region as a "historical meso-region."[5] The present handbook aims to further investigate the structural features in historical and cultural terms that conceptualize the Balkan-Black Sea-Caucasus space as a specific space.

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1 See Neal Ascherson, *Black Sea* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).

2 See Charles King, *The Black Sea: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

3 Eyüp Y. Özveren, "A Framework for the Study of the Black Sea World, 1789–1915," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 20, no. 1 (1997): 77–113.

4 See Eyüp Özveren, "The Black Sea World as a Unit of Analysis," in *Politics of the Black Sea: Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict*, ed. Tunç Aybak (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 61–84.

5 See the chapter by Stefan Troebst on "The Black Sea Area as a Historical Meso-Region."

1 The Black Sea as an Object of Historiography

Following these proposals to analyze the Black Sea as a historical entity, a growing number of research projects have examined different aspects of this area in the field of history and cultural studies. For instance, the ongoing project "History of the Black Sea, 18th–20th century," run by the Centre of Maritime History of the Institute for Mediterranean Studies (IMS) of the Foundation of Research and Technology (FORTH) in Rethymno, Crete, aims to analyze the economic activities of port cities of the Black Sea, which formed an integrated regional market.[6] The project "Knowledge Exchange and Academic Cultures in the Humanities. Europe and the Black Sea Region," conducted by the University of Graz and eleven other research institutions from the Black Sea region, investigated knowledge and cultural transfers between the Black Sea region and Western Europe from the late eighteenth century to the present.[7] Furthermore, the priority program "Transottomanica: Eastern European-Ottoman-Persian Mobility Dynamics" funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and under the chair of Stefan Rohdewald examines the historical ties between the Moscovite Tsardom/the Russian Empire, Poland-Lithuania, the Ottoman Empire, and Persia from the early modern period to the middle of the twentieth century. The Black Sea region is thus the main focus of the Transottoman migration society studied across the Empires.[8] And in the field of literature, the project "Batumi, Odessa, Trabzon. The Cultural Semantics of the Black Sea from the Perspective of Eastern Port Cities" implemented at the Leibniz-Zentrum für Literatur- und Kulturforschung (ZfL) explores different imaginations of the Black Sea from the perspective of those three Black Sea ports.[9] Lastly, there exists a "Black Sea Networks" initiative affiliated with the Columbia University that aims to connect regions, disciplines, and institutions in order to establish innovative interdisciplinary programs for studying the Black Sea region.[10]

In addition, some academic journals are specifically dedicated to the study of the Black Sea (and sometimes include other neighboring regions such as Southeastern Europe) in the social sciences and humanities. The interdisciplinary *Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies*, founded in 2018, provides an academic forum for the investigation of the Balkan countries and the former Soviet republics in historical as well as contem-

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6 See "The Black Sea Research Project Web," accessed July 11, 2023, https://blacksea.gr/en/.

7 See "KEAC-BSR: Knowledge Exchange and Academic Cultures in the Humanities," Europe and the Black Sea Region, accessed July 11, 2023, https://blacksearegion.eu/.

8 See "DFG Priority Programme Transottomanica," project number 313079038, as represented on its website: accessed July 11, 2023, https://www.transottomanica.de/, and the relevant publications, especially the series, indicated there.

9 See "Batumi, Odessa, Trabzon: The Cultural Semantics of the Black Sea from the Perspective of Eastern Port Cities," ZfL. Leibniz-Zentrum für Literatur- und Kulturforschung, accessed June 8, 2020, https://www.zfl-berlin.org/project/batumi-odessa-trabzon-black-sea-semantics.html.

10 See "Black Sea Networks," Columbia University Slavic Department, accessed June 8, 2020, http://black-seanetworks.org/.

porary context.[11] A similar focus is pursued by the journal *South East European and Black Sea Studies*, which is associated with the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). Since 2001, it has published cross-country analyses and research on individual countries within Southeastern Europe and the Black Sea region with a principal disciplinary focus on political science and international relations, political economy, political anthropology, and late modern and contemporary history.[12] And the journal *Karadeniz – Black Sea – Chernoe More*, established in 2009, is a quarterly periodical published in English, Turkish, and Russian which aims to produce and disseminate academic studies in all social disciplines.[13] In a similar vein, the online open-access journal *Euxeinos. Culture and Governance in the Black Sea Region*, published by the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, has provided political, cultural, and economic perspectives on social processes in the Black Sea region since 2011.[14]

Despite this growing number of research projects and initiatives focused on the Black Sea region, it is striking that it is not usually conceptualized as a historical meso-region sui generis in such reference works and handbooks.[15] While Russian and East European studies often divide the eastern part of the Eurasian continent into subregions such as "East-Central Europe," "Northeastern Europe," and "Southeastern Europe," only a few researchers have rather recently started to speak of a "Black Sea region" as a specific historical meso-region.

As Stefan Troebst outlines, this heuristic device serves to analyze de-territorialized units across state, social, and civilizational boundaries. And most recent historical research suggests that such a concept is also applicable for the Balkan-Black Sea-Caucasus space. Eyüp Özveren, in this regard, speaks of a "Black Sea world" that has the Black Sea as its center of gravity but encompasses a larger region. It partially overlaps with other regional conceptions, such as the "Mediterranean world," the Balkans, Eurasia, or the "Danubian world." The main constituents of the "Black Sea world" are, according to Özveren, circulations of people(s), fauna and flora, merchandise, technologies, and skills. Jörg Stadelbauer, on the other hand, draws attention to the region's distinctive physical geography. The geology and landscapes of the Black Sea area pro-

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11 See "Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies," accessed June 10, 2020, https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/balkar.

12 See "Southeast European and Black Sea Studies," accessed June 10, 2020, https://www-tandfonline-com.uaccess.univie.ac.at/toc/fbss20/current.

13 See "Karadeniz – Black Sea – Chernoe More: Black Sea International Scientific Journal," accessed June 10, 2020, http://www.dergikaradeniz.com/index.php/en/.

14 See "Euxeinos: Governance and Culture in the Black Sea Region," Center for Governance and Culture in Europe, University of St. Gallen, accessed August 16, 2023, https://gce.unisg.ch/en/euxeinos.

15 An exception is *The Black Sea Encyclopedia*, published in 2015. As it is, however, a cross-disciplinary reference book structured purely alphabetically, it does not satisfy the need for a historical and cultural handbook on the region. See Sergei R. Grinevetsky et al., *The Black Sea Encyclopedia* (Berlin: Springer, 2015).

duce many contrasts, ranging from different climate zones to mountain ranges juxtaposed with flat coastlines and significantly shaping the practices of historical actors.

2 The Black Sea from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century

The history of the Black Sea region usually begins in antiquity, around the eighth century BC, with the appearance of written texts—mostly in Greek. As David Braund points out, this often resulted in neglect of the many non-Greek peoples who inhabited the coasts as well as the hinterlands of the Black Sea, including the Scythians, Colchians, and Thracians, whose histories can be traced mainly through archeology. Due to its vast reservoir of resources for the surrounding areas as well as the Mediterranean world, the ancient Black Sea region was already characterized by the movement of people and goods. At the same time, security—especially towards the north —was a key issue. The northern Black Sea was the object of several failed imperial ambitions by the Persian, Greek, and Roman empires. In the southern Black Sea area, Byzantium/Constantinople began to develop as the center of the Eastern Romans, driven by the economic importance of the transfer of goods and peoples across the Black Sea.

Stefan Albrecht outlines the history of the "Pontos euxeinos" in the Middle Ages as a "Byzantine Sea." The successors to Eastern Rome continued to dominate the area in political and economic terms. Nevertheless, the appearance of new actors—including Rus from the ninth century onwards, the Crusaders, and the expanding Mongol Empire—gradually challenged the Byzantine dominance. Economic relations expanded globally, and trade goods moved between the Iberian Peninsula, China, and Mamluk Egypt, using the Black Sea area as a transit region. The Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 ended this global circulation of goods and turned the Black Sea into an "Ottoman Lake."

For the early modern period, Dariusz Kołodziejczyk describes how the northern Black Sea region witnessed the influences of various political actors—the persistent Golden Horde (*Ulug Ulus*), Lithuania, Nogays and Cossacks, the expanding Ottoman Empire, and, later, the advancing Russian Empire. He draws attention to the discussion of whether new political entities claiming Genghisid heritage, such as the Crimean Giray Khans, can be seen as successors to the Golden Horde, which "survived" in a diminished form until the Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783. At the same time, the Ottoman Empire exercised power on almost all the coasts of the Black Sea by the mid-sixteenth century, until its influence became challenged in the northern Black Sea areas by Cossacks and Nogays as new actors from the late sixteenth century on. The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 and the Russian conquest of the Crimean Khanate in 1783, along with the second and third partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795, brought the northern Black Sea region under the rule of Russia, which emerged as a major European power. Kenan İnan, on the other hand, sketches the political and economic de-

velopments in the southern Black Sea region between 1500 and 1700. While this region was dominated by the Ottoman Empire, its rivalries in trade and wars with Safavid Persia in the Caucasus and in Eastern Anatolia still significantly affected daily life and trade activities along the Black Sea.

Kerstin S. Jobst and Stefan Rohdewald trace the rivalries between the Ottoman and Russian Empires in the Black Sea region from the sixteenth century to the outbreak of World War I. With the Russian annexation of the Crimean Khanate along with the northern coast of the Black Sea in 1783, the shifting power balance was also felt beyond the Black Sea in Europe and the Near East. Russia's advance also diminished the Persian-Ottoman antagonism, as the treaties of Gulistan in 1813 and Turkmenchay in 1828 consolidated Russia's power in the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea region. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Black Sea became the central theater of war between the Ottoman Empire and the allied European Great Powers against Russia's hegemonic ambitions. At the same time, these long episodes of military confrontation were characterized by traveling concepts of warfare between the two empires. In fact, the Ottoman and Russian reforms in military, politics, and society since the eighteenth century were in many respects mutually influenced. Moreover, the Russo-Ottoman transimperial ties were fostered by economic and political networks consisting of Armenian and Greek merchant communities as well as Muslim Tatar and Circassian migrant groups.

The interwar period is presented by Adrian Brisku in a triadic narrative. While he portrays World War I as a continuation of the previous antagonism and rivalry between the Russian and Ottoman Empires, the post-World War I period is characterized by historically unusual friendly relations between the two main successor states—the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey—and a multilateral regime based on international law and agreements, such as the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) and the Montreux Convention on the Regime of the Straits (1936).

Onur İşçi highlights the moments of cooperation and conflict across the Black Sea during and after World War II. As he points out, the war drastically changed the political landscape around the Black Sea, as the smaller littoral Black Sea states were caught in the power struggle between the Soviet Union and Turkey. Ultimately, the Soviet Union gained two new satellite states (Romania and Bulgaria) and turned the Black Sea into a "Russian lake" free of Western interference. At the same time, Turkey remained the only littoral state outside the Soviet sphere of influence and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in order to maintain its status free of Soviet incursions.

The end of the Cold War dissolved this block confrontation in the Black Sea area, and paved the way for intensified cooperation among the Black Sea littoral states. As a result, various initiatives and multilateral organizations, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) or the GUAM (later GUUAM), emerged in the 1990s to promote economic and political exchange. However, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 put a halt to these cooperative political Black Sea endeavors. With the ongoing war in Ukraine (as of the summer of 2023), the prospects for a unified political landscape around the Black Sea are bleak.

While we can only speculate about future political and economic cooperation in the Black Sea, a look into the past from a historical and cultural perspective renders several structural features visible. More specifically, this handbook focuses on common ideas and identities, mobility and transfers, as well as violence, conflict, and conflict resolution, which provide guiding examples for the interconnectedness of the different Black Sea coasts from their hinterland across the Sea. Where appropriate and possible, some chapters also consider contemporary developments in the Black Sea region. However, they were only able to take into account the rapidly changing constellations up to the completion of the editorial work (2021/22).

3 Ideas and Identities in the Black Sea Region

It is not only in geopolitical terms that the Black Sea can be considered a pivotal region. The societies living on its shores have developed various shared and unifying, as well as contrasting and competing identities and ideas. Zaur Gasimov points out that the relevance of the Black Sea for regional concepts of national security and raison d'état varies enormously among the different littoral states. Drawing on Ukrainian geopolitical thinking about the Black Sea, Polish-supported Prometheanism, Russian-backed Eurasianism, and Turanian perceptions of the Black Sea, he emphasizes that only in Ukraine and Georgia is the Black Sea perceived as central to the countries' national security, while in the other geopolitical discourses, it plays a less prominent role.

From the long nineteenth century onwards, national identities emerged as relevant categories of belonging in the Black Sea region. Dennis Dierks links the regional nation-building processes to intellectual transfers from the "West" and to a symbolical (re-)alignment of the Black Sea region with "Europe." After World War I with its ensuing violent ethnic engineering, the nation-state principle was established in all parts of the Black Sea region. However, since the dissolution of the bloc confrontation, post-imperial nostalgia has been on the rise, such as neo-Ottomanism in Turkey or the concept of the "Russkii mir" (Russian World), propagated by Putin's Russia as a space of civilization distinct from and (allegedly) superior to the West.

Nikolas Pissis and Hannah Müller-Sommerfeld discuss the importance of religion and religious identities. Pissis highlights the diversity of Christian communities in the Black Sea region, including primarily Orthodox Christians of the major Slavic, Greek, Romanian, and Georgian ethno-linguistic groups, but also Armenian Monophysite communities, Levantine Catholics, Gagauz Orthodox, Russian Old Believers, German Mennonites, and Armenian and Pontic Greek Protestants. At the same time, these diverse Christian communities evolved collective identities and interacted with one another. Hannah Müller-Sommerfeld, on the other hand, presents the diversity of Muslim and Jewish communities in today's Black Sea littoral states and their historical background. She concludes that the heterogeneous and fragmented religious communities often overlap with ethno-linguistic affiliations. Muslims are predominantly Sunni, and while they form the majority in Turkey, today they can be found only as religious mi-

norities in the other Black Sea states. Jewish communities are composed of Sephardic and Ashkenazi groups, while a peculiarity of the Black Sea region is the presence of the Turkic-speaking Crimean Karaites, who reject the religious normative meaning of the Talmud and rabbinic teachings. Despite their ethno-religious plurality and diversity, Black Sea Muslims and Jews have closely intertwined histories, also due to their historical political affiliations with the Ottoman Empire on the southern and the Russian Empire, and later the Soviet Union, on the northern coast.

Tangible and intangible places of memory—or *lieux de mémoire*—play a central role in a cultural and historical perspective on the Black Sea region; thus, two major chapters deal with sites of memory and remembrance that connect the peoples and communities from across the different shores, as well as those that are objects of "wars of monuments." Nicole Kançal-Ferrari emphasizes that dominant narratives of memory sites need to be analyzed alongside silenced memories, as remembering space involves multifaceted processes of selection, often under the influence of political aims and goals. Memory sites have, then, meanings and attached memories on multiple levels—local, national, global, and across diaspora communities. Using selected examples around the Black Sea (Constanţa, Batumi and Azizi, Trabzon, the Sumela Monastery, and Bağçasaray), Kançal-Ferrari highlights the complexities of remembering and silencing the history of specific spatial sites. Tatiana Zhurzhenko, in turn, describes the tensions and contests over monuments as well as the political instrumentalization of memory in the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. She highlights that monuments link narratives about the past to a specific territory and thereby play a significant role in demarcating, contesting, and shifting national borders.

As Zaal Andronikashvili outlines, the Black Sea region is known for the location of many well-known myths, including ancient Greek, Hittite, and biblical ones. Especially the southern, eastern, and northern Black Sea region share many legends and myths with common meta-plots as well as associations with the Sea and aquatic elements. Modern literature is also connected to the Black Sea and the coast. Helena Ulbrechtová and Siegfried Ulbrecht analyze the role of the Black Sea, the Crimean Peninsula, and the Caucasus Mountains as important motifs in Russian literature since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. They point out that Crimea and the Caucasus in particular demonstrate Russia's coloniality and acculturation processes. Larissa Cybenko depicts the prominent role of the Black Sea and Crimea in Ukrainian folk poetry and literature. She highlights that while early modern folk poetry was characterized by the tensions and military conflicts between Ukrainian Cossacks and Crimean Tatars and Ottomans, modern Ukrainian literature often depicted Crimea as an ethnic, religiously and culturally heterogeneous, and transnational place that resulted in the acceptance of the Crimean Tatars as the peninsula's indigenous population.

Kristina Popova, Nurie Muratova, and Georgeta Nazarska draw attention to the role of gender alongside ethnic, national, and religious categories by highlighting women's activities in education and culture in the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century. Although, as they argue, feminism emerged relatively late in

the patriarchal-dominated societies of the Black Sea region, there was a strong presence of female leadership in the interwar period.

4 Mobility and Transfers in, around, and across the Black Sea

Throughout history, the Black Sea region is also characterized by different flows and transfers of peoples, goods, knowledge, and ideas. Trade and economy played a crucial role in this, as Eyüp Özveren has already emphasized in his conceptualization of a "Black Sea World" that was also characterized by the sea and its port-cities as a trade hub.[16] More than a quarter of a century later, several research projects have already begun to analyze the trade connections and merchants' activities in the Black Sea in more detail.[17] The sea's role as a hub for trade and economy also went hand in hand with the flows of people and knowledge, however. At the same time, this mobility and transfer was dependent on the development of transportation networks and infrastructure.

Migration and human mobility constituted a defining and structural element of the Black Sea region that can be observed over the *longue durée.* István Vásáry outlines the nomadic migrations between the fourth and thirteenth centuries. Since the colonization of the Pontic coasts by Greek settlers, Greek culture and language had been present throughout Roman and Byzantine times. However, the migration of nomadic peoples arriving from the east significantly affected the demographic structures on the northern and southern coasts of the Black Sea. While the north was characterized by constant incoming nomadic migration, the Greek population and culture preserved its dominant role in the southern Black Sea region until the arrival of the Seljuks in the eleventh century. Still, the Mongol-Tatar conquest in the thirteenth century also accelerated the already ongoing Turkicization of the northern Pontic coast. Arkadiusz Blaszczyk highlights that for the period between the thirteenth and the eighteenth centuries too, Crimea and the western Black Sea region were focal points of migration, originating predominantly in the northeast and the southeast; peoples including the Seljuks, Turks/Yörüks, Armenians, Circassians, Jews and Karaites, Mongols/Tatars, and Nogays were drawn to the shores of the Black Sea for various reasons, the location

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16 Y. Eyüp Özveren, "A Framework for the Study of the Black Sea World, 1789–1915," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 20, no. 1 (1997): 91–99.

17 The project "History of the Black Sea, 18th–20th century" run by the Centre of Maritime History of the Institute for Mediterranean Studies (IMS) in Rethymo, Crete, highlights, for instance, the interconnections of the port cities in the Black Sea. See "The Black Sea Research Project Web," accessed July 11, 2023, https://blacksea.gr/en/.

Boris Belge's current research project "Managing Trade: Infrastructure and Economic Practices in the Port of Odessa (1794–1905)" investigates Odesa's role for the development of trade and economy in the Russian Empire. See https://forschdb2.unibas.ch/inf2/rm_projects/object_view.php?r=4602406.

of the northern Black Sea on relevant long-distance trade routes as well as on the fringes of empires playing a significant role. Andrew Robarts, furthermore, investigates the migration that took place in the Black Sea region between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. As he argues, migration was, on the one hand, significantly shaped by the introduction of the steamships in the late 1820s, which fostered active migration along the north-south axis. On the other hand, Russian-Ottoman relations actively affected their state-driven policies toward controlling migratory populations, the largest groups including Bulgarians, Crimean Tatars, Circassians, and Jews.

Human mobility, however, also included slaves. Christoph Witzenrath outlines that from antiquity to the nineteenth century, the Black Sea area witnessed a wide variety of asymmetric dependencies, including slavery, within the various state formations. The slave trade was an important factor that not only connected the northern and southern shores of the Black Sea, but was also established beyond the Black Sea up to Mamluk Egypt. A result of various forms of human mobility was the exchange of ideas and knowledge. Dominik Gutmeyr-Schnur analyzes the increasingly internationalized exchange of knowledge that began in the Black Sea region in the second half of the eighteenth century. The region began to attract the attention of foreign scholars, and modern disciplines were developed and institutionalized in the humanities throughout the region.

All these exchanges and transfers were facilitated by the development of transfer technologies and infrastructures. At the same time, the routes were one of the most enduring facts and consequences of trade, migration, and knowledge exchange networks. For a region centering on a sea, maritime transportation was certainly significant. However, as Florian Riedler points out, before the introduction of steam shipping —that is, from antiquity to the eighteenth century—land transportation was equally important, since difficult weather conditions prevented sea travel in winter and sometimes even in summer. With regard to the "long" nineteenth century, Reinhard Nachtigal highlights the consequences of the Russian conquest of the northern Black Sea coast and the South Caucasus, which led to the development of port cities and maritime infrastructure that increasingly connected the region to other oceans. While these developments fostered trade and economic expansion, they also led to increased processes of migration. Stefan Rohdewald examines the role of energy resources and infrastructures in the Black Sea region since the late nineteenth century. He highlights the Transottoman context of Russian-Ottoman and Turkish-Iranian entanglements in the transportation of oil, and, since the mid-twentieth century, natural gas, which has a global significance for energy infrastructure. At the same time, energy resources and infrastructures have played an important role during conflicts and warfare, stretching from World War I to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

5 Violence, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution in the Black Sea Region

Violence and conflict have been present in the Black Sea throughout its history and have taken various forms. One such phenomenon is piracy—and as Albrecht Fuess points out, it has played a role from the beginnings of seafaring and maritime trade. Piracy began primarily as a coastal business, and there was not always a clear distinction between pirates and merchant seafarers. Arkadiusz Blaszczyk examines the groups and bandits operating in the border zones between empires in the early modern period, including Tatar raiders, Cossack groups, Caucasian pirates, the Celalis of Anatolia, and the Kırcalıs of Rumelia.

A general overview of the naval history of the Black Sea is provided by Tuncay Zorlu. Due to its geo-strategic and economic characteristics, the sea has been a theater of naval battles throughout history. At the same time, this has facilitated the circulation and transfer of naval technology and know-how as well as personnel. Mara Kozelsky focuses in her chapter on the Crimean War (1853–56) and its consequences for the Black Sea, where this global war started and was concentrated, while it also had significant impact on the hinterlands. The Crimean War brought about not only a new type of mass violence, but also advances and innovations in infrastructure, warfare technique, and battlefield medicine, as well as a new role of mass media in military conflict.

The geopolitical conflicts between the Russian and the Ottoman Empire in the "long" nineteenth century did not always result in direct military confrontations, as Lora Gerd outlines. Rather, they were also accompanied by "soft power" measures, such as in the case of Russia's imperial Church policy. The Holy Synod and the Russian foreign ministry used diplomatic and cultural means, based on the Orthodox faith shared with the Greek and Slavonic populations under Ottoman rule, to support their aspirations of further penetration into the Ottoman Empire.

Violence against populations has not only been a collateral effect of military rivalries and conflicts. The Black Sea region also witnessed targeted violence against specific religious, ethnic, or national groups, resulting in persecutions, mass deportations, and genocide.

Mariana Hausleitner sheds light on the destruction and murder of the Jewish populations around the Black Sea during World War II. However, she also emphasizes that, due to the different settlement patterns of Jews, the Jewish populations in the various littoral states had different experiences—ranging from the systematic destruction in southern Ukraine by the German occupying forces, to the killing of a quarter of a million Jews in Romanian-controlled Transnistria through massacres and disease, to the discrimination against Jews in neutral Turkey.

Various ethnic groups in the Black Sea region were also targeted for ethnic cleansing and genocide before, during, and after World War I. Mass violence led to the genocide of Armenians and Pontic Greeks in the Ottoman Empire. On the northern shore, the Holodomor, a man-made famine under Soviet rule, led to genocidal violence and

the mass killings of Ukrainians and other ethnic and social groups in the early 1930s. These genocidal policies continued during World War II within the context of the Soviet deportations of different ethnic and national groups. Rudolf Mark outlines the domestic reasons for as well as the role of international politics in the deportations of Crimean Tatars, Greeks, Moldovans, Germans, Italians, Meskhetians, Turks, Khemshids, and others in the Soviet Union and of Turks and Jews in Bulgaria during and after World War II. He thereby argues that although deportations cannot be directly equated with genocide, they often served as a first phase of ensuing acts of genocide.

Conflicts also emerged with the dissolvement of the block confrontation and the fall of the Soviet Union. Although the latter has often been perceived as rather peaceful, especially in contrast with the violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, various "intra state" conflicts emerged in the former Soviet Union, also in the Black Sea region. Jan Zofka analyzes these conflicts ranging from Moldova to Ukraine and the Caucasus. Drawing on the military conflicts in Crimea, Odesa, Transnistria, Abkhazia, and Ajaria, he investigates to what extent these post-Soviet conflicts were connected to the Black Sea. And although he states that these conflicts were mostly associated with the decay of the Soviet state, the Black Sea influenced the development of the conflicts as a site and through maritime infrastructures, but also as an imaginary space. As Alexandr Osipian highlights, such conflicts have large impacts on logistics and infrastructure. Analyzing the Russo-Ukrainian conflict between 2014 and 2022, he concludes that the military conflict on the Black Sea littoral has not only regional, but also global impact, for instance with regard to global food security.

6 Approaching the Black Sea Region as a Cultural and Historical Entity

The diverse chapters in this handbook demonstrate that all the shores of the Black Sea have been connected in some way by shared ideas and flows of people, goods, and knowledge. While these connections and transfers may have waxed and waned in scope and relevance over time, this handbook provides a basis for approaching the region as a specific "Black Sea world" or a "historical meso-region." The chapters highlight various features that connect the different shores across the sea and deep into the hinterland.

Writing a cultural history of the Black Sea, however, presents several challenges. In antiquity, the different people who inhabited the region left different kinds of traces. While we have a variety of textual sources for the Greek colonization of the Black Sea, we have very few material remains of the non-Greek peoples. As a result, the latter are largely marginalized in historiography. The availability and accessibility of (textual) sources is also asymmetrical for the later periods, while archeological findings have not been sufficiently analyzed yet either. And even for the periods for which we have fairly detailed archival documentation in various archives and languages, its anal-

ysis and interpretation often remain unbalanced. These limitations are often due to language barriers and disciplinary boundaries; for example, historians with a background in Eastern European or Russian history have tended to focus on the northern Black Sea region, using Russian, Ukrainian, and other Slavic sources, while Ottoman scholars have tended to focus on the southern shores. Fortunately, an increasing number of scholars have overcome these challenges by grasping the interconnections between the southern and northern shores, often, but not always, based on mastery of Russian, Ukrainian, and other Slavic languages as well as Turkish and/or Ottoman.[18]

The present handbook aims to overcome these hurdles by bringing together authors from different national and disciplinary contexts, resulting in diverse perspectives on the Black Sea region, from antiquity to the present.[19] The chapters' authors are thereby responsible only for their own contributions and do not accept liability for any statements made in the other chapters of the volume. The editors are certainly aware that it is not possible to cover every single aspect of the region's history during such a long period. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic, precarious academic working conditions, and other reasons made the completion of some chapters of the handbook difficult, and in some cases even impossible. Although it was not always viable, the editors have tried to fill these gaps in some other chapters, while they are aware of the remaining missing aspects and issues. The editors nevertheless hope that this handbook will serve as a basis for the further development of Black Sea studies, which will hopefully lead to the remaining gaps being filled in more detail in the future.

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18 Recent examples include, for instance: Eileen M. Kane, *Russian Hajj: Empire and the Pilgrimage to Mecca* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015); Andrew Robarts, *Migration and Disease in the Black Sea Region: Ottoman-Russian Relations in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries* (London: Bloomsbury, 2017); Onur İşçi, *Turkey and the Soviet Union During Wolrd War II: Diplomacy, Discord and International Relations* (London: I.B. Tauris, Bloomsbury, 2020).
19 The editorial work was completed in 2021–2022. The individual chapters could therefore only cover developments up to that date.

Stefan Rohdewald

Mapping the Black Sea: From the Sea to the Region and beyond

Maps and images as a whole have their own power in creating reality: Visualizations are always more than just illustrations or documentations.[1] "Mental maps"[2] have effectively been constituted by certain visual and/or discursive "frames" and specific map genres (maritime maps, continental maps, political maps of a state, etc.):

Since the late Middle Ages, maps of the continents became an authoritative frame for representing the territorial parts of the world: Within the genre of increasingly detailed and large world maps and the genre of continental maps in the atlas depictions of Asia, widespread since the seventeenth century, the Black Sea as a whole as well as all areas of its hinterland were included, but of course at such a small scale that hardly any details are recognizable. Maps of Europe, on the other hand, could include the Black Sea (as well as the entire Mediterranean), but then nevertheless lacked the Caucasian hinterland, not to mention the Caspian Sea.[3] Later maps of Asia Minor, especially if in combination with the Caucasus and the Black Sea, came close to a complete representation of our focal region, however.[4]

Maritime maps, by their very nature, of course early on focused on the Seas: portolan maps were common to the Mediterranean region and mainly depicted coastal strips and the location of the most important port cities. But in the sixteenth century, Latin maps also combined the Mediterranean portolan map with the Black Sea and its shores.[5] Ottoman maps of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean were strongly based on

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1 Maps reproduced in this volume are mentioned here in the main text, while others appear in the footnotes only. Ute Schneider, *Die Macht der Karten: Eine Geschichte der Kartographie vom Mittelalter bis heute* (Darmstadt: WBG, 2004); Gerhard Paul, ed., *Visual History: Ein Studienbuch* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006). This short sketch adapts and enhances Stefan Rohdewald, "Anhang A: Mapping Transottomanica. Anstelle einer transosmanischen Kartenkunde," and Florian Riedler, "Anhang B: Transosmanische Räume, 1500–1900," both in Stefan Rohdewald, Stephan Conermann, and Albrecht Fuess, eds., *Transottomanica – Osteuropäisch-osmanisch-persische Mobilitätsdynamiken: Perspektiven und Forschungsstand* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019), 247–58.
2 Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, "Mental Maps: Die Konstruktion von geographischen Räumen in Europa seit der Aufklärung," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28 (2002): 493–514.
3 E.g., Willen and Joan Blaeu, cartographers, *Europe 1643–50*, accessed November 20, 2023, https:// sanderusmaps.com/our-catalogue/antique-maps/europe/general-and-large-regions/old-antique-map-of-europe-by-willem-blaeu-27099.
4 Edward Stanford, cartographer, *Asia Minor, Caucasus, Black Sea*, 1904, David Rumsey Historical Map Collection, accessed November 20, 2023, https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/detail/RUMSEY~8~1~314704~90083576.
5 Mateus Prunes, cartographer, *Chart of the Mediterranean, Black Sea, and the coasts of Western Europe and Northwest Africa*, 1559, Library of Congress, accessed December 4, 2023, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/g5672m.ct002457. A collection of four early modern maritime maps including the Black Sea: "Old Mar-

these portolan maps common to the Mediterranean.[6] However, some of these maps were apparently interested not only in the coastal strips, but also in the rivers flowing into the sea and their course, which they depicted as reaching deep into the hinterland and with their own fluvial port cities. Even fortresses and mountains quite far away from these rivers were recorded.[7] Maps covering (and often titled) "The Environs of the Black Sea" or similar were printed from the eighteenth century onwards and often represented most parts of the hinterland, with a special focus on the expanding territories of the Russian Empire.[8]

Political maps of individual empires, for instance of Persia[9] and also of the Ottoman Empire[10] or the earliest Atlas of Russia,[11] hardly ever depicted larger neighboring territories, but regularly included the Black Sea and large parts of the hinterland by their very nature. Persia, for example, was only exceptionally depicted together with the Ottoman Empire: The Black Sea and also the Caspian Sea found themselves on such a map, published ca. 1730, but without really being the focus of interest: in the upper left-hand corner, instead of the Danube, longitude measures were explained, and the Ukrainian hinterland too is only partially recorded.[12] In the combination of

itime Maps of the Black Sea Region," PeopleOfAr, last modified June 12, 2014, https://www.peopleofar.com/2014/06/12/old-maritime-maps-of-the-black-sea-region/. Cf. A. Gordyeyev, *Cartography of Black and Azov Seas: Retrospective up to 1700* (Moscow: self-pub., 2008).

6 On the map by Piri Reis, see Bülent Arı, ed., *Piri Reis: Kitab-ı Bahriye/Book of Navigation* (Ankara: Prime Ministry, Undersecretaryship of Navigation, 2002); generally: Pinar Emiralioğlu, *Geographical Knowledge and Imperial Culture in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (New York: Ashgate, 2014); Ahmed Karamustafa, "Introduction to Ottoman Cartography," in *The History of Cartography*, ed. John B. Harley and David Woodward, vol. 2, bk. 1, *Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 206–8; Cf. *Türkischer Portolan (Küsten des Mittelmeers*, 1062 d.H. [1652]): Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Cod.turc. 431, accessed December 3, 2023, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb00009119-0.

7 *Southern Greece and the Aegean Sea*, Wikimedia Commons, accessed December 3, 2023, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:16th-century_Turkish_portolan_map_of_the_Black_Sea.jpg.

8 For instance, Didier Robert de Vaugondy, cartographer, *Carte des environs de la Mer Noire où se trouvent l'Ukrayne, la Petite Tartarie, la Circassie, la Géorgie et les confins de la Russie européenne et de la Turquie, dédiée et présentée à Monseigneur le duc de Choiseul*, accessed December 3, 2023, https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b53039400r.

9 Cyrus Alai, *General Maps of Persia 1477–1925* (Leiden: Brill, 2005); Cyrus Alai, *Special Maps of Persia 1477–1925* (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

10 Ian Manners, *European Cartographers and the Ottoman World 1500–1750* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2007); overarching: Palmira Brummett, *Mapping the Ottomans: Sovereignty, Territory, and Identity in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman, eds., *The Early Modern Ottomans. Remapping the Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

11 *Atlas Russicus*, 1745, accessed November 22, 2023, http://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?PPN337625352.

12 Reiner and Joshua Ottens, cartographers, *Regnum Persicum Imperium Turcicum in Asia Russorum Provinciae and Mare Caspium*, ca. 1730, accessed November 22, 2023, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1730_Ottens_Map_of_Persia_(Iran,_Iraq,_Turkey)_-_Geographicus_-_RegnumPersicum-ottens-1730.jpg.

a representation of Russia with Poland-Lithuania, the "Little Tartary" and the Black Sea, the Anatolian coast was only considered without its hinterland.[13] Similarly, the first printed maps by Arab or Ottoman geographers appearing in the eighteenth century depicting the Ottoman Empire included the Black Sea and its coastlines.[14] The Black Sea was also 'added' to a map of the geographically European part of the Ottoman Empire, albeit without consideration of the Caucasus.[15] A map on the occasion of the Crimean War focused in oversized dimensions on the peninsula, but left other regions behind.[16] Even more recent maps of the Black Sea clearly restrict the view to the maritime and coastal regions; only in a few exceptions is an approach integrating the hinterland regions recognizable.[17]

In historical atlases, even after the beginnings of Ottoman or Arab map printing, maps of Europe, possibly Asia Minor, including the Near East, but mostly excluding Persia, continue to dominate. Representations of "Eurasia"[18] have been equally common since the invention of this historical spatial concept in the interwar period,[19] but exceed our focus by a very wide margin. Maps of the "Middle East" or the MENA region or even "Eastern Europe"[20] mostly bracket each other out to a large extent, often with the common intersection of Turkey, or the Black Sea region, but again not with a clear

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13 Herman Moll, cartographer, *Map of Moscovy, Poland, Little Tartary and ye Black Sea*, 1732, David Rumsey Historical Map Collection, accessed November 22, 2023, https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/detail/RUMSEY~8~1~277424~90050443.

14 Cf. this later rendering regarded as the first map of Arabia in a European language to be compiled by a Turk: Abu Bakr Ibn Braham, cartographer, *Mappa dell'Impero Ottomanno*, 1740, accessed November 22, 2023, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1b/Abu_Bakr_Ibn_Braham._Mappa_del l%27Impero_Ottomanno._composta_da_Abubekir_Efendi._1740.jpg. First version published in Amsterdam in 1732.

15 Samuel Dunn, cartographer, *First part of Turkey in Europe … to which is added the whole of the Black Sea*, New York Public Library Digital Collections, accessed December 4, 2023, https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/bbe76f20-857c-0132-d31c-58d385a7b928.

16 Thomas Packer, cartographer, *A Panoramic View of the Seat of War; the Crimea & the Principal Towns & Forts on the Shores of the Black Sea*, 1855, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, accessed December 4, 2023, https://onb.digital/result/110DEE66.

17 John and Charles Walker, cartographers, *The Euxine or Black Sea: From the Russian Gov. Surveys. With Additions by the Surveyors to the European Commission on the River Danube, 1870 – 73*, 1893, accessed December 4, 2023, https://goobi-viewer.univie.ac.at/viewer/fullscreen/AC12006251/1/.5.

18 Mark Bassin, "Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space," *Slavic Review* 50 (1991): 1 – 17; Stefan Wiederkehr, *Die eurasische Bewegung: Wissenschaft und Politik in der russischen Emigration der Zwischenkriegszeit und im postsowjetischen Russland* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007).

19 Within a historical atlas: Georges Duby, ed., *Atlas Historique Larousse* (Paris: Larousse, 1978).

20 Hans Lemberg, "Zur Entstehung des Osteuropabegriffs im 19. Jahrhundert: Vom 'Norden' zum 'Osten' Europas," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 33 (1985): 48 – 91; Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

intention to represent it.[21] In historical atlases, at most for antiquity, the Black Sea and also its hinterland are rather firmly established as the focus.[22]

It is only lately that more cartographic representations of regional concepts emerge, which aim to consciously represent the Black Sea region as a historical space analogous to the Mediterranean region,[23] or the Caucasus region, "Southeastern Europe,"[24] or the "Balkans,"[25] but also "Kleineurasien."[26] Of course, maps in handbooks on the Black Sea as a region also consolidate this trend.[27]

In summary: Maps focused exclusively on the Black Sea *and* its hinterland regions, that is, not typical maritime maps, remain very rare to this day. However, special thematic maps of, for example, the Crimean War or the export of oil and natural gas also focus on the Black Sea region including the networks using it as transregional hub. Moreover, within "New" or "Post Area Studies," the mapping of networks and structures evolves with new priorities, looking beyond established container spaces. An example of this perspective is the "Transottoman" approach to spatiality, conceiving a Eastern European and Near Eastern shared history of actors, knowledge, and objects from 1500 to the twentieth century: The Black Sea region (including the Caspian Sea) figures as the natural center of such a larger interdisciplinary interest, and, thus, also in a map representing aspects of this broader approach.[28]

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21 Stefan Stautner, *Türkei: Europa oder Orient? Repräsentation der Türkei zwischen Europa und Orient* (Berlin: Rhombos, 2004).

22 *Pontus Euxinus et quae adjacent, in Atlas Antiquus*, ed. Carl Spruner (Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1865), 24, Wikimedia Commons, accessed December 4, 2023, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1855_Spruneri_Map_of_the_Black_Sea_or_Pontus_Euxinus_in_Ancient_Times_-_Geographicus_-_PontusEuxinus-spruneri-1855.jpg.

23 Combined with the Ottoman Empire: Henri Abraham Chatelain, cartographer, *Carte de l'Empire Othoman Consideree dans les Etats de Cette Puissance, et des Etats qui L'avoisine ou qui luy sont Tributaries ainsi que deux Petites Cartes pour conduire à l'Histoire universel, et a l'Histoire d'Alexandre le Grand dressées sur les instructions les plus nouvelles,* ca. 1719, accessed November 22, 2023, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9c/1719_Carte_de_l%27Empire_Othoman_Consideree_dans_les_Etats_de_Cette_Puissance..._a_l%27Histoire_d%27Alexandre_le_Grand.jpg.

24 Cf. the maps for the handbook on the History of Southeastern Europe by the IOS Regensburg: *Handbuch zur Geschichte Südosteuropas*, ed. Ulf Brunnbauer, Konrad Clewing, and Oliver Jens Schmitt, vol. 1, *Herrschaft und Politik in Südosteuropa von der römischen Antike bis 1300*, ed. Fritz Mitthof, Peter Schreiner, and Oliver Jens Schmitt (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 38–59 ; vol. 2, *Herrschaft und Politik in Südosteuropa von 1300 bis 1800*, ed. Oliver Jens Schmitt (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 949–69.

25 Holm Sundhaussen, "Europa balcanica: Der Balkan als historischer Raum Europas," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 25 (1999): 626–53; Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Maria Todorova, "Der Balkan als Analysekategorie: Grenzen, Raum, Zeit," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28 (2002): 470–92.

26 Karl Kaser, *Balkan und Naher Osten: Einführung in eine gemeinsame Geschichte* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2011), fig. 1.

27 Cf. the illustrative maps in the *Black Sea Encyclopedia* mentioned in our introduction: Sergei Grinevetsky et al., eds., *The Black Sea Encyclopedia* (Berlin: Springer, 2015).

28 Cf. Rohdewald, "Anhang A: Mapping Transottomanica," and Riedler, "Anhang B: Transosmanische Räume."

The examples selected here are exemplary not only of visual discourses and structures that can historically document the evolution of the cartographic imaginability of a Black Sea region.

Fig. 3: Map of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea by Mateus Prunes (1559).

Fig. 5: Southern Greece and the Aegean Sea, anonymous artist.

Fig. 6: Map of the Ottoman Empire by Matthäus Seutter, ca. 1730.

Fig. 7: Map of Muscovy, Poland, Little Tartary and the Black Sea by Herman Moll, 1732.

Fig. 8: Map of the Black Sea by Didier Robert de Vaugandy, 1768.

Fig. 9: Map of the Black Sea by Samuel Dunn, 1788.

Fig. 10: Map of the Black Sea during the Crimean War, 1855.

Fig. 11: Map of the Black Sea in Ancient Times, 1865.

Fig. 12: Admiralty Chart of the Black Sea from Russian Government Surveys, 1893.

Fig. 13: Map of Asia Minor, the Caucasus and the Black Sea, 1904.

Stefan Troebst

The Black Sea as a Historical Meso-Region

150 years after the Crimean War, the Black Sea, with the Russian annexation of the Crimea in spring 2014, returned to the centre of world politics. The Black Sea region has, once again, become the scene of shifts in the basic order of Europe, reflecting its geopolitical importance as well as the strong symbolic and affective charge of the Black Sea.[1]

1 Introduction: What is a Historical Meso-Region?

The concept of historical meso-region as an analytical framework for transnational-comparative research has its genesis in the historical sub-discipline of Russian and East European history, as it emerged in the German-speaking world. Consequently, the level of awareness of this middle-range theory has been confined to a narrow guild. It is a concept, that is to say, a working hypothesis, utilized for comparative historical research. As such, it serves as a heuristic device for analyzing de-territorialized, yet time-specific, conceptual units that traverse the boundaries of states, societies, and even civilizations. The aim of this type of comparative analysis is to identify and differentiate clusters of structural attributes over the *longue durée.* From this perspective, it is the various combinations of markers of this type, rather than the individual markers themselves, that make it unique and therefore cluster-specific. A cluster covering a large geographic space and limited to one or more specific epochs, can be referred to as a historical meso-region;[2] some well-established examples include "East-Central

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1 "Batumi, Odessa, Trabzon: The Cultural Semantics of the Black Sea from the Perspective of Eastern Port Cities," outline of a research project of the Leibniz-Zentrum für Literatur- und Kulturforschung (ZfL), accessed June 26, 2023, https://www.zfl-berlin.org/project/batumi-odessa-trabzon-black-sea-semantics.html.

2 Arno Strohmeyer, "Historische Komparatistik und die Konstruktion von Geschichtsregionen: Der Vergleich als Methode der historischen Europaforschung," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur Südosteuropas* 1 (1999): 39–55; Stefan Troebst, "What's in a Historical Region? A Teutonic Perspective," *European Review of History* 10, no. 2 (2003): 173–88; Stefan Troebst, "'Historical Meso-Region': A Concept in Cultural Studies and Historiography," *EGO – European History Online*, March 6, 2012, http://www.ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/crossroads/the-historical-region; Stefan Troebst, "Historical Mesoregions and Transregionalism," in *The Routledge Handbook of Transregional Studies,* ed. Matthias Middell (London: Routledge, 2018), 169–78; Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, "The Historical Regions of Europe – Real or Invented? Some Remarks on Historical Comparison and Mental Mapping," in *Beyond the Nation: Writing European History Today* (Bielefeld: Zentrum für Deutschland und Europastudien, 2004), 15–24; Holm Sundhaussen, "Die Wiederentdeckung des Raums: Über Nutzen und Nachteil von Geschichtsregionen," in *Südosteuropa: Von vormoderner Vielfalt und nationalstaatlicher Vereinigung*, ed. Konrad Clewing and Oliver Jens Schmitt (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2005), 13–33; Maria Todorova, "Spacing Europe: What Is A Historical Region?," *East Central Europe* 32, no. 1–2 (2005): 59–78.

Europe," "Northeastern Europe," and "Southeastern Europe."[3] Here too, the specific is inconceivably removed from its surroundings; one historical meso-region can only be understood in the context of others. Accordingly, relationality and relational dependency complement the internal structures of a historical meso-region.

It is only in recent years that historians, art historians, and literary scholars as well as those in other fields of the humanities and social sciences have made use of the concept of historical meso-regions, thereby rediscovering the Polish historian-in-exile Oskar Halecki's seminal book *The Limits and Divisions of European History of 1950*.[4] The early modernist Heinz Schilling can be mentioned as a representative example in Germany;[5] internationally notable examples include the Icelandic expert on comparative civilizations Johann Arnason,[6] the Swiss ethnologist Christian Giordano,[7] and the British sociologist Gerard Delanty.[8]

3 Klaus Zernack, *Osteuropa: Eine Einführung in seine Geschichte* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1977), 20–30 and 88–92; Dietmar Müller, "Southeastern Europe as a Historical Meso-Region: Constructing Space in Twentieth-Century German Historiography," *European Review of History* 10, no. 2 (2003): 393–408; Holm Sundhaussen, "Was ist Südosteuropa und warum beschäftigen wir uns (nicht) damit?," *Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen* 42, no. 5–6 (2002): 93–105; Stefan Troebst, "Vom *spatial turn* zum *regional turn?* Geschichtsregionale Konzeptionen in den Kulturwissenschaften," in *Dimensionen der Kultur- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Festschrift für Hannes Siegrist zum 60. Geburtstag*, ed. Matthias Middell (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2007), 143–59; Stefan Troebst, "Nordosteuropa: Geschichtsregion mit Zukunft," *Scandia: Tidskrift för historisk forskning* 65, no. 2 (1999): 153–68; Stefan Troebst, "Northeastern Europe?," *Herito: Dziedzictwo, kultura, spółczesność | Heritage, Culture & the Present* 20, no. 3 (2015): 70–81; Stefan Troebst, "'Intermarium' and 'Wedding to the Sea': Politics of History and Mental Mapping in East Central Europe," *European Review of History* 10, no. 2 (2003): 293–321.
4 Oscar Halecki, *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1950). See also Stefan Troebst, "From Halecki to Hann: The Historiography of Historical Regions," *Explorations in Economic Anthropology: Key Issues and Critical Reflections*, ed. Deema Kaneff and Kirsten W. Endres (New York: Berghahn Books, 2021), 35–51; Stefan Troebst, "European History," in *European Regions and Boundaries: A Conceptual History*, ed. Diana Mishkova and Balázs Trencsényi (Oxford: Berghahn, 2017), 235–57; Diana Mishkova, Bo Stråth, and Balázs Trencsényi, "Regional History as a 'Challenge' to National Frameworks of Historiography: The Case of Central, Southeast, and Northern Europe," in *Transnational Challenges to National History Writing*, ed. Matthias Middell and Lluis Roura (Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 257–314.
5 Heinz Schilling, "Die europäischen Mächte und Mächtezonen," in *Konfessionalisierung und Staatsinteressen: Internationale Beziehungen 1559–1660* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007), 191–419.
6 Johann P. Arnason, "Interpreting Europe from East of Centre," in *Domains and Divisions of European History*, ed. Johann P. Arnason and Natalie J. Doyle (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2010), 139–57.
7 Christian Giordano, "Interdependente Vielfalt: Die historischen Regionen Europas," in *Europa und die Grenzen im Kopf*, ed. Karl Kaser, Dagmar Gramshammer-Hohl, and Robert Pichler (Klagenfurt: Wieser, 2003), 113–35; Christian Giordano, "Südosteuropa – eine Region eigener Art?," in *Kulturelle Orientierungen und gesellschaftliche Ordnungsstrukturen*, ed. Joachim von Puttkamer and Gabriella Schuber (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010), 19–39.
8 Gerard Delanty, "The Historical Regions of Europe: Civilizational Backgrounds and Multiple Routes to Modernity," *Historická sociologie* 3, no. 1–2 (2012): 9–24.

2 The Black Sea Region as a Histor(iograph)ical Meso-Region

The concept of historical meso-regions is strongly associated with Eastern Europe and specifically the Black Sea area, namely in the form of an interdisciplinary and also intercontinental regional frame that at times has been called the "Black Sea World" and at others "Southeastern Europe" (broadly defined and used as a synonym for the Balkan-Black Sea-Caucasus region).[9] Most importantly, the restoration of communication lines in the states and societies surrounding the Black Sea that had been disrupted during the decades of East-West confrontation has prompted historians to approach conflict and cooperation in the Black Sea region from a meso-regional perspective. Naturally, these historians have looked for precedents in earlier historical writings and in past writings of related disciplines and have made some interesting discoveries. Thus, this essay will undertake a historiographical journey through those genres of social and cultural studies that have now created a veritable research direction. The question as to whether the spatial concept of Southeastern Europe as developed in political science[10] is transferable for our purposes (transnational comparative research) to a Balkan-Black Sea-Caucasus space[11] can now be answered positively.

The Black Sea region appeared on the European horizon in connection with the Eastern Question, that is, the international problem posed from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century by the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. It arose particularly vividly during the Crimean War from 1853 to 1856 and on this basis assumed a prominent role in geopolitical considerations at the turn of the century. The global importance of this war had been ignored in recent historical scholarship, until Orlando Figes rescued it from oblivion in his 2010 bestseller *Crimea: The Last Crusade*, which appeared in print just a few years prior to the Russian Federation's annexation of Ukrainian Crimea in March 2014.[12] In general, the pre-imperial age brought about a global geopolitical discourse on the maritime dimension of great power politics—with "Russia's urge to the warm waters" and "Rule, Britannia! Britannia rule the waves" as prominent slogans. In the nineteenth century, historians followed suit, and points of culmination were and are the concept of coastal societies like the "Indian

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9 Stefan Troebst, "Schwarzmeerwelt: Eine geschichtsregionale Konzeption," *Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen* 46, no. 5–6 (2006): 92–102.

10 See, e.g., Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., *The Southeast European Challenge: Ethnic Conflict and the International Response* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999).

11 Stefan Troebst, "Eine neue Südosteuropa-Konzeption? Der Balkan-Schwarzmeer-Kaukasus-Raum in politikwissenschaftlicher Sicht. Ein unvorgreiflicher Vorschlag zur Diskussion," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur Südosteuropas* 2 (2000): 153–59.

12 See Orlando Figes, *Crimea: The Last Crusade* (New York: Lane, 2010). See, however, also the multivolume document edition by Winfried Baumgart, *Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs 1853–1856* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1979–2006).

Ocean," the "Adriatic," or an "Atlantic World"[13] as well as the intense and ongoing historiographic debate on the role of seas in globalization processes.[14]

3 Mackinder, Toynbee, and Rostovtzeff: An Early Cohort and Its Followers

In 1904, the London-based British geographer Halford Mackinder situated the "geographical pivot of history" as the overlapping hegemonic spheres of tsar and sultan, specifically in the south of the Russian Empire and in the Black Sea region.[15] The decade of war in the region from 1912 to 1922 also attracted the interest of international historical scholarship. In 1922, Arnold Toynbee published his antithetically titled book, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations*, in which he introduced a meso-regional approach under the rubric of the "Near East." His "Near East" encompassed both the Balkans and the Caucasus.[16] That same year, the Russian émigré historian of antiquity, Mikhail Rostovtzeff, published his seminal work *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia*, which took a much more explicit meso-regional perspective: "I take as my starting-point the unity of the region which we call South Russia: the intersection of influences arriving by way of the Caucasus and the Black Sea, Greek influences spreading along the sea routes, and the consequent formation, from time to time, of mixed civilisations, very curious and very interesting."[17]

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13 Kurti N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Kurti N. Chaudhuri, *Asia Before Europe: Economy and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean Before the Rise of Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Dieter Rothermund and Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, eds., *Der Indische Ozean: Das afro-asiatische Mittelmeer als Kultur- und Wirtschaftsraum* (Vienna: Promedia, 2004); Jan-Georg Deutsch and Brigitte Reinwald, eds., *Space on the Move: Transformations of the Indian Ocean Seascape in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century* (Berlin: Schwarz, 2002); Marina Cattaruzza, ed., *L'Adriatico: Mare di scambi tra Oriente e Occidente* (Pordenone: Edizione Concordia Sette, 2003); Eugenio Turri and Daniela Zumiani, eds., *Adriatico mare d'Europa: L'economia e la storia* (Bologna: Silvana, 2002); Predrag Matvejevitch, *La Méditerranée et l'Europe: Leçons au Collège de France et autres essais* (Paris: Favard, 2005); Barry Cunliffe, *Facing the Ocean: The Atlantic and its Peoples 8000 BC – 1500 AD* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds., *The British Atlantic World, 1500–1800* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Juliette Roding and Lex Heerma van Voss, eds., *The North Sea and Culture (1550–1800): Proceedings of the International Conference Held at Leiden 21–22 April 1995* (Hilversum: Verloren, 1996).

14 Felix Schürmann, "Raum ohne Ort? Meere in der Geschichtsforschung," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 67, no. 51–52 (2017): 41–46.

15 Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *The Geographical Journal* 23, no. 4 (1904): 421–44. See also Geoffrey Sloan, "Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 22, no. 3 (1999): 15–38.

16 Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations* (London: Constable, 1922).

17 Mikhail Rostovtzeff, *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), 1.

To this day, Mackinder, Toynbee, and Rostovtzeff continue to influence how the Black Sea region is represented in historical studies. For example, in his well-known book of 1995, *The Black Sea*, the British historian Neil Ascherson took Rostovtzeff's work as his starting point,[18] while his German colleague Dan Diner explicitly referenced Mackinder's "pivot of history" in his history of the twentieth century, *Cataclysms: A History of the Twentieth Century*. Diner took Mackinder's reference literally, telling the history of the century "from its eastern periphery—from the periphery inward."[19] "Such a vantage point," Diner continued, "starting from the fringes of the continent, might be that of a virtual narrator situated on the legendary steps of Odessa, looking outward South and West."[20] Accordingly, Diner constructs his interpretation, utilizing the East, that is, East-Central Europe, Southeastern Europe, and the Middle East, as the geographical focal point for a history of twentieth-century Europe; his against-the-grain orientation provides a history that is just as consistent and enlightening as more traditional approaches. With a view to the post-war confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Balkans and the Black Sea and Caspian regions, Diner represents "the recurring Eastern Question as the midwife of the Cold War."[21] From this perspective, the Cold War was born in the Balkans, namely with the Greek Civil War from 1946 to 1949. Its birth is marked by President Harry Truman's speech on March 12, 1947, in which before a joint session of the US Congress he explicitly asked for American assistance for Greece and Turkey to forestall Soviet expansionism—the so-called Truman Doctrine. Here too, the pivot of history is situated in the Black Sea region. Indeed, the Cold War in Greece and the Megali idea of establishing a Greek state that would encompass all ethnic Greek-inhabited areas were dialectically linked.

4 Gheorghe Ion Brătianu—the "obscure Braudel of the Black Sea"

However, during the interwar years, it was a Romanian who was primarily responsible for propagating the meso-regional concept of the Black Sea: the economic historian Gheorghe Ion Brătianu, who in the 1930s and 1940s developed the concept in a two-volume history titled *La Mer Noire et la Question d'Orient*. Unfortunately, the second volume covering the Black Sea region during the Ottoman period remains missing to this day. (The author was a political prisoner in Stalinist Romania and died in prison in 1956). However, Part One, covering the region's pre-sixteenth century history as part

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18 Neal Ascherson, *Black Sea* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).
19 Dan Diner, *Cataclysms: A History of the Twentieth Century from Europe's Edge* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), 6. For the reference to Mackinder, see Diner, 7.
20 Diner, *Cataclysms*, 7.
21 Diner, 266.

of the Byzantine Empire, was published posthumously in 1969 as *La Mer Noire des Origines à la Conquête Ottomane.* Interestingly, it was the Munich-based publishing house Societas Academica Dacoromana, established by an exiled Romanian, that brought it to print.[22]

At the same time as Brătianu, but without any knowledge of his yet-to-be-published opus, the French historian Fernand Braudel was also working intensively with the concept of historical meso-regions in general and in relationship to the Black Sea region. In his well-known 1949 study on the Mediterranean region during the early modern period, he came to the conclusion that the Black Sea was little more than an "Ottoman lake," albeit a "well-guarded" one. He went on to describe it as a "fringe area" of the "extended Mediterranean" (not unlike the Sahara) and as a "hunting ground of Constantinople." In short, it was no historic region sui generis.[23] The American-Macedonian historian Traian Stoianovich assessed the Black Sea region essentially in the same light as Braudel. Utilizing Braudel's concept of the Mediterranean world as his model, Stoianovich postulated a Balkan world in numerous studies from the 1960s to the 1990s, including his 1994 monograph *The First and Last Europe.* In his conceptualization of the Balkan world(s), the Black Sea figured as a mere backyard.[24]

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22 Gheorghe Ion Brătianu, *La Mer Noire des origines à la conquête ottomane* (Munich: Societas Academica Dacoromana, 1969).
23 Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, 2 vols. (Paris: Colin, 1949). For Braudel's ancient history of the Mediterranean Sea published posthumously, see Fernand Braudel, *Les Mémoirs de la Méditerranée: Préhistoire et antiquité* (Paris: Édition de Fallois, 1998). For discussions of Braudel's work, see Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (Oxford, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000). This first of two planned volumes triggered a large response. See Brent D. Shaw, "Challenging Braudel: A New Vision of the Mediterranean," *Journal of Roman Archeology* 14 (2001): 419–53; Elizabeth Fentress and James Fentress, "The Hole in the Doughnut," *Past and Present* 173 (2001): 203–19. For the authors' response to this reaction, see Nicholas Purcell, "The Boundless Sea of Unlikeness? On Defining the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Historical Journal* 18 (2003): 9–29; Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, "Four Years of Corruption: A Response to Critics," in *Rethinking the Mediterranean*, ed. William V. Harris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 348–75. For a synopsis of the discussion, see Stefan Troebst, "*Le Monde méditerranéen – Südosteuropa – Black Sea World:* Geschichtsregionen im Süden Europas," in *Der Süden: Neue Perspektiven auf eine europäische Geschichtsregion*, ed. Frithjof Benjamin Schenk and Martina Winkler (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2007), 55–60. Incidentally, it is also often overlooked that Braudel not only constructed the regions making up the Mediterranean world, but also divided all of Europe into four regions or isthmuses: the Russian, the Polish, the German, and the French isthmus.
24 Traian Stoianovich, *Between East and West: The Balkan and Mediterranean Worlds*, 4 vols. (New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas, 1992–95); Traian Stoianovich, *Balkan Worlds: The First and Last Europe* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1994). In a recent German handbook on Mediterranean studies, the Black Sea does not figure at all: Mihran Dabag et al., eds., *Handbuch der Mediterranistik: Systematische Mittelmeerforschung und disziplinäre Zugänge* (Paderborn: Fink, 2015).

5 1989 and All That

The actual breakthrough for a historical meso-regional concept of the Black Sea world, as noted earlier, was facilitated by the epochal year of 1989. As had happened in earlier times, it opened the region, making it once again relevant from an economic standpoint as well as from a geo-strategic perspective.[25] One result of the events of that year was the creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), which took place at Turkey's initiative in 1992; BSEC's membership includes neighboring states as well as others such as Greece and Albania.[26] The official language of this multilateral organization for practical reasons, rather than political, is Russian. Another result of '1989' was the founding of GUAM in 1996, which in 1999 became GUUAM; the acronym is short for Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. If we consider the geographic relation of Tashkent, Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, Kyiv, and Chişinău, it becomes clear that here we are primarily dealing with a transport route for Caspian oil to the EU via the Black Sea that explicitly circumvents the territory of the Russian Federation. The likewise Russophone GU(U)AM was temporarily robbed of its raison d'être by the proposed Gazprom South Stream Pipeline. However, with the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 that could change; but it would be without Armenia. The BSEC appears now to be dead, because its members have only been able to reach a consensus in the area of economics and ecology.

In the 1990s, the prospect of Romania and Bulgaria gaining membership of NATO and the EU also generated demand for a regional identity, which especially in Romania provoked a veritable Brătianu renaissance. Thus, the yearbooks *Il mar nero: Annali di archeologie e storia* have appeared in Romania since 1994 and the book series *Bibliotheca Pontica* since 1996, both in Italian. The first issue of *Il mar nero* included the following programmatic statement:

> In the course of its one-thousand-year existence, the Black Sea has played a dual role, i.e., a role in regional history and one in global history. As an area of contact between neighboring civilizations and peoples, whose contact it has always facilitated, the Black Sea was also a crossroads for movements of major intercontinental trade, civilizations, and ideas. Like the sea, which is the object of its research, the journal IL MAR NERO serves as the meeting place of scholars who in the East and the West dedicate their research to this factor in world history.[27]

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25 See, for example, Yannis Tsantoulis, *The Geopolitics of Region Building in the Black Sea: A Critical Examination* (London: Routledge, 2020). This observation is true even for the wider sphere of culture. For the field of literature, see *pars pro toto* Katharina Raabe and Monika Sznajderman, eds., *Odessa Transfer: Nachrichten vom Schwarzen Meer* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2009), and for cuisine Caroline Eden, *Black Sea: Dispatches and Recipes – Through Darkness and Light* (London: Quadrille Publishing, 2018).

26 Panagiota Manoli, *The Dynamics of Black Sea Regionalism* (London: Routledge, 2019).

27 *Il mar nero* 1 (1994): 7.

The Brătianu renaissance in Romania should be seen against the backdrop of Bucharest's new *Ostpolitik.* Thus, the former Romanian President Ion Iliescu advocated in 2003, prior to his country's accession to NATO, the idea of the Black Sea as a "future 'European' sea" that together with the Caucasus would form "Southeastern Europe proper."[28] In addition to Romania, this "real Southeastern Europe," according to Iliescu, would include Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine, Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Thus, they too should have the prospect of EU accession. Iliescu deliberately excluded the Russian Federation from his conception of the Black Sea countries. In the academic sphere, Iliescu's "real Southeastern Europe" found expression in a political science journal called *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies.* The product of a 2001 Greek initiative, this journal is now firmly established in the highly competitive market of international periodicals. Even within West German political science, a "broad" Iliescu-like concept of Southern Europe is occasionally used.

6 Enlightenment from the Bosporus: Y. Eyüp Özveren

In the world of historians, the ground-breaking essay "A Framework for the Study of the Black Sea, 1789–1915" by the Turkish economic historian Eyüp Özveren of Ankara's Middle East Technical University marked a decisive push in the direction of the meso-regional concept of the "Black Sea world"; the essay first appeared in *Review,* a journal founded by Immanuel Wallerstein in 1976 as the official publication of the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations at Binghampton University in New York.[29] Özveren substantiated his view of an interactive Black Sea world using the momentous effects of the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which ended the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–74. Under the terms of the treaty, the sultan was forced to concede to the Russian Empire access to the heretofore Ottoman *mare clausum,* including the Bosporus, Dardanelles, and the Danube. According to Özveren, an internal economic dynamic arose that transcended the economic spheres of both the Russian and the Ottoman Empire, crossing the borders of each. A series of Black Sea port cities, that is, Trabzon in eastern Anatolia with its proximity to the Persian trading metropolis Tabriz, the new Russian city of Odesa, which served as a gateway to the Ukrainian breadbasket, and Brăila and Galaţi on the lower Danube on Ottoman Empire territory but oriented toward the Habsburg Empire, took advantage of Istanbul's loss of absolute control over the Black Sea region to create a new trade relationship. "These ports," Özveren concluded now, "could trade among themselves,

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28 Konrad Schuller, "Iliescu für EU-Beitritt der Türkei. 'Die EU sollte sich nicht als das christliche Europa definieren'," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* September 27, 2003, 6.
29 Y. Eyüp Özveren, "A Framework for the Study of the Black Sea World, 1789–1915," *(Fernand Braudel Center)* 20, no. 1 (1997): 77–113.

thereby creating a new triangular trade, escaping control of the once dominant Istanbul."[30] The fact that this transnational movement of goods across the borders of the Ottoman, Habsburg, and Russian Empires in the long nineteenth century was initiated from below by mercantile actors in the abovementioned ports, rather than by the authoritative seats of power of said empires, Özveren interpreted as proof of "the unity of geography."[31] "We now recognize this geography," Özveren stated, "as a historically-constituted unit of analysis, a 'world', the reality of which precedes in importance the actors placed on it."[32] For Özveren, merchants figured prominently among these actors, more specifically Pontic Greeks, whom he identified as part of the region's Byzantine heritage. In keeping with this research direction, he studied other coastal societies, focusing on their specific trans-maritime interactions and parallels—for example, those surrounding the Indian Ocean and more recently the North Sea, and inquired into the relationship between the constituent elements and the whole. His hypothesis was: "The level of integratedness among themselves of the constituent elements of the Black Sea world is greater than the integration of each element by itself to the circuits of the outer world."[33] In other words, at least in the sphere of commerce, Özveren's Black Sea world operated as a cohesive unit; accordingly, it was as dominant in shaping its constitutive elements as the respective competing political units (e. g., Ottoman, Russian, Habsburg) to which these elements belonged.

For the period of the Eastern Question, Eyüp Özveren postulated a historical Black Sea region, created by means of regional exchanges of goods, and thus also cultural transfers. These exchanges owed to the ubiquity of professional traders, namely Greek merchants, as Stoianovich too had claimed earlier.[34] Özveren provided historical back-references for his perspective (for example, Byzantium and the Kingdom of Trebizond and also the Pontus Euxinus of antiquity) and invoked a unifying, almost timeless, geography. Through the Ottoman re-captioning of the palimpsest "Black Sea," one could paraphrase Özveren, the original ancient text has resonated as a Byzantine text since Küçük Kaynarca at the latest. Put differently, even empires cannot permanently resist the power of economic geography. However, he also stressed that the spatialization of social and economic processes, that is, the mercantile activities (including their cultural dimensions) of Pontic Greeks and other merchants in the Black Sea port cities, turned the concrete space of action into a perceptual and imaginative space. Indeed, a system formed from a contemporary cognitive map made up of economic centers and their catchment areas that heretofore had not interacted and which had even taken on similar structures. For in the entrepreneurial coordinate system of a Trabzon mer-

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30 Özveren, 85.

31 Özveren, 82.

32 Özveren, 86 – 87.

33 Özveren, 89.

34 Traian Stoianovich, "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant," *Journal of Economic History* 20, no. 2 (1960): 234 – 313.

chant, Cairo, also under Ottoman rule, was situated far beyond the horizon, while Russian Odesa was only a short, albeit dangerous, sea passage away.[35]

In a 2001 essay, "The Black Sea World as a Unit of Analysis," Özveren utilized his 1997 empirical findings to create a theoretical foundation for his concept of a historical meso-region.[36] In contrast to the *Annales* approach of Braudel and his student Stoianovich, who classified the Black Sea as a largely passive annex of the Mediterranean Sea and the Balkans, respectively, Özveren assigned the region great significance; in fact, he turned the tables, describing not the Black Sea as an appendage of the Balkans, but the Balkans as an appendage of the Black Sea: "It is my contention that the Balkans constitute a zone within the Black Sea world, rather than being a meaningful unit of analysis itself."[37] Özveren's primary inspiration is Brătianu, whom he considers "the obscure Braudel of the Black Sea"[38] and whose work he comprehensively details and reviews.

According to what could be called the Özveren-Brătianu thesis, the meso-regional features of the Black Sea world consist of two axioms. First, the Black Sea region is characterized by a north-south opposition, whereby during antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the early modern era, the innovative impulses originated from the South, with tsarist Russia encroaching from the north. Second, the Black Sea world has been defined by long periods of imperial hegemony and *mare clausum* policy—as enforced under Byzantine, Ottoman, and Soviet rule—interrupted by periods of openness and multilateralism (for instance, in the late Byzantine era with the economic penetration of Genovese and Venetian traders, during the long nineteenth century, which here extended to the beginning of World War II, and again since the end of the East-West conflict).

7 Brătianu 2.0? Charles King

Also following in Brătianu's footsteps is the American historian Charles King, whose monograph *The Black Sea: A History* was published in 2004.[39] King's book is original insofar as the chapter titles read 'Black Sea' in five different languages: Pontus Euxinus, Mare Maggiore, Kara Deniz, Chernoe More, and Black Sea, thereby clearly indicating the imperial orientation of each respective epoch: Hellenic antiquity, the Byzantine-Venetian-Genovese medieval era, the Ottoman early modern era, the "Russian" long

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35 The history of Odesa, founded in 1794, is particularly well-researched. Cf. Patricia Herlihy, *Odessa: A History, 1794 – 1914* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991), and Evrydiki Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa: Peoples, Spaces, Identities* (Leiden: Brill, 2017).

36 Eyüp Özveren, "The Black Sea World as a Unit of Analysis," in *Politics of the Black Sea: Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict,* ed. Tunç Aybak (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 61 – 84.

37 Özveren, 71.

38 Özveren.

39 Charles King, *The Black Sea: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

nineteenth century, and East-West bloc confrontation in the twentieth century. However, King's justification for the Black Sea region as a framework for investigation and a unit of analysis is much less innovative:

> The lands surrounding the Black Sea share a colourful past. Though in recent decades they have experienced ethnic conflicts, economic collapse, and interstate rivalry, their common heritage and common interests go deep. Now, as a region at the meeting point of the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East, the Black Sea is more important than ever.[40]

Compared with Özveren's highly sophisticated analysis of structural factors, the rather simple reasoning in Charles King's *The Black Sea* appears to be throwback to Rostovtzeff's description of the region as "very curious and very interesting." King's Black Sea world is not based on structural or regional history nor is it limited to a specific time period. Instead, it is static, timeless, and thus almost essentialist.

Even when King does attempt to identify the region's structural characteristics, his analysis remains orthodox, and essentially considers only one factor: insufficient modernization in the region. The modern territorialized state, the culturally based nation, and eventually the nation-state, according to his argument, arrive here only in the twentieth century—much later than elsewhere. In keeping with this negative assessment of the region's progress, his book ends on a pessimistic note: The integration of large parts or the entirety of the Black Sea region into NATO and the EU will trigger a process of migration that will leave the region largely depopulated and consequently will change its social, economic, and ecological structure.

The gloomy outlook of Charles King, a professor of international affairs and government at Georgetown University in Washington DC, differs sharply from that of his Turkish colleague Eyüp Özveren, whose thesis King inexplicably ignores. Özveren, in fact, is quite optimistic about the future of the Black Sea world:

> Present trends in the region reveal a momentum for the Black Sea to recuperate its losses and assume an important role with respect to both the states and peoples of the region as well as in relation with the global political economy in-the-making by way of blocs along the Eurasian axis.[41]

Thus, he sees a "return" to a political polycentrism similar to the regional integration of the late Byzantine era or of the long nineteenth century as being within the realm of possibility, so long as one central condition is met: "the effective—and hopefully this time voluntary—constitution of law and order within the Black Sea world."[42]

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40 King, see book jacket, back cover.
41 Özveren, "The Black Sea World as a Unit of Analysis," 79.
42 Özveren.

8 Conclusion: "a geographical pivot of history" Once More

The current *pax turco-rossica* brought about by Presidents Putin and Erdoğan most probably does not provide the law and order Özveren hopes for. To the contrary, the Russian-Georgian tensions, the ongoing aggression of the Russian Federation towards Ukraine in the Donbas region and the Sea of Azov, the unresolved conflicts in the Dniester Valley in eastern Moldova and in Abkhazia in northwestern Georgia, but above all the Russian Federation's intervention, occupation, and ultimately annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea in 2014 followed by the full-fledged invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation from the north, east, and south in 2022 and the ensuing multi-front war of attrition destabilize the region for the foreseeable future. This holds, in particular, for Moscow's massive extension of its exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea in the wake of the annexation of Crimea. This extension cuts off Ukraine from the resources of offshore natural gas and oil, not to mention the still untapped deposits of manganese at the bottom of the sea. Also affected is the pipeline project from Baku in Azerbaijan to the EU territory of Romania via Poti in Georgia. The impact of actors like the European Union with its "Black Sea Synergy," the People's Republic of China with its "New Silk Road," and a "16+1 Initiative" (sixteen East European countries plus China) or Poland with her concept of a "Trójmorze" (Three Seas Initiative), aiming at the region between the Baltic, the Adriatic, and the Black Seas, will most probably be limited.

The discussion on a Black Sea meso-region, now in full swing, should be of interest to historians for multiple reasons: First, it directly affects how we construct meso-regional spaces, such as "Southeastern Europe," "East-Central Europe," or "Eurasia." Second, it offers possibilities for comparison with other maritime-based meso-regional concepts, such as "the Mediterranean," "the Levant," "the Adriatic" or "the Baltic Sea"/"Northeastern Europe." Third, it provides a gateway to a global historical approach to trans-maritime seascapes and coastal societies, such as the "Atlantic world," the "Red Sea," or the "Indian Ocean." Moreover, it can serve as the focus region of "Transottoman mobility dynamics," whereas the concept "Transottomanica" itself has been conceived recently as a larger, social relational spatial condensation of concrete mobilities of people, objects, and knowledge between and across the Ottoman Empire, Persia, Muscovy/Russia and Poland-Lithuania (plus the relevant successor states) from 1500 to the mid-twentieth century, thus systematically opening up the perspective on a shared history between and beyond the container spaces of the "Near East/Middle East" and "Eastern Europe."[43] Finally, a Black Sea meso-region sharpens

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[43] For an introduction, see Stefan Rohdewald, Stephan Conermann, and Albrecht Fuess, eds., *Transottomanica: Osteuropäisch-osmanisch-persische Mobilitätsdynamiken. Perspektiven und Forschungsstand* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019). For the numerous publications elaborating and using the concept, see "DFG Priority Programme Transottomanica," www.transottomanica.de, and the fundamen-

our understanding that the historical meso-regions of Europe extend far beyond the conventional political, geographic, or cultural structures of "EUrope."

tal volumes of the homonymous series in open access: https://www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht-verlage.com/themen-entdecken/geschichte/osteuropaeische-geschichte/14840/transottomanicav. In this context, see a special issue on the Black Sea seen from a Transottoman perspective: Lyubomir Pozharliev, Florian Riedler, and Stefan Rohdewald, eds., "Transottoman Infrastructures and Networks Across the Black Sea," special issue, *Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies* 3, no. 5 (2020).

Eyüp Özveren

Circle(s) and Circulation(s) as Constitutive of the Black Sea (World)

> From there [the Thracian Bosporus] begins its vast Pontic gulf, with the marshes of
> Maeotis (i.e. the Sea of Azov) at its furthest point. This sea has fresher water than the
> others because of the great number of rivers, and is foggy and rather shallow. Accordingly
> it is called *Pontus* (i.e. the Black Sea), because it is traversable (cf. pons. gen. *pontis* 'bridge')
> and for that reason it supports seals, tuna and dolphins, but no larger sea-creatures.[1]

1 Introduction

Isidore of Seville, writing in early seventh century, approached the Black Sea from the other end of the Mediterranean, and had no difficulty in describing it as the outermost extreme, and as a somewhat different, though human-friendly, "nature preserve." Although he narrated it as if he were traveling by boat, he depended for his account on ancient works and hearsay. He differentiated the Black Sea from the Mediterranean as well as the Sea of Azov, suggesting a progression in stages from the south, mirroring a similar shorter one from the north. The Sea of Azov was to the Black Sea what the Black Sea was to the Mediterranean.

Braudel's depiction of the Black Sea reminds us of Isidore: "The far-off Black Sea, limit of Mediterranean shipping, was ringed round by wild lands, with a few exceptions, both un-civilized and de-civilized."[2] The Black Sea is "far-off" and associated with a "limit." It is nevertheless a mere extension—by its function in relation to Mediterranean shipping. This characterization has been influential for all subsequent literature. The four dissenters from this dominant view who treat the Black Sea as a sea in its own right are the interwar Romanian historian Gheorghe Brătianu,[3] myself,[4] Owen

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1 *The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville*, trans. and intro. Stephen A. Barney, W. J. Lewis, J. A. Beach, and Oliver Berghof (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 277.

2 Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip II* (London: Collin, 1976), 110.

3 George [Gheorghe] I. Brătianu, *La Mer Noire des origines à la conquête ottomane* (Rome: Societas Academica Dacoromana, 1969).

4 I was inspired, after years of working on the Mediterranean, by the journal *Il Mar Nero*, the result of international cooperation with a focus on the Black Sea, the first issue of which had come out in 1994, the year before I had access to Brătianu's then rarely available book in the library of the *Maison des Sciences de l'Homme*, Paris. For a more detailed exposition of my theoretical and historical viewpoint, see Eyüp Özveren, "A Framework for the Study of the Black Sea World, 1789–1915," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 20, no. 1 (1997): 77–113; and "Black Sea World as a Unit of Analysis," in *Politics of the Black Sea*, ed. Tunç Aybak (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 61–84.

Doonan,[5] a Black Sea archaeologist, and Cyprian Broodbank, the author of a contribution as important as that of Braudel but with a different temporal focus, who addressed the issue head on under the heading "Mediterranean centres and edges":

> Should the Black Sea be included, another, 461,000 sq. km (178,000 sq. miles) connected via the slender Bosphorus and Dardanelles? Plato, writing when Greek towns ringed its shores, certainly thought so. But although a close neighbour, and far more than the Mediterranean's backyard, the Black Sea has a notably more equable, continental environment, a totally contrastive maritime aspect (it is effectively islandless, for a start) and partly as a result, a different early history from the larger basin.[6]

Unlike the formative phase of oceans in the "deep time" of geologists, the Black Sea was connected with the Mediterranean, not in pre-human history but in the prehistory of a more recent vintage, ca. 5,500 BC. Hence the unification of the two seas was a catastrophic event witnessed by humans in the vicinity of the Black Sea as their settlements along the littoral were inundated and their means of procuring livelihood as well as their basic food patterns were altered.[7]

In the following section we first place the Black Sea in a comparative perspective. We then specify its shape before we delineate the mechanism that supports it, before proceeding with a series of close-ups on select subjects and objects involved in circulation, only to relate them in order of importance as constitutive of a complex yet specific dynamics.

2 What is the Black Sea Like?

A distinction is maintained here between "the Black Sea" and "the Black Sea world." We must first address what the Black Sea is. Is the Black Sea a mere extension, an outgrowth, a periphery, no different than the other inner seas of the Mediterranean, as noted by Fernand Braudel? Putting the Black Sea in comparative perspective serves to support the case for its independent treatment. The Black Sea covers 183,000 square miles, while the Mediterranean is 960,000 square miles; the Black Sea is, then, about a fifth the size of the Mediterranean. The Tyrrhenian and the Ionian (subseas of the Mediterranean) are much larger than the Black Sea. In juxtaposition, the Ligurian and Adriatic subseas, as well as the Sea of Marmara, are much smaller. Finally, the Aegean Sea, where it all began according to textbooks on the history of Western civilization, a

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5 Owen P. Doonan, "The Corrupting Sea and the Hospitable Sea: Some Early Thoughts Toward a Regional History of the Black Sea," in *KOINE: Mediterranean Studies in Honor of R. Ross Holloway*, ed. Derek B. Counts and Anthony S. Tuck (Providence: Joukovsky Institute of Archaeology Publications Series, 2010), 68–74.

6 Cyprian Broodbank, *The Making of the Middle Sea: A History of the Mediterranean from the Beginning to the Emergence of the Classical World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 55.

7 Charles King, *The Black Sea: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 14–15.

sea of innumerable islands that facilitated the diffusion of peoples, goods, technologies, ideas, and religions, is surprisingly small, all the more so when the accomplishment registered on its behalf is reconsidered. It is less than half the size of the Black Sea. In short, the Black Sea is larger by a considerable margin than several subseas of the Mediterranean. Then there are the enclosed seas in the vicinity of the Black Sea that await comparison. The Caspian, with its 170,000 square miles, is only slightly smaller than the Black Sea. The Aral Sea, considerably shrunk due to environmental destruction since the 1960s, was even then only 26,500 square miles.[8]

The Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, and the Aral Sea are descendants of a once much greater pre-human prehistoric sea that encompassed them. Whereas the Mediterranean is a relic of the ancient Tethys Sea, the Black Sea and its associates have their origin in the Paratethys Sea. When thus approached as a set of remnant seas, along with the legendary Pannonian Sea (of which the Lake Balaton in Hungary survives), both the total area and the size conveyed by the standard maps become comparable to that of the Mediterranean Sea. In other words, the Greater Black Sea is approximately the same size as what the ancients called the Great Sea. We indulge in a mental exercise here—but not a farfetched stretch of the imagination—since the term "*région pontico-pannonienne*"[9] inspired by zoologists has already expressed it, albeit in a narrower sense. With this receding horizon in space/time as a backdrop, one is more tempted to treat the Black Sea as an entity in its own right.[10]

We now need to identify this entity as part of a specific world. The Black Sea world is larger than the Black Sea that occupies its center of gravity. The Black Sea world is defined in relation to the centricity of the Black Sea. The convergence between the two is highest where the sea is. As we move inland from the littoral, the divergence starts to irritate the observer as the maritime influence becomes less marked, introducing the question of boundaries. It is best to think of this space as a set of graded and distorted concentric circles. Beyond the Black Sea world, there are other meso-level worlds. In graded zones, two or more worlds overlap. The Black Sea world overlaps in part with the Mediterranean world, the Balkans, Eurasia, and the Danubian world extending into *Mitteleuropa* as expounded in the *Danube* of Magris, the contemporary writer known for exploiting the possibilities of the boundary between fiction and documentary. Drawing the boundary between two seas being difficult as it is, demarcating two worlds is next to impossible, given shifting porous boundaries that defy linear representation.

Seas have other attributes than size, such as salinity, depth, natural resources, currents, winds, whether they have islands or not, principal ports and various aspects of

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8 For further details, see Élisabeth Dumont-Le Cornec, *Les mers mythiques* (Paris: Éditions Belin, 2010).

9 Claudio Magris, *Danube* (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), 221.

10 I benefitted greatly to see that some of my insightful inferences were shared by natural scientists in the Second International Conference on the "Oceanography of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea: Similarities and Differences of Two Interconnected Basins," Institute of Marine Sciences, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, October 14–18, 2002.

the coastline, rivers that flow into them, and climates along with the seasonal variations they impose upon the environment. The Black Sea has a salinity of 18 percent, whereas the Sea of Marmara to which it joins by the Bosporus, 36, and the Aegean 37–39 percent. This criterion alone can help us draw the border of the Black Sea at the Bosporus. Moreover, the Black Sea climate is characterized as "temperate," that of Marmara as "Mediterranean": further supporting evidence for the above choice of boundary. Finally, the Black Sea, unlike the Mediterranean, receives more than sufficient rainfall on a regular basis. This makes regions more self-reliant economically. Whereas Mediterranean regions, in a constant state of unstable equilibrium, are forced to look outwards to make up for their periodic food shortages, their Black Sea counterparts could afford to remain introverted.

A distinguishing feature of the Black Sea is its wealth of rivers. The best known is the highly internationalized Danube, from its origins turning its back to Europe to join the Black Sea.[11] The Dnipro (also known as Dnieper), and the Don enrich the Black Sea, but have also polluted it badly since the last quarter of the twentieth century. The smaller Caspian Sea receives the disproportionately significant Volga and the Ural. Altogether, the Black Sea has some fifty medium-length and thirteen long rivers.[12] In this respect, compared with the Mediterranean, the Black Sea world remains unmatched. It is not only the replenishment of water the rivers provide, but also the vastly expanded economic "catchment area" penetrating deep into the hinterland that makes all the difference. Hence when approached as the Black Sea plus its riverine networks, the Black Sea becomes even more comparable with the Mediterranean.

3 The Circle, When the Center Can Hold, or Otherwise

Today we tend all too easily to forget that, before modern aviation, it was impossible for humans to experience a bird's eye view of the Black Sea. Even so, the ancients were, by inference from piecemeal evidence, aware that the Black Sea resembled a Scythian bow with its grip at the *Palus Maeotis* (the Sea of Azov) and its string coinciding with the southern shore of the Sea of Pontus (that is, the Black Sea).[13] The maps we know came much later, on the eve of modernity. Those drawn with sailing ships in mind are quite different from those that take steamships for granted. Whereas the former emphasize the trajectories suggested by the directions favored by winds and currents and go into greater detail along these routes, the latter take abstract geometrical properties, such as the straight line between two points representing the shortest distance, into foremost consideration. In the former, the shortest distance between two points can

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11 Paul Morand, *Entre Rhin et Danube* (Paris: Nicolas Chaudun, 2011), 123–24.

12 Refik Baskın, *Hey Gidi Karadeniz* (Istanbul: Yitik Ülke, 2017), 23.

13 Adem Işık, *Antik Kaynaklarda Karadeniz Bölgesi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2001), 3.

be ignored because it is not practically navigable, whereas in the latter it becomes the most pertinent route to detail. After the Crimean War (1853–56), which introduced an internationally sanctioned law of the sea with a corresponding regulatory regime to the increasingly multipolar Black Sea, the necessity of exploratory scientific expeditions for the sake of modern mapmaking induced Russians and Ottomans to work together, as when in 1860 Colonel Hacı Ahmed Vesim of the Ottoman Navy was assigned the task of drawing the map of the Black Sea coastline in collaboration with the Russian Admiral Podukov [*sic*].[14]

The very shape of the Black Sea brings to mind a distorted form that resembles first and foremost a circle. There is something archetypal about the circle. Out of it can be generated a whole series of geometric forms, including the square. Symmetry has always attracted as much attention, as it is a property of both, even more of the circle than of the square. By looking at the shape of seas as represented in maps, we can single out the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the latter more so than the former, as displaying a strong symmetry along the north–south as well as the east–west axis. There was an even greater degree of symmetry before the Black Sea was joined with the Mediterranean—that is, when the Sea of Marmara still remained a lake connected to the Black Sea with a river,[15] hence mirroring the Sea of Azov. Alternatively, the Black Sea, with respect to the Mediterranean, and the Sea of Azov, in relation to the Black Sea, are like successive phases of an optical illusion moving in a hall of mirrors. The Straits in the south are also mirrored disproportionately in the Strait of Kerch, not surprisingly also known as the Cimmerian, as distinct from the Thracian, Bosporus in the north,[16] controlling the entrance to the Sea of Azov. Moreover, the alignment of ports around the circumference of the Black Sea raises a symmetric pattern to new heights. The archetypal shape of the Black Sea hence seems to have developed over time into a quadrilateral, and more specifically a trapezoidal. Corners and straight lines have been worn out in a transformation that owes as much to geology as to the advances in mapmaking. In this elongated process, curvilinearity has become more pronounced and, for a contemporary observer with a penchant for abstraction, it would not be farfetched to imagine the original form as a circle that deformed into an ellipse as perceived by the ancients.

What concerns us here is the etymological connections between "circle," the noun, "circular," the adjective, and "to circulate," the verb, which lead us to yet another noun, "circulation." We should note in passing the formal affinity between the circle and the

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14 İdris Bostan, *İstanbul'un 100 Denizcisi* (Istanbul: IBB Kültür A.Ş. Yayınları, 2014), 235. We have not been able to track down this name. Deciphering foreign names in Ottoman script involves guesswork and the source cited here may involve a misreading of the original document. It is highly likely that we are faced here with a member of the famous Butakov dynasty of Imperial Russian naval commanders. Admiral Grigorii Ivanovich Butakov (1820–82) is the most plausible candidate given his term of service (1856–60) and his innovative record in general, and his scientific credentials in particular.
15 Ali Pasiner, *İki Denizin Suları* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2001), 13.
16 King, *The Black Sea*, 16.

sphere, the latter being a tridimensional projection of the former. It is worth recalling that Eratosthenes, the polymath librarian of Alexandria, believed that the world was spherical, and thereby contradicted the commonly held conviction that it was flat. If we conventionally speak of spheres of circulation, it is because the sphere by its very nature imposes a circular form as well as a cycle—associated with rotation or revolution—and facilitates travel, transfer, transmission, and ultimately circulation at large. Time itself moves literally in a cycle on the surface of the clock. We relate this progression so strongly to the clock that we project from the clock to the world at large the very specification of clockwise or anticlockwise movement as two fundamental categories of classification where motion is concerned.

We spoke above of centricity and gravitation as responsible for holding the Black Sea in shape. As we approach towards the center, centripetal forces intensify whereas in the reverse direction centrifugal forces increasingly dominate. Centricity in the Black Sea was imposed twice from Constantinople/Istanbul. First, it was with the founding of the city under the Romans as an imperial capital (330 AD) overly dependent on overseas provisioning. The Roman Empire was the only political entity that established its sovereignty all around the Mediterranean and converted it to a "mare nostrum." This was exceptional and provided its heirs with a model. The Eastern Roman Empire, inspired by Rome, also looked to the Mediterranean. As its power over the Mediterranean declined, the Black Sea escaped from its hold. Secondly, with the post-1453 conversion of the Black Sea into an "Ottoman lake," non-Ottoman merchant shipping and trade was prohibited until the late eighteenth century.[17] Even so, the Ottoman Empire was also Mediterranean-looking.[18] In short, Black Sea was second-best as far as both empires were concerned. This was because it did not suffice to sustain an empire; though potentially rich, it was difficult to bring to its knees, the regular enforcement of law and order being comparatively costly given its Eurasian frontier across the steppes.[19] Be that as it may, the above first attempt was unsuccessful but left its legacy, whereas the second was effective. In both instances, albeit to different degrees, economic organization favoring the capital city's provisioning needs was imposed from above. Regional specialization took shape accordingly, with the deepening economic division of labor.

Each of the two instances of top-down domination was preceded and followed by a period when more spontaneous horizontal forces originating from multiple ports were

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17 This was not as absolute as the literature suggests, at least until the Cossack raids started towards the end of sixteenth century. See Halil İnalcık, "The Question of the Closing of the Black Sea under the Ottomans," *Archeion Pontou* 35 (1978): 108–10. In any case, it gave a stimulus to Ottoman local maritime traffic as well as land-based caravans.

18 So was the Russian Empire, as its advent toward the south changed the Black Sea as of the late eighteenth century.

19 The only empire to originate from within the Black Sea was the lesser Empire of Trebizond, and in terms of calling, function, scale and scope, it did not measure up to the model. Hence its record supports our argument.

allowed to negotiate a moveable center. This relatively more bottom-up alternative arrangement relied on a political multi-polarity of rival empires and states, caught in a singular economic division of labor, fostered by trade across the sea. There have been three historical examples of this mode of organization: (1) the Black Sea before and during the Ancient Greek colonization, (2) the penetration of Italian city-states into Black Sea trade via partnership with local powers, imperial and otherwise, and (3) the modern experience—albeit with a long Cold War interregnum more resembling the antithesis via bizonal application[20]—by way of modern trade and shipping. Each of these three instances coincides with exogenous forces at work to incorporate the Black Sea into a greater (world) market and its corresponding international political economic regime. This comes at the cost of Istanbul's monopoly and reduces its role to that of a strategically located intermediary that is advantageously positioned but by no means unrivalled (by Trebizond, Caffa, Odesa, Constanţa, Batumi, Varna, etc.). Either way, the periodically renegotiated centricity of the Black Sea is defined vis-à-vis the division of labor.

If the Black Sea world survives as a "meso-region," it is because neither of the two rival arrangements has so far been able to eliminate its nemesis completely from the scene. If the first arrangement succeeded for good, it would imply a Black Sea world completely cut off and enclosed upon itself, whereas with the opposite, we would witness a complete disintegration and absorption of the Black Sea world into the global system. In between the two extremes, the Black Sea world survives as a meso-region, indicating that its center is still being sustained to a significant extent by the power originating from its own division (and integration)[21] of labor, as well as its (spatially) circular and (temporally) cyclical mechanisms reinforcing centripetal forces in favor of preserving its unity.

Modern geology, paleontology, and oceanography contribute greatly to our claim that the Black Sea was originally cut off from the Mediterranean in much of its pre-human formative ages. The earliest Black Sea economy, which predated the ancient Greek colonization and which the colonizers themselves encountered, was also introverted and self-sufficient. Ancient colonizers entrenched themselves in a pre-existing network of connections only to reorient and consolidate the Black Sea economy to their benefit. The two opposite coasts along the east–west axis are further apart than those on the north–south axis (some 700 miles for the former and 160 – 400 miles for the latter) and their economic activities are similar. Hence it is understandable that the connection along this axis has always been weak. Even before the Greek colonization, locals traded along the north–south axis, connecting Asia Minor

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20 It was during the Soviet Empire that a highly exceptional maritime line was opened connecting Odesa with Batumi along the diagonal. This exception proves the rule of which more will be said below.
21 Division of labor alone would serve disintegration via accelerating centrifugal trends. Because division of labor is accompanied by a further round of "integration" that is either automatic through increasing trade or achieved socially through organization, cooperation, provisioning, or planning, the combined effect is reinforcement of the system.

with Crimea by the shortest route through the open sea. For much of history, major advances in Black Sea navigation, technological or institutional, contributed to the intensification of traffic along this line. It is not only physical proximity and facility that favored this outcome, but also the complementarity of economic activities at the two ends, as befitting a consolidation of division of labor in conformity with the expansion of trade. Institutional and historical factors also mattered; Sinope, an original beneficiary, yielded its place to Trebizond, just as Istanbul successfully overshadowed Trabzon as the southern destination. During the nineteenth century, Odesa rose as a major competitor to Istanbul by becoming the main northern port by a wide margin. The recent rise of Constanţa (at the expense of Odesa, no longer serving as a port for Russia) and Batumi announces a new era insofar as both owe their fortunes not to the expansion of trade and travel between the two, but to their connections with the world at large.

It should be noted here that nothing like the spectacular "triangular trade"[22] that nurtured British economic development ever emerged on the Black Sea. If it did, then there would have been a self-sustaining circular trade at work. The Black Sea trade with a focus on Istanbul could be interpreted as vaguely similar to the Amsterdam-centered Dutch trade in its Baltic preserve, to which the British reacted by building up their Atlantic "triangular trade" from the seventeenth century on. "Circular" trade being absent, "circular" navigation along the coastline remained the privilege of modern cruise ships, emerging as an offshoot of the European travel culture of the Grand Tour, the Orient Express, and the Danubian cruises, but had its final take with the popular Soviet cruise companies of the 1960s and 1970s, when they squared the Black Sea circle by transgressing the Iron Curtain with a stopover in Istanbul.

4 Circulation in the Black Sea as Constitutive of the Black Sea World

But what else circulates besides ships? Obviously, people(s), but also fauna and flora, merchandize, technologies, and skills, some of the more prominent being pottery-making, baking, shipbuilding, and seafaring. Those that do not circulate are as important as those that do. For example, when plants circulate, they help transform the landscape, as was the case with vines, citruses, and tea, which grow in milder or subtropical climate micro-regions, as well as those humans who make their living off them, as when Herodotus "recorded seeing Scythians high on hemp on the shores."[23] When goods did

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22 A three-legged trade whereby one pays for imports from one country with exports to another, as was the case with Britain (exporting manufactures and shipping services), West Africa (slaves), and the West Indies (sugar). This amounts to self-sustaining circular trade.
23 Predrag Matvejevic, *Mediterranean: A Cultural Landscape* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 59.

not circulate, they brought either the needy to their feet directly, or their business-minded merchants. There exists a related set of documents in the Archives of the Chamber of Commerce of Marseille, including the correspondence of the Embassy in Istanbul;[24] the French were particularly interested in procuring strategic naval supplies from Kherson to their arsenal in Toulon during the closing decades of the eighteenth century.

The Black Sea world, at the crossroads of Eurasian routes and its southern connections, has attracted humans since time immemorial and incoming peoples moved, more often than not, anticlockwise. The Black Sea was relatively easy to approach through the vast steppes reaching the northern shore. This proved particularly useful for pastoralists who moved with their animals in need of pasture. Each new wave that arrived pushed the previous further. Those who had to surrender their lands under pressure sought refuge in more secure but less fertile places out of the way. There was a mechanism at work that periodically replenished and rejuvenated the population, which lost considerable numbers to the slave trade.[25] This lasted until the nineteenth century, when Russians could bring migratory movements under control. The Black Sea was attractive for (re-)settlement because it had many less accessible swamplands, river deltas, and mountainous regions in the vicinity of the sea, where a certain security could be enjoyed thanks to nature. Because borders were easily trespassed, there emerged the phenomenon of locally mobile border peoples who provided security for the larger states in return for enjoying *de facto* autonomy. Cossacks come to mind immediately, but there were others like Crimean Tatars with their khanate playing the buffer state between rival empires. These intermediaries would lose to expanding states in the long run.

Human circulation was not restricted to nomads. Circassians, inhabitants of highlands unaccustomed to the sea, who resisted Russian submission by armed struggle, were forced into exile in the Ottoman Empire, tens of thousands dying on the way in overcrowded boats. The more submissive Crimean Tatars had to migrate to Dobruja (Romania) or Sinop, the nearest friendly oversea destination, and spread into Anatolia.[26] The many human dramas occasioned by World War I only foreshadowed the human tragedies the more notorious World War II would bring about. However, there has always been voluntary migration too, be it permanent or temporary. For example, during the long nineteenth century, many Greeks moved from Istanbul to Odesa to set up businesses and did very well. Muslims from Trabzon, Rize, or Artvin on the

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24 Chambre de Commerce de Marseille, Archives antérieures à 1801, "*Commerce avec la Mer Noire et la Géorgie,*" Liasse, Série H Article no. 79, 1747–1787.

25 Slaves were regularly procured from the territories of nowadays Ukraine and accessible parts of Russia and the Caucasus. The numbers involved were spectacular. This pillage drained the region of its surplus population and even more. Slaves were either directed to the palace or put to work as domestics. They were gradually absorbed into Ottoman society and hence left no trace.

26 Paul Robert Magocsi, *This Blessed Land: Crimea and the Crimean Tatars* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014).

further end of the Turkish coast moved across the sea to the north, as well as to the east into Georgia, in search of making a living. Some of the best bakers in Turkey are now descendants of those who first started their trade in the southern territories of imperial Russia.

One final example serves as an ironical endnote: The Romanovs, aspiring to become the rulers of the "Third Rome," sought hard to acquire Istanbul as late as World War I. As a corollary, the Black Sea would also become a Russian lake. This project failed miserably. With the Bolshevik Revolution, the *crème de la crème* of Russian society found themselves as refugees in Istanbul.[27] In 1919, a Russian writer appealed to British public opinion, via a letter to *The Times*, demanding that Istanbul should be given to these Russian refugees.[28] The Allies disagreed, but with Istanbul under their occupation, they entertained the idea of imposing an international regime on the city. They saw the advantage of holding in their hand both the gateway to the Black Sea and a resident Russian community refurbished by the demobilized White Army, as the sword of Damocles hanging over Soviet Russia. The most unimaginable candidate for forced exile, however, was yet to arrive within less than a decade. He was Leon Trotsky, commander of the Red Army. He spent some four years (1929–33) in Istanbul, mostly on one of the Princes' Islands, where he demonstrated his fishing skills.[29]

The Black Sea had first attracted Mediterranean fishermen on a seasonal basis because of its rich fisheries, presumably as early as before the Trojan War. We will nevertheless save this discussion for later. In contradistinction, what attracted the ancient colonizers was the prospect of grain cultivation and trade, in return for olive oil from the Mediterranean. With the closing of the Middle Ages, Italian city-states such as Genoa, Pisa, and Venice resuscitated the Black Sea trade because they could import food again, in return for their manufactures. This is the "*plaque tournante*" function to which Brătianu referred.[30] It bestowed upon the Black Sea an economic role of far-reaching significance. Afterwards, with the Black Sea an Ottoman lake, this picture was substantially modified. Because Istanbul's population, extraordinary by European standards, required regular overseas provisioning of foodstuffs, the Danubian provinces were assigned to specialize in agriculture and animal husbandry. This they did very well until the Russian penetration. Even so, Black Sea trade continued to play a major role in Istanbul's food provisioning as late as World War I.

With the rise of Russia, the composition of trade and regional specialization on the Black Sea were altered. The center of gravity of grain production shifted clockwise, with Odesa the major port for exports. It would move further east as the cultivated area and the marketable surplus expanded and made the region the breadbasket of the world. By the *fin-de-siècle*, it was evident to careful observers that oil exports

27 Svetlana Uturgauri, *Boğaz'daki Beyaz Ruslar: 1919–1929* (Istanbul: Tarihçi Kitabevi, 2015).

28 İ. Hakkı Sunata, *İstanbul'da İşgal Yılları* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2019), 45–46.

29 Ömer Sami Coşar, *Troçki İstanbul'da* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010), 85.

30 Brătianu, *La Mer Noire*, 43.

were likely to become the new engine of growth. The Soviet Empire slowed down this trend. After its disintegration, oil and natural gas exports by sea, from an ever greater energy supply zone, came to determine not only Russia's but also the Black Sea's global role. We wait to see if this will merely renew its fortunes as a *plaque tournante*, this time as an energy hub, or accomplish even more. Whereas in the past external actors intruded to initiate momentum for change by reshaping the division of labor, this time, local actors of international stature may well call the tune.

5 The Heart and Soul of the Matter

Matvejevic wrote: "If any part of the Mediterranean gear can be considered symbolic, it is the net."[31] This was even truer of the Black Sea, where a higher ratio of inhabitants short of arable land depended on sea for their livelihood. The fishing net has always occupied a unique place in the Black Sea's scenery. It is paradoxical that a sea in which life is limited to the upper layer only should be populated by a variety of fish species such as anchovies, mackerel, sardines, turbot, and tuna.[32] Gündüz Vassaf, a contemporary Turkish writer, distinguished by his rhapsodic style reminiscent of Matvejevic, lists examples of fish penetrating into the symbols of the region, including Byzantine coins with engravings of bonitos (sometimes accompanied by dolphins). He emphasizes that the only place where the trajectories of whales (named Porphyrion and alleged to have disrupted the sea traffic periodically for over fifty years during the times of Empress Theodora) and Black Sea anchovies (*hamsi*) intersected was the Bosporus.[33]

The Black Sea has been a destination for many a Mediterranean fisherman and their fleets by virtue of its fisheries. Even before their arrival, however, the indigenous population, starting out from their riverine prior experiences, had already developed their fishing skills, and built up local knowhow concerning the seasons, winds, storms, and skills of interpreting the sky. Since then, the rhythm of life and the struggle to make a living off the sea have been subject to the dictates of the fishing calendar, at least until recently. The cycle and circle thus inserted into the flows through time

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31 Matvejevic, *Mediterranean*, 59.

32 In this respect, the Caspian Sea is also in the same league and with an advantage. It is famous for its abundance of high-quality caviar, as well as sturgeons, salmon, seal, and other fish species. Whereas the Mediterranean remains a "desert" in terms of supplies essential for the nourishment of fish, the Black Sea and the Caspian, especially in the north, are richly endowed with plankton. Black Sea anchovy need on average 80,000 tons of plankton per day during the summer, about a fifth of the daily produce. The role of anchovy in the reproduction of the eco-system is considerable. The estimates for the anchovy stock (1968–89) ranged between 346,000 and 461,000 tons. See Kudret Emiroğlu, A. Cemal Saydam, and Nihal K. Çevik, *Hamsi Kurban O Göze* (Istanbul: Heyamola Yayınları, 2008), 14, 74, 98–100.

33 Gündüz Vassaf, *Boğaziçi'nde Balık* (Istanbul: YKY, 2016), 53, 61–62.

and space have been fundamental in bringing about a uniquely important circulation that we wish to address below.

Ovid, the Roman poet, banished to Tomis (today: Constanţa, Romania) to live among the "barbarians" while expecting clemency in vain from the emperor in return for his apologetic poetry is well known. Much less known is the fact that, towards the end of his life, he was inspired by what he saw with his own eyes on the Black Sea and in the Danube Delta to write his *Halieutica*, a fragmentary didactic poem on fishing.[34] Magris was also impressed by the Danube Delta and its ability to regenerate itself with its rich diversity of flora and fauna, including some 110 species of fish.[35] The Danube Delta is not alone in this respect. Until recently, the Sea of Azov, benefitting from the delta of the river Don, served as the "home of more than a hundred breeds of fish."[36]

One of the many rivers that join the Danube is the Tisza River (Serbian: Tisa), and on the small island at its intersection with the Maros River (Romanian: Mureş), we are told, one eats the best fish soup in the world, according to a literary source. Magris adds that, according to the tradition, two-thirds of the Tisza River consisted of water and one-third of fish and other aquatic produce.[37] This may involve much exaggeration, as he admits, but contains more than a grain of truth. In the Black Sea world, freshwater fish rivaled the catch from the sea.[38] A compendium of fish in Georgia, with a coastline share of 315 km, identifies a total of 168 species, of which sixty-one species inhabit freshwater, seventy-seven inhabit the sea, and thirty are transitory. Rich diversity and the porousness between categories command our attention.[39] We obtain a similar impression from an observant folklorist, Kemal Özbıyık, a native of Arhavi on the easternmost Turkish coast, which shares the highland-lowland mix characteristic of neighboring Georgia, when he notes how until recently locals opted for the abundant trout found in the streams, which are now threatened by hydroelectric power plants under construction.[40]

At about the same time as Ovid, Pliny the Elder in his natural history shared information on tuna that crossed into the Black Sea in spring because this was where they laid eggs. Fish grew fast from one day to the next because of the less salty waters

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34 Çiğdem Dürüşken, "Ovidius ve Epistulae ex Ponto Üzerine," in Publius Ovidius Naso, *Karadeniz'den Mektuplar* (Istanbul: YKY, 1999), 14.

35 Magris also notes how the Roma among many other outcasts and refugees found a safe haven in the delta and adapted themselves to its life cycle just like the conscientiously troubled Lipovans, who became a fishing community making their living peacefully from the river.

36 Neal Ascherson, *Black Sea* (London: Vintage, 1996), 5.

37 Magris, *Danube*, 392, 541–51.

38 Both domains combined provide us with a pointer to draw the boundaries of the Black Sea world.

39 We are faced here with the devil in the details. Deeply anchored it in the Black Sea world, Georgia had nevertheless been, until the nineteenth century, much less sea-looking. Beyond this microcosmic difference is found a more general attribute of the Black Sea: "Its faunal complex is made up mostly of Paratethys relictic fauna." Nargiza Ninua, Bella Japoshvili, and Vera Bochorishvili, *Fishes of Georgia* (Tbilisi: Tsigni Eri Publishing, 2013), 5.

40 Kemal Özbıyık, *Üzerleri Toz Olmasın: Doğu Karadeniz'de Yaş Almak* (Ankara: Karina, 2016), 226.

enriched by rivers, and the safe haven they found from dangerous marine species. He supplied incredible details of their progress through the Bosporus as they exited the Black Sea, taking the wind at the back. Because there was a bright white rock reflecting light sharply on the right bank near Chalcedon on the Asian side, scared tuna shoals escaped to the European side, where they could be caught easily, and where the fishermen still stand with their rods in hand. Because harsh weather with occasional freezing affects the upper levels of water, there occurs a large seasonal migration through the Straits to the warmer waters of the Marmara and the Aegean Seas, followed by a reverse movement in spring. Istanbul benefits greatly from its positional advantage for easy and abundant spring and autumn catches. Because of pollution in the Black Sea and overfishing, the size and variety of the fish stock have been declining for some time.

As distinct from the two-sided traffic separated by an intervening season through the Bosporus, there exists a "circulation proper" within the Black Sea that commands our attention by virtue of its uniqueness. It is no coincidence that this circle is largely identified with anchovies, small in size but great in significance, being the most abundant and characteristic fish of the Black Sea. Anchovies are consumed largely as a basic food in the region and beyond.[41] It is part of common people's diet, consumed in combination with corn (bread) in places like northeastern Anatolia short of land to grow wheat. Local cuisine has been incredibly creative in preparing even desserts with them. At times when the catch exceeded normal levels, it was also used as a fertilizer in tobacco cultivation, and sometimes even in vegetable and fruit gardens.[42] In 1928, Hamamizade İhsan published his extraordinary book in praise of them, his *Hamsiname*, in Trabzon, the most fitting place of all.

Anchovies are most concentrated in the Sea of Azov, where they lay their eggs in May and June. As the weather gets cooler, they pass to the warmer Black Sea to spend the winter. They let themselves be carried by the current rather than swimming, hence the concentration of anchovies in hordes that sometimes hit the shore because of strong waves. This anti-clockwise migration cycle starts around September, reaches the Danube Delta, proceeds off the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria, and reaches the Turkish coastline by November, tracing it via Sinop until Trabzon, where the fish appear having attained full size by December. Sometime around January, they reach the southeastern corner. With the weather warming by March, the northward migration begins. Off the coast of Batumi the anchovy shoals divide into two. One subgroup proceeds along the coasts of Georgia and Abkhazia before reaching ultimately its original starting point. This group thus completes the greater full circle anticlockwise. The other subgroup returns to Sinop, from where it crosses to the Crimean coastline. This trajectory, despite a slight detour, also traced anti-clockwise, amounts to a smaller circle. Yet

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41 Turbot (*kalkan*), almost extinct, or bluefish (*lüfer*) are considered more prestigious and desirable for consumption.

42 Hamamizade İhsan, *Hamsinâme* (Ankara: Phoenix, 2007), 37–41.

the original points of departure remain as the final destination in both circles. This is the "circulation" *par excellence* characteristic of the Black Sea. According to one estimate dating from the 1980s, about "a million tons of anchovies swam in this circular pilgrimage" annually:[43]

> One of the remarkable features of Black Sea ecology is the seasonal migrations of several fish species that circulate in a[n anti]-clockwise fashion [...] The spirit of [the] Varna convention [of 1959, when the Black Sea was most divided at the height of the Cold War] reflects the regional structure of the marine ecology that has encouraged contact and coopetition by fishermen for millennia.[44]

This circulation was like no other in terms of its spatial as well as its temporal scope, its completeness, its backward and forward linkages in the economic sense, and, finally, its anthropological and ecological overall significance. Looking back from where we are, nothing is likely to measure up to either the resilience or the romance of the fishing cycle, as also manifested in the circulation of songs, stories, symbols, and routines along the way, while it served to shoulder the increasingly impossible task—under pressure from centrifugal forces—of the integration of labor as constitutive of the Black Sea world.

43 Ascherson, *Black Sea*, 6.
44 Doonan, "The Corrupting Sea," 70.

Jörg Stadelbauer
The Black Sea Region as a Natural Region

Translated by Paul Vickers

Any exploration of the Black Sea area as a site of historical relations and developments should consider the sea basin and the adjacent coastal area together with its hinterland in terms of a natural region. Indeed, all of the established societies there, across a variety of temporal and spatial conditions, have encountered this space in such a manner. That the natural region shaped the practices of historical actors does not imply a geo-deterministic perspective. Awareness of the Black Sea developed early, with the foundation of Greek colonies in the first millennium BCE demanding and developing spatial knowledge. With the appropriation of this space, there was no question of pleading ignorance—or at least not with any conviction.

1 The Black Sea Basin

1.1 A Complex Geological History and Tectonic Structure

The Black Sea does not, in fact, have a uniform basin. An extensive shelf area constitutes almost one third of the entire area of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Its northern section first acquires a depth of 50 meters (164 feet) only between the Danube Delta and the western tip of the Crimean Peninsula, some 150 kilometers (93 miles) off the coast of Odesa. The main basin reaches depths of up to 2,245 meters (7,366 feet), while the steepest continental slope is located off the Turkish coast north of the Küre Dağları mountain range within the Pontic Mountains ("Pontides"). This deep sea basin comprises a larger, deeper western subbasin and somewhat more reliefed eastern subbasin, which are separated by an undersea mountain range formed of the Andrusov Ridge and the Tetiaev and Arkhangelskii elevations. The Tuapse Trough is separated from the eastern subbasin by the Shatskii elevation, while there is another subbasin off the coast near Batumi. The primary consequence of these different depths is the diverse currents and levels of fishing potential in the Black Sea.

The division into the shelf area and deep sea area is based upon the emergence and position of the Black Sea along the southern edge of the Eurasian supercontinent and within the geological-tectonic superstructure of the Eurasian folded mountain belt. The latter includes the Caucasus Mountains with their northwestern foothills, the Crimean Mountains, and the foothills of the Bulgarian Balkan Mountains, which together form the northern limits of the deeper sea basin, while the southern limits are formed by the Pontides. During the transition from the Palaeozoic to the Mesozoic period, a mountain range existed between the other two ranges that was partially eroded and

tectonically sunken.[1] The Black Sea is therefore a remnant of the larger Thetys Ocean, which emerged in the Mesozoic period. During the lifting of the Pontic Mountains severing the connection to the Mediterranean Sea in the late Tertiary period of the Cenozoic Era, the Caspian and Black Seas still formed a large, single inland sea that was divided by a slight incline north of the Caucasus. Until the Pleistocene period there was always a connection from the Atlantic via the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, and from there via the Kuma-Manych Depression to the Caspian Sea. The connection from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean via the Bosporus and Dardanelles emerged later, following the course of ancient rivers.

In terms of plate tectonics, it is generally argued that the Anatolian and the Eurasian Plate meet in the Black Sea. This is evident in the fault lines that run from west to east in the northern half of the Black Sea and in the mountain ranges of North Anatolia, as well as in the formation of the Sea of Marmara. The fault line running southeast to northwest through the Black Sea and the high level of seismic activity on the southern edge of the Pontides are a result of the Anatolian Plate pushing westwards against the Eurasian Plate owing to pressure from the Arabian Plate. The Sea of Azov follows a slight depression at the edge of the Eurasian Plate, which was filled with water as sea levels rose. Today, earthquakes are indicative of ongoing tectonic movements. A tremor measuring 5.3 on the Richter scale occurred on October 15, 2016 around 120 kilometers (76 miles) north of the Turkish coast and 230 kilometers (143 miles) east of the Bulgarian coast without causing significant damage.[2] Istanbul is highly susceptible to seismic activity, as the most recent significant earthquake, measuring 5.7, in September 2019 showed.

There have been diverse opinions regarding the significance of fluctuations in sea levels and their impact on terrain in the geological past, starting in the Pleistocene, i.e., in the prehistoric period. Experts today reject the "deluge hypothesis," which claimed that a former inland sea experienced catastrophic levels of flooding when water levels increased rapidly following rising temperatures in the post-glacial period, some 8,400 years ago, before a gradual and more or less continuous rise in water levels took hold.[3]

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1 For more details of the geology and tectonics of the Black Sea, see Aral I. Okay and Gültekin Topus, "Variscan Orogeny in the Black Sea Region," *International Journal of Earth Sciences (Geologische Rundschau)* 106 (2017): 569–92, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00531-016-1395-z.

2 Lukas Rentz, "Starkes Erdbeben im Schwarzen Meer, " *Erdbeben news,* October 15, 2016, accessed January 1, 2021, https://erdbebennews.de/2016/10/starkes-erdbeben-im-schwarzen-meer-spuerbar-in-bulgarien-und-in-der-tuerkei/.

3 Igor P. Balabanov, "Holocene Sea-Level Changes of the Black Sea," in *The Black Sea Flood Question,* ed. Valentina Yanko-Hombach et al. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 711–30; Wolfgang Behringer, *Kulturgeschichte des Klimas: Von der Eiszeit bis zur globalen Erwärmung* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2007), 63–64; Liviu Giosan, Florin Filip, and Stefan Constantinescu, "Was the Black Sea Catastrophically Flooded in the Early Holocene?," *Quaternary Science Reviews* 28, no. 1–2 (2009): 1–6, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.quascirev.2008.10.012; Helmut Brückner et al., "The Holocene Sea Level Story since 7500 BP – Lessons from the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black and the Azov Seas," *Quaternary International* 225 (2010); Eric Fouache et al., "The Late Holocene Evolution of the Black Sea – a Critical View on the so-called Phanagorian

According to this argument, in the first centuries of the Common Era, the Black Sea was around two or three meters shallower than it is today. In the Sea of Azov, the *Phanagorian regression*—which is disputed in research—saw sea levels decrease between 2,800 and 2,500 years ago, with the breadth of the Bay of Taganrog decreasing during the Holocene by up to half, before the *Nymphean transgression* saw sea levels rise again some 2,300 years ago.[4]

1.2 A Heterogeneous Body of Water

The extent of the body of water in today's Black Sea basin can be described in rather dry figures: The entire amount of water in the basin measuring 421,713 square kilometers (163,000 square miles) is calculated to be 530,000 cubic kilometers (127,154 cubic miles).[5] The inflows come primarily from the East and Central European drainage basin, totaling some 350 cubic kilometers (84 cubic miles), which are supplemented by 300 to 400 cubic kilometers (72 to 96 cubic miles) from precipitation. Some 80 percent of the inflows come from the Danube, Dniester, Dnipro, Rioni, and Çoruh (Georgian: Chorokhi) rivers that flow into the Black Sea. Evaporation over the sea causes the loss of some 350 to 400 cubic kilometers (84 to 96 cubic miles) of water from the sea, while outflow into the Bosporus sees some 600 cubic kilometers (144 cubic miles) leave the Black Sea, with countercurrents ensuring around half of that amount flows back into it.[6] This means that just 0.2 percent of the entire volume of water in the Black Sea is exchanged annually, with this amount coming primarily from the upper decameters. Fluctuations in water levels hardly exceed a few decimeters, while there are no tidal fluctuations.

This limited exchange brings about two clearly discernible "floors" or levels in the body of water. The transition layer between the two different masses of water, known as the pycnocline, can be found between 35 and 150 meters (between 115 and 490 feet)

Regression," *Quarternary International* 266 (2012): 162–14; Hannes Laermanns, "A Palaeogeographic and Geoarchaeologic Study on the Colchian Plain along the Black Sea Coast of Georgia" (PhD diss., University of Cologne, 2018).

4 Gennady Matishov, "The History of the Azov Sea and the Northern Azov Sea Area During the Holocene," in *Between Grain and Oil from the Azov to the Caucasus: The Port-Cities of the Eastern Coast of the Black Sea late 18th–early 20th century,* ed. Gelina Harlaftis, Victoria Konstantinova, Igor Lyman, Anna Sydorenko, and Eka Tchkoidze (Rethymno: Centre for Maritime History, 2020), 180–81, 184.

5 Innokentii P. Gerasimov et al., eds., *Ukraina i Moldaviia: Prirodnye usloviia i estestvennye resursy SSSR* (Moscow: Nauka, 1972), 161. There are significant disagreements concerning the figures in the literature, but they cannot be discussed here.

6 Emil V. Stanev, "Understanding Black Sea Dynamics: An Overview on Recent Numerical Modelling," *Oceanography* 18, no. 2 (2005): 58. The data given are long-term averages showing considerable variability. Cf. The Commission on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution, ed., "Black Sea State of Environment Report 2009–2014/5" (Istanbul, 2019).

below the surface.[7] While the upper level has lower salt content thanks to the inflows of freshwater from East European rivers, the water with higher levels of salt remains because of its higher density in the lower, significantly more powerful layer. In the central basin, salt content reaches 1.8 percent and 2.2 percent in deeper waters (half the level of the salinity of the Mediterranean), while the inflows in the north and west reduce the concentration of salt significantly along the respective coastlines.[8] There are few vertical exchange flows between the layers. The water in the deeper basin experiences hardly any oxygenation, making it the world's largest source of hydrogen sulphide and thus the largest body of anoxic water. It is for this reason that this "lower floor" is almost entirely deprived of life forms.[9] Furthermore, the limited force of the upper layer containing higher levels of oxygen is what makes the water appear dark, hence the name Black Sea. Between 1955 and 2015, the depth of the pycnocline shifted, most likely as a result of global climate change, from an average depth of 140 meters to 90 meters (460 to 295 feet), which has had a negative impact on the habitat of fish stocks.[10]

1.3 A Body of Water in Continuous Motion

The upper layer of water is in continuous motion, driven by winds, the inflows and outflows of water in the sea basin, and the Coriolis force caused by the Earth's rotation. In both subbasins of the Black Sea, as well as in its central part, they form individual anticlockwise "cyclonic" gyres in the upper levels of the waters, while in the deeper waters there is a common gyre that drives the seawater into a rim current. Smaller, "anticyclonic" eddies off the coast of Ajara, over the graben of Novorossiisk, and west of Crimea, as well as along many points of the Turkish Black Sea coast, flow in the opposite direction. Off the Georgian coast, a northwest to southwest current prevails north of the Rioni estuary and a south to north current off the Ajarian coast.[11] In winter, the current follows just one gyre, while the eddy off the coast of Batumi remains inactive. The formation of eddies in the sea water has an impact on the transportation of materials in the Black Sea. Not only waste on the coast is set in motion

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7 Mehmet Berkun, Egemen Aras, and Semih Nemlioglu, "Disposal of Solid Waste in Istanbul and Along the Black Sea Coast of Turkey," *Waste Management* 25 (2005): 853.

8 Gülfem Bakan and Hanife Büyükgüngör, "The Black Sea," *Marine Pollution Bulletin* 41, no. 1–6 (2000): 27–28.

9 Arthur Capet et al., "Decline of the Black Sea Oxygen Inventory," abstract, *Biogeosciences* 13, no. 4 (2016): 1287–97, https://www.biogeosciences.net/13/1287/2016/.

10 Capet et al., "Decline"; The Commission, "Black Sea State," 473.

11 Stanev, "Understanding," 61.

and concentrated by the eddies, but also crude oil from exploratory oil wells, which then threatens sections of coastline.[12]

Because the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov have significant inflows from the Danube, Dniester, Dnipro, Don, Kuban, and Rioni, as well as series of smaller rivers, while the Mediterranean region experiences a higher degree of evaporation that leads to relatively smaller outflows, the main flow of water from the Black Sea leads into the Mediterranean. As a result, the specifically lighter water of the Black Sea lies above the weaker countercurrent from the Mediterranean.

1.4 A Transitional Climate Zone between Continental Europe and the Mediterranean Subtropics

The most significant differences in air temperature are evident in January, when it can be -4°C (24.8°F) at the Don estuary in the Sea of Azov, while off the east coast of Turkey it can be +7°C (44.6°F). In July, temperatures are more comparable (between 21°C and 25°C/69.8°F and 77.0°F), with the highest values off the coast of Georgia. Precipitation is also highest there, however, as a result of masses of humid air ahead of the Ajarian Mountains. In Crimea, the Crimean Mountains form a regional climate barrier between the dry north and the Mediterranean south coast. The Sea of Azov can temporarily freeze over between Kerch and the Ukrainian mainland, as well as on its east coast. Equally, the shallow sea area between Odesa and the northwest coast of Crimea can experience some surface freezing during particularly severe winters, a phenomenon that until the late nineteenth century significantly hindered shipping.[13] The average water temperatures in the colder half of the year reveal a significant gradient, ranging from between 7°C and 7.5°C (44.6°F and 45.5°F) in the northwest (the Gulf of Odesa) and 13.5°C (56.3°F) in the southeast off the coast of Batumi and Trabzon.[14] The average annual precipitation is 2,440 millimeters (96 inches) near Batumi but only 441 millimeters (17 inches) near Odesa.[15]

Storms and heavy thundershowers are unique events that depending on their intensity and length can influence the development of the coast and impact shipping.[16]

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12 Konstantin A. Korotenko, "Effects of Mesoscale Eddies on Behavior of an Oil Spill Resulting from an Accidental Deepwater Blowout in the Black Sea: an Assessment of the Environmental Impacts," *PeerJ* 6: e5448 (2018), https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj.5448.

13 Apostolos Delis, "Navigating Perilous Waters: Routes and Hazards of the Voyages to Black Sea in the Nineteenth Century," in *Linkages of the Black Sea with the West: Navigation, Trade and Immigration,* ed. Maria Christina Chatziioannou and Apostolos Delis (Rethymno: Centre of Maritime History, 2020), 18 – 19.

14 Stanev, "Understanding," 68.

15 "Climate Data for Cities Worldwide," Climate-Data.org, accessed March 9, 2021, https://en.climate-data.org/.

16 Ekaterina V. Trifonova et al., "Critical Storm Thresholds for Morphological Changes in the Western Black Sea Coastal Zone," *Geomorphology* 143 – 144 (2012): 81 – 94, on the basis of studies on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast.

Well into the nineteenth century, wind direction determined the routes ships could take.[17] The heaviest storms emerge in the winter half of the year, when there are easterly and northeasterly air currents. A catastrophic storm occurred on November 11, 2007 off the south coast of Crimea, causing several freight ships to capsize, including a Russian oil tanker that broke up and released 2,000 metric tons (2,200 short tons) of oil into the sea.[18]

1.5 Critical Environmental Conditions

As long as the rivers flowing into the Black Sea discharged untreated industrial wastewater and urban sewage, the water quality deteriorated further. Since 1992, the riparian countries have been party to the Convention for the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution, which in 2009 was followed by the Strategic Action Plan for the Environmental Protection and Rehabilitation of the Black Sea.[19] Implementation is organized by the Commission on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution, which presented a comprehensive report on the environmental situation. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian coast off Odesa, the densely populated southeastern coastal area of Crimea, the area around the Kerch Strait, as well as sections of the Turkish coast near Istanbul, are highly polluted. Less affected areas are the Russian Black Sea coast near Sochi, as well as the coastline of Bulgaria. There is evidence of oil spills along the shipping routes from Istanbul to Odesa, Novorossiisk, and Tuapse.[20] Heavy pollution of beaches by plastic waste affects the coast near Istanbul. The economic transition after 1990 in Eastern Europe involved deindustrialization, which consequently reduced levels of polluted water inflows. Now, the biggest environmental threat is posed by oil transport. Azerbaijan had been planning to export crude oil via the Black Sea to Europe, but Turkey closed the Bosporus and Dardanelles to oil tankers.[21]

1.6 A Partial Use of Potential Resources

The Black Sea basin contains several mineral resources: There are proven oil and natural gas deposits in the elongated basin zone in the north, while further deposits are assumed to exist in the internal section of the basin. There are also proven deposits of

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17 Delis, "Navigating."

18 Vitaliy A. Ivanov et al., "Atmospheric Modeling for Advanced Warning of Weather Disasters in the Black Sea Region," *Geography, Environment Sustainability* 6, no. 4 (2013): 31–32, https://doi.org/10.24057/2071-9388-2013-6-4-31-47.

19 The Commission, "Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution," accessed January 1, 2021, http://www.blacksea-commission.org/Official Documents/The Convention/full text/.

20 The Commission, "Black Sea State," 101.

21 Bakan and Büyükgüngör, "Black Sea," 32.

manganese and chromium off the Turkish coast. However, geological research in the off-shore area remains in its infancy.[22]

The Black Sea, or at least its upper levels, provides a habitat for fish. The most significant species, the European anchovy (*Engraulis encrasicolus*), has different seasonal migration patterns in the eastern and western halves of the main sea. After catch yields dropped dramatically in the 1980s due to overfishing, efforts were made to introduce protective measures. But because fishing in the Turkish areas of the Black Sea serves growing middle-class demand, with alternative sources of supply unavailable, relative poverty has forced fishermen to remain in their trade.[23] The EU member countries Bulgaria and Romania are subject to fishing quotas on sprats (*Sprattus sprattus*) und turbots (*Scophthalmus maeoticus*).[24] In these cases, too, catches are declining. Climate change-induced warming could further restrict fish habitats and thus fishing.

Since time immemorial, the surface of the Black Sea has served as a transport space, with coastal routes prevailing. Previously, even long-distance connections followed the coastlines, although today they cross the open seas. The connection to the Mediterranean via the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles, declared an international shipping route in 1936, and the Kerch Strait are both of high strategic relevance. Today ferry connections exist between Georgia on the one side and Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Russia on the other. A new practice involves using the seabed to lay natural gas pipelines. After the Blue Stream Pipeline between Beregovaia on the Russian coast and the Turkish terminal Durusu near Samsun went into operation in 2005, the South Stream Project was discontinued following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. However, since early 2020, Russia has been delivering its natural gas to Turkey via the Turkish Stream Pipeline, a project that was negotiated within a different geopolitical framework.[25]

2 The Coasts

The rim of the Black Sea basin is marked by highly diverse sections of coastline. Terrain, water discharge of the rivers, bedrock, and geological-tectonic processes have

22 Mike D. Simmons, Gabor C. Tari, and Aral I. Okay, eds., *Petroleum Geology of the Black Sea* (London: Geological Society, 2018).
23 Ståle Knudsen, Mustafa Zengin, and Mahmut Hakan Koçak, "Identifying Drivers for Fishing Pressure: A Multidisciplinary Study of Trawl and Sea Snail Fisheries in Samsun, Black Sea Coast of Turkey," *Ocean & Coastal Management* 53 (2010): 252–69.
24 Council of the European Union, "Council Regulation fixing for 2018 the Fishing Opportunities for Certain Fish Stocks and Groups of Fish Stocks in the Black Sea," December 5, 2017, accessed January 27, 2021, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14897-2017-INIT/en/pdf.
25 Roland Götz, "Erdöl und Erdgas im Südkaukasus: Binnenversorgung, Export, Transit," *Osteuropa* 65, no. 7–10 (2015): 365–82; Andreas Heinrich, "Exportoptionen für russisches Erdgas nach dem Scheitern von South Stream," *Russland Analysen* 303 (2015): 2–5; "TurkStream," Gazprom, accessed March 22, 2021, http://www.gazprom.de/projects/turk-stream/.

all shaped whether steep cliffs or flat coasts, lowland or upland coasts, coastal bights, or delta areas emerge.[26] Let us take a journey along the coast at the Danube Delta and proceed in a clockwise direction around the Black Sea.

The most extensive delta (4,142 or 5,800 square kilometers/1,599 or 2,239 square miles, depending on the delimitation) is the Danube Delta. It has built up since the post-glacial period from unconsolidated sediment transported by the Danube and its central and southeastern European tributaries, accounting for almost half of the sediment load entering the Black Sea. Narrow elevations trace previous coastlines.[27] For several decades, inland damming of the Danube, creating retention basins, straightening sections of the river, and sedimentation in the delta lakes have prevented it from expanding significantly. The Delta includes four wetland areas that are protected under the Ramsar Convention and it has been designated a biosphere reserve since 1990/1998. In 1993, it was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site.[28] In Romania, this brought to an end the practice of draining swamps and lakes, initiated in the 1960s in order to expand the amount of land available for growing grain. In terms of fauna, the delta area has the world's largest populations of white pelicans and pygmy cormorants. For the local population, the abundance of fish, the use of reeds for thatch, and tourism are of fundamental economic significance. A conflict flared up when in 2004 Ukraine announced plans to expand the Bystroe Canal in the north of the Delta for shipping so that it could avoid Romanian usage fees. It was feared that the ground water level would decline, water pollution would increase, and bird nesting sites would be disrupted. Protests meant that the project was abandoned.

The southern Ukrainian rivers end in limans, wide estuaries. They emerged with the recent tectonic submersion of some sections of the coast and concurrent rising of the sea level. Sedimentary spits mark the coast between Odesa and the Perekop Isthmus, the stretch of land connecting Crimea and the Ukrainian mainland. While a natural bay provides favorable harbor conditions around Odesa, it is effectively impossible to establish harbors on the isthmus and navigation channels must be kept continuously clear.

The Kerch Strait—known in ancient times as the Cimmerian Bosporus—connects the Sea of Azov with the Black Sea. It has been of great strategic significance since time immemorial, as it provides access to the southern Russian-Ukrainian steppe regions

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26 Ruben D. Kosyan and Violeta N. Velikova, "Coastal Zone – Terra (and Aqua) Incognita – Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the Black Sea," *Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science* 169 (2016): A2, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecss.2015.11.016.

27 Max Pfannenstiel, *Die Quartärgeschichte des Donaudeltas* (Bonn: Geographisches Institut der Universität Bonn, 1950); Fabio N. Güttler, Simona Niculescu, and Francis Gohin, "Turbidity Retrieval and Monitoring of Danube Delta Waters Using Multi-Sensor Optical Remote Sensing Data: An Integrated View from the Delta Plain Lakes to the Western–Northwestern Black Sea Coastal Zone," *Remote Sensing of Environment* 132 (2013): 86–101, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rse.2013.01.009.

28 Petre Gâştescu, "The Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve: Geography, Biodiversity, Protection, Management," *Revue Roumaine de Géographie* 53, no. 2 (2009): 139–52.

from the south and the entrance to the Black Sea from the north. Currents, however, do not offer a secure passage for shipping. A shipping channel was first cleared in 1874, while presently the sea route is crossed by a road and rail bridge constructed by Russia a few years after the annexation of Crimea.

The coast between Novorossiisk and Sochi, as in Abkhazia, is divided by the foothills of the Western Caucasus into coastal yards used for agriculture and tourism. Seasonal floodwaters continuously re-deposit the gravel accumulated by relatively short mountain rivers.

The Georgian Black Sea coast forms a flat coastal plain between the Kelasuri River in Abkhazia and the Chorokhi River (Turkish: Çoruh) in Ajara, which is being expanded by the sediments deposited by the rivers forming the delta there. As sea currents close to the coastline transport loose material, former lagoons lost contact with the sea again, such as Lake Paliastomi near Poti. The coastal sediment is a highly sought-after raw material; in the region between Ajara and Abkhazia, some 20 million cubic meters (70 million cubic feet/2.6 cubic yards) of material were extracted between the 1960s and 1980s, primarily for construction purposes.[29] This section of the coast is largely unsuitable for harbors. This is why Redut-Kale, founded in 1804 at the mouth of Kopi River, was abandoned in favor of Sukhumi after the Crimean War had rendered the largely abandoned fortress obsolete. Batumi benefits from a coastal promontory which, like a peninsula, closes off the bay with its harbor to the south.

On the Turkish Black Sea coast, only the estuary areas of the rivers Sakarya, Kızılırmak near Bafra, and Yeşilırmak near Çarşamba have developed into larger coastal yards. Before dams were constructed in the hinterland for hydro-energy production, these rivers delivered around one third of the entire sediment deposited in the Black Sea. Now it is only around one sixth, at some 76.2 million metric tons (84 million short tons) per year. Another challenge for coastal protection measures is abrasion, which is wearing away the coastline.[30] The largest part of the Turkish Black Sea coast is formed of steep cliffs, where the foothills of the Pontides drop off into the sea. In the past, bandits and pirates could easily find shelter in such surroundings, where the hidden nooks and crannies provide a location for launching raids or planning slave trading. The Turkish Black Sea coast is not really suitable for large-scale trading ports. There are, on the one hand, few promontories that can offer protection from the northerly and northwesterly winter storms, while on the other hand the hinterland is difficult to reach over the mountains.[31] Trabzon and Samsun both make use of a small bay for their ports, while the harbor of Ereğli was established inside a west-facing bay. Agriculture is limited to the coastal strip. The mountain areas are generally only used for pas-

29 Bolashvili et al., *National Atlas of Georgia*, 34.

30 Mehmet Berkun, Egemen Aras, and Ummugulsum Ozel Akdemir, "Water Runoff, Sediment Transport and Related Impacts in the South-Eastern Black Sea Rivers," *Environmental Engineering and Management Journal* 14, no. 4 (2015): 781–91.

31 Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth and Volker Höhfeld, *Türkei* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002).

toral livestock farming, unless mineral resources such as coal deposits (Zonguldak) enable local development. Resource extraction and the strengthening of the shore in connection with the coast road impair the natural development of the coastline.[32]

Between the Bosporus and the Danube the foothills of the Iskander Mountains and Stara Planina reach the coast. Due to the alternation of flat and steep coasts, this section of coastline features numerous landmarks that provide orientation for navigation.[33] In terms of vegetation, Cape Emine near the seaside resort of Zlatni Piasatsi marks the border between the southern, sub-tropical-influenced formation and the northern formations that belong to temperate climates.[34] Anthropogenic influences, such as straightening rivers, resource extraction, establishing ports, roadbuilding and shoreline reinforcement, have brought about an increase in coastal erosion while cutting sediment shifts.[35]

2.1 Crimea—a World of its Own

Crimea is a peninsula that is connected to the southern Ukrainian lowlands only by the Perekop Isthmus, a strip of land barely above sea level. To the east, the Syvash, a wetland of international importance and recognized under the Ramsar Convention, is bordered by several lagoons. Because their only source of freshwater is precipitation, the salinity is higher than in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, thus enabling commercial salt extraction. The north of the peninsula is formed of lowlands that through irrigation have been turned into fertile farmland, although since the Russian annexation in 2014 it can hardly be used because freshwater supplies from the Ukrainian mainland have been cut. In the south, the Crimean Mountains culminating in the Roman Kosh (1,545 meters/5,069 feet) separate the inland area from the south coast that together with the city of Yalta traditionally formed one of the most popular tourist destinations in the Black Sea region. The mountain range prevents cold air from penetrating the region, thus giving the south coast a favorable climate.

2.2 Potential Uses of the Coastal Areas

The economic potential of the coast goes beyond the extraction of sediments. Since ancient times, a crucial issue has been finding suitable locations for harbors. Early histor-

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32 Bakan and Büyükgüngör, "Black Sea," 35.

33 Delis, "Navigating," 11.

34 Rossen Tzonev, Marius Dimitrov, and Veska Roussakova, "Dune Vegetation of the Bulgarian Black Sea Coast," *Hacquetia* 5, no. 1 (2005): 7–32, with a detailed vegetation survey.

35 Veselin Peychev and Margarita Stancheva, "Changes of Sediment Balance at the Bulgarian Black Sea Coastal Zone Influenced by Anthropogenic Impacts," *Dokladi na Balgarskata akademiia na naukite* 62, no. 2 (2009): 277–84, for Bulgaria.

ical settlement attached great significance to the location of harbors that could offer a starting point for connections to the hinterland providing goods for trading. Since then, it is only the kind of goods that are traded that has changed, as well as the quality and safety of transport routes. Thus, the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 caused a deep rupture in trading relations in the Old World. With the expansion of Russian rule in the Black Sea area, shipping routes across the Sea regained importance. Odesa and Istanbul developed into significant trading posts, while their military significance declined after the Crimean War.

Growth potential with respect to tourism is evident both in the flatland coastal areas and coastlines marked by cliffs with sand-filled bays. The delta areas attract visitors because of their apparently untouched natural landscapes and vast wealth of birdlife. Indeed, the Black Sea region is a breeding area for twenty-one species of bird and a wintering location for another twenty eight.[36] Bulgaria has attractive sandy beaches, including the seaside resorts of Zlatni Piasatsi (Golden Sands) und Slanchev Briag (Sunny Beach), which are aimed at international mass tourism. Romania offers the Danube Delta, Crimea beaches set against the backdrop of the Crimean Mountains, while the North Caucasus has the pebble beaches of Sochi. Abkhazia can offer the coastal resorts of Pitsunda, Gagra, and Sukhumi, developed during the Soviet era, while in Georgia there is Batumi, Kobuleti, and the recent addition of Anaklia. The Turkish Black Sea coast has numerous smaller destinations that do not share the same level of international recognition as those on the Mediterranean Riviera. Furthermore, many coastal cities with historical monuments and modern cityscapes attract tourists.

3 The Hinterland

Whereas in the north and northwest, the coastline is largely formed of lowland areas, in the east, south, and southwest mountains stretch all the way to the coast, with the exception of the Colchis alluvial plain in Georgia. The extent of the hinterland depends on the question being explored. A delineation of a Black Sea region that would be applicable to all historical periods is therefore hardly possible.[37]

In Romania, the hilly region of the Dobruja (Romanian: Dobrogea) separates the Black Sea coast from the agricultural area of Wallachia. The Danube cuts through the hilly region at the Prut confluence, before this great European river splits into the various channels of the delta, while the northern Chilia river forms the border with Ukraine. Moldova, on the other hand, is marked by the hills located between the river systems of the Prut and the Dniester.

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36 The Commission, "Black Sea State," 435.
37 For more on this, see Stefan Troebst, "The Black Sea as Historical Meso-Region: Concepts in Cultural Studies and the Social Sciences," *Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies* 2, no. 2 (2019): 11–29; Nasuh Sofuoğlu, "Theoretical Approaches to the Black Sea Region: 'Is the Wider Black Sea Area a Region?'," *Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies* 3, no. 5 (2020): 171–90.

In Ukraine, the coastal plain contrasts with the loess-covered and now cultivated steppe landscapes that are marked by large rivers. The steppe merges into the hill country of Podolia and the Dnipro uplands, both of which are wide-open agricultural landscapes that emerged from the steppe, although anthropogenic steppe gorges (Russian: *ovrag*) limit their usability. North of the Sea of Azov, the hills of Azov (highest peak 324 meters/1,063 feet) separate the coast from the steppe on the lower Dnipro. The Donetsk Massif and the hills of Azov are tectonic uplifts of the East European platform forming part of the Eurasian plate. The Donetsk Massif dips down to the coal deposits of eastern Ukraine. Southeast of the Sea of Azov, the flat terrain of the seabed continues in the agricultural landscape of the Kuban lowlands with the Taman Peninsula, before turning into the small hills of the North Caucasus steppe.

The transition to the Great Caucasus occurs near Novorossiisk, with its steepness and thick forests giving the impression of an impenetrable barrier. Several foothills reach the coast. The lowland sections in between are crossed by rivers, which usually have low runoff, but can transport and deposit large amounts of gravel after heavy rains in the mountains. In southeast Abkhazia, the coastal lowlands are extensive, although the mountains also form a barrier here.

The Georgian lowlands of Colchis and Rioni offer a broad opening into the hinterland, although large parts of these areas were only meliorated in the course of the twentieth century and even today parts remain difficult to traverse. It is for this reason that the most important areas of settlement and agriculture in Mingrelia and Guria are located away from the coast on the lower mountain slope. The mountain region, accessible only through a few valleys, continues south of the Çoruh in the Pontides. These mountains are difficult to open up, meaning that the area is cut off from the Anatolian highlands to the south. It is only in the metropolitan area around Istanbul that the mountain ranges subside and the low density of settlement is transformed by the sprawl of the metropolis.

West of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, the low mountains of the Istranca Dağları (Bulgarian: Strandzha) emerge. North of Burgas, the climatic divide of the Eastern Balkan Mountains rises up, separating the milder south from the harsher climate of the north. Heading northwards until the Romanian border, agriculture dominates a loess-covered tableland that is considered part of Dobruja.

3.1 Fertile Soil and Natural Resources as Development Potential

Extending southwards into Crimea, the Chernozem of the Ukrainian steppe changes into Kastanozem ("chestnut soil") under drier climatic conditions. The regional climatic conditions thus transform a sequence of soil types which have developed a relatively rich humus horizon over calcareous loess deposits. While the relatively dry summer conditions prevent minerals from being washed away, the cold winters hinder the biological and chemical degradation and hence the humus layer can grow. At the same time, the soil fauna provides significant water storage capacity, with the accumulation

of lime in dead root tubes enabling the vertical movement of soil water.[38] The narrative of Ukraine as a breadbasket was already familiar in Antiquity, as the region was used for grain cultivation. Unsuitable agricultural technology damaged the black earth, primarily in the Soviet period, leading to soil erosion and deflation. Further west, in the Carpathian foothills, podsolization increases. Soil leaching also affects soil formation in Georgia, albeit under much warmer conditions.

Among mineral resources, the iron ore deposits around Kryvyi Rih and the coal deposits of the Donetsk area (Donbas) have been known for centuries. Alongside the manganese deposits of Nikopol, they have formed the basis for heavy industry in the area since the 1880s. There are some mineral deposits in the hilly hinterland of Georgia. In Soviet times, coal deposits were developed in Tqvarcheli (Abkhazia), close to the coastal region. Further to the east are the coal deposits of Tqibuli and the manganese ore deposits of Chiatura, which were once of global significance.

3.2 Climate and Landscape Development

Any examination of earlier phases of climate change must apply terminology drawn both from paleoenvironmental research and from archaeology to the postglacial period, too.

The last period of cooling in the late glacial era, the Younger Dryas, was succeeded around 10,200 years ago by the warming during the postglacial climate optimum of the Boreal. During the Atlantic period (between 8,000 and 4,800 years ago), the melting of ice masses in the North Pole region and in the European mountain ranges had passed its peak, meaning that that the water flow of many East European rivers receded. When sedentary cultures developed during the Neolithic Era, forest steppe vegetation on the loess plateaus and in the mixed forests in the river valleys shaped the southern Ukrainian hinterland, the Chernozem emerged, and a favorable climate enabled the development of agriculture.[39] During the Chalcolithic Age (6,000 to 5,500 years ago), high levels of humidity led to increased humus formation before the Subboreal period (around 3500 BC onwards) brought in a dryer climate that reached a peak around 3000 BC. This probably initiated a new period of steppe formation in parts of the North Pontic region. The third century BC was marked by climate volatility, including extended dry periods and—at its end—a catastrophic drought that resulted in a withdrawal of the human population from many areas.[40]

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38 Jörg Stadelbauer, *Die Nachfolgestaaten der Sowjetunion: Großraum zwischen Dauer und Wandel* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996), 379 – 80.

39 Galyna Pashkevich, "Environment and Economic Activities of Neolithic and Bronze Age Population of the Northern Pontic Area," *Quaternary International* 261 (2012): 175 – 82.

40 Elke Kaiser, *Das dritte Jahrtausend im osteuropäischen Steppenraum: Kulturhistorische Studien zu prähistorischer Subsistenzwirtschaft und Interaktion mit benachbarten Räumen* (Berlin: Edition Topoi, 2019), especially 139 – 43.

The late Subboreal period, with increased precipitation from around 2000 BC, marked the start of the Bronze Age. Another period of cooling from around 800 BC on led to the abandonment of previous settlements in mountain areas. In the seventh century BC, Greek colonization began from Miletus with the founding of trading ports and settlement colonies. This was followed by a renewed warming at the turn of the century, which also coincided with the heyday of the Roman Empire. A rapidly growing population sought new areas of settlement. Burgundians and Goths had settled in the south of today's Ukraine, but by the end of this warmer phase Xiongnu ("Huns") invading from Mongolia had overrun these kingdoms, initiating a decline in steppe agriculture.[41] Colder winters and a more humid climate preceded the warming of the High Middle Ages around 1000. This was succeeded around 1350 by the Little Ice Age before a renewed period of warming emerged in the mid-nineteenth century. Climate change since then, and particularly since the middle of the twentieth century, is mainly attributed to the burning of fossil fuels.

3.3 High Biodiversity

The traditional landscape division in Ukraine notes a transition from the dry steppe in the south to the forest steppe in the north of the country, where forest steppe incorporates a mosaic of sites with different moisture supply, where steppe-like features prevail under dry conditions and forests predominate in wet river floodplains. As a result of human interventions, tree coverage in Ukraine is very limited. It is limited in the south to the pine forests of the lower Dnipro and to deciduous forests of the Crimean Mountains, while the Carpathian Mountains are densely forested. In the steppe areas, forests were pushed back by steppe husbandry and agricultural colonization, with the latter also reducing forest steppe formations through grasses such as feather grass (*Stipa*) and fescue (*Festuca*) to a few remnant sites.

On the Russian Black Sea Coast and in Abkhazia forests stretch right up to the shore where they have not been cleared for settlements or transport infrastructure. At the foot of the mountains, there are stands of oak, beech, hornbeam, and chestnut. Alder and Caucasian wingnut are common in the Rioni lowland. In addition, some plant species that have survived the ice age, such as the Pitsunda pine (*Pinus pithyusa*), Eurasian smoke tree (*Cotinus coggygria*), and Cretan rockrose (*Cistus cretica*). Deciduous forests prevail up to an altitude of 1,200 meters (4,000 feet), above which the proportion of conifers increases. Above the tree line (in western Georgia at about 1,700–2,000 meters/5,600–6,600 feet), there are still some beech trees, while above 2,400 meters (7,900 feet) Alpine grasslands take over. In Ajara, cultivated vegetation (es-

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41 Behringer, *Kulturgeschichte,* 89.

pecially citrus fruits) has largely replaced the natural vegetation in the coastal hinterland, while beech and chestnut stands dominate in the mountains.[42]

In Turkey, too, natural vegetation has largely disappeared. In the immediate coastal hinterland, tea and citrus plants replaced the original moist forests and hazelnut plantations the deciduous beech forests. In the subcolchic moist forests, beech trees prevail alongside other deciduous trees, while in higher altitudes on the mountains firs, spruces, beeches, and rhododendrons grow in what sometimes resemble primeval forests. Where land has been turned over to use, vegetation has generally suffered degradation.[43] In the western section of the Turkish hinterland, the expansion of the megacity of Istanbul has led to the loss of sub-Mediterranean dry forests with pines and deciduous oak trees. In Bulgaria, oak forests can be found in the lower levels of the mountains, beech forests up to 1,800 meters (5,900 feet), while the highest altitudinal belts are occupied by pastureland.

3.4 Landscape Change in the Holocene and Anthropocene

Long- and short-term climate change, together with the resulting changes to inflows and outflows, are important natural drivers shaping the terrain at river estuaries. The expanding delta areas, small-scale changes to the coastline, as well as shifts in nature of flora and fauna are all striking consequences of landscape change. However, even long-term fluctuations in climatic elements such as temperature and precipitation contribute only marginally to changes at the coast. More significant is human impact, because clearance and agricultural use lead to soil erosion and sedimentation. Likewise, the stripping back of forests and the natural steppe, which have been replaced by cultivated plants, is anthropogenic. In the catchment of the upper and middle reaches of the Danube, deforestation dates back to Roman times, whereas in its lower reaches it only occurred in the past millennium.[44]

4 Conclusion

The Black Sea region is a highly diverse space marked by contrasts and transitions: from a temperate continental climate to the subtropical; from barely accessible mountain ranges to flat coastlines; from wetlands of particular ecological value to dry areas bearing little fauna and flora. Whether the area is seen as a single unit shaped by its proximity to a large body of water, or instead as a neighborhood featuring various spaces, depends on the perspective adopted. There is no uniform picture of the forma-

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42 Bolashvili et al., *National Atlas of Georgia,* 72–75.

43 Hütteroth and Höhfeld, *Türkei*, 105–9.

44 Giosan et al., "Anthropogenic Transformation," 4–5.

tion and shaping of landscapes that would pertain throughout history; instead, the area has been altered constantly by climatic changes. In this way, many classifications and constructs that might seem to have scientific basis are actually a product of mental imaginaries. Indeed, treating this expansive albeit navigable sea as a spatial unit is itself something that is based on mental constructs.

Part II: **The Black Sea History from Antiquity until the Twentieth Century**

David Braund

Antiquity

Our sources for the ancient Black Sea are characterized by great unevenness and patchiness, as is usual in the study of ancient history in general. Our written texts are overwhelmingly the creations of Greek culture, not only for the Greek and Byzantine periods, but also for the Roman empire, when the imperial Greek culture of the eastern Roman empire embraced also the Black Sea world. In consequence our view of the region throughout antiquity tends to be dominated by Greek concerns of different kinds, which are largely perspectives from the Mediterranean world. For we have few texts from authors of the Black Sea area itself. Accordingly, our sense of the region, and especially of the many non-Greek peoples there, as well as the region's broader connections to its every side, can easily be overshadowed and even diminished by these written traditions. Since other ancient peoples of the region have left very little in written form, it is largely through Greek eyes and terminology that their very identities are usually understood. For example, we know (thanks to Greek evidence) that the pastoralist Scythians of the northern coastlands and above did not call themselves Scythians, but Skolotoi.[1] Moreover, like the Scythians, the Colchians of the eastern coast and the Thracians of the west were loose confederations even at times of their greatest unity: these dominant ethnic labels are sweeping terms, which conceal and obscure an extraordinary range of difference in economy, political organization, customs and much more besides, to the extent that our Greek sources sometimes display their difficulty and dissatisfaction with the terms that they themselves employ.[2] For while Greeks of the Mediterranean might well have scant concern with the close realities of the Black Sea world, and especially its non-Greek populations, those Greek authors who had experience of the region or sought to pursue regional idiosyncrasies for other reasons, struggled to offer a nuanced account of the region.[3]

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1 Herodotus, *Histories* 4.6, with David Asheri, Alan Llyod, and Aldo Corcella, *A Commentary on Herodotus Books I–IV*, ed. Oswyn Murray and Alfonso Moreno (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), as for all matters in Book Four of the *Histories*.
2 On Thrace, see Zofia Archibald, *The Odrysian Kingdom of Thrace: Orpheus Unmasked* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Julia Valeva, Emil Nankov, and Denver Graninger, eds., *A Companion to Ancient Thrace* (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2016); on Colchis, David Braund, *Georgia in Antiquity: A History of Colchis and Transcaucasian Iberia, 550 BC–AD 562* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
3 See Reinhold Bichler, "Persian Geography and the Ionians: Herodotus," in *Brill's Companion to Ancient Geography: The Inhabited World in Greek and Roman Tradition,* ed. Serena Bianchetti, Michele R. Cataudella, and Hans-Joachim Gehrke (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 3–20; Tim Rood, *The Sea! The Sea!: The Shout of the Ten Thousand in the Modern Imagination* (London: Duckworth Overlook, 2005); David Braund, "Greek Geography and Roman Empire: The Transformation of Tradition in Strabo's Euxine," in *Strabo's Cultural Geography*, ed. Daniela Dueck, Hugh Lindsay, and Sarah Pothecary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 216–34.

With some limited exceptions, it is archaeology that illuminates these non-Greek peoples for us, while it also casts considerable light upon the Greeks of the Black Sea too.[4] However, there is an important disconnect here, with which ancient history must always live. Archaeology seldom offers a good fit with our written historical sources. For example, if we wish to know about building practices around the Black Sea, archaeology will show us much about, say, the wooden dwellings in the marshlands of the Colchian plain, or about defensive structures in the Taman peninsula. Ancient texts, however, are seldom concerned with such matters, which crop up for the most part only in the course of historical narratives, if at all.[5] Pottery (easy to break, hard to destroy) forms the basis of most of our social and economic history of the region, but it is rare indeed for any ancient writer to say much about it.[6] Meanwhile, there is another kind of unevenness which must also be understood. Archaeology has been far more actively pursued in some parts of the region than in others. On the southern coast there has been very little archaeology, which may also help to explain the relatively small number of inscriptions that we have from the southern shores.[7] However, we do have a rare eye-witness account of much of this coast, thanks to the remarkable tale of Xenophon, whose large force of Greek mercenaries made its way from Mesopotamia to the Black Sea coast at Trapezus (today: Trabzon) and thence along the coast to Byzantium, and in some cases on into Thrace. These particular instances serve to illustrate the general problem of our patchy data, to which must be added the full suite of problems in interpretation and exegesis.

The appearance of written texts on the Black Sea region (largely but not exclusively Greek)[8] dates from around the eighth century BC and provides the usual starting point for the history of the region. It is also from that date onwards that archaeology around the region has been most intensive, substantially driven by efforts to unearth evidence on the process of Greek colonization there.

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4 Cf. Askold I. Ivantchik, *Am Vorabend der Kolonisation: Das nördliche Schwarzmeergebiet und die Steppennomaden des 8.–7. Jhs. v. Chr. in der klassischen Literaturtradition. Mündliche Überlieferung, Literatur und Geschichte* (Moscow: Paleograph Press, 2005).

5 In fact, these instances did attract some interest: Vitruvius, *De architectura* 2.1; Tacitus, *Annals* 12. Our problems in interpreting dugout dwellings are not at all helped by the written texts on the region: Pierre Dupont, "L'habitat grec du Point-Euxin: Quelques pierres d'achoppement," *Pallas* 58 (2002): 285–99.

6 Cf. the general remarks of Timothy Taylor, "Believing the Ancients: Quantitative and Qualitative Dimensions of Slavery and the Slave Trade in Later Prehistoric Eurasia," *World Archaeology* 33, no. 1 (June 2001): 27–43.

7 See the papers gathered in Victor Cojocaru, Ligia Ruscu, Thibaut Castelli, and Annamária-Izabella Pázsint, eds., *Advances in Ancient Black Sea Studies: Historiography, Archaeology and Religion* (Cluj-Napoca: Mega Publishing House, 2019); Manolis Manoledakis, *Peoples in the Black Sea in Ancient Times: Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on the Black Sea in Antiquity* (Oxford: Archeopress, 2021).

8 Ivantchik, *Am Vorabend*; Jochen Fornasier, *Griechische Kolonisation im nördlichen Schwarzmeerraum vom 7. bis 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Bonn: Habelt-Verlag, 2016).

1 The Archaic Black Sea (c. 750 – c. 500 BC)

Most of the traders, settlers, and adventurers who made the voyage to the Black Sea in the archaic period considered themselves Greek, but they came largely from communities on the eastern coast of the Aegean and less often from the Greek mainland. The city of Miletus stands out. It prided itself upon the extraordinary number of colonies it had founded in the Black Sea and elsewhere.[9] Miletus' neighbors also joined in, under circumstances which remain obscure, and they occasionally took the lead, so that Teos, for example, was recognized as the mother city of Phanagoria in the Crimean Bosporus.[10] Important too, though similarly obscure, is the process of secondary foundations, whereby, for example, the key city of Sinope on the south coast evidently founded a series of communities to its east, possibly including Trapezus, as some believed in antiquity.[11] While our ignorance of detail can frustrate, we can see some broad themes here which serve to characterize the whole region. Among the most important is the fact that these colonists were themselves from cities of the Aegean which were colonies from the Greek mainland. While there was some significant colonial settlement directly from mainland Greece (notably from Megara),[12] most Greeks who arrived in the Black Sea came from cities with an acknowledged mixed heritage, close to and intermarried with non-Greek populations.[13] Such origins must have assisted their adaptation to the new environment of the region, especially in the crucial matter of relations with local peoples.

Around the whole region, these Greek settlements were very much based on the coast. They commanded natural harbors and defensible locations, but they could only hope to survive in cooperation with the populations among whom they established themselves. For, while Greek infantry was formidable, early settlers were massively outnumbered by local populations, so that forms of diplomacy were considerably more important to the success of the colony than the use of force. It is true that in later cen-

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9 Vanessa B. Gorman, *Miletos, the Ornament of Ionia: A History of the City to 400 B.C.E.* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2001).

10 Located on the Taman peninsula in the so-called Asiatic half of the Bosporus, later the eastern capital of the Bosporan Kingdom, on which more below: see Vladimir Kuznetsov and Alexey Zavoikin, "On the Archaeological Topography of Phanagoria," in *Phanagoreia und darüber hinaus…: Festschrift für Vladimir Kuznetsov,* ed. Nikolai Povalahev (Göttingen: Cuvillier Verlag, 2014), 29 – 52; David Braund, "The Thessalian Foundation of Phanagoria: Civic Identity Re-visited and Extended," in Povalahev, *Phanagoreia und darüber hinaus,* 53 – 74.

11 Rood, *The Sea!*; Amiran Kakhidze and Michael Vickers, *Pichvnari 1: Greeks and Colchians on the East Coast of the Black Sea. Results of Excavations Conducted by the Joint British-Georgian Expedition 1998 – 2002* (Oxford: The Ashmolean Museum, University of Oxford/The Batumi Archaeological Museum, 2004) on Pichvnari, with subsequent volumes.

12 Adrian Robu, *Mégare et les établissements mégariens de Sicile, de la Propontide et du Pont-Euxin: Histoire et institutions* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2014).

13 Naoíse MacSweeney, *Foundation Myths and Politics in Ancient Ionia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

turies these colonies liked to imagine their beginnings in terms of epic conflict and the defeat (and sometimes enslavement) of any local resistance; it is clear enough that colonies had enjoyed good relations with at least part of the local population from the beginning.[14] Their military strength contributed to their value to local elites, while we can trace exchange of many kinds. These colonies in effect mediated between local economies and the produce of the Aegean world. In broad terms the natural products of the Black Sea world (notably fish, pastoral and agrarian products, and, in a different sense, slaves, as well as metals, timber, pitch, and more) were exchanged for wines, textiles, metalware, and other goods that were embraced by local elites as prestige items, by which they could differentiate themselves from others around them.[15] For these imports did not fill a void in the regional or local Black Sea economies. Wine had been available in the eastern Black Sea, for example, for many centuries before the arrival of Greeks, and this Colchian wine continued to be traded around the region, while the arrival of Mediterranean wines in Colchis itself seems to have had little or no impact on the production of Colchian wine.[16] Similarly, the Scythian and Thracian peoples produced their own textiles and other clothing, after Mediterranean textiles became available, while we know a little of fine wools and silks arriving in the region also from the Caspian and the east.[17]

These exchanges were accompanied by cultural osmosis of different kinds.[18] The Greek coastal settlements attracted settlers too from the hinterlands. At Olbia, for example, there are indications of such arrivals from the Thracian regions to its west, and also from the so-called wooded steppe to the north, whose inhabitants tend to be identified as Scythians by modern scholars, despite their large settlements and agrarian

14 David Braund, "Clashing Traditions Beyond the Clashing Rocks: (Un)Ethical Tales of Milesians, Scythians and Others in Archaic and Later Colonialism," in Cojocaru et al., *Advances in Ancient Black Sea Studies*, 79–108.

15 Vincent Gabrielsen and John Lund, eds., *The Black Sea in Antiquity: Regional and Interregional Economic Exchanges* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2007).

16 Jennifer Y. Chi, Darejan Kacharava, and Guram Kvirkvelia, eds., *Wine, Worship, and Sacrifice: The Golden Graves of Ancient Vani* (Princeton, NJ: Institute for the Study of the Ancient World/Princeton University Press, 2008).

17 David Braund, "On the Camels of the Aorsi: Discorides and the Medicine Trade of the Bosporan Kingdom. Part I. The 'Soldier's Life' of Dioscorides," *Vestnik drevnei istorii* 81, no. 2 (2021): 394–407. On silk finds, see esp. Eliso Kvavadze and Maia Chichinadze, "Palynological Analysis of Organic Materials from Pichvnari (Including the Earliest Silk in Georgia)," in *Wonders Lost and Found: A Celebration of the Archaeological Work of Professor Michael Vickers*, ed. Nicholas Sekunda (Oxford: Archaeopress Archaeology, 2020), 102–7, with David F. Graf, "The Silk Road between Syria and China," in *Trade, Commerce, and the State in the Roman World*, ed. Andrew Wilson and Alan Bowman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 443–530.

18 E. g. Manfred Oppermann, *Die westpontischen Poleis und ihr indigenes Umfeld in vorrömischer Zeit* (Langenweißbach: Beier&Beran, 2004); David Braund and Sergei D. Kryzhitskiy, eds., *Classical Olbia and the Scythian World: From the Sixth Century BC to the Second Century AD* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

lifestyles.[19] Our earliest objection to such identification comes with Herodotus, responding to earlier accounts in the fifth century, and supposing (erroneously, no doubt) that northern town-dwellers had been displaced from the coast and had once been Greeks.[20] He had perceived that they were not much like the pastoralist Scythians and had tried to explain their existence in a context of a general belief among Greeks that the northern hinterland was empty, apart from pastoralists. In fact such towns were quite numerous in archaic times. Greek wares reached them from at least the seventh century, probably by or along the great rivers of the region. Some mutual awareness between these two settled regions, on the coast and above the steppe, seems very likely, but we have no direct evidence on any communal relationships between them. We do hear, however, about the deep penetration of Greeks to the north, and also about Greek contacts with "Scythians" and others of the deep hinterland.[21]

Modern study of the archaic period has been dominated by a quest for causes that is now tired, at best, usually aligned with a desire to label each settlement as a trading-post (*emporion*) or colony (*apoikia*). Most scholars now agree, however, that the colonial processes were far more complex than such simple tagging seems to allow, whereby settlers made the most of their respective locations, and developed in concert with at least a substantial part of the local populations. The role of women was especially important, not least because we are almost certain that in the early phases of colonies in the region women were brought into the settlement from indigenous sources, whether by agreement, trade, or enslavement: the agency of these women is sometimes glimpsed, for example in religion.[22] This was an extended process of adaptation for Greeks who came into the Black Sea, and faced new environments, crops, climatic conditions, neighbors, and more. Such challenges meant that (by contrast with epic tales of conquest, driven by the gods) colonists were in fundamental need of support and know-how from their new neighbors.[23] Far too much modern scholarship has centred upon notions of hostility between settlers and locals, sometimes couched in terms of conflict between agriculturalists and pastoralists. While there is occasional evidence

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19 Further, St. John Simpson and Svetlana Pankova, eds., *Scythians: Warriors of Ancient Siberia* (London: The British Museum/Thames & Hudson, 2017).

20 Herodotus, *Histories* 4.108–9 on the pastoralist Budini and the settled Geloni, whose town of wood has sometimes been taken to refer specifically to the huge settlement at Bilsk in eastern Ukraine.

21 See J. D. P. Bolton, *Aristeas of Proconnesus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962) on Aristeas of Proconnesus, for example. For archaeological evidence, see Galina I. Smirnova, Marina Ju. Vakhtina, Maya T. Kashuba, and Elena G. Starkova, eds., *Nemirov Hill Fort on South Bug River* (St. Petersburg: The State Hermitage Museum/Institute for the History of Material Culture RAS/Neva Book Printing House, 2018).

22 David Braund, *Greek Religion and Cults in the Black Sea Region: Goddesses in the Bosporan Kingdom from the Archaic Period to the Byzantine Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), with extensive bibliography, notably Yulia Ustinova, *The Supreme Gods of the Bosporan Kingdom: Celestial Aphrodite & the Most High God* (Leiden: Brill, 1999).

23 David Braund, "Kings beyond the *claustra*. Nero's Nubian Nile, India and the *rubrum mare* (Tacitus, *Annals* 2.61)," in *Amici – socii – clients? Abhängige Herrschaft im Imperium Romanum*, ed. Ernst Baltrusch and Julia Wilker (Berlin: Edition Topoi, 2015), 123–59.

of that, as also among the Greek communities of the Aegean too, Herodotus describes instead a set of relationships which was broadly peaceful and mutually beneficial, as realities demanded.

2 The Classical Black Sea (c. 500 – 323 BC)

The two classical centuries were a period of prosperity and expansion around the region. External empires sought to command the Black Sea, even by the end of the sixth century,[24] while we see the development too of larger political entities around some parts of the coastlands and interior. At the same time, interaction between the colonial foundations becomes more clear to us, while we see also the power and wealth of some entities within the region, notably among the Thracians of the west and the Bosporan Kingdom of the north.[25] The latter coalesced through the fifth century, so that its numerous settlements, centred upon the shores of the Crimean Bosporus (the Straits of Kerch), became a single state, with a common coinage. This state expanded across eastern Crimea, the Maeotis (the Sea of Azov), and the Taman peninsula, incorporating a range of non-Greek peoples, in peace and war, especially from the 430s BC. Spartocus I established a dynasty there in the late 430s BC, which would rule until its last king died, around 100 BC.[26] While its stability was threatened by internal and external conflicts, the Bosporan Kingdom emerged as a major power in the Greek world, no doubt with extended influence too across the interior, especially to its north and east. We hear most about its relationship with Athens, sustainedly successful, which showed not only the economic power of its agriculture (grain is often mentioned in the fourth century), but also its sheer wealth, some of which can be seen in the archaeology of its fabulous elite burials.[27] By the end of the fourth century the Bosporan kings were using their riches to build great reputations around the Aegean world and the rest of the Black Sea, showing themselves as champions of culture, both against piratical depredations and as supporters of theatre and the arts. They demanded respect as Greeks, but their Mediterranean cousins tended to perceive them as somehow barbarous and even malign.[28]

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24 Christopher Tuplin, "Revisiting Dareios' Scythian Expedition," in *Achaemenid Impact in the Black Sea: Communication of Powers*, ed. Jen Nieling and Ellen Rehm (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2010).
25 Archibald, *The Odrysian Kingdom*; Viktor F. Gaydukevich, *Das Bosporanische Reich* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1971); Jochen Fornasier and Burkhard Böttger, eds., *Das Bosporanische Reich: Der Nordosten des Schwarzen Meeres in der Antike* (Mainz: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 2002).
26 David Braund, "The Relief and Text of *IG* II³ 1 298: Leukon and his Sons in Athens and Mytilene," *Annual of the British School at Athens* 114 (November 2019): 241 – 61.
27 Braund.
28 Diodorus, *Bibliotheca historica* 20.25 with Philip de Souza, *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). On theatre and culture in the Bosporus, see David Braund, Edith Hall, and Rosie Wyles, eds., *Ancient Theatre and Performance Culture Around the Black Sea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019) on theatre across the region.

The colonies of the region had all belonged to the Persian Empire by about 500 BC, despite the apparent failure of Darius' expedition against the Scythians around 512 BC. For Persia controlled the Caucasus to the east and northern Asia Minor below, primarily through local strong men. To the west Persia worked hard to dominate the whole of Thrace and pressed westwards into Macedonia too: the invasion of Xerxes demonstrated the Persian grip on these northern lands. It was rather harder for Persia to control the Crimean Bosporus, no doubt, but we see its domination there too in the mid-fifth century, presumably loosened and perhaps removed with the emergence of the Spartocids.[29] Persian imperial ambitions in the region gave special significance to the Bosporan alliance with Athens, which had sent its imperial warships around the Black Sea in the 430s and probably encouraged and possibly even supported the ascent of Spartocus I in these same years. The Athenian empire had carried on a war of revenge and liberation against Persia since the failure of Xerxes' invasion in 479 BC, so that its determined entry into the Black Sea came rather late in its campaigning, a second front against the Persian Empire, which seems swiftly to have given way in this northern outpost of its extensive realms, in the face of local difficulties and the overwhelming sea-power of Athens and its allies.[30]

After supporting a failed coup in Persia, a large force of Greek mercenaries (the so-called Ten Thousand) escaped Mesopotamia and made its way to the Black Sea as the fifth century turned into the fourth. By taking this hard route through the little-known Armenian highlands, they avoided the long and exposed journey through Asia Minor to the Aegean, whence they had come in more optimistic times. Xenophon the Athenian has left his version of these events and, most importantly here, a detailed account (the closing books of his *Anabasis*) of their passage along the southern coast of the Black Sea, from Trapezus to Byzantium, and from there up into Thrace and the coastlands of the western Black Sea. Xenophon's account is designed to praise and exonerate him, while meditating on larger themes of command, religion, and ethnic interactions.[31] The south coast was in a poor state, he says, with communications by land very difficult: there is no sign of the Persian Empire here and no indication of any other larger entity, for Athens had recently been crushed by the Peloponnesian war, and a brutal civil war that followed. Xenophon shows a region with potential for settlement by his great army, but also makes clear that the mercenaries had no wish to stay in this challenging area. A risky plan to settle on the lowland of Colchis was never pursued, while the potential site at Calpe near Heraclea Pontica was rendered impossible by the hostility of the local population.[32] The cities of the coast maintained uneasy relations with their neighbors. At Trapezus there was symbiosis with natives of

29 Vladimir D. Kuznetsov and Alexander B. Nikitin, "An Old Persian Inscription from Phanagoria," *Ancient Civilizations from Scythia to Siberia* 25 (2019): 1–7.
30 Cf. Edith Hall, "The Tragedians of Heraclea and Comedians of Sinope," in Braund et al., *Ancient Theatre*, 45–58.
31 Rood, *The Sea!*
32 Xenophon, *Anabasis* 6.4.

the locality, but also sustained hostility with those of the uplands above, in which the mercenaries involved themselves. At Sinope, there was a reluctance among the civic elite to engage with the mercenaries at all, but pressure from the local Paphlagonian king made that inevitable.[33] He controlled a large expanse of the hinterland and might choose to depart from his largely peaceful relations with the city. Athenians had been settled in the city some thirty years earlier, but Xenophon does not mention them at all, most likely because that would have put him in a poor light in Greek eyes (especially in Athens) and was best omitted.[34]

While the great force gradually broke up in various directions, Xenophon led a sizeable group into service with the rulers of eastern Thrace. Here lay the major power of the west coast, the Odrysian Kingdom, which had established itself among the great powers of the Black Sea.[35] It received regular tribute from the Greek cities of the west coast, with a taste for silver that is apparent in its archaeology. Its elite had developed a taste also for some parts of Greek culture, fancying themselves part of the mythical past of Athens in particular. Such was their wealth and power that even the Athenians were willing to acknowledge such claims, though there was skepticism and mockery too. Xenophon's account tends to suggest that their claims to culture were at best superficial and their ways routinely crude and treacherous. The general view across Greek culture, which had often associated Thrace with the supply of low-grade slaves, was that Thracians (including the Odrysians) were rich and vulgar, with a taste for excess drink that seemed to be supported by their imports of Greek wine in return for slaves and goods.[36]

3 The Black Sea in the Hellenistic World (323 – c. 100 BC)

Philip II of Macedon had brought Greece and much of Thrace under his control from the middle of the fourth century, and passed it to his son, Alexander the Great, who

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33 David Braund, "Dancing around the Black Sea: Xenophon, Pseudo-Scymnus and Lucian's Bacchants," in Braund et al., *Ancient Theatre*, 470 – 89; cf. Maladina Dana, *Culture et mobilité dans le Pont-Euxin: Approche régionale de la vie culturelle des cités grecques* (Bordeaux: Ausinius Èditions, 2011) on the local Greek culture embroiled with these tendencies.

34 David Braund, "Pericles, Cleon and the Pontus: The Black Sea in Athens c. 440 – 421," in *Scythians and Greeks Cultural Interactions in Scythia, Athens and Early Roman Empire (sixth century BC–first century AD)*, ed. David Braund (Exeter: University of Exeter Press 2005), 80 – 99.

35 Archibald, *The Odrysian Kingdom*; Matthew A. Sears, *Athens, Thrace, and the Shaping of Athenian Leadership* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Jean-Luc Martinez, Néguine Mathieux, Alexandre Baralis, Milena Tonkova, and Totko Stoyanov, eds., *L'Épopée des rois thraces des guerres médiques aux invasions celtes 479 – 278 av. j.-c.: Découvertes archéologiques en Bulgarie* (Paris: Musée du Louvre/Somogy éditions d'art, 2015).

36 Sears, *Athens, Thrace, and the Shaping.*

extended his father's success in the Danube region and realized his plans to invade Asia Minor. Alexander himself turned southwards on his invasion, so that the Black Sea region was largely a spectator, though the Danube regions had taken his armies as far as Olbia.[37] However, his destruction and transformation of the Persian Empire would have massive consequences for the region, and not only on its southern coast. After Alexander's death in 323 the entire region became part of a huge struggle for territory and power by his successors and the dynasties they established, most famously the Ptolemies of Egypt and the Seleucids of Syria.[38]

For the Black Sea region as a whole, these Hellenistic years were a long period of division and uncertainty. The great dynasts certainly had ambitions there, but these never came to fruition. The early Ptolemies involved themselves directly at Byzantium for example, and engaged with the Bosporan Kingdom in diplomacy.[39] It was in Ptolemy II's library at Alexandria that Apollonius Rhodius wrote the most influential version of the Argonautic myth, re-purposing the old myths in a framework of Ptolemaic imperial ambitions that were not at all limited to the eastern Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the early Seleucids forged a massive kingdom across Central Asia and set about plans for the Caucasus. Seleucus I even considered the construction of a canal to link the Don and Volga, giving a better route from Central Asia to the Bosporan Kingdom and the Black Sea as a whole.[40] It was also a Seleucid king who established the kingdom of Caucasian Iberia, now eastern Georgia, while the greater interest of the dynasty was directed further westwards to the Aegean and Asia Minor. Fragments of the strong tradition of Heraclea Pontica in local history give us disjointed glimpses into how all this may have seemed to those who lived on the south coast of the Black Sea at this time.[41] They indicate also the role of other important players in these extended schemes of conquest and influence, notably Lysimachus of Thrace, whose ambitions stretched well beyond the western Black Sea.[42]

By and large, the cities of the region had to fend for themselves through the Hellenistic centuries, dealing with difficulties as they arose, at peace and at war among themselves and their non-Greek neighbors. The growing fashion at this time for honorary inscriptions, celebrating the service of the local elites to their cities, give us a range of vignettes. The arrival of Gauls from the west generated particular trauma through the third century, as far afield as Olbia, until they were settled and subdued

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37 Vladimir Stolba, "Images with Meaning: Early Hellenistic Coin Typology of Olbia Pontike," in Cojocaru et al., *Advances in Ancient Black Sea Studies,* 523–41.

38 See Michel M. Austin, *The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest: A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

39 Braund, *Greek Religion*, 134–86.

40 Pliny, *Natural History* 6.31; in general, Andreas Mehl, *Seleukos Nikator und sein Reich: 1. Teil: Seleukos' Leben und die Entwicklung seiner Machtposition* (Leuven: Peeters, 1986).

41 Stanley Mayer Burstein, *Outpost of Hellenism: The Emergence of Heraclea on the Black Sea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

42 Valeva, Nankov, and Graninger, *A Companion to Ancient Thrace.*

in Anatolian Galatia.[43] These were years of raids, piracy, and on-going disorder, often overshadowed by the struggles of the great dynasts. The war of 220 between Byzantium and Rhodes deserves special notice, because it shows not only the importance of sea-passage in and out of the Black Sea and the problems faced by cities from Gauls and others, but also because it caused Polybius, among the more precise historians of antiquity, to offer a rare overview of the goods that passed in each direction between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.[44] From the Black Sea came hides and slaves, plus honey, wax, and preserved fish in quantity. Into the region came olive oil and wines of many kinds from the Mediterranean. Grain might be moved in either direction as occasion suggested. Clearly the list of goods is incomplete, but it gives a sense of principal goods exchanged between the regions in the Hellenistic period and most probably throughout antiquity. We should note in particular that the uncertainties of grain production were such that grain could be brought into the region as well as out of it, contrary to the notion of many modern scholars that the region was simply a "bread-basket."[45]

From the closing years of the second century BC Mithridates VI Eupator brought a new unity to the whole region. From his principal seat of power in Sinope he created an empire which included all the shores of the Black Sea, while the campaigns of his generals were taken to have established sound geographical knowledge of much of the northern interior too.[46] He claimed to have inherited the Bosporan Kingdom around 100 BC, and an honorific inscription for one of his key generals (Diophantus) from Crimean Chersonesus shows that he had the military resources to take over the fractured kingdom and suppress opposition there, internal and external.[47] Colchis and Paphlagonia came to him in similar fashion. His administration of the east coast was praised long after his death. Mithridates presented himself very much as the protector of the Greeks around the region, especially against threats from non-Greeks who came into the region under circumstances which are poorly understood. At the same time, however, he clearly enjoyed substantial support among the more indigenous non-Greeks around the region, including the most rebarbative of them. However, while his activities around the lower Danube were uncomfortable for the expanding interests of Rome, it was in Asia Minor that Mithridates' imperialism really clashed with Rome and its allies, notably the rulers of Bithynia. A series of wars followed, in which Mithridates saw only limited success, relying in large part on the resources and manpower

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43 See Austin, *The Hellenistic World*, esp. no. 115, with commentary.

44 Polybius, *Histories* 4.50.

45 Gabrielsen and Lund, *The Black Sea*.

46 Brian C. McGing, *The Foreign Policy of Mithridates VI Eupator, King of Pontus* (Leiden: Brill, 1986); Jakob Munk Højte, ed., *Mithridates VI and the Pontic Kingdom* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2009); Duane W. Roller, *Empire of the Black Sea: The Rise and Fall of the Mithridatic World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

47 On the modern myth of Spartacus-like Saumacus there, see Zeev Wolfgang Rubinsohn, "Saumakos: Ancient History, Modern Politics," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 29, no. 1 (1980): 50–70.

that he could bring from the Black Sea region, including regions like Caucasian Iberia at the edge of his sphere of influence. After decades of intermittent warfare from 96 BC, Mithridates was driven to suicide in 63 BC, trying to resurrect his fortunes at Panticapaeum in eastern Crimea. In consequence, Rome found itself in control of the whole of Asia Minor and much more besides, including much of the Black Sea.

4 The Roman Black Sea (c. 100 BC through the sixth century AD)

From its early expansion overseas in the third century, Rome had favored indirect rule as a mode of empire. While cities came to enjoy substantial autonomy, Rome especially favored alliances with local monarchs, particularly where an area presented special difficulties. Accordingly, the Roman response to victory over Mithridates was in large part to find and support a series of such monarchs around the region, strong enough to maintain order and meet Roman demands, but not so strong as to present any serious threat to overall Roman control.[48] It was only on the southern coast that Rome saw immediate profit in annexation and direct rule under provincial governors. Most of the region was wholly unsuitable for direct government from Rome, because there were no great treasure stores to be looted (that had been done with Mithridates' death) and any steady income from taxation would have been swallowed up in local defense and administrative commitments. To the north the Bosporan Kingdom was restored and given to one of Mithridates' many sons, Pharnaces II, who soon proved unreliable. Colchis was entrusted to a monarch named Aristarchus, about whom we know almost nothing. Thrace and its Greek cities were soon troubled by a king of the Getae named Burebista, constructed in heroic terms by some Romanian scholars, but in fact a shadowy figure, largely unknown to us.[49]

Mithridates' defeat and the broader conflict of the Mithridatic wars brought a mass of scholars, poets, and other intellectuals of Hellenistic culture to the centre of power at Rome, some by force and others in search of new patrons. Among these was the young Strabo, whose family had been close to Mithridates and who would go on to write our single most important account of the Black Sea region since Herodotus, completing it at a great age around AD 25.[50] His family had been actively involved in the Mithridatic administration of the Black Sea, while his home city of Amasia in Cappadocia was well connected to the southern coastlands. Moreover, he was himself close to Queen

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48 Further, Roger Batty, *Rome and the Nomads: The Pontic-Danubian Realm in Antiquity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); cf. Tønnes Bekker-Nielsen, ed., *Rome and the Black Sea Region: Domination, Romanisation, Resistance* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2006); Jesper Majbom Madsen, *Eager to be Roman: Greek Response to Roman Rule in Pontus and Bithynia* (London: Duckworth, 2009).

49 Valeva, Nankov, and Graninger, *A Companion to Ancient Thrace.*

50 See the essays collected in Daniela Dueck, ed., *The Routledge Companion to Strabo* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017).

Pythodoris, a key figure among the ruling royalty of the region in his day.[51] While an enthusiastic supporter of Roman rule, Strabo also observes its shortcomings, for example in Roman governors' poor record against endemic piracy in the eastern Black Sea, in particular, a thorny issue for Roman rule across the region. For Rome was very aware of the complexities there, obvious in its multiplicity of languages that seemed strange to Romans, who were comfortable enough with Greek, the lingua franca of the region into the Byzantine era.

Under the early Roman emperors, from Augustus onwards (ruled 31 BC – AD 14) the Black Sea region, like the rest of the empire, was steadily taken under close control in a process of centralization that was driven be several factors. The use of allied monarchs was fraught with risks, such as the ruler's sudden death and conflict over succession, or the unsatisfactory conduct of the monarch himself with regard to Rome. At the same time, the relationships of the monarch in Rome became concentrated overwhelmingly on the emperor himself, so that the personal bonds once shared among the Roman elite were now links primarily to the emperor and to those close to him.[52] Steadily rulers around the Black Sea were replaced by a Roman imperial administration which had also expanded to extend the emperor's direct control of the empire. In AD 46 the last ruler of Thrace died and was replaced by a Roman governor, whose province was shortly (some fifty years later) divided into two as Upper and Lower Moesia, the latter occupying the west coast as far as Olbia. The governor of Lower Moesia was also ready to intervene in the affairs of the city of Chersonesus, across the waters in southwestern Crimea.

On the south coast, provincial control was extended eastwards as far as Colchis, which became part of Pontus Polemoniacus, itself a part of the great province of Cappadocia established early in the reign of Vespasian (ruled AD 69 – 79). It took its name from its last king, Polemo II, who left power around AD 64, when he probably died. Rome took over his fleet and port installations, which were the basis of a new imperial fleet for the Black Sea, the *classis Pontica*.[53] In this way Rome took direct control of the problem of piracy, with fortified ports along the coast from Trapezus to Sebastopolis (today: Sukhumi) and soon onwards to Pityus. The historian Arrian of Nicomedia provides a detailed account of his inspection of this coast during his governorship of Cappadocia in AD 132 in the reign of Hadrian (ruled AD 117–38), who had visited Trapezus in person. Arrian shows us the continued role for minor monarchs of the Caucasus, supporting the Roman fleet. By now the eastern Black Sea had become important to

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51 See Braund, "Greek Geography," 216 – 34.

52 Further, Fergus Millar, "Government and Diplomacy in the Roman Empire during the First Three Centuries," *The International History Review* 10, no. 3 (1988): 345 – 77; Oliver Hekster, "Trophy Kings and Roman Power: A Roman Perspective on Client Kingdoms," in *Kingdoms and Principalities in the Roman Near East*, ed. Ted Kaizer and Margherita Facella (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2010), 45 – 55; Braund, "Kings beyond the *claustra*."

53 See Everett L. Wheeler, "Roman Fleets in the Black Sea: Mysteries of the *Classis Pontica*," *Acta Classica* 55 (2012): 119 – 54.

the whole Roman frontier of the east, especially as a conduit for troops and supplies southwards to the Euphrates region, while they also linked with Caucasian Iberia in facing new threats from peoples north of the Caucasus, especially the Alans, who had organized as a confederation by the 60s AD.[54]

The Bosporan Kingdom underwent a series of upheavals after the deaths of Mithridates and Pharnaces II, with a complex series of brief reigns and internal conflicts. A new stability was achieved by Aspurgus, whose rule was approved by Rome around AD 14, under the new emperor, Tiberius (ruled AD 14–37). Rome would have to intervene directly there under the emperor Claudius (ruled AD 41–54), to ensure the succession of his son Cotys I and the removal of another son, Mithridates VIII, who was brought to Rome and became part of the Roman elite. However, it was only from the time of Vespasian that a stable rule and line of succession was maintained in the Bosporus. Rome provided financial support for its rulers, but made no attempt to replace them with a governor. As experience under Claudius had shown, the Bosporus entailed the vast interior of the north and its many parts and problems, so that it was left to monarchy until its final demise in the later fourth century. Throughout these years, the rulers of the kingdom proclaimed their allegiance to Rome with a zeal and consistency that is unparalleled among Rome's other allies. Already a century earlier, however, in the 250s the kingdom had been unable to resist pressure from its northern neighbors, who forced their way to the sea and raided as far as Trapezus. Some in antiquity held the Romans responsible for Bosporan failure here, particularly through their withholding of the funds needed by the kingdom to manage diplomacy and maintain a strong army.[55] However, Rome had still more profound problems.

The third century saw the Roman Empire at its weakest, rent by internal struggles, economic pressures and the restored power of Persia, which had a direct impact in the Black Sea. The emperor Diocletian (ruled AD 284–305) formalized the division of the empire into east and west. Byzantium re-founded as Constantinople in AD 330, became the capital of the eastern empire. The Black Sea changed in consequence from a distant section of the imperial periphery to become an immediate geographical and security concern of the emerging Byzantine Empire. To the north the Danubian frontier had long had a string of fortified Roman camps along the southern banks of the great river, with a very active campaign of diplomacy beyond. The peoples of the north (usually grouped under the general name of Goths) were a threat, but they could also be

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54 Albert Brian Bosworth, "Arrian and the Alani," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 81 (1977): 217–55; David Braund and Emzar Kakhidze, "Reflections on the Southeastern Coast of the Black Sea in the Roman Period," in *The Roman Pontos*, ed. David Braund, Angelos Chaniotis, and Elias Petropoulos (Athens: Arkheion Pontou, forthcoming).

55 Zosimus, *Historia Nova* 1.31. On the Bosporan army, see Mariusz Mielczarek, *The Army of the Bosporan Kingdom: Studies on the History of the Ancient and Medieval Art of Warfare* (Łódź: Oficyna Naukowa, 1999).

managed to a significant extent and transformed into Romans.[56] It was against Goths and also Huns that the eastern empire had to contend in the northern parts of the region as far as the Bosporan Kingdom. Meanwhile, the old Persian interest in the Black Sea had returned with the emergence of Sassanid Persia, whose kings pursued their own military and diplomatic agendas from the Caucasian regions and from further south along the Euphrates frontier, where they had demonstrated in AD 260 that they could defeat and capture a Roman emperor, the luckless Valerian. A series of uneasy peace treaties were negotiated, but war with the eastern empire was never far away. In the sixth century the Persians built a major road into Colchis, where Roman forces could barely contain them, with the uncertain support of local allies. It was now that the historians of the eastern empire, notably Procopius of Gaza, not only narrated these wars in detail, but also offered another version of old descriptions of the Black Sea, which had a new meaning for the centre of power at Byzantium-Constantinople, in dread of a Black Sea in the hands of the Sassanids.[57]

5 Overview: The Black Sea Region in Antiquity

Throughout antiquity the Black Sea region was a major reservoir of resources, not only for the Mediterranean world, but for all the regions laid out around it. The great rivers of the region and the vast steppe across its north, above the main Caucasus range, facilitated movement and exchange across distances that were enormous by ancient standards, while the sea itself became part of a marine system which stretched at least from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Caucasus mountains, cutting far further eastwards into the continent of Asia than the eastern Mediterranean. The variety of environments and populations around the Black Sea itself further encouraged not only exchange, but a series of networks, which we glimpse only on occasion. For example, Dioscorides, a medical botanist of the later first century AD, happens to reveal a trade in medicinal plants and spices (notably cardamom and long pepper) from the northeast of the Indian subcontinent across Central Asia and across the Caspian to the Volga, from which goods moved west by Bactrian camel to the Sea of Azov and the Bosporan Kingdom.[58] There had long been talk of a direct route through Caucasian Iberia, joining the Caspian and Black Seas, but the route was difficult, insecure, and seldom attempted.[59] It was easier to make for the Black Sea from Armenia, as we some-

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56 Peter Heather, *Rome Resurgent: War and Empire in the Age of Justinian* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
57 In detail, David Braund, *Georgia in Antiquity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
58 Weronika Tomczyk, "Camels on the Northeastern Frontier of the Roman Empire," *Papers from the Institute of Archaeology* 26, no. 1 (2016): 1–13; Braund, *On the Camels.*
59 See Pierre Schneider, "From India to the Black Sea: An Overlooked Trade Route?," Archive ouvertes HAL, last modified March 16, 2017, https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01376630v1, on modern debates, in-

times hear. While goods from the Black Sea might reach as far as modern Borispol, it is much less clear what came back southwards in return, probably human traffic. In this case too, however, security was a key factor, so that movement of people and goods northwards might better have proceeded by way of the Danube and routes north from its middle course, as we see with the amber brought from the Baltic southwards.[60]

The ancient Greeks (and no doubt the Persians and others)[61] were overwhelmed by the sheer scale of the northern Black Sea region and its extensive hinterlands. The east coast had its own complexities, but in a much-fragmented mountain context. The south coast of the Black Sea was in some ways distinct from the rest of Asia Minor, hemmed by the Pontic Alps to its south and offering a different, much better environment, but there were connections enough southwards, and sometimes substantial roads, such as that between Sinope and Issus by the north east Mediterranean.[62] To the west, the Danubian lands were huge, but the great river itself offered a line of demarcation and division, as well as a potential for defense and communication that substantially set its southern areas apart from the vast lands to the north under the Roman Empire. Accordingly, it was the north of the Black Sea that seemed to ancient writers to connect their world with unfathomable regions beyond, full of myths and the supernatural, so that actual connection could hardly be imagined through much of antiquity. In that context, the failure of ancient empires to get to grips with this northern world above the Black Sea was part of a general attitude to this vast north, rooted in such experience as Greeks and others had accrued there. In antiquity occasional imperialist ambitions and adventures there—Persian, Greek, and Roman as well as the more local phenomenon of Mithridates Eupator—tended to exemplify the futility of such attempts and the need to limit imperialist ambition itself. Even under the Roman Empire the priority to the north of the Black Sea was to try to hold the coast and its immediate interior, by military and diplomatic means, while engaging in a range of exchanges which largely assisted in that attempt. There is much to be said for the old hypothesis[63] that the development of Byzantium-Constantinople as the centre of the eastern empire was driven by the economic importance of the crossroads there not only of Europe and Asia, but also of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean worlds.

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cluding the arguments of Otar Lordkipanidze, *Phasis: The River and City in Colchis* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2000).

60 David Braund, "Nero's Amber-Expedition in Context: Connectivity Between the Baltic, Black Sea, Adriatic and India from Herodotus to the Roman Empire," in *Interconnectivity in the Mediterranean and Pontic World during the Hellenistic and Roman Periods*, ed. Victor Cojocaru, Altay Coşkun, and Mătălina Dana (Cluj: Mega Publishing House, 2014), 435–56.

61 Bichler, "Persian Geography."

62 Dominique Kassab Tezgör, ed., *Sinope: The Results of Fifteen Years of Research. Proceedings of the International Symposium, May 7–9, 2009* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

63 Erik Gren, *Kleinasien und der Ostbalkan in der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der römischen Kaiserzeit* (Uppsala: Universites Arsskrift, 1941).

Stefan Albrecht

The Black Sea in the Middle Ages

The *Pontos euxeinos* was a Byzantine Sea in the Middle Ages. In the Byzantine millennium, its shores and waves were culturally, politically, and economically dominated by the successors of Eastern Rome. But while initially the Black Sea area was open only to the Mediterranean and, to a limited extent, to Asia, a new epoch began with the advance of the Rus in the ninth century, when the north-south connection to the Baltic was opened up. The conquest of Constantinople in 1204 and the expansion of the Mongol Empire placed the Black Sea in a new context in which people and goods circulated globally until the fall of Constantinople in 1453 turned the Black Sea into an Ottoman Lake.

1 From the End of Antiquity to the Appearance of the Rus

At the end of antiquity, the Byzantine Empire under Emperor Justinian I controlled almost the entire Black Sea coast, starting from Pontus, Paphlagonia, and Bithynia in the south and across the Bosporus and Thrace to the mouth of the Danube in the west and then to Crimea—surrounded by sea and barbarians—in the north and finally at least partially to the territories of Zichia and Lazica in the east.[1]

In the south, the centres of Byzantine power, apart from Constantinople at the junction of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, were initially Trebizond (today: Trabzon), Sinope (today: Sinop) and Amastris (today: Amasra). The entrance to the Black Sea through the straits was guarded by the city, fortress (and customs station) of Hieron. On the west coast, the ancient coastal cities such as Anchialos (today: Pomorie), Mesembria (today: Nesebar), Odessos (today: Varna), Tomis (today: Constanța), and the Danubian city of Silistra continued to exist for the time being. Crimea was controlled from Chersonesus (known as Cherson in the Byzantine era and located near today's Sevastopol) and Bosporos (today: Kerch); and on the opposite side of the Cimmerian Bosporos (i. e. the Kerch Strait), Phanagoria remained under Byzantine sway. The east coast saw varying degrees of Byzantine influence in Sebastopolis (today: Sukhumi), Nikopsis, Pitsunda, and Anakopia (today: New Athos/Akhali Atoni).

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1 Alexandru Madgearu, "The Byzantine Expansion in the Black Sea Area," *Revista de istorie militara, spec* (2008): 22–31; Peter Schreiner, "Das Schwarze Meer in der byzantinischen Geschichte und Literatur," in *Orbis Byzantinus: Byzanz und seine Nachbarn. Gesammelte Aufsätze 1970–2011*, ed. Peter Schreiner and Simon Alexandru (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române: Muzeul Brăilei Editura Istros, 2013), 315–25; Dan Ruscu, "The Black Sea in the Historical Writings of Late Antiquity," in *Advances in Ancient Black Sea Studies: Historiography, Archaeology and Religion*, ed. Victor Cojocaru, Ligia Ruscu, Thibaut Castelli, and Annamária-Izabella Pázsint, (Cluj-Napoca: Mega Publishing House, 2019), 143–64.

However, only the southern coast and the coastal region of Crimea remained almost continuously Byzantine until the conquest of Constantinople in 1204. The Arab invasions between the seventh and ninth centuries had no long-term consequences for the Black Sea region, except for the administrative reorganization into the *themata* Armeniakon, Opsikion, and Thrace, which were later further subdivided (into Chaldia, Paphlagonia, Bukellarion, and Optimatoi). Only occasionally did Arab troops reach the Black Sea coast.

Trebizond was added to the Armeniakon *thema*, from which Chaldia was spun off as a separate *thema* around about 840, becoming the nucleus of the late medieval Empire of Trebizond. Located on the border with the Persian Empire, Trebizond always played an important military and commercial role. Justinian I used it as a base in the campaigns against the Persians. In 654 Trebizond was conquered by the Arab commander Ḥabīb ibn Maslama, who had defeated the Byzantine forces at Dvin and pursued them to the Black Sea. Later, its function for long-distance trade should be emphasized, as evidenced by a remarkable variety of seals of Kommerkiarioi (i. e., fiscal officials).[2] Arab geographers of the tenth and eleventh centuries state that numerous Muslim merchants transshipped their goods at the market there.[3]

No less important was Sinope. The city, which also belonged to the Armeniakon *thema*, was a substantial base of the Byzantine Black Sea fleet until the twelfth century. It was from here that the fleet set out against Bosporos in 580 or against Cherson in 711, for example. As a trading port, it was significant for trade with the Mediterranean, and pottery from Sinope can be found everywhere in the Black Sea region. Even in the so-called "Dark Ages," it did not lose its importance, although the volume of trade decreased.[4] During underwater archaeological research, several ships of the fifth–sixth centuries were found off Sinope, underlining the supra-regional character of the port.[5] The city and its region repeatedly came into the focus of the Arabs: e. g., in 863 the emir of Malatya Umar al-Aqta moved to Paphlagonia, devastated the subjects of Armeniakon, sacked Sinope, and also conquered the city of Amisos (today: Samsun).

Amastris was the only major port of the Paphlagonian Black Sea coast; the fleet of the Paphlagonian *thema* was probably stationed there. Its *katepano*, appointed directly by the emperor, is attested between the ninth and the eleventh centuries. The Bukellarion fleet was based at Heraclea, the only significant port of this *thema.* In the tenth

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2 Pantelis Charalampakis, "Remarks on the Prosopography of the Byzantine Administration in Northeastern Asia Minor (7th–11th c.)," *Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies* 3 (2019): 71–96.

3 Andrew C. S. Peacock, "Black Sea Trade and the Islamic World Down to the Mongol Period," in *The Black Sea: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Gülden Erkut and Stephen Mitchell (London: British Institute at Ankara Monograph, 2007), 65–72.

4 Gergely Csiky, "Sinope in the Early Medieval Economy of the Black Sea Region (Questions and Problems)," *Antaeus* 33 (2015): 315–44.

5 Sean A. Kingsley, "Mapping Trade by Shipwrecks," in *Byzantine Trade, 4th–12th Centuries: The Archaeology of Local, Regional and International Exchange. Papers of the thirty-eighth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, St John's College, University of Oxford, March 2004,* ed. Marlia Mundell Mango (Aldershot: Ashgate Pub., 2009), 31–36.

century, the two commands were merged, at least temporarily, and apparently had the mission to intervene in Cherson as well, if necessary.[6]

As the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, Constantinople was also of central importance for the Black Sea region and the hinge to the Mediterranean. This is where the administrative threads came together, where extensive consumption and production took place. From here, trade and warships sailed through the Black Sea region, but it was also from that region that one of the heaviest attacks on the capital was launched, when the Slavs, allied with the Avars, came across the Black Sea with their boats in 626.[7]

On the west coast, Byzantine rule was much less stable. Although the coast, in contrast to the hinterland, could be held for a long time, the Avars and later the Bulgarians plundered the coastal towns so thoroughly that the cities and their surroundings remained deserted for a long time. But the ports of Anchialos and Mesembria remained in the long term as Byzantine naval bases, and the mouth of the Danube also remained Byzantine for the time being.[8] Eighth-century seals of Kommerkiarioi indicate that the Black Sea ports continued to be active. The coastal area was a constant bone of contention between Byzantium and Bulgaria. As early as 707, Justinian II had to cede Zagora to Bulgaria. Constantine V was able to recapture some territories in 763 after a concerted naval and army campaign at Anchialos, but they were soon lost again. With the Bulgarian victories under Khan Krum, Byzantium lost Anchialos and Mesembria. Debeltos was divided and became an important hub for trade between Bulgaria and Byzantium. It replaced Mesembria, where an *apothekē* (a kind of customs-depot or warehouse) had existed since 690.[9] Territories that Basileios I (867–86) was able to regain for Byzantium were already lost again under Tsar Simeon I (893–927). It was only with the end of the Bulgarian Empire that the coastal area became Byzantine again.[10] But even though Bulgaria's tsars were quite keen to dominate the coastal cities, they did not establish a navy. Byzantium, on the other hand, could always use its fleet to support its operations against Bulgaria.[11]

The area to the north between the Danube and the Dnipro was only sparsely populated. The ancient cities like Tyras (today: Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi) and Olbia remained

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6 Klaus Belke, *Paphlagonia and Honorias* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1996).

7 Critical of the tradition of the attacks: Martin Hurbanic, *The Avar Siege of Constantinople in 626: History and Legend* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 133–36.

8 Grigori Simeonov, "The Region of the Danube Delta in the 7th to 10th Century and the Case of the so-called Lykostomion Maritime Province," in *Seasides of Byzantium: Harbours and Anchorages of a Mediterranean Empire*, ed. Johannes Preiser-Kapeller, Taxiarchis G. Kolias, and Falko Daim (Mainz: Verlag des Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums, 2022), 235–56.

9 Florin Curta, *Southeastern Europe in the Middle Ages, 500–1250* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Panos Sophoulis, *Byzantium and Bulgaria, 775–831* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 54.

10 Peter Soustal, *Thrace (Thrakē, Rodopē and Haimimontos)* (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1991), 355–59.

11 Dimitar V. Dimitrov, "Simeonova Balgaria i moreto," *Bulgaria Mediaevalis* 8, no. 1 (2017): 373–430.

abandoned.[12] The next Byzantine post was not until Cherson, which for centuries was largely unchallenged as the most important Byzantine city in Crimea. Despite its remote location, the city was closely linked politically, economically, and culturally with the southern Black Sea coast.[13]

The relations of Cherson and the surrounding area to the Khazars who immigrated at the end of the seventh century are interpreted differently. The city itself was probably always subject to Byzantium, while the Khazars sent a representative (Tudun) at most. The extent of the Khazar Empire's influence on Crimea is disputed; some speak of complete dominance, others of a mediating "condominium hypothesis," and still others of the insignificance of the Khazar Empire.[14] Khazar immigrants may have come to the peninsula especially after the lost Arab-Khazar war of 722–37. They soon settled and adopted Byzantine customs, so that here we can speak of a provincial Byzantine culture which differed only in degree from the culture in "Gothic" Dory (Mangup).[15] Bosporos also remained, as is now assumed, Byzantine and was not conquered by the Khazars.[16] The same seems to be true of Phanagoria, situated on the Taman Peninsula. Traces of a Khazar population can hardly be found here, nor can the previously assumed presence of Bulgarians be confirmed.[17] Tamatarkha/Tmutarakan, on the other hand, was a Khazarian foundation of the seventh century in which the Saltovo culture (an early medieval culture of the Pontic steppe region) played an important role, but which was also influenced by Greeks, Alans, Jews, etc. Located at the end of the Silk Road, Tmutarakan played a certain role for the Black Sea trade; in any case, the trade in naphtha, which was used for Greek fire (a kind of flamethrower), was of importance.[18] The numerous coin hoards found in the Kuban area may have

12 Florin Curta, "Ethnicity in the Steppe Lands of the Northern Black Sea Region During the Early Byzantine Times," *Archaeologia Bulgarica* 23 (2019): 33–70; Florin Curta, *The Long Sixth Century in Eastern Europe* (Leiden: Brill, 2021), 158.

13 Stefan Albrecht, "Cherson als Zentralort auf der südwestlichen Krim (6.–10. Jahrhundert)," in *GrenzÜbergänge: Spätrömisch, frühchristlich, frühbyzantinisch als Kategorien*, ed. Ivan Bugarski et al., (Remshalden: Verlag Bernhard Albert Greiner, 2016), 355–84; Stefan Albrecht, "Die Krim und Cherson: Byzantinischer Vorposten im Norden des Schwarzen Meeres," in *Die Höhensiedlungen im Bergland der Krim: Umwelt, Kulturaustausch und Transformation am Nordrand des Byzantinischen Reiches*, ed. Stefan Albrecht, Michael Herdick, and Rainer Schreg (Mainz: Verlag des Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums, 2013), 447–70.

14 Iurii M. Mogarichev, Sergei B. Sorochan, and Andrei B. Sazanov, *Krym v "khazarskoe" vremia (VIII–seredina X vv): Voprosy istorii i arkheologii* (Moscow: Forum: Neolit, 2019).

15 Stefan Albrecht, Michael Herdick, and Rainer Schreg, "Neue Forschungen auf der Krim: Geschichte und Gesellschaft im Bergland der südwestlichen Krim – Eine Zusammenfassung," in Albrecht, Herdick, and Schreg, *Die Höhensiedlungen im Bergland der Krim*, 471–97.

16 Vadim V. Maiko, "Istoriia izucheniia saltovo-maiatskoi kultury Kryma v XXI veke," *Materialy po arkheologii, istorii i etnografii Tavrii* 23 (2018): 589–614.

17 Viktor N. Chkhaidze, *Fanagoriia v VI–X vekakh* (Moscow: Triumf print, 2012).

18 Viktor N. Chkhaidze, "Tmutarakan (80-e gg. X v. –90-e gg. XI v.) ocherki istoriografii," *Materialy i issledovaniia po arkheologii Severnogo Kavkaza* 6 (2006): 139–74; Chkhaidze, "Khazarskaia tamatarkha:

served, at least in part, as subsidy money with which to play the steppe peoples off against each other and to relieve the Byzantine frontiers.[19] Coin hoards of the late eighth century probably date back to the Khazar–Arab wars.[20] These wars led, among other things, to the creation of the independent kingdom of Abkhazia on the eastern Black Sea coast from the remains of Lazica, which had been subjugated by Justinian I. In 737, King Leon I was able to stop the advance of the Arabs at Anakopia, the capital of the kingdom, which was located directly on the sea. Even after Leon II (780–828) had moved the capital away from the Black Sea to the newly acquired interior of Kutaisi, the interest in the Black Sea coast remained, as can be seen, for example, in the cathedral of Pitsunda built by Bagrat III (978–1014).[21]

2 Pontos Euxeinos, Sea of the Rus, Sea of Sinope?

With the Rus/Varangians, the ninth century saw the entry to the Black Sea region of players who, like the Byzantines themselves, had a strong interest in seafaring, so much so that some Arab geographers even called the Black Sea the "Sea of the Rus."[22] The Rus, who assimilated Slavic culture and language,[23] connected the Black Sea region with the Baltic Sea region on the "route from the Varangians to the Greeks." The most important route was the Dnipro, but the Dniester was also used. The first written account of the Rus was in 839, when they were reported to have traveled from Constantinople to the court of Emperor Louis. In 860 a fleet of the Rus plundered the area around Constantinople. Further attacks followed in 907/911. In 941 Prince Igor led a fleet of 10,000 "Monoxyla" (logboats) against Constantinople, Bithynia, and Paphlagonia, where it is said to have destroyed numerous towns and monasteries. Later attacks by the Rus on Byzantium were recorded as late as 1024 and 1047, but they were repulsed and had little impact. In the tenth century, however, Byzantium was forced to make several treaties with the Rus to regulate navigation and trade in

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kulturnyi sloi Tamanskogo gorodishcha VII–X vv." (Candidate of science thesis, Russian academy of Science, Institute of Archeology, Moscow, 2007).

19 Daniel Syrbe, "Reiternomaden des Schwarzmeerraums (Kutriguren und Utiguren) und byzantinische Diplomatie im 6. Jahrhundert," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 65, no. 3 (2012): 291–316; Curta, *The Long Sixth Century,* 159.

20 Mikhail G. Abramzon and Sergey N. Ostapenko, "A Solidus of Leo III the Isaurian from Phanagoria," *Journal of Historical, Philological and Cultural Studies* 1, no. 63 (2019): 171–85.

21 George Hewitt, *The Abkhazians: A Handbook* (London: Routledge, 2013); Liudmila G. Khrushkova, *Vostochnoe Prichernomore v Vizantiiskuiu Epokhu* (Kaliningrad: Rost-Doafk, 2018); Khrushkova, *Les Monuments Chrétiens de La Côte Orientale de La Mer Noire: Abkhazie. IVe–XIVe siècles* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006).

22 Alexander Soloviev, "Mare Russiae," *Die Welt der Slaven* 4, no.1 (1959): 1–12; Henryk Paszkiewicz, "Mare Russiae," *Antemurale* 9 (1965): 133–62.

23 On the early Rus cf. Serhii M. Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 10–48.

the Black Sea.[24] The conquest of Cherson by Vladimir I (988) was decisive for Rus; it was there that it received its baptism. But the events leading up to the conquest brought some longer-term changes for the Black Sea region: The establishment of the Varangian Guard in Constantinople led to a steady influx of Varangians into the Black Sea region, who were present not only in the capital but even in Georgia.[25] As traders, the Rus also left traces of a permanent presence on the Black Sea, namely at the mouth of the Danube, on the island of Berezan at the mouth of the Dnipro, and in Tmutarakan. Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos recorded voyages by the Rus as far as Mesembria.[26]

On the lower Danube, we know of the presence of traders or warriors of Rus, for example, in Dinogetia, Păcuiul lui Soare, and Nufăru, which is believed to be that very Pereiaslavets conquered by Sviatoslav of Kyiv in 968 and which he made his capital for a short time.[27] The island of Berezan, known as St. Aitherios in the tenth century, was an important stopover on the way to Constantinople with a small settlement.[28]

Of greater long-term importance was the settlement of the Rus in Tmutarakan, which they had taken over from the Khazars at the end of the tenth century:

There has been much discussion about the extent of Slavic settlement and rule on the peninsula, despite insufficient sources. A picture was drawn of a powerful and extensive Rus principality with a Slavic population that stood between Kyiv and Byzantium. Today, however, it is assumed that the Rus presence in Tmutarakan was probably limited to the prince, his retinue and some merchants. Otherwise, Kasogians, Alans, and above all Greeks lived in the Byzantine-influenced city. Of the Rusian princes, only Mstislav (988–1036) and Oleg (1083–94) remained there for any substantial amount of time. On the one hand, they were to keep this important trade route under control for Kyiv or Chernigov (today: Chernihiv); on the other hand, they established close contacts with Byzantium and were thus able to gather cultural and symbolic capital in the competition for rule in Kyiv or Chernigov. Whether Tmutarakan

24 Jana Malingoudi, *Die russisch-byzantinischen Verträge des 10. Jahrhunderts aus diplomatischer Sicht* (Thessaloniki: Vanias, 1994).

25 Fedir Androshchuk, Jonathan Shepard, and Monica White, eds., *Byzantium and the Viking World* (Uppsala: Uppsala Universiteit, 2016); Peter Halfter, "Franks and Varangians in Georgia and Armenia in the Early and High Middle Ages," *Le muséon* 129 (2016): 133–98.

26 Elena Aleksandrovna Melnikova, "Rhosia and the Rus in Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos' De administrando imperio," in Androshchuk, Shepard, and White, *Byzantium and the Viking World*, 315–36.

27 Ion Tentiuc, "On the Viking Enclaves and Their Relations with the Inhabitants in the Carpathian-Dniester Region between the 9th and the 11th Centuries," *DACIA* 62–63 (2019–2018): 249–86; Valeri Yotov, "Data about Northmen's Presence in the Lower Danube Area," in *Studia Romana et Medievalia. Miscellanea in Honorem Annos LXXX Peragentis Professoris Emeriti Dan Gh. Teodor Oblata,* ed. Dan Aparaschivei and George Bilavschi (Bucharest: Editura Istros, 2018), 467–76.

28 [Anon.], "Karl," in *Prosopography of the Middle Byzantine Period Online* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), https://www.degruyter.com/document/database/PMBZ/entry/PMBZ25831/html, on the runestone with further reading.

was under Byzantine rule in the twelfth century is a matter of controversy given the difficult source situation.[29]

Further east, at Anakopia and Soteroupolis, a Byzantine *strategos* resided for half a century, after, around 1033, the second wife of Giorgi I of Georgia Alde had fled to Constantinople with her son Demetre, half-brother of Bagrat IV, and handed over her inheritance to the emperor. The aim of Byzantine policy may have been to occupy this stretch of coast where spurs of the Silk Road reached the Black Sea. From here Byzantium also maintained traditionally good relations with the Alans, who were important for regional balance.[30] Until the catastrophe of Manzikert in 1071, the area remained Byzantine.[31]

After this battle, the decline of Byzantine rule over large parts of Asia Minor began. The Seljuks soon extended their power to the Black Sea coast and were even able to briefly conquer Sinope in 1085. But participants of the crusade of 1101, who were on the run after a defeat by Danishmend Gazi, reached Byzantine territory again in Bafra and Sinope and were able to start the journey to Constantinople partly by ship and partly by land along the coast. In 1124/7 and 1139 Danishmend's successor, Amir Gazi, invaded the coastal area of the Black Sea. And despite all his efforts, thereafter John II Komnenos failed to keep more than just the coastal strip under Byzantine control.[32]

The western coast was, after the conquest of the Bulgarian Empire, again firmly in Byzantine hands at the beginning of the eleventh century. Here, between the Danube and the Black Sea coast, there existed, among others, the *thema* Paradunavon,[33] joined southward along the coast by the *thema* Thrake, from which in 1087 Alexios I Komnenos spun off the *thema* Anchialos with the cities of Anchialos and Mesembria, which

29 Jonathan Shepard, "Closer Encounters with the Byzantine World: The Rus at the Straits of Kerch," in *Pre-Modern Russia and Its World: Essays in Honor of Thomas S. Noonan*, ed. Kathryn Louise Reyerson (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006), 15–78; Viktor N. Chkhaidze, *Tamatarkha: rannesrednevekovyi gorod na Tamanskom poluostrove* (Moscow: Taus, 2008); Constantin Zuckerman, "The End of Byzantine Rule in North-Eastern Pontus," *Materialy po arkheologii, istorii i etnografii Tavrii* 22 (2017): 311–36; Viktor N. Chkhaidze, "Matarkha-Tmutarakan – mezhdu Vizantiei i Rusiu: Problemy politiko-administrativnogo statusa," *Vostochnaia Evropa v drevnosti i srednevekove* 30 (2018): 337–41.

30 Andrei Vinogradov, *Istoriia i iskusstvo khristianskoi Alanii*, (Moscow: Publisher, 2019); Szilvia Kovács, "Alan Women in the Neighboring Foreign Courts in the Eleventh-Twelfth Centuries," *Chronica: Annual of the Institute of History, University of Szeged* 7–8 (2008): 134–43.

31 Werner Seibt and Ivan Jordanov, "Stratēgós Sōtēroupóleōs kaí Auakoupías: Ein mittelbyzantinisches Kommando in Abchazien (11. Jahrhundert)," *Studies in Byzantine Sigillography* 9 (2006): 231–40; Szabolcs Polgar, "Notes on the Role of Alania in International Trade in the Early Middle Ages (Eighth–Tenth Centuries) on the Basis of Written Sources," *Chronica. Annual of the Institute of History, University of Szeged* 7–8 (2007): 178–83.

32 *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition, s.v. "Ḳarā Deniz," by Xavier de Planhol, accessed March 22, 2021, http://dx-doi-org.uaccess.univie.ac.at/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0441.

33 Vasile Marculet, *Thema Paristrion – Paradunavon: c.1018/1020–c.1200/1202, istorie, evoluție, rol* (Medias: Editura Samuel, 2008); Alexandru Madgearu, *Byzantine Military Organization on the Danube, 10th–12th Centuries* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 85.

were important naval bases. At the same time, the Pechenegs moved from the grass steppe east of the Dnipro to and across the Danube border, from where they advanced far into the Byzantine Empire on several occasions. When they attacked Byzantium at the request of the Emir Tzachas of Smyrna, they were crushed at Lebounion in 1091 by Byzantine troops and the following Cumans.[34] These Cumans had been the new masters of the Pontic-Caucasian steppe since the middle of the eleventh century. In the Balkans, they led raids into the Byzantine territory and became allies of the new Bulgarian dynasty of the Asenids, who themselves probably had Cuman roots. In Crimea, they had bases of their own, such as Yalta, from where they traded with Byzantine Cherson. If the information of the *Tale of Igor's Campaign*, composed around 1186 (?), is historically accurate, then at the end of the twelfth century they ruled the area from Cherson to Tmutarakan.[35]

3 From the Conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders to the Conquest by the Ottomans

The conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders of the Fourth Crusade and the Venetians and the advance of the Mongols into the Black Sea area not only changed the political order permanently. Economic relations also radically expanded, as the Black Sea now became a transit area for international trade between Spain and China and between the steppe and Mamluk Egypt.[36] At the same time, the Mongols temporarily disrupted the Baltic-Black Sea trade, which was later conducted mainly via Poland,[37] and in which the Black Sea Armenian diaspora played a major role.[38] Not only trade and politics changed considerably. The incomparably denser written tradition, especially

34 Marek Meško, "Pecheneg Groups in the Balkans (ca. 1053–1091) according to the Byzantine Sources," in *The Steppe Lands and the World Beyond Them: Studies in Honor of Victor Spinei on his 70th Birthday*, ed. Florin Curta and Bogdan-Petru Maleon (Iaşi: Editura Universităţii "Alexandru Ioan Cuza", 2013), 179–205.

35 Andrei A. Zalizniak *"Slovo o polku Igoreve": vzgliad lingvista*, 3rd ed. (Moscow: Rukopisnye pamiatniki Drevnei Rusi, 2008).

36 Virgil Ciocîltan and Samuel P. Willcocks, *The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

37 Henryk Samsonowicz, "Die Handelsstraße Ostsee-Schwarzes Meer im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert," in *Der hansische Sonderweg? Beiträge zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Hanse*, ed. Stuart Jenks and Michael North (Cologne: Böhlau, 1993), 23–30.

38 Alexandr Osipian, "Practices of Integration and Segregation: Armenian Trading Diasporas in Their Interaction with the Genoese and Venetian Colonies in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea (1289–1484)," in *Union in Separation: Diasporic Groups and Identities in the Eastern Mediterranean (1100–1800)*, ed. Georg Christ and Franz-Julius Morche (Rome: Viella, 2015), 349–62.

of the richly flowing Italian sources, changes the perspective and makes the period after 1204 appear as a new epoch, as the actual Middle Ages.[39]

It is true that the Italian trading cities had already received and used privileges for trade on the Black Sea from the Byzantine emperors before 1204. But it was not until the fall of Constantinople in 1204 and the expansion of the Mongols' power over the Black Sea area, whose coasts they largely controlled directly or indirectly, that this region became interesting for Italian merchants. The Venetians opened their first offices in Crimea, including in Cumanian Sudak, as early as 1206, and it was here that the Maffeo brothers and Nicolo Polo, Marco Polo's father, stopped off on their way to the Mongol Empire in 1255. After the Treaty of Nymphaion, in which Genoa received extensive privileges in the Black Sea from Byzantium in 1261 for its aid against Venice, the latter moved its trading bases to Trebizond and Tana (today: Azov), while the Genoese established themselves in Crimea. From Caffa (today: Feodosiia), acquired from the Mongols around 1266 or a little later, a large administrative apparatus was used to control or co-administer numerous other Genoese settlements in the Black Sea area. These included the settlements in the port cities of Bulgaria up to Moncastro, where on the one hand grain was shipped from the interior of the country, but on the other hand, the way to Central Europe was open.[40]

The Genoese also had larger colonies of their own on the southern coast, in Simisso (today: Samsun) and Samastris (today: Amasra), which fell into the hands of the Ottomans at a late stage: Samastris, for example, was not conquered by Sultan Mehmed II until 1459.[41] The Genoese also had great influence in the Empire of Trebizond, where they enjoyed considerable trading advantages, much to the displeasure of the locals. Trading posts continued to exist on the Circassian coast, where Genoa was primarily involved in the slave trade. The Genoese family of Guizolfi even managed to marry into a Circassian princely dynasty in the fifteenth century.[42] The lion's share of the lucrative slave trade, however, was conducted in Caffa, from where slaves from the Black Sea region were brought primarily to Italy and, mainly via the southern Black Sea coast

39 For Brătianu, the period before that is the "antichambre du Moyen Age." George I. Brătianu, *La mer Noire: des origines à la conquête ottomane* (Munich: Societas academica Dacoromana, 1969), 99–167; Evgeny Khvalkov, *The Colonies of Genoa in the Black Sea Region: Evolution and Transformation* (London: Routledge, 2017); Wilhelm von Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen âge* (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1885).

40 Dennis Deletant, "Genoese, Tatars and Rumanians at the Mouth of the Danube in the Fourteenth Century," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 62, no. 4 (1984): 511–30; Serban Papacostea, "La pénétration du commerce génois en Europe centrale: Maurocastrum (Moncastro) et la route moldave," *Il mar nero* 3 (1998–1997): 149–58; Rossica Panova, "The Black Sea Coastal Cities in the Economic and Political Interrelations among Medieval Bulgaria, Venice and Genoa," *Études Balkaniques* 35, no. 1–2 (1999): 52–58.

41 Khvalkov, *The Colonies of Genoa.*

42 Evgeny Khvalkov, "The Guizolfi Family: Brokers in the Medieval Black Sea Space," *The World of the Orient* 3 (2019): 31–45.

and past Constantinople, to Egypt.[43] Conflicts between the Golden Horde and the Genoese and Venetians occurred several times (not only) in Caffa and Tana, and in this context, the Great Plague also reached Europe in 1346/47.[44] At the end of the fourteenth century, the Genoese were able to bring the southern coastal strip of Crimea under their rule, before the decline of Caffa began in the fifteenth century. The city was conquered by the Ottomans in 1475.

The conflict-ridden relations of the Italian trading cities in the Apennine Peninsula extended into the Black Sea region.[45] Material evidence of these disputes includes a wreck found off the coast of Crimea near Novyi Svit in 2006, which was almost certainly the victim of a conflict between Pisans and the overpowering Genoese in 1277. The cargo consisted mainly of pottery from Sinope, Amaseia (today: Amasya), and Constantinople; one purse contained small change from Trebizond. This suggests that the ship was primarily engaged in cabotage in the Black Sea area. Pottery from Caffa in the north and southeast between Moncastro and Sinope and Byzantine pottery on the west coast also indicate that the Black Sea was a common trading area.[46] Important trade goods exported over and from the Black Sea area were, apart from slaves, especially grain, honey, and furs; imports were fabrics from Flanders, pottery from the western Mediterranean, and celadon pottery from China and Persia.[47]

The conquest of Constantinople accelerated the fragmentation of the Black Sea region, as several successor empires arose on the soil of the Byzantine Empire, competing with each other and with the strengthening Bulgarian and Seljuk empires.

The southeastern Black Sea coast was initially controlled from Trebizond by the Great Comneni. With Georgian support, they managed to conquer most of the coast and advance as far as Bithynia. However, in 1214 the advance was stopped by a united army of Theodore Laskaris of Nicaea and the Seljuks. Bithynia and Paphlagonia came under the rule of Nicaea, and Sinope became an important Seljuk port city. The Empire

43 Hannah Barker, *That Most Precious Merchandise: The Mediterranean Trade in Black Sea Slaves, 1260–1500* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019); Sergei P. Karpov, *Italianskie morskie respubliki i Iuzhnoe Prichernomore v XIII–XV vv.: Problemy torgovli* (Moscow: Izdatelskii dom [Tipografiia] MGU, 1990).

44 Hannah Barker, "Laying the Corpses to Rest: Grain, Embargoes, and Yersinia Pestis in the Black Sea, 1346–48," *Speculum* 96, no. 1 (2021): 97–126.

45 Serban Papacostea, *La mer Noire: carrefour des grandes routes intercontinentales 1204–1453* (Bucharest: Institutul Cultural Român, 2006).

46 Lilia Dergaciova, "A 13th Century 'Purse' from the Wreck of Novy Svet, Ukraine," *Skyllis* 9 (2009): 178–87; Sergey Zelenko, "The Trade Contacts of the Anatolian Region with the Crimean Black Sea Coast During the Late Byzantine Period," in *Atti del IX Congresso Internazionale AIECM2 (Venezia, 23–28 Novembre 2009),* ed. Sauro Gelichi (Florence: All'Insegna del Giglio, 2012*),* 208–11; Mariia Manolova-Voikova, "Importnaia vizantiiskaia sgraffito keramika iz srednevekovykh poselenii v Bolgarskom Prichernomore," in *Polivnaia keramika Sredizemnomoria i Prichernomor'ia X–XVIII vv,* ed. Sergei Bocharov (Chișinău: Stratum Publishing House, 2017), 317–26.

47 Sergei P. Karpov, "Main Changes in the Black Sea Trade and Navigation, 12th–15th Centuries," in *Proceedings of the 22nd International Congress of Byzantine Studies. Plenary papers* (Sofia: Bulgarian Historical Heritage Foundation, 2011), 417–30.

of Trebizond was limited to the area between the mouth of the Akampsis (Turkish: Çoruh) to Amisos; Cherson also belonged to it in the early thirteenth century. After the emergence of the Mongol Empire of the Ilkhans in 1256 and the resulting change in the long-distance trade routes from Baghdad to Tabriz, Trebizond became an important trade hub between East and West. It was not long, therefore, before Genoese and Venetian merchants settled here, continuing a highly profitable trade in spices, silk, cotton, precious metals, and stones. After the crisis of the Asian trade in the middle of the fourteenth century, the trade was more limited to local products such as hazelnuts, wine, and other agricultural products. Grain was partly imported from other regions of the Black Sea. There were regular conflicts with the Italian merchants, which just as regularly ended in war-like confrontations.[48]

From the conquest of Antalya (1207) and Sinope (1214) onwards, the Seljuq Sultanate bordered two seas and was thus part of a trade route that led from Rus and the Dasht-i Kipchak via the important port city of Sudak, which is why Amir Husam al-Din Chupan also conquered the latter soon after taking Sinope.[49] After the Seljuqs' crushing defeat by the Mongols at the Köse Dağ in 1243, the Seljuq Empire began its decline, dissolving around 1308 with the death of Mesud II. Centrifugal forces had already strengthened before this and now triumphed; they included the Beylik of Canik, who had also obtained Sinope with Kastamonu in 1309. Attempts to ally with Wallachia against the strengthening Ottomans granted respite, as did Timur Lenk's triumphant march in 1402, before the area finally became Ottoman in 1461, shortly before the conquest of Trebizond.[50]

The Latin Empire, which came into being in 1204, did not play a major role as a riparian state of the Black Sea, even though it was granted in the partition treaty Eastern Thrace as far as Agathopolis (today: Akhtopol), the *themata* Optimatoi, and Paphlagonia, Sinope, and Oinoe, none which it was ever able to occupy, however.[51] The Latin Empire did not pursue an active Black Sea policy, although it did put out feelers to the Mongols to the north of the sea. In the form of coins, traces of the Latin Empire in the

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48 Sergei Karpov, *Srednevekovyi Pont* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2001); Anthony Eastmond, Glenn Peers, and Barbara Roggema, eds., *Byzantium's Other Empire: Trebizond* (Istanbul: ANAMED Koç University Research Center for Anatolian Civilizations, 2016); Sergei P. Karpov, *Istoriia Trapezundskoi imperii* (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2018); Jakob Ph. Fallmerayer, *Geschichte des Kaisertums von Trapezunt* (Munich: Weber, 1827).

49 Alexander Dzhanov, "Pokhody seldzhukskikh voisk na Sugdak i v Kilikiyu v pravlenie Ala al-Dina Kaikubada I.," *Sugdeiskii sbornik* 3 (2008): 46–78; Koray Özcan, "The Anatolian Seljuk City: An Analysis on Early Turkish Urban Models in Anatolia," *Central Asiatic Journal* 54, no. 2 (2010): 273–90.

50 Nagy Pienaru, "Relatiile lui Mircea cel Batrân cu emiratul pontic Candar-ogullari," *Revista istorica* NS 7 (1996): 483–510; Nagy Pienaru, "The Timurids and the Black Sea," in *From Pax Mongolica to Pax Ottomanica,* ed. Ovidiu Cristea and Liviu Pilat (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 113–45.

51 Antonio Carile, "Partitio terrarum Imperii Romanie," *Studi veneziani* 7 (1965): 125–306; Aleksandar Uzelac, "Balduin od Enoa i 'nomadska diplomatija'Latinskog carstva," *Istorijski časopis* 61 (2012): 45–65.

Black Sea region can be traced as far as Crimea and the Mongolian Dniester-Prut region.[52]

The rulers of Nicaea, as heirs of the Byzantine Empire, were able to reconquer Constantinople in 1261. Important Black Sea ports of the re-established empire in Asia Minor and at the same time enclaves in the Seljuk territory were Amastris and Heraclea Pontica until they fell first to the Seljuks in 1360 and then to the Ottomans in 1393. The European coasts changed masters more frequently. The Bulgarian Empire, newly founded in 1185, had taken the opportunity to expand to Thrace in 1204. Under the tsars Boril (1207–18) and Ivan Asen II (1218–41) it dominated the Black Sea coast from Agathopolis to the mouth of the Dniester. Bulgaria's decline began after the Mongol attack in 1241, when it lost numerous maritime cities between Agathopolis and Mesembria to the re-emerging Byzantine Empire. Tsar Theodore Svetoslav (1300–22) reconquered them, but almost two generations later (1366), Mesembria was again seized by Amadeo VI of Savoy[53] for his cousin Emperor John V. Mesembria then became the center of the Byzantine apanage of Zagora, which the emperor assigned to his son Michael. Mesembria fell to the Ottomans shortly before the fall of Constantinople in the spring of 1453.[54]

In the middle of the fourteenth century, a rapidly expanding principality emerged from the disintegrating Bulgaria: the Despotate of Dobruja, with the centers Karvuna (today: Balchik), Kaliakra, and finally Varna. It owned the most important Black Sea ports from the mouth of the Danube to Anchialos, and the Despotate even built its own fleet, with the help of which it fought a long war against Genoa.[55] The Dobruja fleet joined the fleets of Venice, Genoa, Savoy, or the Burgundians, and the small fleets of the Ottomans and Seljuks, as well as the Burgundian and other pirates.[56]

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52 Vera Guruleva, "Osnovnye problemy numizmatiki Kryma vizantiiskoi epokhi," in *Materialy i issledovaniia Otdela numizmatiki: po materialam Konferentsii "Sfragistika, numizmatika, geraldika srednevekovogo Kryma"* (St. Petersburg: Izdatelstvo Gosudarstvennogo Ermitazha, 2018), 61–82; Andrei Crivenco and Mikhail N. Butyrskyi, "Monety Latinskoi i Vizantiiskoi imperii iz nakhodok na territorii Pruto-Dnestrovia," in *V poiskakh sushchnosti: Sbornik statei v chest 60-letiia N. D. Russeva*, ed. Mark Evgenevich Tkachuk and Georgi Georgiev Atanasov (Chișinău: Universitet Vysshaia antropologicheskaia shkola, 2019), 89–95.

53 Matteo Magnani, "The Crusade of Amadeus VI of Savoy between History and Historiography," in *Italy and Europe's Eastern Border: 1204–1669*, ed. Iulian Mihai Damian, Ioan-Aurel Pop, and Mihailo Popović (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012), 215–36.

54 Soustal, *Thrace*, 357.

55 Georgi Georgiev Atanasov, *Dobrudzhanskoto despotstvo: kam politicheskata, tsarkovnata, stopanskata i kulturnata istoria na Dobrudzha prez XIV vek* (Veliko Tarnovo: Faber, 2009).

56 Jacques Paviot, "La piraterie bourguignonne en Mer Noire à la moitié du XVe siècle," in *Horizons marins, itinéraires spirituels (Ve–XVIIIe siècles): Mentalités et sociétés. II: Marins navires et affaires*, ed. Henri Dubois, Jean-Claude Hocquet, and André Vauchez (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1987), 203–14.

At about the same time, and in constant conflict with Poland and Hungary, the Principality of Moldavia came into being.[57] For both countries, the ports of Moldavia were of great importance for the Levant trade, which led further west or north via Bistrița or Lviv.[58] In the fifteenth century, the princes of Moldavia attempted several times to pursue an independent "Black Sea policy," for which they tried to establish an anti-Ottoman coalition after the fall of Constantinople with the principality of Theodoro in Crimea (which had come into being in the fourteenth century), Genoa, and Trebizond.[59]

As is well known, all attempts to contain the Ottoman Empire failed. It gradually conquered more and more territories on the Black Sea, and only Constantinople stubbornly resisted. To hamper the latter's supply from the Black Sea region, Sultan Bayezid built the fortress of Anadolu Hisarı in 1394, which was supplemented opposite by Rumeli Hisarı in 1452, cutting off any relief fleet from the Black Sea. The last attempt by a Polish-Hungarian crusading army to come to the aid of Byzantium ended in disaster at Varna in 1444.[60] Thereafter, in rapid succession, the Ottomans conquered Constantinople, Trebizond, Sinope, Amastris, Caffa, and Theodoro in Crimea, and subjugated the Danubian Principalities and the Circassians, turning the once Byzantine Pontos Euxeinos into an Ottoman Lake.[61]

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57 Daniel Ursprung, "Die Moldau von der Entstehung im 14. bis zur Unterwerfung unter osmanische Herrschaft im 16. Jahrhundert," in *Herrschaft und Politik in Südosteuropa von 1300 bis 1800*, ed. Oliver Jens Schmitt (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2021), 327–84.

58 Zsigmond Pál Pach, "Hungary and the Levantine Trade in the 14th–17th Centuries," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 60, no. 1 (2007): 14–16; Matei Cazacu, "À propos de l'expansion polono-lituanienne au nord de la mer Noire aux XIVe–XVe siècles: Czarnigrad, la 'Cité Noire' de l'embouchure du Danube," in *Idem, Au carrefour des empires et des mers : études d'histoire médiévale et modern*, ed. Emanuel Constantin Antoche and Lidia Cotovanu (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române et Editura Istros a Muzeului Vrailei "Carol I", 2015) 313–34.

59 Stefan Sorin Gorovei, "The Principality of Theodoro (Mangup) and Stephen the Great's Moldavia: Observations and Hypotheses," in Cristea and Pilat, *From Pax Mongolica*, 146–68.

60 John Jefferson, *The Holy Wars of King Wladislas and Sultan Murad: The Ottoman-Christian Conflict from 1438–1444* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

61 Sandra Origone, "La fine del dominio greco nel mar Nero: Costantinopoli 1453, Trebisonda 1461," in *La prise de Constantinople: L'événement, sa portée et ses échos,* ed. Mohamed Tahar Mansouri (Tunis: Centre d'études et de recherches économiques et sociales, 2008), 131–54.

Dariusz Kołodziejczyk

The Ottoman Empire, the Crimean Khanate, Poland-Lithuania, Persia, and Others: The Northern Black Sea Region (Fourteenth–Eighteenth Centuries)

1 The Persistence of the Golden Horde

The boundary between the southern and the northern Black Sea landscape is perhaps nowhere as visible as in Crimea, where after crossing the mountain range that occupies the southern tip of the peninsula, one enters a vast steppe that extends to the horizon. Whereas on the southern slopes of the mountains, the mild climate is reminiscent of the Mediterranean and allows horticulture and viticulture, northern grasslands have been the home of husbandry since ancient times.[1] In fact, it was part of the great Eurasian steppe that extended from Dobruja, in the west, towards present-day Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Manchuria, in the east. At the outset of the early modern era, this vast area still owed its political structure to the Genghisid empire that had been founded in the thirteenth century. Genghis Khan's male descendants reigned in Kazan and Astrakhan until 1552 and 1556, respectively, in Siberia and Bukhara until 1598, and in Crimea until 1783, while many other dynasties claimed Genghisid descent and adopted Genghisid titles, or at least inherited elements of Genghisid taxation and military organization.[2] This pattern applied not only to numerous Turkic and Mongol rulers in Central Asia, but also to the Great Mughals in Delhi and the Rurikids in Moscow.[3]

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[1] For an encounter between a settled culture and Scythian nomads on the northern shores of the Black Sea, which in the eyes of ancient Greek colonists represented the contact between "civilisation" and "barbarism," see Neal Ascherson, *Black Sea: The Birthplace of Civilisation and Barbarism* (London: Vintage, 1996), 49.

[2] On the khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan and Sibir, see Donald Ostrowski, "Ruling Class Structures of the Kazan Khanate," in *The Turks*, vol. 2, *Middle Ages*, ed. Hasan Celâl Güzel, Cem Oğuz, and Osman Karatay (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2002), 841–47; Ilia Zaitsev, "The Khanate of Astrakhan," in Güzel et al., *The Turks*, 848–53; Ilia Zaitsev, "The Khanate of Sibir," in Güzel et al., *The Turks*, 860–66. On the Shaybanids in Bukhara and other Central Asian dynasties, see Mehmet Alpargu, "Khanates of Turkestan," in Güzel et al., *The Turks*, 899–922.

[3] On the role of Genghisid heritage in the making and legitimacy of the Muscovite state, cf. Omeljan Pritsak, "Moscow, the Golden Horde, and the Kazan Khanate from a Polycultural Point of View," *Slavic Review* 26 (1967): 577–83; Edward Keenan, "Muscovy and Kazan: Some Introductory Remarks on the Patterns of Steppe Diplomacy," *Slavic Review* 26 (1967): 548–58; Donald Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304–1589* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and the latter's discussion with Charles Halperin in *Kritika* 1 (2000), 237–57, 267–97, 830–32.

The early modern era also saw the birth of new steppe empires, most notably those founded by the Oirats. The Dzungar Khanate, extending between the Altai Mountains and Tibet, reached the apex of its power under Galdan (r. 1676–97), to be swallowed by Manchu China in the following century. Another group of the Oirats, known as Kalmyks to their Turkic neighbors, crossed through the Kazakh steppe and arrived on the lower Volga, reaching the Black Sea shores and pushing the local Nogay tribes into a westward migration.[4] The most renowned Kalmyk ruler, Ayuki (r. 1669–1724), is described by Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay as "the last of the great nomad sovereigns" (*le dernier des grands souverains nomades*),[5] while yet another French scholar—René Grousset—referred to the Oirat empire as a "historical anachronism."[6] By far the most successful nomadic dynasty of the early modern era was the Manchu (Jurchen) Qing, who not only secured the throne in Beijing, but extended the traditional borders of China far into the north and the west, including their ancestral lands in Manchuria as well as Dzungaria, Mongolia, and Tibet.

Grousset's dismissive judgment on the value of early modern steppe empires is not entirely just. In both Eastern European and Central Asian theaters of war, mounted horsemen continued to play an important role.[7] The hostile environment made the steppe barely accessible for regular armies composed of infantrymen and equipped with heavy artillery, as the Russians were to bitterly experience during their invasions of the Crimean Khanate in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Yet, even if a single infantryman was no match for a nomad warrior, the sheer numbers of drilled peasants, massively recruited and provisioned with the help of modern state bureaucracy, proved decisive for the triumph of agricultural empires over their nomadic neighbors. The survival of the Qing dynastic empire into the twentieth century can be explained by the fact that they combined nomadic virility with the control of a huge bureaucratic machine of the Chinese state, tapping its almost unlimited human and material resources.[8] Far to the west, the last Genghisid state ruled by the Giray dynasty also owed its impressive longevity to the fact that it combined an extensive

4 Michael Khodarkovsky, *Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600–1771* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "Tibet in the Crimea? Polish Embassy to the Kalmyks of 1653 and a Project of an Anti-Muslim Alliance," *Acta Poloniae Historica* 114 (2016): 231–53. On the Nogays, see also below.

5 Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Les Kalmuks de la Volga entre l'Empire russe et l'Empire ottoman sous le règne de Pierre le Grand (d'après les documents des Archives Ottomanes)," *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 7, no. 1 (1966): 63–76, esp. 65.

6 René Grousset, *L'empire des steppes: Attila, Gengis-khan, Tamerlan* (Paris: Payot, 1948), 621.

7 Cf. Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "Az oszmán 'katonai lemaradás' problémája és a kelet-európai hadszíntér / The problem of Ottoman 'military backwardness' and the East European theatre of war," *AETAS*, no. 4 (1999): 142–48.

8 On the role of the Manchu element in Qing China, see Mark Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Evelyn Rawski, *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross-Border Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

steppe foreground roamed by Tatar and Nogay warriors with a demographic hinterland and economic center situated in the Crimean Peninsula, and the Khanate could also rely on the protection of the mighty Ottoman Empire situated across the Black Sea.

There is an ongoing scholarly dispute as to whether the Golden Horde had collapsed by 1502 and was replaced by new political bodies which, although claiming Genghisid heritage and reigned by Genghisid rulers, should be regarded as distinct and separate states, or whether we should rather treat them as legal successors and hence admit that the Golden Horde survived, albeit in a diminished form, until the Russian conquest of the Crimea in 1783. This discussion is remindful of similar disputes concerning the (dis)continuation between Kyivan Rus and Muscovy, the Roman and Byzantine Empires, or the *translatio imperii* between the Carolingian and the Ottonian dynasties. In fact, there are serious arguments that support the continuation thesis.[9] Although Hacı Giray, the founder of the Giray dynasty who secured his power in Crimea in 1442,[10] started from a humble position as a Lithuanian client, his Genghisid pedigree notwithstanding, his son, Mengli Giray, already proudly claimed his right to the rule over both the Volga and the Crimean hordes. Furthermore, his grandson, Mehmed Giray, assumed the title of the ruler of all the Mongols (*barça Mogul padişahı*) and, in the years 1521–23, substantiated his claim with the conquests of Kazan and Astrakhan.[11] As late as 1654, a century after the Russian tsars had established themselves on the Volga and over fifty years after they had conquered Siberia, Khan Mehmed IV Giray claimed his hereditary rights to Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberia, the three khanates that, along with the Crimean Khanate, made up the territory of the Golden Horde.[12] In their documents, the Giray khans were invariably referred to as the rulers of the Great Horde (*Ulu Orda* or *Ulug Orda*), while Crimea, or more precisely the Crimean throne (*taht-i Kırım*), entered their *intitulatio* only in the seventeenth century, and was always preceded by the former, evidently more honorable designation.[13] Whereas Crimea, which had once constituted a province (*ulus*) of the Golden Horde, was undisputedly the base of their rule, the Girays' aspirations reached far beyond the peninsula.

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9 For a groundbreaking study that argued that the Golden Horde had not been destroyed but taken over by Mengli Giray Khan, see Leslie Collins, "On the Alleged 'Destruction' of the Great Horde in 1502," in *Manzikert to Lepanto: The Byzantine World and the Turks, 1071–1571. Papers given at the Nineteenth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Birmingham, March 1985*, ed. Anthony Bryer and Michael Ursinus (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1991), 361–99.

10 For the most recent chronology with references to earlier literature, see Vladislav Gulevich, *Ot ordynskogo ulusa k khanstvu Gireev: Krym v 1399–1502 gg.* (Kazan: Institut istorii im. Sh. Mardzhani AN RT, 2018), 188–96.

11 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania: International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (15th–18th Century). A Study of Peace Treaties Followed by Annotated Documents* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 10–11, 60, 551–54.

12 Kołodziejczyk, 10, 167, 363.

13 Kołodziejczyk, 343–45, 350–61.

2 Lithuania's Phantom Body

The impressive territorial growth of Lithuania in the second half of the fourteenth century was enabled by an internal crisis in the Golden Horde, but also by the alliances between the Gediminids and the Horde's rulers. By 1362, Algirdas secured his hold over Kyiv and the territories of southern Rus thanks to his alliance with Emir Mamay, yet this alliance had to be paid for with the grand duke's formal acknowledgment of the Horde's suzerainty and his consent to send a yearly tribute.[14] Under Jogaila and Vytautas, Lithuania obtained a further opportunity to extend its territory towards the Black Sea thanks to the struggle of Tokhtamysh with Tamerlane and Timur Qutlug —Tamerlane's nominee installed on the throne of the Golden Horde. After 1395, when Tokhtamysh sought refuge in Lithuania, he was actually the weaker partner, yet the two sides retained the appearance of tributary relations between Lithuania and the Golden Horde.[15] When the Crimean Girays formally claimed their rights to the heritage of the Golden Horde, they began issuing *yarlıq*s to Jagiellonian rulers that invoked the ancient alliance between Tokhtamysh and Vytautas. These *yarlıq*s, which bestowed on the recipients vast territories situated in present-day Ukraine and western Russia, continued to be issued until 1560. They regularly listed the forts on the Black Sea coast that had been founded by Vytautas at the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries— Kachybei (today: Odesa) and Dashov (today: Ochakiv)—as well as those located in the steppe between the Dniester (Dnister) and the Boh (Southern Bug/Buh) rivers, such as Maiak (today: Maiaky), Iabu, and Balykly. Lithuanian and Polish merchants were authorized to extract salt from steppe deposits surrounding Kachybei and transport it to Kyiv and Lutsk without any hindrance.[16] The *yarlıq*s also included the towns that had been captured by Algirdas by 1362, including Kyiv, as well as—more interestingly—those that had never actually belonged to Lithuania, like Pskov and Novgorod the Great, or had long been lost to Muscovy, like Briansk, Chernigov (today: Chernihiv), and Kursk. There is little surprise that the khans endeavored to inflate their imaginary power by granting lands over which they had no real control, yet it is curious that Jagiellonian rulers not only accepted such documents, but regularly requested their renewal. Their rationale must have been the following: By including a given territory in his "donation *yarlıq*" the khan implicitly engaged not to raid it, and if a given town actually remained in Muscovite hands, the khan's document added legitimacy to Lithuanian claims and could serve as a basis for anti-Muscovite cooperation.

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14 Stefan Maria Kuczyński, *Sine Wody* (Warsaw: Libraria Nova, 1935), 55–57; Feliks Shabuldo, "Chy buv iarlyk Mamaia na ukrainski zemli?," in *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeni Shevchenka*, vol. 243, *Pratsi Istorychno-filosofskoi sektsii*, ed. Oleg Kupchynskii (Lviv: Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 2002), 301–17.

15 Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania*, 5–8.

16 Kołodziejczyk, 266–78, 496, 502, 529–33, 539–44, 555–65, 594–602, 605–11, 642–51, 712–21, 732–68.

The tradition of issuing "donation *yarlıq*s" for Lithuanian rulers was discontinued after the expiry of the Jagiellonian dynasty. In 1569, three years before his death, Sigismund II Augustus resolved to break the opposition of Lithuanian magnates to his plan to unite his two realms into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, by transferring the Ukrainian territories from his hereditary Grand Duchy to the Polish Crown, and hence Poland replaced Lithuania as a Crimean neighbor. Moreover, the kings elected to the Polish throne after the death of Sigismund II Augustus did not value the ancient tradition, which they found detracted from their kingdom's sovereignty. In 1598, King Sigismund III Vasa explicitly forbade his envoy sent to Khan Gazi II Giray to accept any instrument that would grant Kyiv and other lands to Lithuania, since "how could the Tatars donate a thing that had never belonged to them."[17] Although the Polish king no longer wished to be granted any lands by the khan, royal envoys dispatched to Bağçasaray in the years 1598–1622 were repeatedly instructed to demand Tatar recognition of Polish claims to territories that extended as far as the Black Sea coast. Somewhat surprisingly, these claims indeed found recognition in the khans' instruments issued in 1598, 1599, 1607, and 1624, although both sides must have been aware that the territories in question were also claimed by the Ottoman sultan.[18]

3 Towards an "Ottoman Lake"

During the fifteenth century, the Black Sea underwent a gradual transition "from a turning plate [i.e., central hub—D.K.] of the medieval European and Asian trade into a trading area of local interest, even if this had no sizeable effects on the quantity or quality of trade."[19] There were both global and local factors that contributed towards this change. On the far end of the Silk Road, the new Chinese Ming dynasty turned its attention towards the south, loosening the political and commercial links that had connected China with the Eurasian steppe in the Mongol era. Tamerlane's invasions of the Golden Horde, followed by the demolitions of Urgench, Astrakhan, Sarai, and Tana, resulted in the gradual abandonment of the northern trade route that had connected China with Crimea and, further on, with Europe, and its replacement by a route that ran further to the south, through Samarkand, Asia Minor, and the Mediter-

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17 Kołodziejczyk, 278.
18 Kołodziejczyk, 113–31, 137, 509–10, 788–804, 835–39, 876–84; Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "Inner Lake or Frontier? The Ottoman Black Sea in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *Enjeux politiques, économiques et militaires en mer noire (XIVe–XXIe siècles): Études à la mémoire de Mihail Guboglu*, ed. Faruk Bilici, Ionel Cândea, and Anca Popescu (Brăila: Éditions Istros, 2007), 125–39, esp. 129–30.
19 Eugen Denize, "The Romanians and the Fall of the Black Sea Under Ottoman Rule," *Historical Yearbook* 3 (2006): 17–28, esp. 17 (the term *plaque tournante du trafic international* was coined in reference to the late medieval Black Sea by Gheorghe Brătianu); see also Mihnea Berindei and Gilles Veinstein, "La Tana – Azaq de la présence italienne à l'emprise ottomane (fin XIIIe–milieu XVIe siècle)," *Turcica: Revue d'études turques* 8, no. 2 (1976): 110–201.

ranean.[20] The losses suffered by the Black Sea economy were partly compensated for by the dynamic growth of the new Ottoman capital in Constantinople/Istanbul, after the city was conquered by Sultan Mehmed II in 1453. Its demographic revival resulted in the impressive rise of the population from less than 50,000 in the mid-fifteenth century to almost 500,000 a century later. The giant city consumed rising amounts of foodstuffs imported from the northern Black Sea region, including grain (wheat, barley, and millet) and flour, fish and caviar, butter and cheese, dried beef, honey, and salt, as well as ironware, tinware, and linen imported from Central Europe.[21]

The Ottoman direct political control in the Black Sea area was extended in 1461 through the conquests of Sinop and Trebizond (Trabzon). In 1475, an Ottoman fleet commanded by Gedik Ahmed Pasha conquered Caffa (renamed as Kefe), Azak, and a number of smaller Genoese colonies on the northern coast of the Black Sea. Kefe became the center of a new Ottoman province that comprised the southern coast of Crimea as well as Azak (Russian: Azov). The latter, strategically located at the mouth of the River Don, became the chief Ottoman outpost overlooking political and commercial relations with Muscovy.

The richest Genoese merchant families from Caffa were forcibly resettled to Istanbul, where the sultan expected them to revive the economy of the imperial city.[22] Others returned to Italy or migrated to Spain, which was soon to launch its overseas expansion, but many remained in the region. One of the Genoese who entered the service of the Crimean khan was Augustino de Garibaldis, who in the early sixteenth century headed numerous embassies to Poland and became a trusted advisor at the court of his Muslim patron.[23] A century later, one of the most active Crimean diplomats was another Genoese, Gianantonio Spinola, also known under his Tatar name Can Anton İspinola, who undertook numerous diplomatic missions to Poland, Sweden, and Vienna.[24] Due to frequent marriages with Circassian women, local Italians gradually lost their language, yet they retained their distinct identity and Catholic confession until the seventeenth century, leaving a visible trace of the medieval Italian presence in the Black Sea space.

Whereas the southern part of the Crimea was directly incorporated into the Ottoman Empire, the rest of the peninsula was left in the hands of the Giray khans, who also controlled steppe grasslands extending across the isthmus. After 1475, the Crimean

20 Cf. Marian Małowist, *Tamerlan i jego czasy* (Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1985), 112–14.
21 Halil İnalcık, "The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300–1600," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914*, ed. Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 18, 179–82; Halil İnalcık, *Sources and Studies on the Ottoman Black Sea*, vol. 1, *The Customs Register of Caffa, 1487–1490* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).
22 Marian Małowist, *Kaffa – kolonia genueńska na Krymie i problem wschodni w latach 1453–1475* (Warsaw: Towarzystwo Miłośników Historii, 1947), 335–38.
23 Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania*, 236, 623.
24 Kołodziejczyk, 458, 852–53; Ştefan Andreescu, *Din istoria Mării Negre (genovezi, români şi tătari în spaţiul pontic în secolele XIV–XVII)* (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 2001), 163–73.

rulers had to reckon with Ottoman power and the sultans intervened more than once in the Khanate's internal affairs and deposed those khans who defied the Ottoman patronage too openly. Nevertheless, until the end of the seventeenth century, the khans preserved a large degree of sovereignty and often acted as fully independent rulers, especially in their relations with Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania.[25] Apart from serving as a buffer in the Porte's relations with Eastern European states, the Khanate performed an important role as the provider of slaves to Ottoman markets. Slaves had already been exported from the Black Sea region in the Middle Ages, yet this export rose tremendously in the subsequent era. In the years 1500–1700, the number of slaves, originating from Poland-Lithuania, Russia, and the northern Caucasus captured in Tatar raids and imported to the Ottoman Empire might have reached as many as 2,000,000, probably more than the number of slaves who were transported across the Atlantic Ocean in the same period.[26] Hence, the territory extending to the north of the Black Sea became one of the largest slaving zones of the early modern world.[27]

In 1476, Mehmed II invaded Moldavia, whose ruler Stephen the Great (r. 1457–1504) had refused to deliver the tribute that the Moldavian rulers had already been paying for twenty years. Facing defeat, Stephen reentered tributary relations with the sultan and was granted an imperial charter that confirmed his status as an Ottoman vassal.[28] The death of Mehmed II in 1481 brought an effort to reverse the tide as Genoa sent envoys to Eastern Europe with the aim to form an anti-Ottoman alliance and restore the *status quo ante* in Crimea. Although the negotiations were entered into by King Casimir of Poland-Lithuania, Stephen the Great of Moldavia, and the Crimean khan Mengli Giray, no action was taken.[29] On the contrary, in 1484 Sultan Bayezid invaded Moldavia and annexed two ports, Kilia (today: Kiliia) and Moncastro (renamed as Akkerman), located on the lower Danube and on the Dniester estuary, respectively. This aggression

25 On the degree of the khan's sovereignty vis-à-vis the Ottoman sultan, see Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania*, xiii–xvi and *passim*; Natalia Królikowska, "Sovereignty and Subordination in Crimean-Ottoman Relations (Sixteenth–Eighteenth Centuries)," in *The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, ed. Gábor Kármán and Lovro Kunčević (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 43–65; Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "What is Inside and What is Outside? Tributary States in Ottoman Politics," in Kármán and Kunčević, *The European Tributary States*, 421–32.
26 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "Slave Hunting and Slave Redemption as a Business Enterprise: The Northern Black Sea Region in the Sixteenth to Seventeenth Centuries," in "The Ottomans and Trade," ed. Ebru Boyar and Kate Fleet, special issue, *Oriente Moderno* 25 (86), n.s., no. 1 (2006): 149–59; see also Mikhail Kizilov, "Slave Trade in the Early Modern Crimea from the Perspective of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Sources," *Journal of Early Modern History* 11 (2007): 1–31.
27 On the notion of a slaving zone, see Jeffrey Fynn-Paul, "Empire, Monotheism and Slavery in the Greater Mediterranean Region from Antiquity to the Early Modern Era," *Past and Present* 205 (November 2009): 3–40; see also Fynn-Paul, "Introduction: Slaving zones in global history: the evolution of the concept," in *Slaving Zones. Cultural Identities, Ideologies, and Institutions in the Evolution of Global Slavery*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul and Damian Pargas (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 1–19.
28 Viorel Panaite, *Ottoman Law of War and Peace: The Ottoman Empire and Its Tribute-Payers from the North of the Danube*, 2nd rev. ed. (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 117–19.
29 Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania*, 235.

also affected Poland, since from the late fourteenth century Moldavia had remained its formal tributary, notwithstanding the tribute that its rulers were simultaneously sending to the Porte. The response came somewhat belatedly, yet in 1497 King John Albert of Poland entered Moldavia, ostensibly to help his vassal to reconquer the lost castles from the Ottomans. Sensing that there was more on the agenda, namely replacing him on the Moldavian throne with a Jagiellonian prince, Stephen changed sides and, assisted by Ottoman, Wallachian, and Tatar troops, defeated the royal army in a battle fought in the Cosmin Forest (Romanian: Codrii Cosminului).[30] This painful experience dissuaded the Polish court from challenging the Ottoman dominion in the Black Sea, and the self-imposed limitation allowed for peaceful relations between Istanbul and Cracow that were to last until the end of the sixteenth century.

The memory of the year 1497 also explains the soft reaction of the Jagiellonian court when in 1538 Sultan Suleyman annexed Tighina (renamed as Bender), a Moldavian castle situated on the Dniester upstream from Akkerman. As a matter of fact, the sultan's expedition against Petru Rareş, the son of Stephen the Great, was seconded by the Polish court, which was also in conflict with the Moldavian ruler, and when the Ottomans entered Tighina, Polish troops temporarily occupied Hotin (Ukrainian: Khotyn). What concerned the Jagiellonian court much more was the fact that during the same campaign, Suleyman forced Khan Sahib Giray to cede Ochakiv, a fort on the Dnipro estuary known as Dashov in the times of Vytautas, rebuilt as Cankerman by Khan Mengli Giray and later known to the Ottomans as "the Dnipro fortress" (*Özü kalesi*). Garrisoned by Ottoman troops, the fort was to become the main Ottoman stronghold on the northern Black Sea coast. In the 1590s, it would become the center of a new Ottoman province (*Özü eyaleti*) and in the eighteenth century it would play a crucial role in the Ottoman military confrontation with Russia.

The cession of Ochakiv to the sultan meant that, in his *yarlıq* sent in 1539 to King Sigismund, the khan no longer listed the Black Sea forts among the lands "granted" to Lithuania.[31] The Jagiellonian court sent a formal protest to Istanbul and voiced its claim to control of the coast, yet when in 1542 both sides resolved to demarcate the common border, the royal commissioners adopted a more pragmatic attitude and were ready to start work on the Kodyma, a tributary of the Boh, almost two hundred kilometers (124 miles) from the shore to the north. The demarcation ended in a fiasco as the commissioners failed to meet due to mutual mistrust and then the task was abandoned, yet this failure did not prevent the two sides from maintaining peaceful, even friendly relations for the rest of Suleyman's life, or under his successors. The Ko-

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30 Gheorghe Duzinchevici, "Războiul moldo-polon din anul 1497: Critica izvoarelor," *Studii şi materiale de istorie medie* 8 (1975): 9–61; Ilona Czamańska, *Mołdawia i Wołoszczyzna wobec Polski, Węgier i Turcji w XIV i XV wieku* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 1996); Liviu Pilat and Ovidiu Cristea, *The Ottoman Threat and Crusading on the Eastern Border of Christendom During the 15th Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 243–51.

31 Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania*, 81, 87–89.

dyma was to remain tacitly regarded as the border until it was formally recognized as such in the demarcation of 1633.[32]

The sequence of Ottoman conquests on the shores of the Black Sea, with the capture of Sinop (1461), Trabzon (1461), Azak (1475), Caffa (1475), Akkerman (1484), Kilia (1484), and finally Ochakiv (1538), suggests a conscious policy aimed at strengthening political control over the region and tapping its economic resources. The Ottoman customs tariffs that privileged the sultans' subjects—both Muslim and non-Muslim—over foreigners also contributed towards the autarkization of the local economy. Yet the view once voiced by Halil İnalcık, who saw Ottoman policy in the Black Sea region as motivated by the wish "to put an end, in favor of the indigenous populations, to the economic and political dominance of [...] alien colonial powers,"[33] probably tells us more about the spirit of nationalist étatism that was typical of Kemalist Turkey than about the genuine policy of Ottoman rulers. Even though Mehmed II can be regarded as a precursor of state interventionism,[34] his successors were less so and Ottoman control over the Black Sea was far from total. Italian merchants did not entirely disappear from its economic space[35] and the Ottoman monopoly on power did not remain unchallenged, although the idea of the Black Sea as an "Ottoman lake" was never closer to reality than in the mid-sixteenth century.[36]

4 New Actors: Cossacks and Nogays

In the years 1578–90, during a successful war against Safavid Iran, the Ottomans strengthened their hold on the eastern coast of the Black Sea. A new Ottoman fort was constructed in Faş (today: Poti) in 1579 to secure the coast section between Batum (today: Batumi) and Sohum (today: Sukhumi),[37] and the Georgian princes of

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32 Gilles Veinstein, "L'occupation ottomane d'Očakov et le problème de la frontière lituano-tatare 1538–1544," in *Passé turco-tatar présent soviétique: Études offertes à Alexandre Bennigsen*, ed. Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, Gilles Veinstein, and S. Enders Wimbush (Louvain: Éditions Peeters, 1986), 123–55; Kołodziejczyk, "Inner Lake or Frontier?," 126–29.

33 İnalcık, *Sources and Studies on the Ottoman Black Sea*, 110.

34 According to Şevket Pamuk, "the reign of Mehmed II was unique in the way the central government intervened to regulate not only specie and money but also trade and the urban economy;" see Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 45.

35 Cf. Mihnea Berindei, "Les vénitiens en mer Noire, XVIᵉ–XVIIᵉ siècles," *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 30 (1989): 207–23.

36 Cf. Charles King, *The Black Sea: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 133. Anca Popescu likewise dates the beginning of the "Ottoman lake" to the mid-sixteenth century, yet she observes that the harshest measures against foreign merchants operating on the Black Sea were undertaken in the late seventeenth century and should be rather regarded as a desperate sign of weakness as the Ottomans felt that they were losing control over the region; Anca Popescu, "La Mer Noire ottomane: *mare clausum? mare apertum?,*" in Bilici, Cândea, and Popescu, *Enjeux politiques, économiques et militaires*, 141–70, esp. 163–65.

37 Mahir Aydın, "Faş kalesi," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları / The Journal of Ottoman Studies* 6 (1986): 67–138.

Guria and Mingrelia were forced to reassert their tributary status, although their loyalty towards the Ottoman sultan was to remain fragile in the following decades too.[38]

Yet at the same time, new factors put in question Ottoman control of the Black Sea. In response to Tatar slaving raids, which prevented colonization of the southeastern provinces of Poland-Lithuania, its border commanders organized defense troops, mainly recruited from among local inhabitants, who were exempted from taxes and feudal obligations in return for military service. Both the commanders and their subordinates soon found out that instead of waiting for a Tatar raid, it was more profitable to raid enemy lands and capture herds and other property belonging to the Crimean and Ottoman subjects. In the mid-sixteenth century, the most notorious raiders of the Ottoman northern Black Sea coast were Bernard Pretwicz, the *starosta* of Bar, and Dmytro Vyshnevetskyi, the *starosta* of Cherkasy and Kaniv. In 1552, Ottoman diplomatic pressure forced King Sigismund II Augustus to recall Pretwicz from Bar, yet Vyshnevetskyi soon moved beyond royal control and, in 1556, built a fortified camp on a Dnipro island, known as the Cossack Sich.[39] In the following years, he entered the Muscovite service, intervened in a Moldavian civil war, and was finally captured and executed in Istanbul in 1564, yet the Cossacks[40] were to remain a permanent phenomenon in the lands situated to the north of the Black Sea. Recruited from among local Ruthenian (Ukrainian) inhabitants as well as runaway peasants and volunteers from Poland, Muscovy, the Caucasus, and Crimea, they turned into a semi-independent frontier society that made a lasting impact on the history of the region. Apart from the Dnipro Cossacks, a smaller Cossack group was formed on the River Don, vis-à-vis the Ottoman province of Azak.[41]

Almost at the same time, as a result of the Muscovite expansion in the Volga region, Nogay tribesmen arrived in large groups in the Black Sea region. While the so-called Little Nogay horde took the pastures extending between the northern Caucasus and the River Don, other Nogay groups roamed further to the west. This migration is reflected in the instrument of peace Devlet Giray sent to Sigismund II Augustus in 1560,

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38 Ştefan Andreescu, "Principatul Mingreliei şi Poarta otomană: raporturi politice şi comerciale (prima jumătate a secolului al XVII-lea," in Andreescu, *Izvoare noi cu privire la istoria Mării Negre* (Bucharest: Institutul Cultural Român, 2005), 154–66.

39 Andrzej Dziubiński, "Polsko-litewskie napady na tureckie pogranicze czarnomorskie w epoce dwu ostatnich Jagiellonów," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 103, no. 3 (1996): 53–87; Andrzej Dziubiński, *Stosunki dyplomatyczne polsko-tureckie w latach 1500–1572 w kontekście międzynarodowym* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wroclawskiego, 2005), 168–92; Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Un condottiere lithuanien du XVIe siècle, le prince Dimitrij Višneveckij et l'origine de la *Seč* zaporogue d'après les archives ottomanes," *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 10, no. 2 (1969): 258–79.

40 The term Cossack (*kazak/qazaq*) is of Turkic origin and originally meant a free vagabond, an independent warrior with no tribal or clan affiliation.

41 On the relations between the Dnipro and the Don Cossacks, see Viktor Brekhunenko, *Stosunky ukrainskoho kozatstva z Donom u XVI–seredyni XVII st.* (Kyiv: RA "Tandem-U," 1998).

in which the khan for the first time engaged not to raid the royal domains, also on behalf of his Nogay subjects.[42]

The growing insecurity on the lower Dnipro, caused by the Cossack and Nogay activity, brought as a consequence the abandonment of the medieval *Via Tartarica*, which led from Central Europe to the Crimean isthmus and was still used in the early sixteenth century. In the late sixteenth century, the Crimean khans themselves agreed that annual gifts from Poland-Lithuania that the Tatars regarded as tribute be transported through Moldavia and the Ottoman port of Akkerman, since this route was safer than the one passing through southern Ukraine that crossed the Dnipro near the Tatar fort of Islamkerman, which had been destroyed by the Cossacks in 1556. And even Akkerman was not safe from the Cossacks: When in 1601, a Polish envoy to the khan boarded an Ottoman galley that was to take him to the Crimean port of Közlev (today: Ievpatoriia), on the mere rumor of a Cossack raid the galley was hastily unpacked and it took several days before the envoy found another captain ready to take to the sea.[43] In the years 1574–1634, Akkerman was raided at least fourteen times, so a Cossack raid occurred every four years.[44]

The "golden era" of Cossack raiding on the Black Sea fell in the early seventeenth century, when the Dnipro Cossacks, assisted by their brethren from the Don, sacked or burned Sinop (1614), Kefe (1616), Varna (1620), and Trabzon (1625), to name just a few targets.[45] On their long boats known as *chaika*s, suited to sailing on rivers but also capable of weathering the high sea, they crossed to the southern coast of the Black Sea more than once, triggering panic among local inhabitants, both Muslim and Christian, and provoking angry responses from the Ottoman authorities. In 1615, the Cossacks entered the Bosporus for the first time and pillaged several settlements in the vicinity of the Ottoman capital, striking a heavy blow to the prestige of the Ottoman sultan.[46] Cossack raids shattered the "chimera of [the] Ottoman lake"—to use the wording of Victor Ostapchuk—and forced the Porte to frequently deploy its Mediterranean fleet in the Black Sea in order to defend its core provinces. An incisive comment by Venetian Bailo Giacomo Quirini, who in 1676 observed that "the defense and protection of the Mediterranean depends on the Black Sea" (*da questo mar Nero dipende la difesa e la conservazione del mar Bianco*) aptly describes the realities of the entire century.[47]

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42 Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania*, 94–95.

43 Kołodziejczyk, 460–61.

44 Victor Ostapchuk and Svitlana Bilyayeva, "The Ottoman Northern Black Sea Frontier at Akkerman Fortress: The View from a Historical and Archaeological Project," in *The Frontiers of the Ottoman World*, ed. Andrew Peacock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 137–70, esp. 150–51.

45 Victor Ostapchuk, "The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of the Cossack Naval Raids," in "The Ottomans and the Sea," ed. Kate Fleet, special issue, *Oriente Moderno* 20 (81), n.s., no. 1 (2001): 23–95, esp. 44.

46 Vladimir Korolev, *Bosforskaia voina* (Rostov-on-Don: Izdatelstvo Rostovskogo universiteta, 2002), 175–79.

47 Ostapchuk, "The Human Landscape," 89–93; Kołodziejczyk, "Inner Lake or Frontier?," 135–36.

The activity of the Dnipro Cossacks, who at least formally were the subjects of the Polish king, led to rising tensions in Ottoman-Polish relations. These tensions were further exacerbated by the pro-Habsburg stand of King Sigismund III Vasa (r. 1587–1632) and the revival of Polish involvement in Moldavia, visible from the 1590s when the Ottomans were engaged in a war against the Habsburgs that lasted from 1593 to 1606. In 1595, Polish and Ottoman-Crimean troops met at Ţuţora on the River Prut, but a military confrontation was avoided and both sides reached a compromise, agreeing on a candidate to the Moldavian throne that was acceptable to both the king and the sultan. The conflict was avoided once again in 1617, when Polish hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski negotiated a settlement with the Ottoman commander Iskender Pasha, and the Poles engaged to prevent Cossack raids on the Black Sea and stop military interventions in Moldavia, while the Ottomans promised to stop the Tatar raids into Poland-Lithuania. However, new Cossack raids on the Black Sea and the news of the participation of Polish mercenaries in the Thirty Years' War on the Habsburg side resulted in the outbreak of a full-scale war. In 1620, the Polish Crown's army was annihilated near Ţuţora, and in 1621 Sultan Osman II set out against Poland and besieged Hotin—a castle in northern Moldavia where Polish-Lithuanian troops, assisted by the Cossacks, set up a fortified camp. The siege ended with a stalemate and the belligerents reached an agreement that reiterated the former conditions of peace.[48]

In the following years, the Ottomans turned their attention to the east, especially after the capture of Baghdad by Shah ʿAbbās in 1624. Yet the Ottoman-Safavid conflict also influenced the politics to the north of the Black Sea. In 1623, the Crimean throne was ascended by Mehmed III Giray, who appointed as his *qalga* (deputy) Şahin Giray, his younger brother who had spent nine years in Safavid Iran. When in 1624 the Porte withdrew its support for Mehmed III Giray and aimed to replace him with his relative, the two brothers rebelled and captured Ottoman Kefe, while Şahin Giray sent an envoy to Poland, proposing an anti-Ottoman coalition between the king, the khan, and the shah and offering Tatar assistance if the Poles wished to conquer Bender, Akkerman, and Kilia. When Sigismund III tactfully refused, Şahin turned to the Cossacks, yet the Tatar–Cossack alliance, concluded in 1625, did not materialize, since the sultan reconfirmed Mehmed III Giray on the Crimean throne the same year.[49]

Apart from the Cossacks, Nogays became another factor to reckon with in local policy. They had been present in the region since the Middle Ages and the Nogay Manghıt

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48 For a cursory narration of these events, followed by the edition of relevant documents and further references to secondary literature, see Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th–18th Century): An Annotated Edition of* 'Ahdname *and Other Documents* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 126–35, 298–426.

49 Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania*, 131–38. On the relations between Shah ʿAbbās and Şahin Giray, see Stanisław Jaśkowski, Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, and Piruz Mnatsakanyan, *The Relations of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with Safavid Iran and the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin in the Light of Archival Documents* (Warsaw: Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, 2017), 80–81, 159–67.

clan had played an important role in the social hierarchy of the Crimean Khanate, yet their number dramatically increased as a result of three major waves of migration: 1) the abovementioned exodus from the Volga region caused by the Russian expansion in the 1550s; 2) the migration at the beginning of the seventeenth century, resulting from a Nogay civil war; 3) the migration in the 1630s, caused by the pressure of the Kalmyks, who had arrived in the Caspian steppe from Central Asia, pushing the Nogays to the west. In the 1620s, Kantemir, the powerful Manghit leader, built a semi-independent power base in Budjak and, having secured direct Ottoman protection, openly defied the khan's suzerainty more than once. His slaving raids into Poland-Lithuania, directed from Budjak, were even more detrimental than the raids by the Crimean Tatars, since they affected densely populated regions situated around the city of Lviv (Polish: Lwów) and even further to the west. Kantemir's career abruptly ended in 1637 when, after an open military conflict between the Nogay leader and the Crimean khan, the Porte resolved to rid itself of its unruly vassals and had them both executed. The Nogays then returned under the suzerainty of the new khan, although some of them chose to enter Polish service.[50]

The outbreak of Ottoman-Venetian war over the island of Crete in 1645 triggered a geopolitical revolution in Eastern Europe. Encouraged by Venetian money and motivated by his own ambitions, the Polish king Vladislaus IV Vasa initiated secret talks with the Dnipro Cossacks regarding a possible diversion against the Porte. Forced by the diet to abandon these plans, the king cancelled the talks, yet the Cossacks, whose resentment towards the Commonwealth had been rising for several decades, started a large rebellion headed by Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, in 1648. A skilled politician, Khmelnytskyi secured the military assistance of the Crimean khan and entered into direct diplomatic negotiations with the Porte. These negotiations are reflected in the project of an Ottoman-Cossack trade convention, of which a Polish copy has been preserved. According to this project, the sultan was to allow the Cossacks to freely call on Ottoman ports on the Black Sea and in the Mediterranean and keep trading posts in major Ottoman harbors and a residence in Istanbul. Moreover, the property of castaway or deceased Cossack merchants was to remain immune from confiscation by the Ottoman treasury. In return, the Cossacks were to prevent any raids of Ottoman lands and, if such a raid were committed by the Don Cossacks, to assist the Ottoman galleys in punishing the culprits.[51] Although the precise dating of this project remains uncertain and its author-

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50 Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania*, 130–48, 184, 980–81; Mihnea Berindei, "La Porte Ottomane face aux Cosaques Zaporogues, 1600–1637," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1 (1977): 273–307; Vadim Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi Ordy* (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 2001), 178–83, 430–54, 656–57.

51 The text is published in *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov, khraniashchikhsia v Gosudarstvennoi kollegii inostrannykh del* (Moscow: Tipografiia Selivanovskago, 1822), 3:444–47; republished in Omelian Pritsak, "Shche raz pro soiuz Bohdana Khmelnytskoho z Turechchynoiu," *Ukrainskyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk* 2, n.s. (1993): 177–92, esp. 191–92. For the discussion on its dating, see Vic-

ship is unknown, the text closely reflects Ottoman capitulations granted to Western European maritime powers. Its rationale was to reverse the Cossack military energy from raiding Ottoman lands and redirect it to the north. During the following twenty years, Khmelnytskyi and his successors navigated between Warsaw, Istanbul, and Moscow, also entering into convenient alliances with the rulers of Crimea, Moldavia, Transylvania, Brandenburg, and Sweden with the aim to carve out independent or semi-independent Ukrainian Cossack statehood. In 1654, the Cossack uprising transformed into a Russo-Polish war that lasted until 1667, when, as neither of the two powers was able to control all of Ukraine, they divided its territory along the Dnipro. This move, in turn, incited Petro Doroshenko, the new Cossack hetman, to acknowledge Ottoman suzerainty. The Ottoman-Cossack negotiations were formalized by an imperial patent (*berat*), issued by Sultan Mehmed IV in 1669, which transformed Ukraine into an Ottoman vassal state enjoying similar autonomy to that of Moldavia and Wallachia.[52]

5 The Advent of Russia

Ottoman-Muscovite relations dated back to the fifteenth century, yet they were initially limited to commercial exchange. Envoys rarely traveled between the two capitals and everyday relations were maintained through the mediation of the Crimean khans and the Ottoman governors of Kefe and Azak.[53] Following the Russian conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan in 1552 and 1556, respectively, the Ottomans developed a visionary project to build a channel connecting the Don and the Volga rivers that would allow Ottoman galleys to enter not only the Volga but also the Caspian Sea. Yet the Ottoman-Crimean expedition of 1569 failed due to ecological constraints and, above all, the unwillingness of Khan Devlet Giray to submit to Ottoman control that would have diminished his own autonomy.[54] Paradoxically, Devlet Giray, who in 1569 sabotaged the joint expedition, managed to single-handedly attack and burn down Moscow in 1571, which earned him the nickname *Taht-Algan* ("Capturer of Capitals") and deeply humili-

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tor Ostapchuk, "Cossack Ukraine In and Out of Ottoman Orbit, 1648–1681," in Kármán and Kunčević, *The European Tributary States*, 123–52, esp. 132.

52 Ostapchuk, "Cossack Ukraine In and Out of Ottoman Orbit," 142–43; Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "Tertium non datur? Turetska alternatyva v zovnishnii politytsi Kozatskoi derzhavy," in *Hadiatska uniia 1658 roku*, ed. Pavlo Sokhan, Viktor Brekhunenko et al. (Kyiv: Instytut ukrainskoi arkheohrafii ta dzhereloznavstva imeni M.S. Hrushevskoho NAN Ukrainy, 2008), 67–80.

53 Andrii Zhyvachivskyi, "The Governors of Kefe and Azak in Ottoman-Muscovite Relations in the Fifteenth–Seventeenth Centuries and the Issue of Titulature," *Acta Poloniae Historica* 15 (2017): 211–34.

54 On the campaign of 1569, see Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve İdil boyu (1569 Astarhan seferi, Ten-İdil kanalı ve XVI–XVII. yüzyıl Osmanlı-Rus münasebetleri)* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1966).

ated Tsar Ivan IV.[55] The Ottomans also managed to build a galley fleet on the Caspian Sea, based in Derbent, following the conquest of western Safavid provinces in 1578.[56] Hence, even though their campaign of 1569 ended in a fiasco, they remained the stronger party in their relations with both Muscovy and Iran.

Russia's respect for Ottoman might was so strong that, when in 1637 the Don Cossacks captured Azak, held it for several years in spite of furious Ottoman-Crimean counterattacks, and offered the conquest to the tsar, Moscow kept assuring the Porte that it had nothing to do with the action, and in 1642 ordered the Cossacks to abandon the castle.[57]

The situation began to reverse after the Russo-Polish war of 1654–67, which resulted in the Russian annexation of left-bank Ukraine. Following Doroshenko's submission to the Porte, the Ottomans invaded Poland-Lithuania and, in 1672, annexed the province of Podolia and forced the king to resign from right-bank Ukraine. While Doroshenko hoped to unite right-bank and left-bank Ukraine under the Ottoman umbrella, his enemies among the Cossacks invited Russia to intervene and the war between two Cossack factions turned into the First Russo-Ottoman War. Fought in the years 1677–81, it was concluded with the Treaty of Bağçasaray, which confirmed the Dnipro as the boundary between the two empires and their respective zones of influence in Ukraine.

In 1686, Russia joined the anti-Ottoman coalition that had been formed after the failed siege of Vienna in 1683. In the years 1687 and 1689, Vasilii Golitsyn led two unsuccessful campaigns whose aim was to cross the steppe and break through the isthmus of Perekop into Crimea. However, in 1696 Tsar Peter I captured Azak and his conquest was secured in 1700 by the Treaty of Constantinople, which gave Russia a southern window on the sea.[58] A year earlier, the Treaty of Karlowitz restored Podolia and right-bank Ukraine to Poland.

The Third Russo-Ottoman War (1710–13) broke out after King Charles XII of Sweden found shelter in Ottoman lands, following his defeat in the battle of Poltava (1709). In 1711, Peter I entered Moldavia, but his army was surrounded on the River Prut and the tsar was forced to promise to restore Azak to the Porte and withdraw Russian troops from Poland-Lithuania. The agreement reached on the Prut was formally confirmed by the Treaty of Edirne, in 1713.[59]

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55 Vasilii Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom Otomanskoi Porty*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Rubezhi XXI, 2005), 1:321; Aleksandr Vinogradov, *Russko-krymskie otnosheniia: 50-e–vtoraia polovina 70-kh godov XVI veka* (Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 2007), 192–94.

56 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "Daghestan During the Long Ottoman-Safavid War (1578–1639): The *Shamkhals*' Relations with Ottoman Pashas," in *Tributaries and Peripheries of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Gábor Kármán (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 117–33, esp. 132.

57 Viktoriia Burlaka, *Azov – gorod s tysiacheletnei istoriei* (Azov: Azovskii muzei-zapovednik, 2005), 98–125.

58 Brian Davies, *Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500–1700* (London: Routledge, 2007), 178–87.

59 On the Russo-Ottoman war of 1710–1713, see Vladimir Artamonov, *Turetsko-russkaia voina 1710–1713* (Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole, 2019).

After that war, the Ottomans converted Hotin into the center of a new administrative unit that was carved out from Moldavia. With strengthened and modernized defenses, it was to serve as a major bulwark against possible aggression from the north.[60] Along with Hotin, Bender, Akkerman, and the fortress complex on the Dnipro estuary consisting of Özi (Ochakiv) and Kılburun underwent gradual "Vaubanisation" during the eighteenth century.[61]

In the 1720s, the last great wave of Nogay nomads arrived in the northern Black Sea steppe when the Yedisan, Yedidjek, and Djemboyluq hordes deserted the Kalmyk suzerainty and left their pastures between the Emba and the Volga rivers, seeking the patronage of the Crimean khan. On the one hand, the khan thus gained seasoned warriors valuable in the event of external conflicts, yet on the other hand, the newcomers were less integrated within the Khanate's political structure and hence more prone to domestic riots.[62]

The Fourth Russo-Ottoman War (1735–39) broke out shortly after Russian troops intervened in Poland-Lithuania and placed Augustus III Wettin on its throne, provoking the European-wide conflict known as the War of the Polish Succession. Although this move was in violation of the Treaty of Edirne, the Porte did not respond, since it was engaged in a war against Persia, so it was Russia that took the initiative. In 1736, the Russian troops conquered Azak while another Russian army forced through the Crimean isthmus and took the khan's capital in Bağçasaray. In the following two years, the Ottoman-Crimean allies fared slightly better as the Russian troops suffered supply shortages and widespread disease, yet the capture of Hotin in 1739 by Marshal Burkhard Christoph von Münnich signified a major Ottoman loss. Fortunately for the Porte, the Austrians, who entered the war on Russia's side, suffered several defeats, while France offered welcome mediation, and hence, in accordance with the Treaty of Belgrade, Russia only obtained Azak but was forbidden to restore its fortifications and agreed to return all other conquests.

Throughout the eighteenth century, the rising military pressure from Russia caused the Crimean khans to abandon their former claims to independence and become the sultan's loyal vassals, while in return they were often granted command

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60 Mariusz Kaczka and Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "Introduction," in *Turecki pasza i szlachta: korespondencja osmańskiego gubernatora Chocimia Iliasza Kołczaka paszy ze szlachtą Rzeczypospolitej z lat 1730–1739*, ed. Kaczka and Kołodziejczyk (Warsaw: Narodowy Instytut Polskiego Dziedzictwa Kulturowego za Granicą Polonika, 2020), 83–96.

61 Ostapchuk and Bilyayeva, "The Ottoman Northern Black Sea Frontier," 153–60. The term "Vaubanisation," which is employed by the authors, invokes the influence of the famous French marshal and engineer Sébastien de Vauban (1633–1707) on the military art across the globe.

62 Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, "St. Petersburg and the Steppe Peoples: Diplomatic Correspondences of the 18th Century from the *Arkhiv Vnešnej Politiki Rossijskoj Imperii* in Moscow," in *Proceedings of the 38th Permanent International Altaistic Conference (PIAC), Kawasaki, Japan: August 7–12, 1995*, ed. Giovanni Stary (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1996), 219–36; Vladislav Gribovskii, "Upravlenie nogaitsami Severnogo Prichernomoria v Krymskom khanstve (40–60-e gody XVIII v.)," in *Tiurkologicheskii sbornik, 2007–2008* (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 2009), 67–97.

over Ottoman-Crimean troops operating between the Danube and the Kuban. In the times of conflict, the khans were typically stationed at Qavşan (Romanian: Căuşeni), a military camp in Budjak that was well suited to overseeing military operations against Russia.[63]

In 1768, the Ottomans declared war on Russia, which had again sent troops to Poland in order to crush an anti-Russian movement. This move did not prevent the first partition of Poland, declared by Russia, Prussia, and Austria in 1772, and also proved ominous to the Porte. The war ended with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), which granted Russia a strip of the Black Sea coast between the mouths of the Boh and the Dnipro, and allowed her to build a port in Kherson on the lower Dnipro. The Crimean Khanate was declared independent, yet this clause only helped St. Petersburg weaken the ties between Istanbul and Bağçasaray and extend its own patronage over the khan. In 1779, the Convention of Aynalı Kavak granted Russian merchants free passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean on their ships under the Russian banner, and in 1783 Russia annexed Crimea.[64]

The Russian conquest of the Crimean Khanate had a powerful symbolism, yet the final closure of Russia's southern frontier was only attained after another war, that of 1787–92. Özü (Ochakiv; Russian: Ochakov) fell to the Russians in 1788, and with the Treaty of Jassy (1792), which moved the boundary between the two empires to the River Dniester, the entire steppe extending to the north of the Black Sea was opened to Russian colonization. The former Lithuanian and Tatar fort of Kachybei, known to the Ottomans as Hocabey, became the Russian Odessa, and the conquerors also Hellenized many geographical names in Crimea; for instance, Aqmescit became Simferopol, Aqyar Sevastopol, Közlev Ievpatoriia, and Kefe Feodosiia. The rise of the Russian bureaucratic empire, which successfully "tamed" the steppe through agricultural colonization and urbanization,[65] was achieved at the expense of its former inhabitants, Nogay and Tatar nomads, who were decimated through forced resettlements and whose memory only rarely resurfaces today in local topography. Along with the second and third partitions of Poland that followed in 1793 and 1795, the annexation of the Black Sea steppe crowned the rise of Russia to the status of a major European power and symbolically coincided with the end of the early modern era.

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63 Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania*, 198–203.

64 Brian Davies, *The Russo-Turkish War, 1768–1774: Catherine II and the Ottoman Empire* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016); Virginia Aksan, *Ottoman Wars 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2007), 129–59; Alan Fisher, *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea 1772–1783* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania*, 206–13.

65 Cf. William McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500–1800* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964).

Kenan İnan

The Ottoman Empire, Safavid Iran, and the Southern Black Sea between 1500 and 1700

The Southern Black Sea was dominated by the Ottoman Empire between 1500 and 1700. However, the political and trading activities show that the Safavid state of Iran was the main rival of the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus and in Eastern Anatolia. These powers' wars and trades directly affected the daily activities of the Ottoman life in the Southern Black Sea area. These developments were also closely watched by the European and Eastern European powers too. In the second half of the seventeenth century, Russia began to interfere in Black Sea affairs, mainly due to the weakness of the Crimean Khanate. Thus, the Black Sea had—from an Ottoman perspective—undesired guests.

In order to obtain a clear chronological picture of what happened on the southern Black Sea coast we have to start with the Empire of Trebizond. By the beginning of the thirteenth century, Alexios Komnenos, from the Byzantine imperial family, escaped from Constantinople amidst an internal power struggle and established the Empire of Trebizond with the help of the Queen Tamara of Georgia in 1204. The date also coincides with the invasion of Constantinople by the Latins the same year. The empire initially consisted of most of the southern Black Sea coast. However, by the end of thirteenth century internal problems and outside interventions led to large territorial losses and by the fourteenth century the empire controlled the Black Sea coast between Giresun (known in ancient Greek as Cerasus) and Batumi, with some small regions in the south.[1] The Ottoman interest in the Black Sea began in the second half of the fourteenth century. Later they annexed the territories of the Turcoman principalities on the western shores of the Black Sea. During the reign of Murad II (1421–44, 1446–51), an Ottoman fleet's attack on Trebizond (Ottoman: Trabzon) was unsuccessful due to weather conditions. In the fifteenth century, the emperors of Trebizond began to look for possible allies against the Ottomans. One of them was the strong Turcoman Aq Qoyunlu ruler Uzun Hasan, who offered the emperor protection and launched some military campaigns against the Ottomans in central and eastern Anatolia. The emperor also began to communicate with the Western world against the Ottomans.[2] These de-

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[1] On the establishment and later developments of the Empire of Trebizond, see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1995) 2:451–54. See also Fyodor İ. Uspenski, *Trabzon Tarihi (Kuruluşundan Fethine Kadar)*, trans. Enver Uzun (Trabzon: Ofset Matbaacılık, 2003); Jacop Philipp Fallmerayer, *Trabzon İmparatorluğunun Tarihi*, trans. Ahmet Cevat Eren (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2011); Sergey Pavloviç Karpov, *Trabzon İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, trans. Enver Uzun (Istanbul: Kültür Bilimleri Akademisi, 2016).

[2] For detailed information about the Ottoman conquest of Trabzon, see Kenan İnan, "Trabzon'un Fethi," in *Onyedinci Yüzyıl Ortalarında Trabzon'da Sosyal ve İktisadi Hayat*, ed. İsmail Köse (Trabzon: Trabzon Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2013), 17–19.

velopments alerted Ottoman sultan Mehmed II (1451–81). Ottoman chroniclers relate that the Sultan was thinking of annexing the entire southern shores of the Black Sea.[3] In 1459, he annexed the Genoese castle of Amasra in estern Anatolia. Later, in 1461, the Turcoman principality of Candaroğulları with its important cities Kastamonu and Sinop was annexed, followed by Trabzon on August 15, 1461 Trabzon. With later annexations of Wallachia in 1462, Crimea in 1475, and Moldavia in 1476, Mehmed II almost transformed the Black Sea into an "Ottoman lake."[4]

In the Ottoman governmental organization, the biggest administrative unit was the *eyalet* (province); however, the most important and developed units were the *sancak*s (subprovinces). In the seventeenth and in the first half of the eighteenth century, with some changes, the southern shores of the Ottoman Black Sea were under the administration of three provinces: Anadolu Province, Rum Province, and Trabzon Province. These provinces included the important cities Sinop, Samsun, and Trabzon.[5] In the sixteenth and seventeenth century, Samsun and Sinop were some of the main ship-building ports of the Ottoman Empire, since the cities' geography included rich forests for timber. In terms of the size and number of ships built, Sinop was the third largest dockyard in the Ottoman Empire, timber, hemp, and oakum being readily available around Sinop.[6] In the sixteenth and seventeenth century, compared to Sinop and Trabzon, Samsun was a modest port town and did not receive a large share of the long-distance trade. Instead, the port's main revenues came from the slave trade and local products which were sent to Istanbul by ship. In the seventeenth century, the port and the town were twice attacked and burned by the Cossacks. This obviously hampered the town's development.[7] Ship-building activities were very common before and during the Ottoman naval activities in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and took on even larger dimensions during the seventeenth century, especially during the siege of the island of Crete.[8]

Archival materials show that Trabzon Province and especially its center was the main place for the Ottoman administration in Black Sea activities and expeditions

3 Mehmed Neşri, *Kitab-ı Cihannüma, Neşri Tarihi*, ed. Faik Reşit Unat and Mehmet Altay Köymen (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1995), 2:739–41.

4 Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600* (London: Phoenix, 1994) 23–30. See also Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "Inner Lake or Frontier? The Ottoman Black Sea in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *Enjeux politiques, économiques et militaires en mer Noire (XIVe–XXIe siècles): Études à la mémoire de Mihail Guboglu*, ed. Faruk Bilici, Ionel Cândea, and Anca Popescu (Brăila: Musée de Brăila, 2007), 125–39.

5 Ali Açıkel, "Rum Eyaleti," *TDVİA* 35 (2008): 225–26; Fehameddin Başar, *Osmanlı Eyalet Tevcihatı (1717–1730)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997), 18–22.

6 İdris Bostan, *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilatı: XVII. Yüzyılda Tersane-i Amire* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992), 17–29.

7 Mehmet Öz, "Samsun," *TDVİA* 36 (2009): 84.

8 Bostan, *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilatı*, 18–24. On ship building at the Samsun port in the seventeenth century, see also, Istanbul, T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı (BOA), Trabzon Şeriye Sicilleri (T. Ş. S.), 1831, 87/7; 1835, 60/9, 61/2; 1836, 56/6.

against Iran. The city of Trabzon, the center of the Trabzon *sancak* (subprovince), was an important port on the Black Sea coast connecting the Black Sea to the inner parts of Anatolia and by trade road to Iran. In the sixteenth century the city hosted two important sultans, Selim I (1512–20) and Süleyman I (also known as Süleyman the Magnificent, 1520–66). Selim, as *sancak beyi* (subprovince governor) spread the Ottoman influence towards Georgia and battled against the Safavids. Trabzon became an important military base during the Çaldıran expedition. In the years of the war against the Safavids from the late sixteenth century to 1639, Trabzon became a big military supply center. In the late sixteenth century the *sancak* became a province with the addition of the *sancak* of Batum. Trabzon's military importance continued in the eighteenth century.[9]

The developments of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such as the plague epidemic,[10] Cossack attacks on the main Ottoman cities and ports on the Black Sea coasts,[11] the financial crisis of the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, the *celali* (rebel) and *sekban* (mercenary unit, bandit) movements of the seventeenth century, administrative problems, and the Ottoman Crete campaign, had a profound impact on the city[12] and its population. The Ottoman Crete campaign (1644–69) against the Venetians affected Trabzon socially and economically; *avarız* (extraordinary taxes) were levied many times. Thus, despite distance, the city felt the siege.[13] In the late seventeenth and in the first half of the eighteenth century, the governors of the province of Trabzon were appointed on the condition that they would protect the castles of Azak and Özi on the northern Black Sea coast. Additionally, the governors supplied

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9 M. Hanefi Bostan, *XV–XVI. Asırlarda Trabzon Sancağında Sosyal ve İktisadi Hayat* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2002), 18–23; Heath W. Lowry and Feridun Emecen, "Trabzon," *TDVİA* 41 (2012): 297.
10 See Ronald Jennings, "Plague in Trabzon and Reactions to it According to Local Judicial Registers," in *Studies on Ottoman Social History in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Women, Zimmis and Sharia Courts in Kayseri, Cyprus and Trabzon,* ed. Ronald Jennings (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1999), 667–76; see also Kenan İnan, "Trabzon'da Yönetici Yönetilen İlişkileri (1643–1656)," *The Journal of Ottoman Studies* 23 (2004): 23–60.
11 In 1632, the Bedesten and main trading district of Trabzon was burned by the Cossacks and other places around in Trabzon were also attacked. In the west, the city of Samsun and its port were twice attacked and burned. See Lowry and Emecen, "Trabzon," 300; Öz, "Samsun," 84–85. On July 23, 1653, Tirebolu Castle was besieged for three days by the Cossacks and an emergency force had to be sent from Trabzon; see BOA, T. Ş. S., 1833, 44/8.
12 For information on the Ottoman siege of Crete, see, İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 3, bk. 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1983), 216–22; On the social, military, and economic developments in the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1700," in *Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic History* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), 283–337; Mehmet Öz, *Kanun-ı Kadimin Peşinde Osmanlı'da Çözülme ve Gelenekçi Yorumcuları* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2015).
13 In November 1667, during the siege of Crete, cannonballs were sent from Erzurum to the Trabzon port. They were then loaded onto ships and sent to *Tersane-i Amire* (the Imperial Dockyard) in Istanbul. See BOA, T. Ş. S., 1845, 4/3, 4/4, 66/1.

grain and other necessities to the castle of Azak.[14] Hence most of the Ottoman military activities in the eastern Black Sea were the responsibility of the governor of Trabzon.[15]

The city of Trabzon, the center of the Trabzon province, came under Ottoman rule at a later date than most of the Ottoman Anatolian cities and also had a considerable non-Muslim population. According to sources, after the conquest, Mehmed II transferred some of the population of the city to the other parts of Anatolia and Istanbul and brought a Muslim Turkish population to the city.[16] However, it is clear that this in- and out-immigration did not change the majority of the non-Muslim population of Trabzon, which makes its position unique until 1583, when the number of Muslims surpassed the non-Muslim population for the first time. At the end of the fifteenth century, the population of Trabzon consisted of 2,015 Muslims and 5,549 Christians according to the *tahrir defter*s (land registers). In contrast, at the end of the sixteenth century, there were 6,083 Muslims and 4,901 Christians out of a total of 11,000 people. In the second half of the seventeenth century, however, we do not have *tahrir defter*s; instead we have *avarız defter*s (extraordinary tax registers). Besides the *avarız defters* we have other archival sources like *cizye defter*s (poll tax registers) and *cizye evrakı* (poll tax documents). These archival materials do not give us enough data to guess the exact size of the Muslim and non-Muslim population in seventeenth-century Trabzon.[17]

The Ottoman Empire protected its economic vitality and integrity, although it suffered military losses and political setbacks in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This success was largely due to the empire's position in the Black Sea. European states dominated the Mediterranean Sea trade and the Ottomans controlled the Black Sea. The importance of the Black Sea trade was echoed by the famous seventeenth-century Ottoman traveler Evliya Çelebi, who observed that 8,000 people in 2,000 shops in Istanbul were involved in the Black Sea trade. Again, in the eighteenth century, Henry Grenville, the British ambassador and representative of the Levant Company in Istanbul, mentioned that the Black Sea trade was so profitable.[18] Archival sources show that the extraordinary developments of the seventeenth century, whether internal[19] or ex-

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14 In March 1653, an Ottoman attempt to supply grain to Azak Castle was hampered by bad weather and a Cossack raid; see BOA, T. Ş. S., 1833, 31/7, 32/1, 32/2, 33/1.

15 Temel Öztürk, *Osmanlıların Kuzey ve Doğu Seferlerinde Savaş ve Trabzon* (Trabzon: Serander Yayınları, 2011), 47.

16 Nihal Atsız Çiftçioğlu, *Osmanlı Tarihleri I* (Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1949), 208; Tursun Bey, *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, ed. A. Mertol Tulum (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1977), 110; Kritovulos, *Tarihi 1451–1467*, trans. Ari Çokana (Istanbul: Heyamola Yayınları, 2013), 521; Konstantin Mihailović, *Memoirs of a Janissary*, trans. Benjamin Stolz, ed. Svat Soucek (Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1975), 121.

17 For the population of Trabzon in the late seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth century, see Miraç Tosun, *Trabzon'da Cemaatler Arası İlişkiler (1700–1770)* (Trabzon: Serander Yayınları, 2018), 39–58.

18 A. Üner Turgay, "Trabzon," in *Doğu Akdeniz'de Liman Kentleri (1800–1914)*, ed. Çağlar Keyder, Y. Eyüp Özveren, and Donald Quataert (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994), 45.

19 In Trabzon Province there were complaints to the governor of Trabzon that bandits had been hindering traders in Of *kaza* for some time, BOA, T. Ş. S., 1835, 54/1, Evail Zilkade 1066/August 21–30, 1656;

ternal, did not stop the Black Sea trade. Trabzon's trade with the Black Sea's other ports or interior regions continued. The trading network of traders in Trabzon had a great role in this development. We think that one of the important reasons for this was the involvement of *askeri* (tax-exempt individuals) in trading.[20] The court records reveal that the traders of Trabzon had relations with other ports of the Ottoman Black Sea and main centers like Erzurum in the east and Aleppo and Baghdad in the south. The latter two cities were connected to Iran and India in the east. The non-Muslims of Trabzon also played a large role in this trading network.[21] For social, economic, or political reasons, many people originating from Trabzon, both Muslims[22] and non-Muslims, settled in other Black Sea cities and interior regions, whereupon they continued trading activities with Trabzon.[23]

Evliya Çelebi pointed out that Trabzon's main trading area was in the *Aşağı Hisar* (Lower Castle). There was another small trading area in the *Orta Hisar* (Middle Castle). Sources indicate that in the Lower Castle, traders and guilds of different faiths were active.[24] In that quarter, there was a big trading area called *Suk-i Sultani* (Sultan's Market). In the center of the market there was the *bedesten* (covered bazaar), full of traders from the Trabzon province and other regions as far away as Iran. It is important to note that when the stores and shops were burned during the attacks by the Cossacks, they did not stop the city's desire for trade.[25]

The continuous trade in Trabzon Province was the result of the activities of all religious groups under Ottoman administration. In addition to the ruling elite and Muslim traders, the Greek Orthodox and the Armenians who had settled or existed in Trab-

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Similar complaints were repeated in the presence of the governor of Trabzon that traders were prevented from trading in Gönye Castle and that their goods had been confiscated by bandits, BOA, T. Ş. S., 1836, 14/3, Evahir Cemaziyülahir 1067/April 5 – 14, 1657.

20 From many court entries we provide just one example: Fazlullah Bey, the previous governor of Kefe from Trabzon's Ortahisar quarter, sold his shops and cellar in Trabzon's marketplace to the former janissary officer Mustafa Çavuş for 470 *gurus*, BOA, T. Ş. S., 1840, 25/5, Gurre Ramazan 1074/28 March 1664.

21 BOA, T. Ş. S., 1831, 16/5; 1832, 41/2. These two entries consist of names of non-Muslim traders in Trabzon.

22 It must suffice to provide some *sicil* record numbers demonstrating Muslim involvement in trading and other activities, BOA, T. Ş. S., 1837, 22/2 (Rumelia); 1843, 50/3 (Erzincan and Bağdat); 1843, 19/3 (Rumelia); 1843, 22/1; 1843, 23/5 (Rumelia, Georgia); 1843, 33/1 (Rumelia); 1843, 51/1 (Rumelia).

23 On Trabzon's relations with the north of the Black Sea before the Ottoman conquest, see Rustam Shukurov, "The Empire of Trebizond and the Golden Horde," in *I. Uluslararası Karadeniz Tarihi Sempozyumu Bildiriler Kitabı*, ed. Kenan İnan and Deniz Çolak, (Trabzon: Avrasya Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2020), 89 – 95.

24 *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi: 2. kitap: Topkapı Sarayı Bağdat 304 yazmasının transkripsiyonu-dizini*, ed. Zekeriya Kurşun, Seyit Ali Kahraman, and Yücel Dağlı (Istanbul: YKY, 1999), 47– 55. For detailed information on the trading activities in Trabzon in the second half of the seventeenth century, see Kenan İnan, "Kadı Sicillerine Göre 17: Yüzyıl Ortalarında Trabzon Esnafları ve Faaliyetleri," in *Mahmiye-i Trabzon Mahallatından* (Trabzon: Trabzon Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2013), 57– 82.

25 Jennings, "Plague in Trabzon"; İnan, "Trabzon'da Yönetici Yönetilen İlişkileri (1643 – 1656)," *The Journal of Ottoman Studies* 23.

zon with different aims considerably contributed to the social and economic life of the city. The Armenian population of Trabzon in general was scattered around the city's quarters in the eastern suburbs. They were also allowed to continue living in the city's Middle Castle reserved for the Muslim inhabitants of the city.[26] They were heavily involved in trading activities in Trabzon and in transit trades.[27]

There was also a final group that contributed to the city's life called *Acem taifesi* (Iranians).[28] Even before the Ottoman conquest, in the early fourteenth century, the most important trading square in Trabzon, without an alternative Greek name, was called the *meydan.* This seems to be the result of the opening of the Trabzon-Tabriz trade route after 1260 and the effect of eastern traders on the city.[29] It is very logical to think that this group had been living in Trabzon for a long time and had considerable economic and political relations with powers in eastern Anatolia and Iran.[30]

As in all parts of the Mediterranean Sea, in the Black Sea too the slave trade was one of the most profitable activities. This trade, compared to the other trading activities, brought a continuous flow of humans to the Black Sea ports and cities. In Trabzon, Muslims and non-Muslims possessed male or female slaves of mainly East Slavic and Georgian descent. In addition, there were Polish, Hungarian, Moldavian, and Circassian slaves.[31] A male or female slave was sold mostly for more than one hundred *guruş* (piaster). That was nearly equal to the price of a two-storey house in the city.[32] Slave traders usually sailed or went over land to Georgia, bought slaves, and sold them in Trabzon.[33]

It is known that the negative developments in the Ottoman Empire starting from the end of the sixteenth century and continuing almost throughout the seventeenth century mostly affected Ottoman Anatolia. Trabzon Province and its center, Trabzon city, seem to have been affected by these negative developments as well. Not only internal pressures[34] like village evacuations, banditry, illegal taxes, and plague epidem-

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26 Bostan, *XV-XVI. Asırlarda*, 160 – 62.

27 BOA, T. Ş. S., 1832, 38/2; 1833, 26/2; 1837, 22/1, 44/12.

28 BOA, T. Ş. S., 1835, 7/9, 8/1.

29 Anthony Bryer and David Winfield, *The Byzantine Monuments and Topography of the Pontos*, vol. 1, *The City of Trebizond* (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 1985), 198.

30 Halil İnalcık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Toplum ve Ekonomi* (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1996), 208.

31 On slaves of different nationalities in Trabzon in the second half of the seventeenth century, see BOA, T. Ş. S., 1834, 22/4; 1842, 85/11, 45/3; 1834, 17/9; 1846, 7/7; 1847, 4/1.

32 Kenan İnan, "1831 Nolu Şer'iye Siciline Göre 17. Yüzyıl Ortalarında Trabzon'da Mülk Satışları," in *Mahmiye-i Trabzon Mahallatından,* 147 – 80.

33 BOA, T. Ş. S., 1845,42/2; 46/1; 1844, 54/4. On the slave trade in the northern Black Sea in the same period, see Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, "Slave Hunting and Slave Redemption as a Business Enterprise: The Northern Black Sea Region in the Sixteenth to Seventeenth Centuries," *Oriente Moderno* 86, no. 1 (August 2006): 149 – 59.

34 For some examples on the public order and banditry around Trabzon, see BOA, T. Ş. S., 1835,54/9; 1836, 14/3. See also Kenan İnan, "Trabzon'da Yönetici-Yönetilen İlişkileri (1653 – 1656)", in *Mahmiye-i Trabzon Mahallatından.* 195 – 234.

ics,[35] but also external ones such as Cossack raids seem to have caused economic and social problems affecting the entire population of Trabzon Province, whether Muslim or Christian. However, the sources relate that people around the Black Sea continued with their lives and adapted to the new and ever-changing conditions. They moved to, traded, and settled in other safe places and built up a new life there.[36] Trabzon's Greek Orthodox community usually carried out commercial activities in the region and in the Black Sea. The resident or transit trading Armenians, on the other hand, were at the forefront of trade with the east and the south. The trading activities of the city of Trabzon continued with the other ports of the Black Sea, and Anatolian, Iranian, and Ottoman Arab cities in the Middle East. It seems that the richness of Trabzon's society in terms of social, cultural, and ethnic structure helped develop the city's trading capacity with different geographies. Since the conquest of the city, the tax-exempt administrative sector and janissaries gradually increased their weight in the administration and economy of the city as a typical feature of the seventeenth century and controlled most of the commercial activities.[37]

The name Safavi derives from Shaykh Abu'l-Fatḥ Isḥāḳ (d. 1334), an ancestor of Shah Ismāʿīl I, the founder of the Safavid state. It is important to note that the national unity of Iran[38] originated from a religious source and this had an enormous effect on the continued rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavids.[39] Safavid rule over Persia is conventionally dated from Shah Ismāʿīl's capture of Tabriz in the aftermath of his victory over the Aq Qoyunlu[40] ruler Alwand at Sharur in 1501. The direction of Ismāʿīl's early campaigns certainly suggested that it was the Turkmen[41] heritage he was primarily interested in. By 1508, then, Shah Ismāʿīl was effectively the ruler of most of the territories that had constituted his grandfather's Turkmen empire. Ismāʿīl's expectation was to establish a Turkmen empire after Aq Qoyunlu pattern, consisting of eastern Anatolia, Azerbaijan, western Persia, and Iraq. His military composition relied

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35 Jennings, "Plague in Trabzon."

36 BOA, T. Ş. S., 1835, 19/5; 1837, 22/2; 1843, 19/3, 22/1, 23/5, 33/1, 51/1, 50/3.

37 For an example of the involvement of janissaries in commercial life, see BOA, T. Ş. S., 1840, 25/5.

38 For a general outline of Iran's history and ethnographical structure, see Johannes H. Kramers, "Iran," in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 5, bk. 2 (Eskişehir: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, Eskişehir Anadolu Üniversitesi Güzel Sanatlar Fakültesi, 1997), 1013–30.

39 Bekir Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İran Siyasi Münasebetleri (1578–1612)* (Istanbul: İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1993), 1. See also Walter Hinz, *Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh Cüneyd XV. Yüzyılda İran'ın Milli Bir Devlet Haline Yükselişi*, trans. Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992).

40 For detailed information, see John E. Woods, *The Aqquyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire* (Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1976).

41 On the role played by the Anatolian Turkmens in the establishment of the Safavid state, see Faruk Sümer, *Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999).

on Turkmens. He declared Tabriz his capital and thus he may have seen himself as the legitimate successor to his grandfather, Uzun Hasan.[42]

However, a state whose center was still in Azerbaijan and eastern Anatolia clearly had much more to fear from the Ottoman Empire. The main reason for the conflict between the two empires was that a large proportion of the supporters of the Safavids came from among the Turkmen tribesmen of eastern and central Anatolia, that is to say, mostly from the Ottoman territory. This obviously meant that the Ottoman Empire lost important manpower to its neighbor, but also that for many of those who remained, the Ottomans could not be relied on. The major Qızılbaş[43] revolts of 1511 and 1512 took place in Ottoman Anatolia with vigorous Safavid support in the latter stages. These revolts exhausted the patience of the Ottomans. In 1512, Sultan Bayezid II was forced to abdicate in favor of his son Selim I, who prepared to confront Shah Ismā'īl directly by marching across Anatolia towards Azerbaijan in 1514. The Battle of Çaldıran was to have lasting consequences both for the future of the Safavid Empire and for the political geography of the Middle East down to the present day. The Ottomans were totally victorious.[44] The defeat Selim I inflicted on Ismā'īl I (Safavi) determined where the political borders of the Safavids would lie. The sense of loyalty that spread from Azerbaijan to the interior of Anatolia was destroyed by the Ottoman sultans and the Battle of Çaldıran showed how impossible Iranian expansion in this direction was.[45] Indeed, the current border between Iran and Turkey is a result of Çaldıran. This meant a decisive change to the shape of the Safavid Empire. It was no longer the old Turkmen state with Khorasan added on: Instead it was something more like Iran as we think of it today. Inevitably, although the Turkmen element in the Safavid polity was still of immense importance, this shift of the center of gravity eastwards also resulted, in time, in the state becoming more "Persian" and less "Turkic" in character.[46]

Upon Shah Ismā'īl's death in 1524, his ten-year-old son Ṭahmāsp I ascended to the throne. Till the Treaty of Amasya in 1555, the Ottomans did not have any peace agreement with Iran, and Süleyman I commanded his army in several expeditions against the latter.[47] In 1554, on his return to the capital from the Nakhchivan expedition, the shah sent his men to offer a truce between two states. From this time to the date the hostilities began in 1578, the Ottomans respected the Amasya agreement. In fact, the embassies of Shah Ṭahmāsp, sent to celebrate the enthronement of Selim II and Murad III, were well received in Istanbul and Edirne. However, sometime after the Amasya agreement decrees were sent to the governors of Erzurum and Trabzon

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42 David Morgan, *Medieval Persia 1040 – 1797* (New York: Longman, 1990), 112. On Shah İsmail's life, see Tahsin Yazıcı, "Şah İsmail," in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 11:275 – 79.

43 For detailed information, see Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, "Kızılbaş," in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 6:789 – 95.

44 Morgan, *Medieval Persia*, 116 – 17.

45 Kramers, "Iran," 1023.

46 Morgan, *Medieval Persia*, 117.

47 For detailed information on Süleyman I's Iran expeditions, see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1983), 2:345 – 61.

provinces from Istanbul stipulating that those who were caught escaping to Iran should be punished.[48] During this struggle the Ottomans allied themselves against Persia with the Sunni Shaybanids of Central Asia. In 1554 the sultan sent three hundred janissaries and an artillery company to Barak Nawruz Khan for deployment against the Safavids.[49] During the reign of Sultan Selim II, the Ottomans launched a strategic attempt to control the north of the Caspian Sea. A canal was to open between the Don and Volga rivers to transfer some Ottoman ships to the Caspian Sea. Previously khan of the province of Khwarazm, Haji Muhammad sent a letter and claimed that the Iranians were blocking Central Asian pilgrims' route to Mecca and thus if the Ottomans were to capture Astrakhan from the Russians, Asian pilgrims would have safer passage. It seems that an attempt was also made to weaken Russian influence in the north of the Caspian Sea. Ottoman activities in the region began in 1568 and ended in 1569 without success. Similar proposals to control the Astrakhan region were later made by the Central Asian rulers. In 1587, the ambassador of the Uzbek ruler Abdullah Khan went to Istanbul and encouraged the Ottoman sultan to capture Astrakhan. However, a collective expedition to the region with the Crimean Khanate was not realized.[50] The Ottomans tried to profit from the internal dissension which broke out in Persia after the death of Shah Ṭahmāsp. They entered Persian territory, and the war that followed lasted from 1578 to the Treaty of Qaṣr-i S̲h̲īrīn or Zuhab in 1639. The Persian campaign went through three stages and posed serious threats to the Ottoman Empire.[51]

In fact, the reign of Shah ʿAbbās I (1587– 1629) proved to be the high point of Safavid power and prestige. Initially, he was obliged to make a humiliating peace with the Ottomans in 1590. Vast areas of western and northern Persia, including Tabriz, the original Safavid capital, were ceded to the Ottoman Empire by the Istanbul agreement. During the years up to 1598, Shah ʿAbbās transferred the capital from Qazvīn to Isfahan. ʿAbbās later fought against the Uzbeks, recovering some cities. With the eastern border reasonably secure, it remained to mount a counterattack on the Ottomans. By 1617 the Ottoman troops had been driven from most of the territory that had been defined as Persian by the Treaty of Amasya (1555), and in 1623 ʿAbbās was strong enough to take Baghdad. The previous year, the island of Hormoz in the Persian Gulf, an important center of international trade, was taken from the Portuguese, though not without the help of an English fleet. During his reign, ʿAbbās sought to consolidate his conquest with internal adjustments such as recruiting new Caucasian people to build a standing

48 Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İran Siyasi Münasebetleri*, 4– 9.

49 Halil İnalcık, "The Heyday and Decline of the Ottoman Empire," in *The Cambridge History of Islam*, ed. Peter M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 1 A:333.

50 Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 3, bk. 1, 35– 38.

51 İnalcık, "The Heyday and Decline of the Ottoman Empire," 338.

army. The new campaign was actually taken against the Anatolian Turkmens in the government.[52]

Shah ʿAbbās I died in 1629. As a result of his administrative reforms, more power was centered on the court and the capital than in the sixteenth century. Perhaps of equal importance was the fact that after the reign of Şafī I (1629 – 42), Safavid Persia did not have to face any major external challenges to its security for the remainder of the seventeenth century. War broke out with the Ottomans, always Persia's most dangerous enemy, in 1629, and fighting continued sporadically over the next decade. In 1638, Baghdad fell, and finally ceased to be a Persian possession, remaining part of the Ottoman Empire until World War I. The Persians had to reconcile themselves to the loss of the whole of what is now Iraq, but the Persian-Ottoman border, which approximates to today's border between Iran and Iraq, was established, and there were no more Ottoman-Safavid wars.[53]

The Ottoman–Iranian war, in addition to the political developments, had other important factors we must consider. On the Ottoman side, it seems that wars in the early seventeenth century contributed to the development of some sectors like sea transportation and muleteers in the eastern Black Sea and eastern Anatolia. Transportation of materiel and grain sent by Istanbul and Rumelia to Trabzon and then on to Erzurum increased the activities of muleteers in the region sharply.[54] Again, in the sixteenth century Iranian silk was very valuable for Mediterranean trade and for the Ottoman economy. Iranian silk had been famous since the Middle Ages. In the Ottoman Empire, in Bursa, Aleppo, and İzmir, Western traders bought and invested in Iranian silk. The biggest silk bazar was in Aleppo, with silk coming from Baghdad. When Shah ʿAbbās I tried to deprive the Ottomans of this wealth, the Ottoman-Iranian War became an economic war. ʿAbbās I banned Iranian silk, and the Ottomans responded by preventing gold and silver from going to Iran. This increased the economic crisis in Iran. In fact, this kind of blockade attempts between Iran and the Ottoman Empire displayed important and notable phases. In the last quarter of the sixteenth century, Iran made more frequent communications with Britain, Spain, and Moscow to harm the Ottoman trading activities. When the Russian advance to the Black Sea and the Caucasus alarmed the Ottomans, friendly relations began between Iran and Russia. In the early seventeenth century, Iran, with British help, attempted to stop the silk trade via the Ottoman Empire. However, Shah Şafī I (1629 – 42) realized that the British did not

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52 Morgan, *Medieval Persia*, 132 – 35; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 3, bk. 1, 63 – 68. For diplomatic relations between Ottoman Empire and Iran from 1590 to 1603, see Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı İran Siyasi Münasebetleri*, 201 – 22.

53 Morgan, *Medieval Persia,* 144 – 46; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 3, bk. 1, 194 – 206.

54 See Ömer İşbilir, "Savaş ve Bölgesel Ekonomi: İran Savaşlarında Doğu Karadeniz ve Doğu Anadolu," *OTAM Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi* 21 (2007): 19 – 40.

want to pay cash for silk. Thus, Iranian silk once more found its way to Ottoman Aleppo.[55]

Ṣafī was succeeded by his son ʿAbbās II, during whose reign later Safavid Persia reached the height of its prosperity. The shah resisted the temptation to embroil Persia in the politics of Ottoman Iraq. He preferred to preserve the lasting peace made with the Ottomans in 1639. Shah ʿAbbās II died, aged only thirty-three, in 1666. The new shah was ʿAbbās's eldest son, Sām Mīrzā, who took the title of Ṣafī II. The new shah could perhaps hardly be held responsible for the immediate troubles of his reign: a sudden rise in food prices, outbreaks of famine and disease, an earthquake, and raids by the Cossacks into the Caucasus. Corruption and oppression increased; the military capacity of the state continued to decline. Shah Ṣafī II, also known as Suleyman, died in 1694. The Safavid Empire was handed over to the last shah of the Safavid dynasty, Sultan Ḥusayn. The reasons for the fall of the Safavid dynasty have been attributed mostly to the decline in the personal qualities of the rulers.[56] With the exception of the territory lost during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to Russia in the northwest and northeast, and to Afghanistan in the east, the boundaries of Iran are substantially the same today as in the period from the late tenth to the sixteenth century, and we may assert, therefore, that the rise of the modern state of Iran dates from the establishment of the Safavid state in 1501.[57]

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55 İnalcık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Toplum ve Ekonomi*, 172–78. The importance of the silk trade for the Ottomans was echoed in the peace agreements made after the wars against Iran between 1578 and 1617, Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 3, bk. 1, 57–68. See also Afşin Şahin-Sibel Cengiz, "The Effects of the 16th Century Price Revolution and The Ottoman-Iran Wars on the Ottoman Silk Industry," *Business and Economics Research Journal* 1, no. 1 (2010): 69–82.

56 Morgan, *Medieval Persia*, 148–51.

57 Roger M. Savory, "Safavid Persia," in *The Cambridge History of Islam*, 1 A:398.

Kerstin S. Jobst and Stefan Rohdewald

Forging the Empires in Competition: Russian and Ottoman Transimperial History around the Black Sea until World War I

1 Setting the Ground: The Ottoman and Russian Emerging Empires Expanding to the Northern Black Sea Region

Around the greater Black and Caspian Seas region, the Ottoman Empire, the Grand Duchy of Moscow (from the sixteenth century, the Russian Empire), and the Lithuanian Grand Duchy (from the late fourteenth century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) consolidated themselves at the expense of the Golden Horde and its successor khanates, Persia, and the vanishing Byzantine Empire.[1] The routes over the Dnipro and along or across the Black Sea to Byzantium, which were so important for medieval Rus, besides the older routes via the Caspian Sea to the Near East, came to lie within Poland-Lithuania. From the fourteenth century onwards, this large commonwealth competed with Moscow to gather the former regions of Rus. It was no less successful in this, not least due to the cooperation with Emir Mamai in 1362 and with Tatar leaders such as Tokhtamysh, who fled to Lithuania after losing the fight for Timur's throne in 1395. Nevertheless, the performance of tributary relations between Lithuania and the Golden Horde and then the Crimean Girays would continue.[2] On the other hand, Moscow's conquest of the middle and lower Volga and its acquisition of Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan in 1554 brought Muscovy into direct confrontation with Iran and the Ottoman Empire. Both were present in the Northern Black or Caspian Sea regions—directly, as the Ottomans had laid claim to the southern Crimean coast since 1475. Persia extended as far as Derbent in Dagestan, or, indirectly, as far as the Crimean

1 Cf. a very condensed overview used for this sketch by paraphrasing several passages, albeit with a larger range in a broader Transottoman perspective: Thomas M. Bohn and Christoph Witzenrath, "Verflechtungen zwischen dem Moskauer, Petersburger und dem Osmanischen Reich," in *Transottomanica – Osteuropäisch-osmanisch-persische Mobilitätsdynamiken: Perspektiven und Forschungsstand*, ed. Stefan Rohdewald, Stephan Conermann, and Albrecht Fuess (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019), 191–200.

2 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania: International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (15th–18th Century). A Study of Peace Treaties Followed by Annotated Documents* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 5–8.

Khanate, and at times in the seventeenth century even the Cossack hosts on the Dnipro became Ottoman vassals. While the Ottoman expansion to the north was in the process of turning the Black Sea into an "Ottoman lake" and defined the realm's imperial role in Eastern Europe, the enormous expansion of Moscow to the south and east represented the birth of the early modern Russian Empire, which had now become an even more plurireligious multiethnic realm, stretching from Kazan to the Caspian Sea.[3]

2 The Ottomanization of the Black Sea Region: Transimperial Ties and Competition

Not despite, but rather thanks to the Ottomanization of the Black Sea region, transimperial networks were able to continue and expand their density and outreach—not least between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Merchants were attracted not only from the sphere of power of the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire on the northern Black Sea coast but also from the other parts of the composite Empire, traveling, for instance, from or through Wallachia and Moldavia. They found their way to Moscow, often using the route via Kyiv and Nezhin,[4] avoiding the "Wild Fields"—the large steppe areas on the northern shore of the Black Sea, today south and southeastern Ukraine, where the Cossacks and Tatars dwelt. Among the immigrants to Muscovy, in the seventeenth century, the authorities of the Empire acknowledged the merchants among the Greeks who had entered Russian service, up to the granting of personal estates (*pomeste*). Recognition of transimperial social capital was all the more forthcoming if they could prove that they had belonged to the nobility before the Ottoman conquest and brought with them appropriate letters of confirmation.[5] The desire to attain noble status can also be observed within the group of transregional merchants in the Ottoman Empire, where merchants sought ennoblement for themselves and their families locally, for instance in Wallachia.[6]

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3 Andreas Kappeler, *Rußlands erste Nationalitäten: Das Zarenreich und die Völker der Mittleren Wolga vom 16. bis 19. Jahrhundert* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1982); Andreas Kappeler, *Rußland als Vielvölkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall* (Munich: Beck, 1992).
4 Iannis Carras, "Community for Commerce: An Introduction to the Nezhin Greek Brotherhood Focusing on its Establishment as a Formal Institution in the Years Between 1692 and 1710," in *Merchant Colonies in the Early Modern Period*, ed. Victor Zakharov, Gelina Harlaftis, and Olga Katsiardi-Hering (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012), 141–56.
5 N. S. Zakharina, "Materialy po istorii svetskoi emigratsii iz Balkan v Rossiiu v pervoi polovine XVII v. v fondakh Posolskogo prikaza," in *Sviazi Rossii s narodami balkanskogo polustrova: Pervaia polovina XVII vs*, ed. Boris Floria (Moscow: Nauka, 1990), 198.
6 Stefan Rohdewald, "Adeligkeit, Fernhändler und Luxuswaren in transosmanischen Mobilitätsdynamiken vor 1800," in *Decorum und Mammon im Widerstreit? Adeliges Wirtschaftshandeln zwischen Standesprofilen, Profitstreben und ökonomischer Notwendigkeit*, ed. Annette C. Cremer and Alexander Jendorff (Heidelberg: Heidelberg University Publishing, 2022), 233–56.

Since the mid-sixteenth century, the Volga became more important for long-distance trade between Russia and India—Indian Multani merchants were present by the thousands up to Astrakhan[7]—but also trade with China via Siberia. Russian trade with the Ottoman Empire was growing, too, as far as furs and fur products were concerned: An ever increasing demand for expensive kaftans to be used as honorable gifts to people received by the Ottoman elite expanded fur trading from Siberia to Istanbul:[8] Transimperial trading especially in luxury goods between Moscow or Russia and the Ottoman Empire intensified throughout the early modern period.

While the Ottoman sultans adorned themselves with, among many other titles, that of *kaysar-i rum*, that is, Roman Emperor, from the fifteenth century onwards, the Moscow grand duke sought the title of emperor too, culminating in the first ceremonial coronation of Ivan IV as tsar in 1547. Ivan IV strove not least for equality with the ruler of Kazan, who was also called tsar by the Muscovites, but of course the reference to Constantinople, commonly named Tsarigrad in Slavic sources, was also stressed. Moreover, this development has to be seen in addition to the interaction and competition with the Holy Roman Emperor for the title of Emperor, thus bringing the growth of the Russian Empire into direct competition with Central Europe as well as Muslim-led realms and especially the Ottoman Empire.[9] The idea of the Third Rome expressed anti-Catholic clerical and religious conservative reservations about the strong political center of the empire, yet it was rarely documented in the early modern period. But that Moscow was imagined as the "new Rome" and as the "new Rhomean Metropolis" can be illustrated for instance by the Ottoman Arabic Christian clergyman Paul of Aleppo (Būlus ibn al-Zaʿīm al-Halabī) in his extensive report on the journey he undertook there with his father, Macarius Patriarch of Antioch, from Ottoman Syria via Istanbul, traversing large parts of the Black Sea's western and southern coast, and, on the way back, crossing the Black Sea too.[10] Macarius and Paul travelled via Bucharest, Iaşi, and Kyiv, where Paul praised the Mohyla Academy, to Russia. The Patriarchate of Constantinople, i. e., the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire, saw Russia as a protecting power as

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7 Scott Levi, "The Indian Merchant Diaspora in Early Modern Central Asia and Iran," *Iranian Studies* 32, no. 4 (1999): 483–512; Stephen Frederic Dale, *Indian Merchants and Eurasian Trade, 1600–1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

8 Arkadiusz Blaszczyk, "From the Forests of Siberia to the Urban Jungle of Istanbul: The Ottoman-Muscovite Fur Exchange in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *Transottoman Matters: Objects Moving through Time, Space, and Meaning*, ed. Arkadiusz Blaszczyk, Robert Born, and Florian Riedler (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2021), 119–72.

9 Seeing several empires in one context: Alfred J. Rieber, *The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands: From the Rise of Early Modern Empires to the End of the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 95–96, 126–27.

10 For this part of the journey, see the still relevant edition/translation: Paul of Aleppo, *The Travels of Macarius Patriarch of Antioch [...]*, trans. F. C. Belfour (London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1836), 1:325, 364.

early as the seventeenth century, when Orthodox networks and knowledge flows were condensing in, between, and around the Ottoman Empire and Muscovy.[11]

Within a transimperial social history, beyond trade and religious networks, the militarization of societies in long-term conflicts, that is, wars, have to be considered too. As Moscow and Istanbul gradually came closer to each other from the sixteenth century onwards, they repeatedly fought mutual wars until the twentieth century. These wars were directly significant both for the entire societies involved, from the metropoles to the central areas of direct warfare, and thus the larger Black and Caspian Sea region, and for the standing of the empires in the larger or global arena. The first military confrontation was immediately related to the Muscovite southward expansion, the conquest of Astrakhan, following the conquest of Kazan. In a campaign in 1568–70, using a fleet on the Caspian Sea, the Ottomans attempted to recapture the city for the Tatars or themselves, and also planned to dig a canal between the Don and the Volga to foster a direct connection between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea—which would have improved the Ottoman position vis-à-vis Persia too.[12] However, this enterprise failed, as in this first Russo-Ottoman war, Moscow was able to hold its position. Subsequently, the North Caucasus and the vast hinterland of the northern Black Sea coast became a wide and constantly disputed overlapping area between the empires. This changed the multiple loyalties of local groups such as the Circassians as well as the complex relations with Poland-Lithuania or the Cossacks on the Dnipro and Don.[13]

Only the establishment of fortress lines and Cossack armies partially consolidated rule over this area. In addition to the army on the Don River established in the seventeenth century, the armies on the Kuban and the Terek were formed. The history of this confrontation, which intensified in the eighteenth century and shifted to the Danube and Black Sea regions, directly changed the societies living in the region involved.[14] Ricarda Vulpius shows precisely how this competition surrounding and over the Black Sea and the militarization of the Russian Empire unfolded, turning Moscow into an early modern empire with transregional and transcontinental importance.[15] Simultaneously, the Ottoman Empire saw its standing markedly diminished by the late eigh-

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11 Nikolas Pissis, *Russland in den politischen Vorstellungen der griechischen Kulturwelt 1645–1725* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020).

12 Halil İnalcık, "The Origins of the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal 1569," *Ankara Üniversitesi Yıllığı* 1 (1946/47): 47–106.

13 Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); Brian Davies, *Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500–1700* (London: Routledge, 2007); Dmitrii V. Sen, *Kozachestvo Dona i Severo-Zapadnogo Kavkaza v otnosheniiakh s musulmanskimi gosudarstvami Prichernomoriia (vtoraia polovina XVII v.–nachalo XVIII v.)* (Rostov-on-Don: Izd. Iuzhnogo federalnogo universiteta, 2009).

14 Brian J. Boeck, *Imperial Boundaries: Cossack Communities and Empire-Building in the Age of Peter the Great* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

15 Ricarda Vulpius, *Die Geburt des Russländischen Imperiums: Herrschaftskonzepte und -praktiken* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2020).

teenth century, beginning with the losses against Russia and the Habsburgs in the late seventeenth century. The Russian orientation southward toward the territories dominated by Iran and the Ottoman Empire, that is, to the large northern Black Sea hinterland and the North Caucasus, proceeded in this framework. The marriage of Tsar Ivan IV to Qochenay, daughter of the Kabardinian ruler Teymour, then christened Maria, in 1561 not only directly impacted the dynasty in the imperial center, but also led to the first Russian border markers and fortifications in the North Caucasus. As early as the beginning of the seventeenth century, the tsar's court made an attempt to bind the Georgian kingdoms to itself the same way. With the emergence of Russia as a new political actor in the Caucasus, the tsarist court's special access to the Georgian Orthodox Christian kingdoms as well as the Christian Armenians proved to be key to long-term Russian success in Transcaucasia. Both Iran and the Ottoman Empire intervened to stop these religiously and politically motivated overtures between the Georgian royal courts and Russia. With the fall of the Safavid dynasty (1722), the redivision of zones of influence between the Black and the Caspian Seas gave Russia a predominant position until1991.[16] Thus, we can stress that Russia turned into a transregional and even European power directly in this Black and Caspian Seas arena no less than within the northern sphere.

3 From an "Ottoman Military Revolution" to a Russian-led "European Military Revolution"

As a consequence of this longue-durée military confrontation, the wide grid of Ottoman-Russian relations also included travelling concepts of warfare: The large number and heterogeneous composition of mobile people involved in wars or living under conditions of war had to be organized. This concerned the entire "Danubian-Pontic theater of war," stretching from Croatia and Bosnia, via Transylvania, to Wallachia and the whole northern Black Sea region, i.e., the Zaporozhian and Don Cossack hosts, the Crimean Khanate, and the North Caucasus: Brian Davies notes that Ottoman influences were initially more important for Moscow than Western European models. He therefore even speaks of an "Ottoman military revolution" that reshaped Eastern Europe in the sixteenth century. Russia, for example, adopted the practice of using very large siege cannons. Parallels have been drawn between the service and rifle regiments in the Ottoman Empire (*timar*, janissaries) and the Tsarist Empire under Ivan IV (*pomeste*, *streltsy*). The Janissaries have also been mentioned as a model for rifle-

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16 Cf. Nana Kharebava and Christoph U. Werner, "Persisch-Russische Verzahnungen," in *Transottomanica – Osteuropäisch-osmanisch-persische Mobilitätsdynamiken: Perspektiven und Forschungsstand*, ed. Stefan Rohdewald, Stephan Conermann, and Albrecht Fuess (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019), 231–44.

equipped Hungarian and Polish haiduks too.[17] In the recruitment and supply of recruits and in the construction of fortresses and haul lines driven by Moscow, mutual competition and the adaption of transregionally known best practices in a large area well beyond the Black Sea world were decisive.[18] It was not until the latest Habsburg models were followed and the military build-up of the eighteenth century was taking root with the progressive settlement of the steppe that Russian dominance in the northern Black Sea region and then on the Black Sea itself emerged. Thus Brian Davies, shifting the established terminology as well as the regional focus, proposes speaking of a revised European military revolution led by Russia, when the balance of power shifted between Europe and Asia and for this very reason: At that time, smaller European armies and fleets began to regularly defeat large Asian ones—and this was exactly what the Russian forces did to the Ottoman forces on the Prut in 1711 and in Çeşme, near İzmir, in 1770. Subsequently, the Ottomans, and later other forces often referred to as Asiatic, began to transform themselves, following Western European, but now also the Russian examples, with "new orders" (*nizam-i cedid*). The Russian-led culmination of the European military revolution was, then, a result of the synthesis of the Baltic theater of war, the East-Central European theater, and the Danubian-Pontic theater throughout the eighteenth century.[19]

4 Mobility Dynamics of (Slavic) Slaves, (Crimean) Tatars, and Russian Expansion

Changing alliances of the Tatar successor khanates or the Crimean Khanate with Poland-Lithuania, Muscovy, or the suzerain of the Khanate, the Ottoman Empire, the Khanate established a balance of powers in the extended Black Sea area which remained in place until the partitions of Poland-Lithuania.[20] Pivotal for setting the tone for this interaction was the preponderous role of the recruitment of "slaves." The Crimean Tatars were able to feed slaves into the Black Sea and Caucasus trade within the Ottoman Empire from almost annual campaigns and raids on Ruthenian (Ukrainian), Polish, and Caucasian settlements, providing large numbers of slaves for the rising Ottoman de-

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17 Brian J. Davies, "Introduction," in *Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1500–1800*, ed. Brian J. Davies (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 5–6.

18 Gabor Ágoston, "Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia, 1500–1800," *Kritika* 12, no. 2 (2011): 281–320; Gabor Ágoston, "The Ottoman Empire and the Technological Dialogue Between Europe and Asia: The Case of Military Technology and Know-How in the Gunpowder Age," in *Science Between Europe and Asia: Historical Studies on the Transmission, Adoption and Adaptation of Knowledge*, ed. Feza Günergun (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 27–39.

19 Davies, "Introduction," 11.

20 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "Das Krimkhanat als Gleichgewichtsfaktor in Osteuropa (17.–18. Jahrhundert)," in *The Crimean Khanate between East and West (15th–18th Century)*, ed. Denise Klein (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2012), 47–59.

mand.[21] Cossack raids on the Ottoman Empire supplied Muslim slaves to Muscovy. On the other hand, Moscow's endeavors to free slaves soon extended far into the Ottoman sphere. In the late eighteenth century, under the influence of Enlightenment ideas, the Russian self-conception as the "New Israel" transformed into the offensive imperial ideology of slave liberation, effective in Crimea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.[22]

From this strengthened position, and even more so after the defeat of the Ottomans at the gates of Vienna, beyond the Habsburg Empire, Russia was becoming the main transregional challenger to the Ottoman Empire. Soon after, a dominant Russian position on the northern shore of the Black Sea evolved with Peter I (the Great)'s advancements to the Prut in 1711, but it was the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 that marked it irreversibly: Within the European balance, into which it was integrated in the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was regarded as a predictable and weakening factor.[23] While the Ottomans tried to protect Polish-Lithuanian independence,[24] from 1768 to 1772, Ottoman troops and Polish partisans fought together against Russia, but in an uncoordinated and unsuccessful manner. The conflict ended extremely unhappily for the alliance: In 1772 the first partition of Poland-Lithuania was carried out, and in 1774 Istanbul had to accept the very disadvantageous Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, and with it the formal independence of the Crimean Khanate, which soon became a protectorate of Russia.

5 From the Annexation of Crimea to the Extension of Russia in the Caucasus and towards Iran

When in 1783 Russia annexed the Crimean Khanate and with it the northern coast of the Black Sea, Crimea, and the later New Russia, or the present southern Ukraine, were inscribed into the Tsardom as a "pearl of the Empire" whose undisputed ruler became Catherine II.[25] The dissolution of the Crimean Khanate and the incorporation of the peninsula and the entire northern shore of the Black Sea into the Russian Empire marked an epochal change of the balance of power not only in this region, but in Eu-

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21 Christoph Witzenrath, "Introduction: Slavery in Medieval and Early Modern Eurasia. An Overview of the Russian and Ottoman Empires and Central Asia," in *Eurasian Slavery, Ransom and Abolition in World History, 1200–1860*, ed. Christoph Witzenrath (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), 1–77.

22 Ljubov Kurtynova-D'Herlugnan, *The Tsar's Abolitionists: The Slave Trade in the Caucasus and its Suppression* (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

23 Barbara Schmidt-Haberkamp, "Einleitung: Europa und die Türkei im 18. Jahrhundert – Grenzüberschreitungen in kosmopolitischer Zeit," in *Europa und die Türkei im 18. Jahrhundert/Europe and Turkey in the 18th Century*, ed. Barbara Schmidt-Haberkamp (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 10.

24 Heinz Duchhardt, *Balance of Power und Pentarchie: Internationale Beziehungen 1700–1785* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1997), 185–93.

25 Kerstin S. Jobst, *Die Perle des Imperiums: Der russische Krim-Diskurs im Zarenreich* (Konstanz: Konstanz University Press, 2007).

rope as a whole, including the Near East. The imperial appropriation of Crimea led to its turning into Taurida, referring to the Classical age and thus giving Russia its own (and only) access to Mediterranean antiquity. This and the concurrent (de-)"orientalization" and Christianization of the cultural space fostered the new imagination of Russia itself as a European empire and Great Power.[26]

By claiming to protect the Orthodox population within the Ottoman Empire after the peace treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, the tsars had much greater clout when it came to influencing local politics deep into Ottoman territory. As a result of the Russo-Ottoman Wars of 1768–74 and 1787–92, Russia consolidated its positions in Crimea and secured free shipping on the Black Sea, which would prove to be key for the economic boom and transimperial competition over and beyond the Black Sea region in the nineteenth century.[27] With Russian penetration into the extended region of the Caucasus from the eighteenth century on, Iranian-Russian interlocks changed dramatically. For Persians and Ottomans, the Caucasus region, due to both its geography and the established patterns of political-economic loyalties and dependencies of local rulers, had hitherto represented a shield protecting the two centers of power from their northern neighbor. The third player's becoming active diminished this Persian-Ottoman antagonism.[28] Russia took the leading role in the anti-Ottoman position in the Caucasus. The most important point of the Transcaucasian question in the eighteenth century for Russia was control of the Persian and Ottoman spheres of influence in the Caucasus, with the aim of creating conditions for further expansion towards India. The disagreement and disputes between Russia and Iran over territories in the Caucasus Triangle reignited with the establishment of the Qajarian dynasty and ended with two wars in 1804–13 and 1826–28. These wars resulted in massive territorial losses for Qajarian Persia. The treaties of Gulistan in 1813 and Turkmenchay in 1828 set the Aras River as the Russian-Persian border and completely separated northern Azerbaijan and Armenia from Persia, consolidating Russia's position in the Caspian Sea region.[29]

In the mid-nineteenth century, the Black Sea proved to be the central theater of an extended war between the European Great Powers, with Great Britain and France supporting the Ottoman Empire in order to prevent Russia from becoming the undisputed hegemon over the Black Sea, Istanbul, and the eastern Mediterranean: The Crimean War was intensively reported and quickened the development of media via new techniques such as photographs printed around the world.[30] This event also marked a turning point in terms of the media visibility and the proportion of women in war nursing. In the wake of its crushing defeat, Russia undertook large reforms in the following de-

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26 Mara Kozelsky, *Christianizing Crimea: Shaping Sacred Space in the Russian Empire and Beyond* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010).

27 Victor Taki, *Tsar and Sultan: Russian Encounters with the Ottoman Empire* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016).

28 Kharebava and Werner, "Persisch-Russische Verzahnungen."

29 Muriel Atkin, *Russia and Iran, 1780–1828* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980).

30 Georg Maag, Wolfram Pyta, and Martin Windisch, eds., *Der Krimkrieg als erster europäischer Medienkrieg* (Berlin: LIT, 2010).

cades, strengthening not only the railroad system throughout the empire and especially in the region, but also setting free the serfs to foster industrialization and urbanization. These reforms must be seen, of course, in a larger European and global setting, but can also be explained by the immediate competition with the Western-backed Ottoman Empire, which reformed itself during the years before—and once again after the Russian reforms in order to keep Western support, but also to increase the chances of a comeback on its own.[31] The various stages of Ottoman and Russian military, political, and societal reforms from the eighteenth and nineteenth century onwards can indeed be seen as mutually influenced, not least after military defeats, by the example of the respective victors.

6 Religious and Scholarly Appropriations of Ottoman Territory by Russia

Petersburg's Church policy in the Ottoman Empire developed parallel to, in support of, but often also in competition with the Serbian and Bulgarian national projects: Out of loyalty to the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and hopes for a revival of Orthodoxy as leverage for Russian imperial interests, the diplomats of the Tsarist Empire would not integrate the Bulgarian Exarchate, founded in 1870, into their foreign policy concept.[32] After the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78 and the Russian occupation of the European territories of the Ottoman Empire almost up to the capital Istanbul, the Russian and Bulgarian maximum demands declared in the Treaty of San Stefano had to be revised under pressure from Great Britain in particular. As a result, the Russians alienated their Bulgarian partner.

The scholarly preoccupation in Russia with the Ottoman Empire was part of the consolidation of its position vis-à-vis the evolving transimperial "Oriental Question."[33] In the nineteenth century, imagining Moscow and the Russian Empire as a whole as a new or third Rome spread in the public sphere and developed into an important part of the imperial ideology.[34] With the establishment of the Russian Archaeological Institute in Constantinople in 1894, Russia created a base for its penetration of the Ottoman Empire, reaching out to Palestine in general and Jerusalem in particular.[35] The Institute coordinated scientific expeditions to many Ottoman regions, fostering a Russian impe-

31 Adrian Brisku, *Political Reform in the Ottoman and Russian Empires: A Comparative Approach* (London: Bloomsbury, 2017).

32 Denis Vovchenko, *Containing Balkan Nationalism: Imperial Russia and Ottoman Christians, 1856–1914* (New York: Oxfort University Press, 2016).

33 Lucien J. Frary and Mara Kozelsky, eds., *Russian-Ottoman Borderlands: The Eastern Question Reconsidered* (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014).

34 Daniel Rowland, "Moscow – the Third Rome or the New Israel?," *Russian Review* 55, no. 4 (1996): 591–614.

35 Aleksei Lidov Batalov, *Jerusalem in Russian Culture* (New York: Caratzas, 1994).

rial vision in the minds of the public and in direct competition with the other Great Powers. Thus, regions around the Black Sea and well beyond it were incorporated into Russia's internal and external Orient.[36] Learned societies such as the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, founded in 1882, bolstered these aspirations and broadened the public impact with their publications.[37]

7 Transimperial Society

As both the Russian and the Ottoman were plurilingual, multiethnic, and multireligious empires, the role of Christian, Jewish, and Muslim groups of merchants in the political and economic networks between the Empires continued to be constitutive for transimperial societal networks. With the Black Sea's transformation from an "Ottoman Lake" into a Russian-dominated international trading area (Özveren) following the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, old networks expanded and new ones developed. In the context of the Black Sea region, Armenians continued to enjoy economic importance through their networks in Russia and the Ottoman and Persian Near East, from the Caspian and the Black Seas to the Mediterranean.[38] Trade relations and networks boomed during the early nineteenth century, when the Black Sea and the new port cities such as Odessa and Novorossiisk became the hubs for wheat export and also for steam navigation. Older Ottoman Greek networks, developed not least along the land route to Moscow via Nezhin, now changed and became part of port-based trading.[39] Greeks emigrated to the whole of the Russian Empire via the Black Sea area, expanding or founding trade diasporas there, but also often to serve in the Russian military.[40] Poti and Batumi became important sea ports only after the connection of the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea by railway in 1883. In 1906, a pipeline for petroleum from Baku to Batumi opened, financed by the Russian Empire. Petroleum now flowed via ship to Odessa and

36 Vera Tolz, *Russia's Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Victor Taki, "Orientalism on the Margins: The Ottoman Empire under Russian Eyes," *Kritika* 12, no. 2 (2011): 321–51; David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, *Russian Orientalism: Asia in the Russian Mind from Peter the Great to the Emigration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).
37 Irina A. Borobeva, *Russkie dukhovnye missii i Imperatorskoe Pravoslavnoe Palestinskoe obshchestvo v Sviatoi zemle v 1847–1917 godakh* (Moscow: Institut vostokovedeniia RAN, 2001); Lora A. Gerd, *Konstantinopol i Peterburg: Tserkovnaia politika Rossii na pravoslavnom vostoke (1878–1898)* (Moscow: Indrik, 2006); Lora A. Gerd, *Russian Policy in the Orthodox East: The Patriarchate of Constantinople (1878–1914)* (Warsaw: DeGruyter, 2014).
38 Tamara Ganjalyan, *Diaspora und Imperium: Armenier im vorrevolutionären Russland (17. bis 19. Jahrhundert)* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2016).
39 Iannis Carras, *Orthodoxe Kirche, Wohltätigkeit und Handelsaustausch: Kaufleute und Almosensammler entlang der osmanisch-russischen Grenze im 18. Jahrhundert* (Erfurt: Universität Erfurt, 2020).
40 Nicholas Charles Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service in the Late 18th and Early 19th Centuries* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1991).

by rail through Ukraine, via the Danube or the Mediterranean to the Adriatic ports and on to Central Europe and well beyond.[41]

Russian imperial diplomacy also began to make increasing efforts to reach out to Muslim subjects who aspired to a pilgrimage to Mecca. Until World War I, a "transimperial hajj infrastructure" using steamship lines developed around and across the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea.[42] The continuation of the reference to the New Jerusalem narrative in the formerly Ottoman or Crimean, now Russian, territories on the Northern shore of the Black Sea led to the perception of "New Russia" as the empire's "Garden of Eden."[43] On the other hand, this narrative encouraged the settlement of the region by migrants or confessional refugees, such as Germans, Bulgarians, and Greeks who moved there for the purpose of its colonization in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ultimately all becoming part of the heterogenous imperial society in the vast Russian Black Sea hinterland.

Security issues became an issue between the Russian and Ottoman empires, with a specific focus on the greater Black Sea area, including its larger hinterland regions: If in the eighteenth century it was still the plague that threatened to return from the Ottoman Empire, in the nineteenth century, cholera, the "Turkish plague," raged at periodic intervals, especially in the east of the European continent. Quarantine stations (*tahaffuzhane* or *karantinnaia kontora*) on both sides of the border were only moderately successful in controlling or even steering flight movements and economically motivated migration.[44]

8 From Groups to Minorities: Citizenship and Migration Regimes between the Empires across the Black Sea

From the late eighteenth century, an increasing number of Muslims whose homelands were incorporated into the Russian Empire, as Crimean Tatars, Circassians, and other peoples from the Caucasus and Central Asia increasingly established refugee communities within the Ottoman Empire. The emigration of the Muslim Tatars and Circassians from the former territories of the Crimean Khanate from the end of the eighteenth century onwards turned into ethnic cleansing between 1859 and 1864, and was intensively perceived as such by the emerging Ottoman public too. These communities of "trans-

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41 Stefan Rohdewald, "Petroleum: Commodity, Products and Infrastructures as Transottoman Mobilities around 1900," in Blaszczyk, Born, and Riedler, *Transottoman Matters,* 99–118.

42 Eileen Kane, *Russian Hajj: Empire and the Pilgrimage to Mecca* (Ithaca: Brill, 2015).

43 Kelly O'Neill, "Constructing Russian Identity in the Imperial Borderland: Architecture, Islam, and the Transformation of the Crimean Landscape," *Ab Imperio*, no. 2 (2006): 163–92.

44 Andrew Robarts, *Migration and Disease in the Black Sea Region: Ottoman-Russian Relations in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries* (London: Bloomsbury, 2017).

imperial Muslims" did not lose contact with their former homelands. In the late nineteenth century, intellectuals from these communities who propagated reformist and Pan-Turkist ideas transformed both Russian Muslim communities as well as Ottoman society, re-producing and rethinking migration society in a very large spatial framework.[45] Modern concepts of identity such as Turkism and Pan-Turkism developed in both the Russian and Ottoman Empires and were promoted not only by the Crimean Tatar Ismail Gasprinskii/Gaspıralı İsmail,[46] but also by intellectuals from Baku and Tbilisi, less well known today, and larger transimperial societal groups. These new ideas were formulated and conceived as answers confronting other new concepts of imperial and national identities among the Christians too: In the nineteenth century, both Ottoman and Russian cities around the Black Sea were important laboratories where new national identities formed: Bulgarians, Serbians, Armenians, Jews, Greeks, Crimean Tartars, or Kurds, foremost in Istanbul, formed national, transimperial networks. Within the larger global developments, but within regional constellations of competition, older denominational or political group identities transformed into new "national" ones. Old denominational Orthodox networks began to split up and to develop "Greek," "Serbian," or "Bulgarian" national political loyalties in emancipation from the Ottoman Empire.[47] This has been observed not only for the Ottoman Armenians, for instance—among whom a new sense of national identity began to spread only in the 1880s and under the influence of Russian Armenians.[48] Anti-Semitic governance and pogroms within Russia and then World War I and the revolutions accelerated every form of migration throughout our focus region, including large-scale emigration from the Balkans to Anatolia and from Russia, not least via the Black Sea, in the case of Jews to the US or late Ottoman Palestine.[49] On the other hand, new Turkish identity

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45 James H. Meyer, *Turks Across Empires: Marketing Muslim Identity in the Russian-Ottoman Borderlands, 1856–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

46 Christian Noack, *Muslimischer Nationalismus im Russischen Reich: Nationsbildung und Nationalbewegung bei Tataren und Baschkiren, 1861–1917* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1999); Volker Adam, *Rußlandmuslime in Istanbul am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges: Die Berichterstattung osmanischer Periodika über Rußland und Zentralasien* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002); Yaaqov M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation* (London: Indiana University Press, 1995).

47 Minna Rozen, *Homelands and Diasporas: Greeks, Jews and Their Migrations* (London: Bloomsbury, 2008); Stefan Rohdewald, *Götter der Nationen: Religiöse Erinnerungsfiguren in Serbien, Bulgarien und Makedonien bis 1944* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2014).

48 Howart Eissenstat, "Modernization, Imperial Nationalism, and the Ethnicization of Confessional Identity in the Late Ottoman Empire," in *Nationalizing Empires*, ed. by Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller (Budapest: CEU Press, 2015), 445.

49 Alexandre Toumarkine, *Les migrations de populations Musulmanes Balkaniques en Anatolie (1876–1913)* (Istanbul: Isis, 1995); Gur Alroey, *An Unpromising Land: Jewish Migration to Palestine in the Early Twentieth Century* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014); Gur Alroey, *Ha-Mehapekha ha-sheketah: Ha-Hagira ha-yehudit me-ha-Imperya ha-Rusit 1875–1924* (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History, 2008).

concepts such as Pan-Turkism inspired Russian intellectuals to develop in response Eurasianism as a new transcontinental, national-imperial concept and project.[50]

Revolutionaries too circulated from the late nineteenth century onwards, and with them concepts and knowledge about each other, enabling the urban population to strive for constitutional revolutions in Russia, Iran, and the Ottoman Empire. The Russian Revolution of 1905 erupted violently not least in the large industrial port cities of the Black and Caspian Sea region such as Baku and Odessa, with highly mobile intellectuals active in networks across the metropoles of all three empires.[51] Revolutionary Armenians cooperated with Bulgarians and/or Macedonians to topple Ottoman rule in the remaining European territories of the Empire, which were developing ties and the transport of weapons to the Bolsheviks: In 1904/5, for example, several loads of weapons were transferred from Macedonia, with Armenian help, to the Caucasian branch of the Russian Bolsheviks, which included figures such as Joseph Stalin, Maksim Litvinov, and Leonid Krasin.[52] The culmination of globalized transimperial competition escalated around the Black and Caspian Seas in the years around 1900, during the Balkan Wars, and then in World War I, leading imperial policy to instrumentalize Muslims, Armenians, and Kurds in the Caucasian-Anatolian border region. It was precisely in this context that the Russian-Armenian and the Armenian-Ottoman relationships escalated too. Reflecting the genocidal repression of Armenians within the Ottoman territories in 1915/16, Russia's advance to Trabzon on the Black Sea coast and Erzurum in 1916 opened up the possibility of drastic measures already conceived in 1915: The deportation of the entire Muslim population in the Russian-occupied former Ottoman frontier governments had been proposed to the Council of Ministers in January 1915, with extremely accurate mention of the preceding and then concurrent actions against Jews in Galicia, which Russia had occupied since September 1914. Thus, these plans and actions provided the Ottoman authorities with a model—situating the genocide within a Transottoman framework.[53] The demise of the Russian Empire with the revolutions of 1917 led to a short-term renewal of the strategic importance of Crimea for the White Russian counterrevolutionaries, including a short-lived British intervention reaching as far as Baku. But ultimately, the result was a large number of refugees fleeing to Constantinople and, of course, the end of not least the Russian intellectuals' and public's

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50 Stefan Wiederkehr, "Eurasianism as a Reaction to Pan-Turkism," in *Russia Between East and West: Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism*, ed. Dmitry Shlapentokh (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 39–60.

51 Michael A. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

52 Stefan Troebst, *Das makedonische Jahrhundert: Von den Anfängen der nationalrevolutionären Bewegung zum Abkommen von Ohrid, 1893–2001* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 54.

53 Ozan Arslan, "'Unreliable Muslims' out and 'Loyal Subjects of the Tsar' in?: Two Different Forms of Migration Envisaged by the Russian Authorities in the Southwestern Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia in WWI," in *From Empire(s) to Nation-States: Population Displacements and Multiple Mobilities in the Late Ottoman Empire*, ed. Catherine Horel and Bettina Severin-Barboutie (Leiden: Brill, 2022), 77–101.

dreams of direct control of this metropole and the Straits connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.[54]

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54 Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz, *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman Borderlands* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).

Adrian Brisku

The Black Sea Region during World War I and the Interwar Periods: The Forging of a Modern Identity

1 Introduction

Arguably, while World War I can be largely narrated as a continuation of pre-War geo-political antagonism and rivalry between the two largest states in the Black Sea region, the ensuing history of the interwar period can be weaved as a *triadic narrative* account. Indeed, for the pre-World War I and World War I periods, the dominating narrative is a geopolitical one: Ongoing antagonism was manifested in wars fought for control over military and commercial navigation and access in the region. With respect to pre-World War I competition, the Russian Empire held the upper hand, although it was often thwarted or redirected by other Great Powers—especially when it came to the very existence of the Ottoman Empire, "the Eastern Question"[1]—while the smaller new state of Romania could not and would not be part of this antagonism. Subsequently, during World War I each of these three states, and another smaller and new state in the form of Bulgaria, fought in two power blocs: the Russian Empire (until 1917) and Romania (from 1916) with the Allied Powers, and Turkey and Bulgaria (from 1915) with the Central Powers.

In this interwar *triadic narrative* account, firstly, there is the ongoing geopolitical narrative which, instead of earlier antagonism, features historically unusual, friendly relations between the main imperial successor states: the Soviet Russia/Union and the Ankara Government/Republic of Turkey—sealed in the Treaty of Moscow (1921), the Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression (1925), and the Treaty of Trade and Maritime Transportation (1927)—and a stable, multilateral regime forged via international law and agreements in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) and the Montreux Convention on the Regime of the Straits (1936).[2] Secondly, there is a "collaborative" political-economic narrative of state-led economic developments: industrialization in the Soviet Union

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1 See Stephan Troebst, "The Black Sea as a Historical Meso-Region: Concepts in Cultural Studies and the Social Sciences," *Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies* 2, no.2 (June 2019): 14–15.

2 See Adrian Brisku, "Ottoman-Russian Relations," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History* (April 2019): 1–20.

and Turkey, "agrarianism" in Bulgaria and Romania,[3] and a social-democratic, mixed economy in the short-lived Republic of Georgia.[4] And thirdly, there is the narrative of forced mass displacement of peoples—including ethnic cleansing and genocide—perpetrated by states on the basis of war and geopolitics, as well as on ideological and policy grounds of nation-building and national economy-building.[5]

This chapter offers a historical overview of both these periods using this triadic narrative account and drawing on the historical scholarship on the region to argue that especially the interwar period largely sets the stage for the modern relations between these states, sketching the contours of a regional Black Sea identity.

2 From the "Eastern Question" to a Regional Black Sea Identity

While historical scholarship on the region on this period is vast—considering Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish, Georgian, Romanian, and Bulgarian historiographical accounts and the wider Western historical literature—remarkably, few references engage with the region as such and employ the term "the Black Sea" directly. This is the case for contemporaries as well as for historians and social scientists studying the period.

One of the reasons for this—at least from this wider Western scholarly perspective—is that regional geopolitical events and developments in the "long nineteenth century" were read from an "Eastern Question" perspective. However, the term "the Black Sea" entered Western usage much earlier. A literal translation of the word *karadeniz* (the Black Sea) from Turkish, referring to the sea situated in the northern part of the Ottoman Empire—a direction that in Turkish culture is represented by the colour black—was first recorded in Diderot's Encyclopaedia of 1765 as "the people who inhabit the shores of this area are subjects or tributaries of the Ottoman Empire."[6] It was with the dissipation of the "Eastern Question"—the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1923—that sporadic articulations of and references to the Black Sea were made by contemporaries.

One of those early articulations was made by a representative of the Georgian government at the Paris Peace Conferences in 1919. In justifying his government's military

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3 Nicoleta Ciachir, "A Promising Start of Interwar Bulgarian-Romanian Relations during the Government of Aleksandar Stamboliyski," *Valahian Journal of Historical Studies* 18 (2012): 40 – 52.
4 Stephen Jones, "Between Ideology and Pragmatism: Social Democracy and the Economic Transition in Georgia 1918 –1921," *Caucasus Survey* 1, no. 2 (2014): 63 – 81.
5 Understood as political-economic perspectives and programs for a viable national economy. See Adrian Brisku, "Renegotiating the Empire, Forging the Nation-State: The Albanian Case through the Political Economic Thought of Ismail Qemali, Fan Noli and Luigj Gurakuqi, c. 1890 –1920s," *Nationalities Papers* 48, no. 1 (2020): 158.
6 Stella Ghervas, "The Black Sea," in *Oceanic Histories*, ed. David Armitage, Alison Bashford, and Sujit Sivasundaram (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 249.

control of the region of Abkhazia in June 1918, he stated that this "Black Sea coast had been 'Georgian lands' in the 11th–13th centuries," adding that the tsarist Black Sea town of Sochi was a "'pure Georgian town.'"[7] In interwar Turkey—where the term had long been in usage—noteworthy is a booklet on a Turkish military perspective on the region whose title translates as "The North Part of the Black Sea Area" (1936), referring to the southern part of the Soviet Union.[8] In the Russian (Soviet) context, the historian of antiquity Mikhail Rostovtzeff—a full professor of Latin for two decades until 1918 at the University of St. Petersburg—did not use the term in his book *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* (1922), published in exile. But by the mid 1930s, Soviet Foreign Minister Maksim Litvinov—in light of good bilateral relations with Turkey but in response to the latter's project to change the Bosporus Strait's status at the Montreux Convention in 1936—spoke of a Black Sea identity when declaring that "[t]his remarkable document [was] prepared with an impartial and liberal spirit. This spirit prompted the designer of the project to consider the safety of the Black Sea Countries as well as that of Turkey."[9] Interestingly, in interwar Romania, the economic historian Gheorghe Ion Brătianu, in his two-volume work titled *La Mer Noir et la Question d'Orient*, in studying the region's pre-sixteenth century history—with the Byzantine Empire as its fulcrum—in the first volume and its history during Ottoman rule in the second (which has been lost), used the terms "Black Sea" and "the Eastern Question."[10] Finally, in interwar Soviet Georgia, the historian Simon Janashia seemingly entrenched it in Soviet Georgian historiography with his book *The Historical Geography of the Black Sea*, published in the 1930s.[11]

As for the wider Western scholarship on or touching upon the two periods, one of the most well-known works is Ascherson's *Black Sea: The Birthplace of Civilisation and Barbarism* (1995). Providing a longue durée account of the region, in chapter seven Ascherson dwells more on the forced displacement of Pontic Greeks from the Black Sea's southern and northern shores: the Trabzon area in the context the Greek-Turkish Population Exchange in 1923 and South Russia and Ukraine following Stalinist collectivization and expropriation in the late 1920s. He estimates that 170,000 of the latter were expelled to Siberia and Central Asia. He briefly shines the spotlight on the Soviet Georgian littoral when mentioning Stalin's henchman, Lavrenti Beria, "the most prominent Megrelian," as the man responsible for the destruction of Georgia's interwar generation of intellectuals, and on the Turkish littoral by mentioning the fate of the Lazi peo-

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7 George B. Hewitt, *Discordant Neighbours: A Reassessment of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian Conflicts* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 35.

8 Genelkurmay başkanlığı coğrafya encümeni, *Karadeniz Havzası Şimal Kısmi* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Matbaası, 1936).

9 Quoted in Vefa Kurban, *Russian-Turkish Relations from the First World War to the Present* (London: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), 66.

10 Troebst, "The Black Sea as a Historical Meso-Region," 17.

11 Simon Janashia, *Shavizghvispiretis saistorio geografia*, in *Works* (Tbilisi: Metsniereba, 1988), 6:250 – 322.

ple and their language.[12] Meanwhile, Charles King's book *The Black Sea: A History* (2004), in also offering a longue durée account "on the sea and its role in the histories, cultures, and politics of the peoples and the states around it," supplies a short narrative of World War I and interwar geopolitics, viewing the region "at the intersection of the turbulent Balkans, the Bolsheviks and European protectorates in the Levant."[13] This geopolitical narrative features in Zürrer's *Kaukasien 1918 – 1921* (1978) and in Ghervas's "The Black Sea" (2018), the latter bringing the interwar, World War II, and Cold War periods together under this narrative.[14]

3 A "Cordial" North-South Axis and a European-imposed Multi-laterism on "State(s) with a Black Sea Coast"

One of the most remarkable aspects—in this geopolitical narrative—is that while in World War I the region was plagued by war, violence, and destruction affecting the peoples of the four states, the interwar period became a relatively peaceful time—compounded by a stable and multi-lateral regime—for the four states with a Black Sea coast: the Soviet Union, Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria. The most significant aspect was that "[t]he idea that the Black Sea could unite rather than divide the centres of power on its northern and southern sides [i. e., Soviet Russia and Turkey] would have been unthinkable" and became possible because, being excluded from the European order, "Soviets and Turks came to appreciate the ramifications of a shared geography."[15]

But their rapprochement and focus on a shared geography were not only because of exclusion from Europe, in the Russian case on ideological grounds following Vladimir Lenin's Communist Revolution/coup in Russia, and in the Ottoman case its mere dismemberment. It was also more immediate because Bolshevik Russians as well as Ottoman Turks led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) fought wars within their former imperial territories—wars supported by other European powers—and needed each other's backing, this being the case more for the Ottoman Turkish side. While the Soviets withdrew from the Great War before it had ended, their Red Army began a five-year civil war against the remnants of the tsarist White Army. This was a civil war whose main theaters of war were the northern Black Sea areas, including the North Caucasus, with

12 Neal Ascherson, *Black Sea: The Birthplace of Civilisation and Barbarism* (London: Vintage Books, 2007), 177 – 202.

13 Charles King, *The Black Sea: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 3 – 5.

14 Ghervas, "The Black Sea," 234 – 66.

15 Samuel J. Hirst, "Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery: The Meaning of Soviet-Turkish Convergence in the 1930s," *Slavic Review* 72, no. 1 (2013): 36 – 37.

the White Army making its last stand in Crimea in 1920.[16] And thus the conflict swept over not only the short-lived independent Ukrainian states (the West Ukrainian People's Republic, the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian State) and Crimea (Crimean People's Republic), but also the eastern flank of the Black Sea in 1921, which had also briefly become independent between April 1918 and February 1921, first as a federation, the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic, and then as the separate republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.[17] This area had in fact fallen under British military control, which in turn sought to establish a "Caucasus barrier" against the Ottoman and Russian re-emergence there.

On the Ottoman side, with the Ottoman army having entered World War I on October 29, 1914—with a surprise attack, together with the German navy, on the Russian Black Sea coast—and having ultimately been defeated by the Allies in 1918, Mustafa Kemal Pasha garnered military resistance and established an alternative government to reject the Treaty of Sèvres (1920). The latter, signed by Allies and the defeated imperial government, imposed dismemberment on the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's military resistance—the National Struggle, as it is known in Turkish historiography—to Greek, Italian, and Armenian armies within territories that would become the Republic of Turkey in 1923[18] would have suffered without what came to be Soviet military and financial aid. In fact, this assistance came about when the two governments signed the Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood (the Treaty of Moscow) in March 1921, in which the Soviets recognized the legitimacy of Kemal's government and the territorial integrity of what would become the Republic of Turkey. Among other matters, the two governments decided the contentious issue of which side would control the Black Sea port town of Batumi and its environs; it went to Soviet Georgia but Turkey was allowed to use its port for commercial purposes. More concretely, Turkey's territorial disputes with Soviet Georgia and Soviet Armenia were settled in the Treaty of Kars in October 1921. The two governments also agreed to postpone resolving the question as to who would govern the Straits.[19]

Unlike the northern flank, where the Russian Civil War continued well into the first years of the interwar period, and on the southern flank, where the Turkish National Struggle against the Greek and Italian armies continued, on the western flank, i.e., Romania and Bulgaria, World War I war ended after 1919. Bulgaria accepted the Allies' decision, in the Neuilly Treaty (1919), to return the region of Dobruja to Roma-

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16 Orlando Figes, "The Red Army and Mass Mobilisation during the Russian Civil War, 1918–1920," *Past & Present* 129 (1990): 207.

17 Adrian Brisku, "Afterword," in *The Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic of 1918: Federal Aspirations, Geopolitics and National Projects*, ed. Adrian Brisku and Timothy K. Blauvelt (Oxon: Routledge), 125.

18 Carter Vaughn Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789–2007* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 218–19.

19 Kurban, *Russian-Turkish Relations*, 8–23.

nia, the latter having already expanded even more around the Black Sea coast when the formerly tsarist Bessarabia joined it in a union in March 1918.[20]

Thus, with wars ending in the early 1920s, the early antagonism and competition for imperial hegemony of the *mare clausum* (closed sea) policy of the north-south axis came to be replaced by "cordial"[21] relations between Soviet Russia and the Republic of Turkey as well as a multi-lateral regime for the Black Sea.[22] Their cordiality—despite ideological differences between "nationalist Turks" and "internationalist Bolsheviks" and because of European exclusion and "imperialism"—was reflected in the Soviet military and financial support and in their intense diplomatic, economic, and cultural interactions. For Turkey's interwar president Mustafa Kemal and prime minister İsmet İnönü, the Soviet Union became a shield against "European imperialism," and as such it made sense for their governments to align in opposing a "Western-dictated international order."[23] This was especially so for Turkey, which from its very existence experienced the weight of this order whereby a multi-lateral, open regime of navigation and commerce was imposed on the Ottoman government by the Allies in the Armistice of Mudros (October 1918)—reinforced by the Treaty of Sèvres (August 1920)—and remained unchallenged by the Turkish government in the Treaty of Lausanne (July 1923).[24] In this Treaty—signed by Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, and Romania, but not by the Soviet Union and Bulgaria—Turkey's sovereignty and its new borders were recognized in exchange for its relinquishing claims to the remaining parts of the former Empire. This Treaty, however, did not strain Soviet-Turkish cordiality and their anti-Western cooperation[25] in the Black Sea region, as illustrated by the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Neutrality signed in December 1925. This Treaty of Non-Aggression confirmed that if the signatories fought a third party—Britain was trying to put a wedge between the two states—the other signatory would declare its neutrality.[26]

On the basin's western flank, after the Dobruja's handover, Bulgaria and Romania —especially upon the Bulgarian prime minister Aleksandar Stamboliyski's initiative— put their relations on a good footing. Stamboliyski, as a key figure of agrarianism, which had spread in the Balkans and Central Eastern Europe, sought closers relations with the Romanian state and proponents of agrarianism there. He visited Bucharest several times with the aims of forging a dynastic inter-marriage between the two royal houses and enlisting Romanian peasant parties in the Green International, an in-

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20 Leften S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453* (London: Hurst & Company, 2000), 579.

21 Onur Isci, "The Massigli Affair and Its Context: Turkish Foreign Policy after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact," *Journal of Contemporary History* 55, no. 2 (2019): 272–74.

22 Troebst, "The Black Sea as a Historical Meso-Region," 17–18.

23 Isci, "The Massigli Affair and Its Context," 276. See also, Stefan Plaggenborg: "Kemalismus und Bolschewismus: Ungleiche Brüder und ihr historisches Erbe," *Osteuropa* 68, no. 10–12 (2018): 51–80.

24 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Lausanne Peace Treaty," accessed June 21, 2020, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-part-i_-political-clauses.en.mfa.

25 Hirst, "Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery," 37.

26 Kurban, *Russian-Turkish Relations*, 42–44.

ternational platform of agrarian parties in the Balkans and Central Eastern Europe that opposed the Soviet Communist Red International. The latter in turn had its subdivision, the *Krestianskii Internatsional* (*Krestintern*; Peasant International).[27]

But while interwar Bulgarian-Romanian relations would not move beyond these initial interactions—except for the Balkan Pact in 1934 (more on this below)—Turkish-Soviet relations intensified. Against a background of Western financial exclusion and pressure, the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey signed the Treaty of Trade and Maritime Transportation in Ankara in March 1927—the first of its kind. The negotiation of this Treaty—which took place at the Soviet Black Sea port of Odesa in November 1926—had been contentious regarding aspects affecting the eastern and southeastern Black Sea littoral in particular. The Turkish side sought to export its consumer goods to the Soviet market and third countries by using the port town of Batumi as an outlet, whereas the Soviet side wanted to establish commercial agencies with diplomatic status in Turkey. Though the Turkish side considered such agencies propaganda outlets, it ultimately accepted them on its territory, except for the Artvin and Kars regions. Meanwhile, the Soviet side allowed Turkish commercial use of the port of Batumi. Turkey also received financial aid to the tune of USD 6 million to invigorate its struggling economy.[28] Additionally, both countries signed the Ankara Protocol in December 1929, extending by two more years the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Neutrality and adding that neither could enter into a political agreement with third parties without the consent of the other party.[29] But the pinnacle of their cordiality was reached between 1932 and 1933. With Soviet Odesa becoming one of the venues for high-level meetings between Prime Minister İnönü and his Soviet counterpart in April 1932, among many issues agreed upon, the Soviets reluctantly approved Turkey's intent to join the League of Nations—the Soviets wanted to do it jointly. In the event, Turkey joined that year, followed by the Soviet Union in 1934, both fearing the rise of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany). They also provided Turkey with a credit of USD 8 million to purchase industrial goods from Soviet stock.[30] Meanwhile, a Soviet delegation— led by the head of the Soviet army and navy—attended the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Republic of Turkey that took place in Ankara on October 29, 1933.[31]

Their cordiality began to wear off, however, due to increasing geopolitical divergence concerning the Black Sea region and beyond. The Balkan Pact of 1934 was one the instances that pointed to this divergence. A Turkish initiative aimed at preserving the post-Lausanne Treaty status quo in the Balkans and the western flank of the Black Sea, this pact was signed between Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Romania in the February. The Soviet Union declined the invitation to sign on the grounds of a border dis-

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27 Ciachir, "A Promising Start of Interwar Bulgarian-Romanian Relations."

28 Kurban, *Russian-Turkish Relations*, 44 – 47.

29 İsmail Soysal, *Turkey's Political Treaties with Background and Explanations* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000), 1:279 – 80.

30 Kurban, *Russian-Turkish Relations*, 58 – 59.

31 Hirst, "Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery," 43 – 45.

pute with Romania concerning Bessarabia.[32] The other instance was the Montreux Conference of 1936. Again a Turkish initiative—supported by Britain and France—to finally change the Straits' status by giving Turkey control over the number of military battleships passing through it, it was opposed by the Soviets, who did not wish Turkey to be the only "state with a Black Sea coast" to have such control. As Minister Litvinov put it "[i]n [the] case [that] a state with a Black Sea coast goes to war, we will not take kindly to the fact that only one country has control of the Straits even if it is Turkey, our best friend."[33] Ultimately, a multilateral agreement—the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits—was signed in July 1936 by the four Black Sea coastal states as well as Greece, Yugoslavia, France, Britain, and Japan, giving Turkey control over the transit of military vessels of non-Black Sea states.

At the onset of the World War II, with Turkey getting closer to Britain and France, while the Soviet Union was beginning to "affiliate itself with Germany,"[34] in April 1939 the two states discussed the possibility of a mutual alliance. But a major geopolitical drift emerged when the Soviets signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Hitler's Germany in August 1939, sanctioning the partition of Poland that triggered World War II with the Nazi occupation of the country on September 1.[35]

4 Internationalized Trade, and "Collaborative" National Economy-Building

If this geopolitical narrative points to the novelty of an unusual cordiality in the north-south axis and multi-laterism, the political-economic narrative points to continuity and novelty in economic interactions and relations in the region. Continuity in relation to the region's internationalized trade, novelty in terms of a "collaborative," state-led development of economies[36] in the sectors of industry and agriculture, between the Soviet Union and Turkey, with brief attempts in the agricultural sector in Bulgaria and Romania.

Thus, the region's internationalized trade predated the interwar period and was certainly disrupted in the last two years of World War I. Indeed, it was the onset of "the long-nineteenth century," ending a long Ottoman (Istanbul) absolute monopoly of trade relations in the Black Sea basin and opening it to Russian and other European trading interests. Russia was the first to break this monopoly via wars, one of the principal causes of antagonism between the two empires. This was the case with the 1806–12 war concluded with the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), which gave Russia control

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32 Kurban, *Russian-Turkish Relations*, 64–65.

33 Kurban, 66.

34 Kurban, 67–68.

35 Isci, "The Massigli Affair and Its Context," 272–74.

36 Hirst, "Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery," 45.

of Bessarabia, of shipping rights on the Danube, and of a large part of the Ottoman-Georgian Black Sea coast. Meanwhile, the 1828–18 war settled with the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) accorded Russia control of the Danube Delta on the western flank and of Mingrelia and Guria on the eastern flank, as well as the right to free navigation for all its commercial vessels on the Bosporus.[37] A significant corollary to this Ottoman loss of monopoly was the emergence of new port cities: Trabzon in the Black Sea coast of East Anatolia—close to the Persian trading metropolis of Tabriz—the new Russian city of Odesa, channelled through Ukrainian grain surpluses, and Romanian port towns of Brăila and Galaţi on the lower Danube.[38]

But while Russia broke this monopoly, Britain and France further internationalized the economic activity in the Black Sea basin, especially after Russia's defeat in the Crimean War (1853–56) by the Ottoman, British, and French armies. With this defeat settled at the Treaty of Paris (1856), this Treaty established the European Commission on the Danube (ECD), which took away Russia's control of commerce and navigation on the Danube Delta. Additionally, the Public Act of 1865—signed by all the Great Powers, including the Ottoman Empire and Russia—confirmed this Commission as an international body protected under international law, including from territorial (i.e., Russian and Ottoman) authorities.[39]

Trade remained internationalized during the first two years of World War I, as representatives from both the Allied and the Central Powers—including all the coastal states—in the ECD met and continued to operate it. But by the early interwar period, both Soviet Russia and Turkey were excluded from this Commission, never to return. However, throughout the period the ECD's international status was challenged by Romania, which sought *de jure* control over it, in competition with British *de facto* control, a contention resolved in Romania's favor in the Sinaia Agreement, signed with Britain and France in August 1938.[40] However, Britain and France, with the Armistice of Mudros (1918), the Treaty of Lausanne (1924), and the Montreux Conference (1936), in addition to the ECD, preserved a multi-lateral regime for the interwar period.

To be sure, however, these treaties and agreements did not exclude the Soviet Union and Turkey from this internationalized trade. What they were excluded from was access to international capital, which in turn led to this increased Soviet-Turkish economic collaboration. As mentioned above, the Treaty of Trade and Maritime Transportation in 1927 sealed this economic and financial collaboration, with the Soviet Union becoming Turkey's financial creditor, offering USD 6 million USD in 1927 and

37 Brisku, "Ottoman-Russian Relations," 9.

38 Troebst, "The Black Sea as a Historical Meso-Region," 20. See also Y. Eyüp Özveren, "A Framework for the Study of the Black Sea World, 1789–1915," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 20, no. 1 (1997): 85–91.

39 Constantin Ardeleanu, *The European Commission of the Danube, 1856–1948: An Experiment in International Administration* (Leiden: Brill, 2020).

40 Stephen Gorove, *Law and Politics of the Danube: An Interdisciplinary Study, with a Foreword by Hans Kohn* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 32.

USD 8 million in 1932.[41] But their collaboration went beyond giving and receiving capital credit to subscribing to and sharing a modern, state-led national economy-building approach.[42] Since the mid-nineteenth century, various imperial governments had engaged with policies of economic development,[43] which by the turn of the century, influenced by Friedrich List's political-economic ideas of the "national system" and "infant industries,"[44] had crystalized as statist doctrines. And while World War I forced governments to be more involved in their own economies—in commanding their war economies—the interwar period witnessed a more "collaborative" side in the form of this approach.

Certainly, Lenin and Stalin's Soviet Union was ideologically Marxist-communist, propagating itself as a better socialist, multi-ethnic, political, and political-economic system to than Western imperialist capitalism that was based on profit, exploitation, and colonialism. Atatürk and İnönü's Turkey, meanwhile, was conceptualized as a republican, nationalist, and secular state not opposed to capitalism *per se.* But Stalin's point to İnönü—in their Moscow meeting in 1932—that "if you don't create your industry, you will be wiped from the face of the earth"[45] rang true to the latter and to most of the Turkish political establishment. This was when the Soviet Union, with Stalin's "great break"[46] of 1928, had already moved away from Lenin's early interwar New Economic Policy of combining "state capitalism" (nationalization of industry, trade, and finance) with market relations in agriculture—between 1918 and 1921, independent Georgia also "created a mixed economy, framed by social democratic goals but driven by pragmatism [i. e. market principles]."[47] It was now pursuing Stalin's complete nationalization (including the collectivization of agriculture), with the aim of generating a surplus to finance rapid Soviet industrialization (heavy industry) and catching up with or even outdoing Western capitalism.[48] Within this state-led approach, the Soviets introduced a central agency for economic planning (*Gosplan*) with a five-year plan that planned, commanded, and spearheaded Soviet economic development, including in its northern and eastern territories on the Black Sea.

Atatürk, İnönü, and their one-party establishment did not espouse Soviet communism but embraced the idea of a greater role for the state in the economy and opposed Western imperialism as affecting Turkey. In fact, they recognized the state's greater

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41 Hirst, "Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery," 45.

42 See also Adrian Brisku, *Open But not Dependent: National Economy-Building in Albania Georgia and Czechoslovakia* after the Great War (London: Routledge, forthcoming).

43 Adrian Brisku, *Political Reform in the Ottoman and Russian Empires: A Comparative Approach* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 104.

44 Eric Helleiner, *The Neomercantilists: A Global Intellectual History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2021), 90 – 96.

45 Quoted in Hirst, "Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery," 45.

46 Hirst, 39.

47 Jones, "Between Ideology and Pragmatism," 63.

48 Ronald G. Suny, *Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern* History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 143.

role in the economy in their Republican People's Party platform of 1931 as *statism* and as one of their party's six principles.[49] Like the Soviet government, İnönü's government began to use a five-year plan for the development of industry, especially when the Soviets sent engineers and machinery to Turkey.[50] In his trip to the Soviet Union in May 1932, İnönü and his large delegation—comprised of prominent figures of the Turkish industry—gathered first-hand expertise on the Soviet economy and learnt how to develop the Turkish textile industry.[51]

And while Soviet-Turkish economic collaboration on the northern, eastern, and southern shores was predicated largely on their exclusion from Western capital and premised upon *statism*, on the western flank, i.e., Bulgaria and Romania—which had no collaboration during World War I, nor the kind described above with Turkey or the Soviet Union—exhibited brief attempts at collaboration on agrarianism in the interwar period. Emerging as an ideological and political program of peasant parties in the Balkans and Central Eastern Europe, proponents of agrarianism opposed heavy industrialization and foreign capital and supported the development of agriculture and light industry and the redistribution of land. As the leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and prime minister between 1919 and 1923, Stamboliyski sought to establish a "model agricultural state"[52]—in fact implementing agrarian reform (land redistribution) in Bulgaria—and closer links with his Romanian counterparts, visiting the country several times. However, Stamboliyski's Green International, which opposed the Soviet Red International—the dictatorial government that overthrew Stamboliyski in 1923 and established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1934—did not manage to bring the Romanian National Peasants Party into its fold until 1927.[53] A year later, led by Iuliu Maniu, the National Peasants Party—a coalition of the Peasants' Party and the Romanian National Party—came to power after a decade of the Liberal Party government, which in fact had carried out land reform (land redistribution) in 1921.[54] Seeking to implement a similar political-economic approach to Stamboliyski's, Maniu's government encouraged the establishment of cooperatives and higher prices for agricultural products. However, undermined by the Great Depression in 1929 and his decision to open up Romania to foreign capital, Maniu's government collapsed in 1930, with Romania falling under its king's direct rule in 1938 and his dictatorship in 1940.[55]

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49 Hirst, "Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery," 41.

50 Hirst, 33.

51 Hirst, 43 – 45.

52 Stephen J. Lee, *European Dictatorships, 1918 – 1945* (London: Routledge, 2016).

53 Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, 610 – 53.

54 Ioan Scurtu, "Relationships of Peasants' Party of Romania with Agrarian Parties of Central and South-East Europe," *Revue des Études Sud-est Européennes* 19, no. 1 (1981): 31 – 39.

55 Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, 695 – 99.

5 Violence and Forced Mass Displacement of Peoples

Aside from these new geopolitical and politico-economic narratives, in World War I and during the interwar period, patterns of catastrophic violence and forced mass displacement of peoples (ethnic and religious communities) were experienced and witnessed in the Black Sea basin. Such patterns of violence, however, had already occurred during the Russo-Ottoman wars of "the long nineteenth century," whereby an estimated five million people (Crimean Tatars, Circassians, and Abkhazians) had been displaced from the tsarist state to the Ottoman Empire.[56] These patterns reoccurred in the midst of World War I, when in 1915 the Ottoman state perpetrated the Armenian Genocide—a term disputed by some Turkish historians—by engaging in mass killings, forced labor, and displacement of between 0.8 and 1.8 million of the Ottoman Armenian population,[57] as well as from late 1914 on and again in 1916, when it perpetrated the ethnic cleansing[58] or genocide[59]—there is even a stronger dispute on the use of these terms here—of the Ottoman, including Pontic, Greeks. It is estimated that between 300,000 and 700,000 Ottoman Greeks lost their lives to this campaign between 1914 and 1918.[60] And it continued in the interwar period, whereby violence and forced mass displacement of peoples were perpetrated not only due to continued inter-state and civil wars but also because of state-led nation(s)-building and national economy-building policies.

Indeed, as the Turkish state began to define its citizens in ethno-religiously homogenizing terms, a "hierarchy of citizens" emerged whereby "non-Muslims"—especially Armenian and Greek Orthodox peoples in the contexts of the Turkish-Armenian War/Eastern Operation (1920) and the Greco-Turkish War (1919–22)—were seen as a threat to the new republic and hence their forced mass displacement was seen as a solution. The most striking example of this was the Compulsory Population Exchange in 1923, a policy that Turkey implemented with Greece, with the "blessing" of the Great Powers and the League of Nations in the Treaty of Lausanne. The Turkish request to

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56 Stefano Taglia, "Pragmatism and Expediency: Ottoman Calculations and the Establishment of Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic," in Brisku and Blauvelt, *The Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic*, 53–54. See also Brian Glyn Williams, *The Crimean Tatars: From Soviet Genocide to Putin's Conquest* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

57 See Ronald Grigor Suny, "AHR Forum: Truth in Telling: Reconciling Realities in the Genocide of the Ottoman Armenians," *American Historical Review* 114, no. 4 (2009): 930–46; Brisku, "Ottoman-Russian Relations," 12.

58 Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

59 Vasileious Th. Meichanetsidis, "The Genocide of the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire 1913–1923: A Comprehensive Overview," *Genocide Studies International* 9, no.1 (Spring 2015): 104–73.

60 Erik Sjöberg, *The Making of the Greek Genocide: Contested Memories of the Ottoman Greek Catastrophe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2016), 234–35.

the League of Nation for "unmixing of the peoples"—i.e., ethno-homogenizing peoples from multi-ethnic and multi-religious imperial settings—was premised upon ensuring lasting peace in the region, and the League of Nations' representatives saw it as the most viable policy for protecting minorities and nation-building.[61] Although it was the first compulsory policy of mass displacement of peoples, this Exchange built on the Convention for Voluntary and Reciprocal Emigration of Minorities that Bulgaria —in conjunction with the Treaty of Neuilly—had signed with Greece in 1919. Implemented between 1924 and 1925—under the supervision of a Mixed Commission of the League of Nations—this Convention led to the forceful displacement of 350,000 people due to ethnic difference.[62] The Greco-Turkish Exchange, meanwhile, forcibly displaced 1.6 million people, some 1.2 million of whom were sent to Greece, being Greeks from Central Anatolia and Pontic Greeks of the Black Sea littoral—while those living in the surrounding mountains, nearly 80,000, had already moved to Georgia and Russia during the Turkish-Armenian war.[63] Bulgaria, meanwhile, in an agreement with Turkey, "repatriated" nearly 100,000 of its Turkish population to Turkey between 1934 and 1939. Additionally, more Muslims (mostly ethnic Albanians) were "returned" from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to Turkey, and Bulgaria and Turkey saw the arrival of the "White Russians" who settled in their respective territories after the Russian Civil War.[64]

A similar story of forced mass displacement of peoples as well as famines traumatized and terrorized the Soviet northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea and beyond. While the Russian Civil War, which had begun during World War I, on November 7, 1917, and continuing until June 16, 1923, created "extensive refugee flows" and the first group of stateless people in modern history,[65] in the interwar period national economy-building and nation-building processes displaced and hurt millions. The unprecedented mass industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture, which in turn demanded mass labor mobilization and expropriation, led to resistance and forced displacement. Between 1930 and 1931, nearly two million Soviet people—including hundreds of thousands of Pontic Greeks and Circassians on the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea—were removed from their villages and sent to the Far North, the Urals, and Siberia. Stalin's Great Terror of 1937—killing more than 600,000 people—also took place in

61 Theodora Dragostinova, "Navigating Nationality in the Emigration of Minorities between Bulgaria and Greece, 1919 – 1941," *East European Politics and Society* 23, no. 2, (2009): 146.

62 Dragostinova, 185 – 86.

63 Anastasia Filippidou, "The Impact of Forced Top-Down Nation Building on Conflict Resolution: Lessons from the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey," *Nationalities Papers* 48, no. 1 (2020): 148. See also Renée Hirshon, ed., *Crossing the Agean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey* (New York: Berghan Books, 2003).

64 Rogers Brubaker, "Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples: Historical and Comparative Perspectives," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 18, no. 2 (1995): 194.

65 Filippidou, "The Impact of Forced Top-Down Nation Building," 145.

the context of ongoing forced displacement of collective groups.[66] Stalin's Soviet nation(s)-building process, too, while entailing the recognition of national and minority rights—ethno-territorial federalism for "historic nations" and national cultural autonomy for everyone else—perpetrated between 1932 and 1933 the *Holodomor* (death by hunger), the famine of around four million of Ukrainians,[67] recognized as genocide by Ukraine and eighteen other countries, as well as the European Union.[68]

6 Conclusion

Violence against the peoples and tensions among the four states with a Black Sea coast never really left, certainly during World War I, but also during the interwar period despite emerging cordial relations in the north-south axis, and irrespective of a multi-lateral regime and "collaborative" political-economic platforms, as outlined above. Violence, in fact, was horrifically exacerbated during World War II in and between the Soviet Union, Romania, and Bulgaria. Turkey and its population were spared this war, for the country remained neutral, at least until February 1945, when it joined the Allies against the Axis.

66 Alain Bloom and Emilia Koustova, "A Soviet Story: Mass Deportation, Isolation, Return," in *Narratives of Exile and Identity*, ed. Violeta Davoliute and Tomas Balkelis (Budapest: CEU Press, 2018), 21; James Forsyth, *The Caucasus: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 445–47.
67 Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine* (New York: Doubleday, 2017).
68 Julia Damn, "EU Parliament Votes to Recognize 'Holodomor' Famine as Genocid," *EURACTIV*, December 15, 2022, https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/eu-parliament-votes-to-recognise-holodomor-famine-as-genocide/.

Onur İşçi

Mare Clausum: War and Diplomacy on the Black Sea, 1939–91

On February 23, 1942, a Soviet submarine (*ShCh-213*) attacked two vessels in the Black Sea, near the Turkish coastline. The first was a Turkish schooner (*Çankaya*), sunk by gunfire ten miles north of the Bosporus. Captained by Lieutenant D. M. Denezhko, the *ShCh-213* was carrying secret orders to attack all neutral and Axis vessels to impede the delivery of strategic arms into the Black Sea. Less than 24 hours after the *Çankaya* incident, the *ShCh-213* torpedoed a second vessel, the *SS Struma*, which was chartered to carry Jewish refugees from Axis-allied Romania to British-controlled Palestine. After a series of engine failures, it had barely made it half-way through its voyage before anchoring in Istanbul with its 769 Romanian refugee passengers on board. When this 170-ton former yacht sank, it left behind only one survivor, making it one of the largest civilian naval disasters of World War II.[1] The acts of sinking of the *Çankaya* and the *Struma* were but two in a line of Black Sea tragedies that this chapter seeks to place in a broader geopolitical context. Rather than a survey of military encounters on the Black Sea between 1939 and 1945, the present work highlights moments of cooperation and conflict between the littoral and non-littoral states.

Ultimately, this paper highlights the way that the war brought fundamental changes to the peoples around the Black Sea. The argument is in keeping with existing historical literature on World War II that has begun to compensate for earlier accounts that overlooked this region. To take just one example, exploring the broader ramifications of the Nazi-Soviet collaboration between 1939 and 1941, Roger Moorhouse's *The Devils' Alliance* shows how, despite the Soviet Union's best attempts to forge its own post-war narrative, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was essentially an imperialist division of spheres of influence between two great powers at the expense of smaller neighboring states.[2] Likewise, in his *Grand Delusion*, Gabriel Gorodetsky illustrates the centrality of a Black Sea logic in Stalin's war plans.[3] In a similar vein with Moorhouse, Gorodetsky et. al., the present chapter demonstrates how the smaller littoral states around the Black Sea got caught up in the meshes of a struggle between two great powers.

The wartime transformation of the Black Sea political landscape was remarkable. After World War II, the Soviet Union acquired two new satellites (Romania and Bulga-

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1 Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, *Death on the Black Sea: The Untold Story of the "Struma" and World War II's Holocaust at Sea* (New York: Ecco, 2004); Onur İşçi, *Turkey and the Soviet Union During World War II: Diplomacy, Discord and International Relations* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2020).

2 Roger Moorhouse, *The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939–41* (London: The Bodley Head, 2014).

3 Gabriel Gorodetsky, *Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

ria), pressured Turkey to revise the Straits regime, and cherished hopes to finally bring an end to the Eastern Question and turn the Black Sea into a "Russian lake"—free from Western incursions. Several years into the Cold War, Moscow had reason to entertain such designs. But in a dicey volte-face and diplomatic brinkmanship, the neutral Turkish state set out to mend fences with Western powers and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to maintain its status as the sole custodian of the Straits —free from Soviet incursions. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey remained the only littoral power outside the Russian sphere of influence on the Black Sea, which once again divided neighbors.

1 Resurrecting the Eastern Question

The Straits Question, which had long been an intrinsic part of the larger problem known as the Eastern Question, reemerged in the context of a Europe whose map was changing. Bitterness towards the Western-dictated postwar international order drove relations between newborn states around the Black Sea.[4] In particular, nationalist Turks and internationalist Bolsheviks found themselves in an unusual convergence that each side defined as anti-imperialist and laid to rest centuries of rivalry between their imperial predecessors. At the heart of their cooperation was a geopolitical alignment that sought to shield the greater Black Sea region from Western intrusions.[5]

On the eve of the Turkish Republic's establishment, the Ankara government was vexed about the existing regime of naval passage into the Black Sea—as that passage took foreign navies through the heart of Istanbul. But, during the Lausanne Conference in 1922–23, which replaced the Sèvres Treaty of 1919, Turkish nationalists had other priorities, such as sovereignty, recognition, and state-building on the rubble of a failed empire. Hence, in 1923 Turkey reluctantly agreed to demilitarize the Straits and transfer their control to an international convention. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, argued that the Black Sea constituted a *mare clausum* that differed from internationalized waterways like the Suez and Panama canals. Hence, Georgii Chicherin, the head of the Soviet delegation at Lausanne, argued against the demilitarization of the Straits much more strongly than the Turks themselves.[6] The Soviet Union was disappointed with Turkish concessions at Lausanne regarding naval passage through the Dardanelles and the Bosporus.

The Soviet Union's position on the Straits Question was clear at the Lausanne Convention—they were categorically against the inclusion of non-littoral powers in any ne-

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4 Samuel J. Hirst and Onur Isci, "Smokestacks and Pipelines: Russian-Turkish Relations and the Persistence of Economic Development," *Diplomatic History* 44, no. 5 (November 2020): 834–59.

5 Onur Isci, "Yardstick of Friendship: Soviet-Turkish Relations and the Montreux Convention of 1936," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History,* 4 (Fall 2020): 733–62.

6 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsialno-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI), f. 159, op. 2, d. 19, l. 100 (December 19, 1922).

gotiation, in order to offer protection to the Soviet coastline in Ukraine, southern Russia, and Georgia. But they understood Turkey's predicament and proclaimed that they would support Turkey's sovereignty and its desire to remilitarize the Straits when the time was right. Hence, thirteen years later, when Turkey pointed to rampant revisionism in Europe and set out to revise the Lausanne Convention in 1936, the Soviet government "empathized with Turkey's legitimate concerns regarding the insecurity of peace and the grave danger of the outbreak of war."[7]

The Montreux Convention represented the first peacefully negotiated revision of the post-World War I peace treaties. At Montreux, with a position strengthened by postwar recovery, Turkey asserted its sovereignty over the Straits, claiming the right to develop fortifications in the area and take control of passage into its own hands. There were a number of issues that the Soviets sanctioned: For instance, it was more or less established that unhindered commercial traffic, both in peace and war, would be guaranteed, and that Turkey would have the right to remilitarize the Straits. What disturbed the Soviet Union in the draft treaty was the inclusion of the Turkish sovereignty clause, which meant that Turkey would have the right to open or close the Straits to warships.[8] Maksim Litvinov, head of the Soviet delegation at Montreux, announced that his government would support the Turkish thesis provided that non-littoral use of the Straits would be "for specific purposes and within specific limitations."[9] In its final amendments, Article 10 of the Montreux Convention introduced the kind of specific limitations Litvinov sought and expressed exactly when and how non-littoral powers could pass through the gates of the Black Sea.[10] Additionally, Article 12 gave Black Sea littoral countries privileged access to the Straits and the right to dispatch their fleet for purposes of rejoining their base outside the Black Sea with adequate notice. Finally, Article 18 curbed the aggregate tonnage of non-littoral states in the Black Sea in times of peace and stipulated that their vessels of war may not remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one days, whatever the object of their presence there. The Soviet conditions were met almost entirely in the new accord.

Given the impending war in Europe, the Soviets were understandably irritated that Black Sea security now relied exclusively on good-neighborly relations with the Turkish government. Although this was a significant issue, serious concessions had been made to alleviate Soviet concerns. The so-called "Black Sea yardstick" clause, which Turkey had introduced in the final draft of the treaty, limited non-littoral powers to a fixed tonnage of 30,000 tons with a limited period of stay in the Black Sea. There was a clause allowing a one-off increase in tonnage to 45,000, if the Soviet fleet was further expand-

7 "Nota Narodnogo komissara inostrannykh del SSSR poslu Turtsii v SSSR Apaidynu," April 16, 1936, in *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974), 19:231–32.

8 Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVP RF), f. 5, op. 16, pap. 112, d. 113, l. 28 (Stomoniakov to Karakhan, July 13, 1936).

9 "Nota Narodnogo komissara inostrannykh del SSSR."

10 No. 4015, "Convention Regarding the Régime of the Straits," signed at Montreux, July 20, 1936, in *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 173, *1936–37*, 215–41.

ed. Nonetheless, this was a much more stringent limitation than anything in the Lausanne Convention and, given that the Soviet Black Sea fleet had a known tonnage of 60,000 tons, beneficial to the Soviet Union. The Soviets accepted the yardstick clause and agreed to sign the convention, which replaced the Lausanne regime on July 20, 1936 and reinstated "Turkey's full sovereignty over the Straits in times of war and when it senses an imminent possibility of war."[11]

Despite hindrances, Soviet-Turkish interactions in 1937 permeated the Black Sea, where the two states looked beyond their geopolitical differences and focused on state-sponsored ventures. In fact, there was even a ray of hope for a bilateral military pact on the Black Sea between Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union to ward off imperialist penetration. Indeed, as undeniable tensions grew between these states, until 1939, when the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact demonstrated that one party had aligned with an expansionist power outside the region, Moscow and Ankara shared a sense that their interests overlapped in defense of the Black Sea.[12] Turkey's foreign minister Tevfik Rüştü thus entered into negotiations with Ion Antonescu of Romania to probe the possibility of an exclusive Black Sea Non-Aggression Pact that would have included the Soviet Union.[13] Even though the proposed Black Sea pact was not much more than a gesture, the British ambassador in Ankara voiced his concerns about the support his country had given Turkey at Montreux and questioned whether it would backfire.

Indeed, the Soviet Union had significantly more interest in the Black Sea coastline than it did in the ice-bound Baltic or the Barents Sea, which were easily threatened by the German navy. The Black Sea had well-equipped commercial ports; proximity to valuable manganese, oil, wheat, coal, and steel hubs; and developed canal systems. Another auxiliary aspect of the question of a Black Sea pact was also evident in the matter of interstate trade among its littorals. Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria were all customers of the Soviet Union, where water-borne merchandise passed through the Black Sea to the Danube and was then reshipped to Istanbul and to other Black Sea ports. Given the centrality of this area for Soviet trade outlets and routes, the British government was concerned about a more privileged partnership between Ankara and Moscow, which they had so carefully sought to circumvent at Montreux.[14]

The struggle to carve out sovereignty in a world demarcated by postwar international order defined the formation of the three newborn littoral states of the Black Sea —Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania. In the case of Turkey, which now controlled the Straits, Kemalists had always looked to the Soviet Union—whatever its other faults—

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11 "Montrö Boğazlar Sözleşmesi ve Ekleri," *Resmi Gazete*, August 5, 1936, 37.

12 Türk Diplomatik Arşivi (TDA), TSID 5028381 (15th Anniversary of the Soviet–Turkish Friendship Treaty, March 24, 1936).

13 In fact, as early as 1933 there had been rumors of Turkish–Romanian negotiations about a Black Sea pact (Karadeniz Misakı) between Aras and Nicolae Titulescu. See TDA, TSID 6940596 (Turkish Embassy in Moscow to Ankara, September 15, 1933); TDA, TSID 6940463 (Turkish Embassy in Moscow to Ankara, September 18, 1933).

14 Public Record Office (FO), 424/280 E 4434/386/44 (Loraine to Eden, July 26, 1937).

as a foil to European great-power politics. Soviet rapprochement with Nazi Germany, and hence with the aggressive revisionism that Turkey feared, brought an end to that vision. At talks in Moscow, Viacheslav Molotov referred menacingly to occupied Poland as an example of the kind of fate that could befall Turkey.[15] While the discourse of national sovereignty was associated exclusively with Western imperialism during the early Kemalist years, it took on a new meaning with the outbreak of World War II and began to reflect Turkey's apprehension vis-à-vis Soviet imperialism across the Black Sea.

2 The Black Sea on the Eve of World War II

Between the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and Hitler's unleashing of Operation Barbarossa, the Black Sea was a neutral but eerie trading zone. The Soviet Union freely exchanged critical raw materials such as petroleum, grain, rubber, and manganese with the Third Reich in return for weapons, technology, and manufacturing machinery. Beginning in the fall of 1939, the three neutral riparian states that remained outside the Soviet Union —Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria—watched the convergence between these two colossi with utter trepidation. For the governments in Ankara, Bucharest, and Sofia, the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact meant that the balance of power could only be attained by maintaining relations with either London or Berlin as possible allies against imminent Soviet aggression.

The Black Sea played a paramount role in Nazi Germany's acquisition of raw materials during the early phase of war. By 1939, almost all of Nazi Germany's resources for arms production were imported: 80 percent of its rubber, 60 percent of its oil, 60 percent of its iron ore, and 100 percent of its chrome and manganese came from abroad.[16] Given the country's dependence on imports, the Soviet Union was a natural trading partner, being the world's largest producer of manganese, copper, and iron ore. The two countries signed a credit agreement in 1939, which was supported by a trade agreement ratified the following year. Soviet deliveries to the Third Reich were shipped across the Black Sea from the Caucasus to Bulgaria and then transported by rail to Germany. In the spring of 1940, Soviet exports to Germany were approximately 10 million Reichsmarks per month, rising steeply to nearly ten times that value in September 1940.[17] Likewise, German exports to the Soviet Union rose from 15 million Reichsmarks in May 1940 to 37 million in December 1940. This meant that in 1940 alone, over 50 percent of Soviet exports were destined for Nazi Germany, which valued around 400 million Reichsmarks against a German export volume of 240 million Reichsmarks. The extent of Nazi-Soviet trade across the Black Sea was remarkable but the role of Soviet oil

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15 TDA, TSID 16992896 (Molotov–Sarper Meeting—First Report, June 9, 1945).

16 Moorhouse, *The Devils' Alliance*, 173.

17 Heinrich Schwendemann, "German-Soviet Economic Relations at the Time of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, 1939–1941," *Cahiers du Monde russe 36*, no. 1–2 (January–June 1995): 176.

exports was grossly exaggerated. Although Hitler certainly had an insatiable thirst for fuel to feed the *Wehrmacht*, Nazi Germany went to war in 1939 with over 2 million tons of oil stocks, which merely dropped by a quarter when the Nazi-Soviet war began in 1941.[18] Soviet oil exports to the Third Reich were by no means unsubstantial, but nonetheless amounted to barely 3 percent of USSR's annual production. What the Soviet Union offered Berlin in return for bullion was Ukrainian grain that fed Nazi soldiers.[19]

A more significant source of crude oil for Nazi Germany was Romania, which offered its wells to the *Wehrmacht*'s disposal in 1940. As Adam Tooze argued in his magisterial *Wages of Destruction*, "if the Third Reich was to survive a truly global war, it would need to extend its influence systematically to the oil fields of Romania and Iran. Turkey thus took on a strategic importance."[20] Beyond its oil resources, Romania had a strategic value as a gateway into the Black Sea steppe in Hitler's odyssey to realize *lebensraum.* As early as 1936, Richard Walther Darré—the Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture—stressed the centrality of this area for the Nazis' blood and soil designs in a conference paper: "The natural area for settlement by the German people is the territory to the east of the Reich's boundaries up to the Urals, bordered in the south by the Caucasus, Caspian Sea, Black Sea, and the watershed which divides the Mediterranean basin from the Baltic and the North Sea. We will settle this space, according to the law that a superior people always has the right to conquer and to own the land of an inferior people."[21] Here too, the Black Sea's relevance was clear.

Regarding Romania, Stalin's plans were equally unambiguous. Beginning with the Crimean War, the Romanovs laid historic claim to Bessarabia, which provided the Russian imperial navy with a natural depth of defense for the port of Odesa. In many ways, Romania constituted the backbone of Russian security in the Black Sea. In Stalin's mind, the annexation of this area would also help the Red Army extend its influence into the Balkans with the ultimate goal of acquiring naval bases on the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. For both Nazi and Soviet chiefs of staff, Romania and Turkey were two of a series of critical moves to control the Black Sea.

Mindful of the situation, the Third Reich attempted to cultivate a historic fear of Russia in Romania for the next stage of war. Nazi propaganda means and purposes were ubiquitous and not exclusive to Romania.[22] Diplomats of the Third Reich did their best to amplify fears of the Soviet threat among Turkish political elites as well. When the Red Army marched into Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in late June

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18 Moorhouse, *The Devils' Alliance*, 188.

19 Moorhouse, 268.

20 Adam Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 198.

21 Andrea D'Onofrio, "Rassenzucht und Lebensraum: Zwei Grundlagen im Blut- und Boden-Gedanken von Richard Walther Darre," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 49 (2001): 141–57.

22 Louis de Jong's *Die deutsche fünfte Kolonne im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1959) and Peter Longerich's more recent *Goebbels: Biographie* (Munich: Siedler, 2010) are useful sources for probing Nazi propaganda efforts in general.

1940, Ernst von Weizsäcker of the Nazi Foreign Office asked for a meeting with the Turkish ambassador in Berlin. Weizsäcker insinuated to the Turkish ambassador that Stalin might soon make a motion to revise the Straits regime if an agreement was not reached. Nazi Germany's anti-Soviet propaganda efforts also created, however, deep reserve in Turkey toward Berlin.

For Hitler, Turkey was necessary as a buffer zone against the Allies, mainly because Romanian oil destined for Nazi Germany was shipped via the Straits to Italian ports. But the Anglo-French coalition had equally vital reasons to cajole the Ankara government into a friendly neutrality. First and foremost, Turkey's active participation was needed to impede the Black Sea trading routes that the Soviets had been using to provide the Nazis with oil, food, and other supplies. Four months before the Nazi invasion of Paris, the French Ambassador in Ankara, René Massigli, was entertaining such scenarios in a detailed report in which he outlined how a naval blockade of Moscow's Black Sea trading routes was possible. In despair, the French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier welcomed Massigli's plan to ease France's troubles in the Western theater through a twofold campaign in the East: against the Nazis on the Black Sea and against the Soviet Union in the Caucasus.[23]

After France succumbed to Hitler's pressure in June 1940, Turkey began hedging its bets for two separate wars involving Nazi Germany, conducted independently by Britain and the USSR. On the eve of the impending Nazi-Soviet War, fear of the Soviet Union was so strong that Ankara hoped for a Nazi victory over the Soviet Union, provided that Britain was then able to check the Third Reich, which would soon encircle Turkey via Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece. Stalin, on the other hand, was mostly concerned about the country's southern flank, which stretched from the Caucasus to the Black Sea, but now that France had collapsed, his anxiety about Nazi designs in the Black Sea became more pronounced. In fact, Turkish records demonstrate that as early as July 1940, the Ankara government already anticipated an aggressive Soviet reaction that might target the Bosporus and Dardanelles in order to secure their southern flank.[24]

In the fall of 1940, on the eve of the Greco-Italian War, it became more important to weld the Balkan states into the fabric of the dam against the Axis to prevent the war from spreading to the Black Sea. But there were serious obstacles which eventually proved to be insurmountable. The main problem was that both Turkey and Romania distrusted Bulgaria, and neither one of them seemed inclined to sacrifice much to improve the situation. Without Bulgaria, both the Balkan and the Black Sea formations were insecure but its inclusion could be brought about only by concessions. Gafencu, the Romanian foreign minister, although opposed to any immediate concessions to Bulgaria, did not seem entirely averse to some ultimate accommodation.[25] By the time Italy

23 Onur Isci, "The Massigli Affair and its Context: Turkish Foreign Policy after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact," *Journal of Contemporary History* 55, no. 2 (April 2020): 271–96.

24 TDA, TSID 11584331 (Ambassador Hüsrev Gerede to Ankara, July 18, 1940).

25 BCA, 30.10.0.0/200.370.3 (Conversation with Romanian Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, June 8, 1939).

entered the war, Turkey was considering a solution whereby Bulgaria could be brought at once into the Balkan Entente, in return for an undertaking that a settlement of the Dobruja problem would be made when hostilities were over. Dobruja had been a source of territorial contestation between Romania and Bulgaria since World War I, and the Bulgarian Prime Minister Georgi Kioseivanov was known to make public claims to the region, but it was at least essential that Romania kept the door open to construct a cordon sanitaire between the Balkans and the Black Sea.

Before the end of 1940, however, all hopes for Balkan solidarity had foundered. The situation was exacerbated by disasters suffered by the Allies. The Netherlands, Belgium, and France had been overrun within six weeks of the start of May 1940. The Kioseivanov government in Bulgaria was succeeded by the weak-kneed Bogdan Filov cabinet. Following King Boris's orders, Filov would drive Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Nazis in March 1941. On the Turkish side, while there was clear evidence of a determination not to allow themselves to be hurried into hostilities before they had decided for themselves that the moment had arrived, there had never been any doubt that they would defend themselves if their vital interests were attacked. As the Balkan turmoil unfolded towards the end of 1940, Turkey gave verbal assurances that this determination would cover an attack by any power on Turkey itself, an attack by Bulgaria on Greece, or an invasion of Bulgaria by Nazi Germany (which Turkey would regard as aimed equally at herself and Greece), or a Nazi attack on Greece through a non-resistant Bulgaria.[26]

Ultimately, however, the long-drawn-out efforts to unite the Black Sea littoral powers in common defense ended. Perhaps Romania was the most to blame, but Bulgaria could also be regarded as culpable. The treachery of King Boris placed Bulgaria under the Nazis' heel. Athens briefly triumphed over Rome but its victory was brought to naught by Hitler's assistance to Mussolini. Regardless of historians' prosecutorial rhetoric on the subject, the prospects for a collective security system on the Black Sea via the three Balkan powers crumbled to dust. As far as Turkey's fate was concerned, policy-makers in Ankara seemed unwilling to provide the necessary assurances to their neighbors in the Black Sea. Yet, as the British ambassador correctly defined, it was the fiscal situation in the country, more than anything, along with exhausted local remedies and overdue arms deliveries, that deterred the Turks from implementing their treaty obligations in the Balkans and protecting the Black Sea from the spreading war.

Hitler was acutely aware of Turkey's critical position and in March 1941; during a meeting with the Turkish ambassador in Berlin, he referred to the Soviet bases in passing as he considered bringing Turkey to a more benevolent neutrality towards Berlin. Hitler insinuated that back in November 1940 Molotov had spoken about the granting of bases, which no doubt fed Turkey's apprehension. The context of that conversation between Hitler and the Turkish ambassador was mostly about the closure of the Black

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26 BCA, 30.18.1.2/96.72.3 (Turkish Ambassador in Sofia to the Foreign Ministry, December 13, 1940).

Sea to non-Black Sea powers, but the Nazis played on Turks' historic fear of Russia.[27] Hitler was not lying either. On the eve of the Molotov-Hitler meeting in Berlin in November 1940, Molotov had handed the Nazi ambassador in Moscow a draft protocol regarding Soviet conditions for acceptance of the Four Power Pact, which included the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the USSR within the range of the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Hitler was informed that just a few days before his meeting with the Turkish ambassador, the Soviet Union had delivered a note to Turkey which stated that if the Turks were attacked, they could rely on the full neutrality and benevolence of Moscow in the Black Sea.[28] Hence, by referring to Molotov's November 1940 request in passing, Hitler sought to ridicule the Soviet Union's volte-face after the failed Nazi-Soviet talks in Berlin, in which Stalin decided to improve the Straits regime in direct negotiations with Turkey and not behind her back.[29] The Turkish government suspected that by divulging Molotov's request a fortnight before the *Wehrmacht* marched into Greece with Bulgaria on its heels in April 1941, Hitler might be offering an ambiguous reassurance to Turkey that the Straits would be off Nazi limits.

When Ribbentrop ordered the Nazi Ambassador in Moscow, Friedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg, to communicate the Third Reich's war declaration to Molotov, he counted six reasons, one of which pertained to an earlier Soviet proposal to establish military bases on the Straits for Stalin's acceptance of the Four Power Pact.[30] Nazi Germany also pointed to the centrality of the Romanian and Bulgarian problems and the Soviet invasion of Northern Bukovina as grounds for Nazi Germany's war declaration. The Nazi declaration of war against the Soviet Union thus proclaimed that competition for influence in the Black Sea via the Turkish Straits was a crucial part of the Nazi-Soviet hostility.

3 The Nazi-Soviet War, 1941–45

The Eastern Front encompassed a large area stretching out from the Baltic to the Black Sea and saw some of the deadliest battles in human history. When Hitler unleashed Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, the German Army High Command (OKH) had 151 divisions in the east, with 3.8 million personnel, over 3,300 tanks, 7,200 artillery

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27 TDA, TSID 11848208 (Gerede to Saracoglu, March 17, 1941).

28 No. 177, "Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat," March 18, 1941, in *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945*, Series D, vol. 12, *The War Years, February 1–June 22, 1941* (Washington: US Government Printing Press, 1962), 310.

29 Turkish records confirm Gorodetsky's assessment about changing motives behind the Stalin's attempt to secure an agreement with Turkey after Molotov's failed negotiations with Hitler in Berlin in November 1940. See Gorodetsky, *Grand Delusion*, 76.

30 No. 659, "The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union," June 21, 1941, in *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945*, Series D, 12:1063.

pieces, and 2,770 aircrafts.[31] Supported by the Romanian Black Sea fleet, Hitler deployed fourteen panzer and ten motorized *Wehrmacht* divisions against the Soviet Union. Black Sea naval campaigns officially began with the Raid on Constanţa, when the Soviet fleet unsuccessfully besieged the Romanian port on June 26, 1941. Two Soviet destroyers were ordered to bombard Constanţa but later were engaged by Axis coastal artillery. After the failed Soviet attack, the German Army crushed Soviet border defenses, advancing quickly and decisively, and by the first week of July 1941, three main Soviet armies (the 3rd, 4th, and 10th) had been encircled.

The Raid on Constanţa became the first and only encounter during World War II between major warships in the Black Sea, where operations turned into a succession of offensives and counter-offensives involving Nazi and Soviet submarines. Once the German Army Groups North and Center crossed the Daugava and Dnipro rivers, they advanced in two directions—the former swept across the Baltic along the Leningrad axis and the latter toward Smolensk along the Moscow axis. It was the German Army Group South that drove inexorably toward Kyiv, while the Romanian forces invaded Moldavia and threatened the Soviet Black Sea port in Odesa. Romania played a crucial role in early Nazi operations around the Black Sea but the decisive blow came from Army Group South, which moved from the Baltic Sea southward to the Black Sea with four panzer groups.[32]

Even before the war, Stalin ordered the formation of a colossal defense line from Korzhenits to the mouth of the Danube at Kiliia (Romanian: Chilia Nouă) and along the Black Sea shores down to the Turkish Straits.[33] His plan was to use the Soviet navy in the Black Sea to intercept an amphibious landing in the direction of Odesa and to strengthen Soviet forces in Crimea with reinforcements from the Black Sea and the Caucasus. Clearly, this was a bigger undertaking than what the Soviets could accomplish alone, and Stalin knew that he had no allies left in the Black Sea. The crux of Moscow's defensive strategy in this region was a legacy of the Russian tsars and based on the notion of a buffer zone that would give the Red Army unhindered access to the Black Sea.[34]

Drawing on historical lessons dating back to the Crimean War, Stalin was afraid that either Great Britain or Nazi Germany could cajole neutral Turkey into accepting the lesser of two evils and serving as a springboard for an attack against the Soviet Union. This is why he sought but failed to achieve supremacy in the Black Sea littoral, including the mouth of the Danube, as part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.[35] The Red Army also provided military training to Bulgarian communists living in exile in the Soviet Union and brought them to the Bulgarian Black Sea coast in two submarines in the

31 David M. Glantz, *Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia* (Stroud: Tempus, 2001), 9.

32 For a comprehensive survey, see Lawrence Paterson, *Steel and Ice: The U-boat Battle in the Arctic and Black Sea 1941–45* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2016).

33 Gorodetsky, *Grand Delusion*, 238.

34 Gorodetsky, 317.

35 Gorodetsky, 318.

summer of 1941 so that they could then carry out attacks. Others were dropped off as parachutists. Almost all of the total of fifty-eight people were shot on arrival or executed later.[36]

Initially the German plan was to encircle Soviet forces in southern Ukraine, while the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies would clear the Black Sea coast and capture Odesa. Only a fortnight after Barbarossa, Hitler was entertaining scenarios of capturing Moscow and Leningrad by the late fall. As successful as the German *blitzkrieg* tactics were, however, it soon became clear that the Soviet Union would not succumb to the *Wehrmacht*'s advance unless all Red Army forces west of the Dnipro were destroyed and all Soviet coastal armies in the Black Sea were swept.[37] As the war dragged on, Hitler ordered the German 11th Army to begin an invasion of Crimea in the October.[38] Although the *Stavka* evacuated the Odesa garrison to reinforce the defense of Sevastopol and successfully moved the Black Sea fleet from harm's way, on November 6, a Romanian submarine torpedoed and sank the Soviet cargo ship *Uralets* a few miles off the coast of Yalta and encircled the Soviet fleet.[39]

Throughout 1942, the Black Sea theater almost exclusively involved submarine warfare and was marked by the Siege of Sevastopol. Soviet and Romanian navies clashed intermittently, sinking thousands of tons of goods and ammunition. Suspecting that neutral Turkey was allowing Axis submarines through the Straits to assist the Romanian navy, the Soviet fleet began systematic attacks near the Bosporus. In the late February, a Soviet submarine (*ShCh-213*) attacked a Turkish steamer (*Çankaya*) in the vicinity of Istanbul's Black Sea coast. When the torpedo missed the *Çankaya*, the submarine surfaced and used its onboard canon to sink it. While this gave additional time for the Turkish sailors to evacuate the ship's passengers into lifeboats and escape, the Turkish government never felt more insecure than it did during the early hours of February 24.[40] Just when the Turkish authorities began working on a diplomatic note to be delivered to the Soviet ambassador, less than ten hours after the *Çankaya* incident, the Soviet submarine *ShCh-213* torpedoed a second vessel north of the Bosporus—the *SS Struma*.[41] *Struma* left behind only one survivor, David Stoliar, making it one of the largest civilian naval disasters of World War II.[42]

Anti-Semitism in Turkey and Ankara's ambivalence towards its own Jewish citizens is a subject that falls outside the scope of this article. But as the *SS Struma* incident demonstrates, the Ankara government was directly or indirectly involved in determining the fates of many Jews who were trying to escape the Holocaust. Some scholars

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36 See "Soviet Contributions: The Arrival of the Parachutists," in *Bulgarian Communism: The Road to Power, 1934–1944*, ed. Nissan Oren (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 174–80.

37 Glantz, *Barbarossa*, 127.

38 Glantz, 135.

39 Richard Compton-Hall, *Submarines at War 1939–1945* (Berkshire: Periscope, 2004), 127.

40 Isci, *Turkey and the Soviet Union During World War II*, 112–16.

41 BCA, 30.10.0.0/171.185.21 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Prime Ministry, February 24, 1942).

42 BCA, 30.10.0.0/124.881.6 (SS Sturma, February 24, 1942).

have emphasized moments when Turkish diplomats facilitated Jews' escape from Nazi-occupied territories, while others have highlighted episodes when the Turkish government was decidedly less than helpful.[43] Beyond competing narratives on Turkey's policy towards Jews in Nazi-occupied territories and anti-Semitism in the country, one thing is clear: The menacing naval incidents of February 24, 1942 left Soviet-Turkish relations irreparably damaged.

The sinking of the *Çankaya* and the *Struma* was not an isolated incident and points to Stalin's broader strategy of containing the naval advances of Nazi Germany in the Black Sea. As the *Wehrmacht* got bogged down in a protracted siege of Sevastopol, Hitler sought to probe the Soviet defense line from the Black Sea. This was the first time Stalin experimented with a large-scale operation, involving millions of soldiers, and despite General Erich von Manstein's skillful counter-offensives, the Red Army was able to hold its ground until mid-1942.[44] But, with a new round of heavy Nazi bombardment in the June, Sevastopol was reduced to rubble and surrendered in the July. Through the fall's fog and filthy air, Stalin repeatedly overplayed his hand by counting on his numeric superiority and pushing the Red Army beyond its realistic capabilities.[45] As the Battle of Stalingrad loomed, Stalin initiated Operation Saturn, which essentially aimed to recapture Rostov by cutting off the approaching Nazi reinforcements from the Caucasus. Many German units were able to hit back from a narrow corridor along the Black Sea coast.[46]

The Battle of Stalingrad was heavy with symbolism for any rank-and-file Soviet soldier. To accomplish Vasilii Chuikov's pyrrhic victory alone, more than half a million Soviet soldiers were killed in action in January 1943. But with Stalingrad, the tide turned to Stalin's favor decisively. All the way from the Baltic to the Black Sea shores, the German army lost nearly a million soldiers that year.[47] The 6th Army was annihilated and in freezing conditions the *Wehrmacht* was pushed out from the Dnipro bend. Army Group South was wedged between Ternopol (Ukrainian: Ternopil) and the Black Sea without any possible support from the *Luftwaffe*, which too was beaten. After the Battle of Kursk in July–August 1943, the Soviet Army broke the stalemate and was ready to

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43 For Turkey's ambivalent policies regarding Jewish refugees, see Corry Guttstadt, *Turkey, the Jews and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). For debates on anti-Semitism with German contacts, see Berna Pekesen, *Nationalismus, Türkisierung und das Ende der jüdischen Gemeinden in Thrakien, 1918–1942* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2012). On Jewish academic emigration to Turkey, see Philipp Schwartz and Helge Peukert, *Notgemeinschaft: Zur Emigration deutscher Wissenschaftler nach 1933 in die Türkei* (Marburg: Metropolis Verlag, 1995). On Turkey's facilitation of some Jews' escape, see Stanford Shaw, *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic* (New York: NYU Press, 1991).

44 Richard Overy, *Russia's War* (London: Penguin, 1997), 151.

45 Overy, 173.

46 Overy, 174.

47 Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction*, 660.

thrust into Romania. In the fall, Stalin took back Smolensk and was about to drive the *Wehrmacht* out of Ukraine and Belarus.[48]

Throughout the first half of 1944, despite heavy German losses, submarine warfare in the Black Sea continued between German U-boats (supported by Romanian warships and submarines) and the Soviet navy. What tipped the balance was King Michael's coup in August 1944, when the Romanian government joined the Allies, effectively leaving the German navy to its own fate. Meanwhile, in the Ukrainian front, the Odesa-born Rodion Malinovskii launched a new offensive along the Black Sea coast onwards to the Danube.[49] Finally, in the spring of 1944, the Red Army encircled all remaining Nazi forces and recaptured Crimea in the April. When World War II came to an end in the Black Sea, tens of millions lay dead on the Eastern Front.

4 The Sovietization of the Black Sea, 1945 – 91

Built from white Inkerman granite in 1911 from Nikolai Krasnov's blueprints, Livadia Palace in Yalta is situated 150 feet above the Crimean coastline, and, facing the Turkish Castle of Sinop across the Black Sea, it glows with a daunting aura. In February 1945, Livadia Palace housed its most important guests since the departure of the Romanovs. The results of the Yalta Conference would determine much of the post-war order in the Black Sea—and the Turks, who were kept out of the loop, feared that secret protocols regarding the Straits might also be signed in those rooms. The Soviet Union, having emerged triumphant from a life and death struggle against Nazi Germany, demanded that the existing Straits convention was detrimental to Moscow's Black Sea security. Stalin alleged that Turkey, under the veneer of its wartime neutrality, had been a silent ally of Berlin and allowed passage of Axis warships into the Black Sea. Soviet demands to revise the Montreux Convention and the subsequent war of nerves between Ankara and Moscow between 1945 and 1947 ultimately pushed the former into NATO in 1952.[50] After the war, the Soviet Union also acquired two of the three neighboring littoral

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48 Overy, *Russia's War*, 222.

49 David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, *When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler* (Kansas: Kansas University Press, 1995), 179 – 95.

50 Several important works have shaped our understanding of İnönü's predicament during this period. For the lasting legacy of Turkey's postwar transformation, see Nicholas Danforth, *The Remaking of Republican Turkey: Memory and Modernity since the Fall of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021). For the evolution of US–Turkish relations, see also Barın Kayaoğlu, "Strategic Imperatives, Democratic Rhetoric: The United States and Turkey, 1945 – 52," *Cold War History* 9, no. 3 (August 2009): 321 – 45. For Turkey's transition to multi-party democracy, see John VanderLippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938 – 1950* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005). On the longer chronology in which this period constitutes a major rupture, see Samuel J. Hirst and Onur Isci, "Smokestacks and Pipelines: Russian-Turkish Relations and the Persistence of Economic Development," *Diplomatic History* 44, no. 5 (November 2020): 834 – 59.

states as satellites—Romania and Bulgaria—leaving Turkey as the only Black Sea power that remained outside the Eastern Bloc.

Years later, in a series of interviews with the writer Feliks Chuev, Molotov ruefully admitted that coercing Turkey in 1945 was a big mistake. When asked about the Turkish Straits, Molotov became animated and, in a stutter, said that "it was an untimely and unfeasible undertaking," but that "he had to do what he was instructed to do." Extricating himself from the blunder, Molotov claimed that Stalin was "a wonderful politician" but that he became "arrogant" in his last years and brushed off Molotov's counsel about not intimidating Turkey.[51] Only two months after Stalin's death in 1953, the new Soviet government repudiated their earlier demands on the Straits. By that point, however, the Ankara government had already sworn enthusiastic fealty to the Soviet Union and was proclaimed as NATO's anchor in the Black Sea to shield Europe from communist subversion.

From 1945 all the way through the turbulent 1960s, Turkey was closer to the Transatlantic community than at any other point in its history. Indeed, Turkey's unqualified allegiance to the US-led containment in the 1950s was so strong that one Soviet diplomat argued that the country was acting "more royalist than the king."[52] Beginning in the late 50s, however, Turkey's relations with the West began to deteriorate, partly because conditions on European and US economic assistance to Turkey's development plans tightened, but also because of geopolitical differences over Cyprus and Syria. After the Syrian Crisis of 1957, when Turkey aggressively pushed against Soviet influence in Damascus and sought to drag NATO into an unwarranted conflict, Ankara's leadership felt betrayed and abandoned by its allies. This was around the time when Turkey and the Soviet Union began to explore ways to push economic exchange beyond their carefully managed bilateral trade. As the Cyprus conflict deepened the wedge between Ankara and Washington, DC, economic cooperation defined Soviet-Turkish interstate relations.

Throughout the 1960s, successive governments in Ankara—left and right—described their nation's "underdevelopment" as one of the most pressing problems of the day, and Soviet economists added Turkey to their lists of "developing countries."[53] Ultimately, Ankara and Moscow were united again by a vision of a world composed of haves and have-nots. Although Turkey remained a member of NATO, tension with the West created parallels between Ankara's foreign policy and the policies of non-aligned countries. Turkey's politics again became explicitly statist and Soviet engineers crossed the Black Sea to build factories in a number of Anatolian towns. As it had done thirty years earlier, Turkey paid off Soviet investments and machinery in figs and raisins.

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51 Feliks Chuev, *Sto sorok besed s Molotovym: iz dnevnika F. Chueva* (Moscow: Terra, 1991), 199–203.
52 Turkish Prime Ministerial Archives (BCA) 30.01.0/37.226.7 (Soviet Chargé d'affaires Voronin on Latest Developments in Cyprus, 1955 – day and month unspecified).
53 Aleksei A. Rodionov, *Turtsiia: perekrestok sudeb. Vospominaniia posla* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2006); V. Smirnov, "Na osnove vzaimnoi vygody, v interesakh ukrepleniia ekonomicheskoi nezavisimosti razvivaiushchikhsia stran," *Vneshniaia torgovlia* 12 (1972): 24–29.

Cold War construction projects followed the model that isolated exchange from the global market economy and from the two states' divergent geopolitical interests.

This is not to suggest that geopolitical tensions suddenly vanished. Even at the peak of Soviet—Turkish cooperation in the 1960s, Turkey's diplomats in Moscow still complained that in 1945 their position would not have changed had it not been for "the demands of Molotov, who pushed (them) into the Americans' arms."[54] Turkey was still a NATO ally, but, beginning in the 1960s, Ankara and Moscow returned to an earlier model of managing their geopolitical conflicts for the sake of economic cooperation. Soviet observers rightly stressed the growing discontent in Turkey with the country's financial and military dependence on the US and noted that, from the eyes of the common people in small Black Sea towns, the existence of US bases and NATO offices came to be seen as infringements upon Turkish sovereignty.[55] Capitalizing on the growing US-Turkey rift, Moscow explored possibilities for developing bilateral touristic exchange. Given the favorable opportunities for tourism in the Black Sea region, the Soviet Union looked into the creation of a joint Soviet-Turkish company that would organize Black Sea tours. The crux of this plan was a proposal that avoided the need for foreign exchange, which facilitated the transit of tourists from other countries across Soviet and Turkish territory.[56]

Moscow's desire to transform the Black Sea region into a zone of economic and touristic cooperation among littoral states was not limited to Turkey. Without question, Moscow's main partners in this new scheme were Bulgaria and Romania. In May 1962, for instance, when Nikita Khrushchev was in Bulgaria for a comprehensive tour of seaside resorts and industrial plants, the Soviet leader proclaimed that the Black Sea would soon become a shared socialist space in which Bulgaria would be the true pearl with its warm water and sunny shores. Khrushchev was truly impressed by what he called "our Black Sea coast" and framed its development as a project of Sovietization.[57] Khrushchev recalled an earlier tour of Bulgaria back in 1955, when he had laid the groundwork for an international health resort which would be the centerpiece of a shared, Sovietized space under the Kremlin's aegis.

Although the sort of Sovietized space in Khrushchev's mind never came into being, Moscow had mixed successes in facilitating exchange among littorals across the Black Sea. With normalization of Soviet-Turkish relations, regional trade improved noticeably throughout the mid-1970s, and Turkey's deteriorating relations with the West over Cyprus played a major role in the commensurate diversification of economic exchange. While previously Ankara and Moscow had exclusively traded heavy machinery in return for agricultural products within a net-balance framework, by the mid-1970s

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54 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI), f. 5, op. 50, d. 508, l. 59–75, here l.63.

55 RGANI f. 5, op. 59, d. 348, ll. 1–22.

56 RGANI f. 5, op. 59, d. 348, ll. 1–22.

57 Johanna Conterio, "Our Black Sea Coast: The Sovietization of the Black Sea Littoral under Khrushchev and the Problem of Overdevelopment," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 19, no. 2 (Spring 2018): 327–61.

both parties were probing possibilities to further improve relations through import substitution industrialization. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, for instance, travelled to Moscow in 1978 and asked for more Siberian oil and Soviet-built metro lines for Ankara and Istanbul.[58] The Soviets agreed in principle and offered to buy Turkish pharmaceuticals and textiles. But the US arms embargo on Turkey ended later that year and many of these projects had to be shelved. Nevertheless, even after Turkey reopened the US base on the Black Sea (Sinop) and stationed US early warning systems in 1979, Ankara and Moscow worked on the first blueprints of oil and gas pipelines that would soon be laid in the Black Sea.

In hindsight, the history of the Black Sea since World War II has more episodes of cooperation than conflict. The latter half of the past century was more idle than its first half, which had been defined by an exciting interwar convergence in economic, political, and cultural terms before the violence and desolation of 1939–45. Except for the 1960 U2 Crisis or several other plane hijackings from the Eastern Bloc to NATO-allied Turkey in the 1970s, the Black Sea littoral states were mostly engaged in trade.[59] Certainly, there were moments of geopolitical tension even amongst Eastern Bloc littorals. During the Prague Spring, for instance, the Soviet Union dispatched mini-submarines to Bulgaria as well as a tank ferry from Ilichivsk (today: Chornomorsk) to Varna when Romania refused to grant transit permission for the Bulgarian army during the Soviet invasion of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in 1968. In that sense, Khrushchev was quixotic when he argued for improvement of economic ties for the sake of peace and said "let the Black Sea unite us, not divide us."[60] Moscow's imagining of the Black Sea mainly as a geopolitical space prevented it from being truly united.

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58 Rodionov, *Turtsiia*, 155.

59 For an exciting article on plane hijackings during the Cold War, see Eric R. Scott, "The Hijacking of Aeroflot Flight 244: States and Statelessness in the Late Cold War," *Past and Present* 243 (May 2019): 213–45.

60 Nikita S. Khrushchev, "Kemal Ataturk i sovetsko-turetskie otnosheniia," *Izvestiia*, November 13, 1963; and "Pust chernoe more ne raziediniaet, a soediniaet nas," *Izvestiia*, May 29, 1963.

Part III: **Ideas and Identities**

Zaur Gasimov

Regional Concepts in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries

Geopolitically, the region of the Black Sea has been considered pivotal. The region was often mentioned within the debate on geopolitics-related 'key' notions such as Eurasia's *heartland* and *rimland* coined by Halford Mackinder, Nicholas Spykman, and Zbigniew Brzezinski.[1] Partly due to its geopolitical significance, the Black Sea was one of the central battlefields during World War I and World War II, and it became even more prominent during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period, in the era of pipeline diplomacy and the murky relationship between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and with regard to its proximity to the Greater Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, its geopolitical significance rose remarkably. Several aspects are essential for study of regional concepts on the Black Sea in a *longue durée.* First, the reception of the Black Sea, of its place in the regional concepts of national security and *raison d'état*, is asymmetric in the countries sharing its coast. For Turkey and particularly for Russia, access to the Black Sea is important, but Russia has access to dozens of other seas. Secondly, huge asymmetry exists in military terms as well: The Turkish army is the second strongest within NATO, while Russia's military force is the second strongest in the world, and its nuclear potential remains leading worldwide. For all other Black Sea nations like the EU and NATO member-states Bulgaria and Romania and pro-NATO-oriented Georgia and Ukraine, the Black Sea is of paramount importance in economic, political, and cultural terms. In the case of Georgia and Ukraine, the Black Sea is the only sea they have access to.

The Russian e-journal *Odna Rodina* (One Motherland) reported critically on the foundation of the "Alliance of Baltic-Black Sea Nations" (ABChN) in late 2014.[2] The Kyiv-based Ukrainian-language media published the memorandum signed by more than ten Ukrainian, Georgian, but also Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian far-right organizations. ABChN sees itself as a pro-EU and a pro-NATO organization and aims for

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1 See Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (1919; repr. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1942), 76–78; Nicholas J. Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944), 25–26; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Great Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 46–52.
2 Vladislav Gulevich, "Zachem natsionalisty sozdaiut Alians balto-chernomorskikh natsii," Odna Rodina: Infromatsionno-analiticheskoe izdanie, accessed February 9, 2021, https://odnarodyna.org/content/zachem-nacionalisty-sozdayut-alyans-balto-chernomorskih-naciy.

"united resistance" against the "ambitions of aggressive imperialistic Russia."[3] While the Russian *Odna Rodina* portrayed the ABChN as fascist, ABChN is a strange conglomerate of extreme far-right organizations as well as liberal political parties with an environmental agenda. A neo-Eurasianist journal, *Ritmy Evrazii* (Rhythms of Eurasia), reported on one of the rallies organized by the ABChN in Kyiv in the late May of 2015. This rally was devoted to the anniversary of the foundation of the state of Georgia in 1918. One of the ABChN female activists, Tamara Shavladze, an ethnic Georgian, said during the demonstration: "I believe that we will have no borders when Russian troops disappear from the Black Sea. We will have a common sea, the Black Sea, that will be both Georgian and Ukrainian […]." A Ukrainian journalist who joined the rally and reported on it asked Shavladze about the 'common Ukrainian-Georgian border' and then "whether we [Georgians and Ukrainians] would give anything [within this common Georgian-Ukrainian Black Sea] to the Turks." Shavladze smiled and answered: "We will give them a bit. But the Turks have to give back what they took away years ago."[4] This message was disseminated by Russian state-backed media quite quickly.[5] This example mirrors the current-day populist views and narratives on the Black Sea and on the question as to whom it should belong to; however, there have been several international legal documents regulating the demarcations of coastal and sea borders.

It was Russia and Turkey, or the Russian and Ottoman Empire, that managed to dominate the entire region on their own for centuries. The facts of Tsarist and Ottoman control of the Black Sea coined the notions of a "Russian lake" (Russian: Russkoe more, Turkish: Rus gölü) and a "Turkish lake" (Russian: Turetskoe more, Turkish: Türk gölü). In the Russian and Turkish discourses, these notions are still alive today, and are used as horror scenarios of foreign domination and a challenge to their own geopolitical aspirations and security. When Russian-Turkish relations deteriorated following the Turkish attack on the Russian military airplane over the Turkish territory on the Syrian border, the Turkish president Recep T. Erdoğan warned NATO at the Tenth Meeting of the Heads of the General Staff of the Balkan region of the danger that the Black Sea would turn into a "Russian lake" in May 2016.[6] Valerii Gerasimov, the head of the Rus-

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3 "Memorandum politychnykh ta hromadskikh organizatsii Aliansu Balto-Chernomorskikh Natsii (ABChN)," *Ukrainskyi pohliad*, December 3, 2014, http://ukrpohliad.org/komentari/memorandum-polity-chny-h-ta-gromads-ky-h-organizatsij-al-yansu-balto-chornomors-ky-h-natsij-abchn.html.

4 "Tbilisi i Kiev deliat Chernoe more bez Rossii," Youtube video, May 27, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5jeWgWVzfCU.

5 See Dmitrii Rodionov, "Ukraina i Gruziia podeliat Chernoe More?! Natsionalisty Tbilisi i Kieva pretenduiut na ves Chernomorskii region?," *Svobodnaia Pressa*, May 27, 2015, https://svpressa.ru/politic/article/123298/; "V Tbilisi i Kieve deliat Chernoe more bez Rossii," *Gruzinform*, May 29, 2015, http://ru.saqinform.ge/news/22734/v-tbilisi-i-kieve-delAt-Cernoe-more-bez-rossii-.html. Gruzinform is a Russia-backed Georgian news portal.

6 "Suriye'de Tüm Kırmızı Çizgilerin Aşılmasına Rağmen Bir Adım Atılmadı," Official Website of Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, May 11, 2016, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/43922/suriyede-tum-kirmizi-cizgilerin-asilmasina-ragmen-bir-adim-atilmadi.

sian General Staff, and the inventor, or revitalizer of "hybrid warfare,"[7] announced in September 2016 that Turkey was no longer the boss on the Black Sea.[8] Gerasimov announced this just a couple of days before his official visit to Turkey,[9] and the prominent Turkish columnist and intellectual Taha Akyol critically discussed the statement in the daily *Hürriyet*.[10] According to Gerasimov, the "reunification" of Russia and Crimea, the reappearance of the Russian navy and military in the peninsula, and the foundation of Russian airbases in Syria ended the alleged Turkish domination of the Black Sea. Russian discourses portray the idea of the Russian Black Sea as a necessity to overcome Western expansionism, while the Turkish discourse on the Turkish Black Sea has certain roots in intellectual neo-Ottomanism. Furthermore, the images and conceptualization of the Black Sea are quite different within national ideoscapes.[11] It is hardly possible to speak on the Russian concepts of the Black Sea or that of Turkey. And finally, the concepts of the Black Sea or concepts in which the Black Sea plays a certain role exist in the ideological constructions of the societies without access to the Black Sea. Recently, Chris Miller, the director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Eurasia Program, wrote about the crucial importance on the Black Sea region for Americans.[12] Luke Coffey from the Washington-based Heritage Foundation claimed that "the Black Sea should be a US and NATO priority."[13]

This chapter's goal is to portray several concepts from the region(s) of Central, Eastern, and South-eastern Europe in which the Black Sea plays a central role. I will concentrate on so-called Polish-backed Prometheanism, Ukrainian geopolitical thought on the Black Sea, Russian-backed Eurasianism, and the Turanian perception of the

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7 See Molly K. McKew, "The Gerasimov Doctrine: It's Russia's New Chaos Theory of Political Warfare. And it's Probably Being Used on You," *Politico Magazine*, September/October 2017, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/gerasimov-doctrine-russia-foreign-policy-215538.

8 Inna Kimakovich, "Genshtab RF: VMS Turtsii perestali byt khoziaevami na Chernom More," Federalnoe Agentstvo Novosti, September 14, 2016, https://riafan.ru/555021-genshtab-rf-vms-turcii-perestali-byt-hozyaevami-na-chernom-more.

9 Sputnik Turkey reported on it in Turkish, and contributed to the dissemination of the message in Turkey. "Rusya Genelkurmayı: Türkiye artık Karadeniz'in efendisi değil," Sputnik Turkey, September 14, 2016, https://tr.sputniknews.com/rusya/201609141024832161-rusya-genelkurmay-turkiye-karadeniz/.

10 Taha Akyol, "Karadeniz'in efendisi!," *Hürriyet*, September 15, 2016, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/taha-akyol/karadenizin-efendisi-40224368.

11 The notion of the ideoscape was proposed by Arjun Appadurai as one of five dimensions that help better understand the disjuncture and differences in the evolution of the global cultural economy. Regarding the fluidity of ideas a central condition, Appadurai described ideoscapes as "concatenations of images" which were "often directly political" and linked with ideology of the political regime. Ideoscapes are densely bound with mediascapes, fluid spaces of information flows. See Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 36.

12 Chris Miller, "Why the Black Sea?," Black Sea Strategy Paper, Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 23, 2017, https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/01/why-the-black-sea/.

13 Luke Coffey, "The Black Sea Should be a US and NATO Priority," Middle East Institute, February 6, 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/black-sea-should-be-us-and-nato-priority.

Black Sea. From the outset, I have to add that the respective ideas are very heterogeneous, and very asymmetrical in their scholarly elaboration. Notions such as "Russian Eurasianism" and Turanism should not be understood as strict and ethnically defined but rather as multiconfessional and multiethnic phenomena. Ukrainians contributed heavily to Prometheanism as well as developing distinct Ukrainian plans for the Black Sea beyond the Poland-supported federalism or "intermarium"[14] concept. Common to all them was the idea of a certain cultural superiority of their own value systems, geopolitical and imperialistic aspirations, and justification of territorial acquisition. When speaking about all these "isms" today, we should use the prefix "neo," since "classical" Prometheanism and Eurasianism were founded in the interwar period, and Turanism, or linguistically defined (Pan-)Turkism, goes back even to the end of the nineteenth century. The circulation of ideas is an additional dimension that should be kept in mind when discussing regional concepts of the Black Sea. It was the Turkic intellectuals from the Russian Empire that transferred the idea of "Turan" and of what became Pan-Turkism to the late Ottoman Empire. Along with this logic, the perception and conceptualization of the Black Sea flow from one national discourse into another, impact and influence, and finally co-shape each other, particularly today thanks to the acceleration of the information flow via the internet and social media.

1 Ukraine

The rise of nationalism on the eve of and during World War I was crucial for the ideological re-thinking of the Black Sea in the littoral societies. The Ukrainian intellectual Stepan Rudnytskyi reflected on the Black Sea in his seminal two-volume study published in the years 1910–14 in Kyiv and Lemberg (Ukrainian: Lviv, Polish: Lwów) in Ukrainian, and in 1916 in German in Vienna.[15] Two years later, in 1918, the prominent Ukrainian activist and politician Mykhailo Hrushevskyi issued *Na porozi Novoi Ukrainy* (On the Threshold of the New Ukraine), and titled one of its central chapters "Black Sea orientation." Both Rudnytskyi and Hrushevskyi defined the Black Sea as crucial for Ukraine, its statehood, and its very existence as a nation-state. According to Hrushevskyi, Ukraine belonged culturally—in his terms "intellectually and mentally"—to the West, but geographically to the South, to the Black Sea. Hrushevskyi claimed that the Black Sea had historically played a unifying role, writing that it "did not divide but connected the littoral states."[16] He saw the Black Sea as an important bond between Uk-

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14 For more on the Intermarium concept, see Stefan Troebst, "'Intermarium' and 'Wedding to the Sea': Politics of History and Mental Mapping in East Central Europe," in "Geschichtsregionen: Concept and Critique," ed. Stefan Troebst, special issue, *European Review of History/Revue européenne d'histoire* 10, no. 2 (2003): 293–321.

15 See Stephan Rudnyckyj [Rudnytskyi], *Ukraina: Land und Volk. Eine gemeinfassliche Landeskunde* (Vienna: Verlag des Bundes zur Befreiung der Ukraina, 1916), particularly 17–23.

16 Mykh.[ailo] Hrushevskyi, *Na porozi novoi Ukrainy: Hadki i mrii* (Kyiv: Petro Barskyi u Kyivi, 1918), 17.

raine and the Middle East. The radicalization of the Ukrainian national perception of the Black Sea and the articulation of its own imperialistic views began among the Ukrainian exile intellectuals in the 1930s. Iurii Lypa embodied the group of Ukrainian intellectuals who shared anti-Polish and anti-Soviet views but was pro-German in orientation. In 1938, Lypa published in Lwów his essay *Pryznachennia Ukrainy* (Ukraine's Purposes) as the first part of a sequel on Ukrainian geopolitics. Influenced by the German discourses on *Raum*, Lypa published two books with several maps and schemes in 1940, *Chornomorska doktryna* (Black Sea Doctrine), and a year later, in 1941, another under the title *Chornomorskyi prostir*[17] (The Black Sea Space; see fig. 14). These monographs were issued by the Warsaw-based Ukrainian Black Sea Institute, which was co-founded by Lypa in German-occupied Warsaw with the financial support of Nazi authorities. The main idea of Lypa's "Black Sea Doctrine" was the Ukrainian acquisition of the Black Sea, particularly of the Crimean Peninsula, and even beyond. Lypa referred to Hrushevskyi's idea of the Black Sea's past unifying function but 'elaborated' a distinct Ukrainian strategy towards the region. He portrayed the Black Sea coast with Crimea and Odesa, as well as the Azov industrial quadrangle, as "natural

Fig. 14: Iurii Lypa's conceptualization of the Black Sea region.

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17 Iurii Lypa and Lev Bykovskyi, *Chornomorskyi prostir: Atlas* (Odesa: Ukrainskyi Chornomorskyi Instytut, 1941).

provinces (territories) of Ukraine" (*naturalnye oblasti Ukrainy*). According to Lypa, Ukraine should cooperate with the "bulwark of Europe in Asia Minor,"[18] that is, with Turkey. With regard to the Caucasus, Lypa stressed the fact of Ukrainian-Caucasian cooperation in 1917/18 and wrote about the "unification of Ukraine with the Caucasus." Having elaborated that, he mentioned the rich mineral resources of Chiatura and Baku; this unification "from the historical-political view would second the traditions of the Kingdom of Pontus at the time of Mithridates VI."[19] Lypa's "Black Sea Doctrine" was republished several times during World War II. In 1944, he was arrested by the Soviet secret service, the NKVD, and murdered, and the Ukrainian Black Sea Institute was disbanded. In 1947, the "Black Sea Doctrine" was republished for the Ukrainian diaspora overseas. Lypa belonged to the right-wing Ukrainian nationalists from the former Austro-Hungarian province of Galicia, which was a part of the Polish Republic in the interwar period.[20] Contrary to this group of intellectuals, many other Ukrainian activists supported the Warsaw-backed project of Prometheanism.

2 Polish Prometheanism, the Intermarium, and the Three Seas Initiative

Prometheanism emerged within the milieu of Polish Socialists around Marshall Józef Piłsudski, who played a crucial role in the foundation of the Republic of Poland in 1918 and dominated Polish politics after seizing power in May 1926. This milieu initially opposed Russian expansionism, witnessed persecution by the Tsarist authorities, and experienced arrests and harassment by the Tsarist police. Piłsudski himself, his comrade-in-arm Leon Wasilewski, the diplomats Tadeusz Schaetzel and Władysław Pelc, the editor and publicist Włodzimierz Bączkowski, and many others defined the Polish *raison d'état* as a strong bulwark on Europe's margin, as a Commonwealth of Nations, as they supposed was the case in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth back in the early modern period. Polish Prometheanists aspired Poland's close cooperation with all non-Russian nations of the former Tsardom in order to strengthen its own capacity for resistance against the Soviet Russia. After a short withdrawal from politics in the early 1920s, Piłsudski managed seize power in May 1926. Prometheanists founded several research units and numerous journals and conducted anti-Soviet and anti-Communist propaganda in Poland itself, as well as in Paris, Istanbul, Rome, and Constanţa. Prometheanists pleaded for close cooperation between the so-called Promethean peoples of the Baltics, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, the North Caucasus, Crimea (Tatars), and the Volga region. The idea was that these nations should collaborate and overthrow Soviet domination and forge cooperation with each other, and that Poland

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18 Lypa and Bykovskyi, 19.
19 Lypa and Bykovskyi, 16.
20 For more on Lypa, see Iurii Kovaliv, "Iurii Lypa," *Slovo i chas* 5 (2019): 82–89.

had to coordinate these processes. Polish Prometheanists recalled times when Poland had access to the Black Sea, back in the afore-mentioned period of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Polish Prometheanists considered it Poland's duty to involve itself in the Black Sea and the Caucasus. The Crimean Tatar politician and leader Cafer Seydahmet met Marshall Piłsudski in Warsaw after he had left the peninsula for political reasons. Poland was invited to accept the protectorate over Crimea, and Seydahmet sent the appropriate declaration to the League of Nations. In the following years, Seydahmet, living in Polish and Turkish exile, tried to use Polish Prometheanists as intermediaries in his dialogue with the Ukrainian political diaspora that began to lay claim to Crimea in the 1930s. Promethean maps localized Crimea outside of Ukraine. According to the Promethean plans for the former Tsarist littoral states, that is, for an independent Ukraine, Crimea, and Georgia in 1918, Russia had to lose its presence in the Black Sea and be reduced to the territory of the Moscow Principality. According to the Polish-backed Prometheanism, the region of the "Intermarium" (Polish: *międzymorze*) between the Baltics and the Black Sea should become politically and economically independent of Russia. Polish intellectuals certainly thought of their own economic interests in this "between-seas region" but it was not about the Polonization of those territories, or integration into the Polish state.[21]

In the Prometheanist journal *Problemy Europy Wschodniej* (Problems of Eastern Europe), the Polish intellectual Jan Kowalewski wrote in his programmatic article "Bałtyk – Morze Czarne" (Baltic – Black Sea) in May 1939: "We have to dig up the continent [...] the revitalization of the Baltics-Black Sea axis via the Vistula, San, Dniester, and Prut is the most important duty of Poland's current generation."[22] He asserted that Warsaw and Poland's southeast were a certain core of the spatial bond between the Baltics and the Black Sea (see fig. 15). In September 1939, German and Soviet troops attacked and occupied Poland. Polish activists like Tadeusz Schaetzel moved to London, as did, eventually, the entire Polish government. Jan Kowalewski escaped via Romania to France, Seydahmet stayed in Istanbul, and the prominent Ukrainian Prometheanist Roman Smal-Stotskyi taught at Charles University in Prague. In 1945, Schaetzel and Seydahmet stayed where they were, but Smal-Stotskyi moved to Munich and then to the U.S. Prometheanism underwent a metamorphosis as its elements were absorbed by new groups of exiled Polish and Ukrainian intellectuals. In 1946, a programmatic volume with different articles under the title *Międzymorze* (Intermarium) was published in Polish in Rome. Its slogan was "The Future of the Intermarium is the destiny of 160 million Europeans." The map which the editors placed on the fourth page included cities like Tallinn, Prague, and Kyiv as well as Belgrade, Athens, and Sofia (see fig. 16). The

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21 For more on Prometheanism, see Marek Kornat, ed., *Ruch prometejski i walka o przebudowę Europy Wschodniej (1918–1940): Studia i szkice* (Warsaw: Instytut Historii PAN, 2012); Paweł Libera, ed., *II Rzeczpospolita wobec ruchu prometejskiego* (Warsaw: CAW, 2013); Zaur Gasimov, *Warschau gegen Moskau: Prometheistische Aktivitäten zwischen Polen, Frankreich und der Türkei 1918–1939* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2022).

22 Jan Kowalewski, "Bałtyk – Morze Czarn,e" *Problemy Europy Wschodniej* 1, no. 5 (May 1939): 273–74.

Fig. 15: Jan Kowalewski's idea of a Baltic-Black Sea axis.

Black Sea was literally divided into two parts: Bulgarian, Romanian, and Ukrainian coasts of the Black Sea were included, while Turkish Thrace and the Soviet Georgian coast were left aside. The editors delivered their definition of the "Intermarium" as a space in Central and Eastern Europe surrounded by the Baltics, the Black Sea, the Aegean, and the Adriatic Sea.[23] Interestingly, the post-war "Intermarium" integrated Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece, which were either already ruled by Communists or challenged by them. While this circle of Polish and other East European exiles such as Miha Krek, Juliusz Poniatowski, or Ciril Žebot 'broadened' the definition of the "Intermarium" by bringing the Black Sea into a dialogue with three other 'sea regions,' the Paris-based circle of the Polish intellectual Jerzy Giedroyć, himself a former Prometheanist, reduced Polish Prometheanism to the formula 'ULB.' Derived from the initial letters of Ukraine (Ukraina), Lithuania (Litwa), and Byelorussia (Białoruś), the ULB was characteristic of Polish exiles' aspiration to improve relations with these societies and to search for understanding with Russia as well. Giedroyć's intellectual journal *Kultura* (Culture) had no aspirations of a geopolitical or geopoetical kind with regard to the Black Sea.

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23 Klub Feder. Środ.-Europ, *Międzymorze* (Rome: Sitwa, 1946), 9.

Fig. 16: The concept of the Intermarium.

In cooperation with Croatia, Poland launched the idea of the Three Seas Initiative in 2015. Coined by the Dubrovnik Summit in 2016, the organization currently comprises twelve EU members and targets "economic growth, security and a stronger and more cohesive Europe."[24] Along with Poland, Croatia, three Baltic nations, Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are members of the initiative representing the space *trójmorze* (between three seas), the area between the Baltic, the Adriatic, and the Black Sea. During the meeting in Warsaw in 2017, U.S. president Trump attended the session and backed the initiative that was considered a

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24 Homepage of Three Seas Initiative, accessed November 5, 2021, https://3seas.eu/about/objectives.

sort of East European opposition to German-Russian cooperation in the energy sector. Some observers outside of Poland as well as some Polish politicians and scholars see the initiative as a continuity of the Polish geopolitical idea of the Intermarium.[25]

3 Turkish and Turkic Perspectives

Pan-Turkism was more of a Turkic, or more precisely a Tatar and Azerbaijani, phenomenon than Turkish; however, it was Turkey where the exiled Turkic intellectuals could elaborate their ideas and publish and popularize them by influencing their Turkish contemporaries. The Turkish discourse on Crimea and Dobruja remains abundant but the perception of the Black Sea (Turkish: Karadeniz) is ambiguous. The Black Sea is literally the watershed between Turkey and Russia. During the final stage of World War II, Moscow launched its territorial claims to the eastern parts of Turkey by initiating the famous letter by two Soviet Georgian historians about the Kars and Ardahan provinces in the Soviet media. According to these large-scale pretentions, the Turkish Black Sea coast including the ports of Trabzon, Giresun, and Ordu had to become Soviet. The Soviet strategy to change borders on the southeastern Black Sea was without success, but it heavily damaged Soviet-Turkish relations and forced Turkey to join NATO in 1952.

The key notion of Pan-Turkist thought is "Turan," an ambiguously defined space with blurred borders between Turkish Thrace and China.[26] The intellectual fathers and mothers of Pan-Turkism, such as the Russia-born Yusuf Akçura, Ali Bey Hüseyinzade from Azerbaijan, and Zeki Velidi Togan from Bashkiria, as well as Ziya Gökalp, Halide Edib Adıvar, and Nihal Atsız from the Ottoman Empire, elaborated and partly mystified Ergenekon, a Central Asian steppe somewhere in present-day Mongolia, Western China, and Central Asia as the cultural cradle of the Turks. Praising the ethnic, linguistic, and even religious Turkicness, Pan-Turkists, particularly the Tatar and Central Asian exiles, published and popularized knowledge about the "Outside Turks" (*dış türkler*) in Turkey. They portrayed Tatar life in Romanian Dobruja and in Crimea, as the main coastal centers of Turkic cultural life outside of Turkey in the in-

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25 Exemplary is the edited volume published by Warsaw University in 2016 under the title *Międzymorze: Nadzieje i ograniczenia w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw: Studium Europy Wschodniej, Uniwersytet Warszawski, 2016). In her preface, the distinguished Polish historian Elżbieta Znamierowska-Rakk traces the evolution of the Polish idea of the Intermarium and reflects on "the menace of an economic nature, the German-Russian project of Nord Stream II that negatively affects the energy interests of the countries of our microregion." See Elżbieta Znamierowska-Rakk, "Wstęp," in *Międzymorze: Nadzieje i ograniczenia,* 10.

26 For more on Pan-Turkism, see Jacon M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation,* 2nd rev. and updated ed. (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995); Berna Pekesen, "Pan-Turkism," European History Online (EGO), published by the Leibniz Institute of European History (IEG), January 29, 2019, http://www.ieg-ego.eu/pekesenb-2014-en.

terwar period. The nationalistic perception of the Black Sea in the Turkish and Pan-Turkist context took place later, and was somewhat sporadic.

The example of Ahmet Cevat's verse *Çırpınırdı Karadeniz* (The Black Sea Struggled) is an interesting example of cultural transfer within the Turkic world. During World War I, the Azeri poet Ahmet Cevat travelled to the Ottoman Empire, joined its army as an officer, and took part in the Battle of Çanakkale. He wrote reports from the front, then moved to Batumi, where he remained for several years, working as a teacher at a local school. Deeply impressed by the Ottomans, Cevat wrote the verses, and in 1918, the Azerbaijani composer Üzeyir Hacıbeyli composed the music, and the piece was played during Nuru Pasha's arrival in Baku. A year later, it was published in Cevat's collection of poems. Neither the manuscript of the verse nor that of the musical notes survived. Cevat was murdered in the course of the Stalinist purges in 1937. Less known in Azerbaijan itself, this song became popular in Turkey. In September 2018, a Kyrgyz singer performed it during the official visit of Recep T. Erdoğan to Bishkek,[27] and it was performed by thousands of supporters of Turkey's nationalist Party MHP, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, and by its leader Devlet Bahçeli during the political rally in Samsun on June 19, 2018.[28] The video clip of its performance by Azerbaijani soprano Azerin in Istanbul's central Taksim Square in 2012 has since attracted about nine million "likes." The song coined the notion of "Çırpınırdı Karadeniz" in Turkey's political language.[29] Aside from this geopoetical preoccupation with the Black Sea as a source of inspiration for Turkish nationalism, I have been able to discover few statements regarding the Black Sea's "inclusion Turkish influence sphere." Kemal Güçlü, the head of the Konya-based marginal Islamist *Ahlak-Der* (Society of World Ethics and Morals), posted the video with Erdoğan condemning the Russian occupation of Crimea and his non-acceptance of this violation of international law, and wrote beneath the link "Everyone should know that Crimea is a Motherland of Muslim Turks. It is our duty to unify all of Caucasia with Turkey and turn it into a Turkish Sea again in order to bring justice to the people of the region within thirty years."[30]

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27 "Erdoğan'a 'Başbuğ' sürprizi," *Yeni Şafak,* September 3, 2018, https://www.yenisafak.com/video-galeri/gundem/erdogana-cirpinirdi-karadeniz-surprizi-2182161.

28 "Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Genel Başkanı Sayın Devlet BAHÇELİ'nin Samsun'da düzenlenen 'Çırpınırdı Karadeniz Bakıp Türk'ün Bayrağına' mitinginde yapmış oldukları konuşma. 19 Haziran 2018," website of Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, accessed January 26, 2021, https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/mhp/4433/mhp/Milliyetci_Hareket_Partisi_Genel_Baskani_Sayin_Devlet_BAHCELI__nin_Samsun__da_duzenlenen__Cirpinirdi_Karadeniz_Bakip_Turk_.html.

29 See Orhan Dede, "Çırpınırdı Karadeniz şimdi ise kaynıyor," *Yeni mesaj,* November 29, 2018, http://www.yenimesaj.com.tr/cirpinirdi-karadeniz-simdi-ise-kayniyor-H1308083.htm.

30 Kemal Güçlü (@_kemalguclu), February 3, 2020, Tweet, https://twitter.com/_kemalguclu/status/1224458241674858496.

4 Russian Eurasianism in the Interwar and Post-Soviet Eras

The Russian Revolution of 1917 brought masses in motion. Thousands of Russian and non-Russian intellectuals refused to cooperate with the Bolsheviks and left the country. Reflection on why the Russian Revolution happened and why the Bolsheviks were able to hold onto power dominated Russian minds in and outside of Soviet Russia. Based at the universities and academic institutions in Sofia, Prague, and Paris, a group of Russian exiles published the programmatic manifesto *Iskhod k Vostoku* (Exodus towards the East). Opposing the Bolshevik ideology, these intellectuals searched for a post-imperial re-construction of Russia. They condemned Russian Bolshevism as European domination (Romano-Germanic influence), while praising the century-long co-existence and mutual influence of Slavic and Turkic societies. In close co-operation with Turkic ethnic groups and peoples, Russia had to reorganize itself as a Eurasian continent and oppose the European influence worldwide. The Russian-Turkic symbiosis was perceived as the savior of humankind.[31] The prominent linguist and Professor of Philology of the University of Vienna, Nikolai Trubetskoi, wrote on the eternal antagonism of Europe vs. humankind in his seminal *Evropa i chelovechestvo* (Europe and Humanity)[32] and praised "the Turanian element in Russian culture,"[33] to cite the title of an article of his that was well-received by Russian Eurasianists of the interwar period and still is by neo-Eurasianists today, both in Russia and in Turkey. Similar to the Turkish Pan-Turkists, Trubetskoi perceived Central Asia, specifically its rural areas, as the cradle of Turkicness, and in its nature he saw similarities with Russian folk culture. The urban spaces of Baku and Tbilisi were poisoned by urbanism, by Persian culture, and condemned. Savitskii, another representative of Eurasianist thought, stressed the importance of seas for Russia, and for its economy: "One should reach real guarantees that an enemy's navy would not pass the straits and would not bomb the coasts of the Black Sea. It is fruitful to gain access to the Persian Gulf [...]. One should keep in mind that the both aims are not of extraordinary importance."[34] According to Savitskii, Russia had to strengthen integration on the continent, and it should not invest too

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31 For more on Russian Eurasianism, see Leonid Luks, "Die Ideologie der Eurasier im zeitgeschichtlichen Zusammenhang," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 34, no. 3 (1986): 374–95; Stefan Wiederkehr, *Die eurasische Bewegung: Wissenschaft und Politik in der russischen Emigration der Zwischenkriegszeit und im postsowjetischen Russland* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007).

32 N. S. Trubetskoi, *Evropa i chelovechestvo* (Sofia: Rossiisko-Bolgarskoe knigoizdatelstvo, 1920).

33 N. S. Trubetskoi, "O turanskom elemente v russkoi kulture," *Evraziiskii vremennik* 4 (1925). This article was repeatedly republished in post-Soviet Russia. The Russian text is available online (accessed November 5, 2021): http://www.hrono.ru/statii/turan_ru.html. See the English translation of the article: Nikolai Trubetskoi, "On the Turanian Element in Russian Culture," *Anthropology & Archeology of Eurasia* 37, no. 1 (1998): 8–29.

34 Petr Savitskii, "Kontinent – Okean (Rossiia i mirovoi rynok)," accessed January 26, 2021, http://nevmenandr.net/eurasia/1921-isxod.php.

much in "monkey-like imitation of the "oceanic" politics of others."[35] The "classic" Eurasianists of the interwar period preferred continentality, soil-relatedness, and were much less admirers of the sea. The Neo-Eurasianists around the ill-known political analyst and 'grey cardinal' of present-day Russian politics, Aleksandr Dugin, seem to be more integrationist in their views on the geopolitics of the seas. Dugin preaches Neo-Eurasianism, and propagates close cooperation between Russia and every other nation against the alleged U.S. hegemony and NATO.[36] He is intertwined with Europe's far right circles,[37] is a polyglot, and his works have been translated into several languages. The Eurasianist television channel *Evraziia* and several news portals disseminated the "Directive of Dugin" under the title "The Black Sea Belongs to us and not to NATO."[38] Dugin's rhetoric is harsh but not new. Andrei Okara wrote in *Evraziiskoe obozrenie* (Eurasian Review) in May 2002, almost twenty years ago: "[T]he countries of the Black Sea region could turn the Black Sea into an inland lake of Eastern Christian civilization, however, it is turning into an inland lake of NATO."[39] The Bulgarian intellectual Mincho Minchev repeated the ideas of importance, indeed the "centrality" of the Black Sea for Russia-dominated Eurasia, in his essay "The Black Sea as the Center of Eurasia" of November 2012. For Minchev, the Black Sea is the "starting point of the great project of Eurasian unity."[40]

The narrative on the Black Sea attracts interest not only among Neo-Eurasianists but also in the broader extreme right and staunchly conservative circles in Russia. In 2016, the conservative daily *Zavtra* (Tomorrow) published an article with the title "Baltic Melody about the Black Sea," a nostalgic imperialistic verse of Aleksandr Klimov. The aim of this piece was the restoration of a "Soviet" mental map of possessions Moscow once controlled.[41] In an essay titled "A Thousand Years-long Struggle for Russian Sea and Tsargrad," Aleksandr Samsonov, an amateur historian and far-right intellectual, called Crimea a "parasite state": "The liquidation of this "tumor" was a monumental task for the Russian state."[42] According to the author, "Strategic security of Russian civilization in the South is concerned. Enemies occupied Kyiv and part of the northern *prichernomore*[43] [...]. Georgia and Ukraine are bulwarks of NATO. Turkey is a historical

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35 Savitskii.

36 For more on Neo-Eurasianism and Dugin, see Audrey Tolstoy and Edmund McCaffray, "Mind Games: Alexander Dugin and Russia's War of Ideas," *World Affairs* 177, no. 6 (2015): 25 – 30.

37 See Anton Shekhovtsov, *Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir* (New York: Routledge, 2018).

38 "Chernoe more: ne NATO, a nashe," Website of Aleksandr Dugin, accessed January 26, 2021, http://dugin.ru/en/node/4891.

39 Andrei N. Okara, "Prichernomore: Forpost ili podbriushe Bolshoi Evrazii," Website of Mezhdunarodnoe Evraziiskoe Dvizhenie, published May 24 2002, http://med.org.ru/article/375.

40 "Bolgarskii ekspert: Prichernomore mozhet stat startovoi tochkoi grandioznogo proekta evraziiskogo proekta," regnum, November 21, 2012, https://regnum.ru/news/polit/1595499.html.

41 Aleksandr Klimov, "Baltiiskaia melodiia o Chernom more: Nostalgiia," *Zavtra*, July 6, 2016.

42 Aleksandr Samsonov, "Tysiacheletniaia borba za Russkoe more i Tsargrad," *Voennoe obozrenie*, November 17, 2018, https://topwar.ru/149901-tysjacheletnjaja-borba-za-russkoe-more-i-cargrad.html.

43 *Prichernomore* is a Russian word meaning literally "the lands before the Black Sea."

enemy and a member of NATO. [...] A thousand-years-long battle for the Russian (Black) Sea and Constantinople-Tsargrad is not over."[44] The far-right Russian writer Elena Chudinova, the author of *Mechet' Parizhskoi Bogomateri* (English title: *The Mosque of Notre Dame in Paris: 2048*), wrote just after the Russian annexation of the Crimea: "Not Putin, but we need the Black Sea [...]. For the first time in the last 23 years, European Russia crosses the borders of the 17th century [...]. It is not only about the Black Sea [...]. The destinies of living people and the reunification of Russian lands is more important [...]."[45]

The Black Sea commands great attention among geographers, philosophers, and other intellectuals in the context of the region's geopolitical significance. It plays a certain role in the Russian debates on Eurasia, and in the Turkish discourse on "Turan." However, the Black Sea has never been at the center of intellectual discourses. For Polish (Neo-)Prometheanists, the region was of importance as part of the "Intermarium" concept as well as in the Poland-backed Three Seas Initiative of 2015. And they do share with U.S. strategists the common idea of the region's importance for containing Russia. In the regional concepts of Ukraine and Georgia, the Black Sea is perceived as central to those countries' national security.

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44 Samsonov, "Tysiacheletniaia borba."

45 Elena Chudinova, "Martovskie idy Ukrainy," March 13, 2014, http://www.golos-epohi.ru/?ELEMENT_ID=11792. Also published in Elena Semenova, ed., *Evromaidan i russkaia vesna: Istoriia, fakty, analitika* (Moscow: Traditsiia, 2014), 483–85.

Dennis Dierks

Nation-building and Nationalism in the Black Sea Region (Nineteenth–Twenty-First Centuries)

1 Introduction and Outline of the Chapter

Rooted in Western European liberalism, the idea of the nation as a politicized concept of belonging, commonality, and solidarity found its way to the Black Sea region during the long nineteenth century.[1] Promising a modernizing reconfiguration of the state, society, economy, and culture, it initially attracted especially those sections of the local elites that were seeking a symbolical (re-)alignment with Europe by reproducing its institutions and lifestyles. Even if the blind imitation of Western modernity met with criticism—in Romania, for example, Titu Maiorescu (1840–1917) coined the critical bon mot *formă fără fond* (i.e. "form without content")[2]—conservative elite members (like Maiorescu) were also able to agree on the concept of the nation, as it made it possible to inscribe the values they cherished in a normative corpus that was imagined as part of a national tradition reaching far into the past. Unwanted change could thus be castigated as a deviation from the path the nation was destined to follow. As for liberal intellectuals, the great appeal of this concept lay in the fact that it promised to harmonize opposites such as old and new, the self and the other, or rich and poor.[3] Imagining urban bourgeoisies, an often landless peasantry, and a nascent industrial proletariat as one great community connected by the common interest in the welfare of the nation, it should bridge social antagonisms—regardless of differences in socialization, conflicting economic interests, or the fact that mutual understanding was difficult due to the use of different dialects and sociolects (and sometimes even languages). At the same time,

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1 In this article, such a conceptualization will be addressed as nationalism. The term nationalism is used as an analytical category, not, as is often the case in the media, a normative one.

2 For an English translation of the essay "În contra direcţiei de astăzi în cultura română" (*Against the contemporary direction in Romanian culture*), published in 1868, in which Titu Maiorescu makes this criticism, as well as a short biography of the author, see the following anthology: Ahmet Ersoy, Maciej Górny, and Vangelis Kechriotis, eds., *Modernism: Representations of National Culture* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2010).

3 On the close link between the emerging idea of the modern nation and nineteenth-century liberal thought, see the still fundamental study by Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 [first edition 1991]), especially 14–44.

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liberal conceptualizations of education, prosperity, gender roles, and even affect control could be embedded into—most often personalized—accounts of national history. This strategy of historical make-believe was intended to obliterate the traces of recent intellectual transfers from outside that had brought these concepts into the communities in which they were now to become effective.

Grand narratives have played an essential role in this process. They have popularized notions of a common ethnic origin reaching far into the past and of historical experiences shared by all members of the nation as a "community of fate," thus shaping the genre of ethnonationalist historiography. Pre-modern realms and dominions have been anachronistically interpreted as precursors of nation states that are to be restored in the present, or whose existing borders are to be shifted. This is true, for example, of references to the Byzantine Empire in the Greek *megali idea* or to the pre-modern Armenian kingdoms, which also date back to antiquity, the realm of the medieval Georgian kings and other dynasts ruling this region from the sixteenth century, the two Bulgarian Empires in medieval Southeastern Europe and Kyivan Rus, which for both Russian and Ukrainian nationalism represents the starting point of national statehood imagined as having continuously existed since the ninth century. For other national historiographies, the post-medieval pre-modern period provides a reference point: the Cossacks for Ukrainian nationalism or the Khanate of Crimea for Crimean Tatar historical narratives.[4] In narratives of Romanian national history, a central role is played by the reign of Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazul, 1558–1601), during which the principalities of Wallachia, Transylvania, and Moldavia were united under one ruler for a brief period of four months in 1600, which is seen as the nucleus of the Great Romanian nation state established after World War I.

References to the past were more difficult for Turkish national historiography. The Kemalist cultural revolution of the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s decreed a break with cultural practices of the Ottoman past, which Atatürk roundly condemned as a historical aberration in his own interpretation of history.[5] This did not necessarily mean that the Ottoman era did not represent any positive point of reference for national historiography—contrary to the portrayals in older research.[6] However, the picture of the Ottoman era remained ambivalent and characterized by numerous negative cli-

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4 An early example of narrating the history of the Crimean Khanate as part of Crimean Tatar national history can be found in Cafer Seydamet Qırımer (1889–1960): Djafer Seïdamet, *La Crimée. Passé – Présent – Revendications des Tatars de Crimée* (Lausanne: Imprimerie G. Vaney-Burnier, 1921), esp. 16–32.
5 For Atatürk's interpretation of the Ottoman sultanate and caliphate as institutions that prevented the vital development of the Turkish nation, see his iconic speech *Nutuk* held in 1927 and lasting a total of 36 hours: [Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal], *A speech delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, October 1927* (Leipzig: Koehler, 1929).
6 This was recently demonstrated by Deniz Imamoğlu in his dissertation on Turkish historiography of the 1930s: Uğur Cenk Deniz Imamoğlu, "Turkish Historical Society and Nation Building (1931–1938)" (PhD thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 2023), https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/giris.jsp.

chés. The situation was different with the history of pre-Ottoman Anatolia.[7] In addition to the Seljuk Empire, the ancient history of this region played a role here, similar to Greek and Romanian national history with their references to classical Greece or the ancient people of the Dacians as the supposed progenitors of today's Romanians. As in Romanian and other national historiographies in the Black Sea region, in the Turkish case too questions of migration history have played a central role: The supposed proof that the Turkish tribes colonized Anatolia as early as prehistoric times was intended to fend off competing claims of Greek, Armenian, and Kurdish nationalisms. An unreservedly positive reference to the imperial dimensions of Ottoman history and an emphasis on the civilizational significance of Islam did not take place until the 1980s, and was intensified after the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) came to power in 2002. In the meantime, imperial Ottoman history and the Islamic dimensions of Turkish history have become a usable past and play a prominent role in national modes of self-description. This reappropriation of the imperial past, apostrophized as neo-Ottomanism, is intended to legitimize the definition of spheres of interest and the reorientation of foreign policy in the present, when it focuses on an imagined Ottoman commonwealth.[8] Such neo-imperial appropriations of the past are even more pronounced in the historical policy of Putin's Russia, where they are supposed to justify the war against Ukraine.

In all these cases, strategies of constructing a *normative past*[9] are discernible, that is, imaginings of the past are used as a yardstick for shaping the present. The construction of such normative pasts goes hand in hand with the imagination of a "golden age," that is, epochs that are imagined as a phase of a cultural heyday, economic prosperity, and maximum territorial expansion. Developments that took place after these imagined golden ages and contradict what national historiographies describe as its "essence" are seen as historical aberrations and misdevelopments that need to be revised, be it borderlines, demographic conditions, or cultural practices such as the use of a given language. In this context, the use of various forms of repression or even physical violence is usually considered legitimate, as will be shown below.[10]

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7 This was summarized in historiography under the term *Türk Tarih Tezi* (Turkish History Thesis). On the role of the Battle of Manzikert in 1071, in which a Seljuk contingent defeated the Byzantine emperor, as a national founding myth, see Carole Hillenbrand, *Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol: The Battle of Manzikert* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 196–225; regarding the changing perception of the once Ottoman Balkan region, see Ebru Boyar, *Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans: Empire Lost, Relations Altered* (London: Tauris Acad. Studies, 2007).

8 M. Hakan Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire: The Politics of Neo-Ottomanism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

9 For the concept of normative pasts, see Jan Assmann, *Religion and Cultural Memory: Ten Studies*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).

10 Helpful overviews of the development of national grand narratives, which take into account political contexts and social conditions, can be found in: Hercules Millas, *National Myths in Greece* (London: Transnational Press, 2023). And in a comparative perspective: Hercules Millas, "History for Nation-Building: The Case of Greece and Turkey," in *Palgrave Handbook of Research in Historical Culture and Edu-*

In the process of nation-building, five phases can be distinguished in the Black Sea region: (1) the long nineteenth century, (2) the continuum of war and ethnicized violence from 1911 to 1923, (3) the interwar period starting with the foundation of the Soviet Union 1922 and the Treaty of Lausanne 1923, followed by the period of World War II that affected the Black Sea Region directly since 1940, (4) the period of bloc confrontation, and finally (5) with regard to the northern Black Sea region, the post-socialist period, and with regard to the southern Black Sea region, the period of post-Kemalism.

2 The Long Nineteenth Century: Nation-building in the Age of Empire

The emergence of nationalisms took place in the Black Sea region in the nineteenth century within the framework of imperial rule. The initial conditions, potential effects, and goals of the various national movements were highly diverse. In an overview such as this article, it seems sensible not simply to enumerate individual national movements, but to describe and compare them with the help of abstract models and at the same time to ask about possible interactions. The approach of this chapter is, as outlined above, that nationalism is an elite project whose advocates seek to have a broad social impact. The temporalization of the Prague historian Miroslav Hroch is a model that is able to describe the dynamics of how such an impact unfolded. It helps to make developments in different societies comparable, which is also shown by studies on national movements in the Russian and Ottoman Empires. Hroch's model distinguishes, as is widely known, between phase A, in which patriotic intellectuals develop cultural models of the nation, phase B, in which these models are politicized in order to gain broad popular support, and phase C, in which nationalisms are supported by mass movements.[11] In recent research, it has been proposed to extend

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cation, ed. Mario Carretero, Stefan Berger, and Maria Grever (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 355–72; Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Roumen Daskalov, *The Making of a Nation in the Balkans: Historiography of the Bulgarian Revival* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2004); Serhii Plokhy, *Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014); Stephen Velychenko, *National History as a Cultural Process: A Survey of Interpretations of Ukraine's Past in Polish, Russian and Ukrainian Historical Writing from the Earliest Times to 1914* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992); Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2001). For a general account of the reorientation of Kemalist historiography after the founding of the Turkish Republic and its dissemination, see: Étienne Copeaux, *Éspaces et temps de la nation turque: Analyse d'une historiographie nationaliste (1931–1993)* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1997), and in Turkish translation: *Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk İslam Sentezine: Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931–1993)* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998).

11 Miroslav Hroch: *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

this model to include a phase D focusing on nation-building processes after independence.[12]

Another model, which was first developed in a comparative European and then in a global perspective, and whose reception seems to be essentially limited to German-speaking academia, is that of Theodor Schieder, who distinguishes between integrating and unifying varieties of nationalism.[13] Such a classification might help us distinguish between conceptualizations of the national that aimed at political emancipation—be it autonomy, or be it through territorial secession from imperial rule, and those that aimed at the integration of an existing state, now based on the idea of the nation. Concerning the Black Sea region before World War I, this last category of integrating nationalisms includes Russian nationalism in the Russian Empire and—under much more complex conditions—Turkish nationalism emerging in the Ottoman Empire and—until the rise of Kemalism—being diffusely linked to the idea of imperial rule.

Another possible distinction is that between so-called "old" and "young nations," which Andreas Kappeler makes in his groundbreaking study of national movements in the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. Among the "old nations" Kappeler counts those ethnonational groups that had their own cultural elite and that had developed their own tradition of statehood and literary language before their integration into the Russian Empire. On the northern shores of the Black Sea these were the Crimean Tatars and Georgians. Kappeler contrasts them with the so-called "young nations," that is, "peasant peoples," which had only an incomplete social structure, as they lacked traditional elites and their urban middle classes were only weakly developed.[14] In the northern Black Sea region, this categorization applies first and foremost to the Ukrainians.

Kappeler's categorization is based on socio-historical considerations. However, the distinction as such is older and, as Holm Sundhaussen has already argued in relation to Southeastern Europe, might involve problematic judgment.[15] Since the nineteenth century, the argument that a nation is new, suggesting that it was invented, or too small has been used to delegitimize competing emancipatory claims. At present, a denial of national self-determination based on such an argumentation can be observed on the part of Putin's Russian neo-imperialism in relation to Ukraine. While one's own nation is imagined as having existed since time immemorial, the nation of the "others" is denounced as new and artificial. Such possible problematic implications must always be considered when applying generalizing categories of analysis.

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12 Ulf Brunnbauer and Klaus Buchenau, *Geschichte Südosteuropas* (Ditzingen: Reclam, 2018), 128.
13 Theodor Schieder, "Typologie und Erscheinungsformen des Nationalstaats in Europa," in Theodor Schieder, *Nationalismus und Nationalstaat: Studien zum nationalen Problem im modernen Europa*, ed. Otto Dann and Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1992), 65–86.
14 Andreas Kappeler, *The Russian Empire: A Multi-ethnic History* (London: Routledge, 2014).
15 Holm Sundhaussen, "Ambiguities of 'Natural' and 'Artificial' Nations: Introductory Remarks," in *The Ambiguous Nation: Case Studies from Southeastern Europe in the 20th Century*, ed. Ulf Brunnbauer and Hannes Grandits (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2013).

As regards the emergence of national movements under the conditions of imperial rule, it must finally be pointed out that the idea of a sharp antagonism between empire and nation, which is deeply rooted in both older scholarship and in self-historicizations of national movements in the region itself, in many cases, did not exist. Loyalties and identities were complex and situational, and the advocates of national emancipatory claims often tried to assert them within the framework of—and not against—the existing imperial order.

If we take up the categorization between state-supporting integrating and unifying nationalisms on the one hand and secessionist nationalisms on the other, then Greek nationalism can be addressed as an early example of secessionist nationalism in the Black Sea Region. Here, too, however, a differentiated view is necessary. What initially catches the eye—and what is also at the center of traditional accounts of national movements in Southeastern Europe—are the efforts to establish an independent Greek nation state as early as the first decades of the nineteenth century, culminating in the War of Independence between 1821 and 1829.[16] Still, the ideas as to which historical polity—Ancient Greece, the Byzantine Empire, or something in between—should be revived and which territorial outlook this state was to have diverged significantly.

Similarly to the case of other secessionist nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Greek intellectual activists were driven by the idea of emulating the French Revolution, which implied imaging Ottoman rule not only as illegitimate foreign occupation, but also as an *ancien régime*, stubbornly ignoring the fact that social conditions in the Ottoman Empire were entirely different from those in late-eighteenth-century France. Besides that—and here too we can recognize a parallel to other uprisings against Ottoman rule during the nineteenth century—national activists utilized different forms of social banditry and peasant resistance for their own purposes. They now framed such practices of disobedience as *national resistance* against foreign rule aiming at mobilizing the broad mass of the rural population. In the Greek case, such local "communities of violence"[17] were the Klephts, in the Romanian case they were called Pandurs, and Chetniks in the Serbian and Bulgarian case.[18]

Yet another pattern, which was to become typical of nineteenth-century independence struggle, could already be discerned during the Greek revolution of the 1820s: the attempt to mobilize public opinion in Europe in order to bring about an intervention by the Great Powers in one's own favor. Such a military intervention (this time by Brit-

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[16] For detailed information on its social and cultural dimensions, the theatres of war, and biographies of its most important actors, see Paschalis M. Kitromilides and Constantinos Tsoukalas, eds., *The Greek Revolution: A Critical Dictionary* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2021).

[17] Winfried Speitkamp, "Gewaltgemeinschaften in der Geschichte: Eine Einleitung," in *Gewaltgemeinschaften in der Geschichte: Entstehung, Kohäsionskraft und Zerfall*, ed. Winfried Speitkamp (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht), 11–40.

[18] See also, with a focus on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Ramazan Öztan and Alp Yenen, eds., *Age of Rogues: Transgressive Politics at the Frontiers of the Ottoman Empire* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021).

ain, France, and Russia) took place for the first time in 1827, and again in 1876, when Russian troops almost reached the Ottoman capital. In both cases, these interventions, together with the diplomatic activities of the European Great Powers, led to international recognition of national sovereignty, in the case of Greece by the London Protocol in 1830, and in the case of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro by the Congress of Berlin in 1878.[19]

As for the emergence of a public opinion that was sympathetic to the cause of the Christian nationalist activists in the Ottoman Empire, traditions of Islamophobia and hostility towards the Ottoman Empire played a crucial role. This is particularly evident in the emergence of European middle class philhellenism in the 1820s, which was rooted in idealized imaginings of Greek antiquity. The liberal bourgeoisie of Western Europe assumed a congeniality between its own aspirations for freedom, which were suffocated by the post-Waterloo regime of restoration, and the cause of the Greek insurgents. In addition, the use of violence by the Ottoman authorities when suppressing Christian uprisings fed favorable views of the insurgents, as demonstrated by the example of the Batak massacre in 1876, which, not least through targeted political manipulation, fostered anti-Ottoman sentiment in Great Britain, British papers labeling this massacre "Bulgarian atrocities." However, the quest of territorial expansion to the detriment of the Ottoman Empire could also create critical public opinion. This was particularly true of the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, as a result of which the persistent stereotype of Southeastern Europe as an uncontrollable "powder keg" and the site of ethnicized "ancient hatred" became established in the Western media. As Maria Todorova has eloquently argued, these stereotypes still inform Western perceptions of Southeastern Europe in the present.[20]

Besides such practices of armed resistance to achieve national independence we can also identify attempts to enforce political participation and autonomy for one's own ethnonational group within the framework of imperial rule. This aspect of nationalism was long overlooked by research. Among representatives of the Greek community in the Ottoman Empire, for instance, models of autonomy oriented toward the Austro-Hungarian Compromise (*Ausgleich*) of 1867 were discussed. Until 1908, the autonomous Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia, constituted by the decisions of the Congress of Berlin, could also claim to be a model for self-government. The fact that approaches to participation within the framework of imperial rule were seen as promising may be shown by the positive response that the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 met with among the Greek and Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire immediately after the reinstatement of the Ottoman constitution.[21] That the Young

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19 A good overview of national movements and wars of independence in Southeast Europe can be found in the the chapter "Nation- and state-building" in John R. Lampe and Ulf Brunnbauer, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Balkan and Southeast European History* (London: Routledge, 2021).

20 Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

21 Bedross Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Violence in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).

Turks would so bitterly disappoint the hopes of non-Muslims and non-Turks within the empire, and that in the case of the Armenians they would even choose genocidal ethnic engineering, was beyond what could be imagined at the time.

As for the Russian Empire, the revolution of 1905 had a catalytic effect on the further development of nationalism.[22] The bloody suppression of a workers' demonstration in St. Petersburg reverberated in the peripheries of the empire, all the more so as regions such as Ukraine and Transcaucasia had already been places of social and political unrest, articulated as claims to political participation and also, in some cases, in protests against cultural and linguistic russification. However, as the example of Ukraine shows, peasant populations could be mobilized for social demands such as a radical land reform without necessarily identifying with a genuinely national agenda.

The Ukrainian peasant population was particularly affected by the empire's russification politics that began in the 1860s and aimed at the suppression and repression of the Ukrainian language, the existence of which was denied by the tsarist authorities, who saw in the local language only a variety of Russian contaminated by Polish and, in general, considered Ukrainian nationalism—typical of the imperial stance towards national movements during the nineteenth century—an invention of a few misguided intellectuals who wanted to stir up the bulk of villagers and urban toilers. The same strategy of russification was also applied in other parts of the Northern Black Sea region, affecting the Romanian-speaking population of Bessarabia from the 1860s and the Georgian and Armenian speaking populations of Transcaucasia from the 1870s and the 1880s, respectively. This policy of linguistic assimilation was accompanied by an attempt to limit the autonomy of local church institutions, as had already happened in the case of the Georgian Church during the reign of Nicholas I and with the Armenian Church at the beginning of the twentieth century. In contrast to this, the Ukrainian population in the Russian Empire, unlike the Ukrainians in Austrian Galicia, did not have their own church organization, which was another reason for the hesitant development of their national movement.

The situation was different with the Muslim populations in the Northern Black Sea region. The Russian conquest of the Caucasus led to the displacement of part of the Muslim population, a particularly dramatic example being the enforced resettlement of the Circassians and other Muslim populations into the Ottoman Empire in 1864, which was accompanied by mass deaths. Such coercive measures against recalcitrant populations did not, however, preclude the co-option of loyal Muslim elites into the system of imperial rule or the staging of the benevolence and lawfulness of the tsarist administration.[23] At the same time, the emergence of pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic solidar-

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22 For an overview of the impact of the 1905 revolution on nationalism and national movements in the tsarist empire, see Kappeler, *The Russian Empire*, 328–48.

23 Mustafa Tuna, *Imperial Russia's Muslims: Islam, Empire, and European Modernity, 1788–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 195–216; Volker Adam, *Rußlandmuslime in Istanbul am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges: Die Berichterstattung osmanischer Periodika über Rußland und Zentralasien* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2002).

ities, which went along with the spread of the Muslim reform movement of Jadidism, gave rise to fears of Muslim irredentism, although these concerns of the tsarist authorities usually lacked substance.[24]

This generally points to the role of transimperial entanglements in the emergence of national movements as well as protonational ideas of commonality in the Black Sea region before the First World War. They were also strong in the case of Ukrainian nationalism, which received important impulses from the Ukrainian national movement in Austrian Galicia, which is why the tsarist authorities tried to prevent the import of Ukrainian press products from Austria-Hungary. In the case of Armenian nationalism, cross-border exchange played a role too. As Armenian activists in the Ottoman Empire no longer shied away from the use of terrorist violence after the experience of the pogroms of 1894, the tsarist administration viewed such links with growing concern, perceiving Armenian nationalism as increasingly threatening and potentially terrorist. This was also a major reason for the described action against the Armenian Church in 1903. These transimperial interconnections become even more complex when one considers that the model for the Armenian terrorist acts in the Ottoman Empire was the violent practices of the Russian terrorist organization *Narodnaia Volia* ("People's Will") in the Russian Empire.[25]

Despite the continuing mistrust of the tsarist authorities, the 1905 revolution created completely new conditions for the development of national movements in the Russian Empire. Even if it was granted reluctantly, the tsar's October Manifesto opened up new scope for action, as it enabled pre-existing and newly founded national parties and periodicals to articulate their concerns in public legally and—more or less—freely. A completely new platform was provided by the newly opened Duma as a place for parliamentary debate where nationally-based demands for autonomy could be articulated. Reform-oriented Russian Muslims made use of these new freedoms by founding their own party, which soon sought proximity to the liberal party of the Russian Constitutionalists (Cadets).[26]

These new freedoms led to a differentiation of the political spectrum. At the same time, it became apparent that ethnonational emancipation policies were directed not only against russification, but also against other non-Russian nationalisms, as the violent conflicts between Georgians and Armenians and Muslims and Armenians in the Transcaucasia demonstrated. The imperial administration used such tensions to divide and rule.[27]

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24 Stefan B. Kirmse, *The Lawful Empire: Legal Change and Cultural Diversity in Late Tsarist Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

25 Kappeler, *The Russian Empire*, 220–38.

26 Hakan Kırımlı, *National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars, 1905–1916* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 56–72, 105–15.

27 On the development of nationalisms in the Caucasus region in the late tsarist period, with a focus on the Armenian, Georgian, and Azerbaijani national movements, see the individual chapters in the section "Nationalism and Social Change under Tsarist Rule" in the anthology *Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and*

The early withdrawal of the freedoms granted at the end of 1905 led to increasing frustration, especially among the younger generation of national activists. Quite a few of them doubted that meaningful political participation was within reach under the condition of imperial rule. Among the younger generation of Crimean Tatars, for example, this led to a reorientation within the imperial party spectrum from the liberal Cadets to the social revolutionaries.[28]

The Young Turkish Revolution was to bring new possibilities of articulation for the Russian Muslims. Activists like Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935) now moved to Istanbul in order to publish there. The ideas of community and solidarity they articulated there can be described as his Turkish-grounded pan-Islamism. A sharply contoured Turkish ethnonationalism actually based on the commonality of language and the imagination of common descent was to emerge only in the following years. It was the result of over a decade of persistent experiences of war and expulsion that began in 1911. Here, the circulation of ideas within the Black Sea region played a decisive role.[29]

3 The Period from 1911 to 1923: Nation-Building in a Time of Continuous War and Violence

Italy's attack on the Ottoman province of Tripolitania in 1911, justified with flimsy arguments, represented a bitter setback to the Young Turks' experiment with modernization. The hope that through their constitutionalists efforts and committed reform policies they would be recognized by the European Great Powers as one themselves was severely disappointed by the indifference of European cabinets to Italy's blatant breach of international law. The Balkan Wars, which began in 1912 and resulted in mass violence and expulsion of Muslims from Southeastern Europe, represented an even more drastic experience. Within the Young Turk leadership, doubts increasingly prevailed about the possibility to integrate the Christian populations within the Ottoman Empire.[30]

This marked the beginning of a reorientation towards imperial integration strategies. Yusuf Akçura had described such integration strategies in 1904 as "three types of politics" (*üç tarz-i siyaset*): (1) Ottomanism as trans-confessional imperial patriotism, (2) pan-Islamism as a politicized notion of common religious affiliation, especially including the Arab population, and (3) Turkism as (pan-)Turkish nationalism potentially

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Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983), 107–239.

28 Kırımlı, *National Movements*, 73–104.

29 For the transimperial activities of Akçura and other "identity freelancers," see James H. Meyer, *Turks Across Empires: Marketing Muslim Identity in the Russian-Ottoman Borderlands, 1856–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) and Adam, *Rußlandmuslime in Istanbul.*

30 Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010).

encompassing all Turkic-speaking peoples.[31] The political elites now increasingly oriented themselves towards the latter integration strategy. This resulted in growing disappointment among non-Turkish population groups.

Such a shift towards imperial nationalism also took place in the Russian Empire—not least in the face of the rise of non-Russian nationalisms manifested in the revolution of 1905. An ideological amalgam of imperial ideas of domination and nationalist striving for hegemony increasingly replaced older imperial patriotism, which was primarily based on loyalty to the dynasty, without being able to completely displace it.[32]

World War I once again radically changed the situation in the Black Sea region. With it, the hope cherished during the constitutional revolutions of 1905 (Russia), 1906 (Iran), and 1908 (the Ottoman Empire) that divergent ethnonational interests could be politically negotiated within a constitutional framework was finally displaced in favor of the idea of a radical "solution" to ethnic "questions."[33] During the Great War, there was an unprecedented intensification of practices of mass expulsion and mass killing in these "shatterzones of empire."[34] Violent ethnic engineering culminated in the genocide of the Armenians in 1915 and 1916[35] and the so-called population exchange between Turkey and Greece during the Turkish War of Independence.[36]

31 Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 388–96.

32 Kappeler, *The Russian Empire*, 238–42; Geoffrey Hosking, "Empire and Nation Building in Late Imperial Russia," 19–33, and, in a broader historical perspective Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia: People and Empire, 1552–1917* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).

33 Holly Case, *Age of Questions: Or, a First Attempt at an Aggregate History of the Eastern, Social, Woman, American, Jewish, Polish, Bullion, Tuberculosis, and Many Other Questions over the Nineteenth Century, and beyond* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018).

34 Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz, eds. *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013). For the dynamisation of nationalisms in the Russian Empire as a result of World War I, see Eric Lohr et al., eds., *The Empire and Nationalism at War* (Bloomington: Slavica, 2014).

35 Ronald Grigor Suny, *Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 94–115; Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek, and Norman M. Naimark, eds., *A Question of Genocide* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Fatma Müge Göçek, *Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and Collective Violence against the Armenians, 1789–2009* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Uğur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of the Modern Turkish Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913–1950* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Hans Lukas Kieser, *Talaat Pasha: Father of Modern Turkey, Architect of Genocide* (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 2019).

36 Bruce Clark, *Twice a Stranger: The Mass Expulsions that Forged Modern Greece and Turkey* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Aslı Iğsız, *Humanism in Ruins: Entangled Legacies of the Greek-Turkish Population Exchange* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018).

4 The Interwar Period and World War II

The new international order of the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Lausanne seemed to have finally established the nation state principle in all parts of the Black Sea region. "Greater Romania," for example, now united nearly all Romanian-speaking territories into one state. And while Greece's efforts to unite all Greek-populated areas in one nation state failed, the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations of 1923 seemed to have created a "rational" instrument, legitimized under international law, for how divergent territorial claims could be settled in ethnically heterogeneous areas by "unmixing" them through resettlement agreed by contract.

The Soviet Union also seemed to have internalized the nation state principle by making it a guideline in its dealing with cultural difference. At a first glance, this might be surprising as, according to Marxist doctrine, bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism were incompatible. However, the political practice under Lenin and Stalin assigned to each group that corresponded to Stalin's definition of a nation its own standardized national language, national culture, and an autonomous territory. This policy, which was finally established as binding from 1923 onwards, would subsequently be known as *korenizatsiia* (indigenization). A key aim of *korenizatsiia* was to make Soviet power "intimate" and "comprehensible" to all population groups in the Soviet Union by having them addressed in their native languages (although it was often only now that they were defined and standardized as such) by their "own" people.[37] This approach was applied to the Transcaucasia region too after it had been conquered by the Red Army and the local political elites had either fled or been executed. In April 1918, the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic had been founded here, but by the end of the year it had already split into the states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.[38]

A closer look, however, shows that the collapse of the continental empires by no means led to a consistent implementation of the principle of nationality and associated notions of autonomy. In the first place, this applies to the border shifts established in the Paris Peace Agreements. This is well illustrated by the example of Bulgaria. As a defeated Central Power it had to cede Eastern Thrace and Dobruja. However, the ambiguous demographic conditions in these regions made it difficult to justify the border shifts with the right of peoples to self-determination enshrined in Woodrow Wilson's

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[37] Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," *Slavic Review* 53, no. 2 (1994): 414–52; Jeremy Smith, *Red Nations: The Nationalities Experience in and after the USSR* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

[38] See the contributions collected in Adrian Brisku and Timothy K. Blauvelt, eds., *The Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic of 1918: Federal Aspirations, Geopolitics and National Projects* (London: Routledge, 2021).

Ten-Point Program. The demographic conditions in the existing or newly established nation states also indicate that they reproduced the ethnonational heterogeneity of the empires that collapsed after World War I—only on a smaller geographical scale. And where homogeneity actually existed, it had only been established through the use of large-scale violence. This also applies to the Greek-Turkish population exchange mentioned above.

A consistent recognition of the nationality principle would also have meant that the rights of national minorities would have been respected. However, this did not happen in most cases, despite the minority protection clauses in the peace treaties.

In the Soviet Union, too, the claim by Lenin, Stalin, and their followers to guarantee the emancipation of all nationalities living there proved to be an illusion. The bureaucratic obsession, which lasted until the end of the Soviet Union, to assign every Soviet citizen a nationality imagined as unchangeable, contrasted with the reality of hegemonic Russian culture. The definition of the cultural canon, as it had existed in the Stalinist Soviet Union since the 1930s, drew on Russian models of the nineteenth century, especially in the areas of literature, music, ballet, and, in the case of classicism, architecture, and used them to form a model of high culture that was presented as exemplary to other Soviet peoples.[39]

At the same time, the interwar period in the Black Sea region marked the definitive departure from the initially dominant liberal variety of nationalism. Nationalism —and this once again shows its enormous adaptability—now entered into a lasting relationship with the ideologies of right-wing authoritarianism, fascism, communism, and Kemalism. While the first manifested itself in the Black Sea region in the royal dictatorships in Bulgaria in 1935 and in Romania from 1938, which aimed to preserve the existing social order, fascism, communism, and Kemalism formulated transformation programs—with varying intensity and goals—that sought a revolutionary transformation of state, society, and culture. With the reorientation of Soviet cultural and educational policy under Stalin, and even more clearly in the cases of fascism and Kemalism, these transformation agendas became embedded in national narratives, be it in relation to ideas of family and gender roles, work, everyday life, or mechanisms of social inclusion and exclusion.[40]

However, the idea of an unchangeable ethnonational classification of people was also the starting point for selection mechanisms according to which different groups of people were expelled or exterminated during World War II. This applies first and foremost to the genocidal racial ideology of National Socialism.[41]

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39 See, with a focus on language, Michael G. Smith, "The Hegemony of Content: Russian as the Language of State Assimilation in the USSR, 1917–1953," in *Kampf um Wort und Schrift: Russifizierung in Osteuropa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Zaur Gasimov (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Rupprecht, 2012), 193–208.

40 For an attempt at a comparative view, see Stefan Plaggenborg, *Ordnung und Gewalt: Kemalismus – Faschismus – Sozialismus* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012).

41 See the article by Mariana Hausleitner in this handbook.

Ethnonationally coded mechanisms of selection were also applied in the Soviet Union; after cases of actual or anticipated collaboration with the German occupiers, entire population groups were subjected to the collective punishment of deportation, as was the case with the Crimean Tatars. Stalinist (and post-Stalinist) anti-Semitism also followed this racist-nationalist logic of exclusion.[42] The situation is more complex with regard to the famine of 1932/33, known in Ukraine as the "Holodomor," which claimed millions of victims in large parts of the Soviet Union, including Ukraine, the Middle Volga, the Caucasus, and Kazakhstan. The starting point was initially the radical agenda of socio-economic transformation, which was associated with a disastrous agricultural policy, although it is undeniable that these measures were enforced with particular vehemence in non-Russian areas, especially in Ukraine. This is one of the main reasons why the Holodomor is now classified as genocide in the declarations of various European parliaments.

5 The Cold War Period

In the Black Sea region, the antagonistic relationship between the Eastern and Western blocs after World War II caused a change of national statehood both as an idea and social practice, which went along with a revision of existing mental maps.

As concerns the impact of national statehood on everyday practices, it was particularly manifested in the tightening of border regimes. The drawing of new borders and their surveillance posed a new challenge for the circulation of people, ideas, and commodities as early as the nineteenth century. However, with the erection of the Iron curtain and the associated drastic restriction of mobility, this problem took on a completely new quality.

The East-West confrontation, which in the geography of the Black Sea region actually manifested itself as a North-South conflict with the northern shores belonging to the Warsaw Pact and Turkey to NATO, was also accompanied by a change of notions of progress and civilization that where bound to spatial imaginings. This is shown by the example of Turkey: Kemal Atatürk's *cultural revolution*[43] of the 1920s and 1930s had understood modernization as radical Westernization. At that time, continental Western Europe (especially France, Switzerland, Italy and, to a certain extent, Germany) had been seen as a model to imitate. Now, in the Cold War, the Kemalist elites increasingly oriented themselves towards the US. Newly founded elite universities took the leading American universities as their model. Anyone who wanted to join the highest ranks of the Turkish academic elite had to gain intellectual experiences in the States.

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42 Edward A. Allworth, ed., *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998).

43 For such a conception of the transformation of Turkey under Atatürk, see Klaus Kreiser, *Atatürk: Eine Biographie* (Munich: Beck, 2024).

However, these phenomena of elite culture said little about orientations in the broader strata of the population.

In the northern part of the Black Sea region, representations of the national had to be based on the Soviet model of national culture described above. For the ethnonational groups that had already been in the Soviet Union's sphere of power before World War II, this meant a continued reproduction of everyday practices that condensed into a Soviet civilization, as described by Karl Schlögel.[44] Besides common places,[45] practices of remembrance played a crucial role in the formation of this cross-national Soviet civilization: Within the communist festive calendar, the anniversary of the victory in World War II, commemorated as the "Great Patriotic War," now joined the remembrance day for the October Revolution.

Cultural difference was imagined in stereotyped presentations of folklore which became common knowledge all over the Soviet Union. In the post-Stalin period, such canonical folkloric stereotypes were also disseminated through newly emerging patterns of leisure and consumer culture, especially tourism to the Black Sea and Caucasus regions. Finally, Soviet film contributed to the dissemination and consolidation of such stereotypes, albeit via ironic allusion: The most prominent example of this is undoubtedly the romantic comedy *Kavkazskaia plennitsa, ili Novye prikliucheniia Shurika* (Prisoner of the Caucasus or Shurik's New Adventures; released as *Kidnapping: Caucasian Style*) from 1967, which was extremely popular in the Soviet Union. The film depicts the adventurous journey and amorous entanglements of a Russian ethnography student in Transcaucasia, playing with heterostereotypes of the local inhabitants and clichéd notions of backwardness.[46] Both the plot and the original Russian title allude to Pushkin's canonical poem "Kavkazskii plennik" ("The Prisoner of the Caucasus"), which was published in 1822 and played a central role in the formation of Russian Orientalism and the imagination of the Caucasus as a rough, uncivilized, but also exotic and fascinating mountain region.[47]

With the expansion of the Soviet sphere of power, aesthetics that had emerged in the Soviet Union now also became influential in Bulgaria and Romania for the representation of culture. The field of architecture illustrates this particularly clearly: The *Casa Scînteii* in Bucharest, for example, named after the Communist Party newspaper

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44 Karl Schlögel, *The Soviet Century: Archaeology of a Lost World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2023).

45 Svetlana Boym, *Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).

46 Elena Prokhorova, "The Man Who Made Them Laugh: Boris Gaida, the King of Soviet Comedy," in *A Companion to Russian Cinema*, ed. Birgit Beumers (Chichester: Blackwell Wiley, 2016), 562–62.

47 Susan Layton, *Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

Scînteia (The Spark), imitated the architecture of the *Stalinskie Vysotki* (Stalin's high-rises), seven monumental skyscraper projects in late-Stalinist Moscow.[48]

The dominance of the Soviet cultural model also required the revision of national histories reproduced in academic discourse and in history teaching at school. National history had to be told in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist dogmas of the regularity of historical development, for example when the Middle Ages were portrayed as an epoch of domination by a local feudal class. At the same time, the presentation of national history had to be in line with the political interests and claims to power of the Soviet Union. This was particularly true of the representation of recent history, that is, the phase of national movements and nation-building. In the case of Bulgaria, this development had long been closely aligned with Russia, so it was not difficult to stylize Russia and the Soviet Union as the historical big brother whose care for Bulgaria's well-being dated back to the very beginning of modern Bulgarian statehood.

The reorientation towards the Soviet model was much more difficult in Romania. Here, the local intellectuals saw themselves as a natural part of the Western and Central European elite culture, even though the question of which concrete cultural models to follow—France or Germany—remained controversial. During the nineteenth century, the elite's urge for symbolic Westernization went along with a symbolic break with the Cyrillic writing tradition, and in the process of standardizing a Romanian national language, traditional Slavic elements were systematically suppressed. Although these developments did not go unchallenged and—as in other Orthodox countries of Southeastern Europe—anti-Occidental discourses gained in importance during the interwar period, the affiliation to Romance Europe remained more or less unquestioned. Additionally, the aggressive anti-Bolshevism of the Antonescu regime during the Second World War made use of racist anti-Russian stereotypes.

Nevertheless, the years after the Communists came to power in Romania initially saw a radical reinterpretation of recent national history in line with Soviet patterns of interpretation. The establishment of national statehood in the nineteenth century and the expansion of the Romanian nation state after World War I was now narrated as a project oriented primarily towards the class interests of the boyar and bourgeois elites. In addition, the annexation of Bessarabia—part of the Soviet republics of Moldova and Ukraine after World War II—to the Kingdom of Romania in 1920 was criticized. This pro-Soviet presentation of history was gradually dismissed from the 1960s onwards. Nicolae Ceaușescu's establishment of the Romanian variant of national communism from 1971 onwards finally marked the ultimate break with this mode of interpreting the past. Whereas Ceaușescu's regime in terms of the technique and representation of power was characterized by a leader cult oriented towards contemporary Chinese and North Korean models, a paranoid surveillance of one's own population by the state security service, and a representation of multiculturalism borrowed from the So-

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48 Emanuela Grama, *Socialist Heritage: The Politics of Past and Place in Romania* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2019), 32–65.

viet model, a deliberately sharp demarcation from the neighboring Eastern and South-eastern European countries took place through the emphasis on Romanity. The orientation towards models of the pre-communist era went so far that Ceaușescu, like the fascist dictator Ion Antonescu before him, claimed the designation *Conducător* (leader) for himself.[49]

Such a use of nationalism, which was oriented towards models of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, as can be seen in Romanian national communism, was contrasted by the phenomenon of mobility and the dynamization of notions and practices of identity. This applied in the first place to emigration from the Soviet Union, as had already been the case in the interwar period. The Crimean Tatar émigré community continued to play an important role in Turkey's political and intellectual life and shaped ideas of the Crimean nation and its connectedness to Turkey in Turkish society.[50] Concerning institutionalized scientific nation-building in exile, mention should be made of the Ukrainian University, which was founded in Prague in 1921 and moved its headquarters to Munich in 1945, or the academically far more important Center of Ukrainian Studies, which was established at Harvard University in 1973.[51]

A completely new form of cross-border mobility and identity patterns was brought about by labor migration from Turkey to Germany from 1961 onwards, which gave rise to transnational kinship networks that still exist today. Political, social and, for a long time, also economic experiences of discrimination, encounters with diverse forms of everyday racism, and a lack of access to educational resources often strengthened the immigrants' feeling that they had to preserve and defend their own culture in the host society, which in some cases led to phenomena of retraditionalization. At the same time, emigration to Germany opened up new opportunities for minorities that were discriminated against in Turkey, such as the Alevis.[52]

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49 For the development of historiography in communist Romania, see Francesco Zavatti, "Between History and Power: The Historiography of Romanian National-Communism (1964–1989)," *Cuadernos de Historio Contemporánea* 42 (2020): 39–58.

50 Alan Fisher, "The Crimean Tatars, the USSR, and Turkey," in *Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers*, ed. William O. McCagg, Jr. and Brian D. Silver (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), 1–24 (reprinted in: Alan Fisher, *Between Russians, Ottomans, and Turks: Crimea and Crimean Tatars* [Piscataway: Gorgias Press, 2010], 177–200).

51 Nadia Zavorotna, *Scholars in Exile: The Ukrainian Intellectual World in Interwar Czechoslovakia* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020); Zaur Gasimov, "Krimtatarische Exil-Netzwerke zwischen Osteuropa und dem Nahen Osten," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften/Austrian Journal of Historical Studies* 28, no. 1 (2017): 142–166.

52 See, for example, the investigations into this matter by the sociologist Esra Özyürek: Esra Özyürek, "The Politics of Cultural Unification, Secularism, and the Place of Islam in the New Europe," *American Ethnologist* 32, no. 4 (2005): 509–12; and Esra Özyürek, "'The Light of Alevi Fire was Lit in Germany and then Spread to Turkey': The Debate about the Relationship between Alevism and Islam," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 15, no. 1 (2009), 233–53.

6 Reinventing the Nation: Post-Socialism and Post-Kemalism

The period from the 1980s to the first decade of the new millennium in the Black Sea region was a phase of long transition from socialist to post-socialist societies on the one hand and from the Kemalist approach to politics, religion, and culture to a post-Kemalist society on the other. While in the Soviet Union, with Mikhail Gorbachev's assumption of the office of General Secretary of the CPSU in 1985 a reform phase began during which he tried to combine a course of social liberalization with a return to what he considered true Leninism, in Turkey, Turgut Özal attempted to follow a path of economic liberalization and a moderate re-Islamization of the public sphere, which meant a break with orthodox Kemalist secularism almost twenty years before Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came to power. The success of these policies was very different. While Gorbachev's approach failed before the eyes of the world at the latest with the coup by reactionary forces of the old Soviet Union in August 1991, Özal's idea of combining re-Islamization with liberalization can be seen as an approach that Tayyip Recep Erdoğan also pursued in his first years in office—at least to certain extent—before he turned towards paternalistic authoritarianism.[53]

Gorbachev's clear renunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine enabled the states of the Warsaw Pact, which finally dissolved in July 1991, to find their own political future without having to fear Soviet intervention, as was the case in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968. Where there were violence and deaths in the replacement of the old regime, as in Romania, this was due to internal factors. Whereas Gorbachev had initially vehemently opposed the independence of the Baltic states, he was no longer able to influence the final dissolution of the Soviet Union. It was finally sealed in the Belovezha (Belarusian: Belavezha) Accords on December 8, 1991, and in Alma-Ata (today: Almaty) on December 21, 1991, after Georgia had already declared its independence in April 1991 and Ukraine (including the majority of the population in the Donbas and in Crimea) had overwhelmingly opted for independence in a referendum held on December 1.[54] Research has emphasized the compromise nature of these agreements. While in the non-Russian successor states of the Soviet Union they were largely seen as recognition of independence, on the Russian side there was the hope that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) established by these agreements could create the conditions for Russia to retain control over CIS member states. In the course of Putin's historical revisionism, a kind of stab-in-the-back legend has developed around the Belovezha Accords according to which the dissolution of the Soviet Union was brought

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53 For a basic orientation for these two transformation phases, see Archie Brown: *Seven Years That Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, 107–25.

54 Serhii Plokhy, *The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union* (New York: Basic Books, 2014).

about without any political necessity. The lasting significance of these agreements, however, is that they recognized the inviolability of the borders.[55]

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union was accompanied by a reinvention of the nation both on a symbolical and on a scholarly level. In most cases, this process did not mean an actual break with paradigms and practices of producing and presenting national culture as already performed in socialist times, even if it often was staged as such in order to distract from the manifold continuities that existed between the socialist and post-socialist elites. Historical discourses and commemorative practices shaped during the socialist period were inserted—albeit often in modified form—into the official narratives and representations of national history if they continued to appear politically useful. Besides that, points of reference were now sought again in pre-communist times. In Romania, the new period of reference became especially the interwar period, which is stylized as a golden age of national statehood. For countries like Ukraine or Georgia, which had only experienced a short phase of national independence before 1991, looking for such historical points of reference was a much more difficult undertaking. In a monograph on the historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866–1934), who was also the first president of independent Ukraine in 1917, the Ukrainian-American historian Serhii Plokhy describes how Hrushevsky's approach to Ukrainian history helped him to free himself in the 1980s and 1990s from the Russocentric narratives encompassed in the paradigm of the "History of the Peoples of the USSR."[56] For him, as for many other historians in post-socialist Europe, in a phase of fundamental change and reorientation the models of national history shaped in the nineteenth century became meaningful again.

In Georgia, the designation of the post-Soviet nation state as the "Third Republic" refers to the phase of national independence after the end of the tsarist empire—despite its short-lived nature. At the same time, the example of post-socialist Georgia illustrates the importance of "invented traditions" for the reproduction of models of commonality and belonging. In the Georgian case, the ritual of the banquet (*supra*) —with its toasts considered specifically Georgian and under the guidance of a *tamada*—takes on the role of such a tradition that is essentialized as the core of national identity. This charge of meaning makes it possible to use the ritual in a situation of social change not only to stabilize a positive self-image—the virtue of hospitality itself— but also to epitomize certain patterns of behavior, in this case ideas of masculinity in a male-dominated form of sociability. As with many of the "invented traditions," this is

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55 Felix Riefer, "Die Erzählung vom Ende der Sowjetunion als außenpolitischer Referenzpunkt," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 67, no. 21–22 (2017): 22–26.

56 Serhii Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), ix–x and 3–21.

essentially a practice that was only standardized from the nineteenth century onwards and not ethnically marked beforehand.[57]

Such national appropriations of a common cultural heritage also take place in the post-Ottoman areas of the Black Sea region (and in post-Ottoman Southeastern Europe in general), for example when in Bulgaria Ottoman architecture of the nineteenth century is re-labeled "Bulgarian Revival architecture" (*balgarska vazrozhdenska arhitektura*), a term coined in socialist Bulgaria in the 1950s and used to this day—also in the presentation of local culture to foreign tourists.[58]

Similar observations can be made in the field of cuisine, when food consumed across borders is reinterpreted as a national dish.[59] In today's Turkey, a revival of Ottoman cooking traditions is taking place which—at least to a certain extent—can be described in terms of post-imperial nostalgia. This revival is part of cultural and political practices usually labelled neo-Ottomanism.[60] It goes hand in hand with a positive reassessment of the Ottoman legacy. A positive reappropriation of the Ottoman past is also taking place in other areas of everyday culture, for example in music and in extremely popular historical telenovelas (which have also found an audience in Southeastern Europe), which focus on ruler personalities such as Süleyman I ("the Magnificent") or Abdülhamid II, who was portrayed notoriously negatively in traditional Kemalist historiography.[61]

Although it is an older conceptual coinage, in the field of politics neo-Ottomanism is associated primarily with the AKP's (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*/Justice and Development Party) assumption of power in 2002. The neo-Ottoman revival initiated by the AKP is based on the mental map of an Ottoman commonwealth in which Turkey strives for increased visibility in foreign and cultural policy, for example by maintaining cultural institutes, but also strives to assert political interests with robust measures, for

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57 Florian Mühlfried, *Postsowjetische Feiern: Das georgische Bankett im Wandel. Mit einem Vorwort von Kevin Tuite* (Stuttgart: ibidem-verlag, 2006); Florian Mühlfried, "Banquets, Grant-Eaters, and the Red Intelligentsia in Post-Soviet Georgia," *Central Eurasian Studies Review* 4, no. 1 (2005): 16–19.

58 Tchavdar Marinov, "The 'Balkan House': Interpretations and Symbolic Appropriations of the Ottoman-Era Vernacular Architecture in the Balkans," in *Entangled Histories of the Balkans*, vol. 4, *Concepts, Approaches, And (Self-)Representations*, ed. Roumen Dontchev Daskalov, Diana Mishkova, Tchavdar Marinov, and Alexander Vezenkov (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 559–60; Tchavdar Marinov, "Constructing Bulgarian Heritage: The Nationalisation of the Byzantine and Ottoman Architectures of Melnik," in *Balkan Heritages: Negotiating History and Culture*, ed. Maria Couroucli and Tchavdar Marinov (London: Routledge, 2016), 84–114.

59 For the construction of the *shopskata salata* as a Bulgarian national dish, see Stefan Detchev, "Shopska Salad: From a European Innovation to the National Culinary Symbol," in *From Kebab to Ćevapčići: Foodways in (Post-)Ottoman Europe*, ed. Arkadiusz Blaszczyk and Stefan Rohdewald (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2018), 273–88.

60 Stefan Rohdewald, "Neo-Ottoman Cooking in Turkey in the Twenty-First Century: Cooking as a Means to Imagine a Common Past and Future," in Blaszczyk and Rohdewald, *From Kebab to Ćevapčići*, 289–300.

61 Leyla Amzi-Erdogdular, "Ottomania: Televised Histories and Otherness Revisited," *Nationalities Papers* 47, no. 5 (2019): 879–93.

example when it violates the Syrian border in order to attack Kurdish militias in Syria. Domestically, this neo-imperialist approach to politics is used to present Erdoğan to his electorate as a respected statesman and Turkey as a major regional power and one of the leading nations in the Muslim world. At the same time, political neo-Ottomanism goes hand in hand with a policy of re-Islamization of society. This includes the ostentatious observance of religious commandments in everyday life, the commitment to Islam as a source of ethical orientation applied to politics, and the use of religious codes when addressing the public. Ideologically, this results in a synthesis of Turkish nationalism and politicized Islam, which other political actors had already experimented with before Erdoğan, but which no longer meets with significant resistance due to the ousting of the old Kemalist elites from positions of political, social, and military leadership.[62]

This reinvention of the Turkish nation outlined here has a number of similarities to reinterpretations of the national in the post-socialist societies of Eastern Europe. In addition, research has pointed out similarities to Russian neo-imperialism. First of all, the temporal parallelism is striking: Both Vladimir Putin's assumption of power as president in 2000 and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's as prime minister in 2003 have ushered in neo-imperial new designs of national identity. For Russia, a link to the pre-socialist era means above all a reappropriation of the traditions of the tsarist empire. In addition to recourse to older epochs of Russian history, we can discern a reappropriation of imperial imaginaries that go back to the time of Peter I but were shaped above all in the nineteenth century. In addition to the much older concept of the "Holy Rus," which was coded nationally during the nineteenth century and cultivated in church and church-related milieus, this is above all the concept of the *Russkii mir* (Russian World) as a space of civilization distinct from and superior to the West. The basic features of this concept go back to the politician and scholar Sergei Uvarov (1786–1855) and have been reactivated and expanded since the first decade of the new millennium. These spatial images are accompanied by the idea of a historical unity of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, which is why the existence of an independent Ukrainian nation is denied. Ideas of Russia as a Eurasian power also play a role.[63]

Even before the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the resulting image of history was characterized by an aggressively anti-Western orientation and barely bridgeable differences with historical interpretations in neighboring countries such as Ukraine. The latter may be illustrated by the example of the celebrations of the three-hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Poltava. The battle, which took place in 1709 during the Great Northern War, abruptly ended the hopes for independent development of the Ukrainian territories ruled by the hetman Ivan Mazepa (1639–1709) and paved the way for Russia's imperial expansion towards the West. A balancing mediation between the im-

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62 Soner Çağaptay, *The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017).
63 Zaur Gasimov: "Idee und Institution: 'Russkij mir' zwischen kultureller Mission und Geopolitik," *Osteuropa* 52, no. 5 (2012): 69–80.

ages and interpretation reproduced in Russian and Ukrainian historiographies did not succeed even at the central commemorative ceremonies on the occasion of the three-hundredth anniversary in 2009, although they were attended by representatives of both Russia and Ukraine.[64] The narratives and public representations of the history of the Second World War In Russia and Ukraine diverge even more strongly.

This also addresses an essential difference to neo-Ottomanism: The relationship to the Soviet legacy on the one hand and to the Kemalist era on the other. While Erdoğan's staging as the father of the nation shows certain parallels to the personality cult of Atatürk, a positive integration of the political heritage of Kemalism into the neo-Ottoman narrative hardly seems possible. In contrast, in contemporary Russia there is certainly an appropriation of such strands of tradition from the Soviet period that can be integrated into the neo-imperial narrative, such as remembrance of the victory in the "Great Patriotic War." Clear differences can also be identified with regard to the instrumentalization of neo-imperial imaginaries in foreign policy: Although both cases are about the legitimation of hegemonic claims, in Putin's Russia this is combined with efforts to shift existing borders through the use of military force (as in the case of Russia's war on Ukraine) and to advance the establishment of territorial units controlled by Moscow through political destabilization. In the Black Sea region, Abkhazia in particular should be mentioned in this context. Such a policy of revising existing political borders is currently not discernible in Turkey.

7 Conclusion

The emergence of national movements and the founding of nation states has changed the Black Sea region like almost no other historical development of modernity. One lasting consequence of this process was a hitherto unknown proliferation of border regimes with consequences for the flow of people, goods, and ideas.

While the liberal variety of nationalism, as it was still predominant during the Paris peace conferences ending World War I, propagated the idea of the nation as a rational and just principle for the organization of statehood, in reality it created border conflicts and new minority problems. At the same time, nationalism has brought with it a leveling of cultural diversity, often through coercion, such as forced assimilation, or even through physical violence, with ethnic and religious groups that do not fit into hegemonic notions of homogeneity expelled or killed in the course of ethnic engineering.

The processes under consideration involved intellectual interactions and personal mobility that extended far beyond the Black Sea region and in some cases were not focused on it at all. This is shown by the nation-building processes in the nineteenth

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64 Serhii Plokhy," The Battle That Never Ends," in *Poltava 1709: The Battle and the Myth*, ed. Serhii Plokhy (Cambridge, MA: HURI, Havard University Press), xiii–xiv.

century, which took place during the first globalization and were characterized by the reception of ideas circulating worldwide. This also applies to the hubs where personal contacts between mobile intellectuals led to a transfer of ideas. Such hubs could be located in the Black Sea region or nearby, such as Istanbul, but could also be far away, such as the capitals of St. Petersburg and Moscow, which were of major importance as intellectual centers for nation-building processes. Additionally, diaspora groups and exiles spread across Europe and, in the interwar and Cold War periods, the US played an important role as initiators in nation-building processes, for example for Greek merchant communities in European trading cities, or anti-communist intellectuals from the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union.

The example of Greek nationalism refers to the Black Sea as a communication space, as do Turkish and Crimean Tatar nationalisms. Beyond that, as is shown in other contributions to this handbook, the Black Sea has constantly been part of nationalist mental maps and geopolitical fancies. A systematic study of the development of nationalism focusing on the Black Sea as a site of nationalist imagination or its role as a communication space in the emergence and spread of nationalist thinking would be an attractive subject for future research.

Nikolas Pissis

Christians and Their Collective Identities around the Black Sea after 1453

A concise survey of the history of Christianity on the Black Sea littorals covering the early modern age is necessarily compelled to confine itself to the delineation of general trends, illustrated by little more than impressionistic brushstrokes of the varied historical experience involved. To be sure, Orthodox Christians of the main Slavic, Greek, Romanian, and Georgian ethno-linguistic groups constitute the majority of Christian populations throughout the period, followed by Armenian Monophysite communities. However, the sheer diversity of Christian denominations, from Levantine Catholics in Galata to Gagauz, Turkish-speaking Orthodox on the northwestern shore, Russian Old Believers and German Mennonites on the northern or Armenian and Pontic Greek Protestants on the southern one, to name but a few indicative examples, renders any attempt at exhaustiveness futile.

The point of departure for this rough overview is set by the definition of the Black Sea region as a time-specific historical unity following the conceptualizations of Eyüp Özveren[1] and Stefan Troebst[2] as well as the reflections on the historicity of cultural landscapes by Edgar Hösch.[3] The Black Sea world in the centuries following the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople (1453) is structured on the one hand by the expansion and almost complete success of Ottoman control along the Black Sea shores and then by Russia's challenging of Ottoman domination and the subsequent inter-imperial dualism that Russia's advance effected. Thus, Ottoman order and Russian challenge shaped the context of the Christians' historical experience in the period discussed. On the other hand, the decisive factor generating an "interactive space"[4] is primarily mobility and connectedness. In the context of religious identities, most prominent is the role of pious networks generating symbolic universes and sacred geographies. Finally, smaller or larger Armenian and Greek diaspora communities in most port-cities constituted standard features of the Black Sea's Christian universe.

The focus of this chapter lies, accordingly, on evolving collective identities, loyalties, and symbolic legacies, on the interconnected vicissitudes of Black Sea Christian populations during the early modern age. Religious identities may not have been exclusive, pure and unambiguous; they were as a rule intertwined with ethnic or ethno-confessional, local, and not least social ones, depending on the distinct contexts of peasant

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1 Eyüp Özveren, "A Framework for the Study of the Black Sea World, 1789–1915," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 20, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 77–113.
2 Stefan Troebst, "The Black Sea as Historical Meso-Region: Concepts in Cultural Studies and the Social Sciences," *Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies* 2, no. 2 (June 2019): 11–29.
3 Edgar Hösch, "Kulturgrenzen in Südosteuropa," *Südosteuropa* 47, no. 12 (1998): 601–23.
4 Özveren, "Framework," 86.

or urban, usually multi-religious societies. As elsewhere in the Ottoman world, economic rivalry had, for example, a remarkable part in shaping religious identities.[5] Nevertheless, they were crucial for the formation of "interpretative communities",[6] built around not just sacred texts but also common experiences and narratives. Again, mobility and interaction were crucial for the shaping of images of the self and the other. As for the structure of this contribution, it consists in a combination of spatial and chronological circle tour, moving clockwise from Istanbul (Constantinople) and halting at certain stations along the Black Sea shores.

1 Orthodox Unity and Variety

Paul of Aleppo, the son and secretary of Macarius Ibn al-Za'im, Arab Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch (1647–72), whom he accompanied on his journeys from Syria to Muscovy in 1652–59 and 1664–69, recorded his multifarious observations in his journal of his travels, a source of unique value and appeal.[7] From Constantinople, "the Queen of Cities, where everything is to be found,"[8] the Patriarch's sojourn sailed first in January 1653 to Constanţa, to "repose from our fright and terror at the rolling and tossing of the waves." For on the Black Sea "the navigation is extremely difficult; all windings and turnings; and frequently there is very little depth of water; and it is moreover infested by various pirates." At least, its waves "are not ground small by continual agitation but remain still within it; so that we could see the shores on either side":

> On our right-hand was Trebizond, and Sinope, and Castamon, and the Bay of Mingrelia, which is the country of the Georgians. Before our face were the countries Kafa, Nazar and Khan. On our left were Rumelia, Silistria and Barja, on which we had now landed […].[9]

Paul had a particular eye for the diverse Christian communities he encountered on his way, for their habits and customs, their languages and descendances, their church buildings, and their ritual and sacramental practices. His notes convey both a sense

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5 Adnan A. Husain, "Introduction: Approaching Islam and the Religious Cultures of the Medieval and Early Modern Mediterranean," in *A Faithful Sea: The Religious Cultures of the Mediterranean, 1200–1700*, ed. Adnan A. Husain and Katherine E. Fleming (Oxford: One World, 2007), 1–26.

6 Tijana Krstić, *Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives of Religious Change in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 27. Cf. Denise Klein and Stefan Rohdewald, "Religionskulturen – Strukturen, Praktiken, Diskurse," in *Das Osmanische Europa: Methoden und Perspektiven der Frühneuzeitforschung zu Südosteuropa*, ed. Andreas Helmedach et al. (Leipzig: Eudora, 2014), 271–74.

7 Ioanna Feodorov, "Paul of Aleppo," in *Christian-Muslim Relations: A Bibliographical History*, vol. 10, *Ottoman and Safavid Empires (1600–1700)*, ed. David Thomas and John Chestworth (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 355–69.

8 Francis C. Belfour, *The Travels of Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch, written by his attendant Archdeacon, Paul of Aleppo, in Arabic* (London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1836), 1:55.

9 Belfour, *The Travels*, 1:41.

of the perceived unity of the early modern Orthodox world as well as of the ruptures and fractures that permeated it. Mobility in the form of travels for the collection of alms (*zeteiai*), as that in which Patriarch Macarius was engaged in contributed substantially to the shaping of an Orthodox sacred geography, linked across the knots of monastic centers, renowned shrines, and the veneration of local saints and, martyrs as well as being defined by the shared cultural symbolism of Orthodoxy, by beliefs and practices, and by an ecclesiastical calendar determining the perception of time—elements of a shared "Orthodox mentality."[10] Paul rejoiced when experiencing the dominant position of Orthodox Christianity in the Danubian Principalities, compared to Ottoman territories proper. In Galaţi, his next stop on the way to Moscow, "they rang the brazen bells, according to custom. This was the first time of our hearing them. May God not be startled at the noisy pleasantness of their sounds!"[11] He had no issues with the pluralism of Orthodox religious life. With vivid interest he kept comparing the habits of "our Christian brethren" in the "country of Greece" or the "country of the Cossacks" to those "of our country."[12] In his observations one may perceive the ethnic variety of a common religious identity rather than religion being merely a component of ethnic identities.[13] At the same time, he reproduced widespread ethnic stereotypes, for instance about the vicious Moldavians ("God Almighty has not created upon the face of the earth a more vicious people than the Moldavian; for the men are all of them murderers and robbers"[14]) or, especially, the corrupted and arrogant Greeks:

> Through [...] the vices and deformities of the Greeks at all times, and in all places wherever they are found, we observed they are nowhere at all liked: and this fact we were continually confirming by the evidence of our own eyes. In Moldavia [...] the whole population rose upon them [...]. We did not see the Cossacks bear any love for them; and the Muscovites will not receive them, except through pity, and to give them alms. [...] And all this comes from the multitude of their vices, and the greatness of their crimes. [...] What a degenerate people! And what vile conduct![15]

A "love-hate relationship between Greeks and Russians"[16] was indeed a lasting feature of early modern inter-ethnic relations in the Orthodox world. But "graecophobia,"[17] re-

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10 Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "'Balkan Mentality': History, Legend, Imagination," *Nations and Nationalism* 2 (1996): 163–91, esp. 176–77, 180.

11 Belfour, *The Travels*, 1:44.

12 Belfour, 1:10–11, 16–17, 50, and passim.

13 See Raymond Detrez, "Pre-National Identities in the Balkans," in *Entangled Histories of the Balkans*, vol. 1, *National Ideologies and Language Policies*, ed. Roumen Daskalov and Tchavdar Marinov (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 13–65.

14 Belfour, *The Travels*, 1:62.

15 Belfour, 2:45.

16 Nikolaos A. Chrissidis, "The World of Eastern Orthodoxy," in *The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern European History, 1350–1750*, vol. 1, *Peoples and Places*, ed. Hamish Scott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 647.

17 Konrad Petrovszky, "'Those Violating the Good, Old Customs of Our Land': Forms and Functions of Graecophobia in the Danubian Principalities, 16th–18th Centuries," in *Disliking Others: Loathing, Hostil-*

sentiment towards the "Greeks" or people labeled as such due to their social and educational profile—Greek language and culture functioning increasingly as a marker and a means of social ascendancy for Orthodox peoples— characterized the attitudes of both Slavic and Romanian, but also Arab Orthodox throughout the early modern period. It was primarily Greek dominance in the Patriarchal administration and no less important in the monastic networks of the great monasteries with their dependencies (*metochia*) scattered all over the Balkans that triggered this aversion.

2 The "Great Church"

The Ecumenical Patriarchate, the so-called "Great Church" (*Megali Ekklisia*), was recast as an Ottoman institution after 1453. According to the "foundation myths"[18] that prevailed not only in the Greek Orthodox case but also in the Armenian and Jewish ones, Mehmed II the Conqueror recognized non-Muslim ethno-confessional communities under their respective leaders as autonomous entities with broad competences of self-governing, that is, the *millet* system. Since the 1980s, Ottomanist research in particular has persuasively demonstrated on the one hand that this narrative projects back onto the early centuries certain Tanzimat realities, that is, results of the nineteenth-century Ottoman series of reforms which transformed the legal status of non-Muslims. Thus, it obscures a historical process that reached its apogee only as late as the second half of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. On the other hand, this research proved that the Ottoman government treated religious officials such as the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople rather as tax farmers than as *ethnarch*s, that is, as recognized leaders of ethno-confessional communities. This in fact goes a long way to helping us understand the process of the Church's integration in the Ottoman administration, its adaptation to the rotation principle of Ottoman officials, the frequent alterations on the patriarchal throne, and the deplored, but ubiquitous, venality of ecclesiastical offices.

However, the conventions of Ottoman bureaucracy do not necessarily coincide with the self-perception of Orthodox prelates, their notions of legitimacy,[19] their asser-

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ity and Distrust in Premodern Ottoman Lands, ed. Hakan T. Karateke et al. (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2018), 187–214. Cf. Lidia Cotovanu, "'Chasing away the Greeks': The Prince-State and the Undesired Foreigners (Wallachia and Moldavia between the 16th and 18th Centuries)," in *Across the Danube: Southeastern Europeans and Their Travelling Identities (17th–19th c.)*, ed. Olga Katsiardi-Hering and Maria A. Stassinopoulou (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 215–52.

18 Benjamin Braude, "Foundation Myths of the Millet System," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holms & Meier, 1982), 69–88. Cf. Tom Papademetriou, *Render Unto the Sultan: Power, Authority, and the Greek Orthodox Church in the Early Ottoman Centuries* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 19–62.

19 Eleni Gara and Ovidiu Olar, "Confession-Building and Authority: The Great Church and the Ottoman State in the First Half of the Seventeenth century," in *Entangled Confessionalizations? Dialogic Perspec-*

tions of stability and tradition, or the Church's symbolic capital and its bearing on the faithful. As Paul of Aleppo generously added to his fierce remarks:

> Yet, they [the Greeks] have some laudable qualities, as regards their love for the Heads of their Clergy, their Monks and Priests. For though they witness the flagitiousness of their Clergy, and the crimes they commit—and see that their Patriarchs banish some of them, some they behead, and others they drown—yet they shut their eyes to their infamy and love to honour them as befits the sacred character of their office.[20]

The Church's unbroken if not enhanced symbolic capital explains at least as much as its financial functions and obligations its entanglement with powerful lay Orthodox men, the *archon*s, who came to dominate the Church and mediate its relations to the Ottoman government. As early as the first decades after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, notables from Edirne (Adrianople) in Thrace and from Trabzon (Trebizond) in Pontus, who were transferred to Constantinople in the context of the sultan's measures to repopulate his new capital and were themselves involved in Ottoman service in tax farming or state monopolies, competed for control over the Patriarchate.[21] Ports of the western Black Sea coast such as Anchialos (today: Pomorie, Bulgaria), Mesembria (today: Nesebar), and Sozopolis (today: Sozopol) were in many cases their bases, where they acted as custom officers for the Ottoman state. During the sixteenth century they expanded their enterprises to the north, to Wallachia and Moldavia, and managed to control the vital supply of Istanbul's market, the palace, and the army with sheep from the two tributary principalities as well as with furs from Muscovy. The emergence of this lay elite, inextricably linked to the power game in the upper echelons of Ottoman society, had at the same time a decisive impact on the gradual formation of a quasi-stratified Orthodox sub-society with the *archon*s at the top.

Most notorious was Michael Kantakouzinos, the "Devil's son" (Şeytanoğlu), who, claiming descent from the eponymous late Byzantine imperial family, managed to rise to the position of unofficial patron of the empire's Orthodox community in the third quarter of the sixteenth century. From his mansion in Anchialos, he directed his diverse business with the Ottoman court—among other things, providing galleys to the Ottoman navy from Anchialos' shipyard, which he supervised, or Muscovite furs to the Sultanic Palace—promoted and patronized local monasteries,[22] prelates such as the eminent Patriarch Jeremias II the Great (1572–79, 1580–84, 1587–95), a native of Anchialos, and successive princes in the Danubian Principalities, but he also cul-

tives on the Politics of Piety and Community Building in the Ottoman Empire, 15th–18th Centuries, ed. Tijana Krstić and Derin Terzioğlu (Piscataway: Gorgias Press, 2022), 164.

20 Belfour, *The Travels*, 2:46.

21 Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, "The Great Church in Captivity 1453–1586," in *The Cambridge History of Christianity*, vol. 5, *Eastern Christianity*, ed. Michael Angold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 175–77.

22 Lambros Kamperidis, *The Greek Monasteries of Sozopolis, XIV–XVII Centuries* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1993), Appendix no. 14.

tivated the profile of a learned collector of precious manuscripts. All this, before—symptomatically of the fates of both Muslim and non-Muslim players attached to rival Ottoman power networks—he was hanged on the sultan's orders at the gates of said mansion in 1578. Nonetheless, he succeeded in bequeathing his extraordinary position, his networks, and his influence to his son Andronikos.[23]

In the last third of the seventeenth century, certain shifts within the structure of the *archons*' milieu and, more importantly, a transformation process in the Ottoman elite echelons themselves[24]—the rise of the "men of the pen" ousting the "men of the sword"—enabled the emergence of a new elite or a new configuration of the *archons*' clans with new families through strategic intermarriage. These were the Phanariotes—from Phanar/Fener, the district where the Ecumenical Patriarchate had resided since 1601.[25] Attached to influential Ottoman grandees such as the Köprülü viziers, they founded households (*hanedan*) on their masters' model,[26] they oversaw and patronized Church politics and Orthodox education and letters, but most prominently—and in this they broke with the former *archons*' model—they capitalized on linguistic and bureaucratic skills to secure formal positions, reserved for non-Muslims, in the Ottoman administration. For over a century—until the Greek revolution in 1821—they occupied the distinguished posts of grand dragoman of the Porte, dragoman of the fleet, and prince (*hospodar/beg*) of Wallachia and Moldavia.

The Phanariotes' patronage facilitated a process already underway, that of the stabilization, centralization, and integration of the Church in the Ottoman administration that culminated in the late eighteenth century.[27] The strengthening of the Church's position and of Greek dominance upon it in addition to the Phanariot phenomenon, led a prominent representative of both Phanariot society and Modern Greek Enlightenment, Dimitrios Photiades-Katartzis (ca. 1725–1807), to assert in a text he composed in the 1780s or 1790s that the Greeks, although formally "captive" under Ottoman rule, nevertheless formed a "political society" in Aristotelian terms, since they partook in imperial governance and their religious and secular leaders enjoyed the recognition of the sovereign.[28]

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23 Radu G. Păun, "'Well-born of the Polis': The Ottoman Conquest and the Reconstruction of the Greek Orthodox Elites under Ottoman Rule (15th–17th Centuries)," in *Türkenkriege und Adelskultur in Ostmitteleuropa vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. Robert Born and Sabine Jagodzinski (Ostfildern: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2014), 61–63.

24 Cumhur Bekar, "The Rise of the Köprülü Household: The Transformation of Patronage in the Ottoman Empire in the Seventeenth Century," *Turkish Historical Review* 11 (2020): 229–56.

25 Andrei Pippidi, "Phanar, Phanariotes, Phanariotisme," *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes* 13 (1975) : 231–39.

26 Molly Greene, *The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, 1453 to 1768: The Ottoman Empire* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 132–36, 192–212.

27 Greene, *Edinburgh History*, 175–83.

28 Paschalis M. Kitromilides, *Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013), 150.

Loyalty on behalf of the Christian ecclesiastical and lay elites was a prerequisite for this effective integration. Indeed, the Orthodox Church contributed to the legitimization of Ottoman rule by inscribing it into the providential narrative of salvation. A loyal stance vis-à-vis the infidel ruler was a matter of both pragmatism and benefit, as the expansion of the Church's authority under Ottoman rule—not least in geographic terms—persuasively demonstrated. It was already sanctioned by biblical commands of the Old and New Testaments. At the same time, however, a biblical interpretation was the commonplace conceptualization of Ottoman rule as "captivity" on account of committed sins. One should not assume a contradiction in this discourse as long as one keeps in mind that the Ottoman "Empire of difference"[29] did not aspire to homogenization anyway and did not demand of its non-Muslim subjects an ideological identification with the state. Concepts recently elaborated by Ottomanist scholars such as "tolerated legitimacy"[30] or "simple submission" (*raiyet*)[31] help capture the ambiguities of the Christian subjects' stances. According to testimonies of Greek, Slavic, or Romanian origins, the sultan could at once be the legitimate successor of the Byzantine emperors or a tyrant, if not the Antichrist.[32] The same ambiguity and the same pragmatism conditioned the Christian subjects' flexibility in appealing in cases of civil law to either ecclesiastic or Kadi courts.[33]

Besides, the option of disloyalty, however risky and exceptional, was never out of the question, more so for the churchmen than for the *archons*.[34] If in the first centuries of Ottoman rule the temptation of subversion concerned almost exclusively pro-Latin prelates, since the seventeenth century the rise of Muscovy as the leading Orthodox power and the renewed Greek influence upon it as well as the sooner or later unavoid-

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29 Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 110, 119–23.

30 Hakan T. Karateke, "Legitimizing the Ottoman Sultanate: A Framework for Historical Analysis," in *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, ed. Hakan T. Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 33–34.

31 Yusuf Ziya Karabıçak, "Between Submission and Fidelity: Ottoman Muslim Elites' Changing Perception of the Greek Orthodox Populations, 1768–1821," *Dimensioni e problemi della ricerca storica* 1 (2020): 89–111.

32 Radu G. Păun, "The Barbarian Emperor. Empire and Power Hierarchies in the Slavic Orthodox Lands During the Ottoman Era (15th–17th Centuries)," in *Osmanischer Orient und Ostmitteleuropa: Perzeptionen und Interaktionen in den Grenzzonen zwischen dem 16. und 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. Robert Born and Andreas Puth (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2014), 75–106; Kristina Nikolovska, "*Tsar* or *Son of Perdition:* South Slavic Representations of Ottoman Imperial Authority in Church Slavonic Paratextual Accounts (1466–1710)," *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes* 54 (2016): 71–86.

33 Evgenia Kermeli, "The Right to Choice: Ottoman, Ecclesiastical and Communal Justice in Ottoman Greece," in *The Ottoman World*, ed. Christine Woodhead (London: Routledge, 2014), 347–61.

34 Radu G. Păun, "Enemies Within: Networks of Influence and the Military Revolts Against the Ottoman Power (Moldavia and Wallachia, Sixteenth-Seventeenth centuries)," in *The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, ed. Gabor Kármán and Lovro Kunčević (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 235, n. 78.

able Russian clash with Ottoman interests rendered Russia a challenge and an alternative for the allegiances and expectations of Ottoman Orthodox Christians.[35]

Paul of Aleppo recounts that when he was in Moscow, on Easter Day 1656, Tsar Alexis received a group of Greek merchants, and after distributing to them, in accordance with the custom, red eggs, he asked: "Do you wish and desire, that I should redeem you, and free you from your captivity?" After the positive reply of the Greeks, the tsar is said to have turned to his dignitaries, cried, and sighed:

> My heart is broken for the captivity of these poor men, who are in the hands of the enemies of our religion. At the Day of Judgement, God will call me to account for them, because, having it in my power to release them from their slavery, I neglected their cause [...]. There are constantly coming to us Patriarchs, Bishops, Monks and poor to complain of the tyranny of their enslavers [...] and I have resolved in my own mind, that, please God, I will expend my troops, my treasury, and my own blood to the last drop, in the endeavor to release them.[36]

Although still far from corresponding to a tangible program of foreign policy, the tsar's emotional exaltation indicated nonetheless the beginning of Russian appropriation of projected images, discourses of legitimation, and ideological offers, after a long period of consciously neglecting or ignoring them. Contrary to past accounts, the emergence of the "Russian expectation"[37] was not the result of a dubious Russian propaganda among Balkan coreligionists; the routes of such notions followed rather the other way around.[38] Moreover, Western perceptions and apprehensions of the tsars' claim to inheritance of the Byzantine throne and of Russia's historical destiny, already before Peter I (the Great), proved no less instrumental in Russia's gradual adaptation to such notions.[39] All that said, the political orientation towards Orthodox Russia rather implied expectations projected upon and invested in the tsar as a providential, messianic redeemer than "russophilism" per se.

In the field of theological contents of the faith, Orthodoxy faced a distinct challenge. It was forced to respond to questions that had arisen out of the fierce confessional debates in Western Christianity and to present authoritative, normative, and repre-

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35 Ekkehard Kraft, *Moskaus griechisches Jahrhundert: Russisch-griechische Beziehungen und metabyzantinischer Einfluß 1619–1694* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1995); Vera G. Tchentsova, "The Correspondence of Greek Church Leaders with Russia," in *Christian-Muslim Relations: A Bibliographical History*, vol. 10, *Ottoman and Safavid Empires (1600–1700)*, ed. David Thomas and John Chestworth (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 485–91; Nikolas Pissis, *Russland in den politischen Vorstellungen der griechischen Kulturwelt 1645–1725* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020).

36 Belfour, *The Travels*, 2:292.

37 Kitromilides, *Enlightenment and Revolution*, 121–25. Cf. Iannis Carras, "What to Expect When Expecting: Waiting for the Russians in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," *History of European Ideas* 48, no. 8 (2022): 1074–88.

38 Victor Taki, "Limits of Protection: Russia and the Orthodox Coreligionists in the Ottoman Empire," *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, no. 2401 (2015).

39 Pissis, *Russland*, 218–22.

sentative statements that would demarcate Orthodox dogma.[40] The issuing of Orthodox *Confessions of Faith* such as that of the Kyivan metropolitan Petro Mohyla (1596 – 1647), accepted as binding for Orthodox churches by an ad-hoc Synod in Moldavian Iaşi as well as by the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate (1642/43), was only one of several pertinent developments. In the various local branches of Orthodoxy, the challenge presented itself in different forms.[41] In any case, post-Tridentine Catholicism brought the issue of Church Union back onto the agenda, while trained papal missionaries in the Levant were particularly efficacious in the field of preaching and education. In their effort to counterbalance this challenge, Orthodox churchmen not only adopted Catholic, especially Jesuit, models of education and, to a degree, of theologizing, but occasionally aligned themselves with Protestant opponents of Rome, as illustrated by the spectacular case of the "Calvinist patriarch" of Alexandria and Constantinople Kyrillos Loukaris (1570 – 1638).[42] These processes formed part not only of European Confessionalization and its "collateral" effects, but probably of a global early modern trend towards the definition of true belief and the imposition of religious uniformity, a trend which in the context of the Ottoman Empire affected all three great monotheistic communities and involved multiple interactions between them.[43]

One could, though, question the actual range of these transformations. To be sure, the Western perception of Eastern Orthodoxy as a distinct confession in a world of confessions had pivotal repercussions for the self-perception of Orthodox believers and for the emergence of widespread discourses of Orthodox unity and cohesion. However, this did not manage to bridge the great diversity and segmentation across the Orthodox world. On the other hand, it appears that confessionalization processes affected chiefly ecclesiastical elites, especially theologically conversant prelates as well as lay theologians in the service of the Church. Parish priests, who in contrast to the hierarchs did not stem from the monastic clergy, were little differentiated from their peasant or urban flock. They were married, the priest's office being usually hereditary, they pursued additional occupations, and they were seldom educated or theologically skil-

40 Mihai-D. Grigore and Florian Kührer-Wielach, eds., *Orthodoxa Confessio? Konfessionsbildung, Konfessionalisierung und ihre Folgen in der östlichen Christenheit Europas* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2018); Kostas Sarris et al., eds., *Confessionalization and/as Knowledge Transfer in the Greek Orthodox Church* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2021).

41 See e.g., Ivan Biliarsky and Radu G. Păun, "La version roumaine du Synodikon de l'Orthodoxie (Buzău, 1700) et les combats pour la 'juste foi' à la fin du xviie siècle," *Cahiers du monde russe* 58, no. 3 (2017): 395–434.

42 Gunnar Hering, *Ökumenisches Patriarchat und europäische Politik (1620–1638)* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1968); Ovidiu Olar, *La boutique de Théophile: Les relations du Patriarche de Constantinople Kyrillos Loukaris (1570–1638) avec la Réforme* (Paris: Centre d'études byzantines, néo-helléniques et sud-est européennes – EHESS, 2019).

43 Tijana Krstić and Derin Terzioğlu, eds., *Entangled Confessionalizations? Dialogic Perspectives on the Politics of Piety and Community Building in the Ottoman Empire, 15th–18th Centuries* (Piscataway: Gorgias Press, 2022).

led.[44] Although the impact of post-Tridentine Catholic versions of piety on 'popular' or 'lived' Orthodoxy should not be underestimated, a conscious ecclesiastical policy of systematic supervision over parishes, of social disciplining, and of standardizing religious practices, was largely absent. As a rule, popular Orthodoxy appeared desperately "superstitious" to confessionalized Western Christians.

3 Armenian Communities

The case of the Armenian community in Constantinople bears multiple similarities and parallels to that of the Greek Orthodox experience. This was obviously due to the decisive Ottoman framework, but also to lateral entanglements between confessional communities and to their largely competitive and mimetic modes of coexistence.[45] A noteworthy Armenian Gregorian, Monophysite—that is, of non-Chalcedonian, one-(divine)-nature Christology—existed in Constantinople from Byzantine times onwards.[46] Nonetheless, the decisive event for the formation of a Western Armenian culture was the "Great Armenian Flight" from Eastern to Western Anatolia, to Thrace and Constantinople but also as far as Poland-Lithuania (there had been a significant Armenian community in Lviv since the thirteenth century), owing to the series of Ottoman-Safavid wars and to that of Celali revolts at the turn of the seventeenth century.[47] The Armenian Church shared with the Orthodox both the "foundation myths" and the realities of Ottoman suzerainty, with the Armenian Patriarch being recognized as an Ottoman official mainly via his fiscal obligations to the state. The antagonism between the catholicos's see of Etchmiadzin (founded in 1441, under Ottoman control from 1514 on) and the Patriarchate of Constantinople (founded at some point during the 1530s or 1540s) and later between Constantinople and Jerusalem is reminiscent of the less manifest rivalries between Orthodox patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem during the seventeenth century.[48] In both cases, Constantinople prevailed, a fact underlined by the consecration of the patriarchs of Etchmiadzin, Jerusalem, or Alexandria in Constantinople, by the Constantinopolitan patriarchs' mediating position regarding relations with the

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44 Chrissidis, "The World of Eastern Orthodoxy," 635.

45 Tijana Krstić, "Can we Speak of 'Confessionalization' Beyond the Reformation? Ottoman Communities, Politics of Piety and Empire-Building in an Early Modern Eurasian Perspective," in Krstić and Terzioğlu *Entangled Confessionalizations,* 29; Polina Ivanona, "Armenians in Urban Order and Disorder in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul," *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association* 4, no. 2 (2017): 239–60.

46 S. Peter Cowe, "The Armenians in the Era of the Crusades 1050–1350," in Angold, *Eastern Christianity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 409.

47 Henry R. Shapiro, *The Rise of the Western Armenian Diaspora in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire: From Refugee Crisis to Renaissance* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2022).

48 S. Peter Cowe, "Church and Diaspora: The Case of the Armenians," in Angold, *Eastern Christianity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 439; Kevork B. Bardakjian, "The Rise of the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople," in Braude and Lewis, *Christians and Jews*, 89–100.

Ottoman state, but also by the evident stabilization of both churches during the eighteenth century, their more effective integration into the Ottoman administration, and the decrease in the rhythm of the continuous successions to the Constantinopolitan thrones.[49]

Even more striking is the resemblance between Orthodox archons/Phanariotes and Armenian men of power, called *amiras* or *çelebis*. These Ottoman terms designated Armenian notables who had gathered from various places in Constantinople, were active as tax farmers, money lenders, and providers of the Ottoman court, and were clients of powerful Ottoman dignitaries and participants to their networks, with all the benefits and risk this entailed; they exploited this social capital to exert control over the Armenian Church and acted as patrons of education and printing.[50]

The repercussions of the confessionalization, the need to articulate and circumscribe one's own creed and to react to the intense missionary activity of Jesuit and Capuchin missionaries in Constantinople, were probably more momentous in the Armenian case. The split into different confessional allegiances, recognized in the nineteenth century as distinct Armenian Catholic and Armenian Protestant *millets*, represented a grim experience, one that Ottoman Orthodoxy was largely spared.[51]

The Armenian community faced similar dilemmas of loyalty. *Amiras* as archons tended to be more tied to Ottoman legitimism than churchmen, who repeatedly dealt in secret negotiations with Rome or France in the seventeenth century.[52] Since 1700, Russia had increasingly acquired the image of a potential liberator of the Armenian people, with all the accompanying expectations and disillusionments. Such expectations and projects—like those of Prince Israel Ori (1658–1711)[53]—were intimately linked to the self-perception of a chosen people—a conviction not at all seldom in early modern Christianity[54]—which in the case of the Greeks rested on the imperial legacy and in that of the Armenians on the singularity of Gregorian Christianity.[55]

4 Cossack Militant Orthodoxy

From Moldavia, Paul of Aleppo together with his father's retinue crossed over the Dniester to the "country of the Cossacks" in June 1654. Although Paul offers a rather

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49 Cowe, "Church and Diaspora," 439; Bardakjian, "The Rise," 93–95.

50 Hagop Barsoumian, "The Dual Role of the Armenian Amira Class Within the Ottoman Government and the Armenian Millet (1750–1850)," in Braude and Lewis, *Christians and Jews*, 171–84.

51 Cowe, "Church and Diaspora," 431–33, 441, 443–44; Krstić, "Can we Speak," 61–65.

52 Cowe, "Church and Diaspora," 432–33.

53 Ashot Ioannisjan, ed., *Armiano-russkie otnosheniia v pervoi treti XVIII veka*, 2 vols. (Yerevan: Akademiia Nauk Armianskoi SSR, 1964–1967).

54 Alois Mosser, ed., *Gottes auserwählte Völker: Erwählungsvorstellungen und kollektive Selbstfindung in der Geschichte* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2001).

55 Andreas Kappeler, *Rußland als Vielvölkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2001), 144.

awkward etymology of the name ("beard-shorn" instead of Turkish "free man"),[56] his appellation of the land was not out of place. Since 1648 the Khmelnytskyi Uprising had rendered large parts of Poland-Lithuania and of today's Ukraine into an autonomous Cossack polity, the Hetmanate. What interests us in the context of this chapter, is especially the Hetmanate's confessional outlook and legitimization. The Cossacks, a phenomenon of the borderland society of the steppe frontier—the no man's land called the "Wild Fields" (Ukrainian: *dyke pole*; Russian: *dikoe pole*)—military communities of all kind of adventurers and especially peasants fleeing serfdom, bearing multiple affinities with the early modern phenomenon of "social bandits" but also that of sea pirates, initially had little to recommend them as warriors for the Orthodox faith.[57] Certainly, both the "Ukrainian" Zaporozhian Cossacks with their headquarters "behind the rapids" on Khortytsia Island on the lower Dnipro, and their "Russian" colleagues, the Don Cossacks, had a long tradition of warfare not only against the Crimean Tatars but also against their Ottoman masters, with Cossack seagoing raiding expeditions befalling Ottoman fortresses as far as the suburbs of Istanbul itself. Although Christian inhabitants of such unfortunate places, such as Greeks in Thrace or Armenians in Caffa, associated only dread and horror with the Cossack name,[58] for interested milieus in Western Christianity, such as the Papal Curia or the Venetian Senate, the audacious Cossacks increasingly appeared to be potential partners and allies in projects of anti-Ottoman leagues and crusades.[59]

But it was only in the wake of the Orthodox renewal in Ruthenian Orthodoxy (that is, the Orthodox communities of Poland-Lithuania)—a momentous movement following the Union of Brest (1596) and associated mainly with the lay brotherhoods and learned Kyivan prelates such as Mohyla—that the Cossacks grew into the image of the armed wing of Orthodoxy. The uprising of 1648 under Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi ultimately transformed Ruthenian Orthodoxy into a militant faith, in contrast to the rather moderate confessional attitudes of the Ruthenian Orthodox clergy. The extreme violence unleashed against Catholic Poles, Jews, and to a lesser extent Armenians, on the grounds of a collation of religious, ethnic, and social identities, signaled a sharp break with religious tolerance and resulted in the creation of a mono-confessional society.[60] Paul of Aleppo was most thrilled:

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56 Belfour, *The Travels*, 1:198.

57 Andreas Kappeler, *Die Kosaken* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2013), 12–20.

58 Spyridon Lambros, "Enthymeseon etoi chronikon enthymeseon sylloge prote," *Neos Hellenomnemon* 7 (1910): 186 (year 1623); Edmond Schütz, "Eine armenische Chronik von Kaffa aus der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 29, no. 2 (1975): 133–86, passim. Cf. Belfour, *The Travels*, 2:425. The Armenian chronicler also shares with Greek Orthodox contemporaries the praise for the righteous sultan Murad IV (1623–40) and the sorrow for the murder of Sultan Osman II (1618–22).

59 Serhii Plokhy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 100–3.

60 Plokhy, *Cossacks,* 176–206, 334–44; Liliya Berezhnaya, "Ruthenian Lands and the Early Modern Multiple Borderlands in Europe: Ethno-Confessional Aspect," in *Religion and Conceptual Boundary in Central*

> And what a blessed nation it is! And what a happy country! This is its greatest merit, that it contains no one inhabitant of any other sect whatever, but is pure, and peopled only with the orthodox, the faithful, and the truly religious. How great is its zeal for purity and holiness of spirit! How clear its principles in the truth of Orthodoxy! Blessed be our eyes for what we saw, and our ears for what we heard, and our hearts for the joy and exultation which we experienced![61]

Paul's all but unique acclamation, combined with truly malicious comments on the annihilation of Polish, Armenian, and especially Jewish communities, constitutes perhaps a needed corrective to all-too enthusiastic appraisals of premodern religious coexistence.[62] It was true that the piety of the Ruthenian Orthodox in all its stringency and its ascetism seemed rather exaggerated relative to the Mediterranean taste,[63] an experience Paul would only deepen on his later journey to Moscow. But he was generous on account of what he appreciated as the Ruthenians' purity of faith:

> There is not even a chair for the head of the Clergy [in Rashkiv]. You might see them, from the beginning of the service to the end, standing like rocks, without motion [...]. They never neglect to read the Epistles and Gospels, and the Reader pronounces the Epistles with a modulation much more beautiful than ours in reading the Gospel [...]. As for us, we suffered great pain [in Uman]; so that our very souls were harassed with fatigue and anguish; but, as we mentioned before of them, we observed in all of them a perfect spirit of religion, and abstinence and humility to the utmost.[64]

5 Sacralizing *Novorossiia*

It was only in the last quarter of the eighteenth century that the actual northern littoral of the Black Sea as well as the Crimean Peninsula were claimed as Christian lands. In the wake of her victories over the Ottoman Empire, Catherine II (1762–96) celebrated the conquest of the new territories, labeled "New Russia" and "Tauris," as a regaining of Greek as well as Slavic historical landscapes. For the Russian Church, the religious divergence of the new dioceses (the diocese of Slaviansk and Kherson had already been founded in 1775 and assigned to Greek bishops in the context of ongoing Greek colonization projects) posed a particular challenge. Efforts to come to terms with this challenge coincided with an ongoing (in the second-half of the eighteenth century) broader ecclesiastical campaign to reshape popular Orthodoxy or rather to suppress deviant

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and Eastern Europe: Encounters of Faiths, ed. Thomas Bremer (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 40–65.

61 Belfour, *The Travels*, 1:191. Cf. also 175, 185.

62 Cf. the enthusiasm of the eighteenth-century Greek monk and poet Kaisarios Dapontes concerning the Orthodox purity of Samos Island in the Aegean Sea: Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "Orthodox Identities in a World of Ottoman Power," in *An Orthodox Commonwealth: Symbolic Legacies and Cultural Encounters in Southeastern Europe* (Aldershot: Variorum Reprints, 2007), Study III, 6.

63 Kraft, *Moskaus griechisches Jahrhundert*, 53–55.

64 Belfour, *The Travels*, 1:164, 166, 186.

"Heterodoxy,"[65] a process that amounted to a belated confessionalization or, as Gregory L. Freeze termed it, a "Re-Christianization" of Russia.[66] Given the weakness of missionary tradition in the Russian Church and the stress Catherine's enlightened religious policy placed on tolerance of recognized faiths and confessions, the prelates' efforts mainly targeted the numerous "sectarians": Old Believers who had moved to the south fleeing state persecution and discrimination before the Russian annexation, Molokans, Skoptsy, and Dukhobors. While up to the first quarter of the nineteenth century a rather lenient, accommodating policy proved effective, achieving tangible results such as the "edinoverie" compromise (similar to the Catholic Unionist pattern) with Old Believer communities, under Nicholas I a return to more aggressive persecuting and proselytizing measures took place.[67]

Since Lora Gerd's chapter in this volume covers the subsequent developments of the nineteenth century, a brief remark on Crimea is in order here: The Christianization of the peninsula, a project of paramount symbolic significance for the Russian Empire, was initially rather a matter of sacralizing the landscape with the foundation of churches and monasteries, of reducing the visibility of other faiths, than of Christianizing the Muslim population. However, in the course of the nineteenth century, the combination of the Muslim Crimean Tatars' continuous migration to the Ottoman Empire with the reverse movement of, among other groups, Orthodox Bulgarians to Crimea, resulted in an additional Orthodox reshaping of the peninsula in demographic terms.[68]

6 The Georgian Dominions

In the wake of the Russian expansion towards the Black Sea and Caucasia, Georgian Christianity was institutionally incorporated into the Russian Church. The Georgian experience constitutes a further example of the collation of confessional and ethnic identities, since Orthodoxy functioned here as a distinctive marker especially vis-à-vis the Armenian Christian culture. Once again, Georgian Orthodoxy experienced in the early modern period similar challenges to those the other Christian communities around the

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65 "Russian Orthodoxy was actual Russian Heterodoxy, with kaleidoscopic variations in local customs, superstitions and religious practices." Gregory L. Freeze, "Russian Orthodoxy: Church, People and Politics in Imperial Russia," in *The Cambridge History of Russia*, vol. 2, *Imperial Russia, 1689–1917,* ed. Dominic Lieven (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 296.

66 Gregory L. Freeze, "The Re-Christianization of Russia: The Church and Popular Religion," *Studia Slavica Finlandensia* 7 (1990): 101–36. Cf. Aleksandr S. Lavrov, *Koldovstvo i religiia v Rossii, 1700–1740 gg.* (Moscow: Drevlekhranilishche, 2000).

67 Mara Kozelsky, "A Borderland-Mission: The Orthodox Church in the Black Sea Region," *Russian History* 40 (2013): 111–32; Gregory Bruess, "Sacred Spaces and Imperial Boundaries on Catherine II's Southern Frontier," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 62 (2020): 296–314.

68 Mara Kozelsky, *Christianizing Crimea: Shaping Sacred Space in the Russian Empire and Beyond* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010).

Black Sea had to face. For example, Islamic sovereignty, a divided and contested one between Safavids and Ottomans, presented Georgian kingdoms and principalities with dilemmas comparable to those in the Ottoman tributaries Moldavia and Wallachia. Catholic missionary activity in the seventeenth century, backed by French diplomacy, made notable achievements, numerous representatives of the Georgian princely or ecclesiastical elites flirting with Catholicism or openly converting. Georgians' relations to the wider Orthodox world of the Ottoman Empire were at periods particularly intense, for instance with the Patriarchate of Jerusalem under patriarchs Theophanes III (1608–44) and Dositheos II (1669–1707). Anthim the Iberian, a Georgian prelate who, with Dositheos's support, ascended to the metropolitan sees of Râmnic (1705–8) and Wallachia (1708–15), played a leading role in Orthodox printing in both Georgia and Wallachia from 1691 on, issuing books for the Orthodox flock in Romanian, Church Slavonic, Greek, Georgian, and Arabic.

Loyalty to the Islamic ruler was no less a requirement than in the Greek and Armenian cases. Some Georgian princes and kings, such as David X (1569–88) of Kartli, even converted to Islam. Nonetheless, from the late sixteenth century on a series of projects and negotiations unfolded, attempts by the Georgian nobility to win the aid of Christian monarchs such as Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV of France, or Alexis Mikhailovich and Peter I of Russia against Ottoman or Persian rule.[69] During the eighteenth century, a period of material growth as elsewhere in the Black Sea world, the "Russian expectation" was particularly virulent. In the Georgian case, successive emotional roller coasters between excitement, disillusionment, and distress were particularly pronounced, since especially during the 1770s and 1780s, in the context of Catherine II's Ottoman wars, Russian tactics of inciting support from Georgian allies and instantly forsaking them appeared extremely cynical. This experience grew even larger in the first decades of the nineteenth century, when after the annexation of the Georgian lands and contrary to former promises and guarantees the autocephaly of the Georgian Church was abolished, annexed to the Russian Church, and subjected to severe Russification policies.[70]

7 Pontic Realities

On its way back to Syria in the winter 1658/59 the Patriarchal retinue sailed from Izmail along the western coast of the Black Sea, halting at Varna and Sozopolis and then along

69 Stephen H. Rapp Jr., "Georgian Christianity," in *The Blackwell Companion to Eastern Christianity*, ed. Ken Parry (Malden MA: Blackwell, 2007), 149–51; Nana Kharebava and Christoph U. Werner, "Persisch-russische Verzahnungen," in *Transottomanica – Osteuropäisch-osmanisch-persische Mobilitätsdynamiken: Perspektiven und Forschungsstand,* ed. Stefan Rohdewald, Stephan Conermann, and Albrecht Fuess (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019), 231–44.
70 Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 46–68.

the southern coast (the "coast of Caramania") from Heraclea (Karadeniz Ereğli) to Pontic Sinope. Paul of Aleppo again had an odd etymology to offer: "The meaning of using the word Ponto is, because all the coasts of the Black Sea (and we ourselves remarked this circumstance) are round and concave."[71] It was shortly before Christmas and Paul was anxious about brumal conditions: "During this whole winter season, every year, the merchants and travelers perform the journey in caïcks from Constantinople to Trebizond and the frontier of Georgia, regarding it as the most favorable time for the voyage".[72] He was finally relieved that God "granted us [the chief blessing] that we passed the Black Sea before winter came on."[73] In Sinope Paul was impressed by the tranquility of the Christians' circumstances:

> The life of the Christians in this place is spent in perfect ease, happiness, and security [...] the Priests there are like magistrates and governors. The people generally are fond of possessing slave girls, and Mamelooks or male slaves. The place contains upward of a thousand Christian families; and in each family are five or six captive men and women, or more.[74]

They were even "morning and evening [striking] the wooden bells in their churches, there being no Turkish houses among them." In Oinoe (today: Ünye), a further port east of Sinope, Paul admired the "reverence and religiousness" of the local Christians, the "submissiveness and humility towards our Lord the Patriarch, such as we had never yet beheld in our time." He was, however, irritated by their and their priests' lack of mastery of the Greek language: "These persons knew none but the Turkish language."[75]

Indeed, the Pontic coastland, virtually isolated from the Anatolian interior by the Pontic Alps, was in several regards a world of its own. Anthony Bryer, the most distinguished historian of the Pontos, noticed the "peculiar localism" of the region's inhabitants, which seemed to transcend religious allegiances and even conversions.[76] While around 1520 Greek Orthodox still constituted the vast majority of the population (ca. 215,000 or 85 percent), the last Ottoman census of 1910 counted 350,000 but out of a total population of 1.3 million, the result of mass Muslim migration (mostly Turkomans and Laz) rather than large-scale conversion.[77] Pontic Greeks seem to have maintained their faith and also—contrary to Paul's experience in Oinoe—their Greek dialect more determinedly than those of inner Anatolia. As Bryer remarked: "In the

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71 Belfour, *The Travels*, 2:424. On the Black Sea appellation, he remarked: "This sea has been marked with the name of Black, because all its deeds are black." Belfour, 425.
72 Belfour, 2:425.
73 Belfour, 2:427.
74 Belfour, 2:428.
75 Belfour, 2:435–36.
76 Anthony Bryer, "The Pontic Greeks before Diaspora," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 4, no. 4 (1991): 319.
77 Anthony Bryer, "The *Tourkokratia* in the Pontos: Some Problems and Preliminary Conclusions," in *The Empire of Trebizond and the Pontos* (Aldershot: Variorum Reprints, 1980), 38–39; Anthony Bryer, "The Pontic Revival and the New Greece," in *The Empire of Trebizond*, 173.

Pontos, by contrast, the language outlasted the faith in some areas and the faith outlasted the harac classification in others."[78] A sense of the ambivalence of ethnic, linguistic, and religious identities might be recovered by what a Pontic Turkish inhabitant of Santa, a formerly Christian village, told Bryer in 1969: "This is Roman (Rum) country; they spoke Christian here."[79]

This ambiguity was due not only to loose administrative control but also to the high degree of what past research used to call "syncretism" and modern scholars "transreligiosity" or "hybridity," the fluidity and the ambiguity of religious and confessional allegiances. Popular religion was shaped in Pontos by shared places of worship, such as the Sumela monastery.[80] Most Muslims were Alevites anyway, while the Armenian Hemşinli practiced similar forms of hybrid religious rites.[81] Instances of "Crypto-Christianity," the concealing of the true, inner Christian faith under an external, official Muslim one, seems to have been rather a result of the nineteenth-century Tanzimat reforms, which threatened convenient inherited ambiguities.[82] Source evidence is scarce, but it is probable that a provisional decrease of Ottoman tolerance, associated with the rise of the Kadizadeli movement, the Islamic zealot resurgence of the seventeenth century, had repercussions on Pontic Christianity (mass conversions, the appearance of neo-martyrs), as it had on Armenians, Greek Orthodox, and especially Jews in Constantinople itself.[83] Relations of the great Pontic monasteries such as Sumela and Vazelon with Russia go back to the seventeenth century, but the emergence of the "Russian expectation" among Pontic Greeks is evidenced for the late eighteenth and especially the nineteenth-century. In the wake of Russian-Ottoman wars, especially that of 1828/29, great numbers of Pontic Greeks emigrated to the now Russian ports on the northern and eastern shores: Odesa, Yalta, Mariupol, and Batum.[84]

The history of Christianity around the Black Sea in the late nineteenth and the twentieth century is a story of nationalization of Church institutions, of sacralization of national communities, of suppression of religious practices, but also of ethnic cleansing and mass violence. This is a story that is told in fragments in other chapters of this handbook.

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78 Bryer, "Pontic Revival," 174.

79 Bryer, "The Pontic Greeks," 321.

80 Bryer, "Tourkokratia," 48; Bryer, "Pontic Revival," 174.

81 Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., *Armenian Pontus: The Trebizond-Black Sea Comminities* (Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 2009).

82 Yorgos Tzedopoulos, "Public Secrets: Crypto-Christianity in the Pontos," *Bulletin of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies* 16 (2009): 165–210. See the chapter "Russian Imperial Church Policy in the Black Sea Region (1856–1914)" by Lora Gerd in this volume.

83 Bryer, "Tourkokratia," 41–42. See Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

84 Bryer, "Pontic Revival," 179–82.

Hannah Müller-Sommerfeld
Muslims and Jews in the Black Sea Region

Translated by John Heath

Writing about identities generally means wading into troubled waters, since the topic is something of a semantic minefield. Identities, be they individual or collective, are comprised of different and interdependent building blocks such as gender, age, space, and time, never finite, but always in motion and changing. Identities are and will remain socially, politically, and emotionally controversial; even within a collective, they are never uniform and valid for all. This also applies to spaces such as the Black Sea, which for inhabitants of the coastline constitutes a key local agent in the fabric of their identities, while for the inland populations it primarily means holidaying, leisure, and the beach.

The historical Black Sea region is a diverse political and economic contact zone between Europe and Asia, and as a historical meso-region[1] it has ensured that the populations of the riparian states have always been densely multiethnic and multireligious. The general question of identity took on a new intensity after the end of the Ottoman and Russian Empires; from the 1920s on, a series of new states emerged on the shores of the Black Sea with fundamentally new political and national constellations. They also had an impact on the heterogeneous and fragmented religious communities, whose religious identities are almost uniform in comparison to their ethnolinguistic identities. The overwhelming majority of Muslims are Sunnis; few are Shiites and even fewer Alevis. They constitute religious minorities in all the riparian states, with the exception of Turkey. In the case of Jews, too, we encounter a historical religious plurality and fragmentation. The dominant religious and cultural group among Jews in the region is the Sephardim, who found a new home in the Ottoman Empire after their expulsion from Spain, Portugal, and Italy. Over the centuries, many Ashkenazim also arrived. Specific to Jewish history in the Black Sea region is the historical presence of the Karaites, who reject the religious-normative significance of the Talmud and Rabbinic doctrines.

The Muslim and Jewish past and present have been shaped by several different factors, and the Black Sea region is no exception. Besides official religious policy, civil legal status, and relations between the majority society and minorities, since the nineteenth century such factors have included a high degree of mobility, migration, refugeeism, in some cases deportations, demographic stagnation or decline, secularization, internal stabilization via self-administration, and displays of transnational solidarity. Despite high internal ethnoreligious plurality, diversity, and heterogeneity, Muslims and Jews have closely entwined histories, not least because both groups found

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1 Stefan Troebst, "The Black Sea as Historical Meso-Region: Concepts in Cultural Studies and the Social Sciences," *Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies* 2, no. 2 (2019): 11–29.

themselves belonging politically to the Ottoman Empire, on the southern Black Sea coast, and to the Russian Empire or, later, the USSR, on the northern shore.

The supranational power- and religiopolitical constellations have been reconfigured once more since the 1990s. On the southern Black Sea coast, the Turkish government has repositioned itself and changed religiopolitical course despite a secular state doctrine. Ankara began to expand by tracing historical Ottoman footsteps in the Balkans and the Black Sea region and strengthened its local presence, be it by funding religious infrastructure (mosques, madrasas, schools, etc.), or through religious institutions and charity organizations. With this neo-Ottoman trend, the Turkish government has promoted and exported a conservative Sunni form of Islam, gradually establishing itself as a new transnational Islamic actor in the region, principally in opposition to the fundamentalist missionaries from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, which had increasingly exported "true Islam" to these countries since the 1990s.

On the northern Black Sea coast, the Russian government has expanded with its older concept of the "Russian world." The neo-imperial annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in the spring of 2014 and the war of aggression against Ukraine (since February 2022) serve these pretensions to geopolitical dominance and emphasis on the status of the Russian Federation as a global power. Quantitatively, these pretensions are evident in the fact that almost half the 5,800-kilometer (3,600-miles) Black Sea coastline currently finds itself under Russian rule or influence.

My chapter provides insights into the historical religious diversity and plural identities of Muslims and Jews in the Black Sea region since the nineteenth century. Where relevant, consideration will also be given to earlier times. However, the unbalanced state of research on the subject prevents uniform treatment of the different countries. Jewish communities in Romania, Turkey, and Odesa are relatively well researched, as are Muslims in Turkey and the Crimean Peninsula. Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania are examined as entire countries, while for Ukraine and Russia mention is made only of the city of Odesa and Crimea. Well-rounded demographic surveys can be found for all religious communities, mostly from official statistical sources that, like demographic figures, must be read critically. They serve primarily as orientation.

In terms of theory and methodology, my chapter is largely informed by a post-Orientalist conception and ethical scholarly criteria that do not necessarily reflect the emic perspectives and self-understandings of the respective religious communities and states.

1 Georgia

The small Caucasian country lies on the southeastern edge of the Black Sea. The port city of Batumi forms the urban center for Georgia's approximately 310 kilometers of Black Sea coast. Batumi is the capital of the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria, the country's second-largest city, one of the most important supraregional industrial centers in the Caucasus, and one of the largest ports on the Black Sea.

According to the 2014 census, Georgia had a total population of approximately 3.7 million, around 83 percent of whom were Georgian Orthodox Christians (3,097,600) and 10 percent Muslims (398,700). After the end of tsarist rule, the Muslim population stood at around 20 percent. Today, Georgians constitute the ethnic titular nationality, forming around 86 percent of the total population, followed by the Turkic-speaking Azeris as the second-largest ethnicity (ca. 6.3 percent—i. e., ca. 233,000).[2]

Georgia officially recognizes its ethnic and religious pluralities, and since the Rose Revolution of 2003 the general situation of minority groups has improved. The government has launched interreligious dialogue initiatives and training courses for religious personnel in questions of freedom of religion and human rights. Nevertheless, an obstacle to the prosperous coexistence of Christians and Muslims is revitalized nationalist tendencies and discourses such as historical foreign rule and aggressions, Georgia's unique position within Christianity, and a "return to the West."

1.1 Muslims

Muslims represent Georgia's largest religious minority. The law recognizes Islam as one of the country's "traditional" religions, which for the Muslims themselves means both official state tolerance and interventionist religious policy. "Non-traditional" religions, on the other hand, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses or Bahá'í, are generally rejected. Yet despite this legal recognition, Muslims have remained socially marginalized, and not only since the 1990s, when the Pankisi Gorge on the border with Chechnya became an international training camp for Islamic terrorists and a retreat for radicalized fighters. The negative image of Islam in Georgia is rooted in the country's historiography and national ideology; the official national metanarrative stresses almost catechismically that it is the world's second-most Christian state after Armenia. And the role Georgian Orthodox Christianity plays in constituting the nation has also been enshrined in the constitution since 1995 (Article 8). Since 2004, it has been virtually impossible to overlook Georgia's confessing an exclusively Christian national identity: The new national flag displays a large St. George's Cross with four small red crosses against a white background.

Besides their religious heterogeneity, Georgia's Muslims are characterized by even greater ethnic-linguistic plurality and fragmentation. It is not easy to provide a detailed overview of their manifold divisions, which are due to the turbulent political history of the Caucasus region and Georgia's geopolitical location between expanding great empires, be it from the north, east, south, or west, for which the territory of today's Georgian state remained a designated military contact zone for centuries. Additionally, pil-

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2 "2014 General Population Census: Demographic and Social Characteristics," National Statistics Office of Georgia, accessed May 18, 2023, https://www.geostat.ge/en/modules/categories/739/demographic-and-social-characteristics.

laging and plundering by various nomadic tribes often left economic and political ruin in its wake. From the sixteenth century on, most of Georgia belonged to the Safavid Empire, while a smaller territory on the Black Sea coast was part of the Ottoman Empire. The Safavid and Ottoman governments, political and religious archrivals, launched campaigns to convert their largely Christian subjects to Shiite or Sunni Islam, respectively.[3]

Within a hundred years from the late eighteenth century onwards, Georgia fell under Russian tsarist rule. St. Petersburg pursued an ambiguous religious policy towards the Muslim population, oscillating between support and neglect. In the Soviet era (1922–91), Muslims were also subject to the state's militant mass atheism policy. The religious factor survived these seven Soviet decades and saw a veritable boom from the early 1990s on, as it did in many other post-communist countries.[4] Among Muslims, this revitalization of religion took place both internally (via the opening and restoration of many mosques, the import of religious literature, and the introduction of Quran lessons) and externally (Turkey, Iran, the Middle East).

Although Muslims in Georgia in the 2020s will soon be able to look back on 150 years of common history, they have not developed a unified collective identity. Their different local-rural and ethnic identities continue to predominate. Five historical traditions can be distinguished here, displaying neither religious nor ethnic homogeneity: the oldest and only urban tradition in the capital, Tbilisi, another further south among the Azeris, earlier among the Meskhetian Turks too, the province of Ajaria on the border with Turkey, and the Kists in the Pankisi Gorge in northern Georgia.

1. In Tbilisi, the beginnings of Muslim history date back to the seventh or eighth century. It was here that the expanding early Islamic empires from the Middle East founded the Emirate of Tiflis, which for Damascus and Bagdad remained more of an outpost. The city of Tbilisi nevertheless developed into a flourishing Islamic center, thanks in part to its location on the international trade route between the Middle East and Europe. From the twelfth century onwards, Tbilisi and other Georgian principalities came under Christian rule (the "Golden Age"). The Sunni Juma (Friday) Mosque in Tbilisi, one of Georgia's historical congregational mosques, is a singular building in two respects. It survived the Soviet government's anti-religious campaigns, unlike the historical mosque of the Shiites, which was destroyed in 1951. Thereafter, Shiites were taken in by the Sunni; since then, they have held Friday prayers together, which is certainly not to say, however, that historical tensions between the two have been resolved. According to the 2014 census, Tbilisi had around 16,200 Muslims. Since 2011, Georgia's Muslims have had their own central administrative body: The Georgian Muslim Department (GMD) with its headquarters in Tbilisi stands for their

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3 For an introduction, cf. George Sanikidze and Edwards Walker, "Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia," *BPS Working Paper*, University of California, Berkeley, Fall 2004, https://iseees.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/2004_04-sani.pdf.

4 Bayram Balci and Raoul Motika, "Islam in Post-Soviet Georgia," *Central Asian Survey* 26, no. 3 (2007): 335–53, https://doi.org/10.1080/02634930701702399.

transregional emancipation from the Caucasus Muslim Department in Baku (Azerbaijan), which has existed since the late-nineteenth-century tsarist era. As an umbrella organization for Sunnis and Shiites, the GMD offers stabilizing potential for the heterogeneous Muslim community, but it also creates institutional competition for the office of mufti. Together with a project to translate the Quran into Georgian initiated in 2006, this development heralded a new tendency for the nationalizing of Islam in Georgia.

2. On the border with Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Shiites dominate, which explains the long rule of the Shiite Safavid dynasty and its Islamization campaigns. Currently, the largest group are the abovementioned Turkic-speaking Azeris, who live in their compact settlement area in Kvemo Kartli (population ca. 182,000). In Georgia, Azeris have had the fastest demographic growth since the mid-twentieth century; according to the 2014 census, they represent the country's second-largest ethnicity. Many Azeris share markers of Azerbaijani identity, although most of them see their history and future in Georgia. Due to their linguistic-cultural autonomy, the Azeris are integrated into Georgia's economy more than into its culture.

3. The Turkic-speaking Meskhetians, some of whom are Catholic, constituted Georgia's largest Muslim community until the mid-twentieth century. In 1944, Stalin ordered their forced deportation.[5] Unlike other forced deportees in the Soviet era, the Meskhetians were not granted the right to an official return to their homeland. Internationally dispersed, they are still fighting for this right in the early twenty-first century.

4. In the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria on the border with Turkey, the dominant Islamic tradition is Sunni. For several centuries, Ajars found themselves under Ottoman rule, which came to an end with the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877/78. Istanbul's political retreat from Ajaria—and the province of Abkhazia, which remains disputed today—triggered a Muslim exodus for the Ottoman Empire. Under tsarist Russian rule, Ajaria was Christianized in the course of rapid industrialization. A prime example is the abovementioned port city of Batumi; of its total of approximately 4,970 inhabitants around 1870, some 4,500 were Muslims, whereas at the end of the nineteenth century Batumi, now a free port, counted around 15,000 Christians and about 3,000 Muslims.[6] Ajaria's Muslims considered themselves ethnic Georgians, which conflicts somewhat with the construct of an exclusively Christian nation. The 2014 census recorded around 132,000 Muslims living in Ajaria (a third of the population).[7] In the late 1990s, the autonomous republic had the largest number of mosques in Georgia: around 110 out of an approximate total of 150.[8] Plans to build a new mosque in Batumi, where the country's second historical congregational mosque is located, had to be

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[5] Ca. 200,000 were deported. Rainer Münz, "Das Jahrhundert der Vertreibungen," *Transit. Europäische Revue* 23 (2022): 138.

[6] Sanikidze and Walker, "Islam," 493–94.

[7] National Statistics Office of Georgia, "2014 General Population Census."

[8] Bayram Balci and Raoul Motika, "Der Islam im post-sowjetischen Georgien: Ein vorläufiger Überblick," in *Georgien: Gesellschaft und Religion an der Schwelle Europas*, ed. Bernd Schröder (St. Ingbert: Röhrig Universitätsverlag, 2005), 106.

shelved due to considerable resistance from the Christian population. In Abkhazia, on the other hand, the population is rather indifferent to religions.

5. The Pankisi Gorge in northeastern Georgia is home to around 5,700 Kists, according to the 2014 census.[9] Historically speaking, they constitute the youngest Islamic tradition in Georgia. Kists are descended from the Chechen and Ingush tribes who emigrated to this small, isolated valley with its thousand-meter-high rock walls in the nineteenth century. The bilingual Kists consider themselves ethnic Chechens and maintain their family ties with their old homeland. Their religious practice is also influenced by Sufi traditions (*dhikr*) and Christian customs.

1.2 Jews

Georgia's official national narrative is explicitly positive in its portrayal of close ties with Judaism, usually emphasized as religious tolerance. However, this religiopolitically instrumentalized view is more about Christian religious appropriation than about genuine tolerance, let alone recognition; historiographical sources, for instance, mostly depict Jews as quasi-Christians.

The Jewish community in Georgia has been in steady decline since the mid-twentieth century. While in 1951 around 51,000 Jews lived in the country, at the end of the Soviet era there were approximately 14,000 (1989 census),[10] and around 1,400 according to the census of 2014, most of them living in Tbilisi.[11]

Georgia's Jewish population is characterized by a complex historical religious heterogeneity and fragmentation.[12] Besides the autochthonous Georgian Jewish majority, there are Mountain Jews (Caucasus), Jews from Central Asia, and Jews from Crimea (Krymchaks). Ashkenazim from Europe and Russia increasingly fled or migrated to Georgia from the nineteenth century onwards.

The autochthonous Georgian Jews trace their genesis and local history back to biblical times. The Jewish presence in Georgia is also intertwined with famous Georgian national topoi such as Saint Nino. Into the seventeenth century, however, historiographical sources hardly make any mention of Jews in Georgia. Nevertheless, they claim a 2,600-year Jewish history, a construct which is also upheld by the Georgian state.

Unlike other Jewish communities, Georgian Jews have not developed a dialect of their own like Yiddish, Ladino, or Judeo-Arabic. They adopted the local dialects of their mostly rural settlement areas and added Hebrewisms to them. In the Soviet

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9 National Statistics Office of Georgia, "2014 General Population Census."

10 Mark Tolts, "The Jews in Georgia in the Late Soviet Period: A Demographic Profile," in *Studies in Caucasian, Georgian, and Bukharan Jewry: Historical, Sociological, and Cultural Aspects*, ed. Goldah Akhiezer (Ariel: Ariel University, 2014), 103.

11 National Statistics Office of Georgia, "2014 General Population Census."

12 Eldar Mamistvalishvili, ed., *The History of Georgian Jews* (Tbilisi: Georgian Academic Book, 2014).

era, the official repressive religious policy from the 1920s on, including the closure of synagogues or their transformation into cinemas or sports venues, also threatened the existence and organization of the Jewish community. Georgian Jews nevertheless largely escaped the National Socialist regime's so-called "Final Solution" to the "Jewish question."

Following the Second World War, their history and identities were transformed by sustained migration both within Georgia and abroad. Most Georgian Jews migrated to urban centers, primarily to Tbilisi, where they received access to radio, television, and newspapers, as a result of which their spoken Jewish Georgian became unified. In the 1970s and 1990s, many Georgian Jews emigrated to Israel, Europe, and the USA. For those who remained, this meant a significant decline, not only in demographic terms. Nevertheless, the Georgian government pursues a decidedly proactive Jewish religious policy. For instance, in 1998 the synagogue in Batumi was declared a national monument, the Jewish Museum in Tbilisi opened in 2014, having originally been founded in 1933, and closed only a few years later, and in 2018 the government requested UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage status for twenty-six (!) centuries of Georgian-Jewish coexistence.

2 Turkey

The Black Sea coastline in Turkey is around 1,329 kilometers (826 miles) in length, bordering the country to the north. The northeastern part of the coastal region is low on industry and cut off from the interior by the Pontic Mountains, and is thus an isolated and relatively thinly settled part of the country. Unlike the beaches of the Aegean and the Mediterranean, the Black Sea waterfront has seen little construction and is not one of Turkey's hotspots for international tourism.

Since the Republic of Turkey was founded (in 1923), the spheres of religion and ethnicity have been highly politicized and vehemently contested in politics and society. Since the census of 1965, the Turkish Statistical Institute has not published any official religiodemographic data, pointing to the equality of all citizens before the law. It doesn't provide figures on ethnicity either. According to official statistics, some 99.8 percent of the entire population of Turkey are Sunni Muslims and 0.2 percent Christians and Jews. Here one can easily recognize the nation-state's doctrine of a religiously and ethnically homogeneous Turkish nation. According to the 2021 census, Turkey has a total population of 84.6 million.[13] They represent a colorful mosaic of Sunnis, Alevis, Shiites, and various Jewish and Christian communities, in addition to many secular people for whom religion is of more general cultural significance.

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13 "Population and Housing Census 2021," Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, accessed May 18, 2023, https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Population-and-Housing-Census-2021-45866.

2.1 Muslims

Unlike in the other states of the Black Sea region, in Turkey Islam is the majority religion. The country's Muslims are mostly Sunni and homogeneous in their religious identities. There is a clear division between Sunnis and Alevis, who since the twentieth century have grown into the country's second-largest religious community. Ethnically, most Muslims consider themselves Turks. There are also several million Kurds, who constitute Turkey's largest ethnic minority. The Laz, primarily settled in the Black Sea region, are one of Turkey's numerically smallest minorities.

The territory of the present-day Turkish state gradually came under Islamic political rule from the eleventh century on. Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire, was not conquered by the Ottoman dynasty until 1453. Thanks to sustained military and political victories, the Ottoman Empire was able to secure its status as a regional power, which it then began to lose in stages from the late eighteenth century onwards as it found itself between the fronts of the expanding great powers of Britain and France on one side and the Russian Empire on the other, whose rivalry increasingly played out in the Black Sea region.

Turkey was one of the last territories in the history of the Islamic conquests to be Islamized; it took several centuries (from the twelfth to the thirteenth) for adoption by the majority of the population. In this region too, Islam took on new forms and influences. In the east of the country, in the territories bordering Iran, the influence of Shiite Islam gave rise to the heterogeneous religious community of the Alevis, for instance, who combine local religious elements with Islamic principles (discussed in greater detail below). The centralist Sunni administrative institutions such as the caliphate and the *şeyhülislam* (the highest authority on religious law) were all located in Istanbul, which was a long way from many areas, not only from rural regions like Anatolia. Islam in the Ottoman Empire (1453–1923) was characterized by a moderate conservative interpretation of religious principles and close ties to dervish (Sufi) communities within the populace and in the political arena.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's government (1922–38) rejected the Ottoman Islamic legacy, with the exception of the minorities policy, as backward, and introduced a radical nationalist modernizing and cultural revolution based on the Western model. The intention was to transform the country's ethnically and religiously heterogeneous and plural society into a modern uniform Turkish nation. This long-term radical secularization process took aim at the centuries-old Islamic institutions and religious elites (abolition of the sultanate, the caliphate, the *şeyhülislam*). Many graves of saints and dervish convents were closed or turned into museums, and religious personnel were released *en masse.* Protests by established religious scholars hardly had any effect. Many Sufis, sheikhs, and religious scholars fled abroad or went underground. This authoritarian secularization broke the country's popular Islamic institutional religious infrastructure, and in 1928 the article establishing Islam as the state religion was removed from the constitution. Ankara also introduced Western European norms. Besides a dress code (the fez and the headscarf were abolished; it became mandatory

to wear a hat), this also held for Ottoman Arabic script, which was replaced with its Latin counterpart, and the Islamic calendar was rejected in favor of the Christian Western system. Arabic was abolished as the language of religion and worship, as was the public call to prayer; instead Ankara commissioned the translation of the Quran into Turkish, which proved unsuccessful, however. From the 1930s on, all Turkish citizens had to adopt a surname. This concerted modernization program secured for the government the administrative and discursive role of a paternalistic actor that watched over Islam and other religions with an authoritarian and jealous eye.[14]

The Turkification of Islam or the state-sanctioned attitude of being "happy to be Turkish" proved much more successful in the early years of the Republic than secularization, which was mostly observed only by urban elites.[15] For the rural population, religion/Islam remained their identity markers. The brief political thaw from 1946 on, during which Ankara permitted public Islamic institutions again (including the call to prayer and religious training), was brought to a violent end by the military coup of 1960, when the military positioned itself as a counterweight to religious policy and another strict guardian of the constitution and guarantor of the secular order. A total of five further military coups would take place up to 2016 (1971, 1980, 1997, 2007, and 2016).

Given these multipolar constellations, multireligious and multiethnic society, Turkey constantly finds itself subject to the tensions between nationalism, secularism, and Islam, which drove the country to the edge of political ruin in the 1970s. It was in these years that the rise of political Islam began, characterized by dense networks in all spheres of society and close ties to Sufi communities. One of its influential (early) figures was the politician Necmettin Erbakan. A tough crackdown by the army during and after the military coup of 1980 publicly restored the secular order. Despite the dual authoritarian control, Islamic religious landscapes reconfigured themselves underground, including the clandestine Islamic revival movement, which gained a considerable following among young Muslims in the cities. One of its central figures is the preacher Fethullah Gülen (born 1941).

In the 1990s, in many countries Islam experienced a government-supported conservative revival in the public sphere. In Turkey, the Islam/religion factor took on a public political role for the first time. As part of this trend, Ankara pivoted towards a neo-Ottoman foreign policy, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter; the Turkish government secured for itself the status of a new Islamic conservative actor in the Balkan countries and the Black Sea riparian states. In the field of domestic policy, political Islam proved increasingly successful at the ballot box, something the "soft" military putsch of 1997 was only able to halt temporarily. Ankara continued to promote the public revival of a conservative Sunni Islam and its institutions (the Diyanet/Presidency of

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14 Kim Shively, *Islam in Modern Turkey* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021).

15 Soner Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* (London: Routledge, 2006).

Religious Affairs), re-intensifying the old intrasocietal conflicts between nationalist, secular, moderate, and radical Islamic circles. In 2016, the military failed in its attempted coup, having lost its former political power as the guarantor of secularity in the age of the "new Turkey" (from 2014 on).

In July 2020, constitutional secularism reached a historical low when the Grand Hagia Sophia in Istanbul became a mosque once again. An old maximum demand of political Islam in Turkey was thus fulfilled. The splendid Byzantine building was once the central church of Byzantine Orthodoxy (until 1453) and had been a museum since 1934. This act symbolizes the transformation in Ankara's understanding of religious policy: The Turkish government regards itself as the patron of a conservative Sunni Islam. What hasn't changed, however, is its role as an authoritarian, paternalist actor that almost jealously guards its power; Ankara fights critics and opponents, eliminating some of them (for instance, the Gülen movement). Parallel to these developments, there have been state-controlled reforms of Islam in Turkey that have received less public attention. The office of imam was opened up to women, even if they were not awarded equal standing to their male colleagues, their remit being limited to women's matters. In connection with the abovementioned neo-Ottoman trend, on the whole Ankara is attempting to actively restore Turkey's position in the international community (*ummah*) of Muslims that was relinquished in 1923.

2.2 Alevis

Today, the Alevis constitute Turkey's second-largest religious community after the Sunnis. Some Alevis consider themselves Muslims; others see themselves as a non-Muslim religious community. Due to Turkish state doctrine—one nationality (Turkish), one religion (Sunni Islam)—they are officially classified as Muslims or as a branch of Turkish Islam.

The religiohistorical emergence of the Alevis, formerly mostly known pejoratively as *Kızılbaş* ("redhead"), is heterogeneous and dates back to the sixteenth century.[16] For centuries, they lived in isolated communities in the rural regions of southern and eastern Anatolia. Alevis did not develop a unified religious doctrine, although Shiite Islam had clear influences. Their religious knowledge was passed down over the centuries orally by specialists. The common religious basis shared by all Alevis is the triad of Allah (*hak*, divine truth), the Prophet Mohammed, and Allah's chosen one, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (ca. 600–61), Mohammed's cousin and son-in-law. Other religious foundations are the belief in the sacred power of Allah within each person, in the inner path to perfection, and in the soul's immortality. Alevi religion centers primarily on religioethical aspects and goals, and less on norms pertaining to rituals and worship. Corre-

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16 Benjamin Weineck, *Zwischen Verfolgung und Eingliederung: Kızılbaş-Aleviten im osmanischen Staat (16.–18. Jahrhundert)* (Baden-Baden: Ergon, 2020).

spondingly, they reject the five pillars of the Islamic faith, which they interpret in heterodox fashion. Nor do they have mosques, a religious duty to undertake a pilgrimage to Mecca, or gender-based segregation in their religious meetings, which mostly take place in private households. The Sunni world around them has mostly considered Alevis heretics. This remains the case to this day.

The large waves of migration within Turkey and to Western Europe since the mid-twentieth century have profoundly transformed the Alevis.[17] Their new urbanized lifeworld, but also their transnational distribution, have confronted their oral, local religious organization, infrastructure, and identity as a (self-)isolated and hidden religious community with massive challenges, precipitating surges of historical emancipation for which the Sivas arson attack in July 1993, in which almost forty people lost their lives, served as a regenerating catalyst. For Alevis, there began a process of religious-collective "outing." The process of their transformation into a transnational minority was driven by significant religious impulses from abroad that in turn had an impact on the Alevis in Turkey, who have been fighting for official recognition in Ankara since the 2000s.

2.3 Jews

Up until their large internal migration and emigration from the mid-twentieth century onwards, Turkey's Jewish population mostly lived in the urban centers in the west of the country: Istanbul, Izmir, Edirne, and Bursa. There were also smaller communities in Anatolia, in the southeastern provinces of Urfa and Diyarbakır. Following the almost complete dissolution of these communities, the country's Jewish population has primarily been concentrated in the city of Istanbul and its wider region. Istanbul also represents their religiohistorical center.

In the late nineteenth century, around 184,000 Jews lived in the Ottoman provinces from which the Turkish state emerged. In the 1920s, the figure stood at ca. 82,000. In the 2020s, unofficial estimates record around 15,000. Thus within a century, a demographic decline of around 70 percent took place.[18]

On the territory of today's Turkish state, the history of its heterogeneous Jewish population spans over two thousand years. There existed and flourished various autochthonous and allochthonous Jewish traditions that did not develop into a uniform community over time. Instead, they maintained their respective linguistic and religious identities, which lent Jewry in Turkey a pronounced historical internal plurality.

The oldest Jewish tradition is the Romaniotic culture of the Hellenic-Roman era, from which the remains of synagogues have been found in Sardis, Smyrna (today:

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17 Markus Dreßler, *Writing Religion: The Making of Turkish Alevi Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

18 Hannelore Müller, *Religionen im Nahen Osten: Türkei, Ägypten, Saudi-Arabien* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2015), 120.

Izmir), Miletus, and Priene (third century BCE). Jews also settled in the Black Sea region and the Aegean. The Christian mission from Palestine primarily reached the Jewish communities on the territory of today's western Turkey. The Jewish convert to Christianity Paul, born in Tarsus in Cilicia, was an exponent of this autochthonous tradition of the Romaniots, which continued in the Byzantine Empire.

The Ottoman victory over the Byzantine Empire (1453) represented a historical caesura for the Jewish communities too. Many were forcibly resettled to the new capital of Istanbul, together with Christian families. The Ottoman government's official call for immigration was headed by many Jews from Europe, particularly Spain and Portugal, when they were banished in the course of the *Reconquista* (in 1492 and 1497 respectively). They took the Sephardic tradition with them to the Ottoman Empire, which gradually absorbed the other two autochthonous groups (Romaniot-Byzantine and Italian after immigration from Venice and Genoa). The Sephardim took over leadership of the community, experiencing a cultural boom from the mid-eighteenth century on, with centers in Istanbul, Saloniki (today: Thessaloniki), and Izmir.[19]

Parallel to this development, the cultural-religious spectrum was expanded with the arrival of the Ashkenazi tradition due to Jewish migration from Austria, Hungary, Russia, Germany, Poland, and Romania. Some of these Christian states had officially banished Jews. In the Ottoman Empire, however, they received more freedoms and found it comparatively easier to pursue their livelihood. New waves of Jewish migration were triggered by the pogroms in the Russian Empire from the late nineteenth century onwards.

This historically developed religiocultural Jewish diversity explains the strikingly large number of synagogues, houses of prayer, and cemeteries in Istanbul. The Jewish community identified with different cultures, languages, and worship rituals (Sephardic, Ashkenazi), which also influenced their sacral architecture.

A further specific aspect of Jewish tradition in Turkey is the historical presence of the Karaites, who along with rabbinic Jewry represent a further religious tradition. Their historical beginnings date back to eighth- or ninth-century Bagdad (or perhaps Iran). Karaites reject the normative significance of the Talmud, recognizing solely the Hebrew Bible as normative and authoritative. Due to this central doctrine, their relationship with rabbinic Jewry has often been marked by tensions, shifting between hostility, tolerance, and cooperation. The Karaite communities spread from the Middle East to Eastern and Southeastern Europe. They probably arrived in the Byzantine Empire in the tenth century, reaching their cultural and religious zenith there during and shortly after the Ottoman invasion of Constantinople. Eliah Bashyatchi (ca. 1420–90), one of the most important Karaite scholars, developed a codification of Karaite dogmatics that remains to this day the standard work of Karaite theology and law. In Istanbul,

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19 Stanford Shaw, *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991). (To be used critically, since Shaw remains committed to the official narrative of the Ottoman Empire or Turkey as the "savior of the Jews").

as elsewhere, Karaites also have their own synagogues and their own cemetery, located next to the rabbinic institutions.

The era of the official reforms in the Ottoman Empire (1839 – 76) also transformed the Jewish religious community considerably. As a state-recognized non-Muslim minority (*millet*), they were granted *de jure* equal rights in civil law by the much-cited reform edict of February 1856 (*hatt-i hümayun*). Their self-administration was also secularized; leadership of the Jewish communities was no longer the sole preserve of the rabbis, but was now also in the hands of civil councils. These developments and other social issues of the day triggered vehement debates and conflicts between Jews, to be joined later by disputes over Ottomanism and political Zionism. For Ottoman Jews too, the question of nationality and religion again raised its head, although for most of them loyalty to the Ottoman state was a matter of course.[20]

After the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, Ankara's secularist and authoritarian-paternalist religious policy impacted on the Jewish communities too. Together with the representatives of Armenian and Greek Orthodoxy, their leadership forwent the international minority rights granted to them as state-recognized religious minorities by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. All three communities thus lost their corporative legal status, their autonomous self-administration, and their internal religious jurisdiction. State-imposed secularization had a direct impact on Jewish schools; since most Jewish civil schools were run by foreign organizations and foreign teachers, they were forced to close when Ankara prohibited all activities by foreign organizations. Religious schooling was abolished entirely, and Hebrew was replaced with Turkish in Jewish textbooks.

The transition from a multiethnic and multireligious organism to ethnically monolithic Turkishness was also a drawn-out process for the heterogeneous Jewish community; it took the Sephardim several decades to give up Ladino as their mother tongue and adopt Turkish. Jewish adaptation to the new Turkish nation was further hindered by intrasocietal conflicts; thus Jewish history in the Republic of Turkey is characterized by marginalization, anti-Jewish (media) campaigns, and attacks from nationalist extremist circles, state and economic discrimination (dismissals or non-employment, special taxes), and not least by migration.[21]

Ever since international Islamic extremist terrorism arrived in Turkey in the 1990s, the country's Jewish public institutions have been under police protection. Ankara changed its official stance towards Jewish communities; its narrative is that Turkish or Ottoman policy towards Jews has always been one of protection and tolerance. The Jewish leadership also officially endorses this one-sided interpretation, faced as it is with no safe way to extricate itself from this religiopolitical instrumentalization.

20 Julia Phillips Cohen, *Becoming Ottomans: Sephardi Jews and Imperial Citizenship in the Modern Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

21 Rifat Bali, *The Silent Minority in Turkey: Turkish Jews* (Istanbul: Libra Kitap, 2013); Süleyman Şanlı, *The Jews of Turkey: Migration, Culture and Memory* (London: Routledge, 2019).

3 Bulgaria

Bulgaria's Black Sea coast enjoys a national and international reputation as a bastion of tourism. Its urban centers are the two historical port and trade cities of Burgas and Varna.

According to the census of 2021, Bulgaria has a total population of 6.5 million. The religious majority consisted of Orthodox Christians (some 4.2 million, or ca. 84 percent of the total population). The number of Muslims stood at ca. 638,000, while around 1,700 Jews were recorded. Around 5 percent of respondents stated that they had no religion (ca. 305,000) and around 8 percent exercised their right under EU law not to provide any information on their faith. [22]

To this day, the history and identities of Muslims and Jews in Bulgaria and their position in society and the state have influenced Bulgarian national discourses. The dominance of Orthodox Christianity had been established as the state religion since the constitution of 1879, and it was readopted by the constitution of 1991, which enshrines its status as Bulgaria's "traditional religion" while also granting general freedom of religion and stipulating the separation of Church and state (Article 13). In Bulgaria too, the letter of the law and reality are two different things; Orthodox majority society shows little readiness to integrate the country's citizens of different ethnicity and religions in such a way that they enjoy equal rights.

3.1 Muslims

Around 676,000 Muslims lived in the Principality of Bulgaria from its foundation onwards (1887 census). Around 130 years later, there were ca. 638,000 (2021 census). It is only at first glance that these figures suggest little has changed, since if one considers the percentage of Muslims among the entire population, one notes a significant decline from ca. 21 percent (1887) to ca. 10 percent (2021). The majority of the ca. 638,000 Muslims in Bulgaria (2021 census) are Sunnis, while Shiites constitute a small minority. Ethnically and linguistically, however, there is much greater diversity and fragmentation. Most of the country's Muslims considers themselves Turks (ca. 514,000), while a few identify as Pomaks—that is, Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (ca. 107,000)—or as Romani (ca.45,000). The traditional settlement areas with Muslim majority populations were primarily rural regions in the south and northeast of Bulgaria. As a result of various

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22 "Ethno-Cultural Characteristics of the Population as of September 7, 2021," National Statistical Institute Bulgaria, accessed May 18, 2023, https://www.nsi.bg/en/content/19874/прессъобщение/ethno-cultural-characteristics-population-september-7-2021.

waves of migration and economic crises from the mid-twentieth century on, the majority of Muslims live in the country's larger cities.[23]

For nearly half a millennium, the territory of the present-day Bulgarian state formed part of the Ottoman Empire (1396–1878). Sunni Islam was the religion of the political rulers and a small portion of the local population, whose selective Islamization was, as elsewhere, a long and complex socioeconomic process. In particular, the Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks) were marginalized, becoming a distinct group in the course of modern nation-building from the 1870s on.[24] In the official national discourse, they were constructed as forced converts from the Ottoman era, errant Bulgarians who needed to be led back to Christianity. In the interests of the "rebirth" of Bulgaria's Muslims, the government and society undertook several repressive assimilation attempts, since here too the presence of members of a different faith disrupted the myth of a homogenous unified nation. Hence Bulgarian nation- and state-building framed the Ottoman Islamic past and its legacy as something negative, as did the official anti-Ottoman historiography.[25] Given these debates, it is hardly surprising that the political term "Turkish yoke," which came into international circulation, emanated from Bulgaria in the late nineteenth century.

In the Bulgarian state, the heterogeneous Muslim population were faced with an ambivalent state religion policy that oscillated between occasional benevolence and frequent repression. As a religious community, they received a relatively good legal status within the new state structure following the founding of the Principality in 1878. A legal statute of 1880 guaranteed them (and the Jewish community) autonomous self-administration, equal rights as citizens, autonomous schools, and many other freedoms.[26] Parallel to this development, however, the Christian majority became gripped by an almost collective fear of "Islam" that was repeatedly fanned by the discourses of national revival movements and the Orthodox Church. There followed repressive forced assimilation campaigns by the state, which recur as something of a leitmotif throughout the history of Bulgaria in the twentieth century: 1912/13, 1937–44 (supported by Pomaks themselves), 1962–64, 1971–74, and 1984–89. During the last large "rebaptizing campaign" too, the Bulgarian Christian majority feared cultural infiltration by Muslims and Islam. Sofia ordered a new brutal homogenization campaign accompanied by many repressive measures, including a ban on Turkish literature and holidays and

23 "Struktura na naselenieto po veroizpovedanie," Republika Balgaria: Natsionalen statisticheski institut, accessed March 21, 2023, https://www.nsi.bg/Census/StrReligion.htm.

24 Evangelos Karagiannis, *Flexibilität und Definitionsvielfalt pomakischer Marginalität* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2005).

25 Mary Neuburger, *The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

26 On their relatively ambivalent status with respect to state citizenship, cf. Milena B. Methodieva, *Between Empire and Nation: Muslim Reform in the Balkans* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021).

compulsory adoption of Bulgarian names. This "process of rebirth" too triggered a large "excursion" from the country; over 300,000 fled to Turkey in the 1990s.[27]

Although their numbers were thus drastically weakened, for remaining Muslims in post-communist Bulgaria there was then a phase of revitalization, institutional consolidation, and transformation. Freedom of religion, enshrined in the constitution since 1991, provided a change of course. The earlier forced nationalization efforts by the state were overturned legally—and condemned by the parliament in 2012—and those affected could use their actual names again. Around half of the "excursionists" returned from Turkey. Muslims began to found their own faith schools, followed by a university institute in Sofia. Old mosques were renovated and over 300 new ones were built (with foreign financing). Sufi groups played a considerable part in this endogenous re-Islamization, being officially permitted again after their activities had been banned in the 1980s.[28]

Islam in Bulgaria also took on new faces due to exogenous impulses, primarily from Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Additionally, many young Muslims went to the Middle East for religious schooling, returning with Salafist-Wahabi traditions, the practice of which triggered considerable internal conflicts and great controversies over "true Islam" versus traditional Islam in Bulgaria too. This diversification of the domestic and foreign religious actors since the 1990s has reinforced the overlaps between local, regional, and translocal Islam in Bulgaria while undermining, as it were, the already weak intra-Muslim group cohesion. The leading representatives, the grand mufti in Sofia and the ten historical regional mufti's offices, are faced with significant challenges in integrating the diverse religious and ethnic identities.

Islamic religious history in post-communist Bulgaria is further characterized by de-Islamization, political organization, and participation. Under the leadership of Bulgarian Turkish Muslims, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) was founded in 1990. As a liberal centrist party, the organization was able to establish itself as the representative of the interests primarily of Turkish Muslims, despite various internal conflicts, political competition, and several scandals (including corruption and tax fraud). It rose to be the third-largest political (oppositional) force in the Bulgarian parliament.

The historically strong presence of the government remains characteristic, even if there is supposed to be separation of state and religions according to the constitution. After many protests and heated debates, in 2019 a revised version of the 2002 Religions Act was finally passed, resolving the disputed question of state subsidies in favor of the Muslim communities. At the same time, however, it increased the scope of Sofia's interventionist religious policy.

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27 Ali Eminov, *Turkish and Other Minorities in Bulgaria* (London: Hurst & Company, 1997).
28 Nadege Ragaru, "Islam in Post-Communist Bulgaria: An Aborted 'Clash of Civilizations'?," *Nationalities Papers* 29, no. 2 (2001): 293–24.

3.2 Jews

In Bulgaria too, the historical Jewish presence dates back to Antiquity. Later, Jews arrived from European states (Byzantium, Bavaria, Hungary, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and others), sometimes following official expulsion, sometimes via voluntary migration. Among the various ethnic and religious communities, the Sephardim gained the upper hand from the seventeenth century onwards, and their religiocultural tradition remained dominant. Under Ottoman rule (1396 – 1878), the communities were led by wealthy families and notables who were members of the Jewish *millet* (the recognized non-Muslim religious community) and answered to the grand rabbi in Istanbul. But there were also translocal connections with the international Sephardic community.[29]

After the foundation of the Principality of Bulgaria, a statute granted the Jewish (and Muslim) population autonomous self-administration (in 1880). For the hitherto loosely connected Jewish communities, a process of administrative centralization and unification began. The Sephardic chief rabbi in Sofia was designated the official Jewish representative, receiving a state salary, while the other communities had to cover the costs of religious personnel, the upkeep and construction of their own buildings, and other communal matters from their own funds.

For Bulgaria's Jews too, embarking on the path to modernity meant emancipation/ equality, local and national political participation, and, not least, the introduction of a secular Jewish school system by Western European Jewish aid organizations, first and foremost the French *Alliance Israélite Universelle.* However, it was Zionism and Jewish religious schooling that resonated most with Bulgarian Jews, which distinguished them significantly from other Sephardic communities, whose response to Zionism generally ranged from skepticism to flat-out rejection. Parallel to these developments, anti-Semitism was on the rise in Bulgarian politics and society, leading to attacks and escalating into nationwide hysteria (1898).

From the 1880s on, the number of Jewish citizens in the Kingdom of Bulgaria tripled from 14,000 (1887 census) to around 48,000 (census 1943).[30] During this half a century, Sofia became the geographical center of Jewish settlement. There were also small urban Jewish communities in Plovdiv, Ruse, Burgas, Varna, Vidin, etc.

Two new synagogues were symbolic of the communities' boom from the late nineteenth century onwards. In Vidin, a town in the northwest of the country, what was then the largest Sephardic synagogue in the Balkans was consecrated in the 1890s. In 1910, this title was taken by the Grand Synagogue in Sofia. The same year, a reformed statute entered into force democratizing the Jewish community's institutional self-administration. The chief rabbi was joined by a Central Consistory, a second leadership body responsible for all secular matters. In the following decades, differences and con-

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29 Dimana Trankova and Antoni Georgiev, *A Guide to Jewish Bulgaria* (Sofia: America for Bulgaria Foundation, 2021).

30 "Struktura na naselenieto po veroizpovedanie."

flicts often arose between the grand rabbi, the notables, and the Central Consistory, which was soon dominated by Zionists. After 1920, the Consistory also took over the role of the school authority, putting an end to the secular curriculum and introducing Jewish religious instruction; those who went through this school system thus grew up with Hebrew. Parallel to this, the young generation became assimilated to Bulgarian, and hence Ladino increasingly declined as a language of internal communication. Jewish identity in the Kingdom of Bulgaria remained characterized by multilingualism and interculturality.

From the 1920s on, Bulgaria too saw an increase in political and societal anti-Semitism due to the rise of nationalist-chauvinist ideologies. The problem reached its peak after the outbreak of the Second World War; Sofia formed an alliance with Nazi Germany and passed anti-Jewish laws after 1940. Berlin demanded that the Bulgarian government too should commit to the "Final Solution" to the "Jewish question." The absolutist tsar, Boris III (1918–43), complied with the German government and allowed the deportation of ca. 10,000 Jews from the newly annexed territories of (southern) Thrace and Dobruja. When it became public knowledge that Bulgaria was also deporting its "own" Jews, there followed protests and interventions by politicians, intellectuals, Church representatives, and, not least, Jews. In March 1943, a complex interplay of various factors such as ideology, politics, the course of the war, self-interest, and personal sacrifice finally forced Tsar Boris III to stop the deportation of domestic Jews—but not those from the Bulgarian-occupied territories. Hence the Bulgarian Jews could write their own chapter in the transnational history of the Holocaust; they were one of the few Jewish communities to escape extermination. These multilayered events gave rise to the official narrative of "the savior of the Jews," which, serving a doctrine of ethnic tolerance, became the centerpiece of the Bulgarian national myth. Decades later, it is still considered an attack on the Bulgarian nation to question or criticize this version of history.[31]

In the 1940s, however, Bulgaria was only able to "save" its Jewish population for a few years. After the installation of the Communist regime, over 30,000 Jews (ca. 90 percent) migrated to Israel, where Jaffa became the new center for their community. Bulgarian Jews are one of the few Jewish communities to have almost entirely left their historical homeland for Israel. Their generally Zionist outlook was one of many factors triggering this mass emigration.[32]

With the massive weakening of the community in Bulgaria, but also due to the anti-religious and atheistic regime, the religiocultural life of Bulgarian Jews came to a standstill. They no longer had any rabbis and couldn't run their own schools. In 1959, the state's efforts to bring the Central Consistory into line were sealed when the latter officially announced it would actively participate in the development of so-

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31 Jacky Comforty, *The Stolen Narrative of the Bulgarian Jews and the Holocaust* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021), 145 ff.

32 Nasrin Arnold, *Zwischen kollektivem Gedächtnis und Neuorientierung: Identitätsmuster der bulgarischen Juden nach dem Holocaust* (Berlin: Frank & Timme, 2018), 135–90.

cialism and no longer sought to cultivate the particularist Jewish religion and culture. The Consistory was succeeded by a new organization.

After the end of the Communist regime, over 3,000 Jews emigrated from Israel to Bulgaria. This migration too weakened the remaining mini-community. Since the 1990s, it has nevertheless been revitalized, mainly thanks to the (financial) support of international Jewish aid organizations. The secular leadership and official representation was taken over by the newly formed organization *Shalom*, which seeks to offer a diverse religiocultural program.[33] In Sofia, a historical museum was opened, a Jewish school set up, and a publishing house founded. Synagogues are operational only in Sofia and Plovdiv, while in other towns they lie in ruins. For the young generation, Jewish religion is a key identity marker, although they maintain rather informal relations with the Jewish community.

4 Romania

Of all six Black Sea riparian states, Romania has the shortest coast. The ca. 225 kilometers (140 miles) largely run along the historical landscape of Dobruja. The center of the Romanian Black Sea coast region is the historical port city of Constanţa.

The Romanian census of 2011 recorded a total population of around twenty million, eighteen million of whom were Christians, ca. 64,000 Muslims, mostly in the Constanţa district (43,000), and around 3,500 Jews, largely in the capital, Bucharest.[34] According to the census of 1930, ca. 756,000 Jews and around 185,000 Muslims lived in (Greater) Romania, constituting ca. 4 percent and 1 percent of the total population, respectively.[35] Within a century, then, both religious communities, particularly the Jewish, contracted into ever smaller groups.

From the nineteenth century on, Jews and Muslims occupied the position of villains in Romania's official historiography due to historical and political myths, persistent monolithic national ideologies (Romanianization), and political ideals of uniformity and sovereignty. Given the idea of a homogenous Romanian nation, increasing calls for historical reappraisal and demythologization since the 1990s (for instance by Lucian Boia)[36] have given rise to heated public controversies and resistance.

The state of Romania emerged in 1918 out of the unification of the Kingdom of Romania with the Grand Duchy of Transylvania as part of the Kingdom of Hungary or the Habsburg Empire. The Kingdom of Romania had come into existence from 1859–61, when the two Romanian vassal states Moldavia (with Bessarabia) and Wallachia, for-

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[33] "Shalom: Organization of the Jews in Bulgaria," accessed March 21, 2023, www.shalom.bg/.

[34] "Recensământul populaţiei şi locuinţelor 2021," Institutul Naţional de Statistică, accessed May 20, 2023, https://www.recensamantromania.ro/rpl-2011/rezultate-2011/.

[35] Institutul Central de statistică, *Recensământul general al populaţiei României din 29 decemvrie 1930*, vol. 2, *Neam, limbă maternă, religie* (Bucharest: Monitorul Oficial. Imprimăria Naţională, 1938), XXIV.

[36] E. g., Lucian Boia, *Istorie şi mit în conştiinţa românească* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2011).

merly obliged to pay tribute to the Ottoman Empire, were politically united. Romania received full sovereignty in 1878. Its borders shifted several times up to 1948 due to territorial losses and gains (including Dobruja, Bessarabia, Transylvania, the Maramureş, and Bukovina). After 1918, Romania's state territory increased threefold, its total population growing from around 7.2 to seventeen million.

For centuries, the three large historical provinces of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania were destinations for various waves of immigration from abroad: Hungarians, Transylvanian Saxons, Ruthenes, Romani, Serbs, Jews, Swabians, Tatats, Turks, and others. In comparison to Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia remained relatively ethnically homogenous (that is, Romanian). A decidedly state-cultural homogenization policy after 1878 and 1918 heralded the decline of this historical ethnic and religious plurality. Flight, expulsions, deportations, emigration, population exchanges, and assimilation by the various minorities meant that the Romanian population grew from ca. 77 percent in 1930 to ca. 89 percent in 1992.[37]

4.1 Jews

The complex history of Jews in Romania dates back to the Roman era (from the first to the third century CE). Thin sources mention the presence of (individual) Jews on the Black Sea coast and elsewhere, while in later centuries there are various records of Jewish merchants with international networks. Organized Jewish community life in Transylvania is documented from the thirteen/fourteenth century onwards, and from the fifteenth/sixteenth century in Moldavia and Wallachia. Until the political unification of these three large historical provinces in 1859 and 1918, Jewish history was fragmented within different political, legal, and social systems. Accordingly, the legal, economic, and social status of Jews varied, also remaining subject to change due to various annexations or losses of (peripheral) territories (such as Bessarabia, Bukovina, Dobruja, and Transylvania).

The different Jewish histories in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania are a microcosm of the transnational Jewish history of Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Common to them all are diverse forms of historical immigration from abroad, be it following the official expulsion of Jews from other Christian European states (Hungary, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Germany, and elsewhere) or in the course of the excessive murder and looting campaigns during the Khmelnytskyi Uprising in the mid-seventeenth century. The temporary official invitation for Jews to go to Moldavia and Wallachia is unlikely to have caused comparable immigration, unlike the pogroms in Russia in the late nineteenth century. New streams of Jewish mass migration reached the three provinces, in each of which only a few thousand Jews lived in the early nineteenth cen-

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37 Peter Jordan and Thede Kahl, "Ethnische Struktur," in *Rumänien: Raum und Bevölkerung. Geschichte und Geschichtsbilder*, ed. Thede Kahl (Vienna: Lit Verlag, 2008), 63.

tury. According to the census of 1899, the Kingdom of Romania had a total of 266,000 Jews, around 197,000 of whom lived in Moldavia and around 69,000 in Wallachia and Dobruja.[38] Transylvania had a total of ca. 106,000 Jews in 1870. From the 1880s on, mass Jewish emigration to Western industrial states began, particularly to the USA. By 1914, a total of ca. 75,000 Jews had left the Kingdom of Romania and Transylvania.[39]

The historical migration waves from abroad had a sustained impact not only on Jewish demography but also on the local ethnolinguistic and cultural diversity that had grown in the region. From the eighteenth century on, the Ashkenazi tradition dominated, with Hebrew as the language of worship in most communities. Previously, the local majority had been Sephardim, who used Ladino both in their daily lives and their worship. Following the end of Ottoman rule over Transylvania (Hungary), many Jews emigrated to the Ottoman Empire. In Romania's three large provinces, the Jewish population underwent various processes of acculturation; in Habsburg-Hungarian Transylvania, they largely became Magyarized, while in Moldavia and Wallachia they mostly became acculturated to the Romanian majority. The ethnic situation fundamentally shifted when thousands of Polish-, Russian-, and Yiddish-speaking Jews emigrated from Bukovina, Galicia, Poland, Bohemia, and Russia. Many brought with them the religious conservative reform movement of the Hasidim ("the pious"), which had a broad reception in Moldavia. In Wallachia (and Dobruja), community life received new impetus following the arrival of Sephardic Jews from Bulgaria; earlier Sephardic centers in Bucharest, Craiova, Turnu Severin, and Timişoara were revitalized, and there were also signs of revival in other towns such as Iaşi, Brăila, and Constanţa.

Along with this considerable ethnic diversity, Jewry in Romania is also characterized by a variety of histories. Of the three large provinces, the principality of Moldavia, an Ottoman tributary, led in terms of demography and self-administration. In its capital, Iaşi, the Great Synagogue opened in 1670; it is one of Romania's oldest remaining synagogues. It was also the residence of the chief rabbi, who was subordinate to the chief rabbi of Istanbul. In Moldavia (and Wallachia), settlement, employment, and property rights remained highly restrictive for Jews for centuries. There was also a firm religiously motivated anti-Semitism after the Orthodox Church officially declared Jews heretics and forbade all Christians from having contact with them in 1640. Over the centuries, this discourse further fueled the blood libel, accusations, attacks, and pogroms.

Under Russian rule (1819–56), the situation for Jews worsened. A new state civil law drastically limited their civil options; only (Orthodox) Christian enjoyed political and citizens' rights. Jews (and Muslims) were practically declared "foreigners". The

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38 Leonida Colescu, ed., *Recensământul General al Populaţiei României: Rezultate definitive* (Bucharest: Institutul de Arte Grafice "Eminescu", 1905), 72.

39 Ladislau Gyémánt, "Transylvania," YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe, October 28, 2010, accessed May 29, 2023, https://yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Transylvania; Leon Volovici, "Romania", YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe, November 19, 2010, accessed May 29, 2023, https://yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Romania.

law also introduced the category of "vagabond" for Jews without profession, property, or fixed abode; they could now be officially expelled. After the political union of Moldavia and Wallachia (1859/61), anti-Semitism in society and politics intensified. The nation-building program made the civil emancipation of Jews (and Muslims) virtually impossible; they could only be "naturalized" on an individual basis, and by the parliament. The costs of this legal process, which also took many years, meant that only a few thousand Jews had been "naturalized" by 1918. There is hardly any other country in which their political and civil emancipation remained as dependent on international politics and diplomacy.[40] The enlightened Jewish population nevertheless wrote a significant chapter in the country's cultural history. Along with Iaşi, the capital, Bucharest, developed into a center where not only a diverse press flourished: In 1876, the Jewish State Theater was founded there—a unique institution worldwide whose interrupted history has extended into the twenty-first century.[41]

In Transylvania, the Jewish community lived in better social and economic circumstances than in Moldavia and Wallachia thanks to a more favorable legal situation. Jews had received official privileges under Ottoman sovereignty (in 1623). Under Habsburg sovereignty, (after 1687) they enjoyed freedom of movement and settlement, trading rights and rights of worship, some of which were later withdrawn. Following the foundation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1867, Transylvania's ca. 23,000 Jews were granted equality before the law. After further immigration, in the late nineteenth century Jewish settlement was densest in the northwestern region of Crişana-Maramureş (Hungarian: Máramoros, Körösvidék, German: Marmarosch-Kreisch), where more than half of all Transylvanian Jews lived (around 62,000 out of a total of ca. 102,000). Characteristic of Jewish history in Transylvania is a broader acceptance of the European Jewish Enlightenment (Haskala) than in the Romanian principalities; in many urban centers, Jewish communities adopted the modernized religious and ritual reforms. Here too, acceptance or rejection of this reform Judaism divided the communities into Orthodox (conservative) and liberal (neolog) factions. It was in Transylvania that most liberal synagogues were built (Braşov, Arad, Oradea, and elsewhere).[42]

After the Kingdom of Romania merged with Transylvania in 1918, the historically different ethnic and religious Jewish traditions and histories were confronted with one another. They did not form a common cultural identity in the nation state of Greater Romania; there was not enough time before the Shoah in the early 1940s, their historical differences were too great, and their opportunities for national integration too few

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40 Carol Iancu, *Jews in Romania 1866–1919: From Exclusion to Emancipation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

41 Liviu Rotman, *The Romanian Kehilla: The Pulse, Character, and History of the Jewish Community in Romania* (Tel Aviv: The Goldstein-Goren Diaspora Research Center, 2015).

42 Ladislau Gyémánt, *Evreii din Transilvania: Destin istoric* (Cluj-Napoca: Institutul Cultural Roman, 2004); Moshe Carmilly-Weinberger, *Istoria evreilor din Transilvania (1623–1944)* (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 1994).

given the ideology of a monolithic Romanian nation and the hostility towards the "country's misfortune."

Before the Shoah, Romania already had the third-largest Jewish community in Europe, after Poland and Russia: around 756,000 (1930 census). For them too, the Holocaust meant flight, mass deportations, and murder, even if Romania's government, similarly to Bulgaria's, was able to negotiate with Nazi Germany on the "Final Solution to the Jewish question" and initially limited its extent. Nevertheless, a total of over 260,000 Jews were deported from Romania and murdered, under Romanian sovereignty, in what was known as the Transnistria Governorate on occupied Soviet territory. At the same time, thousands of Jews left Romania.[43]

The ca. 295,000 survivors constituted what was then the second-largest Jewish community in Europe. They continued to write Jewish history in Romania, albeit with interruptions and constant demographic decline. After the war had ended, Romania fell under Communist rule. Following a decade of Stalinism, a political "thaw" began in 1956, in the era of national communism (until 1989). Despite political instrumentalization and repressive official religious policy, Jews began to reorganize. New Jewish community life became possible not least thanks to Chief Rabbi Moses Rosen (1912–94). The Federation of Jewish Communities of Romania (FEDROM) was also established, becoming the country's most influential Jewish organization. In Bucharest, the Jewish State Theater remained functional, under state censorship, and a censored Jewish press could publish. Up to 1989, a total of ca. 280,000 Jews left Romania for Israel and the USA.[44] The emigration trend continued in the post-communist era; the census of 2011 recorded ca. 3,500 Jews. Only twenty-one of FEDROM's total of eighty-seven synagogues are still used for worship. In the late 2000s, Jewish youth in Romania was considered more religious than Jewish youth in other Eastern European countries.[45]

4.2 Muslims

In Romania, Muslims have always settled largely in the coastal region of Dobruja. The capital, Bucharest, has an Islamic community with several thousand members. Ethnically, they consider themselves Tatars, Turks, or Turco-Tatars. In terms of religion, Romania's Muslims are a relatively homogenous group; most of them are Sunnis and follow the moderate tradition of Hanafi law.

Dobruja gained notoriety in Antiquity. In the early first century CE, the Roman princely poet Ovid, in exile in Tomis, today's Constanţa, warned of this desolate

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43 On this well-researched period, cf. the chapter by Mariana Hausleitner in this volume.

44 Carol Bines, *Din istoria emigrărilor în Israel* (Bucharest: Editura Hasefer, 1998), 94.

45 Erik H. Cohen, *Jewish Youth Around the World, 1990–2010: Social Identity and Values in a Comparative Approach* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 95.

place.[46] In later periods, its isolation was due to political and spatial factors. As part of the Ottoman Empire (1417/84–1878), for Istanbul it lay on the political periphery. It was separated from the bordering western and northern territories by the Danube and its Black Sea delta. Dobruja's luminal status changed from the nineteenth century onwards. After the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828/29 and the Crimean War (1853–56), many Tatars in particular sought and found refuge there. The different migration waves expanded the local internal Tatar spectrum; the Crimean Tatars quickly became the majority, and their subsequent generations attained cultural and intellectual dominance among the Muslims in the region. During the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78, Dobruja became the center of the political and military conflicts between Istanbul and St. Petersburg, and was split in two after the Ottoman defeat: Northern Dobruja with ca. 71,000 Tatars and 48,000 Turks[47] went to the young Kingdom of Romania (Moldavia and Wallachia) in exchange for southern Bessarabia, which went to Russia. The smaller Southern Dobruja went to Bulgaria.

In this region too, the Ottoman withdrawal also triggered considerable Muslim emigration to the Ottoman Empire, a pattern that lasted well into the twentieth century. These migration waves with various motivations weakened the remaining mini-society in particular and transformed the ethnoreligious structure of Dobruja's population in general. Christians gradually became the majority, forming an even larger ethnic and religious mosaic than the Muslims (Romanians, Bulgarians, Russians, Gagauz—an Orthodox Turkish people—Greeks, and Germans).

The Romanian government placed annexed Dobruja under a special administration (1878–1913) that rather amounted to a combination of territorial exclusion and symbolic inclusion.[48] Bucharest introduced extensive Romanianization measures, and the mass expropriation, the destruction of mosques, and recruitment for military service triggered another significant wave of Muslim emigration. As non-Christians, Muslims did not receive Romanian citizenship or political and civil rights. Bucharest pursued an interventionist religious policy with regard to Muslims; their religious and community life, their self-administration (the establishment of four mufti's offices), and their educational infrastructure were under state supervision. In 1889, the prestigious Muslim Seminar in Babadag (Turkish: Babadağ), where future imams and Quran teachers received their foundational theological schooling with Turkish and Quranic Arabic language training, was reorganized under state auspices. The representative seminary was transferred to Medgidia, in today's Constanţa district, in 1901,

46 Publius Ovidius Naso, *Briefe aus der Verbannung. Lateinisch und deutsch*, trans. Wilhelm Willige (Mannheim: Artemis und Winkler, 2011), 155 (Lieder der Trauer III.10–11, 70–76).

47 Kemal Karpat, "Ottoman Urbanism: The Crimean Emigration to Dobruca and the Founding of Mecidiye, 1856–1878," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 5, no. 1 (1984–85): 226

48 Metin Omer, "Tătarii din Dobrogea (România) de la 1878 până la al Doilea Război Mondial," in *Un Destin la Marea Neagră: Tătarii din Dobrogea*, ed. Metin Omer (Cluj-Napoca: ISPMN, 2017), 16–99.

and remained operational until 1967.[49] The most important Muslim educational institution, it reopened in the mid-1990s, as did, in the early 2000s, the Colegiul Naţional "Kemal Atatürk" Medgidia (with the status of a faculty and funded by Ankara).[50]

Around thirty-three mosques,[51] many cemeteries, mausoleums, and graves of Muslim saints remain of Dobruja's Ottoman era. The largest mosque is from the Romanian era, in Constanţa; Carol I Mosque was consecrated in 1913 as a "gift to the Muslims."[52] The same year, Bucharest annexed Southern Dobruja, which belonged to Romania until 1940.

During the national communist era (1947–89) and state-prescribed atheism, the Romanian government continued to seek to eradicate the Islamic-Oriental influence in Dobruja and indeed throughout the country. Bucharest ordered new Romanianization measures, closing Turkish schools. The Turks and the Tatars, then around 40,000 in total, underwent social and societal assimilation, whether they liked it or not. In the post-communist era from the 1990s on, their mini-community too saw a religiocultural revival. Their historical ethnic fragmentation, and their intra-Islamic problems and rivalries, remained. There emerged a Tatar movement that took up and cultivated transnational ties with Turkey, the Crimean Peninsula, and Central Asia based on the idea of linguistic-cultural unity.[53] The muftiate, the official institutional representative of Muslims in Constanţa, under Murat Yusuf since 2005, rejects such orientations and emphasizes not only Muslims' fidelity and loyalty but also "unity in diversity" as their identity markers.[54]

Like all other minority parties, Muslims too have had a seat in both the Romanian Senate and the House of Representatives since 1990. Moreover, there are also Muslims who serve as representatives of the large popular parties in the parliament and the city and town councils. Many new associations have also been formed.

Since the end of the twentieth century, the fragility of Islamic identities in Romania has continued to weaken.[55] Muslim preachers from the Middle East imported fundamentalist Salafist ideas and rigid religious rules and rituals. They did not meet with much resonance and acceptance among local Muslims, since they not only reject exter-

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49 The renowned historian of Turkey Kemal Karpat (1925–2019), who changed his name in a nod to the Romanian high mountains, attended this seminary. For Karpat's personal memories of the seminary, see Adriana Cupcea, Manuela Marin, and Metin Omer, eds., *Seminarul Musulman din Medgidia: Documente şi memorie* (Cluj-Napoca: Editura ISPMN, 2016), 21–30.

50 Colegiul Naţional "Kemal Atatürk" Medgidia, accessed June 1, 2023, https://colegiulataturk.ro/.

51 For a survey of Muslim institutions (up to 2015), see Thede Kahl, "Die muslimische Gemeinschaft Rumäniens: Der Weg einer Elite zur marginalisierten Minderheit," *Europa Regional* 13, no. 3 (2005): 98.

52 It is also said to have been a display of gratitude to Istanbul for recognizing the Romanian state. Jürgen Henkel, *Halbmond über der Dobrudscha: Der Islam in Rumänien* (Sibiu: Schiller Verlag, 2015), 92.

53 Adriana Cupcea, *Asserting Ethnicity: The Tatars from Dobruja* (Romania) (Cluj-Napoca: ISPMN, 2016).

54 Adina Bocai, "Muftiul Muurat Iusuf," *Interetnica*, March 9, 2015, http://interetnica.ro/muftiul-muurat-iusuf-exista-diferenta-de-interpretare-islamului-in-randul-sunitilor-din-romania/.

55 Alina Isac Alak. "Types of Religious Identities Within Romanian Muslim Communities," *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 41 (2015): 148–73.

nal neoconservative controls (including those from Turkey), but have always preferred more liberal understandings of Islam. The Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs, the *Diyanet*, is raising its own voice and cultivating competition to the mufti.

Compared to other Turkish Muslim minorities in the Balkan countries, the Muslims in Dobruja have experienced less state oppression in the region's 150-year history as part of Romania. They are nevertheless certainly familiar with discrimination. To this day, there is a lack of public discourses on Islam, Muslims, and their place in Romanian society. They have, however, registered small successes with respect to public recognition. In 2006, a national Day of the Tatar Ethnicity (December 13) was introduced, and in 2008 a Day of the Tatar Language (May 5). The same year, the Romanian government passed a new statute recognizing all Muslims in Romania as an autonomous and centrally self-administered religious community.

5 Ukraine

Unlike those in the other countries in this chapter, the long and rich Jewish and Muslim histories in Russia and Ukraine are not examined for the entire state territories. A comprehensive survey would be far beyond the scope of the chapter. Hence I provide an exemplary regional focus on Odesa (Jews) and the Crimean Peninsula (Muslims, Jews, and Karaites) as important historical centers of these religious communities.

5.1 Jews in Odesa

In comparison to other historical urban centers on the Black Sea coast, Odesa's history begins late, towards the end of the eighteenth century, after the northern Black Sea region came under the rule of St. Petersburg. Tsarina Catherine II had Odesa built from scratch, as it were, in 1789, on the site of the Ottoman fortress Yeni-Dünya ("New World"), near the settlement of Kachybei. Due to flourishing grain exports, the planned, free trade city (from 1817 on) developed into a booming metropolis of international trade with a Western European cultural profile (theater, press, etc.). As an impressive neo-Classical city with wide boulevards, the planned city was also symbolic of St. Petersburg's imperial expansion to the southeast and economic boom in Southern Russia. Thanks to a more liberal official immigration policy, thousands of domestic and foreign migrants moved to Odesa, which for many became a more accessible "America." Odesa had a population of ca. 2,300 around 1795, ca. 110,000 around 1861, ca. 630,000 around 1914,[56] and about a million around 2001 (census). The many migrants gave the

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[56] Patricia Herlihy, *Odessa: A History, 1794–1914* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), 234.

port city its own multicultural and cosmopolitan character,[57] a special myth that is perpetuated to this day.[58]

Ca. 246 Jews lived in Odesa around 1795.[59] In the course of the nineteenth century, Jews from Galicia (Ukraine, Poland) and Germany immigrated, mostly Ashkenazim, whose religiocultural tradition remained the dominant one. Odesa became a center of the Jewish Enlightenment movement (Haskala); in 1826, the first school for boys with a modernized curriculum opened, followed by a girls' school in 1835. After the abolition of Jewish self-administration/autonomy, Odesa's Jews too embarked on a process of bourgeois emancipation. Leadership of the heterogeneous and constantly growing Jewish community was adopted by its new ambitious economic elite.

Around 1897, Odesa had a population of ca. 400,000, around 139,000 of whom were Jews. It was the only city in the settlement raion in which Jews were permitted to live without interruption. Odesa developed into the most important metropolis in the Tsarist Empire's Jewish settlement raion after Warsaw, and was considered the most progressive Jewish center in comparison to Polish Lublin, the Jewish "Oxford," or Vilna, the historical rabbinic bastion and Eastern European center of the Jewish Enlightenment movement. Jewish folklore influenced various idioms characteristic of Odesa as a place of worldly-divine existence ("live like God in Odesa") and as a place around which the "flames of the fires of hell burned seven miles wide," since Odesa offered many of the freedoms and opportunities of frivolous city life (for instance, brothels). In juxtaposition to its reputation, the port city had eight large synagogues, the oldest being the Brody Synagogue of 1840, and around fifty prayer houses. However, pogroms, Zionism, and not least of all a well-developed Yiddish-Russian literature and press (until 1921) were also characteristic of Odesa. Under Tsar Alexander II (1855–81), the general situation for the Jewish population in the Russian Empire improved thanks to political and social reforms. Rights of settlement became less restrictive and Jews obtained access to free professions; there developed the first generation of Jewish journalists, censors, and doctors, the first Jewish Russian newspapers appeared (Odesa), and reformed synagogues were established. Most Jews adopted the Russian language and sought to integrate into Russian society, but discrimination remained.[60] After the death of Tsar Alexander II (in 1881), the socioreligious tensions escalated into violence. Around 259 pogroms were registered, mostly in rural areas (219). Jews were held responsible for the negative consequences of modernization and industrialization. Their economic, political, and social rights were restricted, with the exception of Jewish converts to Orthodox Christianity, but the deadly brutality culminated in a second wave

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57 On the ethnic diversity around 1897, see Evrydiki Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa: Peoples, Spaces, Identities* (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 239 ff.

58 For the dominant Jewish perspective, cf. Jarrod Tanny, *City of Rogues and Schnorrers: Russia's Jews and the Myth of Old Odessa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011).

59 All Jewish demographic figures are taken from *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 2nd ed. (Detroit: Macmillan), s.v. "Odessa."

60 Steven J. Zipperstein, *The Jews of Odessa 1794–1881* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985).

of pogroms. A pogrom in Kishinev (Bessarabia; today: Chişinău) in 1903 was followed by a further 700 violent episodes or pogroms. A total of ca. 3,000 Jews had died by 1906, around 800 of them in Odesa. This put an end to Jewish hopes for civil and citizens' integration into Russian society, and ushered in mass emigration to Europe, the USA, and Palestine.[61]

Odesa also became a center of (organized) Zionism, which the Russian government initially tolerated and later banned. In the Jewish quarter, Moldavanka, the physician Leon Pinsker (1821–91), initially an advocate of Jewish Russian assimilation, founded the first Zionist organization in the Tsarist Empire. It was here that he wrote his famous work *Autoemancipation* (1882), which was published anonymously and included the demand that Jews have a territory of their own. Odesa is also associated with the name Vladimir Zhabotinskii/Ze'ev Jabotinsky (1880–1940), who founded the controversial nationalist revisionist Zionism.[62] In 1905, the Zionist Socialist Workers' Party was formed in Odesa, quickly becoming the second-largest Jewish party after the Bund.[63] It was active until 1917.

From the late nineteenth century onwards, Odesa primarily became a center of intellectuals, writers, revolutionaries, and the Jewish Russian press and literature. Since most Jewish authors wrote in Russian, Yiddish literature and the Russian language/culture are virtually inseparable. One of Odesa's most famous sons is the Jewish journalist and prose writer Isaak Babel (1894–1940). His world famous *Odessa Stories*, written in the 1920s, are a literary monument to pre-Revolutionary Odesa, which he presents with great humor and irony as an Eldorado for crooks and thieves whose inhabitants navigate the misery of their daily lives with much intrigue and piety. Other texts too exploit the literary topos of Odesa as a city of crooks and thieves, creating a disproportionate narrative of the "good old days" and perpetuating the myth of old Odesa.[64]

Around 1939, of Odesa's total population of over 600,000, ca. 200,000 were Jews, forming the second-largest Jewish community in Ukraine. After Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union (June 1941), catastrophic dark years began for Odesa too. Together with Transnistria, the city came under Romanian occupation. In October 1941, more than 25,000 Odesans were massacred and the Jewish population was ghettoized (ca. 35,000). There followed deportations to labor camps in Transnistria, from which few returned. This local manifestation of the Holocaust halved the population of Odesa. Around 108,000 Jews survived.

In the Soviet era, despite their patriotic loyalties, Jews continued to be confronted with hostility. The Stalinist regime fought them as "rootless cosmopolitans" and "Zion-

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61 John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza, eds., *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Jewish History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

62 Many of Israel's right-wing conservative politicians are from Odesa or Ukraine. Cf. Colin Shindler, *The Rise of the Israeli Right: From Odessa to Hebron* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

63 General Jewish Labor Bund in Lithuania, Poland, and Russia (1897–1935).

64 For instance, *The Twelve Chairs* (1928) and *The Golden Calf* (1931) by Ilya Ilf and Evgenii Petrov or Jabotinski's less-known novel *The Five* (1936).

ists" and sought to liquidate them along with other ethnicities and religious communities, and indeed religiocultural identities in general. After Stalin's death, the general situation improved, but in the 1960s a new wave of Jewish migration to the USA, Europe, and Israel began, putting an end to Odesa's Jewish community life. Around 1989, the city had ca. 66,000 Jewish inhabitants.

After the end of the USSR, like many Eastern bloc cities, Odesa oscillated between tradition and a new start. The city has taken up its legendary cosmopolitanism, reflected not only in its historically diverse ethnic street names but also by the many new cafés and restaurants in the restored center, which offer a Ukrainian, Jewish, Armenian, and Greek culinary mélange. Beyond this new cosmopolitan Odesa of the rich, most Odesans live in precarious circumstances.[65] According to the census of 2001, Odesa had ca. 12,000 Jews.[66] Since 2019, Ukraine has had a president of Jewish origin elected by the majority of the population (Volodymyr Zelenskyi).

6 The Crimean Peninsula

The Crimean Peninsula has been inhabited since Antiquity. The Tauri (the indigenous population) and Cimmerians were followed by the Scythians in historical times. The Black Sea coast soon had a series of cities formed by Greek colonists under Roman rule and later, in some cases, under Byzantine influence. For centuries, the northern Black Sea steppes were the site of various waves of migration from Europe and Asia (Sarmatians, Huns, Goths, Turks, and Mongols), and political rule also changed hands (Khazars, Mongols/the Golden Horde or the Great Horde, Genoese, Venetians, and Lithuanians). From the fifteenth century on, the Tatar Muslim Giray dynasty was able to establish itself as the dominant political and religiocultural force in the region, forming the Crimean Khanate with the new capital of Bağçasaray. The Crimean Khanate stood under Ottoman sovereignty with privileged political status and autonomy.

In 1783, St. Petersburg annexed the Crimean Peninsula and launched a comprehensive process of religiocultural Russification, claiming that Crimea had always been a Russian land and the "cradle" of Russian Orthodoxy; as such, it had to be defended as a bulwark and outmost bastion of the Russian Empire in the battle against Christian and Muslim enemies. Crimea as the "pearl of Russia" became a longstanding myth that caused tensions and conflicts with the local largely Sunni Tatar population from the nineteenth century on. It remains virulent to this day; the discourse surrounding Rus-

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65 Marina Sapritsky, "Negotiating Cosmopolitanism: Migration, Religious Education und Shifting Jewish Orientations in Post-Soviet Odessa," in *Post-Cosmopolitan Cities: Explorations of Urban Coexistence*, ed. Caroline Humphrey and Vera Skvirskaja (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 65 – 93.
66 "All-Ukrainian Population Census: Databank," State Statistics Service of Ukraine, accessed May 21, 2023, http://db.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Database/Census/databasetree_en.asp.

sia's annexation of Crimea in contravention of international law in 2014 belongs to this narrative of Crimea as part of the "Russian world."[67]

6.1 Muslims

Muslim traders and mystics (Sufis) from Asia Minor took Sunni Islam with them to the Crimean Peninsula between the ninth and eleventh centuries. The Crimean Khanate (1443–1783) with Sunni Islam as its state religion long remained a dominant Islamic center and buffer zone between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires. After Russia's annexation of the peninsula in 1783, St. Petersburg pursued a firm policy of settlement and urbanization. The first immigrants were German, Swiss, and Italian colonists, followed mostly by Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, and Greek settlers. The former were supposed to contribute to (Western) modernization, the latter to the reinforcement of minority Christianity. St. Petersburg granted the Muslim (Crimean) Tatars, ca. 80 percent of the local population, autonomous religious self-administration (a mufti). Nevertheless, their socioreligious transformation from a majority to minority had begun, and was complete by the end of the nineteenth century. This process was accelerated by migration waves, especially those in the course of the Crimean War (1853–56), from and after which around 200,000 Crimean Tatars fled to the Ottoman Empire. This significant departure meant not only local demographic decline, but also de-territorialization and the transformation of the Crimean Tatars from a compact to a transnational community.[68]

The decline of Islam in Crimea also facilitated the marked state Russification and promotion of Orthodox Christianity (the construction of Russian schools, the transformation of mosques into churches, and Russian immigration).[69] Around 1897, Crimean Tatars and Russians had become almost equal in number (ca. 194,000 and 180,000, or 35 percent and 33 percent of the population, respectively). However, the historical decline of Islam was also evident in the strong reduction in active mosques. Before 1914, only 700 out of around 1,600 mosques were still operational.[70]

In this period, the Crimean Peninsula not only transformed into a place of yearning for the Russian aristocracy, who had many palaces built on its riviera; during and after the revolutionary upheaval of 1905, it also became a center for the anti-revolutionary forces of the Tsarist Empire. Like many other (small) nationalities, the Crimean

67 Kerstin S. Jobst, *Die Perle des Imperiums: Der russische Krim-Diskurs im Zarenreich* (Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2007); Kerstin S. Jobst, *Geschichte der Krim: Iphigenie und Putin auf Tauris* (Oldenburg: DeGruyter 2020), 313–24.
68 Filiz T. Aydin, *Émigré: Exile, Diaspora, and Transnational Movements of the Crimean Tatars. Preserving the Eternal Flame of Crimea* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021).
69 Mara Kozelsky, *Christianizing Crimea: Shaping Sacred Space in the Russian Empire and Beyond* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010), 62 ff.
70 Elmira Muratova, "Ukraine," *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe* 5 (2013): 670.

Tatars responded to the issues of nationalism and political sovereignty with demands for cultural autonomy or political independence.

The Red Army's invasion in 1917, however, created new political realities. The year 1921 saw the proclamation of the Taurida Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The catastrophic famine of 1921/22 claimed countless thousands of lives and triggered a new wave of Crimean Tatar migration to Turkey and Romania. Nevertheless, for those who remained, relatively prosperous years remained ahead. Political participation was open to Crimean Tatars; they could cultivate their religion and culture with their own public institutions (including a theater, a press, and a mufti's office). In the late 1920s, however, hard times began due to the Soviet policy of collectivization and "rooting" (*korenizatsiia*); in Crimea too, this meant expropriation, the liquidation of the political elite, the intelligentsia, and the clergy, and the closure of religiocultural institutions. The use of the Arabic alphabet for the Crimean Tatar language was also abolished and replaced with its Latin counterpart, and later with Cyrillic. The new great famine and the "purges" under the Stalinist regime in the 1930s largely destroyed the local Crimean culture. Around 1940, not a single mosque remained open.[71]

Under Nazi German occupation (1942–44), some Crimean Tatars collaborated with the new powers, while others joined the resistance movement or remained apolitical. Immediately after retaking the peninsula, the Soviets embarked on a policy of forced deportation of the Crimean Tatars and other "foreign" immigrants in May 1944. Moscow accused them of "collective betrayal" and collaboration with Nazi Germany. Within a few days, ca. 180,000 people (the elderly, women, and children) were forcibly deported to Central Asian republics. The men followed in 1946. This brutal deportation represented the Crimean Tatars' historic nadir, which has become a transgenerational "chosen trauma" (Vamık Volkan) for them.[72]

For those who remained, as part of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic after 1954, there followed decades without clergy (imams, mullahs, or hodjas), without official institutions (mosques, prayer houses, etc.), and without traditional religious schooling (Quran schools). Militant state atheism also meant that the older generation lived and handed down Islam on an individual and private basis while many young Muslims assimilated to the secular majority. In rural areas, however, Crimean Tatars still celebrated their traditional religious festivals, to which many travelled from abroad (Central Asia, Turkey, and Romania). Crimea, the "green island," became a religious center and yearned-for destination for the transnational community of Crimean Tatars.

After their official rehabilitation by Moscow in 1967, only a few handpicked Crimean Tatars could officially return from exile. It was not until after 1988 that the Ukrainian authorities allowed their collective re-migration. For the local community of ca. 38,000 Crimean Tatars (1989 census), this demographic increase of ca. 200,000

71 Brian Williams, *The Crimean Tatars: The Diaspora Experience and the Forging of a Nation* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 334–73.

72 Greta Lynn Uehling, *Beyond Memory: The Crimean Tatars' Deportation and Return* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

meant significant collective reinforcement, even if most of those who returned spoke Russian.

Post-Soviet Ukraine's nation-building saw the Crimean Tatars marginalized on the one hand, but on the other hand they were increasingly included in the concept of a political Ukrainian nation by Muslim and Christian actors.[73] They also enjoyed a historical endogenous ethnonational, religiocultural revival from the 1990s onwards. As the "autochthonous population" of Crimea, the two identities rejected their minority status and placed a focus on religion/Islam. Crimean Tatars gave themselves a national flag, formed autonomous political and religious institutions (the National Asssembly/Qurultay, National Council/Meclis, religious administration/mufti's office, or the Crimean Muslim Spiritual Board/SAMC).[74] They also gradually regained their mosques, land, and property. They were nevertheless prohibited from settling in their earlier home towns in southern Crimea.[75] The census of 2001 recorded ca. 243,000 Crimean Tatars living in Crimea, which had a total population of just over two million.[76]

The religious field of Islam was lent a new dynamic not only by local actors and discourses but also by foreign Islamic actors, some with strongly competing religious ideas, including the Turkish government with its neo-Ottoman trend, the government of Tatarstan, and Islamic missionaries/organizations from the Middle East. They became involved in all areas of the Crimean Tatar revival via considerable financial resources. In contrast to the foreign Islamic influences, Crimean Tatars emphasize their own peaceful and tolerant "Tatar Islam," in which they recognize historical ties with Turkey. They firmly distance themselves from Middle Eastern fundamentalist Islam with its anti-state tendencies.

The endogenous and exogenous revitalization of the Crimean Tatars and Islam activated old and new interethnic and interreligious lines of conflict within the population as a whole. Particularly the Russian and Ukrainian majority population remained suspicious and dismissive of the Crimean Tatars and their fight for official sociopolitical recognition and rights.

Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, not recognized by many Crimean Tatars with Ukrainian loyalties, or by the international community, added another chapter to the Crimean Tatars' history of collective trauma. For the most part, they lost their local autonomy. Their media (TV, press) were dissolved, and in 2016 the National Coun-

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73 Stefan Rohdewald, "Vom ukrainischen 'Antemurale Christianitatis' zur politischen Nation? Geschichtsbilder der Ukraine und muslimische Krimtataren," In *Religiöse Pluralität als Faktor des Politischen in der Ukraine*, ed. Katrin Boeckh and Oleh Turij (Munich: Biblion Media, 2015), 268 – 86.

74 Following internal differences, a second, competing spiritual representative body based in Ievpatoriia was formed in 2010 (the Spiritual Center of the Muslims of Crimea/DTsMK), an offshoot of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Ukraine.

75 Didem Buhari Gulmez, "Religion and Nation-Building in Crimea," in *Nation-Building and Identity in the Post-Soviet Space: New Tools and Approaches*, ed. Rico Isaacs and Abel Polese (London: Routledge, 2016), 65 – 82.

76 "All-Ukrainian Census 2001: The Distribution of Population by Nationality and mother tongue," State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, accessed May 21, 2023, http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/.

cil (*Meclis*) was banned as an "extremist" organization. Moscow established an over-centralized, patriarchal-authoritarian religious policy involving raids of mosques, the censorship of religious literature, and combating "terrorists" via a rigid practice of registering all religious organizations. Most foreign Islamic actors were extradited, with the exception of those from Turkey and Tatarstan. Only the Crimean Muslim Spiritual Board (SAMC) was able to strengthen its position as an institutional representative body, despite considerable internal tensions (accusations of collaboration with Russia). Overall, the Crimean Tatars, although very fragmented ethnically and politically, largely responded to the Russian occupation and political pressure with civil disobedience, peaceful strategies, and emigration to non-occupied areas of Ukraine. Mustafa Cemilev (also Dzhemilev), who has led the community the 1960s, was again re-elected to the Ukrainian parliament in 2019.[77]

Since the eighteenth century, characteristic aspects of the history of the Crimean Tatars remain their demographic and religiocultural decline, their transformation from a majority to a minority after several migration waves, and their forced deportation from 1944–46. Crimean Tatars became a flourishing transnational community for whom the "green island" of Crimea became a religious center and key *lieu de mémoire*. As for many other societies, for Crimean Tatars Islam is chiefly associated with cultural identity.

6.2 Jews and Karaites

The Jewish presence in Crimea also offers a multiethnic and multireligious spectrum that emerged and changed over centuries. The Jewish historical beginnings in southeastern and western Crimea (Kerch, Sevastopol) date back to the first century BCE. Whether or not the Romaniote communities in the Greek colonial cities along the Black Sea coast survived the many migrations of the peoples remains unclear; scholars have little firm historical and archaeological information on the legendary Khazar Empire (seventh to tenth century), whose ruling dynasty and upper strata are said to have converted to Judaism.[78] In this era, many Jews fled forced conversion or persecution in Byzantium for the Khazar Crimean Peninsula, where they enlarged the Crimean Jewish

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77 Elmira Muratova, "The Transformations of the Crimean Tatars' Institutions and Discourses after 2014," *Journal of Nationalism, Memory, and Language Politics* 13, no. 1 (2019): 44–66, https://doi.org/10.2478/jnmlp-2019-0006.

78 There is some controversy surrounding the issue; most scholars think that they did, while some argue that they didn't (Shaul Stampfer, Moshe Gil). Peter B. Golden, "The Conversion of the Khazars to Judaism," in *The World of the Khazars: New Perspectives. Selected Papers from the Jerusalem 1999 International Khazar Colloquium*, ed. Peter B. Golden, Haggai Ben-Shammai, and András Roná-Tas (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 123–62; Saul Stampfer, "Did the Khazars Convert to Judaism?," *Jewish Social Studies* 19, no. 3 (2013): 1–72; Moshe Gil, "Did the Khazars Convert to Judaism," *Revue des Études Juives* 170, no. 3–4 (2011), 429–42.

population, which formed a peripheral community within the Graeco-Jewish world. Additionally, the prosperous maritime trade cities under Genoese rule (in the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries) attracted many Sephardic Jews from Europe and the Middle East. Following the Ottoman conquest, in the early sixteenth century the Crimean Jews wrote their own prayer book (Caffa ritual), laying the foundation for a distinct Crimean Jewish identity that remained open to foreign Jewish migration into the eighteenth century, primarily from the Mediterranean countries and later from Poland, Ukraine, and Russia.[79]

Any discussion of Jewish diversity in Crimea must make mention of the Karaites, on which a new branch of scholarship has existed since the 1990s, while the general Jewish history of Crimea remains a research desideratum. The Karaites are one of the oldest remaining religious traditions of rabbinic Jewry, having emerged in the Near Orient in the eighth/ninth century. Karaite theology and worship recognize the Torah (Jewish biblical scripture) as the sole normative text. They reject the Talmud, a central pillar of rabbinic Jews' faith as the divinely inspired spoken word. With their fundamental rabbinic criticism, Karaite Jews are one of the oldest reform movements within Judaism. They spread from the Near Orient to North Africa and Western and Southeastern Europe; Istanbul became a bastion of Karaite scholarship and remained the center of their movement into the eighteenth century. Administratively, the Karaite communities mostly belonged to the rabbinic community, while they were/are usually separate in religiocultural terms. Karaites retain their own food laws and holidays, and their synagogues and cemeteries are usually located in the immediate vicinity of rabbinic infrastructure, with the exception of their branches in Crimea, Ukraine, and Lithuania.[80]

The documented historical presence of Karaites in the Crimean Peninsula dates back to the thirteenth century. Their core places of settlement, usually next to rabbinic Jews, include Caffa (Feodosiia), Solkhat, Çufut Qale, Mangup, and later Gözleve (Russian: Evpatoriia, Ukrainian: Ievpatoriia). Under the Crimean Khanate, Karaites wrote a number of religious works. From Crimea, they spread to neighboring regions; other flourishing Karaite centers emerged in Halicz (Ukraine) and Trakai (Lithuania). The fortress town of Çufut Qale, a few kilometers from Bağçasaray, the capital of the Crimean Khanate, developed into a prosperous Karaite center that supported many poorer Karaite communities. From the seventeenth century on, the Karaite Jews' Turkification carried on apace with the adoption of Turkic names and terms. In 1734, Crimea's first publishing house opened in Çufut Qale.[81]

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79 In general, cf. Mikhail Kizilov, *Krimskaia Iudeia: Ocherki istorii evreev, khazar, karaimov i krymchakov v Krymu s antichnykh vremen do nashikh dnei* (Simferopol: Izdatelstvo Dolia, 2011).

80 Nathan Schur, *History of the Karaites* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1992); Daniel J. Lasker, *Karaism: An Introduction to the Oldest Surviving Alternative Judaism* (Oxford: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2022).

81 Golda Akhiezer, *The Crimean Karaite Communities: History, Culture, and Leadership Through the Early Twentieth Century* (Daly City, CA: The Karaite Press, 2021).

Russian rule after 1783 also significantly transformed the Jewish history of Crimea. The most affected were an estimated ca. 2,600 Karaites[82] and around eight-hundred Krymchaks. The latter were given this new ethnonym as part of the official nomenclature and later adopted it for self-designation. The Krymchaks included the ethnically and cultural Tatarized rabbinic Jews whose collective had absorbed the older Jewish diversity in Crimea. Their fore- and surnames reflect an impressive microcosm of European-Oriental Jewry. The Krymchak centers were Caffa (Feodosiia), Qarasuvbazar (Ukrainian: Bilohirsk, Russian: Belogorsk), and Simferopol. Their community had grown to around seven thousand around 1913.[83]

Concerning the Jewish population, St. Petersburg generally pursued a religious policy of segregation and promoted their Russification. Following their own efforts, Karaites increasingly received privileges: exemption from double taxation and from military service, official recognition as a distinct religious community (1837), and full citizens' rights (1863). This new civil status greatly strengthened the Karaite community, especially since St. Petersburg did not grant comparable rights to the other Jews in the Russian Empire.[84]

The Karaites' communal boom also furthered their "nationalist awakening," which led them to cultivate a new religious ethnogenesis and historiography. They rejected all influences and ties to rabbinic Jewry and stressed their autonomous, distinct development in Crimea. By disassociating themselves from the Krymchaks and rabbinic Jewry in general, the Karaites of Southeastern Europe went their own way, separate from all other Karaite communities, who continued to consider themselves Karaite Jews. This modern national theory of the Southeastern European Karaites was largely influenced by three figures: Simcha Babovich (1790–1855), the first chairman of the community under Russian rule; Abraham Firkovich (1786–1874), the community functionary (1840–60), a collector of manuscripts and an amateur historian who would stop at nothing, not even falsification, in his efforts to prove that the Crimean Karaites were the descendents of exiled Israelites and Khazar converts; and Seraya Shapshal (1873–1961), the last chairman of the Karaite community and a Turkologist, according to whom the Crimean Karaites had emerged from the assimilation of the Semitic Karaites and Turkic Khazars.

In the nineteenth century, the Karaites in the Russian Empire generated singular international scholarly interest that sometimes led to substantial controversies. In the meantime, urbanization, internal migration, and demographic growth had a sustained impact in transforming their community and history. Çufut Qale, formerly their bastion, was depopulated in the late nineteenth century. Karaites from other places too migrated to urban centers (Evpatoriia, Odesa, Kyiv, Moscow, Vienna, etc.). According

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82 A total of ca. 3,800 Karaites lived in the Russian Empire.

83 Anatoly Khazanov, *The Krymchaks: A Vanishing Group in the Soviet Union* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1989), 16.

84 Hannelore Müller, *Religionswissenschaftliche Minoritätenforschung: Zur religionshistorischen Dynamik der Karäer im östlichen Europa* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010), 125–30.

to the census of 1897, there were around 13,000 Karaites in the Russian Empire, ca. 6,100 of them in Taurida Province (ca. 1,500 in Evpatoriia, ca. 1,000 in Odesa and elsewhere).[85] Crimea's multireligious and multiethnic spectrum was further expanded by Ashkenazi Jews, who primarily immigrated from Poland; in the early twentieth century, they are estimated to have numbered around 40,000. Before the second wave of pogroms in 1905, Simferopol was their largest center, with nine synagogues and prayer houses, three Jewish schools, and a Jewish hospital.

Under the Soviet regime, the historic decline of the Karaites and Jews in Crimea set in. The famine of 1921/22 led to many deaths, and many left for abroad. In the mid-1920s, Moscow permitted an agricultural project of settling Jews in northern Crimea, with financial support from the Jewish American Joint Distribution Committee (JDC). By the time the project officially ended in the mid-1930s, ca. 20,000 urbanized Jews from the former Jewish settlement raion lived there, raising the total Jewish population to ca. 60,000.[86] Most of them were murdered in the Holocaust by the Nazi German regime, which declared Crimea "cleansed of Jews" ("judenrein") in 1942. The victims included the Karaites, even though they had been recognized in Berlin as a non-Jewish religious community.[87]

After 1945, the historical decline of the few hundred remaining Krymchaks and Karaites in Crimea continued. Many emigrated, while those who stayed sought new identities. In the 1950s, some Krymchaks successfully pushed for their official recognition as a separate ethnicity; in their papers, the designation "Jew" was replaced with "Krymchak." Nevertheless, they proceeded to assimilate. Today, hardly any Krymchaks speak their Crimean Tatar ethnolect. The census of 1989 registered 604 Crimean Tatars and 882 Karaites (Krymska Oblast), the census of 2001 some 204 and 671.[88] The lavishly renovated Karaite center in Ievpatoriia (with a kenesa and a museum), the opening of the historical kenesa in Kharkiv in 2006, and diverse initiatives promoting cultural and religious revival cannot hide the fact that the Karaites in Crimea and the rest of Ukraine are fighting for their religiocultural survival. Even if they have been officially recognized as an indigenous population since 2021, together with the Crimean Tatars and Krymchaks, and are striving for political representation, they remain fundamentally vulnerable as a mini-community. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine since 2022 has considerably heightened this vulnerability; Jews and Karaites will

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85 Mikhail Kizilov, *The Sons of the Scripture: The Karaites in Poland and Lithuania in the Twentieth Century* (Berlin: De Gruyter Open, 2015), 6.

86 Jonathan L. Dekel-Chen, *Farming the Red Land: Jewish Agriculture Colonization and Local Soviet Power, 1924–1941* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).

87 Müller, *Religionswissenschaftliche Minoritätenforschung*, 131–62; Kiril Feferman, *The Holocaust in the Crimea and the North Caucasus* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, The International Institute for Holocaust Research, 2016).

88 "All-Ukrainian Population Census: Databank," State Statistics Service of Ukraine, accessed May 21, 2023, http://db.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Database/Census/databasetree_en.asp.

once again draw on their minority experiences and survival strategies. This time, the support of the international community will be crucial.

7 Conclusion

The many Jewish and Muslim religious communities in the Black Sea riparian states can all look back on a turbulent history since the nineteenth century. Different waves of migration leading to the continual decline of the Jewish population, a plethora of political upheavals, but above all the officially atheist religious policy between the 1950s and the late 1980s brought profound transformations for their religious identities. Insufficient effort was made after 1990 to make up for this lack of societal debate on religion, religious identities, and their different forms during these four decades of state communism. For instance, the patriarchal organizational structures continue to exist in the 2020s. Ernst Bloch's famous principle of the "simultaneity of the non-simultaneous"[89] seems to have been put into practice in exemplary fashion. Here too, not everyone is present in the now. The regional Jewish and Islamic religious histories are also characterized by waves of proliferating anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Nevertheless, in most countries in the Black Sea region, Jews and Muslims are minorities who have stood the test of history and have developed sustainable strategies and techniques for their preservation as communities.

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89 Ernst Bloch, *Erbschaft dieser Zeit* (Original 1935), Werkausgabe vol. 4 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2016), 104.

Nicole Kançal-Ferrari

Between Imposed Memory and *Damnatio Memoriae:* Places of Memory in the Black Sea Region

> Men bu yerde yaşalmadım
> yaşlığıma toyalmadım
> Vatanıma toyalmadım
> (I could not live in that place
> I could not live my youth fully
> Sighing for my homeland)[1]

In 2016, Jamala won the Eurovision Song Contest representing Ukraine with an adaption of the Crimean Tatar ballad "Ey Güzel Qırım" (O beautiful Crimea), a paean of longing for a homeland lost after the Soviet Union's deportation of indigenous peoples in 1944. By not naming Crimea in the lyrics, Jamala turned this song into a universal metaphor for expulsion, trauma, and place-bound remembrance; but by keeping the verses above in Crimean Tatar, with a haunting allusion to her homeland in the song's final line, she also maintained its connection to a specific place.

The song serves as a jumping-off point for this chapter's discussion of *lieux de mémoire* in the Black Sea region, a region rich in material heritage and riven by competing narratives about the pasts this heritage evokes and the presents erected upon them. This chapter is not primarily about the sites at the center of these divides, but rather about how such sites are perceived, valorized, and instrumentalized by various actors through different practices of remembering and forgetting. It is about how place, history, culture, and memory interact to produce certain patterns of commemoration and remembrance, to create certain kinds of identities, and to forget others. As a result, this chapter, probably more than other contributions in this handbook, must be read alongside and against the backdrop of the other chapters, especially those on history, identity, religion, and nation building—for places of memory are space-bound constructions of the past in the present, manifestations of and linked to these concepts.[2]

Lieux de mémoire come in many forms: public buildings, monuments, landscapes, virtual spaces, even immaterial concepts. Invested with symbolic significance through

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1 Crimean Tatar lyrics from the song "1944" by Jamala (Susana Alimivna Camaladinova, after her grandfather Jamaladdin). Translation by Nicole Kançal-Ferrari. For more context, see Kerstin S. Jobst, *Geschichte der Krim: Iphigenie und Putin auf Tauris* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 281–82.
2 As the main focus of this chapter is, in the widest sense, on space-bound, site-related memory, I have opted to translate the term *lieux de mémoire,* coined by Pierre Nora, as "places" or "sites" of memory, in preference to the wording "realms of memory," used in the English translation of Pierre Nora's seminal work: *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past,* trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996–98).

rituals, images, and practices that create or support the identity of a nation, religious group, or specific community, they figure and operate in religious, historical, communal, and political narratives, narratives that can intermingle, overlap, and, often, conflict. The same site can have very different meanings for different communities or groups. Places of memory are created through active historical and politico-cultural actions, through ideological interventions which create, erase, or reactivate sites and attribute meaning to them, sometimes quite independently of whatever meanings the sites originally held. Such sites are at once products of and disconnected from the ever-changing flow of history, embedded in the historical past yet filled with meaning in the present by those who use, remember, imagine, or visualize them, sometimes up close, sometimes from afar, through narrative accounts or photographs—expressions of pasts, both real and imagined, that shape the future of the communities that lay claim to them.[3]

Sites of memory are related to power, power which is exerted on or through them. As powerful symbolic sites, they can operate dichotomously as vehicles both for unification and for exclusion, elevating certain perspectives on or elements of the past even as they sideline others. They can also serve as spaces of resistance, when memories associated with a place challenge official narratives, and as targets for violence, when that resistance turns to anger or provokes a backlash. In the Black Sea region, where many different pasts, histories, identities, and memories, as well as resettlements, deportations, and other traumas, come together in the same places of memory, the questions as to what is remembered by whom and why, and who decides which memories are cultivated and commemorated, rarely have simple answers. The tendency to monopolize heritage is strong, and every act of remembrance contains the danger of excluding other memories.[4]

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3 Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire," in "Memory and Counter-Memory," special issue, *Representations*, no. 26 (Spring 1989): 12, 14; Jan Assmann, "Erinnern, um dazuzugehören: Kulturelles Gedächtnis, Zugehörigkeitsstruktur und normative Vergangenheit," in *Generation und Gedächtnis: Erinnerungen und kollektive Identitäten*, ed. Kristin Platt and Mihran Dabag (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1995), 60–61; Lionella Scazzosi, "Limits to Transformation in Places' Identity: Theoretical and Methodological Questions," in *Landscape, Identity, Development*, ed. Zoran Roca, Paul Claval, and John Agnew (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 9–24; Philip L. Kohl, Mara Kozelsky, and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, eds., *Selective Remembrances: Archaeology in the Construction, Commemoration, and Consecration of National Pasts* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Charles W. Withers, "Place and the 'Spatial Turn' in Geography and in History," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 70, no. 4 (Oct. 2009): 637–58.
4 Michael Landzelius, "Commemorative Dis(re)membering: Erasing Heritage, Spatializing Disinheritance," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 21 (2003): 195–221; Kelly O'Neill, *Claiming Crimea: A History of Catherine the Great's Southern Empire* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), 1–31; Brian Graham and Peter Howard, eds., *The Ashgate Research Companion to Heritage and Identity* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008); Neil A. Silberman, "Heritage Interpretation as Public Discourse," in *Understanding Heritage*, ed. Marie-Theres Albert, Roland Bernecker, and Britta Rudolff (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), 21–34, https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110308389.21; *The ICOMOS Charter on the Interpretation and Presentation of Cultural Heritage Sites* (2008) and the *Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention* (Paris: UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 2019).

Given the vast number of memory places in the Black Sea region, a comprehensive survey here is out of the question. Instead, I opt to focus on a selection of places of memory, tangible and intangible, drawn from across the region, including sites in Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, Turkey, and Crimea. Because of space limitations, these examples are meant to be illustrative rather than representative, and because of my own fields of expertise, the reader may note a certain preference for examples drawn from Turco-Tatar Muslim heritage. This preference is counterbalanced by Tatiana Zhurzenko's chapter in this volume, on Ukrainian and Russian memory sites. It is also worth noting that I do not include a discussion of Istanbul, which, though part of the broader region, would deserve a separate analysis, the city being itself a multilayered *lieu de mémoire*; nor do I discuss the Black Sea itself, despite its great role in shaping the literary and artistic imagination of the region's many peoples.

My primary goal here is to explore the complex dynamics in which places of memory are embedded and the many roles these places play as both vessels and vehicles for the conveying of historical lived experience and place-bound identities. I therefore begin with a discussion of the politics of memory and the forms it takes in successive sections on national historical consciousness, place-bound remembering through monuments and memorials, and remembering within minority communities and diasporas. I then move on to offer a more extended treatment of how the politics of memory unfolds in a selection of particular sites of memory to illustrate how these sites shape the way the Black Sea region is perceived. By way of conclusion, in the paper's final section, I turn to explore innovative new approaches with the potential to overcome some of the challenges presented by memory places in contested areas like the Black Sea region.

1 Politics of Collective Remembrance Linked to Territoriality: Construction of Place-Bound Historical Consciousness

Any effort to understand memory spaces in the Black Sea region must reckon with the region's multilayered past—the region's oscillation between the regional and the global, its history as part of Southeastern Europe, the Balkans, Anatolia, the Caucasus, and beyond, and thus its historical and cultural embeddedness in regional and global history[5]—as well as the way various aspects of that past are continually reinterpreted and instrumentalized on political, societal, cultural, and individual levels. As a disputed region, it not only holds overlapping memories but also is the stage for the construction of competing memories, identities, and hegemonic claims.

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5 Stefan Troebst, "The Black Sea as Historical Meso-Region: Concepts in Cultural Studies and the Social Sciences," *Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies* 2 (June 2019): 11–29.

This has consequences for how we evaluate sites of memory. On the one hand, history and memory and their traces transgress the borders of the nation-states that now make up the region. On the other hand, they are also inextricably bound up in the often much narrower narratives of identity those nation-states invoke. These states establish narratives of an exclusive historical past, claim their territories as solely their own, and incorporate only the layers of the past useful to those efforts. In doing so, they often exclude other agents historically involved in the region, agents who share, in one way or another, the same territories. Efforts to transcend the narrowness of these narratives and to embrace transnational pasts risk undermining national uniformity and complicating nationalist ideologies.

In the construction of national narratives, sites of memory are tied closely to historical events and facts that are selected, manipulated, and transmitted as tools of socio-cultural integration, especially in multiethnic states, while simultaneously being sacralized and politicized. In post-Communist countries like Bulgaria, Georgia, and Romania, the nation-state is justified and material heritage instrumentalized against the foil of Ottoman rule and its legacy.[6] In Crimea, the Russian interpretation of the past is embedded in a twofold narrative: of exclusive and uninterrupted Christian presence, documented through archaeological "evidence," turning the peninsula into a Christian territory of salvation; and also, since Catherine II (the Great), a narrative of Crimea's Greek past, reinterpreted through the lens of enlightenment ideology and philhellenism, connecting the peninsula to the European past and its values.[7] Both narratives exclude Crimea's Turco-Muslim past, as well as its present; and both have only gained further traction since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Ukraine, by contrast, has followed a different path since the second half of the twentieth century, when it was still a Soviet Socialist Republic. While tracing its roots, and therefore its legitimacy as a nation-state, to the Cossack Hetmanate (mid-sev-

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6 James V. Wertsch, "Deep Memory and Narrative Templates: Conservative Forces in Collective Memory," and Nutsa Batiashvili, "The 'Myth' of the Self: The Georgian National Narrative and Quest for 'Georgianness,'" in *Memory and Political Change*, ed. Aleida Assmann and Linda Shortt (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 173 – 85 and 186 – 200; Victor Shnirelman, *The Value of the Past: Myths, Identity and Politics in Transcaucasia* (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 2001); Gheorghe Alexandru Niculescu, "Archaeology and Nationalism in the History of the Romanians," in *Selective Remembrances*, 127 – 59; Tchavdar Marinov, "Ancient Thrace in the Modern Imagination: Ideological Aspects of the Construction of Thracian Studies in Southeast Europe (Romania, Greece, Bulgaria)," in *Entangled Histories of the Balkans*, vol. 3, *Shared Pasts, Disputed Legacies*, ed. Roumen Daskalov and Alexander Vezenkov (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 10 – 117; Ana Luleva, "Das Nationale versus das Europäische in der bulgarischen Gedächtniskultur: Zeitschichten konfliktreicher Erinnerungspraktiken," in *Neuer Nationalismus im östlichen Europa*, ed. Irene Götz, Klaus Roth, and Marketa Spiritova (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2017), 101 – 17.

7 Mara Kozelsky, "The Challenges of Church Archaeology in Post-Soviet Crimea," in *Selective Remembrances*, 71 – 98; Kerstin S. Jobst, "Holy Ground and a Bulwark Against 'the Other': The (Re)Construction of an Orthodox Crimea in the Nineteenth-Century Russian Empire," in *Rampant Nations: Bulwark Myths of East European Multiconfessional Societies in the Age of Nationalism*, ed. Liliya Berezhnaya and Heidi Hein-Kirche (New York: Berghahn Books, 2019), 149 – 72. For the transformation of Crimean territory into Russian space, philhellenism, and the exclusion of the Crimean Tatars, see O'Neill, *Claiming Crimea.*

enteenth century to the second half of the eighteenth century), it has also embraced a more integrative perspective based partly on a common history and mutual cultural influence with the Crimean Khanate and its non-Christian, Turco-Mongol predecessors. In the twenty-first century, despite Russia's annexation of Crimea, this new approach served as a basis for a more inclusive narrative of Ukraine as a political nation-state, one that embraced the historical presence of minorities, mainly the Crimean Tatars, and eschewed legitimization through appeals to a religiously and ethnically uniform past.[8]

In Turkey, place-bound narratives are based on Turco-Islamic and Ottoman conquests and subsequent transformations, and on the Turkish nation's struggle during the war of independence and creation of the Turkish Republic,[9] all of which has the effect of marginalizing the religiously and ethnically diverse elements of the country and its past.

From this perspective, material heritage is at the heart of identity construction. Thus, the study of this heritage, in particular archaeological excavations and the inventorying of material remains and artifacts, often also serves, and is seen by others, as an ideological intervention with political goals.[10] While the recollection of material heritage and the detection of cultural landscapes is an imperative first step to the recovery of the multiple dimensions of a region's past,[11] such efforts also risk upsetting the nationally-minded historical status quo, and they are thus often fraught with political considerations. Hence, while the researching and inventorying of Ancient Greek, Byzantine, and even Genoese remains and inscriptions in the northern Black Sea, for example, is understood as a legitimate scholarly undertaking,[12] the inventorying of Turco-Muslim architecture in the region is often viewed with suspicion, not as a simple act of recovering material heritage, but as preparation for eventual hegemonic claims to a

8 Stefan Rohdewald, "Vom ukrainischen 'Antemurale Christianitatis' zur politischen Nation? Geschichtsbilder der Ukraine und muslimische Krimtatataren," in *Religiöse Pluralität als Faktor des Politischen in der Ukraine*, ed. Katrin Boeckh and Oleh Turij (Munich: Biblion Media, 2015), 395–422.
9 Gökhan Çetinsaya, "Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of the 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' in Modern Turkish Political Thought," *Muslim World* 89 (1999): 350–86; Hakan T. Karateke, "Interpreting Monuments: Charitable Buildings, Monuments, and the Construction of Collective Memory in the Ottoman Empire," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 91 (2001): 183–99; Ebru Erbaş Gürler, Başak Özer, and Ebru Yetişkin, "Hafızanın Arayüzü Olarak Anma ve Anma Mekanları: Gelibolu Yarımadası Örneği," *Mimarist* 56 (Summer 2016): 73–79.
10 Ulrike Sommer, "Archaeology and Nationalism," in *Key Concepts in Public Archaeology*, ed. Gabriel Moshenska (London: UCL Press, 2017), 166–86.
11 Maximilian Hartmuth, ed., *Centres and Peripheries in Ottoman Architecture: Rediscovering a Balkan Heritage* (Stockholm: Cultural Heritage without Borders, 2011); Hakan Kırımlı and Nicole Kançal-Ferrari, eds., *Kırım'daki Kırım Tatar (Türk-İslâm) Mimarî Yadigârları*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, 2021); Nebi Gümüş and Nicole Kançal-Ferrari, eds., *Ahıska Bölgesindeki Türk İslâm Mimari Yadigarları* (Ankara: Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, 2019).
12 Svetlana V. Koch, "The National Self-Determination Projects of Greece and Bulgaria: The Role of Ethnic Bessarabian Diasporas," in *Europe and the Black Sea Region: A History of Early Knowledge Exchange (1750–1850)*, ed. Dominik Gutmeyr and Karl Kaser (Zurich: LIT Verlag, 2018), 304.

bygone Ottoman or Crimean Khanate domain. Similar skepticism is seen in the documentation of Pontic Greek, Georgian, and Armenian heritage in Turkey, especially for sites dating from the Ottoman period onwards.

In other fields relating to material heritage, this dynamic plays out differently. In architecture, for example, national identity construction translates as the search for a unique national style, as part of which the material heritage in a state's territory is interpreted in line with an imagined or idealized past. Since the nineteenth century, in parallel with the rise of historical national narratives, Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, and the southern provinces of the Russian Empire all "rediscovered" their respective national styles (neo-classical, but mostly neo-Byzantine), and these continue to be used in the design of new churches.[13] Meanwhile, ambitious mosque architecture around the Black Sea followed European eclectic trends, mainly the popular Orientalist neo-Mamluk style, which was also used for governmental buildings and synagogues in the region.[14] But it was also in this period that Turkish/Ottoman architecture was rediscovered, and this revivalism had a lasting impact on the architectural milieu in the Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic.[15] Its legacy remains discernible in more recent mosque constructions which, in a narrow and simplified act of imitation, deliberately refer to the golden age of Ottoman architecture, the style developed by Mimar Sinan in the sixteenth century.[16]

The question of which examples of material culture are viewed as part of a common heritage and which are held suspect relates to a broader divide in the Black Sea region between north and south—a geographical but also historical-cultural division stemming from the partition of the region between two historical empires (the Russian and the Ottoman, and later the Soviet influence zone and Turkey) that have today been replaced by multiple nation-states, some of them now part of the European Union.[17]

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13 Ada Hajdu, "The Search for National Architectural Styles in Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to World War I," and Tchavdar Marinov, "The 'Balkan House': Interpretations and Symbolic Appropriations of the Ottoman-Era Vernacular Architecture in the Balkans," in *Entangled Histories of the Balkans*, vol. 4, *Concepts, Approaches, and (Self-)Representations*, ed. Roumen Daskalov, Diana Mishkov, Tchavdar Marinov, and Alexander Vezenkov (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 394–439 and 440–593. See also Dragan Damjanović and Aleksander Łupienko, eds., *Forging Architectural Tradition: National Narratives, Monument Preservation and Architectural Work in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2022).
14 Examples of this eclectic style include the Friday Mosque in Aqyar (Russian/Ukrainian: Sevastopol), Crimea, inaugurated in 1914; the Carol I Mosque (Grand Mosque) in Constanţa, Romania, inaugurated in 1913; and the synagogues of Batumi, Georgia (1904), and Cluj-Napoca, Romania (1887).
15 For architectural culture in the Ottoman realm at the turn of the twentieth century, see Ahmet Ersoy, *Architecture and the Late Ottoman Historical Imaginary: Reconfiguring the Architectural Past in a Modernizing Empire* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Press, 2015).
16 Examples include an oversized mosque based on the classical Ottoman model now under construction in Ortahisar, Trabzon, overlooking the sea; and, in a case of the export of this "Ottoman Golden Age architecture" outside of Turkey, the Akhmad Kadyrov Mosque in Groznyi, Chechnya, opened in 2008.
17 For the historical context of this division, see Eyüp Özveren, "A Framework for the Study of the Black Sea World, 1789–1915," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 20, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 77–113.

These new states have all undertaken great efforts to create their own, national and often exclusive, narratives, rituals of remembrance, and places of memory, all to illustrate a uniform national identity. Nevertheless, in dealing with "their own" memories and corresponding sites, such states remain firmly caught up in this north-south dichotomy.

This division is also discernible in scholarship. Scholars working on the region can be divided into those who work from a background in Southeastern European history in the widest sense and those who are trained in Ottoman and Turkish (Turkic) or Islamic studies, not to forget those who work from a national perspective. The gap between these divergent perspectives directly affects the way the region's past, and its many identities and related places, is investigated and presented in scholarship, and it is one of the many reasons behind the multiple blind spots in discussions of the Black Sea world. The centuries-long Turco-Muslim presence and related historical-cultural places and sites of memory fall between the cracks of scholarly accounts on the Black Sea region in Southeastern Europe and outside Turkey more generally, despite the fact that Islam was present on the northern shore from the fourteenth century, and that the Black Sea was an "Ottoman preserve" from the sixteenth century.[18] The same can be said for the non-Turkish, non-Muslim dimension of the Turkish Black Sea region to the south, for the memory sites of former political entities and later societal communities there: ethno-cultural Pontic Greeks, Georgians, Armenians, Hemshin, Laz, and others.[19]

To this north-south divide might be added another, an East-West divide that has become increasingly prominent with the accession of states on the western shore of the Black Sea into the EU, and with it the rise, or perhaps resurgence, of the notion of the Black Sea as a "European Sea."[20] Seen from the European perspective, the Black Sea world is embedded in the ancient Greek, then Roman, and later Byzantine cultural sphere, with local ethnic groups and Venetian and Genoese colonies later still forming a world around the sea. In an important project founded by the EU, with the goal of integrating the Black Sea world into the larger geography of Europe, the region's past was virtually "mapped" for heritage tourism. This mapping was made by a careful selection of narrative spaces, dividing the region's past into north

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18 For a recent discussion of this notion, see Kahraman Şakul, "From *Mare Clausum* to *Mare Liberum*: Black Sea Diplomacy in the Era of Russo-Ottoman Duopoly," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 21, no. 4 (Fall 2020): 701–32.

19 While the Turkish coastline of the Black Sea is "fitted" within the line of the country's official history thesis and related commemorations of (pre-Ottoman, Ottoman, and Republican) Turkish history, this largely excludes the 1,500 entries related to Armenian, Greek, Syriac, and Jewish cultural heritage that the Hrant Dink Foundation has marked on the southern Black Sea shore of its *Turkey Cultural Heritage Map*, accessed February 2, 2024, https://hrantdink.org/en/bolis/activities/projects/cultural-heritage/12-turkey-cultural-heritage-map.

20 This idea was promoted, for example, by the former Romanian president Ion Iliescu in 2003; quoted in Troebst, "The Black Sea as Historical Meso-Region," 19.

and south, into a Turkish part and the "Western" rest.[21] Abundant reference is given to Jason and the Argonauts and their search for the golden fleece, the Greek mythological account of heroes navigating the Black Sea; the focus is thus on the sea and the coastline, one of the main aspects of ancient Greek settlements and their occupation of space, and in general of Greek identity, comfortably in line with new studies focusing on Greek dominance in the region's port cities from the late eighteenth century until the early twentieth century, obscuring other identities and narratives of the past.[22]

Meanwhile, the sea itself does not have the same importance in the cultural memory of Eurasian people—they used the territory around the sea, the hinterland, and operated through intermediaries in well-defined port cities, although the Seljuks and Ottomans conquered and temporarily dominated many places of the Black Sea region by sea, such as Sudaq (Russian/Ukrainian: Sudak) and Caffa (today: Feodosiia) in Crimea.[23] These two contrasting poles—between cultures that are shaped and defined through the sea and those that occupy the space around it and connect the region with the larger geography of the Balkans and Europe, the Caucasus, and Eurasia—mutually condition each other and constitute the dynamic reality of the broader Black Sea world, their different views on space creating divergent places of memory. Thus, although the ambitious EU project furnishes many valuable insights into layers of the Black Sea region's past, it is also a noteworthy example of a cultural heritage politics that privileges narratives relating to a European past and future while silencing others.[24]

This amnesia concerning the northern Black Sea region's Turco-Tatar Muslim communities and their memories and the marginalization or even absence of a discussion

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21 The project was conducted between 2007 and 2013, with a conference held in 2016, the proceedings of which were published in 2019. For a presentation of the project and its goals, see Dorothea Papathanasiou-Zuhrt, Nikolaos Thomaidis, Aldo Di Russo, and Valentina Vasile, "Multi-Sensory Experiences at Heritage Places: SCRIPTORAMA, the Black Sea Open Street Museum," in *Caring and Sharing: The Cultural Heritage Environment as an Agent for Change: 2016 ALECTOR Conference, Istanbul, Turkey*, ed. Valentina Vasile (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019), 11–49.

22 Another similar project, the ongoing "History of the Black Sea, 18th-20th Century" (2012–), supported by Greece and the EU, focuses on the port cities of the region and their connections with the global economy: https://blacksea.gr/. Among the project's published or planned publications is one on the architecture and urbanism of twenty-two of these cities; however, in this project too, the exclusive focus is on Greek heritage at the expense of Russian and Ottoman cultural places: Vassilis Colonas, Alexandra Yerolympos, and Athina Vitopoulou, eds., *Architecture and City Planning in the Black Sea Port-Cities* (forthcoming).

23 This said, difficult topography meant that many Ottoman cities on the northeastern coastline, like the important port cities of Samsun and Trabzon, were accessible only by sea, although tentative efforts to connect them by road were undertaken in the second half of the nineteenth century and accelerated during the Russian occupation in 1916–18.

24 Małgorzata Pakier and Bo Stråth, eds., *A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010); Maria N. Todorova, Augusta Dimou, and Stefan Troebst, eds., *Remembering Communism: Private and Public Recollections of Lived Experience in Southeast Europe* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014).

of the "Oriental" part of the region's past are due to the fact that this past has, since the end of the eighteenth century, been at odds with the official imperial, and later national, historical narratives in the region. One noteworthy exception in this regard is Ukraine's effort, mentioned above, to embrace a more integrative understanding of its national past and to present the non-Christian elements of that past in a more positive light; though this effort has been interrupted by the current political situation in Ukraine, they will hopefully resume in the near future.[25]

Meanwhile, a similar historical amnesia obtains in Turkey, where the establishment of an official, exclusive narrative—in contrast to the more inclusive Ottoman perception of the empire's non-Muslim, non-Turkish subjects in the nineteenth century—gained shape with the "Turkish Historical Thesis" and the effort to create a uniform citizenry in the new republic.[26] These selective perceptions have to be seen against the backdrop of a long history of cross-cultural presence, of fluctuations and transfers in the Black Sea region. Successive waves of people established themselves, created colonies, and were expelled or forced to either emigrate or assimilate. Traces of those who left have disappeared, been altered, or, worse, in the case of many monuments and sites, been victims of destruction, of what has been named a "memoricide of monuments."[27] In any case, one can speak of a constructed, often imposed, amnesia in the region's historical narratives and, as a consequence, of *lieux d'oubli*, of sites of oblivion, physically destroyed sites and erased memories of a past which is or has to be "forgotten."[28]

In this section I have shown how different ways of reading and presenting the past, even in the form of cultural heritage protection, selectively shape the perception of the region's identity. I now turn, in the following sections, to examine a thematic selection of different forms the politics of memory can take in this process, first in the context of monuments and memorials, and then in the context of remembering among minorities and exile communities.

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25 There are other exceptions to this amnesia, such as Kerstin S. Jobst, who mentions (without elaborating) the existence of a rich collection of legends and myths belonging to the Crimean Tatars in her *Geschichte der Krim*, 32.

26 See the related chapters in this handbook. See also Çetinsaya, "Rethinking Nationalism and Islam"; Dietrich Jung, "Minorities as a Threat: A Historical Reconstruction of State-Minority Relations in Turkey," *European Yearbook of Minority Issues Online* 2, no. 3 (2002): 127–49, https://doi.org/10.1163/221161103X00076.

27 For this term, see Bénédicte Tratnjek, "Géographie des conflits: Les lieux de mémoire dans la ville en guerre; Un enjeu de la pacification des territoires," *Diploweb.com: La revue géopolitique*, October 31, 2011, http://www.diploweb.com/Geographie-des-conflits-Les-lieux.html.

28 Sites of oblivion and related literature are discussed in Guy Beiner, *Forgetful Remembrance: Social Forgetting and Vernacular Historiography of a Rebellion in Ulster* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 1–30.

2 Place-Bound Remembering Through Memorials of National Greatness, Victory, War, and Martyrdom

2.1 Monuments of Imperial and National Greatness and Victory

States and communities use monuments, memorials for individuals and significant events, and even the awareness and cultivation of cultural landscapes (e.g., battlefields or planned urban space) to transform space into meaningful place. This section investigates how this process operates, how monuments and memorials function as vessels of identity construction in different parts of the Black Sea region, and how, in doing so, they create zones of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. This section also examines instances of radical spatial transformation, where a memory is erased and new ones are imposed.

Monuments, imbued with layers of social and cultural memory, are the physical manifestation of pasts that are deemed worthy of commemoration by imperial, national, or, more rarely, minority or diasporic communities. Those who participate in this remembering effort are "imagined communities."[29] Like religious (pilgrimage) sites, themselves stages of social-cultural religious practices, monuments can undergo a process of sacralization; and the rituals connected to or held at these sites often blur the boundaries between the national, the hegemonic, and the religious. Monuments codify the past and make it concrete; they also create precise interpretations of the past through their materiality, fostering new public/collective memories and nourishing group identity related to a specific place and time.[30] As sites of memory, monuments (and other symbolic markers, like flags) are thus instrumentalized as vessels and transmitters of all kinds of messages. They are powerful tools for the creation of a group identity, but also for determining boundaries of belonging and exclusion for the imagined community.[31] In the nineteenth century, public monuments became more and more widespread and turned into expressions of the specific forms of hegemonic national identity that arose in that period. With the rise of these new forms of group identity, new forms of remembering arose that used public monuments, statuary, memorials, and commemorative sites in the (urban) landscape as a means of conveying to newly coalescing national publics values like human dignity, (past and future) national

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29 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006); Nuala Johnson, "Cast in Stone: Monuments, Geography, and Nationalism," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 13 (1995): 51–65.

30 Karen Till, quoted in Nuala C. Johnson, "Public Memory," in *A Companion to Cultural Geography*, ed. James S. Duncan, Nuala C. Johnson, and Richard H. Schein (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 323.

31 Sara McDowell, "Heritage, Memory and Identity," in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Heritage and Identity*, ed. Brian Graham and Peter Howard (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008), 37–53.

greatness, and sacrifice for a better cause.[32] The major transformations of nation-building and regime change the Black Sea region has undergone over the last two centuries produced an abundance of monuments related to these concepts, ideologically loaded sites that not only commemorated past greatness or important events but also projected these constructs/interpretations back into the past.

A typical example of an "official" site of memory is the monument of honor in Samsun, erected in 1932 in commemoration of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's arrival in this city on the steamer *Bandırma* in 1919 and the beginning of the Turkish War of Independence. The monument, a statue with Atatürk atop a rearing horse, marks Samsun as one of the starting points in the formation of the Turkish Republic.[33] Together with the open-air museum housing a replica of the steamer, the monument turns the city's coastline into a symbolic space of the new republic. Situated in the first public park of Samsun next to the Square of the Republic, the monument was commissioned by the people of Samsun and made by the Austrian painter and sculptor Heinrich Krippel (1883–1945), who also created other statuary monuments in Turkey.[34] Krippel's description of the monument at the opening ceremony effectively conveys how it captures the foundation myth of modern Turkey: "His [Gazi Mustafa Kemal's] bearing expresses a fearlessness […] and the power of Turkishness."[35]

Like other cities on the Black Sea's southern coast, Samsun was a rich port whose urban space blossomed from the mid-nineteenth century onward. Impressive official and religious buildings dominated the city's skyline, among them the especially impressive Greek Orthodox Aya Triada (Holy Trinity) Church. But after the forced population exchange between Turkey and Greece in 1923–24, Samsun's demographic composition abruptly changed: churches were transformed, repurposed, and ultimately torn down, paving the way for the city's reinterpretation in line with the new republican narrative, conflating place and the person of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.[36]

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32 Katharyne Mitchell, "Monuments, Memorials, and the Politics of Memory," *Urban Geography* 24, no. 5 (2003): 456.

33 The monument was the target of vandalism in February 2022, triggering a national outcry: "Samsun'-daki Onur Anıtı'na Yönelik Çirkin Saldırının Ardından Atatürk Nöbeti," *Habertürk*, last modified February 15, 2022, https://www.haberturk.com/son-dakika-samsun-da-mesalelerle-ataturk-nobeti-3334777.

34 Osman Nuri Dülgerler and Tülay Karadayı Yenice, "Türklerde Anıt Mimarisinin Bir Örneği: Konya Atatürk Anıtı," *Selçuk Üniversitesi Mühendislik, Bilim ve Teknoloji Dergisi* 23, no. 1 (2008): 70.

35 "Onur Anıtı," Samsun Turizm Haritası, accessed August 22, 2024, https://www.samsunharitasi.com/turizm/onur-aniti/.

36 For the process of the transformation of the churches in Samsun, see Tuğba Tanyeri-Erdemir, "The Fate of Tanzimat-Era Churches in Anatolia after the Loss of Their Congregations," in *Christian Art under Muslim Rule*, ed. Maximilian Hartmuth (Leiden: NINO, 2016), 219–30; Baki Sarısakal, *Bir Kentin Tarihi: Samsun* (Samsun: Samsun Valiliği İl Kültür Müdürlüğü Yayınları, 2002). And for a smaller church that is still functioning, the Roman Catholic church Mater Dolorosa (from the second half of the nineteenth century), see the following document on the website of the Catholic Church of Antioch, accessed March 28, 2022, http://www.anadolukatolikkilisesi.org/samsun/tr/storia.pdf.

Other examples of physical manifestations of national-identity building are the monuments to King David (David the Builder, 1073–1125) in Tbilisi and Kutaisi and to the legendary queen Tamar the Great (ca. 1160–1213) in Mestia and Akhaltsikhe (Georgia). Symbols of Georgia's past greatness and its struggle for independence, these monuments both elevate and delimit Georgian identity, raising up those who fit within the rigidly defined national narrative while simultaneously excluding other kinds of communities and minorities. The same holds true for monuments to Stephen the Great (Stephen III of Moldavia, r. 1459–1504) in historical Moldavia (now Romania and Moldova), a national symbol of resistance against the Ottoman and Crimean invaders and of later Romanian and Moldovan independence. While these date to the 1880s, another more recent symbol of national unification is Carol I (1839–1914) of Romania. Proclaimed king in 1881 after Romania's independence in 1877, the most famous of his monuments is the equestrian statue in front of the former royal palace in Bucharest. Erected in 1939, the statue, a symbol of the Romanian monarchy, was destroyed under the Communist regime in 1948, with a copy reinstalled in 2015, illustrating the attitude of Romania towards its monarchic past during de-communization. The Soviet Army Monument erected in 1954 in Sofia to commemorate the role played by the Soviet Army in the last period of World War II is another controversial case which can be seen in the same line, understood either as a symbol of Soviet occupation and subsequent oppression or of the liberation of Bulgaria and the expulsion and defeat of Nazi Germany. In recent times, it has been the scene of vandalism and political graffiti.[37]

As exemplified in the statue of Carol I and this war monument, once-unifying monuments can turn, in times of regime change, into problematic symbols. These are sometimes destroyed or annihilated, but, more often, such sites are remodeled according to new ideologies and attributed new meanings that, where possible, incorporate dimensions of the old imaginary. This transformation is most visible in cultural and political centers, which are generally at the forefront in the symbolic implementation of new identities.[38]

A striking example is the Khan's Palace in Bağçasaray (Russian: Bakhchisarai, Ukrainian: Bakhchysarai), Crimea. After the annexation of Crimea in 1783 and the elimination of the Crimean Khanate, the palace was used by the tsar's family and remodeled into a monument to the Russian imperial regime's tolerance. Maintaining its

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37 Martin Dimitrov, "Sofia's Red Army Monument: Canvas for Artists and Vandals," *Balkan Insight*, October 26, 2018, https://balkaninsight.com/2018/10/26/sofia-s-red-army-memorial-the-favorite-canvas-of-artists-and-vandals-10-25-2018/; Daniela Koleva, "The Immortal Regiment and Its Glocalisation: Reformatting Victory Day in Bulgaria," *Memory Studies* (August 2021): 216–29.

38 Karen E. Till, "Places of Memory," in *A Companion to Political Geography*, ed. John Agnew, Katharyne Mitchell, and Gerard Toal (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 289–301. This process is especially apparent in the case of monuments from the Soviet period in formerly Soviet countries around the Black Sea: Mischa Gabowitsch, "Der Umgang mit sowjetischen Kriegsdenkmälern seit 1989/91: Ein Überblick," in *Kommunismus unter Denkmalschutz?*, ed. Jürgen Danyel, Thomas Drachenberg, and Irmgard Zündorf (Worms: Wernersche Verlagsgesellschaft, 2018), 49–64.

Oriental flair, the palace under the tsars suggests a smooth passage from the annexed khanate to Russia. Today, visitors to the palace learn about the Oriental features of the edifice, especially the famous Fountain of Tears, through the eyes of Pushkin, and experience the rooms through narratives connecting them to the tsar's family. Although not perceptible at first sight, this is a rather radical reinterpretation and appropriation of a conquered monument and an example of what has been called "spatial violence" in recent scholarship.[39]

Another, even more complex, example of this sort of spatial violence is the Ayasofya (Hagia Sophia) Mosque in Trabzon, a Byzantine imperial church (erected 1250–60). While the biggest church in Trabzon, the Panagia Chrysokephalos Church, was converted into the Fatih Mosque ("mosque of the conqueror") by Sultan Mehmed II (1432–81) upon the Ottoman conquest of the city in 1461, the Ayasofya was transformed into a mosque only in 1584, more than one hundred years after the conquest of Trabzon.[40] It underwent restoration and was opened as a museum in 1964, but in 2013, it was again turned into a mosque. This recent transformation triggered vehement reactions from both supporters and opponents, and it can thus be seen as a real symbol of a "double" re-appropriation and re-sacralization of a place.

The various examples mentioned in this section all show the effort of political entities, both empires and nation-states, to construct places of memory which can serve as sites for the creation of new group identities. In doing so, they erase meanings and narratives which are not in line with these new identities. This is especially clear in the case of memorials to war dead and fallen soldiers, the subject of the next section.

2.2 Memorials of War and Martyrdom: Claiming Territory through Heroes and the Dead Body

I was ten. Caught out in the rain far from the village, soaking wet, we'd piled onto our horse-drawn cart to return home. Our "uncle" Nuri Ağa from Bulgaria was at the reins. … Suddenly these lights rose from the ground all around us, shining in the night. Spellbound, I asked, "Nuri Ağa, what are those?" … Nuri Ağa turned to me and said, "Those are lamps Allah has lighted for our martyrs." …

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39 For a discussion of this term, see Andrew Herscher and Anooradha Iyer Siddiqi, "Spatial Violence," *Architectural Theory Review* 19, no. 3 (2014): 269–77. Aside from ideological reinterpretation, the palace also seems to be undergoing another, even worse, kind of spatial violence: physical alteration and destruction under the guise of restoration. While I have not visited Crimea since 2014 and no first-hand information on the condition of the palace is available to me at this moment, alarming information is circulating about the destructive scope of recent "restoration work" that began in 2018 with the mosque and continues with the privy chambers.

40 Ömer İskender Tuluk and Halil İbrahim Düzenli, "Osmanlı'da Fetih Sonrası Dinsel Mekânı Camileştirme Anlayışı: Trabzon Örneği (1461–1665)," in *Trabzon Kent Mirası: Yer – Yapı – Hafıza*, ed. Ömer İskender Tuluk and Halil İbrahim Düzenli (Istanbul: Klasik, 2010), 93–118.

He could have simply said "fireflies," but people had loaded them with a particular significance: "In this place here, our martyrs yet live."[41]

This is one of the many childhood memories the late Ottoman historian Kemal Karpat shared in his autobiography about the Romanian part of Dobruja. Home to Turkish settlers since the thirteenth century, the region was Ottoman from the fifteenth century; later, many Crimean Tatar Muslims from the northern Black Sea region settled there after Crimea and its hinterland were incorporated into the Russian Empire.[42] With the creation of the nation-states in Southeastern Europe and the weakening and later collapse of the Ottoman Empire, (forced) immigration to Anatolia surged and continued for decades. Like other minorities in changing political situations, these people were forced to question their identity in an increasing hostile environment. To claim the soil as being populated by Turkish martyrs was a symbolic, spiritual appropriation of the earlier conquered and now threatened territory.

In general, war memorials illustrate how empires and nations shape and nourish their identity cultures. And something all these commemorative sites share is the problem of how to transmit the memory of a past event—war or martyrdom—to a living community that has no experience of it. Therefore, they have to generate their own identity-creating context which functions in a sacred time-space, similar to artifacts in museums, which are experienced as witnesses to and relics of a meaningful past.

Though the creation of monuments in public spaces is a relatively new cultural practice, the commemoration of important events, victories, and conquests in memorials and (funeral) monuments has existed since ancient times. The Tropaeum Traiani, today a popular tourist attraction, is a monument erected in commemoration of the victory of Roman Emperor Trajan over the Dacians at the Battle of Adamclisi in 101/ 102 CE. Standing prominently over the plain of Constanţa in the Dobruja Region (Romania), the monument is an early example of this practice and a unique site of Roman commemoration politics. Part of the building complex was a (slightly earlier) altar upon which were inscribed the names, ranks, and birthplaces of the nearly 4,000 Roman soldiers who died in the battle.[43] Standing as a testament to the success and greatness of Rome, the memorial also, through the individual inscriptions of the identities of the soldiers on the altar, illustrates the cruel dimension of war, the loss of thou-

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41 Kemal Karpat, *Dağı Delen Irmak*, ed. Emin Tanrıyar (Istanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2008), 24. Translation by Nicole Kançal-Ferrari. The historian Kemal Karpat (1923–2019) spent his childhood in Babadağ (today Romania).

42 Machiel Kiel, "The Dobrudja: A Bridge and Meeting Point between the Balkans, Anatolia and the Ukraine," in *Turco-Bulgarica: Studies on the History, Settlement and Historical Demography of Ottoman Bulgaria* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2013), 167–86.

43 The monument was reconstructed in 1977. Elements of the original edifice are displayed in the museum on site. For the altar, see Brian Turner, "War Losses and Worldview: Re-viewing the Roman Funerary Altar at Adamclisi," *American Journal of Philology* 134, no. 2 (2013): 277–304, https://doi.org/10.1353/ajp.2013.0019.

sands of lives. This monument thus incorporates the fundamental double dimension of war memorials: celebrating victory and (temporal) domination of a territory and the remembrance of the individuals who died for this triumph.[44] It exemplifies what Aleida Assmann has called the "transformation of a traumatic place into a heroic memorial site."[45] In addition, by including the place of origin of the soldiers, it is one of the first examples illustrating that "the dead are not allowed to pass unnoticed"[46]— also discernable in Karpat's recollection about the martyrs around his village—while also establishing territorial links to various other places of the Roman Empire outside Romania.

This site in Adamclisi stands today as a symbol of not just the Roman past, but also a historical defeat for Romania. It is the precursor of many monuments around the Black Sea region, including the monument commemorating the role of the Russian emperor Alexander II in Nikopol (Bulgaria) in the victory over the Ottomans in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, which ultimately led to an independent Bulgaria.[47] This commemoration of the liberation of Bulgaria from "the Ottoman yoke" is a popular theme brought to life in more than four hundred monuments in the region, most of them at former battlegrounds. These monuments reinstall, at least on the popular level, a national narrative bound into the old hegemonic, dichotomic discourse between Russia and Turkey.[48] This focus also bypasses the periods of Russian domination, World War II, Communism, and the past three decades, effectively sidelining the critical reappraisal of those periods. At the same time, it creates an exclusive group identity that marginalizes the descendants of those inhabitants of the region who are not considered culturally and ethnically Bulgarian. The same attitude is also visible in other neighboring nations, and it represents a major obstacle to the "pluralization" and "democratization" of the region's memory.[49]

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44 The conquest celebrated in this monument, the subsequent demographic change it engendered, and thus the question of the ethnographic composition of the Romanians (as purely Dacian, and the Thracoromans as foreigners, and the like) have haunted Romanian scholarship for a long time. On this, see Niculescu, "Archaeology and Nationalism in the History of the Romanians."

45 Aleida Assmann, *Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit: Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2006), 220.

46 McDowell, "Heritage, Memory and Identity," 41.

47 The monument was "erected in honor of 1300 Russian and Romanian soldiers who lost their lives during the liberation of Bulgaria in 1877. It was built in 1906 [immediately before the declaration of Bulgaria's independence in 1908] and is one of the 12 monuments built immediately after the Liberation, at the initiative of the Russian Ministry of War": "The Monument of Victory," The Bridges of Time, accessed March 28, 2022, https://thebridgesoftime.com/?ait-item=the-monument-of-victory&lang=en.

48 Vildane Dinç, "Bir Savaşın Bellek Alanlarında Yeniden Üretiminin İşlevleri: 1877–78 Türk-Rus Savaşı (93 Harbi) Örneği," in *The 1st Annual Kurultai of the Endangered Cultural Heritage AKECH 2018, 5–8 July, Constanța, Romania*, ed. Taner Murat (Constanța: Anticus Press, 2018), 165–80.

49 Heike Karge, "Practices and Politics of Second World War Remembrance: (Trans-) National Perspectives from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe," in Pakier and Stråth, *A European Memory?*, 64–74, 139. Karge discusses how in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, memorial tourism in the form of "pilgrimage to

War memorials are also abundant in Turkey. But because Turkey directly experienced neither World War II nor Communism, and because what is commemorated as victory by the nation-states elsewhere around the Black Sea, like the liberation of Bulgaria, was a defeat for the Ottomans, the Turkish Republic differs from its neighbors in that it concentrates its commemorative efforts on sites connected to Turkey's War of Independence and World War I. These so-called *şehitlik* (lit. "martyrs' memorials") commemorate fallen Ottoman and later Turkish soldiers. Dozens of these are situated around the Black Sea region outside Turkey: six in Ukraine, three in Romania, one in Bulgaria, and eight in Azerbaijan. While a few of these memorial sites date back to the 1930s, most were established or restored in the late 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century—that is, they were created just as the experience of these historical events was about to disappear from living memory.[50] These places are visited by Turkish government representatives on official trips to the region. One site in Crimea, known as the Sevastopol Memorial for the Martyrs of the Crimean War (1853–56), was "inaugurated" in 2004, and the remains of forty Turkish war dead from the vicinity were exhumed and transferred to the site. Due to its proximity to the "Hero City" of Sevastopol, this war memorial has a highly symbolic significance and constitutes a contested, appropriated space by Turkey in the Russian-dominated understanding of that part of Crimea. It is therefore no wonder it was the scene of vandalism in 2014. The city of Sevastopol occupies an extraordinary place in Russian memory. Besieged, destroyed, and seized twice—in the Crimean War, and ninety years later in World War II—it was liberated by the Soviet Army on May 9, 1944, only some days before the deportation of the Crimean Tatars. The *şehitlik* are thus binding official and counter memorials on foreign territory and are examples of symbolic territorial appropriation and the effort to maintain place-bound identity.

War memorials are inclusive only for the party they stand for; they make sense only for those who belong to the community of those the monuments commemorate, those who share the same perception of the past and identify with, or at least feel empathy toward, the fallen soldiers and want them to be remembered. They operate much as the firefly tale Karpat related in his autobiography, but in a more formal and official way, imprinting the presence of (real or imaginary) war dead on a particular territory. This is also the case in the most important commemorative site of Turkey, the memorial for the battle of the Dardanelles (1915–16) on the Gallipoli (Turkish: Gelibolu) Peninsula, which ended in a victory for what was still at that time the Ottoman Empire. Although only indirectly part of the Black Sea world, the traumatic memory of this battle at the Straits exemplifies place-bound individual and official remembering and col-

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war memorials" came to replace visits to religious sites, and how with it arose an understanding of meaningful dying on the battlefield different from that in the West.

50 Cengiz Dönmez, "I. Dünya Savaşıyla İlgili Yurt Dışındaki Türk Şehitlikleri," *Gazi Akademik Bakış* 7 (2014): 137–62.

lective mourning in the region.[51] It is not only the Turkish side who suffered casualties in the fighting; the Anzac (Australians and New Zealanders fighting for Great Britain) soldiers did as well. In the 1920s, construction began on a cemetery for and monuments to the Anzac war dead, and efforts were undertaken to have the entire site around the Anzac Cove designated as consecrated ground. Similar efforts on the Turkish side began in the 1950s, and the first memorial structures were erected only a decade later. Starting with the construction of a cemetery and monuments in the 1920s, today the whole Gallipoli Peninsula has been developed into an immense *lieu de mémoire* and the victory there incorporated into the successful founding narrative of the Turkish Republic. This place of memory, the real battlefield and its constant remembrance by Turkey, Australia, and New Zealand as a place of a common mourning, constitutes at the same time a place of multiple official and individual (counter-)memories, a dissonant space with competing interpretations.[52]

Monuments of victory and martyrdom are always embedded in concepts of triumph for a certain group, while representing mourning and defeat for others. However, even as sites of defeat, as in the case of Turkey's *şehitlik*s in former Ottoman territories, they keep alive the memory and lay claim to the spaces they are erected upon. While these monuments, on an institutional scale, commemorate past events and work against forgetting, communities in exile or local minorities need different strategies of remembering.

3 Remembering and Postmemory

This section explores the many strategies minority and diaspora communities have elaborated to prevent forgetting and keep place-bound memory alive; among these strategies are the establishment of strong rituals and narratives related to place and the experience of exile, the creation of new sites, and the establishment of (counter-) monuments referring to episodes of the community's past or to the traumatic experience of exile. I also look at the organized renaming of places at different moments in the past, a practice that goes hand in hand with the reshaping and reinterpretation of sites and landscapes, and at efforts of diaspora communities to keep the memory of the original names alive.

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51 Another traumatic World War I experience for Turkey, this time a defeat, was (the prelude to) the battle of Sarıkamış against Russia (part of an Ottoman campaign to retake the northeastern part of the Black Sea, the port of Batumi, and access to the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea). Before the battle, more than 25,000 Turkish soldiers froze to death on the march to the battlefield. As part of a Turkish effort to keep the memory of this trauma alive, young people from all over Turkey have in recent years participated in an annual large-scale reenactment of their march.
52 Paul Gough, "Commemoration of War," in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Heritage and Identity*, ed. Brian Graham and Peter Howard (Farnham: Ashgate 2008), 215, 223–24; Gürler, Özer, and Yetişkin, "Hafızanın Arayüzü Olarak Anma ve Anma Mekanları."

3.1 Memories from Exile

Many diaspora communities are connected to the countries around the Black Sea. To maintain their place-bound identity and memories far from the geographical places people left behind because of expatriation, deportation, and emigration, these communities hold the places in their memories and create new memory sites, real or imaginary. Countless such monuments referring and relating to these places left behind, many of them counter-monuments, have been erected all over the globe. In Turkey and elsewhere, these include symbolic sites of ritual, places of individual and/or official remembrance, and monuments related to the victims of the population exchange (*mübadele*) of Pontic Greeks and the deportation and annihilation of the culture of Armenians, Crimean Tatars, and Meskhetian (Ahıska) Turks, and also to the memory of the immigration of diverse peoples from the Caucasus.

These memories include narratives of the experience of being deported from their homelands, as well as all sorts of narratives transmitting the idealized places and milieus they left behind. These often take the form of stories, tales, and songs that are performed and transmitted within families and groups, listened to again and again, reinforcing and recreating the bonds within the community and the link between the lost place and its memory, between those who experienced deportation, *mübadele*, expulsion, or worse and the following generations through the theme of traumatic experience. Community-specific rituals, like the preparing of certain dishes, such as the *havitz* (Turkish *kuymak/mıhlama*) or the *piroshki* (a loan word from Russian, similar to the Turkish and Tatar *börek*) of the Pontic Greeks, reinforce not only community identity but also the spatio-cultural link to the "homeland." In recent years, Turkish and Greek diaspora communities have also begun to visit their respective sites of origin in the other country, thus enriching abstract narratives of places left behind with the real experience of the sites.

For those living in Turkey today, even the act of planting young fruit trees imported directly from Crimea or the Caucasus—whose fruits are said to be of the best quality—can be considered a way of commemorating a lost past through recreating its symbolic site, articulating indirectly the loss of the real place. While these real sites of memory are often erased, destroyed, or simply transformed, in the common imagination of the community, they are suspended in their imaginative timeless "original" form. Or, in some cases, their substitutes are constructed at the new settlement, as in the case of the Pontic Greeks in Kastania (Greece), who built there a reconstruction of the monastery Panagia Sumela near Trabzon to accommodate the famous icon of the Virgin they took with them during the population exchange.[53] This is an excellent ex-

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[53] For this icon, see Stefanos P. Tanimanidis, *Historical Account of the Holy Icon and the Monastery of Panagia Sumela* (n.p., 2020). And for the creation of similar pilgrimage places with copies of this icon elsewhere, and for more on the Greek diaspora generally, see the work of Michel Bruneau; for an example in English, see his article "The Pontic Greeks, from Pontus to the Caucasus, Greece and the Diaspora," *Journal of Alpine Research* 101, no. 2 (2013): 1–10, https://doi.org/10.4000/rga.2092. For forms of

ample of the transformation of so-called communicative memory, of lived experience, present, and transmitted by those who were part of the event, into institutionalized memory, where this traumatic experience is transformed into a place of commemoration.

The study of individual and collective suffering and trauma began with and remains dominated by work on the Holocaust, which serves as the archetypal model for European and even global memory politics. This model is often adopted by and for other communities who have suffered: Pontic Greeks, Armenians, Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, etc. However, there are two problems with this model: (1) the danger of ethnocentrism, and (2) the problem of mediation. How can the experience of one group's suffering be communicated to those who did not experience and whose communal past was not affected by that suffering or similar traumas of their own? In the global politics of commemoration, some minorities experience a double exclusion due to their absence both from official national narratives, including possible recent reappraisals, and from other minority or counter-narratives. Every act of remembrance contains the danger of excluding others' memories, even, or perhaps especially, if they are connected to the same spatio-temporal past.

That said, current global and specifically European memory politics involves more than merely integrating negative or neglected episodes in a national past into commemorative efforts and official narratives—it extends to the recording and institutionalization of memory passed down through the lived experience of individuals. This cultivation and preservation of the experiences of a community, the struggle against the forgetting of past (traumatic) experiences as the generations who lived through them die out, has been named postmemory.[54] For all the minority and diaspora communities around the Black Sea, this process of institutionalization of memory is well underway, and thus new ways of memory storage, of not forgetting, have been developed to replace intergenerational memory transmission and transfer memory to future generations. Examples include the efforts of Bulgarian and Greek diaspora communities living in Odesa and Bessarabia (today Moldova and Ukraine) to create and support museums

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remembering and the recreation of symbolic memory sites of people of the Caucasus in Turkey, see Abdullah Temizkan, Didem Çatalkılıç, and Tuğba Erdem, eds., *Kafkasya Kökenlilerin Hafıza Mekânları – Memory Spaces of the People of Caucasian Origin* (Izmir, 2018), http://hafizamekani.com/calistay-kitabi/. For Crimean Tatars, see Filiz Tutku Aydın, *Émigré, Exile, Diaspora, and Transnational Movements of the Crimean Tatars: Preserving the Eternal Flame of Crimea* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021). For Turks in the Dobruja region, see Yelis Erolova, "(Re) Invented Traditions – Reconstructed Identities (Case Studies from Bulgarian-Romanian Border Region of Dobrudzha)," in Taner, *The 1st Annual Kurultai*, 7–20. For Armenian sites of memory, which largely focus on eastern Anatolia, see David Leopold, *Embattled Dreamlands: The Politics of Contesting Armenian, Kurdish and Turkish Memory* (New York: Routledge, 2020).

54 For the notion of postmemory, see Marianne Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Ernst Van Alphen, "Second-Generation Testimony, Transmission of Trauma, and Postmemory," *Poetics Today* 27, no. 2 (2006): 473–88, https://doi.org/10.1215/03335372-2005-015.

and memorial complexes like the Museum of the Filiki Etairia ("Friendly Society"), which commemorates the role of Odesa's Greek community in Greece's nation-building process and its struggle for independence from the Ottoman Empire.[55]

Interestingly, it is often only in the phase of postmemory—that is, in generations who do not have direct experience of a memory through transmission from family members or other firsthand witnesses—that people become interested in their past. While the search for "one's origins" has until recently been a difficult undertaking, that has now changed thanks to the internet and digital resources, and memory is thus placed increasingly in a virtual space. Diasporas create their own digital (often exclusive) communities and exchange platforms, and in doing so, they create virtual places of memory. Individuals, too, can easily search for or gather information on the internet. For instance, people in Turkey are interested in their ancestors in Dobruja (Bulgaria and Romania), Crimea, and the Caucasus, while Pontic Greeks and Armenians are exploring their past in the southern Black Sea region. In recent years, this interest in places of past habitation has turned to action. While Pontic Greeks visit the Sumela Monastery, its vicinity, and places they or their ancestors left behind, Turks from Dobruja claim Romanian citizenship through their ancestry.[56]

Oral history records are an effective instrument for the storage of personal experience and memory and for the preservation of the group identity of diaspora communities. In the last twenty years, much effort has been put into the collection of oral biographical records of Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Meskhetian Turks, and other diaspora communities.[57] Through these first-hand records, abstract historical narratives of past events are fleshed out and tied to individual experience, thus creating another level of understanding and remembering. Collectively, they represent a new wave of efforts to keep alive the memory of different ethno-social groups who for-

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55 Koch, "The National Self-Determination Projects of Greece and Bulgaria," 304. Also see the website for the Odessa Hellenic Foundation for Culture, accessed March 28, 2022, http://hfcodessa.org/en/museum/.

56 See, for example, the Facebook group Romanya Yerdeğişim Göçmenleri – Romanian Turks Exchange Migration, accessed March 28, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/groups/13889500458/.

57 For the deported Meskhetian Turks, see Ömer Beyoğlu, ed., *1944 Ahıska Sürgünü Son Tanıklar* (Ankara: YTB, 2019). For exile experiences from Crimea, see the website of the Crimean Turks Cultural and Mutual Aid Society, accessed March 28, 2022, https://www.surgun.org, and the journal *EMEL* at https://emelvakfi.org/emel/, as well as the autobiography of a Crimean Tatar educator translated into English by his daughter: Fevzi Altuğ, *Thornbush: Memoirs of a Crimean Tatar Nationalist and Educator Relating to the Russian Civil War and the Famine of 1921–1922*, trans. İnci A. Bowman (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 2004). For Armenian oral accounts (from Ordu, Samsun, Trabzon, and elsewhere), see the oral histories section of the archive of the Armenian Research Center at the University of Michigan–Dearborn: https://umdearborn.edu/casl/centers-institutes/armenian-research-center-0/collections-and-archives/oral-histories. For biographic accounts, see Selçuk Küpçük, "Ordu Şehrinde Gayri Resminin Tarihi: Bakırcı Harut Usta'nın Öyküsü," and Ibrahim Dizman, "Ordu: Çoklu Bir Kimlik Bileşkesi," in *Karadeniz'in Kaybolan Kimliği*, ed. Uğur Biryol (Istanbul: İletişim, 2014), 147–77, 179–198. For Pontus Greek memory, see Vahit Tursun, "Farklı Kimliğin Somut ve Psikolojik Bedeli," in Biryol, *Karadeniz'in Kaybolan Kimliği*, 119–26.

merly inhabited the Black Sea region through the creation of diverse places of memory, among them museums, recordings of memory, and virtual communities. While these efforts focus on collection and remembering, and can thus be viewed as primarily preservative in focus, others are more confrontational.

3.2 Counter-Hegemonic Monuments and Dissonant Memories

Places of memory that actively challenge dominant narratives are termed counter-monuments. These are visual and material expressions of the memory and experience of minority, diaspora, or other communities which challenge or reject the normative and officially accepted version of the past. Counter-monuments are spaces of resistance that create disruptive openings, real and imaginary "landscapes of minority" in the landscape of official narratives. In the case of exiled communities, they can also establish counter-narratives related to another nation's established history and view of the past, and reintroduce ignored or suppressed events and identities.[58] When conceptually well planned, they can promote fruitful discussion, debate, and reflection and encourage the inclusion of formerly neglected dimensions of that past in official narratives. At the same time, counter-monuments run the risk of provoking violent reactions and vigilant defense of the established version of an official narrative of a national past; that is what happened to monuments erected in commemoration of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944 in Alushta and the memorial in Mamaşai (renamed Orlovka) to Crimean Tatars who served in the Soviet army and were either killed in World War II or exiled after their return to their village near Sevastopol. Both of these monuments were vandalized and destroyed shortly after their unveiling.[59]

Two monuments of different function and scope exemplify the role of counter-memory in the Black Sea region. The first is the so-called Monument to the Genocide of the Greeks of Pontus. Erected in Piraeus, Greece, in 2017, the provocatively named monument further inflamed the already tense debate on the different readings of the population exchange in 1923 between Turkey and Greece and the subject of the Pontic Greeks, who hail originally from northeastern Anatolia. Erected in the square where the Athenian general Themistocles launched the fleet that defeated Persia at the battles of Marathon and Salamis in 480 BCE, the monument establishes a historical link to ancient Greek success and territorial expansion and dominance. It was inaugurated with a liturgical procession that included the sacred icon of the Virgin Mary of Sumela—a powerful symbol of Pontic Hellenism, the centerpiece of the Sumela Mon-

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58 Mitchell, "Monuments, Memorials, and the Politics of Memory," 451.
59 "Ukraine Monument to Victims of Crimean Tatars' Deportation Vandalized," *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*, January 17, 2014, https://www.rferl.org/a/crimea-tatars-memorial-vandalized/25233461.html; Halya Coynash, "Monument to Crimean Tatar WWII Heroes Which Debunked Russia's Lies Destroyed in Occupied Crimea," Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group Information Portal, May 10, 2019, https://khpg.org/en/1557448771.

astery near Trabzon in Turkey, brought to Greece when the Pontic Greeks left the country in the 1920s—thus also making a spatio-religious connection to the eastern Black Sea region and the Pontic Greeks' expulsion from their historical homeland. Given its religious dimension and reference to the greatness of ancient Greece, the memorial to this displaced community is a powerful counter-hegemonic monument that challenges the narrative of the eastern Black Sea coast as exclusively Turkish, a narrative that is closely tied to the rise of the Turkish Republic and the wave of nationalist historiography that came with it.

The second example is a memorial in the village of Taraktaş, near Sudaq (Crimea), to three young Crimean Tatars who were accused of killing a priest in 1866 and executed two years later. The fate of the three men—who, according to the Crimean Tatars, were falsely accused—was the source of great sorrow for the people of Taraktaş, and a folk song lamenting their deaths is still popular even today.[60] On May 18, 1998, fifty-four years after their deportation from the village in 1944, the returned people of Taraktaş erected a memorial next to the graves of the three men. Regular commemorative ceremonies are held at the site by Crimean Tatars who have returned to their villages, turning the monument into a site of remembrance for all the victims of oppression and despotism. And gravestones from destroyed cemeteries nearby have been collected at the site as well, further contributing to its accusatory dimension, thus creating an uneasy stumbling block in the neat hegemonic Russian narrative of the Crimean landscape.[61] Compared with the genocide monument in Greece, this monument, on a much more modest scale, perforates the official amnesia about the fate of these people, whose voices have been silenced since the Russian annexation of the peninsula.

Both examples show how commemoration of forgotten or oppressed events of the past creates a rupture in official and imposed narratives. But at present, neither has served to initiate much reflection or dialogue, let alone a new negotiation of established narratives. Nevertheless, the creation of counter-monuments, as an act of standing up for and reintroducing officially neglected dimensions of the past, is an effective tool against oblivion, against forgetting and being forgotten. So too is another strong vessel of place-bound memory: the name of a place.

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60 For different orally transmitted versions of the Crimean Tatar folk song, see Feridekhanum Useinova, "Sözlü Gelenekte Kırım Tatar Türklerinin Muhacereti ve Sürgünler" (master's thesis, Gazi University, 2016), 43–49.

61 For an analysis of the Taraktaş tragedy based on archival research, see Ibraim Abdullaev, *Taraktashskaia tragediia* (Simferopol: Tezis, 2010).

3.3 Spatial Violence and Resistance: Erasing of Place Names and Place-Bound Memory

The way a place, a settlement, or a cultural landscape is designated contributes to how it is perceived; a name is fundamental in constructing not only the geographical but also the historical and socio-cultural dimensions of the identity of space and place. In other words, the name, with all its connotations, constitutes the place. This holds both for real, physical places and for imaginary, intangible sites of memory. Therefore, toponyms are places of memory par excellence, and research on place names includes such dimensions as their meaning and the various namings and renamings of a place or space in different textual sources and maps across history. Recent scholarship has been particularly interested in the close connection between place names and heritage, identity, and memory.[62]

The Black Sea region has undergone many different phases of renaming, through colonization, conquests, resettlements, and direct colonial and political intervention. In Antiquity, newly founded Greek colonies "mapped" the Black Sea region with Greek names, and later communities, conquerors, settlers, and others added names of their own, including Turco-Tatar Islamic names, imprinting their identity on places by renaming them. Often, places have several names, and different communities use the name with which they identify themselves. One of the first systematic renaming projects was undertaken after the conquest of the northern Black Sea region by Russia at the end of the eighteenth century. Part of the colonial project of Catherine II was the symbolic incorporation of the cultural landscape into her empire, in line with which historically rooted place names were changed into names connecting them to ancient Greek settlements.[63]

This radical remapping was followed by many others in different parts of the region. Reinterpretation through renaming has been particularly marked during periods of nation building, serving as a preferred tool in the construction of a national past and common identity. Renaming, the erasing of a place name or its replacement by a new one, creates new connections between the past and present and a uniform citizenry. It is a manipulative political act with the goal of changing the perception of the past based on the ideological framework of those who change the names; it is a reinvention of national identity and history, but also an act of memory annihilation and spatial violence against historically given names and toponyms.[64] Meanwhile, clinging firmly to a name, or re-implanting it onto a real or imaginary landscape, can be understood as

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62 Derek H. Alderman, "Place, Naming and the Interpretation of Cultural Landscapes," in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Heritage and Identity*, ed. Brian Graham and Peter Howard (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008), 196.

63 Kelly O'Neill, "Constructing Russian Identity in the Imperial Borderland: Architecture, Islam, and the Transformation of the Crimean Landscape," *Ab Imperio* 2 (2006): 163–92.

64 On government change and the "reorganization of memory" through renaming, see Aleida Assmann and Linda Shortt, "Memory and Political Change: Introduction," in *Memory and Political Change*, 7.

an act of symbolic resistance and as a refusal to forget the dimensions of a place connected to that name. Thus, groups like minority communities and diasporas create their own counter-memories through an insistence on the use of alternative place names, tying together place and group identity.

Exemplifying this tendency is the map of Crimean Tatar place names, an effort dating to the post-Soviet period. In tandem with the physical deportation of the Crimean Tatars and other communities in 1944, Soviet authorities carried out an ethnic cleansing of all Turkic and Crimean Tatar village and city names, replacing them with Russian names to erase, once and for all, the memory of these people. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, returning Crimean Tatars sought to reintroduce the original place names. While this goal was never realized, their efforts did succeed in producing a map with more than nine hundred original names, including names of extinct villages, and a comprehensive list with corresponding Russian names was compiled by Crimean Tatar scholars and made available online, in the "hope that many individuals seeking their roots in Crimea will be able to locate the place of their ancestors."[65] This map is a virtual reclamation of a territory and an insistence on place-bound remembrance of past and present identity. In 2016, these original names even made a brief appearance on Google Maps' online maps of Crimea, following Ukraine's decision, within the framework of its de-communization program, to reinstall Turkic and Crimean Tatar geographical names erased during the Soviet era. Because Crimea had been under Russian occupation since 2014, this can be seen as an example of the international community, here represented by Google Maps, supporting Ukraine's effort to respect the heritage of the Crimean Tatars and distance itself from Soviet ideology policies. However, after intervention by Russia, Google removed these historically and culturally rooted names and reinstalled the names from the Soviet period, even on the Ukrainian versions of Google Maps.[66]

In Turkey, the renaming of topographic and settlement names has been carried out in different periods. During the Ottoman period in 1913–16, when the government wanted all names of non-Turkish, non-Islamic settlements to be changed into Turkish ones, villages were given new names designed "to reflect diligence and military victories."[67] Later in the twentieth century, especially from 1957 to 1978, place names of different origins were again changed to remap the cultural landscape into a territory of Turkishness. On Turkey's northern shore, nearly five hundred names of villages were replaced because they were Greek (*Rumca*), Armenian, Georgian, or Laz, and this renaming simultaneously erased both the historical presence of deported groups and

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65 For the map and relevant literature on its compiling, see "Crimean Tatar Place Names," International Committee for Crimea, accessed September 2, 2022, https://iccrimea.org/place/placenames.html.

66 "Google Maps Reverts to Soviet-Era Place Names in Crimea," *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*, July 29, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-crimea-google-maps-soviet-names/27888523.html.

67 Daniel Steven Fields, *State Imposed Place Name Change in Turkey and the Response of Giresun Residents* (master's thesis, Sabancı University, 2013), 69.

the historically rooted cultural identity of those who remained.[68] This went hand in hand with efforts to prove that the roots of places names were etymologically Turkish, and thus that the places themselves were originally Turkish as well.[69] Similar attempts to connect place to an imagined national past can be seen on the other side of the border, in Georgia, where place names are etymologically retraced to legendary figures, this time erasing the Ottoman dimension of the past.[70] Similar to the map of Crimea, the various erased or forgotten historical names of places in the southern Black Sea and their etymologies are reinstalled in the toponymic inventory of the so-called Index Anatolicus, a steadily evolving map open to individual contributions with entries of actual and historical names of places in former Ottoman territories, at present Turkey and the Balkans. Information on the map includes historically known names, related dates, and brief information on the meaning of the names, thus constituting a virtual window onto the past dimensions of places.[71]

Another example of a similar dynamic playing out—an effort to create a uniform landscape and to erase dissonant cultural identities and place-bound memories through renaming—can be seen in southern Bulgaria, where place names of Turkish and Arabic origin are still debated.[72] There, this push for renaming and the related erasing of other group identities gained a new wind in the 1980s, when Muslim Turks and Tatars were forced to change their first and last names to Slavic-Christian ones, while those who resisted were severely persecuted, sometimes even expelled from the country, triggering a wave of emigration to Turkey.[73]

In all these cases, names of places, sites, and individuals as holders of memory and acts of renaming are part of the negotiation of past and present place-bound identity, and efforts to preserve or reinstate old names are acts of resistance against manipulative transformations, assimilation, and forced forgetting.

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68 Harun Tunçel, "Türkiye'de İsmi değiştirilen Köyler," *Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 10, no. 2 (2000): 23–34.

69 For these efforts, see especially the works of Fahreddin Kırzıoğlu. For a critical approach to the work of Kırzıoğlu, see Hovann H. Simonian, "History and Identity among the Hemshin," *Central Asian Survey* 25, no. 1–2 (March–June 2006): 164–70.

70 Mathijs Pelkmans, *Defending the Border: Identity, Religion, and Modernity in the Republic of Georgia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 65.

71 The website, which Sevan Nişanyan has operated since 2010, is Nişanyan Yeradları: Türkiye ve Çevre Ülkeler Yerleşim Birimleri Envanteri, last modified September 1, 2022, https://nisanyanmap.com/. See also Fields, *State Imposed Place Name Change in Turkey*.

72 Martin Dimitrov, "Bulgarian City Stirs Tensions by Changing Place Names," *Balkan Insight*, June 1, 2018, https://balkaninsight.com/2018/06/01/bulgarian-nationalists-stir-tensions-by-changing-turkish-arabic-names-in-stara-zagora-area-06-01-2018/.

73 For the 1980s, see Stefan Troebst, "Vergangenheitsbewältigung auf Bulgarisch: Zum Umgang mit den Akten der ehemaligen Staatssicherheit und zur strafrechtlichen Verfolgung kommunistischer Staatsverbrechen," in *Zwischen Arktis, Adria und Armenien: Das östliche Europa und seine Ränder; Aufsätze, Essays und Vorträge, 1983–2016* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2017), 184–85. See also Tomasz Kamusella, *Ethnic Cleansing During the Cold War: The Forgotten 1989 Expulsion of Turks from Communist Bulgaria* (London: Routledge, 2019).

The dimensions of memory conservation discussed here and the struggle against (imposed) forgetting of minority and diaspora memory, the collection and making available of individual experience through virtual storage, the establishment of counter-narratives and -monuments, and the insistence on retaining or reintroducing changed place names are all strategies of place-bound commemoration against forgetting.

However, there is another dimension of place-bound remembering which should not be neglected: Memory can be retrieved through an examination of the places themselves. The final section of this paper thus turns to a closer examination of a selection of specific sites and elaborates on the layers of identity and memory they contain, some forgotten or hidden, many still retraceable through their material remains or documentation.

4 Selected Sites of Memory

The last section of this chapter looks at the different dimensions of place-bound memory in four selected sites to illustrate some aspects of their complexity, to show how these dimensions are prioritized in local and national heritage politics, and to explore how the current way the sites are presented creates site-specific narratives that shape our perception of them. The re-examination of a place's past and the effort (official and individual) to reveal and promote awareness of its masked and ignored dimensions enriches and, in the long run, enhances the way we understand these sites.

4.1 Constanța

Constanța (ancient Tomis), the oldest continuously inhabited city in Romania and one of the biggest ports of the Black Sea region, is a particularly interesting heritage site, as it is home to remains belonging to Antiquity, the Ottoman era, and the national Romanian past. In the Ottoman period, several prayer houses adorned the city; as late as the second half of the nineteenth century, a church for the Greek community was constructed by decree of the sultan in 1865–67. The later-destroyed Mahmudiye Mosque (named after Mahmud II) was situated close to the harbor, and the Hünkar (Sovereign) or Aziziye Mosque (after Abdülaziz) was erected in 1867–68 for the immigrants from Crimea who settled in Constanța.[74] Still open for prayer, the Hünkar Mosque presents on its entrance façade the carved *tuğra*, or imperial monogram, of the Ottoman sultan, proudly expressing his territorial claim.

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74 Bruno Andreşoiu, ed., *Geamii: Minarete pe cerul Dobrogei – Minarets in a Dobrogea Sky* (Bucharest: Igloo, 2012), 34–41. For the mosques erected during the reign of Abdülaziz in different parts of the Ottoman Empire, see Kasım Hızlı and Selman Kılınç, *Sultan Abdülaziz Han'ın Yadigarları: Aziziye Camileri* (Istanbul: Çamlıca, 2013).

Constanţa gained importance in the Romanian Republic from the late nineteenth century on, and its urban fabric was restructured according to the ideological tenets of the young nation. The Romanian Orthodox cathedral of Saints Peter and Paul was built in 1883–85, and some forty years later, the archbishop's palace was constructed next to the church. A statue of the Roman poet Ovid (43 BCE–17/18 CE), who was exiled there, was made by the sculptor Ettore Ferrari in 1887; it now dominates the square, to which it has lent its name. Many new buildings were erected in the early twentieth century: the Casino, in Art Nouveau style, inaugurated in 1910; and, more importantly, the City Hall on Ovid Square, now the Constanţa History and Archaeology Museum, designed in the Romanian Revival style, together with the square, by the architect Victor Ştefănescu in 1911 and constructed, interrupted by World War I, between 1912 and 1921.[75] Today, this museum not only holds an extensive archaeological collection, including a huge Roman mosaic *in situ* next to the museum building, but also illustrates the efforts to establish a Romanian national history narrative. In 1966–68, its so-called *sala pictată* (the painted hall) was adorned with frescoes showing historical scenes from Antiquity (Greek, Roman), the Middle Ages, and the independent Romanian nation, including even contemporary scenes of the Communist regime. However, any reference to the centuries-long Turkish/Ottoman past is absent from this national museum.

Ottoman memory had to be replaced by a new national claim without upsetting the still-numerous Muslim population in Constanţa and the then still existing Ottoman Empire. In 1905, the construction of a Royal Mosque was decided, partially as a response to the recognition of the authority of the Romanian Church in Macedonia by Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909). Construction started in 1910 on the site of the Mahmudiye Mosque, which was torn down to create space for the new mosque. The first cornerstone was laid in the presence of the head of the Romanian bureau of religious affairs and the Ottoman ambassador. The mosque was inaugurated in 1913 by the Romanian king Carol I, and the sultan sent a huge carpet from the renowned imperial Hereke Factory for the interior of the mosque. The mosque was built in the then-popular eclectic style, with an impressive dome and a high minaret, by chief architect Victor Ştefănescu on the tip of the historical city center, dominating the harbor region and replacing the Ottoman visual presence with a new Romanian edifice. The architect, who was invited to Istanbul in 1912 to study Ottoman religious architecture, was awarded the prestigious Mecidiye order on behalf of Sultan Mehmed V (r. 1909–18) at the inauguration ceremony.

These few selected examples of the cultural heritage of Constanţa illustrate the complex interplay and overlay of sites of memory and the multicultural, multilayered past of the town and region. They also illustrate how a young, independent Romania

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75 "Proiect 'Reabilitarea Muzeului de Istorie Naţională şi Arheologie Constanţa' Cod SMIS 116053," website of the Constanţa Museum of National History and Archaeology, accessed March 28, 2022, https://minac.ro/muzeu-istori-CT/index.php.

shaped the perception of its history through a national lens, integrating and excluding well-selected dimensions of its past.

4.2 Batumi and Aziziye

Strategically situated on the connection to the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea and home to the most important harbor in the eastern Black Sea, Batumi has been the scene of numerous territorial claims and, as a consequence, clashing and competing place-bound memories.

The history of Batumi goes back to the Greek colony Colchis, later a Roman-Byzantine garrison, and during the Middle Ages it was part of different local (Georgian) kingdoms. Batumi belonged to the Ottoman Empire from 1614 to 1878; it was then incorporated into the Russian Empire after the Russo-Ottoman War, returned to the Ottomans in 1918, and brought into the Soviet Union in 1920, where it remained until Georgian independence in 1989. Today, Batumi is a popular regional tourist destination famous for its casinos. Similar to other places around the Black Sea, Batumi embraces its antique past as a Greek colony and related legends. A statue of Medea and the Golden Fleece—a local princess in the mythological account of Jason and the Argonauts—by the sculptor Davit Khmaladze (unveiled in 2007) dominates the city's Europe Square. Another monument, *Man and Woman*, was installed in 2010 on the tip of historical Batumi; it is a moving work of art in which two lovers are brought together only to separate in the next instant, by the artist Tamara Kvesitadze. The people of the city have renamed this statue "Ali and Nino," relating it to the famous protagonists of the novel by the same name about the impossible love between a Georgian Christian girl and an aristocratic Azerbaijani boy in Bolshevik-era Baku.[76] Today these two monuments are among the best known sites in Batumi; together, they shape the perceptions of the city by tying Batumi to two elements of the city's many pasts, the first one relating to ancient Greek culture and Europe, the other to the interplay of complex regional identities.

Neglected here is the contested and delicate subject of the city's Ottoman past. Modern Batumi was actually founded by the Ottomans in the second half of the nineteenth century, prior to which it had been little more than a small village. The Ottoman Empire undertook great efforts to build up and defend this region and its important port, restructuring it as a stronghold against an advancing Russia in parallel with similar efforts in the western Black Sea. These efforts began in 1864 under Sultan Abdülaziz (the town was renamed Aziziye in his honor) and continued until 1878, when the

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76 Originally published by Kurban Said, the pseudonym for Lev Nussimbaum, in 1937. For the English version, see Kurban Said, *Ali and Nino*, trans. Jenia Graman (New York: The Overlook Press, 1996).

territory was lost to Russia.[77] The Ottomans developed the city's harbor, constructed a lighthouse, a quarantine center, a customs building, fortifications, barracks, and a government office, and they planned churches and cemeteries for the city's non-Muslim communities similar to those built in Samsun and Constanţa in the post-Tanzimat period. The still-functioning St. Nicholas's Church (1865–71), designated for the Rum (Anatolian Greeks) who were brought there from Rize and Samsun, is situated in the historic city center.

This vibrant chapter of the city's past is not commemorated today, and Georgia's cultural-heritage register lists only a single historical mosque still functioning in Batumi, the Orta Cami (Central Mosque) (1866) on the border of old Batumi. Another prayer house, the octagonal Aziziye Mosque (1869), a symbol of Ottoman domination, has disappeared. This mosque can serve as an interesting example of the transformation of a contested site of memory and illustrates debates on cultural legacies. Also known as the Valide Sultan (Queen Mother) Mosque, as it was partly supported by Pertevniyal Sultan (d. 1883), the Circassian mother of Sultan Abdülaziz, the mosque was constructed together with the new city and bore the same name, Aziziye. Though it continued to be used by local Muslims, under Russian rule it eventually fell into neglect and was torn down in the 1930s.[78] The Aziziye Mosque opened onto the Aziziye Square, which, deprived of the mosque, was renamed Lenin Square in Soviet times and is currently called Freedom Square. Today, the mosque and its urban context exist only in the memory of Georgian and Turkish Muslims, the memory being nourished by its documentation in archival material, plans, and some photographs. Without these documents, the memory of this mosque would not continue—and thus in this case, it is the photographs and other documents that are a *lieu de mémoire*, which can be reanimated at any time. In 2012, a bilateral agreement between Turkey and Georgia was signed with an accord for the reconstruction of the Aziziye Mosque, initially at the site of the original mosque on the headland in the center of Batumi, but later, because of local opposition, at another location. The matter has never been resolved, and discussions about the reconstruction of the Aziziye or the erection of a new mosque continue. This example illustrates the difficulty of dealing with contested or excluded pasts. What is at stake here is not the edifice itself, it is the struggle over a specific dimension of the region's past and its sites of memory, at once transformed, rejected, suppressed, and reclaimed.[79]

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77 Abdullah Bay, "Limanı Olan Bir Kasabadan Liman Kentine: Batum Şehri (1830–1905)," *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 26, no. 1 (2016): 61–80; Selma Saltoğlu, "Batum Burunbaşı Mevkii'nde Aziziye Şehrinin Kuruluşu, Mimarisi ve Osmanlı Dönemi Yapıları (1864–1878)" (master's thesis, Istanbul Technical University, 2016).
78 Saltoğlu, "Batum," 71–79.
79 See Ruslan Baramidze, "Political Process, Social Activity and Individual Strategies in Georgia: Institutional Transformations, Struggle for Identity and Georgian Muslims in the Media," *CAP (Central Asian Program) Papers* 166 (April 2016): 1–17; Nicole Kançal-Ferrari, "Islamic Art and Architecture in a Contested Region: Negotiating the Muslim Heritage in Meskheti, Georgia," in "Hinterland Forces: Architec-

4.3 The Southern Black Sea Region: Trabzon and the Sumela Monastery

Trabzon

Unlike Samsun, discussed above, which gained importance only in the second half of the nineteenth century, Trabzon was always a vital cultural center in the eastern Black Sea region. A Greek colony, later part of the Romano-Byzantine world, it was the capital of the Empire of Trebizond founded by the noble family of the Komnenoi (1204–61), thus outliving Constantinople. Conquered by Mehmed II in 1461, the city was a sanjak (administrative district) under Ottoman rule, with an Ottoman prince (*şehzade*) at its head. The first prince to be installed as a sanjak-bey, between 1487 and 1510, was Selim I (1470–1520); and his son, Süleyman I, known as the Magnificent (1494–1566), was born in Trabzon. Today, the city is perceived by Pontic Greeks as the capital of their lost empire, a symbol of the irretrievable loss of their culture in the region they left behind in the *mübadele* in 1923–24; in contrast, it is understood in Turkey as the city of the princes (*şehzade şehri*) and viewed as a symbol of the successful conquest of the last stronghold of Byzantium.

In the nineteenth century, like other port cities of the Black Sea region, Trabzon experienced considerable growth. The brisk trade passing through the city's well-situated natural harbor helped give rise to rich Pontic Greek, Armenian, and Muslim merchant families, the best known among them the Nemlizade.[80] Trabzon flourished further after the Ottoman–Russian War in 1877–78 and the Russian conquest of the southern Caucasus, as emigrants from the conquered lands, including many merchants, flocked to the city and its vicinity; Western countries and Russia opened consulates there, and foreign trade companies established branch offices. At the turn of the twentieth century, Trabzon was a wealthy city with, besides its Byzantine and earlier Ottoman heritage, many newly constructed government and educational buildings, like the still-extant Muslim İdadisi (High School from 1880, currently the Science High School) and the Greek College (1902, open until 1921; currently the Kanuni Anadolu Lisesi), both prominently facing the sea; both are depicted in their original splendor on postcards from the period and on the web pages of the current educational institutions they host, standing as witnesses to the pre-republican flourishing city at the turn of the century. Another hallmark of the city was the Sümer (Turan) Cinema, also known as the Opera of Trabzon, as it was also a stage for opera and theater performances. A unique building constructed in the Art Nouveau style in 1912, the cinema was demolished in 1958 during the urban transformation of the city and is today remembered

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tural Responses at the Margins," ed. Angela Andersen, special issue, *International Journal of Islamic Architecture (IJIA)* 11, no. 2 (2022): 293–321.

80 The Nemlizade Hacı Ahmet Efendi corporation, established in 1869, is one of the first documented Ottoman joint-stock companies: Yasemin Nemlioğlu Koca, "19. Yüzyılda Trabzon Limanı: Seferler, Tüccarlar, Mallar," *Karadeniz Araştırmaları*, no. 49 (Spring 2016): 157–87.

only in images. It nevertheless remains part of Trabzon's current visual memory; and in recent times, voices of regret about the loss of this beautiful building and calls for its reconstruction have been raised, criticizing the decisions made by Trabzon's urban modernizers in the 1950s.

Discussions about tearing down the building as part of an effort to modernize the city were taking place as early as the 1930s. Part of the move to apply modern principles of urban design to the city was the commission of a city plan, a novelty introduced in Turkey in that period. Between 1931 and 1958, Trabzon underwent fundamental changes in the new republican spirit: the French urbanist Jacques H. Lambert produced a master plan and preliminary development project for Trabzon in 1937–38, and a year later, many historical streets and neighborhoods were renamed after important republican figures and institutions. The reorganization changed and covered up the earlier layers of the city, destroying some buildings while preserving but reinterpreting others in new ways.[81]

Two mansions constructed by rich Greek bankers and merchants in the eclectic, neo-classical European style of around 1900, reflecting the wealth and ambition of their owners, exemplify this transformation and conversion.[82] Both buildings, witnesses to Trabzon's rich cultural life at the turn of the century, changed ownership, meaning, and function in the young Turkish Republic. With the change of ownership, the memory of the first owners also disappeared.[83]

The first of these, a summer residence erected between 1890 and 1912 for the merchant Konstantin Kabayanidis on the slopes of Soğuksu near Trabzon, caught the eye of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on his visits to the city, and he stayed there twice, in 1924 and 1937. The kiosk was given to Atatürk as a gift and was later transformed into a museum. Today, the Atatürk Kiosk is among the top tourist attractions in Trabzon.[84]

The second, an even grander example, is the Kostaki Kiosk, since 2001 the Museum of Trabzon, in the heart of the city. This mansion was constructed around 1900 by the wealthy Kostaki Teophylaktov, who, immigrating from the northeastern shore of the Black Sea, settled in Trabzon around 1880. Falling into financial troubles in the aftermath of the Russian occupation of the city (1916–18), he was forced to auction off the

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81 Evrim Düzenli, "Cumhuriyeti Trabzon'da İnşa Etmek: Belediye Zabıtnamelerinde 'Meydan,' 'Anıt,' 'Müze' ve 'Sinema' Tartışmaları (1936–1958)," and "J. H. Lambert Trabzon'da, Yıl 1937: Trabzon'da 'Şehirleşme' Çabaları ve Lambert'in 'Trabzon İmar Planı ve İzah Raporu' Üzerine Notlar," in Tuluk and Düzenli, *Trabzon Kent Mirası*, 265–306.

82 See also Stéphane Yerasimos, "La Communauté grecque de Trabzon au XIXe siècle," in *CIÉPO Osmanlı Öncesi ve Osmanlı Araştırmaları Uluslararası Komitesi VII. Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, ed. Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, İlber Ortaylı, and Emeri van Donzel (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1994), 241–67.

83 For the mansions in Trabzon included in the inventory of cultural property, see Hamiyet Özen et al., *Trabzon Kent İçi Kültür Varlıkları Envanteri* (Trabzon: T.C. Trabzon Valiliği İl Kültür ve Turizm Müdürlüğü Yay., 2010), 265–82.

84 Gültekin Kâmil Birlik, "Trabzon Atatürk Köşkü," *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, no. 59 (Fall 2016): 51–71.

mansion. It was bought by Akif Kaptan Bey of the Nemlizades and was soon thereafter expropriated by the government. It was successively used as the Russian consulate, the Trabzon Provincial Hall, and, between 1936 and 1987, a school for girls. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his wife Latife Hanım are known to have stayed here in 1924.

It is worth taking a closer look at the architecture and interior decoration of the Kostaki Kiosk, thought to have been constructed by an Italian architect.[85] The impressive building is erected in an eclectic neo-Classical style with a bi-colored façade decorated with Italian tiles; several balconies and tower-like elevations covered with domes create multiple vistas on Trabzon and the sea. The interior bears sophisticated decoration, reflecting the mindset of the community the rich merchant was part of. While some of the rooms display the neo-Turkish decoration that was in fashion during the revival of Turkish art, of a perhaps slightly later date, other rooms are embellished with neo-Classical and neo-Baroque decoration programs. The most interesting room is without doubt the so-called play/fortune room. This room's ceiling is not only decorated in a neo-Classical style; the iconography of the depictions contains multiple references to Greek mythology. Hermes, the herald of the gods and protector of merchants, is depicted in a cartouche, and two scenes show Zeus on his throne surrounded by his entourage. Other motifs include mythological creatures and the signs of the zodiac. This edifice, especially the references to Greek mythology, offers a glimpse into the now-forgotten world of the educated merchants and urban elite at the turn of the nineteenth century, a shared world that spanned the Black Sea, with similar architectural and decorative programs found everywhere from Constanţa to Odesa and even Istanbul.

Sumela Monastery

The Greek Orthodox Panagia ("Virgin Mary") Sumela Monastery is unquestionably one of the most famous and most contested sites of memory in the southern Black Sea region, and it is exemplary of the innumerable holy sites related to the region's pre-Ottoman and Christian dimensions. Situated in the mountainous region behind Trabzon, the monastery dedicated to the Virgin is said to date back to the fourth century and, under sultanic protection, continued to function until 1923. Housing, among other significant items, one of the most venerated icons of the Virgin (now located in a reconstruction of the site in Greece),[86] it was the spiritual center and pilgrimage place of the Orthodox Greeks and a symbolic site of identification for Pontic Hellenism; this second quality made it an unwieldy monument in the early republic, when it was closed. A more neutral attitude toward the site has been adopted only in the recent years, in part to meet the international demands of heritage politics.

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85 Candan Nemlioğlu, *Trabzon'un Abidevi Eserlerinden Kostaki Köşkü* (Istanbul: Nöbetçi, 2008).
86 Michel Bruneau, "Lieux de mémoire, hauts lieux et diaspora: Sanda et Soumela dans la diaspora grecque pontique," *L'Espace Géographique* 25, no. 2 (1995): 124–34.

Abandoned to its fate for decades, services once more began to be held at the monastery between 2010 and 2015, when restoration work began, and again beginning in 2021, when Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew performed the liturgy on the occasion of the Feast of the Assumption of the Virgin. The monastery's Ayazma (holy water) is attributed healing powers and has always been in demand by both Christians and Muslims, the latter of whom show great respect to this site as the Meryemana (Mother Mary) monastery. The site, similar to many other religious places across the Black Sea region, thus shows dimensions of syncretism.[87] Reopened as a museum in 2020, Sumela is currently promoted as an important regional touristic attraction, while the descendants of Pontic Greeks visit the monastery for its spiritual dimension.

The city of Trabzon and Sumela Monastery both are multilayered sites of memory with many forgotten or excluded rich dimensions, claimed and used by different communities and advocacy groups.

4.4 Muslim Heritage in Crimea: Bağçasaray Neighborhood

My last example in this selection of places of memory is a region in Crimea. The reader has no doubt realized that Crimea and related memories are present throughout the lines of this chapter. As already noted, the peninsula itself is one of the most disputed territories in the Black Sea region, and many of its historical and cultural sites are claimed by different stakeholders as part of a struggle over the past and for future legitimacy. One such site is the former capital of the Crimean Khanate, Bağçasaray (founded in the first half of the sixteenth century), in the Çürük Suv valley in the southwestern part of the peninsula. The same area is also home to the historical settlement of Salaçıq at the end of the valley, the hilltop Qırq Yer (later Çufut Qale, "the fortress of the Jews"), and in between, an ancient dervish lodge and cemetery with the tomb of the saint Gazi Mansur, the region called Eskiyurt (literally "old settlement," renamed Podgorodnee in 1948), and the nearby Azizler (saints) graveyard. All these Muslim sites are not only considered sacred by Crimean Tatars, they are also fundamental for their historical self-conception and identity, as they are the scene of the formation of the Crimean Khanate in the mid-fifteenth century, while other material remains testify to the presence of the khanate's predecessor state, the Golden Horde.[88]

The Khan's Palace in Bağçasaray (currently the Bakhchisarai Historical, Cultural, and Archaeological Museum-Reserve), discussed above, is a site which holds innumerable place-bound narratives and memories of multilayered and even multidirectional potential – a *lieu de mémoire* par excellence.[89] However, sites in this region are also

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87 Anthony M. Bryer and David Winfield, "Nineteenth-Century Monuments in the City and Vilayet of Trebizond: Architectural and Historical Notes," *Archeion Pontou* 30 (1970): 277–78.

88 For these sites, see Kırımlı and Kançal-Ferrari, *Kırım'daki Kırım Tatar (Türk-Islām) Mimarī Yadigārları.*

89 Nicole Kançal-Ferrari, *Kırım'dan Kalan Miras: Hansaray* (Istanbul: Klasik, 2005).

considered sacred by other ethno-religious communities. Examples include the historical Balta Tiymez (literally "untouched by the axe") Karaite cemetery in an oak grove held sacred by the Crimean Karaites, the later inhabitants of Çufut Qale; another is the Orthodox Assumption (Dormition) Monastery. Both sites are situated on the slopes of Qırq Yer, the latter on the edge of a route in the valley linking the foot and the top of the hill. While no historical territorial dispute ever existed between the Crimean Karaites and Tatars, the situation is different for Islamic and competing Orthodox Christian sites. At the end of the Soviet era, the Muslim community returned from its deportation and exile and sought to reclaim its religiously and culturally significant sites and houses of worship, or simply to have them protected from destruction. At the same time, with the end of Soviet-era restrictions on religion, the Orthodox Church once more looked to expand. As a consequence, conflicts arose over places and sites claimed by both communities. Today, also due to the new political situation in the peninsula, a fragile (im-)balance exists between the two communities regarding these overlapping memory spaces and official attitudes toward heritage protection.[90]

These four selected sites, each in its own way, illustrate the manifold dimensions of place-bound memory and the interplay between remembering and religious, cultural, and territorial claims, ideologies, and national history constructs, as well as the transformation and selective appropriation and exclusion of memory connected with these places and sites. They also make clear that the excluded dimensions of a place's past continue to haunt it, hindering any fruitful renegotiation of the site until they are included in the way it is perceived and remembered.

5 Conclusion

In the sections above, I have presented different dimensions of places of memory related to the Black Sea region – tangible and intangible, conceptual constructs, and protected heritage sites. More than an all-inclusive overview, my goal was to show how remembrance and forgetting related to a specific territory have to be seen in their larger context and complexity, and how place-bound memory and understanding of space is directed by multifaceted processes of selection, many of them political. This selective approach has an impact on the current and future interpretation of sites in the region on multiple levels: locally, nationally, globally, and across diaspora communities.

The beginning of the twenty-first century was marked by a strong belief in a new politics of remembering, a belief that we had moved beyond a narrowly nationalist and ideological relationship with our collective pasts, and by a transformation in regional

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90 Dariya Afanasyeva, "Shared Heritage: Sacred Landscapes of Crimea, Their Development and Protection in the Multicultural Context" (PhD dissertation, Brandenburg University of Technology, 2015); for the expansion of the Orthodox Church and the conflicts with Muslim sites, including the region mentioned here, see Kozelsky, "The Challenges of Church Archaeology in Post-Soviet Crimea," 82–90; O'Neill, *Claiming Crimea.*

discourses on cultural heritage and places of memory toward a more global vision of identity, culture, and memory. Now, twenty years later, we know better: the haunting, recurring memories bound to sites, instrumentalized by dominant agents, implemented in the past and recreated in the present, are omnipresent, especially in regions like the Black Sea, where both past and present remain fiercely contested. Therefore, for the sake of equity, dominant narratives of memory sites have to be counteracted by other, silenced memories. This effort of renegotiation, the constant insistence on the multiple possible other readings of cultural landscapes and places, of the existence of alternative, dissonant, and muted pasts, of counter-memories and alternative sites of memory, is not separate from scholarship—not the private domain of the activist —but goes hand in hand with research, scholarly investigation, and interdisciplinary work that pairs the fields of memory studies with neighboring disciplines ranging from history, sociology, and geography to material culture studies and architectural and art history.

Memory and cultural heritage management today is expected to contribute to a better understanding of the multi-dimensional spatio-temporality of places. However, simultaneously, the umbrella terms "heritage" and "culture management" are increasingly seen and instrumentalized for their economic value, with heritage management carried out with an eye to its potential contribution to a region's economic development. This focus on exploiting sites for profit through touristic promotion, often also ideologically driven, brings with it the dangers of oversimplifying a territory's past, of reifying an exclusive understanding of it, and even of willful misinterpretation, when such misinterpretations make economic sense.

The task of recapturing, maintaining, and preserving the multiple layers of a site and the complex intertwining of memory and place, the struggle against forgetting and exclusion, requires the will to remember, a will that is often lacking in discourses about memory sites in the Black Sea region today. To rectify this, the region's places of memory and the discourses around them must be rethought, reinterpreted, and transformed through a critical opening and negotiation, an act that would have the added benefit of countering the rising danger of postmodern fundamentalism (European, national, imperial, Muslim, Christian, etc.). The first step should be to keep all kinds of place-bound memory, tangible and intangible, intact and alive through protection, conservation, and documentation; the second step is to raise conscientiousness about and concern for overlapping, multilayered visions, for tolerance toward alternative voices, and to agree on a more heterogeneous way of remembering. The keeping alive of multifaceted (hi)stories and memory spaces of the past and the reappraisal of their forgotten layers would have an immediate impact on the understanding of sites and the region as a whole. Doing so would make them accessible for future generations while giving collectives, societies, and individuals the possibility to evaluate them as part of their own possible pasts. Further, in the long term, doing so would also promote broader reconciliation and open perspectives, including tolerance toward and fruitful interplay between different political, religious, ethnic, and cultural entities in the region.

The pressing question, then, is: How can the region's many different pasts co-exist without any falling into oblivion? Or, to phrase it differently: How can forgotten pasts—that is, pasts that are remembered only by specific groups—be reclaimed as parts of our general understanding of the region without sidelining other narratives? By way of a tentative answer, I would suggest two approaches to memory politics within and outside the region that use spatial investigation and critical mediatization and musealization to convey experience while avoiding the exclusion and suppression of memory, both focusing also on education. The first example is the labor camp of Belene (Bulgaria); the second is the divided city of Nicosia (Cyprus).

Belene was established on the island of Belene (Persin) on the Danube, a beautiful nature preserve and spot for bird watching, as a labor camp by the Communist government in 1949 for "adversaries of the regime." It was later expanded to include a prison where, between 1985 and 1989, Bulgarian Turks who opposed Bulgaria's forced assimilation policies were held. In the public memory, Belene thus became a symbol of the Communist regime and, for Turks, of forced assimilation. After the closure of the labor camp in 1989 (the western part of the island is still used as a prison), efforts were made to investigate the arbitrary imprisonments, cruelties, and crimes that had taken place at the camp and to keep alive the memory of the suffering its inmates had to endure. Among the strategies employed to this latter end are the holding of annual memorial services and the production of academic publications and documentaries in Bulgarian, German, and the latest one in Turkish (2020), all heavily relying on surviving inmates. Additionally, a site of remembrance has been established on the island, and the labor camp has been turned into a commemorative site on the model of Holocaust memorials.[91] In recent times, in the search for new strategies of mediation, a new approach was started to target in particular young Bulgarians who know of the Communist regime and its oppressions only through second-hand transmission. As part of this approach, annual summer camps are organized where students are confronted with Bulgaria's Communist past and its oppressive dimensions, including the forced assimilation of minorities, and learn about the importance this knowledge holds for understanding the present and shaping the future, and they are encouraged to spread the awareness they gain as "ambassadors of memory."[92] Among the strategies of mediation are academic lectures and the study of archival material, but also visits to and experience of the site, and, most importantly, the opportunity to meet and converse with the former inmates of the camp, the eyewitnesses. Students are encouraged to produce their own thoughts on the site, harnessing the experience they have gained

91 Daniela Koleva, "Belene: Remembering the Labour Camp and the History of Memory," *Social History* 37, no. 1 (2012): 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071022.2011.651581.
92 Krasimira Butseva and Julian Chehirian, eds., *Summer School "Why Should We Remember?" 2019* (Sofia: Sofia Platform Foundation, 2021), http://sofiaplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Belene-digital.pdf; "A Summer School Transforms Attitudes about Bulgaria's Socialist Past," America for Bulgaria Foundation, July 12, 2018, https://us4bg.org/news/belene-summer-school/.

as participants in the summer camp to turn the site into their own personal and concrete place of memory.

Another promising approach is the one Anita Bakshi has laid out in her investigation of cultural heritage and conflict and search for memory recovery in the city of Nicosia (Cyprus).[93] Divided since 1974 after years of conflict and intervention, the city is separated into a Greek and a Turkish part, with the zone around the division line, once the pulsing heart of the city and now a no-man's land, an empty buffer zone that has virtually been frozen in time for nearly fifty years. In her spatial investigation of the city, Bakshi searches for layers of presence and absence of memory; she identifies different types of remembering that are still traceable in the city and that can be recovered through a reading from the present. She studies the city from a spatial and material angle, with the tools of architectural investigation and mapping, but also with the cooperation of those who once used this buffer zone, Cypriot Greeks, Turks, and Armenians. Her effort to re-energize this specific space's apparently forgotten and buried past and to re-activate its hidden memories involves the elaboration of new designs and concepts for memorial spaces and heritage practices. Her work involves, besides the visualization of place through detailed mapping, the inclusion of non-visual aspects of design, like aspects of cognition and perception and of social, mental, emotional, and physical dimensions of experience—recapturing mentally and physically stored memories by wandering through space, visiting left-behind places, looking at (old and new) photographs of the once-vibrant zone, and exchanging experience with past neighbors and workmates. What she proposes is thus a combining of different ways of commemoration, including the training of practitioners and engagement of the community, especially those who frequented the now emptied zone on a daily basis. In this holistic approach, forgotten memory is triggered through evocation, and commemoration is made possible through physical and emotional engagement.

In both examples, place-bound memory is explored in a very concrete way by the community and/or visitors, who not only listen to historical facts or look at museum evidence, but are integrated into an active project of remembering, without neglecting uncomfortable memories and past harms in their experience of the multifaceted dimensions of a site's past and its significance for the broader understanding of the mutual conditioning of place, memory, history, and heritage. And it is this active engagement with memory and place which bears the potential to renew a site's meaning and transform and enrich our understanding of memory places into pluralistic, open, active, and inclusive sites, an engagement so needed in the Black Sea region today.

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93 Anita Bakshi, *Topographies of Memories: A New Poetics of Commemoration* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

Tatiana Zhurzhenko

Ruptured Histories, Contested Memories, Fluid Borders: Monuments in the Northern Black Sea Region from Catherine II to the Russo-Ukrainian War

1 Introduction

On May 4, 2022, on the occasion of the upcoming Victory Day, a new monument was inaugurated in the Russian-occupied Ukrainian city of Mariupol in presence of Sergei Kirienko, the vice-head of Putin's administration, and Denis Pushilin, the head of the self-proclaimed "Donetsk People's Republic." Made of black plastic, it represents an old woman carrying a Soviet flag. The monument refers to an episode from the current Russo-Ukrainian war which went viral on social media and was eagerly instrumentalized by Russian propaganda. In April 2022, seventy-year-old Anna Ivanova, who had lived on the outskirts of the heavily shelled city of Kharkiv, came out of her house with a Soviet flag to welcome Ukrainian soldiers who wanted to bring her food, but whom she mistakenly took for Russians. In the first months of the Russian invasion, the Soviet flag as a de facto official Russian symbol (the "Banner of Victory") was used by the Russian army even more often than the national tricolor to replace the Ukrainian flag in the occupied territories. When one of the Ukrainian soldiers took her banner and trampled on it, the woman rejected their gift. While the later embarrassed Anna Ivanova denied her pro-Russian sympathies, the meme of the "babushka with the Soviet flag" started to take on a life of its own. In the eyes of the supporters of Russia's "special military operation" it was a perfect illustration of its liberating mission in allegedly "Nazi-controlled Ukraine." Murals and statues of the "babushka" appeared in Crimea, the Donbas, and the newly occupied territories in the south of Ukraine. This newly created symbol refers to the glorious Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in 1945 (now re-enacted in Ukraine), and at the same time to the "geopolitical tragedy" of the Soviet collapse in 1991 (which Russia is determined to undo). This admittedly extreme case of a highly politicized commemoration helps frame the issue addressed in this chapter, namely the instrumentalization of memory in the Ukrainian–Russian conflict, and, in particular, the role of monuments in demarcating, contesting, and shifting national borders as well as in bridging historical ruptures and drawing temporal boundaries.[1]

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[1] Tatiana Zhurzhenko, "Borders and Memory," in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies*, ed. Doris Wastl-Walter (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 63–84.

The previous chapter in this volume deals with places of memory in the Black Sea region, focusing primarily on Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, and the Crimean Peninsula; it mainly draws on examples from the Turco-Tatar Muslim heritage. My chapter aims to complement this account from a different geographical angle by focusing on the northern Black Sea coast. Integrated into the Russian Empire during the nineteenth century, and part of the Soviet southern frontier for most of the twentieth, after the dissolution of the USSR it was divided between independent Ukraine and Russia along the administrative boundaries of the Soviet republics.[2] The new international border was violated by the Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014; most recently, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine led to the military occupation and unlawful annexation of the Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts in September 2022. A theater of the most brutal war in the region for decades, the northern Black Sea coast is contested not only militarily but also on the symbolic level. Russian occupying forces have been destroying Ukrainian sites of memory, have restored Lenin statues, and plan to erect new monuments referencing the Russian imperial narrative. It would be wrong to argue that the Ukrainian-Russian memory wars simply escalated into a real war, the latter being caused by the clash of two irreconcilable versions of the past. At the same time, one can safely argue that the mnemonic contestation has been an important aspect of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, which goes back at least to the Orange Revolution in 2004.[3] This chapter offers examples of some places of memory which are central to understanding this contestation. And yet, as illustrated by other examples in this text, it would be too simple to present Ukrainian and Russian historical narratives as homogeneous and lacking internal controversies. Many places of memory in the region display conflicts, tensions, and ongoing reinterpretations *within* both Ukrainian and Russian narratives.

The previous chapter has already outlined a theoretical framework for the analysis of sites of memory in the Black Sea region. My chapter profits from this theoretical discussion but focuses on monuments as a particular type of sites of memory.

Monuments establish links between territory and narratives about the past; they invest geographic places with historical meaning. In this way, monuments contribute to the process that political geographer Robert Kaiser called the "production of homelands"[4] and the historian Antony Smith conceptualized as the "territorialization of

2 Tatiana Zhurzhenko, "Making and Unmaking the Ukrainian-Russian Border since 1991," in *Making Ukraine: Negotiating, Contesting and Drawing the Borders in the Twentieth Century,* ed. Olena Palko and Constantin Ardeleanu (Montreal: McGill University Press, 2022), 329–54.
3 Georgiy Kasianov, *Memory Crash: Politics of History in and around Ukraine, 1980s–2010s* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2022).
4 Robert J. Kaiser, "Homeland Making and the Territorialization of National Identity," in *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism,* ed. Daniele Conversi (London: Routledge, 2002), 229–47.

memory."[5] As symbolic markers of collective identities, monuments do not just memorialize historical events and personalities; often, they help make territorial and geopolitical claims. Especially in times of crisis and rapid change they are instrumental for the re-bordering of political communities. As political boundaries shift, new monuments are erected in order to celebrate territorial gains or help cope with territorial losses. Monuments are also political projects deeply rooted in local politics and society. Monumental commemoration projects have often been sites of public debate and political battles around such issues as location, funding, and ideological interpretation; they involve multiple actors and reveal different visions not so much of the past as of the present. Moreover, the initial meaning of a monument can be changed by means of its various uses and re-appropriation by new actors. "Sleeping" monuments, that is, monuments which have long become an invisible part of the urban landscape or an element of undisputed "cultural heritage," can sometimes be "awakened" and re-ideologized in the context of a political crisis, revolution, or military conflict.

In other words, monuments represent events or personalities that belong to the past, and yet they live their own lives. To grasp this twofold nature of monuments, I find it important to differentiate between static and dynamic aspects of collective remembrance, or between what Eric Langenbacher calls its synchronic and diachronic dimensions, the former referring to dominant collective memories and the latter to the "histories" of these memories.[6] Another distinction which points in the same direction is drawn by some authors between "legacies" and "(politics of) memory." Legacies are "tangible" and "more firmly rooted" in the past; with the passage of time they take on a more or less "permanent form" while "memory" is more subjective and open to instrumentalization (and thus can hardly be separated from the political context).[7] In the context of this chapter, historical and cultural legacies can be seen as material and immaterial traces left in the region by different cultures, civilizations, and states, from ancient Greek and Byzantine, Kyivan Rus, Ottoman and Tatar, and Cossack, to Russian imperial, Jewish, Ukrainian, and Soviet. Legacies provide the "content" for the monuments that have been erected by different state and non-state actors in the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, post-Soviet Ukraine, and Russia. But these monuments also have their own, often dramatic, histories: They are inaugurated, celebrated, forgotten, sometimes toppled, and then restored; some of them even go into exile. These personal "biographies" of public monuments testify to dramatic historical ruptures, geopolitical shifts, and political earthquakes.

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5 Antony D. Smith, "Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism," *International Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1996): 445–58.

6 Eric Langenbacher, "Collective Memory as a Factor in Political Culture and International Relations," in *Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations*, ed. Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 13–49.

7 André Liebich et al., "The Ukrainian Past and Present: Legacies, Memory and Attitudes," in *Regionalism without Regions: Conceptualizing Ukraine's Heterogeneity,* ed. Ulrich Schmidt and Oksana Myshlovska (Budapest: CEU Press, 2019).

The differentiation between "legacies" and "memory" is analytical and should not be essentialized. On the one hand, legacies are often seen as placing constraints on memory politics. According to Ukrainian-Canadian historian Serhy Yekelchyk, "states and intellectuals do not have a free hand to invent or manipulate national traditions and memories because, as Arjun Appadurai noted back in 1981, history is not 'a limitless and plastic symbolic resource'."[8] And yet, legacies themselves are cultural and political constructs. Take, for example, the Russian imperial expansion and colonization of the northern Black Sea region in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Seen today as a "Russian imperial legacy," at the time the (geo)political project of Catherine II and Prince Potemkin was conceived as a "Greek project." The ideology of the Russian imperial conquest was framed in terms of references to the earlier legacies of ancient Greece and Byzantium, as testified today by local toponyms—see the Greek names of Kherson, Mariupol, Odesa, and Simferopol, among others.

Which legacies became salient and seen as worth preserving (or requiring disposing of) in a certain historical moment is also a highly political question. The Russian imperial legacy was rejected in the early Soviet era but had already been partly rehabilitated under Stalin. As will be illustrated below, despite some continuity of the historical narrative of Cossackdom, rather different elements of the Cossack legacy in the region were institutionalized in Soviet and post-Soviet Ukraine as well as in post-Soviet Russia.[9]

Moreover, it should be noted that legacies as social constructs are often inherently contradictory; their "dark" and "bright" sides are contested by different social groups and political communities and re-evaluated under different political regimes. The Russian imperial legacy in the region has been interpreted rather differently in post-Soviet Ukraine and in Russia.[10] An object of "decolonization" in Ukraine, it was partly re-appropriated by local actors as part of the regional identity in such places as Odesa, where it has been an important part of the "foundation myth."[11] Russia's ruling elites have used the Russian imperial legacy to legitimize the annexation of Crimea and, most recently, of further Ukrainian territories.

The Soviet legacy is especially controversial in Ukraine, where the crimes of the Communist regime, and in particular the Holodomor (the Great Famine of 1932/33), overshadow what many still see as the largely "positive" legacy of Soviet modernization, industrialization, and urbanization. An important part of the Soviet legacy is the heroic myth of the "Great Patriotic War" (i.e., World War II) sustained by the So-

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8 Serhy Yekelchyk, *Stalin's Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 7.

9 Andreas Kappeler, *Die Kosaken: Geschichte und Legenden* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2013).

10 Andreas Kappeler, "Ukraine and Russia: Legacies of the Imperial Past and Competing Memories," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 5 (2014): 107–15.

11 Tanya Richardson, *Kaleidoscopic Odessa: History and Place in Contemporary Ukraine* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008); Oleksandra Haidai et al., *Polityka i Pamiat: Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, Kharkiv vid 1990-h do siohodennia* (Lviv: FOP Shumylovych, 2018).

viet veteran organizations, the Russian and (until 2014) the Ukrainian Communists, and especially by the Russian authorities. In Ukraine, this part of the Soviet legacy has been radically re-evaluated over the last decade; the Soviet regime has been increasingly equated with the Nazi one, and Stalin's mass repressions against the Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups are now classified as genocide. From today's perspective, (southern) Ukraine in the twentieth century appears as an object of subsequent occupational regimes: Soviet, Nazi and Romanian, and Soviet again.[12]

The chapter is divided into two parts: In the following, I first deal with the Russian imperial and Soviet histories of public memorialization on the northern Black Sea coast and then address the contemporary "wars of monuments" in post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia.

2 Histories of Monumental Commemoration from Catherine II to Gorbachov's Perestroika

During Russia's "long nineteenth century," an imperial commemorative culture had emerged that glorified the territorial expansion, military power, and civilizing mission of the Russian Empire on the northern Black Sea coast, in particular by erecting public monuments to the tsars, their administrators, and their military leaders. This Russian imperial legacy became contested and re-evaluated during the turbulent first half of the twentieth century, when the Bolsheviks sought to create an alternative canon of revolutionary heroes—an attempt interrupted by World War II and the German-Romanian occupation of the region. The post-World War II decades, with their relative political and social stability, saw a consolidation of the Soviet commemorative culture, centered around the myths of the October Revolution and the "Great Patriotic War" but also partly rehabilitating the Russian imperial legacy and at the same time granting some space for the (Soviet) Ukrainian commemorative canon. The collapse of the Communist regime and the dissolution of the USSR turned this Soviet commemorative culture into a part of the "Soviet legacy," albeit a politicized and highly contested one.

2.1 Glorifying the Russian Empire

Before Peter I ("the Great"), historical events and personalities were commemorated in Russia according to the Orthodox tradition: by building churches, monasteries, and chapels. The idea of a secular monument in the form of an obelisk or statue, like other Western innovations, arrived in Russia with Peter's reforms but began to be implemented only during the reign of Catherine II ("the Great"). These first monuments, mostly glorifying Russian military victories and military leaders, were architectural

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12 Olena Stiazhkina, *Zero Point Ukraine: Four Essays on World War II* (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2021).

rather than sculptural and constructed in classicist style. They were often placed on the territory of imperial residencies and aristocratic estates and rarely in the public space. Sculptural monuments became more widespread during the reign of Nicholas I, who personally initiated some of them. In the last decades of the nineteenth century and up to World War I, monumental commemoration, often related to anniversaries of historical events (military victories, territorial gains) and historical personalities, became an important part of public life. The local elites and society played an active role in such activities by initiating monuments and raising funds.[13]

On the northern Black Sea coast, which in the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century was an arena of geopolitical contestation between two empires, the Russian and the Ottoman, the monumental commemoration followed—and glorified—the military conquest and colonization of the newly acquired territories and their integration into the Russian Empire. Previously, Ottoman and Cossack territories as well as Crimea, annexed from the Crimean Tatar Khanate, became the Russian province of Novorossiia (New Russia). Monuments erected on these territories commemorated Russian imperial rulers, military leaders, and heroes of Russian imperial wars as well as statesmen who contributed to the colonization of the new province.

Among the imperial rulers, Catherine II, the mastermind of the Russian territorial expansion to the south, was by far the most prominent. Monuments devoted to her presented the empress as a benevolent ruler who brought peace, economic flourishing, civilization, and enlightenment to the "Wild Fields" previously populated mostly by nomadic tribes. During the "long" nineteenth century, monuments to Catherine II were erected in several towns founded during her reign: in Ekaterinoslav, now Dnipro in Ukraine (erected in 1846), in Ekaterinodar, now Krasnodar in Russia (1907), in Nakhichevan-on-Don, now part of Rostov-on-Don in Russia (1894), in Odesa (Russian: Odessa) in 1890, and in Simferopol in 1890. These monuments were meant to express the adoration, gratitude, and loyalty of the imperial subjects who saw themselves as greatly benefitting from the imperial policies of territorial conquest, colonization, and resettlement.[14] For example, the monument to Catherine II in Nakhichevan-on-Don expressed the gratitude of the local Armenians who had founded the town upon their resettlement from Crimea. In a similar way, the monument in Ekaterinodar (which means "Catherine's gift") was an expression of gratitude and love of the "children"—as the Black Sea Cossacks called themselves—to their "mother-empress" who had given them territories on the right bank of the Kuban River freed from nomadic tribes.[15] The monument to the empress in Odesa was initiated by the city to mark

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13 Kiril Sokol, *Monumenty imperii* (Moscow: Grant, 2001).

14 On the commemoration of Catherine in Ekaterinoslav, see Andrii Portnov, *Dnipro: An Entangled History of a European City* (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2023), 52–58.

15 Aleksandr Polianichev, "Ekaterina II kak kazachia mat: Pamiatnik imperatritse v Ekaterinodare i zaporozhskii mif Kubani," in *Chetyrekhsotletie doma Romanovykh, 1613–2013: Politika pamiati i monarkhicheskaia ideia,* ed. Vladimir Lapin and Iuliia Safonova (St. Petersburg: European University Publishing, 2016).

the centenary of its foundation. The ten-meter-high monument was crowned by the statue of Catherine pointing to the port with one hand and holding the order for the founding of the city in the other. With her foot, she was trampling the Ottoman flag. Catherine's statue was surrounded by four figures showing her companions who contributed to the foundation of Odesa: Prince Grigorii Potemkin, commander-in-chief of the Russian army, who captured the Ottoman fortress of Hacıbey on which the city was built, Platon Zubov, the governor of Novorossiia, José de Ribas, the first mayor of Odesa, and François Sainte de Wollant, a Flemish engineer and the author of the first city plan.

Other monuments to Russian imperial rulers included the one to Peter I in Taganrog (erected in 1903) on the occasion of the bicentenary of the city founded by the tsar, who had been a predecessor of Catherine II in her politics of territorial expansion to the south (the Azov Campaigns in 1695/96). The annexation of Bessarabia, another territorial gain of the Russian Empire in the northern Black Sea region, was celebrated by a monument to Alexander I in Kishinev, now Chișinău, the capital of Moldova. Russian statesmen and close associates of the imperial court engaged in the colonization of the Russian south received their monuments too. Prince Potemkin, apart from his statue on the monument to Catherine II in Odesa, was also memorialized in Kherson, founded under his administration in 1778 to host the first Russian Admiralty on the Black Sea coast (the Kherson admiralty moved to Nikolaev [today: Mykolaiv] in 1829). The monument to Potemkin in Kherson was erected in 1836 in front of the Orthodox cathedral, where he was buried in 1791. One of the most popular monuments in Odesa, which has become a symbol of the city, belongs to the Duke of Richelieu, a French aristocrat and statesman who after the French Revolution made a career in the Russian imperial army; in 1803 he became the governor of Odesa and later of the Novorossiia province. The bronze statue of Richelieu, the first monument in Odesa, was erected in 1828 at the top of the famous Odesa steps. The second monument in the city was unveiled in 1863 and memorialized Prince Mikhail Vorontsov, a nobleman, field marshal, and governor-general of Novorossiia and Bessarabia who died and was buried in the city.

In a region shaped by a long progression of Russian-Ottoman wars, it is probably no surprise that many monuments were dedicated to Russian military commanders and war heroes, as well as to the architects and admirals of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The latter had not only military but also huge political and symbolic significance: Control over the Black Sea strengthened Russia's status as a European naval power and brought it closer to the ultimate dream of bringing Istanbul under Orthodox rule. One example is the monument to the Russian field marshal Aleksandr Suvorov in Ochakov (today: Ochakiv in Ukraine's Mykolaiv oblast). Initially it was built in the nearby Kinburn fortress to commemorate the Battle of Kinburn in 1787, which resulted in Russia's victory over the Ottomans. This bust monument to Suvorov, who had led the defense and was heavily wounded in this battle, was destroyed during the Crimean War. A new, more impressive statue of Suvorov was erected in Ochakiv in 1907, on the occasion of the 120th anniversary of the Battle of Kinburn. Another example is the monument to Aleksei Greig, an admiral of the Imperial Russian Navy of Scottish descent and the

commander of the Black Sea Fleet in 1816–33. The monument commissioned by the navy was erected in 1873 in Nikolaev, a city hosting the Russian admiralty and the main center of Russian shipbuilding on the Black Sea.

But the richest and most impressive memoryscape referring to the glory of the Russian army emerged in Sevastopol, the main base of Russia's Black Sea Fleet. The powerful Sevastopol myth,[16] which has survived both the Russian and the Soviet Empire and was instrumental in the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, had been formed in the second half of the nineteenth century in the aftermath of Russia's defeat in the Crimean War. Britain and France, who supported the Ottomans in this conflict, invaded Crimea and besieged Sevastopol in 1854. Despite the heroic resistance of its defenders, Sevastopol fell one year later, and Russia lost the war. The siege of Sevastopol and its heroes were memorialized in the city in various ways. The remains of the Russian admirals Pavel Nakhimov, Vladimir Kornilov, and Vladimir Istomin, who fell during the siege, as well as the commander of the Russian fleet Mikhail Lazarev (who had died shortly before the Crimean War), were buried in St. Vladimir's Cathedral, constructed in Sevastopol as a memorial to the war heroes. In the subsequent decades, Sevastopol received separate impressive monuments to Lazarev (1867), Kornilov (1895), and Nakhimov (1898). The charismatic Pavel Nakhimov, the hero of the Battle of Sinop, especially popular among the Russian public, was memorialized in Sevastopol's central square, named after him, in the presence of Nicholas II. In 1909, a particularly impressive monument was erected to Eduard Totleben, military engineer and general of the Russian imperial army, who was in charge of fortification during a number of military campaigns, including the Crimean War. The general's statue was surrounded by six bronze figures representing the defenders of Sevastopol—Russian soldiers and sailors (see fig. 17).

Finally, worth mentioning is the Monument to the Sunken Ships erected in 1905 in memory of Russian warships scuttled in Sevastopol Bay in 1854/55 to prevent the enemy from entering the city from the sea. The monument in the form of a Corinthian column, built on an artificial granite rock and crowned with the Russian imperial eagle, has become a symbol of Sevastopol.[17]

2.2 Monuments in Troubles: Revolution, the Early Soviet Era, and World War II

Monumental commemoration reached its peak in the last decades of the Russian Empire. However, the Russo-Japanese War and the revolution of 1905 had already halted some projects. More serious consequences resulted from the February Revolution of

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16 Serhii Plokhy, "The City of Glory: Sevastopol in Russian Historical Mythology," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 35, no. 3 (2000): 369–83. See also Kerstin Jobst, *Geschichte der Krim: Iphigenie und Putin auf Tauris* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2014), 214.

17 Sokol, *Monumenty imperii*; Plokhy, *The City of Glory.*

Fig. 17: The monument to General Eduard Totleben in Sevastopol.

1917, which rejected the Russian imperial tradition and prompted a vehement public discussion on the value of imperial monuments. Soon after the fall of the monarchy, the monument to the controversial Russian minister Petr Stolypin in Kyiv was dismantled, and statues of Catherine II in Ekaterinoslav and Nakhichevan-on-Don were toppled.[18]

What was a sporadic initiative of revolutionary actors supported by frustrated masses, became a consistent policy of the new Soviet government after the Bolshevik Revolution. In the spring of 1918, Vladimir Lenin came up with the "monumental prop-

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18 Sokol, *Monumenty imperii*, 16.

aganda" (*monumentalnaia propaganda*) plan, which proposed the removal of the tsarist monuments and the mass construction of new ones.[19] According to a Soviet government decree of April 12, 1918, "monuments devoted to tsars and their servants which have neither historical nor artistic value" were to be removed and either stored in museums or utilized.[20] At the same time, the government issued a list of historical personalities recommended for monumental commemoration. It represented the new Bolshevik canon of progressive thinkers and leaders of revolutionary and working-class movements, critics of tsarism, and activists of the democratic movement in Russia, as well as Russian cultural figures reinterpreted as bearers of the democratic tradition. (The list also included the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko and the Ukrainian philosopher Hryhorii Skovoroda.) The Soviet government decided to remove the "ugliest idols" and install the first new Communist monuments already on the occasion of May 1, 1918. These efforts were, however, mostly limited to Moscow and St. Petersburg; the government lacked resources and, moreover, did not have control over much of the territory of the former Russian Empire. A couple of monuments erected in Kyiv in 1919 (to Lenin, Karl Marx, and Karl Liebknecht) did not survive occupation by the White Army.[21] In the southern parts of Russia and Ukraine, due to the chaos of the Civil War and the allied military intervention, it was not until the 1920s that the Soviet authorities began to implement their monumental propaganda plans.

As in other parts of the former Russian Empire, monuments to imperial rulers, statesmen, and military heroes in the region were either destroyed or dismantled and removed from public space. Behind this politics, especially later in the 1920s, was not only revolutionary iconoclasm but also more pragmatic motives, such as the need for precious metals like bronze. Those monuments that were lucky enough to survive were re-contextualized, as was the case with the statue of Prince Vorontsov in Odesa. After initial attempts to remove the monument, it was supplemented by a new plaque citing an unflattering epigram by Aleksandr Pushkin, Vorontsov's competitor in love affairs and his subordinate during exile in Odesa.[22] In many cases, plinths left from old imperial monuments were used by the Bolsheviks for new Communist ones. For example, the monument to Prince Potemkin in Kherson mentioned above was veiled in 1917, removed in 1921, and stored in the local museum. His place was

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19 Christina Lodder, "Lenin's Plan for Monumental Propaganda," in *Art of the Soviets: Painting, Sculpture and Architecture in a One-Party State, 1917–1992,* ed. Matthew Cullerne Bown and Brandon Taylor (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 16–32.

20 Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov RSFSR, "Dekret o pamiatnikakh Respubliki," Decree of April 12, 1918, Electronic Library of the History Department of the Moscow State University, www.hist.msu.ru/ER/Etext/DEKRET/18-04-12.htm.

21 Evgenii Golodryga, "Kultura v Kieve-1919: Isskustvo nachinaetsia s ulitsy," *Big Kyiv,* April 23, 2019, https://bigkyiv.com.ua/kultura-v-kieve-1919-iskusstvo-nachinaetsya-s-ulitsy/.

22 "Half milord, half merchant,/Half wise man, half ignoramus,/Half scoundrel, but there's hope./He'll finally become a full one." Richard Pevear, "Introduction," in Alexander Pushkin, *Novels, Tales, Journeys: The Complete Prose of Alexander Pushkin,* trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016), xi.

taken by a Karl Marx statue, which was destroyed during World War II. The Potemkin statue, too, disappeared during the German occupation.

The monument to Catherine II in Simferopol (erected in 1890 to celebrate the centenary of the annexation of Crimea) was destroyed in 1920 after the occupation of Crimea by the Red Army. The plinth was later used for a new "monument to freedom": It depicted a proletarian breaking the chains binding the globe, his naked figure surrounded by statues of Lenin, Marx, and Engels. This Communist monument was destroyed by the Nazis during World War II.[23] The monument to Catherine in Odesa was veiled in 1917 and dismantled in 1920. The statue of the empress was partly destroyed, but its fragments—as well as the statues of Catherine's companions—were stored in the local history museum. In 1921, on the first anniversary of Soviet rule in Odesa, the plinth of the destroyed monument was crowned with Karl Marx's head; later, the head was replaced with a full Marx statue. When the statue was destroyed by a storm, the plinth was crowned by a hammer and sickle (a symbol of the Bolshevik revolution and the new Soviet state).[24]

Most of the new Communist monuments did not survive World War II and Nazi occupation.[25] Monuments to Lenin, Stalin, and other Bolshevik leaders, as well as Soviet and Communist symbols in the public space were destroyed by the German army. Destroyed Communist monuments symbolized the victory over Bolshevism and were often filmed by the occupational authorities and *Wehrmacht* officers.[26] However, the occupying authorities usually had neither interest nor time to implement their own commemorative projects. In Odesa under the Romanian-German occupation (1941–44), Soviet street names were changed back to Russian imperial ones (except for those re-named after Hitler, Mussolini, and Antonescu). Gheorghe Alexianu, the governor of Romanian-occupied Transnistria (of which Odesa became the capital) came up with the idea of "resurrecting the Preobrazhensky Cathedral, levelled by the Soviets in the 1930s, as an homage to Romania's eastern expansion."[27] But the idea did not materialize, and the cathedral was rebuilt only in the 1990s. It seems that the only known case of the German occupying authorities' active involvement in commemorative politics during World War II concerned the monument to Peter I in Taganrog. Erected at the gates of the city park at the end of the nineteenth century, it was taken down by the Bolsheviks and taken to a local museum. In 1940, shortly before

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23 Sokol, *Monumenty imperii*, 100.

24 Aleksandra Poliak, "Den v Istorii: 99 let nazad v Odesse poiavilas golova Karla Marksa," *Pravda za Odessu*, February 7, 2022, https://zaodessu.com.ua/den-v-istorii-99-let-nazad-v-odesse-poyavilas-golova-karla-marksa/.

25 One of the rare examples of early Soviet monumental art that have survived to this day is the gigantic statue of the Bolshevik Artem (Fedir Sergeev) in Sviatohirsk (Donbas); it was created in 1927 by Ivan Kavaleridze, a Soviet Ukrainian avant-garde sculptor and filmmaker.

26 Serhii Stelnykovych et al., "Nazi Occupation and Dismantling of Communist Monuments in Ukraine during World War II," *Intermarum: History, Policy, Culture*, no. 8 (2020): 76–87.

27 Charles King, *Odessa: Genius and Death in a City of Dreams* (New York: Norton Company, 2011), 221.

the war, the local Soviet authorities received permission from Moscow to install the monument in a different place, in front of the city port. The Germans, seeking to win the loyalty of the Don Cossacks, reinstalled Peter's statue in its initial, more prominent place. The official public ceremony took place on July 18, 1943.[28]

2.3 Soviet Monumental Culture after World War II

2.3.1 The Imperial Legacy Rehabilitated: Russian Military Glory

Soon after the end of the World War II, elements of the Russian imperial legacy, in particular Russian military glory, were rehabilitated and integrated into the Soviet historical canon. During the war, Suvorov military schools and Nakhimov naval schools had already been created by decree of the Soviet government with the purpose to raise new army and navy cadres. Decorations for outstanding military leadership named in honor of Aleksandr Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov, and Aleksandr Nevskii were introduced in 1942; two years later, decorations for navy officers named after Admirals Nakhimov and Ushakov followed. After the war, the restoration of damaged historical monuments became part of the agenda of the Soviet authorities. For example, the monument to Field Marshal Aleksandr Suvorov in Ochakiv (erected in 1907) was renovated in 1950; in 1951, a memorial room, and in 1960, a museum dedicated to Suvorov (one of several in the USSR) were opened in Ochakiv, featuring a diorama depicting the Siege of Ochakov in 1788.[29] In the Black Sea region alone, some five new monuments to Suvorov were erected, in Izmail, Odesa oblast (1945), Simferopol (a bust in 1951, replaced with a statue in 1984), Kherson (1950), and, during the late Soviet era, Tiraspol (1979), where later it became one of the symbols of Transnistrian identity.[30] In Soviet Kyiv, a statue of Suvorov was erected in front of the Suvorov military school.

In a similar vein, the monument to Admiral Nakhimov in Sevastopol, which had been dismantled by the Bolsheviks and replaced with a Lenin statue in 1928, returned to its old site in 1959; Nakhimov Square replaced the Square of the First International. The monument to Eduard Totleben, which had been damaged during the war, was restored as early as 1945. According to Karl D. Qualls, this interest in the history of the Crimean War "heralded a new emphasis on local identity, historical depth, and national pride."[31] In his book dealing with the rebuilding of Sevastopol during the first postwar decade, Qualls focuses on the conflict between competing visions of urban resto-

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28 Margarita Kirichek, *Muzei pod okrytym nebom* (Taganrog: IP Stadnikov, 2010), 22–23.

29 "Istoriia muzeiu im. O.V. Suvorova," Ochakivskyi viiskovo-istorychnyi muzei im. A.I. Suvorova, accessed September 21, 2023, https://ovim.ochakiv.info/uk/istoriya.

30 Stefan Troebst, "'We Are Transnistrians!': Post-Soviet Identity Management in the Dniester Valley," *Ab Imperio*, no. 1 (2003): 437–66.

31 Karl D. Qualls, *From Ruins to Reconstruction: Urban Identity in Soviet Sevastopol after World War II* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 143.

ration. While the plans of Moscow architects propagated the dominance of the symbolic triangle of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin in the public space and sought to concentrate the old monuments of the Crimean War in one particular place, Malakhov Hill, the local authorities and architects as well as the Black Sea navy opposed the plan to create a single large outdoor museum. They opted to keep the existing memorials in their traditional places and spread new ones through the city.[32] They also rejected the initial plans to dismantle St. Vladimir's Cathedral, which housed the burial vault of four Russian admirals, thus recognizing its significance as a memorial.[33] The monumental commemoration of the new heroes of the "Great Patriotic War," which had already commenced in the first weeks after the liberation of Sevastopol, was thus symbolically linked with the city's heroism in the Crimean War and its traditional identity as a stronghold of the Russian navy. The narrative of the "second defense of Sevastopol" (the city resisted for eight months before it fell to the Germans in July 1942) was inscribed in a number of memorial sites, including the Victory Monument at Cape Chersonesus and the Glory Obelisk at Sapun Gora. Fifteen years later, the memorial at Sapun Gora was upscaled with a new diorama museum, a counterpart to the Crimean War Panorama on Historical Boulevard.[34] This politics of symbolically linking the "Great Patriotic war" with the Crimean War and thus with Russia's imperial history continued in the late Soviet decades, culminating in the two hundredth anniversary of the founding of Sevastopol in 1983.

Among other commemorative projects, the monument to Kornilov, which according to the Soviet sources was stolen by the Germans during World War II, was restored in even larger scale and reinstalled Sevastopol in 1983. The identification of Sevastopol with Russian naval history and Russia's nineteenth-century state building remained strong even after the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954.[35]

2.3.2 Memorialization of the "Great Patriotic War": The Case of Novorossiisk

Between 1941 and 1944, the northern Black Sea coast became an arena of major operations of the Axis and Soviet naval and land forces. Control over the heavily embattled Black Sea ports was crucial for both sides, and although the Soviet fleet initially outnumbered the Axis ships, German air superiority and the initial success of the *Wehrmacht* on other fronts allowed the occupation of the Black Sea coast from Odesa to Novorossiisk by the summer of 1942. It was only the defeat of the German army near Stalingrad that opened the way to the de-occupation of these territories. The level of destruction and the human cost paid by the Soviet military and civilians were enormous.

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32 Qualls, 130.

33 Qualls, 136.

34 Qualls, 140.

35 Qualls, 3 and 8. See also Plokhy, *The City of Glory.*

On May 1, 1945, Stalin ordered a salute in honor of four Soviet cities (two of them Black Sea ports) which had shown particular endurance and sacrifice in the fight with the German invaders: Leningrad (today: St. Petersburg), Stalingrad (today: Volgograd), Sevastopol, and Odesa. The term "Hero City" was thus coined even before the end of the war, while the title was officially introduced on May 8, 1965, on the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. Half a year earlier, Leonid Brezhnev had become first secretary of the Communist Party, and it was during his era that the full-fledged commemorative cult of the "Great Patriotic War" was developed.[36] In 1973, another two Black Sea ports—Novorossiisk and Kerch—joined the exclusive club of the Hero Cities, which until the collapse of the USSR comprised thirteen members.

Soviet war memorials and monuments were so omnipresent and numerous[37] that an overview for the Black Sea region would go beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, I will focus on the example of Novorossiisk, a city in the southern Russian Krasnodar oblast whose official mnemonic identity as a Hero City during the late Soviet era was shaped by its connection to Leonid Brezhnev and his wartime career. Novorossiisk was extremely important for the Soviet Navy, especially after the fall of Sevastopol in July 1942, but despite the desperate resistance, the Germans occupied most of the city in September of the same year. On February 4, 1943, a small Soviet detachment landed on the outskirts of Novorossiisk near the village of Stanichka and conquered a small bridgehead that became known as Malaia Zemlia (the Little Land). Although it was only meant to be a decoy operation, the Soviet troops, after receiving reinforcement, managed to hold the bridgehead under heavy German fire for 225 days, until Novorossiisk was finally de-occupied in September 1943. Major Tsezar (Caesar) Kunikov, who led the operation and fell in the battle, was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Colonel Leonid Brezhnev, the future leader of the Soviet state, who had occasionally visited Malaia Zemlia as head of the political department of the 18th Army, was the main reason why this piece of land was later officially elevated to an almost sacred site of memory.[38]

As in post-war Sevastopol (see above), the urban reconstruction of the utterly destroyed city went hand in hand with its commemoration. The first modest Soviet war monument was already erected in Novorossiisk two months after the liberation, and its site, Heroes' Square, was to become the symbolic center of the commemorative landscape that emerged in the subsequent decades. Major Kunikov's remains were reburied there shortly after the war. In 1958, Heroes' Square became the third place in the Soviet Union to receive a permanent eternal flame. It arrived from Sevastopol, another Hero City, which received it from the Field of Mars in Leningrad, and this transfer was

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36 Boris Dubin, "Goldene Zeiten des Krieges. Erinnerung als Sehnsucht nach der Brežnev-Ära," *Osteuropa*, no. 4–6 (2005): 219–34.

37 Mischa Gabowitsch, "Soviet War Memorials: A Few Biographical Remarks," *Chto delat*, no. 37 (2014): 6–8.

38 Ivo Mijnssen, *Russia's Hero Cities: From Postwar Ruins to Soviet Heroarchy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2021), 142.

meant to symbolize the continuity of the revolutionary and Soviet military traditions and the deep links between the three maritime cities.[39]

Some more monuments appeared in Novorossiisk during the Khrushchev era, such as an impressive memorial to the Unknown Sailor which was erected on the promenade in 1961.[40] In September 1963, a nine-meter-tall stela was opened on Malaia Zemlia celebrating the landing operation of February 4, 1943, and the heroic defense of the bridgehead.[41] And yet, the city authorities continued to lobby for a new, more ambitious monument worthy of the significance of Novorossiisk in the official war memory; they proposed a project developed by the local sculptor Vladimir Tsigal, who himself had participated in the legendary landing.[42]

With Leonid Brezhnev's election as first secretary of the Communist Party in 1964, the consolidation of the commemorative cult of the "Great Patriotic War" became a high priority for the Soviet government. The Order of the Patriotic War First Class that Novorossiisk received in 1966 contributed to the approval of the Tsigal project.[43] But the most important event took place in 1973: On the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the liberation of Novorossiisk the city was awarded—together with Kerch— the official title of Hero City. The recognition of the key role of the city in the history of the "Great Patriotic War" opened the door to a further proliferation of war monuments. When a year later Leonid Brezhnev came to Novorossiisk to officially hand over the Gold Star of the Hero City, he was taken to Myskhako, a part of the Malaia Zemlia bridgehead, where his headquarters were based back in 1943. Here, an impressive memorial landscape, "The Valley of Death," had been created featuring several elements, such as the expressionist sculpture *Vzryv* (Explosion), the *Kamennyi kalendar aprelskikh boev* (Stone Calendar of the April Fights) displaying the chronology of the battle, and the *Kolodets zhizni* (Well of Life) symbolizing the source of precious drinking water.[44]

Meanwhile, Tsigal's ambitious monument on Malaia Zemlia, after years of lobbying and negotiations with Moscow, was in the process of construction. Planned for 1978, the opening was delayed due to numerous technical problems: The monument had to be built directly on the water.[45] A political complication emerged due to the Brezhnev cult, which reached its peak in the late 1970s. In 1978, Leonid Brezhnev's memoir, entitled *Malaia Zemlia*, was published and immediately became the "central symbol of official war memory in the political elite—bypassing even Stalingrad and

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39 Vicky Davis, "The City as a Work of Monumental Culture: The Hero-City Novorossiisk as a Site of War Myth and Memory," in *The City in Russian Culture,* ed. Pavel Lyssakov and Stephen M. Norris (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 92–93.

40 Davis, "The City as a Work of Monumental Culture," 93.

41 Mijnssen, *Russia's Hero Cities*, 159–60.

42 Mijnssen, 169.

43 Mijnssen, 167.

44 Davis, "The City as a Work of Monumental Culture," 97.

45 Mijnssen, *Russia's Hero Cities*, 169–70.

Leningrad in terms of propagandistic attention."[46] The memoir, ghostwritten by a Moscow journalist four years before Brezhnev's death, presented him as a key military figure in the Battle of Novorossiisk.

The publication of the memoir invested the project with even more political prestige, but caused further delays, as it was decided to feature Brezhnev quotations on the walls of the monument. The monument, whose construction had taken more than ten years, was finally opened in a grand ceremony on September 16, 1982, less than two months before Brezhnev's death (see fig. 18).

Fig. 18: The Malaia Zemlia Memorial in Novorossiisk.

The twenty-two-meter-high triangular construction rising from the sea symbolizes the prow of a ship landing on the beach. On the external walls, sculpted figures depict the landing troops coming out of the water. The monument is integrated into the surrounding landscape still bearing traces of fortifications and a protected area. With its monumental gigantism typical of the Brezhnev era's commemorative cult of the "Great Patriotic War," it testifies to the special status of Novorossiisk in the ranks of the Hero Cities.[47]

46 Mijnssen, 171.
47 Mijnssen, 168–76.

2.3.3 The Canon of the October Revolution Consolidated

Another aspect of post-war Soviet monumental commemoration was the consolidation of the canon of the "Great October Revolution." While first monuments celebrating the Bolshevik leaders and heroes of the Revolution and the Civil War had appeared in the 1920s and 1930s, most of them, as mentioned above, did not survive World War II. After the war, sometimes even immediately after de-occupation by the Red Army, the Soviet authorities reinstalled Lenin and Stalin monuments. They were supposed to mark in a symbolic way the return of Soviet rule over the territories of the northern Black Sea region, which had remained under Nazi occupation for two or three years, thus exposing the local population to anti-Bolshevik and anti-Soviet propaganda. In Bessarabia, which was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 and became part of Romania again from 1941 to 1944, the "monumental propaganda" of the Soviet regime was even more important, as it was a means of Sovietizing the newly acquired territories.

During the first post-war decade, monuments to Stalin were produced en masse, usually reproducing some approved samples. Sometimes Stalin was portrayed together with Lenin: A popular subject presented Stalin visiting Lenin in his Gorki summer residence. The meeting of the two leaders, the already rather sick Lenin and his successor Stalin, symbolized the continuity of the Bolshevik leadership and the legitimacy of Stalin's rule. After Stalin's death in 1953 and especially the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, which denounced his "cult of personality," monuments to Stalin began to be dismantled. After the decision to remove Stalin from the Lenin Mausoleum and rebury him near the Kremlin Wall, in 1962, practically all monuments to Stalin disappeared.

At the same time, during the first post-war decades, Lenin monuments appeared in big cities and small towns, usually at central locations that served as sites of major public celebrations on May 1 and November 7. They were usually inaugurated on Lenin's round anniversaries or anniversaries of the October Revolution, which had become the foundational myth of the USSR. In the post-Stalin era, Lenin appeared on such monuments as a single leader—reflecting his special role in the pantheon of the Revolution. On some monuments Lenin was surrounded by symbolic figures of workers and revolutionary soldiers and sailors, thus underlining not only his leading role in the revolution but also his strong bond with the people. One such example is the Lenin monument in the Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia near the Dneprostroi Dam, the largest hydroelectric power station on the Dnipro River. One of the achievements of the first five-year plan, the dam was destroyed during World War II but later restored. The giant Lenin monument (almost twenty meters high) was created by a group of Soviet Ukrainian sculptors and architects and erected in 1964 (and dismantled in 2016 as a result of decommunization). The plinth was surrounded by bronze figures of a steelworker, a construction worker, a female farmer, and a scientist representing the unity of the Soviet people and featured a Lenin quotation: "Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country." The monument was thus symboli-

cally linked to Lenin's plan for economic recovery and development (GOELRO—the Russian acronym for the "State Commission for the Electrification of Russia").[48]

Other Bolshevik leaders and heroes of the Civil War (who died early enough or were lucky to avoid political repressions) received their own monuments, too. Among them were Sergei Kirov, Mikhail Frunze, Mikhail Kalinin, Feliks Dzerzhinskii, Grigorii Petrovskii, Grigorii Kotovskii, Vasilii Chapaev, Mykola Shchors, and Semen Budennyi. But none of them had the same symbolic status as Lenin. The post-war pantheon of the Revolution had become more hierarchical, but also less internationalist: The pre-war public celebration of the classics of Marxism and of the German revolutionaries was mostly gone, and Lenin was honored as a founder of the Soviet state rather than a leader of the revolution. Monuments to Karl Marx were still erected during the post-Soviet decades, but none of them took a prominent place. In the northern Black Sea region, several of them were erected in areas of traditional ethnic German settlement (even though the ethnic German population almost entirely disappeared as a result of repatriation and forced deportations). One example is Artsyz in Odesa oblast, founded in the early nineteenth century by German colonists under the name of Johanneshort and later renamed to honor the Russian victory over Napoleon near Arcis-sur-Aube in France. The monument to Karl Marx stood before the headquarters of the Artsyz party committee (after 1991 the city council) and was removed only in September 2022. Another monument to Karl Marx in Kholmske, Odesa oblast, was re-dedicated to the Bulgarian revolutionary poet Hristo Botev in a vain attempt to avoid de-communization; it was also dismantled in 2022.[49]

There were some local heroes who took a special place in the pantheon of the Revolution and were extensively memorialized in the northern Black Sea region. One of these heroes was the Russian navy lieutenant Petr Shmidt, one of the leaders of the uprising in the Black Sea Fleet during the revolution of 1905. In October–November 1905, he participated in the street protests in Sevastopol and took command of the rebel ships. The uprising was defeated by the government; Lieutenant Shmidt and his comrades were arrested and, after a brief trial *in camera*, executed in March 1906. In the 1920s and 1930s, Petr Shmidt became a martyr of the Revolution and a symbol of the new Red Navy. The first monument to Shmidt and his comrades was built in Sevastopol in 1935 in the newly founded Communars' Cemetery. During the post-war decades, the commemorative cult of Lieutenant Shmidt developed in the Soviet

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48 On the commemoration of Lenin in the pre-war Soviet Union, see Nina Tumarkin, *Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983) and Benno Ennker, *Die Anfänge des Leninkults in der Sowjetunion* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1997). On Lenin monuments in Soviet and post-Soviet (Central) Ukraine, see Oleksandra Haidai, *Kamianyi Hist: Lenin u Tsentralniy Ukraini* (Kyiv: K.I.S., 2018). On the post-Soviet era, see Lina Klymenko, "Choosing Mazepa over Lenin: The Transformation of Monuments and Political Order in Post-Maidan Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 72, no. 5 (2020): 815–36.

49 Ilona Iakimiuk, "Na Odeshchyni demontuvaly pamiatnyk Karlu Marksu," *Suspilne Novyny*, September 16, 2022, https://suspilne.media/282366-na-odesini-demontuvali-pamatnik-karlu-marksu/.

Union was particularly rooted in the northern Black Sea region. Monuments to Petr Shmidt were erected in Odesa (1946), where he was born, in Ochakiv (1964), where he spent the last weeks of his life as a prisoner and was brought before the court, on the island of Berezan (1968), where he and his comrades were executed, and in Berdiansk (1973), where he grew up and went to a local *gymnasium.* Moreover, museums dedicated to his memory were opened in Ochakiv and Berdiansk.[50]

Another, even more powerful, local myth was the mutiny on the battleship *Potemkin* in June–July 1905. The uprising was sparked by outrage over spoilt food; it expressed a long-accumulated frustration with the conditions of the navy service and animosity toward the officers. The revolutionary committee, elected by mutinous sailors, decided to set course for Odesa in order to seek out the support of the striking workers. With the arrival of the *Potemkin*, protests in the city escalated and loyalist troops fired into the crowd. Despite the initial hopes, the uprising failed to spread to other ships. This episode of the Russian revolution of 1905 was immortalized by Sergei Eizenshtein in his famous silent film produced in 1925. According to Charles King, *Battleship Potemkin* "turned Odessa into the avant-garde of revolutionary change, providing a usable prehistory for the Bolshevik revolution and, by extension, for the new Soviet state."[51] In 1965, on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the uprising, a monument to the mutinous sailors (Potemkintsy) was erected in Karl Marx Square, formerly named after Empress Catherine and hosting her monument until it was dismantled in 1921 and briefly replaced with one to Karl Marx. The new monument presented the figures of four sailors at the peak of the mutiny; the plinth in the form of a ship's deck displayed the inscription "The descendants to the Potemkintsy" and Lenin's words "The battleship Potemkin remained the undefeated territory of the revolution."[52] The imperial myth which related the foundation of the city to Ekaterina and Prince Potemkin was thus replaced with a new foundational myth tracing the history of Soviet Odesa back to the heroic uprising of the battleship *Potemkin.*

2.3.4 Creating the Soviet Ukrainian Canon

After the Bolshevik revolution and the Civil War, most part of the northern Black Sea and Sea of Azov coasts became part of the Ukrainian SSR; after World War II, the territory of the latter included South Bessarabia and, from 1954, the Crimean Peninsula. How was the state policy of creating a Soviet Ukrainian identity reflected in monumental commemoration? What elements of the Ukrainian historical narrative were presented in the monumental landscape of the region during the Soviet era? And how

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50 Agnessa Vinogradova, *Rasstreliannaia mechta: Khronika zhizni leitenanta P.P. Shmidta* (Mykolaiv: PP Gudym, 2004).

51 King, *Odessa*, 196.

52 Andrew Osborn, "Potemkin: The Mutiny, the Movie and the Myth," *Independent,* June 14, 2005, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/potemkin-the-mutiny-the-movie-and-the-myth-225737.html.

were they reconciled with the ideologically dominant narrative of the October Revolution and the partial rehabilitation of the Russian imperial memory?

Rather than simply suppressing what they considered "Ukrainian nationalism," the Bolsheviks sought to create a canon of Ukrainian culture and history that fitted into the official ideology of social liberation and the struggle against tsarist colonialism. And as Serhy Yekelchyk shows, during the late Stalinist period, when the Russian imperial narrative was partly rehabilitated, the republic's ideologists and intellectuals found ways to reconcile "Ukrainian historical mythology with the Russian grand narrative within a framework of Russian-dominated 'friendship of peoples'."[53] The Ukrainian historical narrative was accepted "as long as it complemented, but did not undermine, the story of the Russian imperial past."[54] The memory of the Ukrainian Cossackdom, rooted in the northern Black Sea region, illustrates the ambivalence of Soviet memory politics in this respect. But before I address the Soviet monumental commemoration of Ukrainian Cossackdom, allow me to make a brief excursion into the imperial era.

Since the mid-nineteenth century, the myth of the Ukrainian Cossacks as defenders of freedom against authoritarian Russian rule has played an important role in the Ukrainian national renaissance and nation-building. For almost three hundred years, Cossacks inhabited the steppe frontier north of the Black Sea coast; they developed specific political institutions and traditions, drawing on military democracy and self-rule.[55] Skilful warriors and sailors, the Cossacks contested the rule of both the Ottoman and the Russian empires, as well as that of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Cossack Hetmanate, an early modern state, founded in the mid-seventeenth century by the hetman of the Zaporizhian Host, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, entered into vassal relations with the Muscovite state by signing the Pereiaslav Agreement (1654) and gradually lost its independence. The autonomous status of Cossackdom was abolished in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Russian Empire expanded to the northern Black Sea coast. In 1775, Catherine II, who saw Ukrainian Cossacks as a security threat, destroyed their last stronghold, the Zaporizhian Sich, a semi-autonomous polity on the lower Dnipro. In accordance with the empress's order, executed by Prince Potemkin, the Zaporizhian Cossacks were resettled to the territories between the River Kuban and the Sea of Azov and reorganized into the Black Sea Cossack Host (later renamed the Kuban Cossack Host). While loyalty to the empire was at the center of Kuban Cossack identity in the nineteenth century, the myth of their Zaporizhian origins and links to Ukraine played an important role.[56]

This ambivalence is reflected in the monument to Catherine II in Ekaterinodar (see above). Erected in 1907 at the initiative of the Kuban Cossack Host to express gratitude for the new lands granted to them by the empress a century earlier, the monument

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53 Yekelchyk, *Stalin's Empire of Memory*, 11.

54 Yekelchyk, 11.

55 Kappeler, *Die Kosaken*.

56 Polianichev, "Ekaterina II kak kazachia mat."

depicted, along with Prince Potemkin, the three Cossack leaders Antin Holovatyi, Za-kharii Chepiha, and Sydir Bilyi. After the destruction of the Zaporizhian Sich, they played a key role in the formation of the Black Sea Cossack Host and the resettlement to the Kuban region. The monument also accommodated the figure of a Ukrainian blind bard (*kobzar*) accompanied by a small boy as a guide. The bard was intended to refer to the famous Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko, who was not allowed to be endorsed officially in the Russian Empire due to his radical views but was held in high esteem by his friend and creator of the monument Mikhail Mikeshin.[57] The Cos-sacks entrusted the latter with the project of the monument, not least due to his pre-vious creation of the Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi statue in Kyiv. Destroyed after the Bolshevik revolution, the Ekaterinodar monument was restored in 2006. Another monument celebrating the resettlement of the Zaporizhian Cossacks to the new lands granted by the empress was erected in 1911 in Taman (today in the Krasnodar oblast). The figure of a Zaporizhian Cossack stepping onto the shore represents Sydir Bilyi, who led the first group of re-settlers.[58]

There is some irony in the fact that the first monuments presenting the history of (Ukrainian) Cossackdom (albeit as an element of the imperial narrative) appeared on a territory that after the Bolshevik revolution became part of the Russian Federation. While the destruction of the rebellious Zaporizhian Sich and the resettlement of the Cossacks turned loyal imperial subjects is a success story of colonization and assimila-tion from the Russian perspective, it is a story of collective trauma and historical defeat in the Ukrainian national narrative. At the same time, in the Ukrainian geographic imagination, the Kuban region was often considered an "ethnic Ukrainian land," a po-tential part of a future "Great Ukraine"; the Cossack myth served to legitimize Ukrai-nian claims to Kuban.

With the collapse of the Russian Empire and the beginning of the Civil War, the Kuban as well as the Don Cossacks mostly sided with those forces that strove to restore the old order. At the same time, in the Kyiv of 1917 to 1920, the Ukrainian Cossack tra-ditions and symbols were rediscovered and played an important role in the nation-building politics of the Ukrainian People's Republic and especially in the Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadskyi. In this context, the equestrian statue of Khmelnytskyi, which had been erected in St. Sofia Square in 1888 as a symbol of Russian imperial triumph over Poland and the "return" of Ukraine under Russian rule, gained a new political meaning pointing to the origins of the Ukrainian political tradition as different from Russia. For the Bolsheviks, with their class approach to history, Khmelnytskyi was a feudal warlord who failed to represent the people's interests, and hence his statue was something of an embarrassment. According to Yekelchyk, during mass public cel-

57 Polianichev, 148 – 50.

58 Sokol, *Monumenty imperii*, 438 – 39.

ebrations "the monument was boarded up with wooden panels and the local bosses even considered demolishing it altogether."[59]

In the late 1930s, however, Khmelnytskyi was incorporated into the Soviet canon as a symbol of Ukrainian national patriotism; the interpretation of his role as an enemy of the Polish aristocracy fitted into the anti-Polish propaganda of the Stalinist regime. In 1943, a military decoration named after Khmelnytskyi was introduced in the context of the Soviet liberation of the Ukrainian territory from the Nazis. Finally, in 1954, the pompous celebration of the three hundredth anniversary of the Pereiaslav Agreement, seen as a historical moment of the re-unification of Ukraine with Russia, cemented Khmelnytskyi's central place in the Soviet narrative of Ukrainian-Russian relations. A popular toponym in the Ukrainian and Russian urban space, Khmelnytskyi became a symbol of the "brotherly friendship" between the two Soviet republics. Monuments to Khmelnytskyi on the anniversary of the re-unification were erected in Dnipropetrovsk (today: Dnipro), Kryvyi Rih, Donetsk, Melitopol, Kherson, and other places, and more followed in the subsequent decades.

In 1965, a Khmelnytskyi monument was also erected on Khortytsia, the largest island in the Dnipro River, historically a stronghold of the Zaporizhian Cossacks. In the 1960s, the construction of a museum of Zaporizhian Cossackdom was begun on Khortytsia (part of the city of Zaporizhzhia). The project, initiated by Ukrainian intellectuals and supported by some members of the party nomenklatura, was soon frozen when Khrushchev's thaw period ended with a new wave of repressions against Ukrainian culture. The museum had to change the initial concept, which was criticized as "nationalist" and was opened only in 1983, as a museum of local history.[60] But only a few years later, during perestroika, the initial focus on the history of Zaporizhian Cossackdom was restored. In 1990, mass celebrations of the five hundredth anniversary of Ukrainian Cossackdom, especially in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia, contributed to the national mobilization in Ukraine on the eve of state independence.[61]

3 Nationalization of Memory, Dealing with the Soviet Past, and the Role of Monuments in the Ukrainian-Russian Conflict

The fall of the Communist regime and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the transformation of the former Soviet republics into independent states, the emergence of new international borders—all these factors radically changed the political context

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59 Yekelchyk, *Stalin's Empire of Memory*, 17.

60 Haidai et al., *Polityka i Pamiat*, 58 – 59; Christian Ganzer, *Sowjetisches Erbe und ukrainische Nation: Das Museum der Geschichte des Zaporoger Kosakentums auf der Insel Chortycja* (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2005).

61 Haidai et al., *Polityka i Pamiat*, 58.

of monumental commemoration in the northern Black Sea region in the early 1990s. As new independent states embarked on nation-building, public monuments were at the center of national and local projects aimed at the creation of official historical narratives and pantheons of heroes, the search for ancient roots, and reassessment of the Soviet past. Some of these projects caused interstate tensions and even conflicts, often referred to as memory wars. Mnemonic conflicts also emerged inside the post-Soviet societies, and in combination with other factors contributed to pro-Russian separatism and political legitimation of de-facto states in Moldova, Georgia, and, most recently, Ukraine. Historical memory was weaponized in Russia's aggression towards Ukraine, leading to the unlawful annexation of Ukrainian territories in 2014 and in 2022. Reflecting dramatic political changes, geopolitical shifts, and territorial disputes, both new and long-existing monuments have often become contested sites where different, sometimes mutually exclusive narratives of the past, collective identities, and political visions have clashed.

3.1 Mnemonic Pluralism and its Limits

During perestroika, political liberalization and democratization of public life already paved the way for the pluralization of historical narratives. The politics of glasnost in the last years of the Soviet Union gave an impulse to renewed public interest in history and heated up debates about the past. Old ideological taboos were lifted, and newly formed "communities of memory" and local political actors (journalists, descendants of victims, cultural associations, groups of veterans, etc.) initiated new commemorative projects. In the subsequent two decades, Stalinist political repressions, the Holodomor (the Great Famine of 1932/33), the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, and other traumatic events of Soviet history found their place in the region's commemorative landscape. Veterans of the Soviet war in Afghanistan and the Chernobyl (Ukrainian: Chornobyl) "liquidators" created their own commemorative cultures, which included numerous local memorials. The memory of the "Great Patriotic war" became subjected to de-ideologization and democratization, and its emphasis shifted from the official triumphalist narrative of heroic sacrifice to the recognition of the immense human tragedy and to a multiplicity of victims' voices. The commemoration of the Holocaust victims, slowly but surely, became part of the local mnemonic landscape, and Jewish memory, in particular in Odesa (e.g., the memorialization of Isaak Babel and Ze'ev Jabotinsky), demonstrated a new multiculturalism that replaced the official ideology of proletarian internationalism.

Unlike in the Russian Empire or in the Soviet Union, local authorities and civil society in both Ukraine and Russia after 1991 largely had a free hand in the issue of monumental commemoration. While presidents and central governments certainly favored specific projects (such as the Poklonnaia Gora Memorial in Moscow patronized by Boris Eltsin or the Holodomor Memorial in Kyiv initiated by Viktor Iushchenko), quite some freedom was left to the regions to decide what monuments and memorials

served better for building local identities and articulating historical traditions. It is only during the last decade that the limits of this mnemonic pluralism have become obvious in both Russia and Ukraine, in rather different ways, however. In Russia, the glorification of the imperial past leaves some space for other, more particularistic narratives as long as they do not contradict the official canon implemented from above by the Russian Military-Historical Society (RVIO, Rossiiskoe Voenno-Istoricheskoe Obshchestvo). Created by presidential decree in 2012 to replicate the Imperial Russian Military-Historical Society (1907–17), it is meant to "consolidate the forces of state and society in the study of the military history of Russia, to promote the study of Russian military history and counter attempts at distortion, ensuring the popularization of the achievements of military-historical scholarship, of patriotism, and of raising the prestige of military service."[62] The website of the RVIO mentions "Monumental Propaganda" among its main activities, and indeed, since 2012, the society has erected more than 250 monuments in Russia and abroad,[63] most of them devoted to Russian imperial rulers, statesmen, military leaders, and war heroes, as well as to Orthodox saints and priests. In Ukraine, where mnemonic pluralism has been more antagonistic, the limits were set by the decommunization legislation of 2015, which banned the public use of Soviet symbols and obliged local authorities to dismantle monuments to the figures of the Communist regime.[64] The Institute of National Remembrance, which had been created in 2006 at the initiative of President Iushchenko and re-launched after Euromaidan, was entrusted with the implementation of the decommunization legislation.

3.2 Soviet Monuments, Post-Soviet Nostalgia, and the Civil War Memory in Ukraine and Russia

Public monuments of the Communist era, especially those referring to the foundational myth of the October Revolution, have lost their primary ideological function of legitimizing the Soviet regime. Only few of them were immediately dismantled—such as the iconic Feliks Dzerzhinskii statue in front of the KGB headquarters in Moscow, or the Lenin monument in October Square (now the Maidan) in Kyiv. On the periphery— and the northern Black Sea region has been a periphery of both the Ukrainian and the Russian state—changes were less dramatic, especially in those places where local identity was rooted in the history of Soviet modernization and where the Commu-

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62 "Ukaz No. 1710," Rossiiskoe voenno-istoricheskoe obshchestvo, accessed September 21, 2023, https://rvio.histrf.ru/official/decree-no-1710.

63 "Monumentalnaia propaganda," Rossiiskoe voenno-istoricheskoe obshchestvo, accessed September 21, 2023 https://rvio.histrf.ru/projects/monumental-promotion.

64 Tatiana Zhurzhenko, "Legislating Historical Memory in Post-Soviet Ukraine," in *Memory Laws and Historical Justice,* ed. Elazar Barkan and Ariella Lang (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 97–130.

nist Party was still strong.[65] While in western Ukraine, where Soviet rule was established only after World War II, monuments to Lenin and other Communist leaders were quickly removed in the early 1990s, in southern Ukraine most of them survived until the "Leninfall" of 2014 and the decommunization law of 2015. In Russia, as soon as Eltsin's war with the Communists was over, the increasingly conservative Putin regime avoided any moves that could be seen as revolutionary iconoclasm: However embarrassing the remaining Communist monuments might have been, removing them and thus challenging the symbolic order of power would have been even worse from the authorities' perspective.

In general, monuments of Lenin and other Communist leaders—the remnants of the Soviet era—were dismantled, relocated, or simply marginalized due to the changing political context. But sometimes new monuments were also built, reflecting the post-Soviet nostalgia which was instrumentalized by some political forces. At the center of this neo-Soviet monumental commemoration has been the figure of Joseph Stalin, whose growing popularity can be explained by longing for a "strong hand" and the frustration with post-Soviet transition. In Russia, the erection of Stalin monuments underwent a real boom after 2015, related to the celebration of the seventieth anniversary of the Soviet victory in World War II and the nationalist mobilization following the annexation of Crimea. In most cases, these monuments were initiated by local Communists and Soviet nostalgists. More than a hundred Stalin monuments exist in Russia today, many of them in the North Caucasus, on the territories of Dagestan, and in North Ossetia.[66] In Ukraine, where his popularity is a generational phenomenon and in decline, Stalin was instrumentalized as a counter-symbol to the nationalist hero Stepan Bandera in the memory wars following the Orange Revolution. In the Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia in 2010, the local Communists erected a Stalin bust in front of their headquarters. It caused a political scandal and was blown up by Ukrainian nationalists.[67] A monument to Stalin as a neo-Soviet political symbol was erected in 2015 in the so-called "Luhansk People's Republic,"[68] where it also serves to deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state. A less ideological form of post-Soviet nostalgia ("nostalgia light") is expressed in the cult of Leonid Brezhnev, whose rule is often remembered today as an era of stability and of modest but secure social welfare. In the Russian city of Novorossiisk, a statue of the young Brezhnev was erected in 2004,

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65 It was different, for example, in Odesa, where the local foundational myth drawing on the Russian imperial past made the farewell from Soviet symbols relatively easy. See Richardson, *Kaleidoscopic Odessa.*

66 Omskii Kraeved, "Pamiatniki Stalinu v sovremennoi Rossii, ili kult lichnosti 2," *Vkontakte*, October 25, 2019, https://vk.com/@kraeved55-pamyatniki-stalinu-v-sovremennoi-rossii-ili-kult-lichnosti-2.

67 Serhii Plokhy, "When Stalin Lost his Head: World War II and Memory Wars in Contemporary Ukraine," in *War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus,* ed. Julie Fedor et al. (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 171–88.

68 "V okupovanomu Luhansku vstanovyly biust Stalina," *Ukrainska Pravda*, December 19, 2015, https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2015/12/19/7093027/.

representing a strong symbolic link between the Soviet leader and the city created in the post-war years.[69] A local Brezhnev cult also exists in the Ukrainian Dniprodzer-zhynsk (before 1936 and from 2016 Kamianske), the town of his birth. The Brezhnev bust erected there in 1976 was spared dismantling under the decommunization law by being transferred to a local museum.[70]

The dramatic events of the Civil War (1917–21) in Southern Russia and Ukraine are reflected in Communist-era monuments that were meant to celebrate the "establish-ment of Soviet power" in the region. While in Ukraine such monuments came under criticism and are threatened with dismantling under the decommunization legislation, Russia has meanwhile seen the erection of monuments which seek to re-write the his-tory of the Civil War from a new perspective. Two examples below illustrate such proj-ects and the mnemonic conflicts arising around them.

3.2.1 "The Legendary Tachanka" in Kakhovka

In the autumn of 1920, the Bolsheviks, in temporary alliance with Nestor Makhno, were able to defeat the White Army in the northern Tavria steppe (today's Kherson and My-kolaiv oblasts, Ukraine). The Whites were forced to retreat to the Crimean Peninsula and the victory of the Bolsheviks ensured the establishment of Soviet power in south-ern Ukraine. In the subsequent decades, the Red Army and in particular the First Cav-alry Army were glorified in Soviet mass culture. One of the most powerful images of the Civil War (appearing, for example, in the Soviet film *Vasilii Chapaev*) was the *ta-chanka*, an open horse-drawn wagon with a heavy machine gun installed at the rear. Providing mobile warfare before the era of widespread motorized vehicles, *tachankas* were cheap, especially suitable for steppe landscapes, and therefore used by various armies: the Poles, the Makhno troops, and of course the Reds. Romanticized in Soviet poems and songs as a symbol of the stormy years of the Revolution and Civil War, the *tachanka* offered a suitable motif for monumental commemoration. In 1967, a gigantic monument called The Legendary Tachanka (Russian: Legendarnaia tachanka, Ukraini-an: Lehendarna tachanka) was built on an artificial hill near Kakhovka (Kherson ob-last), where the headquarters of the Soviet military commander Vasilii Bliukher had been in 1920. The monument, an outstanding piece of Soviet monumental art, was de-signed and produced in Leningrad and installed on the occasion of the fiftieth anniver-sary of the October Revolution. It depicts a *tachanka* drawn by four houses and man-ned by three Red Army soldiers during an impetuous attack[71] (see fig. 19).

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69 Davis, "The City as a Work of Monumental Culture," 109–10.

70 On the Brezhnev cult in post-Soviet Dnipro and the region, see Portnov, *Dnipro*, 319–21.

71 A similar motif, also referencing the history of the Civil war, was used for the Tachanka monument built near the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don in 1977. A little different—presenting two horsemen of the First Cavalry Army in the moment of attack—was the monument to the fighters of the 1st Cavalry Army built in 1975 in Lviv oblast (western Ukraine) and dedicated to the Red Army defeated near Warsaw in

Fig. 19: The Legendary Tachanka monument in Kakhovka.

In 1983, another monument thematically related to the *tachanka* was erected in Kakhovka: the Girl in the Military Overcoat (Russian: *Devushka v shineli*, Ukrainian: *Divchyna v shyneli*), the protagonist of the romantic revolutionary poem by Mikhail Svetlov entitled *Pesnia o Kakhovke* (The Song about Kakhovka). With the fall of the Soviet regime and Ukraine's independence, the Legendary Tachanka monument lost its ideological significance and was repeatedly plundered by metal thieves. At the same time, the monument became a tourist attraction and the unofficial symbol of Kakhovka. An annual motorbike festival and a cycling tournament integrated the monument into their programs. After the adoption of the decommunization legislation, the future of the Tachanka and other Soviet monuments was discussed in Kakhovka. While the local monument to Mikhail Frunze, a Bolshevik leader and military commander, was dismantled after 2015, the Tachanka remained intact. In December 2019, the Institute of National Remembrance (INP) sent a letter to the local city council demanding the dismantling of both the Legendary Tachanka and The Girl in the Military Overcoat as symbols of the totalitarian Communist regime. The mayor of Kakhovka, who published the letter on his Facebook page, announced that he would not give in to the pressure from Kyiv. He was supported by local residents, some of them driven by post-Soviet nostalgia, others just attached to the monument as an important local symbol.

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the Polish-Soviet war in August 1920. Not unimportant for our story is the fact that while the monument in Rostov-on-Don was renovated in 2009, the one in western Ukraine was abandoned and finally dismantled in 2017.

Ukrainian media extensively reported on the conflict,[72] and the Russian media used the case as a pretext to criticize the nationalism of the Kyiv government.[73]

To solve the conflict, the INP organized a public discussion in Kakhovka, inviting experts, the local authorities, and activists. The director of the INP from 2019, Anton Drobovych, saw this as an opportunity to start a public dialogue about controversial Soviet monuments.[74] Some rather creative solutions were proposed, such as removing the *budenovka*, the archetypal hat of the Red Army soldiers in order to turn the Tachanka into a monument to the Insurgent Army of Nestor Makhno. A shaky compromise was finally reached: The monument was to become part of an open-air museum of totalitarian propaganda, yet to be created. The COVID-19 pandemic and then the Russian invasion halted this project; in late February 2022, Kakhovka was occupied by the Russian army.

The story of the Tachanka is not only characteristic of memory politics in post-Euromaidan Ukraine; it also illustrates a shift in Ukrainian historiography from the concept of the Civil War, which was central to Soviet historiography, to the concept of the Ukrainian-Soviet war, which ended with the defeat of the Ukrainian national revolution and eventually with the Soviet occupation of Ukraine. As we will see in the next section, in Russia the narrative of the Civil War has been revised, too, albeit in a different way.

3.2.2 The Exodus Monument in Novorossiisk and the Reconciliation Monument in Sevastopol

In April 2013, a new monument was erected on the promenade in Novorossiisk to commemorate the evacuation of the White Army in the spring of 1920. The composition, entitled *Iskhod* (Exodus), presents a White Army officer pulling his stubborn horse towards the sea. The scene refers to the dramatic events that unfolded in the port town of Novorossiisk in March 1920, when the remnants of the defeated White troops (and many civilians) fled the approaching Red Army. The idea of the monument was supported by the mayor of the city and the head of the Kuban Cossack Host. It was also welcomed by the local residents, not least because the depicted scene was reminiscent

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72 Iuliana Skibitska, "'Ne chipaite moho Lenina': V chomu poliahaiut problemy dekomunizatsii i iak ikh rozviazuvaty – rozpovidaemo na prykladi pamiatnuka Tachantsi v Kakhovtsi," *Zaborona*, May 25, 2020, https://zaborona.com/problemi-dekomunizacziyi/; Dmytro Shurkhalo, "Pro kakhovsku 'lehendarnu tachanku' i radiansku monumentalnu spadshchynu: ruinatsiia chy adaptatsiia?," *Radio Svoboda*, January 19, 2020, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/tachanka-kakhovka-dekomunizatsiya/30385790.html.

73 Andrei Sidorchik, "Dekommunizatsiia Tachanki: Kiev khochet lishit Kakhovku legendarnykh pamiatnikov," *Argumenty i Fakty*, January 14, 2020, https://aif.ru/politics/world/dekommunizaciya_tachanki_kiev_hochet_lishit_kahovku_legendarnyh_pamyatnikov?from_inject=1.

74 Anton Drobovych, "Kakhovska #Tachanka sudnoho dnia," *Istorychna Pravda*, January 15, 2020, https://www.istpravda.com.ua/columns/2020/01/15/156881/.

of the popular Soviet era film *Sluzhili dva tovarishcha* (Two Comrades Were Serving, 1968), sympathetic to the tragic fate of the White officers (a partial rehabilitation of the White movement in mass culture was already underway in the late Soviet era). Half a year later, however, a scandal erupted when it turned out that the White general Anton Turkul, cited on the plinth of the monument as a witness to the chaotic evacuation in 1920, had later sympathized with the Nazis and contributed to the formation of the so-called Russian Liberation Army under the command of the notorious General Vlasov.[75] The local experts argued that Turkul's Novorossiisk episode had nothing to do with his later political trajectory and, moreover, that he had never been convicted of collaboration and his memoirs were not on the official list of extremist texts. But the activists of *Sut Vremeni* (Essence of Time)—a neo-Stalinist conservative ultra-patriotic organization founded in 2011 by Sergei Kurginian—demanded the removal of the quotation of a traitor and Nazi collaborator.[76] The activists, who presented themselves as "antifascists," drew parallels with the Euromaidan in Ukraine, which was framed in the Russian media as a fascist coup, and warned against the lack of political vigilance. Moreover, they criticized the very name of the monument, Exodus, as the assumed parallel with the Old Testament conferred victim status and thus moral superiority on one particular side, the Whites. The absence of the other force, the Reds, from the composition, testified, in their view, to a failure to take the proclaimed reconciliation seriously. Under pressure from the activists, who were able to mobilize local support, in 2015 the authorities removed the name of Turkul (but not the—now anonymous—quotation).[77]

Some years later, a similar conflict, but on a larger scale, emerged in Sevastopol, then already annexed by Russia. The idea of a monument symbolizing the reconciliation between the two sides that fought each other in the Civil War was put forward by Prince Nikita Lobanov-Rostovskii and other representatives of the Russian aristocracy at the 5th World Congress of Russian Compatriots Living Abroad, held in November 2015.[78] The idea was supported by Patriarch Kirill and by Vladimir Putin, who endorsed the official preparations for the centenary of the Russian Revolution in 1917 under the motto "reconciliation and concord."[79] In 2016, the Russian Military Historical Society (RVIO) initiated a project for the monument, which was then developed by the pro-Kremlin "patriotic" sculptor Andrei Kovalchuk. The opening was planned in the au-

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75 Vitalii Chaika, "V Novorossiiske ustanovili monument s familiei natsistskogo generala?," *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, November 4, 2013, https://www.kuban.kp.ru/daily/26154.7/3042765/#comment.

76 "Iskhod vsemu? V gorode-geroe Novorossiiske pod razgovory o primirenii chtut pamiat posobnikov fashistov?," *Novorossiiskie Izvestiia*, May 19, 2014, http://www.novodar.ru/index.php/tribuna/124-history-freetr/9379-vnpropchppf-05-2014.

77 "Skandal v Novorossiiske: oskvernivshikh 'Iskhod' lishit prava na Den Pobedy," *Regnum*, April 8, 2015, https://regnum.ru/news/society/1913401.html.

78 Konstantin Klimovskiy, "V Vsemirnyi Kongress sootechestvennikov, prozhivaiushchikh za rubezhom," *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn* 12 (2015), https://interaffairs.ru/jauthor/material/1412.

79 Olga Malinova, "The Embarrassing Centenary: Reinterpretation of the 1917 Revolution in the Official Historical Narrative of Post-Soviet Russia (1991–2017)," *Nationalities Papers* 46, no. 2 (2018): 272–89.

tumn of 2017, on the occasion of the centenary of the October Revolution. As for the location of the monument, the initiators hesitated between Kerch and Sevastopol, but the final choice was made in favor of the latter, a symbolically much more important place for Russian identity. Sevastopol, according to this narrative, "became the last piece of Russian land for those who left their homeland. This is where the long-suffering history of the Russian White emigration began."[80]

Not everybody in Sevastopol, however, was happy about the project and the idea of reconciliation that it was supposed to represent. As in Novorossiisk, protests were initiated by Essence of Time activists; this organization had been already successful in similar campaigns (having forced the RVIO to take down a memorial plaque dedicated to Finnish marshal Karl Gustav Mannerheim in St. Petersburg, for instance).[81] During 2016/17, the Sevastopol branch of Essence of Time organized street protests, collected signatures, initiated open letters and even went to court opposing the project, primarily for ideological reasons. The activists argued that "under the pretext of reconciliation, Soviet history is being denigrated in every possible way and the monarchical period is extolled by all means, fascist collaborators in the Great Patriotic War and war criminals of the Civil War are being rehabilitated and glorified."[82] They pointed to Ukraine, Spain and other countries where, in their view, the idea of reconciliation is used to rehabilitate fascism and argued that the "Great Victory" in World War II had already reconciled warring political camps. Instead of "reviving anti-Soviet myths from the perestroika era," they called for celebration of the centenary of the October Revolution.[83]

The protests against the "de-Sovietization of Russian history" and the "White revanchism" were supported by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and by a number of local organizations: the Soviet War Veterans, the Association of the Children of War, the Union of Soviet Officers, the veterans of the war in Afghanistan, and the "Immortal Regiment," as well as by local journalists and architects. To the surprise of those in Moscow who saw the triumph of the "Russian Spring" in Sevastopol as a manifestation of political unity, the Soviet nostalgic and the neo-imperial narratives, which before 2014 had coalesced in the protests against the alleged Ukrainization, turned out to be antagonistic and divided the local community. In a similar way, since annexation public opinion in Sevastopol on the issue of the city's official symbols

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80 Nikita Lobanov-Rostovsky [Rostovskii], "Open Letter," *Russkaia Mysl,* April 22, 2021, https://russian mind.com/open-letter/.

81 "Controversial St. Petersburg Memorial Removed," *The Moscow Times*, October 14, 2016, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/10/14/controversial-st-petersburg-memorial-removed-a55743.

82 "V Sevastopole obsudili vopros ustanovki pamiatnika Primirenia," *Krasnaia Vesna*, June 8, 2017, https://rossaprimavera.ru/news/v-sevastopole-obsudili-vopros-ustanovki-pamyatnika-primireniya.

83 "Sevastopol dobilsia obshchestvennykh obsuzhdenii pamiatnika Primirenia," *Krasnaia Vesna*, July 15, 2017, https://rossaprimavera.ru/news/obshchestvenniki-rasskazali-smi-o-pamyatnike-primireniya-na-press.

has been divided between the "communists" and the "monarchists."[84] In the subsequent years, numerous attempts failed to replace the Soviet flag and coat of arms (showing the Monument to the Sunken Ships and the Gold Star medal of the Hero City) with the imperial one displaying the griffin and the monograms of the two emperors, Nicholas I and Alexander II.

Having faced local protests, the RVIO had to put the project on ice. Putin himself supported the demand of the Soviet war veterans to build a new memorial to the defenders of Sevastopol during the siege in 1941/42 at the spot initially designated for the controversial reconciliation monument. But the issue was not closed. In the autumn of 2019, Sevastopol saw the return of the contested project and the foundation stone was laid during the official ceremony, which was attended by, among others, the minister of culture and head of the RVIO, Vladimir Medinskii, and the famous Russian film director Nikita Mikhalkov. This time, a different location was chosen—Quarantine Bay with its view of ancient Chersonesus. The monument was supposed to be officially inaugurated in November 2020, on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the "Russian Exodus" but due to the covid pandemic the opening was postponed and took place on April 22, 2021 (Lenin's birthday was probably chosen to further humiliate opponents).

The monument is a female statue on top of a twenty-five-meter stele. She represents Mother Russia stretching out her hands over the two figures of the White Guard officer and the Red Army soldier. Between them, the eternal flame burns in a bowl in the form of an olive wreath. Contrary to the secular Soviet tradition (according to which one eternal flame was ignited from the other; see the section on post-war Novorossiisk), this time the flame was brought, in a kind of hybrid ritual, from St. Volodymyr's Cathedral in Sevastopol. In this way, the Christianization of Russia and the myth of the siege of Sevastopol were connected to the eventual end of the great split brought by the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War.[85]

The protests against the monument continued even after the official inauguration, and the local community remained divided.[86] Over the five years from the idea to the realization of the contested project, the name has changed several times, reflecting the uneasy search for compromise: from the Reconciliation Monument to the Monument to the Unity of Russia to the Monument to the 100th Anniversary of the End of the Civil War. It is also known as the Monument to the Sons of Russia who fought in the Civil War and as the Monument to the Victims of the Civil War. On November 4, 2021, the Day of National Unity, the site was finally visited by Vladimir Putin, who spoke

84 "Sevastopoltsy vosprotivilis smene gerba i flaga goroda," *Sevas*, March 10, 2015, http://news.sevas.com/politics/obrashhenie_protiv_smeny_flaga_i_gerba_sevastopolya.

85 Iulia Krymova, "V Sevastopole otkryli pamiatnik okonchaniiu Grazhdanskoi voiny," *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, April 22, 2021, https://rg.ru/2021/04/22/reg-ufo/v-sevastopole-otkryli-pamiatnik-okonchaniiu-grazhdanskoj-vojny.html.

86 Dmitrii Okunev, "'Potoki lzhi': pochemu pamiatnik Primireniia ne ustroil ni krasnykh, ni belykh," *Gazeta.Ru*, November 3, 2020, www.gazeta.ru/science/2020/11/03_a_13344577.shtml.

about the eventual end to the "fraternal war" and the tragedy of the "Russian exodus"[87] (see fig. 20).

Fig. 20: The Reconciliation Monument in Sevastopol, visited by Vladimir Putin on November 4, 2021.

This was just a couple of months before the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, one of the dramatic consequences of which was the mass emigration of Russians fleeing the country from the war and mass mobilization.

3.3 The Ukrainization of the Commemorative Landscape: Ambivalence and Conflict

The unmaking of Soviet memorial culture went hand in hand with nation-building and the "territorialization of national memory" in Ukraine and Russia. From the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, the antagonism of key historical narratives in Ukraine and in Russia resonated with the diverging (geo)political orientations of both countries. While Russia built on its unique "civilization" and the continuity with the imperial and Soviet past, Ukraine embraced an anti-colonial identity and the pro-European path. And yet, there was a lot of room in Ukrainian–Russian relations for ambivalent historical symbols and narratives inherited from the Soviet era. One of them was the "invented tradition" of Cossackdom, which lent itself to appropriation by different actors and was given both Ukrainian nationalist and pro-Russian interpretations. Another exam-

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87 "Pozdravlenie s Dnem Narodnogo edinstva," *President Rossii*, November 4, 2021, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67065.

ple is the legacy of Kyivan Rus and the figure of St. Volodymyr/Vladimir, a historical symbol which refers to the national origins, to Europe, and to Orthodox Christian tradition simultaneously.[88]

The Ukrainization of the commemorative landscape after 1991 did not challenge the Soviet Ukrainian canon and reflected the inertia of Soviet symbolic politics. This primarily concerned prominent cultural figures whose cult had been established in the previous decades—Lesia Ukrainka, Ivan Franko, and, of course, Taras Shevchenko. Their monuments, which under Communism had symbolized the "friendship of peoples" and the multinational character of Soviet culture, gained a new meaning in independent Ukraine—they became markers of the Ukrainian cultural space in a largely Russian-speaking region. On the northern Black Sea coast, where Aleksandr Pushkin and Leo Tolstoy had been among the key *lieux de mémoire*, such a visualization of the Ukrainian culture was especially important. Thus, the monument to Ivan Franko was unveiled in Odesa in 2006 and Lesia Ukrainka received some new statues and memorial plaques in Crimea (in addition to the monument built in 1972 in front of the museum to her in Yalta).

3.3.1 Monuments to Taras Shevchenko

But most telling was the erection of monuments to Taras Shevchenko, who in the Soviet era was principally seen as a representative of the "revolutionary democratic tradition" but in post-Soviet Ukraine gained the prominent position of the main national bard, founder of the national literature, and a symbol of the anti-colonial fight. While the first real monument to Shevchenko was erected in Odesa in 1966 (replacing a cheap plaster statue), many new—albeit if less impressive—monuments in Kherson, Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts followed, especially in the last Soviet and first post-Soviet decades. This development was particularly visible in Crimea, where there had not been a single monument to Shevchenko before 1991. The monopoly of the Russian language and the marginal status of Ukrainian in Crimea was seen with concern by many in Kyiv, especially against the background of the Ukrainian–Russian tensions surrounding the future of the Black Sea Fleet and the territorial claims to the Crimean Peninsula voiced by Russian nationalists. The erection of Shevchenko monuments in Crimea were thus attempts by some Ukrainian actors to challenge the dominance of Russian culture and to mark the peninsula as part of Ukraine. The first Shevchenko monument was erected in Simferopol in 1997 as a gift from the western Ukrainian town of Kalush and replaced an old Soviet sculpture of the same poet built on the site in 1964, on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of his birth. In

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88 Tatiana Zhurzhenko, "The Monumental Commemoration of St. Volodymyr / St. Vladimir in Ukraine, Russia and Beyond: The Nationalisation of the Past, the Orthodox Church and 'Monumental Propaganda' before and after the Annexation of Crimea," in *Official History in Eastern Europe*, ed. Korine Amacher, Andrii Portnov, and Viktoriia Serhiienko (Osnabrück: Fibre Verlag, 2021), 173–217.

2001, a monument to Shevchenko, created by a local sculptor, appeared in Kerch as a symbol of partnership between the city and Kyiv and at the initiative of both mayors. The monument in Sevastopol was unveiled in 2003 in front of the Gagarin district council and is the product of a cooperation between Lviv sculptors and a local Sevastopol architect. The four-meter-high statue stands on a plinth in the form of a traditional Ukrainian musical instrument, the *bandura.* The monument to Shevchenko in Yalta was erected in 2007, already against the background of mnemonic tensions following the Orange Revolution. It was sponsored by a Ukrainian diaspora couple from Toronto and made by the famous Canadian Ukrainian sculptor Leo Mol, the creator of several Shevchenko monuments in different countries. Transported by ship from Argentina, it was officially inaugurated in the presence of Ukrainian officials and activists despite the protests of some pro-Russian organizations.[89]

The annexation of Crimea changed the meaning of the Shevchenko monuments: They became sites of dissent and potential resistance to the Russian occupation.[90] In particular, the Russian occupational authorities tried to prevent public gatherings at these sites on Ukrainian national holidays. At the same time, Ukrainian cultural associations loyal to Moscow and various "societies of peoples' friendship" were allowed to re-appropriate the Shevchenko monuments to demonstrate the unity of the residents of Crimea and their consent to the annexation. While some radical Russian nationalist voices demanded the dismantling of the Shevchenko monument in Sevastopol, the authorities obviously did not see him as a politically subversive symbol. (After all, monuments to Shevchenko, a legacy of Soviet "internationalism," exist in several Russian cities.)[91]

3.3.2 Ukraine as a Black Sea Naval Power: Antin Holovatyi in Odesa and Hetman Sahaidachnyi in Sevastopol

As shown in section 2.3.4, the memory of the Ukrainian Cossackdom, rooted in the northern Black Sea region, was already institutionalized during the Soviet era. After 1991, the Cossack tradition took on new significance in the context of Ukrainian nation-building. Based on the Soviet tradition, the Cossack cult developed in Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia. Odesa with its strong imperial myth was, however, a new territory for the monumental commemoration of Ukrainian Cossackdom. In 1999, the monu-

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89 Serhii Konashevych, "Istoriia ta dolia pamiatnykiv Shevchenkovi v Krymu," *Holos Krymu – Kultura*, October 6, 2020, https://culture.voicecrimea.com.ua/uk/zloveshchye-symvoly-ukraynskoj-okkupatsyy-istoriia-ta-dolia-pam-iatnykiv-shevchenkovi-v-krymu/.

90 Andriy Ivanets, "On the 200th Anniversary of Shevchenko, Crimeans Oppose the Occupation," *Virtual Museum of Russian Agression*, March 9, 2014, https://rusaggression.gov.ua/en/event-article.html?object=50d810b4496a36faa7bcb15fc3c4bbf0.

91 Konashevych, "Istoriia ta dolia pamiatnykiv."

ment to Antin Holovatyi (Russian: Anton Golovatyi) was inaugurated in Odesa in the presence of President Kuchma (see fig. 21).

Holovatyi was a prominent Cossack leader who after the destruction of the Zaporizhian Sich played a crucial role in the formation of the Black Sea Cossack Host and the resettlement of the Black Sea Cossacks to the Kuban region. The Cossack troops of Holovatyi took part in the Russian conquest of the Northern Black Sea and distinguished themselves as a naval force during the siege of Ochakov, Akkerman (today: Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi) and Izmail. By order of Prince Potemkin, Holovatyi captured the Ottoman fortress of Hacıbey in 1789, and, in this way, contributed to the foundation of Odesa. The Odesa monument depicts the Cossack leader as sitting deep in thought, with his horse close by. It is worth remembering that Holovatyi was already depicted on the monument to Catherine II in Ekaterinodar. He thus illustrates perfectly the ambivalence of the myth of Ukrainian Cossackdom: the claim to autonomy and a distinct political tradition and, at the same time, loyalty to the Russian Empire and the contribution to the Russian colonization project. While part of the Ukrainian historical narrative, he also belongs to the imperial myth of Odesa.

A less ambivalent monument to a Ukrainian Cossack leader was, however, erected in Sevastopol in 2008. Since removed, it was devoted to Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachnyi, hetman of the Zaporizhian Cossacks from 1616 to 1622, a political and military leader whose key achievement was the transformation of the Cossack Host into a regular

Fig. 21: The monument to Antin Holovatyi in Odesa.

army. Sahaidachnyi defeated the Ottomans in the Battle of Khotyn (1621) and supported the Polish military campaign against Moscow (1618). From the Ukrainian perspective, it is especially significant that long before Russia became a hegemonic force in the region, daring Cossack sea raids had challenged Ottoman control over the northern Black Sea coast.[92] It was under the leadership of Sahaidachnyi that the Zaporizhian Cossacks became famous as a naval force. In 1616, his troops captured Caffa (today: Feodosiia) on the Crimean Peninsula and, according to the legend, released many Christians from slavery. These military credentials (as well as his "geopolitical" sympathies) made Sahaidachnyi a suitable figure as a patron of the Ukrainian naval forces. Following the division of the Black Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine in the 1990s, the frigate named after Hetman Sahaidachnyi became the flagship of the Ukrainian navy for over twenty years.[93] The monument to Hetman Sahaidachnyi was erected in Sevastopol in June 2008 on the 225th anniversary of the city at the initiative of the then naval commander of Ukraine, Admiral Ihor Teniukh. The idea of the monument was long due: Sevastopol, which since the division of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet had hosted both Russian and Ukrainian naval forces, was dominated by the Russian narrative of imperial military glory. Ukraine needed its own naval symbol which would anchor its claim to Crimea and Sevastopol and historically legitimize its role as a naval force in the Black Sea. At the inauguration ceremony, the governor of the city appointed by President Iushchenko argued that "from now on nobody will have doubts about Sevastopol as a Ukrainian city."[94] The erection of the monument coincided with the peak of memory wars in Ukraine; in Sevastopol, an alternative project intended to celebrate the 225th anniversary of the city was supported by the local elites, to the irritation of Kyiv: a monument to Catherine II (to be discussed in the next section). The Sahaidachnyi monument—which locals also called "the dancing hetman" due to his pose—was seen as an unwanted gift from the capital.

Little wonder, therefore, that only some weeks after the annexation of Crimea, the Moscow-appointed governor of Sevastopol ordered the dismantling of the Sahaidachnyi monument (as well as the memorial plaque dedicated to the tenth anniversary of the Ukrainian navy). On April 25, 2014 the monument was "carefully" removed: The Russian occupational authorities stressed the "civilized way" they dealt with monuments—unlike Ukrainians toppling Lenin statues.[95] One year later, the monument was re-inaugurated in Ukrainian Kharkiv—the local mayor had offered refuge to the displaced het-

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92 Charles King, *The Black Sea: A History* (Oxford University Press, 2005), 129–34.

93 The frigate *Hetman Sahaidachnyi* was moved to Odesa after the annexation of Crimea in 2014; in March 2022, the ship, which had been in the Mykolaiv dock for refitting and upgrading, was scuttled by Ukraine to prevent her from falling into the hands of the invading Russian forces.

94 "U Sevastopoli vidkryly pamiatnyk Sahaidachnomu i 'pidpilno' Kateryni II," *Radio Svoboda*, June 14, 2008, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/1139584.html.

95 "Vchera po resheniiu gubernatora Sevastopolia byl akkuratno demontirovan 'pamiatnik' getmanu Sagaidachnomu," *ForPost Novosti Sevastopolia*, April 26, 2014, https://sevastopol.su/news/vchera-po-re sheniyu-gubernatora-sevastopolya-byl-akkuratno-demontirovan-pamyatnik-getmanu.

man.[96] In April 2022, after the full-scale Russian invasion, Hetman Sahaidachnyi was declared patron saint of the military forces of Ukraine by the head of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Metropolitan Epifanii.[97] On May 7, the Russian army dismantled —reportedly at the initiative of local residents—another monument to Sahaidachnyi erected in 2017 in Manhush on the outskirts of Mariupol at the initiative of the Azov Battalion and the right-wing National Corps Party.[98]

3.4 The Uses and Abuses of the Russian Imperial Legacy

As shown in section 2.3.1, a partial rehabilitation of the Russian imperial past took place as early as the late 1930s and the 1940s and continued during the late Soviet era. Being instrumental for patriotic education, imperial history did not endanger the meta-narrative of the "Great October Socialist Revolution" because the former was firmly perceived as "the past"—a chapter that had closed long ago, historical and cultural heritage that belonged in the museum, something hardly relevant politically. This changed after 1991: The fall of the Communist regime allowed a re-evaluation of imperial history, especially its last period. The public condemnation of the crimes of the Communist regime opened the way to the rehabilitation of the Romanov family as victims and—at the initiative of the Russian Orthodox Church—martyrs of Bolshevik terror. With the Soviet era seen as a "deviation" in Russian history, the imperial past gained new significance.

Under Eltsin, Russia saw itself as a young democracy striving to integrate into the West. With ideological taboos no more, some Russian tsars could be interpreted as Westernizers and modernizers, and none suited this role better than Peter I, who according to Pushkin opened for Russia "a window to Europe." The erection of the gigantic (ninety-eight-meter-high) monument to Peter I in Moscow had strong public resonance. Created by the prolific Georgian-Russian sculptor Zurab Tsereteli, a friend of the mighty mayor of the Russian capital, Iurii Luzhkov, it was meant to celebrate the three hundredth anniversary of the Russian navy, but was inaugurated only two years later, during the pompous celebration of the 850th anniversary of Moscow. In southern Russia, where Peter's era is associated with his Azov campaigns of 1695/

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96 "V Kharkove otkryli pamiatnik getmanu Sagaidachnomu," Kharkov: Ofitsialnyi sait Kharkovskogo gorodskogo soveta, gorodskogo golovy, ispolnitelnogo komiteta, last modified August 22, 2015, https:// city.kharkov.ua/ru/news/-29016.html.

97 "Metropolitan Epifaniy Proclaims Hetman Petro Sahaidachny the Patron Saint of the Ukrainian Army," Religious Information Service of Ukraine, last modified April 20, 2022, https://risu.ua/en/metro politan-epifaniy-proclaims-hetman-petro-sahaidachny-the-ukrainian-army-patron-saint_n128525.

98 "V Mangushe otkryli pamiatnik getmanu Sagaidachnomu," *0629com.ua*, October 13, 2017, https:// www.0629.com.ua/news/1826562/v-manguse-otkryli-pamatnik-getmanu-sagajdacnomu-fotovideo; Elena Blokha, "V osvobozhdennom Mangushe demontirovali pamiatnik getmanu Sagaidachnomu," *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, May 8, 2022, https://rg.ru/2022/05/08/v-osvobozhdennom-mangushe-demontirovali-pamiatnik-get manu-sagajdachnomu.html.

96, new monuments to him were erected in addition to the pre-revolutionary statue of Peter I in Taganrog, which survived all the turbulences of the twentieth century. The monuments usually depict Peter I as a young and determined ruler and military leader who expanded the boundaries of the Russian state and founded the Russian military fleet. In 1996, on the three hundredth anniversary of the Russian navy, a monument to Peter I was erected in Azov (Rostov oblast). In 2009, it was supplemented by a monument to Peter's close associate, Aleksei Shein, who during the Second Azov Campaign was the commander-in-chief of the Russian land troops. Monuments to Peter were also built in Sochi (2008), Rostov-on-Don (2018), and Astrakhan (2007), which Peter visited in 1722, and in Makhachkala (the former Petrovsk fortress) in Dagestan (2019).[99] After the annexation of Crimea, a bust monument to Peter I was built in Kerch (2016). The conservative turn in Putin's Russia did not diminish the popularity of Peter I, now seen as the founder of the Russian Empire rather than as a "progressive" and pro-Western tsar.[100]

Some imperial monuments which had been destroyed in the early Soviet era were restored after 1991 at the initiative of local authorities, business, and the Church. Among them is the statue to Alexander I in Taganrog, built in 1830 (five years after the unexpected death of the imperator during his stay in the city) and dismantled in the 1920s. The statue was restored in 1998 on the three hundredth anniversary of Taganrog. Another example is the monument to Catherine II in Krasnodar (formerly Ekaterinodar) initiated by the Kuban Cossacks and built in 1907 (discussed in detail in section 2.3.4). Destroyed in the 1920s, it was rebuilt in 2006. In southern Russia, constructions of new monuments referring to imperial history were relatively rare during the first two post-Soviet decades, not least because such projects faced the opposition of the Communists and the Soviet-minded majority of the local population. Where such monuments were built, their main function is the popularization of local history and the consolidation of local founding myths (for instance, the Monument to the Founders of Novorossiisk featuring General Nikolai Raevskii, Vice-Admiral Mikhail Lazarev, and Counter-admiral Lazar Serebriakov, built in 2011). One exception seems to be Sochi, the capital of Russian Black Sea tourism (including Putin's summer residence) and the venue of the 2014 Winter Olympics. Besides the statue of Peter I, in this health resort crammed with public sculptures one also finds bust monuments of Catherine II, Alexander II, and Nicholas II. They have no direct relation to the local history and primarily serve touristic purposes. During the last decade, Russia's southern regions have seen a proliferation of relatively cheap and standardized busts of Russian emperors, generals, and Orthodox clerics. Most of them have been sponsored by the Krasnodar businessman Mikhail Serdiukov and his project "Alley of Russian Glory"

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99 "Svod petrovskikh pamiatnikov Rossii i Evropy," Institut Petra Velikogo, accessed September 21, 2023, https://petersmonuments.ru.

100 Marina Koreneva, "Isolated Russia Celebrates Tsar who Opened 'Window to Europe'," *The Moscow Times*, June 9, 2022, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/06/09/isolated-russia-celebrates-tsar-who-opened-window-to-europe-a77959.

(Russian: Alleia rossiiskoi slavy). Serdiukov sees his mission in a revival of Russian patriotism.[101] The ideological function of these objects obviously outweighs their value as public art.

In southern Ukraine, similarly to in Russia, the restoration of imperial monuments destroyed during the Soviet era (and rarely the erection of new ones) contributed to the construction of local historical narratives and founding myths by the local political elites.[102] In 2003, on the occasion of the 225th anniversary of Kherson, the monument to Prince Potemkin, moved to the local museum in 1921 and lost during the Nazi occupation, was restored according to the original but diverging in some details. Two bust monuments to Potemkin were unveiled in Mykolaiv, one in front of the former Admiralty headquarters (2007) and another one in the grounds of the local yacht club (2009). But while in the Russian regions the (re)construction of imperial monuments resonated with the general trend for the nationalization and re-imperialization of history and public memory, in southern Ukraine the narrative of Russian colonization and the "golden" nineteenth century contradicted the Ukrainian national narrative. Not only pro-Ukrainian activists, but also other groups—most notably the Crimean Tatars—opposed the glorification of the Russian imperial past. The respective monuments, in particular those celebrating Catherine II, thus became sites of tensions and political conflicts. They have been particularly pronounced in Odesa, where the Monument to the Founders of the City was restored at its original site, replacing the Soviet monument to the mutiny on the battleship *Potemkin.* This example will be analyzed more in detail in section 3.4.2. More than just a celebration of local founding myths, imperial monuments in southern Ukraine were often used by local actors as sites of resistance against Kyiv, as instruments of mnemonic protest or even "mnemonic separatism."

This was the case in Sevastopol, where the idea of constructing a monument to Catherine II as the founder of the city emerged in the mid-1990s, when the pro-Russian elites were negotiating Crimea's autonomy status with Kyiv. The idea was put forward by the Council of Veterans of the City of Sevastopol, and the monument's design was developed by locally known sculptors and architects. The project was postponed as the compromise between Kyiv and Simferopol was finally reached and the Big Treaty between Ukraine and Russia signed in 1997. It was implemented only in 2008, on the 225th anniversary of the city's foundation and against the background of political tensions between Kyiv and Moscow following the Orange Revolution, in particular concerning the future of the Sevastopol naval base. The idea of the monument was opposed by the Kyiv-appointed head of the city administration Serhiy Kunitsyn; instead, he supported the project of the Monument to Hetman Sahaidachnyi, which symbolized the Ukrainian claim to Crimea (see the previous section). But the project of the monument to Catherine II endorsed by the City Council was eventually realized,

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101 "Proekt 'Alleia Rossiiskoi Slavy'," accessed September 21, 2023, https://alroslav.ru.

102 Haidai et al., *Polityka i Pamiat*, 50–82.

even despite a negative court ruling.[103] The representation of Catherine II follows the tradition established in the nineteenth century: The three-meter-high bronze statue of the empress depicts her with symbols of imperial power and holding the decree ordering the foundation of the city. The inauguration, held in the early morning to prevent pro-Ukrainian protests and the interference of the city administration, was attended by members of the pro-Russian parties and representatives of the Russian Duma; the event was guarded by pro-Russian nationalists and Cossacks.[104]

3.4.1 Monuments in Service of Neo-imperial Expansion

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 changed the meaning of the existing monuments, such as those to Catherine II and to St. Volodymyr/Vladimir in Sevastopol. With state boundaries being moved unilaterally and violently, these monuments lost their ambivalence and came to legitimize the territorial gains of Russia and justify its historical rights to Crimea.

Even more importantly, after the annexation dozens of new monuments were built with the aim of the symbolic consolidation of Russia's presence on the Crimean Peninsula.[105] The most significant of them refer to the Russian imperial past seen by Moscow and the local authorities as the key symbolic resource for legitimizing Crimea as part of Russia. For example, the conquest and colonization of Crimea by Catherine II and her close associate Prince Potemkin are celebrated by several bust monuments, sponsored by the "Ally of Russian Glory" project. Moreover, the impressive monument to Catherine II and her associates in the center of Simferopol (erected in 1890 but dismantled by the Bolsheviks) was restored in line with the original in 2016. It is supplemented by a memorial plaque declaring that the "monument was rebuilt on the occasion of the re-unification of Crimea with Russia in 2014 forever."[106] But the most ambitious project referring to the era of Catherine II is still in the making: a gigantic statue of Prince Potemkin in Sevastopol. The idea was put forward in 2015 by several deputies of the Russian Duma, including its chairman Sergei Naryshkin (later the director of the foreign intelligence service) and the leader of the Communists, Gennadii Ziuganov. The twelve-meter-high statue was supposed to be erected in the historical center

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103 Olga Naidanova, "Pamiatnik imperatritse Ekaterine II v Sevastopole: Kratkaia istoriia sozdaniia," *Komsomolskaia Pravda,* March 11, 2022, https://www.crimea.kp.ru/daily/27375.5/4556870/.
104 Felix Münch, "New Symbols of the Old Empire: Re-Bordering through Historical Remembrance on the Crimean Peninsula," in *De-Bordering, Re-Bordering and Symbols on the European Boundaries,* ed. Jaroslaw Janczak (Berlin: Logos, 2011), 97–114.
105 Daria Chubukova, "Pamiatniki rossiiskogo Kryma: Simvolicheskoe zakreplenie poluostrova v sostave Rossii," in: *RSUH/RGGU Bulletin: Literary Theory, Linguistics, Cultural Studies,* no. 4 (2019): 95–116.
106 Chubukova, "Pamiatniki rossiiskogo Kryma," 100.

of Sevastopol, on the seafront.[107] Local architects, however, criticized the megalomanic project, which would dissonate with the urban environment, and the local media complained about yet another instance of Moscow voluntarism.[108] Since then, the size of the statue has been reduced to six meters and various alternative locations have been discussed, but no decision has been taken. One reason might be that the foundation (under the telling name "Krym nash," Crimea is ours) that had been established to raise money for the project, fell victim to the collapse of its bank in 2019.[109]

Apart from the era of Catherine II, another period of Russian history receives much attention in annexed Crimea: the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century. According to Daria Chubukova, the commemorative projects referring to the last decades of the empire fit the narrative of a "Russia that we lost." While the last Russian emperor, Nicholas II, who was honored with three bust monuments, represents the loss, his father, Alexander III, represents what was lost—power, stability, and prosperity.[110] The inauguration of the impressive monument to Alexander III—he is depicted sitting on a rock and leaning on his saber—took place in Yalta in November 2017 in the presence of President Putin. The pedestal bears words ascribed to the emperor and often quoted by Putin: "Russia has only two allies—its army and navy"[111] (see fig. 22).

One can only agree with Chubukova that the monumental commemoration of the imperial past in Crimea is the expression not only of nostalgia and mourning for the "Russia that we lost", but also of the triumph of Russia's imperial revival which started with the annexation in 2014.

With the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian imperial legacy took on yet another meaning. Its instrumentalization became part of the Kremlin's strategy aiming to de-legitimize the Ukrainian state as an artificial construct and justifying the annexation of further territories of southern Ukraine. In his speech at the annexation ceremony on September 30, 2022, Putin underlined that this act "is based on historical unity, in the name of which the generations of our ancestors won, those who from the origins of Ancient Rus for centuries created and defended Russia. Here, in Novorossiia, Rumiantsev, Suvorov, and Ushakov fought, Catherine II and Po-

107 Gennadii Kravchenko, "Pamiatnik Potemkinu: rossiiskaia vlast 'metit' territoriiu Sevastopolia," *Krym.Realii*, April 15, 2019, https://ru.krymr.com/a/sevastopol-pamyatnik-potemkinu-rossiyskie-pamyatniki/29863581.html.

108 Irina Ostashchenko, "Potemkin: Darenomu koniu v zuby ne smotriat," *Informator*, May 31, 2015, https://ruinformer.com/page/potjomkin-darjonomu-konju-v-zuby-ne-smotrjat.

109 Maria Mukutina, "Sobrannye deputatami dengi na pamiatnik Potemkinu propali v banke-bankrote," *TVRain*, July 25, 2019, https://tvrain.tv/news/sobrannye_deputatami_dengi_na_pamjatnik_potemkinu_propali_v_banke_bankrote-490211/.

110 Chubukova, "Pamiatniki rossiiskogo Kryma," 104.

111 "Putin Agrees with Emperor that Russia's Only Allies are Army and Navy," *TASS*, April 16, 2015, https://tass.com/russia/789866.

Fig. 22: The monument to Alexander III in Livadiia, Yalta (Crimea).

temkin founded new cities. Here our grandfathers and great-grandfathers stood to death during the Great Patriotic War."[112]

Preparing for the referendum on the occupied territories, Russia used imperial symbols and narratives along with political slogans such "Forever with Russia." Not only the occupational authorities and Ukrainian collaborators but also other political actors in Russia joined these efforts. In occupied Kherson, the pro-Putin United Russia Party sponsored street posters glorifying Grigorii Potemkin, Aleksandr Suvorov, and Aleksandr Pushkin bearing the slogan "Kherson is a city with Russian history." In June 2022, the head of the Kherson occupational administration appointed by Russia, the collaborator Volodymyr Saldo, wrote a letter to the head of the RVIO, Vladimir Medinskii, requesting support for the construction of a monument to Catherine II in the city. According to Saldo, generations of Kherson residents had dreamed about such a monument.[113] In November of the same year, however, the Russian troops had already retreated from Kherson; they took with them the Soviet era monuments to General Suvorov and Admiral Ushakov as well as the monument to Potemkin restored by the Ukrainian city authorities in 2006. Even more bizarrely, the Russian occupiers also exca-

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112 "Podpisanie dogovorov o priniatii DNR, LNR, Zaporozhskoi i Khersonskoi oblastei v sostav Rossii," President Rossii, last modified September 30, 2022, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465.
113 Denys Karlovskyi, "Okupanty zbyraiutsia vstanovyty v Khersoni pamiatnyk Kateryni II," *Ukrainska Pravda*, June 19, 2022, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/18/7353323/.

vated and took with them Potemkin's bones, which were buried in the local cathedral.[114]

In Ukraine, the Russian invasion accelerated the de-Russification and de-colonization of the public space. In Odesa, the Monument to Catherine II became a site of renewed protests. Other imperial monuments, such as the statue of Suvorov in Izmail (Odesa oblast), were dismantled. Even monuments to Aleksandr Pushkin came to be seen as an imperial symbol and were dismantled in many Ukrainian cities, including Nikopol, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, and Dnipro.[115]

3.4.2 From Memory Wars to Decolonization: The Monument to Catherine II in Odesa

The fate of the monument to Catherine II in post-Soviet Odesa is a classic case of a highly politically contested monument.[116] It was disputed on the local level, caused tensions between Odesa's local authorities and Kyiv, and, finally, contributed to the Ukrainian-Russian memory wars. Discussions about a possible restoration of the monument (see the story of its erection and removal in section 2.1 and 2.2) started in Odesa in the early 1990s. Like in other post-Soviet cities, the interest in local history and the re-discovery of the traces of the pre-Soviet past in Odesa inspired the return to old toponyms and plans for the reconstruction of the historical center. In Odesa, however, it was the powerful myth of a multicultural, cosmopolitan, and globally connected harbor city that has become the key to local identity politics. Notions of Odesa's distinctiveness and exceptionality, popular in the public discourse, offered an answer to the continuing provincialization of the city after the collapse of the Soviet Union and at the same time to the pressure of Kyiv's nationalizing policies.[117] In the frame of this Odesa myth, the Russian imperial past was seen as proof of the city's imagined Europeanness—in opposition to its still very much Soviet reality—while the Ukrainian historical narrative appeared too narrow and particularistic for a cosmopolitan city.

The first attempt to restore the monument in the mid-1990s was blocked by President Kuchma, but the City Council returned to the idea ten years later, after the Orange Revolution. The new political context was shaped by memory wars in Ukraine

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114 Marc Santora, "Why Russia Stole Potemkin's Bones from Ukraine?," *The New York Times*, October 27, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/27/world/europe/ukraine-russia-potemkin-bones.html.

115 Charlotte Higgins, "Pushkin Must Fall: Monuments to Russia's National Poet under Threat in Ukraine," *The Guardian,* May 5, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/05/monuments-to-rus sia-national-poet-pushkin-under-threat-in-ukraine.

116 See also Olivia Durand, "The Statue of Catherine II 'the Great' or the Monument to the Odessa Founders" (Contested Histories Occasional Paper X, Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation, The Hague, May 2022), https://contestedhistories.org/wp-content/uploads/OP-X_Catherine-the-Great_Uk raine.pdf.

117 Richardson, *Kaleidoscopic Odessa.*

as well as between Kyiv and Moscow. In 2007, a decision was taken to restore the historical appearance of Ekaterininskaia Square, including the monument to Catherine II. To make space for it, the Soviet monument to the Heroes of the Battleship Potemkin Uprising, which had stood there from 1965, was relocated closer to the port. The Catherine II monument was rebuilt according to old drawings that were found in the local archive; the original statues of her associates had survived in the museum, but the plinth and the granite column as well as the statue of the empress were produced anew (see fig. 23).

Fig. 23: The Monument to the Founders of Odesa (Catherine II).

The historical buildings surrounding the square were renovated too. The monument was opened in October 2007 in a pompous public performance reenacting the official inauguration of 1900, including a costume parade.

Ever since then, the monument has become a contested site. For the initiators and supporters of the monument, the figure of the empress symbolized the "golden age" of Odesa's history and the city's special role in Russia's expansion towards the Black Sea, which brought economic prosperity to the region. Ukraine, in their eyes, still profits from these developments. The opponents blamed Catherine II for the abolishment of Cossack autonomy, the destruction of the Zaporizhian Sich, and the introduction of serfdom in Ukraine.[118]

For the pro-Ukrainian activists, Ukrainian Cossack associations, and nationalists such as the Svoboda Party, the restoration of the monument was clearly a pro-Russian manifestation. In the following years, the monument became a site of public protests and sometimes even acts of vandalism: The statue was daubed with red paint and decorated with Ukrainian symbols, the plinth covered with insulting inscriptions, and an effigy of the empress was burned.

The official name Monument to the Founders of the City (Russian: *Pamiatnik osnovateliam goroda*, Ukrainian: *Pamiatnyk zasnovnykam mista*) was "a conscious choice to avoid focusing exclusively—and perhaps celebratorily—on Catherine II"[119] and to reinterpret the imperial symbol as a symbol of local patriotism. However, the reduction of the city's history to the Russian imperial period met with criticism from some local historians and activists for whom such an interpretation silences the earlier history of Cossack and Tatar settlements on the territory of today's Odesa. Some of them propose including in the city's historical narrative the Ottoman fortress of Hacıbey, the conquest of which by the Russian troops is celebrated as the moment of Odesa's birth.[120] What is contested, therefore, is not just the historical role of Catherine II but the founding myth of Odesa. While in 1994, the city officially celebrated its bicentenary, in 2015 the then governor of Odesa oblast, Mikheil Saakashvili, supported the idea of celebrating the six hundredth anniversary of the city, which was supposed to include the region's Cossack legacy.[121]

The Euromaidan protests which broke out in November 2013 invested the monument to Catherine II with an additional geopolitical meaning: It now embodied Russia's continuing influence over Ukraine in opposition to its desired European future. Following the annexation of Crimea and Russia's instigation of the military conflict in the Donbas, Odesa appeared as the next target of the Kremlin's hybrid aggression. In the context of the Kremlin's Novorossiia project, the Odesa monument to Catherine II came to symbolize Moscow's territorial claims to a region historically shaped by Russian colonialization politics.

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118 "Piat let nazad v Odesse ustanovili pamiatnik osnovateliam Odessy," *Dumska*, October 27, 2012, https://dumskaya.net/news/pyat-let-nazad-v-odesse-ustanovili-pamyatnik-osn-022464/ua/.
119 Durand, "The Statue of Catherine II," 8.
120 "Kateryna II – zasnovnytsia Odesy chy okupantka Khadzhybeiu?," *Yuzhne.City*, June 23, 2022, https://yuzhne.city/articles/218126/katerina-ii-zasnovnicya-odesi-chi-okupantka-hadzhibeyu.
121 Haidai et al., *Polityka i Pamiat*, 50–51.

The de-communization laws of 2015 took aim at Soviet symbols and ideology and thus did not concern the monument to Catherine II. And yet the ongoing conflict with Russia and the mass dismantling of the Soviet-era monuments now perceived as symbols of colonial subjugation kept tensions surrounding the monument high. In 2019, the Supreme Court of Ukraine confirmed the legitimacy of the monument's construction and thus put an end to a legal battle between the City Council and its opponents that had dragged on for more than a decade.[122] But the protests demanding the dismantling of the monument continued; in 2020, they resonated with the Black Lives Matter movement demanding the decolonization of the public space and the removal of monuments representing colonial power.[123]

Since February 24, 2022, the public mood has changed. According to a local commentator, "the shock and trauma of Russia's invasion has convinced many Odessites to abandon their previous enthusiasm for the city's Russian imperial heritage and has sparked a surge in public demands for the removal of Catherine."[124] In the summer of 2022, an electronic petition calling for the dismantling of the monument received the necessary 25,000 signatures, prompting President Zelenskyi's appeal to the City Council to consider the issue. Ukraine's minister of culture Oleksandr Tkachenko supported the call for its dismantling. The mayor of Odesa, Gennadii Trukhanov, was reluctant, however. He argued that Odesa is an intercultural capital of Ukraine and the hatred of Russian culture worries him; he opposed the dismantling of the monument and called for compromise with Russia.[125]

In September 2022, protests against the monument and vandalistic actions continued; against the backdrop of the public discussion about decolonization and the responsibility of Russian culture for the neocolonial war in Ukraine, local authorities in some cities preferred to remove controversial monuments in order to avoid violent actions. Eventually, Mayor Trukhanov agreed to dismantle the Catherine monument "in a civilized way" and to move it to a prospective "park of the imperial and Soviet past" to be created in Odesa. On November 30, 2022, the City Council voted for the removal of the Catherine and Suvorov monuments.[126] Reacting to these developments,

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122 "Verkhovnyi Sud uzakonyv odeskyi pamiatnyk Kateryni II," *LB.ua*, April 8, 2019, https://lb.ua/news/2019/04/08/424036_verhovnyi_sud_uzakonil_odesskiy.html.

123 Durand, "The Statue of Catherine II," 15.

124 Oleksiy Goncharenko, "Odesa Rejects Catherine the Great as Putin's Invasion Makes Russia Toxic," *Atlantic Council*, November 14, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/odesa-rejects-catherine-the-great-as-putins-invasion-makes-russia-toxic/.

125 Diana Zubar, "Vid zberezhennia do povnoho demontazhu: iak zminiuvalosia staavlennia mistzevoi vlady Odesy do pamiatnyka Kateryni II," *Suspilne Novyny*, November 7, 2022, https://suspilne.media/311428-vid-zberezenna-do-povnogo-demontazu-ak-zminuvalosa-stavlenna-miscevoi-vladi-odesi-do-pamatnika-katerini-ii/.

126 Iryna Lysohor, "Odeska miskrada pidtymala rishennia demontuvaty pamiatnyk Kateryni II," *LB.ua*, October 30, 2022, https://lb.ua/society/2022/11/30/537571_odeska_miskrada_pidtrimala.html. On the discussions surrounding the Suvorov monument, see Diana Zubar, "Nikoly ne buv u misti: Iake vidnoshennia do Odesy maie Oleksandr Suvorov ta chomu tut stoit ioho pamiatnyk," *Suspilne Novyny*, November 9,

Russia promised to investigative the "desecration" and preparations for the dismantling of the monuments. The authorities of the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don came up with the proposal to evacuate the Catherine monument and erect it in their city. Before the Bolshevik revolution, Rostov already possessed such a monument (initiated, as mentioned above, by the local Armenian community). In the last two decades, there had been several attempts to restore it at the initial location, but they were blocked by the neo-Stalinists: Essence of Time protested against the removal of the Karl Marx statue which stood in its original place. It is quite unlikely that Odesa's Catherine will go into Russian exile, but even if the decision to remove it is not the end of the story, it reflects, according to one Ukrainian observer, "the city's decisive turn away from the imperial myth-making that Putin has tried so hard to exploit."[127]

4 Conclusion

The Russian imperial, Soviet, post-Soviet Ukrainian, and Russian histories of public commemoration in the northern Black Sea region are reflected in the dramatic biographies of monuments. Having been erected, inaugurated, and celebrated, many of them become forgotten for decades and then suddenly turn into targets of political passions, being dismantled only to be restored later—and sometimes toppled again. Material objects of public art, meant to signify the closure of a certain historical era and to provide future generations with a final judgment about its achievements, monuments are in practice restless creatures which can only dream about eternity and are unable to escape the tides of history.

It is tempting to cite here an old Soviet joke: "The future is certain; it is only the past that is unpredictable." The future is, however, not certain anymore, and it is least certain on the northern Black Sea coast, which since 2014 and particularly since 2022 has become an arena of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. A devastating military conflict with far-reaching consequences for both countries, the war has made the historical past even less predictable. In some sense, the choice of material for the statue of the "grandma with the Soviet flag" installed in Russian-occupied Mariupol is symptomatic: Cheap and disposable plastic appears ideal for the export version of Russian post-modern neo-imperialism. In general, the preference for a certain material can be seen as related to the mode of temporality central to each historical era. Bronze for the Russian imperial monuments and granite for the late Soviet ones represent both regimes' claims to eternity; turbulent times of revolutions, wars, and changing occupation regimes often express themselves in "temporary" monuments, such as the plaster statues of Lenin and Marx in the 1920s. Having said this, we

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2022, https://suspilne.media/313024-nikoli-ne-buv-u-misti-ake-vidnosenna-do-odesi-mae-oleksandr-suvor
ov-ta-comu-tut-stoit-jogo-pamatnik/.
127 Goncharenko, "Odesa Rejects Catherine the Great."

might, however, ask ourselves if the fates of monuments on the northern Black Sea coast are indeed so unique. The "death of the monument" has been a recurrent topic in the critical arts and architecture discourse for decades. Indeed, modern democratic societies seem to have increasing difficulties with the traditional idea of the monument, while "stone exoskeletons for those who hold power"[128] are still in demand in autocracies and illiberal regimes. De-commemoration—the politically motivated removal of monuments and renaming of places—has become a global phenomenon accelerated by decolonization, feminist movements, and the discourse of minority rights.[129] Some of these tendencies and their implications in the context of de-communization and de-Russification are vigorously discussed in the Ukrainian cultural milieu; potential regime change in Russia might trigger a critical debate about the "monumental propaganda" of the Putin era. At the same time, a big war is often followed by the consolidation of a heroic narrative and a new wave of monumental commemoration.

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128 Martin Zebracki, "Coming Out of the 'Death of the Monument'," *Espace*, no. 127 (2021): 40, https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/espace/2021-n127-espace05876/95145ac/.
129 Sarah Gensburger and Jenny Wüstenberg, eds., *De-Commemoration: Removing Statues and Renaming Places* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2023).

Zaal Andronikashvili

Ancient Myths and Legends of the Black Sea: An Integrative Analysis

The Black Sea region is one of the oldest cultural regions in the world. Many peoples and cultures have left their traces there: There are traces of human habitation—especially on the east and south coasts—dating back to the Paleolithic Era. The Kura-Araxes culture in the southern Caucasus and the southeastern Black Sea (4000 BC–2000 BC), the Bronze Age Maikop culture (3700 BC–3000 BC) in the northeastern Black Sea region, and the Hattian culture in central Anatolia and the southern Black Sea, display contacts or hybridization between the carriers of the non-Indo-European—(today's) South and North Caucasian, as well as other (now extinct) isolated pre-Indo-European languages (Hattian, Hurro-Urartian)—with the carriers of the Indo-European languages. The Hittite Empire emerged in the seventeenth century BC and was a great power until the twelfth century BC. Hittite was an Indo-European language, but in their religion, cult, and myths, the Indo-European Hittites integrated the religious ideas of the non-Indo-European Hattians and Hurrians. In the ninth century BC, Urartu emerged as a large empire in the Black Sea region (in eastern Anatolia and the South Caucasus around Lake Van). Urartian is also an extinct isolated language whose origin and relationships with the South Caucasian and North Caucasian languages remain somewhat unclear. The Hittite Empire and Urartu linked Mesopotamian cultures with the Caucasus and the Black Sea Region. The religious cults of Hittites and Urartians show a mixture of Anatolian, Caucasian, and Mesopotamian religious ideas: Hittite religious texts mention the Black Sea, and the Black Sea starts to play a role as a location for mythical plots.[1] In the eighth century BC, Iranian-speaking Cimmerians and Scythians appeared in the Caucasus and Black Sea regions. While Cimmerians brought down Urartu and spread to Anatolia, some of the Scythians settled in the northern Black Sea region and founded the Greco-Scythian Bosporan Empire (on the Cimmerian Bosporus and Kerch Strait), which existed between the sixth century BC and the fifth century AD. On the Black Sea's eastern coast, the kingdom of Colchis arose in the sixth century BC and was conquered by the Hellenistic Kingdom of Pontus in the first century BC. The Kingdom of Pontus had been the great power of the Black Sea region since the third century BC, dominating the entire coast. It could not resist the Roman expansion, especially the land and sea campaigns of Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus. The Greek Black Sea colonies from the fifth century BC onwards, the great empires of the Hellenistic period, the Empire of Alexander the Great, Achaemenid Iran, and later the Roman Empire have had a lasting influence on the Black Sea region politically, economically, and

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1 Gernot Wilhelm, "Meer B. bei den Hethitern," *Reallexikon der Assyriologie*, ed. Dietz Otto Edzard (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1993–1997), 8:3–5; Volkert Haas, *Die hethitische Literatur: Texte, Stilistik, Motive* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006), 97.

culturally. This cultural context also extends to Caucasus and Black Sea kingdoms of Great Armenia, Iberia, and Egrisi, from which emerged the medieval kingdoms of Armenia and Georgia, while most of the Black Sea region was under Byzantine rule in the medieval period until the end of the Comnenian era.

Ancient myths have left their traces in the toponyms of the Black Sea. Bosporus, (the "Ox-ford" in the literal English translation from ancient Greek, İstanbul Boğazı in Turkish), the strait between Europe and Asia connecting the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara, was named after Io, a mistress of Zeus, the Priestess of Hera. Hellespont, the Greek name for the strait of Dardanelles, came from the Argonaut myth, probably the best-known myth about the Black Sea.

Greeks imagined Colchis (western Georgia) as a "barbarian" (non-Greek) land. Its rulers were nevertheless closely related to the gods and heroes of Greece. Aeëtes, the king of Colchis, was the son of Helios and the moon goddess Perse. His sisters were Kirke (the ruler of the island of Aiaia, who turned Odysseus's companions into pigs and from whom her niece Medea probably inherited her magic skills) and Pasiphae the wife of Minos and mother of Minotaur and Ariadne. Aeëtes possessed the Golden Fleece, the skin of the golden-winged ram with which Phrixos and Helle escaped from Boeotia to Colchis. Once in Colchis, Phrixos sacrificed the ram, which was hung on a tree in the sacred grove and guarded by a dragon.[2] Jason, the Thessalian prince, was commissioned by his uncle Pelias to retrieve the fleece. It was then that Jason was allowed to become king. He built the ship Argo and assembled a crew. Heracles, the most prominent argonaut, however, never reached Colchis.

Biblical and ancient myths made the Black Sea region especially prominent. However, they constitute only a fraction of the myths and legends circulating in the Black Sea region.

These different cultures' religious cults and mythical narratives entered into complicated connections with each other and the "local" cults and beliefs, especially in the southern, northern, and eastern Black Sea regions. These connections gave rise to mythological palimpsests in which today we can distinguish several religious-cultural and mythical layers, some of them dating back to the prehistory of the northwestern Black Sea region. To name only two examples, the Scythian goddess Agrimpasa became Aphrodite Ourania, and the Ossetian sea god Donbettyr became Saint Peter.[3]

Although there are numerous studies on the mythologies of various regional cultures of the Black Sea region, there is still a lack of an integrative, interdisciplinary

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2 The Hittites also used the skins of various animals, including sheep, as symbols of power. Cf. Volkert Haas, *Geschichte der hethitischen Religion* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 454; Piotr Taracha, *Religions of Second Millenium Anatolia* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2009), 57.
3 For Agrimpasa, see Yulia Ustinova, *The Supreme Gods of the Bosporan Kindgom: Celestial Aphrodite and the Most High God* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 75. For Donbettyr, see Vasilii Abaev, "Kak apostol Petr stal Neptunom," in *Izbrannye trudy: Religiia. Folklor. Literatura* (Vladikavkaz: Ir, 1990), 123–36.

study beyond the national-philological, national-historical borders of the religion/mythology of the Black Sea region, especially with a maritime focus.[4]

I can hardly claim to accomplish this task, even as an outline. Nevertheless, I wish to point out the necessity of such an investigation and indicate starting points for it at least selectively. On the one hand, I limit myself to the myths and legends of antiquity (going into more detail on the material from the Near East, the Caucasus, and the northern Black Sea region—ca. 5000 BC to 600 AD—than on Greek and Roman antiquity). On the other hand, I treat those myths and legends that directly relate to the sea or emphasize the aquatic element. Generally, I will refrain from the later use of myths (for example, in literature and art).

The material for studying myths and legends in the Black Sea region is very heterogeneous, as are the disciplines dealing with it. While Hittite texts, for example, date back to the second millennium BC and belong to the oldest evidence of literature, relevant religious and mythical material from the Caucasus were recorded in the nineteenth and, in part, in the twentieth century and were assigned not to literature but to folklore. Archaeology and religious studies also provide insight into the myths and legends of the Black Sea region. However, the interpretations connected to the archaeological material are speculative without corresponding written texts. For example, Hittite religious texts sometimes name gods, but we only know of myths related to some of them.[5] Therefore, I have chosen the approach based on the mythical or legendary plot. Plot or *sujet*, the intermedial substrate for communicating an occurrence, underlies a rite and a mythological narrative or a pictorial representation (although I will restrict myself to the narrative sources).[6]

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4 For example: Haas, *Geschichte der hethitischen Religion*; Haas, *Die hethitische Literatur*; Taracha, *Religions*; Mikhail Rostovtsev, *Skifiia i Bospor* (Leningrad: Rossiiskaia akademiia istorii materialnoi kultury, 1925); Elena Virsaladze, *Gruzinskii okhotnichii mif i poeziia* (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), Georges Dumézil, *Osetinskii epos i mifologiia* (Moscow: Nauka, 1976) (a Russian compilation of different works of Dumézil related to Ossetian mythology); Vasilii Abaev, "Nartovskii epos u osetin," in Abaev, *Izbrannye trudy*, 142–243; Ustinova, *The Supreme Gods*; Zurab Kiknadze, *Kartuli mitologia: Jvari da Saq'mo* (Tbilisi: Ilia Chavchavadze State University Publishing, 2016); Vera Bardavelidze, *Drevneishie religioznye verovaniia i obriadovoe graficheskoe iskusstvo gruzinskikh plemen* (Tbilisi: Izdatelstvo akademii nauk Gruzinskoi SSR, 1957); Mikheil Chikovani, *Kartuli Ep'osi*, vol. 1 (Tbilisi: Sakartvelos SSR metsnierebata ak'ademii gamomtsemloba, 1959); Irine Tatishvili, *Kheturi religia: Genezisi, pormireba, p'anteonis st'rukt'ura* (Tbilisi: Logosi, 2004). An example of an attempt to integrate different perspectives on a maritime region: Jens Kamlah and Achim Lichtenberger, eds., *The Mediterranean Sea and the Southern Levant: Archaeological and Historical Perspectives from the Bronze Age to Medieval Times* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2021).

5 There are several examples of a strong presence in the religious cult of the Hittite goddess Inar and the Greco-Scythian goddess Aphrodite Apatouros. However, both are less present in myths (see below).

6 I use the term meta-plot to refer to a plot identical to several unrelated texts/traditions: The plot structure and functions of the protagonists remain essentially identical, despite the different settings and names of protagonists. The pioneer of plot-based reconstruction in folklore was Vladimir Propp. See Vladimir Propp, *Morphology of the Folktale*, trans. Lawrence Scott, intro. Svatava Pirkova-Jakobson (Austin:

In the first part, I will reconstruct the plot of the goddess of wild animals/fish, common to the Black Sea region from the myths and legends of different cultures around the Black Sea (Hittite, Georgian, Scythian, North Caucasian, Greek etc.). I argue that this was the maritime myth common to the whole the Black Sea region before the introduction of agriculture there. In the second part, I will go into the myths and legends in the Black Sea region in which the sea appears either as a setting or as a person acting. Finally, I briefly discuss the transformation of the semantics of the sea from benevolent to rather hostile in the cultures of the Black Sea region and the afterlife of the myths in modern times and the present.

1 The Lady of the Wild Animals / Fish and her Rebellious Son

One of the most widespread mythical or legendary plots narrated in different versions and variations throughout the Black Sea region is the myth of the Lady of Wild Animals/Fish. From her union with a mortal is born a hero who threatens the cosmic order and is finally overpowered and punished by a celestial or weather god. I will reconstruct the plot of the goddess of wild animals/fish from the following myths from different cultures around the Black Sea.

1.1 Inar / Hittite Goddess of Wild Animals and Hunting

The Hittite texts are among the oldest written sources of the Black Sea region. The Hittite Illuyanka myth belongs to the "genuine Anatolian myths, which originate from the Hattian tradition" and thus are of a pre-Indo-European origin.[7] Hoffner dates this myth to the Old Hittite period (1750–1500 BC).[8] The setting of the myth is the coast of the Black Sea "near the former mouth of the River Kızılırmak near Barfra."[9] There are two versions of the myth. In the first version, the Storm God is overpowered by the chthonic snake Illuyanka. To help the Storm God, the goddess Inar organizes a festival and asks a human called Hupasiya for help. At the feast, Hupasiya ties up Illuyanka, whom the Storm God then slays. Inar brings Hupasiya into her house on a rock in the land of Taruka and rewards him with her love. However, she forbids him to

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University of Texas Press, 1968). For the plot-based approach, see Zaal Andronikashvili, *Die Erzeugung des dramatischen Textes: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des Sujets* (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 2008).

7 Haas, *Die hetthitische Literatur*, 96. The Hattic language was a non-Indo-European language whose speakers populated Anatolia in the Bronze Age. They were displaced or assimilated around 2000 BC by Indo-European Hittites, who took over part of their language but also their cults, religious beliefs, and mythology.

8 Harry A. Hoffner Jr., *Hittite Myths* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 11.

9 Haas, *Die hetthitische Literatur,* 97.

look out of the window, where he can see his wife and children. Hupasiya violates the goddess's prohibition. In Haas's reconstruction of the incomplete text, the violation leads to the death of Hupasiya.

Inar has several functions in the Hittite pantheon. She is the city goddess of Hattusha, the capital of the Hittite Empire. But she is also a goddess of wild animals[10] and the goddess of hunting. While Inar was the goddess of the capital city, there were comparable goddesses in other Hittite towns of central and northern Anatolia.[11] Other mythological plots associated with these goddesses are unknown.[12]

The Illuyanka myth does not address Inar's function as a goddess of wild animals. However, in the second sequence of the Illuyanka myth, she becomes the protagonist, rewards the mortal with her love, and takes him to his house. This sequence is not directly related to the Illuyanka myth but is connected to other myths from the Black Sea region, where a goddess of wild animals or a goddess of hunting plays a central role (see 1.3). Hupasiya, the mortal lover of the goddess, is comparable to the human lover of the goddess of animals from the Caucasus and her rebellious son (cf. 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6). While in the Georgian myths about the goddess of the wild animals, the hunter (the mortal lover of the goddess) is punished for violating her prohibition, her son is the one who fights chthonic or aquatic monsters.

1.2 The Hittite Myth of the Kingship of the Rebellious Deer God Kurunta

The Kurunta myth[13] belongs to the Hurrian-Hittite cycle surrounding the god Kumarbi, the father of the gods who belongs to the gods of the older generation and is, according to Hoffner, a God of the netherworld, as opposed to his son Teshub (Hittite: Tarhunta), a celestial god[14] who has to fight different monsters fathered by Kumarbi. (Only in the case of Kurunta is the connection unclear.) The cycle is incomplete, but there is consensus that Teshub triumphs in the end.

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10 Taracha, *Religions*, 42–43.

11 Taracha, 53.

12 Hoffner, *Hittite Myths*, 12–13. In the Illuyanka myth, different mythical narratives that may have belonged to the different mythical cycles converge. For example, in the first sequence of the Illuyanka myth, Inar helps the storm god defeat the serpent. This sequence is related to other Hittite myths in which the storm god fights different monsters related to the sea (see II below). In the second version of the Illuyanka myth, the connection between the serpent and the sea is more explicit. While it is unclear whether the snake lives in the sea, the battle takes place on the shore.

13 Some Hittite gods are not known only by the designation ^DLAMMA. The logogram D (Dingir) means god and is used as determinative for all divine names. "Kurunta" is one possible reading for the tutelary deity ^DLAMMA which is used in some translations of Hittite texts. On the reading of the ideogram ^DLAMMA (meaning the god LAMMA), see Gregory McMahon, *The Hittite State Cult of Tutelary Deities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 23.

14 Hoffner, *Hittite Myths*, 41.

Inar and Kurunta belong to the same religious sphere of hunting, wild animals, and tutelary gods and can be represented by the same ideogram ^DLAMMA,[15] which generally means tutelary god without specification of name or gender.[16] The patron god is iconographically depicted as standing on a stag, with a lance or bow and arrow, often holding a hare as hunting prey.[17] Kurunta can appear iconographically both anthropomorphic and zoomorphic.[18] He is, like Inar, a deity associated with hunting. Therefore, he belongs to a cult or religious belief related to Inar.[19] Volkert Haas describes the Kurunta myth as "a utopia of a happy hunter epoch in which the toils of fieldwork were still unknown."[20] As we will see, the Kurunta myth demonstrates features not uncommon in the myth of the Lady of Wild Animals. Therefore, we can legitimately consider the Kurunta myth in the context of hunting myths.

The Kurunta myth narrates the short kingship of the deer god Kurunta over the gods and his fight with the storm god. Ea (the god wisdom) and Kumarbi agree to give their "kingship in heaven" to the deer god Kurunta.[21] Kurunta attacks the storm god Tarhunta and his sister Ishtar. He injures Ishtar with an arrow, hits Tarhunta with a stone, and snatches the royal insignia from him. "Under Kurunta's rule, humanity, disregarding the gods, lives in vain joy," and Kurunta himself "refuses [...] in presumptuous pride to revere the 'great gods'."[22] As a result, Ea and Kumarbi decide to punish Kurunta and take the kingship of the gods from him. In the battle with Tarhunta and Ninurta, Tarhuntas vizier, Kurunta, is defeated and must acknowledge the rule of the weather god.

Kurunta's hubris and struggle with the storm god make him comparable to the characters from the Caucasus (see 1.4 and 1.5).

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15 Myths of Inar and Kurunta belong to different linguistic and cultural areas and periods (Hittithe, Hurrian, and Old Hittitian and the period of the Hurrian-speaking dynasty in the fourteenth century BC). While Hattian myths are located in northern Anatolia, Hurrian myths are set in southeastern Anatolia, Syria, the Gulf of İskenderun, and around the Van Sea. Therefore, from the philological point of view, it is impossible to connect the myth of Inar with Kurunta. However, the history of religion and the plot-based approach provide some connections between Kurunta and Inar.

16 McMahon, *Tutelary Deities,* 5.

17 McMahon, 4.

18 Haas, *Die hetthitische Literatur,* 144.

19 However, this connection is missing in the (mythological) plot. The tutelary deities are generally from the pre-Hittite (and pre-Indo-European) Hattic religious culture, while the Kurunta myth is Hurrian from a likewise non-Indo-European, but different cultural area.

20 Haas, *Die hetthitische Literatur,* 146.

21 Haas, 144.

22 Haas, 145.

1.3 The Lady of Wild Animals / Fish (Eastern Coast of the Black Sea / Caucasus)

The Georgian ethnographer Elene Virsaladze, in her research on Georgian hunting myths, reconstructed a mythical plot of the Lady of Wild Animals.[23] In this plot, mostly handed down in fairy tales, the goddess lives in a cave on a rock or a rocky island in the sea. She can take the shape of different animals, especially a chamois or deer (cf. 1.1 and 1.2). She chooses a hunter to whom she offers her love or luck hunting as a reward. However, the goddess's gifts are ambivalent, for the chosen hunter ultimately perishes due to the goddess's love, usually because he violates one of her prohibitions, including that of returning to his family (cf. 1.1). In some legends, the goddess shows herself as a wild animal but has a special mark. If a hunter shoots her, the bullet or arrow will backfire and kill him. In other legends, the goddess entraps the hunter on the rock, which he cannot leave. He might hang there on a rope or even on the golden hair of Dali (cf. 1.4) and dies there or commits suicide by jumping down from the rock.

The minimal version of the plot of the goddess of wild animals from the Caucasus is comparable to the myth of the Hittite hunting goddess Inar. In both cases, the hunting goddesses choose a mortal human and reward him with their love on the condition of specific prohibitions. In the Hittite myth, the connection with the sea is not clear.

A double of the goddess of the wild animals in western Georgia was the goddess of the fishes, also called Mistress or Mother of the Waters.[24] Similarly to the goddess of wild animals, to Inar or Atargatis (cf. 1.8), the goddess of fish was a fertility goddess. She plays a similar role for fishermen to the one the goddess of wild animals plays for hunters.[25] The fish and animal goddesses have the same characteristics and similar external appearance (beautiful women with shiny golden hair who can transform into fish and animals, respectively).

For Virsaladze, the goddess of the wild animals was a developmental stage of religious ideas between an animal deity yet to be anthropomorphized and its replacement by the goddess of the animals and, later, the male god of wild animals and hunting.[26]

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23 Virsaladze, *Gruzinskii okhotnichii mif.*

24 Visaladze, 35; Giorgi Chitaia, "Imeretis eksp'editsia: Baghdatis raioni," *Bulletin de l'institut Marr de langues, d'histoire et de culture matérielle* 2, no. 3 (1937): 339.

25 In Georgian, hunting applies to both animals and fish. Bardavelidze, *Drevneishie religioznye verovaniia*, 98, points out that in Georgian fairy tales, the fish can also assume the function of the goddess of wild animals. It gives a mortal a gift, which, however, is connected with a taboo. After violating this taboo, the mortal is punished.

26 In the Svanetian (a group of speakers of a Kartvelian language in the western Georgian Caucasus) religious beliefs, there are different deities for different animals: for mountain game (Dal), for forest game (the male forest angel), for wolves (Saint George), and for birds and trout (the male deity Apsaets). A supreme deity of animals is Beršišvliš (the Naked Lord of Animals). Georgian ethnologist Mikheil Chikovani assumes that a goddess of animals ceded her influence to the male deities with the transition to

In the minimal plot of the goddess of wild animals found in Georgia and the North Caucasus, the rule of the goddess is not challenged by other gods. She is sovereign over wild nature and provides humans with her grace, but also punishes them for violating her taboos. However, in the Caucasus, we can find a more extended plot in which a goddess of wild animals plays a role (cf. 1.4 and 1.5).

1.4 Dali and Amirani (Eastern Black Sea / Caucasus)

The cycle of Amirani—a hero of the Georgian epos—consists of different, sometimes originally unrelated episodes, of which those about his birth and punishment are probably among the oldest.[27] It is handed down in numerous oral narratives in Georgia and the North Caucasus and a medieval Georgian chivalric novel by Mose Khoneli.

In the most archaic Svanetian versions of the Amirani-saga, he is a son of Dali, the goddess of wild animals.[28] According to Svanetian versions of the Amirani saga, a hunter hears the voice of Dali and ascends to the rock where the goddess dwells,[29] whereupon the goddess falls in love with him. The hunter's wife sneaks into the goddess's house out of jealousy, cutting off her hair and thereby causing the goddess's death. The goddess asks the hunter to cut a child she is pregnant with from her belly. The child is born with a golden tooth (a feature his enemies recognize him by). In one of the versions, he claims that he does not burn in fire because he is made of brass. (In this characteristic, he shows similarity with Batraz [cf. 1.5]). The dying Dali asks the father of Amirani to abandon the child in the cradle at the water source of Iamani.[30] Iamani brings up the abandoned Amirani; with the sons of Iamani, Amirani later commits his heroic deeds.

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patriarchy, but did not disappear entirely and rather turned into a malevolent deity. Chikovani, *Kartuli ep'osi*, 113.

27 The connection between different episodes is controversial (Chikovani, *Kartuli eposi,* 77). The beginning and the end of the Amirani plot (his birth and his punishment) do not appear in the novel. Therefore, it is assumed that they are the oldest layers of the tradition. For the sequence of events in the Amirani plot, see Chikovani, *Kartuli ep'osi*, 207.

28 Chikovani, *Kartuli eposi,* 156; Virsaladze, *Gruzinskii okhotnichii mif*, 99. Dal is also the supreme deity in several northern Caucasian languages, see Virsaladze, *Gruzinskii okhotnichii mif*, 131.

29 In some versions of the Amirani saga, Amiranis father, the hunter, remains nameless. In some Svanetian versions, he is called Daredzhan or Danjelan. In a Pshavian version, his name is Sulkalmakhi. The Abkhazian version of the saga does not know the father at all; Amirani is conceived "immaculately." Therefore, Chikovani (*Kartuli ep'osi*, 152) assumes it is the myth's oldest, matriarchal version. In some versions, the goddess does not die; rather, the hunter abandons her. Amirani, when he grows up, searches for his father. There are Dali sagas in which Amirani does not appear. These sagas repeat the myth's plot structure about the goddess of wild animals and the hunter. See Virsaladze, *Gruzinskii okhotnichii mif*, 94.

30 Chikovani, *Kartuli ep'osi,* 210, rightly points in this context to the supra-regionally widespread motif of the abandonment of the child in the water. In the Black-Sea-related myths, Batraz (cf. 1.5) is abandoned and brought up in the sea kingdom. See also the myth of Agrimpasa/Derceto (cf. 1.8).

In the middle parts of the saga, which play a significant role in the medieval novel and the oral epic, Amirani (together with his adoptive brothers) performs heroic deeds: He defeats monstrous male and female giants (Georgian: devi). Some of Amirani's heroic actions are explicitly connected to the sea: Amirani defeats sea dragons (Georgian: veshapi, literally: wales), and steals the daughter of the weather god, who dwells "behind the sea" between heaven and earth. In some versions of the saga, the sea dragon that Amirani vanquishes is fire-breathing and dwells in the sea or, specifically, the Black Sea. In some versions, the female personified Black Sea is the dragon's mother. The sea dragon, as in the Hittite Illuyanka myth (see 2.1), swallows the sun. Initially, Amirani cannot defeat the dragon and is also swallowed himself. But Amirani can free himself from the dragon's belly with the help of his diamond knife and release the sun.

There are other aquatic motifs in Amirani sagas: In the Pshavian version, Amirani's father is called Sul-Kalmakhi (literally: trout spirit). "Kalmakhi" (trout) generally designates a fish in Georgian and plays a prominent role in fertility customs (cf. 2.2). Amirani meets Mr. Igri (Igri-batoni), who guards healing water. Chikovani reconstructs Igri as a "virg"—a dragon or crocodile who lives by the rivers, springs, and lakes and protects them.[31] Amirani defeats Igri-batoni and takes healing water from him.

At the end of the cycle, Amirani, who has fallen into hubris, wants to wrestle with his godfather, Christ, to whom he owes his strength. As punishment, Amirani is bound to the Caucasus to suffer the eternal torment of a bird tearing at his liver.[32] Amiran's punishment was for a long time at the center of scholarly interest primarily for its resemblance to the Prometheus myth.[33] However, Amirani's punishment is only one part of a more complex plot.[34]

The Amirani cycle plays a crucial role in the reconstruction of the mythology of the Black Sea region. He is a hunter, as is his father, and his mother is a goddess of wild animals. His genealogy makes him comparable with the Hittite (see 1.1 and 1.2) and

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31 Chikovani, *Kartuli ep'osi,* 182.

32 Several other figures in myths and legends from the Caucasus were punished by being bound to a rock. Rokapi is an evil female deity known from Georgian folklore. She is tied to an iron pole plugged deep in the earth with an iron chain. Rokapi shakes the pole until it is loose, but at this moment, a bird comes to sit on it. Rokapi, in her rage, tries to kill the bird with the hammer but instead plugs the pole deeper into the earth again. There are also several northern Caucasian myths about an old man bound to the mountain, but they don't give a reason for his punishment. Movses Khorenatsi (410–90), a medieval Armenian historian, narrates in his history of Armenia a legend about King Artavasd, cursed by his father and held captive in Mount Ararat. Two dogs gnaw at his chain, which gets thinner. But the chain grows thicker when smiths hammer on the anvil. For the detailed treatment of Amirani's doppelgängers, see Chikovani, *Kartuli ep'osi,* 189–206. The motif of being bound to a rock is also present in the legends of the hunter entrapped by the Lady of Wild Animals. However, the motive of bondage is present but not central there.

33 Chikovani, *Kartuli ep'osi*; Georges Charachidzé, *Le système religieux de la Géorgie païenne: L'analyse structurale d'une civilisation* (Paris: La Découverte, 1968).

34 Chikovani, *Kartuli ep'osi;* Virsaladze, *Gruzinskii okhotnichii mif*; Kevin Tuite, "Achilles and the Caucasus," *Journal of Indoeuropean Studies* 26, no. 3–4 (1998): 289–344.

the North Caucasian and northern Black Sea (1.5–1.8) corpus of myths and texts related to the hunting cults and myths about rebellious heroes born from the union of a goddess with a mortal human.

While his punishment makes him comparable to Prometheus, unlike Prometheus, he is not a cultural hero and is highly ambivalent in his qualities. His punishment, however, is a result of a conflict with a celestial/astral deity, a motif present both in the Hittite Texts of the Kumarbi cycle and North Caucasian Nart epics (cf. 1.5 and 2.1). The Canadian Caucasiologist Kevin Tuite extended this context to the Mediterranean and compared Amirani (as well as other figures from the Caucasus, the Ossetian Batradz and the Abkhazian Tswitsw) to reconstruct the figure of Proto-Achilles (cf. 1.6).

1.5 The Daughter of Donbettyr and Batraz (North Caucasus)

The Nart epic cycle, especially in its Ossetian version, is most relevant for reconstructing the mythology of the Black Sea region, because it provides important links for the reconstruction of the meta-plot of the Lady of Wild Animals/Fish and explicitly links the hunting myths to the sea.[35] The Narts are related to the aquatic element.[36] Uarchag, the progenitor of the Nart clan, is married to a daughter of the sea god Donbettyr, Dzerassæ, who was previously married to his deceased son Æhsærtæggatæ. From the marriage of Dzerassæ and Æhsærtæggatæ the twin brothers Uryzmæg and Haemyts are born. The latter marries a sister of Dzerassæ's and becomes the father of Batraz. Also, Satana, the wife of Uryzmæg and one of the central characters of the Nart epos, is the daughter of Dzerassæ and the astral god Uastyrdzhi.[37] The plot of Æhsærtæggatæ is similar to the plot of the goddess of wild animals: while hunting, Æhsærtæggatæ wounds Dzerassæ, in the form of a bird, with an arrow, pursues her to the sea, where her father Donbettyr lives, and takes her as his wife.

Similarly, the marriage of Haemyts is a consequence of the hunt. There are different versions of his marriage and the birth of Batraz, but all of them are connected with

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35 For the Nart epos in general, see Abaev, "Nartovskii epos" and Dumézil, *Osetinskii epos.* The Nart legends are widespread among the North Caucasian peoples: Ossetians, Abkhazians, Circassians, Chechens, Balkars, and Ingush people. Abaev traces the origin of the epos to Ossetian tradition (the only Indo-European language in the North Caucasus). Abaev and Dumézil assume the Scythian origin of the Nart cycle.

36 Abaev assumes that Ossetians must have initially lived by the sea or the great river. Abaev, "Nartovskii epos," 158.

37 Uastyrdzhi is associated with St. George. In western Georgia, Saint George also replaces a storm deity; Chikovani compares him with the Hittite storm god Teshub. See Chikovani, *Kartuli ep'osi*, 126–27. However, St. George replacing a lunar deity is more common in Georgia. In several Georgian legends, St. George is the enemy of the goddess of wild animals and Amirani, cf. Virsaladze, *Gruzinskii okhotnichii mif,* 138–37. In one of the Georgian versions of the Amirani saga, St. George asks Christ, Amirani's godfather, to punish him with death. However, Christ chooses a "milder" punishment and binds him to the rock with an iron chain. See Chikovani, *Kartuli ep'osi,* 165.

the sea. In one version recorded by Vsevolod Miller, Haemyts meets a dwarf from the clan of chthonic Bytsentæ while hunting. He is so skilled that Haemyts wants to marry a woman from his clan. Bytsentæ are dwarves who live underground, below the ant-hill, and are relatives of the Donbettyrs. He marries the sister of the Bytsentæ named Bytsenon. One of the conditions of marriage is a taboo: The woman must not be offended by anyone. Once the taboo is broken, Bytsenon leaves Haemyts, but before leaving, she transplants her unborn son onto Haemyts's shoulder. After Batraz is born from his father's back, he is thrown into the sea, where he grows up and becomes a mighty warrior. Batraz does not want to be like all men of flesh and bone but asks the divine blacksmith Kurdalægon to temper him. After that, he asks the blacksmith to cool him in the sea, and his body becomes steely (in some traditions, a part of him remains unhardened, leading to his death.[38] In another version, Batraz jumps into the sea after his birth, where his relatives from the Donbettyr clan bring him up.

In a version also recorded in the nineteenth century by Shanaev, Haemyts pursues a wonderful white rabbit, which revives itself three times after Haemyts kills it. In the end, the rabbit comes to "the edge of the earth" to the sea and disappears there. An older man comes to the perplexed Haemyts, standing on the shore. Talking to him, Haemyts calls the rabbit "Ovsati"—the god of wild and domestic animals and assumes that it is a punishment because the Narts, among others, also fight Falvara, the lord of all animals. The older man reveals himself to be a servant of the sea god Donbettyr, and explains to him that the white rabbit is the daughter of Donbettyr, who has fallen in love with Haemyts and is destined to be his wife.[39] Haemyts is to return in a month to marry the daughter of the sea god. The daughter of Donbettyr can live on the hot earth only if she wears the shell of a sea turtle during the day, shedding it at night. The cunning Narte Syrdon hides in the bedroom, watches Donbettyr's daughter shed her shell and turn into a beautiful woman, and then burns the shell. When the wife of Haemyts can no longer find her shell, she leaves him forever. Since she is pregnant, she transplants her fetus to the Haemyts's shoulder. Finally, after nine months, from his shoulder, Batraz is born.[40]

In this version, the plot sequence of Bartaz's tempering is missing, but his connection with the sea and hunting deities are made explicit.[41] We can reconstruct the plot

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38 Vsevolod Miller, *Osetinskie etiudy* (Moscow: Imperatorskii Moskovskii universitet, 1881), 15.

39 In different versions of the marriage of Haemyts and the birth of Batraz, three circles are connected or are interchangeable: the realm of the goddess of wild animals and hunting, the chthonic and aquatic elements: In some versions, the wife of Haemyts is a chthonic deity (related to the sea god Donbettyr), while in others she is the daughter of the sea god Donbettyr. However, in both versions, the marriage starts with a hunting scene.

40 Dzhantemir Shanaev, "Iz osetinskikh skazanii o Nartakh," *Sbornik svedenii o kavkazskikh gortsakh* 9, no. 1 (1876): 234.

41 In different versions, a) Batraz is born burning hot, and after his birth, immediately jumps into the black sea; b) he is heated by the divine blacksmith Kurdalægon and then thrown into the sea for cooling, where he is hardened; c) after Batrazis born on the tower of his parental house from the bladder on his father's shoulder, the glowing infant breaks through seven floors. On each is a cauldron of water. Batraz

sequence of Batraz as follows: hunting—the marriage of Haemyts to a demigoddess—the disappearance of the demigoddess—the birth of Batraz—exposure (and/or education in the realm of the sea god—tempering and acquisition of supernatural powers and qualities—heroic deeds—the fight with the astral and weather deities—death.

Batraz is an ambivalent hero. He lives not on the earth but in the sea and in the sky and comes to the earth to perform his heroic deeds. When a thunderbolt strikes, the Ossetians believe that Batraz rises from the sea to the sky to fight the weather deities and the evil spirits.[42] He inherits this liminality and ambivalence from the sea, which marks his life's beginning and end. Although he is a Nart, he is at enmity with a part of his tribe responsible for his father's death.

The plot sequence of the daughter of Donbettyr is comparable to that of the Lady of Wild Animals. As already demonstrated, the goddess of wild animals has her double in the goddess of fish, at least in the eastern Black Sea region. The sea, the mountain, and the forest are interchangeable and can generate similar religious or mythological ideas. As we will see below, this plot sequence is also comparable to the plot sequence of Derceto/Agrimpasa (cf. 1.8).

Batraz and Amirani are comparable in several plot sequences: the birth and abandonment of the heroic child of a goddess are one of them. Moreover, in Batraz's struggle with the storm deities Uatsillatæ (St. Ilia) and Uastyrdjytæ (St. George) and his subsequent death, Abaev saw parallels to the battle against the celestial Gods of Prometheus and Amirani.[43]

1.6 Achilles and Thetis (Greece/Mediterranean/Northern Black Sea Coast)

The popularity of Achilles's cult on the northern coast of the Euxine is usually attributed to the Greek colonists.[44] In Olbia (close to today's Parutyne, Ukraine), Achilles was honored as Achilles pontarches (the King of the Seas).[45] Snake Island in the northern Black Sea region (today's Ukraine) is known as one of the most important cultic sites of

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stops only in the seventh cauldron on the lowest floor; d) Batraz asks the hostile Narts to build a huge pyre for him, where he is brought to heat, jumps into the sea, and comes back hardened and kills his enemies.

42 Abaev, "Nartovskii epos," 187. This characteristic made Dumézil and Abaev ("Nartovskii epos," 184) believe Batraz was a storm deity. However, his connection to the hunter myth and his conflict with storm deities, which leads to his death, makes this interpretation implausible. Therefore, Abaev interpreted Batraz as a pre-Christian storm deity who fights already Christianized storm deities, Ilia and St. George, to resolve this contradiction. See Abaev, 186.

43 Abaev, 183.

44 Guy Hardeen, "The Cult of Achilles in the Euxine," *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 60, no. 3 (1991): 314–15, 320.

45 Anna Rusiaeva, "Voprosy razvitiia kulta Akhilla v Severnom Prichernomore," in *Skifskii mir*, ed. Aleksei Ternozhkin et.al. (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1975), 174–85.

Achilles.[46] According to the (lost) poem *Aithiopis*, which is known in Proklus's summary, after the death of Achilles in the Trojan War his mother, the Nereid Thethis, snatches him from the funeral pyre and takes him to the White Island to lead an immortal life there.[47] The White Island was identified with Island of the Blest or Elysian Fields, with the difference that the White Island, unlike other islands where the dead lead an immortal life, was located in the real geographical space in the realm of mortals.[48] On the White Island, he lives in a marriage with Helena.[49] According to legends, Achilles is occasionally seen on the island in his armor and is considered the protector of sailors.[50]

Mythologically, there is no explicit connection between Achilles and the Black Sea, which makes it challenging to explain the origin of his cult in the region. However, the Canadian Caucasiologist Kevin Tuite, in his reconstruction of the figure of Proto-Achilles, a pre-Homeric layer of Achilles, has compared him with the Caucasian heroes Amirani, Batradz and Tswitsw. This comparison served not only "to prove an old and long coexistence between the groups of peoples of the South Caucasus and the Indo-European origin",[51] but also to explain the origins of the cult of Achilles in the Black Sea and help reconstruct maritime mythologies of the region.[52]

Achilles is born as the son of the nereid Thetis and the Peleios, the king of Mirmidonians (who is also connected to hunting). Thetis tries to make him immortal in fire or the water of the Styx, depending on the different traditions. However, her husband, who does not understand the meaning of her actions, prevents Thetis from immortalizing her son. As a result, she leaves her husband (and child) in a rage and returns to her father, Nereus. Achilles is trained by the centaur Chiron and can die young but achieve eternal glory or lead a long but uneventful life. He chooses eternal glory and is killed in the Trojan War by Paris or Apollo, who wounds the only unprotected part of his body—the heel.

On the basis of comparison with the Caucasian mythological and legendary heroes, Tuite reconstructs the plot of Proto-Achilles as follows:

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46 The modern names of the White Island are Ostriv Zmiinyi (Ukrainian), Insula Șerpilor (Romanian), Ostrov Zmeinyi (Russian), Phythonsy (Greek), and Yılan Adası (Turkish), meaning Snake Island. The name is associated with the many snakes that inhabit the island, which is also related to the cult of Achilles and its chthonic aspects. Snake Island made international headlines when Ukrainian border guards refused to surrender to the superior force of the Russian warship after the Russian aggression in Ukraine on February 24, 2022. "russkii voennyi korabl idi na khui" (Russian warship fuck you!") became the slogan of Ukrainian resistance, even making it onto a postage stamp, which has become a sought-after collector's item.

47 Hardeen, "The Cult of Achilles," 320.

48 Hardeen, 320.

49 Hardeen, 320.

50 Hardeen, 320.

51 Charachidzé, *Le système religieux*, 338–39; Tuite, "Achilles and the Caucasus," 21.

52 Walter Burkert thinks that the region's cult of Achilles as a ruler of the Black Sea is connected much more to his mother than his popularity founded on epic. Walter Burkert, *Greek Religion* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 172. At least it would be difficult to understand the Black Sea Achilles cult without his connection to Thetis.

> Proto-Achilles is born from the union of two individuals representing two very different worlds. His mother's people dwell in nature, outside of and either above (mountains) or below (sea) the spaces domesticated by humans. They are an ancient race, largely female in some traditions (e.g. the Nereids and the Dæls), with an economy based on herding, hunting or fishing, ignorant of agriculture (and perhaps even of fire), but immortal. [...] The hunter gets the goddess pregnant, but through a careless or rash action—intruding on her immortalization of the child, refusing to leave Dæl's cave before his wife finds them, allowing her to be humiliated—causes the child to be thrust into the world, or even ripped prematurely out of the maternal womb, before he can fully become his mother's son.[53]

The chthonic aspect of Achilles and his mother, Thetis, was pointed out by the Russian cultural scientist Vladimir Toporov.[54] Thetis is the daughter of Nereus, the son of Pontus and Gaia. Thetis's mother is Doris, a daughter of the Titan Oceanus and Tethys. Nereus's siblings are, among others, Phorcys and Ceto, whose daughter is Echidna, the snake, who is also part of the origin myth of the Scythians. Thetis turns into a snake, among other things, when she tries to escape Peleus. According to Toporov, Achilles is also imagined as snake-footed.[55] In his reconstruction of the Proto-Achilles, Toporov assumes his origin as a chthonic deity, and among the Near Eastern texts that could help in the reconstruction of Proto-Achilles, he also assumes the Hittite myth of Ullikummi (cf. 2.1) and the South Caucasian material.[56]

Achilles's connections to the Caucasian and Hittitian material, established by Toporov and Tuite, allow his inclusion in the reconstruction of the Black Sea myth of the goddess of wild animals (with her chthonic or aquatic variations) and her rebellious son.

1.7 The Snake-Footed Goddess and the Progenitor of the Scythians (Northern Black Sea Coast)

According to Herodotus (I4, 1–11), in the ancestral myth of the Scythians, which he ascribes to the Greeks living in the Pontus, the Scythians are descendants of Heracles. The mythical story is that Heracles, while driving the cattle of Geryon, had come "to the land now called Scythian." When he lay down to rest, the cattle disappeared. So,

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53 Tuite, "Achilles and the Caucasus," 47–49.

54 Vladimir Toporov, "K rekonstruktsii Proto-Akhilla," in *Balkany v kontekste Sredizemnomoria: Problemy rekonstruktsii iazyka i kultury. Tezisy i predvaritelnye materialy k simpoziumu,* ed. Viacheslav Ivanov, Vladimir Neroznak, Vladimir Toporov, and Tatiana Tsivian (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), 21–36.

55 Toporov, "K rekonstruktsii Proto-Akhilla," 33.

56 There is another possible connection between Achilles and Batraz through the chthonic genealogy of both heroes. Achilles's grandfather Aikes, a son of Zeus, prayed to him to populate the uninhabited island of Aegina. Zeus then transformed the ants into human beings, from which emerged the Mirmidonians, whose king was Achilles. See Toporov, "K rekonstruktsii Proto-Akhilla," 29. In one of the versions of the Ossetian Narten epic, Batraz is a son of the chthonic Bytsenon, whose tribe lives "below the anthill." (Cf. above 1.5)

after a long search, he went "to the land called the Woodland" (Hylaia), where he found a half-maiden and half-serpent in a cave. "When he saw her, he was astonished and asked her if she had seen his mares straying; she said that she had them and would not return them to him before he had intercourse with her; Heracles did, in hope of this reward. But though he was anxious to take the horses and go, she delayed returning them so that she might have Heracles with her for as long as possible."[57] She bore Heracles three sons, the strongest of whom—Scythus—became king and tribal father of the Scythians.

There are five different Greek myths of Scythian origin. The plot is similar; however, the protagonists differ. 1) A Scythian version (narrated by Herodotus but held by him to be implausible) makes them the descendants of Zeus and the daughter of the river god Borysthenes; 2) A story that Greeks who live in Pontus told to Herodotus makes them the descendants of Heracles and the snake-footed goddess; 3) Valerius Flaccus makes them the descendants of Jupiter and Hora, who also has the form of a snake; 4) Diodorus of Sicily makes them the descendants of Zeus and the snake-footed goddess; 5) Tabula Albana makes them the descendants of Heracles and the daughter of the river god Araxes, but only after Heracles defeats Araxes in battle.[58] While the father figure changes in different versions of the myth, the mother's features remain constant: a chthonic goddess, half-woman, half-snake who dwells in a cave, or a daughter of a river god.

The mythical story narrated by Herodotus (in the version of the Greeks of Pontos) is the most extended one. It parallels the plot line of the goddess of wild animals/fish who dwells in a remote place. However, in the case of the Scythian myth of origin, it is not a hunting mortal but Heracles with Geryon's cattle. However, the sequence of the plot is intact, even if the protagonist changes.

Comparing different stories of Scythian origin makes clear that chthonic and aquatic elements are interchangeable in the myth. According to Rostovtzeff, the snake-footed goddess is associated with Aphrodite Ourania Apatouros, who had a widespread cult in the northern Black Sea area. This identification, however, is disputed.[59]

1.8 Aphrodite Ourania Apatouros / Agrimpasa / Snake-footed Goddess (Northern Black Sea Coast)

The Kingdom of Bosporus existed for almost a thousand years from the fifth century BC to the fourth to fifth centuries AD on the two sides of the Cimmerian Bosporus, now called the Kerch Strait on the Crimean Peninsula and the Taman Peninsula.

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57 Herodotus, *The Persian Wars,* trans. A. D. Godley (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1921), 2.207.

58 Ustinova, *The Supreme Gods*, 87–89.

59 For the detailed treatment, see Ustinova, *The Supreme Gods*, 40.

Among the most prominent cults of the Kingdom of Bosporus was the cult of Aphrodite Ourania (between the fourth century BC and the third century AD).[60]

One—perhaps the most important—sanctuary of Aphrodite Ourania was located in Apatouros in the Greek colony of Hermonassa on the Taman Peninsula.[61] Probably for that reason, Aphrodite Ourania was also called Aphrodite Apatouros by Strabo (11.2.10), who provided an etymological explanation of that name: "here is also in Phanagoreia a notable temple of Aphrodite Apaturus. Critics derive the etymology of the epithet of the goddess by adducing a certain myth, according to which the Giants attacked the goddess there; but she called upon Heracles for help and hid him in a cave, and then, admitting the Giants one by one, gave them over to Heracles to be murdered through 'treachery'."[62] Since *apate* means treachery in Greek, the etymological myth of Aphrodite Apatouros is "treacherous."

Contrary to the Russian and Soviet scholarly tradition (cf. 1.7), Ustinova identified Aphrodite Ourania Apatouros not with the snake-footed goddess but with the local Scythian goddess Agrimpasa, whose cult was adopted by the Greek colonists.[63] Although the cult of Agrimpasa is well-attested in the northern Black Sea region, she has no explicit connection to any particular mythical plot. Ustinova based her argument on complicated series of identifications of Aphrodite Ourania with Agrimpasa in the northern Black Sea region (attested by Herodot 4. 59), on a well-attested identification of Aphrodite Ourania with Astrate in Syria,[64] and on the identification of Aphrodite with the Syrian goddess Derceto.[65]

Derceto's myth, as narrated by Diodorus of Sicily (*The Library of History*, 2.4), goes as follows: "Aphrodite, being offended with this goddess, inspired in her a violent passion for a certain handsome youth among her votaries; and Derceto gave herself to the Syrian and bore a daughter, but then, filled with shame of her sinful deed, she killed the youth and exposed the child in a rocky desert region, while as for herself, from shame and grief she threw herself into the lake and was changed as to the form of her body into a fish; and it is for this reason that the Syrians to this day abstain from this animal and honour their fish as gods."[66]

Iconographically, she is depicted with an upper body of a woman and the lower body of a fish. Cultically, she is devastated in Ascalon (Syria) and identified with Atargatis, a fertility goddess. The connection with Atargatis creates another essential link.

60 Ustinova, *The Supreme Gods*, 27.

61 Mikhail Rostovtsev, *Ellinstvo i iranstvo na iuge Rossii* (Petrograd: Ogni, 1918), 124; Sergei Tokhasev, "Apatur: Istoriia Bosporskogo sviatilishcha Afrodity Uranii," *Vestnik drevnei Istorii* 2 (1986): 138–45.

62 Strabo, *Geography*, trans. H. L. Jones (London: William Heinemann/Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press: 1961), 5:201.

63 Ustinova, *The Supreme Gods*, 44.

64 Ustinova, 79, 80.

65 Ustinova, 81.

66 *Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes*, trans. E. C. Oldfather (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press: 1933), 1:359.

Walter Burkert compares Atargatis with Leucothea, the white goddess, who was worshipped in Colchis.[67] Leucothea was "originally a mortal woman, daughter of Kadmos, who acted as a nurse-maid to Dionysos, but Hera made her mad, and she threw herself into the sea along with her own son Melikertes-Palaemon."[68] Burkert suspects as a common ground for these cults "Agaen fishermen cults and myths devoted to the Mother and Mistress of the sea creatures [...]."[69]

Ustinova concludes that "Argimpasa-Aphrodite Ourania [...] evolved as a distinct divine personality, with her own cult, mythology, and iconography, presumably due to the powerful impact of Near Eastern religions. The realm of Scythian Argimpasa-Aphrodite embraced fertility of the animal and vegetal kingdoms, the underworld and heaven, the life of the entire Scythian people and the stability of royal power."[70]

If the connection of Agrimpasa with Derceto and Atargatis is correct (via the figure of Aphrodite Urania of Ascalon, who should be identical to Derceto according to Herodotus, and at least this connection seems to be credible), Agrimpasa/Derceto/Aphrodite Uriania will share the structure of the mythical plot with Lady of the Wild Animals/Fish from the Black Sea region.

Agrimpasa/Aphrodite Ourania, associated with Aphrodite Ourania (and indirectly with Agrimpasa) in her realm and features and especially in the mythical plot of Derceto, allows us to compare her with other goddesses of fertility, hunting, and fishing.

1.9 A Narrative Reconstruction and Interpretation of Short and Extended Versions of the Meta-Plot of the Lady of Wild Animals/Fish and her Rebellious Son

We can now proceed to a reconstruction of a metaplot from the above myths coming from different cultural and religious contexts. This reconstruction is a hypothetical one. A metaplot containing all elements, should it have existed, has not been preserved. In different myths around the Black Sea, we encounter only fragments of the plot of the Lady of Wild Animals/Fish in different versions and under the cover of different religions. Reduced to a plot scheme, it looks like this:

1. The protagonist of the meta-plot is the Fertility Goddess/Lady of Wild Animals/Fish (Derceto/Atargatis/Agrimpasa, Lady of the Wild Animals, Dali, Inar). Indirectly, the connection with animals also occurs in the myth of Heracles and the snake-footed goddess, as she offers him the cattle in exchange for her love, as in the meta-plot of the Lady of Wild Animals.

67 Ustinova, *The Supreme Gods*, 92.

68 Burkert, *Greek Religion*, 172.

69 Burkert, 172.

70 Ustinova, *The Supreme Gods*, 128.

2. The goddess is anthropomorphic and zoomorphic; she has the shape of a human and a snake or fish (snake-footed goddess or fish deity) or can change her anthropomorphic shape and become different animals or fish.

3. The Fertility Goddess/Lady of Wild Animals is connected either to the aquatic element or to the chthonic element, which are generally compatible or interchangeable.

4. In the short version of the meta-plot of the Lady of the Wild Animals, the goddess falls in love with a mortal and offers him her love in exchange for a reward. As a result, the mortal is usually granted extraordinary luck in hunting and/or sexual relations with the goddess. The love of the goddess is, however, ambivalent. As a rule, the mortal violates a prohibition of the goddess and therefore dies, sometimes trapped on a rock which he cannot leave alive.

5. In the extended version of the meta-plot, the goddess gives birth to a heroic child whose father is her mortal lover.

6. The son/daughter of the goddess grows up to be a mighty hero and commits heroic deeds. These deeds include fighting against sea or chthonic monsters.

7. Overcome by hubris, the son of Lady of Wild Animals rebels and attacks other gods (usually the supreme god or the astral or storm god). In this battle, he is defeated and punished in one form or another (usually by the storm god).

The cult of the fertility goddess in her different hypostasis (as a Lady of Wild Animals or Lady of Fish) is widespread throughout the Black Sea region (it is less known on the west coast of the Black Sea) but also in the Caucasus.

Elene Virsaladze, Walter Burkert, and Volkert Haas assume that the Lady of Wild Animal was a goddess of a Paleolithic, pre-agricultural fertility cult and a myth associated with it. Burkert also makes a special connection between this cult and the sea.[71] The fight of the rebellious son of the Lady of Wild Animals with the astral and storm gods and his demise could have captured the demise of the old hunter religion, which was replaced by the agricultural religion with a different structure to the pantheon: strong astral and storm gods on the one hand and with the more strict division between celestial, terrestrial, and chthonic realms as in the pre-Indo-European hunting/fishing pantheons around the Black Sea. The former supreme goddess survived in lower functions of the pantheon in succeeding cults or even as a demonic figure in folklore.[72]

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[71] "The Idea of a Master or a Mistress of the Animals who must be won over to the side of the hunters is widespread and very possibly Paleolitic in origin; in the official religion of the Greeks this survives at little more than the level of folklore." Burkert, *Greek Religion,* 172. See also Virsaladze, *Gruzinskii okhotnichii mif,* 102, 145; Haas, *Die hethtitische Literatur,* 146, 174. Both Haas and Burkert occasionally refer to the material from the Caucasus. A more integrative study of Black Sea mythology would require more substantial consideration of ethnographic material from the Caucasus.

[72] For the structure of the changes in the pantheon of the Hittite Empire, see Taracha, *Religions,* 53, 81–82, 92–93.

2 Maritime Plots around the Black Sea

The Lady of Wild Animals/Fish plot is not the only plot connected with the Black Sea region. The Sea features in several other traditions, with the Hittite as the most prominent, as a location or protagonist of myths and legends.[73]

2.1 Hittite Legends about the Sea

2.1.1 The Illuyanka Myth

In the second version of the Illuyanka myth (cf. 1.1) Illuyanka defeats the storm god and removes his heart and eyes. The storm god Tarhun(ta) begets a son with the "poor man's daughter." This son grows up and marries the daughter of Illuyanka. As a gift from the bridegroom, he demands his father's eyes and heart. When the weather god regains his organs, he resumes the fight with Illuyanka on the seashore. He defeats Illuyanka. The weather god's son, now loyal to his father-in-law, asks his father to kill him too, or he will have to take revenge for Illuyanka. The weather god then kills him. The setting of the myth is "the coast of the Black Sea, probably the estuary of the River Kızılırmak."[74]

2.1.2 The Telipinu Myth

Telipinu is a Hittite deity of cultivated plants that dies and resurrects, similarly to Tamuz, Attis and Osiris. Teilipinu is the son of the king of the gods, the storm god Tarhunta (cf. 1.1 and 1.2). Telipinu myths belong to the pre-Indo-European Hattic substrate of Hittite mythology.[75]

The cycle of Telipinu myths includes the myth about the sea god who steals the sun god Ištanu. The storm god Tarhunta instructs his son Telipinu to bring back the sun god. The sea god is afraid of Telipinu. It releases the sun god and gives Telipinu his daughter as a wife. The sea god receives from Tarhunta a thousand cows and a thousand sheep as a dowry.[76] In another myth about the disappearance of the sun god, the sea god and its daughter Hatepuna figure as helpers of the sun god.[77]

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[73] For a general discussion, see Haas, *Die hethtitische Literatur*, 151–52.

[74] Haas, *Die hethitische Literatur*, 98. Haas believes that the myth preserves the memory of the "matrilocally structured society that had long ceased to exist at the time of writing." Haas, 102.

[75] Haas, 104.

[76] Haas, 114; Hoffner, *Hittite Myths*, 26–27.

[77] Haas, *Die hethitische Literatur*, 117; Hoffner, *Hittite Myths*, 27–28.

2.1.3 Kumarbi Cycle

The myth about the sea serpent Hedammu belongs to the Hurrian Kumarbi cycle (cf. 1.2). The cycle centers on the rivalry between the god Kumarbi and his son, the storm god Teshub (identical to Tarhunta), and thus on the generational struggle of the gods.[78] Kumarbi claimed the throne from his father Anu and emasculated him. To prevent Anu from having further offspring, Kumarbi swallowed his sperm and became pregnant. Teshub is born from the skull of Kumarbi. Kumarbi fights with his son Teshub not in person but with the help of various adversaries (such as Kurunta and ^DLAMMA, respectively). The sea serpent Hedammu, Lord Silver, and the stone giant Ullikummi (and possibly ^DLAMMA)[79] are sons of Kumarbi, whom he begets to defeat Teshub. The sea god is one of Kumarbi's allies against the weather god Teshub.

The setting of the Hedammu myth is the Bay of İskenderun on the Mediterranean Sea. The song of Ullikummi is set around Mount Ararat.[80] The Song of Lord Silver and the Song of Ullikummi parallel the Caucasian myths (cf. 1.4 and 1.5).

2.1.4 The Song of Silver

Silver beats an orphan for revealing that Silver is also growing up without a father. Silver threatens his mother, who eventually reveals the identity of his father, Kumarbi. Silver sets out to find him. He becomes king of the gods and threatens the sun and the moon.[81] The end of the song has not been handed down, but it is assumed that Silver will perish in the battle with Teshub. The characteristics of Lord Silver make him comparable to the rebellious son of the Lady of the Wild Animals. There are direct parallels to the Amirani myth (e. g., the insult by his peers who know the secret of his birth and the search for the unknown father).

2.1.5 Hedammu Snake

The sea god gives Kumarbi his daughter Sertapsuruhi, a beautiful giantess, as a wife. From this marriage is born Hedammu, a snake or dragon. Hedammu is so voracious that he causes famine and threatens the cosmic order. The sister of the weather god, the love goddess Shaushka, seduces the snake. The song is incomplete, but Höffner assumes that "the overall plot line of the Kumarbi cycle implies that each opponent of Teshub is eventually defeated."[82]

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78 Hoffner, *Hittite Myths*, 40–41.

79 According to Hoffner, 40–41.

80 Haas, *Die hethitische Literatur*, 131.

81 Hoffner, *Hittite Myths*, 49.

82 Hoffner, 51.

2.1.6 Ullikummi

Kumarbi begets the stone giant Ullikummi with a rock.[83] To protect the child before he grows and becomes powerful, Kumarbi hides him in the underworld and mounts him on the shoulder of the world giant Ubelluri. Ullikummi grows bigger and more powerful by the hour. Similarly, as in the song about Hedammu, Shaushka tries to seduce him, but Ulllikummi is deaf and blind and can resist the charms of the goddess of love. In the first battle he defeats the weather god Teshub. The wisdom god Ea advises Teshub to cut Ullikummi from Ubelluri's shoulder with a sickle. Thereupon Teshub can defeat him. The song is incomplete, but it is assumed that Ullikummi, similarly to other adversaries of Teshub, is defeated.[84]

2.1.7 The Song of the Sea

The battle of the sea with the storm god Teshub, in which Teshub overpowers the sea god, is considered by some scholars to be part of the Kumarbi cycle, although it is not certain that the Song of the Sea was part of the Kumarbi cycle.[85] Hurrian and Hittite versions of the Songs have survived. In both, the sea rages in the form of a storm flood reaching the heavens. Kumarbi advises the gods to pay tribute to the sea god. The sea god is nevertheless dissatisfied. In the reconstruction of the myth based on the Astrate Papyrus the sea demands the goddess Ishtar (who is identical with Shaushka) as his wife.[86] There then follows the battle of the storm god with the sea, ending with the victory of the weather god.

As well as the Kumarbi cycle, the song of the sea belongs to the Hurrian cultural circle. The weather god Teshub, who fights with the sea (among others), can be identified with the Hattic weather god Tarhunta.[87] In Hurrian and Hattic texts from northern Anatolia, their battle can be explicitly located to the Black Sea region. In both traditions, the sea has different semantics. While in Hurrian, the sea is clearly in

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83 For the birth of Ullikummi from the rock Haas finds parallels only in the Caucasus, in the Nart epos; see Haas, *Die hethitische Literatur,* 174. The Nart Soslan (Sosruko) was also born from a rock, which was fertilized by the sperm of a shepherd and/or a god who saw the naked Satana. Unlike Batraz, Soslan has no connection with the sea. Like Batraz, he is vulnerable only in one part of his body. He also dies in battle with the celestial gods. See Abaev, "Nartovskii epos u osetin," 172.

84 Haas, *Die hethitische Literatur,* 154; Hoffner, *Hittite Myths,* 55.

85 Philo Howink ten Cate, "The Hittite Storm God: His Role and His Rule According to Hittite Cuneiform Sources," in *Natural Phenomena: Their Meaning, Depiction and Description in the Ancient Near East*, ed. Diederik J. W. Meijer (Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1992), 83–148; Daniel Schwermer, "The Storm-Gods of the Ancient Near East: Summary, Synthesis, Recent Studies. Part II," *Journal of Ancient Near Eastern Religions* 8, no. 1 (2008): 6. Cf. Alfonso Archi, "Orality, Direct Speech and the Kumarbi Cycle," *Altorientalische Forscnungen* 36, no. 2 (2009): 209–29.

86 Haas, *Die hethitische Literatur,* 152.

87 Schwemmer, "The Storm-Gods," 22.

opposition to the sky gods and can rather be assigned to the underworld, this opposition is not clear in Hattic mythology.[88] While the Hurrian myths, possibly under the influence of the Mesopotamian myths, make it possible to understand the battle of the storm god with the sea as a fight for cosmic order against chaos,[89] it seems that in the Hattian religious culture, there was a cult of the sea.[90] In an ancient Hittite founding ritual, the insignia of royal power come from the sea.[91]

Despite this difference between Hattic and Hurrian semantics of the sea, in both religio-cultural circles, the storm god struggles with the sea or with other gods from around it. This reference has not yet been clarified in the history of religion.[92] The texts from the Caucasus also indicate a struggle between old (hunter/fisher/gatherer) gods with direct or indirect reference to the sea and the younger agricultural storm gods (see 1). This context from the Caucasus and the eastern Black Sea coast could at least also be used for the religious-historical interpretation of the assertion of the weather gods as the supreme deity of the pantheon.

2.2 Maritime Myths and Legends from the Caucasus

2.2.1 The Sun Goddess who Dwells in the Sea

The Georgian ethnologist Vera Bardavelidze investigated the afterlife of the cult of the great mother Nana and her children in Georgian myths and rituals.[93] Her cult survived, particularly in the customs related to healing infectious diseases (especially smallpox and measles). The goddess has children (minor deities, primarily of infectious diseases) called *batonebi* (the lords). The relatives of the person affected with an infectious disease had to appease them with flowers (roses and violets), fruit and ritual food, special candles, and bright, especially red, decoration of the sick person's room.

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88 Alfonso Archi thinks that Hurrites adopted the weather god from northern Mesopotamia and Syria and that he prevailed as king of the gods in the pan-Hurritic pantheon in the second millennium BC. Archi, "Orality, Direct Speech and the Kumarbi Cycle," 212. On the emergence of the weather god, see also Guido Kryszat, "Herrscher, Herrschaft und Kulttradition in Anatolien nach den Quellen der altassyrischen Handelskollonien – Teil II. Götter, Priester und Feste Anatoliens," *Altorientalische Forschungen* 33, no. 1 (2006): 106.

89 Schwemmer, "The Storm-Gods," 25.

90 Wilhelm, "Meer B. bei den Hethitern," 4; Ian Rutherford, "Puduhepa, Piyamaradu and Sea: Kub56.15ii15 – 24 (Aht26) and its background," in *Acts of the IXth International Congress of Hititology*, ed. Aygül Süel (Ankara: Çorum, 2019), 2:823 – 33; Alfonso Archi, "The Anatolian Fate-Goddesses and their Different Traditions," in *Diversity and Standardization: Perspectives on Ancient Near Eastern Cultural History*, ed. Eva Cancik-Kirschbaum, Jörg Klinger, and Gerfrid W. Müller (Munich: De Gruyter, 2013), 1.

91 Wilhelm, "Meer B. bei den Hethitern," 4; Archi, "The Anatolian Fate-Goddesses," 1.

92 Schwemmer, "The Storm-Gods," 27.

93 Bardavelidze, *Drevneishie religioznye verovaniia*, 81 – 82.

Nana—according to Bardavelidze—is the fertility goddess. She was associated with planting (especially spring flowers, roses, and violets) and water, with awakening nature, and with love. In Georgian songs, fairy tales, and folk rituals the land of the goddess is called the *batonebi* land (the land of lords), the *batonebi* garden (the garden of the lords), or the sun garden.[94] The *batonebi* land is difficult to access; it is located either high in the mountains on the inaccessible rock above the sea or an island in the sea. In the *batonebi* realm, a garden blooms and withers simultaneously. The place also has similarities with the land of milk and honey: rivers of honey and milk flow there. In the house of the goddess—the mother of the *batonebi*— there is a pillar with the eyes of people afflicted by *batonebi* diseases.[95] (The healing rituals reproduce at the bedside the *batonebi* land). The place of Nana and *batonebi* bears some resemblance to the Isle of the Blessed, but their realm is less a realm of the dead than a liminal space. There, for instance, the souls of those who have fallen ill with *batonebi* diseases dwell, but they can return after recovery to their homes. Bardavelidze considered the legends about the great goddess Nana and the *batonebi* land fragments of an older astral religion, since she considered Nana a sun deity. Nevertheless, the realm of this goddess lies in the sea. Hittite religion knows several celestial and earthly sun deities. According to Volkert Haas, the sun goddess Arinna represents the night sun.[96] Irine Tatishvili, on the contrary, thinks, that the two principal designations of the sun deity, nepišaš, "of heaven," and taknaš, "of the earth," refer not to two different sun deities, but to two essential functions of the same deity, the two hypostases of the sun. As she writes, "in the Hittite cosmology, the relationship of the Sun deity with the earth is based on the idea that the sun sets on the horizon in the evening in order to pass through the underworld and shine out again in heaven. However, unlike other peoples, the Hittites believed that the Sun was neither asleep at night, nor had a rest, [n]or was captured or acted as a judge in the netherworld as it is in the Egyptian or the Mesopotamian theological systems, but ruled over the earth, the underworld."[97]

Tatishvili's findings might explain why the sun goddess dwells in the sea—as one of the realms the sun passes temporarily.[98]

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94 Bardavelidze, 78.

95 The motif of the eyes as a part of the soul of a (sick) person is preserved in Hittite and Georgian sagas. (Cf. the Illuyanka myth in 2.) For example, in the Amirani saga the eyes of the stepfather of Amiran, Iaman, are stolen by a giant (*devi*) and brought back by Amirani and his brothers.

96 Volkert Haas, *Die Religionen des alten Orients: Hethiter* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 226.

97 Irine T'at'ishvili, "Aietes – Son of Helios (For the Study of Hittite-Georgian Religious Parallels)," *Phasis, Greek and Roman Studies* 10, no. 1 (2007): 182 – 92.

98 For the parallels between Hittite and Georgian religious worlds with further bibliography, see Tatishvili, "Aietes," 182 – 83.

2.2.2 The *mesephebi,* Lords of Wild Animals who Come from the Sea

In the areas adjacent to the sea in western Georgia, people worshipped male and female sea deities called *mesephebi* (the Georgian word *sepe* also means royal, belonging to the lord), who dwell in the sea and come to the land from October 28 to November 3 to count the living animals and revive the dead ones.[99] *Mesephebi* are again closer to the Lady of the Wild Animals / Fish than to the myths about the fertility and sun goddess Nana.

2.2.3 Fish Cults in the Caucasus

Georgian ethnographer Alexi Robakidze, who studied fish cults in Georgia, concluded that they were part of an early religion in which the fish was related to procreation, fertility, power, and recovery. This cult was related to the "Mother of Fishes."[100] Based on ethnological material in the South and North Caucasus, Robakidze concluded that in the different parts of the Caucasus different gods were associated with fish cults: the fish god St. Larsa in the Georgian province of Imereti,[101] the Cherkessian water god Kodes,[102] and the Ossetian water god Donbettir (see 1.5 above). Robakidze associates the fish cult in the Caucasus with the Sumerian fish god Ea. Still, the evidence of this association hardly goes beyond some analogies (such as procreative and healing powers).

2.2.4 Vishaps

Nikolai Marr and Iakov Smirnov discovered fish-shaped stelae in Armenia, known as *vishap*s. *Vishap* (Armenian) or *veshapi* (Georgian) referred to a whale but also a dragon.[103] Similar stelae were found in Georgia and in the North Caucasus. In Armenia and southern Georgia, the fish idols are found in an area reached by water, but not by the sea. Usually, they are decorated with ornaments representing water, cranes, or ox hide. Marr and Smirnov, as well as later scholars, associated them with a water and fertility

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99 Virsaladze, *Gruzinskii okhotnichii mif,* 38.

100 Alexi Robakidze, "K voprosu o nekotorykh perezhitkakh kulta ryby," *Sovetskaia Etnografiia,* no. 3 (1948): 120. In the Soviet research, it was assumed that with the replacement of matriarchy by patriarchy, the male gods took over the functions of the goddesses; even if the latter did not completely disappear, their rank or function changed. In the case of aquatic gods too, there are female and male gods in the Caucasus In the meta-plot about the lady of animals/fish, the female deities are usually the daughters of the higher male aquatic gods.

101 Chitaia, "Imeretis eksp'editsia", 339.

102 Robakidze, "K voprosu," 125.

103 Nikolai Marr and Iakov Smirnov, *Vishapy* (Leningrad: OGIZ, 1931), 96.

cult.[104] Marr assumed the existence of a pre-historical cult, which later was displaced and demonized in a transformed form by a new religion, where the initial sacral fish became a demonic snake or dragon.[105] Marr considered the vishap idols to be the oldest religious artefacts in the South Caucasus.[106] In Armenian and Georgian legends, the vishaps are evil spirits living in the sky or mountain (especially Mount Ararat).[107] However, a number of the legends portray vishaps as at least ambivalent or even helping.[108] In Georgian legends, quoted by Elene Virsaladze, The Lady of Wild Animals, vishaps and snakes appear in similar plots: They grant hunters (or humans more general) help, hunting luck, or other superhuman abilities. However, the gift of the deities is connected with a taboo. By violating this taboo, a human is punished (usually by death).[109] As in the case of the Lady of the Wild Animals / Fish, Virsaladze considers vishaps to be the gods of the pre-agricultural hunter cult. With the transition to agricultural culture, the predecessor gods migrated into demonology and were now fought and defeated by the celestial or storm deities.

3 Conclusion

Especially in the southern, eastern, and northern Black Sea region, there are traces of religious beliefs associated with the aquatic element in general and the sea in particular. The oldest layer of this religious beliefs is represented by the zoomorphic, fish-shaped idols (vishaps); in these cults, fish were associated with vitality and fertility. The fish stelae discovered in Armenia, Georgia, and the North Caucasus are material survivals of these cults, which also survived in folklore and popular beliefs until the middle of the twentieth century. The next layer was the zoo-anthropomorphic Lady of the Wild Animals or Fish, a fertility goddess with a house in a liminal space (on a rock or in the sea). She is ambivalent and grants wealth to the humans (hunters) she chooses as her partners but she is also a cause of their death. The Lady of the Wild Animals and/or Fish is also a goddess of a pre-agricultural hunter cult. In different forms, her cult is known especially in the Hattic substrate of Hittite religious culture, in the folklore epic of the South and North Caucasus, and in the Greco-Scythian religious culture of the northern Black Sea.

With the transition to agriculture, the cult of Lady of the Animals / Fish was supplemented by her son's fight with the astral or weather gods, in which he is defeated and killed or punished. However, the older Hattic myths (Illuyanka, Kurunta), the Caucasian

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104 Virsaladze, *Gruzinskii okhotnichii mif,* 76.

105 Marr and Smirnov, *Vishapy,* 98, 102 – 3.

106 Dating back to the first millennium BC but possibly up to the fifth millenium BC. Virsaladze, *Gruzinskii okhotnichii mif,* 77.

107 Marr and Smirnov, *Vishapy,* 98.

108 Virsaladze *Gruzinskii okhotnichii mif,* 78.

109 Virsaladze, 90 – 91.

myths (Amirani, Narts, hunter myths) and the Scythian myths of the northern Black Sea region, which have became Grecisized, might have preserved the fragments of the old, pre-agricultural (Neolithic to Middle Bronze Age) religion.

Another goddess with a house in the sea was a sun goddess, Nana, who seems not to have any connection with the hunter cult but is also responsible for fertility, prosperity, and health. Chronologically she might stand between the pre-agricultural hunting goddesses and later agricultural religions with a celestial pantheon. However, she seems to represent a dual structure of the cosmos (Heaven/Earth) as opposed to a tripartite structure (Heaven/Earth/Underworld), more common for Mesopotamian and Indo-European religions. Deities are not strongly associated with their respective realms in religious cultures with a dual cosmic structure. Still, they can migrate from one realm (Heaven) to another (the sea), as in the case of Hittite and possibly the Georgian sun goddess. The dual or tripartite structure of the cosmos influences the respective semantics of the realm (for example, of the sea or the earth), which can be negatively connotated in the tripartite cosmic structure and ambivalent in the dual.

These religious shifts attribute to the general change in the cultural semantics of the sea. From the benevolent space of wealth and prosperity, the sea (as an aquatic element in general) starts to be ambivalent and finally hostile to celestial deities and humans. From the ancient Greek perspective, the Black Sea is a place of escape and exile charged with strong connotations of the otherworldly, yet, or perhaps for this very reason, it exercises a fascination of the liminal.

The Black Sea had great mythogenic potential over the millennia. A cult directly connected with the sea—a cult of the goddess of wild animals and fish—united the cultures —at least before the emergence of the first great empires—into a religious and narrative region. This heritage, even if overwritten several times, remains in many cultures to this today. This shared heritage of the Black Sea region has been studied differently: The Hittite and Greek myths tend to be assigned to (high) literature, while the Greek heritage in particular became canonical in Western Europe and enjoyed multiple modifications over the centuries. Meanwhile, many of these fragments from Georgian, Turkic, Persian, or North Caucasian cultures, less known to the Western public, were partly assigned to folklore partially found in hagiographic and historical works, travelogues, or literary works.

Especially in the age of nationalism, mythological figures such as Amirani, Medea, or the Narts, which tended to persist across cultural and linguistic barriers, were used as national symbols or for national branding. To this day, the mythological heritage of the Black Sea culture, especially in Crimea or on Snake Island, is abused to legitimize imperial claims—Russian chief ideologist Aleksandr Dugin, for example, exploited the archaeological heritage of the northern Black Sea as justification of territorial

claims,[110] while on the Ukrainian side the same Snake Island leads to the formation of new national heroic legends.

Ultimately, I would emphatically reiterate the necessity of integrative, interdisciplinary study beyond the national-philological, national-historical borders of the religion/mythology of the Black Sea region, especially with a maritime focus. Even if this kind of "post-national" research does not solve political conflicts, it will help us understand the international foundations of culture later monopolized by imperial or national actors.

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110 Aleksandr Dugin, February 25, 2022, posting on VK https://vk.com/wall18631635_10015: "Snake Island plays a crucial role in the sacral history [...] Whoever controls the Snake [Island], controls the course of world history."

Helena Ulbrechtová and Siegfried Ulbrecht

Russian Literature on Crimea, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea

Translated by Paul Vickers

1 Outline of Our Research Focus

The areas that we are interested in—the Black Sea, the Crimean Peninsula, and the Caucasus Mountains—have featured as subjects or motifs in Russian literature since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. They remain popular to this day.[1] Each appears, however, in different forms and is prominent to varying degrees. While Crimea and the Caucasus form part of the conceptions of the Russian Empire's coloniality and acculturation processes taking place within it, and as such have featured regularly in literary works, the (Black) sea has largely remained marginal in literature.[2] An analysis of literary reflections of cultural history concepts should not limit itself to the "impression" these concepts have left on texts, thus treating literary works as a parallel mode of expressing historical facts, but should also take into account the aesthetic form of individual pieces of literature. Furthermore, the extensive contextualization of literary texts enables them to become elements of particular literatures' aesthetic-axiological systems. In turn, literary texts can exert influence on, for example, cultural history precisely because they are aesthetic facts. Fictional texts thus belong chiefly to the aesthetic-literary context and not to a (cultural) historical one. The primary objective of a literary studies analysis is to establish, above all else, how texts are "made," with what they depict (or objectivize) being of lesser significance.[3] In our approach to "Crimea" and "the Caucasus," however, what we propose is to combine literary historical and cultural history methods especially because—at least as far as Crimea is concerned—these approaches have been adopted not in tandem but separately, leading to a certain degree of discord on particular aspects.[4]

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1 It is necessary to stress that Crimea tends to serve as a synecdoche for the northern Black Sea coast.
2 This is how the sea has traditionally been approached in Russian culture, a theme also addressed in Helena Ulbrechtová's essay, "Die Fluidität in der russischen Kultur: Erde, Wasser und Luft in der russischen Literatur," in *The Meeting of the Waters: Fluide Räume in Literatur und Kultur*, ed. Marija Javor Briški and Irena Samide (Munich: Iudicium, 2015), 219–44.
3 Cf. the critique of Hayden White: Ansgar Nünning, "Wie aus einem historischen Geschehen ein Medienereignis wird: Kategorien für ein erzähltheoretisches Beschreibungsmodell," in *Der Krimkrieg als erster europäischer Medienkrieg*, ed. Georg Maag, Wolfram Pyta, and Martin Windisch (Berlin: LIT-Verlag, 2010), 201–2.
4 A starting point is offered by two divergent conceptualizations of Crimea: one that emphasizes "insularity," with the peninsula treated as a *de facto* literary island; Tatjana Petzer, "'Falten von Land und Meer': Zur geokulturellen Begründung der Krim," in *Grundordnungen: Geographie, Religion und Ge-*

In Russian literature, the topoi of Crimea and the Caucasus play an important role because they constitute an integral element of Russian "culturosophy and historiosophy." Relations towards both regions were shaped not only by a Russian imperial urge, but also by the fact that these were spaces about which much knowledge was produced, something that was reflected in literature. Both topoi were "appropriated" by literature, with Crimea almost always being treated as a "Russian realm" and sacred Russian space, while the Caucasus (as well as Armenia and Georgia) was for a long time framed using orientalizing and exoticizing tropes. In other words, while the Caucasus was subject to re-semanticization (and not only in literature), Crimea was treated from the outset as a "familiar" territory, even though the ethnic groups there and its environment was something of a blank page for the Russian Empire.[5] Thus, literary texts on Crimea and the Caucasus established a particular tradition in Russian literary spatial semiotics.

A more fruitful conception that is associated with Russian culturosophy and geopoetics[6] treats Crimea as part of the South. This is connected both to the Russian axiology of the points of the compass[7] and to specific models of the Russian South.[8] Imaginations of Crimea as a fertile orchard form a trope that can be traced back to literary conceptions of Ukraine. Mirja Lecke has outlined the literary motifs and metaphors of Ukraine as a (southern) garden, with Ukrainians depicted as a southern people, where

setz, ed. Zaal Andronikashvili and Sigrid Weigel (Berlin: Kadmos, 2013), 67–85, or also Franziska Thun-Hohenstein, "'Wo es ganz plötzlich abbricht: Rußland/Über dem schwarzen dumpfen Meer': Russische kulturelle Semantiken des Schwarzmeeresraumes," in *Topographien pluraler Kulturen: Europa vom Osten her gesehen*, ed. Esther Kilchmann, Andreas Pflitsch, and Franziska Thun-Hohenstein (Berlin: Kadmos, 2012), 75–96; and another that treats Crimea as a crossroads of cultures; for example, Kerstin S. Jobst, *Die Perle des Imperiums: Der russische Krim-Diskurs im Zarenreich* (Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2007). The diverse positions regarding the seclusion or openness of Crimea towards to outside world give rise to different assessments of the value of Antiquity for different conceptions of Crimea. While historians consider Antiquity an essential component of conceptions (and visions) of Crimea owing to historical facts, reflections on Crimea in literary studies tend to play down Antiquity, generally reducing it to a literary-aestheticizing pose of the modern (cf. Thun-Hohenstein, "Wo es ganz plötzlich abbricht...," 96).

5 Cf. Jobst, *Die Perle des Imperiums*, 81.

6 For more on this concept, see Magdalena Marszałek and Sylvia Sasse, eds., *Geopoetiken: Geographische Entwürfe in den mittel- und osteuropäischen Literaturen* (Berlin: Kadmos, 2010).

7 The opposition of East and West was, and remains, part of Russia's efforts in the realms of developing culture, nation-building, and state-building. The North–South axis, with St. Petersburg and Crimea at either end, constituted a geopolitical and "historiographical" supplement to the East–West axis. The North–South axis has re-emerged regularly since the times of Peter I and reached a peak with the first annexation of Crimea in 1783. This theme has also been addressed by Aleksandr Liusyi, *Krymskii tekst v russkoi literature* (St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 2003), 20–31, who offers a summary of the most renowned studies on the subject.

8 Cf. for example Kerstin S. Jobst, "Über den russischen Südländer: Zur Funktion der Krim als russischer Süden und des *iuzhanin* (Südländers) im russischen Krim-Diskurs des Zarenreichs," in *Bilder der 'eigenen' Geschichte im Spiegel des kolonialen 'Anderen': Transnationale Perspektiven um 1900*, ed. Claudia Bruns (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2010), 34–49.

images of cherry trees and arcadia are prominent, albeit in a highly folkloristic manner (in contrast to texts on Crimea).[9]

Crimea played a much less significant role in Ukrainian literature than in Russian works. Ukrainian modernist poets like Lesia Ukrainka, Mykola Zerov, and Pavlo Tychyna, for example, were, much like their Russian counterparts, in awe of the peninsula's ancient charm and the environment there. Interestingly, Ukrainian poetry paid greater attention to the Black Sea and its waters, presenting them as a vital, vibrant world. In certain cases, however, the Black Sea was compared to the Ukrainian nation and language, reflecting a tendency towards didacticism in Ukrainian literature that remains in place today. It also opened up a strand of competitiveness between Ukrainian and Russian literary nationalisms. One difference between the two literatures is the Ukrainian interest in the Crimean Tatars, a group that was framed from the late nineteenth century on as another victim of Russian imperialism (for example, elements of the works of Kotsubynskii) that the Ukrainians could thus identify with. The second annexation of Crimea in 2014 provoked renewed interest in Crimean Tatar culture, leading to new reflexive texts by younger poets who took up the theme of the "loss" of Crimea. Most of the authors mentioned here had already produced works on Crimea before the annexation. Such works of poetry are not numerous, although representative examples include texts by Viacheslav Huk (*Krymski Elehii* [Crimean Elegies], 2013), Olena Kytsan (Pashuk), Oleh Kotsarev, and Svitlana Povaliaieva (*Pislia Krymu*, [After Crimea], 2018). Many other works have appeared primarily online as a nationalist counter to Russian propaganda poetry. A mixture of naïve patriotism and modern poetry typified the 2016 anthology *Krym, iakyi my liubimo* (Crimea, Our Love).

2 Is There a Russian "Crimea Text"?

The first scholarly-journalistic Crimea "reports" resulted from the Enlightenment-era pursuit of knowledge, something that they had in common with the first literary documents. From the nineteenth century, literary and journalistic discourses formed separate realms, although they were both typified by travel reportage. This kind of "tourist exploration of Crimea" that the Symbolist poet and painter Maksimilian Voloshin criticized heavily in 1925[10] was for a long time—including still quite often in the twentieth century—the primary mode in artistic representations of Crimea. These included depictions of nature and certain tourist attractions (Chatyr Dag [Crimean Tatar: Çatır

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9 Cf. Mirja Lecke, *Westland: Polen und die Ukraine in der russischen Literatur von Puškin bis Babel* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2015), 130, 140, 176. Lecke's literary studies analysis suggests a certain parallel to Kerstin S. Jobst's findings regarding "beautiful Crimea" (Jobst, *Die Perle des Imperiums*, 132–58). From the perspective of the literary South, the literary take on Crimea became part of Russian literary discourse on Ukraine.

10 Maksimilian Voloshin, "Kultura, iskusstvo, pamiatniki Kryma," in *Koktebelskie berega: Poeziia, risunki, akvareli, stati* (Simferopol: Tavriia, 1990), 217.

Dağ], Chufut-Kale [Crimean Tatar: Çufut Qale] etc.) that featured regularly (mostly in lyrical epic travel cycles).[11] This "travel perspective" was adopted, for example, by Esther Kinsky and Martin Chalmers in their travel diary.[12] Their journey, pursuing traces of representations of Crimea in literature, myth, and sagas, took place before the second annexation of the peninsula and ultimately ended in disappointment as far as the authors were concerned: The famous *genius loci* had disappeared. Although the book consistently draws on individual impressions that are juxtaposed with literary texts,[13] with the authors also avoiding politicization, their text is nevertheless implicitly critical of the economic situation and tourist infrastructure of Crimea as they were under the Ukrainian government.[14]

The number of literary primary sources related to Crimea is rather meagre compared to historical studies, with historiographical and cultural historical writings on Crimea often appearing ahead of literary studies on the subject. Interest in literary aspects of Crimea has fluctuated greatly, often in relation to dominant political discourses, with the outcome of such studies generally spontaneous and spread across a range of texts. This means that certain literary texts remain undiscovered, while other works fail to meet the expectations of literary and cultural studies scholars. The situation is similar with scholarly texts that deal with literature on Crimea. The fact that there has not yet been a systemic study on such works means that it is only possible to trace research in the field partially, in contrast to studies on literature depicting the Caucasus.

Even in Russia, systematic research on "Crimea literature" is rare. With the increasingly imperialist tendencies of the state under Putin from around 2000 on, the subject of "Russian literary" Crimea acquired increasing salience. This resulted not only in a series of diverse essays that explored literary depictions of "Russian Crimea," but also led to efforts to create theoretical frameworks for such research. Hence the literary historian Aleksandr Liusyi developed the concept of "the Crimea text in Rus-

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11 In this way, poetic journeys to Crimea contributed to the development of cycles in Russian poetry; cf. Siegfried Ulbrecht, "Das literarische Verfahren der Zyklisierung in der Germanistik: Mit einem Ausblick auf die slavische Philologie sowie Ansätze einer europäischen Zyklusforschung," *Weimarer Beiträge* 54, no. 4 (2008): 612–23; Siegfried Ulbrecht, "Zum Problem der Gattungsinterferenz in der russischen Lyrik der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts: am Beispiel ausgewählter poetischer Reisezyklen," in *Zyklusdichtung in den slavischen Literaturen: Beiträge zur Internationalen Konferenz, Magdeburg, 18.–20. März 1997*, ed. Reinhard Ibler (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2000), 545–61.

12 Esther Kinsky and Martin Chalmers, *Karadag Oktober 13: Aufzeichnungen von der kalten Krim* (Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, 2015).

13 First and foremost, Laurence Oliphant's travel reportage *Russian Shores of the Black Sea in the Autumn of 1852: With a Voyage Down the Volga, and a Tour Through the Country of the Don Cossacks,* from 1853; new edition: Laurence Oliphant, *The Russian Shores of the Black Sea and a Journey to Katmandu* (Cologne: Könemann, 1998).

14 An insightful outline of the complex situation of Crimea after 1990 and the "culture war" between Russia and Ukraine is presented in the contributions to the edited volume: Matthias Schwartz and Roman Dubasevych, eds., *Sirenen des Krieges: Diskursive und affektive Dimensionen des Ukraine-Konflikts* (Berlin: Kadmos, 2019).

sian literature"[15] as an analogy to the notion of "the Petersburg text in Russian literature."[16] In Russian literary and cultural studies, however, this model has gone "cold," to use the terminology of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Jan Assmann:[17] Theoretical aspects remained underdeveloped and, contrary to initial intentions, the Petersburg text remains something of a metatextual phenomenon, meaning that rather than tracing Petersburg as a motif in particular texts, it is instead treated as a catalogue of motifs. This also pertains to the concept of "the Crimea text in Russian literature," which is applied in diverse ways to any text that mentions Crimea in one way or another. It is for this reason, too, that we will not apply this concept and instead use the more neutral notion of "the literary Crimea topos" or "the literary model of Crimea."

Liusyi's book is indeed an interesting read, but it is not very sophisticated in terms of theory. In the introduction, he attempts to elucidate his concept of the Crimean metatext by tracing the symbols of Ancient Tauris that appear in Russian poetry. In the analyses of individual works, however, he does not highlight metatextual symbols but specific Tauric motifs in Semen Bobrov, Konstantin Batiushkov, and Aleksandr Pushkin, among others. Liusyi connects his largely compilation-based texts to a geopolitical stance typical of Russia today. Hence his description of Crimea after 1990 as "an alternative mode of being for Russia,"[18] while describing the poetry expressing yearning for a Russian Crimea as a "simulacrum." However, he overlooks other modes and forms of literature on Crimea, including prose literature, as well as works marked by patriotic or Orthodox traits. Indeed, a patriotic element implicitly underlies his essays, interviews, and book reviews that were then compiled into books. In 2006, the Saint

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15 The concept was used in parallel by others, but Liusyi claims to be the "founding father" of this reworking of Toporov's term. The first, abovementioned book, appeared in 2003, with a second, *Nasledie Kryma* (Heritage of Crimea), appearing in Moscow in 2007. The latter, however, is a "copy" of his first Crimea-related publication, reusing the most important and longest study word for word. The second Crimea book also features reviews, reports and interviews that were by and large reprints of previously published texts.

16 This term was introduced to literary studies in the mid-1980s by Vladimir Toporov, "Peterburg i 'Peterburgskii tekst russkoi literatury,'" in *Trudy po znakovym sistemam. Vyp. 18: Semiotika goroda i gorodskoi kultury,* ed. Aleksandr E. Maltsev (St. Petersburg: Tartuskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1984), 4–29. It describes a metatext that is positioned, or understood, between the city that is being read and its depictions in particular literary texts. Both elements (the city-as-text and texts about cities) are involved in constant exchanges and are inseparable from each other. The term has its origins in Iurii Lotman's spatial semiotics. This perspective is being superseded today by a regional perspective that Susi Frank terms "geoculturological" (Susi K. Frank, "Geokulturologie – Geopoetik: Definitions- und Abgrenzungsvorschläge," in Marszałek and Sasse, *Geopoetiken*, 19–42). What is missing from this concept, however, is the spiritual element that shapes Toporov's concept.

17 Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1999), 66–70.

18 Liusyi, *Krymskii tekst v russkoi literature*, 14. What is evident in this work is a memory-based, aesthetic take that following Renate Lachmann can be termed a "diegetic memory model." Cf. Renate Lachmann, "Kultursemiotischer Prospekt," in *Memoria: Vergessen und Erinnern*, ed. Anselm Haverkamp, Renate Lachmann, and Reinhart Herzog (Munich: Fink, 1993), xxi–xxii.

Petersburg-based Pushkin House Institute of Russian Literature of the Russian Academy of Sciences published an edited volume bearing the familiar title "The Crimea Text in Russian Culture."[19] The volume features a series of diverse essays that are neither methodologically nor theoretically coherent.

What follows here is an outline of the particular literary models depicting Crimea, taking into account, on the one hand, their entanglement with political models of Crimea and those applied in cultural history, while on the other hand stressing the models' aesthetic and literary specificities, as well as their role in Russian literature more generally. What is outlined here is not so much a set of fixed categories with strict borders but rather an open model that shows that certain texts can be aligned with several models, while some fit with no model at all. What we present here, then, is a brief overview with pointers towards the most important names or existing studies for analysing particular models.

The Classicist/Ancient Crimea Topos: Taurians in Crimea: This refers to the first literary evidence related to depictions of Crimea, with these texts linked directly to the political program of Catherine II known as "the Greek project." Her political-cultural idea was immediately reproduced in two literary models of Crimea. A true copy of it was evident in the national/nationalistic model that will be explored in the conclusion to this part of the article, while stylization of it that was more significantly inspired by Antiquity appeared in the Classicistic model of literary reflection on Crimea. The most important texts include Semen Bobrov's 1798 poem *Khersonida*, although this features a strong national tone, as well as Aleksandr Pushkin's poetry that was inspired by his three-week stay in Crimea and the elegy *Tavrida* (Tauris, 1815) by Konstantin Batiushkov.

The Romantic/Oriental Crimea Topos: Christianity vs. Islam: With increasing attention to the "Orient" and "Barbarian" or "primitive" peoples, literary interests in Crimea also shifted. The Crimean Tatars were increasingly foregrounded as a "Barbarian" people that was to be subject to missionary and civilizing efforts. The first text to illustrate the struggle between Russian Orthodoxy and Islam was Mikhail V. Lomonosov's play *Tamira i Selim* (Tamira and Selim, 1750). The best-known "Orientalistic" Crimea text, however, is Pushkin's epic poem *Bakhchisaraiskii fontan* (The Fountain of Bakhchisarai, 1824). It is also worth mentioning at this point the Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855) and his famous Crimean Sonnets (*Sonety Krymskie*, 1825–26) as a form of reaction to Pushkin. As was the case in Russian literature, poetic journeys through unknown and Romantic worlds (Crimea and later Odesa) contributed to the development of cycles of poetry in Polish.

The Intercultural Crimea Topos: Crimea as a Liminal Space between the Mainland and the Sea, and as a Site of (not only) Traumatic Memory: During the modern

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19 Nora Buks and Mariia N. Virolainen, eds., *Krymskii tekst v russkoi kulture: Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii. Sankt-Peterburg, 4.–6. sentiabria 2006 g.* (St. Petersburg: IRL RAN, 2008), http://lib.pushkinskijdom.ru/Default.aspx?tabid=8917.

period, literary-cultural reflections on Crimea shifted significantly. The region's previously fixed geopolitical (and ethnographic) contours became blurred as they were replaced by a conception of Crimea as an intercultural space positioned between two elements: the mainland (steppe) and the sea. The intercultural conception of Crimea can be ascribed to two poets: Osip Mandelstam[20] and Maksimilian Voloshin. The Poluostrov [Peninsula] Group drew on the "archaeological" conception of Crimea of the latter, as did, somewhat later, the Geopoetic Crimea Club led by Igor Sidorenko (Sid). We also consider Liudmila Ulitskaia's 1996 novel *Medeia i ee deti* (Medea and her Children) to reflect this model, as it deals with, among other themes, the Stalinist repression of Crimean Tatars.

Utopia/Anti-Utopia: Crimea as an Imaginary Space Enabling the Fulfillment of Both Private and Political Desires: In contrast to historiography, in certain literary works, Crimea developed into a realm resembling an island where both time and space dissolved. Thus, this "island" becomes a promised land that ultimately remained out of reach. In such conceptions, Crimea appears as a Garden of Eden that at the same time reveals the futility of everyday life. This is the case in perhaps the most famous text on Crimea, Anton Chekhov's short story *Dama s sobachkoi* (The Lady with the Dog, 1899). The absolute pinnacle of the image of a utopian island is Vasilii Aksenov's novel *Ostrov Krym* (The Island of Crimea, written in the 1970s and published in the USA in 1982). It imagines Crimea as an island that secured its independence in a civil war before being retaken by the Soviets at the conclusion of the novel.

The National/Nationalistic Topos: Crimea as Part of Russian National Identity: This literary conception of Crimea stems from the cultural historical myth of an "Orthodox" and "Slavic-Russian" Crimea, as outlined by Kerstin S. Jobst.[21] Its origins can be traced back to the period before the first annexation and serve to justify the incorporation of Crimea into Russia. It is applied in this "pure" form only under certain historical conditions, when the national and the patriotic are brought to the fore. Illustrations include Catherine II's correspondence with Prince Potemkin, her drawings and literary writings,[22] as well as the odes by Vasilii Petrov, Vasilii Kapnist, and others. The most famous ode, Gavrila Derzhavin's *Na priobretenie Kryma* (To the Conquest

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20 Research on Mandelstam's writings on Crimea has so far treated it as part of his reflections on Antiquity. See, for example, Oleg A. Lekmanov, ed., *Mandelshtam i antichnost* (Moscow: Mandelshtamovskoe obshchestvo, 1995). In Pavel M. Nerler and Oleg A. Lekmanov, eds., *Mandelshtamovskaia entsiklopediia: V dvuch tomach* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2017), Crimea does not feature as a keyword in the index, which instead lists the particular places where he stayed, with further references to them also included under the entry "Antiquity."

21 Jobst, *Die Perle des Imperiums*, 289–311.

22 For example, the drama *Nachalnoe upravlenie Olega* [Oleg's First Government] merged the objectives of the "Greek Project" with the myth of Crimea as the cradle of Russian Orthodoxy. For more on the content of this play, see Andrei Zorin, "Krym v istorii russkogo samosoznaniia," *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie* 31 (1998): 133.

of Crimea, 1783), offers a digest of Catherine II's Greek Project.[23] Leo Tolstoy created a monument to Russian patriotism in his *Sevastopolskie rasskazy* (Sevastopol Sketches, 1855), which also include a powerful criticism of the failures of the Tsarist system and its responsibility for the deaths of thousands of soldiers and civilians. The phenomenon of the collective defense of Sevastopol[24] was appropriated by Marxist-leaning literature, as demonstrated by Sergei Sergeev-Tsenskii's epic *Sevastopolskaia strada* (The Ordeal of Sevastopol, 1937–39). The propaganda literature produced around the time of the second annexation of Crimea corresponds to this model. Some examples include Elena Iablonskaia's *Krym kak predchuvstvie* (Crimea as an Augury, 2017) and poetry on "Russian Crimea."[25] This model also covers anti-Ukrainian and anti-Tatar poetry, as well as texts of an Orthodox bent that call for a new Empire under Vladimir Putin or those that celebrate the annexation (such as Viacheslav Egiazarov, Sergei Ovcharenko, or Olga Golubeva with her poem "I skazala Rossiia − Svoikh ne brosaem").[26] The pinnacle of propaganda poetry is Petr Savelev's 2015 *Oda Vladimiru Vladimirovichu Putinu na vziatie Kryma* (An Ode to Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin on the Conquest of Crimea),[27] a text that also references the war in Eastern Ukraine, a conflict Savelev claims was started by the Ukrainians. Putin is depicted as a savior who drives out all "enemies" and whose new kingdom is awe-inspiring. An enemy that had supposedly threatened the entire world is disarmed. Yet it is not clear what is meant by this: Is the enemy Ukraine, Europe, or indeed all those who are critical of Russia's policies? The explicit aggression expressed in this text goes beyond even the official Kremlin propaganda, demonstrating that just as in previous historical eras, Russia's rulers are abusing literature to political ends.[28]

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23 While Liusyi emphasizes the repertoire of Antique figures (Catherine as Minerva, the god of war Mars, Circe and Homer), thus depoliticizing those texts (cf. Liusyi, *Krymskii tekst v russkoi literature*, 27), other researchers have stressed the political aspects of these odes—such as Zorin, "Krym v istorii russkogo samosoznaniia," 126, and Ulrike Jekutsch, "The Annexation of Crimea in Russian Literature of the 18th and the 21th Centuries," *Rocznik Komparatystyczny – Comparative Yearbook* 6 (2015): 255.
24 While Sevastopol became a model of Russian literary patriotism, Odesa was more typical of a hybrid Russian-Ukrainian culture that, together with the highly prominent Jewish element, was also reflected in Russian literature. Odesa constitutes a literary topos that differs greatly from Sevastopol; it provided the foundation for diverse literary motifs and styles, particularly in the first three decades of the twentieth century. The city as such was less significant than the fact that it became a location where many Russian literary figures gathered.
25 Many works of poetry can be found online while numerous anthologies were also published. This article draws on V. I. Kalugin, ed., *Krym v russkoi poezii i iskusstve: Antologiia* (Moscow: Veche, 2014).
26 Kalugin, 627. [And Russia Said: We will not abandon our people].
27 Petr Savelev "Oda Vladimiru Vladimirovichu Putinu na vziatie Kryma," accessed July 2, 2024, https://www.stihi.ru/2015/09/24/6155.
28 This section on literature on Crimea is based on the chapter: Helena Ulbrechtová, "Krym v ruské literatuře," in *Poloostrov Krym: od křižovatky kultur k ruské kolonii (Řecko – Řím – Byzanc – Osmanská říše – Krymský chanát – Ruské impérium – Sovětský svaz – Ukrajina – Ruská federace)*, ed. Helena Ulbrechtová and Radomír Vlček (Prague: Slovanský ústav AV ČR, v .v. i., 2022), 157–255.

3 Russian Literature about the Caucasus

While it is the peaceful, diplomatic incorporation of Crimea that is emphasized in relation to that region, the Caucasus are usually associated with battles and military conquest.[29]

Russian literary models of the Caucasus have been studied extensively, particularly as far as nineteenth-century Romantic literature is concerned. Seminal studies include the monographs by Susan Layton[30] and Harsha Rams,[31] while Susi Frank's article on the Caucasus as a site of double imprisonment is also particularly insightful.[32] The Caucasus has always been treated as an integral whole, and not only in politics or in Soviet-type studies.[33] This was also the case in literature that applied notions of foreignness to the entire region, treating it as a borderland between Europe and Asia.[34] The Caucasus often served as a means of giving expression to Romantic desires for (political and private) freedom that ultimately proved illusory. Drawing on other studies on the Caucasus, Frank defines the region through a cultural semiotic lens as a periphery and border where the familiar and the other encounter each other, while examining it through the lens of aesthetics and poetics reveals the Caucasus to be an object and site of projection for Russian Romanticism. The political and imperial often went hand-in-hand with the cultural and aesthetic.[35]

The authors of the 2018 monograph *Landna(h)me Georgien* (Naming and Claiming Georgia) adopted a different approach. They did not perpetuate colonial and Orientalistic discourses because they also listened for the voices of "the Other," while also developing a polyphonic, rather than centripetal, depiction of the Caucasus. This is why

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29 In contrast to Crimea, the Caucasus has been read through the lens of postcolonial studies, albeit to a very limited extent. Cf. Alfred Sproede and Mirja Lecke, "Der Weg der postcolonial studies nach und in Osteuropa: Polen, Litauen, Russland," in *Überbringen – Überformen – Überblenden: Theorietransfer im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Dietlind Hüchtker and Alfrun Kliems (Cologne: Böhlau, 2011), 28.

30 Susan Layton, *Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

31 Harsha Ram, *The Imperial Sublime: A Russian Poetics of Empire* (Madison: UW Press, 2003), and also "Masks of the Poets, Myths of the People: The Performance of Individuality and Nationhood in Georgian and Russian Modernism," *Slavic Review* 67, no. 3 (2008): 567–90.

32 Susi K. Frank, "Gefangen in der russischen Kultur: Zur Spezifik der Aneignung des Kaukasus in der russischen Kultur," *Die Welt der Slaven* XLIII (1998): 61–84.

33 The authors of the monograph *Landna(h)me Georgien: Studien zur kulturellen Semantik* (Berlin: Kadmos, 2018), Zaal Andronikashvili, Emzar Jgerenaia, and Franziska Thun-Hohenstein, attempted to diversify the Caucasus, seeking first and foremost to draw attention to its various regions together with their literary and cultural semanticizations. They focused in particular on Georgia and, to some degree, Abkhazia.

34 It was the conquest of this border that, according to Aleksandr Bestuzhev-Marlinskii in the novel *Kavkazskaia stena* (Caucasus Wall), marked the birth of the Russian Empire, which could then offer protection against Islam. Cf. Andronikashvili, Jgeneraia, and Thun-Hohenstein, *Landna(h)me Georgien*, 145–46.

35 Frank, "Gefangen in der russischen Kultur," 61.

they focused on space and its contextualizations, with the concept of cultural semantics proving particularly suited to this approach that made cultural phenomena such as place and space central. Their study explored the shifting symbolic meanings and semiotic loads attached to the area. Drawing on other works, Andronikashvili developed the semantic concept of the literary space of the Caucasus as a "non-place" or an "atopos." He also incorporated the theoretical frameworks of Mikhail Bakhtin and Carl Schmitt, as he termed the region a ChroNomotopos.[36]

The authors of the monograph *Sonniges Georgien*[37] (Sunny Georgia) focused primarily on the process of the historical legitimization of the annexation of Georgia by the Russian Empire. Literary examples are largely limited to Georgian literature, although there are also cases highlighting translation practices from Georgian into Russian, as well as Soviet cultural policy. A separate theme is the image of Stalin in Georgian literature. The authors' central analytical concept is *Figuren des Imperialen*, or "figurations of the imperial," and their translations in the national context. These figurations were often instrumentalized according to the formalistic concepts of form and content (and later according to Stalin's reappropriation of them). The study reveals the unequal relationship between the Empire and Georgia, with the latter nevertheless acquiring a specific position in the Soviet family of nations.

The literary myth of the Caucasus, as marked by the ambivalent attributes of freedom and colonization, has its origins in Russian Romanticism.[38] Tolstoy's texts on the Caucasus shattered any illusions.[39] While he saw the defense of Sevastopol of 1854/55 as the moment a new myth was born, his short stories "Rubka lesa" ("The Wood-Felling") and "Hadzhi Murat" were the nail in the coffin of the classicist-colonial Caucasus myth. Of course, it did not disappear entirely, as it was revived in the Soviet mythology of new men and socialist development.

In Russian Modernism, it was the Eurasian space that came into focus,[40] although an interest in the Caucasus remained in place. The genre of "travel literature," be it in the form of prose or poetry, acquired new forms. The lyrical subject of the period sought to combine impressions from travels or expressive takes on them with a social

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36 Frank, 36. Andronikashvili proposed this concept in 2012 already. Zaal Andronikashvili, "Der Kaukasus als Grenzraum: Ein *atopos* russischer Literatur," in *Topographien pluraler Kulturen*, 47–48. Transferring the relationship between order and orientation (*Ordnung* and *Ortung*) to time and space (Mikhail Bakhtin) gives rise to the "contaminated" form of ChroNomotopos. Andronikashvili also defines it as the "united of space, time, and the law"; Andronikashvili, Jgeneraia, and Thun-Hohenstein, *Landna(h)me Georgien*, 133.

37 Giorgi Maisuradze and Franziska Thun-Hohenstein, *Sonniges Georgien: Figuren des Nationalen im Sowjetimperium* (Berlin: Kadmos, 2015).

38 The best-known texts are Aleksandr Pushkin: *Kavkazskii plennik: Povest* (1820–21), *Puteshestvie v Arzrum vo vremia pokhoda 1829 goda* (First edition 1836), *Stikhi, sochinennye vo vremia puteshestviia (1829)* (1836); Mikhail Lermontov: *Mtsyri* (1839; first edition 1840); Aleksandr Bestuzhev-Marlinskii: *Kavkazskie povesti/ocherki* (1820–30).

39 Lev Tolstoi: *Nabeg* (1853), *Rubka lesa* (1853–1855), *Kazaki* (1852–63), *Hadzhi Murat* (1896–1904).

40 Cf. Felix Philipp Ingold, *Russische Wege: Geschichte – Kultur – Weltbild* (Munich: Fink, 2007), 322.

message. This was the case, for example, with Andrei Belyi and his travel prose on Georgia and Armenia, which he combined during the late Symbolist period with efforts to include a degree of politicization. Belyi, like Mandelstam, sought to get closer to "the Other." Their efforts to understand "the Other" differentiated them from the Romantic poets.[41]

The original Romantic literary reflections on the Caucasus, whose thrust was towards producing images of alien others, shifted significantly during the course of the socialist period, particularly during the interwar years. The "Other" was Sovietized and dissolved in a supposed multiculturalism. The Caucasus Republics were subject to Soviet imperial projects in the 1930s that adopted the forms of Socialist Realism and Futurism. Beyond poems, there were travel reportage and production novels[42] as well as texts that could be classified as Socialist Romanticism (for example, Konstantin Paustovskii: *Kolkhida* [*Colchis*], 1934). This situation persisted in various forms long into the twentieth century.

A bigger shift began in the 1970s, with writers of Caucasus origins writing in Russian.[43] Such literature, which served the postcolonial role of "the Other," made a significant contribution to the destruction of Socialist Realism. To draw on Spröde and Lecke's argument, these texts on the one hand presented postcolonial knowledge of the colonized regions,[44] while on the other hand developing a subversive force against Soviet centralism.[45] The more or less implicit critique was directed primarily against the destruction of ethnic particularities and the national cultures of non-Russian peoples. Many of the non-Russian literary texts played an important role in perestroika under Mikhail Gorbachev. Perestroika literature could nevertheless also adopt imperial-colonial forms (regardless of certain critical points), as is the case with the Siberian author Viktor Astafiev's *Lovlia peskarei v Gruzii* (The Catching of Gudgeons in Georgia, 1986). The novel's depiction of an encounter between two Soviet writers—the narrator and his Georgian former friend Otar—turns out to be an embodiment of Russian cul-

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41 Andrei Belyi: *Veter s Kavkaza*, *Armeniia* (1928); Osip Mandelshtam: *Puteshestvie v Armeniiu* (written between 1931 and 1932, published 1933), the poetry cycle *Armeniia* (1931). See also Carmen Sippl, *Reisetexte der russischen Moderne: Andrej Belyj und Osip Mandelštam im Kaukasus* (Munich: Otto Sagner, 1997); Christa Ebert, "Man muss sehen können: Andrej Belyjs Reisetexte 'Der Wind vom Kaukasus' und 'Armenien' als ästhetische Lektion," in *Flüchtige Blicke: Relektüren russischer Reisetexte des 20. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Wolfgang Stephan Kissel and Christine Gölz (Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2009), 181–206.

42 Zinaida Rikhter: *Kavkaz nashikh dnei* (1923–24, as a book 1924), *V solnechnoi Abkhazii i Khevsuretii* (1930); Marietta Shaginian: *Sovetskaia Armeniia* (1923), *Gidrotsentral* (1931); Nikolai Tikhonov: das Poem *Doroga* (written 1924, published 1927).

43 The best-known representative of Caucasus literature is Fazil Iskander with his prose cycle *Sandro iz Chegema* (*Sandro of Chegem*, 1973–89).

44 Spröde and Lecke, "Der Weg der postcolonial studies," 30.

45 This also applies generally to Russian-language literature from the Central Asian republics of the USSR.

ture's mission in Georgia.[46] The unequivocally negative coding of the Romantic Caucasus topos as a site of refuge in Astafiev's novel is something that Thun-Hohenstein has also commented upon.[47]

The Caucasus, like Crimea, was a location of political exile that was often framed as a promised land. The place of exile was thus presented as a desired site of escape or refuge. This applies to a more significant extent to the individual countries, particularly Georgia and Armenia, than to the Caucasus as such. The development of artistic friendships, the sense of finding inspiration to write poetry or indeed the "rebirth" of a poet (as was the case with Osip Mandelstam in Armenia) could all be attributed to this model of the Caucasus. The forced as well as the (almost) voluntary stays in the Caucasus, beginning with Pushkin and all the way through to Mandelstam and Pasternak,[48] not only brought new experiences into Russian literature but also generated innovative texts. From the 1970s, Soviet Russian authors' memories of their encounters with the culture of the Caucasus—primarily though Georgian and Armenian culture—were increasingly the subject of literary works. It is not possible to state here the extent to which the texts mentioned below feature Orientalizing elements. The motif of Georgia as a site of refuge underwent transformation, starting in the 1970s, and it was depicted as a promised land or as the "poetic" homeland of Russian poets.[49] A nostalgic and at the same time politically explosive approach was adopted by the writer and émigré Andrei Bitov. He, too, presents Georgia as a site of refuge and salvation, particularly in his travel sketches *Gruzinskii albom* (Georgian Album, written in the 1970s and first published in Tbilisi in 1985, followed by various subsequent editions). In his late-period essays, he described Georgia as the "internal abroad," while his position between approving and opposing the "Empire" meant that he drew not only on Pushkin but also, albeit polemically, on Joseph Brodsky's explicitly anti-imperial discourse. Despite all the contradictions, Georgia did indeed become a second homeland to Bitov, while he "merely" discovered Armenia.[50]

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46 On the content of the novel and its critique of Georgia, cf. Ulbrechtová, "Die Fluidität in der russischen Kultur," 240–41.

47 Andronikashvili, Jgeneraia, and Thun-Hohenstein, *Landna(h)me Georgien*, 409.

48 The volume of poetry *Vtoroe rozhdenie* (1932), with more on the subject in Andronikashvili, Jgeneraia, and Thun-Hohenstein, *Landna(h)me Georgien*, 299–302; Zaal Andronikashvili, "Pasternaks Reenactment der Kaukasusreise," in *Erzählte Mobilität im östlichen Europa: (Post-)Imperiale Räume zwischen Erfahrung und Imagination*, ed. Thomas Grob, Boris Previšić, and Andrea Zink (Tübingen: Francke, 2014), 245–59.

49 For example, Evgenii Evtushenko: *O Gruziia, nam slezy vytiraia, Moi Tbilissi* (1977); Bella Akhmadulina: *Sny o Gruzii* (1960), *Anne Kalandadze* (1975), and the cycle of poems *Sny o Gruzii* (2000).

50 See his travel reportage *Uroki Armenii* from 1969.

4 The Black Sea in Russian Literature

This is a rather marginal theme, as most literary historians and cultural historians agree. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to revise this view, particularly when it comes to the role of individual images of the sea within the structures of Russian literature. For now, it must suffice to outline the most important arguments in this respect with reference to selected works.

Interest in water, particularly in the form of the sea and rivers, is something that in Russian culture can be traced back almost exclusively to imperial and geopolitical concerns. Just as rivers have been treated as border markers,[51] the same applies to the sea, including the Black Sea.[52] The sea is not something that connects, with its waters providing a common body to multiple cultures and countries; rather, it is a space that divides worlds and is linked to a military strategy.[53] That Russians had little cultural or literary interest in the sea, preferring instead rivers, was something that Evgenii Markov noted in the early twentieth century in his book *Ocherki Kryma* (Sketches of Crimea).[54] Often, the Black Sea remained merely a symbol of the Russian Empire's territorial expansion, as is the case in Derzhavin's well-known poem, "Pamiatnik" ("Monument," 1795): his fame as a poet will "flow from the white to the black waters."

The Black Sea is also present in Russian literature as the embodiment of Romantic desire and as the backdrop for the sensitive poetic soul. This tradition can be traced back to Vasilii Zhukovskii (the 1822 poem "More" ["The Sea"]), reaching a peak with Pushkin and his cycle of Crimea poems, of which two directly address the Black Sea. They deal with arrival in and departure from Crimea, with both set on the deck of a ship. In the farewell poem "K moriu" ("To the Sea," 1824), the sea is associated with freedom (Pushkin employed a similar motif with reference to the Caucasus), while its dark, turbulent waves and depths are a reflection of the Romantic poetic soul. For Pushkin, the Black Sea is also a reservoir of memory, a motif that Osip Mandelstam later drew on. This Romantic tradition also found resonance in the aesthetic play evident in certain Symbolist poets, including for example Innokentii Annenskii.

Pushkin's metaphor of the Black Sea as a "free element" was also employed by the Slavophile poet Fedor Tiutchev, whose poem "Chernoe more" ("The Black Sea," 1871) praises the lifting of restrictions imposed on Russia in the wake of its defeat in the Crimean War. The sea appears again as a reflection of Russia's military and imperial might; once it was again permitted to employ its Black Sea Fleet, based in Sevastopol, in battle.[55]

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51 Ingold, *Russische Wege*, 33–34.

52 This is the case, for example, in Bestuzhev-Marlinskii (*Kavkazskaia stena*). Cf. Andronikashvili, Jgeneraia, and Thun-Hohenstein, *Landna(h)me Georgien*, 145.

53 See also Ulbrechtová, "Die Fluidität in der russischen Kultur," 234.

54 Cited in Jobst, *Die Perle des Imperiums*, 353.

55 On the geopolitical load of this text, see Liusyi, *Krymskii tekst v russkoi literature*, 133.

Osip Mandelstam contributed a special chapter to the body of works featuring sea motifs and themes, with his poems giving expression, first and foremost, to the desire for freedom and a "world culture" in the form of materialized metaphors. In several of his poems, the sea is transformed into a reservoir of memory (of ancient poetry, mythology, and culture). Mandelstam consciously adopted Pushkin's metaphors, including his use of the term "blue sea" (*sinee more*). Irina Surat is one scholar who has conducted an intertextual comparison of the two poets.[56] Mandelstam, however, viewed the Black Sea as a "one-way street" which offered no route out of Russia. Transit (in physical and mental terms) was something that he associated with the Mediterranean, a body of water that he believed offered a genuine connection to the world of Antiquity and Europe.[57]

The Black Sea as an escape route that offered no return path was a motif that was taken up by the Russian émigré and Nobel Prize winner Joseph Brodsky (1940–96). In his well-known essay "Flight from Byzantium" (1985),[58] he also mentioned the absence of the sea in Russian culture. Generally speaking, Brodsky's primary focus was on confronting Soviet imperial policy, which was something that he associated with Byzantine rule. Furthermore, Brodsky also mentions the issue of the Russo-Asiatic space that, rather than using the usual term Eurasia, he termed "Asiopa."[59]

While the Black Sea formed in the 1980s a border between worlds that, read through an imperial framework, connected two autocratic regimes across different periods, in transcultural migrant literature the sea was a place where a hybrid temporal-spatial culture emerged. One example is Mariia Rybakova's essay "Shumit Tirrenskoe more" (The Hum of the Tyrrhenian Sea, 2006). The Tyrrhenian Sea, reminiscent of the Black Sea of her childhood, develops into an image of the whole of Europe. Rybakova's deliberations on relations between Russia and Europe, and Russia and Asia, could have been inspired by Brodsky's take on the same issues.[60]

The literary images of the Black Sea (there are some that "merely" depict the sea as such, although we have assumed that they have the Black Sea in mind) oscillate between the (anti-)imperial and the Romantic, with the latter also enveloping metaphors of memory.[61] For Russian literature, however, it is the image of the Black Sea coast that typically serves as an image for the topos of the sea, thus bringing us back again to Crimea and the Caucasus. The sea is a "liminal" space that primarily serves to link the center of the empire with its "colonies" and peripheries.

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56 Irina Surat, *Mandelshtam i Pushkin* (Moscow: IMLI RAN, 2009), 240–44.

57 Cf. Ralph Dutli, *Mandelstam: Eine Biographie* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 2005), 128.

58 On his essay, see, for example, Thun-Hohenstein, "'Wo es ganz plötzlich abbricht…'," 76, 91–94.

59 See also Ulbrechtová, "Die Fluidität in der russischen Kultur," 235.

60 Cf. Ulbrechtová, 236. For more on the intercultural poetics in Rybakova's essay and the so-called "mixing places," see Eva Hausbacher, *Poetik der Migration: Transnationale Schreibweisen in der zeitgenössischen russischen Literatur* (Tübingen: Stauffenburg, 2009), 211–15.

61 Comparison with the Georgian vision of the sea, which presents it as an almost exclusively destructive element, could prove interesting.

Larissa Cybenko

Ukrainian Literature on the Black Sea

1 The Cultural Space of Ukraine and the Black Sea

Geographically, Ukraine[1] belongs to the politically and culturally heterogeneous Black Sea region: Its southern border is formed by several hundred kilometers of the northern Black Sea coast. As a political space that according to Friedrich Ratzel has a certain abstract quality,[2] during the course of history the south of Ukraine became one of the border zones between the Ukrainian and Ottoman or Tatar culture and between the Christian and Muslim faiths, a Black Sea "borderscape"[3] that not only separates the riparian states but has also resulted in several points of contact. It would be of relevance here to emphasize that over the centuries, the northern Black Sea coast formed part of the arena for the political presence and hegemonic rivalry of such states as the Roman Empire, Byzantium, the medieval Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ottoman Empire, tsarist Russia, and the totalitarian Soviet Union. On the other hand, Ukraine, which always had to fight for its national independence, had no imperial relationship with the coastal lands: it never had to struggle for access to the Black Sea and hence it never had to annex territories: As a politicogeographical space, the land settled for many centuries by the Old East Slavic and later by the Ukrainian population was connected to the Black Sea coast.[4] For this reason, the Black Sea played an important role in Ukrainian geopolitical thought as attempts were made to establish a sovereign state

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1 The name "Ukraine" was first mentioned in 1187 and originally meant, as the historian Andrii Plakhonin claims, "a military border" with Asia. In the course of time, it spread westwards and came to denote the entire country: Dmytro Shurkhalo, "Iz samoho pochatku tse buv viiskovyi kordon, i zaraz tse znachennia zberihaieia – istoryk Plakhonin pro nazvu "Ukraina"," *Radio svoboda*, February 9, 2017, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/28300421.html. It was not until the late nineteenth century that the population's self-identification as "Ukrainians," which originated in Kharkiv, spread to Lviv via Kyiv. In the course of history, the main entholinguistic and ethnonational term used was "Rusyny" ("Ruthenes," in the Habsburg tradition). To avoid ambiguity, throughout this chapter the name "Ukraine" and the term "Ukrainian" are also used for the Old East Slavic group on the territory of Ukraine before the nineteenth century.
2 Friedrich Ratzel, "Über die geographische Lage," in *Raumtheorie: Grundlagentexte aus Philosophie und Kulturwissenschaften,* ed. Jörg Dünne and Stephan Günzel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006), 390.
3 Johan Schimanski, "Border Aesthetics and Cultural Distancing in the Norwegian-Russian Borderscape," *Geopolitics* 20, no. 1 (2015): 35–55.
4 The first state structure on the territory of today's Ukraine—the Cossack state "Hetmanshchyna," which emerged in the mid-seventeenth century—bordered the Crimean Khanate. The Black Sea played a large role in the political visions of the Ukrainian Cossacks and their hetmans. As an independent republic, Ukraine had direct access to the Black Sea in the years 1917–1921, and as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet Union. It has also had direct access as a sovereign state since 1991.

from the early twentieth century onwards. Notable ideas in this context were those advanced by the founder of the cartographic orientation within Ukraine, Stepan Rudnytskyi, in his volumes published in 1910–1914,[5] and the concept of "orientation towards the Black Sea" in *Na porozi novoi Ukrainy: Hadky i mrii* (On the Threshold of the New Ukraine: Ideas and Dreams) published in 1918 by the prominent historian and first president of the Ukrainian People's Republic (1917–21) Mykhailo Hrushevskyi.[6] In these works, both thinkers place emphasis on the significance of the sea for the idea of Ukrainian statehood. These ideas were developed further by Ukrainian intellectuals in subsequent decades. Important works in this respect are Iurii Lypa's *Chornomorska doktryna* (Black Sea Doctrine)[7] of 1940 and the atlas *Chornomorskyi prostir* (The Black Sea Region), published as a manuscript by the Ukrainian Institute for Black Sea Studies in Odesa the following year[8] and written by Iurii Lypa and Lev Bykovskyi. Both publications were popular with the Ukrainian politicians and cultural figures living in exile in the 1930s and 1940s and considered the Black Sea region one of the most important for Ukrainian statehood. In all of these concepts, the maritime border of Ukraine as one of the Black Sea riparian states played an important role as a link not only economically and politically but also in a cultural context. For in contrast to the politics of the colonization of the Black Sea coast by the Great Powers, life in the southern regions of Ukraine was characterized by cohabitation with other peoples, cultures and religions, manifested not only in resistance and struggle but also in dialogue and cooperation. The Black Sea entered the cultural mind of Ukrainians as a natural border that divides and unites, evoking strong images in Ukrainian culture.[9]

These circumstances were of great importance for the mental mapping of the Black Sea region not only in its political but also in a poetic dimension, as demonstrated by the centuries-old tradition concerning the Black Sea established in Middle Ukrainian folklore and in Ukrainian literature of the early modern period and from the early nineteenth century onwards.[10] It should be noted that here the term literature is to be understood in its broader sense; in the spirit of the literary turn, the text corpus is expanded from the genres of aesthetic writing (prose and poetry) to include

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5 See Stephan Rudnyckyj, *Ukraina: Land und Volk. Eine gemeinfassliche Landeskunde* (Vienna: Verlag des Bundes zur Befreiung der Ukraina, 1916).

6 Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, *Na porozi novoi Ukrainy: Hadky i mrii* (Kyiv: Petro Barskyi u Kyievi, 1918).

7 Iurii Lypa, "Chornomorska doktryna, Vseukrainska trylohiia," in *Biblioteka ukrainoznavstva*, ed. Vasyl Iaremenko (Kyiv: VAT, 2007), 2:392.

8 Iurii Lypa and Lev Bykovskyi, *Chornomorskyi prostir: Atlas* (Odesa: Ukrainskyi Chornomorskyi Instytut, 1941).

9 Oksana Szupta-Wiazowska, "'Chornomorska doktryna': Obraz i kontsept Chornoho moria v ukrainskii kulturnii svidimosti," in *Odessa i Morze Czarne jako przestrzeń literacka*, ed. Jarosław Ławski and Natalia Maliutina (Białystok: Prymat, 2018), 305–12.

10 Regarding the history of the Ukrainian language, Michael Moser distinguishes between Old Ukrainian (988–1340) and Middle Ukrainian (1340–1798): Michael Moser, "Grundzüge einer Geschichte der ukrainischen Sprache," in *Vom Rand ins Zentrum: Perspektiven auf die Ukraine*, ed. Peter Deutschmann, Michael Moser, and Alois Woldan (Berlin: Frank & Timme, 2023), 54, 58.

other text types and cultural manifestations such as folk poetry. The study's methodological framework with respect to the specifics of the location, the history, the political processes, and the different ideas concerning identity is formed by post-imperial or post-colonial questions, the concepts of alterity and otherness, the cultural-theoretical paradigm of "similarity," and the thought model of geopoetics in contradistinction to geopolitics. These terms is well suited, as Magdalena Marszałek and Sylvia Sasse emphasize, to "analyzing and describing different correlations and interferences between literature and geography," since the "question of the role of geographical attitudes, perceptions, or materialities" is provoked in literary practice and production, "irrespective of whether these are cultural constructs or naturally given."[11] The combination of these approaches enable examination of the Ukrainian local texts on the Black Sea and on Crimea and Odesa in specific. The proposed survey of the most important texts and names is structured chronologically by historical and artistic epoch.

2 The Topos of the Black Sea and Crimea in Ukrainian Folk Poetry of the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period

Ukraine's appropriation of the Black Sea dates back over a thousand years, as also demonstrated by one of its historical names: "Ruske more" (the Sea of Rus), which was used in the era of the East Slavic empire of Kyivan Rus[12] on the territory of today's Ukraine (882–1240), as the East Slavic annals of 858 to 1485 and Arabic chronicles relate. From the fifteenth century onwards, the Black Sea coast began to be settled by the population from today's Ukrainian territory, especially the limans—the estuaries of the Dnipro, Dniester (Dnister), the Southern Buh, and the northern side of the Danube Delta—which served as places of refuge. It was here that there developed a rich Middle Ukrainian folklore in which the limans formed an entity with the Black Sea. The estuary connects the sea and the steppe, the river and the sea, is easier to appropriate and settle, and provides safety. Thus in the mid-fifteenth century the "free" people—that is, those not subject to the law—who came from other regions of today's Ukraine[13] and were later given the Tatar designation "Cossacks" began to establish themselves in

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11 Magdalena Marszałek and Sylvia Sasse, eds., *Geopoetiken: Geographische Entwürfe in den mittel- und osteuropäischen Literaturen* (Berlin: Kadmos, 2010), 9.

12 It was not until the nineteenth century that Kyiv's large medieval empire, "Rus," was termed "Kyivan Rus," mainly by Russian historians in order to distinguish it from "Moskovian Rus."

13 In 1340, the regions of the Ukrainian-speaking world were divided between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which were united in a personal union in 1386 and in a real union in 1569; cf. Moser, "Grundzüge einer Geschichte der ukrainischen Sprache," 58.

the south.[14] Linguistic history plays a considerable role here: "the language of the Cossacks," notes Michael Moser, "was mixed, but characterized above all by a compromise between various Ukrainian dialects of origin. This meant the birth of the extraordinarily homogeneous Southeastern Ukrainian dialects that were later drawn upon as the basis of the Ukrainian standard language."[15] The Cossacks were, as Andreas Kappeler also emphasizes, "communities of warriors, [...] predominantly of Ukrainian provenance."[16]

Although the social and cultural space of the northern Black Sea coast was also extremely heterogeneous in the Middle Ages, the medieval period was not marked by permanent confrontation between the difference ideas concerning identity. The researcher on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Crimean folk poetry Ivan Erofeev is of the view that there were no hostile relations between Slavs and Crimean Tatars in the first half of the fifteenth century.[17] Relations were primarily connected to trade-based communication. From the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries onwards, one of the oldest and most important sidelines for the Ukrainian population, especially in the central and eastern territories, was "chumatstvo," the transport of goods, mainly salt, from the Black Sea coast and Crimea to the north. This trade, practiced until the early nineteenth century, was undertaken not only by peasants but also by the urban population and Cossacks. The role this source of income plays in the Ukrainian memory is demonstrated by several tales and songs as well as paintings by such prominent painters as Ivan Aivazovskii, Aleksei Savrasov, Jósef Brandt, Arckyp Kuindzhi. It is striking that the Ukrainian name for the Milky Way became "Chumatskyi Shliach" (*Chumak* Way).

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14 Andreas Kappeler, *Die Kosaken* (Munich: Beck, 2013); Kerstin S. Jobst, *Geschichte der Krim: Iphigenie und Putin auf Tauris* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 137– 40. There are various interpretations of the origins of the Ukrainian Cossacks. In contrast to the position of historians in tsarist Russia and the ideologically tailored interpretation of Soviet historiographers, who connected them with settlement on the Black Sea coast and the border to the "wild steppe" by the "serfs who had fled," the hypothesis of Mykhailo Hrushevskyi seems to reflect the truth and also enjoys the support of today's Ukrainian historians: Hrushevskyi connects the emergence of the Cossack communities with the military measures of the then feudal elites and middle strata following the example of the Western European orders of knights. For both, in addition to defence, conquering new territories and material gains played a large role. The Zaporozhian Cossacks' legitimation as an "Antemurale Christianitatis" from the sixteenth century became a narrative framing the Ukrainian nation. See Stefan Rohdewald, "Vom ukrainischen 'Antemurale Christianitatis' zur politischen Nation? Geschichtsbilder der Ukraine und muslimische Krimtataren," in *Religiöse Pluralität als Faktor des Politischen in der Ukraine*, ed. Katrin Boeckh and Oleh Turij (Munich: Biblion-Media, 2015), 396 – 97.

15 Moser, "Grundzüge einer Geschichte der ukrainischen Sprache," 62; Georg Y. Shevelov, *A Historical Phonology of the Ukrainian Language* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1979), 557– 58.

16 Andreas Kappeler, "Konkurrierende Narrative der vorsowjetischen ukrainischen Geschichte," in Deutschmann, Moser, and Woldan, *Vom Rand ins Zentrum*, 14.

17 Ivan Erofeev, "Krym v malorusskoi narodnoi poezii XVI – XVII vv., preimushchestvenno v dumakh," *Izvestiia tavricheskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi komissii*, no. 43 (1908): 73 – 87, accessed May 24, 2024, https:// www.uknol.info/ru/Records/Krym_v_malorusskoj_narodnoj_poez.html.

However, after the Ottoman Empire, which had its own designs on control over the Black Sea, had conquered the northwestern coast in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, it began to subjugate Crimea: From 1478 onwards, the Crimean Khanate, which had emerged in 1441, became an Ottoman vassal state and was transformed into an area for concentrating troops for assaults on other territories, primarily Christian ones. The Ukrainian Cossacks became an important obstacle in path of the Ottomans and their subordinate Tatar invaders. As their military-political organization grew in size and developed, the Cossacks not only repelled these attacks but also led preventative campaigns themselves against the Ottoman-Tatar fortresses in the northern Black Sea region, not seldom in the form of looting raids. In this period, the Black Sea region began to play an increasingly large identity-shaping role for the bordering Ukrainian territories: as a space with a decidedly heterogeneous quality that includes several differences, mainly cultural ones such as language, religion, customs, and history, it became a space of direct confrontation of the Ukrainian Cossacks with the "Other." Of central importance here is the topos of the struggle against the Other, the conflict between Christianity and Islam, between Europe and Asia.

From the late fifteenth century onwards, military activities undertaken by the Cossacks against both Ottomans and Crimean Tatars were expressed in Middle Ukrainian folk poetry, in which a striking role is played by the particularly rich corpus of *dumy* (emotionally charged historical ballads)[18] and historical songs. Central to these texts is the subject of protection from enemies, rescue from peril, and liberation from captivity and slavery. The protagonists of this poetry, which was often recited performatively with accompaniment on the *kobza* (*bandura*), a popular string instrument in Ukraine, were the Cossacks, especially the Dnipro Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Sich, a military federation on the lower bank of the river. In the Ukrainian imagination, the phenomenon of Cossackdom was always bound up with moral and aesthetic concepts such as willpower, heroism, honor, loyalty, justice, patriotism, and self-sacrifice in the name of the homeland. Hence its tight connection to the poetic creativity of the common people was quite deliberate. The symbolic myth of the Cossacks still plays a large role in the cultural consciousness of Ukrainians to this day. The value attached to it, observes Kappeler, is evident in the Ukrainian national anthem, which stems from the nineteenth century.[19]

Some of the most frequent motifs in the Ukrainian *dumy* are a Cossack setting out to war with the magical prediction of his death, dramatic circumstances conspiring to cause his death, slavery as a result of Tatar attacks, and the dramatic fate of Cossacks in Ottoman captivity. This tradition also gave rise to a series of historical ballads from the sixteenth to the seventeenth century with the culmination of the Cossack wars against the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire. One of the first scholars to ex-

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18 The term "Duma" defining a genre of Zaporozhian Cossack epic oral poetry is first mentioned in the chronicle by S. Sarnytsky in 1506.

19 Kappeler, "Konkurrierende Narrative der vorsowjetischen ukrainischen Geschichte," 22.

amine these texts was the founder of Ukrainian folkore studies, Prince Mykola Tserteliev (Russian: Nikolai Tsertelev, also Tsereteli), the ethnographer and pedagogue of Georgian origin and a great lover of Ukrainian culture. In 1819 he published the volume *Opyt sobraniia starinnykh malorossiiskikh pesnei* (The Experience of Collecting Old Little Russian Songs),[20] which had a large influence on subsequent researchers. Tserteliev concerned himself with the theoretical problems of folklore, the specifics of the genre, and its classification; he condemned the falsifications of folkloristic and ethnographic works that appeared in the age of Romanticism. The old Ukrainian *dumy* and songs of this period were also the subject of commentaries by the next collectors of the nineteenth century, Volodymyr Antonovych and Mykola Kostomarov, and a little later Pavlo Zhytetskyi, Mykhailo Drahomanov, and others, who examined their connection to historical events.[21] They recorded over 140 variants of thirty *dumy* and a number of historical songs. They reflect the history of the Ukrainians' struggle against the Crimean Tatars and Ottomans and have a direct connection to the Black Sea.[22] Particularly renowned examples are: *Pro znyshchennia bureiu turetskoho korablia* (On the Destruction of a Turkish Ship by the Storm), *Plach nevilnykiv u turetskii katorzi* (The Lament of the Slaves in the Turkish Jail), *Vtecha triokh brativ z Azova* (The Flight of Three Brothers from Azov), *Vtecha Samiila Kishky z turetskoii nevoli* (Samiilo Kishka's Flight from Turkish Captivity), *Plach nevilnyka v turkiv pro vykup* (A Slave of the Turks' Lament for Deliverance), and *Kozak provodzhaie sester svoiikh* (A Cossack Takes Leave of his Sisters).

Middle Ukrainian *dumy* and historical songs of the sixteenth and seventeenth century contain a strong focus on Crimea, since it was from this peninsula that the regular Tatar raids on regions settled by Ukrainians in the south of the country emanated. It was also renowned for its slave markets, the largest of which, in Caffa (Crimean Tatar: Kefe; today: Feodosiia) delivered slaves to Istanbul and other parts of the Ottoman Empire—beyond the sea, then. The name "Crimea" was often avoided in the texts, however, and replaced by metaphors such as unfreedom, slavery, "Turkish," "Busurmanic"[23] forced labor, or stony, walled dungeons into which the sun never shines. Some *sujets* were particularly popular, as in the poems about Marusia Bohuslavka, for example, who became the protagonist of many ballads in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. She won the sultan's mercy in the Ottoman harem, but remained loyal to her

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20 Mykola Tserteliev, *Opyt sobraniia starinnykh malorossiiskikh pesnei* (St. Petersburg: Tip. Karla Kraia, 1819). The term "Malorossia" (Little Russia) is one of the historical names for the region of central Ukraine and the left bank of the Dnipro in the second half of the seventeenth and the eighteenth century. The term "Little Russia" was artificially spread through Ukrainian lands by Russian tsarism, although the Ukrainians themselves did not use the name as their ethnonym or to denote their territory. See Evhen Nakonechnyi, *Ukradene imia: Chomu rusyny staly ukraintsiamy* (Lviv: Lvivska naukova biblioteka NAN Ukrainy im. V. Stefanyka, 2001).

21 See Dmytro Doroshenko, *Slovianskyi svit u ioho mynulomu i suchasnomu* (Kyiv: Tempora, 2010), 518.

22 Erofeev, "Krym v malorusskoi narodnoi poezii."

23 Busurmany – an old term in Ukraine for people of a different faith, above all Muslims.

homeland and freed seven hundred captured Ukrainian Cossacks. In "Marusia Bohus-lavka," the Black Sea is interpreted as a barrier, as a boundary between two worlds—the familiar and the alien, giving rise to the symbolic, the figurative. This dichotomy pervades all texts of the old Ukrainian *dumy* and songs. It is striking that in them, the Crimean Tatars and Ottomans, who are almost always identified as such, are por-trayed as other, as alien: They are the enemies of the Ukrainian people, in league with each other, Godless people who raid and loot villages, hunt people in the vast steppe, and kill them in the most brutal fashion, defiling the corpses. Ukrainian historical po-etry contains a cycle of slave songs that stress the toughest aspect of the Tatar raids—the extermination of children. In these works, Ukraine is personified, as for instance in the historical song *Zazhurylas Ukraina* (Ukraine Mourns): "Ukraine mourns that it no longer has a place to live, small children are trampled to pieces by the Horde's horses, the bigger ones taken, driven to the khan, despairingly she stretches her arms after them."[24]

Ukrainian folklore of the sixteenth and seventeenth century offers a particularly artistic portrayal of nature, which becomes an important protagonist. This holds espe-cially for the descriptions of the vast steppe landscapes and the storms on the Black Sea, for instance in the ballads about Oleksii Popovych: On the Black Sea, all the stars in the sky have grown dark, a strong wind blows, raising the high waves that split the Cossack ships. The "Tatar horde"[25] is likened to a black cloud; the enemy war-riors are rejected even by nature: For instance, the birch by which the Tatars stop loses its green leaves. In these ballads and songs, the Black Sea becomes a permanent topos as the natural boundary between the homeland and the Other; it is often associated with galley slavery. For the treatment of the prisoners at the hands of the Tatars and the Ottomans is depicted in the old folklore as merciless. These laments create a true-to-life portrayal of the desperate plight of Christian slaves, to which several histor-ical sources also bear witness.[26] For instance, Erofeev refers to a statement by Mustafa Ağa in Warsaw in 1650 in which he stressed that the Tatars needed war.[27] The six-teenth-century *Kronika świata* (Chronicle of the World) by the Polish historiographer Marcin Belsky contains horrific details on the Tatar raids. And the nineteenth-century Crimea scholar Feokrist Khartakhai describes the Tatars' campaigns and the capture of Slavs in the same colors as the Ukrainian Medieval poetry: The captives were driven to Crimea, surrounded by a chain of riders, whipped, and branded with a hot iron.[28] The figures of the Other were, then, as the tradition of Ukrainian folklore with its medieval roots demonstrates, extremely negative. Yet the cruelty of the Cossacks during their

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24 Erofeev, "Krym v malorusskoi narodnoi poezii." Here and henceforth the original Ukrainian quota-tions are rendered into English by the author and the translator.

25 Erofeev, "Krym v malorusskoi narodnoi poezii." In these ballads, the use of the term "the horde" is thoroughly pejorative.

26 Erofeev.

27 Erofeev.

28 Erofeev.

raids on land and sea was sometimes equal to that of the Tatars and Ottomans. For instance, the abovementioned chronicle by Marcin Belsky relates that after their invasion of Crimea in 1575, the Cossacks "burnt everything and left nothing alive."[29] But this was a "widespread practice among all groups throughout the region,"[30] writes Oleksandr Maiboroda; thus, he stresses, "a more nuanced view must be taken of the references to the Crimean Tatar practice of raiding humans prevalent in Ukrainian historiography [...]."[31]

But there were also cases of compassion on both sides, especially when the defeated party had to pay a ransom. For as unpleasant as the old enemies' traits were, their positive aspects could not be ignored. In the seventeenth century, during the Ukrainian war of liberation against Poland-Lithuania, there was even a military alliance between Zaporozhian Cossacks and the Crimean Tatars.[32] Consequently, the centuries-old historical, political, and cultural process in the south of today's Ukraine, on the Black Sea coast, and in Crimea were highly ambivalent; the alterity also led to the formation of a peculiar identity that over time displayed hybrid characteristics. For example, in the early twentieth century, the thesis became widespread among Polish and Ukrainian historians that Ukraine was influenced by the Crimean Tatars. Relevant in this regard was the view expressed by Viacheslav Budzynovskyi in 1907 that Ukrainian Cossacks' adopting practices of the "Asians" had to be assessed positively: "Learning from their opponent enabled their own defense."[33] This author described "clearly long and close cohabitation with the Tatars," even if he "remained within the discourse of the time" and mentioned the "hordes of the Asians."[34]

Hence one can say that over the course of the centuries, the rich tradition of historical Ukrainian folk poetry that emerged in the heterogeneous Black Sea region from the Middle Ages onwards served as a bridge to the subsequent periods of Ukrainian literature. Even the first of the works written in today's vernacular, which laid the cornerstone for the new linguistic art in Ukraine—Ivan Kotliarevskyi's (1796–1838) *Aeneis* burlesque published in 1798—is written in the form of a Cossack epic. But this tradition also had a strong influence on the Romantic poets, the most prominent being the Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko (1814–61).

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29 Erofeev.

30 Oleksandr Maiboroda, "Istoriia ukrainsko-krymskotatarskykh vidnosyn iak skladova ukrainskoii natsionalnoi svidomisti," in Ivan Kuras et al. (eds.) *Problemy intehratsiii krymskykh repatriantiv v ukrainske suspilstvo* (Kyiv: Svotohliad, 2004), cit. Rohdewald, 410.

31 Maiboroda.

32 A striking example is the battle at Zhovti Vody in 1648, in which the Polish-Lithuanian troops were defeated by Bohdan Khmelnytskyi's Ukrainian Cossack troops and their Crimean Tatar allies.

33 Viacheslav Budzynovskyi, *Nashi hetmany* (Lviv: Nakladom avtora, 1907), 11, accessed May 25, 2024, http://irbis-nbuv.gov.ua/cgi-bin/ua/elib.exe?Z21ID=&I21DBN=UKRLIB&P21DBN=UKRLIB&S21STN= 1&S21REF=10&S21FMT=online_book&C21COM=S&S21CNR=20&S21P01=0&S21P02=0&S21P03=FF=&S21STR= ukr0001150, see also Rohdewald, "Vom ukrainischen 'Antemurale Christianitatis' zur politischen Nation?," 398–99.

34 Rohdewald, 399.

3 Topoi of the Black Sea and Crimea in Ukrainian Literature of the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries

Shortly before the Russian tsarist empire's victory over the Crimean Khanate, in which the Zaporozhian Cossacks offered great assistance, and the peninsula's subsequent incorporation "into the holdings of the Russian Empire" proclaimed by Catherine II's manifesto of April 8, 1783,[35] the Cossack federation of the Zaporozhian Sich was liquidated in accordance with her order of June 15, 1775. This event had drastic consequences for the subsequent history of Ukraine: From the late eighteenth-century onwards, the colonization of the territories of today's Ukraine began. The south of the country, including the Black Sea coast, which belonged to the "Free Land of the Zaporozhian Sich," and the territory of the Crimean Kahante and some other former regions of the Ottoman Empire were given the new official name of "Novorossiia" (New Russia). In addition to the many economic and political measures taken by the Tsarist Government, the Black Sea was to be eliminated from the cultural consciousness of the Ukrainians. Russification played a large role in this. Resistance was offered by, among other things, literature, by geopoetics as a counterpart to geopolitics. For, as Shevchenko wrote in 1839 in the poem "Do Osnovianenka" (To Osnovianenko), a melancholy depiction of the glorious Ukrainian history of the previous centuries: "Our idea, our song will not die, will not go under."[36] Here, as in many other poems and epics of the Ukrainian national poet's first period, considered to belong to Romanticism, we encounter the topos of the Black Sea and the wars of liberation fought by the Cossacks, who advanced as far as Crimea and Istanbul (Ukrainian: "Tsarhorod") to free their enslaved compatriots. Along with this poem there are the works "Dumka" (A Brief Duma) ("The river flows into the blue sea"[37]), "Ivan Pidkova" ("It was once in Ukraine, the canons roared, it was once—the Zaporozhian Cossacks had fought"[38]), and the poem "Hamaliia," in which the Cossacks' navigation of the Dardanelles to "Byzantium" is depicted. Thematically and poetologically, these verses of Shevchenko's are close to the old ballads and songs, with which he was familiar (as is well known, the poet was a friend of Tserteliev's), but they accentuate different aspects: Shevchenko portrays the Ukraine of old as a free land in contrast to the time in which he is living and writing. His poetry is about the enslavement of his homeland by Russian tsarism. The Black Sea, Shevchenko's depictions of which are particularly nuanced, and the figures of the Ukrainian Cossacks as fighters for freedom are charged with many of the symbols of the day, which remain prevalent throughout his oeuvre. For instance, since the Romantic era the

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35 Jobst, *Geschichte der Krim*, 163–69.
36 Taras Shevchenko, *Kobzar* (Kyiv: Korbush, 2008), 64.
37 Shevchenko, 14.
38 Shevchenko, 67.

Black Sea has been an important part of Ukrainians' cultural memory and is also expressed in subsequent literature. Another role is played by the maritime themes in the texts written in or about Crimea in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

As the periphery of the Russian Empire but at the same time a site of several cohabiting peoples, Crimea also began to take on a prominent position in Ukrainian literature during the nineteenth century. The peninsula, whose natural backdrop was the bordering Ukrainian steppe, receives a different connotation here than in the old folklore characterized by several traumatic cataclysms, in which even the name was avoided. Rich in nature and culture, thanks to the dry subtropical climate on its southern coast the peninsula was seen as a place that bestowed good health on the sick. It was in this period that Crimea obtained its "geopoetic" truth; It became a source of inspiration for many Ukrainian cultural and literary figures. It is also noteworthy that Ukrainian as a literary language was subjected to repression in the Russian Empire, particularly between 1876 and 1905; the intention was to drive it out of the cultural sphere. Irrespective of this situation, one can speak of the Ukrainian "local Crimea text" in this era as a semantically stable entirety of texts devoted to a geospace. Although the representation of literature on Crimea became increasingly Russocentric due to the colonial cultural policy of the tsarist empire and, later, the Soviet Union, as demonstrated by most anthologies[39] and the corresponding literary criticism, two other literary histories of Crimea should be mentioned besides the Russian Crimea topos; the Ukrainian and the Crimean Tatar, which previously received little attention. This also includes the Crimean Tatar topos in Russian and Ukrainian literature. In this context, it would be vital, however, to consider these two "local Crimea texts" for the representation of the literary landscape of the peninsula, which was always an ethnically, religious, and culturally heterogeneous entity. I refer here to the works of some authors who are representative of the Ukrainian "local Crimea text," although its systematic study remains a desideratum.

One of those who lived in Crimea and dedicated himself to the art of poetry was Stepan Rudanskyi (1834–73), who worked as the town doctor in Yalta. He wrote ballads, lyric poetry, and a drama about the life of *Chumaky* who moved to Crimea to collect salt, fish, and other goods. The play is set on the coast. But Rudanskyi also attained renown for his Ukrainian translations of Classical literature, especially Homer's *Iliad.* Another poet, publisher, and scholar of this era, Amvrosii Metlynskyi (1814–70) lived in Yalta due to his health problems. His legacy includes the collection *Dumy i pisni ta shche deshcho* (Ballads, Songs, and Other Writings). In his letters he ca1lls Crimea an oasis offering health and inspiration. A "Crimea pilgrim" was the moniker given to Mykola Kostomarov (1817–85), who walked the boundary between Russian and Ukrainian

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39 One example would be the collection *Poeticheskii atlas Krima* (Simferopol: Tavriia, 1989), which was published in Simferopol along with four other anthologies in 1989 and only contains texts by Russian poets, with the exceptions of Adam Mickiewicz's "Crimean Sonnets."

literature. The historian and poet traveled around Crimea several times. It was here that he wrote poems such as *Aglaie-Chesme*, *Do Marii Pototskii* (To Maria Pototska) —a poem touching on the themes of Pushkin's poem *Bakhchisaraiskii fontan* (The Fountain of Bakhchisarai) and Mickiewicz's sonnet *Bakhchisarai*, and the lyrical dramas *Pantikapaion* and *Iupiter svetlyi plyvet po zelenym vodam kimmeriiskim* (Russian; The Light Jupiter Sails over the Green Cimmerian Waters). After visiting Chersonesus in 1870, he wrote the historical drama *Elliny Tavridy* (Russian; Hellenes of Tauris). The late-nineteenth-century poet Iakiv Shchoholiv (1824 – 98) became renowned as an idiosyncratic landscape poet who devoted many of his works to the southern Crimean coast. He called Crimea "a magical land," a "green paradise on the endless sea."[40] Somewhat dissonant is the mention of the pale, sickly-looking passerby on the promenade in Yalta, the petals of whose life mercilessly fade into this blossoming land. A special place in Crimea's literary landscape is occupied by Liudmyla Vasylevska (Dniprova Chaika) (1861 – 1927), a poet who has been called the first female Marinist of Ukrainian literature. Her symbolist prose poems *Morski maliunky* (Pictures of the Sea), written in Crimea, were highly regarded by Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi, Serhii Iefremov, and Maxim Gorki.

One of the most striking characteristics of the work of Ukrainian writers and poets of the age who wrote about or in Crimea is their acceptance of the peninsula's old local population, the Crimean Tatars—in stark contrast to the poetic intentions of the classical Russian authors, such "troubadours of the empire" (to cite Ewa M. Thompson)[41] as Aleksandr Pushkin, Leo Tolstoy, Maxim Gorki, and others. Over the centuries, as imperial claims to power in Crimea changed radically and both peoples—the Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars—were oppressed by Russian tsarism, relations between them underwent a clear evolution. Drawing on the cultural-theoretical paradigm of "similarity,"[42] juxtaposed with the dichotomy of "Self"/"Other," we can trace an analogous initial situation with respect to the sociohistorical circumstances of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in the context of the Russian Empire from the late eighteenth century onwards. In the new historicopolitical situation, the Ukrainian authors had different principal intentions to those encountered in medieval Ukrainian folk poetry: Their work was shaped by a keen interest in the way of life, customs, history, and culture of the Crimean Tatars. For instance, in the works of the most prominent authors of Ukrainian Modernism that have entered the literary canon, the prose of Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi and the poetry of Lesia Ukrainka, we can trace the parallels between the Cri-

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40 Cit. Svitlana Kocherha, *Pivdennyi bereh Krymu v zhytti i tvorchosti ukrainskykh pysmennykiv 19.– poch. 20-ho stolittia* (Yalta: RIO KHU, 2011), accessed May 27, 2024, https://www.vesna.org.ua/txt/kocher gas/metod.html.

41 Ewa M. Thompson, *Imperial Knowledge: Russian Literature and Colonialism* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2000).

42 Anil Bhatti and Dorothee Kimmich, eds., *Ähnlichkeit: Ein kulturtheoretisches Paradigma* (Konstanz: Konstanz University Press, 2015), 7– 34.

mean Tatars' social and political situation and that of the Ukrainians in the tsarist empire.

A striking example in this respect is Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi's (1864–1913) Crimean cycle consisting of four longer narratives. In 1892, he started working in Odesa, in the phylloxera commission; three years later, he went to Crimea as an inspector. The peninsula made an unforgettable impression on the writer. Kotsiubynskyi worked in the Simeiz region and in the Alushta Valley. During subsequent stays in Crimea he visited Alupka, Sevastopol, and Bakhchisarai. While fulfilling his occupational tasks, he observed what for him was the unusual lifestyle of the Crimean Tatars, taking an active interest in their culture. The result was three novellas written between 1899 and 1904: *V putakh shaitana* (In the Chains of the Shaitan), dealing with the modernization of Crimean Tatar society in conflict with the patriarchal tradition; *Na kameni* (On the Rock), a tragic story of "forbidden love" between a married Tatar woman and a young shipwrecked Turk that becomes a metaphor of protest against unmoving tradition; and *Pid minaretamy* (Under the Minarets), in which the author opposes the fanaticism and obscurantism of the age. The generational conflict is portrayed on the cultural level. Scholarship has emphasized that the "literary reflection of the Crimean Tatar reform and nationalist movement in the Russian Empire by the Ukrainian author Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi [...] can also be understood in the context of Ukrainian and Russian literature and their tendencies toward popular enlightenment in the second half of the nineteenth century."[43]

A somewhat different thematic orientation is demonstrated by the fourth narrative in Kotsiubynskyi's Crimea cycle: *U hrishnyi svit* (Into the Sinful World), about a convent in a gorge in the majestic Crimean Forest, whence four novices are banished. The work depicts the dissonance between Orthodox asceticism, the nuns' lack of morality, the perfection of nature, and the fullness of a free life. The banished recognize the harmony of the colors and sounds of the Crimean morning forest, the panorama of the sea, and the Alushta Valley: "The distant sea opened its wide arms to the green earth and fluttered joyfully, like the lively blue of the sky [...]. And all this wonderful land floated somewhere in the sea of warm light in a vast, borderless space."[44] Along with the new, "exotic," but also ethnically and socially engaged content, Kotsiubynskyi's Crimea texts are fascinating due to the richness of the Ukrainian language and their depiction of their setting: With the play of colors, the Impressionist Kotsiubynskyi lends depth to the psychological traits of the characters and attempts to fill all the elements of the plot with meaning.

Sojourns on the Black Sea and especially in Crimea also left a profound mark on the works of Lesia Ukrainka (Larysa Kosach-Kvitka, 1871–1913), the central figure of Ukrainian Modernism. Due to severe illness (the poet suffered from tuberculosis)

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43 Helena Ulbrechtová, Siegfried Ulbrecht, Kerstin Susanne Jobst et al., *Die Halbinsel Krim in Geschichte, Literatur und Medien* (Prague: Czech Academy of Sciences, Slovanský ústav, 2017), 11.
44 Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi, "U hrishnyi svit," in Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi, *Tvory v 6 tomakh* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo akademii nauk Ukrainy, 1961), 2:158.

she spent almost a thousand days and nights in the peninsula, three of the forty-two years fate granted her. For her, the Black Sea and Crimea became not only a place of healing but also a source of vitality and inspiration. The principal motifs in her poetry in this period were the sun, the sea, inner peace, and hope. Lesia Ukrainka wrote her first poem about the peninsula and the beauty of the sea in 1890 in Ievpatoriia—"Tysha morska" (The Silence of the Sea) in the cycle *Krymski spohady* (Memories of Crimea), in which she called Crimea "the land of light and the golden blue."[45] But her Crimea poems also contain motifs of estrangement, loneliness, nostalgia, the disharmony between the wonderful landscape and the feeling of being a "captive," as her letters from this time testify.[46] She wrote in a letter to her mother of October 1897, for instance: "Although this land is despised by people, it is not Godforsaken, if only it were not so alien…"[47] She increasingly complained about her "lonely life," as in a letter from Yalta to her cousin Ariadna Drahomanova in April 1898: "I have now been in Crimea for 10 months, for 7 of them I have lived completely alone—that is not little!"[48] This psychic state also influenced the motifs in her poetry. Here, in Crimea, Lesia Ukrainka discovered "mythic Tauris" and turned to it in her works. In 1898 she wrote a dramatic scene, "Ifigeniia v Tavrydi" (Iphigenie in Tauris), part of the cycle *Krimski vidhuky* (Sounds of Crimea). As she mentioned in a letter to her mother,[49] it was not intended for performing on stage; the work consists of a dialogue between a choir of Tauric girls and a long monologue by the protagonist composed of Homeric epithets which is also the author's internal monologue. The principal motif is yearning for her homeland: In Iphigenia's heart only her beloved Hellas remains; here, in this beautiful, majestic land she wanders like a sad, faded, powerless shadow.[50] As a poet of Modernism, Lesia Ukrainka creates a subjective, non-traditional image of Iphigenia, if we think of Euripides and Goethe. In her letters she also compares her psychic state with that of Agamemnon's daughter. The poet's personal circumstances had a large influence on her perception of Crimea as an alien world. But her work was also shaped by her turning to the Classical legacy as a whole that is particularly discernible in Crimea. For instance, in Yalta in 1907 Lesia Ukrainka completed one of her most important works, the dramatic poem *Cassandra*, the "tragedy of the truth" she had begun in San Remo in 1903. It was in Yalta that she would also write the five-act play *Rufin i Pristsilla* (Rufin and Priscilla,1907/8), dedicated to early Christianity in ancient Rome.

A particularly noteworthy aspect is Lesia Ukrainka's interest in the culture and fate to the Crimean Tatars, to whom her poetic works are devoted. Similarly to Kotsiu-

45 Lesia Ukrainka, "Tysha morska," in Lesia Ukrainka, *Zibrannia tvoriv u 12 tomakh* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1975), 1:99.

46 See Lesia Ukrainka, *Lysty*, vol. 1, *1876–1897*, vol. 2, *1898–1902* (Kyiv: Komora, 2016–17).

47 Lesia Ukrainka, "Lyst do Kosach O. P., 1.10.1897," in *Lysty*, 1:461.

48 Lesia Ukrainka, "Lyst do Drahomanovoi A. M., 27.03.(8.04.) 1898," in *Lysty*, 2:40.

49 Lesia Ukrainka, "Lyst do Kosach O. P., 21.01.1898," in *Lysty*, 2:17.

50 Lesia Ukrainka, "Ifiheniia v Tavrydi," in Lesia Ukrainka, *Tvory v desiaty tomakh* (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1964), 5:7.

bynskyi, Ukrainka sees their social position in the tsarist empire from the colonial perspective: The Crimean Tatars are an oppressed people that has to assimilate. The imperial regime seeks to homogenize the territory settled by this people for centuries—that is, to appropriate it without the "alien" culture, tradition, religion, or language. In this regard, the themes and moods in Lesia Ukrainka's Crimean poetry display several parallels to the circumstances of the Ukrainians in the tsarist empire. During her very first stay in Crimea in 1891, in Ievpatoriia, Lesia Ukrainka wrote the poem "Nehoda" (Storm), in which she compares Crimea—"this splendid, God-blessed land"[51]—with a shipwreck and laments that the people there are ruled by foreigners and live the lives of slaves. Crimea appears to Lesia Ukrainka in the figure of a dying wild horse from the steppe already surrounded by a flock of predatory birds. The poet dreamt that the sea, awakened by the people's anger, would liberate the unhappy land from imprisonment. She was convinced that Crimea was a Tatar land, and was fascinated by the Crimean Tatar culture, as demonstrated by her emotional poem "Tatarochka" (A Tatar Girl), describing a young Crimean Tatar girl in national costume. The poem conveys warm feelings on the part of the poet, admiration for the beauty of a girl who still lives freely, and fascination with her national costume.[52] In Crimea, Lesia Ukrainka was interested in the Crimean Tatars' language, folklore, and applied art. She collected their national embroidery and considered them similar to the Ukrainian – pointing to the hybridity of the popular culture of two peoples living in close contact for several centuries. In a letter to Mykhailo Drahomanov, she wrote that she wanted to publish the Tatar patterns she had collected in Crimea.[53] During her life in Crimea, Lesia Ukrainka's interest in Islam also intensified. In 1907 she wrote a poetic dialogue, "Aisha ta Mohamed" (Aisha and Mohammed), describing Mohammed's love for his deceased wife Khadidzha (Crimean Tatar: Hatice), to whom he was married for twenty-four years. After marrying the young Aisha, he recognizes that his love for the deceased was something eternal that lives on, hears his words and thoughts, and speaks to him with a secret voice.

Like her renowned poetic predecessors Pushkin, Mickiewicz, and others, Lesia Ukrainka visited Bakhchisarai, with whose beauty she was enthused. Like them, she also wrote a series of sonnets about the old Crimean Tatar capital, expressing her admiration for the former seat of the khans. In "Bakhchysarai"[54] and the other two sonnets, "Bakhchysaraiska hrobnytsia" (The Bakhchysarai Crypt) and "Bakhchysaraiskyi dvorets" (The Palace of Bakhchisarai), Lesia Ukrainka corresponds with the other poets in turning to the topic of the fountain of Bakhchisarai. Hers is a different emphasis, however: It is not the beauty of the harem, the sad Maria, and the passionate Zarema

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51 Lesia Ukrainka, "Nehoda," in Lesia Ukrainka, *Zibrannia tvoriv u 12 tomakh*, 1:104.

52 Lesia Ukrainka, "Tatarochka," in Lesia Ukrainka, *Zibrannia tvoriv u 12 tomakh*, 1:106.

53 Lesia Ukrainka, "Lyst do Drahomanova M.P.,22.08.1891," in *Lysty*, 1:157.

54 Lesia Ukrainka, "Bakhchysarai," in Lesia Ukrainka, *Zibrannia tvoriv u 12 tomakh* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1975), 1:107.

that lie here, but "even the glory of Bakhchysarai!"[55] The poem "Bakhchysaraiskyi dvorets" (The Palace of Bakhchysarai) is full of reminiscences about the history of the Crimean Tatars and reflections on their present lack of freedom: As the final strophe observes, while power and slavery once dominated here, the power has disappeared, everything lies in ruins, but slavery still prevails.[56]

Another Crimean work by Lesia Ukrainka can be considered in this context: the story "Nad morem" (By the Sea), which can be seen as one of the series of texts constructing the southern coast of Crimea, especially Yalta, as a seaside holiday destination. Here, the summer guests, particularly those from the central territories of the Russian Empire, are described as alien. Their boredom, the emptiness of their interests and the transience of their artificial feelings of love are juxtaposed with the imposing beauty of the cliff coastline and the majestic sea as media of eternity and vastness. Her narrative is thus reminiscent of Anton Chekhov's renowned novella *Dama s sobachkoi* (*The Lady with the Lapdog*). Lesia Ukrainka's final visit to Yalta was in 1908. She would later refer to Crimea as the cradle of her creativity, a role the peninsula later also played for the next generation of Ukrainian Modernist poets such as Oleksandr Oles and Pavlo Tychyna, but in particular for the neo-Classicists Mykola Zerov and Maksym Rylskyi and the poets of the 1960s, one of the most prominent of whom was Mykola Vinhranivskyi. The aura of antiquity peculiar to Crimea, the intoxicating nature, and the feeling of freedom suggested by the sea's expansive horizon was experienced and reflected with a sense of immediacy by the Ukrainian lyric poets of the twentieth century.

One of the most illustrative examples of the constant presence of the topos of the Black Sea and Crimea in Ukrainian literature is the novel *Liudolovy* (People Hunters) by Zinaida Tulub (1890–1964). Appearing in two volumes between 1934 and 1937, it is considered one of the best examples of Ukrainian historical-psychological prose of the twentieth century. The author, born into a Kyiv aristocratic family with roots in Crimea, was a historian by training. She began writing in the 1920s, during the policy of "rooting" (*korenizatsiia*) and the "Ukrainian Cultural Renaissance." Because her biography did not correspond to proletarian values, she was forced to spend the time from 1937 and 1957 in Soviet gulags. In her childhood, Tulub often stayed in Crimea; she was familiar with the Iphigenia Cliff, Simeiz, Feodosiia, Koktebel, and other places. Her greatest success—the novel *Liudolovy*, which won an award in Paris in 1937—depicts the plight of the Ukrainian people in the days of the Crimean Tatar and Ottoman raids as well as the attacks on the country by the Polish aristocratic invaders in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The idea behind this epic work was to create a literary biography of the Cossack hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi, which then gave rise to a broad panorama of life in Ukraine and in Crimea. Due to her enthusiasm for ethnog-

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55 Lesia Ukrainka, "Bakhchysaraiska hrobnytsia," in Lesia Ukrainka, *Zibrannia tvoriv u 12 tomakh*, 1:108.

56 Lesia Ukrainka, "Bakhchysaraiskyi dvorets," in Lesia Ukrainka, *Zibrannia tvoriv u 12 tomakh*, 1:107.

raphy, the author had a good knowledge of Ukrainian folklore; old legends, historical ballads, and songs became one of the sources for the novel, with Crimea as one of the main settings. The text is also particularly revealing with respect to Ukrainian—Tatar relations and attributions of the Self and the Other. In terms of equality, peculiarity, and similarity, Tulub creates several convincing portrayals of the Western and Eastern cultural worlds and the bridges of historical understanding. Notably, she does not idealize Ukrainian Cossacks; their campaigns to Crimea, especially Caffa, are just as merciless and cruel as the Tatar raids on Ukrainian land. The writer adopts the humanist stance that there is no such thing as a "just" or an "unjust" war. A great deal of attention is paid to the ethnic phenomenon of the Crimean Tatars; the author distinguished between the Nogai hordes of the steppe[57] and the sedentary Tatars on the peninsula's southern coast, who for centuries were subjected to the influence of the Greek and Italian culture in Crimea. She thereby avoids creating hostile stereotypes. Of particular aesthetic value are the novel's description of the steppe,[58] the natural world of the Black Sea coast,[59] and Crimea as the lifeworld of the Crimean Tatars.[60]

One of the more recent literary publications in Ukraine on the subject of Crimean and the complicated mix of cultures in the peninsula is Anastasiia Levkova's *Za Perekopom ie zemlia: Krymskyi roman* (There Is an Earth beyond Perekop: A Crimean Novel, 2023), which can be categorized within the genre of autosociobiography combining individual biography with social analysis. The work deals with the complicated path to emancipation taken by the protagonist, who perceives herself as an ethnic Russian and whose male forebears were active collaborators in the Soviet regime, in forming her own personal identity, something that became possible due to her turning to the Ukrainian language in close intertwinement with the language and culture of the Crimean Tatars. The story develops against the panorama of the traumatic epochal upheavals in Crimea from the late 1980s to the present day. Anastasiia Levkova's novel, writes Alim Aliiev in the blurb, is a "Crimean travel guide," but not of the glossy tourist kind: It is a portrayal of the complicated world of human relationships that have emerged in recent decades between Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians, and Russians in the peninsula, a demonstration of how the political turbulence has been reflected in the everyday lives of the local people.[61]

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57 Jobst, *Geschichte der Krim*, 133 – 34.

58 Zinaida Tulub, *Liudolovy* (Simferopol: Tavria, 1980), 1:15, 32, 47, 81, 100, 110, 230.

59 Tulub, 1:115, 130, 154, 158, 160, 173, 175, 190, 193, 196, 202, 216, 259; 2: 9, 56, 58, 68, 84, 85, 99, 102.

60 Tulub, 1:158, 172, 176, 236; 2:2, 3, 15, 36.

61 Alim Aliiev, in Anastasiia Levkova, *Za Perekopom ie zemlia: Krymskyi roman* (Kyiv: Laboratoriia, 2023), Cover.

4 The Topos of the Black Sea and the Port City of Odesa

To a lesser extent, the Ukrainian literary landscape includes Odesa, the most important port city in the south of the country, whose culture has always been characterized by large Russian-Jewish-Ukrainian hybridity. With the works of Ivan Nechui-Levytskyi (1838–1918), we also encounter the topos of the Black Sea in Ukrainian Realist prose of the second half of the nineteenth century; he even entitled one of his novels *Nad Chornym morem* (On the Black Sea, 1890). With this psychological work, the author opens a new chapter in Ukrainian prose: the novel examines the Ukrainian intelligentsia with progressive views whose educational work offers people the perspective of a new, free, and meaningful existence. The novel's settings include Odesa and the Black Sea coast; the sea becomes a medium of vastness, freedom, and beauty. His poetic descriptions often contain mythological motifs and figures: "The sea became black once more, and the shine fell again from Heaven onto the Black Sea, as if someone's hand were throwing golden wreaths, golden bouquets of flowers. [...] 'It seems that the Sirens have surfaced from the water and are swimming and playing in golden wreaths in the sea,' said Mavrodin."[62] Thus in Ukrainian Realist literature, the Black Sea is no longer depicted as a dividing boundary, as an alien, dangerous space; its image is positively charged and poeticized.

Odesa is also associated with Lesia Ukrainka's first stay of convalescence on the Black Sea in 1888. The city's multiculturality made a great impression on the young poet; she describes Odesa as loud, full, with a fast rhythm of life and a kind of southern exoticism.[63] A large impression was also made by the people: imposing Slavs with their own peculiar language quite different to hers, pedantic Germans, loud and temperamental Greeks, Italians, Moldavians.[64] It was here that Lesia Ukrainka saw for the first time in her life the boundless sea that so impressed and enthused her. She described its beauty in the cycle "Podorozh do moria" (Journey to the Sea); of its ten chapters, five are devoted to Odesa. It was first published in 1893, in the collection *Na krylakh pisen* (On the Wings of Songs) and dedicated to the family of the renowned Odesan literary critic and folklore scholar Mykhailo Komarov. Later, Lesia Ukrainka visited Odesa almost annually.

The Black Sea port is also associated with other Ukrainian literary figures. Liudmyla Vasylevska (Dniprova Chaika) spent her youth there, and from 1892 to 1897 it was home to Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi, who described his impressions of the southern city and its multinational atmosphere in the narrative *Dlia zahalnoho dobra* (For the

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62 Ivan Nechui-Levytskyi, *Nad Chornym morem* (Kharkiv: Folio, 2008), accessed May 29, 2024, https://osvita.ua/school/literature/n/71948/list-40.html, 41.

63 Tetiana Ananchenko, "Odeskymy stezhkamy velikoi poetesy," *Vecherniaia Odessa,* February 25, 2021, http://vo.od.ua/rubrics/dalekoe-blizkoe/45927.php.

64 Ananchenko, "Odeskymy stezhkamy velikoi poetesy."

Common Good). The first representatives of Ukrainian literary Modernism were also active in Odesa: Mykola Voronyi, Ivan Lypa, and his son, the Neo-Romantic poet Iurii Lypa. In subsequent years, the Odesite literary space was presented by several Ukrainian poets and dramaturgs, the most renowned being Volodymyr Sosiura, Mykola Kulish, Mykola Bazhan, and Iurii Ianovskyi, who lived in Odesa from 1926 and devoted two novels to the city: *Maister korablia* (The Master of the Ships, 1928) and *Holivud na berezi Chornoho moria* (Hollywood on the Shores of the Black Sea, 1930). In this respect, it should be mentioned that the first Ukrainian film studio was founded in Odesa in 1907. The port's cultural space was always characterized by tolerance, including during the Soviet era, and hence one can also speak of the Ukrainian themes, motifs, and topoi in the works of the Russian and Jewish authors who have written in or about Odesa.

In conclusion, one can say that the literary topoi of the Black Sea, Crimea, and Odesa in Ukrainian literature expand our view of this independent cultural landscape characterized by heterogeneity. Both the Old Ukrainian folk poetry and the works of several Ukrainian authors of the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries prove to be a peculiar phenomenon that can contribute to a better understanding of individual components of this multidimensional, historical, and cultural space. The discourse of power is thus juxtaposed with the geopoetics of the Black Sea coast, Crimea, and Odesa.

Kristina Popova, Nurie Muratova and Georgeta Nazarska

Women in the Black Sea Region: Education, Intellectual Exchange, and International Contacts (1850s–1930s)

1 Introduction: Women's Archives

Without preserving and institutionalizing women's memory and realizing its importance, women's history is not possible.[1] In this regard, the countries of the Black Sea region, especially the former Eastern Bloc countries, have their own specificity. They differ in their practices from Western Europe, where in recent decades there have been stronger civil, feminist, and scholarly initiatives related to the preservation and publication of documents of women's movements, organizations, and individuals. Women's collection initiatives in these countries have changed the notion of an archive and contribute to the development of forms of cultural memory of women.

The centralized system of archives in the former socialist countries selected what it considered important, whereby women's archives remained relatively underrepresented and were often hidden in the archives fonds and holdings of men—husbands, brothers, sons and fathers—as additional documents with inaccurate or even incorrect descriptions. There have been more successful attempts to organize women's archives in Turkey, Greece, and the countries of the former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, a number of significant ego-documents (letters, diaries, memories, and other testimonies) concerning women's history remained unpublished. Teaching women's and gender history in universities is also an important precondition for increasing interest in women's history and archives. Such courses have been introduced in the universities in the region, but sustainable courses are few, mainly because graduates have limited opportunities for professional realization. In the countries of the Black Sea region, there are many actions to preserve women's memory, some of them carried out with international support: collection and publication of oral history (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan), civil initiatives to create women's libraries (Yerevan, Armenia, and other places),

1 See Nurie Muratova, *Zheni otvad arhiva* (Blagoevgrad: Universitetsko izdatelstvo "Neofit Rilski," 2021).

and feminist walks[2] at places of women's memory, but most of them fail to remain sustainable institutions over time.

The purpose of this chapter is to present the achievements of women in education and culture in the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century as well as their participation in international women's movements. To this end, it uses scientific publications as well as materials from a virtual exhibition on the contribution of women to the exchange of knowledge in the Black Sea region over the last two centuries.[3]

2 Theoretical Approaches—Intersectional Theory, Decolonial Theory

Apart from gender inequality, other inequalities are intertwined both in policies towards women and in the development of women's memory: ethnic, religious, class, and other types. In the Black Sea region, overt and hidden religious and ethnic inequalities are of particular importance. This led to the theoretical framework of postcolonial theories, but also to the theory of intersectionality as stressing the accumulation and interweaving of various segregations and marginalizations. Developed three decades ago by Kimberlé Crenshaw, it examines the category of gender in intersection with other categories such as race, ethnicity, class, age, and health as well as the interweaving of various relations of power/subordination and inclusion/exclusion.[4]

In search for a research approach to the Soviet policies towards Muslim women (also applied in Bulgaria, Albania, and other countries), Madina Tlostanova's studies on the North Caucasus are particularly important. Examining the region, especially the Caucasus, where the political influence of the Ottoman and Russian empires intertwined, she accepted them as subaltern empires because they themselves were subject to European influence. If in the Russian Empire the object of the pressure of power was mainly men, in the Soviet Union women were placed at the very center of modernization efforts. An adherent to decolonial theory, Madina Tlostanova believes that the Soviet power created a colonial environment with mediators of the local people through which the local people's assimilation and self-denial was carried out under the slogan of modernization. She analyzed the way women were colonized despite the rhetoric of emancipation and modernization. As an exemplary phenomenon, Tlostanova consid-

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2 On the feminist walks, see Georgeta Nazarska, "'Feministka razkhodka' v Sofia: Krachka kam sazdavane na herstory," *Balkanistic Forum*, no. 2 (2015): 349–60; Milena Angelova, "Marshrut po zhenskite mesta na pamet v Blagoevgrad," *Balkanistic Forum*, no. 2 (2017): 308–12; Gayane Ayvazyan, "Memory Walk Dedicated to the History of Armenian Women," *Balkanistic Forum*, no. 2 (2020): 378–79.
3 "Women and the Transfer of Knowledge in the Black Sea Region," accessed April 4, 2023, http://womeninscience.swu.bg/.
4 See Kimberlé Crenshaw, "Mapping the Margins, Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color," *Stanford Law Review* 43, no. 6 (1991): 1241–99.

ered the actions regarding Muslim women such as the "Mountain Woman's Coat," through which they are disguised in a 'modern' way and sent to the labor market while their oppression was propagated as liberation.[5] The "coat" was presented as a symbol of the woman's exit from the home and her liberation. The legendary image of liberated Soviet women from the East or mountainous regions, especially those who passed the ideological schools for women and became party activists or pioneers of the new Soviet feminist lifestyles, operated as one of the powerful myths in Soviet gender discourses that live on to this day.

Indeed, according to Tlostanova, Soviet "liberation" of women often resulted in ostensible changes in dress and no less ostensible Russo-Soviet-style education that colonized rather than liberated minds, leaving them ignorant of their own cultural tradition or history, of their own epistemological and linguistic inheritance. It created a persistent specific self-orientalizing inferiority complex offset by heroic efforts to modernize at the fastest possible pace. At the same time, women of a similar cultural and religious background who did not undergo intensive Soviet modernization, although retaining some traces of their traditional culture, often found themselves freer in their thinking than the forcibly emancipated women.[6]

3 Women's Education

The ambivalence of policies towards women is clearly manifested in the sphere of knowledge and education. On the one hand, women's education should be seen as a sphere of colonial policies, but on the other—as an opportunity for emancipation and a path to equality. Women's education is of the utmost importance in the struggle for women's political rights, as well as in the struggle for more autonomy and independence for women.

The most serious obstacle to women's education are the traditions of patriarchy in the regions of the Balkans and the Caucasus, strengthening conservative attitudes about the place of women in society, and about their "natural" role as wives and mothers. These attitudes are reinforced by conservative ideas emanating from right-wing political parties and religious circles. Despite the modernization processes, in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, in relation to women in the Caucasus and partly in the Balkans, traditional patriarchal attitudes towards women in the family (patrilineality, early marriage, arranged marriages, the re-

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5 The Soviet official action "A Coat for the Mountain Woman" (*Palto gorianke*) was spread in the North Caucasus in 1927 in order to propagate the "coat" as an element of the female dress code which was not traditional for Muslim women. It had to facilitate her activities outside the home and contribute to her emancipation.

6 Madina Tlostanova, "The Janus-faced Empire Distorting Orientalist Discourses: Gender, Race and Religion in the Russian/(Post)Soviet Constructions of the 'Orient'," *Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise* 2, no. 2 (2008): 1–11.

quirement of virginity at marriage, the subordinate place of women in the family hierarchy) further existed.

Against this background, female education in the region achieved significant success during the period. As early as the second half of the nineteenth century, the education of girls in the Black Sea region made remarkable strides, although state initiative was still relatively limited. Girls' education became a matter of prestige among the upper and some middle urban circles. Girls from different ethnic and religious groups were given the opportunity to gain worldly knowledge, to study art and foreign languages (mainly French), and women were given limited access to public life in the cities, mainly in women's societies and charity activities. The importance of educational institutions for girls goes far beyond the subjects studied in school. During the years in high schools and other institutions, the process of individual development unfolded with the reading of books and periodicals, communication and meetings with classmates and friends, keeping personal diaries, and the exchange of letters and albums. Communicating with female teachers and principals, often foreign women from other countries, along with the female role models from books, translations and periodicals, created new patterns of behavior and aspirations for more autonomy.

Although they had to overcome many difficulties, in the first half of the twentieth century, female representatives of the region—Georgian, Armenian, Turkish, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Greek, Russian, and many others—participated in the international women's movement, taught at universities, and made a name for themselves in science, literature, and journalism. Indeed, the majority of girls still remained outside the sphere of school, but education for girls was constantly expanding with new forms, vocational courses, and schools.

A look at the beginnings of modern secular education for girls in the Black Sea region shows an extraordinary wealth of practices and models in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in which various inequalities were again intertwined. Krassimira Daskalova notes that, unlike men's education, where the state was the main factor in the establishment of institutions such as high schools, universities, and military and vocational schools and courses with clear rules of graduation, recognition, and realization, in women's education private initiative played a much larger role, and to a much lesser extent the state.[7] Created as a result of women's initiative and with private support, these educational institutions for girls often lead long struggles for institutional recognition of the acquired knowledge and skills. Such courses, training, and vocational and other schools therefore encountered numerous financial and regulatory obstacles, depended heavily on public attitudes, and were often short-lived. This is how a general specificity of the beginning of women's education is manifested—it is nonstate, interrupted, and often unrecognized.

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7 Krassimira Daskalova, *Zheni, pol i modernizatsia v Bulgaria 1878–1944* (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo, 2012), 144–45.

Another common feature is that the rise in female education in the Black Sea region in the second half of the nineteenth century and the pursuit of modern knowledge encompassed, albeit in different ways, the ethnic and religious communities in the two empires—Ottoman and Russian. It was preceded and accompanied by important changes in the place of girls and women from the urban strata in the domestic space and public life, related to the identification of individual interests and personal spaces.[8] This was especially strongly expressed in the large cities of the region, where coexistence and competition between different cultural traditions played a favorable role. These are cities such as Istanbul, İzmir, Tbilisi, Baku, Odesa, Kyiv, Thessaloniki, Bucharest, and others. Here the conditions for the emergence of school institutions for girls proved to be the most suitable. They were also related to the process of reformation and westernization in the Ottoman Empire and the penetration of the ideas of the Enlightenment and orientation towards European models of education in the Russian Empire. The influence of the Enlightenment ideology, which motivated the local cultural elites to emphasize the natural human rights of education, the development of intellectual abilities, and economic prosperity, was enormous. The reformation of girls' secondary schools, which began "from below" as an effort of the local aristocracy (Russia and Austria-Hungary) was subsequently assisted "from above," by monarchical institutions and nation states. In Russia, the unification of the curricula of girls' and boys' high schools was completed in the 1860s, in Austria-Hungary in 1868, in the Ottoman Empire in 1903–8, and in some national states like Bulgaria in 1895–1906.

The penetration of the ideas of socialism also added impetus to women's quest for equality. In the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, the radius of the education of girls from the region extended further and reached the universities of Paris, Zurich, Geneva, Vienna, Oxford, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Beirut, New York, Chicago, and other centers. In the post-World War I era, university-educated women from the Black Sea region actively participated in the transfer of knowledge as teachers, journalists, writers, scientists, and political leaders.

The superimposition of various inequalities and the interweaving of cultural influences stands out in the establishment and survival of women's educational institutions. In the Russian Empire in the middle of the nineteenth century, an addition to the network of institutes for noble maidens established after 1774, when the first institute opened in Smolnyi, St. Petersburg, were urban *gymnasium*s to which other social classes had access. The attitude of the authorities towards these establishments is not unambiguous. But the relative liberalization of Russian society opened up opportunities for women's intellectual associations as well. Such a remarkable association from the 1860s onwards brought together the translation and publishing activities of women from the nobility.

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8 Kristina Popova, "The Urban Balkan Home: The Flower Garden as a Young Girl's Place," in *The Routledge History of the Domestic Sphere in Europe 16th to 19th century,* ed. Joachim Eibach and Margareth Lanzinger (London: Routledge, 2020), 383–96.

The participation of girls of different nationalities and religious communities in this educational upsurge was influenced by different policies and accompanied by a variety of obstacles. In Russian high schools, Russian was the language of instruction. As early as 1876, publication in the Ukrainian language was banned in Russia. Especially in the years after the death of Alexander II and under the conservative rule of Alexander III, the use of local languages was severely limited. This caused protests in high schools in Tbilisi, Yerevan, and other places. For many Bulgarian and Serbian girls, who went to the Russian Empire to enjoy the opportunity for schooling in the 1870s (for example in Kyiv's Fundukleev High School), their education opened a window to the world of knowledge and gave them the opportunity for a career, but they had difficulties adapting when they returned to their communities after completing their education.

3.1 The Education of Muslim Girls: First Efforts in Tbilisi and Baku

Reform movements in Islam also influenced women's education, as this was one of their goals. In the Caucasus, and especially in Azerbaijan, school reforms took place and the importance of secular sciences and the inclusion of the achievements of Western civilization grew. For example, the Islamic movement for a new way of life and Enlightenment—Jadidism, based on the ideas of İsmail Gaspıralı (Russian: Ismail Gasprinskii, 1851–1914) and his "new method of teaching" (*usul-i cedid*)—directly affected the education of girls.[9] In 1893, the first girls' school according to Gaspıralı's method was opened in Bağçasaray.

In the high schools of St. Nina in Tbilisi and Baku, the number of Muslim girls was extremely small, and hence secular education remained inaccessible to them, both because of the politics of the authorities and because of the prejudice of the community itself against sending women to school. One of the first Muslim schoolgirls in the Caucasus was Hanifa Abayeva Melikova (1853–?), originating from a local Muslim aristocratic family. She graduated from the high school of the Women's Charitable Society "St. Nina" Women's society in Tbilisi, opened in 1846 (in 1861 a branch of the Society opened a high school in Baku). After marrying, Hanifa took part in the foundation of the first Muslim women's societies in Baku, and after the founding of the first secular school for Muslim girls in the city in 1901, known as Tağıyev's School, for a long time she was its director and teacher of Russian. For the opening of this school, the local oil businessman Hacı Zaynalabdin Tağıyev (Russian: Gadzhi Zeinalabdin Tagiev) made efforts to win both the support of Russian Empress Alexandra Feodorovna, whose name the school took, and to attract the cooperation of Muslim religious leaders.

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9 Ravshan Abdullaev et al., *Istoriia obshchestvenno-kulturnogo reformatorstva v Tsentralnoi Azii i na Kavkaze (19–nachalo 20 veka)* (Samarkand: MITsAI, 2012).

To this end, Mullah Mirza Ahmed visited Medina, Khorasan, and Baghdad to obtain confirmation that such a secular school did not contradict the Quran. He met the Shiite leaders, who produced a written statement that the Quran was not against the secular education of little girls. Baku's chief architect drew up a project, and Tağıyev financed the venture. The Muslim Girls' School opened on October 1, 1901 with about forty-five girls. At first they wore headscarves to school, but after 1904 they rarely covered their hair. The work of the school was accompanied by difficulties created both by the Russian authorities and by religious institutions and the local public. Nevertheless, it managed to survive. The girls learnt Russian, Azerbaijani, geography, music, drama, French, mathematics, needlework, etc. Additionally, it maintained the connection with the local tradition, which, according to Madina Tlostanova, was missing from the Soviet modernization policy.[10] The first headmistress was Hanifa Melikova, the wife of Həsən bəy Zərdabi, a journalist and supporter of secularism who had founded the first newspaper in Baku in 1875. Most of the other teachers were also educated Muslim women who had completed their education in Moscow and elsewhere. The drama teacher was Səkinə Axundzadə (1865–1927)—the first woman author of theatrical plays (*The Benefit of Science*, 1904). She settled in Baku after her attempt to establish a secular school in Quba failed and her husband was murdered.

Tağıyev's School in Baku was the first school for Muslim girls in the Caucasus. It continued to exist under the independent Republic of Azerbaijan but was closed by the Soviet authorities. It was only later that people realized its enormous importance in creating a whole generation of women writers, translators, doctors, teachers, and scientists in Azerbaijan. Great difficulties accompanied the opening of a Muslim girls' school in Tbilisi at the beginning of the twentieth century. It opened its doors in 1908 and existed for three years, and the second school opened in 1910, but existed only for a few years before closing.

3.2 Educational Centers: Istanbul and Thessaloniki

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the capital of the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul (Constantinople), was the center of female education for girls from different religious and ethnic groups—Armenians, Turks, Greeks, Jews, and Bulgarians. The educational landscape of the Ottoman capital included a variety of initiatives, institutions, languages, and teaching and funding methods, some of them existing for a few years and others more permanent. Efforts to develop women's education increased especially after the Crimean War (1853–56). Education regulations in the 1860s allowed non-Muslims to open grammar schools and also permitted non-Muslims to attend the same grammar schools as Muslims. In the 1870s, the first Greek schools for girls were established; until then they had been educated by home teachers. One such famous

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10 Tlostanova, "The Janus-faced Empire."

school was "Palada I Zappeion", founded by the benefactor Zappas, located near Taksim Square. A central goal of its curriculum was the creation of a cultural horizon for the girls by teaching French language and classes in music, theater, literature, and other readings. The pedagogical methods of Bell-Lancaster, Froebel, and Pestalozzi were used. The first director was Calliope Kehagia, who had previously taught in Athens. One of the first graduates, Eftalia Adam, continued her studies at the University of Paris. The school had a solid building with rich architectural decoration and a well-appointed library.

Competition between ethnic and religious groups in the metropolis led to the opening of new schools and the improvement of teaching methods. This also strengthens the process of opening Turkish women's schools with innovations in curricula and teaching methods.[11]

In Istanbul, as in İzmir and Tbilisi, some of the first women's initiatives for the education of girls arose among the Armenian community as early as the 1840s. In 1847, the first Armenian women's association was opened in Istanbul, aiming to improve the local Armenian school. A period of mass founding of women's societies and charitable organizations followed. Among the Armenian women in Istanbul, the first sprouts of feminist aspirations for equality also appeared. One of the first was the Armenian Catholic Srbui Tusab (Srpuhi Dusap, 1841–1901), who studied at the French school in Ortaköy district. She was a novelist and was considered the first Armenian and Ottoman feminist. Her example inspired women of the next generation in Istanbul, such as Zabel Yesayan (1878–1943)—writer, translator and university teacher, and author of several novels. She studied at the Sorbonne and began her career as an author at the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1915, Zabel Yesayan fled to Bulgaria, and then to Tbilisi.[12] In 1933, she decided to settle in Soviet Armenia and taught at Yerevan University. In 1937, she was arrested during the Stalinist terror and died in Siberia.

American Protestant (missionary) educational institutions played an important role in male and female education in Istanbul after the Crimean War. The girls' American College in Istanbul, which made a very large contribution to female education in the Ottoman Empire, opened in 1871, shortly after the men's Robert College, established in 1864. It played a central role for girls of various nationalities from the Black Sea region (Armenians, Bulgarians, Jews, and Turks), setting high academic and cultural standards. Several generations of women graduated there, then playing an important role in the cultural life of their communities. Halide Edib Adıvar (1884–1964), who graduated in 1901 and was a writer, fighter for women's rights, nationalist, associate of Kemal Atatürk, and deputy in the Turkish parliament, also studied there.

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11 Oya Dağlar Macar, "Ottoman Greek Education System and Greek Girls' Schools in Istanbul (19th and 20th Centuries)," *Educational Sciences: Theory and Practice* 10, no. 2 (2010): 805–17, https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ889194.pdf.

12 Author of the book *Melikha Nuri Hanum,* also published in French.

Diverse cultural and religious traditions also coexisted in Thessaloniki. A Greek school for girls opened in 1843. At that time, Thessaloniki was a city with a majority of Jewish population. Founded in 1860, the Alliance Israelite Universelle, an organization for spreading knowledge also among Sephardic Jews in the Balkans and the Middle East, emphasized the education of girls.[13] In 1874, the Alliance established a school for girls directed by the Italian-Jewish Stella Orvieto Caro.

In Thessaloniki, the first schools for Muslim girls were established in the community of the so-called *Dönme*—descendants of Islamized Jews. This was Terakki Mektebi School. One of its graduates was Sabiha Sertel (1895–1968), Turkey's first professional journalist.[14] She studied at Terakki Mektebi School in Thessaloniki, and later received a scholarship with the help of Halide Edib Adıvar and graduated in social work at Columbia University. She translated some writings of Friedrich Engels and August Bebel into Turkish. Subjected to political persecution because of her left-wing political orientation, she emigrated with her family to Europe, and then to Baku.

3.3 Higher Education

Higher education for women in the Black Sea region was motivated by the ideals of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. It was also a result of the needs of the Second Industrial Revolution for a professionally qualified workforce, and the need of nation-states for female teachers in the state education system.

In the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the process was facilitated by the political elites: in Russia, the liberal movements sympathized with women's education, while in other countries of the region it was the liberal, democratic, and social democratic parties. The Reform Era in the Ottoman Empire after 1839 (Tanzimat) brought, along with other modernization processes, new possibilities for female education.[15] In 1908, in the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turks gave Turkish women formal access to higher education, and the Kemalist regime popularized secondary education and opened wide the doors to higher education with a 1924 law.[16] However, as Karl Kaser wrote, this emancipation from the top then touched almost only the Western-oriented elites in the cities.[17]

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13 Rena Molho, "Salonika: Female Education at the End of the Nineteenth Century," Shalvi/Hyman Encyclopedia of Jewish Women, December 31, 1999, https://jwa.org/encyclopedia/article/salonika-female-education-at-end-of-nineteenth-century.

14 Sabiha Sertel participated in the child protection initiatives. She was a socialist, a feminist, and a close friend of the Turkish poet Nazım Hikmet.

15 See Karl Kaser, *The Balkans and the Near East: Introduction to a Shared History* (Vienna: Lit Verlag, 2011), 320.

16 Ekin Enacar, *Education, Nationalism and Gender in the Young Turk Era (1908–1918): Constructing the "Mother Citizens" of the Ottoman Empire* (Saarbrücken: VDM, 2009).

17 Kaser, *The Balkans and the Near East.*

The contribution of the feminist movement was also very important for achieving access to universities. The feminist periodicals considered higher education a prerequisite for a new legal, social, economic, and cultural status for women. In Russia, Vladimir and Bestuzhev Women's Higher Courses at St. Petersburg were founded after a petition to the emperor, initiated in 1868 by the activist of the women's movement Anna Diagileva-Filosofova and signed by 4,000 people.[18] Praskovia Belenkaia-Ariian—a graduate of St. Petersburg Women's Higher Courses, translator, and journalist, founded the First Polytechnic for Women in St. Petersburg (1906 – 24).[19] Women's societies in Bulgaria also struggled for women's access to university education. The Sofia Women's Educational Society *Saznanie* (Consciousness) and the Bulgarian Women's Union initiated an appeal to the parliament for the admission of women to universities in 1898 – 1901.[20]

The role of foreign universities, which enabled women from the Black Sea region to study even before this became possible in their home countries, cannot be overlooked. The first countries to which Russian, Ukrainian, Moldovan, and Russian Jewish and Ukrainian women went to study were France (1861) and Switzerland (1865). After them, universities opened (at first partially, and then completely) in England (1869), Denmark, and the Netherlands (1873), Sweden (1875), Belgium and Italy (1876), Austria-Hungary (1878), Norway (1888), and Germany (1901). In the first decade of the twentieth century, a third of the female students in Paris were Romanian and Russian.[21]

Until the beginning of the World War I, the impact of the scholarship system, which stimulated student mobility and accelerated the feminization of universities throughout Europe, was particularly productive. Funding was provided by the host countries (Italy), nation-states (including Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey), private donors, and international organizations.[22]

Gradually, higher education became available to women in the Black Sea region itself. The transition is their admission as students in the "closed" universities and majors until then. The coeducation of men and women, which has been a fact in the USA since 1869, struggled to make its way in Europe, including England and Germany, until the 1920s. There are precedents for the will of individual professors only at St. Petersburg University (1823 and 1859 – 61), the St. Petersburg Medical and Surgical Academy

18 Marianna Muravyeva, "Anna Filosofova," in *A Biographical Dictionary of Women's Movements and Feminisms: Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe: 19th–20th Centuries,* ed. Francisca de Haan, Krassimira Daskalova, and Anna Loutfi (Budapest: CEU Press, 2006), 135 – 39.

19 Rochelle Goldberg Ruthchild, "Praskov'ia Arian," in Haan et al., *A Biographical Dictionary*, 30 – 32.

20 Georgeta Nazarska, *Universitetskoto obrazovanie na balgarskite zheni, 1879 – 1944* (Sofia: International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, 2003).

21 Ljubinka Trgovčević, "La science européenne et les élites balkaniques: Considérations statistiques sur les étudiants des pays balkaniques dans les universités allemandes et françaises au XIXème siècle," *Balkanologie* 4, no. 1 (2000): 132 – 41; Ljubinka Trgovčević, *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku* (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 2003).

22 Rayna Manafova, *Inteligentsia s evropeyski izmerenia* (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo, 1994); Elena Siupiur, "Les intellectuels roumains du XIXe siècle et la réorganization de la classe politique et du système institutional," *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire* 34 (1995): 75 – 95.

(1862–64), and the Medical Faculty of the University of Istanbul (1893). In the early twentieth century, women's societies in Russia sent repeated requests to the emperor. As a result, in 1905–8, women were enrolled, but without the right to take exams, in law and medicine (at universities in St. Petersburg, Saratov, and Tomsk). In the Ottoman Empire, this did not take place until 1920–21.[23]

Alternatively, following the example of the USA, England, and Germany, private universities for women were only established in the countries of the Black Sea region. This was especially widely practiced in Russia, where, on the one hand, there was strong opposition from conservative circles and a desire for censorship and repression on the part of the tsarist regime, and on the other it was seen as an opportunity to find private funding. This model was also chosen in the Ottoman Empire. In 1914, the Young Turks allowed the foundation of a women's university, whose first graduate was Şükufe Nihal in 1918. Its female graduates were considered the first female Turkish graduates in a number of scientific fields; for instance, Remziye Hisar was a pioneering chemist who received her doctorate at the Sorbonne in 1933.[24] The Higher Social School for Women in Sofia, established in 1932 by the Bulgarian Women's Union on the model of the Alice Salomon Social Academy for Women, provided specific academic education in social work for women.[25]

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, coeducation of women and men was adopted in the national states of the region: in 1866 at the University of Bucharest (founded in 1864), in 1879 at Iaşi (founded in 1860), and in 1901 at the Sofia Higher School (founded in 1888, since 1904 Sofia University). Similar reforms were undertaken in Russia (1905) and Turkey (1930), and at Russian universities, women were given the right to receive doctoral degrees in all faculties for the first time in 1911. Over the years, the number of women increased, and access for girls from the villages, from the lower social strata, and from the ethnic minorities was democratized. Quite a few women graduated in the so-called male majors. For instance, in Romania, the first female surgeon, Marta Trancu-Rainer graduated at Iaşi (1899), the first pharmacist, Paulina Cruceanu, at Bucharest, and the first astrophysicist. Maria Teohari, also at Bucharest (1914).

However, this did not mean complete equality. Women rarely completed their education with scientific degrees higher than licentiate (Bachelor's) or Master's.

Ethno-religious restrictions were introduced in some universities or their faculties. From 1887–1917, 3–10 percent ethnic quotas (*numerus clausus*) for Jewish women operated in Russia, and were especially tight in the Ukrainian and Belarusian territo-

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23 Elmira Fedosova, *Bestuzhevskie kursy: Pervyi zhenskii universitet v Rossii (1878–1918)* (Moscow: Pedagogika, 1980), 62.

24 Yücel Gelişli, "Education of Women from the Ottoman Empire to Modern Turkey," *SEER: Journal for Labor and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe* 7, no. 4 (2004): 121–35.

25 Kristina Popova, "Between Sofia and Berlin: Impulses and Background of the High Social School for Women at the Bulgarian Women's Union (1929–1932)," *Balkanistic Forum*, no. 1 (2022): 137–72.

ries.[26] In Bulgaria, such quotas were introduced with the anti-Semitic legislation in 1940–44, and in Romania they were applied by the universities of Cluj, Bucharest, Iași, and Chernivtsi.[27]

Following the Western European example, restrictions were also introduced on the enrollment or profiling of women in specialties traditionally considered by society to be "male" (theology, law, medicine, engineering, etc.), and girls were pushed towards acceptable "feminine" specialties (literature, languages, pedagogy, pharmacy, etc.). For example, at the University of Cluj, only 3.8 percent of women, most of them German and Jewish, studied law. At Sofia University, women studied law from 1903 on, but until 1945 their degrees did not allow them to practice as lawyers, notaries, or judges, because the state did not recognize them as voters. In 1911, in Russia, women were authorized to be lawyers, but they too were without political rights.[28]

Until the middle of the twentieth century, the admission of women to polytechnics and art academies in the region was also problematic. It was the result not only of the late opening of such higher schools, but of unbroken patriarchal stereotypes. For these reasons, the first generation of local female engineers and architects were entirely foreign graduates, left with almost no practice after returning to their homeland: The first Romanian chemical engineer Elisa Leonida Zamfirescu graduated in Berlin (1912), and the first Bulgarian architect Maria Luiza Doseva in Darmstadt (1917). Some of the first professional female artists acquired skills through private lessons or at separate art schools for women. Such an institution was founded in 1914 in Istanbul by the Turkish painter Mihri Müşfik Hanım, who became its director. Only the Bulgarian State Drawing School (later the State Art Academy) was an exception, having accepted women since its establishment in 1896.[29]

4 Women's Writing and Cultural Exchange

A significant common feature of the writing of women from the Black Sea region in the second half of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth century was their translation activity. Most women intellectuals, writers, and journalists during the period were also translators. Educated in Western languages or having grown up in a multilingual environment, they began translating novels, political papers, scientific works, and fiction into their native languages, often writing poetry and prose themselves, or engaging in science or the various arts. Women translators made a significant contribution to cul-

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26 Anatolii E. Ivanov, *Evreiskoe studenchestvo v vysshei shkole Rossiiskoi imperii nachala XX veka: Kakim ono bylo? Opyt sotsiokulturnogo portretirovaniia* (Moscow: Novyi Khronograf, 2007).

27 Nazarska, *Universitetskoto obrazovanie*.

28 Nazarska.

29 Irina Genova, *Modernisms and Modernity – (Im)Possibility of Historicizing: Art in Bulgaria and Artistic Exchanges with Balkan Countries (*Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo, 2004); Duygu Köksal and Anastasia Falierou, *A Social History of Late Ottoman Women: New Perspectives* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 157–67.

tural exchange. They were often among the first translators of women's literature. A lot of their translations remained unpublished. Women intellectuals often translated and wrote under pseudonyms or did not sign their works. Fatma Aliye Topuz (1862–1936) signed her translations from French to Turkish with "Dama," and the novel she published was signed only with the name of her co-author. Many of the first translations are signed only with initials or a pseudonym, and their authorship cannot always be established.[30] The first translation of Marcel Proust in Bulgaria in 1923, by Mara Seizova-Yurukova, was signed with a pseudonym. The establishment of women's education and the recognition of translation work began to legitimize women in the public space and create authority for them. For example, the Bulgarian Mara Belcheva (1868–1937), born into a wealthy merchant family in Sevlievo, was educated in Geneva and Vienna. She was one of the first Bulgarian poets and the author of the first complete translation into Bulgarian of Nietzsche's *Also sprach Zarathustra.* Zhivka Dragneva (founder of the Bulgarian Section of the University Women Association), Elisaveta Konsulova-Vazova (an artist), Sofia Yurukova, and others translated from French, English, and German.

The Armenian Gayane Hovhannesian-Matakian (1852–1900), born in Tbilisi, was engaged in translation work from the age of 18, translating from French and Russian. Gayane studied pedagogy in Switzerland. Returning to the Caucasus, she devoted herself to the education and upbringing of children. She was the head of the first Armenian kindergarten and another one in Istanbul. She sent several girls to study pedagogy in France, and published articles on preschool education in the magazine *Ayrenik* in Istanbul.[31]

There was also Anastasia Tumanishvili-Tsereteli (1842–1932, Tbilisi), who in 1876 went to Switzerland, where she became acquainted with the problems of raising children according to Pestalozzi's methods, the new pedagogical ideas in Switzerland and France. Upon returning home, she became involved in cultural and educational life. Soon her literary translations would be published—*The Pain of the Marshal* by Alphonse Daudet and *The Widow of the Mountain* by Walter Scott, as well as her first original story, *Mamis Mskhverp'li* (The Sacrifice of the Father). She was an active member of the Society for Spreading Literacy among Georgians, and opened a primary school in her native village.[32]

A translator from Russian was the Crimean Tatar feminist, educator, and politician Şefika Gaspıralı (1886–1975), the daugher of İsmail Gaspıralı's and the editor of the

30 "Fatma Aliye Topuz (1862–1936)," Women and the Transfer of Knowledge in the Black Sea Region, accessed April 4, 2023, http://womeninscience.swu.bg/?p=2152.

31 Anait Arutyunyan, *Vek zamechatelnykh zhenshchin: Obshchestvennaia deiatelnost armianskikh zhenshchin v 19–nachale 20 veka* (Yerevan: Dukhovnaia Armeniia, 2005), 84–85.

32 "Anastasia Tumanishvili-Tsereteli Born (25 August 1842–7 February 1932, Tbilisi)," Women and the Transfer of Knowledge in the Black Sea Region, accessed April 4, 2023, http://womeninscience.swu.bg/?p=2008.

women's magazine *Alem-i Nisvan* (Women's World), who in 1917 became one of the first women deputies in the Crimean People's Republic.[33]

Along with writing letters, keeping diaries and personal albums with dedications from friends and guests became widespread among high school girls in the second half of the nineteenth century. Girls developed the skills of introspection, especially in foreign institutions—French and American schools and boarding schools in Istanbul, Samokov, Varna, Plovdiv, and other places. Most surviving diaries and personal albums from this time are of girls, schoolgirls, and students far from their native homes. Some of those ego-documents were in foreign languages—the language of the school of education. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, portraits of girls with personal albums (the so-called *Poesie-Album*) in hand (as in Bucharest National Gallery) appeared in paintings and photographs, which show the strong connection of ego-documentation with the girl's personality and presentation.

Documentation of the self also included the travelogue genre in women's writing, especially for women from the upper class. One of the first female writers of the Caucasus was Ekaterina Petrovna Lachinova (Shelashnikova) (1813–96). She had written since she was a child, although this did not meet with the approval of her father, a rich landowner, nor later of her husband, chosen by her father. In 1838, she published "Nekotorye fakty i mysli o muzhiakh i supruzheskom schastie, izvlechennye iz druzheskoi perepiski dvukh zhenshchin" (Some Facts and Thoughts about Husbands, Extracted from the Friendly Correspondence of Two Women) in the magazine *Biblioteka dlia chteniia* (A Library for Reading). She wrote under the pseudonym Cleopatra Leonidova. The writer behind this pseudonym was recently revealed after her diaries on Russia were analyzed. Her writings were some of the first feminist works in the Russian Empire. Ekaterina Petrovna Lachinova was also the author of the novel pamphlet, *Prodelki na Kavkaze* (Tricks in the Caucasus, 1844), published under a pseudonym. It criticized the disorder and corruption of Russian rule in the Caucasus and the hidden sides of the Caucasian War (1817–64). The novel was banned and the author pursued by the police. Her second novel-pamphlet, *Dva imama, ili istreblenie Avarskogo doma* (Two Imams or the Extermination of the Avar House) was also banned and was only published after her death.[34]

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33 In 1919, Şefika Gaspıralı's family was persecuted and left for Baku and after that to Turkey, where she continued her political, organizational, and writing activities.

34 "Ekaterina Petrovna Lachinova (Shelashnikova) (1813–1896)," Women and the Transfer of Knowledge in the Black Sea Region, accessed April 4, 2023, http://womeninscience.swu.bg/?p=1969.

5 Membership of International Women's Organizations

The first women's societies in cities the Black Sea region appeared around educational, charitable and cultural goals. In the context of the social reforms in Russia in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Russian women's movement arose in efforts to support female independency. Central figures were Maria Trubnikova, Anna Filosofova, and Nadezhda Stasova. Some decades later, at the end of the nineteenth century, the women's also movement acquired political aims, and thus in 1905, the struggle for suffrage began. The Russian feminist journals appeared: *Zhenskii vestnik* (Women's Herald), *Soiuz zhenshchin* (Women's Union), and others. Women's participation in radical political movements, as well as in social democracy, also gave impulses to the struggle for political equality. In 1908, an All-Russian Women's Congress was organized by the physician Anna Shabanova (1848–1932) to fight for universal suffrage. After the February Revolution in Russia in 1917, women received voting rights (April 1917), although women in Finland, then part of Russian Empire, had already acquired the right to vote in 1906.[35] The first public manifestations of social and cultural activity by Ukrainian women around the middle of the nineteenth century (Nataliia Kobrynska (1855–1920), Olena Pchilka (Olha Kosach, 1849–1930) and her daughter, the famous writer Lesia Ukrainka (1871–1913), were engaged with the efforts to strengthen the social and cultural role of Ukrainian women as well as with the struggle for national emancipation. After the Bolshevik Revolution, in Galicia (western Ukraine), which became part of Poland, a Ukrainian Women's Union was founded. In the late 1920s, the writer and politician Milena Rudnytska (1892–1976), one of the Union activists (and later its president), was elected a member of the Polish Parliament. She was also very active in the International Women's movement.

The establishment of international women's organizations began in the second half of the nineteenth century as a response to gender inequality and, above all, to win the right to vote. As part of the first wave of liberal feminism in Western Europe and the USA, they represented an expression of feminist solidarity (the cross-border "sisterhood") and of support for local women's organizations and initiatives, and especially for the suffragette movements.[36]

From its founding in the USA in 1888, the International Council of Women (ICW) was one of the first international women's organizations to focus its efforts on women's rights. Feminist formations from the region joined it relatively soon: from Russia at the end of the nineteenth century, and from Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire in 1908 and 1911, respectively. The largest local feminist organizations participated in

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35 See Irina Iukina, *Russkii feminizm kak vyzov sovremennosti* (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2007).
36 Karen Offen, *European Feminisms 1700–1950: A Political History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 347; Leila Rupp, *Words of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

the ICW congresses in Rome (1914), Oslo (1920), Washington (1925), and Vienna (1930). Prior to 1914, the ICW Board included vice-president (1899–11) Anna Diaghileva-Filosofova, a Russian philanthropist and founder of higher education for girls, as well as honorary presidents Anna Chabanova, a doctor from St. Petersburg, and Selma Rıza from Istanbul.[37] The Romanian Women's Union (CNFR) entered the ICW after World War I, with its leader Princess Alexandrina Cantacuzino (1876–1944), who was elected for two terms as vice-president (1925–36). In the 1930s, she headed the Council's Arts Committee, which allowed her to attract more Romanian women to its governing bodies.

With the victory of the "Bolsheviks" in Russia, the new power equalized the two sexes in legal terms. The "Bolsheviks" assumed that the problem of gender equality had been solved and thus the existence of feminist organizations was redundant, as was participation in international women's organizations.

The representatives of the Ukrainian political emigration in Western Europe Maria Zarchy and Hanna Chykalenko-Keller (1884–1964) were authorized to attend the Oslo Congress (1920) to speak about the Ukrainian question in order to support the preservation of their country's independence. In 1922, Milena Rudnytska, vice-president of the Galician Union of Ukrainian Women, lobbied for its inclusion in the ICW, and Hanna Chykalenko-Keller was a guest at its Washington Congress (1925). Despite her advocacy and the appeal by Sofiia Rusova, chairperson of the Ukrainian National Women's Council, the candidacy was not accepted because it came from an emigrant organization. In return, they were offered guest observer status. In the 1930s, this led to the idea that Ukrainian women in the United States should unite in their own formation, through which they would participate in the American National Council.[38]

The International Woman Suffrage Alliance/International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship (IWSA/IWSAEC) (at present the International Alliance of Women—IAW) separated from the ICW at its congress in Berlin (1904) with the intention of devoting its activity entirely to political goals of the women's movement. The first countries to join it were Russia with its Union of Defenders of Women's Rights (League for Women's Equality), headed by Dr. Poliksena Shishkina-Iavein, and Bulgaria with its most influential organization, the Bulgarian Women's Union (1908).[39] In the following decade, three Romanian formations entered: *Liga Drepturile si Datoriile Femeii* (Women's Rights and Duties League) (1913), *Asociaţia pentru Emanciparea Civilă si Politică a Femeilor Române* (Association for the Civil and Political Emancipation of Ro-

37 International Council of Women, *Report on the Quinquennial Meetings/Rapport de l'assemblée quinquennal/Bericht über die Generalversammlung*, Rome 1914 (Karlsruhe: Braun, 1914); Krassimira Daskalova, "Julia Malinova," in Haan et al., *A Biographical Dictionary*, 293–95; Muravyeva, "Anna Filosofova."
38 Martha Kichorowska Kebalo, "Exploring Continuities and Reconciling Ruptures: Nationalism, Feminism, and the Ukrainian Women's Movement," *Aspasia* 1, no. 1 (2007): 36–60.
39 "Archive of the International Woman Suffrage Alliance," accessed April 4, 2023, https://archiveshub.jisc.ac.uk/search/archives/a21280c0-a886-389e-9da0-17439377e1b3; Krassimira Daskalova, "Dimitrana Ivanova," in Haan et al., *A Biographical Dictionary*, 182–84.

manian Women, AECPFR) (1924), and *Solidaritatea* (Solidarity), an association chaired by Princess Alexandrina Cantacuzino (1926).[40]

The delegations of feminists from the Black Sea countries were particularly large at the congresses in Berlin (1929) and Istanbul (1935). The Istanbul Bosporus Forum gathered 5,000 women from thirty countries and had a great impact on public attitudes towards feminism and general attitudes towards women's rights in the Black Sea region and the Balkans. It was covered widely in the Turkish press, including by two famous Turkish journalists, Nezihe Muhittin and Suat Derviş.[41] In this period, Eugenia de Reuss-Ianculescu, leader of the Romanian National Suffrage Association (1926–35), and the president of the Bulgarian Women's Union, Dimitrana Ivanova (1935–44), were elected to the board of the IWSAEC.[42] Princess Alexandrina Cantacuzino was sent as a special representative of the IWSAEC to the League of Nations (1926–28, 1933, and 1938) to discuss the issues of the trafficking of women, the legislative settlement of the status of abandoned and illegitimate children, and the preparation of child protection in times of war.[43] IWSAEC was joined individually at the end of the 1920s by some representatives of the Ukrainian emigration living in Western Europe and the USA.

In May 1923, during the IWSAEC Congress in Rome, women from Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Greece agreed to form the Little Entente of Women (LEW), a feminist network to defend the international status quo of the winners of the war and to act as an alternative to the existing associations led by Western European and American women.[44] A major figure after them is Princess Alexandrina Cantacuzino, who became its first president (1923–24). The women discussed a number of issues, such as child labor, abolition of the death penalty, and women's suffrage. Princess Cantacuzino visited Sofia and made attempts to attract Bulgaria and Turkey to the Little Entente of Women, but without success.[45]

After the end of World War I, feminist networks expanded to include professional, pacifist, and other aims.[46] One of the earliest was the International Women's Commit-

40 Raluca Maria Popa, "Eugenia de Reuss Ianculescu," in Haan et al., *A Biographical Dictionary*, 463–66.

41 Fatmagül Berktay, "Suat Derviş," in Haan et al., *A Biographical Dictionary*, 109–13; Aslı Davaz, "An Annotated Archive of Entangled European Feminist History: The Union of Turkish Women, the Second Balkan Conference and Cécile Brunschvicg's Visit to Balkan Feminists (1923–1935)," *Feminist Encounters: A Journal of Critical Studies in Culture and Politics* 4, no. 2 (2020): 1–11.

42 Serpil Çakir, "Nehize Muhittin," in Haan et al., *A Biographical Dictionary*, 356–59.

43 Roxana Cheschebec, "Princess Alexandra Cantacuzino," in Haan et al., *A Biographical Dictionary*, 89–93.

44 Maria Bucur, Katerina Dalakoura, Krassimira Daskalova, and Gabriela Dudeková Kováčová, Introduction to "The Little Entente of Women: Transnational Feminist Networks and National Politics in Interwar Europe," special issue, *Aspasia* 16 (2022): 1–12.

45 Cheschebec, "Princess Alexandra Cantacuzino"; Maria Bucur, "Calypso Botez," in Haan et al., *A Biographical Dictionary*, 76–79; Krassimira Daskalova, "Little Entente of Women/Malkata zhenska Antanta i feministikite dvizhenia na Balkanite prez 20–30-te god na 20 v.," *Sotsiologicheski problemi*, no. 2 (2018): 675–95.

46 Nitza Berkovitch, *From Motherhood to Citizenship: Women's Rights and International Organizations* (New York: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

tee of Permanent Peace, founded in 1915 in The Hague by American and English Quakers with pacifist aims and renamed in 1919 as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). From the Black Sea region, Bulgarian women were the first to join it, with the two representatives Zheni Bozhilova-Pateva and Maria Hadzhiangelova participating in the Hague Congress, and in 1918 the Bulgarian section was founded.[47] In 1915, Aletta Jacobs invited Eugenia de Reuss-Ianculescu to participate on behalf of Romanian women, but received her refusal as a patriot loyal to the foreign policy of her country.[48] In the following years, despite the tours undertaken and proposals made, the foundation of sections in Turkey and Romania was significantly delayed—they were organized only in the 1930s. The Romanian section was headed again by Princess Alexandrina Cantacuzino, who combined her activities in the League of Nations, the ICW, and the LEW. The first sporadic contact between the Bulgarian and Romanian sections took place in 1932–34, but did not lead to cooperation, due to their different visions of the future of the status quo in the Balkan Peninsula.[49]

The Bulgarian representatives actively participated in all the congresses of the WILPF, did not miss its summer schools, and themselves became the hosts of one in Sofia in 1930. Representatives of the WILPF often visited Sofia. They were engaged in the care of refugees, and later conducted inspections on reports of violations of the rights of minorities in Macedonia and Western Thrace.[50]

In the early 1920s, Ukrainian émigrés entered the organization, personally engaging secretary Emily Greene Balch with the Ukrainian issue. In 1921 they established their section with six branches and participated in the Congress of Vienna (1921). In 1928 Milena Rudnytska, chairwoman of the emigrant Union of Ukrainian Women, entered into contact with the new secretary of the WILPF Mary Sheepshanks, at whose invitation she participated in the Prague Congress (1929) and spoke to the delegates about the anti-Ukrainian measures of the Polish state. For her part, Sheepshanks undertook a tour of 800 Ukrainian villages in Galicia, after which she advocated the rights of the Ukrainian minority in Poland before the session of the League of Nations in Geneva (1931).[51]

Another transnational women's network founded in 1919 by British and American college and university professors was the International Federation of University

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47 Georgeta Nazarska, "Feministki mobilizatsii za mir: Balgarskata sektsia na Mezhdunarodnata zhenska liga za mir i svoboda (1918–1952)," *Balkanistic Forum*, no. 3 (2022): 146–62.

48 Popa, "Eugenia de Reuss Ianculescu."

49 Ingrid Sharp, Judit Acsády, and Nikolai Vukov, "Internationalism, Pacifism, Transnationalism: Women's Movements and the Building of a Sustainable Peace in the Post-War World," in *Women Activists Between War and Peace: Europe, 1918–1923*, ed. Ingrid Sharp and Matthew Stibbe (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017), 77–122; Nazarska, "Feministki mobilizatsii za mir."

50 Kristina Popova, "Sofia kato myasto na mira: Lyatnata shkola na MZHLMS (Mezhdunarodnata zhenska liga za mir i svoboda) prez 1930 g.," in *Voynata i mirat — minalo, nastoyashte, predizvikatelstva*, ed. Margarita Karamihova and Petko St. Petkov (Veliko Tarnovo: Universitetsko izdatelstvo, 2021), 224–38; Reneta Roshkeva, "Ekaterina Karavelova," in Haan et al., *A Biographical Dictionary*, 230–34.

51 Kebalo, "Exploring Continuities."

Women (IFUW). Its goal was the convergence of women scientists of different nationalities and assistance for more women seeking higher education. In the Black Sea region, Bulgaria and Romania were the first to enter it in 1924–25; a Turkish section was founded only in 1949.[52] Although the local sections were the product of the activities of local teachers or writers, and not of women scientists, they affirmed the place of women in the public sphere. Bulgarian and Romanian delegates participated in the conferences and councils of the board in Brussels (1925), Amsterdam (1926), Vienna (1927), Geneva (1929), Prague (1930), Boston (1931), Edinburgh (1933), Geneva (1933), and Stockholm (1939). The Bulgarians Tatyana Kirkova and Zhivka Dragneva were elected as members of the commissions, on intellectual cooperation (1926–32) and on education (1939), respectively. In 1932, the IFUW chairwoman Professor Ellen Gleditsch, Regina Clemm, and Freda Bage visited the Balkans. They gave lectures and met officials and ministers. However, the women from the national Balkan sections of the IFUW did not have intensive ties with each other, but interacted more with the headquarters in Geneva. Bilateral contacts were strengthened in the 1930s: in 1929–30, the sections in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Romania exchanged women's groups; in 1932 a meeting of the Bulgarian and Romanian branches was held; in 1934, Princess Alexandrina Cantacuzino visited Sofia; and in 1938 the Romanian jurist Elena Ramniceanu gave lectures to Sofia members.[53]

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

In the Black Sea region, internationalization was influenced by ethnic, religious, and cultural factors and the relatively late appearance of feminism in the patriarchal-dominated societies. The obstacles to women's secondary and higher education together with the women's slow entry into the labor market also influenced this process. Nevertheless during the interwar period, women's leadership was established in the countries of the Black Sea region, to which international women's contacts and organizations also contributed.

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52 Christine von Oertzen, *Science, Gender, and Internationalism: Women's Academic Networks, 1917–1955* (New York: Palgrave, 2016), 9–37.
53 Bulletin of IFUW (Geneva, 1930), 52; Dimitrana Ivanova, "Rumansko-balgarskoto sblizhenie i uchastieto na zhenata," *Zhenski glas*, no. 16, May 25, 1932; Krassimira Daskalova, "Dimitrana Ivanova," in Haan et al., *A Biographical Dictionary*, 182–84; Cheschebec, "Princess Alexandra Cantacuzino"; Ana-Maria Stan, "Eliza Constantinescu-Bagdat, portretul unei feministe din lumea academică interbelică," *Yearbook of the Institute of National History in Cluj Napoca* 49 (2010): 245–57.

Part IV: **Mobility and Transfers**

István Vásáry

Nomadic Migration Waves in the Pontic Region (Fourth–Thirteenth Centuries)

The Black Sea region is one of the most complex geographical and cultural areas of the globe. To study it in its entirety is almost impossible, since different parts of the coastal and the adjacent regions have significantly disparate cultural and historical pasts. The focus of this chapter rests on the northern and western regions of the Black Sea from the fourth to the thirteenth centuries because, owing to migration waves of mainly nomadic populations arriving from the east, this millennium witnessed unprecedented changes in power politics and in the ensuing ethnic processes. The southern Pontic region (the Anatolian littorals) will also be investigated cursorily, but to a lesser extent, since it was less influenced by nomadic migration waves.

The main divisions of the Pontic Region examined in this essay can best be described as follows:

I. the northern and western Pontic region.
    1. the Volga-Don Caucasus triangle or northeastern Pontic Region; 2. the Don-Dnieper (Dnipro) region; 3. within the former region, the Crimean Peninsula can be regarded as a special unit, almost completely surrounded by the Black Sea (Pontus Euxinus) and its northeastern bay, the Sea of Azov (Maeotis); 4. the Dnieper-Dniester region; 5. the Dniester-Prut-Danube region called Moldova and Bessarabia in different periods (its southeastern part often designated as Bucak in Turkish); and 6. Dobruja, a territory bordered by the Danube and the Black Sea (called Scythia Minor in Antiquity).
II. The southern Pontic region (the Georgian and Anatolian littorals).

The above historical territories were successively conquered and populated by Indo-European peoples, the Cimmerians (from the twelfth to the eighth century BC), the Greeks (from the eighth century BC onward), the Scythians (from the seventh to the fourth century BC), and the Sarmatians (from the fifth century BC to the fourth century AD), and the southern coastal area was colonized by the Greeks from the seventh century BC onward. Subsequently, a fairly high civilization came into existence in Antiquity along the entire Black Sea, which combined the finest elements of Scythian, Sarmatian, Greek, and Roman cultures (see fig. 24).[1] Although the fragmented Greek city states long preserved their relative independence and autonomy, the Roman conquests united the whole Pontic region under Rome's suzerainty (47 BC–330 AD).[2]

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1 Mikhail Rostovtzeff, *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922).
2 For the Greek colonies of the Northern Pontic region, stretching from Odessos (near today's Varna) as far as Dioscuria (near today's Sukhumi), see fig. 24.

Fig. 24: Greek colonies on the northern Black Sea, eighth to third century BC.

Rabbinic Jews (Krymchaks), Karaites, Armenians, and Italians (Genoese and Venetians) were also migrant groups that settled on the Black Sea littoral and especially in the Crimean towns at different times. These ethnic and religious groups also contributed considerably to the motley cultural landscape of the Northern Black Sea region, but—unlike the nomadic pastoralists of the North—they arrived within the framework of peaceful migration waves in smaller groups, and were mainly merchants, artisans, and mariners who—together with the Greeks—were typical representatives of the urban culture. As far as the polity of the region is concerned, the Roman suzerainty of the Pontic region slided imperceptibly into Eastern Roman (Byzantine) rule in the fourth century. But soon the first nomadic intruders, the Goths and the Huns, appeared, and from that time onward to the thirteenth century, the frequently changing nomadic conquerors were instrumental in shaping the military and social history of the region. They became undoubtedly the real actors of the political life of the Black Sea.

In the following a brief sketch will be given of the migrations to the northern Pontic, then to the southern Pontic region. The first section begins with the Goths and Huns and ends with the appearance of the Tatars at the Battle of the Kalka River in 1223, when the united Rus and Cuman forces were crushed by the Tatars (Mongols).

1 The Northern and Western Pontic Region

1.1 Goths, Alans, and Huns

Goth was the common name for various Germanic tribes living northeast of the Roman Empire. The Gothic tribal world was rather fragmented in the third and fourth centuries; it was divided into six or perhaps more "kingdoms." By the 370s, the larger part of the Crimean Greek towns were under Gothic control, and the Bosporan Kingdom also fell under Gothic rule.[3]

In the 370s, the new and formidable nomadic tribal confederation of the Huns appeared in the Pontic steppe region, and their presence totally convulsed the power structure in the area. First, the Alans[4] living east of the Don were subjugated and compelled to join the Hunnic forces. Ammianus Marcellinus remarks that "by repeated victories they [the Alans] gradually wore down the peoples whom they met and like the Persians incorporated them under their own national name."[5] Obviously, the Alans did not disappear from the Pontic region, but after the Hunnic invasion, in the fourth and subsequent centuries, the historic records are silent on the Alanic tribes which remained in the Pontic steppes.[6] According to Peter Golden, the Iranian nomads remained in the Pontic steppes and formed an important substratum of the later Turkic peoples of western Eurasia.[7]

After the subjection of the Alans, the Greuthungi (predecessors of the later Ostrogoths or Eastern Goths) were attacked. (H)ermanaric, king of the Greutingi, resisted but soon he died (he probably committed suicide), and his successor Vithimer also lost his life on the battlefield. The remaining Goths, under the command of Alatheus and Saphrax, drew west of the Dniester. Athanaric, the ruler of the Tervingi (later the Visigoths or Western Goths) also tried to resist the Hunnic storm, but he failed to halt them.[8] The

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3 For a foundational monograph on the history of the Crimean Goths, see Aleksandr A. Vasiliev, *The Goths in the Crimea* (Cambridge, MA: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1936), 21–23. See also Mikhail Kizilov, *Krymskaia Gotiia: Istoriia i sudba* (Simferopol: Nasledie Tysiacheletii, 2015); Aleksandr I. Aibabin and Elzara A. Khairedinova, *Krymskie goty strany Dory (seredina III-VII v.)* (Simferopol: Antikva, 2017).

4 For the Alans, see Vasilii I. Abaev and Herold W. Bailey, "Alans," *Encyclopædia Iranica*, Vol. 1, Fasc. 8, 801–3. Alemany's monograph (Agustí Alemany, *Sources on the Alans: A Critical Compilation* [Leiden: Brill, 2000]) provides an inexhaustible wealth of information concerning the history of the ramified groups of the Alans from Antiquity to the late Middle Ages.

5 Ammianus Marcellinus, *Res Gestae*, 31.2.13: "Ammiani Marcellini Historiae Liber XXXI," accessed March 3, 2021, http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/ammianus/31.shtml.

6 Agustí Alemany, "Alans in Khazaria and Khazars in Alania: On the Nature and Role of North Iranian Elements in the Khazar Empire," *Chronica: Annual of the Institute of History, University of Szeged* 11 (2011): 169.

7 Peter B. Golden, "Cumanica III: Urusoba," in *Aspects of Altaic Civilization III*, ed. Denis Sinor (Bloomington, Indiana: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1990), 44.

8 Ammianus Marcellinus, *Res Gestae*, 31.3.1–8: "Ammiani Marcellini Historiae Liber XXXI," accessed March 3, 2021, http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/ammianus/31.shtml.

Eastern Goths, now under Alavivus and Fritigern's command, also drew to the Danube. Soon, in 376, the two Gothic groups, the Tervingi and the Greuthungi, met at the Danube, at the northern border of the Eastern Roman Empire, and requested admittance. In 378 the Byzantines suffered a devastating defeat at the hands of the Goths in the Battle of Adrianople. The further fate of the Goths within the Roman Empire falls outside the interest of this paper, but several Gothic groups under Hunnic rule remained in the Pontic region and a sizable portion of them migrated to the Crimean Peninsula, where they occupied the southern coastal area, which was mainly populated by Greek colonies.[9]

After displacing the Goths and compelling them to move west and south, subsequent to 376 the Huns inundated the northern Pontic region and permanently streamed toward the west. The Huns also invaded Crimea, but the Hun conquest of the peninsula is poorly documented in the sources. Common opinion has it that the bulk of the Huns flocked from east to west but a smaller part of them turned south and crossed the Cimmerian Bosporus (Kerch Straits). Then they drove through the Crimean steppe, pushing the Goths to the southern mountainous region, before moving toward the north and left Crimea through the Isthmus (Perekop).[10] All this allegedly happened during the reign of Emperor Valens (364–78). But the chronology of the events has been questioned recently; most probably the Huns must have crossed the Kerch Straits and plundered the Bosporan towns only twenty to thirty years later.[11]

The widely dispersed Gothic groups underwent a long process of Christianization from the mid-fourth century onward, and Crimea was no exception. Unlike the majority of Goths, the Crimean Goths were not Arians, but lived under the jurisdiction of the Constantinopolitan patriarchs, who ordained the bishops and organized the Eparchy of Gothia.[12] The center of the bishopric of Gothia was the town of Dory or Doros in southwestern Crimea (later, from the eighth century onward, also known as Mangup, and from the eleventh century Theodoro).[13]

As far as the language of the Crimean Goths is concerned, from the fifth century onward they were subjected to a strong influence of the Greek language and culture but it is difficult to tell to what extent they were Hellenized. There are numerous accounts by historians and travelers concerning their language but the only serious ac-

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9 For the Goths and the Gothic wars there is an extensive literature; for a selection, see Peter Heather, *The Goths* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 98–104; Arne Søby Christensen, *Cassiodorus, Jordanes and the History of the Goths. Studies in a Migration Myth* (Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen/Museum Tusculanum Press, 2002); Michael Kulikowski, *Rome's Gothic Wars: From the Third Century to Alaric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

10 Vasiliev, The Goths, 23–32.

11 Aleksandr I. Aibabin, "Gunny v ravninnom Krymu," *Nizhnevolzhskii arkheologicheskii Vestnik* 18, no. 2 (2019): 48–50.

12 Vasiliev, *The Goths*, 32–38.

13 Omeljan Pritsak, "Dory," in *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, ed. Alexander Kazhdan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 654–55.

count providing some Gothic words and sentences came about very late, in Busbecq's book of 1581.[14]

Although the center of the Hunnic Empire gradually shifted to the Carpathian Basin, the entire northern Pontic region remained under Hunnic rule. The Hun Empire reached its apogee in the years 434–53 under Attila's reign but after his death in 453 the gigantic nomadic realm immediately collapsed and was dismembered.[15]

1.2 Ogurs and Bulgars

Subsequent to Attila's sudden death in 453, part of the Hunnic core tribes inhabiting the Carpathian Basin dispersed, and some of them drove back to the northern Pontic region, their pristine homeland before the European campaigns. In a short decade thereafter a new wave of nomadic migrations reached the Black Sea region, changing the extant power relations in the area again. This large migration wave, encompassing almost the entire territory of Central Eurasia, was recorded only by Priscus of Panium (c. 410–72), to whom we owe the only eye-witness account on Attila and his court. In the 460s (probably in 463) envoys of the so-called "barbarian" peoples of the Saragur, Urog, and Onogur appeared at the Byzantine court and gave an account of a large-scale migration wave which had prompted them to flee and request the tutelage of the Byzantine Empire. The above three peoples were dislodged by the Savirs, who in turn were ousted and compelled to run from their abodes by the Avars. Their embassy was favorably received and, as usual, the new barbarians performed military borderline services for the Roman Empire in return for tribute (euphemistically called "gifts" by the Byzantines).[16] For example, a few years later, in 466, the Saragurs fought in Byzantine service against the Persians, in Transcaucasia on the territory of Iberia and Armenia.[17]

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14 The Fourth Turkish letter by Ogier Giselin de Busbecq (1522–92), a sixteenth-century Flemish writer and diplomat, describes the language of the Crimean Goths. The whole language corpus of the Crimean Gothic was analysed by Todd B. Krause and Jonathan Slocum, "Gothic Online, Lesson 10, 46–5," The University of Texas at Austin. Linguistic Research Center, accessed March 3, 2021, https://lrc.la.utexas.edu/eieol/gotol/100; cf. also Kizilov, *Krymskaia Gotiia*, 153–202.

15 Edward A. Thompson, *The Huns* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 69–175.

16 The excerpt from Priscus's text, together with equally important texts concerning the Byzantine embassies, was preserved by Constantine Porphyrogenitus's (mid-tenth-century) compilation: See "Constantine Porphyrogenitus," in *Excerpta de legationibus,* vol. 2, *Excerpta de legationibus gentium ad Romanos,* ed. Carl de Boor (Berlin: Weidmann, 1903), 586, fragment 14. Cf. also J. Moravcsik, "Zur Geschichte der Onoguren," *Ungarische Jahrbücher* 10 (1930): 54–61; Denis Sinor, "Autour d'une migration de peuples au Ve siècle," *Journal Asiatique* 235 (1946–1947): 1–77; András Mohay, "Priskos' Fragment über die Wanderungen der Steppenvölker (Übersicht über die neueren Forschungen)," in *Studies in the Sources on the History of Pre-Islamic Central Asia,* ed. János Harmatta (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1979), 129–44.

17 Boor, *Excerpta de legationibus* 2:588, fragment 19.

Who were the newcomers to the Pontic region? At first sight, one can see that *Ogur* is a common element in these ethnonyms, which can be interpreted in Turkic:[18] *Saragur* (< *Sharï* + *Ogur* 'white Ogur'; *Onogur* < *On* + *Ogur* 'Ten Ogurs'). So the Ogurs were the first ethnic group in Central Eurasia who can securely be identified as belonging to the Turks. (The ethnicity and language of the Huns is much debated). The Ogur tribal groups must have arrived from the Kazak Steppe, where they formed parts of the large tribal confederation of the northern steppe region stretching from Mongolia to the Urals and known as Tiele in Chinese sources.[19] The eastern Tiele groups were called *Oguz* in Turkic (the later Uygurs also belonged here), and the western tribes were the Ogurs.[20] The origin of the Savirs, who ousted the Ogur peoples, is shrouded in obscurity; perhaps they came from the Ili river and Dzungaria.

The Ogur peoples must have been in a hegemonic position in the history of the region stretching north of the Caucasus but from 506 to 557 the Savirs took overlordship of the region, frequently making incursions into Transcaucasia. In 557 the appearance of the Avars put an end to the Savir rule but the Avar presence was only temporary, since from 567–68 they escaped from the Turks (*Türk*) further westward and invaded the Carpathian Basin. In their wake, the Turks appeared as new lords of the new Inner Asian Turkic (*Türk*) Empire founded in 552 and drew the Ogur and Savir tribes under their rule. A Syrian author, Pseudo-Zacharias rhetor (ca. 555), who largely drew on former Byzantine sources, enumerated the nomadic peoples inhabiting the steppe region north of the Caucasus, among others the Onogurs, Ogurs, Savirs, and Saragurs.[21] This is the last mention of the Saragurs; thenceforth their name disappeared from the sources, unlike that of the Ogurs. In 569, Zemarchus, head of the Byzantine embassy to the new Turkic Empire, makes mention of the Ogur tribes whom he met on his way back from the Turks west of the Lower Volga river, where the Ogur ruler exercised his power in the name of the Turkic Khagan.[22] The last mention of the Ogurs occurs at Theophylact Simocatta (fl. 620s),[23] whereafter the name disappears from the sources.

Among the various Ogur tribal groupings in the northern and eastern Pontic region, only the Onogurs succeeded in sustaining their power for a rather extended period of time, in the sixth and seventh centuries.

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18 The forms *Saraguroi* and *Onoguroi* in Priscus' text clearly show that the form *Urogoi* must be amended to Oguroi.

19 For the Tiele confederation see Peter B. Golden, *An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples: Ethnogenesis and State-Formation in Medieval and Early Modern Eurasia and the Middle East* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992), 93–95.

20 The two forms of the same name (*Oguz* ~ *Ogur*) clearly refer to the two basic groups of Turkic languages, the *z-Turkic* (Common Turkic) and the *r-Turkic* (Oguric) types.

21 See Károly Czeglédy, "Pseudo-Zakharias Rhetor on the Nomads," in *Studia Turcica,* ed. Lajos Ligeti (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1971), 133–48.

22 *The History of Menander the Guardsman (Historikon syngramma),* trans. R. C. Blockley (Liverpool: F. Cairns, 1985), 125 and 266, n. 144.

23 Theophylactus Simocatta, *The History of Theophylact Simocatta,* trans. and annotated Michael Whitby and Mary Whitby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 224–25.

But before we proceed to the treatment of Onogur history in the Pontic region, a short bias seems reasonable to survey another ethnonym, *Bulgar*, and to clarify its ethnic content and possible connection with the Onogurs. The well-known ethnonym *Bulgar* surfaces in the Byzantine sources, first at the end of the fifth century and a few decades later than the ethnonyms of the Oguric peoples (Ogurs, Saragurs, Onogurs) emerged in Priscus' account. The first unambiguous mention of the Bulgars was made in 482, when they were employed as the allies of the Byzantine Emperor Zeno (474–91) against the Ostrogoths.[24] Afterwards, in the sixth century, they are frequent actors of the historical scene in the Northern Pontic region as well as in Thrace and Moesia in the Balkans. The origins of the Bulgars and their name has caused much headache for historical researchers, and despite the voluminous literature of the problem, a definitive answer cannot be given.[25] The most plausible opinion tries to explain the name on Turkic ground as far as the ethnonym Bulgar is a participle of the Turkic verb *bulga*-, meaning 'to mix, stir' and/or 'to rebel.' The ethnogenesis of the Bulgars is even more mysterious. According to a widespread, yet unproved opinion, the Turkic interpretation of the name Bulgar as 'mixture' or 'rebel' is explained by the fact that after the dissolution of Attila's empire (453) the Hunnic ethnic elements fleeing to the Pontic steppes melted with the Oguric tribes arriving there in the 460s. At any rate, the Hunnic contact must be taken into consideration since the emergence of the name Bulgar in most former territories of the Hunnic Empire (the western and northern Pontic region) from the 480s on cannot be coincidental.[26]

1.3 Onogurs or Onogundurs

To return to the Onogurs, their central habitat was between the Lower Don and Kuban rivers. According to Jordanes' *Getica* (ch. 5.37), the "*Hunuguri* are known to us from the fact that they trade in marten skins. But they have been cowed by their bolder neighbors."[27] The Anonymus of Ravenna (seventh century) also places the land of the Onogurs (*Onogoria*) near the Black Sea.[28] It is of special interest that in the *Notitia episcopatuum* (mid-eighth century) an Onogur episcopate that belonged to the eparchy of

24 Ioannis Antiocheni *Fragmenta ex Historia chronica*, ed. and transl. Umberto Roberto (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2005), no. 303, p. 516, lines 72–75.

25 For the best presentation of all the prevailing views on the issue, see Ziemann, *Vom Wandervolk zur Großmacht,* 32–44.

26 For an excellent, detailed treatment of the Ogur and Bulgar question, see Daniel Ziemann, *Vom Wandervolk zur Großmacht: Die Entstehung Bulgariens im frühen Mittelalter (7.–9. Jh.)* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2007), 24–141 ("Die bulgarische Frühgeschichte").

27 *The Gothic History of Jordanes in English version*, trans. Charles Christopher Mierow (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1915), 60.

28 Ravennatis *Cosmographia et Guidonis Geographica*, ed. Moritz Pinder and Gustav Parthey (Berlin: Fridericus Nicolaus, 1860), 170, lines 16–17.

Gothia is mentioned.[29] The Onogur Episcopate must have come into existence as early as the seventh century given Byzantine missionary activity in Gothia.

After Zemarchus' legation to the Turks in 576, another Byzantine envoy, Valentinus, was sent to the Western Turks. He was hosted by the Turkic local chief Turxanthus (a rendering of *Türk shad?*), probably a son of Silziboulus, the first western Turkic ruler. Turxanthus openly accused the Byzantines of treachery, since they made alliance with the Avars, the archenemies of the Turks. He openly cautioned them not to oppose the Turks and warned them by referring to the fate of the Alans and Unigurs,[30] who were subjected by the Turks. Soon the Western Turks began to attack the Pontic region at the Cimmerian Bosporus and occupied the city of Bosporos (ancient Panticapaeum) at the Kerch Straits and the adjacent territory belonging to Byzantium.[31]

Returning to the terms (On)ogur and Bulgar, originally in the sixth century, the appellations Onogur and Bulgar may have referred to different kindred tribal groups, since they were used separately as for example in Jordanes[32] (*Vulgarum sedes* […] *Hunuguri*) as well as other sources, but later they seemingly came to designate more or less the same ethnic formations, as witnessed by Agathon, who, under the year 713, mentioned the inroads of the Onogur Bulgars into Thrace.[33] The same event is recounted by two other, later sources, Theophanes and Patriarch Nicephorus, in which both authors designate the attacking barbarian enemy simply as Bulgars.[34] The exact ethnic processes underlying these ethnonyms cannot be clarified but seemingly by the eighth century the terms Onogur and Bulgar became *quasi* equivalent, the term Bulgar being a generic term for all groups of the Ogur branch.

The above-mentioned Theophanes and Patriarch Nicephorus give an excursus on the origins of the Unnogundur-Bulgars and the Kotrags.[35] The primordial habitat of the Bulgars is placed to the region of the Maeotis and the Kuban river (in the Greek text Kufis/Kofis). Here lay the old homeland of the Bulgars, called Great Bulgaria, founded by Kubrat, who was the first ruler of the Bulgars and the Kotrags (the latter

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29 Carl De Boor. "Nachträge zu den Notitiae Episcopatuum 2," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 12 (1891): 519–34; its new edition in Jean Darrouzès, *Notitiae episcopatuum ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae*, vol. 1, *Texte critique, introduction et notes* (Paris: Institut Français d'Études Byzantines, 1981), 242 (notitia 3, no. 615). See also George Vernadsky, "Byzantium and Southern Russia: Two Notes. 1. The Eparchy of Gothia," *Byzantion* 15 (1940–41): 67–76.

30 The form *Unigur* probably stands here for *Onogur*, but there are scholars who thought rather of *Utigur*, another Ogur group (for the Utigurs and Kutrigurs see further below). Be that as it may, an Oguric group was evidently meant here.

31 *The History of Menander*, 173–79 and 276–78, nn. 221–36. Cf. also Zieman, *Vom Wandervolk zur Großmacht*, 79.

32 See *The History of Menander*, 125 and 266, n. 144.

33 For this passage in Agathon, see Moravcsik, "Zur Geschichte der Onoguren," 67.

34 Theophanis *Chronographia*, vol. 1, *Textum graecum continens*, ed. Carl de Boor (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1883), 382–83; Nicephori archiepiscopi Constantinopolitani, *Opuscula historica*, ed. Carl de Boor (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1880), 48–49.

35 Nikephoros, Patriarch of Constantinople, *Short History*, ed., trans. and com. Cyrill Mango (Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 1990), 86–89.

stands for Kutrigur/Kuturgur, a tribal grouping of the Bulgars).[36] The appellation *Ono-gundur* and the former known forms *Onogur* are equivalent; Onogundur is a Turkic variant of Onogur with the Turkic suffix +*dur* (cf. also *Quman → Qumandur*). All this happened some time in the first quarter of the seventh century, when Kubrat Khan shook off the Avar yoke and became sovereign of the Bulgars. Theophanes' and Nice-phorus' narratives go back to earlier sources, and, although they seem to be authentic, it is impossible to separate the historic and mythic element in them. This holds true especially for the story of Kubrat's five sons. After his death, his sons followed different paths: The eldest son, Batbayan, remained in the paternal lands in the Don-Kuban region. The second son, Kotragos, crossed the Don river and settled in the territories west of the Don. This must be a reference to the Kutrigur Bulgars, whose eponym is the fictitious person Kotragos. The third son, Asparuch, crossed the Dnieper and Dniester rivers, and settled in the Onglos, a territory bordered by the Bug, the Lower Danube, and the Black Sea, a safe territory for many nomads, later called Budjak by the Turks. In 679 the Bulgars of Asparuch moved forward, crossed the Lower Danube and conquered Thrace, thereby laying the ground for the future First Bulgarian Empire. The fourth son, whose name is not mentioned in the source, went to Pannonia where he became a subject of Avar rule. Finally the youngest son (name unknown) migrated to Pentap-olis at Ravenna, where he settled. The Bulgar myth of origin as presented in the narrative of the two Byzantine historians is evidently construed, comprising earlier and later events of Bulgar history, displaying both historical and fictitious features, but their basic elements (the homeland at Maeotis and the disintegration of Great Bulgaria) cannot be questioned.[37]

1.4 Khazars

The Khazars, a Turkic tribe, were founders of the Khazar Empire, a state formation that for three hundred years (from the mid-seventh to the mid-tenth century) was the decisive factor and played a pivotal role in the history of Eastern Europe. Prior to the Mongol conquest in the thirteenth century, Khazaria was the mightiest state in Eastern Europe (see fig. 25). Its territory encompassed a vast area the nucleus of which lay within the ill-defined borders of the North Caucasian steppe lands, the lower and middle Volga region, the Don-Dnieper region and the northern coasts of the Black Sea (including Crimea). This unique empire founded by nomads and semi-no-mads could incorporate and organize the agriculturalist settled population of the con-

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36 For the Kutrigurs and Utigurs, see Zieman, *Vom Wandervolk zur Großmacht*, 95–103, esp. 102–3.
37 On Great Bulgaria, Kubrat, and the foundation myth, cf. also Zieman, *Vom Wandervolk zur Großmacht*, 142–56.

Fig. 25: The Khazar Khaganate, c. 820 AD (area of direct Khazar control in dark blue, sphere of influence in purple).

quered territories and ensure and promote the activities of urban craftsmen and a variegated group of merchants, actors of international trade.[38]

After the disintegration of the Western Turkic Empire in the 630s, a western successor state of Khazaria emerged in its stead, some time between 630 and 650. The ruling house of the new confederation must have hailed from the Ashina clan, the ruling clan of the Turks from the inception of their empire in 552.[39] It secured the *Pax Khazarica*, which fostered international trading by an undisturbed flow of merchandise from East to West and back. One could say Khazaria was a real commercial empire. Like all former nomadic realms in Eurasia, the Khazar state was polyethnic and polyglot. The semi-nomadic conquerors made up the ruling elite, most of them speaking various Turkic tongues, Common Turkic languages, and Oguric or Bulgaric ones.

By the second half of the eighth century the Khazar Empire had reached the apex of its expansion from the lower Volga in the East to the area westwards between the Dnieper and the Danube. One of the most important moments in empire building was the subjugation of the Onogu(ndu)r-Bulgar realm of Kubrat in the 670s. After the intermezzo of half a century of Bulgar suzerainty (Magna Bulgaria) in North Caucasia, the Khazars took power and became the dominant force not only in the region but also expanding their jurisdiction throughout the Pontic steppes, Crimea, and the territory what

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38 Out of the plethora of excellent monographs on the Khazar Empire, I highlight only two: Douglas M. Dunlop, *The History of the Jewish Khazars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954); Mikhail I. Artamonov, *Istoriia khazar.* 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg: Filologicheskii fakultet Sankt-Peterburgskogo gosudarst-vennogo universiteta, 2002).

39 Peter B. Golden, "Khazar Studies: Achievements and Perspectives," in *The World of the Khazars: New Perspectives,* ed. Peter B. Golden, Haggai Ben-Shammai, and András Róna-Tas (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 53.

is now Southern Russia and Ukraine. In addition to the main Turkic ethnic components, several ethnic groups were present in the Khazar Empire. The wide ethnic diversity of the Khazar realm comprised the Iranian Alans, the Crimean Goths, and the Greek colonies in Crimea. And we must not forget the ubiquitous Jewish and Armenian communities in Crimea and the Taman Peninsula.

The empire's main activity was collecting tribute from and levying taxes on the subjected population. The nomadic sector of the realm pursued traditional pastoralism while the ruling elite had a semi-nomadic way of life: From spring to autumn they nomadized outside the towns, living in their tents, and moved to the towns in the winter period.

In the mid-ninth century the Khazar Empire began to weaken on account of new nomadic attacks by the Pechenegs and Oguz, and the strengthening of Eastern Slavs and Hungarians. The final blow was dealt by Sviatoslav, prince of Kyiv (Kiev), and a former tax-payer to the Khazars, when he overwhelmed the Khazar fortresses Sarkel and Tamantarkhan (Russian: Tmutarakan), and finally in 968–69 the Rus forces plundered the Khazar capital Itil, at the Volga estuary. The new power center of Eastern Europe had shifted to Kyivan Rus.[40]

The subjected lands and settlements were governed by Khazar *tudun*s,[41] representatives of the central power, in charge of governing the towns and collecting the tribute. Let us have here a short overview of the major settlements that fell under Khazar rule.

The Byzantine city of Cherson (Old East Slavic: Korsun) was subjected to the Khazars in the 690s, and retaken by Byzantium in 838. On the same western coast of Crimea Kerkinitis also became a Khazar town, under the name Közliev (Crimean Tatar: *Kezlev*, Ottoman: *Gözleve*, renamed *Evpatoriia* after the Russian annexation). The central city of Crimean Gothia, Doros, also fell under long Khazarian rule, with the governor (*tudun*) at its head.

On the eastern shores of Crimea lay the ancient sea port Theodosia, devastated by the Huns in the fourth century AD. The Khazars extended their influence several times, but the swift development of the city began only after the Mongol invasion, with the advent of Genoese colonialists, who called the city Caffa (Crimean Tatar / Turkish: Kefe). To the west of Caffa lay the town of Sudak (Sugdaia), founded by the Alans and from 787 onward an episcopal see.[42]

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40 On the Khazar-Rus interrelations, see Sergei P. Shchavelev, "Slavic Tribute to Khazaria: New Materials for Interpretation," *Anthropology & Archeology of Eurasia* 57, no. 4 (2018): 282–93.

41 *Tudun* was already a dignitary in the Türk, Avar, and Bulgar Empires. For *tudun*, see Peter B. Golden, *Khazar Studies: An Historico-Philological Inquiry into the Origins of the Khazars* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1980), 1:215–16.

42 On Sudak, see Maria G. Nystazopulu-Pelekidu, *Hé en té Tauriké Khersonésó polis Sougdaia apo 13 mekhri tou 15 aiónos* (Athens: Hyperesia Archaioteton kai Anasteloseos, 1965); Omeljan Pritsak, "Sougdaia," in *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, ed. Alexander Kazhdan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 1931.

On the easternmost, strategic point of the Kerch Peninsula stood Panticapaeum. The city was subject to the influx of the Goths, then the Huns in 375 AD. Later it fell under Byzantine rule under the name Bosporos. In the seventh century the city came under Khazarian suzerainty[43] and was named Karcha (an antecedent of present-day Kerch). With the decay of the Khazar realm, Kyivan Rus rose to power, and the city (its Old East Slavic name was *K"rch"v*) belonged to the Tmutarakan Principality.

Opposite Bosporos (today: Kerch), in the Taman Peninsula lay the small settlement Hermonassa, founded by the Greeks. Following Bulgar rule the settlement fell into Khazarian hands in the late seventh century, and the new lords of the town built a fortress and gave it the name Taman-tarkhan (in Byzantine sources *Tamatarkha*). Lying on the Silk Road, it was an important hub of international commerce; accordingly, its inhabitants encompassed a wide variety of ethnic and religious groups (Khazars, Greeks, Armenians, Georgians, Jews, Alans, Lezgins, and Circassians). When it came under Rus control in the tenth century, Old East Slavic sources called the city *Tmutarakan*,[44] while in Arabic sources it features as *Samkarsh al-Yahūd*, with reference to the heavy Jewish presence in the city's trade.[45]

The role of Judaism and the Jews in the Khazar realm lies beyond the scope of this paper, similarly to the history of both the Rabbinic and the Karaite Jewish settlements in Crimea.[46]

1.5 Pechenegs and Oguz (Uz)

The Pechenegs were a nomadic tribal confederation whose roots go back to Central Asia. Their basic layer was the Kangars, an Iranian population living in the Aral-Syr Darya region, who later became Turkicized by the Pechenegs, presumably a Kipchak group of Turks.[47] The first massive migration by the Pechenegs took place from ca. 830–40, when they were ousted from their own territory by a concerted attack by the Oguz, allied with the Qarluqs and the Kimeks.[48] The Pechenegs had to leave

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43 As attested in the sources, in 698, a Khazar governor stood at the head of Bosporus and Phanagoria; see Moravcsik, "Zur Geschichte der Onoguren," 83.

44 Igor Georgievich Dobrodomov, "Tmutorokan i Taman," *Russkaia rech* 5 (1973): 129–33; Karl G. Menges, *Vostochnye elementy v "Slove o polku Igoreve"* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1979), 150–56.

45 See Joseph Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge: Ethnologische und historisch-topographische Studien zur Geschichte des 9. und 10. Jahrhunderts (ca. 840–940)* (Leipzig: Theodor Weicher, 1903), 163–64, 203, 336, 351.

46 There is extensive literature on the conversion of the Khazar elite and the history of Judaism in Khazaria; here allow me to refer only to Peter B. Golden, "Khazaria and Judaism," *Archivum Europae Medii Aevi* 3 (1983): 127–56.

47 On the Pechenegs, see Omeljan Pritsak, "The Pečenegs," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 1 (1975): 211–35; Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Peçenek tarihi* (Istanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1937).

48 Al-Masʿūdī, *Kitāb al-tanbīh wa'l-ishrāf*, ed. Michael J. de Goeje (Leiden: Brill, 1894), 180–81.

their age-old homeland on the Syr Darya and moved westward, south of the Ural Mountains, to the steppe region along the Emba, Yayik (Ural), and Volga rivers.[49] But a contingent of the Pechenegs remained in their old habitat and accepted the new overlordship of the Oguz, and, moreover, became integrated into the tribal system of the Oguz (as one of their subclans), preserving their own self-appellation *Becheneg*.[50]

The second exodus of the Pechenegs occurred in 889 – 94. This time it was again the Oguz (called *Guzz* in Arabic sources, *Uzoi* in Byzantine sources, *Torki* in Old East Slavic sources),[51] in alliance with the Khazars, who attacked the Pechenegs, whose only escape route was to the west, since in the north the Volga Bulgarian state, and in the south the Khazar Empire, stood in their way. They attacked the Hungarians in the Southern Russian steppe region and expelled them westward. The Hungarian tribes ousted by the Pechenegs occupied the Carpathian Basin in 895/96.[52] Thereafter, the Pechenegs became the masters and new lords of the northern and western Pontic region, the steppe zone from the Don to the Lower Danube, including Crimea (see fig. 26).

Fig. 26: The Pechenegs, c. 1030 AD.

Fifty years after their settling in the Pontic region, Constantine Porphyrogennetos, in § 37 of his work, composed a splendid description of the Pecheneg polity in the mid-

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49 Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De Administrando Imperio*, ed. Gyula Moravcsik, trans. Romilly J. H. Jenkins (Dumbarton Oaks: Center for Byzantine Studies, 2008), 166 – 67.

50 Maḥmūd al-Kāšγarī, *Compendium of the Turkic Dialects (Dīwān Lugāt at-Turk)*, ed. and trans. Robert Dankoff and James Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Printing Office, 1982) 1:362.

51 For the early Oguz history, see Peter B. Golden, "The Migrations of the Oğuz," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 4 (1972): 45 – 84.

52 There is extensive literature on the history of the Hungarian conquest of the land (the so-called "honfoglalás" in Hungarian and "Landnahme" in German); suffice it to refer here to one of the latest, the foundational study by István Zimonyi, *Muslim Sources on the Magyars in the Second Half of the 9th Century: The Magyar Chapter of the Jayhānī Tradition* (Leiden: Brill, 2016).

tenth century.[53] He described the land of the Pechenegs as consisting of eight provinces (tribes or groups). The learned emperor gave the names of the tribes and their leaders and their geographical situation. In his account, the land of the Pechenegs (Patzinakia) is very close to Cherson, and even nearer to Bosporos.[54] Their main military actions against Byzantium, Kyivan Rus, Khazaria, the Hungarians, and the Danube Bulgarians did not have a lasting impact on the region.

As an independent nomadic entity, the Pechenegs ceased to exist in 1091 after their crushing defeat in Lebounion (Thrace) at the hands of the Byzantine emperor Alexios I Komnenos, who was supported by Cuman and Vlakh warriors. The Battle of Lebounion was mild consolation for Byzantium in view of the heavy losses the Seljuk Turks inflicted in 1071 at the Battle of Manzikert. Most of the defeated Pechenegs were settled on Byzantine territory in Moglena (Macedonia), but a few independent Pecheneg groups that remained on the Pontic steppes revived and invaded Byzantium in 1122. The Pecheneg army was defeated again, this time for good, at the Battle of Beroia (near Stara Zagora in today's Bulgaria), recorded by John Cinnamus and other sources,[55] and the Pechenegs were dissipated throughout the Balkans and in the Hungarian Kingdom. Their further fate was total assimilation into the neigboring Slavic, Greek, and Hungarian populations.

Although in the tenth century the Pechenegs were the main actors of the Pontic steppe region, the Oguz tribes were gradually pushed to the west by a new confederation of Turkic nomads, the Cuman-Kipchaks, and appeared west of the Volga. Their role and number were incomparably less than the Pechenegs but were constantly involved in the power struggles in both Rus and Byzantium. After the dissipation of the Pecheneg tribal groups only a small contingent remained in their former Pontic homeland, and there they were easily absorbed by the Cuman-Kipchak newcomers, close relatives and new lords of the region.

1.6 Cumans or Kipchaks

After the Khazars' defeat by Sviatoslav in 965, in the mid-eleventh century a massive nomadic migration wave was set in motion which again rearranged the ethnic map of the Pontic steppes. This migration can be reconstructed on the basis of two narrative

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53 Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De Administrando Imperio*, 167–69. For the occurrences of the Pechenegs (*Patzinakoi, Patzinakitai* in Greek sources), see Gyula Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica,* vol. 2, *Sprachreste der Türkvölker in den byzantinischen Quellen* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1958), 247–49.

54 Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De Administrando Imperio*, § 37, ll. 48–49. For the Muslim sources, especially the anonymous geography of the ninth century, see *Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam: 'The Regions of the World'. A Persian Geography, 372 A.H.–982 A.D.,* trans. and expl. Vladimir Minorsky (London: Luzac & Co., 1937), 312–15.

55 See Sergei A. Kozlov, "Vizantiiskaia traditsiia o poslednei vizantino-pechenezhskoi voine," *Evropa. Mezhdunarodnyi Almanakh (Tiumen)* 10 (2011): 7–22.

sources, Marvazī's work in Arabic and Matthew of Edessa's Armenian chronicle.[56] Marvazī reports that the *Qūn*s were Nestorian Christian Turks who fled from the east from the Khitay territories. Expelled by the *Qāy*s, the *Qūn*s moved on to the territory of the *Shārī*s, then the latter migrated to the land of the *Türkmen*s, who in their turn shifted to the *Guzz* country. The *Guzz* Turks then moved to the territory of the *Bajānak*s (Pechenegs) near the sea.[57] The same event is related by Matthew of Edessa in his chronicle under the year 1051(?), according to which the people of the pale (Armenian: *xartešk'*; -*k'* is the Armenian plural form) expelled the Uz and the Pechenegs from their habitats.[58]

For our purposes, the most important participants in this migration wave are the *Qūn*s (at Marvazī) and the *Xartešk'*s, "the pale" (at Matthew of Edessa). The same people is designated in the Byzantine sources from the eleventh to the thirteenth century as *Kumanoi*/*Komanoi*,[59] in Latin sources as *Cumani*/*Comani*,[60] in the German sources as *Valwen*,[61] and in the contemporary Old East Slavic sources as *Polovtsy*.[62] The Old East Slavic and Armenian words undoubtedly mean "pale," and the ethnonyms *koman*/*kuman* and *kun* must have had the same meaning, "pale, sallow," in Turkic. All in all, a Turkic ethnonym meaning "pale" was translated into the languages of different sources.

The Cumans or *Qūn*s and the *Shārī*s, who can be identified with a Uygur group, the Sary-yugurs ('yellow Uygurs,'), arrived in southwestern Siberia, the homeland of the Kipchak (Qïpchaq) tribal confederation, around the middle of the eleventh century. On the basis of Marvazī's text we may claim that the Kipchaks and Cumans were originally two separate peoples but had merged by the twelfth century.[63] The best example to demonstrate this fusion of different names can be found in William of Rubruck's travel account (1253–54). After leaving Crimea for the East, he writes as follows: "This used to be the grazing ground of the Comans, who are known as the Capchac [Kipchak] [...]. This territory stretches in longitude from the Danube to the Tanais, the border between Asia and Europe, which is a journey of two months if one rides

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56 Sharaf al-Zamān Ṭāhir Marvazī, *On China, the Turks and India,* transl. and com. Vladimir Minorsky (London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1942), 18, 29–30. – For the sources as well as a detailed history of the Cumans, see Joseph Marquart, "Über das Volkstum der Komanen," in *Osttürkische Dialektstudien,* ed. Willy Bang and Joseph Marquart (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1914), 25–238, esp. 54–55.

57 For a commentary of Marvazī's text with a detailed explanation of the ethnonyms occuring therein, see Marvazī, *On China, the Turks and India*, 95–103.

58 For the digital critical edition of Matthew of Edessa's *Chronicle,* see https://editions.byzantini.st/ChronicleME/#/Edition.

59 For the Greek data, see Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica*, 2:167–68.

60 For the Latin data, see Albin F. Gombos, *Catalogus fontium historiae Hungaricae aevo ducum et regum ex stirpe Arpad descendentium ab anno Christi DCCC usque ad annum MCCCI* (Budapest: Szent István Akadémia, 1937–43), 4:46–47.

61 Gombos, *Catalogus* I, 23, 171, etc.; II, 852, 880, etc.; III, 1732–35, 1740, etc.

62 For all the occurrences of *Polovtsy* in the Russian Annals, see *Ukazatel k pervym osmi tomam Polnogo sobraniia russkikh letopisei: Otdel vtoroi. Ukazatel geograficheskii* (St. Petersburg: Arkheologicheskaia komissiia, 1907), 345–51.

63 Marquart, *Komanen*, 140, see also 78–79.

swifly, at the Tartars' speed. All of it used to be inhabited by the Capchac [Kipchak] Comans […]."[64] At another place: "Beyond these two rivers [i. e. the Don and the Volga], in the territory we crossed, used to live the Capchac [Kipchak] Comans before they were overwhelmed by the Tatars."[65] In the twelfth century and at the beginning of the thirteenth, the Kipchak-Cuman confederacy occupied an immense territory stretching from the middle reaches of the Irtysh as far as the Lower Danube. There existed no Kipchak or Cuman empire, but different Cuman groups under independent rulers or khans who acted on their own initiatives.[66] The politically strongest Cuman alliance was situated between the Volga and Dnieper rivers.

The territory of this Kipchak-Cuman realm consisting of loosely connected tribal units was called *Dasht-i Kipchak* (Kipchak Steppes) by the Muslim historiographers and geographers, *Zemlia Polovetskaia* (Polovtsian land) or *Pole Polovetskoe* (Polovtsian Plain) in the Rus sources, and *Cumania* in the Latin sources.[67]

2 The Southern Pontic Region

This region can be defined as the northern littoral of Anatolia. The first Greek colonists from the Ionian town Miletus appeared in this territory in the eighth century BC, and in the subsequent centuries settled all over the northern littoral of Anatolia. The most important settlements (from west to east) were Sinope (today: Sinop), Amisos (today: Samsun), Kotyora (today: Ordu), Cerasus (Ancient Greek: Kerasous, today: Giresun), and Trebizond (Ancient Greek: Trapezos / Trapezunda, today: Trabzon). In examining the history of these settlements one must not forget about the presence of a massive pre-Greek substrate as elsewhere in Anatolia. These so-called Pontic Greeks preserved their presence and significance on the shores of the Black Sea and in the Pontic Mountains of northeastern Anatolia, until their expulsion from Turkey as part of the Turkish–Greek population exchange in 1923. From the fourth century onward the entire area was Christianized, and in the important urban centers such as Amisos, Cerasus, and Trebizond Christian bishoprics were established that had an active role in Byzantine church history in the fifth to tenth centuries.

During the Byzantine era, the Greek population of Anatolia, including the southern Pontic region, lived in relative peace until the eleventh century. The vicissitudes of the Eastern Roman territories began with the appearance of the Seljuks on the eastern bor-

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64 Rubruck, "*Itinerarium* XII.6," in *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck*, trans. Peter Jackson (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1990), 105 – 6.

65 Rubruck, "*Itinerarium* XIV.3," in *The Mission of Rubruck*, 113.

66 For the tribes of the Cuman-Kipchaks, see the survey by Peter B. Golden, "Cumanica IV: The Tribes of the Cuman-Qipčaqs," *Archivum Europae Medii Aevi* 9 (1995 – 97): 99 – 122.

67 For occurrences in the Greek sources, see Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica,* 2:167; in the Latin sources, see Gombos, *Catalogus,* 2:47. Practically all the data for *Cumania* relate to the thirteenth century.

ders of Anatolia.[68] In 1071, in the Battle of Manzikert (today: Malazgirt), the army of the Byzantine emperor Romanus Diogenes suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the Seljuk sultan Alp-Arslan, the emperor himself being captured. It was the starting point of a centuries-long process during which the majority of the populace of Anatolia became Muslim and Turkicized. The factual and symbolic end of this process was the fall of Constantinople in 1453.

After the Battle of Manzikert, the Seljuk forces pushed forward in Anatolia under the leadership of the Seljuk commander Sulayman ibn Qutulmish, and in 1075 they captured the Byzantine cities of Nicaea (today: İznik) and Nicomedia (today: İzmit). By declaring himself sultan, Sulayman established a new independent independent Seljuk state with İznik as its capital. Later, in 1096, under the pressure of the forces of the First Crusade, the capital of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum was transferred to Konya (former Iconium).

In the thirteenth century there were two interesting episodes in the history of the Rum Seljuks as a result of which they came into contact with Crimea. In the 1220s, Kayqubad sent an expeditionary force on the Black Sea to Crimea,[69] and in 1260 Kaykāʾūs II fled from Konya to Crimea, where he died in 1279.[70]

In the twelfth century the settlements of the southern Pontic littoral were saved from the further advance of Seljuk expansion. After the capture of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204, the Empire of Trebizond emerged as a successor state of Byzantium in the Pontus region. Its first ruler was Alexios I Komnenos. The small realm of Trebizond encapsulated the settlements of the eastern zone of the northern Anatolian littoral, from Sinope to Trebizond and further east. Parts of the Byzantine territories of the northern Pontic region in Crimea such as Kerch and Doros (Theodoro/Mangup) were also connected to the Trebizond Empire as parts of its overseas province (*perateia*).[71] It survived, with an ever-shrinking territory (e.g., Sinope was taken by the Seljuks in 1204, and after 1244 the Seljuks appeared in the region of Cerasus too) for more than two centuries; finally it was taken by Sultan Mehmed II in 1461 and incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. Although after the capture of Constantinople (1453) and Trebizond (1461) the Greek-speaking Christian population became a minority in the Ottoman Empire, in Pontus, on the Black Sea coast, the Greek presence remained very strong: They formed the majority of the population until the seventeenth century.

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68 There exist plenty of works dealing with the Seljuks in Anatolia. Suffice it to mention here two important works: Claude Cahen, *The Formation of Turkey: The Seljukid Sultanate of Rūm. Eleventh to Fourteenth Century,* trans. and ed. Peter M. Holt (Harlow: Longman, 2001); Andrew C. S. Peacock and Sara Nur Yıldız, eds., *The Seljuks of Anatolia: Court and Society in the Medieval Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013).

69 Andrew C. S. Peacock, "The Saljūk Campaign against the Crimea and the Expansionist Policy of the Early Reign of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Kayqubād," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 16 (2006): 133–49.

70 István Vásáry, *Cumans and Tatars: Oriental Military in the Pre-Ottoman Balkans, 1185–1365* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 72–9; Rustam Shukurov, *The Byzantine Turks, 1204–1461* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 99–105.

71 Vasiliev, *The Goths,* 159.

3 Closing Remarks

The entire Pontic region was an area long inhabited by populations of ancient cultures. From the eighth century BC onward, both the northern and the southern Pontic coastal areas were colonized by Greek settlers. From then on, Greek culture and language played a dominant role in the region, both in the Roman and in the Byzantine eras. The most important changes in the long-term history of the Pontic region were caused by the waves of nomadic migrations from the east that affected both the northern and the southern Pontic littorals. The most essential difference in the history of the northern and southern regions is that in the north the nomadic waves flowed incessantly from the fourth century AD onward, while in the south, in what is now northern Anatolia, the Greek population and culture were able to retain their hegemonic role until the eleventh century, when the first waves of Seljuk-Turkish conquerors appeared. Even afterwards, until the fifteenth century, when the whole area finally fell into the hands of the Ottoman Empire, the Greek participation in the political and cultural life of the area cannot be neglected. In both the north and the south, the usual protagonists of the invasions were various Turkic peoples and tribal groups, the only exception being the Mongols in the thirteenth century.

The Mongols first appeared in the Dniester region in 1223. Their arrival and the beginning of a new political era was heralded by the crushing defeat at the Kalka River of the allied Cuman and Rus forces at the hands of the new nomadic power of the Mongols, marking the beginning of a period of more than five-hundred years in the history of the northern Pontic region. In the timespan between ca. 350 and 1250 examined in this essay, the Pontic region was never under the rule of a single overall state organization. The two decisive state powers were the Byzantine and the Khazar Empires which, for almost a millenium, had to face the recurrent attacks of nomadic waves of Goths, Alans, Huns, Ogurs, Bulgars, Onogurs, Pechenegs, Oguz (Uz), Cumans, and Kipchaks, to mention only the most influential. One may raise the question whether, in addition to constantly influencing the political power relations and economic situation in the northern Pontus region, these nomadic influxes had a lasting impact on the historical fate of the region. Arguably their most important impact was that by establishing political control over the indigenous inhabitants of an area, they settled among them and gradually changed the ethnic picture of the region. They left an indelible imprint on the region which indisputably originated from Turkic ethnic groups and with the Mongol/Tatar conquest in the thirteenth century the influx of Turkic elements continued unabatedly. The majority of the Tatars of the Golden Horde, then of the Crimean Khanate were Mongol conquerors in Turkic ethnic garb. Hence the Turkicization of the northern Pontic region, which proceeded at a slower pace in the years 350–1250, accelerated after the Mongol/Tatar conquest. It was mainly the Turks who entailed real ethnic changes: By the fifteenth century, in both the northern Pontic and southern Pontic regions the Turkic ethnic elements had become predominant.

Arkadiusz Blaszczyk

Migration around the Black Sea (from the Mid-thirteenth Century to 1700)

Between the thirteenth and the eighteenth centuries, Crimea and the coasts and hinterlands of the western Black Sea were an important focal point of migration. The migrations originated predominantly in the northeast (the Volga, the Caucasus, and the adjacent steppe regions of northwestern Eurasia / Central Asia) and southeast (Anatolia, Anatolia via southern Rumelia, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia/Iran via Anatolia). They included people like the Seljuks, Turks/Yörüks, Armenians, Circassians, Jews and Karaites, Mongols/Tatars, and Nogays. Migrations from the north, northwest, and southwest had fewer origins but more durative effects: The Vlach migrations into the lands of the lower Dnister (Dniester) and Danube as well as the Slavic colonization of the former Dasht-i Kipchak from the realms of Poland, Lithuania, and Muscovy.

1 Between the Steppe and the Sea: Cuman Heritage, Seljuk Exiles, and Mongol Relocation Practices

Due to the lasting effect on the ethnogenesis of many littoral people of the Black Sea and its riverine systems, a few words on the Cumans / Kipchaks seem in place. They dominated the western steppes of Eurasia for almost two centuries leaving an impact not only on the Kyivan Rus but also on their later conquerors, the Mongols, whose western branch, adopting the Kipchak language and merging with their speakers, formed the Tatar ethnos. But Cuman traces can also be found further west. Until the Mongol campaign of 1241, the last and westernmost safe haven of the Cuman confederation from Mongol onslaught was the steppe lands between the river Olt, the Danube, and the Carpathians—a stretch of land called Cumania even until the fourteenth century, when it became known by the new names of Wallachia (Oltenia and Muntenia) and Moldavia. At the end of the twelfth century, from the cultural and ethnic symbiosis of Slavs to the south of the lower Danube, Vlachs of the Balkan Mountains, and Cumans to the north of the Danube, emerged the Second Bulgarian Empire, whose ruling houses (Asenids,

Shishmanids, and Terterids) were of Cumano-Vlach or Cuman extraction.[1] The emergence of the Second Bulgarian Empire and later the crushing of the Cuman rump confederation as well as the settlement of its remnants in Hungary and south of the Danube, allowed for the migration of the Vlachs from the mountains south of the Danube into the depopulated plains of former Cumania. Here several small Vlach dominions (knezates) emerged, which were to become the Principality of Wallachia, originally ruled by the Basarabs, a family of Cumano-Vlach descent, and, with some detour via the Carpathians, the Principality of Moldavia. The Mongol/Golden Horde's presence on the lower Danube reached its peak in the second half of the thirteenth century under Genghisid prince and emir Nogay (d. 1299), who ruled over the most western ulus between the Don and the Danube. A powerful *éminence grise* in the Golden Horde, he also actively intervened in the affairs of the Bulgarian and the Byzantine thrones. From 1286 on, he minted his own coins in Saqçı (Ottoman: İsakça, today: Isaccea) in the Danube Delta, which was to become his residence. After the death of Nogay and his sons around the turn of the century, the cities of the Danube Delta as well as Maurocastro, which was to become Ottoman Akkerman (today Ukrainian Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi), came, by the grace of the Golden Horde, as most researchers agree, under the administration of Bulgarian tsar Theodore Svetoslav for a period of two decades.[2]

Nogay's rule on the Danube and the subsequent Bulgarian administration connect to the problem of the pre-Ottoman Anatolian Turkish colonization of what was later called Dobruja, that is, the coastal lands between the Danube and the eastern Balkan mountains. The sources indicate that prior to the Ottoman conquest this area was inhabited by turcophone Christians. The modern-day Gagauz of Moldavia, a Christian people with an Oghuz Turkic language, whom the Russians had resettled in the 1830s from their old abodes south of the Danube, are generally considered their descendants. The origins of this people are heavily debated. The theories can be grouped into two camps: One sees the Gagauz descendants of Turkic peoples such as the Pechenegs, Cumans, Tatars, etc., who migrated successively from the north and were Christianized by Bulgarians and Byzantines. The other sees them as the descendants of socalled "Tourkopouloi," Anatolian Turks, who came to Byzantium with the Seljuk prince ʿIzz al-Dīn Kaykāʾūs II in the mid-thirteenth century and were eventually settled to defend the Byzantine borders in the later Dobruja.[3] Machiel Kiel's analyses of Ottoman

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1 Alexandru Madgearu, *Byzantine Military Organization on the Danube: 10th–12th Centuries* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 115–66; István Vásáry, *Cumans and Tatars: Oriental Military in the Pre-Ottoman Balkans, 1185–1365* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 13–144.

2 Vásáry, *Cumans and Tatars,* 69–165; Virgil Ciocîltan, *The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 241–79.

3 For a representative of the first position, see Georgi Atanasov, *Dobrudzhansko Despotstvo: Kam politicheskata, tsarkovnata, stopanskata i kulturnata istoriia na Dobrudzha prez XIV vek* (Veliko Tarnovo: Faber, 2009), 401–39, who builds on the work of Strasimir Dimitrov and Petar Mutafchiev. The opposite research tradition was established by Paul Wittek. Cf. Paul Wittek, "Yaz̧ı̂ĵîog̲h̲lu ʾAlī on the Christian

tax registers of the region show that a Christian population with ancient Turkic names, rather untypical for the Ottoman Empire, settled in the regions along the coast and the rivers, while the largely deserted plains in the interior were repopulated from Anatolia, where typical Muslim names prevailed. Machiel Kiel therefore assumed that the "original population" of Dobruja was ethnically and linguistically a mixture of Cumans, Pechenegs, and pre-Ottoman Anatolian Turks.[4] This is supported not least by the name for the Dobruja Turks used by Evliya Çelebi in the Seyahatname, which has also been handed down in other sources:[5] "çıtak," which Evliya Çelebi clearly used in the sense of "half-breed" or hybrid.[6] It seems that for Evliya it was not the ethnic or religious affiliation that defined a "çıtak," but certain linguistic and cultural markers, such as their clothing and food, which Evliya would recognize as expressing a closeness to the Tatar world. Thus, for him, all Turkic-speaking inhabitants of Dobruja, whether Christian or Muslim, were Çıtak.[7] An alternative term Evliya used is "Tatarşe/Tatarşa," which derives from either the Persian diminutive "-çe" ("little Tatar") or the Turkic-language equative -ce/-ca or -şe/-şa ("Tatar-like"). For example, Evliya Çelebi wrote about the inhabitants of Silistra:

Turks of the Dobruja," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 14, no. 3 (1952): 639–68. For recent discussions, see Vásáry, *Cumans and Tatars*, 72–79; Ciocîltan, *The Mongols,* 241–49.

4 Machiel Kiel, "The Dobrudja: A Bridge and Meeting Point Between the Balkans, Anatolia and the Ukraine. The Ottoman-Turkish Sources for the History and Historical Demography and Settlement History of the Dobrudja and How They Can Be Used," in *Turco-Bulgarica: Studies on the History, Settlement and Historical Demography of Ottoman Bulgaria,* ed. Machiel Kiel (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2013), 147–66.

5 The word "çıtak" for the people of Dobruja was also used in the seventeenth century by the Crimean Armenian chronicler Khachatur Kafaetsi. Edmund Schütz, "Eine armenische Chronik von Kaffa aus der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 29, no. 2 (1975): 146.

6 The word is derived from the old Oghuz root "çat": to pair, to breed. Cf. Nişanyan Sözlük, s.v. "çat[mak]."

7 Seyit Ali Kahraman et al., eds., *Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, vol. 3, *Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi Bağdat 305 Numaralı Yazmanın Transkripsiyonu-Dizini* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2006), 114a, 120a, 122a, 125a–25b. Outside Dobruja, Evliya used the term Çıtak mostly in connection with Rumelian Yörüks, for instance for the Yörüks of Thessaloniki ("yörükân ve çıtakân"). The actual Yörüks were Turkmen (Oghuz) nomads. Yet the Yörüks of Thessaloniki were called "yörükan ve tataran" until the sixteenth century (cf. Mehmed Tayyib Gökbilgin, *Rumeli'de Yürükler: Tatarlar ve Evlâd-ı Fâtihân* [Istanbul: Osman Yalçın Matbaası, 1957], 87), since they were originally mixed in composition and included some "Tatars," that is, non-Oghuz Turkic peoples who had come to southeastern Europe or Anatolia in connection with the Mongol invasion, Timur Lenk, or through immigration from the Golden Horde area. Since Evliya Çelebi obviously often used the term Çıtak for dialects of Turkish that had a certain "Tatar" appeal, it can be assumed that the "Tataran" of the sixteenth century had become "Çıtakan" in the seventeenth due to linguistic assimilation to the Oghuz language of the Yörüks. Sometimes, however, Evliya refers to Greek and Bulgarian influences as well; see Kahraman et al., *Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi,* 3:142a–42b; Seyit Ali Kahraman et al., eds, *Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi,* vol. 8, *Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi Bağdat 308 Numaralı Yazmanın Transkripsiyonu-Dizini* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2003), 202b, 207b, 212b, 220a, 223b.

> And their warriors ride saddled horses like the Tatars and carry bows. These are the ones who go on raids with the Tatars, they are the Tatarşe people. In another way, they are also called the Dobruja people. It is a çıtak people born from Tatars, Bulgarians, Moldovans, and Wallachians. Initially, they were offspring of the warriors of Orhan's son Süleyman Şah of the House of Osman. Later, when Yıldırım Bayezid Han adorned the city with the Tatars, their mothers were Tatars, Bulgarians, Moldovans, and Wallachians, and a kind of mixed race [*çıtak kavmı*] emerged.[8]

Evliya saw the Çıtak as the descendants of the companions of Süleyman Pasha, son of the second Ottoman ruler Orhan Gazi and pioneer of the Ottoman raids / conquests in Southeastern Europe. He therefore moved the emergence of the Tatarşe / Çıtak to a historical context more familiar and closer to him, but his description can certainly be read as a later reflection of Sultan ʿIzz al-Dīn Kaykāʾūs II's story. Evliya Çelebi was not the only Ottoman chronicler to make such remarks. İbrahim Peçevi proved the existence of a cultural memory about the Cumano-Tatar past of the lower Danube region when he wrote that some of the Tatars settled in Wallachia and Moldavia and were converted to Christianity by the "infidels." In particular, the majority of Moldavians, he wrote, were descendants of these Tatars.[9]

The Bulgarian historian Georgi Atanasov rejects the "out of Anatolia" theory of the Gagauz's Seljuk origin, arguing that Byzantium could not have settled ʿIzz al-Dīn's retinue in Dobruja, as it was under Mongol suzerainty.[10] In fact, Atanasov ignores that ʿIzz al-Dīn's retinue, following the imprisonment of their prince by the Byzantine emperor, must have switched allegiance from the Byzantines to the Mongols—making Dobruja a place of Seljuk settlement under Mongol rule. ʿIzz al-Dīn Kaykāʾūs II had kinship ties in the Golden Horde to thank for his liberation during a large Bulgarian-Mongol raid against Byzantium in 1264. He migrated with his followers to Crimea, where he received the cities of Solkhat (or Eski Qırım) and Sudaq as an apanage—a choice that was not entirely coincidental, since Sudaq had been under Seljuk rule from around 1222 until the Mongol conquest of Crimea in 1239.[11]

The Ottoman chronicler Yazıcıoğlu reported that some of ʿIzz al-Dīn's followers returned to Dobruja after a few years in Crimea, including the semi-legendary Sufi mystic Sarı Saltık (d. 1297/98), whose mausoleum in Babadağı (today: Babadag, Romania) and *zaviye* (small convent) in Keligra (today: Kaliakra) became important places of

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8 Kahraman et al., *Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, 3:120a.

9 İbrahim Peçevi, *Tarih-i Peçevi* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1283/1866), 1:473; Mihail Guboglu and Mustafa Mehmet, *Cronici turceşti privind ţările Române: Extrase*, vol. 1, *Sec. XV – mijlocul sec. XVII* (Bucharest: Ed. Acad. Republicii Soc. România, 1966), 492–93.

10 Atanasov, *Dobrudzhansko Despotstvo*, 436.

11 Vásáry, *Cumans and Tatars*, 72–79; Ciocîltan, *The Mongols*, 241–47; Andrew Charles Spencer Peacock, "The Saljūq Campaign Against the Crimea and the Expansionist Policy of the Early Reign of 'Alā' Al-Dīn Kayqubād," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland* 16, no. 2 (2006): 133–49; Aydın Taneri, "Hüsâmeddin Çoban," *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1998), 18:513. On the architectural heritage of the Seljuks in Crimea, see Nicole Kançal-Ferrari, "Contextualising the Decorum of Golden Horde-Period Mosques in Crimea," *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, no. 143 (2018): 191–214.

Sufi worship in subsequent centuries.[12] The remigration to Dobruja probably took place during Nogay's reign in Saqçı in the 1280s and 1290s, from which Babadağı is only about sixty kilometers away. Confirming the connection to Nogay is the oldest extant source on Sarı Saltık, an Arabic hagiography written in 1315, which locates the mystic in Saqçı.[13] This source largely invalidates Atanasov's argument that archaeological investigations in Babadağı have not brought to light any traces of pre-Ottoman Anatolian settlement from the thirteenth century: Apparently the Sufis lived ascetically in the wilderness, on a mountain at some distance from Saqçı, later called Babadağı ("Baba[14] mountain")—so the absence of a Seljuk city at this location is not a valid argument for a general absence of pre-Ottoman Turkish colonists. The extensive conversion of the Anatolian immigrants to Christianity, apart from changes of faith made in Byzantine service, probably took place in the first years of Bulgarian rule in the Danube Delta region. An important condition for this was certainly the reign of the last Tengrist ruler of the Golden Horde, Tokhta Khan, who, although not a Christian himself, was at least sympathetic to Christians. Those of ʿIzz al-Dīn's followers who escaped conversion from the Bulgarians and Byzantines returned to Anatolia in the early fourteenth century.[15] It can be assumed that the worship of Sarı Saltık continued among the Dobruja Turks, who converted to Christianity. In any case, the cult survived the years of Bulgarian rule in the Danube Delta. Three to four decades after his death, a small town already existed at the site of Sarı Saltık's burial place. Ibn Battuta, who traveled through the region in 1332/33, named it Baba Saltık in his travelogue and noted that it was named after an "ecstatic mystic." That the Sarı Saltık cult was preserved by the Christian proto-Gagauz until the mystic's Muslim / Ottoman reappropriation in the fifteenth century might be also assumed by the fact that he appears as a religiously ambiguous figure in most of the preserved written traditions about him.[16]

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12 Wittek, "Yazîĵîoghlu"; Ayşe Kayapınar, "Dobruca Yöresinde XVI. Yüzyılda Gayr-i Sünnî İslam'ın İzleri," *Alevilik-Bektaşilik Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no. 1 (2009): 85–102; Machiel Kiel, "Ottoman Urban Development and the Cult of a Heterodox Sufi Saint: Sarı Saltuk Dede and Towns of İsakçe and Babadağ in the Northern Dobrudja," in *Syncrétismes et hérésies dans l'Orient seldjoukide et ottoman (XIVe–XVIIIe siècle): Actes du Colloque du Collège de France, octobre 2001*, ed. Gilles Veinstein (Paris: Peeters, 2005), 283–98.

13 Kiel, "Ottoman Urban Development," 286–87.

14 *Baba* (father), *dede* (grandfather), *pir* (elder) are Sufi titles.

15 Atanasov, *Dobrudzhansko Despotstvo*, 436–37; Ciocîltan, *The Mongols*, 259–68. On Tokhta's attitude towards Christianity, see Ciocîltan, *The Mongols*, 268, fn. 513, and Thomas Tanase, "A Christian Khan of the Golden Horde? 'Coktoganus' and the Geopolitics of the Golden Horde at the Time of Its Islamisation," *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, no. 143 (2018): 49–64.

16 Stefan Rohdewald, "A Muslim Holy Man to Convert Christians in a Transottoman Setting: Approaches to Sarı Saltuk from the Late Middle Ages to the Present," in *The Changing Landscapes of Cross-Faith Places and Practices*, ed. Manfred Sing, special issue, *Entangled Religions: Interdisciplinary Journal for the Study of Religious Contact and Transfer* 9 (2019): 57–78; Kiel, "Ottoman Urban Development," 284–85.

As seen in the example of Seljuk colonists, the shifting of populations with the aim of (re)populating cities in their steppe core lands was a typical feature of the early Golden Horde. Its rulers and elites found prestige in the foundation of cities, most of which disappeared again, however, in the period from the late fourteenth to the mid-fifteenth century, leaving a series of ruinous sites or landmarks called *urochysh-cha* or *horodyshcha* in Ukrainian (Polish: *uroczyszcza, grodziszcza*).[17] The Seljuks were not the only group transplanted in such a manner—a prominent group in that respect is the Crimean Armenians. Thus, in the Crimean Armenian cultural memory of the seventeenth century, as reflected in the works of Dawit Krimetsi and Martiros Krimetsi, their ancestors were described as having arrived in Crimea from the Volga, that is, the Golden Horde's capital Sarai, in the fourteenth century, where they had migrated earlier from Transcaucasia.[18] Deportations of artisans of various religious and ethnic backgrounds were a common feature of Mongol warfare and marked inner-Mongol conflict too, such as the Golden Horde raids on Ilkhanate Caucasia.[19] Obviously, once in Crimea, this core community of displaced Armenians attracted more and more Armenian colonists from nearby Asia Minor and Transcaucasia, especially in the turbulent years of Ilkhanid disintegration and after the conquest of Armenian Cilicia by the Mamluks in 1375. First settling predominantly in Solkhat (or Eski Qırım), the administrative center of Mongol Crimea, the focus of settlement later shifted to the Genoese colony of Caffa (today: Feodosiia)—a safe haven with many opportunities for trade. The migration of Armenians to Crimea took on massive proportions, reaching a population of 30,000 in Caffa alone in 1439—Latin sources even began to refer to the Armenian colonies of Crimea and the Azov Sea as Armenia Magna or Armenia Maritima.[20] By analogy, a similar process was also assumed for the early modern Karaite and Rabbanite Jewish communities of Crimea—a core of former Sarai citizens originating from Persia and Transcaucasia whose ranks were filled by migrants from the fading Byzantine Empire.[21] The demographic impact of the Genoese colonies

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17 Consider for example Yangı Şehir on the Dnister, mentioned below, or Ordu on the lower Dnipro, founded by Beklerbek Mamai. Mikhailo Elnikov, "Rezydentsiia Bekliarbeka Mamaia i misto Ordu (do 60-richchia doslidzhennia Kuchuhurskoho gorodyshcha)," *Naukovi pratsi istorychnoho fakultetu Zaporizkoho natsionalnoho universytetu* 36 (2013): 28–32.

18 Federico Alpi, "In Magna Armenia: appunti sugli Armeni nella Caffa del XIV secolo," *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome: Moyen Âge* 130, no. 1 (2018): 73–83.

19 Christopher P. Atwood, "Artisans in the Mongol Empire," in *Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongolian Empire*, ed. Christopher P. Atwood (New York: Facts On File, 2004). See for example the deportation of many Tabrizian artisans to Sarai on the Volga by Tokhtamysh Khan in 1385, when he probably took them first to Crimea and later into Lithuanian exile, see Dan Shapira, "Crimean Tatar," *Encylopaedia Iranica Online*, 2017, accessed August 23, 2022, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/crimean-tatar.

20 Alpi, "In Magna Armenia"; Edmund Schütz, "The Stages of the Armenian Settlements in the Crimea," *Transcaucasia* 2 (1978): 116–35.

21 Dan Shapira, "Beginnings of the Karaite Communities of the Crimea Prior to the 16th Century," in *Karaite Judaism: A Guide to Its History and Literary Sources*, ed. Meira Polliack (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 709–28; Golda Akhiezer, "The Intellectual Life and Cultural Milieu of Jewish Communities in Medieval Kaffa and Solkhat," *AJS Review* 43, no. 1 (2019): 1–21.

in Crimea is significant not only from the influx of people, be it Italians, Armenians or others, but also as an outlet of the slave trade infusing large numbers of Tatar and Circassian slaves from the steppe hinterlands of the Black Sea into the major slave markets of the Mediterranean, especially Mamluk Egypt.[22] Yet Circassians (Adyge) displacement was not reduced to slavery. As in the other examples, they were displaced for strategic reasons too. Thus, there are reasons to believe that Emir Nogay settled Circassians in the border zones of his realm for defensive purposes—in Crimea and at the border with Lithuania on the middle Dnipro. There the town of Cherkasy is assumed to have been founded as a Circassian colony by the Mongols.[23]

2 Winds of Change? New Regional Powers in Eastern Europe and the Struggle over the Mongol Legacy

After the violent death of Nogay and the unsuccessful attempt by his son Çaqa to take over his political inheritance, the Tatars began their slow retreat from the area of the lower Danube and the Dnister, which, as already mentioned, first became evident in the fact that the Tatars left the administration of their Danubian territories to the Bulgarians for two decades. Even after reclaiming these territories, they were continuously on the retreat from the expanding East-Central European powers of Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania. In 1345, a Hungarian Szekler army led by András Lackfi defeated the Tatar army of the Genghisid prince/emir Atlamysh. Further clashes followed in the 1350s. In 1362, again, Atlamysh's successors, Demetrius/Timur, Hacıbeg, and Qutluboğa suffered a crushing defeat at the Battle of the "Blue Waters" (Syniukha in Ukraine) against a Lithuanian army. Timur-Demetrius is still traceable in the lower Dnister–Danube region until 1374—his end is probably connected with a Lithuanian campaign against him documented for that year. Hacıbeg and Qutluboğa were probably still active in the region until the turn of the century. In 1388, according to the Ottoman chronicler Neşri, they were invited by the Ottoman grand vizier Çandarlızade Ali Pasha to participate in the ongoing Ottoman campaign against Bulgaria. Finally, the Tatar presence at the Dnister was probably concentrated in the middle and lower Dnister between the present-day towns of Camenca and Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi, as indicated mainly by archaeological findings. The main settlement was apparently the town of Šahr al-Ġadid/Yangı Şehir in the area of present-day Orheiul Vechi, which was abandoned, however, in the late 1360s or early 1370s. Elsewhere in the mentioned area, sporadic Tatar presence can be traced as late as the first years of the fifteenth century. One

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22 For a recent study, see Hannah Barker, *That Most Precious Merchandise: The Mediterranean Trade in Black Sea Slaves, 1260–1500* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019).

23 Oleg Bubenok, *Adygi v Severnom Prichernomore* (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 2019), 241.

of the main reasons for the Tatar withdrawal from the region, apart from the expansion of Lithuania, Poland, and Hungary, was the internal succession struggles of the period referred to in Ruthenian sources as the "great confusion" (*velikaia zamiatnia*) after the death of Khan Berdibek in 1359.[24]

This situation enabled the emergence of new semi-autonomous principalities in the area between the Carpathian Arc and the Balkan Mountains. In the early 1360s, Bogdan, the voivode of Maramureș in the north of the Carpathians, defected from the Hungarian king and expulsed the voivode Dragoș from the Vlacho-Hungarian March on the Moldova River that had been founded earlier by Vlach colonists from Maramureș. Bogdan declared himself the first independent voivode of Moldavia. The territory of the later principality included, in addition to the still Tatar-controlled area between the Danube and the Dnister, the territory of the Alans (As/Yas) on the Prut River. In contrast to the Cumans, to whose confederation they originally belonged, some of the Alans had remained on the territory of the later Principality of Moldavia after the Mongol conquest and had served the Mongols/Tatars as auxiliary troops or as mercenaries for Byzantium and Bulgaria.[25] They are very likely identical with the "Brodniks" mentioned in Ruthenian, Hungarian, and papal sources[26]—probably a Slavic loan translation of their Iranian-language proper name, which goes back to their ethnically associated function as ford guards in the Cumanian as well as later in the Tatar context. In that sense they were quite similar to the *derbendci*s ("pass guards") of the Ottoman period—a privileged auxiliary formation often exercised by Vlachs. In Russian and Ukrainian research, there is a tendency to conceive of the *Brodnik*s (or the *Berladnik*s, often equated with them) as a kind of proto-Cossack movement, since the Rurikid exiled prince (*izgoi*) Ivan Rostislavovich from the Halych principality, who was

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24 Vásáry, *Cumans and Tatars*, 88–98, 122–65; Aleksandar Uzelac, "Tatary v dunaisko-dnestrovskom mezhdureche vo vtoroi polovine XIV. v.," *Zolotoordynskoe obozrenie* 7 (2019): 417–33; Ion Chirtoagă, *Din istorii Moldovei de sud-est până în anii '30 al. sec. al XIX-lea* (Chișinău: Editura Museum, 1999), 62–68; Laurențiu Rădvan, *At Europe's Borders: Medieval Towns in the Romanian Principalities* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 520–21. For the "Great Confusion," cf. Vadim Vintserovich Trepavlov, *Stepnye imperii Evrazii: Mongoly i tatary* (Moscow: Kvadriga, 2015), 221–34.

25 Vásáry, *Cumans and Tatars*, 93–94, 108–13, 123–24; Chirtoagă, *Din istoriei Moldovei*, 54–68; Ciocîltan, *The Mongols*, 254, 268; Virgil Ciocîltan, "Alanii și începuturile statelor românești," *Revista istorică* 6, no. 11–12 (1995): 945–55.

26 It is interesting to note that the Prut is sometimes called "Alanus fluvius" in medieval sources and "nahr Yasi" in Arabic ones. Ciocîltan, "Alanii și începuturile," 937. It is not unlikely that the "Prutheni" listed in Polish chronicles (Długosz, Boguchwal, Pasek) along with Tatars, Ruthenians, and Cumans are identical with the *Brodnik*s of Russian sources. Ion Țurcanu, *Descrierea Basarabiei: teritoriul dintre Prut și Nistru în evoluție istorică (din primele secole ale mileniului II până la sfîrșitul secolului al XX-lea)* (Chișinău: Cartier, 2011), 285–86. After all, the etymology of the river Prut seems to be related to the Indo-European root for ford. In the sources of the Teutonic Knights of Burzenland, they are called "Prodnici" ("usque ad terminos Prodnicorum"). Oleg Bubenok, *Yasy i brodniki v stepiach Vostochnoi Evropy (VI. – nachalo XIII vv.)* (Kyiv: Loros, 1997), 134; László Pósán, "Das Verhältnis zwischen dem Deutschen Orden und den siebenbürgischen Bischöfen im Burzenland (1211–1225)," *Ordines Militares Colloquia Torunensia Historica* 24 (2019): 64–65.

given the nickname "Berladnik" in the Old Ruthenian chronicles, sought refuge with them in the mid-twelfth century. Together with them and the Cumans, he raided towns and ships on the Danube, made raids into Rus and hired himself out as a mercenary leader. In fact, it is not unlikely that the *Brodnik*s in their military-privileged function attracted adventurers from Rus in the north or Bulgaria in the south and were largely Slavicized before eventually being Vlachicized in the Principality of Moldavia.[27] This might be supported, among other things, by the name of the oldest boyar family documented in the Iași area, the Procelnici. Judging by the Slavic name of their progenitor Stoian Procelnic and also by the location of their land holdings in the Iași area, they may have performed the function of a *daruga* (tax collector/administrator) in the Yas/Alan area during Tatar rule.[28] The fact that the legends about the Moldavian land seizure recorded in Romanian chronicles of the seventeenth century describe the area south of the Moldavian founding colony as populated by Ruthenians under a certain "Iatsko"—Virgil Ciocîltan considers Iatsko an ethnonymically derived personal name ("the Alan")—may also speak in favor of a Slavicization of the Alans.[29] Yet it is also possible that the story of Iatsko reflects a southward migration of Halychian Ruthenian refugees after Polish king Casimir the Great had conquered their principality in 1349 or the rivalry between the Lithuanian prince Iurii Koriatovich and the Moldavians over the largely deserted land in the 1370s.[30] The last historically verified mention of the Alans of the Prut as an independent entity ("gospodstvo iashko") is in connection with their use as mercenaries in the Battle of Velbazhd in 1330, when the Bulgarian army, reinforced by Alan (Yas), Tatar, and Wallachian auxiliaries, suf-

27 Bubenok, *Yasy*, 125–37; Victor Spinei, *The Romanians and the Turkic Nomads North of the Danube Delta from the Tenth to the Mid-Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 131–32, 137–38, 141, 159–61; Grzegorz Skrukwa, *O czarnomorską Ukrainę: Procesy narodotwórcze w regionie nadczarnomorskim do 1921 roku w ukraińskiej perspektywie historycznej* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza, 2016), 175–79; Ioto Valeriev, "Commentary on Several Sources of Information for the Early History of the Vlachs in John Kinnamos and Nicetas Choniates," in *Interethnic Relations in Transylvania: Militaria Medieavalia in Central and South Eastern Europe*, ed. Anca Nițoi and Zeno K. Pinter (Sibiu: Editura Astra Museum, 2015), 49–50; Iaroslav V. Pylypchuk, "Sloviany u Dasht-i Kypchaka," in *Movy i Kultury: Mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom (Pamiati Omeljana Pritsaka)*, ed. Leonid Lvovich Zalizniak et al. (Kyiv: VD Kyievo-Mohylianska Akademiia, 2015), 59–68; Dragos Moldovanu, "Reconstructing an Old Slavic Toponymic Field: The Base * Bïrl – in Romanian Toponymy and Its Historical Implications," *Zeitschrift für Slawistik* 54, no. 3 (2009): 320–37. On the *derbendci*s, cf. Vjeran Kursar, "Being an Ottoman Vlach: On Vlach Identity (Ies), Role and Status in Western Parts of the Ottoman Balkans (15th–18th Centuries)," *OTAM* 34 (2013): 115–61.

28 Elena Gherman, "Un domeniu feudal din ținutul Cârligăturii," *Cercetari Istorice (Serie Noua)* 24–26 (2010); Rădvan, *At Europe's Borders*, 501–6. For the office of daruga/basqaq, see István Vásáry, "The Tatar Factor in the Formation of Muscovy's Political Culture," in *Nomads as Agents of Cultural Change: The Mongols and Their Eurasian Predecessors*, ed. Michal Biran and Reuven Amitai (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2015), 252–70.

29 Ciocîltan, "Alanii."

30 On Koriatovich, see below.

fered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Serbs.[31] Their activity as mercenaries for Serbia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Byzantium in the first decades of the fourteenth century probably led to the continuous dispersion of the Alan confederation, whose former members settled on the territory of the rulers who had hired them. In the end, it must have been easy for the Moldavians to take over the remnants of the confederation on the Prut.[32]

The incorporation of the originally Tatar-administered territories at the Dnister into the Principality of Moldavia is connected with the already mentioned Lithuanian prince Iurii Koriatovich, who dealt the final blow to the rule of the local Tatar prince Timur-Demetrius with a campaign in 1374.[33] There are indications that this might have happened with the permission of the beklerbek of the Golden Horde, Mamai. Such a "friendly" turn of events would explain the continuity of Tatar archaeological remains at the Dnister until the beginning of the fifteenth century, as well as Neşri's reference to the Tatar leaders Qutluboğa and Hacıbeg's presence after 1374.[34] In absence of an agnate heir to the Moldavian throne, the Lithuanian victory over Timur-Demetrius probably prompted some of the Moldavian boyars to choose Iurii Koriatovich as their prince, adding the Tatar territories he had acquired to the Moldavian dominion. Yet Iurii Koriatovich's reign did not last long. Between 1375 and 1377 he was assassinated by his Moldavian subjects and succeeded by a cognate line of the founding dynasty.[35]

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31 Ciocîltan, "Alanii," 939; Vásáry, *Cumans and Tatars*, 110–13.

32 Ciocîltan, "Alanii," 937–38; Vásáry, *Cumans and Tatars*, 93–128.

33 Uzelac, "Tatary," 421.

34 Anatol P. Gorodenco, "Moldova de sud în a doua jumătate a secolului XIV," *Tyragetia* 17 (2008): 83–88. Although this scenario is controversial in Russian and Ukrainian historiography, the thesis that Mamai formed an alliance with the Lithuanians earlier than generally assumed cannot be dismissed. In fact, at the same time as the Battle of the Blue Waters in 1362, Mamai was waging a war against the eastern wing of the Golden Horde. If the three Tatar leaders defeated at the Blue Waters were loyal supporters of the eastern wing in the west, it would have been in Mamai's interest to eliminate them. In this scenario, Mamai would have officially granted the Gediminid prince Iurii Koriatovich Podolia in 1362—in exchange for Lithuanian military assistance. A similar course of events might be assumed for the domain of Demetrius-Timur in 1374. The main proponent of this position was the Ukrainian historian Feliks Shabuldo. For a summary of his arguments, see the posthumously published essay aimed against his critics, Feliks M. Shabuldo, "K itogam izucheniia sinevodskoi problemy," *Istoriia i Sovremennost* 17 (2013): 69–89. For an opponent, see Roman Iulianovich Pochekaev, *Mamai: Istoriia "antigeroia" v istorii* (St. Peterburg: Evraziia, 2010). One of the arguments in favor of the Tatars granting the Lithuanians Podolia after the Battle of Blue Waters is the fact that the Lithuanians paid tribute for its possession until the fifteenth century. Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania: International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (15th–18th Century). A Study of Peace Treaties Followed by Annotated Documents* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 5.

35 Dennis Deletant, "Moldavia Between Hungary and Poland, 1347–1412," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 64 (1986), 197–201; Lia Bătrâna and Adrian Bătrâna, *Biserica "Sfântul Nicolae" din Rădăuţi: Cercetări arheologice și interpretări asupra începutirilor Ţării Moldovei* (Piatra Neamţ: Constantin Matasă, 2012), 200–4, 208, 253–80.

The area south of the Danube Delta also entered a phase of increased independence with the retreat of the Tatars. In the mid-fourteenth century, the Bulgarian *hora* (province) of Karvuna, named after its main town, seceded from the Bulgarian tsardom under the brothers Balik, Dobrotitsa, and Todor, who came from a Cuman family. After the death of Balik, his brother Dobrotitsa subordinated himself to Byzantium and was elevated to the rank of despot, and as such became the namesake of the Dobruja region. After the reign of Dobrotitsa's son Ivanko, Dobruja finally fell to the Ottomans at the end of the fourteenth century.[36]

3 Living under the Shade of the Phoenix: Migration under Ottoman Hegemony (Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries)

Dobruja and the adjacent areas were already the terminus of nomadic immigration immediately after the Ottoman conquest, both from Anatolia and from the northern steppes. Evliya Çelebi reported in the seventeenth century that Sultan Bayezid I had settled Tatars and nomadic Turks (Yörüks) from Anatolia there immediately after the conquest. These Tatars were probably the followers of Taş-Temur and Aqtau, two Tatar leaders who fled to the Danube via Moldavia and Wallachia after the defeat of Tokhtamysh Khan in the battle against Timur Lenk on the Terek River in 1396. They subordinated themselves to Sultan Bayezid and conquered Varna for him in 1399, thus finally dissolving the despotate of Karvuna or Kaliakra. Bayezid settled Aqtau's Tatars in Thrace, in the regions of Edirne and Plovdiv, where from the middle of the fifteenth century they appear in the tax registers organized in *zeamets* (prebends of 20,000 to 100,000 *akçe* annually) consisting of *ocak*s[37] ("hearths/fireplaces").[38]

Tatar was a blanket term often applied to any people that arrived to Eastern Europe and the Middle East with the Mongols or Timur Lenk. Thus, another source of Tatars in the Dobruja and Thrace was Anatolia itself, which had long been under Ilkhanid suzerainty and was not populated exclusively by Turkmens. For example, the rulers of the Beylik of Eretna, which encompassed large parts of eastern Anatolia and whose capital was Sivas, were referred to as "Scythians" by the Byzantine emperor Manuel II Palaiologos in 1391, while he commonly referred to the Turkic population of Asia Minor

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36 Atanasov, *Dobrudzhansko Despotstvo*; Anca Popescu, "The Region of Dobrudja Under Ottoman Rule," *Encyclopaedia of the Hellenic World, Black Sea*, 2008, accessed January 10, 2022, http://blacksea.ehw.gr/forms/fLemma.aspx?lemmaId=12392.

37 On these formations, see Harun Yeni, "The Utilization of Mobile Groups in the Ottoman: A Revision of General Perception," *Oriental Archive* 81 (2013): 183–205.

38 Mehmed Tayyib Gökbilgin, *Rumeli'de Yürükler, Tatarlar ve Evlâd-ı Fâtihân* (Istanbul: Osman Yalçın Matbaası, 1957), 15–29, 87; Uzelac, "Tatary," 424–26.

as Persians.[39] It can be assumed that the so-called Tatars, who were shipped to Dobruja from the port cities of Sinop and Samsun after the Ottoman conquest of the Beylik of İsfendiyar in 1461, were inhabitants of the Beylik of Eretna, which ceased to exist at the end of the fourteenth century, as well as "Tatars" newly immigrated to Anatolia during Timur Lenk's invasion. The Tatars thus deported were organized in the *zeamet* of the Yanbolu Tatars.[40]

Similar to the strategic deportations of the Mongols, their Ottoman equivalent, called *sürgün* (from *sürmek*, to drive cattle), served economic and military-strategic needs. For example, after the conquests of Kilia and Cetatea Albă (Ottoman: Akkerman) in 1484, the Ottomans deported parts or all of its originally Christian urban population and replaced them with deportees from within their dominions. For example, the inhabitants of Cetatea Albă were settled in Biga, and the fishermen of Silistra were deported to Kilia.[41]

Most prominently, however, the *sürgün* affected the Yörüks, Turkmen nomads, who were transplanted to Rumelia and organized there in *zeamet*s/*ocak*s as *eşküncü*s (light auxiliary cavalry). In addition to six *yörük-zeamet*s, four distinct Tatar *zeamet*s existed until the end of the sixteenth century, before they were absorbed into the *yörük-zeamet*s. The geographical focus of these formations was south of the Balkan Mountains, in Thrace and Macedonia. North of the Balkan Mountains, the density and size of the *ocak*s was lower and concentrated in Dobruja, Deliorman (Bulgarian: Ludogorie), and the southern bank of the Danube between Niğbolu (Bulgarian: Nikopol) and Silistra. In 1584, only sixteen *ocak*s were registered north of the Danube Delta, in Akkerman, Bender, and Kilia.[42]

According to İbrahim Peçevi, another group of Tatars, which subordinated itself to Sultan Bayezid, was settled in villages around Babadağı. Each village had to provide a hundred men as auxiliary troops to forage and care for the horses of the beys of Silistra—the nucleus of the *cebelü* Tatars.[43] In the sixteenth century, there were approximately three dozen officially registered *cebelü* Tatar villages in the qadi districts of Hırsova/Babadağı and Tekfurgölü. For their service, the *cebelü* Tatars were exempted from all taxes, except in years without campaigns or in the event that they wished to

39 Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1923* (London: Murray, 2005), 26. See also Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2006), 28, 85, 127–28; Baki Tezcan, "The Memory of the Mongols in Early Ottoman Historiography," in *Writing History at the Ottoman Court: Editing the Past, Fashioning the Future*, ed. Emine Fetvaci and Hakkı Erdem Çıpa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 23–38.
40 Gökbilgin, *Rumeli'de Yürükler*, 16–17, 25.
41 Nicoară Beldiceanu and Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Déportation et pêche à Kilia entre 1484 et 1508," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 38, no. 1 (1975): 40–54; Liviu Pilat and Ovidiu Cristea, *The Ottoman Threat and Crusading on the Eastern Border of Christendom During the 15th Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2018).
42 Gökbilgin, *Rumeli'de Yürükler*, 1–99, see esp. 86–99 and the map in the end.
43 İbrahim Peçevi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*, 1:473; Guboglu and Mehmet, *Cronici turceşti privind ţările Române. Extrase*, 492–93.

free themselves from serving in an individual campaign. In such cases, they had to pay recompense (*cebelü bedeli*). Probably originally formed from *eşküncü ocak*s during the reign of Mehmed II, it seems that their introduction was an attempt to entice nomadic *ocak*s to settle in order to revive agriculture in the region, which had been devastated by plague and wars.[44]

Another driving force of migration and colonization in the early Ottoman period was Sufi orders and dervishes. A major order active in the eastern Balkans and the western Black Sea was formed by the Abdals of Rum. The establishment of the Rum Abdals, like the fifteenth century renaissance of the Sarı Saltık cult, was strongly linked to demographic developments within the Ottoman Empire. In 1461/62, a campaign by Vlad III Drăculea, called the Impaler (Romanian: Țepeș; Turkish: kazıklı voyvoda), devastated and depopulated northern Dobruja to such an extent that the towns of the region either ceased to exist or were reduced to villages. During his campaign to conquer Kilia and Akkerman in the 1480s, Sultan Bayezid II, called "Veli" (God-friend) because of his pro-Sufi stance, had Sarı Saltık's ruined tomb shown to him and a new mausoleum with a mosque complex built on the site. He thus laid the ground for the refoundation of Babadağı, which now took on a distinctly Islamic character through repopulation and whose revenues Sultan Bayezid donated to the preservation of the Sarı Saltık complex.[45] At the same time, the Rum Abdals gained a foothold in the region, founding numerous settlements and convents (*tekkes*) in Thrace, Dobruja, and Deliorman.[46] In the vitae of one of their leaders, Demir Baba, it is described how he liberated Budjak (Ukrainian: Budzhak, Turkish: Bucak, Romanian: Bugeac) or the plain of Özi (the Ottoman name of the Dnipro and the fortress of Ochakiv) together with Moscow from dragons. The victory over the dragon enables the Muslims to settle in Budjak/Özi and can undoubtedly be read as a founding allegory in the context of the pioneering function of Sufi convents in the Ottoman inland colonization.[47] According to his vita, Demir Baba

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44 Enver M. Şerifgil, "Rumeli'de Eşkinci Yürükler," *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 12 (1981), 74–77. As late as 1526, a decree referred to them as *eşküncü* Tatars, who were obliged to muster *cebelü*s. Şerifgil assumed the beginnings of the *cebelü* Tatars during the reign of Sultan Selim I. However, Veinstein and Berindei were able to find a hint in TT 370 that they went back to the time of Mehmed II. Mihnea Berindei and Gilles Veinstein, *L'Empire ottoman et les Pays roumains, 1544–1545. Étude et documents* (Paris: Editions de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1987), 317. On the impact of plague, see Berindei and Veinstein. On the depopulation caused by Vlad III Drăculea, see Kiel, "Ottoman Urban Development," 289.

45 Kiel, "Ottoman Urban Development."

46 Nikolay Antov, *The Ottoman "Wild West": The Balkan Frontier in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 115–48, 205–81.

47 Surprisingly, this level of meaning is not addressed in Sara Kuehn's extensive work on dragons in Islam and Christianity. While she does address the allegorical role of the dragon in the Sufi "spiritual" path and its bridging function in the appropriation of Christian holy sites, the function as a founding and colonizing narrative or as an allegory of overcoming anti-human nature is missing, cf. Sara Kuehn, *The Dragon in Medieval East Christian and Islamic Art* (Leiden: Brill, 2011). This function has been described, for example, by Jacques Le Goff and later Peregrine Horden in the context of Western European Christian saintly vitae. Jacques LeGoff, "Culture ecclésiastique et culture folklorique au Moyen

came to the Budjak at the request of the Genghisid prince of Özi—in fact, Özi/Ochakiv (Tatar: Aqçaqum) was the residence of the heir to the throne (Qalğa) in the still young Crimean Khanate in the early sixteenth century. After Demir Baba killed the dragon "for Islam" and not for the prince, as the vita emphasizes, he moved on to Moscow and defeated a dragon there too. In return, he received 40,000 Muslim prisoners from Moscow's "infidel" ruler, whom he settled in the plains of Özi.[48] Actual events might be reflected in this narrative: After Mehmed I Giray became Khan in 1515, his brother Ahmet Giray, now residing in Özi as Qalğa, found himself in opposition and negotiated with Grand Prince Vasilii III for his defection under Moscow's suzerainty. Before he could do this, however, he was defeated and slain by Mehmed's sons in the winter of 1518/19. Ahmed's son Hemmet retreated to the Ottoman Empire. Together with his uncle Saadet Giray he sought refuge in Akkerman and Dobruja, from where, as Muscovite sources reported, they moved on to Edirne with 20,000 men. After two years in Ottoman exile, following the assassination of Mehmed Giray by the Nogays, Saadet Giray returned to Crimea as the new khan.[49] It is not unlikely that Demir Baba stayed at Ahmet Giray's court in Özi between 1515 and 1518 and played a role in the transfer of the two princes and their subordinates. Possibly, Tatars from the entourage of the two princes settled in villages of the Abdals. Finally, the dragon-slaying story also refers to Sarı Saltık, who was revered by the Rum Abdals, and Saint George or his Islamic counterpart, Hızır, who is revered especially in the Sufi context.[50] Ottoman tax registers of the late sixteenth century mention the "Valley of Şeyh Hızır" in the immediate vicinity

Âge: Saint Marcel de Paris et le Dragon," in *Pour un autre Moyen Âge: Temps, travail et culture en Occident. 18 essais.*, ed. Jacques LeGoff (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 236–79; Dragon- or snake-slaying was also an important element of urban founding legends in Roman and Greek antiquity, and not least this notion is reflected in the belief passed down from late Byzantine and Ottoman times that the serpent column in the hippodrome of Constantinople was a talisman that protected the city from the fate of being overrun by snakes. Paul Stephenson, *The Serpent Column: A Cultural Biography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 98–126, 184–240. Both the founding of Kazan and Astrakhan were associated in sixteenth and seventeenth century sources with the slaying of dragons/snakes on the territory of the later city. Devin DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 473; Jaroslav Z. Pelenskyj, *Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438–1560s)* (Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 1974), 119–21.

48 Antov, *The Ottoman "Wild West"*, 232–33; Vladimir Evgenevich Syroechkovskii, "Mukhammed-Gerai i ego vassaly," *Uchenye Zapiski Moskovskogo Ordena gosudarstvennogo universiteta im. M.W. Lomonosova: Istoriia* 2 (1940): 7, 28.

49 Bulat Rakhimzianov, *Moskva i Tatarskii mir: Sotrudnichestvo i protivostoianie v epokhu peremen, XV–XVI vv.* (St. Peterburg: Evraziia, 2016), 77–82; Syroechkovskii, "Mukhammed-Gerai," 56–58.

50 Antov, *The Ottoman "Wild West"*, 73, 75–76, 97–98, 230, 232, 249, 264; Kuehn, *The Dragon*, 228–35; Oya Pancaroğlu, "The Itinerant Dragon-Slayer: Forging Paths of Image and Identity in Medieval Anatolia," *Gesta* 43, no. 2 (2004): 151–64.

of Akkerman.[51] The villages located here were of mixed population; about half of the heads of households listed by name had the added ethnonym Tatar, and the rest were accordingly settlers from the south.[52] Other villages in Budjak named after their founders also refer to Sufis or dervishes, most likely Abdals, given the frequently occurring epithet "Halife" and "Divane." In Akkerman itself, there was a *tekke* (Sufi convent) named Baba Şahi.[53]

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, there was another large forced resettlement (*sürgün*) of Anatolian Turkmens to Rumelia, which was connected to several pro-Safavid uprisings in Anatolia. The Safavids recruited their supporters primarily among the nomadic Turkmen of eastern Anatolia and Azerbaijan, who wore red caps with twelve folds as a sign of their allegiance and were therefore called *Qızılbaş* (red heads). For this reason, the Ottomans sought to resettle potential or actual supporters of the Safavids from the Ottoman-Persian borderlands to the European provinces located at the other end of the empire. The arrival of these new settlers provoked a secondary wave of migration of the Yörüks from Thrace to the less densely populated areas of Dobruja and Deliorman and further north to the Budjak.[54] The Anatolian immigrants encountered a local population in Dobruja and Deliorman that was already, if not Shiite-Alevite, at least characterized by a subversive dervish attitude with a certain propinquity to the latter. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Safavid Shah ʿAbbās, counting on the support of this population, even planned to capture an Ottoman Black Sea port in order to embark from there to Dobruja in an attempt to open a second front against the Ottomans.[55]

Emigration from Anatolia was of course not only limited to *sürgün*; the Ottoman conquest of Caffa in 1475 paved the way for Anatolian colonists to settle the southern shores of Crimea. During the years of the so-called "Great Flight" of 1603–6 many peasants left the Anatolian provinces plagued by the Celalis rebellions and crop failures. Some of them established new homes in the Ottoman province of Caffa.[56]

A major demographic development in the history of the Black Sea steppes was the downfall of the eastern Jochid realms situated on the Volga: First, the Golden Horde's

51 Feridun Emecen, "The Wild Frontiers of the Ottomans: Akkirman-Bender-Özü Region According to Archival Documents from the 16th Century," *Journal of Turkish Studies/Türklük Bilgisi Araştırmaları* 44 (2015): 226.

52 Alper Başer, "Bucak Tatarları (1550–1700)" (PhD diss., Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi, 2010), 30–31.

53 Kayapınar, "Dobruca Yöresinde," 90, 96. Cf. the villages of Divane Kara and Divane Mustafa in the 1574 tax register, Mustafa Işık, "701 Nolu Tapu Tahrir Defterine Göre Akkirman Sancağı" (Master thesis, Sakarya Üniversitesi, 2008).

54 Antov, *The Ottoman "Wild West"*, 115–27. On the headgear, see Willem M. Floor, *The Persian Textile Industry in Historical Perspective, 1500–1925* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999), 277–89.

55 Nicolae Iorga, *Studii și documente cu privire la istoria Romînilor*, vol. 4, *Legăturile principatelor romîne cu Ardealul de la 1601 la 1699. Povestire și izvoare* (Bucharest: Editura Ministerului de Instrucţie, 1902), doc. no. 13, p. 147.

56 Oktay Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia: Amasya 1576–1643* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 140.

nominal successor, the Great Horde, in 1502, and then the khanates of Kazan in 1552 and of Astrakhan in 1554/56. The westward migrations beginning or accelerating with these events are closely associated with the Nogays and the noble Manghıt family. The Nogay Horde, originally based around the Ural River, was a mid-fifteenth century offshoot of the Manghıt ulus/patrimony within the Golden Horde. A product of Manghıt internecine strife after the death of its prominent patriarch, the Golden Horde's Beklerbek Edigü, the Nogay Horde was ruled by the descendants of Edigü's son Nureddin. Other lines, but especially that of Edigü's son Mansur, took hold of the office of the beklerbek and remained in charge of the Golden/Great Horde for most of the time until its defeat by the Crimean khan Mengli Giray. Submitting to the Crimean khans, the descendants of Mansur formed the Manghıt ulus of the Crimean Khanate. The Mansurids, bringing with them their subject people, settled in the northwestern steppe lands of the Crimea and the steppes between the Dnister and Kuban rivers.[57] They swelled the ranks of those Tatar newcomers that had already started to trickle into the once Tatar lands beyond the Dnister after the Ottomans had reopened them to Muslim colonization by taking Cetatea Albă and its coastlands from the Moldavians in 1484. Contemporary sources called these "pioneers" "Cossacks of Akkerman."[58]

4 The Rise of the Double-Headed Eagle: Muscovite Expansion and its Impact on Migration in the Black Sea (Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries)

While the Nogay Horde remained a major military threat to the Crimean Khanate throughout the sixteenth century, in contrast to their Crimean cousins the Manghıts of the Volga suffered constant internal and external pressure from Muscovite expansion and internecine strife.[59] Around 1550, there occurred a first major rupture within the Nogay Horde: the ulus of Gazi, splitting off from the Nogay Horde, established itself under Crimean rule in the pre-Caucasian steppe.[60] This was only the start of a decade of turmoil in the Volga lands: The conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, a bloody throne

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57 The most authoritative study on the Manghıts/Nogays is Vadim Vintserovich Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi ordy* (Kazan: Kazanskaia nedvizhimost, 2016). Another important study including the Manghıts in a general overview of early modern Crimean history is Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli dvukh materikov*, vol. 1, *Krymskie khany XV–XVI stoletii i borba za nasledstvo Velikoi ordy* (Kyiv: Maistiernia Knyhy, 2010).

58 Cf. the section "Pirates and Bandits (after 1475)" in this volume.

59 Michael Khodarkovsky called the Muscovite strategy vis-à-vis the Nogays a "debilitation policy." Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 124.

60 On the ulus of Gazi/the Lesser Nogays, see Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi ordy*, 384–421.

conflict within the Nogay horde and a terrible drought forced many steppe herders to seek a living under Crimean and Ottoman protection. The crisis even revived old steppe habits, such as selling one's children as slaves, which the Ottomans vigorously tried to curb, for they were Muslims.[61]

Other waves of Nogay migrants followed. In 1633, after another period of internal conflict, the Great Nogay Horde was finally dispersed by an attack by the Kalmyks.[62] Two Manghıt clans, the Dinmambetoğlu and the Ormambetoğlu, crossed the Volga seeking refuge in Crimean lands. The Qalğa Hüsam Giray settled the Dinmambetoğlu in the steppes abandoned by the Lesser Nogay near Perekop and the so-called "Milky Waters." Since seven leading mirzas, that is, noblemen, of the Ormambetoğlu were dissatisfied with the conditions, Hüsam Giray promptly crushed the Ormambetoğlu. He had the mirzas imprisoned in Çufut Qale and their uluses forcibly disbanded: Five men at a time were distributed among various villages in the Crimea, and the rest of the Ormambetoğlu joined the Dinmambetoğlu or offered allegiance to Crimean Tatar nobles.[63] The Nogay messenger Maral, who was sent to Astrakhan by Dinmambetoğlu Can Muhammed, reported in July 1635 how the Crimean Tatars dealt with the Nogay refugees: The hostages the Nogays gave to the Crimean Tatars were held in cells, their "wives and daughters they took to their beds, horses, cows, and sheep they slaughtered and they took from them the best people, armor, and any weapons [they had]. They committed such acts of violence and dishonor as they had never before experienced."[64] While the descriptions of these atrocities are surely dramatized in order to convince the voivode of Astrakhan to reaccept the Dinmambetoğlu as subjects, they were nevertheless probably not far from the truth. The two last Nogay migrations into the Dnistro-Danubian dominions of the Ottomans were the Ormambetoğlu, or what was left of them, and the Oraqoğlu in the 1660s as well as, finally, in the 1730s the so-called Yedisan Nogays, who settled between the rivers Dnister and Boh.[65] In 1666, the Ottomans created an official pale of settlement for the Nogays on the Ialpuh River in the barely populated inlands of the Budjak. As a prerequisite to settle there,

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61 Trepavlov, 243–79; Gilles Veinstein, "La grande Sécheresse de 1560 au nord de la mer Noire: Perception et réactions des autorités ottomanes," in *Natural Disasters in the Ottoman Empire: A Symposium Held in Rethymnon 10–12 January 1997*, ed. Elizabeth A. Zachariadou (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 1999), 273–81; Mária Ivanics, "Hungersnot in der Steppe," in *"Die Wunder der Schöpfung": Mensch und Natur in der türksprachigen Welt*, ed. Brigitte Heuer, Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, and Claus Schönig (Würzburg: Ergon, 2012), 251–57.

62 Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi ordy*, 370–73; Aleksei Andreevich Novoselskii, *Borba Moskovskoga gosudarstva s Tatarami v XVII v.* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1948), 245–46.

63 Novoselskii, *Borba*, 240–41.

64 Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi ordy*, 376.

65 Chirtoagă, *Din istoriei Moldovei*, 114. For a detailed study on the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Nogay migrations to Ottoman territories, see Başer, "Bucak Tatarları (1550–1700)."

they had to denounce pre-Islamic legal traditions and were implicitly expected to start a settled life as peasants.[66]

Yet the Nogays were not the only group seeking refuge in the realms of the Crimean khans. Russian state-building in Ukraine and in the southern Russian steppes provoked resistance among the Cossacks. Thus as early as the 1680s, some Cossacks of the Don Host, being Old Believers, shifted their allegiance to the Crimean khan and settled in the Khanate's territories on the Kuban. Following the Bulavin rebellion in 1707–8, they were joined by another wave of Don Cossack dissidents, called Nekrasovites, after their leader Ignat Nekrasov. Similar developments can be observed for the Zaporizhian Cossacks—following hetman Ivan Mazepa into secession from Russia and entering Swedish allegiance, they submitted to the khan after the death of Mazepa and the Swedish defeat in 1711. While the Zaporizhian headquarters remained on the lower Dnipro, married Cossacks and their families began to settle not only in the lower Dnipro region but also in the cities of Crimea and in the Kuban region. Many of them remained there even after the Sich was moved back under Russian suzerainty twenty-three years later, in 1734. But even after that, the Crimea remained a reservoir for Cossack dissidents fleeing the Russian authorities. Subsequently, in the memory culture of Cossack dissidents, Crimea was romanticized as a haven of Cossack freedom and traditional lifestyle. The 1770s, especially after the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, brought an end to this phase as Russia was closing in to subordinate the khanate. First the Nekrasovites, feeling unsecure from Russian encroachments, left for the Ottoman Empire, where they settled on the lower Danube. They were followed closely by dissident Zaporizhian Cossacks who after the abolishment of the Hetmanate state entered Ottoman service, founding the Danubian Sich. To this day, the Danube Delta is home to the Lipovani people, descendants of Cossack Old Believers.[67]

What drew so many different people to the shores of the Black Sea? There is of course no simple answer to this question. In the case of the northern Black Sea, a major factor was that it was a nexus or hub between the Ponto-Mediterranean and the "sea" of the steppes. Nested between these two "seas," it profited from connecting politically, culturally, and economically very different regions over vast distances. Thus, it appealed to those interested in long-distance trade, such as Armenians and Genoese / Venetians. But far from being only an economic watershed providing the opportunity for trade, most of the time the northern Black Sea was also a fringe of empires. As such it attracted people seeking refuge from persecution and the restrictions of state-building, as was primarily the case with the Cossacks and Nogays. Here opportunities for cross-border banditry have to be taken into account too. Religious persecu-

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66 Başer, "Bucak Tatarları (1550–1700)," 150, 185–88. Cf. Gemil Tahsin, ed., *Relaţiile ţărilor române cu Poarta otomană în documente turceşti* (Bucharest: Direcţia Generală a Arhivelor Statului din Republica Socialistă România, 1984), doc. no. 142, p. 322.

67 Vladyslav Volodymyrovich Hrybovskyi and Vadim Vintserovich Trepavlov, eds., *Kazachestvo v tiurkskom i slavianskom mirakh: Kollektivnaia monografiia* (Kazan: Institut arkheologii im. A. Kh. Khalikova AN Respubliki Tatarstan, 2018), 489–547. Cf. the section "Pirates and Bandits after 1475" in this volume.

tion or antinomianism were another driving force, as seen in the Nekrasovites and the colonizing Abdal dervishes. Yet migrants were not always pulled. Sometimes they were pushed too: They were transplanted from one place to the other in order to serve a ruler's economic or defensive needs, as in the case of the Circassians and the Yörüks, for instance. But these displacements were far from the total approach of forced mass-migrations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Andrew Robarts

Migration in the Black Sea Region in the Modern Period (Late Eighteenth–Twentieth Centuries)

From the early modern into the modern period (from the seventeenth to the twentieth century), migration and human mobility constituted a defining and essential element of the Black Sea region. Like many maritime regions in the early modern period (prior to industrialized forms of transportation), coastal areas acted as the primary migratory routes for populations on the move around the Black Sea littoral. The introduction of steamships into the Black Sea in the late 1820s opened up cross-sea transportation corridors (especially along a north-south axis), generating a particularly active period of migration in the Black Sea region into the early part of the twentieth century. This essay will highlight the centrality of Russian-Ottoman relations in the history of migration in the Black Sea region in the modern period. The interplay between migratory populations and state-driven policies geared towards controlling or managing these populations has been an enduring component of Black Sea regionalism. The durability of the state-migration nexus as well as the historical continuity of migration-generated regionalism in the Black Sea basin will be emphasized.

This article will adopt an expansive definition and understanding of both the Black Sea "region" and the category of "migrant." The conceptualization of the Black Sea region here includes the sea itself and the coastal littoral, as well as the important riverine systems feeding the sea and the close-in hinterland settlements along these rivers. The category of migrant here includes voluntary and forced migrants, economic migrants, religious dissenters, merchants, coastal traders, seasonal laborers, pilgrims, and soldiers.

1 Migratory Groups and Numbers

While caution is in order when specifying the numbers of people on the move in the Black Sea region (at least prior to the late nineteenth century), historical demographers provide reasonable estimates for the level of migration among some of the larger and more recognizable migratory groups around the Black Sea basin in the modern period. These groups include Bulgarians, Crimean Tatars, Circassians (and other Caucasian Highlanders), and Jewish migrants from southern Russia to Palestine. An estimated 250,000 Bulgarians migrated from the Ottoman Empire to the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (roughly modern-day Romania) and southern Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This number constitutes around 10–15 percent of the Orthodox, Slavic-speaking, agriculturalist population of the southern Ottoman Bal-

kans during the period in question.[1] These Bulgarian migrant populations travelled along roads close to the western Black Sea coast or along well-established commercial cabotage corridors along the western and northern Black Sea littoral. An estimated 150,000–200,000 Crimean Tatars migrated from the Russian to Ottoman Empires in the latter part of the eighteenth century and historians have noted a steady movement of Crimean Tatars across the Black Sea region throughout the nineteenth century, with a recognizable spike in displacement and migration during and after the Crimean War of 1853–56.[2]

In the 1860s, the final phase of the Russian Empire's decades-long penetration into the Caucasus (the north-eastern and eastern part of the Black Sea basin) resulted in a significant out-migration and re-settlement of Circassian migrant and refugee populations in the southern (Anatolian) and western (Balkan) parts of the Black Sea region. These movements were accompanied by on-going Ottoman slaving activity, which brought an estimated 150,000 indentured Circassians across the Black Sea and into the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century. These slaves formed a subset of the roughly 500,000 Circassians who forcibly migrated to the Ottoman Empire after 1867. Overall, up to one million Muslims moved from the Russian Empire to the Ottoman Empire in the 1860s and 1870s and an estimated five million Muslims migrated from the Russian Empire to the Ottoman Empire in the period from 1783–1908.[3] In what is known in Jewish/Israeli history as the second Aliyah, between 1904 and 1914 an estimated 35,000 Jewish people fled pogroms and persecution in Russia for refuge and settlement in Ottoman Palestine. Many of the worst pogroms perpetrated against Russian Jewish populations occurred in cities (Kishinev [Romanian: Chișinău] and Odesa) close to and along the northern Black Sea coast. The primary route for this Jewish migratory movement was across the Black Sea from Odesa to Istanbul and on to Palestine. In the first half of the twentieth century, the Black Sea served as on-going transportation corridor for subsequent Jewish migrants moving from Eastern Europe and Russia to Palestine. The sinking of the MV Struma in February 1942 (en route from Constanța, from Romania to Istanbul) and the catastrophic drowning of 800 Jewish refugees on board the ship constitutes the largest exclusively civilian naval disaster in the history of the Black Sea.

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1 Stefan Doynov, *Balgarite v Ukraina i Moldova prez Vazrazhdaneto 1751–1878* (Sofia: Akademichno izdatelstvo "Marin Drinov", 2005); Ufuk Gülsoy, *1828–1829 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı'nda Rumeli'den Rusya'ya Göçürülen Reaya* (Istanbul: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1993).

2 Alan Fisher, "Emigration of Muslims from the Russian Empire in the Years after the Crimean War," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 35, no. 3 (1987): 356–71; Brian Williams, *The Crimean Tatars: The Diaspora Experience and the Forging of a Nation* (Boston: Brill, 2001).

3 See Vladimir Hamed-Troyansky, "Imperial Refuge: Resettlement of Muslims from Russia in the Ottoman Empire, 1860–1914" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 2018); Mark Pinson, "Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire, 1854–1862," *Güney-Doğu Araştırmaları Dergisi* 1 (1972): 37–56; Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

Additional recognizable and significant migratory groups in the Black Sea region in the modern period include: Armenians, who established sizable migrant communities across the northern Black Sea littoral from the Dniester River to the southern Caucasus; Greek merchant and seafarer communities, who served as important commercial actors in the Black Sea region during the period in question and provided aid and support to Greek fugitives and refugees before, during, and after the Greek uprising against the Ottoman Empire in the 1820s; Moldavian and Wallachian nobles and peasants, who moved across and lived on both sides of the Prut River; mixed Nekrasovite, Zaparozhian Cossack, and Russian Old Believer communities, who, fleeing Russian state control in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, found refuge in the Ottoman Balkans and the Danubian estuary, where they formed several migratory groups such as the "mouth of Danube Cossacks" (Russian: *Ust-Dunaiskoe Kazachestvo*) and the "community of Trans-Danubian Old Believers" (Russian: *Zadunaiskoe Staro-obriadcheskoe Obshchestvo*); and mobile and sizable (though difficult to categorize) Gagauz and Roma populations.[4]

2 Ottoman-Russian Relations and Black Sea Migration in the Modern Period

Ottoman-Russian warfare was the primary, although by no means sole, generator of displacement and migration in the Black Sea region in the modern period. From 1768 to 1915 the Ottoman and Russian empires engaged in seven armed conflicts on and around the Black Sea. Each of these conflicts produced significant demographic displacement, migrant outflows, and redistribution of populations in the Black Sea region. In response to these migratory movements and outflows, Ottoman and Russian state officials (at the imperial, regional, municipal, and local levels) consistently coordinated and cooperated on migration management and resettlement initiatives in the Black Sea region. Although migrant removal, re-distribution, and re-settlement operations typically followed periods of Ottoman-Russian warfare, state-organized peacetime

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4 See Roger P. Bartlett, *Human Capital: The Settlement of Foreigners in Russia, 1762–1804* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Charles King, *The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 2000); Ivan Meshcheriuk, *Pereselenie bolgar v iuzhnuiu Bessarabiiu 1828–1834 gg.* (Kishinev: Kartâ moldovenâskè, 1965); William Wilkinson, *An Account of the Principalities with Various Political Observations Relating to them* (London: Longman, Hurst, Ress, Orme, and Brown, 1820), re-issued as *An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldovia* (New York: Arno Press, 1971); Carl von Sax, *Geographisch-ethnographische Skizze von Bulgarien* (Vienna: Mittheilungen der kaiserlich-königlichen geographischen Gesellschaft, 1869). For more on the Nekrasovite-Old Believer Cossack group, see A. A. Skalkovskii, "Nekrasovtsy zhivushchie v Bessarabii," *Zhurnal Ministerstva vnutrennikh del* 8, no. 10 (October 1844): 61–82; "Dobrudzha," in *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar* (St. Petersburg: Brokgauz i Efron, 1893), 10a: 830–31. For general information on Russian Old Believers, see P. L. Iudin, "K istorii russkago raskola," *Russkaia starina* 25, no. 1 January 1894): 183–96.

migrant recruitment operations (primarily for agricultural development purposes) were regularly conducted in the Black Sea region during the period in question. Additionally, an analysis of Ottoman-Russian peace treaties in the modern period indicates that migration and the disposition of displaced populations were a core part of diplomatic negotiations between these two Black Sea powers. Indeed, one can make the argument that the dynamism and particularism of Black Sea migration in the modern period generated a certain type of Black Sea diplomacy specific to the unique state-migrant characteristics of the Black Sea basin in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Repeated bouts of Ottoman-Russian warfare devastated and depopulated important agricultural lands around the Black Sea basin. The demographic and economic damage inflicted during and after these conflicts prompted Ottoman and Russian authorities to adopt pro-migration measures to re-settle agricultural communities and revitalize agricultural output. Pro-migrant reform measures implemented by the Ottoman state in this period included: the reduction, suspension, and rationalization of the taxes imposed on peasant populations as a means to re-invigorate economic activity in post-war Balkan territories; a crackdown on corrupt tax-farmers; administrative reforms to improve the delivery of resettlement services; the extension of material benefits, administrative assistance, and tax exemptions to return migrants; and an offer of amnesty to any Ottoman subjects who had sided with or joined the Russian army during Russian-Ottoman wars.

Similarly, Russian imperial proclamations exhorted provincial officials to persuade migrants living outside of Russia to migrate and settle on newly-conquered imperial lands north of and along the Black Sea coast. These proclamations offered the following incentives for migrants settling in Russia:

> a residence and life in Russia free of any danger to their person or possessions; protection from enserfment; subordination only to the crown of Russia; exemption from military service; the possibility to choose the most advantageous settlement site for the construction of their homes; relief from any imposts; and government assistance for town-planning and economic development.[5]

Overall, Ottoman and Russian state re-settlement and revitalization efforts had a significant impact on migratory processes in the Black Sea region in the modern period.

Post-conflict revivals of annual trade fairs in the Ottoman Balkans further contributed to travel and migratory circulation in the Black Sea region, particularly in the nineteenth century. Trade fairs (Bulgarian: *panairi*) flourished in eighteenth-century Balkan Black Sea coastal regions and were an integral feature and consequence of the early modern *Pax Ottomanica* in the Balkans. Large weekly, monthly, and seasonal fairs in Balkan towns on or close to the Black Sea coast and along the Danube, such as Karasu (Bulgarian: Chervena Voda), Mangalia, and Babadağ drew merchants from the

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5 "Orders to Frontier Commanders issued by the Governor-General of Novorossiya Duc de Richelieu" (October 18, 1805), quoted in V. P. Grachev, "Kam vaprosa za preselvaneto na balgari v Rusia v nachaloto na XIX v., 1800–1806 g," in *Balgarskoto vazrazhdane i Rusia* (Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1981), 284–85.

Anatolian Black Sea towns of Sinope and Trabzon. By the mid-nineteenth century the autumn trade fair in Karasu was attracting roughly 35,000–40,000 visitors per annum.[6] In Dobruja in the north-western part of the Black Sea, the vibrancy of the Hacıoğlu Pazarcık (Bulgarian: Dobrich) trade fair was a "sure sign of the growing commercial volume of the area and of Dobruja's attractiveness, which drew not only the urban poor but those who could bring along relatively large amounts of capital."[7] In the 1860s, the "ethnic" composition of the most prominent merchant proprietors who annually set up shop in Pazarcık included representatives from the region's Bulgarian, Turkish, Armenian, and Jewish communities.[8] Additionally, the liberalization of trade between Dobruja and the Danubian Principalities (as stipulated in the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople following the Russian-Ottoman War of 1828–1829) resulted in an up-tick in the trans-Danubian carry trade in the 1830s—a development that contributed to wealth accumulation among Bulgarian merchant families with long-established agents and factors in northern Rumelia, Wallachia, Bessarabia, and Odesa.

3 Migratory Patterns, Push and Pull Factors, and Disease

While large numbers of people did flee the Ottoman Empire during and after Russian-Ottoman wars, an analysis of Russian registration lists of Ottoman subjects crossing the Danube, Prut, and Dniester Rivers into the Russian Empire provides clear evidence of considerable in-migration for every year in the period from 1768 to 1834.[9] In the general narrative of migration between the Ottoman and Russian Empires in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, therefore, two basic points needs to be made. First, the establishment of structural connections—through trade, communication, and return migration—among members of various migrant communities in the Ottoman Balkans, the Danubian Principalities, and southern Russia preceded Ottoman and Russian border demarcation initiatives (including the construction of quarantines). Second, these connections endured despite on-going efforts by the Ottoman and Russian states to police their borders and manage (or control) in and out-migration. Non-linear migra-

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6 Velko Tonev, "Natsionalno obrazuvashti protsesi v Severoiztochna Bulgaria i Dobrudzha," in *Balgarskata natsia prez Vazrazhdaneto* (Sofia: Balgarskata akademia na naukite, 1980), 265–91.

7 Nikolai Todorov, *The Balkan City, 1400–1900* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983), 462–63.

8 Todorov.

9 For a good example of a comprehensive migrant registration compiled by the Russian state, see the list requested by the Kishinev Town Duma in 1821. Besides the name, age, and gender of each registered Bulgarian migrant, this registration list notes the year that each migrant family crossed the Danube and settled in the Russian Empire. Tsentralnyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (TsGIA), Moldavskaia Sovetskaia Sotsialisticheskaia Respublika (MSSR), f. 75, op. 1, d. 130, ll. 22–45. See also TsGIA, MSSR, f. 5, op. 2, d. 439 and f. 5, op. 2, d. 442. Microfilmed copies of these types of registration lists can be found in the Bulgarian Central State Archives in Sofia, Bulgaria.

tion and, for certain groups and individuals, a circular migration involving out-migration, multiple secondary moves, and a return trip to their homelands was a common experience for many migrants in the Black Sea region in the modern period.

A variety of push and pull factors incentivized and stimulated voluntary and involuntary migration in the Black Sea region. In addition to warfare, the main push and pull factors spurring migration around the Black Sea in the modern period included: political instability and frequent outbreaks of epidemic disease resulting in the regular displacement of primarily peasant populations; chain migration due to previous re-settlement of kin-migrant communities around the Black Sea; fear of enserfment for newly arrived migrants in the Russian Empire, which prompted considerable return migration; the inability to adapt to harsh and unfamiliar environmental conditions, principally in the Budjak steppe and the windswept and bitterly cold northern Black sea littoral; the depletion of natural resources due to rapid and large-scale migration during and after Russian-Ottoman Wars and subsequent and significant crop failures for migrant agricultural communities; the lethalness of the migrant experience, in particular deadly outbreaks of plague and cholera in the Ottoman Balkans, Bessarabia, and southern Russia; the overcrowding and squalid conditions at border quarantine stations, which often prompted the immediate return of large numbers of migrants to their homes towns and villages; and the natural desire of migrants to return to their homeland and to be reunited with kinfolk.

Sub-state diasporic communication networks among kin-migrant communities scattered across the Black Sea region contravened and frustrated state-driven migration management and control initiatives. Members of Bulgarian migrant communities in the Black Sea region communicated with their kinsmen about the pros and cons of settlement conditions in the southern part of the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Balkans. Word of favorable economic and resettlement conditions stimulated out and return migration movements around the Black Sea.[10] Ottoman officials in particular took into account the existence of communication networks among Bulgarian migrant communities in the Black Sea region when formulating migration and settlement policies. For example, following the Ottoman-Russian War of 1828–29, the Ottoman governor of Silistre took advantage of communication channels among Bulgarian migrants to publicize the Ottoman state's offer of preferential treatment for Bulgarians returning from the Danubian Principalities and southern Russia to the Ottoman Balkans.

Additionally, despite the best efforts of Russian state servitors and border guards, Bulgarian migrants en route to the Russian Empire were aware of, and sought out, the easiest points of entry into and through the Danubian Principalities. For example, in the fall of 1830 Russian officials in Wallachia received reports on a significant drop in Bulgarian migrant arrivals at the Kalaraşi (Bulgarian: Kalarash, Romanian: Călăraşi) quarantine and a significant increase in migrant arrivals at the Brăila (Turkish: İbrail)

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10 Iov Titorov, *Balgarite v Bessarabia* (Sofia: Pechatnitsa na G. A. Nozharov, 1903).

and Pioa Pietri quarantines.[11] This shift in a migratory pattern—as a counter to recently-enacted Russian border security measures—typifies the fluidity of the Ottoman-Russian Black Sea migratory processes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The endemism of disease (plague and then cholera) in Istanbul and the Ottoman Balkans and the linkage made by Ottoman and Russian state authorities between migration and the spread of disease promoted the implementation of migration management and control initiatives in the Black Sea region in the modern period. The etiology and spread of the plague, an insect-borne bacterial disease, revolved around a rat-flea-human nexus. Fleas, after biting plague-infected rats, transferred the disease to humans. Textiles and hides constituted a particularly conducive breeding environment for fleas and, to a lesser extent, rats. Therefore, the primary method for the long-range spread of the disease between human populations in the Black Sea region was through trade in wool, silk, cotton, and the personal effects of merchants, migrants, and soldiers.[12] Dislocations and population displacements caused by warfare, political instability, and natural disasters (such as earthquakes, fires, and floods) compromised immune systems and indirectly contributed to the susceptibility of human populations to the plague. Particularly virulent strains of the plague in the Black Sea region carried a case mortality rate of 60–90 percent.[13] The appearance of Asiatic cholera (*cholera morbus*) in the Ganges plain in 1817 coupled with the increased use of steamship travel by Muslim pilgrims (*hadjis*) from the Indian subcontinent, resulted in significant outbreaks of epidemic cholera in Mecca and Medina in the early part of the nineteenth century. The disease was spread to Russian Black Sea ports by Russian Muslim *hadjis* returning from the Hejaz; the Russian Empire was the first European nation to suffer the ravages of the global cholera epidemic of the 1820s and 1830s and remained susceptible to a series of cholera pandemics across the nineteenth century.[14]

For many Ottoman subjects flight (for safety and to escape social ostracism) was the natural response to the appearance and contraction of disease, and plague-induced displacements resulted in the formation of new population settlements and significant alterations to the human geography of the Black Sea region.[15] In response to migrations and flight from disease-ridden areas, in the first half of the nineteenth century the modernizing and increasingly technocratic Ottoman and Russian states introduced en-

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11 "Doklad na logofeta Sht. Vladesku do izpalnitelnia Divan vav vrazka s preminavaneto i nastaniavaneto na balgarski bezhantsi (May 23, 1830)," in *Balgarite v Rumania, XVII–XX v.: Dokumenti i materiali*, ed. Maksim Mladenov, Nikolay Zhechev, and Blagovest Niagulov (Sofia: Akademichno izdatelstvo "Marin Drinov", 1994), 27–28.

12 Daniel Panzac, *Quarantines et lazarets: l'europe et la peste d'orient* (Aix-en-Provence: Édisud, 1986).

13 John T. Alexander, *Bubonic Plague in Early Modern Russia* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

14 For example, from 1823–31, over 250,000 Russians died of cholera. For a thorough overview of cholera in the Russian Empire, see Roderick McGrew, *Russia and the Cholera, 1823–1832* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965).

15 "*Chuesh li za chuma, byagay v shuma*" ("If you feel the plague coming, flee to the forest") was a common proverb in nineteenth-century Bulgaria.

hanced public health measures in the more heavily-trafficked Black Sea port cities of Odesa, Istanbul, and Varna and constructed quarantine lines along important rivers draining into the Black Sea (principally the Danube and the Prut). These *cordons sanitaires* had a wide-ranging impact on the direction, duration, and pace of population movements in the Black Sea region. Quarantines are primarily constructed in an effort to combat the spread of disease and, from an historiographical standpoint, are generally discussed within this context. However, it is clear that in the Black Sea region in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries quarantines rapidly evolved into all-purpose border posts where trade goods were inspected, customs collected, currency exchanged, criminals and fugitives surveilled, intelligence gathered, and migrants and refugees registered and provided with travel documents.

Historians tend to analyze migrant populations in units of hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands. The adoption of this macro-level frame is often unavoidable, as historians lack the conventional tools (such as real-time surveys and personal interviews) used by scholars of contemporary migrations to appreciate and evaluate individual migrations. Memoirs and travel accounts penned by Black Sea migrants and refugees are rare (at least until the latter part of the nineteenth century), making it difficult to engage the topic of migration in the Black Sea region at the human or individual level. However, through a closer look at city life and time spent in quarantine stations it is possible to get a glimpse of the mundane experience of migration in and around the Black Sea basin in the modern period. In Odesa, repeated outbreaks of plague and cholera prompted provincial officials to restrict movement into and out of the city as well as to impose lockdowns on neighborhoods suspected of harboring individuals stricken with disease. State-issued documentation was required to circumvent these restrictions and move throughout the city. Similarly, in Istanbul, in response to outbreaks of disease, Ottoman officials interdicted migration to and from the Ottoman capital and physically relocated suspected (and suspicious) populations outside of the city. Unmarried and itinerant, migrant laborers from the countryside were particularly subject to harassment and surveillance by Ottoman authorities. Several extant diaries and memoirs of literate merchants, pilgrims, and students on the move in the Black Sea region detail the experience of entering and surviving Ottoman and Russian quarantines.[16] The typical experience of migrants entering into quarantine included invasive medical checks, congested living conditions, the fumigation of clothing and trade goods, the rinsing of coinage in vinegar, and the resort to bribery and graft to avoid or reduce quarantine stays.

Pilgrimage and particularly the consistent and large-scale movement of Muslim migrants (*hadjis*) from Russia across the Black Sea en route to Mecca and Medina contributed significantly to the overall migratory regime of the Black Sea region in the modern period. The annual nature and the spatial specificity of the Muslim pilgrimage

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16 See for example the diaries of Ruscho Vulkov Mirkovich and Panaret Rashev, *Balgarski Istoricheski Arkhiv* (BIA), Fond 169 – Ruscho Vulkov Mirkovich, and BIA, Fond 8 – Panaret Rashev.

resulted in the forging of several well-trafficked Black Sea pilgrimage-migration routes. Istanbul served as the main collection point for Russian Muslim pilgrims arriving from the north, with the three primary pilgrimage routes of Odesa–Istanbul, Sevastopol–Istanbul, and Batumi–Istanbul funneling Muslim migrants to the Ottoman capital for onward travel to the Holy Lands of Mecca and Medina. Secondary trans-Black Sea *hadj* routes included Sevastopol–Samsun and Sevastopol–Trabzon, both with onward links to central Anatolia. In time, Odesa emerged as the main collection point and way-station on the northern Black Sea littoral for Russian Muslim *hadjis.* In the first decade of the twentieth century, up to 10,000 Muslim pilgrims annually passed through Odesa on their way to Istanbul.[17] Orthodox Christian migrants in the Russian Empire also engaged in long pilgrimages through Ottoman territory to important religious sites on the Khalkidiki Peninsula (in the northern Aegean). For example, in the period from 1816–21, an estimated 1,400 Bulgarian pilgrims travelled from Russia to the Zograf Monastery on Mt. Athos in Khalkidiki. Many of these Bulgarian pilgrims opted to remain in the Ottoman Empire rather than undertake the arduous journey back to the Russian Empire.

4 Migration in the Black Sea Region: 1850s–1920s

The Crimean War (1853–56) inaugurated a period of intense migration in the Black Sea region. A significant number of Muslim migrants (both Crimean Tatars and Circassians) who fled Russia during and after the war resettled in the Ottoman Balkans south of the Danubian estuary and along the Balkan Black Sea coast. Scholars estimate that a total of up to 350,000 Crimean Tatar and Circassian refugees were transported across the Black Sea and re-settled in the Ottoman Balkans in the second half of the nineteenth century. These migrants travelled to Ottoman Dobruja and the eastern Balkans by both land and sea, the latter group entering the Ottoman Empire via the Black Sea ports of Varna and Constanța before being transported inland on newly built rail lines.[18] Although the migration and settlement of Russian Muslims in Anatolia was not as numerous as in the Ottoman Balkans, Circassian refugees in particular were also re-settled in and around the Anatolian towns and cities of Trabzon, Amasya, Sivas, Kars, and Erzincan in the period after the 1860s.

In general, as with previous state-driven migration and settlement initiatives in the Black Sea region, the Ottoman state (building on the provincial Governor Midhat Pa-

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17 Eileen Kane, *Russian Hajj: Empire and the Pilgrimage to Mecca* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015); Daniel Brower, "Russian Roads to Mecca: Religious Tolerance and Muslim Pilgrimage in the Russian Empire," *Slavic Review* 53, no. 3 (1996): 567–84.

18 For more on infrastructural developments and migration, see the excellent collection of articles in the recently published volume of the *Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies:* Lyubomir Pozharliev, Florian Riedler, and Stefan Rohdewald, eds., "Transottoman Infrastructures and Networks across the Black Sea," special issue, *Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies* 3, no. 5 (December 2020).

sha's modernization drive in the Danube *Vilayet* in the 1860s) extended significant re-settlement assistance and incentives to the post-Crimean War wave of Crimean Tatar migrants entering the Ottoman Empire. While many Crimean Tatar arrivals were re-settled in Bulgarian villages and in Bulgarian homes, new, migrant-specific settlements were established for Crimean Tatar settlers. Circassians (and other Caucasian highland-ers) were not treated as well in the Ottoman Empire as were the Crimean Tatars and were generally looked down upon by Ottoman servitors and Orthodox Christian pop-ulations along the western Black Sea coast. Both Circassians and, to a lesser extent, Cri-mean Tatars were pressed into service by the Ottoman state as irregular militia (*başı-bozuk*) against rebellious Bulgarian populations, contributing to Orthodox Christian antipathy towards Muslim migrants in the Ottoman Balkans. In general, the large num-ber of Crimean Tatar migrant arrivals in a condensed period of time following the Cri-mean War (80,000 – 100,000) overwhelmed municipal and regional Ottoman authori-ties, leading to a reprisal of earlier Ottoman-Russian efforts to communicate about, coordinate on, and manage migratory circulation in the Black Sea region. The migra-tion of Crimean Tatars from the Russian to the Ottoman Empires after the conclusion of the Crimean War contributed to a significant population increase along the Black Sea coast in the late nineteenth century. By the second half of the nineteenth century, the population of Varna (the largest Bulgarian city on the Black Sea coast) had risen to 40,000, and the population of the Russian Black Sea port of Nikolaev had tripled in size. In this same period, the populations of the Russian Black Sea port cities of Odesa and Rostov grew six-fold and ten-fold respectively.

Typifying the circular and dynamic nature of the Black Sea migration experience, many Muslim migrants opted to return to the Russian Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century. While a certain number of Circassians (and other Muslim high-landers from the Caucasus) found their way back to Russia, Crimean Tatars constituted by far the largest group of Muslim migrant returnees to Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century. The south-north return journey to the Crimean Peninsula was shorter and easier for Crimean Tatars (aided by the increased use of steamship to nav-igate the open waters of the stormy Black Sea) compared to the lengthy and treacher-ous trans-montane route for Caucasian migrants. Crimean Tatars also enjoyed a better reputation in Russia as imperial subjects and were encouraged to return to the empire by Russian authorities. Up to 10,000 – 15,000 Crimean Tatars returned to the Crimean Peninsula shortly after the conclusion of the Crimean War and Crimean Tatar return migrations to the Russian Empire are documented well into the early part of the twen-tieth century.[19] The collapse of Ottoman authority in the Balkans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries exposed Muslim migrant communities to Orthodox Christian backlash and many Crimean Tatars undertook a second migration from the Ottoman Balkans to Anatolia in this period. In the period during and after the Rus-

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19 James H. Meyer, *Turks across Empires: Marketing Muslim Identity in the Russian-Ottoman Border-lands, 1856 – 1914* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

sian-Ottoman War of 1877– 78, up to 160,000 Muslim refugees left the Balkans for Istanbul. An additional 20,000 died of disease during this post-war displacement.[20] As James Meyer notes, in the nineteenth century

> [l]ike Armenians, Greeks, and Jews, and others traveling between the two empires, Russian Muslims frequently devised strategies that helped them take advantage of the categorical ambiguity of their positions. Living as Russians in the Ottoman Empire and Ottomans in Russia, these individuals succeeded in manipulating the politics of citizenship on both sides of the frontier.[21]

In general the story of Crimean Tatar migration in the second half of the nineteenth century highlights the fluidity and circulatory dynamism of migration in the Black Sea region in the modern period.

According to Charles King, the collapse of the Russian and Ottoman Empires during and after World War I and the post-World War I settlement of political boundaries in the region, sparked a "series of massive population movements that dwarfed the multiple exoduses of the late nineteenth century."[22] World War I, the Russian Revolutions of 1917, and the ensuing Russian Civil War (1918 – 21) generated both another wave of Jewish out-migration to Palestine (part of the third Aliyah of 1919 – 23) and a significant movement of White Russian (anti-Bolshevik) dissenters, émigrés, and refugees from Russia across the Black Sea to Istanbul. Starting in 1920, up to 200,000 White Russians, having migrated south to the Russian Black Sea ports of Odesa and Sevastopol ahead of the Red Army, fled the generalized violence of the Russian Civil War and sailed and steamed to safety in Istanbul.

5 Conclusion

Following a Cold War interlude from the 1950s to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, high levels of in- and out-migration re-emerged as a key structural component of Black Sea regionalism. According to Charles King, "the population movements of the 1990s and the early 2000s—the flow of economic migrants, asylum-seekers, transit migrants and refugees—may yet transform the demographic structure of the region in as profound a way as the region's last major period of mass population movements: the multiple rounds of ethnic cleansing and war-time displacement that took place from the 1860s and the 1920s."[23] These continuities underscore the durability of the state–migration nexus and the continuity of migration-generated regionalism in the Black Sea basin.

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20 See Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922* (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, Inc., 1995).

21 Meyer, *Turks*, 28.

22 Charles King, *The Black Sea: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 211.

23 King.

The economic and political cycles of the Black Sea region have fluctuated between periods dominated by a closed command economy and periods marked by international openness and free trade. Between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, the political economy of the Black Sea region was organized around the monopolistic provisioning of the Ottoman capital of Istanbul. At the start of the modern era, a series of treaties and trade agreements signed by the Ottoman and Russian Empires initiated a long period in the history of the Black Sea region marked by relative openness, commercial activity, and demographic exchange. Following a period of closure during the Cold War era, the thirty years since the collapse of the Soviet Union have seen both the return of the Black Sea region to participation in the international system as well as a pivot back to a Russian-Turkish condominium over Black Sea affairs. The regionality and spatial qualities of each of these cycles have both driven and circumscribed the level and pace of migration in the Black Sea region.

In the modern period, the Black Sea region was an active zone of exchange between the Ottoman and Russian Empires. The two key regional characteristics of the Black Sea basin—commercial interaction and large-scale migration—linked these two powerful empires along a clearly defined north-south axis. Defining a region as "a distinct geographical zone of interaction," Charles King identifies migrants and merchants as the main connective tissues that have historically linked the communities and political entities around the Black Sea.[24] To this list, for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, one can add diseases such as the plague and cholera which used migrants, merchants, and movers as carriers to infect human populations.

Focusing primarily on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and adhering to an expansive pre-twentieth century definition of "migrants" (to include movers of all types, such as voluntary and forced migrants, economic migrants, religious dissenters, merchants, coastal traders, seasonal laborers, pilgrims, and soldiers) this article, in addition to providing a broad overview of migration in the Black Sea region in the early modern and modern periods, has addressed the following themes: the environmental factors that defined and determined the number and flow of migrants in the Black Sea region; structural factors, such as "international" or transimperial relations and diaspora networks, that contributed to the direction and timing of migratory movements; migratory push and pull factors; the role of the state, state-migrant dynamics, and state-society relations, migration management initiatives and technologies; and the connection between migration and the spread of epidemic diseases in the Black Sea region.

The formation and articulation of diaspora communities and their ability to circumvent efforts by Black Sea states to enforce political and territorial sovereignty continues to be a salient feature of migration in the Black Sea region today. Turkish businessmen and traders have established themselves in Odesa, while Ukrainian migrants

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24 Charles King, "Is the Black Sea a Region?," in *The Black Sea Region: Cooperation and Security Building*, ed. Oleksandr Pavliuk and Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), 13–26.

and settlers have formed a visible community in Istanbul. The Chechen diaspora along the Bulgarian Black Sea coast controls a large segment of the lucrative Black Sea tourist industry in Bulgaria. Statistics compiled by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) document the migratory links among countries around the Black Sea littoral and the ongoing dispersion of peoples in the Black Sea region. Annually, an estimated 13.6 million migrants are on the move in the Black Sea basin. According to the IOM, intra-regional migration accounts for roughly 60 percent of total immigration into Black Sea countries. Russia is the primary source country for intra-regional migration, accounting for 22.5% of intra-regional migrants. Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania all send a large number of labor migrants to Russia and Turkey.[25] These regional migration flows have remained relatively stable throughout the first two decades of the twenty-first century. As has been the case throughout the history of the Black Sea region, the dynamism of migratory flows around and across the Black Sea region continues to both knit the Black Sea together and erode the sovereignty of nation-states around the Black Sea littoral.

Large-scale population movements, shifting patterns of agricultural settlement, and the commercial and political activities of migrant diasporas animated and energized the Black Sea world in the modern period. Today, trade, return migration, and intra-communal communications around the Black Sea littoral continue to forge strong and enduring structural connections among migrant communities in the region. The establishment of regional communication networks and historically high rates of return migration contributed in the past and will continue to contribute in the future to socially-constructed and culturally-articulated expressions of Black Sea regionalism.

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25 International Organization for Migration (IOM), *Migration in the Black Sea Region: An Overview 2008*, November 2008, https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/regional_overview_black_sea.pdf.

Christoph Witzenrath

Slavery

Slavery in the Black Sea region in its extremities from the Roma to the female regents of the Ottoman Empire has been a multifaceted phenomenon with many shades and hues since the onset of recorded history.[1] It has attracted criticism from Atlantic abolitionists giving rise to the defensive notion of "mild" Ottoman slavery. Although slavery has been defined in many ways, the core definition of chattel slave revolves around the hereditary loss of personal rights, or the lack of penalties for murdering slaves, and their status as property, thing or animal which can be sold or otherwise alienated by the owner, who has complete control over their day-to-day and domestic life, including their children.[2] Religions, states, and communities have sought to lessen the threat posed by slaves, as they increased the power of their marginal owners, and defined rules for treatment or manumission. Close to the Black Sea, new forms of rule evolved between 500 BCE and 1500: In monarchy, rulers of expansive empires realized the loss of taxpayers due to imperial overstretch, consequent growth of transaction costs, and indebtedness to merchants on the part of taxpayers. Some reclaimed those former taxpayers by inventing a personal relation of the ruler to every subject, requiring liberation, which did not exist in early empires.[3] Haphazardly enacted in historical time, such measures resulted in the multifarious blurred edges of slavery. The broad varieties of asymmetric dependency in which slavery was thus embedded were characterized by control of resources or actions on the part of the superior person in the relations.[4] In many cases, such relations were determined by the more or less clearly defined status which manumitted, ransomed, or liberated slaves obtained, or by slaves themselves through their agency. They could be aligned in scarcely defined continua or in incrementally ordered scales of asymmetrical dependencies.[5] Since the interagency

1 Felicia Roşu, ed., *Slavery in the Black Sea Region, C. 900 – 1900: Forms of Unfreedom at the Intersection Between Christianity and Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 2022).
2 Suzanne Miers, "Slavery: A Question of Definition," in *Critical Readings on Global Slavery*, ed. Damian Alan Pargas and Felicia Roşu (Boston: Brill, 2017), 186.
3 Joseph Calder Miller, *The Problem of Slavery as History: A Global Approach* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012).
4 Rudolf Stichweh, "How Do Divided Societies Come About? Persistent Inequalities, Pervasive Asymmetrical Dependencies, and Sociocultural Polarization as Divisive Forces in Contemporary Society," *Global Perspectives* 2, no. 1 (2021); Rudolf Stichweh, "Values, Norms, and Institutions in the Study of Slavery and Other Forms of Asymmetrical Dependency," *Dependent*, no. 1 (2022): 6.
5 Maryna Kravets and Victor Ostapchuk, "Cossacks as Captive-Takers in the Ottoman Black Sea Region and Unfreedom in the Northern Countries," in Roşu, *Slavery in the Black Sea Region, C. 900 – 1900.*

of dependents relies on the resources they can mobilize, whether material, social, or symbolical, the institutionalization of status was a ready incentive.[6] Many forms of dependency[7] mixed institutionalized features on an incremental scale with the threat of falling from favor, an element of ambiguous, continuous dependency often observed in privileged elite slavery. Unlike the epitome of "slavery" everybody seems to know, Southern US plantation slavery, these dependencies often came without an emphatic antonym of freedom, voting rights, individual rights, or privileges. Virtually all groups and cultures know an emic notion of freedom, as perceived from the internal of a given language or culture rather than in analytical, outward, or etic terms, and often contrasted to captivity and enslavement. However, in most cases this went hand in hand with acceptance of hierarchies and elite political privileges, something which today is seen as at least defective freedom, if as freedom at all.[8] In systems that employed elite slaves and manumitted, or rather, elite asymmetrical dependents enjoying great power and clearly defined privileges, high office below the ruler was constituted by socially mobilizing, motivating forms of ambiguous, continuous asymmetric dependency, which also might instill crippling fear of the ruler's caprices. However, where, as in later Mamluk Egypt, the sultan was a manumitted military slave or descendant, the mamluk networks became entrenched, weakened the sultan's power, and constituted an institutionalized elite group.[9]

Since the measures to increase tax payer numbers took slaves and workers from the market, they created new demand which resulted in additional slaving activities, preferably in areas outside the group thus defined. In those slaving areas, which could be defined by territory, religion, language, taxpayer status, gender, race, or political exigency, extraneous demand for captives and slaves was created.[10] Such areas could spread everywhere, but there are spaces in which historically such conditions existed more often than elsewhere. Supply had to meet demand, and in historical terms, anarchy or polytheistic religion are only partial criteria of eligibility, especially as even monotheism did not automatically guarantee protection of believers against enslavement, as in early Christianity; nor did a strong state such as the early Mongol Empire, Nazi Germany, or the Soviet Union. Various markers of discrimination inter-

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6 Juliane Schiel, Isabella Schürch, and Aline Steinbrecher, "Von Sklaven, Pferden und Hunden: Trialog über den Nutzen aktueller Agency-Debatten für die Sozialgeschichte," in *Neue Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte/Nouvelles contributions à l'histoire sociale*, ed. C. Arni, M. Leimgruber and S. Teuscher (Zurich: Chronos, 2017), 17.

7 For accessibility, "dependency" in this text excludes mutual symmetric dependency, a logical if counter-intuitive corollary, unless expressly stated.

8 Miers, "Slavery: A Question of Definition," 186.

9 Stephan Conermann, ed., *Everything is on the Move: The Mamluk Empire as a Node in (Trans-)Regional Networks* (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2014).

10 Jeffrey Fynn-Paul, "Introduction. Slaving Zones in Global History: The Evolution of a Concept," in *Slaving Zones: Cultural Identities, Ideologies, and Institutions in the Evolution of Global Slavery*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul and Damian A. Pargas (Leiden: Brill, 2018).

sect in a given person, increasing the likelihood of strong asymmetric dependency or alienable slaves, given legitimizing worldviews, institutions, and practices.[11]

Slaving in the Black Sea region is at first glance perennial, with booms and slumps stretching back eons. Myths presented to legitimize this trade include the notion that locals sold their own children.[12] Since antiquity, the trade has given rise to prejudiced notions of barbarians seen as uncivilized and un-cultured by predominantly sedentary historians because they did not cultivate the land as proper agriculturalists did and were therefore legitimately enslavable. Yet this is precisely the reason why it is mandatory to historicize these phenomena, to place them within their premodern and early modern social, economic, and practice contexts. Extreme forms of social asymmetrical dependency such as slavery were a matter of differentials of power and control. Since antiquity the steppe remained the main area of slaving in the Black Sea trade. A historical analysis of underlying causes and conditions of supply from this zone, moreover, primes the multifarious and widely divergent forms of dependency in the Black Sea and connected spaces. The Atlantic trade demonstrates this principle in an extreme case, as on the other side of the ocean, access to resources such as localized social relations ended, a new condition made possible primarily by new types of ships sailing on the open seas at the disposition almost exclusively of slave traders. The Black Sea and connecting rivers and straits were more shipping lanes one might circumvent than dividing oceans. Fugitives might return on their own feet, and some did, influencing the level of inclusiveness of dependency.

1 Slaving in Steppe and Littoral Interactions

Backgrounds to power differentials in the Eurasian steppe are less obvious or less well-known, but even more extensive. With respect to slavery, the last 4,000 years before c. 1800 CE are marked as one period, yet historically richly structured. Wide-ranging genome studies using archaeological material of horse bones show that the genome to which all modern horses relate quickly spread from ca. 2200 BCE within just a hundred to two hundred years to most of Eurasia and Northern Africa, starting in the Black Sea steppe. This could only happen because horse and human teamed up, learning to use their combined power to herd other animals and, finally, humans.[13] Mounted warriors from the steppe, armed with the powerful and expensive composite reflex bow re-

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11 Bernadette Brooten, "Enslaved Women in Basil of Caesarea's Canonical Letters: An Intersectional Analysis," in *Doing Gender, Doing Religion*, ed. Ute Eisen, Christine Gerber, and Angela Standhartinger (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013); Youval Rotman, *Byzantine Slavery and the Mediterranean World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard College, 2009).

12 Hannah Barker, *That Most Precious Merchandise: The Mediterranean Trade in Black Sea Slaves, 1260–1500* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 125–28.

13 Pablo Librado et al., "The Origins and Spread of Domestic Horses from the Western Eurasian Steppes," *Nature* 598, no. 7882 (2021): 634–40.

mained the superior military force in open field battle until the rifled, and finally repeating gun became widespread from the late eighteenth century.[14] This broad period of four millennia correlates with changes in the supply of slaves from the steppe: After the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768–74 saw the last reported outlier slave raids of the Crimean Tatars, in 1774 the Khanate was formally neutralized but dependent on Russia. Catherine II dispersed the Zaporozhian Cossacks, another consistently, though less extensively slaving group guarding the frontier yet causing trouble in foreign relations.[15]

In studies of the Black Sea trade, the steppe is often treated as a blank, a terra incognita with low socio-economic development and bellicose character scarcely appearing in the main extant sources on the transaction and demand sides of the trade, namely outside Italian and Ottoman registers and Mamluk chronicles, or the Greek and Roman authors.[16] In slave supply, steppe social relations figure as a main agent. The rich black earth soils of the Western Eurasian steppe grew vast amounts of grass feeding large herds. Yet the unsteady climate in these areas meant frequent years of famine. Pastoral nomads found additional sources of income in transcontinental trade in luxury items predominantly directed east-west. Herds moved seasonally south to north, at an angle of almost ninety degrees, and there was frequently tension between these movements: Nomadic guards secured caravans from nomads who tried to rob them, conflicts might lead to founding steppe empires securing the routes, ruling in rogues,[17] and dormant steppe laws waited to be enforced by charismatic leaders like Genghis Khan.[18] Penalties were the destruction of rival groups and confederacies, with either integration into one's army and confederacy, or selling the victims into slavery. When the Mongols founded their empire, they sent a stream of captives sold in the Genoese and Venetian harbors of the northern Black Sea.[19] It was equally in keeping with the purpose of clearing the trade routes that tax arrears could result in selling the debtor into slavery, although this practice was not limited to the steppe. Civilization, and not just the worst aspects of it, as much as the often stressed anomy and mutual infighting of fragmented slaving areas brought about conditions of mass enslavement.[20]

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14 Donald Ostrowski, "The Replacement of the Composite Reflex Bow by Firearms in the Muscovite Cavalry," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 11, no. 3 (2010), 513–34.

15 Kravets and Ostapchuk, "Cossacks as Captive-Takers in the Ottoman Black Sea Region."

16 Danuta Quirini-Popławska, *Włoski handel czarnomorskimi niewolnikami wo późnym średniowieczu* (Cracow: Wydawn. Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2002), 284–86. See, however, Brian L. Davies, *Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500–1700* (London: Routledge, 2007), chapter 1.

17 Nancy Shields Kollmann, *The Russian Empire 1450–1801* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 25–27, 32–33.

18 Lhamsuren Munkh-Erdene, "The Rise of the Chinggisid Dynasty: Pre-Modern Eurasian Political Order and Culture at a Glance," *International Journal of Asian Studies* 15 (2018): 38–39.

19 Lawrence N. Langer, "Slavery in the Appanage Era: Rus' and the Mongols," in Witzenrath, *Eurasian Slavery, Ransom and Abolition in World History, 1200–1860* (Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2015), 150, 153–54.

20 Quirini-Popławska, *Włoski handel czarnomorskimi niewolnikami.*

Cooperation and competition, moreover, characterizes the links between nomads and sedentary agriculturalists. Nomads needed exchange with the latter, offering horses and hides for grain and products of the forests. However, burgeoning agricultural expansion periodically ate into the grazing grounds, so from the nomadic perspective it made sense to use their skills as herdsmen and warriors and treat some agriculturalists, especially those allied to their rivals, as another form of animal husbandry.

2 Antiquity

The Black Sea trade and communication link reveals some of the earliest evidence in this respect. Slaves were among the few goods available in numbers and at a price advantageous to the Greek traders. They had to be, since the long voyage to the northern shores was dangerous.[21] Not only is the Aegean island emporium of Chios renowned for early and extensive trade in slaves channeled through the Greek colonies on the northern Black Sea board since the seventh century and, due to the high density of its slave population, for one of the first known slave rebellions; among Classical authors it also enjoyed the dubious honor of being the first to express the notion of the chattel slave. In Chios, which founded no colony of its own, they were mainly traded in exchange for Chian wine, which was much in demand among the leaders of the Scythian nomads and Greek colonists.[22] The Greek language knew a revealing metaphor for slaves, *andrapodon*, "man-footed animal," with obvious analogies to animal husbandry (*tetrapodon*) and the cattle market alongside metaphors stressing monetary transactions.[23] Reducing humans to the status of animals or objects traded was therefore first recorded in proximity to the transactions of steppe and maritime forms of transport.

Most data on ancient Greek slavery derives from Athens, the emporium and imperial center in which laws prohibited enslavement of citizens—although in principle everyone could become a slave—while slaves had no rights. Slaves were considered appropriate targets of humor, but most of the relevant comedies have not been copied

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21 David Braund, "The Slave Supply in Classical Greece," in *The Cambridge World History of Slavery*, vol. 1, *The Ancient Mediterranean World*, ed. Keith R. Bradley and Paul Cartledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 114.

22 Heinz Heinen, "Schwarzmeerraum," in *Handwörterbuch der antiken Sklaverei*, ed. Heinz Heinen (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2012), 74–90; Paul Cartledge, "The Helots: A Contemporary Review," in Bradley and Cartledge, *The Cambridge World History of Slavery*, 1:80, 115, 121. Wine against slaves, fur and other hides as the driving force of exchange in the Greek Black Sea colonies, rather than grain: Nadiia O. Havrylyuk, "The Graeco-Scythian Slave Trade in the Sixth and Fifth Centuries BC," in *The Cauldron of Ariantas: Studies Presented to A. N. Sceglov on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday*, ed. Pia Guldager Bilde (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2003), 75–85; on the economy of the Scythians: Nadiia Oksentiivna Havryliuk, *Istoriia ekonomiki Stepnoi Skifii VI–III vv. do n.e.* (Kyiv: Inst. Arkheologii NAN Ukrainy, 1999).

23 Tracey E. Rihill, "Classical Athens," in Bradley and Cartledge, *The Cambridge World History of Slavery*, 1:51.

and are no longer extant. Killing humans in peaceful conditions was considered to offend the gods and this principle was also applicable to slaves. Apart from the colony of Tana (today: Azov) at the estuary of the Don, Thrace provided many slaves, especially female servants whose tattoos are visible on the red-figured vases, attaining new meaning. On the Peloponnese, in a situation shared more widely throughout the region and pre-modern history, helots were subjugated neighboring groups working the fields in their own communities, under the supervision of the war-like Spartans.[24]

Roman and Byzantine slave laws combined a trading emporium's commitment to clear-cut laws with expansionist slaving. Slaves (*servus*, *ancilla*) were alienable property without legal capacity. Children shared the status of their mother. Manumission was granted by the owner and used as a motivator. Only by legal construction of the *peculium*, a limited liability device, could owners entrust duties of a manager or business representative to slaves.[25] While this was widely shared practice until at least the middle Byzantine period, agricultural and domestic slaving were far more widespread. Facing the pressure of Muslim expansion, which employed the liberty of the believer as a propaganda instrument, Byzantine emperor Leo VI ("the Wise," 886 – 912) promulgated the Novella, allowing slaves to dispose freely of their property, including by bequest. Protection of Christian marriage, church asylum, and direct access to courts of law made the slave more subject to higher spiritual or imperial authority but reduced the law of property and rights of free persons.[26] Moreover, in a move typical of reformers of slavery facing external competition, he made concessions to private slave owners, the Byzantine elite, leaving to their discretion the application of the law among their own slaves, but encouraging them to do so.[27] Given the lack of sources on social history as opposed to laws, it remains difficult to gauge the effects. A rise in the number of slaves in the tenth century was followed by decline and reduced numbers in productive labor in a shrinking empire.[28] The Church was split between humanization of slavery and the multitude of slaves toiling on monastery estates. Increased frequency of captured citizens led to the obligation of the parish and bishop to ransom.

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24 Peter Hunt, "Slaves in Greek Literary Culture," in Bradley and Cartledge, *The Cambridge World History of Slavery*, 1:30; Braund, "The Slave Supply in Classical Greece," 127–28; Rihill, "Classical Athens", 50–51; Cartledge, "The Helots," 73–90.

25 Neville Morley, "Slavery Under the Principate," in Bradley and Cartledge, *The Cambridge World History of Slavery*, 1:265–86.

26 Rotman, *Byzantine Slavery and the Mediterranean World*, 166–79.

27 Daphne Penna, "The Role of Slaves in the Byzantine Economy, 10th–11th Centuries: Legal Aspects," in Roşu, *Slavery in the Black Sea Region*, 63–89.

28 Alexander P. Kazhdan, ed., *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, 3 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 3:1915.

3 Medieval Slavery

Slavery was common in the medieval Palatinates of Rus, leaving the greatest cache of business documentation at Novgorod's slave corner of the main street market, written on birch bark preserved in a swamp. Inter-princely competition, cooperation with nomadic pastoralist groups, and external raids produced many captives ceded as a tribute to the Mongols since 1237, traded or used in agriculture, domestically, or at the court, as bailiffs or administrators.[29]

Scythian nomads left kurgans, burial mounds containing evidence of the quantities of wine traded by the Greeks, and gold treasures. The archaeological record of later Black Sea steppe societies is much broader, representing the immobile part of the nomadic-settled interaction. The urban sprawls and commercial hubs—including the human trade—of the Ulus of Jochi—emic for "Golden Horde"—extended for over ten kilometers at various sites along the lower Volga. The power of the steppe empire did not require fortifications, until it broke down after civil war in the 1360s–70s and downscaled transcontinental trade following the ouster of the Mongol Yuan dynasty in China.[30] Local level, transimperial agents and brokers inserted themselves into regional raiding economies reconfiguring steppe empires, often with the help of Tatar concubines, whom even the Latins allowed to inherit in analogy to Muslim custom. Slaves found new roles in the transmission of knowledge and served as universally accepted currency and in gift exchanges.[31] Breakdowns of steppe confederacies, re-stabilizations, and the ensuing slow disintegration sent yet more waves of captives through the Black Sea, their origins indicative of internal instabilities, which were likely as causal to the trade as the marketized demand especially to the south of the steppe and Black Sea that destabilized and destroyed the social fabric of the steppe and neighboring societies.[32]

Late medieval slave trade between the northern Black Sea ports, Egypt, and Italy mainly revolved around mixed goods. It was almost monopolized after wars in the first half of the fourteenth century against Venice and Byzantium by Genoa from its hub Caffa (today: Feodosiia) on the Crimean Peninsula. To a lesser degree, Venetians traded at Tana under the oversight of the Tatar representative. These trades carried from ca. five hundred to several thousand documented slaves through the Bosporus each year.[33] Despite papal restrictions on the slave trade with Christians, enslavement of heterodox

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29 Langer, "Slavery in the Appanage Era."

30 Recent Russophone literature is covered in Christoph Witzenrath, "Rezension von: Aleksandr Vladimirovič Pačkalov: Srednevekovye goroda nižnego Povolž'ja i severnogo Kavkaza, Moskva: Knorus 2018," *sehepunkte* 19, no. 9 (2019).

31 Juliane Schiel, "Tatort Tana: Die Rolle Lateineuropas in der Sklavenökonomie des Schwarzmeerraums (ca. 1300.1500)," *Historische Zeitschrift* 313, no. 1 (2021): 32–60.

32 Hannah Barker, "Egyptian and Italian Merchants in the Black Sea Slave Trade, 1260–1500" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2014); Barker, *That Most Precious Merchandise,* 121–51.

33 Barker, *That Most Precious Merchandise,* 138, 153, 155–56.

was considered just punishment and, in the case of Slavonic Christians, a case of natural law.[34] Attempts to use the geopolitical bottlenecks of the Northern ports, the Bosporus, and the Anatolian-Syrian frontier as means to control the trade in a crusading spirit led to diversions and transferal from sea to land connections. The Mamluk sultans made access to the spice trade in their harbors conditional on strategical supply with slaves and paid generously. After the collapse of the competing Ilkhanate in 1335, treaties with buffer states in eastern Anatolia, such as Armenia, guaranteed unimpeded slave trade along the Simisso (today: Samsun)–Sivas–Aleppo land route. From a perspective of the balance of power, rules against enslaving co-religionists might be just as important when observed in terms of their breach as with respect to compliance. Increasing Genoese competence in controlling the trade since the 1380s went hand in hand with Ottoman expansion.[35]

A minor wave of new slaves came from Circassia resulting from Khan Tokhtamysh's re-stabilizing the Ulus of Jochi in 1380. The Circassian nobles had supported the losing side during the preceding civil war, and were barred from redistributed revenue and spoils in Sarai. They raided local northwestern Caucasian peasant settlements and competing princes for exchange to obtain unprecedentedly rich grave goods found in elite burials, imported from the lower Volga and the wider Mediterranean. These minor shifts led to larger consequences, as Circassian slaves were the new mamluks after Tatar sources dried up and the Circassian Barquq became the Egyptian sultan.[36]

The Roma in mainly southeastern Europe are a case of outright chattel slavery in Europe. Their ethnonym in Romanian, *ţigani,* was a synonym for slave, whereas terms like *rob*—slave in local Slavonic chancellery language—were used in parallel and only later. In the Romanian principalities, where the source material and study situation is better than in other countries, they could be sold, bequeathed, gifted, and used as collateral. All had to pay taxes and dues to the state, monasteries, or boyar masters, on whom they were personally dependent. However, passing death sentences was the preserve of the prince. Originally nomadic, many Roma settled to a sedentary life according to their professions, from highly-sought blacksmiths to a majority of agricultural workers and female domestic workers as well as some itinerant peddlers and street artists keeping, for example, dancing bears. Occupations determined to which self-organized "band" they belonged, along with partly differing cultures and dialects. Owners' obligations were limited to feeding the settled. The itinerants were excluded from this, inducing them to top up uncertain income by occasional thievery, to meet obligations. Those who crossed into the Ottoman Empire were free there, but without rights; on return, they would become slaves of the prince again, as did all Roma who had no

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34 Quirini-Popławska, *Włoski handel czarnomorskimi niewolnikami*, 39.

35 Barker, *That Most Precious Merchandise*, 135–50, 161–63.

36 Hannah Barker, "What Caused the 14th-Century Tatar-Circassian Shift?," in Roşu, *Slavery in the Black Sea Region, C. 900–1900*, 339–64; John Latham-Sprinkle, "The Late Mamlūk Transition of the 1380s: The View from the North Caucasus," *Al-Masāq* 35, no. 2 (2022): 1–21.

owner. Some fled to join the prince's—or princess's—slaves due to worse conditions under their other owners. Their origins are shrouded in silence, although they seem to have arrived as slaves of the Tatars. They first appeared with some captured Tatars in an already existing asymmetric dependent status in the Romanian principalities founded in the fourteenth century. The slavery of Roma was abolished in Romania between 1843 and 1856.[37]

Muscovite *kholopstvo* was slavery in the sense that *kholopy* could be sold or otherwise alienated in dowries, donations, or inheritance. It was one term for a whole array of different, often contractual arrangements. Few were inherited full slaves; most were temporary debt slaves who legally could not be bequeathed although in practice they were, within the family. Temporary service contract *kholopy* sold themselves to the owner, initially for a year, often repeatedly and from 1586 onwards, not for longer than the life of the owner. Tension between these arrangements stem from the harsh conditions of life on the edge of agricultural viability, exchanges with and depredations from the steppe, and the Muscovite striving to limit, fortify, and mobilize against the latter, an effort imposing additional austerity on ordinary Muscovites. Steppe and wider Iranian practices were transferred by the widespread occupation as military slaves accompanying the owner during campaigns. Others were employed in the household and a few in agriculture. The owner's main obligation was to feed and, by implication, maintain them. It was impossible to abolish the institution due to its social functions, so rulers and the Church, aiming to limit its threat to the tax base and communities, tried to protect *kholopy*, upholding honor and marriages, although someone who married a *kholop*, male or female, also became one. The unique *kholopy* chancellery centralized obligatory registration and settling disputes. By the same token, no urges to protect have been observed regarding heterodox captives.[38] The latter were mostly exchanged for Muscovite captives, for which purpose a dedicated prison was set up in Sevsk near the steppe.

4 Early Modern Slave Raiding and Trade

Demand for labor was high in the economically thriving Ottoman Empire and raiding nomads' access to human resources easy, fast, and ugly. After acquiring the northern harbors in 1475, the Ottomans took over the trade from the Italian sea powers, while volume had slumped since the 1440s. After reaching the Mamluk border in 1480, the

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37 Viorel Achim, "The Gypsies in the Romanian Lands During the Middle Ages: Slavery," in Pargas and Roşu, *Critical Readings on Global Slavery*, 991; Viorel Achim, *The Roma in Romanian History* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004), 103–12.

38 Hans-Heinrich Nolte, "Iasyry: Non-Orthodox Slaves in Pre-Petrine Russia," in Witzenrath, *Eurasian Slavery*, 247–64; Richard Hellie, *Slavery in Russia, 1450–1725* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Alessandro Stanziani, "Slavery and Bondage in Central Asia and Russia: Fourteenth–Nineteenth Centuries," in Witzenrath, *Eurasian Slavery*, 81–104.

Ottomans used their hold on the bottlenecks to halt the Black Sea slave trade and curb Mamluk power until surrender in 1517. However, under Ottoman aegis, Mamluks were again imported and continued to hold local power in Egypt.[39] Demand for slaves in the burgeoning Ottoman Empire and the collapse of expansion in the Balkans contributed to a new upswing in the Black Sea trade. Estimates rely on patchy, but in global historical terms fairly reliable sources, mainly Ottoman tax records and Muscovite governors' and Polish *starostas*' incomplete reports on losses. Accordingly, some 1.5 – 2 million people were taken by raiders and merchants through the harbors and the Caucasus from 1475 to about 1700. Almost annual slave raids of various sizes across the steppe, often several per year, yielded large numbers of slaves: Eastern Europe from the Caucasus to Poland was second in numbers only to sub-Saharan Africa as a source of slaves in this period.[40] This surge was fed by the decomposing steppe confederacies, as conflict in Central Asia further reduced transcontinental east-west trade and nomads sought extra income in raiding the emerging northern powers, first Poland-Lithuania, and from the early sixteenth century Muscovy.[41]

Connectivity was central to this nomadic extra income: Muscovite and Ruthenian slaves may be found in numbers in places as far removed as Aleppo, Istanbul, or the center of silk and carpet production, Bursa. For most captives, this was a one-way trip, as they never returned. They did not necessarily remain in their new places against their will due to the attraction of the cosmopolitan Ottoman Empire, although efforts are needed to prove this in individual cases. However, the power of the holding areas to retain them, such as the danger of being recaptured in the steppe, contributed to the larger numbers who did not return.[42]

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39 Barker, *That Most Precious Merchandise*; William G. Clarence-Smith and David Eltis, "White Servitude," in *The Cambridge World History of Slavery*, vol. 3, *AD 1420–AD 1804*, ed. David Eltis and Stanley L. Engerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 147.

40 Christoph Witzenrath, "Introduction. Slavery in Medieval and Early Modern Eurasia: An Overview of the Russian and Ottoman Empires and Central Asia," in Witzenrath, *Eurasian Slavery*, 1 – 77; Ian Wilkinson, "The Problem of Suffering as a Problem for Sociology," *Medical Sociology Online* 1, no. 1 (2006): 113 – 21; Charles Wilkins, "A Demographic Profile of Slaves in Early Ottoman Aleppo," in *Eurasian Slavery*, 221 – 46.

41 Davies, *Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe.*

42 Ehud Toledano, *As If Silent and Absent: Bonds of Enslavement in the Islamic Middle East* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 38 – 47; Ehud Toledano, "Enslavement in the Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern Period," in Eltis and Engerman, *The Cambridge World History of Slavery*, 3:25 – 47; Brian L. Davies, "The Prisoner's Tale: Russian Captivity Narratives and Changing Muscovite Perceptions of the Ottoman-Tatar Dar-Al-Islam," in Witzenrath, *Eurasian Slavery*, 279 – 94; Aleksandr Lavrov, "Captivity, Slavery and Gender: Muscovite Female Captives in the Crimean Khanate and in the Ottoman Empire," in Witzenrath, *Eurasian Slavery*, 309 – 19; Aleksandr Lavrov, "Rapatriement, genre et mobilité sociale: La liste des captifs rapatriés de Crimée par Timofej Hotunskij (1649)," *Cahiers du monde russe* 57, no. 2/3 (2016): 667 – 85.

5 Muslim Slavery

As Islam came to be the dominant religion in one of the world's most developed and culturally advanced regions, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Mediterranean, it inherited whole sets of institutions and customs. They were not always easily compatible with what had taken root in the mind of Mohammed in an impoverished peninsula inhabited by herdsmen and some townspeople. Connected to civilization but remote in the desert, early Muslims combined an ancient local identity with a universal, monotheistic truth to create a momentum that kept them both apart from and linked to the cultures they conquered.[43] In these regions and beyond, one of the main institutions of the ancient world, slavery, proliferated and soon obtained its own Muslim cultural vector. The tensions inherent in the adaptation of nomads to the remnants of antiquity lived on and may still be discerned in various forms in early modern Muslim perspectives on slavery.[44] There is consequently no one Muslim take on slavery: The various schools of religious law, laws promulgated by Muslim rulers, the locally strong admixtures of customs or regional, pre-Islamic laws and the diverse Sufi orders as well as individual Islamic scholars, all contributed to a rich and variegated patchwork of views. The tensions created by these overlapping texts, practices, and customs could be exploited by slaves to some degree; therefore, the study of Muslim slavery presupposes a great deal of attention to details of law.[45] From early on in its history, Islam called for the humane treatment of slaves.

Scholarly claims that Muslim slavery was "milder" than the chattel slavery in the New World have to be weighed against the backdrop of continuing enslavement in remote areas and recent sexual enslavement of Yazidi women, and the more methodically bottom-up perspective of the latest scholarship on the early and middle periods of Ottoman history. Students of Muslim slavery are now less prepared to accept unquestioningly the good treatment thesis created as a defensive concept by the late Ottoman elite in the face of Western abolitionists.[46] Considering the extant archival sources, studies have barely scratched the surface.

In Islam, slavery had a special edge because of the very egalitarian ideals and high social mobility.[47] However, concomitant military successes brought the creation of dominant social groups. Such broad enfranchised groups before long refused to serve in the military. Before industrialization, the only other source of military power were slaves

43 Robert Brunschvig, "'Abd," in *Encyclopedia of Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1960), 1:24–40.

44 Patricia Crone, *Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Polity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 18–26.

45 Toledano, *As If Silent and Absent*, 16; William G. Clarence-Smith, *Islam and the Abolition of Slavery* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2006).

46 Toledano, *As If Silent and Absent*, 17.

47 Marshall Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam,* vol. 2, *The Expansion of Islam in the Middle Periods* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 355.

brought in from abroad.[48] Some rulers gave nomadic warriors the *usus fructus* of agricultural surplus to guard frontiers from raids of their brethren from the steppe, as had already been the case under the pre-Islamic Sassanids. As these local potentates acquired hereditary rights, rulers found themselves on a par with them, in a disintegrating polity. Garrisoned military slaves provided loyal power to the ruler, as they had no local stronghold.[49] The ubiquity of slave labor, drawn mostly from captives of wars or bought abroad, was a response to the inadmissibility of serfdom and forced labor by Muslims and tax-paying heterodox.[50]

The definition of slavery was straightforward, except for the areas in which customary law was strong, which created numerous complex and conflicting gradations. According to the holy law of Islam, the Sharia, slaves were chattels which could be resold, akin in many respects to livestock. However, unlike livestock, they possessed certain cautiously marked-out rights, as their humanity was incontestable.[51]

The clear legal definition obscures a perplexing variety of social roles putting obstacles in way of solidarity between those under the sway of slavery.[52] Rulers became dependent on household and military slaves, on eunuchs and concubines to such a degree that slaves sometimes seized power.[53] Singing girls could become influential at court and they received an education in elite households.[54] A concubine who bore a son to a powerful man wielded immense power herself, especially as a widow. If the son was recognized, she had to be manumitted and her status was legalized. The early seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire was dubbed the "sultanate of the women," many arriving from inner Eurasia as slaves.[55] Some female slaves successfully sued for mistreatment, especially if they were sold while pregnant.[56] Slavery itself contributed to upward social mobility—characteristics that set Muslim societies apart from the increasing social rigidities of European medieval social estates.

The harem system of the Ottoman court was extreme in comparison with other elite households. Recent studies have cast doubt on the notion of concubinage comply-

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48 Clarence-Smith, *Islam and the Abolition*, 19.

49 Kamran Matin, "Uneven and Combined Development in World History: The International Relations of State-Formation in Premodern Iran," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 3 (2007): 419–47; Kurt Franz and Wolfgang Holzwarth, eds., *Nomad Military Power in Iran and Adjacent Areas in the Islamic Period* (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2015).

50 Fynn-Paul, "Introduction. Slaving Zones in Global History."

51 Clarence-Smith, *Islam and the Abolition*, 2; Brunschvig, "'Abd," 1:26–30.

52 Toledano, *As If Silent and Absent*.

53 Tōru Miura and John Edward Philips, *Slave Elites in the Middle East and Africa: A Comparative Study* (London: Kegan Paul International, 2000).

54 Günnaz Çaşkurlu, *Osmanlı sarayında sanatçı cariyeler IV. Mehmed dönemi* (Istanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2020). I am grateful to Veruschka Wagner for providing this information.

55 Ehud Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998), 44. On Roxelane/Hürrem: Leslie P. Peirce, *Empress of the East: How a European Slave Girl Became Queen of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Basic Books, 2017).

56 Liubov Kurtynova-D'Herlugnan, *The Tsar's Abolitionists: The Slave Trade in the Caucasus and Its Suppression* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 42–43; Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition*, 59–67.

ing with the ideal of good treatment in the intimacy of the home, family, or household depicted in late Ottoman defenses of slavery and much of Western literature; these newer studies tend to privilege the view from within and bottom-up perspectives of the enslaved.[57] The inclination to stay, especially among female slaves, has questionable value as an argument for the "good treatment" hypothesis, as decisions were influenced by the "horrors of the return journey," which were worse for non-military captives, females, and those who could pay less.[58] Moreover, women in many societies were socialized to obey men unquestioningly and reproduction yielded new personal bonds in the receiving society—factors that tended to make them stay but are not connected to treatment.[59] However, court cases show female slaves and manumitted were granted a voice to various degrees according to social roles and concomitantly increasing agency.[60]

Yet this was not the lot of the vast majority assigned to menial tasks or who ended up as "cannon fodder." The lives of ordinary soldiers were cruel, brutish, and short.[61] Slavery was also common on small and medium-sized landholdings, in irrigation, mining, transport, public works, proto-industry, and large-scale construction.[62] Nomadic raiders made their slaves "watch the flock, prepare the food, make felts and weave carpets".[63] Singing girls were prostitutes and courtesans.[64] Sexual access and exploitation of female slaves was commonly accepted for owners in Italy, Egypt, and elsewhere.[65] Prostitution of slaves was plainly forbidden in the Qur'an.[66] However, the legal fiction of short-term sales concealed its practice in Ottoman lands and elsewhere.[67]

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57 Jay Spaulding, "Slavery, Land Tenure, and Social Class in the Northern Turkish Sudan," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 15, no. 1 (1982): 1–20; Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition*, 14–19; Kurtynova-D'Herlugnan, *The Tsar's Abolitionists*, 39–40. However, see Çaşkurlu, *Osmanlı sarayında sanatçı cariyeler)*, on artist education.

58 Toledano, *As If Silent and Absent*, 43.

59 Claire C. Robertson and Martin A. Klein, eds., *Women and Slavery in Africa* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 6, 8–9.

60 Veruschka Wagner, "Slave Voices Represented in the Ottoman Court Records: A Narrative Analysis of the Istanbul Registers from the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *Narrating Dependency, Dependency and Slavery Studies,* ed. Elke Gymnich and Marion Brüggen (Berlin: De Gruyter, forthcoming).

61 Daniel Pipes, *Slave Soldiers and Islam* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981); Crone, *Slaves on Horses*.

62 Ehud Toledano, "Preface," in Roşu, *Slavery in the Black Sea Region, C. 900–1900*, vii–xvii.

63 Duncan Cumming, ed., *The Country of the Turkomans: An Anthology of Exploration from the Royal Geographical Society* (London: Oguz Press, 1977), 68.

64 Kurtynova-D'Herlugnan, *The Tsar's Abolitionists*, 39; Leslie P. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 138, 141–42.

65 Barker, *That Most Precious Merchandise*, 77–80.

66 Brunschvig, "'Abd," 1:25.

67 Y. Hakan Erdem, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise, 1800–1909* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 34–35; James Forsyth, *A History of the Peoples of Siberia: Russia's North Asian Colony 1581–1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67–68, 73.

Generalizations about treatment are risky, since reports by slaves have commonly been removed from the historical record. The Sharia banned the molestation of wards, but control of such rules was restricted because the household fell under the private sphere. Less formal sources convey both vigorous exhortations for good treatment and alternative modes of operation, such as approval of corporal punishment.[68] This whole area of study is tainted by implicit comparison, so an appropriate, albeit in this context unanswerable, question remains: Was life in Christian countries better for comparable functional groups, and if so, from which time on?

While there are several reports about mild-mannered masters, and some slaves, female as well as male, enjoyed contractual agency in specific areas (*mukateba*), these are offset by less agreeable treatment that included social marginalization through frequent resale.[69] Court records from the Crimean Khanate tend to support reports by local Dominican missionaries about abusive treatment of slaves; in cases of the killing of a slave, the owner might be compensated, but there was no punishment. Prices for slaves were low in Crimea and slaves might have been considered dispensable.[70] Crimean Tatars are unlikely to have kept many slaves, since local economic structures did not support it.[71] However, the ransom business was profitable and at the same time lacked information about the rank and means of captives. Absent other means to overcome uncertainty about what price they could demand, owners and brokers resorted to inducements as well as torturing captives and witnesses.[72]

Enslavement depended on vicious raids, harrowing forced marches, dismal sales of the disenfranchised, and perilous maritime voyages; this also holds for earlier Italian activities.[73] The recently studied Ottoman slaves who sought agency in multiple everyday acts of petty self-assertion and resistance give every indication that Muslim slavery,

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68 Clarence-Smith, *Islam and the Abolition,* 4.

69 John Hunwick and Eve T. Powell, *The African Diaspora in the Mediterranean Lands of Islam* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2002), 124. For example, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnykh Aktov, f. 210 (Razriad) d. 617, p. 5; ibid., d. 773, pp. 183, 185, ibid., d. 1194, p. 52, ibid., d. 1355, pp. 33, 34; Toledano, "Enslavement in the Ottoman Empire," 37–38.

70 Alan Fisher, "Chattel Slavery in the Ottoman Empire," *Slavery and Abolition* 1, no. 1 (1980): 36–37; Fırat Yaşa, "Desperation, Hopelessness, and Suicide: An Initial Consideration of Self-Murder by Slaves in Seventeenth-Century Crimean Society," *Turkish Historical Review,* no. 9 (2018): 203–5.

71 Valerii Evgenevich Vozgrin, *Istoriia krymskikh tatar: Ocherki etnicheskoi istorii korennogo naseleniia Kryma,* 4 vols. (Simferopol: Krymuchpedgiz, 2013), 1:440–54; Mária Ivanics, "Enslavement, Slave Labour and Treatment of Captives in the Crimean Khanate," in *Ransom Slavery Along the Ottoman Borders: Early Fifteenth – Early Eighteenth Centuries*, ed. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (Leiden: Brill, 2007); Leszek Podhorodecki, *Chanat Krymski i jego stosunki z Polska w XV–XVIII w* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1987), 62–64; Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 186–87.

72 Brian J. Boeck, "Identity as Commodity: Tournaments of Value in the Tatar Ransom Business," *Russian History/Histoire Russe* 35, no. 9, 3–4 (2008): 259–66.

73 Robert Dankoff, ed., *An Ottoman Traveller: Selections from the Book of Travels of Evliya Çelebi* (London: Eland, 2011), 338–40; Davies, *Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe.*

despite the apparently broader spectrum of occupations and roles, was recognizably related to parallel phenomena in other cultures.[74]

Imperial law initially exacerbated slavery but began to rein in the institution from the sixteenth century. Once confronted by the strong and popular Atlantic challenge to slavery in the nineteenth century, responses were still ambivalent. Mystics and millenarians explosively increased rates of enslavement when they chose the way of the sword. However, subversive millenarians who claimed the right to abolish the law and reshape society might oppose slavery and did much to integrate former slaves into Islam. Some of the earliest cases of abolition of slavery occurred in the northern Caucasus khanates, on the border of the Russian Empire.[75]

Overall, a paradox calls for further research: Islam was precocious in regulating slavery and encouraging the faithful to engage in manumission, and yet Muslim conservatives generally lagged behind those of other faiths in approving complete emancipation.[76] Yet as strategic choices, such gradualism made sense, as it allowed the integration of slaves in rather clearly defined scales of asymmetric dependency, curtailing the power of marginal slaveholders in favor of the community of believers.[77]

6 The Slave Trade and Serfdom in the Russian Empire

Another result of the dominance of mounted steppe warriors in open field combat until the late eighteenth century was Muscovy's and the Russian Empire's increasing drive to conquer the steppe. In the early modern period, as the musket and early guns were yet no match for the composite reflex bow, apart from being less high-tech and cheaper, field defenses and earthwork along with forts helped to level the military disparity. The strategy proved successful and from the 1570s to the late acquisition of Central Asia, one consecutive fortified border line after another spread into the steppe, each covering hundreds and even thousands of kilometers. They helped keep raiders out and mobile peasants inside the empire. Muscovy fittingly adapted a liberationist worldview according to which it was the "New Israel" and Ivan IV was like Moses God's instrument leading the Muscovite slaves out of the new Egyptian slavery in Tatar Kazan on the middle Volga. The tsar and all Orthodox believers were obliged to ransom Orthodox slaves and captives. Muscovy used this worldview to justify the conquest and deportation of Tatars from the city, occupying the fortress. This was achieved

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74 Toledano, *As If Silent and Absent*; Lavrov, "Rapatriement, genre et mobilité sociale"; Miers, "Slavery: A Question of Definition."

75 Kurtynova-D'Herlugnan, *The Tsar's Abolitionists.*

76 Clarence-Smith, *Islam and the Abolition*, 19 – 21.

77 Miller, *The Problem of Slavery as History*; Kravets and Ostapchuk, "Cossacks as Captive-Takers in the Ottoman Black Sea Region."

with the help of loyal Tatars, lauded as greater liberators than the Russian boyars themselves, both being portrayed much in the way of Arab and Ottoman *gazi*s. Yet unlike the Ottoman prohibition on enslaving and enserfing believers and taxpayers, it was permitted to subjugate Orthodox peasants to masters as long as they were Orthodox, a phenomenon which became more widespread as the empire expanded and, initially, grain remained scarce and had to be stocked.[78]

Growing taxes and military service meant that peasants became indebted, fled from smaller estates towards larger ones, to monasteries, abroad, or to the new fortified lines in the steppe promising measures of privileges. Muscovy answered flexibly to these challenges, but the 1649 code of laws finally ended legal liberty of mobility. In legal terms, serfdom mainly meant that serfs enjoyed less access to courts beyond landowners and required their assent for mobility. While most serfs, especially those on the fertile black earth close to the Black Sea, were peasants delivering work dues, many engaged in diverse trades, often as absentees or providing replacements for tilling the land and recruitment into the army. Especially complex asymmetrically dependent relations evolved between household serfs and masters. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth century, serfs were increasingly sold, bought, and used as collateral for credit granted by the bank of the nobility. First inconclusive attempts at rebalancing social relations in the then prosperous empire occurred during the first half of the nineteenth century, while numbers of serfs abated.[79] The lost Crimean War of 1853–56 against the maritime powers translated into Russia's awareness of lagging economic and social dynamism, attributed to outmoded serfdom by the government and elites. Abolition in 1861 meant for many former serfs continuing burdens from "redemption" payments to former owners extending into the early twentieth century. Moreover, all peasants were placed in the constraints of the peasant community replacing the landowner, which was meant to uphold order and redistribute the land to those who could till it. It proved a major lost opportunity to make agriculture more efficient, although the reformers could not have foreseen the growth of the rural population, social pressures woven into the backdrop to Russia's revolutions.[80]

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78 Christoph Witzenrath, *The Russian Empire, Slaving and Liberation, 1480–1725: Trans-Cultural Worldviews in Eurasia* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022), 6. On later uses of this worldview for imperial aims: Kurtynova-D'Herlugnan, *The Tsar's Abolitionists*; Lucien J. Frary, "Slaves of the Sultan: Russian Ransoming of Christian Captives During the Greek Revolution (1821–30)," In *Russian-Ottoman Borderlands: The Eastern Question Reconsidered*, ed. Lucien J. Frary and Mara Kozelsky (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), 101–30.

79 Roger Bartlett, "Serfdom and State Power in Imperial Russia," *European History Quarterly* 33, no. 1 (2003): 29–64; Peter B. Brown "Russian Serfdom's Demise and Russia's Conquest of the Black Sea Littoral: Was There a Link?," in Witzenrath, *Eurasian Slavery*, 335–66; Steven Laurence Hoch, "Serfdom and Social Control in Nineteenth Century Russia: Petrovskoe, a Village in Tambov" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1983); Tracy Dennison, *The Institutional Framework of Russian Serfdom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, *Russia's Age of Serfdom 1649–1861* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008).

80 David Moon, *The Abolition of Serfdom in Russia, 1762–1907* (Harlow: Longman, 2001).

Despite their own colonial history, the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union became the major power linking up with the decolonized against former colonizers during debates about the abolition of slavery at the Congress of Vienna, the League of Nations, and the United Nations.[81] President Putin still aimed to mobilize these global links when he spoke of liberation and slavery during his September 2022 speech which legitimized annexing four Ukrainian regions, televised worldwide by Russia Today (RT), claiming that the duplicity of the "West" was clearly seen in the Atlantic slave trade and colonialism.[82] Obviously, such a propagandistic statement also applies in reverse and deserves some background analysis. Muscovy already exemplifies how liberation may end in subjection to the self-proclaimed "liberator." Imperial power politics encourage a fine balance in attitude towards the conquered, say, bombing Chechnya or Syria, and towards powers such as India reliant on Soviet and Russian weapons deliveries, engendering different subtexts in the message. To the latter, it is a poisoned promise, to the former a disguised threat; polemically that may be called duplicity. Putin's autocratic Russia has left not a shred of doubt that it actively suppresses dissent; moreover, the current war of aggression on a democratizing Ukraine is accompanied by a mounting debate about genocidal intent. Nevertheless, some Russian actors still seem to misinterpret such signs, not least notoriously Evgenii Prigozhin in his last viral swagger: "Wagner [Group] is making Africa even freer." Misunderstanding the imperial practice of renegotiating personal links on which the elite customarily relies as some kind of peculiar freedom remains risky, as Prigozhin's dramatic last months, whistleblowing, mutiny, and end in an exploded aircraft suggest, despite the Russian refusal to launch an investigation in accordance with international standards.[83]

Freedom usually comes at a price, to be paid every now and then, everywhere. In some areas it has so far proven too expensive, deceptive, or not sustainable. Moreover, there are different ways of thinking about freedom and asymmetric dependency from which people choose or which they inherit. The local conditions of freedom and dependency deserve close inspection, as they rest on the interaction of historically contingent factors—ecological, economic, cultural, and political, to name but the most general categories. Studying these conditions helps us understand diversity as much as it teaches us to be alert. However, the current official approach to strong asymmetric de-

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81 These debates are traced in: Miers, "Slavery: A Question of Definition," 198–200.

82 In Western media, the reception of this and further speeches covering the subject of slavery ranged from disbelief to misunderstanding: Hans Monath, "Putins bizarre Rede: 'Unsere Werte, das ist die Liebe zum Menschen, Mitgefühl': Russlands Präsident rechtfertigt die Annexion von vier ukrainischen Regionen. Seine prekäre Lage versucht er mit Attacken auf den Westen zu überspielen," *Tagesspiegel,* September 30, 2022, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/putins-bizarre-rede-liebe-zum-menschen-mitgefuhl-8703613.html. Full text of Putin's speech on Interfax: "Tekst obrashcheniia Vladimira Putina," *Interfaks,* September 30, 2022, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/865716.

83 Tatiana Stanovaia, "Prigoshins Aufstand gegen den Kreml: Was war das?", *dekoder,* June 26, 2023, https://www.dekoder.org/de/article/prigoshin-aufstand-wagner-kreml. For emphasis on special deals as a core factor in establishing and running empire: Kollmann, *The Russian Empire,* 4.

pendency in the Russian Federation is very far from the emphatic perceptions of institutionalized freedom and power sharing prevailing in democratic countries.

Dominik Gutmeyr-Schnur

Education and Sciences in the Black Sea Region (Eighteenth–Twenty-First Centuries)

1 Introduction

By the second half of the eighteenth century, the Black Sea region ceased to constitute an Ottoman *mare clausum* and entered the late modern period as an increasingly internationalized sphere of exchange. This development left an imprint on the development of modern disciplines in the humanities, their institutionalization and exchange of knowledge, and academic cultures in and beyond the region from the mid-eighteenth century, when the region began to attract the interest of foreign researchers, to the present day, when knowledge exchange has become spatially unlimited. This chapter seeks to map the intra- and transregional entanglements and exchange of knowledge and attempts to uncover parallels of structural elements within the sectors of science and education in the diverse space of the Black Sea region. It thereby addresses the scholarly desideratum to systematically investigate knowledge exchange with and within a region that has recently become a crossing point for a new critical awareness at the borders of science, politics, and the public sphere, and the need to overcome the still prevailing national frameworks of the various disciplines in social and cultural sciences in the region while connecting them to transnational and global history.

2 The Internationalization of Knowledge Production

Until the mid-eighteenth century, the development of educational institutions in the Black Sea region was shaped by the traditions of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires, where scientific cultures and related academic institutions remained strongly connected to religious and worldly authorities until the very last decades of Ottoman rule. The foundation of the Princely Academies of Bucharest (1689/1707) and Iași (1707/1714) can furthermore be considered late products of the Orthodox Polish-Lithuanian influence that sought to follow the institutional example of the Jesuit colleges.[1] Hence, scholarly production followed the logics of Byzantine Christian and later Islamic dogmata, which

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1 See Hans-Jürgen Bömelburg and Stefan Rohdewald, "Polen-Litauen als Teil transosmanischer Verflechtungen," in *Transottomanica: Osteuropäisch-osmanisch-persische Mobilitätsdynamiken*, ed. Stephan Rohdewald, Stephan Conermann, and Albrecht Fuess (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2019), 172.

is reflected for instance in a delayed adoption of book printing.[2] As the production of books in Arabic letters followed an understanding of the Arabic script's sacred nature, for which only a reed pen was an authorized instrument of representation, the approval of Islamic authorities was required for the establishment of printing houses. It was only in 1727 that the Hungarian-born scholar İbrahim Müteferrika's request that printing should be allowed and supported by the Ottoman state was approved and he became the first Muslim to operate a printing press with movable Arabic letters.[3] This came twenty-two years after the first Arabic book had been printed in the Ottoman Empire, when in Iași the Georgian theologian Anthim (the Iberian), who led the princely printing press in Wallachia and would establish the first Georgian printing press in Tbilisi in 1709, printed a translation of Dmitrie Cantemir's 1698 Romanian-Greek work *Divanul sau gâlceava înțeleptului cu lumea* (The Divan or the Wise Man's Parley with the World).[4]

Until then, other groups had carried book printing in the Ottoman Empire, most notably the Jewish communities of Istanbul and Thessaloniki, who had already established the first printing houses, which primarily served religious purposes, around 1500. Armenian and Greek printing houses followed by the mid-sixteenth to the early seventeenth centuries. The Orthodox-Slavic communities in Southeastern Europe were initially serviced by printing presses in Trieste, whereas the late seventeenth century saw the opening of printing houses in the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. However, these communities did not contribute to the development of academic institutions independent of the influence of religious authorities.[5] Besides potential constraints from the Ottoman state for these *millet*s, the Orthodox communities had not inherited such an educational tradition from the Byzantine period, monasteries remaining the dominating venue of knowledge preservation and diffusion to the Orthodox subjects.

The geopolitical changes in the region by the mid-eighteenth century brought along a new constellation for its exploration and also provided a new framework for the establishment of scientific institutions. Off the back of decisive military victories over the Ottoman Empire, the Russian authorities were increasingly interested in the region that they were aiming to subjugate. Therefore, the era of Catherine II (1762–96) saw the first systematic research of the northeastern parts of the Black Sea region,

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2 On early book printing in the Ottoman Black Sea Region, see Michael Mitterauer, *Why Europe? The Medieval Origins of its Special Path* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), 265–67.

3 William J. Watson, "İbrāhīm Müteferriḳa and Turkish Incunabula," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 88, no. 3 (July–September 1968): 436.

4 Ioana Feodorov, "Beginnings of Arabic Printing in Ottoman Syria (1706–1711): The Romanians' Part in Athanasius Dabbās's Achievements," *ARAM* 25, no. 1–2 (2013): 239–45; Ioana Feodorov, *Dimitrie Cantemir, Salvation of the Sage and Ruin of the Sinful World* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 60, 63–64.

5 Karl Kaser and Dominik Gutmeyr, "Introduction: Europe and the Black Sea Region. A History of Early Knowledge Exchange (1750–1850)," in *Europe and the Black Sea Region: A History of Early Knowledge Exchange*, ed. Dominik Gutmeyr and Karl Kaser (Zurich: LIT, 2018), 11.

which included the annexed Crimean Khanate (1783) and Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti (1801). Seeking to legitimize control and exploitation of the newly acquired territories in the Russian Empire's southern borderlands, the Imperial Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg organized a series of expeditions during which universally educated scholars were instructed to map the region's topography, flora, and fauna.

These expeditions in service of the Russian Empire constituted individualized yet systematic efforts to research the region for which the descriptions of (Baltic) German scholars such as Johann Anton Güldenstädt, Peter Simon Pallas, and Samuel Gottlieb Gmelin, who had been recruited from or educated at German universities, eventually supplanted the prevailing knowledge based on the reports of travelers, diplomats, and adventurers, as well as on (often misinterpreted) information from authors from antiquity.[6] While the accounts of these scholars contained superficial observations and assumptions, they became the standard works for several decades to come and were also widely perceived in Western Europe, thereby laying the foundation for a new quality of an internationalized scientific "discovery" of the Black Sea region. In addition, the rich cultural production on the Caucasus in Russian nineteenth-century literature reduced the impact of early Russian-language studies on the region such as Semen Bronevskii's *Noveishiia geograficheskiia i istoricheskiia izvestiia o Kavkaze* (A New Geography and History of the Caucasus, 1823).[7]

In the western parts of the Black Sea region, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) had similar implications for the region's internationalization, as it strengthened the position of the Russian but also Habsburg Empires in Southeastern Europe, whereas the waters of the Black Sea and the Bosporus were opened to international commercial traffic. These developments led to the Eastern Question, which was accompanied by an increasing influx of foreign researchers who were seeking to map the Ottoman provinces to the west of the Black Sea. Similar to the expeditions in service of the Academy in St. Petersburg, there were individual endeavors of interest to institutions like the Imperial Academy of Sciences in Vienna, to which the French-Austrian geologist Ami Boué reported his "observations on geography, geology, and natural history" in "European Turkey," originally published in French (1840) and eventually translated into German (1889), while as late as 1870 foreign scholars would stress the lack of knowledge on these parts of the continent.[8]

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6 See Marcus Köhler, *Russische Ethnographie und imperiale Politik im 18. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2012); Han Vermeulen, *Before Boas: The Genesis of Ethnography and Ethnology in the German Enlightenment* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015).

7 Susan Layton, *Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 28–31.

8 Diana Mishkova, *Beyond Balkanism: The Scholarly Politics of Region Making* (London: Routledge, 2019), 7, 12.

3 The Institutionalization of Knowledge

From the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth century, a phase of systematic institutionalization of knowledge production and dissemination set in throughout the Black Sea region. The processes of establishing self-organized educational institutions thereby went hand in hand with the political emancipation from the Ottoman Empire for which the Eastern Question and the gradual disintegration beginning with the Greek War of Independence (1821–29) constituted the precondition for the establishment of modern academic institutions in Southeastern Europe. The varying degrees of sovereignty of the region's countries facilitated a process of institutionalizing scientific disciplines at universities, academies, and similar institutions. The University of Athens was founded in 1837, the universities of Iași (1860) and Bucharest (1864) were established shortly after the formal unification of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1859, and the University of Sofia (1888/1904) opened its doors a decade after the Berlin Congress had set up a Bulgarian autonomous state within the Ottoman Empire.

The newly established institutions were, however, still unable to rely on a generation of domestic scholars in the various newly institutionalized academic disciplines, for which they once again attracted and actively invited researchers from abroad, but now they came to stay. It was Austrian, Czech, German, and French scholars who played an important role in the development of science and education in the second half of the nineteenth century. The 1876 dissertation by the Czech Konstantin Jireček on the *Dějiny bulharského národa/Geschichte der Bulgaren* (History of the Bulgarians) marks the beginnings of Bulgarian historiography. He would furthermore become the country's minister of education (1881–82) and director of the National Library (1884). In 1896, his countryman Jan/Ivan Mrkvička co-founded the Bulgarian Academy of Fine Arts and served as its first director for a quarter of a century.[9] In Ottonian Greece, the University of Athens was organized along the Prussian lines of four faculties and Germans such as the controversial Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer had a decisive influence on the development of Greek historiography.[10]

The northern and eastern parts of the Black Sea region experienced the arrival of academic institutions within the framework of the Russian Empire, where several academic institutions besides the Imperial Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg had already been established in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, e.g., the Imperial Universities of Moscow (1755), Dorpat (today: Tartu, 1802), or Kazan (1804). In

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9 Martina Baleva, *Bulgarien im Bild: Die Erfindung von Nationen auf dem Balkan in der Kunst des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2012), 156–58.
10 Zacharias N. Tsirpanlēs, "Die Ausbildung der Griechen an europäischen Universitäten und deren Rolle im Universitätsleben des modernen Griechenland (1800–1850)," in *Wegenetz Europäischen Geistes: Wissenschaftszentren und geistige Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Mittel- und Südosteuropa vom Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg*, ed. Richard Georg Plaschka and Karlheinz Mack (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1983), 260–68; Georg Veloudis, "Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer und die Entstehung des neugriechischen Historismus," *Südost-Forschungen* 29 (1970): 43–90.

Odesa, the Richelieu Lyceum was founded in 1817 on the initiative of the city's French mayor Armand du Plessis, Duke of Richelieu, and existed until 1865, when an edict of Tsar Alexander II reorganized it as the Imperial Novorossiia University.[11] In Moscow, the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages was founded in 1815 and had grown out of a private school primarily for the city's Armenian population. It remained a secondary school but furthermore became the state's main instrument for preparing officials for their service in the southern borderlands. The regional equivalent for an Armenian higher education institution was the Nersisyan School in Tbilisi, which opened its doors in 1824 (operating until 1924) and played a vital role in Armenian education within the Russian Empire.[12] The Russian state's support for the institutionalization of knowledge now gradually also led to the establishment of academic institutions in its southern provinces. The Imperial Russian Geographic Society established a branch in Tbilisi in 1851 and as a first major achievement opened the Caucasus Museum of Regional Studies five years later. The museum served as a repository for collections from the region and became the basis for the Caucasus Museum that the German naturalist and long-term resident of Tbilisi Gustav Radde reorganized in 1867.[13] In Gori, the Transcaucasian Teachers Seminary was founded in 1876 (operating until 1917) and quickly gained immense significance for both the Georgian and Muslim populations of the region. All these institutions helped the Russian state's ambition to oversee the process of supplying regional schools with teachers but also to educate a loyal caste of intellectuals and thereby integrate the local non-Russian population into the imperial structures.[14]

In the Ottoman Empire, traditional structures of education in a *madrasa* were mostly upheld throughout the nineteenth century but the military sector was open to innovations from abroad, for which an early institutionalization modelled on Western European developments took place within the framework of the military. The Imperial Military School of Medicine (founded in 1827) employed and educated predominantly non-Muslims while French was initially introduced as the language of instruction and would remain so until the 1860s. Further steps towards an institutionalization of knowledge were again initiated by foreign interest and investment, which led to the foundation of Istanbul's Robert College (1863) or Beirut's Syrian Protestant College (1866) and Université Saint-Joseph (1875). In 1883, the School of Fine Arts opened

11 Yana Volkova, "The Role of Diasporic Communities in the Development of the Odessa Region," in Gutmeyr and Kaser, *Europe and the Black Sea Region*, 279–80.

12 Zaur Gasimov, "The Caucasus," European History Online, published November 17, 2011, http://ieg-ego. eu/en/threads/crossroads/border-regions/zaur-gasimov-the-caucasus, 15.

13 Austin Lee Jersild, *Orientalism and Empire: North Caucasus Mountain Peoples and the Georgian Frontier, 1845–1917* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 66–67.

14 Gasimov, "The Caucasus," 14–16.

as the first educational institution dedicated to the fine arts and architecture, whereas it took until 1900 for the first fully functioning university to open in Istanbul.[15]

4 Returning from Education Abroad

The newly established institutions in Southeastern Europe were founded on limited resources and therefore primarily tended to address their offers to the respective countries' small elites rather than reach out to the growing number of students. The lack of experts across academic disciplines and social spheres was gradually but continuously filled with a generation that had been trained abroad and now returned to their home countries, where they were able to contribute to the process of professionalizing the newly founded national training facilities from teacher training colleges to universities and academies and establishing additional ones. The establishment of a Greek state in the 1820s had already been accompanied by an influx of Greek students and scholars who had been trained abroad and now wanted to be a part of the revolution,[16] whereas the Bulgarian Literary Society was founded in the Romanian town of Brăila (1869) and moved to Sofia in then autonomous Bulgaria in 1879. The young states developed funding schemes for students going abroad which complemented, and partly incorporated, a tradition of private sponsorship from previous decades. The students had to be mobile and gravitated towards universities in the Habsburg Empire, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Russia, where charity committees, in line with Russian politics in Southeastern Europe, pursued a policy of attracting and educating the region's Slavic population, or in Istanbul, where Bulgarians constituted the largest group among the students at Robert College between 1879 and 1912, two of its alumni becoming Bulgarian prime minister in the 1890s (Konstantin Stoilov, 1887 and from 1894–99; Todor Ivanchov from 1899–1901).[17]

The region's newly nationalized elites were to a high degree composed of these returnees. While Bulgarian ministries especially encouraged its officers to go abroad on a scholarship to specialize in fields hardly or not yet established in the country, three-quarters of Romania's ministers between 1866 and 1918 had obtained a university degree abroad.[18] A very different policy that nonetheless led to additional encouragement of students in the northern Black Sea region to seek education abroad was the Tsarist

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15 Johann Strauss, "Languages and Power in the Late Ottoman Empire," in *Imperial Lineages and Legacies in the Eastern Mediterranean: Recording the Imprint of Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman Rule*, ed. Rhoads Murphey (London: Routledge, 2017), 123–24.

16 Tsirpanlēs, "Ausbildung," 255–56.

17 Roumiana Preshlenova, "State, Society and the Educated Elite in Bulgaria, 1878–1918," in *Universities and Elite Formation in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe*, ed. Florian Bieber and Harald Heppner (Zurich: LIT, 2015), 14–18.

18 Alexandra Iancu, "Knowledge and Power in Romania: University Education and Its Legitimizing Force," in Bieber and Heppner, *Universities and Elite Formation*, 115.

university statute of 1863 (in force until 1905), which prohibited female students from attending universities. Those able to overcome the enormous personal and financial obstacles fled as a last resort to Western European universities willing to open their doors to female students, in particular to Switzerland, where in 1904 almost three-quarters of Bern's and Zurich's female students were of Ukrainian and Russian origin.[19] Upon their return to Ukraine, these students became, for instance, their home towns' first female doctors and paved the way to the eventual integration of women into the region's higher education and the facilitation of professional careers.

Students from the South Caucasus gravitated towards Moscow and St. Petersburg and often returned to their hometowns with progressive ideas. An increasing number of sons from impoverished families in the Georgian nobility were able to make use of a Tsarist system of scholarships enabling them to receive secular education and a second socialization. On the one hand, many eventually pursued civil and military careers in service of the empire, but on the other hand, they were exposed to modern discussions on national and social liberation, some, such as Ilia Chavchavadze and Akaki Tsereteli, becoming leading figures in the Georgian national movement of the late nineteenth century (the "tergdaleulebi"—"those, who have drunk the water from the River Terek") after returning from their studies in the empire's capital. One of their major achievements was the formation of the Society for the Spreading of Literacy Among Georgians in 1879, which laid the foundation for secular education in Georgia and promoted private school teaching in the Georgian language.[20]

Others continued their path of education via St. Petersburg to Western European universities before returning with newly acquired knowledge to their homelands. Georgian caricaturist Oskar Schmerling studied at the Imperial Academy of Arts (1884–89) and continued his education at the Academy of Fine Arts in Munich (1891–92). Upon his return to Tbilisi, he became an influential figure in the field of arts both in imperial and in Soviet times, taking up leading positions at different schools and as a professor at the State Academy of Arts (founded in 1922).[21] Fellow Georgian Nino Jorjadze, born into Tbilisi's upper class in 1884, attended the Transcaucasus Women's Institute (founded in 1840) before enjoying education at boarding schools and conservatories in Austria, Switzerland, and France. Upon her return to Georgia and before the outbreak

19 Ruth Dudgeon, "The Forgotten Minority: Women Students in Imperial Russia, 1872–1917," *Russian History* 9, no. 1 (1982): 1–7; Alissa Tolstokorova, "Women as Agents of Knowledge Transfer: The Role of Academic Migration to West-European Universities in the Formation of Ukrainian Female Intellectual Elites (late 19th–early 20th centuries)," in Bieber and Heppner, *Universities and Elite Formation*, 67–69.
20 Oliver Reisner, "Die georgische Alphabetisierungsgesellschaft: Schule nationaler Eliten und Vergemeinschaftung," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 48 (2000): 68–77.
21 "Oskar Schmerling," Beyond Caricature: The Oskar Schmerling Digital Archive, accessed November 20, 2020, https://schmerling.org/en/people/oskar-schmerling.

of World War I, she received training as a nurse and as one of the first amateur photographers in the region compiled a rare visual chronicle of the Caucasus front.[22]

5 Between Turmoil and Independence

For wide parts of the Black Sea region, the decade between 1912 and 1922 meant war-ridden years. The Balkan Wars, World War I, the Greek-Turkish War, and the Russian Civil War also had an influence on the sphere of education, for different reasons. Firstly, the disintegration of the region's imperial powerhouses led to the formation of newly independent nation states that initiated educational reforms and established new institutions as important symbols of independence. The short era of independence in the South Caucasus between the fall of the Russian Empire and the Bolshevik take-over in the region saw Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia reorganize its post-imperial education sector. The University of Tbilisi was founded in 1918 and with historian Ivane Javakhishvili another Georgian graduate of St. Petersburg University and former visiting scholar at the University of Berlin was instrumental in the process. A year later, the universities of Yerevan and Baku were established. The second Greek university was founded in Smyrna (İzmir) shortly after the end of World War I but never operated due to the Greek evacuation of the city in 1922. The Republic of Turkey was proclaimed in 1923 and recognized as the successor state to the Ottoman Empire. Within the framework of the reforms of its first president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the Swiss professor of pedagogy Albert Malche was called in to oversee the introduction of a university system along European lines. The University of Istanbul was thereby restructured on the German model in 1933. The reorganization of the renamed Istanbul Technical University (1944) and the University of Ankara (1946) followed suit.[23]

Secondly, the educational sector in the countries all around the Black Sea was shaped by the effects of decades of violence and political instability with related displacement and mass migration. The restructured Turkish universities opened their doors to German and Austrian scholars who were forced to leave their homes after the Nazi seizure of control, albeit less for humanitarian than for utilitarian reasons.[24] In the parts of the Black Sea region that were under Soviet control, the advent of the Bolshevik regime moved a significant part of the disintegrating empire, including many university teachers, to flee the country. From the 1920s on, the remaining educational staff were subjected to widespread political purges and driven into exile, arrested, or

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22 Tamar Lordkipanidze, *Nino Jorjadze: World War I Through the Eyes of a Georgian Woman* (Tbilisi: Cezanne, 2015), 15.
23 Christophe Charle, "Patterns," in *A History of the University in Europe*, ed. Walter Rüegg, vol. 3, *Universities in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (1800–1945)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 44.
24 Corry Guttstadt, *Turkey, the Jews, and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 88–89.

murdered. World War II eventually led to the collapse of some of the region's states and their institutions while the Jewish population, including professors and students, faced deportation and murder.

The Bolshevik takeover led, thirdly, to an ideological realignment of institutions and disciplines in the northern and eastern parts of the region. In the Soviet republics of Ukraine and Georgia as well as in the Moldavian SSR (1940), the educational structures changed towards specialized universities and schools, with a particular emphasis on technical education, and a series of new institutions such as the Terek Institute of Public Education (Vladikavkaz, 1920) were established. Authority and control were key elements in a sector of higher education that was fully integrated into the state's economic planning and where engineering and applied sciences were favored over the humanities.[25] Ideology furthermore strongly influenced the development of certain disciplines in the Soviet Union, where science now had to stand on the foundations of Marxist-Leninist dogmata. On this premise, the support for ethnography grew in the Soviet Union, for it was officially considered a means by which to substantiate Marxist theory and a politically useful tool for ruling the country's non-Russian population.[26] In Greece, on the other hand, the increasing national, linguistic, and religious homogenization of the state's population put an end to the previous attempts to institutionalize the study of the 'other,' as the population exchange between Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria deprived the government of ethnography's practical application.[27]

The nationalization of science in these decades of turmoil and independence, fourthly, had an impact on international and intraregional exchange. The outbreak of the Balkans Wars and eventually World War I had sent a wave of nationalist sentiment across the scholarly world, whereas their outcomes decided for the countries involved either integration into or isolation from cooperation with scholars from other states. In interwar Bulgaria, the country's international isolation and the rise of authoritarianism with increasing state influence over scholarly institutions such as the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences contributed to an emphasis on the promotion of the cultural continuity of the Bulgarian nationality rather than on transnational exchange.[28] In neighboring Romania, the transition towards autocracy likewise included the restriction of the independence of higher education and eventually full state control over the educational sector in the Romanian dictatorship during World War II. In the Soviet Republics, scholars who understood science as an international endeavor in-

25 Charle, "Patterns," 68.
26 Andre Gingrich, "After the Great War: National Reconfigurations of Anthropology in Late Colonial Times," in *Doing Anthropology in Wartime and War Zones: World War I and the Cultural Sciences in Europe*, ed. Reinhard Johler, Christian Marchetti, and Monique Scheer (Bielefeld: transcript, 2010), 358.
27 Karl Kaser, "Migration, Knowledge Exchange, and Academic Cultures: Europe and the Black Sea Region," in *Migration, Knowledge Exchange and Academic Cultures in Europe and the Black Sea Region until World War I*, ed. Biljana Ristovska-Josifovska (Skopje: Matica, 2021), 41–43.
28 Eleonora Naxidou, "Scientific Institutions and State Ideology: The Bulgarian Academy of Sciences," in Bieber and Heppner, *Universities and Elite Formation*, 156–57.

creasingly came into conflict with the state authorities, who pursued the aim of a Soviet science as an integral part of national unity.[29] These nationalist approaches towards science thereby stood in contrast to the international congress movement that had developed before these decades of turmoil and now incorporated the logic of political isolation when participants from the Soviet Union and from the allies of the Central Powers were excluded from international collaboration.[30]

6 Education, Science, and the Cold War

World War II had left the academic institutions of the participating countries in ruins while the re-established institutionalization of education and science followed the ideological frontlines settled during the war or in its direct aftermath in the region. The countries that had come under the control of a Communist regime radically changed their educational sector, universities and similar institutions being subjected to the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. The universities affected were integrated into the state's bureaucracy, irrespective of their history, standing, and traditions.[31] The implementation of the restructuring of higher education was partially different from country to country but the main ambition was the same: to subordinate education to the centralized planning of the state and to organize the entire sector in line with the demands of the state's economy. The Soviet system conceptualized the university primarily as a training facility for academic staff and teachers for secondary education and established a multitude of specialized institutions of higher education, reducing the disciplinary field at the "traditional" universities.[32] This system now spread to Southeastern Europe too and reached its apogee in Bulgaria, where beyond the humanities, only the natural sciences and law were taught at universities. At the top of the research system, the various academies of sciences became established. They contributed their share to the close interaction between science and state power by elaborating and pursuing research guidelines in accordance with the demands of the authorities.

The diffusion of the Soviet system to the Communist states in Southeastern Europe brought with it a transfer of knowledge from Moscow, as visiting scholars were called in and accompanied the transition towards a Socialist education in Bulgaria or Roma-

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29 Gennadij D. Komkov, Boris V. Levšin, and Lev K. Semenov, *Geschichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften der UdSSR* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1981), 375–76.

30 Damiano Matasci, "International Congresses of Education and the Circulation of Pedagogical Knowledge in Western Europe, 1876–1910," in *Shaping the Transnational Sphere: Experts, Networks and Issues from the 1840s to the* 1930s, ed. Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck, and Jakob Vogel (New York: Berghahn, 2015), 218–21; Brigitte Schroeder-Gudehus, "Challenge to Transnational Loyalties: International Scientific Organizations After the First World War," *Science Studies* 3, no. 2 (April 1973): 95–96, 115.

31 Walter Rüegg and Jan Sadlak, "Relations with Authority," in *A History of the University in Europe,* ed. Walter Rüegg, vol. 4, *Universities since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 86.

32 Guy Neave, "Patterns," in Rüegg, *A History of the University in Europe*, 4:35–39.

nia. At the same time, the replacement of the political and intellectual elites led to a re-orientation of the new elites' preferred knowledge destination and a change in the patterns of educational mobility. The Cold War meant a caesura for students hoping to study at Western European universities, as movement across the proverbial Iron Curtain was strictly regulated, whereas students increasingly, albeit in smaller numbers, gravitated towards institutions in the Soviet Union.[33] Furthermore, the extension of the Soviet influence to the western Black Sea region added an emphasis on the role of Russia and the Soviet Union in research in various disciplines while overall the nationalization of science was continuously pursued in Communist Bulgaria and Romania.

The ideological frontlines across the continent and across the Black Sea region resulted in an intensification of the exchange of knowledge across the community of Socialist states. An example of the formal recording of this collaboration is the Prague Convention of 1972, where the Socialist countries from Czechoslovakia to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam agreed to mutually recognize the equivalence of certificates originating from the educational sector, from secondary education to academic degrees.[34] Bulgaria, Romania, and the Socialist Republics of the Soviet Union thereby underpinned the international cooperation of their scholars with ideological and political considerations and implications, whereas established ties to neighboring countries were left broken. Academic mobility beyond the group of the world's Socialist states, however, remained under the respective states' control and thus highly restricted.

Students and scholars often carried the burden of protesting against these restrictions and repressions, including in the non-Socialist parts of the Black Sea region. With careers or even health and life in danger, only a few dared to openly criticize the authorities and their influence on the sector of education or to ridicule fellow scholars and their practice of embracing officially-approved narratives whenever possible. Larger protest movements therefore mostly built on national questions, such as in Georgia, where in 1956 young people and students formed the core of the thousands that took their disagreement with Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policy and the subsequent criticism of the ethnic Georgian Ioseb B. Jughashvili (Stalin) to the streets of Tbilisi.[35] A couple of decades later, students were again at the heart of the 1978 protests, demanding the re-affirmation of Georgian as the Soviet Republic's state language. In Greece, the far-right military junta that ruled the country between 1967 and 1974 repeatedly met resistance among students, but it was the brutal crushing of the 1973 protests at the National Technical University of Athens which eventually pulled the rug from under the regime.

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[33] For Romania, see Iancu, "Knowledge," 115–22.

[34] Julia Sułkowska-Kuszteljak and Jerży Rżycki, "Implementation of the Decisions of the Prague Convention – A Case Study: Poland," *Higher Education in Europe* 11, no. 1 (1986): 35.

[35] Vladimir A. Kozlov, *Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion in the Post-Stalin Years* (London: Routledge, 2015), 112–35.

7 From Transition to Regional Integration

The transition of 1989–91 put an end to the ideological frontlines running through the Black Sea region and laid the foundation for a gradual process of re-imagining it as a space of European integration and collaboration. The new geopolitical reality had long-term effects on the development of education and science, as patterns shaped by Communist ideology and authority were shattered while the educational sector was subjected to an all-encompassing democratic change and integrated into a globalized market economy. The reforms included the decoupling of universities and state authority, and international relations in academia were no longer dependent on political approval.[36] Institutions close to the Communist party, so-called party schools like the Romanian Academy of Sciences, were dissolved in the direct aftermath of the fall of the regime and eventually restructured. Long-term strategies for education and sciences had to be newly developed and were often complicated by failing economies in the early 1990s.

The transition in the educational sector mirrored the involved states' difficulties navigating between openness to change and the continuity of conservative structures. Institutions and their faculty were unprepared for the need to redefine their profiles and increasingly found themselves in a balancing act between internationalist and ethnocentric approaches. On the one hand, the educational sector had to cope with diminished state funding for established structures, while on the other hand, private and semi-private universities with foreign know-how and funding, such as the American University in Bulgaria (Blagoevgrad, 1991), but also the attractiveness of the Central European University (Budapest, 1991; initially also set up in Prague and Warsaw) for students and scholars from the Black Sea region, complicated the institutional landscape in the early 1990s.[37]

Internationalization in all its facets has become a key argument in the development of higher education across the region, with governments and institutions actively pursuing a policy of international collaboration and mobility as defining aspects of their educational strategies. By 2005, all the countries of the Black Sea region had signed the Bologna Accord, and they joined the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) upon its launch in 2010. Students are eligible to participate in the Erasmus exchange program for study abroad and can mostly rely on the ECTS (European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System) grading scale for the recognition of classes at their home universities. Furthermore, the entire Black Sea region has been integrated into the European Research Area and since the 2010s association agreements within the European

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36 For trends in the renewal of higher education, see Rüegg and Sadlak, "Relations," 116–17.

37 On the rapid rise of private institutions in 1990s Georgia and their subsequent decline, see Marie Pachuashvili, "Governmental Policies and their Impact on Private Higher Education Development in Post-Communist Countries: Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Georgia, 1990–2005," *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis* 13, no. 4 (2011): 398–99.

Commission's framework program funding research and innovation (e. g. Horizon 2020) have tied institutions from Moldova to Georgia closer to a system of international exchange of knowledge. The allocation of funds, however, remains unfavorably balanced for the majority of the region's countries, with the younger EU member states Bulgaria and Romania obtaining 0.25 percent and 0.47 percent respectively of the net EU contribution and funding success rates below average.[38] A side effect of this transition from a Soviet system towards a global internationalization of education and academia and a pan-regional integration into the EHEA has been the gradual transition of the region's dominant *lingua franca* from Russian to English.

The reimagination of the Black Sea region as a sphere of common interest and exchange is reflected in a series of political, economic, and scientific initiatives. Activities to form associations including institutions from both sides of the Iron Curtain as soon as the Soviet Union and its influence on Southeastern Europe had disintegrated, like the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC, 1992), soon found similar models in the sphere of education. The Black Sea Universities Network (BSUN) was formed in 1998 and today includes more than 120 universities from the region and beyond. The emergence of the region was furthermore accompanied by the establishment of academic journals looking to connect the Black Sea to other established areas of research (e. g., *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* and *Identity Studies in the Caucasus and Black Sea Region*).

However, several geopolitical obstacles remain to be solved to facilitate a spatially unlimited exchange of knowledge in education and science in the Black Sea region. The unresolved question of Abkhazia, the 2014 annexation of Crimea and Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine, or the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh War and the subsequent blockade of the Lachin corridor have all had a sustainable influence on scholarly exchange within and beyond the region, while the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic remains to be studied.

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38 "Horizon 2020 Country Profiles," European Commission, accessed February 26, 2021, https://ec.eu ropa.eu/info/research-and-innovation/statistics/framework-programme-facts-and-figures/horizon-2020-country-profiles_en.

Florian Riedler

Transport Technologies and Infrastructure in the Premodern Era

1 Introduction

Transport technologies and infrastructures constituted the material components of networks that enabled historical processes of mobility such as migration and trade. Routes were the most durable spatial expression of such networks; together with cities as important nodes—with their ports, warehouses, taverns, guesthouses, etc.—they constituted their own kind of infrastructural assemblages, and it is they that form the thematic focus of this chapter. In this way, the diffuse information on transport infrastructure at a time when this term did not even exist can be presented in its different contexts, i.e., mainly the economy and trade, but also the military. For a region centering on a sea, maritime connections, shipping, and ports are usually the focus, but this chapter also will pay attention to land traffic, its technologies, and infrastructures. The latter were of equal importance, because before the era of steam shipping, which began on the Black Sea in the 1830s, the regional weather conditions largely prevented sea voyages during the four to six months of winter, and even in summer adverse winds made travel times highly unpredictable. In contrast, land traffic was more reliable but also slower and impractical when heavy loads had to be transported. Besides purely regional transport networks, which throughout the ages constituted the Black Sea Region as a political, cultural, and economic space, this chapter will pay special attention to those networks that by combining sea and land routes integrated the Black Sea region into even larger contexts. For the Middle Ages, Brătianu has highlighted this important aspect by using the railway metaphor of a "plaque tournante" (turntable, in the sense of a distribution hub) to characterize the function of the Black Sea regarding trade and transport.[1]

2 Geography and Transport in Antiquity

Infrastructures and technologies of transport developed in close connection to the geographical features of the region; they transformed natural geography into mobility

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1 Gheorghe Brătianu, "La Mer Noire, plaque tournante du trafic international à la fin du moyen age," *Revue historique du Sud-Est européen* 21 (1944): 36 – 69.

spaces. From the Bronze Age on, navigation of the Black Sea was not only undertaken along its shores as cabotage, but due to the proximity of the north and south coasts and favorable currents, ships also crossed the open sea between Crimea and the northern Anatolian coast.[2] At any time, the linkages between the north and south coasts of the Black Sea were particularly dense and enabled a lively trade and in some instances the development of common political structures. Cases in point are the Pontic Kingdom (first century BC) and also the Ottoman Empire from the late fifteenth century on, which united the Anatolian coast as well as Crimea under one rule.

Via rivers such as the Danube, the Dniester, the Dnipro, the Don, and the Rioni in Georgia, the Black Sea was linked to its hinterlands. Although rivers were not easy to navigate until their regulation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they established traffic corridors, sometimes in connection with roads or towpaths that were used for upstream transportation or circumvented difficult places such as rapids, as in the case of the Dnipro, for instance. In addition to these riverways, in the south the Bosporus provided easy access from the Mediterranean. This canal-like access supported mobility networks beginning with the Greek colonization in the eighth century BC, which created a network of port cities often placed at the sites of natural harbors. By sea, these cities were linked with one another but also remained connected to their metropolises, resulting in close trade relations with the Aegean (especially with Athens and Miletus) throughout the classical and Hellenistic epochs.[3]

The easy integration of the Black Sea into Mediterranean empires such as the Roman Empire from the first century BC on (and much later the Venetian Empire) also hinged on the access the Bosporos provided to their fleets. Roman control over the region was largely established after the Mithridatic Wars (89–63 BC) against the Pontic Kingdom and reached its peak with the occupation of the Darial Pass (Portae Caspiae) in the Caucasus in the late first century. This pass offered an important north-south route bypassing the Black Sea and was thus of strategic and economic importance.[4]

Being part of the Roman Empire did not fundamentally change the close connection between the port cities, especially on the western Black Sea coast and the north-western coast of Anatolia. At the same time, the garrison cities on the Danube border were also integrated into these Black Sea trade networks. This was possible because the Romans build the first roads in the Balkans, most importantly the road along the Danube in the first half of the first century BC as well as the coastal road from the Danube

2 Alexander A. Bauer and Owen P. Doonan, "Fluid Histories: Culture, Community, and the Longue Durée of the Black Sea World," in *New Regionalism or No Regionalism? Emerging Regionalism in the Black Sea Area,* ed. Ruxandra Ivan (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), 18.

3 Jurij G. Vinogradov, "Der Pontos Euxeinos als politische, ökonomische und kulturelle Einheit und die Epigraphik," in *Pontische Studien: Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte und Epigraphik des Schwarzmeerraumes*, ed. Heinz Heinen (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1997), 1–73.

4 Helmut Halfmann, "Die Alanen und die römische Ostpolitik unter Vespasian," *Epigraphica Anatolica* 8 (1986): 39–50.

Delta to Byzantium. In Asia Minor the Romans extended the existing Hellenistic road network, which connected the dense network of cities, including the port cities.[5]

3 Long-Distance Trade Routes of the Middle Ages

While for Rome the Black Sea was a distant periphery whose northern shore was only ruled indirectly, for the Byzantines who controlled its southern entry it was an essential part of their sphere of power. The Byzantines maintained sea and land routes centered on Constantinople as important infrastructure that held the empire together. The port cities of the western and southern Black Sea coast were directly connected to Constantinople by ship. Moreover, the Byzantines were the direct heirs of the Roman road network in the Balkans and in Asia Minor, which they adapted over the centuries to their own purposes. However, it is difficult to assess how well maintained these roads were, especially in areas such as the Balkans, which the Byzantines had lost in the seventh century and only could partly regain in the tenth century. Because there was a greater degree of territorial continuity and a larger population that could work on the maintenance of roads in Anatolia, it is likely that here the transport network that connected the port cities with the cities of the hinterland functioned better.[6]

As a direct consequence of the presence of the Byzantine navy on the Black Sea, Chersonesus (near present-day Sevastopol) remained an important Byzantine possession until the fourteenth century.[7] Crimea proved an important site for the Byzantines' contacts and trade with Kyivan Rus, which intensified in the tenth century. Kyivan Rus was a state that united a number of cities that had grown by taxing the trade in slaves and "Oriental goods," mainly silk and other textiles as well as spices and drugs, along the trade route from the Baltics to Byzantium. To a large extent, this trade route used rivers such as the Daugava (Polish: Dźwina, Russian: Zapadnaia Dvina [Western Dvina]) and the Dnipro to reach the Black Sea. In the tenth century, a yearly trade expedition went from Kyiv to Constantinople along the Dnipro and the western Black Sea coast.[8]

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5 Octavian Bounegru, "The Black Sea Area in the Trade System of the Roman Empire," *Euxeinos* 14 (2014): 8–16; *Brill's New Pauly Online*, s.v. "Roads," by Hans Lohmann, Josef Wiesehöfer, and Michael Rathmann, accessed January 23, 2021, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e12225290.
6 Anna Avraméa, "Land and Sea Communications, Fourth-Fifteenth Centuries," in *The Economic History of Byzantium: From the Seventh Through the Fifteenth Century*, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2002), 1:57–90; Matthew Larnach, "The Via Militaris in Transition: From Late Rome to the Crusades," in *The Balkan Route: Historical Transformations from Via Militaris to Autoput*, ed. Florian Riedler and Nenad Stefanov (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 21–52.
7 Anne Bortoli, "Kherson and its Region," in Laiou, *The Economic History of Byzantium*, 2:659–65.
8 Thomas S. Noonan, "The Dnieper Trade Route in Kievan Russia, 900–1240 A.D." (PhD Thesis, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1979); Christian Raffensperger, *Reimagining Europe: Kievan Rus' in the Medieval World, 988–1146* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012); Gottfried Schramm, *Altrusslands*

Because of the position of their capital, the Byzantines were able to control the export of grain, slaves, and fish from the northern Black Sea to the Mediterranean. It was only after the conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204 that Italian merchants, especially those from Genoa, took over this trade and held onto it even after the resurrection of the Byzantine Empire in 1261. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Genoese merchants exported goods such as fish and grain from the ports at the mouth of the Danube and probably also moved up the river for their trade ventures. At the same time, their ships transported Oriental goods such as spices and silk upriver, from where they went overland to Central Europe via Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania.[9]

The Genoese made by far their biggest profits by tapping the transcontinental trade network that linked China and India with Europe, colloquially known as the Silk Road. It was in Crimea and at the mouth of the Don at Tana (Ottoman: Azak, Russian: Azov) where land and sea routes converged. Therefore, rather than just entertaining small merchant colonies, the Genoese integrated cities complete with their hinterland such as Caffa (today: Feodosiia) and Soldaia (today: Sudak) in Crimea into their colonial empire.[10]

The Oriental goods that were transhipped to Italy arrived by camel caravans in the ports of the northern Black Sea coast. From the second half of the thirteenth to the middle of the fifteenth century, the main branch of the Silk Road had shifted to a route along the Amu Darya, passing north of the Caspian, crossing the Volga and the Don before reaching the Black Sea. The reason for this shift was the promotion and protection of trade by the Khanate of the Golden Horde, one of the successor states of Genghis Khan, which centered on the lower Volga. The Ilkhans, a rival dynasty of Mongolian origin in Iran, also attempted such a rerouting towards the Black Sea. During their rule, a considerable part of the spices and silk usually going via Baghdad to the Levant was redirected to their capital Tabriz in historical Azerbaijan and from there it went on to Trabzon, the capital of their Byzantine vassals in the Empire of Trebizond. Their main partners in trade were the Venetians, who had a large merchant colony in the city.[11]

Anfang: Historische Schlüsse aus Namen, Wörtern und Texten zum 9. und 10. Jahrhundert (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 2002).

9 Constantin C. Giurescu, "The Genoese and the Lower Danube in the XIIIth and XIVth Centuries," *The Journal of European Economic History* 5, no. 3 (1976); Zsigmond Pál Pach, "Die Verkehrsroute des Levantehandels nach Siebenbürgen und Ungarn zur Zeit der Könige Ludwig von Anjou und Sigismund von Luxemburg," in *Europäische Stadtgeschichte in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit*, ed. Werner Mägdefrau (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1979).

10 Angeliki E. Laiou and Cécile Morrisson, *The Byzantine Economy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 200–15; Evgeny Khvalkov, *The Colonies of Genoa in the Black Sea Region: Evolution and Transformation* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017).

11 Virgil Ciocîltan, *The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (Boston: Brill, 2012), 95–139.

4 Ottoman Control and Transottoman Connections

Ottoman control of the Black Sea from the last quarter of the fifteenth to the last quarter of the eighteenth century was only possible after the conquest of Constantinople. The Ottomans relocated their wharves and maritime arsenal from Gallipoli to Galata and founded a separate arsenal in Sinop to conquer the Crimean coastal cities and Azak at the mouth of the Don in 1475 and those at the mouth of the Danube a decade later. The Tatar khans who ruled inland Crimea as well as the northern Black Sea coast became vassals of the Ottomans, and the economy of the Black Sea soon became centered on the Ottoman capital. After a transition period, the Genoese were pushed out of the trade, and the region's principal export goods, such as grain, fish, butter, hides, and slaves, were directed to Istanbul, which could grow into one of the largest cities in Europe thanks to this constant provisioning.[12]

From the sixteenth to the late eighteenth century, when first Russian and then British and Dutch merchant ships were allowed entry, only Ottoman ships could sail the Black Sea. Over the course of the sixteenth century the Ottomans conquered or controlled most of the coastal areas, patrolled the sea with their war galleys, and eradicated piracy. This situation gave rise to the image of the Black Sea as an "Ottoman lake." However, this image is somewhat misleading. The Ottoman Black Sea was neither a dead end nor a closed system; it remained an important conduit between the Ottoman Empire, Poland-Lithuania, Muscovy, and Persia, as will be shown below. With the circulation of people, goods and ideas, the routes on and around the Black Sea created spaces of interaction that can be labeled Transottoman. In their manifold expressions such spaces can be found until the end of the Ottoman Empire and beyond.[13]

Moreover, the Ottomans' control over the Black Sea always remained contested. From the late sixteenth century on, the Zaporozhian Cossacks of the lower Dnipro and later also the Don Cossacks conducted regular raids along the Black Sea coasts as far as the Bosporus and Anatolia. They relied on river boats called *chaika* that could operate in shallow coastal waters as well as on the high sea and were very hard to control by the Ottoman navy relying on large galleys.[14] Against this highly mo-

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12 Halil İnalcık, "The Question of the Closing of the Black Sea under the Ottomans," *Archeion Pontu* 35 (1979): 74–110; Halil İnalcık, *Sources and Studies on the Ottoman Black Sea*, vol. 1, *The Customs Register of Caffa 1487–1490* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Gilles Veinstein, "From the Italians to the Ottomans: The Case of the Northern Black Sea Coast in the Sixteenth Century," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 1, no. 2 (1986): 221–37.

13 Lyubomir Pozharliev, Florian Riedler, and Stefan Rohdewald, "Introduction to the Special Issue: Transottoman Infrastructures and Networks across the Black Sea," *Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies* 3, no. 5 (2020): 13–18; Albrecht Fuess, Stefan Rohdewald, and Stephan Conermann, eds., *Transottomanica – Osteuropäisch-osmanisch-persische Mobilitätsdynamiken: Perspektiven und Forschungsstand* (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2019).

14 Victor Ostapchuk, "The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of the Cossack Naval Raids," *Oriente Moderno, Nuova Serie* 20 (81), no. 1 (2001): 23–95; Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "Inner Lake or

bile enemy the Ottoman fortresses of Özü (today: Ochakiv) and Azak became very important as infrastructures of immobility. It was their task to prevent the outbreak of the Cossack fleets from the rivers, or at least report on their movements.[15]

To supply their fortresses, move troupes and officials, and convey messages quickly, the Ottoman state tightly integrated the Black Sea region into its network of official routes that radiated out from Istanbul on land and sea. Of the four officially maintained sea routes, two concerned the Black Sea, one leading along the western Black Sea coast to the mouth of the Danube, where it linked up with the Ottoman Danube flotilla's range of action. The other connected 126 ports on the Anatolian shore from Istanbul to Faş (today: Poti). This route was also used by Evliya Çelebi (1611–87[?]), the famous Ottoman traveler, when he accompanied the 1640 naval expedition to recapture Azak from the Cossacks. Before returning to Istanbul, Evliya was left shipwrecked and washed ashore half dead in Dobruja and vowed never to board a ship on the Black Sea again. The account of his roundtrip provides a vivid insight into the Ottoman experiences with and their mental maps of the Black Sea.[16]

Two land routes integrated the extended coastal hinterland in Anatolia and the Balkans. On these and other routes the Ottoman government came close to what can be considered an active infrastructure policy: it organized stations (*menzil*) where post riders and travelling officials could change horses; for merchants, caravanserais were built in between the cities; guard stations protected travelers against highway robbers and bandits, especially on mountain passes; sometimes the road surface was even leveled or paved, especially near the capital and in Ottoman Europe, where wheeled traffic was more frequent than in Anatolia.[17]

In Anatolia, one of the principal routes ran behind the Pontic Mountain range and split up near Amasya into the Anatolian Middle Route, continuing via Diyarbakır to Baghdad and the Left Route that ran via Erzurum to the Ottoman-Persian border and ultimately to Tabriz. Moreover, there were important connecting roads crossing the mountains to major ports such as Samsun and Trabzon. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the main share of the silk exports from northern Iran went via this route to Istanbul and Bursa, where it was processed or exported on to Europe. The

Frontier? The Ottoman Black Sea in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *Enjeux Politiques, Économiques et Militaires En Mer Noire (XIVe–XXIe Siècles): Études à La Mémoire de Mihail Guboglu*, ed. Faruk Bilici, Ionel Cândea, and Anca Popescu (Brăila: Musée de Brăila, Éditions Istros, 2007), 125–39.

15 Brian Davies, *Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500–1700* (London: Routledge, 2007), 89 speaks of their "tripwire" function.

16 Cemal Çetin, "Anadolu İskele ve Kara Yolu Bağlantıları (XVI. Yüzyıl Sonları)," *The Journal of Academic Social Science Studies* 28 (2014): 349–67; Evliya Çelebi, *An Ottoman Traveller: Selections from the Book of Travels of Evliya Çelebi*, trans. Robert Dankoff and Sooyong Kim (London: Eland Publishing, 2011), 47–55; *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, 8 vols. (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1996–2003), book two tells the Black Sea episodes.

17 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *Osmanlılarda Ulaşım ve Haberleşme (Menziller)* (Istanbul: İlgi Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2014); Ümit Ekin, "Klasik Dönemde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Karayolu Ulaşımını ve Nakliyatı Etkileyen Faktörler (1500–1800)," *Belleten* 81, no. 291 (2017): 387–418.

French traveler-*cum*-diamond-merchant Jean-Baptiste Tavernier (1605–89) provides the most detailed account of how this route worked in the mid-seventeenth century.[18] Iranian raw silk was usually transported by camel caravans on the land route, because the sea route was considered too dangerous. Only the silk directly exported to Poland went via Trabzon to Crimea, from where it was transported across the steppe to Lviv (Polish: Lwów) by wagons on a route called the *Via Tatarica*, which had been used since the Middle Ages.[19] Armenian merchants from Isfahan were very active in the silk trade, which ceased in the eighteenth century due to a decline in production.[20]

Also, in Ottoman Europe, an official route, the Rumelian Right Route, followed the Black Sea coast inland with connecting roads to major port cities such as Burgas and Varna. This route crossed the Danube at Tulça (Romanian: Tulcea) or İsakça (Romanian: Isaccea) and continued until Özü, the Ottoman fortress at the mouth of the Buh and the Dnipro. At the Danube, it linked up with an important trade route to Central Europe, which led through Moldavia, crossed the Dniestr into Poland-Lithuania, and terminated at Lviv. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries this route was customarily used by the envoys of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to travel to Istanbul. Likewise, it was a preferential route for Armenian merchants who traded in Oriental goods such as silk, carpets, and luxury weapons, which were important for the self-presentation of the Polish nobility. According to the vivid account by Martin Gruneweg (1562–1618[?]) of Gdańsk (German: Danzig), a merchant's apprentice who travelled six times to Istanbul in the 1580s, big caravans composed of up to forty wagons needed six to seven weeks from Lviv to the Ottoman capital.[21]

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18 Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, *The Six Voyages of John Baptista Tavernier, Baron of Aubonne, Through Turky, into Persia and the East-Indies, For the Space of Forty Years* (London: Godbid and Pitt, 1677); Franz Taeschner, *Das anatolische Wegenetz nach osmanischen Quellen,* vol. 1 (Leipzig: Mayer & Müller, 1924); András Riedlmayer, "Ottoman-Safavid Relations and the Anatolian Trade Routes: 1603–1618," *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 5, no. 1 (1981).

19 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "Polish-Ottoman Trade Routes in the Times of Martin Gruneweg," in *Martin Gruneweg (1562–nach 1615): Ein europäischer Lebensweg,* ed. Almut Bues (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2009).

20 Rudolph P. Matthee, *The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver, 1600–1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, *The Shah's Silk for Europe's Silver: The Eurasian Trade of the Julfa Armenians in Safavid Iran and India* (1530–1750) (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999); Murat Çizakça, "A Short History of the Bursa Silk Industry (1500–1900)," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 23, no. 1/2 (1980).

21 Martin Gruneweg, *Die Aufzeichnungen des Dominikaners Martin Gruneweg (1562–ca. 1618) über seine Familie in Danzig, seine Handelsreisen in Osteuropa und sein Klosterleben in Polen,* ed. Almut Bues (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2008); Kołodziejczyk, "Polish-Ottoman Trade Routes"; Aleksandr Osipian, "Voting at Home and on the Move: Elections of Mayors and *caravanbashi* by Armenian Merchants in Poland and the Ottoman Empire, 1500–1700," in *Cultures of Voting in Pre-modern Europe,* ed. Serena Ferente, Lovro Kunčević, and Miles Pattenden (London: Routledge, 2018), 310–28; Andrzej Dziubiński, *Na Szlakach Orientu: Handel Między Polską a Imperium Osmańskim w XVI–XVIII Wieku* (Wrocław: Leopoldinum, 1998).

In the sixteenth century, the fur exports from Russia to Istanbul were also carried partly along this route. The official buyers from the Ottoman Treasury travelled with cash and some Oriental goods via Moldavia, Kamianets-Podilskyi (Polish: Kamieniec Podolski, Ottoman: Kamaniçe), Minsk, and Smolensk to Moscow and returned with fur, which were an important item of Ottoman court culture. Alternatively, there was a land route further to the east via Kyiv. These two routes were considered safer than the more direct one from Crimea through the steppes, where caravans were prone to attacks by Cossacks and Tatars. On the other routes, the caravans were protected by the Moldavian Prince, an Ottoman vassal, and the Polish-Lithuanian king, who usually entertained friendly relations with the sultan.[22]

The official routes were the expression of a pre-modern infrastructure policy on an imperial level that had a dual military-*cum*-economic purpose. It was designed for integrating the empire but at the same time provided the material basis for Transottoman connections beyond its borders. The organization of routes relied on accumulated knowledge and even material structures of imperial predecessors; Ottoman roads frequently used the foundations as well as the surface of older Roman and Byzantine roads. However, because camels and packhorses were used more frequently than carts, the Ottoman state did not have to pay so much attention to road surfaces. The major investments were rather in bridges and a service and security infrastructure. Caravanserais were directly taken over from the Rum Seljuk Sultanate, which had ruled large parts of Anatolia from the end of the eleventh to the middle of the thirteenth century. The Ottomans also spread the architectural model of the caravanserai to the Balkans. In organizational terms, the system of post riders and halting places strongly resembled the system of the Mongol Empire, the *yam*, which was also used as a model by the Muscovite state.[23]

5 Muscovy's Approach to the Sea

By way of combining land and sea transport and investing in road infrastructure, the Ottoman Empire integrated the southern, western, and northwestern coasts of the Black Sea. On the eastern coast, Ottoman rule depended on fortresses that were only accessible by sea. The unsuccessful Ottoman military expedition to Astrakhan in 1569 shows the degree to which imperial rule was dependent on a functioning trans-

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22 Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Les marchands de la Cour ottomane et le commerce des fourrures moscovites dans la seconde moitié du XVIe siècle," *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 11, no. 3 (1970): 363–90; Arkadiusz Blaszczyk, "From the Forests of Siberia to the Urban Jungle of Istanbul: The Ottoman-Muscovite Fur Exchange in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *Transottoman Matters: Objects Moving through Time, Space, and Meaning*, ed. Arkadiusz Blaszczyk, Robert Born, and Florian Riedler (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2022).
23 Florian Riedler, "The Istanbul-Belgrade Route in the Ottoman Empire: Continuity and Discontinuity of an Imperial Mobility Space," in Riedler and Stefanov, *The Balkan Route.*

port infrastructure. The aim of the expedition was to recapture the city from the Muscovite state, return it to its previous Tatar ruler, and close the emerging direct trade link between Muscovy and Safavid Persia, a geopolitical rival of the Ottomans in the Caucasus. During the campaign, the Ottomans failed in their attempt to transport artillery across the steppe and to deploy ships, which had sailed up the Don from Azak, to the Volga. The idea to dig a 60-kilometer canal between the two rivers proved impossible under the contemporary technological conditions. Unable to take Astrakhan, the Ottoman expedition forces had to retreat through the steppes, where many soldiers died of thirst.[24]

Trade on the south-north route that circumvented the Black Sea was less dependent on infrastructure than the military, but thrived on political encouragement. Muscovite-Safavid relations, which were opened in the late sixteenth century, were largely driven by commercial interests. Trade between the two states that went via Astrakhan became very significant in the second half of the seventeenth century. Iranian silk in particular was brought by Armenian merchants over the Caspian Sea, transported to Arkhangelsk on the White Sea—later directly to the Baltic—and from there exported to Europe. Russian negotiations with the Armenian merchants to redirect the entire silk trade to this route proved unrealistic, but the episode shows once more how dependent early modern empires were on extra revenue from trade.[25]

From the second half of the seventeenth century on, the Muscovite state also began to intervene directly in the Black Sea region after it had managed to restrict the regular incursions by the Crimean Tatars. The Tatar raiding parties used customary routes or trails (*shliakhy*) for their slave raids into southern Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania. These routes followed open country that was ideal for riding avoiding dense forests and large streams. Similar to rivers or sea currents, such trails can be considered natural infrastructure that needed no or only minimal human intervention. The opposite is true for the formidable infrastructure of immobility that the Russians built to cut the trails. From west to east, more than a 1,000 kilometers of abatis lines, i. e., defense lines constructed from felled trees, were created, and later earthen walls with forts were also built to prevent Tatar incursions.[26]

With growing military superiority, the Russians were able to go on the offensive against the Tatars, which also brought them into conflict with the Tatars' Ottoman suzerain. In 1696, as part of the Wars of the Holy League against the Ottomans, Tsar Peter I was able to conquer Azak, which the Russians called Azov. The fortress not only became the first Russian foothold on the Black Sea, but also what in the twentieth century would be called a "white elephant," a costly infrastructure project without much

24 Akdes Nimet Kurat, "The Turkish Expedition to Astrakhan' in 1569 and the Problem of the Don-Volga Canal," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 40, no. 94 (1961): 7–23.

25 Jarmo Kotilaine, *Russia's Foreign Trade and Economic Expansion in the Seventeenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 451–66.

26 Davies, *Black Sea Steppe*, 17–22, 44–47, 88–95.

use.[27] Azov and the new port of Taganrog, which was built adjacent to it, was intended as the base for the Russian navy, which had been built at the wharf in Voronezh on the Don. However, the Ottomans flatly refused to allow any Russian ships to leave the Sea of Azov, the bay on which the city was situated, and to enter the open sea through the Kerch Strait, which was guarded by an Ottoman fort. Hence the Russian navy was left to rot in the shallow waters of the Sea of Azov. Moreover, creating and maintaining a functioning base at Azov proved very expensive, because all building materials and provisions, as well as the work force, had to be shipped down the Don. The logistics were immense and due to disease and supply problems many of the forced laborers perished or deserted. In 1711, everything that had been built up at such immense costs was razed again when the fortress had to be returned to the Ottomans after a military defeat.[28]

In the subsequent Russian-Ottoman wars of the eighteenth century, the Russian Empire was able to conquer Crimea and all of the northern Black Sea coast. This fundamentally altered the geopolitical situation of the Black Sea region and with it the layout of transport and infrastructures that were to be built up from the nineteenth century onwards.

27 Dirk van Laak, *Weiße Elefanten: Anspruch und Scheitern technischer Grossprojekte im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999).
28 Brian J. Boeck, "When Peter I Was Forced to Settle for Less: Coerced Labor and Resistance in a Failed Russian Colony (1695–1711)," *The Journal of Modern History* 80, no. 3 (2008): 485–514.

Reinhard Nachtigal

Transport Technologies and Infrastructure: 1800 until World War I

Translated by Paul Vickers

1 Introduction

Transport routes, economic processes, infrastructural development, and migrations are all interrelated and mutually dependent. This is evident in the Black Sea region, where these phenomena have had an impact since Greek colonization during classical antiquity, while the East European lowlands have always been a transit zone for Asian peoples of the steppe. It is also a space where other mechanisms of transport geography have come into play.

In the course of the long nineteenth century, the Black Sea region was shaped most significantly by two events. By 1793, wars with the Ottoman Empire had brought the entire northern Black Sea coast under Russian rule. From 1801, the Russian Empire also expanded into the southern Caucasus. Parts of the eastern Black Sea coast, together with an important port, were incorporated into Russia. The construction of Russian port cities during this period meant that the Tsarist empire had the upper hand in the development of the region, with the Ottoman Empire playing an increasingly secondary role as a maritime power. The development of infrastructure for sea travel and for long-distance overland routes that connected Russian seaports with the vast hinterland meant that Black Sea shipping was increasingly connected with other oceans.

The second watershed moment was the Crimean War (1853–56), which put a temporary stop to these developments. For fifteen years following the end of the war, the Black Sea was declared neutral, with no military naval forces allowed to enter it. The Russian-Ottoman wars (1806–9, 1828–29, and 1877–78) could not put an end to Russian dominance, however. It was only with World War I that a completely new constellation emerged in the region. However, these wars and domestic factors in Russia, such as the abolition of serfdom (1861), the construction of railways (1869–1916), and the discovery of oil reserves in the Caucasus (from the 1860s on), did lead to a shift in vectors that either brought about stagnation in particular economic sites or allowed others to flourish—or even necessitated the establishment of new sites. These factors had a direct impact on transport routes and the related infrastructure, while state-sponsored transport policies also impacted on trade flows.

The Russian conquest of the northern Black Sea region led to significant migration processes, beginning in the late eighteenth century. Muslim peoples who found themselves under Russian rule left for the Ottoman Empire, with Christians from the Ottoman Empire moving to the Black Sea coast of Russia as part of a targeted settlement program. Greeks, Armenians, Bulgars, and Gagauzes settled not only in rural colonies

but also in new coastal towns.[1] The trading settlement of Nakhichevan at the mouth of the River Don was founded in 1785 for Armenians. From 1817, German colonists came to the area north of the Black Sea and to the Caucasus, where they gained a foothold in towns and prospered until the outbreak of World War I. The population exchanges that began in 1774 together with migrations that continued into the 1870s subsequently determined the demographic and economic development of both the Russian and Ottoman coastal areas. Despite Russia's defeat in the Crimean War, the Russian policy of economic expansion intensified up until World War I precisely because the state recognized the need to catch up and thus took a leading role in the process.[2] The Ottoman Empire was less successful in this respect following the Tanzimat reforms that began in 1839. This resulted in European powers exerting growing influence not only on trade and the economy, but also on domestic policy. British fears of further Russian expansion into South Asia following the Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne) in 1829, together with Britain's growing economic interests in the Black Sea region and in the Caucasus, meant that from the 1820s on, numerous Western visitors travelled through the area and reported on it (Laurence Oliphant, Charles William Shirley Brooks, Karl Koch, Frédéric Dubois de Montpéreux, Moritz Wagner, Xavier and Adèle Hommaire de Hell).[3] Particularly insightful were the nautical and economic data gathered by the Dutch vice-consul Edouard Taitbout de Marigny, who had visited the Black Sea area from 1813 and provided detailed information on trade.[4]

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1 Detlef Brandes, *Von den Zaren adoptiert: Die deutschen Kolonisten und die Balkansiedler in Neurussland und Bessarabien 1751–1914* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993). On the settlement of Kuban and Caucasus, see Arthur Tsutsiev, *Atlas of the Ethno-Political History of the Caucasus* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), map 15 1763–1913: 150 Years of Russian Colonization, and map 17 1763–1918: 155 Years of Non-Russian Colonization.

2 Victoria Konstantinova, "Urbanization and Modernization of the Northern Black Sea Region in the Mid-19th–Beginning of the 20th Century: The Role of the Port-Cities", in *Port-Cities of the Northern Shore of the Black Sea: Institutional, Economic and Social Development, 18th–Early 20th Centuries*, ed. Evrydiki Sifneos, Valentyna Shandra, and Oksana Yurkova (Rethymno: Centre of Maritime History, Institute for Mediterranean Studies, 2021), 55–83.

3 Florian Riedler, "Around the Black Sea in Forty-Five Days: Transottoman Space, Time, and Infrastructure," in *Transottoman Matters: Objects Moving through Time, Space, and Meaning*, ed. Arkadiusz Blaszczyk, Robert Born, and Florian Riedler (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2022), 27–60.

4 Edouard Taitbout de Marigny, *Portulan de la mer noire et de la mer d'Azov ou déscription des côtes de ces deux mers à l'usage des navigateurs* (Odesa: Imprimerie de la ville, 1830); Edouard Taitbout de Marigny, *Plan des golfes, baies, portes et rades de la mer noire et de la mer d'Azov* (Odesa: Alexandre Braun, 1830); Edouard Taitbout de Marigny, *Three Voyages in the Black Sea to the Coast of Circassia, Including Descriptions of the Ports, and the Importance of their Trade* (London: John Murray, 1837).

2 Russia Gains the Upper Hand in Trade and Transport

Russian efforts to catch up with Western Europe in economic and social terms, together with the weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire, resulted in the Black Sea becoming—particularly in the wake of the Crimean War—an integrated, transcontinental, and international economic area. After the World War I, however, this was no longer the case.

It was not only transport-related economic relations that suffered in the Crimean War. Just as the Russian fleet triggered the intervention of the Ottoman Empire's Western European allies with a devastating attack on Sinop in 1853 that destroyed the Ottoman fleet, flourishing Russian port cities were in turn attacked in 1854, resulting in the destruction of part of their infrastructure. The allied fleet attacked Kerch, Novorossiisk, Redut-Kale, Berdiansk, Mariupol, Taganrog, and Eisk in May 1854. In Kerch, as in Taganrog and Eisk, there were landing operations that led to the destruction of urban infrastructure.[5] Taganrog even preceded Odesa in acquiring trade and shipping infrastructure, which was further expanded in 1802 with the establishment of a city prefecture and a central customs office in 1805. The city therefore attracted seafarers and traders, in particular Greeks.[6] To aid its development, Odesa was awarded freeport (*porto-franco*) status for incoming goods. It was thus in a privileged position compared to other new Russian ports on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Odesa also had the best quarantine facilities in the Black Sea region. Very early on, the city also developed into one of the most important Russian stock exchanges and financial centers, outstripping all other Black Sea cities.[7]

Inland cities that were protected from maritime attacks could profit from their neighbors' suffering as trade shifted towards overland routes and away from the coast. This was particularly evident in the case of the sister cities of Rostov and Nakhichevan-on-Don. In 1845, Rostov was no longer obliged to retain its status as a fortified city.[8] And thanks to its river port it subsequently developed into a significant transshipment point whose north-south axis proved additionally beneficial to the twin cities with the construction of the Vladikavkaz Railway in 1871. This new transport route ideally complemented the older west-east/north direction of the river axis. This develop-

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5 Orlando Figes, *Crimea: The Last Crusade* (London: Allan Lane/Penguin Books, 2010), 344–45.

6 Nikolai F. Gulianitskii, ed., *Russkoe gradostroitelnoe iskusstvo: Peterburg i drugie novye rossiiskie goroda XVIII–pervoi poloviny XIX vekov* (Moscow: Stroiizdat, 1995), 322–23, 330–32, 334.

7 Alfred J. Rieber, *Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 67.

8 In contrast to Ottoman ports, some of the Russian ports had been founded as fortresses (Taganrog, Kherson, Sevastopol, and Rostov-on-Don). During the nineteenth century, Sevastopol and Kerch became naval fortresses and reduced their economic functions, while Taganrog and Kherson were stripped of their role as fortresses.

ment sealed the economic decline of the neighboring port of Taganrog, which from 1870 on had a railway connection to Kharkov (today: Kharkiv) via the Donbas. The development of the coastal railroad connection from Taganrog to Rostov actually had a negative impact on the city prefecture. The investigation of and legal proceedings against Greek traders for customs fraud in the early 1880s (the so-called "Taganrog Customs scandal") were another factor in the city's decline, though not its cause.[9] For the first time since the ports were established in the early nineteenth century, the harbors and urban infrastructure of both Odesa and Taganrog underwent significant modernization starting in the 1860s, which is reflected in the cities' architecture.[10] In Taganrog, new branches of industry, including heavy industry, set up business in the city between 1858 and 1896. From 1895 on, newly-discovered iron ore deposits were shipped via Mariupol or taken by rail to the Donbas.[11] This led to further changes in trade and transport flows towards the end of the nineteenth century. Alongside Taganrog, other ports also experienced a third phase of construction to expand or improve infrastructure in the period before World War I (see fig. 27).[12]

A problem encountered early on with shipping in the Sea of Azov was the shallow depth of this inland sea. It was only during the high waters of spring that it became navigable for larger ships. While loading freight from flat-bottomed boats onto ocean-going ships several kilometers out to sea from the ports of Taganrog, Berdiansk, Mariupol, or Eisk, was not a significant hindrance before the Crimean War, in the decades after this conflict several factors changed. Along the coast, the seabed lies at just two meters in some places, which was a nautical problem for larger ships. In antiquity and the early nineteenth century, when sailboats plied the Sea of Azov, the shallowness of the Maeotis did not pose difficulties (see fig. 28).

The silting up of the safe anchorage points at Taganrog, Berdiansk, and Mariupol, the rise of steamships with larger draughts in the second half of the nineteenth century, and unfavorable winds, meant that trade ships, as well as business and industry, oriented towards the more efficient Black Sea ports of Odesa and, increasingly, Nikolaev (today: Mykolaiv) and Sevastopol, where grain exports rose from the 1860s,

9 Evridyki Sifneos and Gelina Harlaftis, "Taganrog: Greek Entrepreneurship in the Russian Frontier of International Trade," in *Between Grain and Oil from the Azov to the Caucasus: The Port-Cities of the Eastern Coast of the Black Sea, Late 18th–Early 20th Century*, ed. Gelina Harlaftis, Victoria Konstantinova, Igor Lyman, Anna Sydorenko, and Eka Tchkoidze (Rethymno: Centre for Maritime History, 2020), 191–233.

10 Frederick W. Skinner, "Odessa and the Problem of Urban Modernization," in *The City in Late Imperial Russia*, ed. Michael F. Hamm (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 209–48.

11 John P. McKay, *Pioneers for Profit: Foreign Entrepreneurship and Russian Industrialization 1885–1913* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 130–31.

12 Particularly successful was Nikolaev in this respect. See Larysa Levchenko, "The Economic History of the Nikolayev International Commercial Sea Port, Late 18th–Early 20th Century," in *Port-Cities of the Northern Shore of the Black Sea: Institutional, Economic and Social Development, 18th–Early 20th Centuries*, ed. Evrydiki Sifneos, Valentyna Shandra, and Oksana Yurkova (Rethymno: Centre of Maritime History, Institute for Mediterranean Studies, 2021), 151–99.

Fig. 27: Water depths in the Azov Sea in the Soviet Sea Atlas (1950).

Fig. 28: Sailboats in Taganrog around 1840.

while Kherson experienced further stagnation.[13] There were proposals in the 1870s to turn Kerch into the main port of the Sea of Azov, with cabotage vessels depositing freight to and from the Azov ports. This, however, would have resulted in the ports along the coast of the Sea of Azov becoming superfluous. Traders and shipowners operating at ports on the northern coast, especially in Taganrog, opposed the plans because the ports were already equipped with the infrastructure necessary to provide storage or transshipment. From 1880, several projects were initiated to improve the port of Taganrog. However, laborious decision-making processes at the central state level, as well as the 1905 Revolution, hindered genuine improvements to most ports before World War I. Only Kherson experienced an economic upturn around the turn of the twentieth century thanks to developing its port.[14] In the case of Kerch, Russia's increasing investment in naval forces meant that the port realigned its functions, moving away from trade, while Evpatoriia and Feodosiia profited from this development. In the wake of the Crimean War, Kerch was developed into a maritime fortress and naval depot.[15] Its port, which officially opened in 1822, had served two functions until that point: as a transit station for goods coming from and going to the Azov ports, and as a transshipment point for material necessary for the war in the Caucasus, such as building materials and weapons being transported to Redut-Kale and Poti, as well as for salt from the Crimean salt lakes.[16]

The various plans—and their actual realization in Taganrog in the form of a sea canal that was dug in the early 1890s—could do little to prevent the decline of the Taganrog port, just as locating heavy industry in the city failed to stop the rot (Southern Russia's largest boiler plant was based there).[17] The neighboring city of Rostov, howev-

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13 Details on this in Vladimir A. Zolotov, *Khlebnyi eksport Rossii cherez porty Chernogo i Azovskogo morei v 60–90 gody XIX v.* (Rostov-on-Don: Izdatelstvo Rostovskogo universiteta, 1966), 193–202. On trade and economy in the Russian Black Sea and Sea of Azov, including statistical material, see Elena Druzhinina, *Severnoe Prichernomore v 1775–1800 gg.* (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1959); Elena Druzhinina, *Iuzhnaia Ukraina v 1800–1825 gg.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1970); Elena Druzhinina, *Iuzhnaia Ukraina v period krizisa feodalizma 1825–1860 gg.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1981); Ludmila Thomas, *Streben nach Weltmachtpositionen: Russlands Handelsflotte 1856–1914* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), 37. Taganrog remained the main port on the Sea of Azov, with more than half of all ships calling at it, followed by Berdiansk and Mariupol: *Bolshaia Entsiklopediia Brokgauz-Efron* (St. Petersburg: Brokgauz-Efron, 1890), 1:234–35. Victoria Konstantinova and Igor Lyman, "Kherson, the City of 'the Glorious Past'," in Sifneos, Shandra and Yurkova, *Port-Cities of the Northern Shore of the Black Sea*, 126–50.

14 *Bolshaia Entsiklopediia Brokgauz-Efron* (St. Petersburg: Brokgauz-Efron, 1903), 37:175–78.

15 Liubomir G. Beskrovny, *The Russian Army and Fleet in the Nineteenth Century: Handbook of Armaments, Personnel and Policy,* trans. Gordon E. Smith (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1996), 262, 266, 268, 284.

16 Anna Sydorenko, "Controlling the Straits: The Development of the Port of Kerch," in Harlaftis et al., *Between Grain and Oil*, 105–37. Until World War I, its balance of trade remained low. The city's connection to the Russian railway network in 1900 brought no improvement to the port infrastructure.

17 The foundation of the *Taganrogskoe Metallurgicheskoe obshchestvo* fostered the improvement of the port, though the company did not prosper: Valerii I. Bovykin, ed., *Inostrannoe predprinimatelstvo i zagranichnye investitsii v Rossii* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1997), 214–28.

er, was less reliant on overseas connections and became one of the most important transport hubs in Southern Russia.

Following the foundation of the port of Eisk in 1848, the northern area of the Kuban region flourished briefly in the wake of the Crimean War, while the southern Kuban region was only integrated into Russia in 1864 following the conquest and deportation of the Circassians.[18] For other ports, export conditions changed from the 1860s. Berdiansk thus overtook the stagnating Eisk in grain exports, while it was only in the 1880s with the vast expansion of coalmining in the Donbas that Mariupol acquired a serviceable port, including a three-meter- deep sea canal.[19] Equally, the fact that Novorossiisk was connected to the Vladikavkaz Railway from 1887 on, coupled with Rostov's economic upturn, meant that the small export-oriented port of Eisk, which served the vast hinterland of the northern Kuban steppe, shifted its economic focus.[20] A branch line from the city to the Vladikavkaz Railway could do little to avert the decline of port. It was only in the 1930s that further changes in the city brought a degree of growth, although this hardly had an impact on (sea) transport or the development of necessary infrastructure.

Although it was protected by Cossacks operating a loose line of defense, the southern Kuban region was not safe from attacks by mountain peoples. The capital city of Ekaterinodar (today: Krasnodar) thus remained an insignificant regional town for quite some time. It was only around the turn of the twentieth century that it became a transregional transport hub.[21] This was a fate shared by other cities in Southern Russia, whose industrial development was restricted until the 1860s owing to the persistence of serfdom or, in the case of the Cossack regions on the Don and Kuban Rivers, by the special constitutions pertaining there that hindered economic activities by non-Cossacks (Russian: *inogorodnye*) in the cities.[22] In the second half of the nineteenth century, the same trends became evident in the broader neighborhood of the Russian Black Sea provinces, with new large cities emerging in Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav (today: Dnipro), and Rostov-on-Don. In the late nineteenth century, financial investments brought large-scale industrialization to the region, the railways having laid

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18 Tatiana Plokhotniuk, *Rossiiskie nemtsy na Severnom Kavkaze* (Moscow: Obshchestvennaia Akademiia Nauk Rossiiskikh nemtsev, 2001), 16–23.

19 Zolotov, *Khlebnyi eksport*, 201–4 and Rieber, *Merchants*, 235–41.

20 Eisk underwent an economic boom in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, though it remained much less multi-ethnic than other ports. At times it had foreign consulates, but Greek merchants left the city when its economy started to decline. Its primary export goods were wheat and wool. Liubov V. Kupriianova, *Goroda Severnogo Kavkaza vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka: K probleme razvitiia kapitalizma vshir* (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), 46–51, 68–71. Kupriianova's study contains lots of statistical material, e.g., on exports and demography.

21 Andrii Reshetko, *Städtische Selbstverwaltung im Wandel – Ekaterinodar 1870 bis 1914* (Frankfurt am Main: PL Academic Research, 2016).

22 In Russia's Southern and Caucasian provinces, serfdom was abolished only in the late 1860s. Walter Richmond, *The Northwest Caucasus: Past, Present, Future* (London: Routledge, 2008), 84–100. On the belated development of Northern Caucasus see Kupriianova, *Goroda*, 30–183.

the groundwork for this trend.[23] In Russia's provinces on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, railways led to the emergence of the following important transshipment centers: Rostov from 1861–69, Odesa in 1865, Taganrog in 1869, Bessarabia / western Kherson Province from 1867–73, Poti-Tbilisi in 1872 (extension to Baku in 1875), Nikolaev in 1873, Sevastopol (Simferopol) in 1875, Mariupol in 1882, Batumi in 1883, and Novorossiisk in 1887. In 1875, the railway between Rostov and Vladikavkaz was completed, leading to a reorientation of transport flows in the Caucasus.[24]

Russia benefitted from the installation of the telegraph much sooner than the coastal regions under Ottoman rule, even though both the Russian Black Sea provinces and Anatolia had been connected to the network since the 1850s.[25] The reason for this difference was the progress that Russia had made in the field of transport infrastructure since the 1820s as part of connecting the Black Sea provinces to the postal network.[26] Russia's territories in the Caucasus also had a functioning transport system as early as the 1830s. The east coast of the Sea of Azov (up to the River Kuban) and the Caucasus were covered by a network of postal routes, some of which remained quite sparse, that were a product of the Caucasus War.[27] From the 1860s on, telegraph lines were installed along the postal routes in the Caucasus, while the Anatolian vilayets Trabzon, Kastamonu, Erzurum, and Kars hardly had any functioning long-distance connections.[28] With the construction of railways well underway by 1876 in Southern Russia and the Caucasus, the Tsarist empire pulled further ahead before the war of 1877–78. Because telegraph lines ran alongside railway routes, two modern means of

23 Oleksandr Romantsov, "Transportation Networks of the Northern Black Sea Coast in Relation to the Black Sea Trade in the 1700s–1800s," in Sifneos, Shandra, and Yurkova, *Port-Cities of the Northern Shore of the Black Sea*, 109–25.

24 Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, *Russlands Fahrt in die Moderne: Mobilität und sozialer Raum im Eisenbahnzeitalter* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2014).

25 Roderic H. Davison, "The Advent of the Electric Telegraph in the Ottoman Empire," in *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774–1923: The Impact of the West* (London: Saqi Books, 1990), 142.
In 1869, there were 103 telegraph offices in Anatolia. Russia's first attempt to introduce the telegraph in the Caucasus failed during the 1850s: Reinhard Nachtigal, *Verkehrswege in Kaukasien: Ein Integrationsproblem des Zarenreiches 1780–1870* (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2016), 254–55. During the mid-1850s the northern Black Sea coast received the telegraph. Cf. Wilfried Feldenkirchen, "Die Firma Siemens im Russischen Reich vor 1914," in *"… das einzige Land in Europa, das eine große Zukunft vor sich hat": Deutsche Unternehmen und Unternehmer im Russischen Reich im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Dittmar Dahlmann and Boris Ananich (Essen: Klartext, 1998), 174–78. Charles King, *The Black Sea: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 172, attributes Ottoman backwardness to feudal institutions in Anatolia. The optical telegraph was installed on Russia's Black Sea coast earlier.

26 "Generalnaia Pochtovaia Karta Evropy, vnov ispravlena i popolnena s pokazaniem noveishago razdeleniia Germanskago soiuza i prochikh gosudarstv i so vkliucheniem dorozhnoi karty vsei Rossii, 1821," Gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii muzei, accessed May 24, 2024, http://nav.shm.ru/exhibits/489/.

27 Nachtigal, *Verkehrswege*, 250–54.

28 A. Shvanin Kl. Khud. Kurakin, "Karta Kavkazskogo Kraia v masshtabe 1/1 680 000 dolia, izdana Kavkazskim otdelom Imperatorskago Geograficheskago Obshchestva 1868 (sostavlena i litogr. v voen. top. Otdl. Kavk. Voen. Okruga)," Wikimedia, accessed May 24, 2024, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6e/Карта_Кавказского_края_1868г.jpg.

communication were combined in an optimal manner, while Northern and Eastern Anatolia remained without railroads for another half century.

From the mid-1860s on, the semi-state-owned shipping company ROPiT (Russian Society for Steamshipping and Trade) even developed a shipping and overseas postal service in ports throughout the Levant, which overlapped and indeed supplemented French and Austro-Hungarian postal services (Lloyd Austriaco). It was possible to send and receive shipments through Russian postal agencies at all Russian ports, as well as in Trabzon.[29] The Caucasus was connected via an overland route with the Russian consular post in Tabriz, which went hand in hand with the diversion of trade on the route Trabzon–Erzurum–Tabriz to the Russian side via Yerevan–Julfa–Tabriz.[30]

The consequences of a century-long modernization process for several of the important transshipment centers in the Black Sea region, as well as for major urban centers in the hinterland, have been researched extensively. This is the case for Odesa,[31] Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav,[32] Taganrog,[33] Trabzon,[34] Mariupol,[35] Berdiansk,[36] Kerch,[37] Batumi,[38] and the twin cities of Rostov and Nakhichevan-on-Don.[39]

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29 V. Mogilnyi, "Iz istorii pochty ROPiT," *Rossiia i khristianskii vostok*, accessed May 24, 2024, https://ros-vos.net/history/ropit/1/7/; Nikolai Ivanovich Sokolov, "The Transmission of Mails on Steamers in Russia," *The Journal of the Rossica Society of Russian Philately* 68 (1965): 48–52.

30 Simon D. Tchilinghirian, "The Consular Post Office of Tabriz (Persia)," *The Journal of the British Society of Russian Philately* 10 (1952): 265–67; Peter T. Ashford, "Mail Traversing the Russo-Persian Border in the Late 19th Century," *The Journal of the British Society of Russian Philately* 10 (1952): 301–4; cf. Charles Issawi, "The Tabriz-Trabzon Trade, 1830–1900: Rise and Decline of a Route," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1 (1970): 18–27.

31 Patricia Herlihy, *Odessa: A History 1794–1914* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Evrydiki Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa: Peoples, Spaces, Identities* (Leiden: Brill, 2018). See also some of her articles, and studies of other authors quoted in Sifneos, 13–17 and 271–72.

32 Rainer Lindner, *Unternehmer und Stadt in der Ukraine, 1860–1914: Industrialisierung und soziale Kommunikation im südlichen Zarenreich* (Konstanz: UVK Verlags-Gesellschaft, 2006), 61–75, 107–74, 309–431 on Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav. These booming economic and commercial centres had been linked by rail to ports on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov since the 1870s.

33 Evrydiki Sifneos and Gelina Harlaftis, "Entrepreneurship at the Russian Frontier of International Trade: The Greek Merchant Community/Paroikia of Taganrog in the Sea of Azov, 1780–1830," in *Merchant Colonies in the Early Modern Period,* ed. Victor N. Zakharov, Gelina Harlaftis, and Olga Ktsiardi-Hering (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012), 157–79; Sifneos and Harlaftis, "Taganrog"; Reinhard Nachtigal, "Taganrog als historischer Ort: Russlands 'Perle des Südens' und ihre Bedeutung für Westeuropa," *Forum für osteuropäische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte* 92 (2005): 117–55.

34 A. Üner Turgay, "Trabzon," *Review of the Fernand Braudel Center* 16, no. 4, Port-Cities of the Eastern Mediterranean 1800–1914 (1993): 435–65.

35 Svitlana Novikova and Vira Volonyts, "Ethnic Factor in the Economic Development of Mariupol (Late 18th–Early 20th Century)," in Harlaftis et al., *Between Grain and Oil*, 259–98.

36 Igor Lyman and Victoria Konstantinova, "The Great Plans for Developing Berdyansk," in Harlaftis et al., *Between Grain and Oil*, 299–328.

37 Anna Sydorenko "Controlling the Straits: The Development of the Port of Kerch," in Harlaftis et al., *Between Grain and Oil*, 105–38.

38 Eka Tchkoidze, "Oil and Soil: The Role of Batoum's Economic Development in Shaping of Geopolitical Significance of the Caucasus," in Harlaftis et al., *Between Grain and Oil*, 461–520.

3 The Ottoman Empire Tries to Catch Up while Russia Modernizes Its Transport Technology

Compared to Russia, which was catching up quickly, the relative backwardness of the Ottoman Empire was particularly evident, especially where land-based transport infrastructure was concerned. Railway construction began in the 1870s in the plains of Southern Russia and then in the Caucasus. This meant that by the end of the century, all of the Empire's most important ports on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov were connected to the hinterland. Railways were also responsible for the creation of some new long-distance (trading) routes. There was nothing comparable in the Pontic Mountain region of Ottoman Anatolia until the 1930s, meaning that the area relied largely on tiring, poor-quality country routes. The Baghdad Railway, whose route through Western and Southern Anatolia—including a branch line to Ankara—had been completed by the time of World War I, had little noticeable impact on either the economy or infrastructure of the Black Sea region. The roads of Anatolia—with the occasional exception of the route between Trabzon and Erzurum—were not part of an integrated transport network in the Black Sea region, despite their east-west orientation.[40]

In contrast to the Anatolian ports, their Russian counterparts often enjoyed the benefit of river access that enabled the transportation of, first and foremost, grain as a bulk commodity from deep in the hinterland: the Dnister to Odesa (established 1794, around 50 km north of the Dnister Liman), the Southern Buh to Nikolaev (established 1789), the Dnipro to Ekaterinoslav and on to Kherson (established 1784), the Don to Taganrog (1775) and on to Azov (1775–84) and Rostov-on-Don (established 1778–1834). However, these favorable locations also meant that occasionally connections to the railway network were delayed. Until World War I, waterways remained the primary route for the transportation of bulk commodities in the Russian interior.[41] To a much more significant extent, the location of the river ports Brăila (Ottoman/Turkish: İbrail) and Galaţi (Ottoman/Turkish: Kalas) on the lower reaches of the Danube had ensured that they were closely integrated into the transport routes of the Black Sea region. This also applied to the secondary Danube ports of Ruse (Ottoman/Turkish:

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39 Sarkis Kazarov, "Nakhichevan-on-Don: Armenian Merchants and Their Role in the Commercial Development of the Azov – Black Sea Region," in Harlaftis et al., *Between Grain and Oil*, 399 – 428; Natalya Samarina, "Rostov-on-Don in the Second Half of the 19th–Early 20th Century: Dynamics and Specificities of the Socio-economic Development," in Harlaftis et al., *Between Grain and Oil*, 369 – 98; Marianna Abdullayeva, "The Rural Population of Don's Hinterland as a Factor of the Economic Life of Rostov, End of the 19th Century," in Harlaftis et al., *Between Grain and Oil*, 329 – 68.
40 Donald Quataert, "Part IV: The Age of Reforms," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300 – 1914*, ed. Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 804 – 21. The author concedes that the Trabzon–Tabriz route was in poor condition, even during the time when trade flourished (Quataert, 817– 20).
41 William L. Blackwell, *The Beginnings of Russian Industrialization 1800 – 1860* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), 262 – 323.

Rusçuk), Silistra (Ottoman/Turkish: Silistre), and Izmail. In 1829, the International Danube Commission was established, which over the next decades focused on improving shipping, first and foremost on the lower reaches of the river.[42] 1830 saw the founding of the Austrian First Danube Steamship Company (*Erste Donau-Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft*). By opening up Danube shipping, both institutions contributed significantly to the expansion of transport infrastructure that helped connect the western Black Sea region and Central Europe.

Railway construction had been delayed in Russia before the Crimean War owing to its "democratizing" effect. Afterwards, however, a building boom emerged, meaning that railroads reached many ports in the 1870s. Other Russian ports that were not located on navigable rivers flowing into the Black Sea were either connected to a far-reaching, fertile steppe hinterland (Berdiansk, Mariupol, and Eisk), or could use older infrastructure and trade routes (Evpatoriia, Feodosiia, Kerch, Redut-Kale/Poti, and Batumi), or were less dependent upon efficient connections to the hinterland—this applied in particular to the Anatolian ports of Sinop, Samsun, Giresun, and Rize.

The ports of Sevastopol (founded 1783, serving primarily as a military port from 1803 to 1883) and Novorossiisk (city founded in 1866, construction of the port in 1888, connection to the railway in 1887) enjoyed particularly favorable geographic and nautical conditions.[43] The rise of Novorossiisk in the 1890s was influenced primarily, however, by the discovery of marl deposits, a raw material used in cement production and an important export product. Oil reached the port from the wells near Groznyi, with 362 steamships, 241 of them British, taking exports in 1892.[44] Novorossiisk's increasing importance and its railway connection meant that neighboring ports and cities experienced economic stagnation around the turn of the twentieth century. Infrastructure thus remained rudimentary in Eisk, Akhtari, Temriuk, Taman,[45] Kerch, Tuapse, and Sukhumi. The mountainous coast of the Caucasus continued, of course, to pose a technical challenge to developing transport routes. This was already evident in the 1880s with the construction of the Annenkov Road from Gelendzhik near Novorossiisk to Sukhumi and on to Kutaisi, with the situation repeating itself in World War I with efforts to develop a Black Sea railway from Tuapse to Kutaisi.[46]

With the discovery of manganese ore in the southern Caucasus and its exploitation by the Siemens brothers from the 1870s on, manganese became the chief good exported

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42 Luminita Gatejel, "Building a Better Passage to the Sea: Engineering and River Management at the Mouth of the Danube, 1829–61," *Technology and Culture* 59, no. 4 (2018): 925–53.

43 Olga Popova, "Novorossiysk: The Formation and Development of the City," in Harlaftis et al., *Between Grain and Oil*, 429–60.

44 "Novorossiisk," in *Bolshaia Entsiklopediia Brokgauz-Efron* (St. Petersburg: Brokgauz-Efron, 1897), 21:292. See also "Novorossiisk," in *Bolshaia Entsiklopediia: Slovar obshchedostupnykh svedenii* (St. Petersburg: Prosveshchenie, 1904), 14:137–38 for 1900.

45 Plokhotniuk, *Rossiiskie nemtsy*, 39, is one of few authors who named the secondary ports on the eastern coast of Azov and Anapa as ports for exporting cereals.

46 Nachtigal, *Verkehrswege*, 206–8, 247. Until the twentieth century, the Western Caucasus remained economically insignificant as a Black Sea hinterland, with the exception of Novorossiisk.

from Poti, which was connected to Tbilisi by railroad from 1872.[47] It was in 1860 that Poti took over from the less favorable harbor of Redut-Kale, where transshipment of goods had been conducted since the early nineteenth century.[48] Still, Poti was hardly an ideal port, in contrast to Batumi, which was under Ottoman control but relatively insignificant in light of the competition it faced from Trabzon and its position on the peripheries of the Ottoman Empire. This changed, however, with the annexation of the Ajarian port following the Russian-Ottoman War of 1878. Batumi thus took over some of Poti's functions and with the transportation of oil from Baku, as well as manganese ore, it became Russia's most important port in the Caucasus. In 1883, a branch line from the Poti-Tbilisi mainline already reached the new port, which in the twentieth century became Georgia's most significant Black Sea port. Into the inter-war period, oil, petroleum products, and manganese were in effect the sole products exported from Transcaucasia.[49] The pipeline from the Caspian to the Black Sea, opened in 1906, was the longest in the world at the time and together with the railways intensified the infrastructural integration of the two regions.[50]

With the exception of Istanbul, the Ottoman Empire could not boast of any similar scale of development. The Danube ports of Galați and Brăila were lost to newly independent Romania in 1878, together with the city of Constanța (Ottoman/Turkish: Köstence), which had been connected to the Danube by rail since 1860. The Bulgarian city of Varna followed some time later.[51] On the Anatolian coast, Sinop was supplanted by the more efficient Samsun.[52] Zonguldak served as a port for the exportation of hard coal that had been extracted locally. Consequently, its importance grew during World War I as it supplied Istanbul and the Ottoman navy with fuel for transportation and heating. The Eastern Anatolian port of Trabzon acquired special status following the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in the first three decades of the nineteenth century. At times it served as a significant transit hub for long-distance trade along parts of

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47 Heinz Lemke, "Deutsche Unternehmen in der kaukasischen Manganindustrie 1900–1914," in Dahlmann and Ananich, *Deutsche Unternehmen*, 147–66. Poti's export also contained bulk freight like corn and liquorice: *Bolshaia Entsiklopediia Brokgauz-Efron* (St. Petersburg: Brokgauz-Efron, 1898), 24 A:734.

48 Nachtigal, *Verkehrswege*, 216–18. Poti was favored because of its location on the River Rioni. There were plans to make it navigable, but such they were never realized. Only half of the route to Kutaisi was navigable.

49 Donald Rayfield, *Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia* (London: Reaktion, 2012), 279.

50 John P. McKay, "Baku Oil and Transcaucasian Pipelines, 1883–1891: A Study in Tsarist Economic Policy," *Slavic Review* 43, no. 4 (1984): 614–15; see also Stefan Rohdewald, "Petroleum: Commodity, Products and Infrastructures as Transottoman Mobilities around 1900," in *Transottoman Matters: Objects Moving through Time, Space, and Meaning*, ed. Arkadiusz Blaszczyk, Robert Born, and Florian Riedler (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2022), 99–118.

51 King, *Black Sea*, 205–6.

52 According to *Bolshaia Entsiklopediia Brokgauz-Efron* (St. Petersburg: Brokgauz-Efron, 1900), 30:48–49, Sinop did not recover after the Crimean War.

the old Silk Road (the Trabzon–Erzurum–Tabriz Route).[53] It experienced its first boom as a transit station in the wake of the transfer of trade privileges from the Ottoman Empire to European powers with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. British merchants were among the first to make their mark, with European traders and companies coming to dominate business with the Orient, while Greek shipowners prevailed in the Black Sea.[54]

Owing to its peripheral position, Trabzon suffered much less in the subsequent Russian-Ottoman wars than other Anatolian ports. During the Crimean War, it benefitted from the fact that the allied Crimean armies were supplied to a significant extent by the city's hinterland. In some respects, the socio-economic development of Trabzon in the nineteenth century resembled that of Taganrog, with both cities experiencing parallel demographic development for a significant period.[55] With the opening of the Suez Canal and the subsequent diversion of traffic from Europe to India, as well as the opening of the railways in the Caucasus in the 1870s, Trabzon's star faded,[56] although the British (who had had a consulate there since 1805) continued to dominate imports and exports. Following the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople, the Russian tax authorities decided to impose high tariffs on goods imported into and transiting the Russian Caucasus in order to stimulate trade and production with Russia and within the Caucasus. The 1838 trade agreement between the United Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire favored trade not only with Britain and thus also contributed to the rise of Trabzon. Transit goods were diverted onto the old trade route between Trabzon and Erzurum,[57] with the section from Erzurum to Tabriz moved to Ottoman territory from the left bank of the Aras (via Yerevan) to the south of the Ararat mountain range. This agreement, together with Russia's failed tax and administration experiments in the annexed territories of the South Caucasus, as well as the pacification of the mountain peoples of the Caucasus that continued until 1864, were all factors contributing to Trabzon's exceptional significance. This was also evident in the number of European consulates

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53 King, *Black Sea*, 175, emphasizes that this ancient route was not important in early modern times (i.e. during Ottoman rule over the Black Sea). From the 1820s it was revived by European merchant sailors, which brought with it British diplomatic pressure on the Ottoman Empire to introduce *porto-franco* in its ports: Figes, *Crimea*, 46–48.

54 Quataert, "Age of Reforms," 762–65, 774–75, 798–804, names the key year 1826. There has been much research on the role of Greek merchant traders, although it does not focus on the Black Sea region; see, for example, Nikolas Pissis, "Investments in the Greek Merchant Marine (1783–1821)," in *Merchants in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi and Gilles Veinstein (Paris: Peeters, 2008), 151–64 ("intermediary function in Ottoman domestic and transit trade", Pissis, 151–52).

55 Turgay, "Trabzon."

56 In 1894, transit transport was still performed by 458 incoming steamers (particularly British, Ottoman, French, and Austrian). Passenger transport existed to Istanbul, to the lower Danube and to Mediterranean ports. *Bolshaia Entsiklopediia Brokgauz-Efron* (St. Petersburg: Brokgauz-Efron, 1901), 38 A:726–27.

57 According to Rayfield, *Edge*, 277–78, in the 1820s traffic already circumvented Russian Georgia via Trabzon.

that were established in the city.[58] From 1870, though, the extent of transit traffic through the city declined.[59] However, secondary Anatolian ports, such as Samsun, Giresun, and Rize, which were reliant on production and consumption in their hinterlands increased in significance in economic terms and as transport hubs.[60] In the 1870s, several coinciding factors had a telling impact on the transport geography of the Black Sea region: the Suez Canal, railway construction in the Caucasus, and the growth of steamships in marine transport.

The connections of the Anatolian ports to the hinterland remained so poor into the twentieth century that they served primarily as transit ports for internal Ottoman Black Sea shipping (cabotage). Railways reached Zonguldak and Samsun during World War II, although trade and the economy of Northern Anatolia, including shipping, remained modest and were largely shaped by regional and domestic economic connections into the 1950s.

The beginnings of modern transport infrastructure in the Russian-Turkish borderlands in the Southern Caucasus can be traced back to the years preceding World War I. On the Russian side, a railway line was constructed from Aleksandropol (today: Gyumri, Armenia) to the Ottoman border via the fortress of Kars (annexed in 1878). By 1913 the line had been extended for military use to the border town of Sarıkamış and with the Russian conquest of Erzurum in 1916, it was extended to the city the following year. This railroad only acquired economic significance in 1939, when it was connected to the Anatolian railway, reaching Sivas via Erzincan.[61] The railway that was constructed in the Russian part of Armenia to the Persian border at Julfa and extended to Tabriz during World War I served a different function. It was constructed for economic reasons in 1908 in order to divert trade with Persia and India through Russian territory.[62] From 1907 to 1917, the whole of North Persia was part of the Russian sphere of interest and influence. Russia gained the upper hand over the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus in terms of transport infrastructure, even if the wartime period hindered transport flows and trade.

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58 The unfortunate Russian custom regulations were withdrawn before the Crimean War. Nachtigal, *Verkehrswege,* passim. During the war, Trabzon became a transit port for goods from Persia to Russia via Poti. Blackwell, *Beginnings,* 84–85, mentions trading over the Black Sea between the enemies during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1808–9.

59 Bedross Der Matossian, "The Pontic Armenian Countries in the Nineteenth Century," in *Armenian Pontus: The Trebizond-Black Sea Communities*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (Costa Mesa, Cal.: Mazda Publ., 2009), 217–44; Turgay, "Trabzon," 450–62.

60 Turgay, "Trabzon," 452–53, dates the beginning of Samsun's rise to the 1840s. After it had been linked by the railway to Sivas, it continued to expand. Today it is the main Black Sea port of Anatolia. Quataert, "Age of Reforms," 817–20.

61 *Stielers Handatlas*, 10th ed. (Gotha: Perthes, 1938), map 63 Kleinasien (1931), with a gap between Sivas and Erzurum. See also "List of Railway Lines in Turkey," Wikipedia, accessed May 24, 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_railway_lines_in_Turkey.

62 Tsutsiev, *Atlas*, map 21: Administrative Division before the Collapse of the Empire.

The Russian railways in the northern and eastern Black Sea region and around the Sea of Azov laid the foundations in the late nineteenth century for an extensive overland transport network, which with time gave the Tsarist empire significant advantages.[63] Its real impact emerged after World War I, with difficult long-distance overland routes and occasionally shipping routes (Trabzon and the south coast of the Caspian Sea) prevailing before then.

4 The Transnationality of an Integrated Commercial Space

The vectors of transport infrastructure and flows were to be found in factors related to infrastructure development (road construction, railway lines, new industrial and business locations, administrative decisions, etc.). The Crimean War (1853–56) was of huge significance in this respect as it not only disrupted promising developments but also opened up new opportunities. In the decades preceding the Crimean War, trade shipping was international and focused on a few flourishing Russian ports. Since the 1790s, Taganrog had been not only the main port on the Sea of Azov, attracting goods from the Don Cossack region and from the Voronezh Province, but also Russia's most important port in the entire Black Sea region—until it was overtaken by Odesa. Evidence of its importance can still be traced in the cityscape today, with the special administration by a city prefecture engendering an international emporium. Greeks settled in the city early on and soon came to form its economic and social elite. Like the Armenians, who were involved in overland and long-distance trade, the Greek community had access to an extensive family-linked commercial network that was based in port and trade cities. It was primarily thanks to the Greeks and Western European entrepreneurs that in the 1870s the Black Sea became part of a larger international and transcontinental transport and economic space that also included the Anatolian coast. During the reign of Tsar Alexander I (1801–25), Odesa had already come to rival the more established port of Taganrog, while Kherson, Nikolaev, and Mariupol remained of secondary importance. Although the port of Berdiansk, established in 1830, flourished briefly, it never achieved the internationality, reach, or capacity of the abovementioned ports.[64]

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63 Eyüp Özveren, "The Black Sea World as a Unit of Analysis," in *Politics of the Black Sea: Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict*, ed. Tunç Aybak (London: Tauris, 2001), 78: "a multi-centred, market-oriented economic orientation in the Black Sea" during the nineteenth century. He depicts Russia and the Ottoman Empire as equally-matched rivals, with Russian having the slight edge.

64 Lyman and Konstantinova, "The Great Plans." Berdiansk largely lacked Greek and foreign merchants, though some seafaring European states had consulates there. It was not until 1898 that the town connected to the railway network.

The intertwined family and trading networks of the Black Sea Greek community have been researched extensively, not only in relation to the Black Sea port cities,[65] but also in the context of the Ottoman-Russian borderland cities in the period before Russia's southern expansion.[66]

British grain exporters used several ports in the broader region: Taganrog, Odesa, Rostov, and Trabzon.[67] Until large-scale coal extraction began in the Donbas, on the return journey the ships imported high-quality British coal, which was useful in the expansion of heavy industry locally.[68] Because the Donbas coal was still generally more expensive than imported British coal around the turn of the twentieth century, this system remained in place for some time after that. It resulted in an imbalance in the goods traded at different Russian ports, with cheap bulk produce and consumer, sometimes luxury, goods directed to various locations.

The Crimean War ended with the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and ensured that the Black Sea was declared neutral, meaning that warships were removed from its waters. Russia's reformers quickly realized that with its existing navy lost, a new one needed to be created—one focused on trade, of course. The dual-purpose ships could be converted into military vessels later on, which was all the more feasible as they were modern steamships. By the end of the ban on forming a military navy, the state had established three companies for shipbuilding and sea transport based in the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, and the lower reaches of the Danube.[69] These companies presented themselves as private enterprises, although they were in fact funded by the state and the marine officers were members of the military navy. The companies initiated the modernization and expansion of port infrastructure and railway lines in the hinterland. Initially the ships were largely used for cabotage, but with the completion of the Suez Canal, South and East Asia appeared on the horizon. Grain exports to Western Europe prevailed, while imports from Western Europe were processed primarily at Russia's Baltic Sea ports.[70] Many of these nominally merchant ships were later transferred to the Naval Ministry, while all three companies were loss making. They could hardly compete with the Danube Steamship Company (DDSG), the ships of the Austrian Lloyd, or the

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65 See the contributions of the Black Sea History Working Papers in Harlaftis et al., *Between Grain and Oil*.

66 Iannis Carras, "Connecting Migration and Identities: Godparenthood, Surety and Greeks in the Russian Empire (18th–Early 19th Centuries)," in *Across the Danube: Southeastern Europeans and their Travelling Identities (17th–19th Centuries)*, ed. Olga Ktsiardi-Hering and Maria Stassinopoulou (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 65–109.

67 Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa*, 112–14, stresses British commercial presence in Odesa, but Britons remained dominant in Trabzon and Taganrog too.

68 Manfred Rasch, "Unternehmungen des Thyssen-Konzerns im zarischen Russland," in Dahlmann and Ananich, *Deutsche Unternehmen*, 231.

69 Thomas, *Streben*.

70 Thomas, 43. According to Ihor Lyman and Viktoriia Konstantinova, *Nimetski konsuly v pivnichnomu Pryazovii/German Consuls in the Northern Azov Region* (Dnipro: Lira, 2018), machinery was imported to the Sea of Azov from Germany, Belgium, and Britain.

German Levant Line without Russian government subsidies.[71] Their inefficient operations were exacerbated by the inadequate regulation of Russian tariffs and fees, as well as the power struggles between the various ministries involved (Trade/Business, Finance, and Naval). The companies thus received official approval for their role as an ersatz navy and for their economic inefficiency, while World War I did nothing to compensate for the Russian navy's missing tonnage.[72]

In the twenty years before World War I, Southern Russia reached a stage of development that meant it could justifiably be described as an integrated large region in terms of its economy and transport infrastructure. An exception to this was the period from 1905 to 1907 in Georgia, a part of the Caucasus Viceroyalty, where the first Russian Revolution stopped production and transport for an exceptionally long time. The more favorable developments applied to the area stretching from the entire northern half of the Black Sea, from Bulgaria to Batumi via Crimea. The Anatolian ports, meanwhile, lagged far behind in terms of transport infrastructure, while Northern Anatolia was economically fragmented. Ottoman shipping was connected through internal routes to some Russian ports, as well as a few Romanian and Bulgarian ones, across the Black Sea. By contrast, Southern Russian cities that were not directly linked to grain exports and the Black Sea region, such as Ekaterinoslav, Stavropol, Ekaterinodar, and Baku, nevertheless experienced a boom that was evident across the late Tsarist empire. This also had an impact on the transport geography of the broader maritime region.

The failed harvest of 1891 in the Volga regions, with the ensuing slump and decrease in exports, led to significant changes related to grain, Russia's most important export good, by the end of the nineteenth century. At the same time, some export routes were redirected as Britain, in particular, imported increasing amounts of grain from the United States, which in the final decades of the nineteenth century emerged as Russia's most significant competitor. Military and civil (social and ethnic) conflicts, including the pogroms against Armenians in Eastern Anatolia in the mid-1890s,[73] regularly disrupted transport routes and the economy. Some locations never fully recovered. The Balkan Wars of 1912/13 had an impact on export-oriented Russian ports, as the Black Sea straits were closed to shipping. This was again the case in 1914. The period of World War I meant that the Black Sea region was no longer an integrated economic area, which had been the case during the ages of imperialism and nationalism, regardless of state borders. The late-nineteenth century Tsarist empire carried out the forced industrialization of Southern Russia by drawing increasingly on foreign capital and know-how, but during World War I it limited the property rights and freedoms not only of enemy aliens but also of Russian subjects who had previously migrated to Russia from what were now enemy states: Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, Bulgari-

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71 Thomas, *Streben*, 44 – 47.

72 Thomas, 85 – 125, 134 – 35, 218 – 19.

73 Barbara J. Merguerian, "Reform, Revolution, and Repression: The Trebizond Armenians in the 1890s," in Hovannisian, *Armenian Pontus*, 249.

ans, and Turks. This led to legal uncertainty. Grain and other goods from Southern Russia were confiscated for the Russian army.

The Black Sea became a warzone, with the closure of the straits enforced by the Central Powers until 1918. Despite its numerical advantage, the Russian Fleet could not achieve its most important objective. The Russian Empire had viewed the straits as a strategic goal as early as the reign of Catherine II, and during World War I this was again the case, with negotiations ensuing with the Western Entente powers. Indeed, Entente troops unsuccessful sought to force them open again in 1915. The Black Sea witnessed maritime raids on the Russian coast by the two Ottoman-German cruisers, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau.* Russian ships, meanwhile, attacked Istanbul and the Anatolian Black Sea coast, including the ports of Trabzon and Giresun in 1915, resulting in disruption to the coal supply from Zonguldak, which was important to the military effort.[74] Russia was able to put its advantage in terms of transport infrastructure to use against the enemy, as it had access to overland connections between its ports, as well as to extensive routes reaching into the hinterland. Russia was thus in a much stronger strategic position than during the Crimean War. The Anatolian ports, meanwhile, were connected only by sea, while the harbors—with the exception of Istanbul—offered large naval vessels insufficient protection from Russian attacks. Nikolaev, Kherson, Sevastopol and the ports on the Sea of Azov, meanwhile, were protected from Ottoman aggression by their topography (deep harbor bays, and being located by river estuaries and on internal seas).

In October 1917, fighting ended. After German and Austro-Hungarian troops occupied the north coasts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, civilian shipping was resumed. The Central Powers, suffering a shortage of raw materials, forced through the reactivation of economic relations in the Peace Treaties of Brest-Litovsk with Ukraine, which declared itself independent in January 1918, and with the Russian Soviet Republic (February and March 1918). The Central Powers, however, expected too much from an economic region that had been exhausted by three years of war, even if the Ukrainian railway network was serving the Central Powers' needs. In June 1918, German troops were transported via the Black Sea and the port of Poti to Georgia, while Ottoman troops occupied Batumi, as well as parts of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Following the Central Powers' surrender, the British and French navies took control of sea transport from November 1918 on while the Russian Civil War continued. The two powers were responsible for the evacuation of tens of thousands of White Army soldiers and sympathizers from the coast of the Caucasus and Crimea in 1920, while the Southern Caucasus fell into chaos as the resistance to the Bolshevik advances lasted until 1923. Turkey was engaged in fighting in Eastern Anatolia as part of efforts to ensure the revision of the state borders that were set out in the Treaty of Sèvres. It secured the restoration of the old border with Russia, including the Kars territory, in the Treaty

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74 Vladimir A. Zolotarev and Ivan A. Kozlov, *Rossiiskii voennyi flot na Chernom more i v Vostochnom Sredizemnomore* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), 118 – 53.

of Lausanne in 1923. Nevertheless, transport in the Black Sea region in the 1920s largely took place on overland routes and never returned to the levels witnessed in the early nineteenth century.[75] In the interwar period, Soviet Ukraine, and the Don and Kuban regions, saw a boost in the development of infrastructure as a result of further industrialization, although the "dekulakization" and collectivization that was imposed there from 1929 on led to a collapse in grain production and the starvation of the local rural population.

Given the small number of Ottoman and the handful of Bulgarian and Romanian ports on the Black Sea, Russia acquired several important geostrategic advantages in the course of the nineteenth century. Most of its ports were relatively well-connected in transport terms to an extensive hinterland where production took place. On the other hand, as far as the Russian-controlled Caucasus was concerned, it has been demonstrated here that inadequate transport routes hindered trade and transformation, with exceptions evident where old connections remained in place. The fact that technological progress reached Russia's southern provinces several decades before the same technologies were introduced by the Ottoman Empire gave Russia further advantages. During World War I, however, Russia squandered its advantage and could only restore it after the Second World War. At the same time, the promising peaceful developments in the Black Sea region, which used exchange and trade to bring prosperity, came to an end.

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[75] On the economic and political decline after World War I, see Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa*, 206–37.

Stefan Rohdewald

Oil, Natural Gas, and More: Infrastructures of Energy around and across the Black and Caspian Seas since the Late Nineteenth Century

The Russian Empire was financed to a large degree by the export of commodities and raw materials since its development and consolidation during the early modern period.[1] The fur trade operating not least to the Ottoman Empire consolidated the Black Sea region as an economic space too.[2] Since the late nineteenth century, oil and since the 1950s, natural gas have been the crucial commodities of foreign trade for Russia or the Soviet Union, as well as Azerbaijan, etc.. Around the Black Sea, first the extraction of oil in Habsburg Galicia, and second in (post)Ottoman Wallachia became important in *Ploesti.* Quite soon, Baku was topping everything that had been known hitherto: It was there that, among other companies, the Russian Oil-Producing Association of the Brothers Nobel, Branobel, was founded. Via the Caspian Sea, Baku was soon connected even more intensely than before with the Black Sea region and integrally participated in its transformation, not least by the pipeline built in parallel to the railway from Baku to the Black Sea, then globally the longest oil pipeline, opened in 1906.[3] In the run for the oil fields that were thought to lie there and in the still-Ottoman Middle East, a transcontinental struggle evolved between the empires of the region and the great powers, which was eventually militarized and globalized in World Wars I and II. In the later Soviet period, the transregional importance of pipelines throughout Europe and the Near East grew even more. It certainly intensified again and escalated after 1991, namely around the Black and Caspian Seas, especially in the competing endeavors to find ways to circumvent or cooperate with Russia and/or Turkey and/or Ukraine on the routes from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan via

1 Alexandr Etkind, "Barrels of Fur: Natural Resources and the State in the Long History of Russia," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 2 (2011): 164–71.

2 Arkadiusz Blaszczyk, "From the Forests of Siberia to the Urban Jungle of Istanbul: The Ottoman-Muscovite Fur Exchange in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *Transottoman Matters: Objects Moving Through Time, Space, and Meaning*, ed. Arkadiusz Blaszczyk, Robert Born, and Florian Riedler (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2021), 119–72.

3 The passages on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are partially based on another text with a broader thematic focus including consumption, etc., and a limitation to the time around 1900: Stefan Rohdewald, "Petroleum: Commodity, Products and Infrastructures as Transottoman Mobilities around 1900," in Blaszczyk, Born, and Riedler, *Transottoman Matters*, 99–118.

the Caspian, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea region, giving it a central position in a much larger transcontinental and global setting. The dense infrastructural networks evolving during the long twentieth century shaped regional spatial cohesion across the empires and political systems, only to intensify significantly in the last three decades. Moreover, and because of this new importance, a geopolitical interpretation of the hinge functions of the region in the global setting—accentuated by Mackinder as early as 1904—in terms of ongoing competition and cooperation has become even more prominent and influential. At the same time, with critical geopolitics, these political or military assumptions are to be deconstructed just like everything else: There is no such thing as a teleological political meaning of geography.[4]

1 Infrastructures of Transportations and Flows of Oil in the Age of Empires up to 1914

Existing infrastructures and their extension were of decisive importance for the beginning of the development portrayed and the new transregional and global horizons of economic and military calculations. The port cities and their new infrastructures, which came into existence or developed after 1775 along the shores of the Black and the Caspian Seas, such as Odesa, Novorossiisk, and Baku, were crucial in this process. The larger Black Sea area again turned into a Transottoman hub of economic networks, i. e., encompassing Russia, Persia, and the Ottoman Empire,[5] as it had already done in the early modern period. As has been stated several times already,[6] the Caspian Sea has to be factored into this analysis: Poti and Batumi, although situated on the Black Sea coast, became important ports only after the connection of these two seas by rail. From 1865 to 1872, the railway from Poti to Tbilisi was built by the Russian Government, not least because of Branobel's interest in putting oil and half products on the global market. The Rothschild brothers financed the route from Tbilisi to Baku, which finally opened in 1883. They were looking for access to cheap oil from Baku for their refinery in Fiume/Rijeka, to compete with American Standard Oil. Thus, their Batumskoe Neftepromyshlennoe i Torgovoe Obshchestvo (BNITO)[7] grew into Branobel's largest competitor. The Mediterranean Sea was thereby connected with the Caspian Sea by the flows of oil. Beginning in 1892, BNITO also navigated its ships via Suez

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4 Cf. Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus, and Joanne Sharp, eds., *The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

5 Stefan Rohdewald, Stephan Conermann and Albrecht Fuess, eds., *Transottomanica: Osteuropäisch-os-manisch-persische Mobilitätsdynamiken. Perspektiven und Forschungsstand* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019).

6 Y. Eyüp Özveren, "A Framework for the Study of the Black Sea World, 1789–1915," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 20, no. 1 (1997): 77–113.

7 Bülent Gökay, "History of Oil Development in the Caspian Basin," in *Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region,* ed. Michael P. Croissant et al. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 10.

to Bangkok, further globalizing these flows from the Caspian and via the Black Sea.[8] The new railway from the Black Sea to the Caspian—with Benjamin Schenk being one of the few profitable lines of the Empire[9]—soon made it necessary to use tank wagons specifically developed for the transport of oil. Yet as these turned out to be too heavy to be carried across the Surami Pass, the logics of infrastructure developed new needs: In the years 1886–90, a tunnel four kilometers long was built—the first of such a length in the entire Russian Empire.[10] One reason for the government's willingness to financially support this project was its potential usefulness for military purposes too. Only after the issue had been publicly debated did the Empire finance a pipeline for petroleum from Baku to Batumi, built from 1896 to 1906.[11] The pipeline ran along the railway, and pumping stations were fueled with steam and diesel engines; moreover, a telephone cable was installed:[12] New transport techniques enhanced the use and installation of new communications techniques. The oil flows now reached Central European markets via ship to Odesa and by rail through Ukraine, via the Danube or via the Mediterranean to the Adriatic ports.[13]

In 1909, not only the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), later British Petroleum, but also the Anglo-Maikop Corporation (AMC) were established: Both British enterprises tried to get access to the newly discovered oil fields in Russian or Persia. The AMC participated in the "Maikop oil rush," which intensified by 1910. This and other companies were interested in planning to build an oil pipeline from Groznyi to Tuapse, a port on the Eastern shore of the Black Sea, which would also bring the oil from the fields in the Krasnodar region near Maikop to the Black Sea.[14] AMC agreed in 1910 with Australian Maikop Oil Company Ltd to establish the Maikop Pipeline and Transport General Co. to construct pipelines for the transport of the oil delivered by Maikop Victory Co. Ltd, Black Sea Oilfields Ltd and London and Maikop Oil Corporation Ltd. In 1914, in a next step, the Anglo-Maikop Corporation was nationalized and put into a Russian legal framework to secure its existence.[15] Although AMC and other companies contin-

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8 Leonardo Maugeri, *The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World's Most Controversial Resource* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 11–12.

9 Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, *Russlands Fahrt in die Moderne: Mobilität und sozialer Raum im Eisenbahnzeitalter* (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 2014).

10 Vladimir Mendeleev, "Suramskii tonnel," in *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar Brokgauza i Efrona* (St. Petersburg: Semenovskaia Tip., 1901), 32:93.

11 John P. McKay, "Baku Oil and Transcaucasian Pipelines, 1883–1891: A Study in Tsarist Economic Policy," *Slavic Review* 43, no. 4 (1984): 622.

12 Airat M. Shammazov, Boris N. Mastobaev, and Anatolii E. Soshchenko, "Truboprovodnyi transport nefti (1860–1917)," *Transneft* 6 (2000): 33–36.

13 Alexander Dorn, *Die Seehäfen des Weltverkehrs* (Vienna: Volkswirtschaftlicher Verlag Alexander Dorn, 1891), 176: "Ein neuer Stern ist dem Handel Odessas in Petroleum, das in Cisternendampfern von Batum hieher gelangt, aufgegangen. Es geht von Odessa an der Donau aufwärts und nach den adriatischen Plätzen."

14 Aurelia Mañe-Estrada, "The Success of the Anglo-Maikop Corporation Within the Fiasco of the Maikop 'Oil Rush'," *Revista de Historia Industrial* 67, no. 1 (2017): 95–123.

15 Aurelia Mañe-Estrada, "The Success," 116.

ued to be active and some of them were profitable even up to 1920, World War I, the revolutions, and Civil War put an end to all these very promising enterprises. Nevertheless, they—together with Branobel, BNITO, all the others, and in consequence the Russian and the international oil industry operating in Russia as a whole—have been described recently as the first modern oil industry worldwide: The largest competitor, Standard Oil, was involved just in exporting, not organizing the whole circle of exploitation, refinement, and transport.[16]

In the frameworks of new public discourses including the Ottoman Empire, too, new horizons of territorialization evolved, having the Black and Caspian region as points of departure: For example, the Ottoman Armenian Calouste Gulbenkian published a report about his knowledge on oil after having traveled to the Caucasus and Baku.[17] As a result of this, he was asked by the Ottoman government in 1891 to advise on the exploitation of the oil of Mesopotamia.[18] In 1912 he founded the Turkish Oil Company as an international institution;[19] it was granted the concessions for Mosul in then Ottoman Iraq. This company was 47 percent owned by Anglo-Persian—but with Gulbenkian's blocking minority of five percent, he was able to stand for Ottoman (or at least his own) interests against the shares of Anglo-Saxon Petroleum, i.e., Royal Dutch Shell (23.7 percent), and Deutsche Bank (23.7 percent).[20] He died in Lisbon as the world's richest man in 1955.[21]

Other, more specific technical innovations developed precisely in this Transottoman transport situation too: The first oil tanker, with a steam engine, navigated on the Caspian Sea in 1877 for Branobel. As of 1903, tankers with engines fueled by diesel and diesel-electricity with newly developed oil combusting engines were used on the Volga and later on the Danube[22]—earlier than on the Rhine. As a matter of fact, the petroleum-related infrastructure expanded from the Black Sea area well into Central Europe: The Romanian Petroleum company Steaua Romana had oil depots in Regensburg from 1898 onwards. In 1903, this company was taken over by Deutsche Bank in

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16 Mañe-Estrada.

17 Calouste S. Gulbenkian, *La Transcaucasie et la péninsule d'Apchéron: Souvenirs de voyage* (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1891).

18 Cf. Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power* (New York: Free Press, 2008), 170.

19 Jonathan Conlin, *Mr Five Per Cent: The Many Lives of Calouste Gulbenkian, the World's Richest Man* (London: Profile Books, 2019), 81.

20 Edward Mead Earle, "The Turkish Petroleum Company: A Study in Oleaginous Diplomacy," *Political Science Quarterly* 39 (1924): 271.

21 Necmettin Acar, "Petrolün Stratejik Önemi ve Mezopotamya Petrol Kaynaklarının Paylaşımında Calouste Sarkis Gülbenkyan'ın Rolü (1890–1928)," *The Journal of Academic Social Science Studies* 6, no. 4 (2013): 1–32; Uğur Selçuk Akalın and Suat Tüfekçi, "Türkiye'nin Petrol Politikaları ve Enerji Özelleştirmelerine Bir Bakış," *İktisat Politikası Araştırmaları Dergisi / Journal of Economic Policy Researches* 1 (2014): 51–66. His story has won the attention of a larger public and arises continuing interest: Ralph Hewins, *Mr. Five Percent: The Story of Calouste Gulbenkian* (London: Hutchinson, 1957); Conlin, *Mr Five Per Cent.*

22 Ingo Heidbrink, "Petroleum Tanker Shipping on German Inland Waterways: 1887–1994," *The Northern Mariner/ Le Marin du Nord* 11, no. 2 (2001): 59.

order to break the menacing oil monopoly of Standard Oil in Romania.[23] The increasingly global competition was reflected by the consolidation of infrastructural nodes and hubs within an ever-larger regional reach, soon extending to Ottoman Salonica (today: Thessaloniki), Smyrna (today: İzmir), and Jaffa. In Russian Tsaritsyn, later known as Volgograd or Stalingrad, oil was loaded from ship to railway in an extensive facility, developing into a city of its own. Trains brought oil into depots all over the Russian Empire, from whence it was supplied by tank automobiles to the local distributors and customers in smaller towns. The existing infrastructures of inland navigation were incorporated into the transport of oil, too, such as the system of canals connecting the Baltics via the Neva with the Volga and the Caspian Sea, especially the "Mariinsky Water System" (Mariinskaia vodnaia Sistema), initially built around 1800. During the 1890s, a bottleneck in this system, located deep in the inland, was broadened to enhance the speed of the flows of oil in particular. Thereafter, oil from Baku was able to flow to St. Petersburg (and even to Warsaw, via the Baltic and the Vistula on Branobel oil tankers. In addition to the mentioned larger, often inter-imperial enterprises, other, smaller—but not necessarily less globalized—companies bought tankers to be used on the Volga or the Black Sea. Indeed, the Ottoman Near East and Persia were soon encompassed in strategies grounded on projects to enhance long-distance infrastructures of the flows of oil: To compete with British infrastructures of exploitation and transport of oil from the Shatt al-Arab, under construction since 1908, the Baghdad railway project gained in importance. At the same time, the Russian but also French and British project of a Transpersian railway from the Caspian Sea to the Gulf of Persia was conceived as a response to the Baghdad railway.[24] Thus, directly in the Transottoman context of the competition between the local and other global actors, the flows of oil ushered in new infrastructures. Cheap and accessible oil fed new demands as well as new strategic deliberations on the newly territorialized areas, which appeared to be ever more central for global contexts and imperial ambitions. This transregional development in consequence not only changed the spatial configuration constituted by and between Iran, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire, but, well before the outbreak of World War I, also included the global powers France, Great Britain, the US, and Germany.

2 World Wars with and for Oil—around and about the Larger Black Sea Area (1914–45)

Beginning in 1905, the British Navy fueled destroyers and submarines by oil rather than coal, but the land and air forces now also started to use combustion engines. In World War I, trucks transported troops and goods, and armored automobiles

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23 Heidbrink, "Petroleum Tanker," 58.

24 D. W. Spring, "The Trans-Persian Railway Project and Anglo-Russian Relations: 1909–14," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 54, no. 1 (1976): 60–82.

made warfare more dynamic. Aircraft were fueled by oil and used for exploration and later for attacks, sometimes with automatic weaponry. Warfare itself quickly became increasingly dependent on oil.[25] Germany accommodated a third of its demand for oil by processing coal; the rest was transported via the Danube, which means via Serbia, which had been conquered in 1915, and from Romania, conquered in 1916—both conquests occurred not least for this very reason, to secure the increasingly vital supply of fuel. However, only a short time before the German conquest, British soldiers had destroyed many refineries in Romania, intervening via the Black Sea.[26] After the Russian Caucasus front collapsed in 1917, the Ottoman Islamic Caucasus Army conquered Baku in 1918, more or less openly in competition with German forces. British and local forces proved unable to defend the city.[27]

The Russian Civil War was not least a war over resources, too, namely access to the oil fields of Groznyi and Baku. In an interview published in *Pravda* on November 30, 1920, Joseph Stalin—then the People's Commissar for Nationality Affairs (Narkom)—was quoted as saying that whoever controlled the Caucasus controlled not only the country's principal source of raw materials and fuel, but also the trade and transportation routes between Europe and Asia. Following the conquest by the Red Army, the private petroleum industry was expropriated and nationalized.[28]

After World War I, the importance of oil and gas exports first ceased due to the Civil War and did not gain new significance until after World War II. Electrification and thus a giant dam project on the lower Dnipro was clearly given priority. In its planning and construction, US engineers from General Electric participated and were honored by the Soviet authorities. This dam was intended to turn the Dnipro into a "water route for heavy traffic," eventually connecting the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea.[29]

Of the larger Soviet projects realized between the wars, only one was a pipeline and important for our Black Sea focus: the abovementioned oil pipeline from Groznyi to Tuapse, a port on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, re-built from 1927 to 1928. A second pipeline from Baku to Batumi was also opened in 1928.[30] On the other side of the Caspian Sea, a Transiranian railway, the plans for which very much changed in relation to the older project, was built in 1927–38 by a US-German led cooperation, connecting the southern shore of the Caspian Sea to the Shatt al-Arab and offering a

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25 Timothy C. Winegard, *The First World Oil War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016).

26 Winegard, 12.

27 Michael A. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 219–51; Winegard, *The First World Oil War*, 178–213.

28 Jeronim Perović, "The Soviet Union's Rise as an International Energy Power: A Short History," in *Cold War Energy: A Transnational History of Soviet Oil and Gas*, ed. Jeronim Perović (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 4. Cf. Jeronim Perović, *Rohstoffmacht Russland: Eine globale Energiegeschichte* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2022).

29 Henry B. Wilkinson, "The Dnieper River Project," *The Military Engineer* 25, no. 140 (1933): 123–26.

30 Heinrich Hassmann, *Oil in the Soviet Union: History, Geography, Problems* (Hamburg: Industrieverlag von Herrnhaussen K.G., 1951), 88.

possible route to Russia during World War II.[31] From 1938, the fields in the Krasnodar region near Maikop delivered oil to the Black Sea via this pipeline too. Groznyi soon turned out to be a "crossroads of the Soviet pipeline system," further connecting the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea, as the pipeline via Maikop to the Black Sea originated there, while two others from Makhachkala on the Caspian coast built in 1924 and 1935 ended at this point.[32] While Stalin repeatedly stressed the vulnerability of the oil fields in Baku and the whole Caucasus region well before 1941, it was only with the German attack on the Soviet Union that he forced the exploration and exploitation in the Urals and the Volga region, which soon became known as the "second Baku." Thousands of workers and experts as well as whole plants were transferred there from the fall of 1941 onwards as it became clear that the *Wehrmacht* was aiming to conquer these fields in the Caucasus, seeing their possession as central for fueling the war industry and military and thus winning the war itself. Although the *Wehrmacht* only got as far as Maikop, by then the fields and installations in Groznyi and Baku had been widely destroyed by the Soviets, too, and it took the Soviet Union many years after the war to recover production there. During the war, the German military and economy were dependent on Romanian and Austrian oil, while the Soviet Union imported US oil.[33] Not least due to its central infrastructural importance, the Dnipro dam became a bone of contention during World War II and was destroyed and rebuilt several times up to the 1950s.

3 Energy and Oil Infrastructures in the Socialist Setting after World War II

Electric energy projects were among the most important and earliest realized after the war: Another dam was planned on the lower Dnipro as early as 1947 and had been built by 1956. While water from this Kakhovka Reservoir irrigates southern Ukraine and northern Crimea via the North Crimean and the Dnipro-Kryvyi Rih Canals, electric energy powerlines from this station supply Crimea. Since 1965, the Donbas region has been connected by a high voltage powerline to the large hydroelectric power station in Volgograd. From 1976 to 1986, in eastern Crimea a nuclear power station was under construction, but had been abandoned by 1989 after an inspection in the aftermath of the Chornobyl explosions.

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31 Edwin M. Wright, "Iran as a Gateway to Russia," *Foreign Affairs* 20, no. 2 (1942): 367–71.

32 Hassmann, *Oil in the Soviet Union*, 92, 95.

33 Dietrich Eichholtz, *Krieg um Öl: Ein Erdölimperium als deutsches Kriegsziel (1938–1943)* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2006); Joel Hayward, "Hitler's Quest for Oil: The Impact of Economic Considerations on Military Strategy, 1941–42," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 18, no.4 (1995): 94–135; Felix Rehschuh, *Aufstieg zur Energiemacht: Der sowjetische Weg ins Erdölzeitalter 1930er bis 1950er Jahre* (Cologne: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2018); Perović, "The Soviet Union's Rise," 9.

As early as 1950, a pipeline connected the old Romanian oil fields at Ploesti with the Soviet Black Sea port of Odesa for direct shipments of Romanian oil to the Soviet Union,[34] stressing again, as from the late nineteenth century on, the at least regional importance of this line of supply on the northwestern Black Sea shore, albeit now in another direction. But soon after 1953, Soviet oil was again exported to Italy, France, the UK, and West Germany. Yet it was only in the 1960s that exports from Baku to other socialist countries became increasingly significant and generated dependency, as well as somewhat later gas exports from the Soviet Union to Eastern and Western Europe.[35]

For these exports, the second Volga-Don Canal was important: This mega-project was planned and construction had already started before World War II, then continued from 1948 to 1952, when it was opened. Among the workers were German prisoners of war and Soviet prisoners. This was one of the largest infrastructure projects of the times and it played a high-profile role in Soviet propaganda and the self-perception of societal and industrial progress.[36]

Soviet energy exports were meant to help integrate the socialist states of Eastern Europe into a single economic space. Beginning with the period of détente in the 1970s, energy and raw materials exports from the Soviet Union evolved into the East-West interdependence that defined relations between the Soviet Union and later Russia and Europe until 2022.[37] It was not until the mid-1960s that new pipelines were planned to reach Czechoslovakia from Soviet western Ukraine and western parts of Europe like Austria, Italy, and France.[38] By the 1980s, the Black Sea region, including the Caspian Sea, had been neatly integrated into a larger network and turned into one of its central nodes, connecting pipelines and natural gas transport routes from the Soviet Union to the rest of the socialist bloc and the Western parts of Europe.

Moreover, by 1960, Siberian oil was transported to ports on the Baltic Sea, or, at somewhat lower costs, to Novorossiisk and Tuapse by railway, to be exported from there via the Black Sea.

By the 1970s, the Soviet Union had once again become the largest oil producer globally, and remained so during the 1980s, although it consumed most of it internally. Falling oil prices were of paramount importance for growing financial problems of the Soviet Union, as hard currency inflows decreased significantly. In consequence, Western oil companies were invited to explore and produce directly in the Soviet fields. Thus, Chevron negotiated a joint venture to explore, produce, and develop the large field Tengiz in Kazakhstan from 1988 on. In May 1990, Elf Aquitaine gained access to a large

34 Hassmann, *Oil in the Soviet Union*, 135.

35 Perović, "The Soviet Union's Rise," 10.

36 Klaus Gestwa, *Die Stalinschen Großbauten des Kommunismus: Sowjetische Technik- und Umweltgeschichte 1948–1967* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010).

37 Perović, *Cold War Energy.*

38 Viacheslav Nekrasov, "Decision-Making in the Soviet Energy Sector in Post-Stalinist Times: The Failure of Khrushchev's Economic Modernization Strategy," in Perović, *Cold War Energy*, 187.

space in the northern Caspian Sea. In June 1991, Amoco Eurasia received permission to exploit the Azeri oilfield in the Caspian Sea, against the competitors Unocal, British Petroleum, and Statoil.[39] These joint ventures markedly changed the global situation, and in hindsight, this cautious opening of the Soviet market was a prelude to the entirely new situation that developed after 1991.

4 The Geopolitics of Oil and Natural Gas in the Late Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries

By 1991, almost all major ports on the Black Sea were also relevant natural gas and oil transportation ports, namely Batumi, Supsa, Tuapse, Novorossiisk, Kherson, Odesa, Constanţa, Burgas, and Samsun. But it was only after the breakup of the Soviet Union that oil or natural gas pipelines across the Black Sea were planned to connect these and other ports and to supplement or, soon, to substitute them. All of them became part of the new negotiations of spatial relations of power in and beyond the entire post-Soviet area, as the newly independent states as well as Russia now had the opportunity to reconnect or intensify connections with old and new neighbors, be it in the northwest via the Baltic Sea, via land to the expanding European Community and NATO states, or to the south via the Caucasus or/and the Black Sea to NATO member Turkey. These questions were soon framed as part of a renaissance of geopolitics.[40] The very recent term "pipeline geopolitics" was coined not least with these examples in mind.[41]

After 1991, the Russian Federation was initially connected even more intensively to Belarus and (East-)Central Europe by another large land-based pipeline, the Yamal project, which was mostly Gazprom owned, but also included Belarusian and—in the relevant sections—Polish ownership. Its main line was built to a large degree by 1999 and completed by 2005, bringing western Siberian natural gas via Minsk to Poland and Germany. Another route was planned to connect Belarus via Poland to Slovakia, but seems to have been abandoned.[42] Moreover, Russia continued to have significant influence on the transportation of oil via the pre-existing oil pipelines or new ones under-construction in the Caspian region, through which natural gas and oil of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan were brought across the Russian territory. This wide network of oil pipelines gave and still gives Russia a pivotal position in the transregional setting. The main oil transit routes were those from Baku to the Black Sea port Novorossiisk via

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39 Nekrasov, "Decision-Making," 185.

40 Mazen Labban, *Space, Oil and Capital* (London: Routledge, 2008), 108.

41 Maciej Zaniewicz, "New Gas Pipeline Geopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe," (special report, Warsaw Institute, Warsaw, December 21, 2019), https://warsawinstitute.org/new-gas-pipeline-geopolitics-in-central-and-eastern-europe/.

42 Cf. "Yamal Europe 2 Pipeline," Global Energy Monitor Wiki, accessed June 26, 2023, https://www.gem.wiki/Yamal_Europe_2_Pipeline.

Groznyi and from Tengiz (Kazakhstan) to Novorossiisk (connected via a direct pipeline since 2001[43]). Groznyi thus again proved out to be of central importance—the merciless Russian wars against Chechen independence certainly have to be contextualized and explained in this perspective, too.[44]

Facing this situation, the newly independent Central Asian states and Azerbaijan were increasingly interested to bypass these Russian pipelines with the help of Western firms and the support of the US. Among the optional possibilities not involving Russia were the Iranian-Pakistani, the Eastern/Asian/Chinese, or the Central or Caucasian/Western connections,[45] which is of most interest in our context. In 1996, the US pushed for a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline (TCGP) to deliver gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Europe, but after resistance from Russia and Iran this project was stopped.[46] Nevertheless, by 1999, a new oil pipeline from Baku to the Georgian Black Sea terminal Supsa was constructed by Western oil firms and Azerbaijan. Moreover, already in 1993, the Turkish government managed to obtain an agreement on the planning and construction of an oil pipeline from Baku via Tbilisi and across Erzurum in Anatolia to Ceyhan in the eastern Mediterranean, bypassing both Iran and Russia— and the crowded bottleneck Bosporus, connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. The involved governments of Turkey, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan supported this project, as did the US, and it was completed by 2006. In parallel to this oil pipeline, a South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) for the transport of natural gas from Baku via Tbilisi to Erzurum was planned in 2003 and opened in 2006. This pipeline is 10 percent owned by the Russian company Lukoil, however.[47]

On the other hand, as a result of debates from 1990 onwards, in 1997, Russia and Turkey decided to build Blue Stream, a natural gas pipeline project by Russian Gazprom and the Italian state-owned company ENI, connecting the Russian Black Sea shore at the Beregovaia terminal near Dzhubka in the Krasnodar region to Durusu in Turkey across the Black Sea to Ankara and further on to Istanbul. Construction began in 2002 and the pipeline was opened in 2005. This line ran parallel to the gas

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43 Tomislava Penkova, "Russia in the Caspian Region: An Attempt to Preserve an Inherited Role," in *The Caspian Sea Chessboard: Geo-Political, Geo-Strategic and Geo-Economic Analysis*, ed. Carlo Frappi and Azad Garibov (Milan: Egea, 2014), 126.

44 Andrew Towner, "The Russians, Chechens and the Black Gold: A Geo-Economic Explanation for the Chechen War," in *The Politics of Caspian Oil*, ed. Bülent Gökay (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 199– 215.

45 Igor S. Zonn, "Pipeline Architecture of the Black Sea-Caspian Sea Region: Geographical and Political Issues," in *Oil and Gas Pipelines in the Black-Caspian Seas Region*, ed. Sergey S. Zhiltsov, Igor S. Zonn, and Andrey G. Kostianoy (Cham: Springer, 2016), 77– 80.

46 Penkova, "Russia in the Caspian Region," 127.

47 See "Lukoil Overseas: South Caucasus Gas Pipeline," European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, accessed June 26, 2023, https://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/projects/psd/lukoil-overseas-south-caucasus-gas-pipeline.html.

corridor along the Black Sea coast from Russia via Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria to Turkey.[48]

Moreover, in 2006, Russia and Italy began openly discussing a corridor known as the South European Gas Corridor or South Stream. At first, it was intended to prolongate Blue Stream from Istanbul to Italy via Greece. But then the idea to connect Beregovaia with the Bulgarian port of Varna with a pipeline laid on the Black Sea bed was prioritized.[49] This project, then, was intended to lead from Russia directly to Bulgaria and then to Austria or/and Italy, but was stalled as a result of the repercussions of the Russian Federation's annexation of Ukrainian Crimea when Bulgaria stopped the project in June 2014 after a visit by senator John McCain and other US politicians.[50] Moreover, the project did not correspond to the EU directive of 2009 stipulating that the companies owning pipelines and supplying gas or oil on EU territory must not be the same, causing Russia to withdraw from it in December 2014.

Facing the existing project involving Russia or/and European Union member states such as Italy, the European Union itself began to be involved in 2002, when gas companies from Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Austria, and Hungary declared their intention to construct Nabucco, a natural gas pipeline with a length of 3,900 kilometers. This project gained official EU support in 2006, and in 2009 a relevant treaty was signed in Ankara in the context of the renewed EU membership negotiations with Turkey.[51] However, the EU was somewhat reluctant to promote the project in the Caspian region, although it was supported strongly by the US, who tried to get Azerbaijan on board too. Yet in 2008, the EU initiated the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC)[52] project to encourage projects to transport gas and oil from the Caspian or the Middle East to Europe omitting Russia, building on the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) opened in 2006 and other pipelines, as a whole replacing the older, very much parallel Nabucco project.[53] The plan was then to export Azeri oil from Baku via Tbilisi to Erzurum and from there by the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP). The relevant treaty was signed by Azerbaijan and Turkey in 2012 and the project was completed in 2018. TANAP is extended further to Italy by the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP),[54] planned from 2013 on, through Greece, Albania, and the Adriatic. Fostered by the Şahdəniz consortium, it was opened in late 2020. When Azerbaijan's agreement with Turkey on TANAP was announced in 2012, the Nabucco project was reduced to a Western prolongation of this pipeline as "Nabucco West" from the

48 Zonn, "Pipeline Architecture," 81 – 82.

49 Zonn, 82.

50 "Bulgaria's Government to Collapse over South Stream," *Euractiv,* June 10, 2014, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/bulgaria-s-government-to-collapse-over-south-stream/.

51 Saban Kardaş, "Geo-Strategic Position as Leverage in EU Accession: The Case of Turkish-EU Negotiations on the Nabucco Pipeline," *Journal of Southeast European & Black Sea Studies* 11, no. 1 (2011): 35 – 52.

52 Lee Morrison, "Southern Gas Corridor: The Geopolitical and Geo-Economic Implications of an Energy Mega-Project," *The Journal of Energy and Development* 43, no. 1 – 2 (2017/2018): 252.

53 Penkova, "Russia in the Caspian Region," 127.

54 Rovshan Ibrahimov, "The Importance of the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan: Opportunities, Challenges and Prospects," in Frappi et al., *The Caspian Sea Chessboard* 106; Morrison, "Southern Gas Corridor," 253.

Turkish-Bulgarian border to Austria via Romania and Hungary.[55] The decision to build the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline TAP in 2013 stopped and replaced Nabucco and Nabucco West totally, then. Ultimately, Nabucco was cancelled not least due to growing problems concerning the economic viability of the project at the time.[56] Thus, neither Nabucco nor South Stream were realized, but were replaced by other parallel or competing projects.

Moreover, in 2002 an oil pipeline from the Romanian Black Sea port of Constanţa to the Croatian oil terminal Omišalj on the Adriatic coast via Serbia was planned, supported by the US and EU, namely by Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE),[57] an initiative by up to ten countries to facilitate a pipeline structure from Central Asia to Europe:[58] This project, initially called "White Stream," would have been built from Georgia via Ukrainian Crimea to Central Europe and Romania or directly via the shelf of Ukrainian Crimea to the Romanian port of Constanţa, as proposed in 2005 by then Prime Minister Iuliia Tymoshenko and the consortium. But the already existing conflicts over Russian natural gas transported via Ukraine made this route soon appear too risky and it was dropped in favor of a pipeline laid from Georgia to Romania directly through the Black Sea. The project would have opened the possibility to bypass not only Russia but also Turkey: This—as it seemed to some observers in 2009—threatened to block the export of Azeri oil and to slow the Şahdəniz and Nabucco projects.[59]

While the Russian annexation of Crimea and the open Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014 effectively made such a project and others with Ukrainian participation impossible—and as such can be considered one of the several reasons for the Russian government's actions against Ukraine in the first place—other projects using Turkey as transit and circumventing Russia, like Nabucco, were fostered even more within the already existing "Southern Gas Corridor" (SGC) project, namely TANAP and TAP in combination with the Southern Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), and soon gained even higher priority for EU energy security politics than before.[60] Despite severe "economic, technical and security challenges hindering the project,"[61] in the long term this plan and the strategy involved actually proved rather successful.

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55 Penkova, "Russia in the Caspian Region," 127.

56 Morena Skalamera, "Revisiting the Nabucco Debacle: Myths and Realities," *Problems of Post-Communism* 65, no. 1 (2018): 18–36.

57 "Milestones," INOGATE, accessed June 26, 2023, http://www.inogate.org/milestones?lang=en.

58 Marian Chiriac, "Romania: Progress in the Pipeline. Bucharest, Belgrade and Zagreb Sign up to the Construction of an Oil Pipeline Linking the Black Sea to Western Europe," Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR), October 7, 2002, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/romania-progress-pipeline.

59 Vladimir Socor, "White Stream Can De-Monopolize the Turkish Transit of Gas to Europe," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 6, no. 199, October 29, 2009, https://jamestown.org/program/white-stream-can-de-monopolize-the-turkish-transit-of-gas-to-europe/.

60 Marco Siddi, "The EU's Botched Geopolitical Approach to External Energy Policy: The Case of the Southern Gas Corridor," *Geopolitics* 24, no. 1 (2019): 124–44.

61 Siddi, 124.

Indeed, as a result of the discussion within the European Union about the territorial and military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, i. e., "in view of current events in Ukraine," the EU adopted a common "European Energy Security Strategy" in May 2014, pushing the aim to reduce dependency from Russian oil and natural gas: Here, several projects involving Russia were named, including Nord Stream and South Stream, and "a strategic discussion at EU level, not just at national level" was demanded "to ensure that decisions in one Member State do not undermine security of supply in another Member State."[62] The old argument of, for instance, the German Federal Government, that projects like Nord Stream were seemingly merely economic and private enterprises had evidently never been correct, as the stakeholders in this case involved state-owned companies like Russian Gazprom and Austrian OMV. Yet at least since the adoption of this EU strategy paper a very high-priority *political* dimension has clearly been officially connected to the issue, just as Poland, France, and the Baltic States had argued since the beginning of the project.

From an infrastructural point of view, the annexation of Crimea not least meant that the ports of the military Black Sea Fleet, above all Sevastopol, now became directly part of the Russian military administration and the lengthy debates about their being leased by Ukraine came to an end. The step enhanced Russia's military potential to control the Black Sea as a whole. The possible usage of some special vessels for nuclear weapons[63] underlines just how damaging the breach of the Budapest Memorandum really is, which was concluded in 1994 after Ukraine submitted its nuclear weapons to Russia and Russia promised Ukraine it would not violate its territorial integrity. As already shown, Crimea was and still is supplied with energy and depends on water from the Ukrainian Dnipro region—while electric power has been continuously delivered, apart from disruptions in 2015, the delivery of water via the Northern Canal has been stopped, causing considerable damage to agriculture in Crimea. This significant problem for Russia has not been resolved by the bridge constructed by 2018/19 across the Kerch Strait, which is being used as a road and rail connection to Russia. Moreover, the bridge blocks the entrance of large military or transport ships to the Sea of Azov—effectively cutting off the Ukrainian port cities of Mariupol and Berdiansk and the export of coal from there. Ukraine is thought to have lost half of its natural gas deposits with the loss of Crimea.[64] Oil rigs have been appropriated by Russia since 2014; in the spring of 2020, this included one close to Odesa, well within Ukraine's (remain-

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62 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: European Energy Security Strategy, COM/2014/0330 final, May 2014, https://www.europex.org/eulegislation/eu-energy-security-strategy-2/.

63 Polina Sinovets, "The Real and Projected Strategic Dimension of the Russian Black Sea Fleet," PONARS Eurasia, policy memo no. 683, December 21, 2020, https://www.ponarseurasia.org/the-real-and-projected-strategic-dimension-of-the-russian-black-sea-fleet/.

64 "Ukraine Loses Half of Its Natural Gas Deposits due to Occupation of Crimea," *Ukrinform*, February 16, 2021, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-economy/3191411-ukraine-loses-half-of-its-natural-gas-deposits-due-to-occupation-of-crimea.html.

ing) exclusive economic zone.[65] These rigs allegedly played a role in Russian plans to exploit the Syrian shelf in the eastern Mediterranean.[66]

Moreover, Russia fostered its infrastructural power position with new pipelines built via its territory since 2014: In 2016, the governments of Russia and Turkey approved plans for the construction of "Turkish Stream" exclusively by Gazprom across the Black Sea from Russian Anapa to Kıyıköy in the small European part of Turkey and farther to the Greek-Turkish border.[67] In 2015, Gazprom chief Miller announced that this project was meant to substitute any transit transport to the EU via Ukraine.[68] A first part of the "Turkish Stream" pipeline for Russian natural gas was finished in 2018. On New Year's Day 2021, Serbian officials boasted about celebrating with Russian partners of the so-called "Balkan Stream" branch of the "Turkish Stream" pipeline connecting Russia and the Western Balkans via the Black Sea and circumventing Ukraine for natural gas deliveries to Hungary.[69] Thus, Turkey has been shown to be central to and interested in executing successfully both projects bypassing Russia as well as cooperating exclusively with Russia.

The first operating nuclear power station in the region was built in Rostov-on-Don: Construction of the two blocks started in 1981 and 1983. They were put on hold after Chornobyl and then finished only in 2001 and 2010. Two other blocks followed by 2015 and 2018. From 1985 to 1989, five reactors were built in Ukrainian Zaporizhzhia, on the shore of the Kakhovka Reservoir on the Dnipro and close to the city of Enerhodar. A sixth reactor followed in 1995, making the plant Europe's largest nuclear power station, a status it retains to this day.

On the southern shore of the Black Sea, a Turkish nuclear power station had been planned since 2013 and built in Sinop with Japanese help, but although this project was started despite the catastrophe in Fukushima in 2011, it nevertheless eventually stalled due to growing costs due to security updates related to Fukushima. Another with Russian technology had already been planned for Akkuyu on the Turkish Mediterranean coast in 2010 and is now under construction. Moreover, since 2015 a third project, with

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65 "Russia Operates Captured Ukrainian Oil Rigs in Ukraine's Exclusive Economic Zone," *Ukrinform*, March 3, 2020, https://informnapalm.org/en/russia-operates-captured-ukrainian-oil-rigs-in-ukraines-exclusive-economic-zone/.

66 Ridvan Bari Urcosta, "Crimean Drilling Rigs Key to Russia's Energy Policy in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 16, no. 83, June 5, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/crimean-drilling-rigs-key-to-russias-energy-policy-in-syria-and-the-eastern-mediterranean/.

67 Siddi, "The EU's Botched Geopolitical Approach," 124–44.

68 "Russland will Ukraine für Gastransit fallenlassen — EU ohne Antwort," *Welt* (AFP), January 15, 2015, https://www.welt.de/newsticker/news2/article136409990/Russland-will-Ukraine-fuer-Gastransit-fallenlassen-EU-ohne-Antwort.html.

69 "Ruski gas potekao kroz Srbiju," *Politika*, January 1, 2021, http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/469968/Руски-гас-потекао-кроз-Србију.

US assistance, has been planned in İğneada, again on the Black Sea shore, very close to the Turkish-Bulgarian border.[70]

But the most prolific long-term prestige project for Recep T. Erdoğan certainly remains the giganticist plan to build another sea strait connecting the Marmara and the Black Sea, in parallel to the Bosporus: For this new canal, the Montreux Convention would not apply, and thus it would be totally controlled by Turkey and hefty transit fees could be collected, lending even further emphasis to Turkey's long-established role as gate keeper of the Black Sea region.

5 Conclusion: Oil and Natural Gas as Regional and Global Factors around the Black and Caspian Seas

It is precisely in the Transottoman context of Russian-Ottoman/Turkish-Iranian entanglements that the development of intense new dynamics connected to the transport of oil and, after 1950, natural gas, quickly acquired global significance: The local, cross-regional, and global circulation and enhancement of knowledge, practices, and materials, as well as the diminishing costs of the structural accessibility of oil thanks to new infrastructures of transportation were of decisive relevance for this. Baku had become the object of envy and a bone of contention for global enterprises as well as for empires and their armies by World War I. Trans-Ottoman tensions—in the sense of "Tensions of Europe"[71]—caused by infrastructural, economic, and military logics drove global attention and the escalation of global warfare into this region during the Civil War and again during World War II, then. After 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in the construction of many new pipelines, as several of the post-Soviet republics now tried to circumvent Russia as a transit territory for their exports. The situation soon grew rather complicated, as there was a burgeoning new demand for cross-Sea pipelines—as the technical experience gained since the 1970s in the North Sea, for instance, now allowed their construction across the Black Sea, albeit markedly deeper.

The Caspian and the Caucasus regions were neatly interwoven into the larger Black Sea area by these strategic infrastructural networks around 1900 and even more so during the twentieth century and the last three decades. As a symptom of this, and not by chance, Armenian and Armenian occupied territory were circumvented by all these projects until very recently. This only changed when Russia promised Turkey a transport corridor through Armenia to Baku as part of efforts to end the lat-

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70 Natalya Ketenci, "Nuclear Energy of Turkey in the Context of the Russian Experience," MPRA Paper No. 100074, May 10, 2020, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/100074/; Hasan Selim Özertem, "Fukuşima Sonrası Türkiye'de Nükleer Enerji Politikaları," *Review of International Law & Politics* 7, no. 26 (2011): 157–60.

71 Cf. one of the volumes produced by this network: Arne Kaijser, Erik Van Der Vleuten, and Per Hogselius, *Europe's Infrastructure Transition: Economy, War, Nature* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

est war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020: The documents signed included the planning of ambitious projects like a natural gas pipeline which would renew the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline supported by the US earlier and could double the capacity of TANAP: The Turkish daily *Sabah* was as bold in its predictions as to write on December 2, 2020 that the corridor between Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan "has opened a strategic trade and energy route that will take Turkey to the shores of the Pacific."[72]

Another new dimension, the import of natural gas to Ukraine via the Baltic and the Mediterranean in order to establish energy independency vis-à-vis Russia, became reality with the deliveries of US liquefied natural gas (LNG) from terminals in Świnoujście, Poland, in early 2022.[73] A first delivery of natural gas from Hungary materialized in February 2022, giving Ukraine the option to source natural gas from the LNG terminal in Krk, Croatia, too.[74] The project to build an LNG terminal on the Ukrainian shore of the Black Sea in Iuzhnyi Port, launched in 2012, was suspended in 2013 and shelved in 2017, however.[75]

In hindsight, these developments have to be seen in the light of Russia's aggression towards Ukraine since February 24, 2022, although they don't explain this disastrous catastrophe. Of course, the military invasion of central, eastern, and southern Ukraine via Crimea was possible only by using the infrastructure occupied and built since 2014, such as the bridge near Kerch. With the forced expansion of Russia's presence on the Ukrainian northern Black Sea shore and well beyond, all relevant infrastructures, beginning with the nuclear power stations in Zaporizhzhia, occupied by Russian forces since March 3, 2022, and extending to the settlements and military and civil ports and railways, as far as they survived the warfare, became part of the neo-imperial power structure. Moreover, as such, they were include in scenarios that can mean their intentional destruction, as is feared for Zaporizhzhia with the disruption of contingency supply lines and the alleged mining of the stations by the occupying Russian military in August 2022, a claim repeated since then.[76] This fear has already come true

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72 Fehim Tastekin, "How Realistic are Turkey's Ambitions over Strategic Corridor with Azerbaijan," *Al-Monitor*, December 4, 2020, http://pantheon.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/12/turkey-russia-iran-conflicting-interests-nagorno-karabakh.html linked to the quoted triumphant newspaper article by Barış Şimşek and Betül Usta, "SON DAKİKA! Dengeleri değiştirecek Nahçıvan koridoru! Türkiye, Pasifik kıyılarına ulaşıyor…," *Sabah*, December 2, 2020, https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2020/12/02/son-dakika-turkiye-pasifik-kiyilarina-ulasiyor-nahcivan-koridoru-denge-degistirecek.

73 Sarah Smith, "US LNG Supplied to Ukraine," *LNG Industry*, February 7, 2022, https://www.lngindustry.com/liquid-natural-gas/07022022/us-lng-supplied-to-ukraine/.

74 Bettina Nemes, "Ukraine: Erste Gaslieferung aus Ungarn," *Budapester Zeitung*, February 2, 2022, https://www.budapester.hu/ausland/erste-gaslieferung-aus-ungarn/.

75 "Ukraine LNG Terminal," Global Energy Monitor Wiki, June 26, 2023, https://www.gem.wiki/Ukraine_LNG_Terminal.

76 Cf. "Russians Threaten to Blow up Mined Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant – Energoatom," *Ukrainska Pravda*, Monday, August 8, 2022, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/08/8/7362321/. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tried to check the claims about mines on the facility in July 2023, but once gain it was not granted access to all relevant places. "Update 168 – IAEA Director General

in the case of the obliteration of the Kakhovka dam, rather clearly by the Russian forces, which led to catastrophic consequences, among them the endangerment of the cooling of the plants in Zaporizhzhia too. Events in the larger Black Sea region have changed the European continent. Not least the German dependence on Russian oil and gas have become a massive problem for European security, and the search for alternative imports has started—rather belatedly!—in Germany too.

Statement on Situation in Ukraine," IAEA website, June 30, 2023, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-168-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine-0.

Part V: **Violence, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution**

Albrecht Fuess
Black Sea Pirates and Bandits—until 1475

1 Pirates

Pirates have been part of human history since the beginning of seafaring and naval trade. If you have something valuable to transport, there will always be someone who is ready to take it away from you. Traders thus needed personal protection or a secure infrastructure. Pirates for their part needed escape routes and the opportunity to sell stolen goods to merchants who whitewashed them and brought them back into legal circulation.

On the sea, sometimes a combination of both was to be found, i.e., the merchant-pirate. Merchant-pirates were willing either to loot or to trade, depending on which seemed to be more lucrative under the given circumstances. A good example of this type would be Genoese seafarers of the late Middle Ages or the Vikings in earlier periods.

The close connection between trade and buccaneering was already noticed by Homer and in ancient Greek myths in which the "peirates" are mentioned as a constant threat to Hellenic shores, and the first historiographical work by Herodotus opens with a book on piracy.[1]

Piracy first entered history primarily as a coastal business. Small boats were used to attack larger ships near the shore or surprise anchoring ship crews on land. It was not before the appearance of the Trireme ("three rower") with three banks of oars around the first half of the first millennium BC that robbery on the high seas and the pursuit of enemies over a longer distance became possible.

However, the capture of mercantile ships on the open sea was quite dangerous and less lucrative than attacking settlements or anchoring ships along the coast. The part-time pirate operating on a smaller scale on a seasonal basis was a known phenomenon as early as antiquity. Part-time pirates would usually loot a shore with up to twelve vessels, looking for undefended or unfortified port towns that promised greater booty than capturing a ship on the high sea. Moreover, in harbors pirates could also capture women and children for the slave market, as this human "commodity" was seldom

1 Robert Bohn, *Die Piraten* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2005), 10.

found on merchant ships.[2] If no opportunity presented itself to the pirates, they switched back to their merchant identity and traded.

As for the terminology, the Greek word "pirate" (from peirān/πειρᾶν, "to undertake, to scout") seems to have been in usage in Greek and Roman sources; however, we cannot find it in Early Arabic or Islamic sources, which describe sea robbery activities as *ghazwat fī 'l-baḥr* ("sea raid") and the pirate as *liṣṣ al-baḥr* ("sea thief"). From the ninth century on, Islamic sources start to use the word *qurṣān* for a pirate, which derives from Latin *cursus* ("raid for booty").[3] With the word *qarṣana* (piracy) Muslim and non-Muslim societies around the Black Sea then shared a common word for freebooters. In late medieval times these terms became associated with pirates who held a *letter of marque* from their state authorities which officially allowed the looting of ships belonging to enemy countries.

2 The Black Sea and its Geography

The Black Sea is connected to the global ocean systems only by the very narrow strait of the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles. As it is the only way out by sea into the Mediterranean, control of the Bosporus became vital for any seafaring, including large buccaneering enterprises. No pirate could escape through the Bosporus if hostile forces controlled it. Three important waterways pour water into the Black Sea: the Danube in the west, the Dniester and Dnipro in the northwest and the Don from the northeast, which enters into the Sea of Azov. From there, the Sea of Azov continues through the Kerch Strait into the Black Sea. These waterways could lead marauding people like the Vikings into the Black Sea but were difficult to navigate because of the currents and natural obstacles in the rivers.

The coastline is usually low and habitable, and living conditions are manageable and not particularly harsh. The Anatolian south coast and the east coast are near very high mountain ranges, which render travel and smuggling of stolen goods more difficult and complicated than on the western and northern shores. Important for pre-modern seafaring are the peculiar currents and winds of the Black Sea, which separate the western and eastern inner parts in specific cycles and pre-dictate ways of moving inside the sea with larger fleets. "For this reason, the Black Sea was regarded as a double sea in antiquity," says Gergerly Csiky.[4]

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2 Amir Gilan, "Pirates in the Mediterranean – A View from Bronze Age," in *Seeraub im Mittelmeerraum: Piraterie, Korsarentum und maritime Gewalt von der Antike bis zur Neuzeit,* ed. Nikolas Jaspert and Sebastian Kolditz (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2013), 52–53.

3 *Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition*, s.v. "Ḳurṣān," by Charles Pellat, Colin H. Imber, and John B. Kelly, accessed July 29, 2021, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0546.

4 Gergerly Csiky, "Sinope in the Early Medieval Economy of the Black Sea Region (Questions and Problems)," *Antaeus*, 33 (2015): 319.

As direct crossing was quite unpredictable, seafaring often followed the coastlines. Naval activities through the ages had a clear inclination towards the western half of the Black Sea. In the west, the building of settlements was easier due to geographical settings than in the east, where more regions are mountainous.

The economy of the Black Sea has been described by Fernand Braudel as a command economy due to the demand for grain in the densely populated areas at the Bosporus Strait. Other authors have stressed periods of free trade and have depicted the region as comprised of small regional micro-economies.[5] In any case, interregional trade had to pass the straits in the southwest on the way to the Mediterranean or the north in order to reach the Don region.

More interesting targets to loot were to be found in the Western area, reaching an historical climax in later medieval times, when the western Black Sea regions witnessed an immense rise in the international slave trade. Merchant fleets moved from Crimea to the Bosporus, mostly along the western coastline. The main reason for this inclination towards westwards naval activities in the Black Sea is of course due to the fact that the only way out is situated in its very southwestern corner.

3 Pirates on the Black Sea in Antiquity

The actual emergence of Piracy in the Black Sea region is difficult to trace, as most of the peoples and tribes settling there prior to the Greek colonization from the seventh to the sixth century BC onwards have not left written sources. The Scythians who dominated the Eurasian steppe above the northern Black Sea were well-known nomadic horse riders and are known to have had unfriendly relations with Greek settlers. They might certainly have taken the opportunity to attack Greek harbors or boats, but nobody wrote about it as far as we know.

The Thracians on the other hand, on the Western shores of the Black Sea, encountered Greek colonies in the Danube region around the same time or a little earlier, i. e., the eighth and seventh centuries, were described as being notorious for their tendency towards piracy. That the Thracians resorted to robbery can be explained of course, as they were "less advantaged populations that resided in barren coastal regions bordering crucial sea lanes."[6]

In the sixth century BC, the Iranian Achaemenid Empire expanded under Darius I (r. 521–486 BC) to the west and crossed the Bosporus, where it transformed the Black Sea into a veritable *mare nostrum* for almost half a century. During this period, pirate activities seemed to have ceased under the control of a more centralized government, although Achaemenid sources stay very silent in this respect and Scythian resistance to

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5 Csiky, 316.

6 Nicolas K. Rauh, *Merchants, Sailors and Pirates in the Roman World* (Stroud: Tempus, 2003), 189.

the Persian advance is reported.[7] In general, we do not know how the Persian government was organized around the Black Sea. That would give us a better indication of their control of naval activities. It seems though that they incorporated the region of the Black Sea into satrapies, but maybe only as "additional lands."[8]

As is known, the Persian Empire was ended by the conquest of Alexander, whose empire fell into pieces after his death. One of its pieces was the Kingdom of Pontus on the southeastern shore of the Black Sea. It would seem that it prospered, partly because it controlled trading routes and offered resistance against the expanding Roman Empire.

Most notorious in this context was King Mithridates VI (r. 135–63 BC). Having secured power in his home region, he conquered almost the entire coastal region of the Black Sea. In 88 BC he ordered a massive massacre of Roman and Italian settlers (some sources speak of 80,000 deaths) in West Asia and entered into several wars with the Romans. What is important in our context is that, because he lacked a vast navy, he resorted to using several pirate principalities to sustain his war against Rome. Most famous were his relations with the pirates of Cilicia in southeastern Anatolia, who helped him in the Aegean and the Black Sea. However, counselors apparently warned him that relying on pirates was dangerous, as they had the tendency to turn against a patron when the money stopped flowing.[9]

The heavy piracy on many shores of the Mediterranean by Mithridates' allies and others moved the Romans to appoint Marcus Antonius, the father of the future triumvir, as extraordinary naval commander to get rid of the maritime threat. Later the Romans would block the Bosporus so that neither Mithridates nor his allies could travel from the Black Sea to the Aegean; moreover, any merchant caught sailing towards the Black Sea was threatened with the death penalty.[10] This meant that the economic situation within the Black Sea region and the Kingdom of Pontus deteriorated and those pirates lost their targets and income. Mithridates fled to Crimea, where he then apparently died in 63 BC.

What this episode does highlight is that in the first century BC we observe piracy developing into full-fledged enterprises led by mercenaries or local regencies that transformed their naval know-how into money and could even operate against the Roman Empire, as they were backed by a substantial regional power that could foster and hide them.

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7 *Encyclopaedia Iranica Online*, s.v. "Black Sea," by Rüdiger Schmitt, accessed July 30, 2021, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2330-4804_EIRO_COM_7010.
8 Maria Brosius, "*Pax Persica* and the Peoples of the Black Sea Region: Extent and Limits of Achaemenid Imperial Ideology," in *Achaemenid Impact in the Black Sea: Communication of Powers,* ed. Jens Nieling and Ellen Rehm (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2010), 32.
9 Duane W. Roller, *Empire of the Black Sea: The Rise and Fall of the Mithridatic World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 172–73.
10 Roller, 175, 207–8.

However, the activities of pirates did not end with the fall of Mithridates. The Greek geographer Strabo (d. 24 AD) from Asia Minor reports in his *Geography* that the sea's eastern region, especially Colchis, had developed into a hotbed of Black Sea piracy:

> Next to Sindica, and Gorgipia upon the sea, is the sea-coast inhabited by the Achæi, Zygi, and Heniochi. It is for the most part without harbours and mountainous, being a portion of the Caucasus. These people subsist by piracy. Their boats are slender, narrow, light, and capable of holding about five and twenty men, and rarely thirty. The Greeks call them camaræ. [...] They equip fleets consisting of these camaræ, and being masters of the sea sometimes attack vessels of burden, or invade a territory, or even a city. Sometimes even those who occupy the Bosporus assist them, by furnishing places of shelter for their vessels, and supply them with provision and means for the disposal of their booty. When they return to their own country, not having places suitable for mooring their vessels, they put their camaræ on their shoulders, and carry them up into the forests, among which they live, and where they cultivate a poor soil. When the season arrives for navigation, they bring them down again to the coast. Their habits are the same even in a foreign country, for they are acquainted with wooded tracts, in which, after concealing their camaræ, they wander about on foot day and night, for the purpose of capturing the inhabitants and reducing them to slavery. But they readily allow whatever is taken to be ransomed, and signify this after their departure to those who have lost their property.[11]

In this passage, several important aspects of piracy and pirates are mentioned: It was a part-time seasonal job. In autumn and winter pirates turned back into peasants. One might find corrupt agents in big harbor cities for help or officials who let them through the Bosporus. They looted and enslaved people but were quite happy if the ransom was paid right away, as this reduced the risk of being caught or the need to return later. In this context, Vincent Gabrielsen mentions the famous Greek Philosoph Aristitoteles (d. 322 BC), who in his work *Politics* divided all economic activity into two classes. The first was that which derives from trade and bargaining and the second is that which consists of collecting the fruits of nature via "pastoralism, agriculture, piracy, fishing and hunting." In addition, a combination of two activities such as agriculture and piracy was possible.[12] In the one you collected vegetables and fruits, in the other human slaves.

After the fall of Mithridates, the Roman Empire consolidated its naval activities from the harbors in the southeastern region of the Black Sea.[13] The Greek cities on the Kerch Strait in the vicinity of Crimea, which had been under Pontian rule, then formed the Bosporan Kingdom. As such, the cities became Roman clients. They pros-

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11 Strabo, *Geography, Literally Translated, with Notes, in Three Volumes*, ed. H. C. Hamilton and W. Falconer (London: George Bell & Sons, 1903), accessed July 30, 2021, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0239%3Abook%3D11#note-link25.

12 Vincent Gabrielsen, "Warfare, Statehood and Piracy in the Greek World," in Jaspert and Kolditz, *Seeraub im Mittelmeer*, 149.

13 Jakob Mund Højte, "From Kingdom to Province: Reshaping Pontos after the Fall of Mithridates VI," in *Rome and the Black Sea Region: Domination, Romanisation and Resistance*, ed. Tønnes Bekker-Nielsen (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2006), 15–17.

pered by trading wheat, fish, and slaves and had their own naval forces to fight off pirates threatening this trade.[14] Their most important harbor was Chersonesus near present-day Sevastopol in the Crimean Peninsula.

In the south, the Black Sea region under direct Roman control, the *lex Gabinia* of 76 BC, had been introduced for Pompey's command against pirates. It stipulated that Roman control should always cover a coastal region up to fifty miles (eighty kilometers) inland, as pirates were never on the sea for long, operating from their land base.[15]

The third century AD witnessed the advent of a strong group of bandits and pirates when the Goths arrived from the northwest and took advantage of the crises besetting the Roman Empire. They ransacked cities on the western shores of the Black Sea and threatened trade there. After 256, they installed themselves in Crimea, whence they launched marauding naval expeditions, even into the Mediterranean. Trebizond and Pityus were taken in the eastern Black Sea region and for twenty years, it seems that Gothic Black Sea pirates and seafarers remained extremely dangerous for trade and local people. They operated, besides from their base in Crimea, from the old pirate hotspot of Colchis mentioned by Strabo. It seems that the last major naval assault on Anatolia was carried out by the Goths around 275. However, Emperor Tacitus crushed them militarily in 276, which earned him the title *Gothicus Maximus.*[16] Subsequently, in the course of the fourth century, the Goths seem to have been increasingly Romanized. In Crimea, the Crimean Goths acted as successors of the former Bosporan Kingdom and behaved in accordance with Rome while officially remaining independent. In addition, many Goths entered into Roman military service. Roughly a hundred years after the Goths ceased large-scale plundering activities on the Black Sea, new invaders arrived from Central Asian step around the late fourth century: the Huns, who subdued the land to the north of the Black Sea, incorporating former Gothic territory and pushing other nations and tribes to the west. Still, we do not hear of any pirate activity by Huns, although that does not mean that pirates and bandits stopped operating. One would suggest that in uncertain times piracy could have been on the rise but as trade was possibly lower too, banditry might have been less lucrative.

4 The Early Medieval Period

After the famous partition of the Eastern and Western Roman Empires in 395, the Black Sea region remained under the control of the Eastern part of the Roman realm. The capital Byzantium/Constantinople was situated at the very entrance to the Black Sea, controlling trade and naval activities. As the Bosporan client Kingdom had finally fall-

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14 Everett Wheeler, "Roman Fleets in the Black Sea: Mysteries of the 'Classica Pontica'," in *Acta Classica* 55 (2012): 120.

15 Wheeler, 128.

16 Alan Bowman, Averil Cameron, and Peter Garnsey, eds., *The Cambridge Ancient History,* vol. 12, *The Crisis of Empire, AD 193–337* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 53–54.

en under attack from the Huns in the 370s, the Eastern Roman Empire attempted to re-establish control over southern Crimea to ensure trade routes and make them safer against the Central Asian nomads who dominated the steppe. However, it was not until the sixth century that the Byzantine Empire took a firm grip over the southern part of the peninsula under Emperor Justinian I (r. 527–65). With Crimea under Byzantine control, the trade routes to Anatolia and Byzantium became safer. Moreover, we might assume that the subsequent nomadic realms on the northern shore after the decline of the Huns, be it the Bulgars or the Khazars, did not engage too much in naval activities and might have been satisfied with the opportunity to sell through the Crimean harbors and receive tribute payments from settlements on the coast.

At about the same time as the Byzantine Empire expanded to Crimea and into the western Mediterranean, they were confronted with a challenge from the east, when control over the Kingdom of Lazica, in the former Colchis region on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, came under heavy pressure from the Sasanian Empire. The rulers of Lazica, long well-known as hotbeds of piracy, tried to balance their trade interests between the Roman and Sasanian Empires. Several wars were fought in the sixth century until a peace treaty in 562 left control of the region to the Byzantines in return for a high annual tribute to the Sasanians.[17] After Arab Muslim armies' conquests in Central Asia and the Caucasus in the seventh century, the region of Lazica briefly came under Arab control, but they retreated after being fought off by Lazica with Khazar assistance. The Kingdom of Abkhazia was then founded there by 780. It would later integrate into the Kingdom of Georgia in 1008. However, little is known about pirate activities at that time. This would certainly change with the appearance of the Vikings on the Black Sea.

5 Varangians / Vikings / Rus

Sometimes before the year 300/912–13, ships carrying thousands of men reached al-Andalus by sea and raided the Atlantic coasts. The people of al-Andalus claimed that these enemies were one of the nations of the *majūs*,[18] who came to attack them by sea every two hundred years and that they reach their country by means of a channel, which communicates with the Ocean. [...] Personally, I think—but God best knows the truth—that this channel communicates with the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea and that the attackers were those Rūs we have already mentioned, since they are the only people who sail those seas that communicate with the Ocean.[19]

This is what the Arab geographer and traveler al-Mas'ūdī (d. 957) has to say about the Vikings and their attacks on al-Andalus. It is remarkable that he sees a clear connection

17 Erich, Kettenhofen, "Justinian I," in *Encyclopaedia Iranica* (London: Routledge, 2011), 15/3:260.
18 In the Islamic tradition, the *majūs (magicians)* are usually identified with Zoroastrians but the term can also denote "foreign people."
19 Ibn Fadlān, *Ibn Fadlān and the Land of Darkness: Arab Travellers in the Far North*, trans. Paul Lunde and Caroline Stone (London: Penguin Books, 2021), 143.

between the people attacking in the western Mediterranean and the Vikings (Varangians) he knows from the Black Sea. He assumes that there must be a connecting channel. However, it is more of a connecting area of origin in Scandinavia, which explains the common feature of the Nordic pirates, whom al-Mas'ūdī identifies as the *Rūs,* who in 300/912–13 reached the sea of Pontus (Black Sea) with 500 ships via the river of the Khazars.[20]

This of course was an important change for piracy and banditry in the Black Sea region. Large pirate fleets now came from the north and threatened Byzantine harbors in southern Crimea. They were strong enough even to reach and threaten the capital Constantinople. These pirate raids were no longer restricted to quick attacks and subsequent hiding. The Varangian Rus certainly brought with them a military naval technology that challenged the Byzantine navy and was superior to that of all other neighboring peoples.[21]

The question as to where the Rus/Varangians/Vikings originated is still a matter of debate, as is the derivation of the name Varangians.[22] It seems that Norse people from southern Sweden wandered and sailed down the large East European rivers in order to merge with local Slavs to form a new entity. This merger of people would then form the Rus, and with this name the also appear Arab chronicles.[23]

The Rus controlled east-west and north-south trade routes from strongholds such as Kyiv. The most important was the Dniester route from Kyiv to the south into the Black Sea. An alternative route used by the Norsemen was the Dnipro route to the west. Further to the east was the Don route to the Black Sea via the Sea of Azov and to the Caspian Sea. The technological advantage of the Viking longship was the shallow draft, which allowed navigating in waters only a meter deep and enabled the Vikings to transport their boats over land in order to bypass rapids and other obstacles. With the help of these ships, the sailor-pirate-merchants went south, where they had to pass Khazar territory and fought other nations of the steppe, such as the Pechenegs.

Varangians had reached the Black Sea around 830 where they looted and traded on the more densely populated western shore. The Byzantine Crimean city of Chersonesus called for help and as the grain trade was vital, Emperor Theophilos (829–42) sent a garrison there and equipped a fortress at the lower Don to protect the Imperial frontier in the east and help the Khazars against the Vikings.[24]

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20 Ibn Fadlān, 144.

21 See also Simon Franklin and Jonathan Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus 750–1200* (London: Routledge, 1996).

22 Sigfūs Blöndal, *The Varangians of Byzantium: An Aspect of Byzantine Military History,* trans. and rev. Benedikt S. Benedikz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 6–9.

23 The Scandinavian Varangians increasingly integrated into the Slavic environment and as such became known as Rus, see Serhii M. Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus* (Cambridge: CUP, 2006).

24 Plokhy, 32.

Nevertheless, the looting continued and intensified over the next century. In 860, the Varangians even attacked Constantinople. Emperor Michael III (r. 842–67) hurried back from the Anatolian front, where he was fighting back the Arabs and managed to defeat the Vikings. However, peace negotiations were opened, which facilitated Varangian trade in the Byzantine Empire and troops of the Rus were contracted to serve in the Byzantine army and navy.[25] Thereafter, Rus mercenaries and soldiers developed into a common feature of the Imperial army. That does not mean that the southward looting by the Rus did stop. They intensified their raids towards the Khazar realm after Prince Oleg took control of Kyiv, coming from Novgorod, around 879. The Rus were henceforth named Kyivan Rus. As an organized regency they now presented a more serious threat to trade in the south and neighboring people of the Black Sea. In 911 and 934 the Kyivan Rus looted the shores of the Caspian Sea and in an alliance with their Oghuz Turk allies attacked the Khazar capital of Atil, which they conquered around 969, severely damaging the Khazar regency.[26] It was through these raids that took place near the Abbasid Empire that the Rus increasingly entered into the works of Arab-Islamic historiography and travel accounts as fierce pirates and warriors.[27]

The Byzantines began to employ Varangian mercenaries in the times of Basil I (867–86). Hiring of Varangians as skilled naval warriors was logical, as they could fight other Rus forces and pirates using their knowledge of their armaments and tactics. In addition, they could be used in other naval encounters. Byzantine sources speak of seven hundred Rus (*Rhosi*) who took part in an attack on Arab Crete in 902. Taming pirates by hiring them or through settlement agreements thus seems to have been an often-used strategy to integrate invaders into one's own society.

This tactic did not prevent large-scale expeditions by Kyivan Rus against Constantinople, however. A first, somehow obscure, attack was led by Prince Oleg around 907 and apparently led to a new peace and trade agreement in 911. More dangerous for the Byzantine Capital was the expedition led by Igor (r. 915–45), the ruler of Kyivan Rus, in 941. His assault took place when great parts of the Byzantine navy were deployed against the Arabs in the eastern Mediterranean and hence initial resistance was weak. The Kyivan fleet plundered and looted the western shore of the Black Sea, where the cities of the First Bulgarian Empire suffered a lot, but even the remaining Byzantine boats inflicted heavy damage with the use of Greek fire (a mixture of petroleum and sulphur which could not be put out by water). The Rus retreated, looting on their way home. In 945, a new treaty stipulated again peace and trade agreements and declared both powers to be eternal allies.[28]

Afterwards it seems that large-scale attacks by Kyivan Rus on the Byzantine capital ceased for a while. However, by defeating the Khazars and the Bulgars, Prince Sviato-

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25 Plokhy, 33.

26 *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition, s.v. "Rūs," by Peter B. Golden, accessed August 23, 2021, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0942.

27 See Ibn Fadlān, *Ibn Fadlān.*

28 Blöndal, *The Varangians*, 36–37.

slav I (r. 943–72) opened up direct access for his realm to the Black Sea and came into territorial conflict with the Byzantines over rule of the Balkans. But Sviatoslav I was killed by the Pechenegs in 972, which ended his dreams of a long-lasting conquest of the northern shore of the Black Sea. His son Vladimir I (r. 980–1015) would have more success. He raided southern Crimea and conquered the Byzantine harbor of Chersonesus, handing it back only when a Byzantine princess was sent to marry him. We thus see that piracy pays off, but in return, Vladimir had to convert to Christianity.[29]

Within the tenth century and the first half of the eleventh century, a considerable rise of the Varangian element in the Byzantine army took place. They were used on a variety of fronts in southern Italy and the eastern Mediterranean by the Byzantine Emperors.[30] One of the leaders of these troops was Harald Sigurdsson, a Norwegian noble who had fled to Byzantium and after years of service returned to Norway to become Norwegian king. His fate is well known, as he would be killed at the battle of Stamford Bridge in England in 1066.[31]

The eleventh century seemed the heyday of Varangian and Viking mercenaries and rulers around the Atlantic, the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea. Their system of warfare and naval raids represented the highest technological level at the time and was apparently hard to defend against. Therefore, they entered the service of regional rulers, who engaged them to fight off fellow Vikings. Still, rulers were careful about how to use their Varangian guards. When in 1043 the navy of Prince Iaroslav (r. 1019–54) attacked Constantinople and looted Black Sea shores for the last time in the history of Kyivan Rus, the Byzantines had apparently sent all their Varangian guards from the capital to distant frontier provinces to prevent them merging with the invaders. The Kyivan Rus had to retreat due to the use of Greek fire but caused considerable damage on their way back.[32] Thereafter, the Rus were still present in the Black Sea for some time, but the region witnessed the arrival of new occupants very well versed in land raids, i.e., the Seljuks in Anatolia and the Kipchaks in the Pontic steppe.

6 Kipchaks and Seljuks

One of the main features of the Black Sea is the subsequent waves of influx of Nomadic people from Central Asia into the Pontic steppe to its north. From their control of the Crimea, these steppe people supplied, looted, or taxed Black Sea regional trade.

Kyivan Rus had been helped against the Khazars from time to time by Turkish Oghuz tribes from the Caucasus, who had settled there since the ninth century. Al-Ma-

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29 Blöndal, 44.

30 Blöndal, 38–53.

31 On his time in Byzantine service, see Blöndal, 54–102.

32 Blöndal, 104.

s'ūdi recalls for the tenth century that the nomadic Oghuz Turks often used the frozen waterways in winter to raid the Tatar land on the northern shore of the Black Sea.[33] One can understand that this was hard on the Khazars. The Oghuz came down on them in winter from the south and the Kyivan Rus in summer from the north and the west. Hence the Khazars weakened and their place was taken subsequently by the Pechenegs in the eleventh century and then the Kipchaks after the twelfth. These subsequent Central Asian Turkish tribes relied on a nomadic lifestyle and raided their conquered lands in order to gain booty and enslave captured people to sell them, via the Crimean ports, to the Byzantine Empire and the wider Mediterranean world. As they also resorted to internal warfare, Kipchaks were sold to the Muslim realm and as Mamluks ([white] military slaves), they formed a core element of Muslim armies from the twelfth century onwards. This profitable trade triggered a rise in demand and raids to capture slaves became a common feature to the north of the Black Sea.

In the meantime, the Varangians' riverine trade route from Scandinavia to the Black Sea lost its importance, as the European crusades brought Italian seafaring nations into the eastern Mediterranean after 1099. The Italians and others dried up parts of the Varangians' eastern trade by bringing goods directly to Europe from the east.

The Seljuks (a tribal part of the above-mentioned Oghuz Turks) then defeated the Byzantines at the battle of Manzikert (today: Malazgirt) in Eastern Anatolia in 1071 and swept through the Anatolian plateau, but were yet to conquer the coast, where Byzantium, with the help of its fleet, still possessed Trabzon and other important harbors. Although the Seljuks did briefly manage to conquer harbors like Nicomedia (today: İzmit) in the Sea of Marmara and the coastal region around the mouth of the Sangarios River (today: Sakarya River), they did not succeed in holding them.[34]

At the time the Seljuk advance ended, it had not reached much of the Anatolian shores. The Seljuks could not pursue their conquests, as they were now confronted with a new foe, i.e., the Crusaders. In 1096 the knights of the First Crusade arrived in Constantinople and their successful advance through Anatolia and Syria successfully diverted the Seljuk forces from the Byzantine shores. The Black Sea coast in the eleventh century was therefore very much controlled by the Byzantines in the south and in Crimea and by Kipchak and other Turkish tribes in the steppes.

According to Michel Balard, the international importance of Black Sea trade was then minimal. East-West Trade was mainly carried out at Egyptian ports and in the Levant, where the goods had arrived from further east. In the Levant they were taken by the Italian trading nations, which had become vital for the Crusading states, and transported across the Mediterranean. He therefore states: "The Pontic regions, under fairly loose Byzantine control, did no more than provide Constantinople with agricultural

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33 Ibn Fadlān, *Ibn Fadlān,* 144.

34 Alexander Daniel Beihammer, *Byzantium and the Emergence of Muslim-Turkish Anatolia: ca. 1040–1130* (London: Routledge, 2019), 283.

products, grain, fish, and salt. The straits were closed to western ships. The chryso-bulls[35] issued by different emperors for Venice and Genoa in the twelfth century did not authorize entrance to the Black Sea, which remained an internal Byzantine lake."[36] It seems these must have been dull times for pirates too, but things were again about to change.

7 Crusaders and Mongols after 1204—Shifting Trade Routes

The main turning point for trade and piracy concerning the Black Sea in the medieval period was the year 1204 and the conquest of Constantinople by the re-directed Fourth Crusade, which established, with much help from the Venetians, the Latin Empire in Constantinople. With the straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles under the control of Venice, the Black Sea opened up for Italian merchants, as the Venetians apparently did not forbid the Genoese to trade there as well. However, Venice initially left the Black Sea trade mainly in the hands of local Greeks and Seljuks with whom they con-cluded trade arrangements. They themselves concentrated on the transport of goods from Constantinople to the west.[37]

Meanwhile, the Rum (Anatolian) Seljuks had used the disorder of the fall of Con-stantinople in 1204 to conquer Sinope in 1214 and now possessed their own harbor for the naval trade in Anatolia towards the northern shore of the Black Sea.[38] To its east, the Empire of Trebizond still flew the flag of the Byzantines, as did the Empire of Ni-caea in Western Anatolia, which then managed to bring Constantinople under Byzan-tine control again in 1261. However, even after 1261 the Black Sea did stay open for the Italians and trade would really take off there after the middle of the century. The re-stored Byzantine Empire was not able to close the Black Sea again to external compet-itors.

The rise in trade that now followed had to do mainly with another world-shaking event, the Mongol advance of the thirteenth century. The Mongols conquered the Pontic steppe and after the split of the Mongol Empire in 1260, the Mongol regency of the Gold-en Horde installed itself on the northern shores of the Black Sea.

Some historians, like Gheorghe I. Brătianu, argue that it was the meeting of the Italian traders with the territories of the *Pax Mongolica* in the thirteenth century

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35 Chrysobulls or golden bulls were decrees issued by the Byzantine emperor.

36 Michel Balard, "The Black Sea: Trade and Navigation (13th–15th Centuries)," in *Maritimes Mittelalter: Meere als Kommunikationsräume,* ed. Michael Borgolte and Nikolas Jaspert (Ostfildern: Jan Thorbecke, 2015), 182–83.

37 Balard, 184.

38 *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition,* s.v. "Sīnūb," by Johannes H. Kramers and Suraiya Faroqhi, accessed August 25, 2021, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_1086.

that changed the world economy profoundly.[39] It linked Inner Asia directly with the rich Mediterranean and European countries, to the benefit of both. Therefore, the Golden Horde allowed the Italian nations to open up trading stations on the shore of the Black Sea at the end of the silk and spice routes. Moreover, the Mongols had collected huge numbers of captives in their advances and continuous raids towards neighboring territories. Kipchak men, for example, were in high demand in Mamluk Egypt as military slaves, as mentioned above, and Caucasian women were sought after in Italy and other regions of Southern Europe.[40]

How exactly the first contacts of the Italian cities with the Mongols came about is difficult to know, but the Genoese apparently became part of an anti-Ilkhanid[41] alliance of the Golden Horde in 1263, as the Northern Mongols needed someone to transport commodities and raw materials by sea, having no navy.[42]

The Genoese could not be described as staunch ally of the Golden Horde, however. They simply searched for the best way to prosper from commerce and booty and used the rivalry between the two Mongol realms. Then, when in 1285 the Mamluks coming from Syria subjugated the Cilician Kingdom of Lesser Armenia, trade in the local harbor of Ayas became more difficult for Genoa. They therefore attempted to transform the oriental Tabriz-Ayas spice trade into a Tabriz-Trebizond trade that would allow the Genoese to transport the goods to and from Italy without the interference of the Mamluks. Trebizond, which had fallen under Ilkhanid suzerainty, became even more attractive for the Genoese, as they could transport Ilkhanid goods from there to Crimea to the Golden Horde and as such they acted as inter-Mongolian traders despite the political rivalries of the two entities. In 1290, these activities even went so far that Vivaldo Lavaggio, a Genoese naval commander, was hired by Ilkhan Arghun to patrol Black Sea waters with a war galley to secure the Trebizond trade against local piracy. His success in this role seems to have earned him a Genoese command post in Caffa (today: Feodosiia).[43]

However, the relationship between the Genoese and the Golden Horde also depended on secure trade routes to the Mamluks as one of the main customers for Crimean goods and slaves. The Golden Horde used their strong position in the slave trade as a political tool to bargain with the Mamluks of Egypt. When the Mamluks were reluctant to enter into a coalition against the Mongol Ilkhanids from Persia, the khan of the Golden Horde had the main slave transporters, the Genoese, expelled from Caffa in 1308. The Mamluks then apparently offered an alliance, but things only returned to

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39 Balard, "The Black Sea," 184.

40 On this aspect, see Hannah Barker, *That Most Precious Merchandise: The Mediterranean Trade in Black Sea Slaves* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2019).

41 The Ilkhans had formed a Mongol regency in today's Iran and became enemies of their Golden Horn "cousins."

42 Virgil Ciocîltan, *The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 153.

43 Ciocîltan, 116, 158.

normal when the new khan Özbek (1313–41) converted to Islam, re-opened Caffa to the Genoese, and strengthened his ties with the Mamluks.[44]

Özbek's successor, Janibek (1342–57), became far more hostile towards the Genoese. Apparently, he no longer needed the Mamluk alliance, as the Ilkhanid Empire had ceased to exist and the plague within the Golden Horde made it difficult to enslave sufficient people to sell them. Perhaps he wanted to control the trade himself. He expelled the Venetians from Tana (today: Azov) in 1343 and besieged Genoese Caffa, in vain, from 1343 to 1346.[45] Around 1344 the Mongols even initiated a naval building program in the Crimean western ports, but a fleet that had come from Genoa in 1345 swiftly destroyed these boats.[46] It was during the long siege of Caffa that Mongol troops seem to have infected the Genoese with the plague. The Black Death then reached Alexandria on board a Genoese slave ship in 1347.[47] In 1347 Khan Janibek conceded his defeat, concluding peace treaties with Venice and Genoa.[48] Afterwards, trade could go on, and the slave trade in particular regained its former importance.

Although Pope Innocent IV (1243–54) and his successors condemned Italian traders for taking slaves to the Muslims to bolster infidels' armies, the slave trade continued to flourish as the Italian seafaring nations found ways to cover their traces. They took the slaves from Crimea to Trebizond or the Georgian realm on the eastern shores of the Black Sea, where Mamluk slave merchants would take them and transport them further over land. In other instances, they even brought them directly to customers in Syria or Egypt.

Despite some bumpy times in the relationship of the Golden Horde and its successor the Crimean Khanate from 1441 onwards, trade with the Mongols proved highly lucrative, especially for Venice and Genoa. It has been described by Michel Balard as "colonial" due to its specific nature: "The westerners brought finished products to acquire foodstuffs and natural products from the Black Sea."[49]

Caffa in Crimea had been the main trading post of the Genoese since the last quarter of the thirteenth century. Moreover, they had almost a dozen additional trading posts on the shores of the Black Sea to purchase silk, spices, and slaves, and Venice later had fixed trading posts too, establishing one in Trebizond in 1319 and one in Tana at the site where the River Don flows into the Sea of Azov.[50]

These trading arrangements remained in place after 1250 for almost two hundred years and fierce competition evolved between Venice and Genoa over this trade, with

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44 Ciocîltan, 171–82.

45 Ciocîltan, 204.

46 Ciocîltan, 210.

47 al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-Sulūk li-Maʿrifat Duwal al-Mulūk*, ed. M. Ziyāda (Cairo: Maṭbʿat al-kutub al-miṣrīya, 1958), 2/3:776.

48 Ciocîltan, *The Mongols*, 215.

49 Balard, "The Black Sea," 191.

50 Balard, 192.

different approaches and ships.[51] It is remarkable that both cities managed to keep other Southern European nations out of the Black Sea, although they quarreled fiercely between themselves. There were several large naval conflicts between the two cities fought in the Black Sea between 1250 and the beginning of the fifteenth century. The conflict between the two escalated first around 1256 over influence in the harbors of the Holy Land, especially Acre. In 1261, the Genoese helped the Byzantine Empire of Nicaea to reconquer Latin Constantinople while the Venetian fleet patrolled away on the Black Sea. Further wars were to follow, especially after the fall of Acre and the end of the Crusader states in 1291. Venice attacked the Genoese in Cyprus and in 1296 raided Genoese posts in the Mediterranean, on the Black Sea, and in Constantinople.[52]

The fourteenth century increasingly saw the development of state-financed naval plunder activities and the distinction between pirate and corsair emerged.[53] Corsairs received an official letter of marque for their acts, whereas pirates looted on their own account. An example is the case of a Venetian fleet which in 1306 received the order to fight pirates in the Levant but at the same time was asked "to plunder profitable Byzantine territories in the Aegean."[54] Plundering, piracy, and counterpiracy therefore became a regular part of the naval game played by Genoa and Venice between Tana, Caffa, Trebizond, and Pera in the first half of the fourteenth century. Usually, Genoese pirates sacked Venetian ships and then a Venetian response would follow.[55] This was related to the way the Genoese and Venetians organized their naval activities: Whereas Genoa relied on a loose network of semi-independent merchant-pirates, Venice opted for larger convoys under state control, which were less flexible when it came to acts of individual piracy. They thus had to retaliate with special corsair fleets.

Another long-term armed conflict between the two lasted from 1349–55 at the height of the outbreak of the Black Death and the above mentioned attempt by Khan Janibek of the Golden Horde to drive the Italian seafaring nations out of Crimea. As outlined above, Venice had been pushed out of Tana by the Golden Horde in 1343 over trading conflicts in the town. Therefore, Genoa and Venice agreed that trade could be carried out by Venice in Genoese Caffa. However, when Venice returned to Tana, Genoa saw this as a breach of contract and started a corsair war in the Black Sea and other regions against Venice, which led to a full-fledged conflict ending only in 1355.[56]

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51 Balard, 186–92.

52 Gerhard Rösch, *Venedig: Geschichte einer Seerepublik* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2000), 75; Steven A. Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese: 958–1528* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 182.

53 Irene B. Katele, "Piracy and the Venetian State: The Dilemma of Maritime Defense in the Fourteenth Century," *Speculum* 63, no. 4 (1988): 865.

54 Katele, 872.

55 See for several cases Katele, 884–85.

56 Rösch, *Venedig,* 77.

The war of Chioggia of 1376 – 81 between Venice and Genoa was triggered by a conflict about the control of the Island of Tenedos near the Strait of Gallipoli at the entrance to the Dardanelles. In fact, the conflict had much to do about the control of Black Sea trade. During the war years, both sides resorted to piracy and plunder as measures of war. A Venetian fleet raided Genoese strongholds in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea and Genoese pirates retaliated.[57] In the end, Venice and Genoa agreed to leave the island of Tenedos with the Genoese, who were not allowed to fortify it and leave it accessible to the Venetians. That meant that Black Sea trade was still possible for both of the powers and Genoese Famagusta in Cyprus remained still open to Venetian trade as well.[58] Due to other developments in Europe, this would be the last war fought between Venice and Genoa over trade in the Levant and control of the Black Sea.

At around the same time, the Ming Dynasty in China had ended Mongol rule there and closed the inner-Asian trade routes. The Black Sea trade therefore regionalized again and piracy between the European seafaring nations became less lucrative.[59] This development went in favor of the Venetians, who had their outposts in the Black Sea, but were on much better terms with the Mamluk Empire. They could trade more easily than the Genoese, who had had a more hostile approach towards the Mamluks at the harbors of Beirut and Alexandria, where goods from the Far East such as spices and silk were now traded again, to the detriment of the northern Silk Road, which Ming China had closed.[60] However, the rich years and decades of the Black Sea trade of the fourteenth century had not only deepened the Venetian and Genoese rivalry and increased inner-Italian piracy, but had also attracted other Black Sea residents to invest and become involved in the looting business.

For example, on the Sea of Azov and the eastern shores of the Black Sea (the old pirate coast of Strabo) north of the Kingdom of Georgia it seems that the Circassians, as the people of the northwestern Caucasus were increasingly designated in contemporary European and Arab sources, had become more belligerent. By expanding to the north they became more active in the buccaneer business and raided the sea. This brought them into conflict with the Golden Horde, which then sold its Circassian prisoners as slaves to the Mamluks. Circassian military slaves would therefore form the bulk of the Mamluk elite soldiers from the fourteenth century onwards, replacing former Kipchak slaves. According to Balard, Genoese corsairs were very active in the Sea of Azov by the mid-fourteenth century, either attacking and looting Venetian galleys or chasing local Circassian pirates, whom they could then sell as well.[61]

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57 Rösch, *Venedig,* 79; Epstein, *Genoa,* 238.

58 Epstein, *Genoa,* 241.

59 Balard, "The Black Sea," 193.

60 See Albrecht Fuess, "Why Venice, not Genoa? How Venice Emerged as the Mamluks' Favourite European Trading Partner after 1365," in *Union in Separation – Diasporic Groups and Identities in the Eastern Mediterranean (1100 – 1800),* ed. Georg Christ et al. (Rome: Viella, 2015), 251 – 66.

61 Michel Balard, *La Romanie Génoise: XII–XVe siècle* (Rome: Ecole Française, 1978), 1:156 – 57.

8 Ghazi Pirates and Ottomans

Some Turcoman pirates had already shown up in the aftermath of the battle of Manzikert with shipyards and fleets in the years 1080–97 on the Aegean and the Marmara coast but they disappeared shortly after the success of the First Crusade.[62]

The heyday of Venetian and Genoese Black Sea commerce initiated a new age of Turcoman piracy. As mentioned above, the Rum Seljuks conquered Sinope on the northern shore of Anatolia in 1214. With this harbor under their control, they could become seaborne and now had their own harbor for the naval trade from Anatolia towards the northern shore.[63] In southeastern Anatolia, Alanya and its region fell into Seljuk hands between 1207–26, which led to a naval headquarters there, but its policy was not aggressive towards their Christian neighbors at that point.[64]

It would take until 1269 for the first *pirate-ghazi*[65] principality to be founded by Menteşe Bey in southwestern Anatolia. Shortly afterwards, Turkish pirates also settled a little further north, at Ephesus.[66] In the following years, many Western Anatolian harbors were taken over by Turkish post-Seljuk regencies. The strategic advantage was obvious, as the wooded mountains in the hinterland could be used to fell the trees for shipbuilding and the mountains themselves could be used as refuge by pirates too.

Ships' crews quite often consisted of old Byzantine seafarers who had been left unemployed after the dismantling of the Byzantine navy in the thirteenth century as the dominance of Venice and Genoa made it obsolete.

While the ships' crews of these early Turcoman navies comprised Greeks, the soldiers on board were the Ghazi Turks, who were also deployed in the land forces. The Greek-Turkish combination apparently worked well and new harbor societies emerged on the Western Anatolian coast. However, the navies of the Italian cities were still too powerful to be attacked in open battle, but the Turcoman principalities did harm the trade through their corsair activities, pillaging the islands of Rhodes, Chios, and Mytilene. This triggered a response by the Genoese and the Hospitallers. Chios was taken by the Genoese and Rhodes by the Knights of St. John in 1308. At that time, naval suprem-

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62 Halil İnalcık, "The Rise of the Turcoman Maritime Principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium, and the Crusades," in *The Middle East and the Balkans Under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy & Society*, ed. Halil İnalcık (Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies Department, 1993), 310.

63 *Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition*, s.v. "Sīnūb."

64 İnalcık, "Rise," 310.

65 The term *ghazi* denotes a holy warrior in the Turkish context and was a byname given to the Ottoman sultans; see for example Albrecht Fuess, "Ottoman Ghazwa – Mamluk Jihad. Two arms on the same body?," in *Everything is on the Move: The "Mamluk Empire" as Node in (Trans-)Regional Networks*, ed. Stephan Conermann (Göttingen: Bonn University Press 2014), 269–82.

66 İnalcık, "Rise," 311.

acy still lay with the Italians, as the fleet of Aydınoğlu Mehmed Bey from Ephesus had been completely defeated in 1319.[67]

In order to challenge the Italian maritime powers the Turks of Menteşe and Aydın then cooperated with the Catalans under Don Alfonso Fadrique, which enabled them to attack Euboea and even Crete, which especially harmed Venetian interests. After a heavy Turkish-Catalan attack on Euboea in 1327 the Venetians tried to initiate an alliance against the Turkish corsairs who were threatening their trade with Constantinople and the Black Sea. In 1329 Umur Pasha, the son of Aydın Mehmed even managed to wrest Izmir from the Genoese with his fleet. This latter incident, combined with further plundering activities by Umur Beg, convinced European powers and the Hospitallers to act together against the principalities. A powerful fleet of Venetian, Byzantine, French, Cypriot, Rhodesian, and Papal ships crushed a Turkish fleet in 1334, but Izmir did withstand an attack.[68]

Umur Pasha developed thereafter into an important regional player, his fleet being capable of threatening trade relations and military expeditions in the Aegean and the Black Sea. Apparently, Emperor Andronikos III (r. 1328 – 41) approached him in order to form a regional alliance against the western nations in a quest to "re-Byzantinize" the Empire. However, these plans did not take off as planned and after the death of Andronikos the Empire plunged into civil war.[69] Umur Pasha used this period and the help of Byzantine factions to loot the Balkan region with his fleets between 1341 and 1345.

A new Cypriot, Venetian, and Rhodesian alliance against the Turkish commander was then forged by the pope, and Izmir was captured by them in 1344. Umur Pasha died in an attempt to recapture Izmir castle in 1348.[70] His death did not lead to an end of pirate activities emanating from Turcoman principalities but it diminished the threat to Italian seafaring for the time being. Despite the loss of Izmir, naval raids by the sea ghazis in the Aegean continued between 1350 and 1390.[71]

The Turkish corsairs thereby took advantage of the inner Italian rivalries. Moreover, the main military threat for the Byzantine Empire and the European seafaring nations increasingly came from the Ottoman principality, which was able to install itself on the Black Sea coast and to act there. In 1369 Turkish-Ottoman forces occupied Adrianople (today: Edirne) and started to encircle the Byzantine capital Constantinople from the European and the Asian side. The Turcoman maritime principalities of Western Anatolia were incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in 1390. The old pirate emirs of Menteşe and Aydın therefore sided with the winning Timurid army against the Ottomans at the battle of Ankara in 1402 to get rid of the Ottomans. This gave these emirates a lifeline for another 20 years before they were re-incorporated into the Ottoman

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67 İnalcık, "Rise," 313.

68 İnalcık, 313 – 16.

69 İnalcık, 317.

70 İnalcık, 320.

71 İnalcık, 322.

realm by around 1425. Sultan Murad II (r. 1421–51) then conquered the Black Sea coast to the east of Samsun and occupied Germiyan.[72]

However, the most important attack for the fate of the Black Sea (and its pirates) was certainly the conquest of Constantinople by Mehmed II (r. 1451–81) in 1453. The key to success had been the construction of opposite fortresses on the Bosporus to block seafaring in and out the Black Sea. Still, the Ottoman fleet was not able to block all Genoese provisions to the city, but their mighty artillery was finally able to breach the walls.[73] The Genoese consul of Caffa Giovanni Guglielmo Longo Giustiniani had been away on pirating acts in the eastern Mediterranean when on his way back he found that the way to Caffa was now blocked by the Ottomans. The Byzantine emperor Constantine XI (r. 1449–53) promptly hired the ships and men of this able condottiere for the defense of his capital, but to no avail.[74]

The Ottoman conquest together with the end of the *Pax Mongolica* in the northern steppe region changed the game completely. The Ottomans kept the route to the Black Sea open to Genoese and Venetians due to trading agreements for a while, but, as described above, proved to be less lucrative. The Empire of Trebizond, the last Byzantine regency, fell to the Ottomans in 1461. Genoese Caffa already had to pay tribute after the fall of Constantinople, but it too was finally directly conquered by the Ottomans in 1475. With the Black Sea trade finally in one hand again and their mighty fleet constructed in the former Byzantine capital, the new masters of Constantinople, the Ottomans, were clearly able to keep piracy and pirates away from the Black Sea. At least for a limited time.

9 Conclusion

Black Sea piracy in the pre-modern era is very much bound by geography and the political control of its straits. We have some recurrent elements such as the piracy from the Abkhazian era since the time of Strabo and some unusual times like the thirteenth century with an open gateway from China to Italy, which attracted many pirate activities. In general, we perceive the Black Sea as being bound to the south and to the north. In the north were the steppe people from Central Asia, and in the south control over the straits was secured by highly centralized and urban regencies—first Rome, then Byzantium, and finally the Ottomans. From time to time, these southern Empires gained control over Crimea and thereby became masters of the Black Sea trade. In these periods, some local piracy emerged only at the edges of the Black Sea, and the southern empires had to negotiate with the northern people if the purchase of products was to proceed in peace. In two instances, we see a break in the pattern. First

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72 Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire: The Structure of Power* (London: Palgrave-McMillan, 2009), 11–21.
73 Imber, 25.
74 Gábor Agoston, *The Last Muslim Conquest: The Ottoman Empire and Its Wars in Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021), 75.

when the Varangians arrived through the rivers from the north and challenged the supremacy of the Central Asian horse people and then when the Italian seafaring nations broke up the Eastern Roman Empire's monopoly on Black Sea trade. Both periods established new trade routes and in these periods international piracy also flourished in the Black Sea. However, the Ottomans re-established the old north-south relationship on the Black Sea again and proved to be real heirs of the Byzantines.

Arkadiusz Blaszczyk

Pirates and Bandits after 1475

1 Introduction

Banditry, especially highway robbery, on the land and piracy on the sea were common phenomena in premodern times. They could be found anywhere in the world where there were places to hide from authorities that were either too negligent or incapable of persecuting the perpetrators. Moreover, banditry or piracy often thrived thanks to unofficial collaboration with the authorities in power. Yet banditry or piracy were also labels discursively "created" by emerging states wishing to legitimize their own claims to a monopoly on violence. More than often they emerged from such violent groups themselves by successfully delegitimatizing, ousting, or integrating their rivals. Within the realm of the Black Sea, the Ottomans themselves serve as a formidable example of such a bandit community turned state.[1] Modern times, on the other hand, with their largely implemented monopolies on violence—not always legitimate in the eyes of their subjects—have created among the latter a longing for the bandit, which is expressed in the figure of the social bandit, that is, the Robin Hood-type of bandit who robs the elites in favor of the subalterns. Originally coined by Eric Hobsbawm on epistemologically more positivist grounds,[2] this term, drawing mostly from folklore, should today be treated with the necessary critical caution towards narrative discourses, while we should not deny the actual existence of social bandits on a spectrum of banditry per se. As elsewhere, such romanticized figures can be found in many folk traditions surrounding the Black Sea. In Anatolia and the Caucasus (and beyond) there is Köroğlu, who can be traced back to a late-sixteenth-century bandit from the Bolu Mountains in western Anatolia, but whose legend outgrew the historical person by far, building on much older patterns of translocal bandit lore.[3] Yet most of the

[1] Such processes have been aptly described by the German sociologist Heinrich Popitz, whose theoretical findings comply well with those of Heath Lowry on the early Ottomans. Cf. Heinrich Popitz, *Phänomene der Macht* (Tübingen: Mohr, 2004); Heath W. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003).

[2] Eric Hobsbawm, *Bandits* (London: Abacus, 2001).

[3] *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, s. v. "Köroghlu," by Pertev Naili Boratav, accessed January 25, 2022, http://dx-doi-org.uaccess.univie.ac.at/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_4434v; Judith M. Wilks, "The Persianization of Koroglu: Banditry and Royalty in Three Versions of the Koroglu Destan," *Asian Folklore Studies* 60, no. 2 (2001): 305–18; James R. Russell, "From Parthia to Robin Hood: The Epic of the Blind Man's Son," in *The Embroidered Bible: Studies in Biblical Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha in Honour*

Black Sea "Robin Hoods" are unsurprisingly—given the rise of modern states—products of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Such are the Ukrainian/Rusyn Oleksa Dovbush and Ustym Karmaliuk,[4] the Crimean Tatar Alim Azamatoğlu,[5] and the Georgian Arsena Odzelashvili, whose myths, for the most part, are still far from being deconstructed in their respective national historiographies and literatures.[6]

But as the kind of banditry these people represent is not special to the Black Sea area, they shall not concern us here. We will look at larger groups with either a visible connection to the Black Sea itself or groups that interacted with other groups from across the sea. The former is apparent in the case of pirates but may concern bandits on land too. Thus, we will focus on the Tatars and their raids, which had a strong connection to the seaborn slave trade. Furthermore, we will deal with the piracy and banditry of different Cossack groups as well as Caucasian pirates. Groups with no apparent connection to the Black Sea itself but connected across the sea will be covered briefly by discussing the so-called Celalis of Anatolia and the Kırcalıs of Rumelia and their connections to the Black Sea.

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of Michael E. Stone, ed. Lorenzo DiTommaso, Matthias Henze, and William Adler (Boston: Brill, 2017), 877–98.

4 Cf. Volodymyr Hrabovetskyi, ed., *Lehendarni opryshky: Lytsari Karpat (XVI – XIX st.) v litopysi ta iliustratsiiakh* (Ivano-Frankivsk: Prykarpatskyi nats. un-t im. V. Stefanyka; Ivano-Frankivskyi derzh. ist.-memor. muzei O. Dovbusha, 2008); Valerii Diachok, "Ustym Karmaliuk (Karmaniuk) ta rozbiinytstvo na Podilli konkretno-istorychnyi ta dzhereloznavchyi aspekty," *Naukovi zapysky: Istorychni nauky* 12 (2008): 175–201. Interestingly, Dovbush left a big impact not only on Polish and Ukrainian legends and Romantic literature, but also on those of Hassidic Jews. Cf. Boris Czerny, "An der Grenze zwischen West und Ost – Huzulen und Chassidim in den Karpaten: Literarische Verarbeitungen von Märchen und Legenden über den Räuber Oleksa Dovbuš und den Baal Schem Tov in unterschiedlichen Kulturen," in *Blondzhende Stern: Jüdische Schriftstellerinnen und Schriftsteller aus der Ukraine als Grenzgänger zwischen den Kulturen in Ost und West*, ed. Kerstin Schoor, Ievheniia Voloshchuk, and Boris Bigun (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2019), 173–90; Larisa Fialkova, "Oleksa Dovbush: An Alternative Mythical Biography of the Ukrainian Hero Based on Jewish Sources," *Fabula* 52, no. 1 (2011): 92–108; Renata Makarska, *Der Raum und seine Texte: Konzeptualisierungen der Hucul'ščyna in der mitteleuropäischen Literatur des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt a. M.: Lang, 2010).

5 Tamila Seitiagiaeva, "Predvaritelnyi analiz arkhivnykh dokumentov, sviazannykh s deiatelnostiu Alima Azamat Oglu v Krymu," *Uchenye zapiski Krymskogo federalnogo universiteta imeni V. I. Vernadskogo: Filologicheskie nauki* 25, no. 2 (2012): 154–57; Tamila Seitiagiaeva, "Arkhivnye materialy, sviazannye s deiatelnostiu Alima Azamat Oglu v Krymu," *Voprosy krymskotatarskoi filologii, istorii i kultury*, no. 3 (2016): 127–29; Tamila Seitiagiaeva, "Variatsii transformirovaniia obraza Alima v proizvedeniiakh russkoi literatury," *Voprosy krymskotatarskoi filologii, istorii i kultury*, no. 2 (2016): 100–12; İsmail Asanoğlu Kerim, "Istoriia filmov ob Alime," *Uchenye zapiski Krymskogo inzhenerno-pedagogicheskogo universiteta. Seriia: Filologiia. Istoriia*, no. 1–2 (2019): 58–63.

6 On him and other examples of Caucasian "Robin Hoods" (e.g., the abreks), see Rebecca Ruth Gould, *Writers and Rebels: The Literature of Insurgency in the Caucasus* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016).

2 Tatar Raiders

Continuing earlier Golden Horde practices, the raids of the Crimean Tatars and other related Tatar communities on the Black Sea had afflicted the borderlands and, in some cases, even the core lands of the Khanate's northern neighbors ever since it came into existence in the fifteenth century. Following the substantial changes on the Eastern European geopolitical chessboard in the second half of the seventeenth century, they finally became much less frequent and dangerous. Critical events in that respect were the establishment of the Cossack Hetmanate under Russian suzerainty with the treaties of Pereiaslav (1654), Andrusovo (1667), and the so-called Eternal Peace of 1686, the Ottoman conquest of Podolia (Ottoman from 1671 to 1699) and the establishment of right-bank Ukraine as an Ottoman Cossack vassal (1666–99). Both the short-lived Ottoman and the long-lasting Russian expansion into Ukraine severely curtailed the sovereignty of the Crimean Khan, who lost his independence as a subject of international diplomacy to the Ottomans.[7] Together with modernized defensive strategies and the southward movement of the Muscovite defensive line they substantially limited the range of Crimean raiding campaigns outside of wartime.[8] A culminating point was the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699. Thus, the last great Crimean Tatar raid into Polish-Lithuanian territory took place in 1699, only a few weeks after the Treaty of Karlowitz was signed.[9] The reason why the raids stopped so abruptly is still not well understood. Compared with earlier treaties, Karlowitz was not different in its stipulations on the persecution and prevention of border violations.[10] But it seems that while the Ottomans had previously been rather negligent concerning border transgressions by its subjects, the changing balance of power now forced the Ottomans and the khan to control their borders more effectively.[11] Yet even here the bloody suppression of the Nogay Rebellion in

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[7] For a brief comprehensive survey of Crimean Tatar history, see Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania: International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (15th–18th century). A Study of Peace Treaties Followed by Annotated Documents* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 3–220.

[8] Cf. Brian J. Davies, *Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1500–1800* (Leiden: Brill, 2012); Hans-Jürgen Bömelburg, Arkadiusz Błaszczyk, and Vadim Popov, "Gewaltgemeinschaften und die Military Revolution im östlichen Europa: Der Einfluss internationaler Konjunkturen und wirtschaftlicher Faktoren auf die Gewaltmärkte der Frühen Neuzeit," in *Gewaltgemeinschaften in der Geschichte*, ed. Winfried Speitkamp (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017), 101–38.

[9] Andrzej Gliwa, *Kraina upartych niepogód: Zniszczenia wojenne na obszarze ziemi przemyskiej w XVII wieku* (Przemyśl: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, 2013), 599–628.

[10] The thesis of Karlowitz as the "formal closure" of the Ottoman border, originally postulated by Rifaat Abou El-Haj in the late sixties, has been thoroughly refuted, among others by Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "Ottoman Frontiers in Eastern Europe," in *Ein Raum im Wandel: Die osmanisch-habsburgische Grenzregion vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. Norbert Spannenberger and Szabolcs Varga (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2014), 25–37.

[11] Thus at some point during the wars with the Holy League (1683–99) they started installing Giray princes as "commanders in-chief" (*serasker*) in the territories outside of the peninsula to gain better control over the Nogays living there. Cf. Alper Başer, "Bucak Tatarları (1550–1700)" (PhD diss., Afyon

the Budjak in the same year[12] is not without precedent, as revolts against the forceful (and ultimately often futile) eviction of the Nogay/Tatar population in relation to diplomatic negotiations had been a recurring theme in the earlier history of the Ottoman Budjak too.[13] Another reason might be seen in the end of the Nogay migrations to the west and the increasing Ottoman efforts at social disciplining specifically targeting nomads.[14] Ultimately, it must have been the cumulative effect of many developments that brought the raids to an end. In the light of the havoc Crimean raids had wreaked before, it is almost amusing to read of an incident in 1757, when one of several minor Nogay assaults hit a Ukrainian Orthodox Church, causing diplomatic tensions and official protest notes from the Russian side. Some Nogay bandits attacked the church, destroyed some icons, robbed two corpses lying in state of their clothes, and some church items. For this and other minors attacks the local Giray governor made the responsible parties pay twenty-two sacks of silver to the Russians as compensation.[15] With all due respect for sacral places: What a telling difference to the early seventeenth century, when during just one raid several churches could have been burnt to the ground

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Kocatepe Üniversitesi, 2010), 197–200. Valuable insights into the life and problems of such a *serasker* in the mid-eighteenth century can be found in Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, *Aus den Aufzeichnungen des Saʿīd Giray Sulṭān: Eine zeitgenössische Quelle zur Geschichte des Chanats der Krim um die Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Freiburg: Schwarz, 1975).

12 Cf. Denise Klein, "Tatar and Ottoman History Writing: The Case of the Nogay Rebellion (1699–1701)," in *The Crimean Khanate Between East and West: (15th–18th Century)*, ed. Denise Klein (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2012), 125–46.

13 Arkadiusz Blaszczyk, *Frühneuzeitliche Dimensionen steppennomadischer Gewalt: Tataren, Mangiten und Nogaier als grenzüberschreitende Gewaltakteure im Krimkhanat und im Osmanischen Reich, 1538–1637* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2024), 220, 244, 344–46, 358–59, 384–85; Nezihi Aykut, İdris Bostan, Murat Cebecioğlu et al., eds., *3 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri 966–968 / 1558–1560* (Ankara: T.C. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 1993), no. 832, p. 369–70; Başer, "Bucak Tatarları," 153–55.

14 See Vadim Vintserovich Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi ordy* (Kazan: Izdatelskii dom Kazanskaia nedvizhimost, 2016) on the desintegration of the Nogay hordes, or debilitation, as Khodarkovsky called it; cf. Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2002), 124. For a firmly grounded study on the early modern Nogay migrations into Ottoman territories, see Başer, "Bucak Tatarları." The last two Nogay migrations arriving from the east in the Dnistro-Danubian dominions of the Ottomans were the Ormuhammed oğlı and Oraq oğlı family confederations in the 1660s and in the 1730s the so-called Yedisan Nogays, who settled between the Dnister and Bug rivers. Cf. Ion Chirtoagă, *Din istoriei Moldovei de sud-est până în anii '30 al. sec. al XIX-lea* (Chişinău: Editura Museum, 1999), 114. In 1666, the Ottomans created an official pale of settlement for the Nogays at the Ialpuh River in the barely populated inlands of the Budjak. As a prerequisite to settling there they had to denounce pre-Islamic legal traditions and were implicitly expected to start a settled life as peasants. Cf. Başer, "Bucak Tatarları," 150, 185–88; Gemil Tahsin, ed., *Relaţiile ţărilor Române cu Poarta otomană în documente turceşti* (Bucharest: Direcţia Generală a Arhivelor Statului din Republica Socialistă România, 1984), doc. no. 142, p. 322.

15 Kellner-Heinkele, *Aus den Aufzeichnungen des Saʿīd Giray Sulṭān*, 161–68.

and instead of some rags hundreds of people were abducted, diplomats more than often protested in vain, and the afflicted paid to make the raids stop.[16]

Before discussing the raids of the Tatars in more detail, one needs to discuss whether it is actually correct to call them bandits. The term is inherently state-focused and presupposes a state's claim to a monopoly on violence.[17] Yet premodern states are evidently multipolar. The Crimean Khanate as the focal point of the early modern Pontic Tatar world is no different in that respect. The Crimean khans had to share power with their own kin and the grand noble families of Crimea, who owned the bulk of Crimean territory.[18] The ruling dynasty of the Girays was a very productive one and thanks to extensive marrying, each generation produced a lot of legitimate branches. These multiple marriage alliances between individual dynastic branches and noble families created strong mutual political ties. Against this backdrop, open rules of succession that made any son of a khan a legitimate heir to the throne polarized the Crimean elites, causing strong competition among them. One traditional way of settling this issue was *qazaqlıq*—the party seeking to conquer the throne from another would fall back into the steppe in order to gain funds and followers by raiding the littoral societies of the steppe while also evading persecution by the ruling party. With the establishment of Ottoman hegemony and the increasing enforcement of Islamic law in the question of succession, this conflict turned less into a question of *qazaqlıq* as into one of successful networking/lobbying at the Ottoman court. Thus, internal successional strife more than often turned into an Ottoman-Crimean conflict.[19]

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16 On the social impact of the Tatar raids on the southeastern borderlands of Poland-Lithuania, see Maurycy Horn, *Skutki ekonomiczne najazdów tatarskich z lat 1605–1633 na Ruś Czerwoną* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1964); Gliwa, *Kraina upartych niepogód.* On the diplomatic practices involving the problem of Tatar raids, see Blaszczyk, *Frühneuzeitliche Dimensionen steppennomadischer Gewalt*, 114–29; and in general Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania*; Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th–18th century)* (Leiden: Brill, 2000).

17 For a summary of banditry-related studies since Hobsbawm's *Social Bandits*, see Stephanie Cronin, "Noble Robbers, Avengers and Entrepreneurs: Eric Hobsbawm and Banditry in Iran, the Middle East and North Africa," in *Crime, Poverty and Survival in the Middle East and North Africa,* ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: I.B. Tauris, 2019), 81–104.

18 Cf. Natalia Królikowska-Jedlińska, *Law and Division of Power in the Crimean Khanate (1532–1774): With Special Reference to the Reign of Murad Giray (1678–1683)* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 93–117.

19 Blaszczyk, *Frühneuzeitliche Dimensionen steppennomadischer Gewalt*, 27–47, 61–64. An illustrative example of Crimean networking at the Ottoman court is the long-term alliance between the eunuchs Gürcü Mehmed Pasha and Mustafa Ağa on one side and Canibek Giray (d. 1636)—nicknamed by an Ottoman chronicle the "crumb picker of the Ottoman dynasties' table"—on the other: By himself and via his adoptive father Khan Selamet Giray (d. 1610) he lobbied repeatedly and successfully against his more legitimate and belligerent rivals Mehmed (d. 1629) and Şahin Giray (d. 1640). See Blaszczyk, 238–39, 352–56. On *qazaqlıq* as an important phenomenon of the late medieval and early modern Eurasian steppe, see Joo-Yup Lee, *Qazaqlïq, or Ambitious Brigandage, and the Formation of the Qazaqs: State and Identity in Post-Mongol Central Eurasia* (Leiden: Brill, 2016); Maria Subtelny, *Timurids in Transition: Turko-Persian Politics and Acculturation in Medieval Iran* (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

It is evident that in such a multipolar situation, caught between many factions, one can hardly assume every raid to have been a unanimous state project. Raids performed by certain groups within the khanate could be motivated by different interests and be, for example, a means of communicating dissent concerning the existing rule. Bernhard Pretwicz, a mid-sixteenth-century Polish border commander, gives the following assessment after interrogating some captured Tatars in 1549:

> But the captured they reveal to me that the reason [for their raids] is that the young emperors [i. e., princes] want to have the same gift from their majesty [the Polish king] as is given to their father, the old Tatar emperor [i. e., khan] by their majesty, and thus they say: We are already tired of our father, we want to go where we like, we are no longer under his sway.[20]

Vis-à-vis their affected neighbors, the khans would excuse such raids as the folly of youth, as did, for example, Mehmed I Giray in his diplomatic correspondence with King Sigismund I "the Old" of Poland in 1516.[21]

Thus, given that many raids were not sanctioned by the ruler, one could indeed speak of banditry. This was common practice among the Ottomans, who made no distinction between cross-border raiders violating the sultan's oath sworn to the respective ruler or highway robbers violating the sultan's peace within the empire—all of whom were usually called bandits (*eşkıya* or *ehl-i fesad*).

But is it possible to draw a hard line between officially sanctioned raids and non-official ones, considering the former acts of war and the latter banditry? More than often, raids ordered by the ruler were deliberately performed as banditry and labeled as such by the ruler's diplomats in order to conceal their own involvement.[22] Indeed, one of several factors perpetuating cross-border violence north of the Black Sea, be it Tatar or Cossack, was a geopolitically motivated diplomacy of excuses used by both sets of actors, the Ottomans and Crimean Tatars on the one side and Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy on the other.[23]

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20 Carolina Lanckorońska, *Elementa ad fontium editiones L: Documenta ex Archivo Regiomontano ad Poloniam spectantia XX pars. HBA, B4, 1549–1568* (Rome: Institutum Polonicum Historicum Romae, 1980), 4 (my translation—A. B.).

21 Tadeusz Korzon, *Dzieje wojen i wojskowości w Polsce*, vol. 1, *Epoka przedrozbiorowa* (Lviv: Wydawnictwo Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, 1923), 236–37.

22 For examples indicating an Ottoman letters of marque practice vis-à-vis Tatar raiders, see Halil Sahillioğlu, ed., *Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi h. 951–952 Tarihli ve E-12321 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri* (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2002), doc. no. 2, p. 3–5; Mihnea Berindei and Gilles Veinstein, eds., *L'empire Ottoman et les pays Roumains* (Paris: Éd. de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1987), doc. no. 1, p. 158–60; Kazimierz Pułaski, "Trzy poselstwa Ławryna Piaseczyńskiego do Kazi Gireja, Hana Tatarów Perekopskich: Szkic historyczny," *Przewodnik Naukowy i Literacki: Dodatek do Gazety Lwowskiej* 39, no. 2–10 (1911): 135–45, 244–56, 358–66, 467–80, 553–66, 645–60, 756–68, 845–64, 945–60.

23 This policy is well encapsulated in the Slavic term "swawola," literally meaning "own will." It denoted unauthorized transgressions by one's subjects against another sovereign's territory or subjects; Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy used it to denounce responsibility for Cossack raids. Cf. Blaszczyk, *Frühneuzeitliche Dimensionen steppennomadischer Gewalt*, 114–29.

Another aspect reminiscent of banditry is the extortion of protection money. As an heir to the Mongol Empire or rather the Golden Horde, the Crimean Khanate demanded the payment of tributes from all territories once conquered by the Mongols and controlled by the Golden Horde. With the gradually changing factual balance of power between the khanate and its Slavic neighbors to the north, the tribute became the subject of constant haggling. The terms used changed and in the early sixteenth century payments started to be considered "gratuities" for which Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy demanded military services, for example raids on each other's territory. If the gratuities did not arrive on time or did not meet the Crimean expectations, the khan would openly threaten and dispatch raids or pretend to be unable to hold back his subjects deprived of the payments. The decreasing threat of Crimean raids brought an end to the gratuities, which were abolished with the treaties of Karlowitz.[24]

Looking at Tatar raids from a chronological point of view, we can discern different groups at different times. In the sixteenth century, great Crimean campaigns rarely hit Poland-Lithuania, while Muscovy, whose capital was sacked one last time by Crimean khan Devlet I Giray in 1571, was a regular target. Polish and Lithuanian borderlands were hit by small but frequent raids with a more obvious bandit character, mostly originating from Ottoman territories.[25] One of the Tatar groups operating from the Ottoman Budjak appears in the sources from 1494 until 1592 under the label Cossacks of Akkerman. Originally also called Cossacks of Mengli Giray, they might have emerged from a personal retinue of Mengli I Giray he formed after losing the Crimean throne. A look at the names available in the earliest sources shows that initially they had included many younger princes and noble offspring. Yet later sources indicate that this group consisted mainly of non-noble, so-called "black" Tatars. This suggests that originally the Cossacks of Akkerman were a formation of commoners whose role was to train princes and noble offspring in the arts of war and the ways of the steppe, concurring with the *atalıq* tradition according to which commoners were tasked with educating princes. Although they were based on Ottoman territory, responsibility for them initially remained with the Crimean khan. With the conquest of Moldavian Bender and the takeover of the Crimean Tatar fortress of Aqçaqum (Ottoman: Özi, Ukraini-

24 Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania*, 444–49, 497–99, 504–6; Anna Leonidovna Khoroshkevich, *Rus i Krym ot soiuza k protivostoianiiu: Konets XV–nachalo XVI vv* (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2001), 225–71; Aleksei Andreevich Novoselskii, *Borba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoi polovine XVII veka* (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1948), 83, 437–42; Sagit Faizov, "Pominki 'tysh' v kontekste vzaimootnoshenii Rusi-Rossii s Zolotoi ordoi i Krymskim iurtom: K voprosu o tipologii sviazei," *Otechestvennye Arkhivy*, no. 3 (1994): 49–55; Blaszczyk, *Frühneuzeitliche Dimensionen steppennomadischer Gewalt*, 126.

25 Andrzej Dziubiński, *Na szlakach Orientu: Handel między Polską a Imperium Osmanskim w XVI-XVIII wieku* (Wrocław: Fundacja na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej, 1998), 207–8; Andrzej Dziubiński, *Stosunki dyplomatyczne polsko-tureckie w latach 1500–1572 w kontekście międzynarodowym* (Wrocław: Wydawn. Uniw. Wrocławskiego, 2005), 169–70; Andrzej Dziubiński, "Handel niewolnikami polskimi i ruskimi w Turcji w XVI wieku i jego organizacja," *Zeszyty Historyczne UW* 3 (1963): 36–49; Novoselskii, *Borba Moskovskogo gosudarstva*, 9–44.

an: Ochakiv) at the mouth of Dnipro in 1538, this situation was complicated, as from the Polish and Lithuanian perspective the Ottomans were now responsible for the Tatar Cossack raids while the Ottomans relegated responsibility to the khan—a conveniently obscure situation for the raiders and those who profited from them. In the second half of the century, while the term Cossack was gradually replaced by the term Tatar, the Ottomans sought to increase their own control over the Tatars in the Budjak by making local Ottoman authorities punish transgressions and by appointing leaders, the Tatar ağas.[26] Yet the persecution of Tatar raiders was, at least for local Ottoman authorities, more than often a sham to appease the Poles or the central government—usually the malefactors tended to resume their craft very quickly. As mentioned, even the central government occasionally ordered raids to be disguised as banditry. This is especially true for the so-called *cebelü tatar*[27] of Dobruja, a group distinct from the previously mentioned Tatar Cossacks. Recruited from older, pre-fifteenth-century strata of non-Turkmen migrants from the steppes, they formed an officially conscripted unit recompensed for their services with tax privileges.[28] According to the Venetian Lazzaro Soranzo, Istanbul used them to stage fake Crimean Tatar raids on Polish territory, a fact which can be corroborated by a decree by Sultan Süleyman.[29] Here, as in the case of the Tatar Cossacks from the Budjak, with whom they cooperated occasionally, there were entanglements with local Ottoman petty office holders, who oftentimes participated in the raids themselves.[30] Yet when confronted with accusations, local Ottoman elites tended to ascribe the raids to the Tatars alone.[31] This was aided by converging discourses on both sides of the border imagining the Tatars as a brute natural force impossible to contain.[32] Thus, when Ottoman dominions were struck by Polish-Lithua-

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26 Blaszczyk, *Frühneuzeitliche Dimensionen steppennomadischer Gewalt*, 162–80. Cf. Başer, "Bucak Tatarları," 11–75.

27 Literally, Tatars in arms, here to be understood, in analogy to the *cebelü* retainers of the Ottoman Sipahis, as an auxiliary cavalry unit.

28 On the *cebelü* Tatars, see Blaszczyk, *Frühneuzeitliche Dimensionen steppennomadischer Gewalt*, 180–87; Bömelburg, Błaszczyk, and Popov, "Gewaltgemeinschaften und die Military Revolution im östlichen Europa," 115–16.

29 Lazzaro Soranzo, *L'Ottomanno di Lazaro Soranzo [...]* (Ferrara: Baldini, 1598), prima parte, 28–29. On Soranzo see Pier Mattia Tommasino, "L'Ottomanno di Lazaro Soranzo," in *Christian-Muslim Relations: A Bibliographical History,* vol. 9, *Western and Southern Europe (1600–1900)*, ed. John Chesworth and David Thomas (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 654–57. For the decree, see Sahillioğlu, *Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi*; Berindei and Veinstein, *L'empire Ottoman et les pays Roumains.*

30 Blaszczyk, *Frühneuzeitliche Dimensionen steppennomadischer Gewalt*, 119–22, 177–80.

31 Of course, some of the local Ottoman complaints about the Tatars must be considered genuine, as not every local participated in the Tatar raiding business, but many of them suffered Polish-Lithuanian or Cossack retaliations. For an example of such a complaint, see Jaroslav Stepaniv, "A Turkish Document in Ukrainian from the Mid-Sixteenth Century: On the Origin of the Ukrainian Cossacks," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 2 (1977): 211–24. For another, see a Polish intelligence report from the Long Turkish War, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (AGAD), Archiwum Zamoyskich, manuscript no. 3036, p. 336–37.

32 Blaszczyk, *Frühneuzeitliche Dimensionen steppennomadischer Gewalt*, 14–27. Cf. Arkadiusz Blaszczyk, "Food and the Supernatural: How Shared Perceptions of the Tatars Impacted the Diplomatic Relations

nian counterstrikes, the Ottoman side rarely demanded recompense for their Tatar subjects, since these were perceived as guilty per se.[33] Episodic efforts by the central government to curb the raids were hampered by the fact that the bulk of the territories in the region north of the Danube Delta belonged either to religious endowments (*evkaf*) or the sultan privately (*havass-i hümayun*). Such territories and their administrators benefitted from special immunities, primarily the privilege to persecute crimes themselves. This allowed them to hinder provincial administrative forces from entering their territories in pursuit of wanted criminals or bandits. If the latter had struck a bargain with the administrators, they could delay persecution until an imperial decree arrived from Istanbul lifting the ban on entry—plenty of time to turn booty into coin.[34] Other beneficiaries were the buyers: Slave merchants equipped the Tatar bandits with horses and weapons in exchange for a share of the booty and the right of first refusal. The Ottoman fiscus profited from the tax levied on slave trafficking and the Ottoman state apparatus from the human resources generated.[35]

The seventeenth century brought a shift in the raids and the composition of the raiders, who turned from commoners into nobles. After the "Long Turkish War" (1593–1606), during which the Budjak served as a hub for Tatar troop movements into Hungary, one branch of the Crimean noble Manghıt family started to use the water-rich region as a winter camp and operational basis for raids into Poland-Lithuania, particularly notable in the 1610s, 1620s, and 1630s. Especially one member of this family, having a disadvantaged pedigree, rose to prominence and power in the Budjak: Qantemir Mirza (d. 1637). Establishing himself as an indispensable instrument for the Ottomans, inter alia by policing and intervening in the Danubian principalities, he became an important player in the internecine strife of the Crimean Khanate. Besides his Ottoman connection, his influence was rooted in his success as an organizer and leader of raids into Poland-Lithuania. He led raiding parties of several hundred to a thousand men into the Ruthenian provinces of the Commonwealth, even reaching regions which had not seen Tatar raids in many decades. His feats were due to careful planning and coordination of his troops. Each raid followed a careful plan aiming for the highest

Between the Ottoman Empire and Poland-Lithuania (Sixteenth-Seventeenth Centuries)," in *From Kebab to Ćevapčići: Foodways in (Post-)Ottoman Europe*, ed. Arkadiusz Blaszczyk and Stefan Rohdewald (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2018), 39–65.

33 Cf. the Ottoman damage lists compiled in the 1540s and sent to Kraków to demand recompense. The Tatars are listed separately and constitute a minority in terms of numbers and wealth. They are mostly found in relation to an attack on the suburb of Özi (today: Ochakiv), which was too bold a move against Ottoman sovereignty to not include any damage caused. Hacer Topaktaş Üstüner and H. Ahmet Arslantürk, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Dönemi Osmanlı-Leh İlişkilerine Dair Belgeler (1520–1566)* (Istanbul: Okur Kitaplığı, 2014), 269–324.

34 Blaszczyk, *Frühneuzeitliche Dimensionen steppennomadischer Gewalt*, 151–61. On such territories in general, see Halil İnalcık, "Autonomous Enclaves in Islamic States: Temlîks, Soyurghals, Yurdluk-Ocakliks, mâlikâne-Mukâta'as and Awqaf," in *History and Historiography of Post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East*, ed. Judith Pfeiffer (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006), 112–34.

35 Blaszczyk, *Frühneuzeitliche Dimensionen steppennomadischer Gewalt*, 114–61.

gain with as little enemy contact as possible, which demanded a very good knowledge of the terrain. Besides employing spies dispatched by allied Moldavian boiars, each raid had reconnaissance units that spied out future targets. An analysis of Polish damage documentation by Polish historian Andrzej Gliwa shows that they hit their targets systematically very much according to the nomadic logic of changing pastures, each time "grazing" on other villages in their path and avoiding those they had already depleted. Qantemir's success ended after the Poles changed their tactics in fighting off the Tatar raids—instead of hunting the moving base camp (*qoş*) of the Tatars with one unified army, they deployed a network of experienced spotters that tacked onto the heels of the smaller raiding parties which had swarmed out from the *qoş*. They could take the parties out one after the other and disrupt their communication, upsetting their raiding plan and coordination—what was left could be intercepted on bottlenecks like the Dnister fords. Qantemir's defeats also show the importance successful raids could have for the social cohesion of the Crimean elites—recurring failures would exacerbate tensions between the dynastic/noble factions of the khanate, as was the case in the late 1620s and 1630s, ultimately contributing to Qantemir's downfall.[36]

3 Cossacks

The origins of the Cossacks are highly controversial. In this respect, the national historiographies of Ukraine and Russia are prone to anachronisms, as some works tend to project the Slavic character of the Cossacks back into a time when even the term was unknown to the sources.[37] In this respect, this chapter will follow the position of Joo-Yup Lee (Toronto, CA), who relates the emergence of the originally Turkic term Cossack (*qazaq*) and the emergence of Cossackdom (*qazaqlıq*) with the Genghisids and their slow political disintegration. Originally a form of "political vagabondage" of competing Genghisid princes who withdrew into the steppe, raiding the steppe's littorals and assembling followers with the ultimate goal of challenging the actual ruling relative, in the westernmost steppes of Eurasia this elitarian *qazaqlıq* slowly transformed into a multi-ethnic reservoir of commoner-Cossacks, fed by all littoral societies. With the colonizing expansion of the Christian sedentary powers to the north and northwest, Poland, Lithuania, and Muscovy, the human resource that fed this Cossackdom came to be predominantly Slavic and Christian Orthodox—disinherited sons, impoverished nobles, adventurers, and fugitive serfs and criminals. They left a lasting and defining mark on Cossackdom and turned it into a political culture of its own, which in

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36 Blaszczyk, *Frühneuzeitliche Dimensionen steppennomadischer Gewalt*, 191–426. On the documentation of the damage caused by these raids, see Gliwa, *Kraina upartych niepogód.*

37 For an analysis of such anachronisms, see Grzegorz Skrukwa, *O Czarnomorską Ukrainę: Procesy narodowotwórcze w regionie nadczarnomorskim do 1921 roku w ukraińskiej perspektywie historycznej* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 2016).

the Ukrainian case initiated a nation-building process.[38] But this emerging Slav-dominated Cossackdom did not stop at traditional *qazaq* ways of mischief, like hijacking caravans and driving off horses and cattle. They rediscovered a practice which had been infamous in the early Middle Ages, when the Varangians descended the Dnipro with their boats, into the Black Sea, raiding the shores of the Byzantine Empire. Establishing their headquarters (the so-called Sich) in the mid-sixteenth century on barely accessible Dnipro islands south of the Dnipro rapids, the Cossacks from beyond the rapids (Polish: Zaporoże, Ukrainian: Zaporizhzhia, Russian: Zaporozhe), the so-called Zaporizhian Cossacks, used an innovatively designed boat, the highly mobile *chaika*, easy to carry overland, small enough to be used in rivers but stable enough to be navigated and fought from on the sea. *Chaika* fleets would pass the initially Crimean and then Ottoman fortress of Ochakiv guarding the mouth of the Dnipro, raid the shores of the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire, and plunder ships on the sea.[39] Expanding their range of action year by year, decade by decade, they finally arrived at the southern shores of the Ottoman Empire in the 1610s. The first great shock for the Ottomans came in 1614, when a Cossack flottila attacked and sacked Sinop on the Anatolian coast of the Black Sea, whose garrison had left town for a fair in a nearby village. The Ottoman chronicles relate that Grand Vezir Nasuh Pasha tried to conceal this dishonorable event from Sultan Ahmed—when the latter inevitably learned about it, he flew into a rage and wanted to execute the vezir, but, persuaded by his favorite Mahpeyker and his daughter, the Pasha's child bride, restricted himself to striking him with an iron mace.[40] In 1621 the Cossacks appeared at the mouth of the Bosporus, at Riva.[41] Three years later, they were confident enough to enter the straits, where they plundered several villages in the modern-day Istanbul district of Sarıyer. In both cases, the Ottoman army and navy were absent on campaign, and the officials left in charge hastily organized a makeshift flotilla of what was available at harbor, with the aim not to attack but to block the Cossacks from descending further down the Bosporus. During the first of the two raids in 1624, diplomatic reports have Sultan Murad watching the destruction from his palace grounds.[42] The Cossack attacks were a

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38 Lee, *Qazaqlïq.* On the Cossacks of Ukraine see Lee, 74–93. For a summary of his book, cf. Joo-Yup Lee, "The Political Vagabondage of the Chinggisid and Timurid Contenders to the Throne and Others in Post-Mongol Central Asia and the Qipchaq Steppe: A Comprehensive Study of *Qazaqlïq*, or the *Qazaq* Way of Life," *Central Asiatic Journal* 60, no. 1–2 (2017): 59.

39 See the classical study by Victor Ostapchuk, "The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of the Cossack Naval Raids," *Oriente Moderno* 20 (81), no. 1 (2001): 23–95.

40 Ostapchuk, "The Human Landscape," 78–79, 91; Günhan Börekçi, "Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603–17) and His Immediate Predecessors" (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2010), 237–38.

41 Blaszczyk, *Frühneuzeitliche Dimensionen steppennomadischer Gewalt*, 308.

42 Ostapchuk, "The Human Landscape," 64, 80, 70–71, 90; Victor Ostapchuk, "The Ottoman Black Sea Frontier and the Relations of the Porte with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, 1622–1628" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1989), 78–81; Blaszczyk, *Frühneuzeitliche Dimensionen steppennomadischer Gewalt,* 307–8.

huge loss of face for the Ottomans, whose sense of supremacy over the Black Sea, dubbed an "Ottoman lake" by some historians (a status doubted by others),[43] as well as their feeling of security, was suddenly put into question. This was captured nicely by the castellan of Kraków, Jerzy Zbaraski, who wrote in 1626 under the impression of the recent, increasingly daring attacks:

> Who would have dared to say to Süleyman, the famous Turkish emperor, that [one day] the Cossacks, Polish peasants and laborers [agricolae et operarii], human scum [fex hominum], would deride the Ottoman majesty by pillaging and plundering with impunity before the eyes of the emperor.[44]

This statement seemingly stresses the huge gap between the commoner-Cossacks, protoplasts of the modern Ukrainians, and the Polish-Lithuanian nobility, a disparity that was deepened by later nation-building processes starting with the uprising of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and cemented in the respective national historiographic traditions. Yet the latter blurs the perspective on the many instances of cooperation without which the Cossack sea expeditions could not have been such successful undertakings. After all, from the very beginning and for decades to come nobles of the Commonwealth were highly active as organizers of and participants in Cossack attacks. Later too, the Cossacks of Zaporizhzhia could not act in "splendid isolation." They acted in a network which involved many players, more than often reaching the tiers of the surrounding polities. First of all, the Cossack craft was to a large extent a seasonal one; only a small core would remain in their remote headquarters. There was constant movement and contact between the towns and villages of western and central Ukraine and the Sich.[45] As Daria Starčenko could show, the Cossacks, much like their Tatar counterparts in the Ottoman and Crimean case, were unofficially supported by provincial elites and nobles, who gave them money, supplies, ammunition and even boats, for a share of the profits.[46] The aforementioned Zbaraski himself is a case in point. The Zbaraski brothers Jerzy (1574–1631) and Krzysztof (d. 1627) advocated that the king should secretly entice and support the Cossacks in their endeavor to aid the anti-Ottoman rebellion of Crimean khan Mehmed Giray (d. 1629) and his brother Şahin Giray (d. 1640), at the same time advising him to conceal this royal involvement with the argument of Cossack "swawola," Cossack self-will and unruliness. Also, the Zbaraskis were in posses-

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43 Cf. Güneş Işıksel, "La Piraterie abkhaze et la Réaction Ottomane: Une contribution au débat sur la fermeture de la mer Noire," in *Italy and Europe's Eastern Border (1204–1669)*, ed. Alexandru Simon, Julian Mihai Damian, and Mihailo Popović (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012).

44 Biblioteka Czartoryskich, Teki Naruszewicza, T. 118, no. 59, f. 257.

45 Cf. Carsten Kumke, *Führer und Geführte bei den Zaporoger Kosaken: Struktur und Geschichte kosakischer Verbände im polnisch-litauischen Grenzland (1550–1648)* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993), 32–58, 71–90.

46 Daria Starčenko, "The Devil Is Sneaking on a Čajka: Cossack Logic of Loot and Violence in the Black Sea Region in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *The Military in the Early Modern World*, ed. Markus Meumann and Andrea Pühringer (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2020), 205–22, 215–16.

sion of Bershad, a small Cossack-manned fortress, which was commanded by the notorious Cossack highwayman Wasyl Bosy, who regularly harassed Ottoman caravans passing through the Black Sea steppes.[47] Peaks in Cossack sea raiding activities can also be related to another form of Cossack integration into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. From the end of the sixteenth century onwards, they formed a market for soldiers and mercenaries, but only a small part of the Cossacks, the so-called registered Cossacks, were on the payroll permanently. The majority would be recruited on demand—released from service after years of campaigning and without income, Cossack mercenaries would often seek to prolong their martial business by joining the sea raids.

Cossack raids were shaped by many other factors too. An important one was knowledge of the Black Sea, its coastal and riverine geography. On the one hand, this knowledge was acquired in practice, widening the range of action raid by raid. On the other hand, several sources have it that the Cossacks were supported by renegades, slaves who had fled, and local collaborators, who served them as guides or gave them shelter. Knowledge and local networks were crucial for avoiding contact with the growing number of Ottoman ships dispatched to hunt the Cossacks down. It seems that the Cossacks were generally well-informed about the whereabouts of the Ottoman fleet and/or the Ottoman/Crimean Tatar land forces, as their most successful attacks took place during Ottoman campaigns. Much like their Tatar counterparts on land, they used a tactical mix of evasion and sudden reappearances to "shock and awe" their enemy. If necessary, they would hide in remote coastal areas, like the Danube Delta or small islands, and reemerge when the danger was gone. Sometimes they would use the light weight of their *chaika*s to their advantage and carry them overland in order to lower them into the water at some place where they were unexpected.[48] With increasing knowledge they would even undertake a day's journey inland to catch a town or village off-guard. Thus, in 1622 they raided Kandıra, a small town some ten kilometers inland from the Black Sea, about 130 kilometers northeast of Constantinople. The prodigy of Ottoman travel writing, Evliya Çelebi, wrote that during the reign of Sultan Ahmed (1603–18) they landed at the coastal village of Perşembe and crossed the mountains to ambush the town of Koyulhisar some 140 kilometers (87 miles) inland, which, to be sure, seems exaggerated. Surviving Ottoman documents show, however, that the Ottoman authorities feared the Cossacks could march as far south as İzmit, about fifty to sixty kilometers from the Black Sea coast.[49] In 1624, the Don Cossacks landed near Sudak and marched some thirty kilometers inland, sacking the former capital of the khanate, Eski Qırım. Four years later they sacked the further

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47 Zbigniew Anusik, "Kasztelan Krakowski Jerzy Ks. Zbaraski (1574–1631): Szkic do portretu antyregalisty," *Przegląd Nauk Historicznych* 9 (2010): 55–138; Karol Szajnocha, "Dwa lata dziejów naszych," in *Dzieła Karola Szajnochy*, ed. Karol Szajnocha (Warszawa: Józef Unger, 1877), 9:153–54; Blaszczyk, *Frühneuzeitliche Dimensionen steppennomadischer Gewalt*, 118–19.

48 Starčenko, "The Devil Is Sneaking on a Čajka," 217–19; Ostapchuk, "The Human Landscape," 64–65.

49 Ostapchuk, "The Human Landscape," 62–63.

inland Qarasuvbazar, the commercial hub of the khanate. The Don Cossacks, being officially under Moscow's suzerainty, and having their headquarters in a number of forts upriver from Ottoman Azak (Russian: Azov), were evident accomplices of the Zaporizhian Cossacks, with whom they joined forces on the sea, especially from the 1620s on, albeit not without frictions.[50] Although the question is not well researched, there are sources that indicate that the Cossack pirates from the Don and Dnipro would also cooperate with the peoples of the Caucasian Black Sea coast, which remained under rather loose Ottoman control. Thus, they would find shelter and supplies, and even a market to sell captives in the Ottoman vassal kingdoms of Georgia, especially coastal Mingrelia and Guria. Whether they actually joined forces in sea raids remains to be clarified by further research. Other support in the form of guides and hideouts they would receive from the inhabitants of the riverine maze of the Danube Delta.[51] A rather prominent and exceptional example of Crimean Tatar support for Cossack sea raids was the tenure of Crimean *qalğa* Şahin Giray, who, an ardent enemy of Ottoman supremacy, opened the Crimean Tatar ports to the Cossacks for supplies and treatment of the wounded.[52] It is certainly no coincidence that the climax of the Cossack sea raids in the 1620s overlapped with this period of Ottoman-Giray conflict. Şahin Giray must be also considered to have been the mastermind behind Shah ʿAbbās' plans of employing the Cossack sea force in a war against the Ottoman Empire, going so far as to carve out a Cossack state on the Anatolian coast.[53]

By the end of the 1630s, the age of Cossack sea raids was coming to an end as Ukraine was entering rather self-consuming times—thus the emergence of the Hetmanate as a political entity in the Polish-Lithuanian Cossacks wars, upsetting the regional balance of power, and the longstanding conflict of supremacy over Cossack Ukraine, finally decided by Russia, brought an end to the sea raids. But the chapter of Cossack raids in general was not closed yet. In the late seventeenth and the eighteenth century, Zaporizhian and Don Cossacks who opposed Russian rule settled in the domains of the Crimean Khanate and, after its demise, in the Ottoman Balkans, in particular in the lower Danube region. During the years under Giray rule, the Cossacks, Zaporizhians as well as the Nekrasovites, Russian Orthodox Old Believers of the former Don Host, continued some of their raiding traditions, albeit in reverse, hijacking merchants and undertaking some small-scale raids on Russian-controlled territories. Yet, as in the case of the Nogay raids, the possibilities of the eighteenth century were limited and the khanate's prosecution of trespasses was incomparably severe. Both groups, used by the Ottomans as irregular forces, were to play a role in the eighteenth- and

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50 For more details on the individual raids of the seventeenth century, see Vladimir N. Korolev, *Bosforskaia voina* (Rostov-na-Donu: Izdat. Rostovskogo Universiteta, 2002).

51 Ostapchuk, "The Human Landscape," 39–40, 60, 65.

52 Ostapchuk, "The Ottoman Black Sea Frontier," 109–10.

53 Ostapchuk, "The Ottoman Black Sea Frontier," 69–70; Oleksa Haivoronskyi, *Poveliteli dvukh materikov*, vol. 2, *Krymskie khany pervoi poloviny XVII stoletiia v borbe za samostoiatelnost i edinovlastie* (Kyiv: Maisternyia knyhy, 2009), 103.

nineteenth-century conflicts between the Ottoman state and bandit-lords known by the name Kırcalı, who will be discussed in subsection 5.[54]

4 Caucasian Pirates

There has been some debate whether the "Ottoman lake" hypothesis, including the sudden loss of a sense of security and sovereignty caused by the Cossack sea raids, is justified considering that the Ottoman Black Sea coast was frequently hit by Caucasian pirates as early as the sixteenth century, even before the rise of Cossack seafaring.[55] Yet the impact of Caucasian piracy in this respect should not be overestimated. It was a phenomenon endemic to a restricted area on the eastern and southeastern Black Sea shores, where reoccurring acts of piracy are documented since antiquity, as shown by Albrecht Fuess in the previous chapter. The Ottomans came into contact with these pirates after 1451, when an Ottoman sea expedition seized Tskhumi (Ottoman: Sohum, Classical Sebastopolis), the capital of the duchy of Tskhumi within the Kingdom of Georgia, home to a Genoese trading outpost. With no tribute arriving, a second punitive expedition was carried out in 1454, turning all Georgian duchies on the coast into Ottoman tributaries. The Ottoman presence in the eastern Black Sea was cemented by the conquest of Trebizond in 1461 and the ousting of the Genoese and Venetians from the Black Sea, starting with the conquest of Caffa in 1475 and ending with the takeover of the last Genoese colonies on the Circassian coast, Anapa, Taman, and Koba in 1479.[56] The 1460s also saw the final disintegration of the Kingdom of Georgia in various rival principalities and kingdoms, including the coastal principalities of Guria, Mingrelia, and Abkhazia.[57] Generally, the Ottomans had no interest in direct rule over the coastal principalities—the premodern Abkhazian coast, for instance, was swampy and malaria-infested. But this attitude changed when strategic deliberations in the wars with Safavid Persia called for it. Thus, in 1547, on Guria's invitation, the Ottomans occupied the fortresses of Gonio (Ottoman: Gönye) and Batumi (Ottoman: Batum) whilst fighting the Safavids and their Imeretian and Kartlian allies.[58] In 1578, at the beginning of another war with Safavid Persia, the Ottomans took Sohum into their direct possession, declaring Abkhazia an Ottoman province (*beylerbeylik*). After two years, the latter was abolished due to a lack of income and incorporated

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54 Vladyslav Volodymyrovych Hrybovskyi and Vadim Vintserovich Trepavlov, eds., *Kazachestvo v tiurkskom i slavianskom mirakh: Kollektivnaia monografiia* (Kazan: Institut arkheologii im. A. Kh. Khalikova AN Respubliki Tatarstan, 2018), 489–547. Cf. the chapter "Migration around the Black Sea (Mid-thirteenth century to 1700)" in this volume.

55 Cf. Işıksel, "La Piraterie abkhaze."

56 Mehmet Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu, "Osmanlılar'ın Kafkas-Elleri'ni Fethi (1451–1590)" (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1998), 2–81.

57 Donald Rayfield, *Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia* (London: Reaktion Books, 2012), 157–59.

58 Nebi Gümüş, "16. Asır Osmanlı-Gürcistan İlişkileri" (PhD diss., Marmara Üniversitesi, 2000), 64.

into the province of Batum. The Ottomans kept the fortresses and leased the countryside back to the Shervashidze (as *yurtluk-ocaklık*). Sohum seems to have fallen into neglect in the seventeenth century, as there is little information about it in that period.[59] All in all, the Ottoman presence remained concentrated in certain areas and was restricted to the fortresses of the coast, which were also to ensure safety from pirate raids. The Circassians, the Abkhaz, and other people of the Caucasian coast and its mountains were organized in various tribes ruled by noble families, who frequently feuded and raided each other. Captives of the raids, along with other local products, had previously been sold to Italian merchants. With the Italian merchants gone, the peoples of the Caucasian Black Sea shores lost their traditional trading partners and corsairing targets.[60] On top of that, the disintegration of the Georgian kingdom added a multitude of warring factions and internecine strife to the equation, which favored the (re-)emergence of sea raids. Thus, although Ottoman documents mention sea raids as early as in 1516, 1523, and 1560 affecting places as westward as Rize and Trabzon, the earliest detailed and tangible Ottoman information we have on sea raids concerns attacks on the Gurian coast, including its Ottoman-ruled Ajarian parts, by Abkhaz and Mingrelian raiders, in 1571.[61] These were probably related to the ongoing throne-related conflicts between Mingrelia, Guria, and Imeretia. The Dadiani of Mingrelia, sometimes backed by the major ruling family of Abkhazia, the Shervashidze, frequently feuded with their relatives and southern neighbors, the Gurieli of Guria.[62] Thus, in 1571, probably after attacking Gurieli territory first, a fleet of fifteen vessels allegedly belonging to "Dadyan and his sons" raided the Ottoman districts of Atine (modern-day Pazar), Arhavi, and Gönye, capturing slaves and victuals.[63] Other Ottoman documents of the same year speak only of Abkhaz raiders attacking the same area, with two or four vessels, whilst Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu assumes that these might have included Mingrelians as well.[64] Yet it is safe to assume that such piracy was a special métier of the Abkhaz and other people of the Abkhazian coast to the north of Sohum, who on some occasions were acting on behalf of their southern neighbor. Still, the power constellations of this area were complex and are difficult to grasp. For instance, in 1532 the rulers of Mingrelia and Guria, in an act of accord, led a punitive campaign against "Jiqeti" for raiding their shores—ending disastrously with the death of one and the capture of the other ruler. Jiqeti, the "land of the Jiqs" or Jigets, a people related to the Abkhaz, is found to the north of Abkhazia proper (around Gagra) and might be associated

59 Anri Robertovich Chediia, "Problema osmanskogo upravleniia chernomorskim poberezhem Zapadnogo Kavkaza cherez prizmu deiatelnosti kavkazskogo piratstva (abkhazskogo, cherkesskogo)," *Historical and Social-Educational Ideas* 10, no. 6/1 (2019): 40–41; Sadık Müfit Bilge, *Osmanlı Çağı'nda Kafkasya 1454–1829: Tarih, Toplum, Ekonomi* (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2012), 472.

60 Kırzıoğlu, "Osmanlılar'ın Kafkas-Elleri'ni Fethi," 11.

61 Kırzıoğlu, 12–15.

62 Rayfield, *Edge of Empires*, 175.

63 Kırzıoğlu, "Osmanlılar'ın Kafkas-Elleri'ni Fethi," 13. Cf. Bilge, *Osmanlı Çağı'nda Kafkasya*, 478–79.

64 Kırzıoğlu, "Osmanlılar'ın Kafkas-Elleri'ni Fethi," 13–15.

with the medieval Zichia from Genoese and Byzantine sources, which has to be considered more of a collective exonym for all the people of the Caucasian coast between the River Enguri and the Taman Peninsula, however.[65] In any case, Zichia was considered a pirate nest in Genoese times and continued to be so later. Ottoman reactions to curb pirate activities included anti-pirate raids and strict action against smuggling arms and black powder to the Abkhazian coast as well as a ban on importing salt—a defective good in those parts. To intercept the raids they built a fortress at Faş (Georgian: Poti) at the mouth of the River Rioni in 1578. Furthermore, in an attempt to clear the complex power relations in Abkhazia they began addressing the head of the Abkhazian Shervashizde family and Abkhazian overlord with the title Melik (King, cf. Abkhaz: *apskha*).[66] An interesting side note involving the Crimean Khanate concerns the year 1583, when an Ottoman decree explained the ordinance of anti-smuggling activities with the need to prevent arms from falling into the hands of the "cossacking" sons of dethroned Crimean khan Mehmed II Giray, who, the Ottomans assumed, had taken refuge among the Circassians of nearby Mount Elbrus.[67] In the seventeenth century, the Ottomans would not change their strategy vis-à-vis the pirates, occasionally dispatching flotillas to fight them. They tackled the problem more seriously only in 1703, when in a joint effort with the forces of Guria, Mingrelia, and Imeretia they invaded Abkhazia and dethroned Abkhazian lord Zegnak, accused of supporting the pirates, in favor of his sons. The invaders killed many Abkhazian nobles and imposed a new territorial division upon the country by dividing it among Zegnak's three sons. The Ottomans resumed the (re-)construction of fortresses along the coast (Anakara in 1704, Sohum and Sucuk in the 1720s, Gelincik in the 1780s) which met with reoccurring resistance from the local populations but effectively limited the range of the coastal raids and forced the pirates to restrict themselves to attacking ships off the coast.[68] The danger of such an attack was still imminent in the mid-eighteenth century, as noted by the famous eighteenth century expert on Oriental trade, Charles de Peyssonnel:

> When one has finished his affairs and loaded the ship, one has to take great care to wait before setting sail for a fresh wind, about which one needs to be sure that it will carry at least ten or twelve miles at large, as the neighboring Beys are lying in wait and arm the vessels for boarding and pillaging the ship. For this reason one has to choose large and well-armed vessels with a good and numerous crew. [...] If one has the bad luck to be taken, they will rob and enslave you. The Abazes put a waterskin on the head of every prisoner und guide them into the mountains, so that no one can find again the way they came. They make them herd pigs, which are numerous

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65 Vakhushti Bagrationi, *Istoriia Tsarstva Gruzinskogo*, trans. Nodar Tadeozovich Nakashidze (Tbilisi: Metsinereba, 1976), 233–34. For a history of Jigetia in documents since 1750s, see Aleksandr. Avrelodovich Cherkasov, ed., *Documents and Materials on the History of Jigetia Spanning the Period from 1750 to 1868: A Collection of Documentary Materials* (Sochi: Issledovatel, 2016). For Zichia in a broader sense see Samir Khamidovich Khotko, *Cherkesiia: Genezis, etnopoliticheskie sviazi so stranami Vostochnoi Evropy i Blizhnego Vostoka (XIII–XVI vv)* (Maikop: Adygeiskoe Respublikanskoe Knizhnoe Izdatelstvo, 2017).

66 Kırzıoğlu, "Osmanlılar'ın Kafkas-Elleri'ni Fethi," 14, 17.

67 Kırzıoğlu, 20–21.

68 Chediia, "Problema osmanskogo upravleniia," 42–44.

in that country, but it is easy to get out of this slavery: The Abazes themselves look out for ransom for their captives and come to offer them to the merchants boarding on their piers. One can buy oneself off easily for the value of one-hundred piastres in merchandise.[69]

The Frenchman's description, although not from direct experience, draws the picture of a still highly segmented society (and coast) with a, despite all Ottoman efforts, merely nominal supremacy of the ruling bey—a situation that fostered piracy as it had in the centuries before.[70] The Ottoman need for a collaborative and integrative local overlord remained critical.[71] In 1771, during a rebellion against Ottoman rule, Sohum was captured by local Abkhaz forces only to be reconquered in 1774 by the Ottomans when they intervened in a local throne conflict. The Ottomans ceded Sohum in 1789 to another newly appointed Abkhaz lord, Kelesh Bey, who built ships in its shipyard, including a large galleon with seventy-four cannons financed by the sultan that was probably never finished, however. In 1808, during the Russian-Ottoman war of 1806–12, Kelesh Bey, who had sheltered a rebellious Ottoman pasha and enemy of Sultan Selim III's military reform (*nizam-i cedid*, "new order"), was replaced and killed by his Ottoman-appointed son Arslan Bey while another son, Sefer Bey, fighting his brother, submitted Abkhazia to Russian rule. The Russians occupied Sohum in 1810. After years of diplomatic protest, the Ottomans accepted the loss of Sohum and Anakara in 1826.[72] Although the threat of piracy had decreased in the last decades of the eighteenth century, they continued even into the first years of Russian rule.[73]

5 Celalis and Kırcalıs

The terms Celali and Kırcalı are both difficult blanket terms for very diverse groups. William Griswold defines the term Celali, first documented for the year 1588, as "companies of brigands, led usually by idle or dissident Ottoman army officers, widely-spread throughout Anatolia from about 999/1590 but diminishing by 1030/1620."[74] The origin of the term is generally associated, however, with religiously connoted revolts by pro-Safavid Anatolian Turkmen tribes in the first half of the sixteenth century—one of which was led in 1519 by Bozoklu Şeyh Celal, who is assumed to be the eponymist of the Celalis.[75] The Celalis are associated with a rise of banditry and rural depopulation in the decades around 1600. There is an ongoing debate on the reasons for this

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69 Charles de Peyssonnel, *Traité sur le commerce de la mer Noire* (Paris: Chez Cuchet, 1787), 2:10–11 (my translation—A. B.).

70 Cf. Bilge, *Osmanlı Çağı'nda Kafkasya,* 477–79, 494.

71 On the many Ottoman interventions in Abkhazia, see Bilge, *Osmanlı Çağı'nda Kafkasya,* 472–75.

72 Chediia, "Problema osmanskogo upravleniia," 43; İdris Bostan, "Rize," in *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2008), 35:147–51; Bilge, *Osmanlı Çağı'nda Kafkasya,* 474–75.

73 Chediia, "Problema osmanskogo upravleniia," 44.

74 William J. Griswold, "Djalālī," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

75 Mücteba İlgürel, "Celâlî İsyanları," *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi* 7 (1993): 252–57.

rise in banditry. The classical interpretation considers it a result of socio-economic changes associated with the rise of a money-based economy and the downfall of the prebendal-feudal system, which fostered the emergence of mercenaries and the armament of the rural population on the one hand and the desertion of prebendal forces on the other.[76] Another, more recent interpretation sees an important factor in the climate changes known as the "Little Ice Age," which forced peasants to look for other sources of income.[77] As noted by Griswold, a typical feature of the Celali revolts was the backgrounds of their most prominent leaders, who were recruited mostly from disgruntled provincial elites demanding offices from the central government.[78] This was connected to the increased importance of the Ottoman court and its courtiers in politics and the retreat of the sultans from the military field, which limited the access of provincial military elites to Sultanic power.[79] For the most part, the Celali movement was an Anatolian inland and less a coastal/sea-related phenomenon, but there were exceptions. For example, in 1605, a group of forty to fifty bandits, dubbed Celalis, made it from Anatolia to the Budjak and occupied the fortress of Kili in the Danube Delta. They killed the sancak bey and Kemerli Abdi, their leader, declared himself the dead man's successor—all the way plundering as much as possible.[80] But local sipahis and janissaries of Dobruja also defied Ottoman orders, hid Tatar raiders in their homes, and joined illegal raids into Moldavia and Wallachia—Ottoman vassals.[81] Most interesting, however, is the case of a few refugee Giray princes who joined the notorious Celali rebel leaders, Karayazıcı and Deli Hasan. Selamet Giray and his grandnephews, the brothers Mehmed and Şahin Giray, had fled Crimea, seeking refuge in Istanbul after the latter's older brother, Devlet Giray, was accused of an attempted coup against Khan Gazi Giray and killed. First accommodated in the vicinity of Yambol in Bulgaria, as was custom for Giray hostages in Ottoman hands, the princes were relocated to Bursa at the request of Gazi Giray, who felt threatened by their proximity. Yet the princes fled from Bursa and joined the camp of the Celali rebels Karayazıcı and Deli Hasan, who had retreated to the mountains south of Samsun. The princes tried to persuade the Celalis to ferry

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76 Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Oktay Özel, "The Reign of Violence: The Celalis c.1550–1700," in *The Ottoman World*, ed. Christine Woodhead (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2011).

77 Sam White, *The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

78 Cf. the classical study by Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

79 Leslie P. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 146.

80 Selçuk Demir, *75 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri'nin Transkripsyonu ve Değerlendirilmesi (s. 1–171)* (MA thesis, Atatürk Üniversitesi Erzurum, 2008), 187–88.

81 Adem Keleş, *75 Numaralı mühimme Defteri'nin Transkripsyonu ve Değerlendirilmesi (s. 172–331)* (MA thesis, Atatürk Üniversitesi Erzurum, 2011), 154–55; Tahsin Gemil, *Relaţiile ţărilor Române cu Poarta Otomană în documente turceşti, 1601–1712* (Bucharest: Direcţia Generală a Arhivelor Statului din Republica Socialistă România, 1984), 135–36, 160–61.

their army from Samsun to Crimea and help them gain the Crimean throne. Yet this plan never came to fruition—Deli Hasan was co-opted by the Ottomans and the princes returned into Ottoman hostageship.[82]

While the Celalis were a predominantly Anatolian phenomenon, the Kırcalıs, appearing in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, were a problem in Rumelia. The term has its origin in the name of the eponymous town in the Rhodope Mountains, which formed one important area of retreat and reformation for the Kırcalıs, whom Ottoman documents also simply called "mountain bandits" (*dağlı eşkıyası*). Several reasons can be listed for their emergence. First of all, they appeared after the Ottomans had lost their centuries-old northern Black Sea borderlands, including the Crimean Khanate, their territories in the Northern Caucasus, and Southern Ukraine, which turned Rumelia into a borderland itself and filled it with refugees and former bellicose frontiersmen from the north. Secondly, the territorial loss caused an economic crisis in Rumelia as it severed traditional networks of economic exchange profoundly and made alternative economic circulation inevitable. Thirdly, the rise of the *ayan*, local notables/magnates, and the competition among them, created a need for a pool of mercenaries perpetuating the mountain bandit problem. Furthermore, the Ottoman administration, short of manpower, made active use of the Kırcalıs in times of war, sanctioning Kırcalı violence against its own Christian subjects suspected of sedition. It is from this that Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian national historiographies established the term "Kırcalı time" for the epoch of violence they associated with Muslims preceding the age of national revolutions. Yet recent research shows that the so-called Kırcalıs can hardly be divided among confessional lines, as there were many occasions of inter-confessional cooperation and plundering of co-religionists.[83] As already noted, there is a strong Black Sea component to the emergence of Kırcalı banditry. For instance, Vera Mutafchieva saw the beginning of the Kırcalı movement in the plundering by deserted troops of Devlet IV Giray, who had joined other bandits and looted the villages of Eastern Thrace, during the Russian-Ottoman War of 1769–74.[84] Later too, the Kırcalıs recruited partially from Crimean and Caucasian refugees the Ottomans had relocated to Rumelia after losing these territories to Russia.[85] After the final disbandment of the Crimean Khanate in 1792, the Girays themselves were permanently settled in Bulgaria and Thrace, where their family had held estates since the sixteenth century. One of the princes, Cengiz Giray, fell out with the Porte and, raising an army of Kırcalıs, instigated a rebellion. He forged an alliance with another Kırcalı condottiere, the rebellious *ayan* of Vidin, Pazvantoğlu Osman, who opposed Sultan Selim III's military reform, the

82 Blaszczyk, *Frühneuzeitliche Dimensionen steppennomadischer Gewalt*, 237.

83 Tolga U. Esmer, "Economies of Violence, Banditry and Governance in the Ottoman Empire Around 1800," *Past & Present* 224, no. 1 (2014): 163–99.

84 Vera Mutafchieva, *Kardzhaliisko Vreme* (Sofia: Balgarskata Akademia na Naukite, 1993), 56–57.

85 Esmer, "Economies of Violence," 197.

nizam-i cedid.[86] But the Girays were not the only "veterans" of Black Sea violence making a reappearance in the "Kırcalı time"—the Ottoman Cossacks of the Danube Host in Kadirlez (Romanian: Sfântu Gheorghe) and the Nekrasovites of the Danube Delta were equally drawn into the conflict. Competing over resources with the Danube Host, the Nekrasovites joined the rebellious pasha of Izmail, Pehlivan İbrahim, an opponent of the *nizam-i cedid*, and ambushed the Danube Host, which had declared its allegiance to the sultan. Although Russia tried to lure the Cossacks back into its fold afterwards, they left en masse only in the 1820s after the Ottomans tried to deploy them against the national uprisings of the Serbs and Greeks, which mark the end of the "Kırcalı time."[87]

6 Conclusion

If we compare all the different groups of bandits and pirates, there are several commonalities that spring to mind. First of all, they all emerged on the border zones between empires among societies with a tendency for open rules of succession and high levels of violent, factional strife with proto-democratic features. For these groups, raiding was not only a matter of material gain, but also one of social capital. The Black Sea, including its extension on land, the vast Eurasian steppe, connected the bandits/ pirates not only with their prey, but also with each other, as can be seen in several instances of cross-Euxine cooperation.

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86 Hakan Kırımlı and Ali Yaycıoğlu, "Heirs of Chinghis Khan in the Age of Revolutions: An Unruly Crimean Prince in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond," *Der Islam* 94, no. 2 (2017): 496–526.
87 Olena Bachynska, "Zadunaiska Sich v geopolitychnii sytuatsii Prychornomoria," *Drinovsky Sbornik* XIII (2020): 90–96.

Tuncay Zorlu
Naval History of the Black Sea

1 Naval Developments (Early Activities up to the Crimean War)

The Black Sea has always been a theater of naval battles, conflicts, and confrontations for the countries neighboring it, mainly due to its geo-strategic, military-maritime, and economic features. It has also witnessed the circulation and transfer of naval know-how, technology, and personnel among the countries in question as well as the non-neighboring ones who sought political/economic advantages to secure their commercial interests in the region under the pretext of helping an ally. This article mainly aims to cover early naval activities in the region to the Crimean War and to provide the reader with a well-balanced panorama of the Black Sea from a naval history perspective, with an emphasis on naval battles, ships, shipyards, shipbuilding technologies, fortresses, and harbors in the Black Sea.

1.1 Early Naval Activities on the Black Sea

Early naval clashes on the Black Sea date back to the ninth century, when Kyivan Rus[1] sent a fleet to capture Constantinople on June 18, 860 AD. Although they failed to seize this well-fortified city, it marked the beginning of Rus-Byzantine relations. The year 941 witnessed the Rus-Byzantine War in which Rus, under Igor of Kyiv, and its allies, the Pechenegs, embarked on an attack on the Byzantine Empire. Emperor Lecapenus, who did not expect such an assault, immediately fitted out fifteen retired ships with "Greek fire" throwers, which played a decisive role in the victory against Igor's fleet. The so-called Greek fire thrown through the tubes set the rival ships ablaze, forcing the crew to jump overboard and drown under the weight of their armor and helmets.[2] Naval attacks continued in the following years and the Kyivans, under two famous generals, Ioannes Kourkouas and Bardas Phokas, turned their attacks towards Thrace and made some gains. However, they could not escape a bitter end when the Byzantine navy under Theophanes launched a surprise attack and destroyed almost the entire Rus fleet. Since Rus's attempts in the following years did not yield any results, and

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1 Kyivan Rus is not identical with Russia; see Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, O. Pritsak, and J. S. Reshetar, *From Kievan Rus' to Modern Ukraine: Formation of the Ukrainian Nation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ukrainian Studies Fund, Harvard University, 1984), 355–64.
2 Edward N. Luttwark, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), 323–26.

the parties decided to establish diplomatic relations, the Byzantine Empire agreed to pay some tributes and make trade concessions to their rivals as a result of a treaty of 945.[3]

Current maritime scholarship also mentions early Genoese maritime colonies and activities from the mid-thirteenth century on the Black Sea, which were mostly commercial rather than naval in nature. The year 1261 constitutes a turning point, since it symbolizes the recapture of Constantinople from the Latin Empire (1204–61), the beginning of the Palaiologan dynasty (1259–1453), and the rise of Genoese long-distance trade along the Black Sea coast.[4]

1.2 Anatolian Seljuks on the Black Sea

During the Anatolian Seljuk period (1075–1308), Süleyman Şah (also known as Sulayman ibn Qutulmish, 1077–86), the state's founder, took advantage of the turmoil in Byzantium to expand its borders towards the Marmara and the Black Seas. A Turkish lord by the name of Karategin captured the coastal city of Sinope in early 1085, though the city was soon recaptured by the Byzantnie emperor Alexios I Komnenos (1081–1118). Turcomans who launched operations against the coastal cities on the Black Sea during the reigns of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kaykhusraw I (1192–96) and Süleyman II (also known as Rükneddin Süleyman Şah, 1196–1204), seized the city of Samsun, which was an important development, since the Anatolian Seljuks now had a port city on the Black Sea. However, the Seljuk's soon lost control of Samsun when Alexios I of Trebizond (also known as Alexios I Mega Komnenos, 1204–22), who ruled the coastal cities of Oinoe (today: Ünye), Sinope (today: Sinop), and Trebizond (today: Trabzon), besieged it. With the involvement of the emperor of Nicaea, Theodore I Laskaris (1204–22), a struggle for superiority began on the Black Sea. This time Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kaykhusraw organized a campaign to Trebizond to besiege and suppress the city, which caused turmoil and had a negative impact on maritime commercial activities. Later, Sultan ʿIzz al-Dīn Kaykāʾūs I (1211–20) besieged Sinope and entered the city in 1214, gaining both a commercial port and a military base on the Black Sea.[5]

After the Mongol invasion in 1223, Suğdak (today: Sudak), an important port and trade center in the Crimean Peninsula, became the focus of attention. When the Empire of Trebizond's attempts to settle in Suğdak were combined with security complaints raised by merchants suffering robbery, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Kayqubad I (1220–37) launched a campaign to the region. Venice and Genoa, whose commercial activities

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3 Donald W. Mitchell, *A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), 1–7; Alexander A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire, 324–1453* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1952), 1:322.
4 For the whole story of the first Genoese colonies in the Black Sea region see Evgeny Khvalkov, *The Colonies of Genoa in the Black Sea Region* (New York: Routledge, 2018).
5 Feridun M. Emecen, *Karadeniz Kıyı Kentleri Tarihi* (Istanbul: Turkuaz Kitap, 2020), 81–87.

on the Black Sea were endangered, also played an important role as instigators of this expedition. The Seljuk sultan commissioned Hüsameddin Çoban, the commander of Kastamonu, to save Suğdak. Kipchaks and rulers of the Rus as well as the governor of Suğdak obeyed and ultimately recognized Seljuk rule, which continued in Suğdak until the Mongol invasion in 1239. After their defeat in the Battle of Köse Dağ of 1243, the Anatolian Seljuks entered a period of gradual collapse and turmoil. The emperor of Trebizond, Manuel I (1238–63), taking advantage of this internal turmoil, captured Sinope in 1259. Later, Pervane Muineddin Süleyman marched on the city to retake it, with a 4,000-strong land force. Realizing that Sinope could not be captured only by ground troops, he set off with a considerable number of ships on the sea. Sinope was re-conquered in 1266, with ships carrying 1,000 fully equipped soldiers and catapults, thanks mostly to the superior performance of Taceddin Kılıç and his soldiers. This victory marked the establishment of the Pervaneoğulları Principality in the region.[6]

1.3 Early Ottoman Naval Activities on the Black Sea

In its early years, the Ottomans had reached the southern shores of the Black Sea in a short time. Mehmed I (1413–21) extended his empire towards the western shores and brought some coastal Turkish principalities under his dominion. On the other hand, the Empire of Trebizond, in the east of the southern shores, had gradually shrunk with the pressure of the Turkoman tribes and had to retreat further east of Giresun (known in ancient Greek as Cerasus). The conquest of Constantinople by Mehmed II (1432–81) in 1453 led to the opening of the Ottoman state to both the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, thus laying the groundwork for the Ottoman naval empire.[7]

Following the conquest of Constantinople, Mehmed II established a naval arsenal on the Golden Horn in 1455 on the relics of an old Byzantine shipyard, which was the second naval base of the Ottoman navy after the one in Gallipoli, which would also be reorganized. All these preparations were the harbinger of a period of intense conquests in the seas and the establishment of the Ottoman naval empire. In the following years Mehmed II strengthened his dominance in the Straits connecting the Asian and European continents. For the Ottomans, the conquest of Constantinople opened the door the Black Sea and all the ports surrounding it. Since he did not want the existence of a second Byzantine center on the Black Sea, he started preparations for a campaign to Trebizond, located on the Anatolian shores of the eastern Black Sea. This time, there would also be an operation against the Genoese, who had colonies on the Anatolian coast. Grand Vizier Mahmud Pasha was deployed to surround the city of Amasra

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6 Erdoğan Merçil, "Selçuklular Döneminde Türk Denizcilik Faaliyetleri," in *Türk Denizcilik Tarihi*, ed. İdris Bostan and Salih Özbaran (Istanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 2009), 1:21–30.
7 İdris Bostan, *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği* (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2015), 13–32.

from the sea and Mehmed II himself attacked on land. The city surrendered in 1460. Ottoman forces, which continued their way both by land and by sea, reached Sinop under İsfendiyar Bey of Candaroğulları. Although Sinope had a navy and a fortified castle that would defend itself, it submitted to Ottoman rule without any casualties. In 1461 Ottomans captured Trebizond after a joint siege by sea (150 ships) and land forces. This conquest meant the opening of the surrounding cities such as Rize and Giresun to the Turkic/Muslim population as well as the revival of maritime commerce. Therefore, Trebizond/Trabzon became an important base for the Ottomans, enabling them to reach the lands on the northern shores and the Caucasus via the sea, as well as Eastern Anatolia and Iran by land. After the conquests on the Anatolian shores of the Black Sea, now it was time to conquer the north coast, since Mehmed II planned to eliminate the Genoese colonies there in order to put an end to foreign trade on the Black Sea. Having captured Amasra, he sent his fleet to the Black Sea in order to take the other Genoese trading posts on the Caucasian coasts, in the Crimean Peninsula, in the Danube basin, and on the Rumelian coast of the Black Sea. Taking the advantage of the struggle for the throne in the Crimean Khanate, a strong Ottoman fleet composed of almost three-hundred ships under Gedik Ahmed Pasha (1474 – 77) captured some positions, including the strategically important Caffa (Crimean Tatar/Ottoman: Kefe), from the Genoese in 1474. Meanwhile, the twelve-year war with Venice had been suspended for a year, to complete the Crimean expedition. The Ottoman fleet reached the Sea of Azov by crossing the Kerch Strait after Caffa surrounded the castle and ultimately captured it. Following the surrender of Mangup Castle, the Crimean Khanate came under Ottoman rule, which marked the domination of the Ottoman Empire over the entire Black Sea, except for Kili (today: Kiliia) and Akkerman (today: Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi). The conquest of Crimea was the first and an important step towards the Black Sea's becoming a "Turkish Lake," as it caused the eastern trade routes to fall into the hands of the Ottomans.[8] Trade continued under Ottoman rule, as it was then to some extent more protected (*pax Ottomana*) despite some disturbances (Cossacks, storms, etc.). The Ragusans, and to an extent other Italian merchants, at least from Galata/Pera, remained important actors, as did Greek and other merchants within the Ottoman Empire.[9]

The administration of the inner parts of the Crimean Peninsula was left to the Crimean khans, though the Ottoman system was established on the coast, especially around the Sea of Azov, in order to follow direct administration policy and to control

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8 İdris Bostan, "Fatih Sultan Mehmed ve Osmanlı Denizciliği," in Bostan and Özbaran, *Türk Denizcilik Tarihi* (Istanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 2009), 1:63 – 72.

9 On this issue, as well as Cretan ships, Caffa, and Trebizond (also important for Armenian merchants), see Eric Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 53 passim.

the Black Sea more easily. In addition, the Ottoman Empire took control of the northern region of the Black Sea and the northern trade route through the province of Caffa.[10]

Bayezid II (1481–1512) continued the maritime policies developed during the reign of Mehmed II and captured Kili and Akkerman in 1484, facilitating the complete annexation of the west coast of the Black Sea to the Ottoman Empire. Almost all the crucial points of the south-north trade route thus came under Ottoman rule. The less populated northern Black Sea regions became an export gateway transferring substantial amounts of grain, meat, fish, and other animal products to the densely populated southern areas. From the south, large quantities of silk, cotton, and hemp were transferred to northern ports such as Kefe, Kili, and Akkerman. With the conquest of Akkerman, the Ottoman Empire, which took all the Black Sea coasts under its control, soon made it impossible for foreign states to cross this sea. Thus, at the end of the sixteenth century the Black Sea, which was completely closed to foreign trade, became an inland sea in terms of politics, administration, and trade. This situation continued until the eighteenth century.[11]

1.4 Cossack Raids on the Black Sea

Form the early seventeenth century onward, Ottoman domination in the Black Sea began to be disturbed and challenged by the northern Cossack raids, which inflicted heavy blows to Ottoman coast cities of Sinop, Samsun, and Trabzon. They even passed the Istanbul Strait and attacked the city in the years 1615, 1620, and 1624.[12] The Cossacks used *chaika* ships which could be operated in rivers and shallow waters as well as on the open sea. These ships with high maneuverability and stealth could cross over to the shores of the Black Sea. Thanks to its low structure preventing enemy ships from seeing it from a distance, a *chaika* could observe the Ottoman ships safely and wait for a suitable time to attack. From the second half of the 1620s, the Ottomans developed a defense system to prevent similar Cossack attacks from the Dnipro to some extent. These attacks obliged the Ottoman fleet operating in other seas to patrol the Black Sea, risking the security of the Mediterranean, the Aegean Sea, and the Straits. From the beginning of the seventeenth century on, Cossacks caused great havoc to western and eastern coastal sites of the Ottoman Empire such as Varna, Misivri (today: Nesebar), Ahyolu (today: Pomorie), Kili, Akkerman, Amasra, Sinop, Samsun, and Trabzon. For instance, in their intermittent attacks on Trabzon in 1625 the Cossacks sacked

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10 For the full story see Halil İnalcık, *Sources and Studies on the Ottoman Black Sea*, vol. 1, *The Customs Register of Caffa: 1487–1490* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ukranian Research Institute, Harvard University, 1995); Yücel Öztürk, *Osmanlı Hakimiyetinde Kefe: 1475–1600* (Ankara: Ministry of Culture Publication, 2000).
11 Mustafa Işık, "XVI. Yüzyılda Akkirman Sancağı," *Journal of Black Sea Studies* 18 (Summer 2008): 19–37.
12 Halil İnalcık, "Karadeniz'de Kazaklar ve Rusya: İstanbul Boğazı Tehlikede," in *Çanakkale Savaşları Tarihi*, ed. M. Demir (Istanbul: Değişim Yayınları, 2008), 1:59–64.

and burned the city and its environs, causing fear among the population, who in turn forced the Ottoman authorities to struggle with various economic and social problems such as halted maritime trade, displacement of people, compensating for the looted properties, and rebuilding the city. Although the Cossacks never established permanent seaports on the Black Sea due to the lack of various tactical and financial means, they troubled the Ottoman rulers and inhabitants of the coastal cities physically, economically, and psychologically.[13]

1.5 Russian Access to the Black Sea and First Confrontations

Gaining access to the Black Sea was a historical aspiration for Russia, since it could provide, in their view, access to the Mediterranean, border security, economic gains, the "liberation" of the Balkans, and the creation of the "Third Roman Empire." However, being well aware of the Ottomans' strong position in the region, Muscovy refrained from taking serious steps to challenge the Ottoman Empire until the end of the seventeenth century, though it secretly supported the Don Cossacks' and Nogays' attacks on Ottoman sovereignty. The unsuccessful Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683 gave Muscovy its long-awaited opportunity and it formed an alliance with Austria, Venice, and Poland against their common rival.[14]

From the early eighteenth century onwards, Russia changed its previous strategy and sought ways to gain access to the Black Sea. For this purpose, Peter I (also known as Peter the Great, 1682–1725) embarked on two campaigns against Crimea in 1687 and 1689, but failed in both.[15] Next time he changed his target and attacked Azak (Russian: Azov) in 1695, the Ottoman fortress at the entrance to the River Don, with a considerable number of naval and land forces, but suffered heavy losses. Thinking that these unsuccessful campaigns were mainly due to the lack of a strong navy able to blockade the mouth of the river, he decided to create a mighty fleet in Voronezh, located at its head. He commissioned foreign shipbuilders from Moscow and Europe and employed almost 26,000 workers from Voronezh and the surrounding provinces. Almost thirty battleships were constructed in 1696. Russian military and naval forces under Peter I surrounded the Azak fortress from all sides. This worn-out and long-neglected Ottoman

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13 Victor Ostapchuk, "The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of the Cossack Naval Raids," in "The Ottomans and the Sea," ed. Kate Fleet, special issue, *Oriente Moderno* 20 (81), n.s., no. 1 (2001): 23–95; Ronald B. Sorobey, "Cossak Pirates of the Black Sea," *Military History* 20, no. 2 (June 2003): 26–32. For a historiographic evaluation, see Ferhad Turanly, "Situation with Studying the History of the Ukrainian Cossack State Using the Turk-Ottoman Sources," *Journal of Black Sea Studies* 8, no. 15 (Autumn 2013): 205–32.
14 Mehmet Ali Ünal, "17. Yüzyılda Karadeniz'de Kazak Saldırıları ve Karadeniz Ticareti," in *Tarih Boyunca Karadeniz Ticareti ve Canik*, ed. Osman Köse (Samsun: Canik Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2013), 1:853–56.
15 Alan W. Fisher, *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea 1772–1783* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 22.

fortress, which was considered to be the key to the Black Sea, could not stand anymore and fell in 1696. This was a first serious challenge to the Ottoman dominance on the Black Sea. After a short while, Peter I embarked on the fortification of the fortress and established a port named Taganrog on the shore of the Sea of Azov, as the base of his new naval forces. To strengthen this new base, he started a campaign to gather support in terms of human and monetary resources. He transferred 20,000 Ukrainian Cossack soldiers to Taganrog in 1697 and mobilized leading noblemen to finance the expenses of construction and maintenance of the navy. Every notable with 8,000 peasant houses under his rule and clergy with 10,000 peasants were demanded to construct a ship in their own name and to meet their expenses on a regular basis. Moreover, to educate the prospective maritime engineers, shipwrights, officers, and personnel, fifty young nobles were sent to leading maritime countries such as Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Italy.[16]

1.6 The Russo-Ottoman Wars of 1736 – 39

In the early eighteenth century, the Ottomans were uncompromising on the entry of a foreign state into the Black Sea, even for commercial purposes. The Ottoman State considered this area its own "inner sea," on the basis that all of the coasts to the east of the line that it assumed to pass through Egypt-Crete and the Morea (today: Peloponnese) were surrounded by its own lands. For almost three centuries, the Black Sea had remained under the absolute rule of the Ottomans. The Ottoman Empire, which did not face a specific threat until the Cossack attacks in this period, managed to protect its superiority until the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty of 1774. Now, the biggest obstacle to the Ottoman Empire's domination in the Black Sea was Russia, which was getting stronger and desired to reach the warm seas. The status of the Black Sea as a "closed sea" became shaky with the rise of Russia. However, Russia, well-aware of the inadequacy of its commercial fleet, tried to ensure that this sea was kept open to the merchant ships of other states in order to find an indirect way to increase its own trade. Russia, which had obtained the opportunity to sail to the Sea of Azov by the Istanbul Treaty of 1700, thought this situation would be restored in 1711 (Treaty of Prut) and in 1713 (Treaty of Edirne [also called the Treaty of Adrianople]).[17]

The Ottoman Empire and Russia waged three naval wars on the Black Sea between 1735 and 1739. Russia, taking advantage of the Ottomans' involvement in the East, decided to attack Crimea, paving the ground for the permanent establishment of the Russian Empire on the Black Sea. Although preparations began in September 1735, Russian attacks started in 1736, when General Lacy deployed 25,000 troops against Azak, pillaged

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16 Roger C. Anderson, *Naval Wars in Levant 1559 – 1853* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1952), 237 – 42.

17 Osman Köse, "Rusya'nın Karadeniz'le İlk Buluşması: İstanbul Antlaşması (13 Temmuz 1700)," *Balıkesir University The Journal of Social Sciences Institute* 15, no. 28 (December 2012): 199 – 220.

the villages, and inflicted many casualties on the Muslim population there. Afterwards, Lacy's men were able to break through Tatar defenses at Or Qapı (today: Perekop), entered Crimea, and burned the city in the absence of the ruler, Qaplan I Giray Khan (1707–8, 1713–15, 1730–36), who was in the Caucasus with the majority of his forces. In response to the unexpected Russian attacks and the occupation of Azak in 1735, the Ottomans immediately deployed the fleet under Grand Admiral Canım Hoca Mehmed Pasha to Azak and intensified shipbuilding to strengthen its naval capacity. The purpose of this first Ottoman fleet was to save Azak from Russian invasion. However, when the risk of Russian occupation of Crimea became apparent, the Ottomans changed their plan and deployed the fleet there. When it anchored off Kefe, the Ottoman navy consisted of some eleven galleys, two galleons, and some other naval ships. By that time the Russian forces had already captured the Or Qapı fortress after a week-long clash. The Ottoman forces, comprising 1,500 naval soldiers, 1,000–2,000 cavalry, and 1,000 soldiers, followed the Russian forces and encountered them in Bağçasaray. After four to five hours of clashes, heavy casualties were inflicted on the Russian forces in Bağçasaray and Aqmescit. The Russian forces also suffered from a rapidly spreading contagious disease. In 1737, Russian forces under Münnich, the commander in chief and a close favorite of Empress Anna, launched another attack and occupied Azak again, though they had to withdraw after almost six months. Although the following year Russian forces under General Lacy made another attempt to invade Crimea, Mengli II Giray (1724–30, 1737–39) defeated them decisively. In the end, the two parties decided to sign a peace treaty.[18]

The first treaty concerning the status of Russian and Ottomans merchants in the Black Sea was the Belgrade Treaty of 1739, whose ninth article stated that the Ottoman and Russian merchants could engage in mutual free trade on the Black Sea via Ottoman ships only. This article left the door ajar to Russian trade in the region. However, it stipulated that Russia could not send war or merchant vessels to Azak, meaning that it also accepted the fact that the Black Sea was under Ottoman rule, and Russia was thus forced to defer its ambitions regarding access to the Black Sea.[19]

1.7 Russia Establishes Itself as a Permanent Maritime Power on the Black Sea

When Catherine II (also known as Catherine the Great, 1762–96) came to power, she embarked on a plan to gain an outlet to the South, construct new fortifications to protect naval bases, and increase maritime trade on the Black Sea. She also aimed to improve the naval school and make use of foreign expertise in modernizing the navy.[20]

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18 Anderson, *Naval Wars*, 237–42; Mitchell, *Russian and Soviet Sea Power*, 48.
19 Bostan, *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği*, 285–305.
20 Mitchell, *Russian and Soviet Sea Power,* 54.

Russia waged the first naval war with the Ottoman Empire in this period. As part of the clashes known as the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768–74, Catherine deployed a fleet under the command of Aleksei Orlov, from the Baltic Sea to the Ottoman territorial waters, and defeated the Ottoman fleet in the Bay of Çeşme on July 6, 1770. The cost of this defeat was huge for the Ottoman navy, since it lost their eleven ships of the line, six frigates, six three-masters, and seven galleys, with thirty-two others burned by the Russian fleet. Additionally, Russians seized a sailing ship and five galleys. Out of 15,000–17,000 men, 5,000–6,000 were captured, wounded, or killed during the clashes. Although this defeat has generally been attributed to the fragility of the Ottoman fleet, it was more likely due to the tactical, administrative, and strategic mistakes of the Grand Admiral Hüsameddin Pasha, who, despite the opposition of Cezayirli Hasan Bey (later Pasha), locked the fleet into a narrow bay at anchor side by side, opening some doors to Russian attacks with fire ships. This victory paved the way for Russia to be one of the leading naval players in the region. On the other hand, in line with the maxim "a good scare is worth more than good advice," this defeat led the Ottoman rulers to start a comprehensive modernization program for its navy.[21]

In the following year, having captured strategically important places such as Kinburn (Ottoman: Kilburun), Enikale (Crimean Tatar: Yeñi Qale), and Kerch (Crimean Tatar: Keriç) in Crimea, Russia obtained the right to free trade and navigation on the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara as a result of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774). Kuban, Azov, Taganrog, Kerch, Enikale, Kinburn, and the Crimean Khanate were declared independent from the Ottoman Empire. Crimea's independence was nominal, but under Russian protection. On April 8, 1783 Catherine II issued the proclamation of the annexation of Crimea, which meant the consolidation of Russian power on the northern shore of the Black Sea. The Ottomans never accepted the annexation of Crimea, which caused new alliances and wars in the Black Sea region. Securing the support of Britain, France and Prussia, the Ottomans demanded the return of Crimea with an ultimatum to Russia. Moreover, these states also recognized Ottoman control over passage of Russian warships through the Straits, and declared Georgia a vassal sultanate, which Russia rejected, kindling the fire for a series naval wars between Russia and the Ottoman Empire from 1787–92.[22]

Naval actions during the siege of Özi (Russian: Ochakov, Ukrainian: Ochakiv, June–July 1788), the Battle of Fidonisi (near "Snake Island," July 1788), the Battle of Kerch Strait/Battle of Enikale (near Kerch, July 1790), the Battle of Cape Kaliakra (July 1790), and the Battle of Tendra (September 1790) witnessed the confrontation between the Russian and the Ottoman fleets. General Ushakov came to the fore in these wars to foil Ottoman plans to regain Crimea. While retaking the peninsula was the Ottoman

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21 For a detailed account of the Çeşme War, see A. Rıza İşipek and Oğuz Aydemir, *1770 Çeşme Deniz Savaşı: 1768–1774 Osmanlı Rus Savaşları* (Istanbul: Denizler Kitabevi, 2006); Anderson, *Naval Wars*, 277–307.

22 Fisher, *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea*, 135.

aim in this Ottoman-Russian War of 1787– 92,[23] not every stage of the conflict took the form of battles between two large navies or fleets. While the war continued, Russia allowed its privateers, which it supported by providing ships, to attack Ottoman ships and settlements on both the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. These pirates sometimes troubled the navies some neutral states as well.[24]

These successive wars and pirate attacks, which mostly went against the Ottoman Empire, served as catalysts for diplomatic means, concluding with the Treaty of Jassy (1792), which caused the Ottoman Empire to transfer Crimea, Ochakov, Kinburn, and Azov to Russia for centuries to come. The most important article of the treaty for the Ottoman side was that they had to recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea. This treaty crowned the Russian efforts both militarily and diplomatically by securing access to the Black Sea.[25]

On the other hand, these wars, although ending in victory mostly for the Russian side, indicated the need for a strong Russian navy and shipyards on the Black Sea. A new shipyard was established at the intersection of the Inhul and Boh rivers in June 1788. Nikolaev came to be the base of shipbuilding in the south in 1789. In addition, Sevastopol was announced as the main port of the Black Sea navy in 1804, serving not only as a port but also as a shipbuilding site.[26] The famous 18-gun brig *Mercury*, which was built here, would win a victory against two Ottoman warships, under Lieutenant Commander A. I. Kazarskii, and therefore came to be awarded the stern flag of St. George. This award was the first to be offered to a Black Sea ship.[27]

In the aftermath of the treaty of 1829 (Edirne), Russia obtained the right for merchantmen to pass the Straits and the treaty of 1833 (Hünkâr İskelesi) established the right of passage for its warships through the Straits, while other states remained banned. Russia had inflicted great losses on the Ottoman navy both at Çeşme in 1770 and at the Battle of Navarino in 1827. Naturally, in doing so, it received great conjunctural help from Britain, which opened its naval bases in the Mediterranean to Russia. Despite this, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles were always under the control of the Ottomans, which was the most important strategic issue limiting the activities of the operational command of Russia's Black Sea navy and preventing it from passing down into the Mediterranean. Moreover, Ottoman control over the Straits also meant support from

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23 Mitchell, *Russian and Soviet Sea Power*, 71– 81; Emir Yener, "Ottoman Sea Power and Naval Technology during Catherine II's Naval Wars of 1768– 1792," *International Naval Journal* 9, no. 1 (2016): 4– 15.

24 Şenay Ö. Gümüş, "1787– 1792 Osmanlı Rus-Savaşı'nda Rus Korsanlığı," *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi* 9, no. 44 (2016): 470– 83.

25 Stanford J. Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789– 1807* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 64– 68; see also Virginia Aksan, *Ottoman Wars 1700– 1870: An Empire Besieged* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2007).

26 Robert J. Winklareth, *Naval Shipbuilders of the World: From the Age of Sail to the Present Day* (London: Chatham Publishing, 2000), 304– 7.

27 Valerii A. Durov, *Russkie i sovetskie boevye nagrady: Gosudarstvennyi Ordena Lenina Istoricheskii Muzei (Russian and Soviet Military Awards: Order of Lenin State History Museum)*, ed. Alexander Nevsky (Leningrad: Lenin State History Museum, 1989), 15.

the Imperial Naval Arsenal in Istanbul for the Ottoman ships operating on the Black Sea, which posed a great threat to Russia's operations there. Aware of its predicament, Russia, while trying to form its own policies through diplomatic maneuvers, attempted to consolidate its naval power in the Black Sea region. Mikhail Petrovich Lazarev, one of the well-known officers of the period, known for his knowledge and experience, was appointed commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Thanks to his initiatives, the foundations of an effective Black Sea navy were laid. Sevastopol was fortified and equipped with new slipways, drydocks, and auxiliary facilities. A shipbuilding program was encouraged and accelerated. The latest naval developments were followed, as in the case of the adoption of shell guns, steam propulsion, and mine warfare. In fact, Russia had two important strategic goals in this period: to protect the Caucasus against smugglers and foreign intervention; and to defend southern Russia and its trade against hostile attacks from the sea. For this purpose, Russia maintained two types of ships in the region: light and swift sailing craft for combating the smuggler; and large battleships for blockading the coasts and large-scale landings. The advances in naval technology under Lazarev offered a great opportunity to improve the Russian navy to compete with the European great powers. Lazarev's efforts proved to be successful against the obsolete Ottoman fleet in the Battle of Sinop and showed that future success in naval warfare would lie in the adoption of steam-driven shell-firing warships. However, the Russian government seemed not as enthusiastic, committed, or far-sighted as Lazarev. The budget allocated to the navy was much less than that for the land forces. Furthermore, Russia had an uneven logistical base on the Black Sea, which was caused by various domestic factors such as fiscal austerity measures, corruption, the severe climate, vulnerable industrial infrastructure, a shortage of skilled workers, and so on. All these factors caused the reforms to exert a limited influence, and therefore, during the Crimean War, the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which consisted of relatively outdated vessels, could not escape a bitter end against the Allied forces equipped with up-to-date naval technology.[28]

1.8 One Naval Engineer and Two Empires: The Case of Jack Balthasard Le Brun

The modernization processes of the Ottoman and Russian navies show some similarities. The most striking of these similarities was that both empires benefited from foreign naval experts.[29] The interesting story of the French shipbuilding engineer Jack

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28 John C. K. Daly, *Russian Seapower and the "Eastern Question", 1827–41* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 35, 100, 190–91.

29 Roger C. Anderson, "British and American Officers in the Russian Navy," *Mariners's Mirror* 33, no. 1 (1947): 17–27; see also Anthony G. Cross, *By the Banks of the Neva: Chapters from the Lives and Careers of the British in the Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Igor Ivano-

Balthazard Le Brun constitutes a good example of this. He and his family worked for the navy of Louis XVI until the French Revolution of 1789, which changed his life dramatically. As his family had been supporters the dethroned Louis XVI, he fell out of favor in the new period. Faced with increasingly unfavorable conditions in France, he accepted the Sublime Porte's invitation to work for the naval program in Istanbul. He arrived in Istanbul in 1793 along with his brother and his team, where he was welcomed by the Porte and equipped with broad powers in naval works. He worked in a variety of fields of the Ottoman navy; he prepared reports for the reorganization of naval education, taught shipbuilding courses at the Naval Engineering School, improved the physical conditions of shipyards, and introduced new ship launching methods, etc. Most importantly, he and his team built various types of warships, such as one 47-meter three-decker, three galleons (45–47 meters), two frigates (40 meters), and seven corvettes (20–28 meters), all along French lines. He built most of the ships in the Imperial Naval Arsenal in Istanbul, but he also directed some other shipbuilding activities in the shipyards on the Black Sea coasts. For instance, he built *Bedr-i Zafer*, the fifty-gun frigate, in the Ereğli shipyard on the southwestern shore. He and his brother remained in Ottoman service even during the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt, which caused great popular and governmental anger towards France. Russia, meanwhile, had been following his successful activities in Istanbul. One day, the Ottoman Porte learned to its great surprise that Jack Balthazard had secretly gone to Russia. This would lead to a diplomatic crisis between the two countries. The Ottomans accused Russia of seducing Le Brun through Admiral Ushakov, who had frequently navigated between the Marmara and the Black Seas in search of an opportunity to transfer him to Russia. Le Brun continued his successful performance under the service of the Russian navy in his capacity as master ship-builder. Following consecutive promotions, he was appointed to higher military ranks: major general in 1811 and lieutenant general in 1829. He became the director of the Naval Shipbuilding School, and designed and constructed the 120-gun *Khrabryi*, the Russian navy's biggest ship in the early nineteenth century.[30]

1.9 The Battle of Sinop (November 30, 1853): Harbinger of the Crimean War

Located on the farthest coast of the Black Sea, with its important geographical location, natural shelter, and its castle surrounded by walls, Sinop became an important base for the winter quarters and shipbuilding site of the Ottoman Black Sea Fleet, especially in

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vich Belousov, "Naem inostrannykh spetsialistov dlia russkogo voenno-morskogo flota v XVIII v.," *Voprosy Istorii* 6 (2008): 47–151.

30 Tuncay Zorlu and Fatih Özbay, "Foreign Shipwrights under Selim III: The Case of Jacques Balthazard Le Brun," in *Seapower, Technology and Trade*, ed. Dejanirah Couto, Feza Günergun, and Maria Pia Pedani (Istanbul: Denizler Kitapevi, 2014), 472–81.

the naval campaigns against Russia. It also served as a center to organize the transportation of soldiers, supplies, and ammunition to other regions in the north. Most of the naval vessels constructed in Sinop from the sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth centuries were galleys; afterwards the Ottomans systematically adopted sailing ships such as three-deckers, galleons, frigates, corvettes, sloops, gunboats, caravels, *mauna, kırlangıç, şehtiye, tombaz,* and *melekse.* Thanks to a well-organized provisioning system, Sinop also provided cheaper and best-quality timber (oak in particular), ballast, lead, raw hemp, pitch, and tar for the Imperial Naval Arsenal in the Golden Horn. During the reign of Selim III (1789 – 1807), Sinop came to be the third largest Ottoman shipbuilding site after Istanbul and Gallipoli, in terms of shipbuilding capacity, mostly due to its proximity to timber sources and having a class of sailors steeped in the traditions of the trade.[31]

Ottoman Sinop did not face a serious security weakness or threat for more than two centuries between the raids by the Cossacks from the north in the first half of the seventeenth century and the Russian attack in 1853, and throughout the entire galleon era, the constructions were carried out safely. On November 30, 1853, Sinop witnessed one of the bloodiest clashes between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, which is generally accepted as the harbinger of the Crimean War and the catalyst for the adoption of new naval doctrines and technologies. Hostilities began in the early October of 1853, when the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia in the aftermath of Russian occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia. In the following months, Russian occupation continued with the forts and principalities along the shores of the Danube, which was then part of the Ottoman Empire. Although the Ottomans managed to ward off the Russian forces to some extent, the course of events did not develop favorably for the Ottomans.[32]

At the beginning of the war, the Ottoman navy had six ships of the line, eleven frigates, eight corvettes, thirteen brigs, five schooners, and five steam warships fit for duty, with 20,000 personnel in total. Egypt also sent three ships of the line, three frigates, three corvettes, and one paddle corvette as reinforcements. On the other hand, the Russian Black Sea Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Vladimir Kornilov and his chief subordinate Vice Admiral Pavel Nakhimov, consisted of fourteen ships of the line, six frigates, four corvettes, twelve brigs, six large paddle frigates, and some auxiliary ships. A squadron of seven frigates, five corvettes, and two steamers under Vice Admiral Osman Pasha was ordered to proceed to Sinop, though he was against this decision, since it just 180 miles from Sevastopol, the base of the Russian Black

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31 İbrahim Güler, "XVIII. Yüzyılda Sinop'ta Gemi İnşa Teknolojisinin Altyapı, İstihkâm, İstihdâm, Üretim ve Pazarlama Sorunu," in *1. Türk Bilim ve Teknoloji Tarihi Kongresi Bildirileri (15 – 17 November 2001),* ed. Emre Dölen and Mustafa Kaçar (Istanbul: Publisher, 2003), 33; Mehmet Ali Ünal, "XVI–XVIII. Yüzyıllarda Sinop Tersanesi," in *XVI. Türk Tarih Kongresi, 9 – 13 September 2002* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2005), 2:911 – 58. For more information on the Sinop Arsenal, see Mehmet Ali Ünal, *Osmanlı Devrinde Sinop* (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2014).

32 Mitchell, *Russian and Soviet Sea Power,* 154 – 61.

Sea Fleet, while Istanbul was as far as 280 miles. Then, the Ottoman naval command decided to reinforce Osman Pasha's fleet with ships of the line, but Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambassador to Istanbul, objected and eventually convinced the Porte to give up this idea, despite the protests of Osman Pasha.[33]

The fleet under the command of Osman Pasha, who oversaw ensuring the security of shipment from Istanbul to Batum, escaped from a storm and took shelter in the port of Sinop. To reinforce his fleet, Abdülmecid I (1839–61) sent a naval squadron consisting of frigates and steamers. Russia, trying to prevent Ottoman shipment to the Caucasus, where things were running against Russian interests, dispatched squadrons to the Black Sea and captured two Ottoman steamers. Reinforced by additional ships, the Russian squadron under Nakhimov took swift action against the Ottoman fleet at Sinop. Osman Pasha, thinking that his fleet was in safety because of the fortified forts and defenses with considerable fire power, underestimated the Russian threat. He overlooked the fact that the Sinop crews under his command consisted mostly of newly recruited young farmers while the experienced sailors were in the fleet of Patrona Mustafa Pasha, who oversaw the transfer of ammunition to Georgia. Admiral Nakhimov, who had followed the Ottoman fleet to Sinop and observed its capacity as well as the conditions of forts and the fire power of the land batteries, was on the lookout for a suitable opportunity to attack. For that end, he blockaded Sinop by lining his own fleet against the Ottoman fleet, and opened heavy fire. The Ottoman fleet, understanding the gravity of the threat, started to fire back and inflicted some casualties on the Russian forces, but could not withstand the fire power of the Russian navy. One of the Ottoman ships caught fire, which spread to other ships and destroyed them. Almost 150 sailors, including Osman Pasha, who had been shot in the foot, were captured by the Russian forces, who continued to bombard the city and caused heavy losses on the Ottoman side. Almost 2,031 sailors were killed, and some 2,500 houses were demolished in the city. Russian casualties were much less, with thirty-seven dead and 229 wounded.[34]

In terms of technology, the Sinop clash was the last major battle of the era of sailing fleets. The Ottomans' defeat was due mostly to the weak fire power of standard smooth-bores and vulnerable ships with wooden hulls compared to the Russian guns with explosive shells that caused fires and far more penetration. Therefore, this battle represents a shift in the classical naval doctrine towards the adoption of "Paixhans" guns and large warships equipped with heavy guns. Moreover, this was the first conflict of the industrial age in which steam warships were commonly used. In this sense, the first confrontation between two steam warships in naval history took place on November 5, 1853. The Russian paddle frigate *Vladimir* under the command of Captain Grigorii Butakov surpassed the ten-gun Egyptian paddle corvette *Pervaz-ı Bahri* and raked her stern and bow, inflicting fifty-eight casualties. Upon the surrender of *Pervaz-ı Bahri*, it

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33 Candan Badem, *Ottoman Crimean War (1853–1856)* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 115.

34 Besim Özcan, *Sinop Deniz Felaketi* (Istanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 2008), 65–87.

was taken to Sevastopol, and added to Russian navy under the name *Kornikov*, after some repairs and maintenance.[35]

The Sinop debacle, which the Ottomans considered a kind of natural disaster, sent shock and considerable panic through the Ottoman side, since the destruction of the defenses made other harbor cities and even Istanbul vulnerable to possible Russian attacks and occupation from the Black Sea. The incident, which had wide international repercussions and triggered the rise of anti-Russian sentiment, was regarded as a "violation of international law," "unjustified," a "cruel act of violence," and a "massacre" in Europe, especially in Britain and France, paving the way for the Crimean War.[36]

As Charles King observes, citing Edmund Spencer, Sinop was in a way "the second Gibraltar." If Russia had conquered the city of Sinop, the tsar could have divided the sea into two, dominating the best natural harbors on the north and south coasts, Sevastopol and Sinop, which would have been the first step towards capturing the Bosporus and Istanbul.[37]

1.10 The Crimean War from a Naval Perspective

The Crimean War of 1853–56 was a series of united land and sea clashes that were carried out on many fronts. It has two turning points in terms of Turkish naval history. The first was the Sinop defeat outlined above, and the second was the Battle of Sevastopol, where the famous Ottoman three-decker *Mahmudiye* joined forces with the ships of the Allied states and successfully bombarded Sevastopol on September 11, 1855.[38] After Britain and France joined the war, the Ottoman naval forces operated as part of the plan drawn by the command of these states. The operations of the Ottoman navy during the Crimean War consisted mainly of transportation between Gallipoli and Istanbul, Istanbul and Varna, Varna and Crimea, Istanbul and Crimea, and Istanbul and Caucasia and ensuring the security of these routes and communication lines.[39]

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35 Emir Yener, "Iron Ships and Iron Men: Naval Modernization in the Ottoman Empire, Russia, China, and Japan from a Comparative Perspective, 1830–1905" (PhD diss., Boğaziçi University, 2009), 27, 96–98; see also its published version, *From the Sail to the Steam: Naval Modernization in the Ottoman, Russian, Chinese and Japanese Empires 1830–1905* (Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010).
36 Besim Özcan, *Sinop Deniz Felaketi*, 133–35; Badem, *Ottoman Crimean War*, 140–42; Eyyub Şimşek, "Sinop Baskınının Fransız Kamuoyuna Yansımaları ve Fransız Filosunun Karadeniz'e Girişi (1853–1854)," *The Journal of Institute of Black Sea Studies* 3, no. 3 (2017): 69–102.
37 Charles King, *Karadeniz*, trans. Zülal Kılıç (Istanbul: Kitap Kayınevi, 2015), 239.
38 Hacer Bulgurcuoğlu, *Efsane Gemi Mahmudiye Kalyonu* (Istanbul: Deniz Matbaası, 2009), 71–83.
39 For a detailed account of the Crimean War, see Badem, *Ottoman Crimean War*; Saim Besbelli, *1853–1856 Osmanlı-Rus ve Kırım Savaşı Deniz Harekâtı* (Ankara: Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, 1977).

The Siege of Sevastopol

Sevastopol, the main base of the Russian Black Sea fleet, was captured by Allied forces after a five-stage bombardment from both land and sea. Realizing that it was impossible to attack Sevastopol by land, the Allied forces decided to do so from the sea. The aim of the first bombardment, on October 17, was to suppress Sevastopol from the sea, disconnect it from the northern shore of the port, and to this end facilitate ground artillery's destruction of the fortifications. The first bombardment was attended by the two-decker *Teşrifiye*, fifteen English and ten French galleons, and some other small crafts alongside a three-decked *Mahmudiye* galleon with 128 guns. These ships with a total of 746 guns on their sides bombarded the Quarantine cemetery, including the Alexander and Konstantin bases, from 1,500–2,000 meters. The *Mahmudiye* under the command of Kayserili Ahmed Pasha anchored off the Konstantin bastion while the *Teşrifiye* was located off the Quarantine. In addition, Sir Adolphus Slade known as Müşavir Pasha, who had been serving the Ottoman navy for nearly twenty years, was on the two-decked *Teşrifiye* with seventy-two guns and 1,234 personnel. The Russians showed great resistance to this bombardment and managed to beat off the Allied forces, the latter suffering around four-hundred casualties. *Mahmudiye*, badly damaged and with her twelve soldiers wounded in the bombardment, was transferred to Istanbul for repair, as were, incidentally, a British two-decker and an Allied frigate.[40] On the Russian side, the casualties numbered around five-hundred. Admiral Kornilov was killed, and Admiral Nakhimov was seriously injured. Some of the Russians' bastions were destroyed, while the others withstood. Ultimately, after the fifth and last bombardment, this difficult siege, which lasted ten months and twenty-three days, ended with the seizure of Sevastopol by the Allies, and Russia's Black Sea Fleet was destroyed.[41]

After the Crimean War, which lasted a total of three years, Russia had to sign the Paris Peace Treaty with the Allies on March 30, 1856. Although this treaty provided the Ottoman Empire with territorial integrity under the guarantee of the great powers and inclusion in the Concert of Europe, the Ottomans could hardly enjoy the advantages from a naval perspective, since the Black Sea was declared neutral and was to be kept free of any naval ships, except for a limited number of small vessels. No fortifications were to be built or held on its coasts, and it would be open to merchant ships of all nations. All commercial navigation on the Danube was also opened to all nations.[42]

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In a nutshell, although early known naval clashes and confrontations in the Black Sea took place between Kyivan Rus and the Byzantine Empire from the ninth century on-

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40 Bulgurcuoğlu, *Efsane Gemi Mahmudiye Kalyonu*, 78–89.
41 Mitchell, *Russian and Soviet Sea Power*, 154–65.
42 Badem, *Ottoman Crimean War*, 287.

wards, the Pechenegs, Genoese, Anatolian Seljuks, Greeks, Don Cossacks, and Nogays were also active in the following periods to some extent. However, the real naval theater was established between the Ottomans, who dominated the region from the fifteenth to the early eighteenth centuries, and the Russians, who took the upper hand from the second half of the eighteenth century onwards, leading to new challenges, alliances, and interplays shaped by new naval technologies and strategies.

2 The Emergence of New Naval Actors on the Black Sea (From the Nineteenth Century to the Present Day)

This part is a modest attempt to present the milestones in the naval history of the Black Sea from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, with a focus on the emergence of new actors, their relations with main players and allies during the two world wars, and later confrontations. The emergence of new types of warships, submarines, seaplane carriers, guns, telecommunication/intelligence techniques, aircraft reconnaissance, and other naval technologies and facilities will also be taken up as elements that shaped the changing nature of modern naval warfare in the region.

For a long time, the decisive naval struggles in the Black Sea had mainly taken place between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. However, some other regional states got involved in the game in one way or another, especially since the middle of the nineteenth century, mostly under the influence of the Russian navy, as in the case of the Bulgarian, Romanian, and Ukrainian navies.

The Bulgarian navy, established in 1879 in the town of Ruse with the assistance of Russia, started to build its Black Sea division in Varna in 1897. Most of the early Bulgarian naval officers were trained in Russian schools in line with the Russian naval program, as seen in the case of Zinovii Petrovich Rozhestvenskii, the leading figure of the Bulgarian navy. The Bulgarian navy took part in some campaigns in the Black Sea during the Balkan Wars and World War I, but it could not prove a serious threat against the rival countries, due mostly to its ships with limited fire power, and vulnerable ports. Thus, it was almost completely devoted to protecting and defending its own shores in the face of four consecutive bombardments of Varna by the Ottoman fleet. One of the rare naval confrontations, known as the Battle of Kaliakra or the Attack of the Drazki, took place on November 21, 1912, some 32 miles off the port of Varna between four Bulgarian torpedo boats (the *Drazki*, the *Letyashti*, the *Smeli*, and the *Strogi*) and the Ottoman cruiser *Hamidiye* during the Balkan War of 1912. Although the confrontation caused some casualties between the two fleets and the *Smeli* and the *Hami-*

diye were damaged, along with some casualties on both sides, it did not yield any serious consequences, except for loosening the Ottoman blockade of Varna.[43]

As for the Romanian Black Sea navy, its formation dates to 1860, when it started rather as a river fleet operating on the Danube River,[44] and later united with the combined Wallachia and Moldavia navies the same year. Izmail (1861), Brăila (1864), and Galaţi (1867) appeared as the first successive naval bases. Unlike in the Bulgarian navy, the naval officers here were educated mainly in French naval schools until 1872, when a new naval school was established in Galaţi. During the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877/78, the Romanian navy served under the Russian flag to transfer Russian troops and supplies across the Danube, protect bridges, and sink two Ottoman River monitors with the assistance of Russian torpedo boats. The year 1890 was a turning point for the creation of the Romanian Black Sea Fleet following the first Romanian sea-going gunboats, cruisers, and training ships that came into the service from the 1880s onward.[45]

Another emergent actor was Ukraine. Regardless of its long Zaporizhian Cossacks background,[46] the naval history of the modern Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet dates back to November 20, 1917, when the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) was declared and gained international recognition.[47] Before this date, ethnic Ukrainian sailors had long served in the Russian Black Sea Fleet, mostly as crew on the Russian ships. After the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the declaration of the autonomous UPR, Ukrainian sailors established an independent Black Sea Fleet under the leadership of the Russian rear admiral Mikhail Sablin, who raised the blue and yellow flags of the UPR over all the ships in Sevastopol on April 29, 1918. However, after 1920, Ukraine would remain a member state of the USSR until 1991, when it became fully independent.[48]

Georgia, on the other hand, despite its strategic location at the Black Sea and its long tradition of maritime commerce, never had a strong fleet in a real sense. Initial attempts to create a modern Georgian navy date back to the country's short-lived independence period (1918 – 21), in which it was known as the Democratic Republic of Georgia. During the Russian Civil War, the Georgian navy came to possess a flagship, a few

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43 For the entire activities of the *Hamidiye,* see Ersan Baş, Arif Emre Kara, and Akmet Küçükoğlu, *Gazi Hamidiye ve Akın Harekâtı* (Istanbul: Piri Reis Araştırma Merkezi, 2006).

44 Robert van Tol and Jonathan Eyal, "The New Romanian Navy: A Weapon Without a Target," *The RUSI Journal* 132, no. 1 (1987): 37.

45 Constantin Oltenanu, *The Romanian Armed Power Concept: A Historical Approach* (Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 1982), 152, 174 – 76.

46 Hrushevs'kyi et al., *From Kievan Rus' to Modern Ukraine,* 3 – 36, 355 – 64.

47 Paul R. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine: The Land and its People* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 510.

48 Mitchell, *Russian and Soviet Sea Power,* 342 – 47; Sergei R. Grinevetsky, Igor S. Zonn, Sergei S. Zhiltsov, Aleksey N. Kosarev, and Andrey G. Kostianoy, "Sablin Mikhail Pavlovich (1869 – 1920)," *The Black Sea Encyclopedia* (Berlin: Springer, 2015), 669; Serhy Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: The Birth of a Modern Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

sailing boats, and tugs appropriated from Russian owners. However, in the aftermath of the Red Army invasion in 1921, Georgia became part of the Soviet Union, and its coastal waters were controlled by the 18th Coast Guard Brigade of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet until 1990. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the brigade in question was drawn from the region, having left behind six vessels. Despite later attempts, Georgia never managed to build up a sizable navy with operational power in the Black Sea and lost its remaining naval power after conflict with Russia in 2008.[49]

2.1 The Mutiny on the *Potemkin*

An interesting incident took place in 1905, when Russia and Romania found themselves involved in an unexpected naval confrontation after a mutiny broke out on the Russian pre-dreadnought battleship *Potemkin* on the pretext that spoiled meat had been served. The crew killed their officers and took the control of the ship. Hoisting a red flag, they sailed to Constanţa to provide some supplies and drum up support. The Russian fleet immediately began to chase it to the Romanian coasts. The Romanian cruiser *Elisabeta* fired two warning shots to drive away the *Ismail,* the Russian torpedo boat that attempted to infiltrate the Constanţa harbor after the *Potemkin.* In the end, the *Potemkin* surrendered to the Romanian authorities, who came aboard the ship and hoisted the Romanian flag. In the following days, the *Potemkin* was handed over to Russia after a series of diplomatic negotiations and its name was changed to the *Panteleimon.* As such, it would participate in World War I, be captured by the Germans in 1918, and later be handed over to the Allies after the Armistice of Moudros (Ottoman: Mondros). Politically, the *Potemkin* incident was generally seen as the most notable occurrence in a series of military/naval revolts against Tsarist Russia and as the harbinger of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.[50]

The *Potemkin* incident and subsequent developments were followed with great interest by the foreign press, especially by the British, with sympathy for the courage of the *Potemkin* sailors.[51] On the other hand, it had some repercussions on the Ottoman side too. Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) followed the course of events closely, and upon the news that the *Potemkin* would leave the port of Odesa and arrive in Istanbul, he ordered the authorities to take necessary defensive measures. The Strait was mined,

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49 For more information see Stephan F. Jones, ed., *The Making of the Modern Georgia 1918–2012: The First Georgian Republic and its Successors* (London: Routlegde, 2014); "Militarization of the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean Theatres: A New Challenge to NATO" (Policy Paper, New Strategy Center and Centro Studi Internazionali, 2019).

50 Robert Zebroski, "The Battleship Potemkin and its Discontents, 1905," in *Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An International Perspective*, ed. Christopher M. Bell and Brude A. Elleman (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 7–25.

51 Ștefan-Cătălin Trofin, "The Mutiny on the Russian Battleship Potemkin in the British Press," *World LUMEN Congress* (Romania: Logos Universality Mentality Education Novelty, 2016), 1027–138.

and large cannons were deployed on the bastions in the event that the *Potemkin* should try to pass the Straits.[52]

2.2 The Black Sea as the Theater of Naval Operations during World War I

In the aftermath of the Balkan Wars of 1912/13, the Ottoman Empire launched an enthusiastic program to revise and increase its current naval capacity and to purchase new warships. Britain was entrusted with construction of the *Reşadiye* and the *Sultan Osman I* dreadnoughts in addition to the battleship *Fatih.* Although the Porte made full payment for both dreadnoughts after their completion, the UK confiscated them at the outbreak of World War I in August 1914.[53] At the beginning of the war, the Ottoman Black Sea Fleet consisted of battle cruisers, the *Turgut Reis*, the *Barbaros Hayreddin*, and the *Mesudiye*; light cruisers, the *Hamidiye*, the *Abdülmecid*, the *Berk-i Satvet*, the *Peyk-i Şevket*, and the *Peleng-i Derya*; eighteen torpedo boats, eleven gunboats, three minelayers, and some auxiliary ships. Of this fleet, the *Mesudiye*, the *Barbaros*, and the *Turgut Reis* were commissioned to defend the Dardanelles. On the other hand, Russian cruisers had superior gun capacity to the Ottoman light cruisers *Mecidiye* and *Hamidiye.*[54]

At the outset of World War I, the Ottoman Empire had declared its neutrality. However, a general military mobilization had already been initiated in the country due to the secret military alliance with the German Empire on August 2, 1914. The second article of this secret treaty had stipulated that if a war broke out between Germany and Russia, the Ottoman Empire would participate on the German side. The third article of the same treaty had stated that in the event that the Ottoman Empire entered the war, the Ottoman military delegation would be under the command of the German military.[55] Meanwhile, two German warships, the *Goeben* (2,240 tons, ten 11-inch and twelve 6-inch guns, 27 knots) and the *Breslau* (4,550 tons, twelve 4-inch guns, 28 knots) navigating the Mediterranean entered the Dardanelles on August 10, 1914 on the pretext of escaping the British chase. As the Ottoman Porte's letting the ships pass the Dardanelles on August 11, 1914 caused a diplomatic crisis, the Sublime Porte, in order not to breach its neutrality, announced that they had purchased the ships for 80 million German marks, and changed their names to the *Yavuz* and the *Midilli* respectively. The reaction of the British and French ambassadors in Istanbul was very harsh, and they put

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52 Hasip Saygılı, "1905 Potemkin İsyanı ve Sultan II. Abdülhamid," *FSM Scholarly Studies Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 7 (Spring 2016): 267–90.

53 Serhat Güvenç, "The Ottoman Navy in the Age of Dreadnoughts (1909–1914)," in *The Logbook of the Ottoman Navy: Ships, Legends and Sailors*, ed. Ekrem Işın (Istanbul: Pera Museum, 2009), 45–63.

54 Fevzi Kurtoğlu, *Birinci Dünya ve Çanakkale'de Türk Donanması,* ed. Ali F. Örenç and Levent Düzcü (Istanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi, 2015), 112–24.

55 Kurtoğlu, *Birinci Dünya ve Çanakkale'de Türk Donanması,* 31–33.

great pressure on the Ottoman government to immediately disarm the ships and remove them from the Strait. Thereafter, the German Admiral Souchon, who was assigned to the Navy Command in compliance with Article 3, took the Ottoman navy, including the *Yavuz* and the *Midilli*, to the Black Sea on October 27, 1914, under the guise of reconnaissance, surveillance, and training activities. However, Souchon conceived a direct attack on the Russian ports of Odesa, Sevastopol, and Novorossiisk, to force the Ottoman Empire into the war. On the other hand, Russia, which did not want to be the first to start hostilities, took this opportunity as a pretext to declare war against the Ottoman Empire on November 2, 1914 and bombarded Zonguldak on the November 4 in retaliation, with a fleet under Admiral Eberhardt. Britain and France declared war against the Ottoman Empire consecutively. The Ottoman Empire followed suit and declared war on them on November 11.[56]

Within the naval operations in the Black Sea region during World War I, the Ottoman navy tried hard to keep the Russian navy away from the Bosporus with the elements it deployed in the Black Sea. In addition, the Ottoman navy secured the transportation of personnel and materials to the eastern front on the Black Sea. It also organized raid-type attacks on some Russian ports on the Black Sea coast and at the same time secured coal transportation between Istanbul and Zonguldak. The speed and firepower superiority of the *Yavuz* significantly impeded the Russian navy's activities on the Black Sea.[57] The operation on the Black Sea ended with Russia's withdrawal from the war after the Bolshevik Revolution that broke out on March 16, 1917. In 1918, the Ottoman navy was withdrawn to the Golden Horn in accordance with the provisions of the Moudros Armistice, marking the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and its allies, and the control of the ships was left to a commission formed by the Allied countries. During the post-Moudros period, British and French warships tried to prevent shipping to Anatolia by depriving Ottoman ports of fortified defense lines and supported Greece, which blockaded the Black Sea coasts and bombarded the ports of İnebolu, Samsun, and Trabzon.[58] Although they inflicted some casualties on the Ottoman side, especially in Sinop, their efforts ended in failure. Incidentally, the *Umur-i Bahriye Müdürlüğü* (Directorate of Naval Affairs) had been founded in July 1920 under the Ottoman Ministry of National Defense to manage the sea organizations, especially transportation in the Black Sea. New naval commands were established in Trabzon, Samsun, Ereğli, and Amasra. Old harbor administrations along the coasts were reorganized and new coastal surveillance stations were added to watch over enemy activities. As for logistics and transportation activities on the Black Sea, approximately 300,000 tonnes of materials (weapons and ammunition) and soldiers were transported from

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56 Figen Atabey, *Karadeniz'de Türk Donanması: Birinci Dünya Harbi ve Milli Mücadele Dönemi* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2006), 6–20.

57 For a detailed account of the activities of *Yavuz*, see İskender Tunaboyu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriye'e Yavuz (Goeben) Zırhlısı* (Istanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 2006).

58 Tuğba Eray Biber, *Karadeniz Rumları ve Yunanistan 1914–1923* (Istanbul: Yeditepe, 2016).

various ports in the region, especially in Soviet Russia, to Ottoman ports by twenty-six boats of various sizes, and thus the fronts in Anatolia were supported.[59]

Russia, another main actor and an ally of the Entente in the region, followed the developments in the Ottoman navy closely and took some measures to continue its military superiority on the Black Sea. On the eve of World War I, the Russian Black Sea Fleet consisted of five battle cruisers (the *Ioann Zlatoust*, the *Estafii*, the *Panteleimon*, the *Rostislav*, and the *Tri Sviatelia*), two cruisers (the *Kagul* and the *Pamiat Merkuriia*), and nine new and seventeen old torpedo boats. After the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* passed through the Dardanelles, the Russian Black Sea Fleet aimed to make it difficult for Ottoman forces to transfer weapons, ammunition, and soldiers to the Caucasian front by sea, as well as to protect their own shores. The operating base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was Sevastopol, while the shipbuilding yard was at Mykolaiv (Russian: Nikolaev). As the war continued, other warships under construction would be added.[60] From the beginning of World War I to the Bolshevik Revolution, warships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet organized attacks on the coal basins in and around Zonguldak at least five times and bombarded this area in almost twenty cases. In addition, four destroyers from the Russian navy (the *Derzkii*, the *Gnevnyi*, the *Pronzitelnyi*, and the *Bespokoinyi*) laid mines in the Strait to prevent Ottoman ships from entering the Black Sea, and also sank Ottoman ships carrying food and various supplies for the army in Anatolia.[61] By June 1915, the Russians had sunk nine coal-carrying steamers, five large sailboats, and around twenty small boats. Along with the arrival of the first Russian dreadnought, the *Imperatritsa Mariia*, on the Black Sea in July 1915, nine new torpedo boats and four new submarines also joined the Black Sea Fleet, making it stronger than the Ottoman navy. However, the status quo remained unchanged, since the Bosporus was far from Sevastopol, the Russian base, and the Ottoman navy was still fast. Therefore, despite sinking Ottoman merchant ships and cutting off communication channels, Russia could not prevent and blockade the routes of incoming additional Ottoman ships. This situation did not change even when the second battle cruiser *Imperatritsa Ekaterina II* joined the fleet in the autumn of 1915. Once more, Russia came to realize that final victory could not be reached unless the Straits were captured. Incidentally, the Russian navy was adept at using some new communication technologies during the war. Their network of radio stations played an important role in locating enemy ships, mostly in the Baltics. In addition, naval aviation played an important role in World War I. Seven Russian seaplane carriers helped naval air reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and bombardments on the Baltic and the Black Sea. When the war broke out, the Russian navy had eight aircraft on the Black Sea. On January 24, 1916, during one of the attacks on Zonguldak, aircraft

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59 Atabey, *Karadeniz'de Türk Donanması*, 53–121.
60 J. N. Westwood, *Russian Naval Construction, 1905–1945* (London: Macmillan Press, 1994), 92–105.
61 Alexey D. Muraviev, "St Andrew Against the Kaiser: Russia's Naval Strategy and Naval Operations in the Baltic and Black Sea Theatres 1914–17," in *The War at Sea: 1914–18*, ed. Andrew Forbes (Canberra: Sea Power Centre Australia, 2015), 82.

from the *Imperator Aleksandr I* and the *Imperator Nikolai I* sunk a 7,000-ton Ottoman transport and damaged port infrastructure decisively.[62]

On the other hand, Russia had established a "Batumi garrison" within its Caucasian Army in 1914. The port of Batumi was the most important port in the eastern Black Sea region and a base for the Russian navy at the beginning of World War I, both to supply the Caucasian army and to hit the ports of the Ottoman Empire on the eastern Black Sea. In order to defend this strategic location, sea mines were laid and gunboats were allocated. On January 30, 1916, the battle cruisers, gunboats, and torpedo boats (*Rostislav*, *Kubanets*, *Lieutenant Pushkin*, and *Zhivoi*) were deployed to Batumi, under the command of General Liakhov for some joint operations along with the Primorskii Unit. These warships formed the Batumi Unit together with the line cruiser *Donets* and the torpedo boats *Strogii* and *Stremitelnyi*, which were previously in Batumi. The commander of the Batumi Military Port, Captain Rimskii-Korsakov, was appointed to command this naval unit. Rize and Trabzon, which were important points for logistical purposes, were to be bombarded and seized by this joint force. After the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russian army had to withdraw from the regions they occupied.[63]

When the Revolution broke out in October 1917, Russia had to withdraw from the war, which brought about a period of chaos and lack of authority on the Black Sea. In the meantime, the newly established autonomous Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) could organize and keep its own navy, which had a life of five months. Between October 1917 and March 1918, besides naval/military headquarters and institutions, the UPR commanded nine battleships, seven cruisers, eighteen destroyers, fourteen submarines, sixteen patrol ships and avisons, and eleven military transports. During World War I, Crimea was invaded by German and Ukrainian forces. The Germans also occupied Sevastopol and transferred all the ships controlled by the Bolsheviks to the Ukrainian Navy, whose main body was in Odesa and Mykolaiv. In addition, the Germans supplied Ukraine with seventeenth U-boats in 1918. However, towards the end of 1918 the fleets of the Allied forces captured most of the Black Sea Fleet and transferred it to the Russian White forces, who were an unsteady confederation of anti-communists fighting the communist Bolsheviks.[64]

As for the Romanian Black Sea Fleet, at the beginning of the World War I it consisted of a 1,320-ton cruiser named the *Nelizabete* and thirty pieces of other ships, with

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62 Şahin Doğan, "I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Rusların Karadeniz Politikası ve Rus Karadeniz Filosu," in *I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Karadeniz ve Kafkasya: Askeri, Siyasi ve Sosyal Gelişmeler,* ed. Mehmet Okur, Bahadır Güneş, and Ülkü Köksal (Trabzon: KTU Publications, 2017), 63–98; Westwood, *Russian Naval Construction*, 104; Andrij Kharuk, "Russian Naval Aviation in the Black Sea, 1914–1917," in *Na skrzydłach Wielkiej Wojny 1916–1917,* ed. Andrzej Olejko, Harald Potempa, and Michal Plavec (Zabrze: Tarnowskie Góry, 2018): 281–305; Alexey D. Muraviev, "St Andrew Against the Kaiser," 82.

63 Ozan Tuna and Mucize Ünlü, "I. Dünya Savaşı'nın Başlarında Batum Limanı'nın Stratejik Önemi ve Osmanlı Donanmasının Batum Limanı'nı Bombalaması," in Okur, Güneş, and Köksal, *I. Dünya Savaşın'nda Karadeniz ve Kafkasya*, 263–82.

64 Mitchell, *Russian and Soviet Sea Power*, 344–46.

6,004 tonnage, and some 101 guns in total. It also had 147 naval officers, engineers, and machinists, ninety-eight civil servants, seventy-five students, and 2,562 soldiers. During the war, Romania's Black Sea Fleet waged low-profile defensive wars against the Central Powers of the German Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and Austria-Hungary. In 1916 the Romanian torpedo boat *Smeul* caused the German minelaying submarine *UC-15* to be sunk by her own mines after some surprise tactics. A year later, the same *Smeul* was involved in another clash, when a German seaplane was struck by Romanian anti-aircraft fire while it was approaching the *Smeul* to drop bombs. The *Smeul* was finally sunk by mines laid by the Ottoman cruiser *Midilli* near the mouth of the Danube in April 1917. The most significant achievement of the Romanian navy was the sinking of an Austro-Hungarian river monitor near Brăila in September 1917 by mines laid by *Alexandru cel Bun*, the only minelayer of the Romanian navy.[65]

2.3 Submarines in the Black Sea during World War I

The Black Sea theater in World War I witnessed some clashes between submarines as well. The Russian Black Sea Fleet had four submarines, the *Karas*, the *Karp*, the *Logos* and the *Sudak*, in the August of 1914, and two other Pacific submarines, the *Skat* and the *Nalim*, which were transferred to the Black Sea later the same year, as well as the unfinished submarine minelayer *Krap*. However, they were involved in clashes until 1915, due to their unsuitability for long-distance wars. In 1915 the new submarines *Nerpa*, *Tiulen*, *Morzh*, *Narval*, *Kit*, and *Kashalot* transferred from Mykolaiv to Sevastopol and began operations under Captain Kloshchkovskii. From 1915 onwards, Russian submarines operated off the Bosporus, patrolling the shores, including the Bulgarian port of Varna. In July 1916, Vice Admiral A. V. Kolchak, an expert at mine laying and underwater operations, was appointed to command the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Thereafter, a mine-laying unit was established and some submarines were commissioned to lay mines along the exits of the Bosporus, which hampered Ottoman shipping and coal supply. The Ottoman Black See Fleet did not have its own submarines at the time. Some submarines of the German Constantinople Flotilla, which was essentially set up for the campaigns against Allied shipping in the Mediterranean, were transferred to the Black Sea from 1915 onwards. These submarines carried out operations such as coast guarding, patrolling, mine laying and reconnaissance mostly off the Odesa, Sevastopol, and Crimean coasts to support the Ottoman fleet, although they inflicted limited losses on the Russian side.[66]

Incidentally, submarines were involved in some tragic incidents too. In one of them, a Russian hospital ship, the *Portugal*, carrying 273 people, including wounded

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65 Nurten Çetin, "Romania's Entry into the First World War and the Effects on the Ottoman Empire," *The Journal of International Social Research* 9, no. 42 (2016): 536–51.

66 Norman Polmar and Jurrien Noot, *Submarines of Russian and Soviet Navies 1718–1990* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 53–55.

soldiers as well as Red Crescent personnel and crew, was sunk off Trabzon by a German U-33 submarine's torpedo fire on March 30 1916; eighty-five died. This incident caused international uproar and the Red Crescent condemned the action, saying that the ship had had all the signs and flags of a hospital ship and had therefore been sunk intentionally, in violation of the Hague Convention of 1907. On the other hand, the German side insisted that necessary hospital signs and flags had been lacking and there had been no lights on the ship, and that it had been towing two large barges without any Red Crescent signs. Although the Germans said they would be more careful in future, a similar incident took place on June 25, 1916, when the *Vpered*, another Russian hospital ship, was sunk by a German U-38 submarine 2.5 miles off Viçe (today: Fındıklı), albeit with some justification. Thereafter, the German U-33 and U-39 submarines sank many other ships too. Some fifty-seven ships were sunk on the Black Sea by U-33s alone. When World War I ended, the captains of the U-33s and U-38s were declared "war criminals."[67]

2.4 Naval Encounters on the Black Sea during World War II

World War II was a naval war to a great extent. Soviet and German submarines played major roles in the different theaters of the war, including in the Black Sea. At the time of the German invasion in June 1941, the Soviet navy possessed forty-seven submarines in the Black Sea, with Sevastopol as their main base and the *Parizhskaia Kommuna* (known as the *Sevastopol*) as the largest Soviet battleship. The Germans did not have any of their submarines in the region, though Romania, its ally, had one submarine and some warships. Over the course of time, the Germans transferred six small submarines, twenty-three minesweepers, sixteen MTBs (Motor Torpedo Boats), twenty-six submarine chasers, fifty landing craft, and some cargo and auxiliary vessels to the Black Sea to support their land forces operating in the region. Another member of the Axis powers, Italy, also sent a submarine to the Black Sea as a sign of solidarity.[68]

On the other hand, the Romanian navy had begun to expand in the post-World War I period, along with the capture of Austro-Hungarian river ships as well as newly purchased Italian patrol ships, which transformed the Romanian Danube Flotilla into the world's leading river navy until World War II. Romania had embarked on a program to strengthen its navy, and purchased new cruisers, gunboats, and torpedo boats from Italy and France from the 1920s onward, including its first submarine, the *Delfinul*, and a submarine tender, the *Constanța*. Furthermore, to educate and train naval personnel a naval college was established in Constanța.[69] Towards World

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67 Resul Turan, "I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Karadeniz'de Batırılan Bir Kızılhaç Gemisi *Portugal*," *Karadeniz İncelemeleri Dergisi* 13, no. 25 (Fall 2018): 185–202.

68 Polmar and Noot, *Submarines of Russian and Soviet Navies 1718–1990*, 21.

69 Norman Polmar and Kenneth J. Moore, *Cold War Submarines: Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2004).

War II, Romania set out to increase its naval capacity both in quantity and quality. A drydock was built in the Galaţi arsenal for the construction of new cruisers, destroyers, submarines, mine-layers, mine-sweepers, and motor torpedo boats, though most of the ships were purchased from the UK, Italy, and Germany. In August 1944, Romania possessed one minelayer/escort ship, four minesweepers, two submarines and minelayers, and twenty MTBs. During World War II, the Romanian navy consisted of four destroyers, two minelayers, three auxiliary minelayers, three motor torpedo boats, three gunboats, fifteen small auxiliary ships, twenty seaplanes, and one submarine. *Delfinul* was the only submarine belonging to the Axis alliance in the Black Sea in 1941, though it did nothing other than sinking a merchant ship sailing without any escorts. In general, the Romanian Black Sea Fleet had to carry out defensive operations only in the presence of a huge Soviet Black Sea navy comprising forty-seven submarines and many other modern battleships with superior fire power. In the aftermath of Romania's capitulation 1944, when the German battleships were ordered to cede Romanian harbors, a German submarine sank a Soviet minesweeper, which in turn caused the Soviet Union to accuse Romania of betrayal and seize all its ships, take them to Caucasian ports, and keep most of them there until the 1950s. Under the Soviet occupation, the Romanian navy was reorganized as the Romanian People's Navy.[70]

During World War II, Romanian and Soviet fleets confronted each other in some clashes in the Black Sea. In one of them, a Soviet submarine attacked with torpedoes an Axis convoy consisting of a Bulgarian and two Hungarian cargo ships and Romanian escorts (two destroyers and two gunboats) off the Romanian coastal village of Jibrieni (presently Prymorske in Ukraine). The Soviet submarine was sunk by the defensive mines laid by Romania on December 17, 1941. Another naval engagement between Soviet and Romanian fleets took place off Cape Burnas in October 1942, when a Soviet M-class submarine sank the *Salzburg*, a German transport ship carrying 2,000 prisoners of war on board. In the aftermath of the incident, a German seaplane determined the location of the Soviet submarine, helping two Romanian gunboats attack and sink it.[71]

Although World War II concluded with victory over the Axis, the Soviets had lost their shipbuilding facilities along the Black Sea and could not prevent the Germans from occupying the western part of the country, including Ukraine.[72] It is interesting to note that neither Tsarist Russia nor the Soviets could escape the isolation of the Black Sea Fleet. Although they received regular intelligence from Britain, they could

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70 Alexander Statiev, "Romanian Naval Doctrine and its Tests in the Second World War," *War in History* 15, no. 2 (April 2008): 191–210.

71 J. Louis Roba and Cristian Craciunoiu, *Seaplanes over the Black Sea: German, Romanian Operations 1941–1944* (Bucharest: Modelism, 1995), 52; Polmar and Noot, *Submarines of Russian and Soviet Navies*, 121–25.

72 Polmar and Moore, *Cold War Submarines,* 22.

not assess it properly and they were never sure that their enemies would not form an alliance with Turkey and have their battleships on the sea.[73]

During the Cold War period, the Soviets dominated the Black Sea, where a considerable part of their naval forces was located. Furthermore, they controlled more than two-thirds of the total shores of the Black Sea through their allies, Romania and Bulgaria, under the Warsaw Pact. The Sevastopol base was strengthened and became "the strongest fortress in the Black Sea region," as mentioned by a CIA report in 1949. Other bases, like Odesa, Novorossiisk, and Batumi, also retained their strategic importance.[74]

Within the context of the Cold War, the railroad and tank ferry from Varna to Chornomorsk near Odesa (before: Ilichivsk [Russian: Ilichovsk]) should be mentioned. Thereby, the recalcitrant Warsaw Pact member Romania could be bypassed (having caused major problems for the Bulgarian People's Army by means of a transit ban when the latter invaded the CSSR in 1968).

2.5 The *Struma* Tragedy

Turkey, which had declared its neutrality upon the outbreak of World War II, had announced that its general policy towards Jewish immigrants to Palestine was to allow them to pass through the Straits by any sea vessels. Between 1939 and 1944 many ships carrying Jewish immigrants to Palestine came to Istanbul for this purpose. Among them were the *Transylvania* with fifty-four Romanian immigrants, the *Imtı* with six-hundred Romanians, the *Atrato* with 325 Czech and German Jews, the *Lasparla* with 380 Germans and Czechs, the *Rim* with 450 German and Czech emigrants, the *Frossola* with 658 German and Czech emigrants, the *Patya* with seven-hundred Romanians, the *Parkerhil* with 850 Romanians, the *Putniçer* with 271 Hungarians, the *Harziyon* with 142 Britons, the *Rudniçer* with 210 Bulgarians, the *Neomi Julia* with 1,200 Romanian emigrants, and the *Salvator* with 246 Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants in 1941. Incidentally, three Jewish ships (the *Bülbül*, the *Mefküre*, and the *Morina*) with a total of 4,190 emigrants from Constanţa to Istanbul were given Turkish flags to save them from any attack. However, on August 5, 1944 they were attacked by three unknown submarines between Ahtapolu and Rezve off Bulgaria, causing the *Mefkure* to sink with her 295 Jewish passengers on board.[75]

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[73] Westwood, *Russian Naval Construction*, 219; Joseph F. Ryan, "The Royal Navy and Soviet Seapower, 1930–1950: Intelligence, Naval Cooperation and Antagonism" (PhD diss., Hull University, 1996), 178–94.
[74] "Militarization of the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean Theatres." However, Romania did not effectively support the Warsaw Pact. See Cezar Stanciu, "A Rebirth of Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy of Communist Romania between Subordination and Autonomy, 1948–1962," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 24, no. 2 (2013).
[75] Ulvi Keser, "Turkish Assistance Activities for the Jewish Immigrants and Jewish Immigrant Camps in Cyprus during Second World War," *Ege Academic Review* 9, no. 2 (2009): 737.

During World War II, the Black Sea witnessed one of the most horrible human tragedies in 1942 when the *Struma*, a British-built ship (46 meters long, 6 meters wide and 227 gross tons) under Panama flag exploded and sank, along with almost 759 Jewish immigrants bound for Palestine to escape the Nazi persecution. The *Struma*, whose crew was Bulgarian and owner a Greek merchant, had been in the service of a Romanian company in Bucharest before its last voyage from Constanţa to Palestine. When the ship arrived in Istanbul on December 15, 1941, it was not allowed to pass the Straits by the British authorities, who wanted to prevent "illegal" Jewish immigration to Palestine (then under British administration) as a part of their agreement with the Arabs.

The Turkish authorities had held some meetings with Hayim Barlas, the leader of the Jewish Agency in Istanbul and Simon Brod, a Jewish merchant, to provide a secure transportation of Jewish immigrants to Palestine. They received additional help from Menaşe Hana and Leon Jabes from İzmir. However, Turkey, struggling to keep its neutral status, came under great pressure from Britain to return the ship back to Romania. After some negotiation, the *Struma* was permitted to remain in the port of Istanbul. Although Turkey allowed Istanbul's Jewish population and the Turkish Red Crescent to send some food and supplies for two-and-a-half months, and continuously declared its readiness to allow the ship to pass through the Straits into the Mediterranean as soon as the British agreed to allow it, the British maintained their refusal. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian captain of the *Struma* also refused to sail his ship into the Mediterranean without the British permission, since his ship was under the flag of Panama, which was at war with the Axis.[76]

Finally, Turkey, no longer able to resist the growing diplomatic pressure from Britain at the highest level and the immediate threat of war by Germany, which had already invaded nearby Greece, had to tow the ship, whose engine was already broken, out of the Straits to the Black Sea. The next day, on February 24, 1942, an explosion of unknown cause took place on the *Struma*; causing it to sink immediately with almost eight-hundred people aboard, five to six miles off Yön Burnu. Only two passengers (David Stalia and Medea Salamovici) survived. It was later claimed that a Soviet patrol submarine (SC-213) whose commander had standing orders from Stalin to sink all neutral ships on the Black Sea to prevent supplies from reaching Germany had sunk it with a torpedo.

The *Struma* incident, combined with similar previous cases, aroused many reactions, protests, and uprisings in the following years. Although all the countries (Britain, Germany, Turkey, and the USSR) involved in the incident were criticized for what they

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[76] Stanford J. Shaw, *Turkey and the Holocaust: Turkey's Role in Rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi Persecution, 1933 – 1945* (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 281 – 83.

had or hadn't done, Britain's hard stance in refusing the passage of the immigrant ship was generally acknowledged as the most likely factor behind the tragedy.[77]

2.6 The Kerch Strait Incident of 2018

After World War II, the Black Sea had not witnessed a serious naval confrontation between the countries bordering it until November 25, 2018, when three Ukrainian naval ships (two Gyurza-M-class artillery boats, the *Berdiansk* and the *Nikopol*, and a tugboat, the *Iany Kapu*) tried to pass the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov via the Kerch Strait. Patrol boats, the *Don* and the *Izumrud*, from Russian coast guard intercepted the Ukrainian navy ships, which kept moving towards the bridge which Russia had built across the Strait after its annexation of Crimea. Ukrainian ships, seeing that the Russians placed a huge cargo ship under the bridge to prevent their passage, remained in the Strait for eight hours and returned to their base in Odesa. However, Russian coast guards kept following the Ukrainian ships. The *Don* twice rammed the *Iany Kapu* and Russian ships fired on and captured the Ukrainian ships in international waters off the cost of Crimea. During the clash three Ukrainian crew members were injured and twenty-four sailors aboard were detained by Russia. The incident caused an international crisis. The Russian side claimed that the Ukrainian ships had maneuvered dangerously in "Russian territorial waters," had not followed the passage procedures under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and had not responded to radio communications, while the Ukrainian side dismissed the Russian claims and asserted just the opposite on the basis of the 2003 treaty that established the Strait and the Sea of Azov as the shared territorial waters of both parties and freely accessible.[78]

In fact, the crisis goes back to the year 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, which was, to a large extent, an internationally recognized Ukrainian territory. Ukraine never recognized this annexation and declared it illegitimate, a stance supported by countries in the region, the EU, and NATO members, who condemned the move as a destabilizing factor for domestic, regional, and global peace and began to discuss possible sanctions against Russia.[79] On the other side, Russia's motivation and justification

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77 Ulvi Keser, "Turkish Assistance Activities for the Jewish Immigrants," 735–58; Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, *Death on the Black Sea* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003); Hasım Surel, "Were Britain and Turkey Responsible for the Struma Tragedy?" (November 2005), http://haruth.com/jw/The_Struma_Tragedy.pdf.

78 Stephen Lewis, "Russia's Continued Aggression against Ukraine," *The RUSI Journal* 164, no. 1 (2019): 18–26.

79 Valentin J. Schatz and Dmytro Koval, "Russia's Annexation of Crimea and the Passage of Ships Through Kerch Strait: A Law of the Sea Perspective," *Ocean Development & International Law* 50, no. 2–3 (2019): 275–97; Yuri Teper, "Official Russian Identity Discourse in Light of the Annexation of Crimea: National or Imperial?," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 32, no. 4 (2016): 378–96; Hall Gardner, "The Russian Annexation of Crimea: Regional and Global Ramifications," *European Politics and Society* 17, no. 4 (2016): 490–505.

for its military and non-military annexation of Crimea were a combination of historical and geo-political factors, including energy and other resources.[80]

The Ukrainian government considered the Kerch Strait Incident the harbinger of a prospective invasion, and therefore martial law was declared along the borders. For its part, Russia claimed that Ukraine's move was a provocation and a political maneuver by President Petro Poroshenko ahead of the 2019 presidential elections. On the international scale, the Kerch incident brought more sanctions on Russia.[81]

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All in all, writing a well-balanced naval history of the Black Sea from the early naval clashes to the present day crises is a difficult task, given the limitations of an article. However, as the discipline of "naval history" refers, by definition, to the military aspect of maritime activities, I have tried to cover mainly the changing nature of naval wars, the transformation of battleship technologies, maritime know-how, strategy, and intelligence/communication on the Black Sea in the context of international naval policies and the balance of power. In addition, I have preferred to assess Ottoman-Russian rivalry, the Sinop Attack, the Crimean War, and clashes during World War I and World War II, as well as the emergence of new regional navies and relatively modern confrontations in the Black Sea, as general categories.

I hope this modest article has provided readers with new perspectives and insights for further studies that will pave the way for sensible and lasting solutions to the present-day crises in the region.

80 John Biersack and Shannon O'Lear, "The Geopolitics of Russia's Annexation of Crimea: Narratives, Identity, Silences, and Energy," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 55, no. 3 (2014): 247–69.
81 Anna-Sophie Maass, "From Vilnius to the Kerch Strait: Wide-Ranging Security Risks of the Ukraine Crisis," *European Politics and Society* 20, no. 5 (2019): 609–23.

Mara Kozelsky

The Crimean War

1 Introduction

Surveying the history of imperial rivalries over the Black Sea Region, Gheorghe I. Brătianu argues that any state controlling the sea and its river channels into Europe enhances its own security and commands Eurasian trade routes.[1] Brătianu further points out that power over the sea is never static, but unravels as soon as it forms. This principle is evident in the origins of the Crimean War, just one of many modern wars fought over the strategic Black Sea space.

Until the Crimean War, conflicts between the Russian and Ottoman Empires followed the localized expansion/contraction movement Brătianu had depicted. Yet, the Industrial Revolution suddenly disrupted age-old patterns by expanding the field of claimants upon the sea and its hinterlands. Able to navigate up the Danube with the invention of steam by the 1840s, distant European powers entered the local competition over Black Sea trade routes. Almost overnight, the Black Sea world had become much larger.[2]

Although the Crimean War ultimately spread across the globe, this chapter focuses on the Black Sea region, where war originated, and where violence concentrated.[3] After a brief discussion of the causes of the war, sections follow the reciprocal impacts of war along the Black Sea's western, northern, and eastern peripheries. The chapter focuses on geographic patterns of violence and environmental agency rather than battles or diplomacy.[4] As this chapter shows, new industrial military technologies offered

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1 Gheorghe I. Brătianu, *La mer Noire: Des origines à la conquête* ottomane (Munich: Societas Academica Dacoromana, 1969), 37.

2 To borrow the words from Eyüp Özveren, the Black Sea Region is an "historically-constituted unit of analysis, a 'world,' the reality of which precedes in importance the actors placed on it." Y. Eyüp Özveren, "A Framework for the Study of the Black Sea World, 1789 – 1915," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 20, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 87.

3 See Stefan Troebst's summary of the concept of meso-region as it relates to the Black Sea: Stefan Troebst, "The Black Sea as Historical Meso Region: Concepts in Cultural Studies and the Social Sciences," *Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies* 2, no. 2 (2019): 11 – 29; Stefan Troebst, "European History," in *European Regions and Boundaries: A Conceptual History*, ed. Diana Mishkova and Balázs Trencsényi (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017).

4 Thousands of books have been composed about the Crimean War, none of which can be addressed in detail. Important recent works on the war (most of which contain bibliographic essays) include Candan Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War (1853 – 1856)* (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Iuliia A. Naumova, *Ranenie, bolezn i smert: Russkaia meditsinskaia sluzhba v Krymskuiu voinu, 1853 – 1856 gg.* (Moscow: Modest Kolerov, 2010); Orlando Figes, *The Crimean War: A History* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2011); Jerszy W. Borejsza, "Crimean War 150 Years Later," in *The Crimean War, 1853 – 1856: Colonial Skirmish or Rehearsal for World War? Empires, Nations and Individuals,* ed. Jerszy W. Borejsza (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Ner-

little defense against climate or disease, while states proved unable to harness the violence they had unleashed. By 1856, the Crimean War had changed the Black Sea world forever, but not necessarily in ways the belligerent parties desired or anticipated.

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European powers began to take an interest in the affairs of the Black Sea following a new international balance of power created at the Congress of Vienna. Reflecting Eurocentric and Orientalist points of view, British and French politicians framed their concerns about Russian expansion and Ottoman contraction as the "Eastern Question." While the Eastern Question may have gained momentum with the Greek Revolution (1821–29), it did not appear regularly in print until after Egyptian Pasha Mehmed Ali had challenged Ottoman authority (1831 and 1840). By the eve of the Crimean War, the Eastern Question had become shorthand for a large set of diplomatic and military issues relating to shifting political powers on the Black Sea.[5]

Although a number of events falling under the umbrella of the Eastern Question led up to the Crimean War, the spark occurred on July 2, 1853, when the Russian army crossed the Prut River. According to public and private expressions on both sides, neither the Ottoman nor the Russian Empire wanted war.[6] A flurry of diplomatic exchanges ensued. Nevertheless, about 90,000 Russian soldiers were concentrated in the space of two hundred miles between Leova and Bucharest, a force that grew to about 100,000 in 1854.[7] Simultaneously, the Ottoman Empire concentrated 150,000–175,000 men along the southern banks of the Danube from Vidin to Varna.[8]

The Russian occupation of the Danubian Principalities triggered alarm among multiple European powers. Britain in particular perceived the move as an effort to control trade routes, and not a humanitarian intervention as Tsar Nicholas I (1825–55) had

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iton Instytut PAN, 2011), 9–18; Andrew Lambert, *The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy against Russia, 1854–1856*, 2nd ed. (Farmham: Ashgate, 2011); Andrew Rath, *The Crimean War in Imperial Context, 1854–1856* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Mara Kozelsky, *Crimea in War and Transformation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); for French historiography, Elena V. Linkova and Marc de Bollivier, "Frantsuzskaia istoriografiia Krymskoi voiny (1853–1856 gg.): Osnovnye napravleniia i tendentsii," *Vestnik Rossiiskogo Universiteta Druzhby Narodov* 19, no. 1 (2020): 240–53; and the large collection of essays edited by Candan Badem, *The Routledge Handbook of the Crimean War* (Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2022).

5 The earliest appearance of the Eastern Question appears in French political discourse. See Théodore Benazet, *Question d'Orient* (Paris: C. Gosselin, 1836); and Charles Dupin, *Discours sur la question de l'Orient* (Paris: Imprimerie Panckoucke, 1840). For a longer analysis, see Lucien Frary and Mara Kozelsky, eds., *Russian-Ottoman Borderlands: The Eastern Question Reconsidered* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 2014), 1–31.

6 For the Russian position, see Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv (RGVIA), f. 846, d. 16, f. 5407, l. 13. For the Ottoman, Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War*, 81.

7 This number includes approximately 6,000 non-combatant personnel. Evgenii V. Tarle, *Krymskaia voina* (Moscow: Izd. AST, 2005), 1:296–97.

8 Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War*, 103–4.

claimed when he announced war in October 1853.[9] Leaders of the diverse civilian populations living in occupied territories, meanwhile, had not been consulted in the diplomatic talks. Most civilians in the war zone had grown weary of war and the burdens of supporting an occupying army; Russia had occupied the Principalities multiple times in the years 1806–12, 1828–34, and 1849–52.[10]

2 The Danubian Front

Foreign armies occupied the Danubian Principalities for more than three years, beginning with Russian mobilization on the Prut and ending with the withdrawal of occupying forces in the summer of 1856. By October 21, 1853 the first shots of war had been fired on the banks of the Danube near the town of Isaccea (Ottoman: İshakçı, Russian: Isakcha).[11] Armies of the empires skirmished in Oltenița on land, and at Sinop on the Black Sea in the November. December introduced more fighting in Calafat and Cetate.[12] Estimates of Russian and Ottoman soldiers killed in direct military engagement approach a few thousand men for the Danubian theater.[13]

Remaining officially neutral, the Austrian Empire positioned an army along its borders with the Principalities to prevent Russia from making contact with Serbia, and to threaten the rear Russian supply chain that ran from Bucharest in Romania to Beltsy (Romanian: Bălți) in Moldavia. After being unable to broker peace, France and Britain declared war on Russia in the late March of 1854, adding another 50,000–60,000 men to the 500,000 Ottoman, Russian, and Austrian forces distributed around the Principalities.[14] Ultimately, the preponderance of power encouraged Nicholas I to withdraw his army during the summer months.

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9 Tarle, *Krymskaia voina*, 1:270. The complex of religious issues behind the war should not be dismissed. See David M. Goldfrank, "The Holy Sepulcher and the Origin of the Crimean War," in *The Military and Society in Russia: 1450–1917,* ed. Eric Lohr and Marshal Poe (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 491–506; David M. Goldfrank, "Policy Traditions and the Menshikov Mission of 1853," in *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy,* ed. Hugh Ragsdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 119–25.

10 See Radu Florescu, *The Struggle Against Russia in the Romanian Principalities* (Iași: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1997), 74; Veniamin Ciobanu, "The Impact of the Crimean War on the Juridical Status of the Romanian Principalities (1853–1866)," in Borejsza, *The Crimean War*, 129–53; Viktor Taki, "The Russian Protectorate in the Danubian Principalities: Legacies of the Eastern Question in Contemporary Russian-Romanian Relations," in Frary and Kozelsky, *Russian-Ottoman Borderlands*, 35–72.

11 Ambiguities surrounded the actual declaration of war, to the extent that when Omer Pasha sent an ultimatum requiring the removal of Russian forces, the local commander denied that he had the authority to conduct the removal. Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War*, 100.

12 Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War*, 177. Sources record 2,300 Russian casualties and 1,000 Ottoman dead and wounded.

13 Tarle, *Krymskaia voina*, 1:325.

14 For a summary of the size of the forces in Varna and Dobruja, see Winfried Baumgart, *The Crimean War, 1853–1856,* 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury Academic Press, 2020), 134–35.

Although the European and Russian armies never met in battle, the death toll increased; on the western shores, as in Crimea, more men died of contagious diseases than of war wounds. Cholera had been raging in several Mediterranean port cities prior to the war, and had traveled into the war zone with the French army from Marseille.[15] Scientists had not yet worked out that the disease derived from bacteria in feces-contaminated water, and so death came quickly, sometimes within six to twenty-four hours. Victims experienced intense and painful dehydration, severe bowel cramping, waves of nausea, and diarrhea. British doctors in Varna recorded a death rate of 68 percent.[16] At the end of July 1854, when several hundred men died from the disease daily, French soldiers erupted into cholera riots, a phenomenon that had occurred in 1831 and 1832 in London, St. Petersburg, and elsewhere.[17] About two-thirds of Varna went up in flames.[18] Even the Austrians, who never officially entered the war, lost 1,700 men by 1856 due to epidemics as well as confrontations with subjects under their occupation.[19]

Disease marked one type of exchange between armies and the natural environment. The ground upon which armies moved and sought supplies represented another. Waterways blocked army movement as much as rivers facilitated transportation. River crossings at Galați (Ottoman: Kalas), Brăila (Ottoman: İbrail), Isaccea, Tulça (Romanian: Tulcea, Russian: Tulcha), and Izmail (Romanian: Ismail, Ottoman: İzmail) forced troops to remain in place. In an effort to tame their surroundings, army brigades razed forests for bridge timbers.[20] Further south, in the dry terrain of Dobruja, the Ottoman army drained local drinking water as they marched northward to meet Russian forces. Subjected to degradation and plunder, nature did not yield without protest. Rushing river waters washed away bridges; heavy rains turned roads into mud pits. Winter temperatures turned harbors into sheets of ice, locking ships in place.[21] Summer temperatures threatened soldiers with heatstroke, and reignited the spread of disease.

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15 Trapped in Marseille's quarantine, American merchant John Codman depicted a city of ceaseless funerals, overcast by gloom and despair. Men fell to their knees in the street, writhing in agony. John Codman, *An American Transport in the Crimean War* (New York: Bonnell, Silver and Co., 1897), 19.

16 John A. Shepherd, *The Crimean Doctors: A History of the British Medical Service During the Crimean War* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1991), 64.

17 Karl Marx, *The Eastern Question: A Reprint of Letters Written 1853–1856: Dealing with the Events of the Crimean War*, ed. Eleanor Marx Aveling and Edward Aveling (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1897), 478; Geoffrey Gill, Sean Burrell, and Jody Brown, "Fear and Frustration: The Liverpool Cholera Riots of 1832," *The Lancet* 358, no. 9277 (2001): 233–37; Roderick E. McGrew, *Russia and the Cholera, 1823–1832* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965); Andrew Robarts, *Migration and Disease in the Black Sea Region: Ottoman-Russian Relations in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries* (London: Bloomsbury Academic Press, 2018).

18 RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5450, ll. 48, 48 ob. (Prince A. S. Menshikov to Tsar Nicholas, August 26, 1854). For a vivid portrayal of the cholera and fires in Varna, see Figes, *The Crimean War*, 191–92.

19 Baumgart, *The Crimean War*, 141.

20 RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5413, 49 ob.

21 RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5413, 48, 55.

Like their natural environment, civilians both succumbed to and resisted war. Armies pressed civilians into labor and commissioned work animals needed to till the fields. From 1853–54, for example, more than 9,000 oxen pulled wagons for the Russian army in a continuous loop between supply depots in central and eastern Ukraine and the Danubian Principalities. Most of these animals died from exhaustion and thirst, although in July 1854 1,600 died of disease.[22]

Rather than sacrificing their livelihoods or sustenance, many local inhabitants fled into the forests with packed wagons and drove herds as far from the armies as possible.[23] Greeks living in Thessaly, Epirus, and Macedonia erupted into rebellion, while Bulgarian, Wallachian, and Greek volunteer militias joined Russian forces on the delta.[24] Tatar legions fought alongside the Ottoman army in the Danubian Principalities.[25] Believing Orthodox Christians might align with Russian forces, Ottoman soldiers terrorized Bulgarian and Serbian populations suspected of harboring collaborators, and forcibly relocated Orthodox families into the interior.[26] Later, the same pattern of religious hostility repeated in Crimea, when the Russians suspected Tatars of collaboration and deported them from the coast.

Facing rapid spread of disease, and increasing hostility from civilians, the belligerent parties entered into peace talks in the summer of 1854. Peace talks in the August focused on Russia renunciation of the right to intervene in the affairs of Orthodox Christians living in Ottoman spaces, and internationalizing Black Sea waterways. When the tsar refused to concede, the Allies resolved to transfer the war to Crimea. In April 1854, Allied ships had already conducted a preliminary scouting expedition of Russia's Black Sea coast, and had attacked Odesa. The quay burst into flames, but most of the city survived.[27]

3 Crimea

Approximately 60,000–80,000 Allied soldiers disembarked in Crimea, a number matched by the Russian forces distributed in the peninsula and nearby territories.[28] Rather than spreading his men sparsely along the Crimean shores, the local military commander concentrated his forces on Sevastopol and the road networks leading

22 Fedor Zatler, *Zapiski o prodovolstvii voisk v voennoe vremia* (St. Petersburg: tip. Torgovogo doma S. Strugovshikova, 1860), 1:192–203.
23 N. Loran, "Pereselenie bolgar v Rossiiu: Sovremennaia zapis," July 10, 1854, *Russkii Arkhiv* (1897): 318–25.
24 Maria Todorova, "The Greek Volunteers in the Crimean War," *Balkan Studies*, 25, no. 2 (1984): 542.
25 RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5413, 51.
26 Tarle, *Krymskaia voina*, 1:296–97; RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5415, 125 ll., 41–42 (Report to General Liders from the Commander at Satunovo, January 14, 1854).
27 Tarle, *Krymskaia voina*, 2:8–35.
28 RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5492, 52–53 (V. I. Charykov to N. N. Annenkov, September 12, 1854); Tarle, *Krymskaia voina*, 2:132; Zatler, *Zapiski o prodovolstvii voisk v voennoe vremia*, 1:253.

into Crimea's interior. By the fall of 1854, Russian defense in Crimea had swelled to 300,000. The major battles of Alma (September 20), Balaklava (October 25), and Inkerman (November 5) proved unable to dislodge the Allies, and so the Allied siege of Sevastopol continued for eleven months.

From the first day of the Allied landing, armies began a quick drain of the peninsula. The mass concentration of soldiers brought with it a voracious appetite that army supply chains could not satisfy. Russian oxen could not pull the wagons quickly enough from the mainland, while goods traveling to the Allies by sea were subjected to the vicissitudes of the weather. In the most severe case, a hurricane on November 14 sank ships transporting precious medical supplies, food, and ammunitions. Hundreds of men on both sides died as a result of the storm, which flooded sewers and eroded trenches. The storm was so damaging to the Allies that the Russians considered it a sign God had taken up their cause.[29]

Before the end of the year, the armies had picked the peninsula clean of all foodstuffs and Crimea entered a subsistence crisis. Wells that once flowed continuously had been drained to mud.[30] Starving Russian soldiers slaughtered more than two-thirds of military and civilian work animals for food, which deprived the military of transportation necessary to import food from the mainland, and stripped the civilians of the means to sow the next year's harvest.[31]

Cholera struck as severely in Crimea as it had in Varna. Dozens died from the disease on the ships en route to the Allied base in Evpatoriia. The disease spread rapidly in the camps; for example, 98.5 percent of Sardinian casualties in Crimea resulted from sickness. From the camps, diseases spread to the civilian population.[32] The concentration of soldiers and brothels quickly produced an outbreak of sexually transmitted diseases that doctors struggled to treat through 1858.[33] Like people, animals near the war zone died in terrible numbers, whether from contagions like anthrax or from exhaustion from overwork and starvation. A Russian army report at the end of the war calculated that more than 35,000 oxen and 12,000 horses died hauling food and hay.[34]

In the middle of a prolonged war, starving men sought a simple explanation for their hunger. They fell upon the Tatars, whom they believed harbored sympathy

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29 Fr. Dombrovskii, "Buria 2-go noiabria 1854 goda, v Krymu," *Odesskii vestnik* 127 (1854), reprinted in *Moskovskie Vedomosti* 145 (1854); Kozelsky, *Crimea in War and Transformation,* 91.

30 RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5610, ll. 31–32 (Prikaz no. 32, March 4, 1855).

31 RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5617, l. 60 (Prikaz no. 102, March 28, 1855); Zatler, *Zapiski o prodovolstvii voisk v voennoe vremia,* 1:240–41.

32 Baumgart, *The Crimean War,* 286; Somerset J. Gough Calthorpe and George Cadogan (illustrator), *Cadogan's Crimea* (New York: Athenaeum, 1980); Rossiiskaia Natsionalnaia Biblioteka, f. 313, op. 1, d. 44, l. 732.

33 Kozelsky, *Crimea in War and Transformation,* 165.

34 Arsenii Markevich, *Tavricheskaia guberniia vo vremia Krymskoi voiny po arkhivnym materialam* (1905; repr., Simferopol: Tavrida, 1994), 192; RGIA, f. 1263, op. 1, d. 2481, l. 11; Kozelsky, *Crimea in War and Transformation,* 165.

with their Ottoman co-religionists.[35] To be sure, some Crimean Tatars joined forces with their "brethren of the faith," but as with Ottoman Bulgarians and Greeks, the percentage of defectors within the overall population remained quite small.[36] However, uncertainty over the loyalties of the Tatar population spread within the Russian military and irregular forces, which at times terrorized and deported several thousand Tatars from the coastal areas near Allied camps.[37]

As the war in Crimea wore on, the Allies compounded destruction of the peninsula with a *guerre de course*, targeting industries and agriculture along the Baltic and Black Seas.[38] In May 1855, Allied ships entered the Kerch Strait. Soldiers looted civilian homes and set fire to the towns when they had finished. Joined by Sardinia-Piedmont, the Allies delivered a sound defeat to the Russian army in the Battle of Chernaia River (August 16, 1855), which precipitated the Russian evacuation of Sevastopol ten days later.[39]

The evacuation of Sevastopol did not end the war. "Sevastopol is not Moscow, the Crimea is not Russia," said Alexander II (1855–81), the Russian Tsar who had unexpectedly assumed the reigns of war after his father Nicholas I passed in March 1855.[40] Instead, the Russian army withdrew to Simferopol and towns of the interior as the Allies retained their position along Crimean coasts. Skirmishes broke out through the fall and winter, but the Allies never managed to penetrate Russian resistance or Crimea's difficult terrain. The war continued until Russian victory in the Battle of Kars in the Caucasus emboldened the tsar to take his place at the negotiating table.

4 Caucasus

Much to Ottoman chagrin, European Allies did not send forces to the Caucasus, but left the Ottoman Army to manage the Caucasian front largely on its own. Violence between the Russian and Ottoman Empires in the Caucasus raged from the Russian storm of the

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35 Greta Uehling challenges the idea of "collaboration." Among other things, her work shows that civilians trapped by occupying powers have circumscribed choices on the one hand, and on the other, invaders have real motives to invent the image of support where none exists. Greta Lynn Uehling, *Beyond Memory: The Crimean Tatars' Deportation and Return* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 49–78. For an analysis of allegations against the Crimean Tatars during the Crimean War, see Mara Kozelsky, "Casualties of Conflict: Crimean Tatars During the Crimean War," *Slavic Review* 67, no. 4 (2008): 862–91.
36 Hakan Kırımlı, "Krymskie tatary i Osmanskaia imperiia vo vremia Krymskoi voiny," in Borejsza, *The Crimean War*, 333–50.
37 RGIA, f. 651, op. 1, d. 468, l. 145 (Untitled Report from the Ministry of the Interior, no. 2292, November 21, 1860).
38 Rath, *The Crimean War in Imperial Context*, 28–30, 47–51.
39 Liubomir G. Beskrovnyi, *Russkoe voennoe iskusstvo XIX v.* (Moscow: Izd. Nauka, 1974), 278; Modest I. Bogdanovich, *Vostochnaia voina, 1853–1856* (St. Petersburg: tip. F. Sushchinko, 1876), 3:45–46.
40 See, for example, Winfried Baumgart, *The Peace of Paris 1856: Studies in War, Diplomacy, and Peacemaking*, trans. Ann Pottinger Saab (Oxford: ABC-Clio, 1981), 58; Trevor Royle, *Crimea: The Great Crimean War, 1854–1856* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 435; Figes, *The Crimean War*, 397.

fortress of Batum on October 25, 1854, through the Russian seizure of the Kars fortress in November 1855. Both Russian and Ottoman war aims centered on a long-term struggle for suzerainty in the southern Caucasus region that had begun in the early nineteenth century and had seen several reversals.

Like Crimea and the Danubian Principalities, the rugged environment of the Black Sea and its hinterlands shaped the flow of violence in the Caucasus. The Caucasus Mountains had historically provided a natural geographic barrier between the Russian Empire in the north and the Persian and Ottoman Empires in the south. Only the north-south Russian military road built in the nineteenth century crossed the mountain chain to connect the military forces of the Russian Empire with the battlegrounds in the southern Caucasus. Quickly concluding that the army could not reinforce the Black Sea coastal forts Russia had wrestled from local powers and the Ottoman Empire in earlier conflicts, the Russian navy stripped the forts of cannon and evacuated nearly 4,000 men shortly after the war began.[41]

As violence unfolded in the Caucasus, an Ottoman army of nearly 120,000 arrayed against a Russian army of 160,000. Most of these men were stationed around the fortresses between Batum and Bayezid, with about half surrounding Kars and Ardahan.[42] In addition to Batum, the two armies met in the fall of 1853 in the vicinity of Aleksandropol (today: Gyumri; November 10) and Akhaltsikhe (November 13), and at Başgedikler (December 1, 1853). More bloodletting occurred as the two armies retreated.[43]

Local populations viewed the Crimean War as one stage of a protracted Russian war of conquest that began in 1816 and lasted to 1864.[44] Nearly half a century earlier Russia had gained a foothold in the region through Georgia. Through subsequent wars with Persia (1804–13; 1826–28) and the Ottoman Empire (1828–29) Russia secured its position in Transcaucasia.[45]

The Russian conquest of the Caucasus was brutal. In 1816 General A. P. Ermolov initiated a deadly campaign of ethnic cleansing, with a clearly expressed goal of cultivating Christian populations such as Armenians and Georgians, at the expense of the Muslim mountain tribes of the Caucasus, namely the Ingush, Chechens, Ossetians, Circassian, and Dagestani. His men burned a wide swath between the coast and the mountains, and indiscriminately slaughtered men, women, and children.[46] Rallied by a Mus-

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41 John Shelton Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979), 186–88.
42 Badem states that there were some 90,000 troops, and Baumgart notes that the initial number dropped quickly due to epidemics and desertion. Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War*, 145–46; Baumgart, *The Crimean War*, 223.
43 Baumgart, *The Crimean War*, 223–25.
44 See for example Nikolai I. Pokrovskii, *Kavkazskie voiny i imamat Shamilia* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2000); Khadzhi Murat Ibragimbeili, *Kavkaz v Krymskoi voine 1853–1856 gg. i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* (Moscow: Izd. Nauka, 1971).
45 Firouzeh Mostashari, *On the Religious Frontier: Tsarist Russia and Islam in the Caucasus* (London: I. B. Tauis, 2006), 23.
46 Moshe Gammer, *Muslim Resistance to the Tsar* (Abingdon, UK: Frank Cass, 1994), 30–38; Mostashari, *On the Religious Frontier*, 37–38.

lim resistance movement known as Muridism and led by Imam Shamil, local tribes hindered Russian expansion in the Caucasus throughout the 1830s. Shamil's movement had gained the attention of Western observers on the eve of the war and garnered Polish sympathies and support.[47]

When war broke out, French and British diplomats met with Circassian and Adyghe leaders in Istanbul, while dozens of English and Ottoman agents traveled the Caucasus issuing calls for "holy war" against the Russian forces.[48] Shamil and his officers considered making an alliance with the Ottoman Empire or creating an imamate under Ottoman protection. They ultimately rejected the idea, concluding that their loose confederation of tribes would not want to be beholden to Ottoman or European powers. That Ottoman *başıbozuk* (irregular forces) traveled through the Caucasian war zone committing atrocities against men, women, and children did not help. Reports of rape and murder, as well as enslavement of non-Muslims, prompted many peoples in the region, including some Muslim tribes, to view Russia as a better alternative.[49]

Without assistance from the local Caucasian tribes, Ottomans had little chance of success. After spending 1854 mired in Crimea, Russia and the Ottoman Empire returned to battle it out in Kars in the fall of 1855. Although the opening battle at Kars on September 29, 1855 resulted in an Ottoman victory and 7,500—8,000 deaths for the Russian army, the Russian forces dug in for a siege. Within weeks, the Ottoman defenders of Kars had fallen into starvation. Cholera and scurvy swept through the camps. After a snowstorm prevented the Ottoman forces from reinforcing Kars, the defenders of the Kars fortress capitulated on November 27, 1855.[50] The Russian victory at Kars proved decisive, and the Allies surrendered the Caucasus.

Victory at Kars meant that the Russian Empire had captured more territory than the Allied forces and gave Tsar Alexander II substantial leverage for peace talks. Further, as disgruntled Anatolian Greeks threatened an uprising after the Russian seizure of Kars, the Ottoman position appeared much more unstable than at the beginning of the war.[51] Britain cared less about Kars than about the possibility of a Russian march upon Istanbul. Entering the talks, the European Allies did not have the same unity of vision about the Caucasus as they did about the Danubian Principalities. France was more concerned about the Near East in the Ottoman Empire. Britain envisioned creating a greater "Circassia," joined with Georgia, Armenia, and other Caucasian states,

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47 Vladimir Bobrovnikov, "Krymskaia voina na russkom Kavkaze: Ideologiia frontira i diskurs musulmanskogo soprotivleniia," in Borejsza, *The Crimean War*, 299–332; Pokrovskii, *Kavkazskie voiny i imamat Shamilia*, 303–4; Asker D. Panesh, *Zapadnaia Cherkesiia v sisteme vzaimodeistviia rossii s Turtsiei, Angliei, i imamatom Shamiilia v XIX v. (do 1864)* (Maikop: Adygeiskii respublikanskii institut gumanitarnykh issledovanii im. T. M. Kerasheva, 2007), 3–4.

48 Panesh, *Zapadnaia Cherkesiia*, 183–85.

49 Pokrovskii, *Kavkazskie voiny i imamat Shamilia*, 458–60; Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War*, 154–55; Yusuf Hakan Erdem, "Wherever Slavery Exists, the Whole Society Suffers: The White Slave Controversy During the Crimean War," in Borejsza, *The Crimean War*, 53–79.

50 Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War*, 251–55; Figes, *The Crimean War*, 398–99.

51 Baumgart, *The Peace of Paris*, 106.

while also returning to Persia and the Ottoman Empire those parts ceded to Russia in the treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Edirne (also known as Adrianople, 1829). Talks ensued from December through February, until all sides agreed upon peace in March 1856.[52]

The Paris peace treaty brought an end to the Russian protectorship in the Danubian Principalities and ceded some portions of Bessarabia (the western part of present-day Moldova) to the Ottoman Empire. The Russian Empire retained sovereignty over most of the Transcaucasian territory it captured, and secured the sultan's assurance of the legal position of Christian subjects stated in the *Hatt-i Hümayun.* The European Allies won neutralization of the Black Sea and freedom of navigation on the Danube.[53]

5 Conclusion

Three years of mobilization and war dramatically changed the world in ways only partially revealed by the peace accord. The European, Russian, and Ottoman Empires had already begun to stretch across the globe, and the consequences of this war took a global dimension. In addition to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, navies fought in the Baltic Sea, the White Sea, and the Pacific Ocean. Armies skirmished in China and on the banks of the Amur River. The Crimean War's Pacific front, fought around the Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin Island, unlocked a new imperial dynamic between Japan and Russia with repercussions stretching to the present.[54] The consequences of this outsized conflict in the Black Sea even rippled in the United States by providing a blueprint for warfare in the Civil War and precipitating the sale of Alaska.[55]

A war of the industrial era, the Crimean War also ushered in a new type of mass violence. Other scholars referenced throughout this article address the role of steamships and rail, along with the importance of long-range guns and sea mines. Modern advances in battlefield medicine have also been well documented in the literature.[56] Mass media captured all of these developments for audiences at home. Roger Fenton pioneered war photography, alongside war journalists like William Russell.[57] In Russia,

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52 Panesh, *Zapadnaia Cherkesiia*, 183; Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War*, 18.

53 Baumgart, *The Peace of Paris*, 107–73; "Traktat zakluchennyi v Parizhe 18 (30) marta 1856," in Tarle, *Krymskaia voina* (unpaginated appendix).

54 Rath, *The Crimean War in Imperial Context*, 191–202; Andrew Lambert, *The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy Against Russia, 1854–1856*, 2nd ed. (Farmham: Ashgate, 2011), 112–16, 151–53, 199–201.

55 Matthew Moten, *The Delafield Commission and the American Military Profession* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000); Lee A. Farrow, *Steward's Folly: A New Look at the Alaska Purchase* (Fairbanks, AL: University of Alaska Press, 2016); Joseph Bradley, *Guns for the Tsar: American Technology and the Small Arms Industry in Nineteenth-Century Russia* (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University, 1990).

56 See for example the works referenced in fn. 4.

57 Ulrich Keller, *The Ultimate Spectacle: A Visual History of the Crimean War* (Amsterdam: Routledge, 2001); Stefanie Markovitz, *The Crimean War in the British Imagination* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-

Leo Tolstoy and Nikolai Berg educated the growing literate public about activity of the front.[58] And there were many other icons associated with this war, be it the nurses Mary Seacole, Florence Nightingale, and Dasha Sevastopolskaia, or the British poet Alfred Tennyson and his contemporary Karl Marx, who wrote about the war for the *New York Tribune.*[59]

Official sources on the death toll of the war rarely depict civilian losses. Sources vary and/or under-represent soldiers' deaths. Taking the previous limitations into consideration, estimates of lives lost to the Crimean War range to 900,000, including up to 600,000 Russians, 120,000 Ottomans, approximately 93,500 French, 2,500 Sardinians, 22,000 British soldiers, and unnamed civilians.[60] By far the largest death tolls occurred in and around Crimea, where nearly 170,000 men died in Sevastopol alone.[61]

In the Black Sea Region, the war's impact penetrated deeply into the hinterland. Soldiers commanded civilian labor and resources in a wide radius around the sea through the present-day spaces of Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Caucasus. Militaries spread war diseases from ports inland. Scorched earth policy and *guerre de course* burned fields and villages. The voracious appetite for violence demanded provisions from an ever-widening field, which forced refugees even further from the violent shores. By war's end, violence had dragged living and material resources from continental interiors, with a demographic and environmental impact that no one could fully calculate.[62]

The war accelerated emerging nationalist movements in Southeastern Europe and the Caucasus, while inspiring transformational reforms in the Ottoman and Russian Empires. Although some areas in or near the war zone suffered terrible destruction, other economies entered the world market in stronger positions.[63] Most significantly, the Crimean War prompted one of the largest mass migrations of the nineteenth century. Some 200,000 Crimean Tatars fled Russia for the Ottoman Empire; Orthodox

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sity Press, 2009); and Georg Maag et al., eds., *Der Krimkrieg als erster europäischer Medienkrieg* (Berlin: Verlag 2010). See also Gavin Williams, *Hearing the Crimean War: Wartime Sound and the Unmasking of Sense* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018).

58 Alexis Peri, "Heroes, Cowards and Traitors: The Crimean War and Its Challenge to Russian Autocracy," *Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Working Papers Series* (Institute of East European and Eurasian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Summer, 2008); Serhii Plokhy, "The City of Glory: Sevastopol in Russian Historical Mythology," *Journal of Contemporary History* 35, no. 3 (July 2000): 369 – 83; and Olga Maiorova, *From the Shadow of Empire: Defining the Russian Nation through Cultural Mythology, 1855 – 1870* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010).

59 Karl Marx, *The Eastern Question: A Reprint of Letters Written 1853 – 1856 Dealing with the Events of the Crimean War,* ed. Eleanor Marx Aveling and Edward Aveling (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1897).

60 Figes, *The Crimean War,* 467 – 92; Baumgart, *The Crimean War,* 286 – 87; Kozelsky, *Crimea in War and Transportation,* 75 – 89.

61 Naumova*, Ranenie, bolezn i smert,* 297.

62 Kozelsky, *Crimea in War and Transformation,* 199 – 206.

63 Ivan Roussev, "Wartime Crisis? The Crimean War (1853 – 1856) – the Different War," *Proceedings of the Centre for Economic History Research* (2019): 52 – 65.

Christians from the Ottoman Empire took their places. Nogay Tatars and Muslim tribes from the Caucasus soon followed.[64]

Over the course of three years, war in the Black Sea had redistributed violence and resources. The lethal intersection pulled life and labor from the hinterlands into the sea, whirlpooling peoples and their faiths, flora and fauna, economies, and militaries around the shores.

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64 A. I. Markevich, "Pereseleniia krymskikh tatar v Turtsiiu v sviazi s dvizheniem naseleniia v Krymu," *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR*, otd. gumanitarnykh nauk 1 (1928): 375–405, 2 (1929): 1–16; Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Alan W. Fisher, "Emigration of Muslims from the Russian Empire in the Years after the Crimean War," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 35, no. 3 (1987), 356–71; Marc Pinson, "Demographic Warfare: An Aspect of Ottoman and Russian Policy, 1854–1866" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1970); Brian Glyn Williams, "Hijra and Forced Migration from Nineteenth-Century Russia to the Ottoman Empire," *Cahiers du monde Russe* 41, no. 1 (January–March2000): 79–108; James Meyer, "Immigration, Return, and the Politics of Citizenship: Russian Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, 1860–1914," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39, no. 1 (2007): 9–26; Catalina Hunt, "Changing Identities at the Fringes of the Late Ottoman Empire: The Muslims of Dobruca, 1839–1914" (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2015).

Lora Gerd

Russian Imperial Church Policy in the Black Sea Region (1856–1914)

For nineteenth-century Russia the Black Sea was an area of rich historical memories, and a birthplace of classical works of Russian literature and fine arts. The present article provides a new view on Russian policy in the Black Sea region during the nineteenth and the early twentieth century. What role did this area play for Russia in the context of the Eastern question? How did diplomacy and Church policy act among the Christian population of the Black Sea region? Some recently discovered documents concerning these relations, rom unpublished archive sources, shed light on the character of Russian policy in the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans during the "long nineteenth century."

1 The Black Sea Region in Russian Policy before the Nineteenth Century

The Black Sea region has played an important role in Russian history since the Middle Ages. The famous trading route "From the Vikings to the Greeks" ("*Iz variag v greki*"), from Kyiv and Novgorod to Constantinople, passed through there. One of the traditions of Prince Vladimir's baptism is also connected with Chersonesus in the Crimean Peninsula.[1] Merchants and pilgrims from the Russian lands travelled to the East following the western Black Sea coast, and the reverse path was taken by clergymen from the Christian Ottoman lands who went to Moscow in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to gather donations.[2] The Eastern route, mountainous and more dangerous, was normally avoided. These contacts were fertile ground for the future political and military steps of the Russian tsars in the eastern Mediterranean.[3]

Since the late seventeenth century the Black Sea coast became an object of Russia's direct political aspirations. Peter I undertook several expeditions against the Ottoman Empire, and captured the town of Azov (Ottoman: Azak). In the second half of the eighteenth century Catherine II started several campaigns against the Ottoman Empire

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1 Andrzej Poppe, *The Rise of Christian Russia* (London: Variorum reprints, 1982); Gerhard Podskalsky, *Christentum und theologische Literatur in der Kiever Rus' (988–1237)* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1982).
2 Nikolai F. Kapterev, *Kharakter otnoshenii Rossii k Pravoslavnomu Vostoku v XVI i XVII stoletiiakh* (Sergiev Posad: Elov Bookshop Publishers, 1914); Sergei M. Kashtanov, *Rossiia i grecheskii mir v XVI veke* (Moscow: Nauka, 2004); Ekkehard Kraft, *Moskaus griechisches Jahrhundert: Russisch-Griechische Beziehungen und metabyzantinischer Einfluss 1619–1694* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1995).
3 On the period under Peter I, see Nikolas Pissis, *Russland in den politischen Vorstellungen der griechischen Kulturwelt 1645–1725* (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2020).

(1768–74, 1787–91), which resulted in joining to Russia vast southern territories and the whole northern Black Sea coastline. In 1783 the Crimean Peninsula was also annexed by Russia.[4] The territorial acquisitions were followed by wide-scale Greek emigration to Southern Russia. The Church organization of these provinces was entrusted to the learned Greek prelate Eugenios Voulgaris, appointed archbishop of Poltava in 1775.[5] The spirit of the Enlightenment and profound interest in Ancient Greek culture was characteristic for the court of Catherine.[6] It led to the hellenization of the topography of the Black Sea: The names of the towns of Odesa, Kherson, Feodosiia, and the newly founded Sevastopol drew on glorious Antiquity. Catherine's political projects were aimed at further penetration into Ottoman territory and in a large-term perspective at conquering the Ottoman capital, Istanbul. During the last decade of the eighteenth century the "Greek" projects were abandoned, but not forgotten.[7]

2 Different Facets of the Eastern Question: Practical Aspirations and Church Policy

The nineteenth century brought a new period, first a series of Russo-Ottoman wars, and from the late 1820s on the competition between the great powers for domination in the Middle East, known as the Eastern question. Its political side was focused on two main issues: the domination in the Straits connecting the Black Sea and the Aegean (the Bosporus and the Dardanelles), and the competition between Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and later Germany for dividing the Ottoman territory into

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4 Matthew Smith Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774–1923: A Study in International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1966), 1–27; Nikolai F. Dubrovin, *Prisoedinenie Kryma k Rossii* (St. Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences Typography, 1885–89); Alan W. Fisher, "Şahin Girey, the Reformer Khan, and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 15, no. 3 (1967): 341–64. For a brief overview of the political events in the eighteenth century: Charles King, *The Black Sea: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 139–86. See also Isabel de Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great* (New York: Phoenix Press, 2002).

5 Steven Batalden, *Catherine II's Greek Prelate: Eugenios Voulgaris in Russia, 1771–1806* (Boulder: East European Quarterly/Columbia University Press, 1982).

6 On the Enlightenment in Russia see: Simon Dixon, *The Modernization of Russia 1676–1825* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Vladimir F. Pustarnakov, *Filosofiia prosveshcheniia v Rossii i vo Frantsii: Opyt sravnitelnogo analiza* (Moscow: Institute of Philosophy RAN, 2002).

7 Olga P. Markova, "O proiskhozhdenii tak nazyvaemogo Grecheskogo proekta (80-e gody XVIII veka)," in *Problemy metodologii i istochnikovedeniia vneshnei politiki Rossii,* ed. Alexei L. Narochnitskii (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1986), 5–46; Petr V. Stegnii, "Eshche raz o grecheskom proekte Ekateriny II: Novye dokumenty iz AVPRI MID Rossii," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia* 4 (2002): 52–78; Grigorii L. Arsh, "O grecheskom proekte Ekateriny II," in *Rossiia i borba Gretsii za osvobozhdenie: Ot Ekateriny II do Nikolaia I. Ocherki* (Moscow: Indrik, 2013), 35–52; Maria A. Petrova, *Ekaterina II i Iosif II: Formirovanie rossiisko-avstriiskogo soiuza, 1780–1790* (Moscow: Nauka, 2011).

spheres of influence.[8] All great powers exploited local nationalisms and the struggle of the non-Turkish nations for independence for their own interests, combining economic, cultural, and religious levers of influence. The religious component in Russian policy, neglected in the scholarship of the twentieth century, played a leading role in relations with the East. For centuries, the shared Christian Orthodox faith made the difference for and gave the advantage to Russian policy in the region over the influence of the Western powers. The messianic image of the Russian tsar-liberator and military success in the wars against the Ottoman Empire created a favorable platform for further geopolitical penetration into the Middle East. The treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) became the new start of a long-term perspective for Russia's interference in Ottoman affairs as protector of the Orthodox population.[9] In the nineteenth century, the Church remained the main basis of Russian soft power and cultural diplomacy among the non-Muslim peoples of the Ottoman Empire. By educating young people in Russian theological academies and universities, financing churches, monasteries, and schools, and sending books and church items, Russia, similar to Britain and France, created clienteles among the population. After the treaty of Adrianople (Edirne, 1829), Russia had obvious advantages in the Eastern question, combining political means with the traditional material and diplomatic support of the Orthodox churches of the Ottoman Empire. In 1818 the Jerusalem dependence in Moscow was founded, followed by those of the Patriarchates of Antioch (1849) and Alexandria (1856).[10] These institutions guaranteed a stable income for the relevant churches in the East. Sizeable material aid was sent in the 1830s and 1840s to a number of Slavonic, Greek, Moldavian, and Wallachian churches. The Church institutions of the Danube Principalities (under Russian control between 1829 and 1834), enjoyed special attention from the Russian authorities: All attempts of the local administrators and landowners to shorter the privileges of the Church before 1853 were neutralized by Russian diplomacy in Istanbul.[11]

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8 From the vast bibliography on the Eastern question, see Benedict Humphrey Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans, 1870 – 1880* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1962); Anderson, *The Eastern Question;* Norman Rich, *Great Powers Diplomacy: 1814 – 1914* (New York: Mc Graw Hill, 1991); Alexander L. Macfie, *The Eastern Question, 1774 – 1923* (New York: Longman, 1996); Lucien Frary and Mara Kozelsky, eds., *Russian-Ottoman Borderlands: The Eastern Question Reconsidered* (Wisconsin: Wisconsin University Press, 2014).
9 On the discussions and perceptions of this claim, see Victor Taki, *Contested Protectorate: Holy Places and Orthodox Christians in Russian-Ottoman Relations, 1815 – 1853* (Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2015), 5; Victor Taki, *Limits of Protection: Russia and the Orthodox Co-Religionists in the Ottoman Empire* (Pittsburgh P. A.: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, 2015).
10 Olga E. Petrunina, Lora A. Gerd, and Kirill A. Vach, eds., *Aleksandriiskii patriarkhat i Rossiia v XIX veke: Issledovaniia i materialy* (Moscow: Indrik, 2020); Lora A. Gerd, "Russian Sacred Objects in the Orthodox East: Archive Evidence from the 18th to the Early 20th Century," *Museikon, Alba Iulia* 4 (2020): 227–36.
11 Barbara Jelavich, *Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State, 1821 – 1878* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Lora A. Gerd, "Sekuliarizatsiia imenii vostochnykh monastyrei i tserkvei v Valakhii i Moldavii v nachale 1860-kh godov i Rossiia," *Vestnik Pravoslavnogo Sviato-Tikhonovskogo Gumanitarnogo Universiteta,* Ser. II, 61, no. 6 (2014): 7– 34.

3 After the Crimean War: Russian Church Policy in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century

The Crimean War of 1853–56 was a turning point in Russian policy in the Middle East and the Black Sea region. Russia lost its favorable positions and had to face a completely new situation in the Ottoman Empire. With the edition of the *Hatt-i Hümayun* of 1856, a series wide-scale reforms was incepted in the Ottoman Empire.[12] The Tanzimat aimed to modernize and secularize the state: The non-Muslim communities were placed under state authority, with the intention that they would gradually lose their independence and economic power. The reforms envisioned a common Ottoman identity and a kind of equality before the law between Muslims and non-Muslims. The Orthodox Church was also under transformation, and after the new regulations were issued in 1860, its laicization began.[13] On the whole, this trend was not welcomed in Russia: Ambassador Butenev characterized the *Hatt-i Hümayun* of 1856 as a "lying and not very well composed document which was created and imposed on the Turks by the Western powers more out of their hatred for Russia and fear of her political and ecclesiastical influence in the East than out of their real concern for the Christian population in the Ottoman state. It has become the beginning of great confusion in the Patriarchate of Constantinople."[14] Quite unfavorable was the attitude of the head of Russian Church policy, the metropolitan of Moscow, Filaret Drozdov. Other conservative-minded politicians, such as Ober-Procurator Aleksandr Tolstoi, were not well-disposed to the Church reforms either. In fact, the reforms in the state and Church clearly diminished both the Church's independence and the Russian influence in the Empire, which was strongly based on the Orthodox Church.[15] In the age of nationalism and reforms, Russia faced a new political situation in which the traditional means of influence by material support could not work well enough; new ways had to be found.

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12 Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876* (Princeton N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963); William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, eds., *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

13 Dimitris Stamatopoulos, *Metarrythmisi kai ekkosmikeusi: Pros mia anasynthesis tis istorias tou Oikoumenikou Patriarheiou to 19o aiona* (Athens: Alexandria, 2003), 77–152.

14 *Sobranie mnenii i otzyvov Filareta mitropolita Moskovskogo i Kolomenskogo po delam pravoslavnoi tserkvi na Vostoke* (St. Petersburg: Typography of the Synod, 1886), III.

15 *Sobranie mnenii i otzyvov Filareta:* 9, 14–15, 20, 29. About the position of Ober-procurator Alexander Tolstoi, see Lora A. Gerd, ed., "'V delakh Vostoka pervoi zabotoi nashei dolzhna byt Sviataia Tserkov...': Dve zapiski ober-prokurora Sv. Sinoda A. P. Tolstogo po greko-bolgarskomu voprosu s kommentariiami Alexandra II. 1860 g.," *Istoricheskii Arkhiv* 2 (2003): 49–61.

4 Russian Policy in the Eastern Pontus Region (1856 – 1914)

The Russian influence in the Eastern Pontus region, inhabited by a mixed population of Greeks, Armenians, Georgians, and Turks was traditionally strong due to economic, social, and cultural links. As early as 1821, during the Greek struggle for independence, the archimandrite of Sumela Monastery, Ioannikios, escaped persecution and brought the relics of St. Christopher to Suhum-Kale. After his death in 1825, another monk, Pachomios, transferred the relics to the Greek monastery in Balaklava. In early 1839, the abbot of Sumela Paisii addressed to the Russian Holy Synod the request that the relics be returned to the monastery. His wish was fulfilled.[16] Around 1843, the abbot of St. George's Monastery, Hutura of Gümüşhane (the Greek Argyroupolis) Seraphim, wrote a letter to the Russian Synod requesting permission to gather donations. After some doubt, in 1845 the Russian authorities issued permission for one year.[17]

The *Hatt-i Hümayun* of 1856 officially put the Ottoman Christians on an equal footing with the Muslims: Among other freedoms, now they could officially practice their religion. As a result, hundreds of crypto-Christians from the Eastern Pontus, who had forcibly Islamized in the seventeenth century, decided to openly declare themselves Orthodox Christians.[18] The Eastern Pontus region was not greatly influenced by the main stream of the national struggle of the non-Muslim Ottoman population of the second half of the 1850s: Unlike the Western regions, the Christians here did not aim for autonomy with the perspective of political independence, but sought a Russian protectorate and prepared to join the territory of the Russian Empire.

After 1856, a campaign to join Orthodoxy was launched under the aegis of the Russian consul in Trabzon, Aleksandr Moshnin. He was convinced that the eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire would soon be joined to Russia and considered it his task to prepare this development by supporting the local Orthodox and crypto-Christians. This population had already had long-term economic contact with the Southern Russian provinces and the Caucasus, working as masons in the towns. Now the opportune moment arose. About 16,000 Greek inhabitants of Kromli (Gümüşhane region) declared themselves officially Christians. The Russian ambassador in Istanbul, Apollinarii Butenev, advised Moshnin to act together with the consuls of other Western powers, but he refused, referring to the fact that they spread active Catholic propaganda among the

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16 Extract from the decision of the Holy Synod, October 16/20, 1839, No. 133. Russian State Historical Archives (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Archiv, furtherafter RGIA), fond. 797, op. 9, 2 otd., 2 st., d. 25633.

17 Extract from the decision of the Holy Synod, November 7/28, 1845 RGIA, f. 797, op 15, 2 otd., d. 36300.

18 On the influence of the Tanzimat over the Eastern Pontus region, see Konstantinos Fotiadis, *Oi ex-islamismoi tis Mikras Asias kai oi kryptochristianoi tou Pontou* (Thessaloniki: Adelfon Kyriakidi Editions, 1993), 349 – 407.

local Armenians.[19] Some stories of the Kromli families are reported by Moshnin: Suleiman Bairamov from Trabzon had worked in Russia for a number of years and had adopted Orthodoxy and Russian citizenship. On returning to the Ottoman Empire, he openly declared himself Christian and was attacked by fanatic Muslims. Heavily wounded, he sought asylum in the Russian consulate, and Moshnin demanded from the Vali (provincial governor) that the guilty party be punished. A few days later a fight broke out between Suleiman's son Charalambos and the Muslims, and one person was killed. The consul demanded an independent investigation of the case and a fair trial for Charalambos and his opponents. Another case concerned a Greek woman who was kidnapped from her husband by a certain Muslim and forced to adopt Islam; Moshnin also granted her asylum in the Russian consulate.[20] In another report, dated 1861, Moshnin tells the story of two more people. The first was a man whom the consul helped move to Moldavia, and the second was a girl (Greek Orthodox on her mother's side) from the village Platamon who escaped from her father. The consul promised her protection from the pasha. She was later baptized in the house of a Greek, and Moshnin helped her leave for Georgia.[21]

Moshnin considered an important demonstration of the rights of Christians to be ringing bells in the church of the Metropoly. In 1857 he had already managed to obtain a three-hundred-ruble donation from the Russian Synod for the new Greek church in Trabzon,[22] where he managed to persuade the cautious Metropolitan Konstantios to install a bell. The re-conversion of the Kromli provoked indignation from the Muslim authorities and was regarded as a betrayal of Islam. Hundreds of them were imprisoned and died of hunger and typhus, and in Giresun the *zaptiye* (gendarmes) broke into the church during the liturgy. Some of the Kromli left the Ottoman Empire for Russia and settled in the region around the town of Poti on the Black Sea. Meanwhile, the Ottoman government recruited most of the young male population as soldiers. By 1859 the persecution had ended. Despite the repressions, Moshnin reported, about 16,000 Kromli were officially recognized as Christians and the Sublime Port had to support the Orthodox schools in Trabzon and Gümüşhane.[23]

The success of his mediation in the Kromli affair encouraged Moshnin to undertake another campaign concerning the Lazy population of the Batum region. "The Pashalık of Lazistan is inhabited by a completely different population than that of the

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19 The first documents on the re-conversion are dated to May 1856 (Reports by the Greek vice-consul in Trabzon K. Kipriotis, see: Konstantinos Fotiadis, ed., *Piges tis istorias tou kryprohristianikou problimatos* [Thessaloniki: Adlefon Kyriakidoi Editions, 1997], 69–70). Report of Alexander Moshnin about 16,000 Kromli joining Christianity. RGIA, f. 797, op. 27, 2 otd., 2 st., d. 341.

20 Report of Alexander Moshnin on 16,000 Kromli joining Christianity. RGIA, f. 797, op. 27, 2 otd., 2 st., d. 341.

21 Alexander N. Moshnin to Sergei N. Urusov, April 17, 1863. RGIA, f. 797, op. 31, 2 otd., 2 st., d. 311.

22 Extract from the decision of the Holy Synod, November 18/December 1857. RGIA. F. 797, op. 27, 2 otd., 2 st., d. 401.

23 RGIA, f. 797, op. 31, 2 otd., 2 st., d. 311. See also the thanksgiving letter of Metropolitan Konstantios to the Russian Synod (May 10, 1859). RGIA, f. 797, op. 31, 2 otd., 2 st., d. 311.

Turks, Greeks, or the Armenians. They are Lazi, whose customs and traditions are similar to those of the traditions of the Hurians […] A significant part of the region are Ajarians who are secretly practicing Christianity, like the Kromli," he reported.[24] On this occasion, he began negotiations over the construction of an Orthodox church in Batum. He regarded this act as even more important than the building of a Russian church in Trabzon. Moshnin's proposal was supported by the Metropolitan of Petersburg Isidor, who stressed the presence of crypto-Christians in the area of Kobuleti: They visited the half-ruined chapels in the mountains, where they lit candles.[25] In 1862 Moshnin travelled to the Caucasus and visited Batum, donated a bell to the church and on his return wrote a detailed report about Batum's perspectives as a future Russian harbor.[26] The Ajarians, however, had not reconverted to Christianity at the time; some of them later became Orthodox, after this territory was joined to Russia in 1878.

Moshnin's activities were greatly appreciated by the Russian government: He was invited to Petersburg and received an audience with the Empress Maria Alexandrovna. The tsarina herself donated to the church in Trabzon a set of ecclesiastical utensils and vessels; they were received by the consul in Istanbul and solemnly in Trabzon: The Metropolitan served a Slavonic liturgy to mark the occasion and granted permission for further Slavonic services in the town once every two weeks.[27]

Surprisingly, less than two years later Metropolitan Konstantios wrote a long complaint about Consul Moshnin to the Russian Synod, accusing him of not supporting the Orthodox. Moshnin was forced to defend himself. The reason for the complaints was clear: Some time earlier he had managed to reveal a massive contraband of weapons from the Ottoman Empire to the Caucasus. The British and Belgian consuls also participated in this affair, as well as some Greek merchants. One of them, Konstantinidis of Giresun, a Russian subject, was held for some time on a Russian naval vessel. This fact provoked indignation of the Metropolitan, financed by Konstantinidis.[28]

Apart of this, Moshnin offered the Russian foreign ministry detailed reports on the state of the Greek schools of the region, with information on the sums given by every church for the Trabzon Greek school.[29]

The persecution of the Christians in the eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire led to their mass emigration to Russian territory in the 1850s and 1860s. In 1864 some of them arrived in the Caucasus together with their priests, without any documents. A few years later, the question arose as to whether their priests could celebrate the liturgy

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24 Alexander N. Moshnin to Evgenii P. Kovalevskii. August 10, 1861. RGIA, f. 797, op. 31, 2 otd., 2 st., d. 311.

25 Metropolitan Isidor of Petersburg to S. N. Urusov, September 9, 1861. RGIA, f. 797, op. 31, 2 otd., 2 st., d. 311.

26 Alexander N. Moshnin to Sergei N. Urusov, April 16, 1863. RGIA, f. 797, op. 31, 2 otd., 2 st., d. 311.

27 Alexander N. Moshnin to Sergei N. Urusov, May 1/13, 1862. RGIA, f. 797, op. 32, 2 otd., d. 119.

28 Alexander N. Moshnin to Petr N. Stremouhov, June 28, 1862. RGIA, f. 797, op. 32, 2 otd., d. 119. The Greek merchant mentioned was possibly Captain Georgi Konstantinidis (1828 – 1906), later mayor of Giresun (1889 – 1906).

29 Report dated December 4, 1865. RGIA, f. 797, op. 36, 2 otd., 3 st., d. 1.

without papers from their bishops. On July 3, 1870 the Russian Synod, on the basis of Orthodox canon law, prohibited this, and Archbishop Theophylact demanded that they receive other Greek priests who already had Russian papers. The conflict was solved by the intermediation of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, then governor of the Caucasus. He explained that the emigrants lived in remote areas, and at the same time they trusted their own clergy and there could be no doubts concerning their legal status. The Synod finally rescinded its decree.[30]

A different situation was presented by the sons of these priests, who wanted to combine the advantages of their stay in Russia with the privilege of dependence on a bishop abroad. Some of them travelled to the Ottoman Empire, and after being ordained there aspired to serve the liturgy in Russia among their compatriots. Here the Synod showed no mercy and demanded that they study in ecclesiastical schools as the sons of Russian priests.[31]

Refugees from the Ottoman Empire's eastern provinces regularly tried to collect donations in Russia without official permission, presenting themselves as clergymen; repeated prohibition by the Russian Synod shows that such attempts endured.[32]

The annexation of Batum and the Kars region to the Russian Empire in 1878 marked the further penetration of Russia into the eastern part of Asia Minor. This was followed by another wave of contacts with the Orthodox population and institutions in the east of the Ottoman Empire, favorable for Russia's influence in the region. Most attention was paid to the largest monastery, that of the Virgin Sumela. In early 1888, the abbot Parthenii sought the Synod's permission to gather donations among the Greeks of Southern Russia, bringing the venerated icon and relics of saints. Permission was granted in early 1889. "Taking into account that the monastery is the mainstay of Christianity in the region and contributes a lot to the spiritual life of the local population, by the foundation and financing of schools in the villages, as well as an ecclesiastical school for priests, and is in poor condition because of its debts," it was allowed to collect money not only among the Greeks, but also among all the inhabitants of Southern Russia. Later, this permission was extended to the entire territory of Russia and prolonged twice, for two more years.[33] The Sumela monastery was also allowed to collect donations in 1902 and 1912. The other Pontus monasteries also enjoyed this right more than once, for example the monastery of St. George Peristera in 1897, 1898, and 1913.[34]

In the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, the East Pontus became the subject of intensive study by Russian Byzantinists. Russian Byzantine studies had been

30 Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich to Dmitrii A. Tolstoi. Borzhomi, June 27, 1871. RGIA, f. 797, op. 41, 2 otd., 3 st., d. 147.
31 RGIA, f. 797, op. 51, 2 otd. 3 st., d. 378.
32 See the Synod reports and restrictions: RGIA, f. 797, op. 48, 2 otd. 3 st., d. 18; op. 45, 2 otd. 3 st., d. 9, etc.
33 Extract from the decision of the Holy Synod, January 18/22, 1889, No. 81. RGIA, f. 797, op. 58, 2 otd. 3 st., d. 66.
34 RGIA, f. 797, op. 82, 2 otd., 3 st., d. 385.

highly encouraged since the 1880s, as part of the mainstream conservative universalist ideology of Alexander III's reign. The first to discover the heritage of the Pontus monasteries was the Greek scholar Athanasios Papadopoulos-Kerameus, who visited the Sumela and Bazelon monasteries in 1884 and made a catalogue of their manuscripts. Kerameus later moved to Russia, where he published his works.[35] He also brought with him from the Vazelon monastery an important manuscript on the economic life of the province during the early Ottoman times. After his death, this manuscript was given to the Imperial Public library in St. Petersburg and is the only preserved manuscript from the monastery.[36] Soon after the foundation of the Russian Archeological Institute in Istanbul, his director Fedor Uspenskii undertook an expedition to Trabzon (1895)[37] and Aleksei Dmitrievskii, professor of the Kyiv Theological Academy, visited Sumela in 1896. Apart from studying liturgical manuscripts, Dmitrievskii discovered and made a copy of the Itinerary of Arsenii of Elassona, who followed Patriarch Jeremy II to Russia in 1586 and 1588. The manuscript contains "Memories from Russian history" and the life of Archbishop Arsenii.[38]

5 During World War I

In early 1916 the Russian army successfully advanced on the Caucasus front and occupied a vast territory in the east of the Ottoman Empire. Trabzon was captured on April 5. Evgenii V. Maslovskii, a witness to the events, described the triumphal entry of the Russian troops and their enthusiastic meeting by the local Christian population.[39] Another witness, the protopresbyter of the Russian army and fleet Georgii Shavelskii, left a more realistic account: The Russian army arrived in the eastern Ottoman Empire soon after the genocide of the Armenians in 1915. The Greek population, however, re-

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35 Chryssanth Loparev, "Afanasii Ivanovich Papadopulo-Keramevs," *Vizantiiskii Vremennik* 19 (1912): 188 – 212; Igor P. Medvedev, "Neizvestnii katalog grecheskikh rukopisei Vazelonskogo monastyria, sostavlennii A I. Papadopoulo-Keramevsom," in *Arkhivy russkikh vizantinistov v Sankt-Peterburge*, ed. Igor P. Medvedev (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 1995), 430 – 44.

36 Later, Russian scholars prepared an edition of the text: Fedor I. Uspenskii and Vladimir N. Beneshevich, *Vazelonskie akty: Materialy dlia istorii monastyrskogo i tserkovnogo zemlevladeniia v Vizantii VIII–XV vekov* (Leningrad: Izdanie Gosudarstvennoi publichnoi biblioteki, 1927).

37 The results of this short visit were published in: *Izvestiia Russkogo Arkheologicheskogo Instituta v Konstantinopole* 1 (1896): 25 – 29.

38 Probably, the original manuscript was lost, and a copy plays the role of the original (Russian National Library, f. 253, op. 1, d. 280). See the publication in Russian translation: Alexei Dmitrievskii, *Arkhiepiskop Elassonskii Arsenii i memuary ego iz russkoi istorii po rukopisi Trapezundskogo Sumeliiskogo monastyria (s fototipicheskim portretom (ikonoi) Arkhiepiskopa i ego faksimile na russkom iazyke)* (Kyiv: St. Vladimir Imperial University, N. T. Korchak-Novitskii editions, 1899). A Greek edition after Dmitrievskii's copy: Fotis Dimitrakopoulos, *Arsenios Elassonos (1550 – 1626): Bios, ergo, apomnimoneumata. Symboli sti meleti ton metabyzantinon logion tis Anatolis* (Athens: P. Kyriakidi Editions, 2007).

39 Evgenii V. Maslovskii, *Velikaiia voina na Kavkazskom fronte: 1914 – 1917 gg.* (Moscow: Veche, 2015), 318 – 19.

mained almost untouched. In Erzincan they met a priest, who reminded him more of a beggar than a clergyman. He preferred Trabzon and described the Russian activities in the town: The buildings around the church of Panagia Chrysokephalos had already been demolished to make room for a square. Shavelskii paid special attention at Metropolitan Chrysanthos and praised his education and abilities. After a personal meeting with the prelate he commented that nothing could be expected from him as far as Russian interests were concerned, especially taking into account his German education and Greek patriotism.[40]

The Russian occupation of the Trabzon region gave new opportunities for research work. Academician Fedor Uspenskii spent a few months there (from May to September 1916) ahead of an expedition. This time he made a detailed study of the churches and monasteries inside the town and undertook a trip to the monastery of St. George Peristera. He paid another (shorter) visit to Trabzon in 1917.[41]

6 The Western Black Sea Coast: Panslavism, Church Policy, and Cultural Diplomacy

The Tanzimat period brought strong inspiration to the national struggle of the Slavonic peoples of the Balkans on their way to Church and political independence. This tendency was accelerated by the government of Alexander II, which was looking for new ways to pursue its policy in the Balkans; the idea of Slavonic unity replaced the previous pan-Orthodox ideology and Panslavism became the official ideology of Russia. Meanwhile, events in the Balkans were taking a dramatic turn, most difficulties being provoked by the Bulgarian case. In the late 1850s, along with other provinces, the Bulgarians sent delegates to the Church-national assembly in Istanbul. The Bulgarians demanded Church autonomy from the Greek Patriarch, the appointment of their own bishops, and service in the Slavonic language. In fact, the Church struggle was the only legal path to future political independence. The famous Greek–Bulgarian question became the central controversial point in the Balkans during the second half of the nineteenth century. It ended in the proclamation of the Bulgarian exarchate in 1870 and the Bulgarian schism in 1872, which split Eastern Orthodoxy for sixty-seven years.[42]

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40 Georgii I. Shavelskii, *Vospominaniia poslednego protopresvitera russkoi armii i flota* (New York: Chekhov Editions, 1954), 189.

41 Uspenskii's expeditions and their scientific findings are presented in a series of articles by Anna G. Tsypkina: "Trapezundskaia nauchnaia ekspeditsiia 1916–1917 gg.: Novye arkhivnye materialy," in *Prichernomorie v Srednie veka*, ed. Sergei P. Karpov (St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 2015), 212–37; "Opis materialov Trapezundskoi ekspeditsii F. I. Uspenskogo (1916–1917)," *Vizantiiskii Vremennik* 100 (2016): 197–212.

42 From the vast bibliography on Russian Panslavism and the Bulgarian question, see Hans Kohn, *Panslavism, Its History and Ideology* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953); Jelena Milojkovic-Djuric, *Panslavism and National Identity in Russia and in the Balkans, 1830–1880: Images of the Self and*

Between 1856 and 1877 Russian policy in the Balkans was contradictory. On the one hand, the Russian politicians aimed to preserve the unity of the Orthodox Church. On the other hand, after the Crimean War the government of Alexander II took the course of supporting the separatist movements of the Balkan Slavs, with a final end of creating a Slavonic state dependent on Russia.[43] In the framework of this policy generous material support was sent to the Slavonic churches of Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia, and wherever possible Russian diplomats supported the Slavonic clergy against the Greek bishops. This line can be well traced in the Bulgarian lands close to the Black Sea. The majority of the Christian population in the towns was traditionally Greek, while the rural areas were inhabited by Bulgarians.

Tensions ran particularly high between the Greek and Bulgarian communities in the largest (and primarily Greek-populated) town of Varna on the western coast of the Black Sea. The Greek Metropolitan resisted the introduction of Slavonic liturgy in one of the churches, acting with the help of the local Ottoman authorities. In his report dated December 3, 1860 the Russian consul Aleksandr Rachinskii wrote:

> The supreme spiritual and political needs of the area and the perspectives of our influence on the Bulgarian people demand the introduction of Slavonic language in the Bulgarian churches. As our ministry does not intend and finds it impossible to apply material force and means in the Bulgarian question, and in the present-day aspirations of the Bulgarians towards a national hierarchy, the church path remains the only one for approaching and influencing them.[44]

Supporting the Bulgarian Church movement, according to Rachinskii, was especially important, taking into account the danger from Catholic and Protestant propaganda, and the activities of the Russian Old Believers who found refuge in the Danube delta. After more than six months of service in the vice-consulate, he succeeded in opening a Bulgarian school in Varna, and the Greek Metropolitan Porphyrios allowed a Slavonic service in St. George's Church on Saturdays. Nevertheless, Rachinskii found reconciliation between the Greeks and the Bulgarians impossible and proposed the foundation of a pure Slavonic church in the town. For this purpose, he suggested renting St. George's Church in Varna, or consecrating a church in the building of the Rus-

Others (New York: Boulder, 1994); Jelena Milojkovic-Djuric, "The Balkan Crisis of 1875 – 1878 and Russia: Between Humanitarianism and Pragmatism," in *Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century: Setting the Precedent*, ed. Alexis Heraclides and Ada Dialla (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 169 – 96; Vera Boneva, *Balgarskoto tsarkovno-natsionalno dvizhenie 1856 – 1870* (Veliko Tarnovo: O pismeneh, 2010). In recent years, new approaches have analyzing the national movements of the Balkan peoples: Dimitris Stamatopoulos, ed., *Polemos kai epanastasi sta Othomanika Balkania (18s–20s ai.)* (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2019).

43 Comprehensive research on Russian policy in the Eastern Mediterranean in the period 1856 – 1914 with respect to the national movements of the Slavonic and Arabic peoples is still a desideratum. An initial approach (with regard to the Bulgarian case) has been made by Denis Vovchenko, *Containing Balkan Nationalism: Imperial Russia and Ottoman Christians, 1856 – 1914* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

44 RGIA, f. 797, op.30, 2 otd. 2 st., d. 367.

sian consulate. Rachinskii's proposal was rejected by Metropolitan Filaret Drozdov of Moscow, then the main authority concerning church affairs in Russia. He stressed that unlike the Catholics or the Protestants, Russia could not afford to act regardless of the local Greek hierarchy, as this was against Orthodox canon law. He also supposed that supporting the Bulgarian case in the conflict would not contribute to church peace. The hopes for reconciliation, expressed by Filaret, were in vain, however: during a pastoral visit Porphyrios was accepted only in four out of sixty-four Bulgarian villages.

In 1861 the question was solved in line with Rachinskii's proposals: In February 1861 the consul had an audience with Alexander II. The initial financing of the church, arranged in the house of the consulate in 1862, was secured thanks to donations from private persons. Countess Elizaveta Vorontsova gave 5,000 rubles, and later sent an annual sum of 1,200 rubles. Other noblewomen donated the interior decoration: Countesses Bludova and Protasova the vestments, vessels, and utensils, and Tatiana Potemkina the iconostasis. Later the private donations were replaced by a subsidy from the Russian Synod (eight hundred and four hundred rubles). The church was visited mainly by Bulgarians from the villages around Varna and could accommodate about two hundred people. The priest, Archimandrite Filaret, served the liturgy according to the Russian traditions. Some years later Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow seemed to have changed his opinion, because in 1865 we see him among the defenders of the church, which faced serious financial difficulties.[45] He stressed the role of the Russian church against the propaganda of the Unia. After the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877/78 the Russian consulate in Varna was closed, and the church moved to the house of the priest. Obviously, now that Varna was on the territory of the Bulgarian Principality, there were no more political reasons for keeping the church open. Alexander II decided, however, to keep it to commemorate the Russian soldiers who had been killed in Varna during the campaign of 1828/29. Hence it was financed by Russia until the construction of a new cathedral in the town.[46] The Greek-Bulgarian controversies did not cease in all Bulgarian towns with Greek communities until World War I; they became especially intensive in 1906.[47]

The last decades before World War I were marked by extreme tension in all controversial issues concerning the Eastern question. The central question, that of the Straits, attempts to create a league of the Balkan or Slavonic Balkan nations under Russian aegis against the Ottoman domination, attempts to pacify the Balkan peoples—these were the main trends in the Western Black Sea territories. In the eastern part, after the Batum, Kars, and Ardahan areas were joined to the Russian Empire in

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45 RGIA, f. 797, op. 35, 2 otd., d. 3.

46 RGIA, f. 797, op. 46 , 2 otd., 3 st., d. 38.

47 Maria Hristemova, "Antigratskoto dvizhenie v Asenovgrad prez 1906 g.," *Godishnik na Istoricheskia muzei v Plovdiv* 2 (2004): 102–13; Iura Konstantinova, "The Anti-Greek Movement in Bulgaria (1906) in the Perception of the Bulgarian Political Elite," *Études Balkaniques* 3 (2009).

1878, further aspirations were aimed at the "Great Armenian" territories of the Van, and attracting the non-Chalkedon Christians to Orthodoxy.[48]

The question of the Straits ("the key to our home," in the terminology of some Russian politicians), always of the utmost importance, became especially hot during World War I. The secret treaty of March 1915, promising Russia Istanbul and the adjacent territory, opened a large perspective for political dreams in the Russian press. Most authors concentrated on the messianic discussions concerning the cross over St. Sofia and the liberation of the ancient capital of the Christian Empire, while others argued that after the war all of Asia Minor would be Russian territory and the Black Sea should become a Russian lake.[49] The advance of the Russian troops in 1916 and 1917 encouraged the authors of these ideas, but the revolution of October 1917 put an end to the imperial ambitions of the time.

7 Conclusion

The long nineteenth century, from the Russo-Ottoman wars of the 1800s until World War I, created a huge complex of interconnected problems in the context of a larger issue, the Eastern question. The Black Sea region became the main area of Russia's geopolitical ambitions. The need to protect its southern borders was combined with aspiration for further penetration into the Ottoman Empire and further territorial acquisitions. Apart from direct military campaigns, the Russian politicians used a wide range of diplomatic and cultural means, and the pressure of "soft policy" and "cultural diplomacy" was applied by both the foreign ministry and the Holy Synod. The Church and the Orthodox faith shared with the Greek and Slavonic population remained the traditional solid basis for the fulfillment of political aspirations. Balancing between the Ottoman authorities and the local non-Muslim communities in their conflicts with each other, the Russian Empire made its way towards the realization of the universalist imperialist idea, aiming for control over the entire Black Sea basin.

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48 Here a significant success was several hundreds of Nestorians from the Lake Urmiah region joining Russian Orthodoxy in 1896. These activities by Russia provoked strong counteraction on the part of British diplomacy, which had its own claims to and aspirations for the Eastern Ottoman and Western Persian territories. See Lora A. Gerd, "Anglikanskia i russkaia pravoslavnaia missii k nestorianam Turtsii i Persii v kontse XIX veka," *Khristianskoe Chtenie* 2 (2015): 137– 57.

49 A. Iashchenko, *Russkie interesy v Maloi Azii* (Moscow: A. I. Mamontov Typography, 1916). For further details, see Lora A. Gerd, *Russian Policy in the Orthodox East: The Patriarchate of Constantinople (1878 – 1914)* (Warsaw: De Gruyter Open, 2014); Lora A. Gerd, "Rosika shedia gia tin Constantinoupoli to 1915," in Stamatopoulos, *Polemos,* 313 – 24.

Mariana Hausleitner

The Persecution and Destruction of Jews in the Black Sea Region

Translated by Paul Vickers

In the area around the Black Sea, the Jewish population's settlement patterns were highly diverse. This meant that during World War II, their experiences were also very different. Romania and Bulgaria were aligned with the German Reich and occupied territories in the Soviet Union were thus put under German administration. In Romanian-controlled Transnistria, over a quarter of a million Jews were killed in massacres and by disease in 1941/42. The Bulgarian government handed over to the SS some 11,000 Jews from its occupied areas in 1943. In southern Ukraine, the German *Einsatzgruppe D* conducted the systematic destruction of the Jewish population. In other parts of Ukraine, it was primarily *Einsatzgruppe C* that murdered Jews, although that aspect does not form part of this chapter. Nor will I go into detail on the massacres carried out by occupying German forces around Rostov and the North Caucasus. Although Turkey remained neutral until 1945, Jews faced discrimination there, too. Nevertheless, some Jewish refugees from Romania managed to reach Palestine via Turkey.

1 The Situation Facing Jews in Romania: From Inclusion towards Exclusion

During Ottoman rule, many Jews had already settled the west coast of the Black Sea. The Romanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which had been united since 1859, were ruled by Carol I from 1866 on. His army secured the territories' independence in 1877 with the assistance of Russian troops. The 1878 Congress of Berlin awarded the coastal region of Dobruja (Romanian: Dobrogea) to the principalities. This area was inhabited not only by Romanians, but also by many Jews, Tatars, and Turks. The Jews there were awarded citizenship, whereas the majority of Jewish inhabitants of the Kingdom of Romania remained stateless until 1919. It was only when its territory was doubled at the Paris Peace Conference that Romania, under pressure from the Entente powers, awarded citizenship to all Jews in Greater Romania. Jews from the newly-incorporated areas of Transylvania and Bukovina already had full civil rights under Habsburg rule from 1867 on, while those from Bessarabia received them in the wake of the 1917 February Revolution in Russia. Romania's territorial expansion in 1918 brought with it an increase in members of minorities, who accounted for 28 percent of the entire population. The 728,115 Jews (according to 1930 figures) formed 4 percent of the population, although this group was in itself highly culturally diverse. Many Transylvanian Jews associated themselves with Hungarian culture,

while those in Bukovina had affinities with German-Austrian culture. In Bessarabia, they spoke both Yiddish and Russian, with the state police persecuting many for supposed pro-Soviet sympathies.[1]

In the wake of the economic crisis that emerged in 1929, two anti-Semitic organizations succeeded in mobilizing many youths, some craftspeople and workers, as well as elements of the farming community, who then blamed Jews for the social upheavals. Following the significant increase in votes received by the far-right Iron Guard in the December 1937 parliamentary elections, the king formed a government of loyal anti-Semites.[2] It then passed legislation in January 1938 that resulted in a third of Romanian Jews being stripped of citizenship by 1939. The 225,222 stateless Jews, who were thus also deprived of their civil and political rights, came largely from the regions that were incorporated into Romania in 1918.[3] Although French pressure soon led to this government's resignation, the law remained in place. By 1938, Carol II had imposed authoritarian rule and parliamentary elections were a thing of the past.

The non-aggression pact signed by the German foreign minister Ribbentrop and his Soviet counterpart Molotov in August 1939, together with the subsequent partition of Poland, brought about a shift in Romanian foreign policy. Until that point, France had acted as guarantor of Romania's territorial integrity after the state had doubled in size. The Soviet Union had not recognized the incorporation of the province of Bessarabia, even though the population was 60 percent Romanian. While the wording of the passage on Bessarabia contained in the secret supplementary protocol was not known in Romania, the king sought to use intensified economic relations with Nazi Germany to secure a guarantee for the integrity of the state's borders from Hitler. Romania was exporting crude oil, wood, grain, and food to the Reich.[4]

In the immediate aftermath of France's capitulation in June 1940, the Soviet government issued an ultimatum for Romanian troops to evacuate Bessarabia, which they duly did before attacking Jews in Dorohoi and Galaţi on the other side of the new border, resulting in 450 deaths.[5] Many Jews who had been deprived of their rights left Romania, which had lost parts of its territory, moving to Soviet-occupied areas. The Romanian press treated this as evidence that Jews were supposedly Bolshevik sympa-

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1 Mariana Hausleitner, "Rumänien," in *Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden durch das nationalsozialistische Deutschland 1933–1945*, ed. Susanne Heim et al., vol. 13, *Slowakei, Rumänien, Bulgarien*, ed. Barbara Hutzelmann, Mariana Hausleitner, and Souzana Hazan (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2018), 46–52.

2 The Iron Guard emerged in 1930 from the right-wing youth movement Archangel Michael Legion, which also found support among impoverished town dwellers and farmers during the Great Depression. See Armin Heinen and Oliver Jens Schmitt, eds., *Inszenierte Gegenmacht von rechts: Die "Legion Erzengel Michael" in Rumänien 1918–1938* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013).

3 Carol Iancu, *La Shoah en Roumanie* (Montpellier: Université Paul-Valéry, 2000), 33.

4 Armin Heinen, "Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt und Rumänien," in *Hitler-Stalin-Pakt 1939: Das Ende Ostmitteleuropas?*, ed. Erwin Oberländer (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1989), 98–113.

5 Radu Ioanid, *Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime 1940–1944* (Chicago: Ivan R Dee, 2000), 41–42, 61.

thizers. Jewish state employees were dismissed from their jobs, while the race law passed on August 8, 1940 featured further discriminatory measures, including forbidding marriage between Jews and non-Jews. Jews were barred from public service and from many occupations, while Jewish children were banned from state schools.[6]

The far-right Iron Guard held Carol II responsible for the loss of one third of the state's territory. He abdicated in favor of his nineteen-year-old son, Mihai, and left Romania. Government power resided with General Ion Antonescu from September 6, 1940 on. He was able to enter into a close alliance with the Third Reich only after Romania accepted the Second Vienna Award of September 1940, which the foreign ministers of Italy and Germany presided over. The Award required Romania to cede Northern Transylvania to Hungary. Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria subsequently became signatories to the Tripartite Pact established by Germany, Italy, and Japan.

The German invasion of the Soviet Union allowed General Antonescu to retake Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, having already offered Hitler the support of the Romanian army on June 12, 1941. In order to "cleanse the territory," Eugen Cristescu, head of the *Serviciul Secret de Informaţii* (Secret Information Service) formed two special units, each comprising 160 men, modeled on the German *Einsatzgruppen.*[7] To what extent they were responsible for the murders of some 14,000 Jews in Iaşi towards the end of June that year, cannot be established conclusively. During a series of mass arrests, a pogrom broke out, with numerous soldiers and civilians involved in looting and murders.[8] Some members of the rural population were involved in murders in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, regions that were also combed by the special units as they searched for possible enemies of the state. In several places, German *Sonderkommandos* carried out murders. Many Jews fled together with the Red Army, but were often overtaken by the quickly advancing enemy troops and shot. Jews that had remained behind in small localities were in the large part murdered on site, while those from larger settlements were driven out on foot and many died in the course of these actions.[9] The *Wehrmacht* allowed only the first convoy of 25,000 Jews to cross the Dniester, with subsequent convoys having to camp out in the open air in Bessarabia without supplies. Tens of thousands of Jews died in such conditions as a result of disease and deficiencies. There were mass shootings in the Bălţi (Russian: Beltsy) district.[10] The census of 1930 counted 41,065 Jews living in the provincial capital Chişinău

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6 Jean Ancel, *The Economic Destruction of Romanian Jewry* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2007), 33–68; "DOK. 136: Das neue Rassengesetz regelt am 9. August 1940 die Diskriminierung der Juden," in Heim et al., *Die Verfolgung*, 13:356–60.

7 Cristian Troncotă and Alin Spânu, *Documente SSI privind spaţiul sovietic: 22 august 1939–23 august 1944* (Bucharest: Academia Română, 2004), 259–73.

8 Henry L. Eaton, "The Story Created Afterward: Iaşi 1941," in *Romania and the Holocaust: Events – Contexts – Aftermath*, ed. Simon Geissbühler (Stuttgart: ibidem, 2016), 41–58.

9 Simon Geissbühler, *Blutiger Juli: Rumäniens Vernichtungskrieg und der vergessene Massenmord an den Juden 1941* (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2013), 59–81.

10 Andrej Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord: Die Einsatzgruppe D in der südlichen Sowjetunion 1941–1943* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003), 163–77.

(Russian: Kishinev), forming 37.3 percent of the population. Some were able to flee. The Romanian authorities established a large-scale ghetto in the city, with significant numbers of Jews dying there of nutritional deficiencies and in shootings.[11] There had been anti-Semitic attacks before 1941 in the Cetatea Albă district (formerly Akkerman – now Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi in Ukraine), where a Greek Orthodox priest, for example, had blamed Jews for many social problems.[12] In 1930, this Black Sea district had 11,390 Jewish inhabitants, forming 3.3 percent of the population. The exact number of people killed is unknown because some of the Jewish population fled as Soviet troops retreated. Those who did not flee were deported or killed.

Negotiations between representatives of Germany and the Romanian general staff over the extent of a Romanian zone of occupation in southern Ukraine lasted two months. The Tighina Agreement of August 30, 1941 awarded Romania the territories between the Dniester and Bug rivers, which came to be known as Transnistria. It included an extensive stretch of the Black Sea coast, including the important port of Odesa. This fertile region provided supplies for the Romanian and German armies, while at the same time serving as the destination for Jews deported from northeastern Romania.[13]

In the summer of 1941, tens of thousands of Jews in southern Ukraine were shot dead by Romanian and German units. There were an estimated 130,000 Jews in Transnistria. How many managed to escape to other parts of the Soviet Union in time is unknown. The systematic deportation of Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina, where in 1930 Jews formed 7.2 percent and 10 percent of the population respectively, began in October 1941. Almost a quarter of a million Jews were forced to move to Transnistria, where in winter 1941/42 there was a typhus epidemic among the starving deportees who had ended up in localities destroyed by war. Tens of thousands died as a result. The majority of Jews performed forced labor, receiving no pay for it. Leaving the ghettoes in order to exchange their possessions for food in the villages was punishable by death. It was only in a few places, such as the large ghetto in Mohyliv-Podilskyi (Russian: Mogilev-Podolskii, Romanian: Moghilău), that some Jews received lunch in exchange for working on the restoration of administrative buildings and bridges.[14]

The largest number of victims was recorded in Odesa. A bomb exploded in the former office of the Soviet secret service, the NKVD (*Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh*

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11 Paul A. Shapiro, *The Kishinev Ghetto 1941–1942: A Documentary History of the Holocaust in Romania's Contested Borderlands* (Tuscaloosa: Alabama University Press, 2015).

12 Diana Dumitru, *The State, Antisemitism, and Collaboration in the Holocaust: The Borderlands of Romania and the Soviet Union* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 77.

13 "Vertrag von Tighina," in Ekkehard Völkl, *Transnistrien und Odessa 1941–1944* (Regensburg: Pustet, 1996), 110–13.

14 Siegfried Jagendorf, *Jagendorf's Foundry: A Memoir of the Romanian Holocaust 1941–1944*, ed. Aron Hirt-Manheimer (New York: Harper Collins, 1991); Mariana Hausleiter, "Überleben durch Korruption: Das Ghetto Mogilev-Podol'skij in Transnistrien 1941–1944," in *Lebenswelt Ghetto*, ed. Imke Hansen, Katrin Steffen, and Joachim Tauber (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2013), 242–66.

del, People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs), during a meeting of high-ranking Romanian and German military officials. Among the sixty victims was General Ion Glogojanu, the Romanian commander of the city. Ion Antonescu, who had just been promoted to the rank of marshal, ordered brutal retaliation. According to a report by the German military intelligence (*Abwehr*) office, some 19,000 men, women, and children were arrested in the Jewish quarter and murdered at the edge of the city at Dalnyk (Russian: Dalnik).[15] The survivors were transported in open trucks between January and March 1942 to temporary camps in Transnistria. A quarter of them froze to death along the way, while others were shot dead as epidemics developed among them. Mass shootings occurred on the left bank of the Bug in Domanivka (Russian: Domanevka, Romanian: Domanovca), Akhmechetka (Romanian: Acmecetca), and Bohdanivka (Russian: Bogdanovka, Romanian: Bogdanovca). Some 14,500 people were driven out, over the Bug. They were murdered together with the Jews in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.[16] In an autonomous region within Transnistria inhabited by the German minority, members of the so-called Self-Defence (*Selbstschutz*) also murdered Jews who had been brought to the area by Romanian gendarmes in 1941/42. According to Romanian foreign ministry sources, there were around 28,000 Jewish victims in this case.[17]

Ion Antonescu and his followers justified the deportation of Jews from northeastern Romania by arguing that Romania must become an ethnically homogenous state. On October 15, 1941, the statistician Sabin Manuilă presented the head of state with a plan that would enable the deportation of over one million Ukrainians and Russians from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. They were to be replaced by Romanians who from the eighteenth century had emigrated to Russia. Manuilă sent a group of researchers into the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, traveling from Crimea along the coast of the Sea of Azov, to register these Romanians. Events on the Eastern Front meant that only very few Romanians arrived in Bessarabia, from where the German minority had been resettled and taken to areas occupied by the German Reich in the autumn of 1940.[18]

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15 Saul Ia. Borovoi, "Gibel evreiskogo naseleniia Odessy vo vremia rumynskoi okkupatsii," in *Katastrofa i soprotivlenie ukrainskogo evreistva/Katastrofa i opir urkainskoho ievreistva*, ed. Ster Ia. Elisabetskii (Kyiv: Natsionalnaia Akademiia Nauk Ukrainy, 1999), 118–53; Alexander Dallin, *Odessa, 1941–1944: A Case Study of Soviet Territory under Foreign Rule* (Iaşi: The Center of Romanian Studies, 1998), 74, 219–21; David Z. Starodinskii, *Odesskoe Getto* (Odesa: Haitekh, 1991).

16 Herwig Baum, *Varianten des Terrors: Ein Vergleich zwischen der deutschen und rumänischen Besatzungsverwaltung in der Sowjetunion 1941–1944* (Berlin: Metropol, 2011), 505; Armin Heinen, *Rumänien, der Holocaust und die Logik der Gewalt* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2007), 140–45.

17 Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik*, 279–87; Eric C. Steinhart, *The Holocaust and the Germanization of Ukraine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

18 Viorel Achim, "The Romanian Population Exchange Project Elaborated by Sabin Manuilă," *Annalli dell'Istituto storico italo-germanico in Trento* 27 (2001): 593–617; Vladimir Solonari, *Purificarea Naţiunii: Dislocări forţate de populaţie şi epurări etnice în România lui Ion Antonescu 1940–1944* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2015), 99–100, 117.

In the summer of 1942, the Romanian gendarmerie deported 25,000 Roma, half of whom were children, to Transnistria. Some 11,000 starved and froze to death, while others were shot by Romanian gendarmes.[19] Furthermore, around 5,000 Jews were deported from Czernowitz (Ukrainian: Chernivtsi, Romanian: Cernăuți, Russian: Chernovtsy) in the summer of 1942, the majority of them losing their lives.

2 Mass Shootings Committed by *Einsatzgruppe D* in the Crimean Peninsula

From July 1941, in Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and Transnistria, *Kommandos* belonging to the German *Einsatzgruppe D* had been carrying out murders of, first and foremost, Jewish men. Their commander, Otto Ohlendorf, received instructions from the Inland Security Service (Inland-SD) of the Reich Security Main Office that in accordance with Hitler's order of September 14, the entire Jewish community was to be killed. *Einsatzgruppe D* proceeded to shoot dead 5,000 Jews in Mykolaiv (Russian: Nikolaev) and the same number in Kherson. Himmler arrived in Mykolaiv, not far from the Black Sea coast, on October 5, 1941 and promoted Ohlendorf to the position of *SS-Oberführer* before assembled colleagues. Himmler outlined his vision for German settlement of Crimea, which was to be renamed "Gotengau."[20] *Einsatzgruppe D* then proceeded through southern Ukraine and Crimea until June 1942. The 11th Army of the *Wehrmacht* was engaged in battles in Crimea in October and November 1941, fighting Red Army units that had been retreating towards Sevastopol. As soon as a place had been captured, members of *Einsatzgruppe D* then ordered all Jews to be registered for supposed resettlement. The Jews were then loaded into trucks before being shot in isolated locations.[21] The diary of a Russian in Simferopol shows that he had believed that his Jewish neighbors were being deported to labor camps.[22]

In early December 1941, *Sonderkommando 11b* murdered Jews in Feodosiia and in the city of Kerch.[23] In the Tatar settlement of Qarasuvbazar (Russian: Belogorsk, Ukrai-

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19 Brigitte Mihok, "Der 'einseitige Transfer': Die Deportation rumänischer Roma 1942–1944. Zum Forschungsstand," in *Holocaust an der Peripherie: Judenpolitik und Judenmord in Rumänien und Transnistrien 1940–1944*, ed. Wolfgang Benz and Brigitte Mihok (Berlin: Metropol, 2009), 178, 184.

20 Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik*, 364; Ralf Ogorreck, *Die Einsatzgruppen und die "Genese der Endlösung"* (Berlin: Metropol, 1996), 208.

21 Norbert Kunz, *Die Krim unter deutscher Herrschaft 1941–1944: Germanisierungsutopie und Besatzungsrealität* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005); Margret Müller, Werner Müller, and Boris Zabarko, eds., *Leben und Tod in der Epoche des Holocaust in der Ukraine* (Berlin: Metropol, 2020), 1039–41.

22 "DOK. 127: Chrisanf G. Laškevič kommentiert am 7. Dezember 1941 Gerüchte, dass bald alle Juden Simforopol's erschossen würden," in Heim et al., *Die Verfolgung*, vol. 7, *Sowjetunion mit annektierten Gebieten I*, ed. Bert Hoppe and Hildrun Glass, 391–94.

23 Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik*, 354–55; "DOK. 126: Die Ortskommandatur I/287 in Kertsch (Kerč) meldet am 7. Dezember 1941 die Erschießung von 25.000 Juden," in Heim et al., *Die Verfolgung*, 7:389–94.

nian: Bilohirsk), Romanian members of the army were involved in the shooting of 76 men, women, and children. *Wehrmacht* soldiers assisted with the transportation and creation of cordons in many locations.[24]

It was *Sonderkommando 11b* that was primarily responsible for the largest massacre in Crimea, with 13,600 Jews, Krymchaks, and Roma shot dead in Simferopol in the first half of December 1941. The Krymchaks were in part descended from Sephardic Jews, who no longer professed the Jewish faith. Still, Himmler demanded their murder for racial reasons. The military leadership there demanded extensive mass murders because the Red Army had taken provisions with them during their retreat, leaving the food supply in a critical condition. The military police units of the *Feldgendarmerie* and the secret field police were also involved in the massacres. Enquires were submitted to Berlin to ascertain whether Turkic-speaking Jews were to be eradicated. The Krymchaks' holy book was the Quran, which was not the case for the Karaims. After extensive discussions, the latter group was spared as it was classified in the summer of 1942 as belonging to the Turkic-speaking Tatars,[25] several of whom served in the SS auxiliary troops.[26] Among the victims in Bakhchisarai (Crimean Tatar: Bağçasaray, Ukrainian: Bakhchysarai) and Yalta were also Russians and Ukrainians suspected of being partisans. The final large-scale massacre took place in July 1942, following the capture of Sevastopol, with five hundred Jews being shot dead. By the second half of 1942, almost all of the Jews and Krymchaks caught in Crimea had been killed. Large numbers of Roma were also shot dead, while from 1943 on Slavs suspected of being partisans were murdered in increasing numbers. Sabotage attacks increased in Crimea from 1943 on after a central coordination unit started receiving support from the Red Army.[27] Historians have suggested that some 40,000 Jews were murdered in Crimea, including 6,000 Krymchaks.[28]

Some *Sonderkommandos* belonging to *Einsatzgruppe D* headed towards the Sea of Azov in the autumn of 1941, murdering the Jewish population and Roma during their march on Rostov-on-Don. Several thousand Jews were shot dead in Melitopol, Mariupol, and other locations.[29] In April 1948, during the Nuremberg Trials, Otto Ohlendorf stated that *Einsatzgruppe D* had murdered around 90,000 Jews in 1941/42.[30] This number included those from Bessarabia and Transnistria.

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[24] Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik*, 323–44; Kunz, *Die Krim*, 189–93.

[25] Hannelore Müller-Sommerfeld, "Gunst und Tragik einer Privilegierung: Karäer im Osten Europas im 20. Jahrhundert," *Judaica* 67, no. 1 (2011): 85.

[26] Yitzhak Arad, Shmuel Krakowski, and Shmuel Spector, eds., *The Einsatzgruppen Reports* (New York: Holocaust Library, 1989), 250, 284–85; Kirill Feferman, "Nazi Germany and the Mountain Jews: Was there a Policy?," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 21, no. 1 (2007): 96–114.

[27] Baum, *Varianten*, 309–29.

[28] Müller, Müller, and Zabarko, *Leben*, 1040.

[29] Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik*, 307–17; Kunz, *Die Krim*, 182.

[30] Jean Ancel, *Transnistria* (Bucharest: Editura Atlas, 1998), 2:220–24; Baum, *Varianten*, 507.

3 Romania Moves Away from a Policy of Extermination in the Autumn of 1942

In the autumn of 1942, Marshal Antonescu began to doubt that Germany would achieve a final victory. As a long-standing member of the general staff, he recognized the growing defensive capabilities of the Red Army. The equipment that the German Reich had promised Romanian units fighting at Stalingrad never materialized as German units were given priority. The Romanian foreign minister Mihai Antonescu issued a complaint to Hitler regarding this matter on September 22 and 23. At their meeting, they also disagreed on the German proposal to pay for grain exports from Romania only after the end of the war.[31]

These tensions meant that around 250,000 Jews remaining in Romania were ultimately spared. In July 1942, the foreign minister had indeed agreed to the deportation of Jews to German camps, but soon afterwards BBC reports revealed details of the planned destruction in Romania. After the *Bukarester Tageblatt* (Bucharest Daily), a newspaper financed by the German embassy, had presented the deportation plan under the headline "Rumänien wird judenrein" [Romania is being cleansed of Jews] on August 8, 1942, the endangered Jewish population sought to rescue their lives by all means possible.[32] Large financial donations for wounded Romanians and several interventions from abroad brought about a gradual shift in the situation. On October 13, some people being held under arrest, who were due to be transported from Bucharest to Transnistria, were released. Speaking to the Council of Ministers, Mihai Antonescu, the marshal's deputy, referred to a decision taken by Marshal Ion Antonescu. Manfred von Killinger, the German envoy in Romania, wrote to the Foreign Ministry on December 12, 1942, stating that deportation was now unlikely with the Romanian government planning to send 75,000 Jews to Palestine.[33]

After two Romanian armies were trounced at Stalingrad, Romanian diplomats abroad enquired into the conditions for a separate peace. In Ankara, Romania's representative entered into negotiations with the US Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt regarding the transfer of 75,000 Jewish survivors in Transnistria to Palestine. The Romanian government demanded that ships be made available. The establishment of the US War Refugee Board in January 1944 meant that funding was available for refugee ships. Most of the money for these measures came from the World Jewish Congress. The Ro-

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31 Ion Calafeteanu, *Români la Hitler* (Bucharest: Univers enciclopedic, 1999), 125 – 33.

32 Dennis Deletant, *Aliatul uitat a lui Hitler: Ion Antonescu şi regimul său* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2008), 221 – 28; Hildrun Glass, *Deutschland und die Verfolgung der Juden im rumänischen Machtbereich 1940 – 1944* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2014), 157 – 87.

33 "DOK. 203: Der deutsche Gesandte berichtet am 12. Dezember 1942, dass die rumänische Regierung mehr als 75.000 Juden die Auswanderung nach Palästina gestatten will," in Heim et al., *Die Verfolgung*, 13:462 – 63.

manian government received a fee for each rescued Jew.[34] Owing to German pressure, by August 1944 it had only been possible to carry out the transportation of around 3,000 Jews from the Black Sea port of Constanţa to Turkey. From there, they were taken by train to Palestine. Among those rescued were many of the 5,000 orphans left behind in Transnistria after their parents had been killed. Jews from Hungary, who had fled to Romania with the onset of mass deportations in the spring of 1944, were allocated places on the refugee ships too.[35] This rescue effort was only possible because Turkey was a neutral state.[36]

Resistance increased appreciably following the German defeat at Stalingrad. German and Romanian special units combed Transnistria, searching for partisans. In early 1944, the Romanian military court in Transnistria sentenced many Slavs to death for supporting partisans. There were often Jews accused of assisting partisans among those executed. Towards the end of 1943, Jews who had been involved in constructing a road linking Lemberg (Polish: Lwów, Russian: Lvov, Ukrainian: Lviv) with the Caucasus were shot dead by SS special units once this infrastructure project had been abandoned.[37] With the Romanian army retreating from Transnistria, the *Wehrmacht* took over the administration of the region in March 1944. During this period, an SS unit shot Jewish political prisoners from Romania who were being held in the jail in Răbniţa (Russian: Rybnitsa, Ukrainian: Rybnytsia).[38]

The Red Army retook possession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in the spring of 1944 before marching over the old Romanian borders in August that year. On August 23, Ion Antonescu was arrested, along with his closest aides, during an audience with the king. A government formed of military representatives and experts led the Romanian army to join forces with the Red Army. Together they were involved in recapturing Northern Transylvania. The discrimination against Jews ended in the autumn of 1944, although only very few were given back their property.

4 Turkish Authorities' Attitudes towards Jews

The role of Jews in the Turkish economy has been emphasized regularly, even though they constituted just 1 percent of the country's population in 1938. Most often, it is the

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34 Mariana Hausleitner, *Eine Atmosphäre von Hoffnung und Zuversicht* (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2020), 147–56.

35 Dalia Ofer, *Escaping the Holocaust: Illegal Immigration to the Land of Israel 1939–1944* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 257.

36 Adina Babeş (Fruchter), "Romanian Jewish Emigration in the 1940s," *Holocaust: Studii şi cercetări* 5 (2013): 32–43; Florin C. Stan, *Situaţia evreilor din România între ani 1940–1944* (Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2012), 425–39.

37 Deborah Schultz and Edward Timms, *Arnold Daghani's Memories of Mikhailowka* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2009), 220–23.

38 Matei Gall, *Finsternis: Durch Gefängnis, KZ Wapniarka, Massaker und Kommunismus. Ein Lebenslauf in Rumänien 1920–1990* (Konstanz: Hartung-Gorre, 1999), 111–92.

amicable acceptance of emigrants from the German Reich, including Ernst Reuter, that has been highlighted, even though only around five to six hundred people arrived in Turkey this way. The larger the number of emigrants to Turkey after 1938, the worse their situation became. They were accused of causing inflation and faced attacks as a result. Far-right groups published articles and drawings taken from the Nazi newspaper *Völkischer Beobachter* (*Völkisch* Observer). Turkish translations of anti-Semitic books, such as Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle) and *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* also appeared. While no anti-Jewish legislation was passed, non-Muslims were prevented from practicing certain professions and had to pay special taxes. It was for this reason that many Jews emigrated to Palestine.[39]

The German Reich was Turkey's most important trading partner, which meant that the government sought to maintain good relations. There were many people who sympathized with Hitler's politics in the Turkish security apparatus and military. From 1938 to 1940, Turkey effectively banned the arrival and transit of Jews traveling to Palestine. After that, Jews were only allowed to enter Turkey if they were in possession of a British travel permit. These certificates were limited in number, which is why between 1940 and summer 1944, only around 11,600 Jews travelled to Palestine via Turkey. Emigration along this route was halted on two occasions. On February 25, 1942, the *Struma*, a ship carrying 769 Jewish refugees who had boarded in the Romanian port of Constanţa, sank. Aboard the ship were many Jews who did not possess a travel permit for Palestine and were thus refused permission to go ashore in Turkey. The ship spent seventy days anchored off the Turkish coast before being driven out to sea in an unseaworthy state. Refugee ships were subsequently refused permission to depart Constanţa until March 1944. During the intervening period, German warships sailed in the Black Sea and could pass through the Bosporus Strait. There were protracted negotiations over the transit route, with Germany threatening to issue sanctions. The British authorities opened the way to entering Palestine from the summer of 1943 after it became clear just how few surviving Jews there were in Central and Eastern Europe. From that point on, the Turkish authorities also issued transit visas. From March to August 1944, 2,844 Jews from Romania were able to travel by ship to Istanbul and from there on to Palestine. But then, on August 5, 1944, a Soviet submarine sank the *Mefkura*, believing the refugee ship, with 379 passengers on board, to be a German vessel. It was only in November 1944 that refugee ships took to the seas again.[40]

The German Reich had sealed a Treaty of Friendship with Turkey on June 18, 1941, guaranteeing Turkish neutrality just four days before the attack on the Soviet Union. Until 1944, the Reich imported chromium, a key component in weapons production, from Turkey. Turkish security personnel collaborated for an extended period with the Gestapo.[41] The Turkish government stripped of citizenship many Jews from Turkey

39 Hatice Bayraktar, "Türkische Karikaturen über Juden (1933–1945)," *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung* 13 (2004): 85–108.

40 Ofer, *Escaping the Holocaust*, 249–64.

41 Stefan Ihrig, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 209–22.

who were living in areas occupied by the *Wehrmacht.* Thus over 2,200 Jews of Turkish origin were deported to the death camps of Auschwitz and Sobibor. It was only in February 1945 that Turkey declared war on the German Reich, albeit without subsequently contributing actively to any military efforts. The Turkish studies scholar Corry Guttstadt argues in her key study that the image of Turkey's positive stance towards persecuted Jews is a myth.[42]

5 Extradition of the Stateless Jews of Bulgaria and the Rescue of Others

During World War I, Bulgaria was an ally of Germany, meaning that the country had to accept territorial losses after the war and pay reparations. From 1935 on, King (Tsar) Boris III imposed authoritarian rule on Bulgaria, forbidding all political parties. Parliament, now consisting solely of directly-elected members, was left with a merely advisory role. In 1934, there were 48,565 Jews in Bulgaria, forming a very small minority making up 0.8 percent of the population. The constitution of 1879 granted Jews equal rights. Most of the Jewish population lived in cities and worked as tradespeople and businesspeople. Jewish businesses were targeted by organized anti-Semitic attacks in September 1938.[43] In 1939, some 4,000 foreign Jews were extradited to Greece and Turkey. In October 1939, Petar Gabrovski was appointed minister of the interior. He had been involved in the Ratniks movement, the "Warriors for the Advancement of the Bulgarian Spirit," which called for the elimination of Jews. He wrote the Law for the Protection of the Nation, which was passed in January 1941 and was modeled on the Nuremberg Race Laws. It forbade the marriage of Jews to non-Jews, with Jews barred from public office and many professions. From May 1941, Jewish males conducted forced labor, often in harsh conditions in provincial locations. In July that year, the government issued an order for Jews to hand over up to 25 percent of their wealth.[44]

Prior to 1940, Bulgaria had been supplied with weapons by France. But following the latter's capitulation, Bulgaria entered into close economic collaboration with the German Reich while declaring its neutrality in respect of German wars of aggression.[45] Thanks to its collaboration with the German Reich, Bulgaria was awarded the Southern Dobruja region in 1940, which had been part of Romania since 1913. On March 1, 1941, Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact. German troops were permitted to march through the country in order to wage war against Yugoslavia and Greece. Following the occu-

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42 Corry Guttstadt, *Turkey, the Jews and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: University Press, 2013).

43 Stefan Troebst, "Antisemitismus im 'Land ohne Antisemitismus': Staat, Titularnation und jüdische Minderheit in Bulgarien 1878 – 1993," in *Juden und Antisemitismus im östlichen Europa*, ed. Mariana Hausleitner and Monika Katz (Berlin: Harrassowitz, 1995), 117.

44 Souzana Hazan, "Bulgarien," in Heim et al., *Die Verfolgung*, 74 – 92.

45 Hans-Joachim Hoppe, "Bulgarien, " in *Dimension des Völkermordes*, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Munich: dtv, 1996), 277– 78.

pation of those countries, North Macedonia was transferred to Bulgaria from Yugoslavia, while Eastern Macedonia together with Western Thrace were taken from Greece in April 1941. Following their annexation, the Bulgarian Council of Ministers imposed its own legislation on these regions. The population of around 13,000 mostly Sephardic Jews was not granted Bulgarian citizenship. In December 1941, Bulgaria declared war on the United Kingdom and the United States, although it did not break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and never sent troops to the Eastern Front.[46]

Following the Wannsee Conference, the German Foreign Office demanded the deportation of Bulgaria's Jewish population. The German authorities planned the operation in October 1942, with the Bulgarian government accepting the plan in the November. As a first step, on the initiative of a German advisor, the Bulgarian Commissar for Jewish Questions Aleksandar Belev signed off on the deportation of 20,000 Jews on February 22, 1943. With the agreement of the Bulgarian government and the support of the Bulgarian authorities, 11,364 Jews from Thrace and Macedonia were deported in March 1943. The majority were murdered immediately at Treblinka. The deportations then stopped because on March 17, Dimitar Peshev, deputy president of the parliament, made a case for pre-war Bulgaria's Jews. Prime Minister Bogdan Filov demanded an open ballot on Peshev's policies and the forty-two members of parliament who had previously signed Peshev's protest letter no longer put their name to it. Peshev was subsequently deselected.[47]

In light of the defeats on the Eastern Front and in Africa, Boris III hesitated to deliver more Jews into the hands of the SS. In May 1943, the 19,150 Jews who remained in employment in Sofia were taken to an internment camp in the provinces. Only part of the Jewish population was evacuated from some Black Sea coast cities, including Varna and Burgas. The German authorities believed that the internment was a signal that the Jews were soon to be turned over to the SS. However, they came to recognize that the situation on the military fronts meant that this was unlikely to happen. The US War Refugee Board made an offer to facilitate emigration, although a response was first issued in August 1944. On September 9, 1943, Boris III died suddenly, with his six-year-old son succeeding him. The government dissolved the alliance with the German Reich on August 28, 1944, five days after the fall of Marshal Antonescu in Romania. On August 30, the special laws were suspended. The Red Army reached Bulgaria's borders in early September.[48] Despite his brave stance, Peshev was barred from working as a lawyer after 1945, as he had upheld the previous regime. He was honored by Yad Vashem in 1973, yet his memoirs did not appear in Bulgaria until 2004.

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46 Hoppe, "Bulgarien," 298; Troebst, "Antisemitismus," 118.

47 Jan Rychlik, "Zweierlei Politik gegenüber der Minderheit: Verfolgung und Rettung bulgarischer Juden 1940 – 1944," in *Solidarität und Hilfe für Juden während der NS-Zeit: Regionalstudien*, ed. Wolfgang Benz and Juliane Wetzel (Berlin: Metropol, 2004), 4:61 – 98.

48 Hazan, "Bulgarien," 90 – 92; Hoppe, "Bulgarien," 300.

6 Working through the Holocaust in Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine

The deportation of the entire Jewish population of Western Thrace and Macedonia by the Bulgarian authorities was concealed for a long time under communism. Bulgaria had had to cede control of these regions in 1944.[49] Later, historians focused primarily on acts of rescuing Jews. In her book, Nadège Ragaru reported statements given by Jewish eye witnesses during trials at the People's Tribunal in Sofia in 1944/45, when Bulgarian perpetrators were sentenced for forcibly removing Jews from the occupied territories. Bulgarian involvement in the murder of over 11,000 Jews was then concealed.[50]

In Romania, trials of the most notorious war criminals held at the People's Tribunal in 1946 also addressed the large number of victims in Romanian-occupied Transnistria. Some five hundred survivors were interviewed, with the media reporting the findings.[51] The accused Ion Antonescu claimed that he only learned of the 27,000 victims in Odesa from foreign sources in 1944.[52] Three volumes of documentation collected by the secretary of the Jewish community relating to the mass crimes of the Romanian Army and the *Wehrmacht* were published in 1946/47. Yet they disappeared from libraries after Stalin in 1948 forbade publication of a Russian "black book" on the suffering of the Jewish people.[53]

Communist historians in Romanian subsequently no longer wrote about the military alliance with the German Reich and its consequences for the Jewish population. The mass murders in Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria were also ignored because these territories were taken over by the Soviet Union in 1944. Nothing could be published on the Hitler-Stalin Pact or the Soviet ultimatum of June 1940 that preceded the annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Ion Antonescu ensured that it was primarily the Jewish population that was deported from the region in the autumn of 1941 because he suspected that it included Soviet sympathizers. After 1990, there was a sudden revision of the reputation of Marshal Antonescu, who was now framed as an anti-Bolshevik hero who reclaimed the territories that had been annexed in 1940. The Romanian parliament honored him in June 1991 with a minute's silence on the occasion of the forty-fifth anniversary of his execution. It was only when the Romanian gov-

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49 Iva Arakchiyska, *Kann ein Mensch dabei untätig bleiben? Hilfe für verfolgte Juden in Bulgarien 1940 – 1944* (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2016), 81 – 90; Gabriele Nissim, *Der Mann, der Hitler stoppte: Dimitar Pešev und die Rettung der bulgarischen Juden* (Berlin: Siedler, 2000), 122 – 84.
50 Nadège Ragaru, *"Et les Juifs bulgares furent sauvés…": Une histoire des savoirs sur le Shoah en Bulgarie* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2020).
51 Andrei Muraru, "Romanian Political Justice: Holocaust and the Trails of War Criminals, The Case of Transnistria," *Holocaust: Studii și cercetări* 10 (2018): 127.
52 Marcel-Dumitru Ciucă, *Procesul mareșalului Antonescu: Documente* (Bucharest: Editura Saeculum, 1998), 3:425.
53 Hausleitner, *Eine Atmosphäre,* 214 – 18.

ernment sought to secure membership of NATO that the Antonescu cult was abandoned. In 2004, the final report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania was submitted, with historians finding that the Romanian Army was jointly responsible for the deaths of between 280,000 and 380,000 Jews.[54] These figures include the victims from Transnistria.

This is a far greater number than the estimated 40,000 people murdered by German *Kommandos* in Crimea and the 11,365 Jews that the Bulgarian government deported in 1943. In Soviet Ukraine, the anonymous term "Soviet victims" was the favored phrase. After 1991, however, some younger historians began to investigate the persecution of Jews. Today, there is also research on the unjust death sentences passed on *Judenrat* representatives by the Soviet authorities after 1944.[55]

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54 Mariana Hausleitner, "Die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Holocaust in Rumänien," in *Die späte Aufarbeitung des Holocaust in Osteuropa*, ed. Micha Brumlik and Karol Sauerland (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2010), 71–90; International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, *Final Report* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2005).
55 Vadim Altskan, "On the Other Side of the River: Dr. Adolph Herschmann and the Zmerinka Getto 1941–1944," in *Holocaust and Studies* 26, no. 1 (2012): 2–28.

Rudolf A. Mark

Deportations in the Context of World War II

As Charles King mentioned in his book *The Black Sea*, the forced movement of people as refugees from armed conflicts or settlers uprooted by governments and resettled in new areas or environments did not present a new phenomenon around the Black Sea in the twentieth century.[1] Before, during, and after World War I, a large number of individuals or groups living around the Black Sea were declared enemies of states and empires and fell victim to physical attacks or forced emigration. Moreover, there were organized campaigns of ethnic cleansing, accompanying, for instance, the fighting in the Caucasus, the Balkans, and Crimea during the war on the peninsula from 1853–56 and in its aftermath. In 1923, as a result of the Paris Peace Conference, the Greek-Turkish War of 1919–23, and the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, ca. 1.4 million Greeks had to abandon Turkey, whilst 400,000 "Turks" had to leave their homesteads in Greece, to mention only the largest groups. This was an act aiming to create a homogenous Turkish nation by means of ethnic cleansing. This can be seen as a parallel to the same efforts made by Greece and Bulgaria before World War I. And Lausanne corroborated this policy with the agreement of the international community.[2]

During World War II,[3] the deportations and resettlements by the Soviet administration took on a new character, not only with respect to the number of people affected, but also in terms of policy and strategic objectives. However, we must not equate "deportation" with "genocide" as defined by the 1948 United Nations (UN) Convention as "acts committed with intend to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group."[4] The same holds true with regard to the term "ethnic cleansing,"

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1 Charles King, *The Black Sea: A History* (Oxford: University Press, 2006), 207; Justin Mccarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922* (Princeton, N. Jersey: Darwin Press, 1996).
2 Ulf Brunnbauer and Michael G. Esch, "Einleitung: Ethnische Säuberungen in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa im 20. Jahrhundert," in *Definitionsmacht, Utopie, Vergeltung: 'Ethnische Säuberungen' im östlichen Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts,* ed. Ulf Brunnbauer and Michael G. Esch (Berlin: LIT VERLAG, 2006), 15–17; Pertti Ahonen, Gustavo Corni et al., *People on the Move: Forced Population Movements in Europe in the Second World War and its Aftermath* (Oxford: Berg, 2010), 3–10; Stanford J. Shaw, "Resettlement of Refugees in Anatolia, 1918–1923," *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 22, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 58–75; Holm Sundhaussen, "Die Ethnisierung von Staat, Nation und Gerechtigkeit: Zu den Anfängen nationaler 'Homogenisierung' im Balkanraum," in *Auf dem Weg zum ethnisch reinen Nationalstaat? Europa in Geschichte und Gegenwart,* ed. Mathias Beer, 2nd rev. ed. (Tübingen: Attempto-Verl. 2007), 69–90; René Hirschon, ed., *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003).
3 For this chapter on World War II, see Tal Bruttmann, Laurent Joly, and Annette Wieviorka, *Qu'est-ce qu'un déporté? Histoire et mémoires des déportations de la Seconde Guerre mondiale* (Paris: CNRS, 2009).
4 UN General Assembly, Resolution 260 A (III), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, No. 1021 (December 9, 1948), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2078/volume-78-I-1021-English.pdf; for the situation in single countries, see the articles of Detlef Brandes, Michael G. Asch, and Marie-Janine Calic in Brunnbauer and Esch, *Definitionsmacht*, 77–143; also Holm

the intention of which is—according to Naimark's definition—"to remove a people and often all traces of them from a concrete territory [...] to get rid of the 'alien' nationality, ethnic or religious group and to seize control of the territory they had formerly inhabited."[5] At the same time, we cannot ignore historical experience that evidences deportations as a first phase of ensuing acts of genocide.

Under the rule of the Moscow grand princes and tsars, deportations and resettlements of people had been administrative measures of Russian internal policy from time immemorial. In Soviet times, when the "nationalities question" formed an essential issue of Bolshevik state building, resettlements of populations, the reorganization, and even the renaming of territorial groups were used as a means to prepare, stabilize, and secure the realm of Soviet rule. Although the Bolsheviks conceived their future state as an internationally designed political entity, the implementation of their rule demanded a consolidation in terms of securing territory and establishing power structures. To this end they had to overcome the centrifugal movements which during the Civil War had almost flung the Bolshevik revolution to the abyss.

The so-called "Leninist" or "liberal" nationalities policy of the 1920s was a result of these experiences. After some disputes, the Soviet leadership opted for a federalist state structure. This concept envisaged ethno-territorial units and substantial rights of autonomy. To some degree, the latter were also granted to diaspora communities living outside of national entities.[6] They were allowed to have their own schools and cultural institutions as well as their own Soviets in the republics of other nationalities. By strengthening national cultures—the so-called policy of *korenizatsiia* ("rooting")—nationalist and separatist aspiration were to be neutralized and a process of rapprochement of the peoples was to be promoted through the development of a supranational class consciousness. However, *korenizatsiia* did not fulfill these expectations. For, rather than a socialist melting pot, the Soviet Union became the experimental field of new nations. This was the case especially in Central Asia and the Caucasus, where

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Sundhaussen, "Ethnische Säuberung," in *Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas,* ed. Edgar Hösch, Karl Nehring, and Holm Sundhaussen (Vienna: Böhlau, 2004), 221; Hans Lemberg, "'Ethnische Säuberung': Ein Mittel zur Lösung von Nationalitätenproblemen?," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament*, November 6, 1992; Georg Brunner, "Minderheiten und Recht: Die völkerrechtliche Lage," in *Nationen, Nationalitäten, Minderheiten: Probleme des Nationalismus in Jugoslawien, Ungarn, Rumänien, der Tschechoslowakei, Bulgarien, Polen der Ukraine, Italien und Österreich 1945– 1990*, ed Valeria Heuberger et al. (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1994), 43–51.

5 Norman N. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Harvard: University Press, 2001), 3.

6 For more details on the Soviet nationalities, see Rudolf A. Mark, *Die Völker der ehemaligen Sowjetunion: Die Nationalitäten der GUS, Georgiens und der baltischen Staaten. Ein Lexikon* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1992); Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Terry D. Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalities in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Gerhard Simon, *Nationalismus und Nationalitätenpolitik in der Sowjetunion: Von der totalitären Diktatur zur nachstalinschen Gesellschaft* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1986).

new nations were created and national Soviet Republics were established between the Pamir, Köpet Dag, and the Black Sea. In order to create administrative units which met Moscow's political, economic, strategic, and ethnic-cultural aims in the region, districts were reorganized and nationalities were divided, separated, or resettled.[7] There were also aspects of safeguarding the North Caucasus, a theater of ongoing resistance to Russian and Soviet rule ever since the beginning of the Russian conquest. Revolts occurred regularly not only in the mountains of Chechnya; guerrilla warfare was a permanent phenomenon throughout the region.[8]

Moreover, in the 1930s the Stalin regime embarked on a policy of ethnic cleansing in the border regions of the entire Soviet territory.[9] The deportations during World War II can be categorized in terms of this policy, although not all of the peoples and ethnic groups it pertained to were affected in the same way:

1 Greeks

Greeks had settled on the shores of the Black Sea since the beginning of Greek colonization more than 2,500 years ago. They exerted a dominant influence throughout the region, as we may learn from the names of the most important cities and regions, such as Simferopol (Crimean Tatar: Aqmescit), Alushta, Evpatoriia (Crimean Tatar: Kezlev), Kherson, Bosporos (Kerch respectively Cimmerian Bosporus), or even Sevastopol (Crimean Tatar: Aqyar). Stalin put an end to this history.

By 1939, the Soviet census showed 286,400 Greeks, ca. 20.000 of whom lived in Crimea, while the majority formed part of the population in the Black Sea littoral of Georgia and Southern Russia.[10] In 1937, many Soviet Greeks were already leaving their national raion in Krasnodar Oblast for Greece when by dint of Ezhov's terror Greek cultural and political institutions were closed down and Greek publications forbidden.[11] In 1939, Greeks were deported from the Kuban region to Vladivostok and the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). In 1941/42 they were followed by the majority of

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7 Barbara Pietzonka, *Ethnisch-territoriale Konflikte im Kaukasus: Eine politisch-geographische Systematisierung* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995), 82–83.

8 Paul B. Henze, "Circassian Resistance to Russia," in *The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance Towards the Muslim World,* ed. Marie Bennigsen-Broxup (London: Hurst &Co., 1996), 105; Abdurahman Avtorkhanov, "The Chechens and the Ingush during the Soviet Period and its Antecendents," in Bennigsen-Broxup, *The North Caucasus Barrier,* 146–83.

9 Viktor Dönninghaus, "'Trojanisches Pferd' für Stalin? Die Deportationen nationaler Minderheiten in den 1930er Jahren," *Nordost-Archiv* XXI (2012): 34–63; Grégory Dufaud, "La déportation des Tatars de Crimée et leur vie en exil (1944–1956): Un ethnocide?" *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'Histoire* 96, no. 4 (2007): 151–62; Juliette Cadiot and Marc Elie, *Histoire du Goulag* (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 2017), passim; J. Otto Pohl, *Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937–1949* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1999), 9–14; Terry D. Martin, "The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing," *Journal of Modern History* 70 (1998): 813–61.

10 Pohl, *Ethnic Cleansing*, 120–21.

11 Jean-Jacques Marie, *Les peoples déportés d'Union Soviétique* (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1995), 106.

Greeks in Southern Russia, who were deported to Siberia and Central Asia (Jambyl [Russian: Dzhambul], Qaraghandy [Russian: Karaganda], Almaty [Russian: Alma-Ata], Kokchetav, Osh,[12] and Fergana Oblasts).[13] After the withdrawal of the German occupiers in 1944, further groups of Greeks were banished from Crimea, including small groups of Turks and Iranians. They were shipped to Uzbekistan and Siberia. Among them were more than 4,200 people destined for special settlement.[14]

The ethnic cleansing of the peninsula and the adjacent regions continued until 1950,[15] when the last group of Greeks (27,000) together with other "foreign passport holders" were exiled from Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Russian and Ukrainian Black Sea coast to be settled in the southern oblasts of Kazakhstan.[16] After the defeat of the Greek People's Army in Greece in 1949, in Moscow Greeks were regarded with suspicion of treason. Moreover, the then leadership of Georgia, steered by Beria's intrigues behind the scenes, was imbued with an ardent nationalism and the idea of creating an ethnically homogenous republic.[17]

All in all, by 1949 approximately 70,000 Greeks had been deported, most of them being settled in Central Asia. Smaller groups lived dispersed across the territory of Siberia.[18] On January 1, 1953 the Soviet authorities counted 52,112 exiled Greeks. They were released from special settlements in the course of the "Thaw" after Stalin's death. However, it was only in 1972 that the deported Greeks were granted freedom of residence[19] and were allowed to return to their traditional areas of settlement. There, however, the Soviet government did not restore the Greek institutions they had established before deportation. After the decay of the USSR in 1991 most Greeks opted to emigrate.[20]

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12 Vlassis Agtsidis, "Asie centrale et Sibérie, territoires de la déportation," in *Les Grecs Pontiques: Diaspora, identité, territoires,* ed. Michel Bruneau (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1998), 157–75; N° 3.75, "Postanovlenie GOKO N° 1828ss O dopolnitelnom vyselenii iz Krasnodarskogo kraia i Rostovskoi oblasti Grekov – inostrannykh poddannykh i lits, priznannykh sotsialno opasnymi," May 29, 1942, in *Stalinskie deportatsii 1928–1953*, ed. Nikolai L. Pobol and Pavel M. Polian (Moscow: MFD Materik, 2005), 387–89.

13 N° 3.163, "Dokladnaia zapiska zam. Narkoma NKVD UzbSSR I. A. Meera nachalniku otdela spetsposelenii NKVD M. V. Kuznetsovy," July 29, 1944, in Pobol and Polian, *Stalinskie deportatsii*, 514–15.

14 Pohl, *Ethnic Cleansing*, 122; Agtsidis, "Asie centrale," 171.

15 Pohl, *Ethnic Cleansing, 122–24;* Tsypylma Darieva and Florian Mühlfried, "Kontaktraum Kaukasus: Sprachen, Religionen und Kulturen," *Osteuropa* 65, no. 7–10 (Summer 2015): 49.

16 N° 4.27, "Prikaz ministra vnutrennikh del SSSR N° 00525, Ob obespechenii perevozok, rasseleniia i trudovogo ustroistva vyselentsev s territorii Gruzinskoi, Armianskoi i Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR, a takzhe poberezhia Chernogo moria," June 2, 1949, in Pobol and Polian, *Stalinskie deportatsii*, 671; Pavel Polian, *Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004), 169.

17 Agtsidis, "Asie centrale," 172.

18 Agtsidis, 171–72.

19 Pohl, *Ethnic Cleansings*, 125–26.

20 Pohl, 127.

2 Moldovans

In the aftermath of the Hitler-Stalin Pact in August 1939 and after the outbreak of World War II, the Soviet Union annexed Bessarabia after an ultimatum that forced Romania to cede this province to Stalin in June 1940. In August 1940, the Supreme Soviet in Moscow founded the Moldavian SSR, uniting Bessarabia with six districts of the then disbanded Moldavian ASSR (Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic)[21] situated on the left bank of the Dniester. The rest of the territory remained with the Ukrainian SSR. In order to safeguard the newly gained acquisition, in June 1941 some 4,342 people were arrested and 13,885 banished from the Moldavian SSR.[22] In addition, more than 10,000 Polish refuges and colonists from the Chernivtsi (Romanian: Cernăuți, Russian: Chernovtsy) and Izmail Oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR were deported to the ASSR Komi and Siberia's Omsk and Novosibirsk Oblasts, while smaller groups were transferred to different settlements and plants in the regions Akmolinsk, Orsk, and Tashkent in Central Asia.[23] The deportation of Moldovans and Romanians was, so to speak, organized in parallel to those accomplished in the annexed eastern territories of Poland in the years 1939–41. Alleged "anti-Soviet elements" were removed (*iziatie*) in a radical way. Probably in order to destroy social ties and to make acts of resistance more difficult, families were torn apart, the heads arrested by the police, and the remaining incriminated people were resettled as "active members of counterrevolutionary and participants of anti-Soviet, nationalist, and White Guard organizations." Furthermore, former secret police officers, gendarmes, leaders of police forces, and prison guards, but also ordinary policemen and warders were arrested if evidence could be found against them. The same regulations applied to former Romanian, Polish, and White Guard officers as well as refugees from the Soviet Union. The largest group consisted of imprisoned "great landowners, owners of large factories, and high officials of the former state apparatus."[24] The composition of the deportees indicates that in the annexed territories the traditional public, administrative, and social-economic structures

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[21] Whereas the SSR was a sovereign state with (theoretically) full political power on its territory within the Soviet Union, an ASSR formed part of the administrative and political structures of a given SSR. In principle the ASSR enjoyed some sort of cultural autonomy and had its own administration, but was subordinated to the SSR's government.

[22] N° 2.69, "Soobshchenie zam. Narkoma NKGB B. Z. Kobulova I. V. Stalinu, S. M. Molotovu i L. P. Berii o khode operatsii po iziatiiu antisovetskogo elementa v Moldavskoi SSR, Chernovitskoi i Izmailskoi oblastiakh USSR," June 13, 1941, in Pobol and Polian, *Stalinskie deportatsii,* 210–11.

[23] N° 2.68, "Zapiska po 'VCH' zam. Narkoma NKVD SSSR V. V. Chernysheva narkomu NKVD USSR V. T. Sergienko i narkomu NKGB USSR P. Ia. Meshiku o sledovanii eshelonov so spetspereselentsami iz Moldavskoi SSR," June 12, 1941, in Pobol and Polian, *Stalinskie deportatsii,* 209–10; N° 2.71, "Zapiska po 'VCH' nachalnika UNKVD po Omskoi oblasti A. M. Kotliarova zam. narkoma NKVD V. V. Chernyshevu o rasselenii spetspereselentsev," June 14, 1941, Pobol and Polian, *Stalinskie deportatsii,* 212–13.

[24] N° 2.72, "Dokladnaia zapiska narkoma NKGB MCCR N. S. Sazykina narkomu NKGB SSSR V. N. Merkulovu o rezultatakh operatsii po iziatiiu antisovetskogo elementa na territorii Moldavskoi SSR," June 19, 1941, in Pobol and Polian, *Stalinskie deportatsii,* 212–14.

were to be weakened or abolished and national elites, as agents of Romanian or Moldovan culture and ethnic orientation, were to be eliminated.[25]

3 Germans

After Russia's conquest of the Crimean Khanate, groups of Romanians, Bulgarians, and Greeks from the Ottoman Empire, Russians from Poland, Swedes from Dagö (Russian/Estonian: Hiiumaa) and—beginning in 1787—German immigrants were allowed to settle as colonists on the entire territory that stretched from the Don in the east to the Budjak (Romanian: Bugeac, Russian: Budzhak) steppe in Bessarabia. Crimea too was included.[26] In the late nineteenth century, these "Black Sea Germans" numbered some 270,000 persons.[27] They were privileged, and on the whole enjoyed economic progress and prosperity. Migrations within the Russian Empire, overseas emigration, the cataclysms of World War I, the Civil War, and Sovietization under Stalin reduced their figures. On the eve of the German–Soviet War in 1941, some 50,000 Germans lived in the Crimean ASSR,[28] forming 4.6 percent of the entire population.[29] German national raions existed in the Odesa, Mykolaiv (Russian: Nikolaev), and Zaporizhzhia (Russian: Zaporozhe) Oblasts, and were home to more than 150,000 people.[30]

In September 1941, approximately 60,000 Germans were deported from Crimea to Kazakhstan and to the Ural region.[31] A year later, they were followed by smaller groups of Germans and stateless persons removed from Krasnodar Krai and Rostov Oblast (encompassing Germans, Greeks, Italians, Romanians, and Crimean Tatars).[32] With the arrival of the German troops, the remaining Black Sea Germans were brought under the control of the Nazi authorities, who used this group for the aims of NS settlement policy or for the "Germanization" of other occupied areas.[33] In 1944, the German retreat forced the former Soviet subjects to follow the withdrawing *Wehrmacht* troops to Ger-

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25 N° 2.69, 210 – 11; N° 2.71, 212; N° 2.72, 213 – 14.

26 Detlef Brandes, "Einwanderung und Entwicklung der Kolonien," in *Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas: Rußland,* ed. Gerd Stricker (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1997), 71.

27 Brandes, 91.

28 The Crimean ASSR was part of the RSFSR (Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic).

29 Dmitrii Riabushkin, "Krym," in *Regiony Ukrainy: Khronika i rukovoditeli,* ed. Kimitaka Macuzato, vol. 3, *Krym i Nikolaevskaia oblast* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center Hokkaido Univ., 2009), 18.

30 Meir Buchsweiler, *Die Volksdeutschen in der Ukraine zwischen den Weltkriegen und zu Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs* (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 1986), 1–2.

31 N° 3.21, "Spravka zam. nachalnika otdela spetspereselenii NKVD M. V. Konradova o chislennosti nemtsev, evakuirovannykh iz Krymskoi ASSR," ca. September 11, 1941, in Pobol and Polian, *Stalinskie deportatsii,* 325.

32 N° 3.75, 387–88.

33 Alfred Eisfeld and Vladimir Martynenko, "Filtration und operative Erfassung der ethnischen Deutschen in der Ukraine durch die Organe des Inneren und der Staatssicherheit während des Zweiten Weltkriegs und in der Nachkriegszeit," *Nordost-Archiv* XXI (2012): 104–81.

many. After victory they were "repatriated" by the Soviet occupation force to the USSR, mainly to Siberia, the Kazakh SSR, and the Komi ASSR, to join Germans who had been deported to labor camps after being sentenced to "special settlement."[34] They were released from these prison-like colonies in the course of the "Thaw" after Stalin's death. However, the deported Germans were refused the right of freedom of residence until Gorbachev's rule. He initiated their rehabilitation when he granted them the status of politically repressed victims in the early 1990s.[35]

4 Italians

Since the end of the eleventh century, Venetian and Genoese merchants lived in places like Bosporos, Sudak, Caffa, and others. Even after the Ottoman invasion and ensuing destruction in the fifteenth century, Italians could survive in the peninsula.[36] At the end of the nineteenth century, there remained some hundred persons in the Taurida und Kherson Governorates.[37] In the context of World War II, Italians fell victim to deportations at various times, first in January 1942, when ca. 500 Italians were banished from Kerch and resettled in Akmolinsk Oblast.[38] Together with the Crimean Tatars, the last remaining Italians also had to leave the peninsula in the autumn of 1944.[39]

5 Crimean Tatars

Turko-Tatar nomads had been living in the Crimean Peninsula since the Middle Ages. They formed the largest group among the subjects of the Crimean Khanate, which emerged as an Ottoman vassal state after the decline of the Tatar Golden Horde in the late fifteenth century. In the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca 1774, the Ottoman sultan renounced his suzerainty over the Khanate, which was incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1783 and 1792. The colonization of the entire region was characterized by an ongoing decrease in the Tatar population, whilst an influx of colonists from the inner Russian governorates, the Balkans, and German lands changed the ethnic composition of the conquered peninsula. This is one major reason why the Crimean ASSR, founded in October 1921, was inhabited by more than 390,000 Russians (51.5 percent of the entire population), Jews and Krymchaks (7 percent), Germans (5.9 percent), Greeks (3.5 per-

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34 Eisfeld and Martynenko, 166–70.
35 Eisfeld and Martynenko, 179.
36 Valerii E. Vozgrin, *Istoricheskie sudby krymskikh tatar* (Moscow: Mysl, 1992) 119–24.
37 *Die Nationalitäten des Russischen Reiches in der Volkszählung von 1897. B: Ausgewählte Daten zur sozio-ethnischen Struktur des Russischen Reiches – Erste Auswertungen der Kölner NFR-Datenbank*, ed. Henning Bauer, Andreas Kappeler, and Brigitte Roth (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1991), 238.
38 "Prilozhenie 2," in Eisfeld and Martynenko, "Filtration," 793.
39 Rudolf A. Mark, "Die Deportation der Krimtataren," *Nordost-Archiv* XXI (2012): 208.

cent), Bulgarians (1.7 percent), and Armenians (1.6 percent), while Poles, Karaims, Estonians, and "Tsigany" (Roma) numbered less than 1 percent each, with the Crimean Tatars forming the largest minority, constituting 25.9 percent of the population.[40]

In May 1944, after the withdrawal of the German occupation force, the GKO (State Committee of Defense) issued a resolution to remove all the Crimean Tatars from the peninsula to settle them in Uzbekistan and distant districts of the RSFSR. Thus, some 191,044 people were evicted, 151,600 of whom were shipped to Uzbekistan while 40,000 Tatars were banned to different places in the RSFSR.[41]

However, the exact number of Crimean Tatars deported has yet to be established. Most analysts of the issue state numbers running from 190,000 to 210,000 persons. The latter number includes 9,000 demobilized Crimean Tatars of the Soviet army, who had to join their families in the special settlements assigned to them. In early 1940, the Crimean Tatars in the peninsula had encompassed 218,179 persons, or 19.36 percent of the total population.[42] These figures are in accordance with those stated by the Soviet authorities as well as with those used by non-Soviet historians.[43]

However, quite a number of Crimean Tatars deserted to the invading German forces when the Soviet troops evacuated the peninsula. Moreover, the German occupation regime forcefully shipped thousands of Crimean Tatars into the Reich to work there as "Ostarbeiter" in agricultural and industrial plants.[44] At the same time, in 1942 the German High Command recruited a Crimean Tatar Legion consisting of 20,000 soldiers to serve as reserve policemen.[45] However, according to other calcula-

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40 Riabushkin, "Krym," 18.

41 N° 3.152, "Telegramma zam. Narkoma NKGB B. Z. Kobulova i zam. Narkoma NKVD I. A. Serova Narkomu NKVD L. P. Berii ob okonchanii operatsii po vyseleniiu Krymskikh tatar," May 20, 1944, in Pobol and Polian, *Stalinskie deportatsii*, 501 – 2; N° 3.153, "Donesenie Narkoma NKVD L. P. Berii I. V. Stalinu i V. M. Molotovu ob okonchanii operatsii po vyseleniiu Krymskikh tatar," May 20, 1944, in Pobol and Polian, *Stalinskie deportatsii*, 502; Polian, *Against Their Will*, 152.

42 Pohl, *Ethnic Cleansings*, 111; Riabushkin, "Krym," 18.

43 "Iz dokladnoi zapiski Narkomu vnutrennykh del L. Berii, 22 aprelia 1944 g.," in N. F. Bugai, "'Pogruzheny v eshelony i otpravleny k mestam poselenii': L. Beriia–I. Stalinu," *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 1 (1991): 151; Ismail I. Aliev, *Etnicheskie repressii* (Moscow: RadioSoft, 2009), 217; D. M. Ediev, *Demograficheskie poteri deportirovannykh narodov SSSR* (Stavropol: Izd. StGAU "Agrus" et al., 2003), 242; Refat I. Kurtiev, ed., *Deportatsiia Krymskikh tatar 18 maia 1944 goda: Kak eto bylo* (Simferopol: Izdat. Odzhak, 2004), 6; Simon, *Nationalismus und Nationalitätenpolitik*, 139; Ann Sheehy and Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities," Minority Rights Group, Report No 6, Third Edition, London, 1980, 8.

44 Brian Glyn Williams, *The Crimean Tatars: The Diaspora Experience and the Forging of a Nation* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 381; Gulnara Bekirova, *"My videli ad na zemle...": K 70-letiiu deportatsii Krymskotatarskogo naroda* (Kiev: Izd. "Stilos", 2014), 112.

45 Brian Glyn Williams, "The Hidden Ethnic Cleansing of Muslims in the Soviet Union: The Exile and the Repatriation of the Crimean Tatars," *Journal of Contemporary History* 37, no. 3 (2002): 328; Joachim Hoffmann, *Die Ostlegionen 1941–1943: Turkotataren, Kaukasier und Wolgafinnen im deutschen Heer* (Freiburg: Rombach, 1976), 39–49; G. Bekirova, *Piv stolittia oporu: Krymski tatary vid vyhnannia do povernennia (1941–1991 roky). Narys politychnoi istorii. Predmova Mustafy Dzhemilieva, pisliamova Refata Chubarova* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2017), 48–49; "Tagebuch A.O.K. (Armeeoberkommando) 11 Abt. Quartiermeis-

tions, only 10,000, that is, 5 percent of the Crimean Tatar population, collaborated with the German occupiers.[46] And it stands to reason that many persons who had collaborated with the occupation forces left Crimea 1944 in the course of the German retreat from the peninsula. According to Soviet sources, 20,000 Crimean Tatars joined the withdrawing German forces.[47] Therefore the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, L. P. Beria, reported to Stalin on May 10, 1944 on first measures taken against Crimean Tatars and proposed the forced relocation of all Crimean Tatars because they had "defected from the Red Army and fought against the Soviet Union with a weapon in hand,"[48] as he put it. At the same time, some 6,000 Tatars fit for military service were called up to the Red Army, whereas a special contingent of 5,000 became forced workers in the coal mining company *Moskvougol*.[49]

6 Deportation and the Special Settlement Regime

Since research on and descriptions of the deportations were restricted in the Soviet era, it was only after the USSR came to an end that studies based on archival research were published. The Soviet authorities not only monopolized history but also attempted to control memory. Therefore, in addition to other reasons, contemporary researchers cannot draw on personal memories of the deportees, but on so-called "postmemories." These "are distinguished from memory by generational distance and from history by personal connection," as established by recent analysis.[50]

From June 18 through 20, 1944, the Crimean Tatars—the majority children, woman, invalids, and the elderly—were rounded up by ca. 30,000 "fighters and officers of the

ter 2 mit 19 Anlagen (G 27-G 45) 14.–15.09.1942 (Bericht der Einsatzgruppe D des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei (SD) über das Ergebnis der Freiwilligenwerbung, die Aushebung und die gemachten Erfahrungen; Stand 15.02.1942," in *Sewastopol, Krim: Dokumente – Quellen – Materialien – Zitate; ein Arbeitsbuch*, ed. Hans-Rudolf Neumann (Regensburg: S. Roderer Verlag, 1998), 3:1392–1406.

46 Karl Heinz Roth and Jan-Peter Abraham, *Reemtsma auf der Krim: Tabakproduktion und Zwangsarbeit unter der deutschen Besatzungsherrschaft 1941–1944* (Hamburg: Edition Nautilius, 2011), 235.

47 Williams, *The Crimean Tatars*, 382.

48 N° 3.147, "Pismo narkoma NKVD L. P. Berii I. V. Stalinu o tselesoobraznosti deportatsii Krymskikh tatar v Uzbekistan," May 10, 1944, in Pobol and Polian, *Stalinskie deportatsii*, 496. Kerstin S. Jobst, *Geschichte der Krim: Iphigenie und Putin auf Tauris* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 184–287, provides a critical assessment of the issue and recognition of the Tatars' part in the war against the *Wehrmacht.*

49 N° 3.152, "Telegramma zam. narkoma NKGB B. Z. Kobulova i zam. narkoma NKVD I. A. Serova narkomu NKVD L. P. Berii ob okonchanii operatsii po vyseleniiu krymskikh tatar," May 20, 1944, in Pobol and Polian, *Stalinskie deportatsii*, 502.

50 Greta Lynn Uehling, *Beyond Memory: The Crimean Tatars' Deportation and Return* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 84; Aurélie Campana, "La mobilisation des Tatars de Crimée pour leur réhabilitation: entre légalisme et rhétorique victimaire," *Raisons Politiques* 30, no. 2 (2008): 91.

NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs]."[51] The deportees had to get ready for transport within less than an hour, and hence most of them were unable to take food and appropriate clothing for the shipment. They had to board wagons that had been used as cattle trucks. These were dirty, unhygienic, overcrowded, with inadequate sanitation. Dead bodies were handled like waste and disposed accordingly, i. e., thrown in ditches during train stops.[52]

The transport was a harrowing experience for those affected. According to the NKVD report, 191 people died, a figure which seems unbelievable given the circumstances of the transport and the observation of eyewitnesses. The literature reports 7,890 deaths, which would have been equivalent to 4.1 percent of the deportees.[53]

The Crimean Tatars, who were mainly deported to the Uzbek SSR, were given the status of special settlers. This made them second-class Soviet citizens living under a punitive regime. They had to live in special settlement camps surrounded by barbed wire and, moreover, they were obliged to do "socially useful work"—meaning hard labor in various branches of industry. Any violation of the regime imposed on the deportees was severely punished. It was only after Stalin's death that the special settlements were abolished in 1956. Since the deportees were still needed as a labor force in the exile areas, they, like the Germans and the Meskhetians, were prevented from returning to their home regions. It was not until the late1980s and Gorbachev's rehabilitation policy that they finally were allowed to resettle their Crimean homelands. There, however, they were not welcomed with open arms. In the course of forty-five years, their peninsula had become home to Slavic people who had moved there from various parts of the Soviet Union.

In addition to the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, from May–June 1944 some 12,242 Bulgarians, 15,040 Greeks, 9,621 Armenians, 1,119 Germans, and 3,654 other "foreigners" were banished from Crimea.[54] The last group included 3,531 Greeks, 105 Turks, and sixteen Iranians with expired passports.[55] The majority of these deportees were destined for settlement in various oblasts of the Kazakh SSR or Fergana Oblast in the Uzbek SSR. Others were transferred to oblasts of the RSFSR or to the Bashkir

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51 N° 3.166, "Predstavlenie narkoma NKVD L. P. Berii o nagrazhdenii uchastnikov operatsii po vyseleniiu Krymskikh tatar i predstavitelei drugikh natsionalnostei s territorii Kryma," July 5, 1944, in Pobol and Polian, *Stalinskie deportatsii,* 518.

52 Kurtiev, *Deportatsiia,* 41; Mark, "Die Deportation," 209–10.

53 Gulnara Bekirova, *Krymskotatarskaia problema v SSSR (1944–1991)* (Simferopol: Odzhak, 2004), 29–30; Timur Sh. Dagzhi, *Stalinskii genotsid i etnotsid krymsko-tatarskogo naroda: Dokumenty, fakty, kommentarii* (Simferopol: Simferopolskaia Gorodskaia Tip., 2008), 48.

54 Polian, *Against Their Will,* 153.

55 N° 3.161,"Soobshchenie PO 'VCh' zam. narkoma NKVD I. A. Serova narkomu NKVD L. P. Berii o zavershenii operatsii po vyseleniiu iz Kryma grekov, bolgar, armian, a takzhe inostrannykh poddannykh," June 28, 1944, in Pobol and Polian, *Stalinskie deportatsii,* 512–13.

ASSR, where they were employed as a labor force in the agricultural sector and in industrial enterprises.[56]

In 1949 a report of the second department of the Soviet Ministry of Home Affairs listed more than 30,000 people representing fifty-eight nationalities who had been banished from Crimea and adjacent regions in the course of the resettlement of Germans. Among them we find, besides the ethnic groups already mentioned: Russians, Ukrainians, Poles, Balts, Jews, Austrians, Abazins, Hungarians, Czechs, Adygei, and many others.[57]

7 Meskhetians, Kurds, Khemshids, and Other Nationalities

"In order to improve the conditions for the defense of the state border in the area of the Georgian SSR"[58] in November 1944, 91,095 Meskhetians,[59] Kurds, and Khemshids[60] —according to other sources some 90,000 to 116,000 people—were banished from the Georgian-Turkish border and deported to the Kazakh, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz SSRs.[61] However, among the 25 trains dispatched from Georgia were—for reasons that are unclear —two railway cars transporting Roma,[62] and beside them were shipped local Turkmens and the small group of Turkic Karapapaks.[63] As the result of an organizational

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56 N° 3.175, "Pismo narkoma NKVD L. P. Berii i V. Stalinu o tselesoobraznosti deportatsii bolgar, grekov i armian iz Kryma", May 29, 1944, in Pobol and Polian, *Stalinskie deportatsii*, 508–9; N° 3.158, "Postanovlenie GOKO N° 5984ss O vyselenii s territorii Krymskoi ASSR bolgar, grekov i armian," June 2, 1944, in Pobol and Polian, *Stalinskie deportatsii*, 510.

57 N°105, "Spravka o kolichestve lits drugikh natsionalnostei, nakhodiashchikhsia na spetsposelenii, vyselennykh s nemtsami, s vyselentsami Kavkaza, Kryma, no ne vkhodiashchikh v sostav etikh kontingentov," December 31, 1949, in *Deportatsiia narodov Kryma: Dokumenty, fakty, kommentarii*, ed. F. Bugai (Moscow: INSAN, 2002), 114.

58 Quoted in Pietzonka, *Ethnisch-territoriale Konflikte*, 117.

59 Meskhetians is the term widely used in the Province of Meskhetia or in the Adjarian ASSR in Georgia. The majority of the Meskhetian Turks in Turkey refer to themselves as "Ahiska Turks"; Andrej Khanzhin, "Durable Solutions for Meshketian Turks: The Issue Revisited," *European Yearbook of Minority Issues* 4 (2004/2005): 496.

60 Ca. 9,000 turkicized Armenians settled next to Meskhetians and Kurds near the Turkish border. More than 10,000 lived on Turkish territory, Simon, *Nationalismus und Nationalitätenpolitik*, 275; Aleksandr M. Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War*, trans. George Saunders (New York: Norton, 1978), 11.

61 N° 3.176, "Dokladnaia zapiska narkoma NKVD L. P. Berii I. V. Stalinu, V. M. Molotovu, G. M. Malenkovu o provedenii operatsii po pereseleniiu turok, kurdov i khemshidov iz pogranichnykh raionov gruzinskoi SSR," November 28, 1944, in Pobol and Polian, *Stalinskie deportatsii*, 534; N° 3.181, "Spravka o kolichestve spetspereselentsev drugikh natsionalnostei, ne kchodiashchikh v sostav semei spetspereselentsev iz Gruzii," March 7, 1952, in Pobol and Polian, *Stalinskie deportatsii*, 538; Polian, *Against Their Will*, 155.

62 Polian, *Against Their Will*, 155; N° 3.181, 538.

63 Turkicized Kurds.

error, they were joined by minor contingents of Turks, Cherkess, Abkhaz, Avars, and Lazi from Ajaria.[64] According to some sources, the deportees numbered 200,000. At the beginning of the deportation, they had been told that they were being evacuated temporarily in view of the approaching *Wehrmacht*.[65] After the war, some of the deported groups were allowed to return to their homesteads.

In the May and summer of 1949, the cleansing of the Black Sea coast was continued. Greek citizens, stateless Greeks, small groups of Armenian Dashnaks,[66] and former Turkish and Greek passport holders were banished from the territories of the Transcaucasian SSRs as well as from the Ukrainian and Russian Black Sea coast. The exiled group probably encompassed more than 45,000 people.[67]

8 Reasons for the Deportations

There were many reasons for the deportations and the shifts in peoples. With regard to Crimea, in early 1944, the Soviet leadership seemed to have considered a resettlement of the Crimean Tatars and their replacement by Jewish people, in order to create a Jewish Autonomous or a Jewish Soviet Republic in the peninsula. However, for practical reasons, the idea swiftly lost its appeal.

In the case of the Crimean Tatars, alleged betrayal and collaboration with the German occupying power played a role. It was a widespread phenomenon during the war —and not least a question of survival in the face of ubiquitous violence and death threats on the part of the invaders. The Russian Germans and the Crimean Tatars can serve as examples here. Moreover, the German occupying forces, the *Wehrmacht* and National Socialists organizations had committed acts of genocide, killing Jews, Krymchaks,[68] and Roma,[69] crimes the Soviet leadership could use for accusations of collaboration. In addition, alleged criminal activities such as smuggling on the Caucasian borders or the formation of armed gangs[70] were used to justify the deportation of smaller nationalities and ethnic groups such as Meskhetians, Kurds, Karapapaks, and related peoples. Accusations of kinship relations across borders with the Turks and al-

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64 A socialist-nationalist party that emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century advocating national-cultural autonomy. After the Civil War, its partisans had to surrender to Bolshevist rule in Armenia.

65 Sheehy and Nahaylo, *The Crimean Tatars*, 24.

66 A socialist-nationalist party that emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century advocating national-cultural autonomy. After the Civil War, its partisans had to surrender to Bolshevist rule in Armenia.

67 N° 4.27, 671; Polian, *Against Their Will*, 169.

68 Tatarized Jews or Tatars following the Mosaic covenant.

69 Norbert Kunz, *Die Krim unter deutscher Herrschaft (1941–1944): Germanisierungsutopie und Besatzungsrealität* (Darmstadt: WBG, 2005), chapter 7; Rudolf Loewental, "The Extinction of the Krimchaks in World War II," *The American Slavic and East European Review* 10, no. 2 (1951): 130–36.

70 N° 3.176, 534; Polian, *Against Their Will*, 155.

leged intentions to emigrate were also made against these peoples as well as against the Khemshids. With the forced relocation, the Soviet leadership allegedly sought to eliminate recruiting fields of informants, spies, and potential collaborators for the Turkish intelligence services.[71]

However, more crucial to the Soviet leadership were intentions to meet economic targets and serve political-strategic interests via this policy. The mobilization of the Soviet population for the armed struggle against the German aggressor deprived the most important economic sectors of labor on an enormous scale. Moreover, in order to preserve them from destruction by the enemy, numerous companies and production plants had been evacuated to the east and to Central Asia via the Volga before the beginning of the war. In addition, existing plants were expanded and new production facilities were constructed.

This eastward shift had already taken on enormous dimensions by 1943[72] and required corresponding labor power. Therefore, disposable, cheap labor,[73] such as that which deported Germans and Crimean Tatars would provide, was highly welcome in the new industrial areas, in the agricultural sector, and in various other economic zones.[74]

However, in the course of the war and in view of international developments, new considerations took precedence for the Soviet leadership. With regard to the Black Sea and Crimea, these pertained to Soviet prospects of acquiring the status of a Great Power state but also to issues of safeguarding border areas the possession of which could be menaced by claims of adjacent countries. So, at the beginning of 1944, Stalin and his accomplices seemed to have envisaged a resettlement of the Crimean Tatars and their replacement by Jewish people, in order to create a Jewish Autonomous or a Jewish Soviet Republic in the peninsula. However, for practical reasons, the idea swiftly lost its appeal.[75]

To be sure, no less important were political-strategic interests with regard to Turkey and the Western powers, then competing with one another for dominance in the Mediterranean region. Atatürk's successor, İsmet İnönü, had signed a treaty of friendship with Germany in 1941, which was endorsed until the summer of 1944. At the same time, contacts developed between Turkey, the United States, and Great Britain were regarded by Stalin with growing suspicion. It was fuelled by reports about the Turkish government laying claim to Soviet territories stretching from Crimea to the Caucasus

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71 N° 3.176, 534.

72 Manfred Hildermeier, *Geschichte der Sowjetunion 1917–1991: Entstehung und Niedergang des ersten sozialistischen Staates* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 636–37.

73 Frederick Kagan, "The Evacuation of Soviet Industry in the Wake of 'Barbarossa': A Key to Soviet Victory," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 8, no. 2 (1995): 393; John Barber and Mark Harrison, *The Soviet Home Front, 1941–1945: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War II* (London: Longman, 1991), 60–61.

74 Mark, "Die Deportation," 224–25.

75 Bekirova, *My videli ad,* 9.

and Central Asia.[76] Finally, in November 1945, Moscow terminated its treaty of neutrality with Ankara of 1925, arguing the convention no longer complied with the profound changes that had occurred during World War II. Soviet calls for the cession of areas in the South Caucasus and for bases at the straits followed suit.[77] They determined Stalin's policy towards Turkey in the years to come. Stalin aimed to control the Black Sea coasts and the Turkish straits to achieve a revision of the Montreux Convention that would enable him to establish the Soviet Union as a Mediterranean power. Moreover, between the wars, international relations within the Black Sea region were critical insofar as clarification of interstate border lines "lagged behind other parts of the world."[78] The Montreux Convention of 1936, the strategic competition of the Great Powers in the Middle East, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Balkans added to the region's significance in the context of British and Soviet imperial rivalry for control over the Turkish straits.[79]

9 Turks and Jews in Bulgaria

As mentioned above, before World War II Bulgarians had been settling widely spread on a territory stretching from Crimea to the western littoral of the Black Sea. During the war, most of these Bulgarians fell victim to ethnic cleansing. This policy was continued after the war.

However, resettlements as means of consolidating crucial peripheries or creating ethnic homogeneous states were not restricted to the Soviet Union. Having eliminated its political opponents and established Bulgaria as a communist republic similar to the USSR, the country's Communist leadership under Valko Chervenkov executed a policy of societal and ethnic homogenization, the minorities being subject to systematic assimilation, repressions, and threats of expulsion.[80] As a loyal Stalinist and follower of the Soviet model, he initiated purges of the party and a profound transformation of state and society. This includes the nationalization of land and the collectivization of agriculture.

The Turkish population, comprising ca. 625,500 people, formed the largest minority in Communist Bulgaria. They lived mostly in closed communities and differed from the majority population by religion, language, and cultural diversity.[81] This may have been

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76 N° 91, "Kopiia, 14 sentiabria 1945 g.," in Bugai, *Deportatsiia*, 100; Dufaud, "La déportation," 8.

77 Klaus Kreiser and Christoph K. Neumann, *Kleine Geschichte der Türkei*, 2nd edition (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, jr., 2008), 393.

78 King, *Black Sea*, 216.

79 Süleyman Seydi, *The Turkish Straits and the Great Powers: From the Montreux Convention to the Early Cold War, 1936–1947* (Istanbul: The Issis Press, 2003), 150.

80 Hans-Joachim Härtel and Roland Schönfeld, *Bulgarien: Vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart* (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1998), 213.

81 Härtel and Schönfeld, 214.

regarded as an obstacle to social integration and Communist rule. For these or other reasons, on the basis of a Bulgarian-Turkish treaty of 1925, regulating the emigration of Turks, 154,000—according to other sources up to 220,000—Turks were forced to emigrate to Turkey after agreements with Ankara in 1950 and 1951.[82] Most of the expulsed came from Southern Dobruja, which in 1940 was transferred by Romania to Bulgaria, whose possession of this territory had been confirmed by the Paris Peace Treaty.[83]

Mutatis mutandis, this also seems to have been the case regarding the Jewish citizens of Bulgaria. They, too, fell victim to growing pressure from Communist rule. At the same time, Zionism grew among the Jews who had survived the Holocaust and was exploited by the leadership in Sofia for its own ends. Hence the Jewish population of about 45,000 people was induced to emigrate to Israel, with the Bulgarian government supporting this exodus,[84] although it could be said that this suited the interests of both parties.

There were many reasons for the deportations and the shifts in peoples in the Black Sea region in the context and aftermath of World War II. As mentioned above, resettlements were accomplished for internal reasons as well as in view of international politics. The Soviet leadership under Stalin strived to secure newly annexed territories by way of eliminating national elites but also by forced ethnical homogenization. This also pertains to Bulgaria insofar as the seizure of power by the Communists was followed by a policy of ethnic cleansing. The new regime had to create a fitting societal environment in order to ease its installation.

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82 Gotthold Rhode, "Die südosteuropäischen Staaten von der Neuordnung nach dem I. Weltkrieg bis zur Ära der Volksdemokratien," in *Handbuch der europäischen Staaten*, ed. Theodor Schieder, vol. 7, *Europa im Zeitalter der Weltmächte* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979), 1264; *Lexikon der Vertreibungen: Deportation, Zwangsumsiedlung und ethnische Säuberung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Detlef Brandes, Holm Sundhaussen, and Stefan Troebst (Vienna: Böhlau 2010), 663–64.
83 Härtel and Schönfeld, *Bulgarien*, 199, 215; King, *Black Sea*, 228.
84 Rhode, "Die südosteuropäischen Staaten," 1265; Yulian Konstantinov, "Strategies for Sustaining a Vulnerable Identity: The Case of the Bulgarian Pomaks," in *Muslim Identity and the Balkan State*, ed. Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki (London: Hurst Company, 1997), 47.

Jan Zofka

Territorial Conflict and Secessionism in the Post-Soviet Black Sea Region

1 Introduction

Charles King has stated that "the end of Soviet communism was a relatively peaceful affair"[1]—given the disputed boundaries and social grievances across the decaying Union. Compared to the end of Yugoslavia and other historical cases of empire and state decay, and if the wars in Ukraine since 2014 are counted as belonging to another epoch, one might say so. The Black Sea region, however, was riddled with conflict in the 1990s. Furthermore, the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the war in Eastern Ukraine since 2014, Russia's takeover of Crimea, Azerbaijan's recent offensive against Armenian-held territories, and Russia's attack on Ukraine have brought a second wave of violence lasting to this day. However, one can also look at what happened in the Black Sea region from the opposite perspective. In the areas bordering the Sea one can find various examples of conflictive situations where peaceful settlement was found, as in Ajaria, Gagauzia, and, for the period up to 2014, even Crimea. Additionally, violence in the Black Sea region was not exceptional, as one might name the civil war in Tajikistan from 1992 to 1997 with 60,000 to 100,000 victims, the pogroms in Osh, or the "Batken events" in 1999 in southern Kyrgyzstan.[2]

Furthermore, most of the political projects of conflict actors in the region were not connected to the Black Sea. Above all, the pro-Russian actors were, at first sight, oriented towards Moscow and not towards the Black Sea. And indeed, to be sure, the conflicts initially took place in the context of the Soviet Union's state decay and were coined by the legacies of Soviet structures and borders. But, on a concrete level, the Black Sea and its shores were influential for and entangled in conflict development and the formation of the acting coalitions—as a conflict site, through sea-related infrastructures, and as an imaginary space.

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1 Charles King, "The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States," *World Politics* 53, no. 4 (July 2001): 529.
2 İdil Tunçer Kılavuz, "Understanding Civil War: A Comparison of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan," *Europe-Asia Studies* 63, no. 2 (March 2011): 263–90; İdil Tunçer Kılavuz, "The Role of Networks in Tajikistan's Civil War: Network Activation and Violence Specialists," *Nationalities Papers* 37, no. 5 (2009): 693–717; Iraj Bashiri, *The History of the Civil War in Tajikistan* (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2020); Tim Epkenhans, *The Origins of the Civil War in Tajikistan: Nationalism, Islamism, and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet Space* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016); Valery Tishkov, "'Don't Kill Me, I'm a Kyrgyz!': An Anthropological Analysis of Violence in the Osh Ethnic Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 32, no. 2 (1995): 133–49.

What conflicts are to be considered here? Firstly, this chapter examines "intra-state" conflicts. To be sure, all civil, internal, or intra-state wars include action and support by outside governments. What is required here for an intra-state conflict is that non-state collective actors of violence or secessionist mobilization make up crucial parts of the conflict scene. The second problem is the geographic question as to whether to treat conflicts in the broader region or to concentrate on direct connections to the sea. In order to do both, the chapter is divided in two parts. The first will provide an overview of the post-Soviet "intra-state" conflicts in the broader Black Sea region and summarize what research has achieved on its way towards a sociology of post-Soviet internal war. The second part looks for concrete entanglements of these conflicts and the protagonists with the Black Sea.

2 Overview: The Sociology of Post-Soviet Intra-State Conflicts

The most visible post-Soviet intra-state territorial conflicts for outside observers are the ones that have left non-recognized states until today, or even led to new wars in recent years. Others are much less well-known, as they remained on a level of low-intensity warfare and did not result in relevant territorial changes, and some conflictual situations were resolved before getting to a stage of protracted violence by autonomy solutions.

The conflict over the region Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh, formerly an autonomous oblast in Soviet Azerbaijan with an Armenian majority, was continued in 2020. In the first war from 1991 to 1994, tens of thousands of civilians died at the hands of government soldiers and nationalist paramilitaries and hundreds of thousands had to flee their homes. Between 1988 and 1991, around 1,000 had already been killed in low-intensity warfare and nationalist pogroms. Interwoven with the Karabakh-conflict, different factions of the Azerbaijani forces fought a short civil war among themselves for power in Baku in 1992/93. The pogroms in the Azerbaijani capital Baku in 1990 and in the nearby industrial town of Sumgait (Azeri: Sumqayıt) in 1988 against Armenian inhabitants, and the massacre of the Azerbaijani population of Khojaly (Azeri: Xocalı, Armenian: Khojalu) in 1992 belong to the most violent events of the Soviet decay. The territorial result of the war was that the autonomous oblast of Nagornyi Karabakh in Azerbaijan became the non-recognized republic of Artsakh and that a corridor between Armenia and the exclave was controlled by the Armenian forces. In 2020, Azerbaijan was able to win back a large part of this corridor, the region of Ağdam (Armenian: Akna), and the strategically important town of Shusha (Azeri: Şuşa, Armenian: Shushi) inside the former autonomous oblast.[3]

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3 Christoph Zürcher, *The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict and Nationhood in the Caucasus* (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 152–85.

Another continuation of violent state decay in the post-Soviet Black Sea region took place in Ukraine when the Russian Federation incorporated the Black Sea peninsula Crimea in 2014 via military action, practically without resistance, while the oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk were dragged into protracted violence and faced *de facto* control of large parts of their territory by two "People's Republics," before the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. More than 10,000 people died in the standoff between the Ukrainian Army and volunteer paramilitaries on the one side and separatist forces supported by Russian military structures on the other between 2014 and 2022.[4]

A third "resumption" of violence occurred with the 2008 war in Georgia, where Russian troops excessively responded to the Georgian army's inroad into South Ossetia after shelling from the separatists' side. In the early 1990s, Abkhazian and South Ossetian regional elites and paramilitaries had resorted to violence in the face of Tbilisi's attempts to deprive them of autonomous status. The Abkhazian war cost tens of thousands of lives, and saw massive nationalist violence by the Georgian nationalistic paramilitary and an expulsion of more than 200,000 Georgians from Abkhazia. The Abkhazians were supported by Russian military and the—rather anti-Russian—paramilitary Confederation of the Mountain Peoples from various Caucasus districts and republics. The smaller former autonomous oblast of South Ossetia in the Caucasus Mountains also made itself independent in a war from 1990 to 1992 that cost 700–1,000 peoples' lives.[5] Additionally, the Georgian forces fought among themselves for power in Tbilisi. A coalition of the former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze as state council chairman with the leaders of the dominant paramilitary racket groups, supported by Moscow, defeated the incumbent nationalist president Zviad Gamsakhurdia and his "Zviadist" forces.[6] Also, the quasi-independence of the Ajar Autonomous Republic around the Black Sea coast resort of Batumi became rather forgotten after the conflict lifted when the Saakashvili government forced the regional strongman Aslan Abashidze to step down in 2004.[7]

In contrast, the conflict in Moldova over the region stretching along the Eastern shore of the river Dniester was met with comparatively great attention on an interna-

4 Tetyana Malyarenko and Stefan Wolff, *The Dynamics of Emerging De-Facto States: Eastern Ukraine in the Post-Soviet Space* (London: Routledge, 2019); Ivan Katchanovski, "The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?," *European Politics and Society* 17, no. 4 (2016): 473–89; Anna Matveeva, "No Moscow Stooges: Identity Polarization and Guerrilla Movements in Donbass," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 16, no. 1 (2016): 25–50; Alexandr Voronovici, "Internationalist Separatism and the Political Use of 'Historical Statehood' in the Unrecognized Republics of Transnistria and Donbass," *Problems of Post-Communism* 67, no. 3 (2020): 288–302.
5 Pavel K. Baev, "Civil Wars in Georgia: Corruption Breeds Violence," in *Potentials of Disorder: Explaining Conflict and Stability in the Caucasus and in the Former Yugoslavia*, ed. Jan Koehler (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 134–37; Zürcher, *Post-Soviet Wars*, 124–25.
6 Baev, "Civil Wars in Georgia," 131–33.
7 Georgi M. Derluguian, "The Tale of Two Resorts: Abkhazia and Ajaria Before and After the Soviet Collapse," in *The Myth of 'Ethnic Conflict': Politics, Economics, and 'Cultural' Violence*, ed. Beverly Crawford and Ronnie D. Lipschutz (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 261–92.

tional level. The small-scale war with around a thousand dead was fought by an embryonic Moldovan army and nationalist volunteers against a coalition of separatist paramilitaries supported by Soviet/Russian military. It led to the foundation of the Moldovan Dniester Republic (Transnistria), which in spite of international non-recognition has existed for thirty years and has seen its second government change by elections in 2019.[8]

The Chechen wars of course are also some of the most well-known post-Soviet intra-state conflicts, mostly due to the massive destruction of the republic and atrocities against civilians by the Russian army in the two wars of 1994–96 and 1999–2001. They are also famous for the image of the enemy as evil "Islamist" terrorists that was created by Russian (and Western) publics to legitimize these military campaigns. In fact, the early Chechen movement was led by the former Soviet army general Dzhokhar Dudaev and propagated a secular "Third World" nationalism. Only after the first brutal crackdown by the Russian army did the adoption of a supra-national political version of Wahhabi philosophy make sense to a part of the younger generation of field commanders, who used it as a "smokescreen"[9] for promoting their business interests and for entering into an internal power struggle against the older generation. It was mainly after the second Russian armed intervention that these people embarked on a destructive guerrilla strategy across various North Caucasian republics, as political options for independence had vanished.[10] Much less known are conflicts like the small-scale one-month war in the Prigorodnyi Raion of Vladikavkaz, between Ingushetia and North Ossetia in October/November 1992. The Ingush side claimed the suburb of the North Ossetian capital on the grounds of a history of expulsion under Stalin. Around 850 people died; the district remained under Ossetian control.[11]

Many more conflictive situations and nationalist mobilizations in the post-Soviet Black Sea region did not result in war-level violence. Nationalist paramilitaries in the South Russian region of Krasnodar perpetrated crimes against members of regional minorities, and the regional Cossack movement failed in its attempts to found new republics in Karachaevo-Cherkessiia.[12] In the Izmail district in southwestern Ukraine, squeezed between Moldova, Romania's Danube Delta, the Dniester Liman, and the Black Sea, dominant minorities with a tendency towards Soviet nostalgia had to adapt to Ukrainian independence, the Orange and Maidan revolutions, without this

8 Gottfried Hanne, *Der Transnistrien-Konflikt: Ursachen, Entwicklungsbedingungen und Perspektiven einer Regulierung* (Cologne: BiOsT, 1998); Stefan Troebst, "Separatistischer Regionalismus als Besitzstandswahrungsstrategie (post-)sowjetischer Eliten: Transnistrien 1989–2002," in *Regionale Bewegungen und Regionalismen in europäischen Zwischenräumen seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Philipp Ther and Holm Sundhaussen (Marburg: Verlag Herder Institut, 2003), 185–214.
9 Zürcher, *Post-Soviet Wars*, 88.
10 Zürcher, 70–114.
11 Dana Jirouš, *Erinnerung als Mobilisierungsressource im Vorfeld ethnisierter Gewaltkonflikte: Das Beispiel Nordossetien – Inguschetien 1989–1992* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2017).
12 Dittmar Schorkowitz, *Postkommunismus und verordneter Nationalismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008), 189–204.

leading to war or secession.[13] A broadly non-violent settlement with autonomy solutions was achieved in Gagauzia (Southern Moldova; Gagauz: Gagauz Yeri, Romanian: Găgăuzia, Russian: Gagauziia), Ajaria, and in 1990s Crimea.

Throughout the Soviet Union, a "Parade of Sovereignties" had been started by the liberalizations of perestroika. As Benedict Anderson noted, these struggles for new territorial arrangements were fought not along ethnic but, first and foremost, along administrative lines.[14] Oblasts wanted to achieve autonomy, autonomous oblasts wanted to become autonomous republics, and autonomous and Union republics independent states. Only in a few exceptions did actors manage to build up institutions without a direct Soviet administrative-territorial predecessor: in Eastern Moldova the Moldovan Dniester Republic, in Southern Moldova Gagauzia, and the Chechen national congress split up the Checheno-Ingush autonomous republic and marginalized the republican parliament, so that the Ingush-dominated oblasts had to build up their own institutions as well.[15]

Most of the actors employed nationalist ideology, but social science and historiography have identified the conflicts as violent re-allocation of power and resources in the context of Soviet state decay. In the pursuit of a sociology of post-Soviet war, the acting coalitions and their interests, motives, socialization, and their political economies have to be discovered. The clearest picture in this respect exists for the conflict in Moldova's Dniester Valley. There, the mobilizations for autonomy started in the factories of the industrial cities and towns on the banks of the Dniester in the form of strikes and demonstrations against the new Moldovan language law in 1989. The directors of the all-Union heavy industry factories collaborated with the local and all-Union security structures to build up the resources for a violent confrontation with Chişinău, with support from the Soviet army, which turned Russian in April 1992.[16]

The Transnistrian directors were not the only factory directors who could capitalize on their enterprise chairmanship in the violent conflicts of the transformation period. The most famous further examples might be the Azerbaijani textile fabricant and warlord Surət Hüseynov, in the Yugoslav sphere, the Bosnian owner of Agrokomerc Fikret Abdić.[17] Many other warlords and separatist leaders had become entrepreneurs in the transformation phase and were able to produce synergetic effects between their

13 Simon Schlegel, *Making Ethnicity in Southern Bessarabia: Tracing the Histories of an Ambiguous Concept in a Contested Land* (Leiden: Brill, 2019).

14 Benedict Anderson, *Die Erfindung der Nation: Zur Karriere eines folgenreichen Konzepts* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus-Verlag, 1996), 214.

15 Zürcher, *Post-Soviet Wars*, 76–79; Jeff Chinn and Steven D. Roper, "Territorial Autonomy in Gagauzia," *Nationalities Papers* 26 (1998): 87–101; Stefan Troebst, "Von 'Gagauz Halky' zu 'Gagauz Yeri': Die Autonomiebewegung der Gagausen in Moldova von 1988 bis 1998," *Ethnos – Nation* 7, no. 1 (1999): 41–54.

16 Jan Zofka, "The Transformation of Soviet Industrial Relations and the Foundation of the Moldovan Dniester Republic," *Europe-Asia Studies* 68, no. 5 (2016): 826–46.

17 Jan Zofka, "Politische Unternehmer: Fabrikdirektoren als Akteure postsozialistischer Bürgerkriege," in *Leipziger Zugänge zur rechtlichen, politischen und kulturellen Verflechtungsgeschichte Ostmitteleuropas*, ed. Adamantios Skordos and Dietmar Müller (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2015), 331.

business and their political or military career—such as Valerii Averkin in Crimea and Shamil Basaev in Chechnya, to name just two examples.[18]

Academics were a second social group from which leaders of conflict factions emanated. Nationalist intellectuals, not least historians, dominated many of the conflict parties in the Caucasus region. In some cases, the academic leaders were close to or partly congruent with the Soviet nomenklatura, as in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[19] In other cases, the leading academics had a dissident background or even had had another career as criminals which helped them become warlords. The Soviet nationality and education policies had broadened access to universities for people from these disadvantaged regions, but employment opportunities were limited, at least in the humanities.[20] In the Georgian civil wars, the historian Vladislav Ardzinba, an expert in Hittitology, led the Abkhaz Republic in its fight for independence. Georgia's president and military leaders were a philologist (Zviad Gamsakhurdia), a sculptor (Tengiz Kitovani, leader of the National Guard, who had a criminal past and had networked with dissidents in prison), and a playwright, Dzhaba Ioseliani, leader of the Mkhedrioni, who had a past as bank robber and long-term prisoner.[21] The "soixante-huitard" Musa Shanib, surrounded by a network of former philosophy, history, and philology students, led the abovementioned Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus movement, which fell short of creating its own state but formed a voluntary army that supported the Abkhaz and later Chechen wars of independence. After the Abkhaz war, Musa Shanib returned to his professorship at Nalchik University.[22] Historians and other academics also played a leading role in the conflict over the Prigorodnyi Raion, primarily on the Ingush side.[23] In Crimea too, the pro-Russian and autonomist movement was dominated not only by a Union of veterans of the Afghan wars and petty entrepreneurs but also by academics who had founded political informal groupings in the perestroika years. The cores of these groupings, after Ukraine's declaration of independence in August 1991, were merged in the Republican Movement of Crimea, which became the dominant pro-Russian organization at the time.[24]

The picture for a third important group is ambivalent: officials of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and other Soviet mass organizations. Former party secretaries who became local strongmen more often than not took a non-secessionist

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18 Jan Zofka, *Postsowjetischer Separatismus: Die pro-russländischen Bewegungen im moldauischen Dnjestr-Tal und auf der Krim 1989–1995* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2015), 386–90; Zürcher, *Post-Soviet Wars*, 84–85.

19 Zürcher, *Post-Soviet Wars*, 134.

20 Jirouš, *Erinnerung als Mobilisierungsressource*, 116; Georgi Derlugian, *Bourdieu's Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A World System Biography* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005).

21 Klaus Schlichte, *In the Shadow of Violence: The Politics of Armed Groups* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus-Verlag, 2009), 47–48.

22 Derlugian, *Bourdieu's Secret Admirer*, 2–4; Zürcher, *Post-Soviet Wars*, 62.

23 Jirouš, *Erinnerung als Mobilisierungsressource*, 142–43.

24 Gwendolyn Sasse, *The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition and Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 140; Zofka, *Postsowjetischer Separatismus*, 295–96.

stance, but in some cases became leaders of conflict factions. An example of the latter was the North Ossetian Soviet chairman and later president Akhsarbek Galazov, who had been a member of the CPSU's Central Committee.[25] Robert Kocharian had been first secretary of the Komsomol in Nagornyi Karabakh during the 1980s before becoming leader of the informal Karabakh Committee in 1988, State Defense Committee chairman during the war, and first president of Artsakh. His peculiar career path then led him from Stepanakert (Azeri: Xankəndi) to Yerevan to become prime minister and president of Artsakh's patron state Armenia in 1997/98.[26] On the other side, in Transnistria, the local party secretaries in the separatist hotspots Tiraspol and Rîbniţa (Russian: Rybnitsa, Ukrainian: Rybnytsia) opposed the industrialists' aspirations to autonomy but remained unsuccessful in the power competition. Also, the long-year Crimean oblast party secretary Vladimir Bagrov took a moderate, non-secessionist stance, but lost the elections for the Crimean presidency to the Russian nationalist Iurii Meshkov in 1994. Nationalism was a ticket that could help beat incumbents in power competitions.[27]

A fourth group that joined secessionist or autonomist regional leaderships were representatives from the Soviet repressive state apparatuses: the military, police, and secret services. These could be representatives of regional offices of KGB or the Ministry of the Interior as well as all-Union officials who came to the respective region when the Soviet Union fell apart in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The first Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudaev had gathered his political capital as the highest-ranked Chechen Soviet Army officer.[28] The Transnistrian state security minister Antiufeev had been an officer of the special police unit OMON in Riga and came to Tiraspol under a false name through his relations with nationalist Duma deputies in Moscow. Although his true identity was revealed by Russian officers in public disputes between the 14th Army Command and the Transnistrian security forces in the early 1990s, he remained in office for twenty years before having to leave his post together with president Smirnov after the latter lost the presidential election in 2011. Together with a few other Transnistrian statesmen from the Smirnov generation he reappeared for a short moment when becoming an official of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) in 2014.[29]

Beyond the leadership, collective violence was perpetrated by violence experts. Former criminal gangs, football hooligans, and trained nationalist far-right groups were among these experts, but most important were current and former members

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25 Jirouš, *Erinnerung als Mobilisierungsressource*, 145–47.

26 Zürcher, *Post-Soviet Wars*, 172–73.

27 Sasse, *Crimea Question*, 156–60; Zofka, *Postsowjetischer Separatismus*, 219–29.

28 Zürcher, *Post-Soviet Wars*, 76–81.

29 Malyarenko and Wolff interpret the appearance of former Transnistrian state officials in the Donbas as steered by Moscow. Malyarenko and Wolff, *Dynamics*, 48. For Antiufeev's career: Gennadii Kodrianu, *Dnestrovskii razlom: Pridnestrovskii krizis i rozhdenie PMR. Rol i mesto spetssluzhb* (Tiraspol: GIPP Tipar, 2002), 202; Natalya Prikhodko, "Rossiiskie ofitsery razoblachayut rukovoditelei Pridnestrovia," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, December 9, 1992, 1, 3; Zofka, *Postsowjetischer Separatismus*, 252–54.

of armed state apparatuses: policemen, veterans of the Afghan war, and secret service members.[30] Of course, many actors belonged to more than one of these spheres at the same time. None of this is specific to the Black Sea region or the Caucasus. The legacy of war, and the heavy weight of armed state apparatuses that belong to it, is now becoming obvious in Western democracies too with the German "Nordkreuz/Uniter" complex or the US "Oath Keepers."[31]

3 Black Sea Entanglements in Post-Soviet Territorial Conflict

While the fundaments of conflict were nothing specific for the Black Sea region, layers of conflict that are directly connected to the sea, its shores, and Sea-related infrastructures can be found nonetheless. At first sight, many of the secessionist projects in the Black Sea region do not refer to the Black Sea but are oriented away from it, for example towards Moscow and Russia. A second glance often shows that the mobilization did have regional anchors and characteristics. Important sites of conflict were directly located at the sea shore, institutions whose existence was directly connected to the sea (as navies, ports, or trade routes) played a crucial role in some of the conflicts, and many war protagonists referred to the Black Sea in their spatial imaginaries. This section provides four examples illustrating these direct entanglements and connections to the Black Sea.

3.1 Sevastopol and Crimea

One of the most obvious direct connections between post-Soviet conflict and the Black Sea is the Black Sea Fleet and the port city of Sevastopol in Crimea. In 2014, the Black Sea Fleet played a crucial role in the takeover of Crimea by the Russian Federation, as it was Moscow's military foothold in the peninsula. Back in the 1990s, the control over the former Soviet fleet had been a bone of contention between Russia and Ukraine. Until the agreement in 1997, the fleet had a dual command and was officially neutral, but on the ground political mobilizations did take place. Its chief commander at the time, Igor Kasatonov, openly advocated for a Russian and undivided Black Sea Fleet. The local pro-Russian forces supported him with demonstrations and campaigned to make him the political leader of Crimea. The ships themselves became sites of conflicts when pro-Russian soldiers raised the old Tsarist, and new Russian, marine flag with

30 Zofka, *Postsowjetischer Separatismus*, 14.
31 Hubert Wetzel, "Kapitolverbrechen," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, January 8, 2021, 3.

the blue Saint Andrew's cross on many ships and swore oaths to the Russian command.[32]

The conflict over the fleet was entangled with the local political structures and developments in the city of Sevastopol. The port city had a specific political landscape due to its history: It was a marine base and the site of defense industries connected to the fleet, and had been one of the closed cities in the Soviet Union. On the Russian mental map, the "Hero City" of two defenses in the Crimean War and in World War II, was an outpost for the entire Black Sea region. These preconditions left an imprint on the local socio-political mentalities with many soldiers, veterans, and officials living in the city and many enterprises and organizations having been directly subordinated to Soviet central organs. The resulting political Soviet-conservative element largely translated into a pro-Russian stance during the 1990s.[33]

Furthermore, by law, the city did not (and still does not) belong to Crimea. In 1948 it had achieved special status as a city of direct republican subordination. The local pro-Russian nationalists claimed that this meant that Sevastopol had not been transferred to Ukraine in 1954. Based on this argumentation, the activists managed to convince their like-minded partners among the deputies to put this question on the agenda of the Russian Duma. In the summer of 1993, the Russian parliament, then dominated by a coalition of Soviet-conservative and nationalist forces, voted for a resolution claiming Sevastopol for Russia.[34]

The Ukrainian government, for its part, used the republican status of Sevastopol to implement direct control. From 1992 on, Sevastopol was ruled by a governor directly appointed by the president in Kyiv. The first Ukrainian president Kravchuk did not send newcomers from other regions of Ukraine but chose his governor from the local political elites. For example, the first governor, the Black Sea Fleet official and enterprise director Ivan Ermakov, combined his Soviet conservative and even implicitly Greater Russian ideas with a pragmatic view on current political adherences. It was precisely these Russian-Vector-leaning, Soviet conservative elites who were able to moderate the first steps of Sevastopol's transition from a closed Soviet "Hero City" to a normal city in Ukraine.[35] This transition has not been completed. In 2014, direct rule was overturned in favor of pro-Russian rule. The governor of Sevastopol, a Soviet-conservative Party of Regions official, promptly resigned when his direct superior, President Ianukovych, was overthrown in Kyiv. A demonstration against the regime change proclaimed Aleksei Chalyi as "People's governor" of Sevastopol. He became visible to the international public when he signed, as representative of the city, the treaty

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32 Zofka, *Postsowjetischer Separatismus*, 127–32.

33 Andrei Malgin, *Krymskii uzel: Ocherki politicheskoi istorii Krymskogo poluostrova* (Simferopol: Novyi Krym, 2000), 34–37.

34 The vote did not have juridical consequences, RF President Yeltsin qualified it as "embarrassing" (Malgin, *Krymskii uzel*, 36), but it was a great success for the pro-Russian movement in Sevastopol.

35 Jan Zofka, *Postsowjetischer Separatismus*, 346–52.

on the accession of Crimea and Sevastopol in the Kremlin on March 18, 2014, posing for press photographs next to Putin and the Crimean representatives in a sweater.[36]

3.2 Transnistria and Odesa

Separatism in Eastern Moldova is often reduced to a (pro-)Russian project supported by Moscow and executed by an army under Russian command. Indeed, Transnistrian secessionism was oriented towards Russia, but it did have a strong regional element. While research correctly emphasizes that the leading protagonists had "all-Union biographies"[37] and came from factories that were directly subordinated to Soviet industrial ministries located in Moscow, the biographies of second-range protagonists were regional. They had spent their working lives and education in the southwest of the Soviet Union, and had studied at universities or technical schools in Chişinău or Odesa before becoming engineers or specialists in one of the industrial enterprises whose employees were mobilized for Transnistrian autonomy in the years between 1989 and 1992.[38]

In the first phase of the mobilizations, 1989/90, the movement also collaborated closely on a regional level with the Gagauz movement in southern Moldova, culminating in the "Gagauzian march" (Russian: *Gagauzskii pokhod*) in the autumn of 1990, when thousands of Transnistrian activists went to Comrat, assisting the Gagauz in resisting an attack by various branches of the Chişinău police and by nationalist paramilitaries. Even the 14th Soviet Army, which many observers mainly perceived through the generals sent from Moscow, most famously Aleksandr Lebed, was strongly anchored in the region, with a deployment stretching from Moldova to Ukraine, regional recruitment patterns, and veterans remaining in the region after their service. A regional aspect was also the fact that Ukrainian nationalists joined the Transnistrian forces in what they seem to have perceived as a fight of Eastern Slavs against Romanian aggression.[39]

Due to the movement's regional basis, the idea that the entire region consisted of historically Russian lands that belonged together as a "Novorossiia" played an impor-

36 "Mer Sevastopolia poddal v otstavku," *Kommersant Online-News*, February 24, 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2415533?isSearch=Truev; "Aleksei Chalyi vozglavil upravlenie po obespecheniiu zhiznedeiatelnostiu Sevastopolia," *Kommersant Online-News*, February 24, 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2415882?isSearch=True.

37 Troebst, "Separatistischer Regionalismus," 185.

38 Zofka, *Postsowjetischer Separatismus*, 233–35.

39 Kimitaka Matsuzato, "Mezhpravoslavnye otnosheniia i transgranichnye narodnosti vokrug nepriznannykh gosudarstv: Sravnenie Pridnestrovia i Abkhazii," in *Pridnestrove: V makroregionalnom kontekste chernomorskogo poberezhia*, ed. Kimitaka Matsuzato (Sapporo: Slavic Eurasian Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2008), 209; Sergei Lipinskii, "Bratia-Gagauzy poprosili nas o pomoshchi," in *Slavy ne iskali: Sbornik vospominanii uchastnikov sozdaniia i stanovleniia PMR*, ed. L. Alfereva (Bendery: Poligrafist, 2000), 79–80; Anatolii Kholodiuk, *O generale Aleksandre Lebede i o zabytoi voine: Zapiski politemigranta* (Munich: Self-Edition, 2005), 56.

tant role as a background ideology. On the grounds of this spatial concept for the territories occupied by Tsarist Russia from the Ottoman Empire in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, supporters of Transnistrian independence formed a paramilitary Black Sea Cossack Army. This group participated in the fighting of 1992 as one of the most significant special units.[40]

A crucial role in the geography of Transnistrian separatism was played by the Black Sea port city of Odesa. In the summer of 1990, the local soviet in Tiraspol, then the Transnistrian separatists' highest political organ, approved a proposition to accede to a supposed future free economic zone of Odesa.[41] The proposition may not have been taken seriously by the authorities of Odesa, but it shows that the separatists envisioned the Ukrainian port city as part of the Russian(-speaking) world. That more than three decades later, a pro-American former president of Georgia—one Mikheil Saakashvili—would become its mayor certainly would have seemed unlikely to these actors. Located sixty kilometers (32 miles) from Tiraspol, Odesa was the port goods from Transnistrian industries had to go through for export and via which raw materials came in. Hence the Moldovan Dniester Republic was hit very hard by new Ukrainian custom laws in 2006 under Iushchenko, which required export goods to bear stamps from Chişinău and led to the introduction of the EU assistance border mission EUBAM.[42]

Odesa was also important because it had hosted the headquarters of the above-mentioned Soviet 14th Army, which came to play a decisive role in the conflict over Transnistrian independence. This army had been established by the Soviet leadership in order to progress towards Southeast Europe in the event of a global war and was stationed in the Odesa military district, which comprised the southwestern Soviet Union. It did not simply become a Russian army after the break-up of the Union; on December 31, 1991, overnight it stretched over two countries and was divided into three parts: a Ukrainian one, a Moldovan one, and a third part in the disputed area in the Dniester Valley that remained a subject of contention for several months. The commander-in-chief, Gennadii Iakovlev, proposed swearing an oath to the newly founded Moldovan Dniester Republic, and some of the units declared allegiance to the secessionists. With the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) command consolidating control, Iakovlev was ousted and in April 1992 the army was officially declared under Russian jurisdiction—a process which could not have been executed in

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40 Besides these local actors identifying themselves as "Cossacks," several hundreds or even thousands of armed activists of the Cossack movement in Russia, from the Don, Kuban, Zabaikal, Orenburg, and Zaporozhe Cossack armies took part in the fighting. Zofka, *Postsowjetischer Separatismus*, 263–64.

41 Interview with Igor Smirnov, *Dnestrovskaia Pravda*, July 3, 1990, 1.

42 Jan Zofka, "Tödliche Wirtschaftsblockade oder transparente Zollregelung? Die neue Zollverordnung der Ukraine und der Transnistrienkonflikt," *Ukraine-Analysen*, no. 7 (May 2006): 2–5, https://doi.org/10.31205/UA.007.01.

the same manner without the pre-existence of the Transnistrian separatist structures.[43]

3.3 The Georgian Black Sea Coast: Abkhazia and Ajaria

The Georgian Black Sea coast is an example of diverging trajectories. In Soviet times, two autonomous republics existed there: the Abkhazian and the Ajarian ASSR. Both saw political mobilization in the early 1990s, but while the Abkhazian republic became *de facto* independent after a war, the Ajarian republic after a phase of *de facto* independence was re-integrated in 2004 in a more or less peaceful process. Both republics host Black Sea resorts and were holiday destinations. The climate also made Abkhazia an important supplier of citrus fruit and tea. Thanks to these immense income potentials, the Georgian Black Sea coast had become the "Soviet Côte d'Azur."[44] These economic branches, however, with their small-scale units, were prone to informal economy, which in times of crisis and state decay could evolve into conflicting claims to control. Violence, however, is bad for tourism. Thus, the warring parties destroyed the prize in 1992–93, although tourists were still on the beach when tanks rolled into Sukhumi. Furthermore, in Soviet times Abkhazia had already seen an ethnicized separation of labor with the Abkhaz as the titular nationality being prioritized in state and academic posts while Armenians and Greeks were more often involved in the tourism business. In the late 1970s there had already been Abkhaz mass mobilizations against Georgian pressure with an explicit pro-Soviet, pro-Moscow stance. The Russia/Moscow-orientation was long-standing, although the violence during the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in the nineteenth century is "the largest historical trauma in Abkhazian collective memory."[45] For their part, Soviet/Russian military officials who had their dachas in Abkhazia were particularly rigorous in supporting the Abkhaz resistance against Georgian attacks and the attempt to dilute autonomy.[46]

In contrast, in Ajaria no war took place in the 1990s. Ethnic discourse, culture, and religion were not comprehensively used for political mobilization. The Ajar Autonomous Soviet Republic had been special, as it had had no titular nationality. Back in 1921, the new Soviet government had promised to the revolutionary Turkish govern-

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43 Mikhail Bergman, *Na ringe epokhi: Neobychainye prikliucheniia polkovnika Rossiiskoi Armii, rasskazannye im samim* (Moscow: Self-edition, 2001); Mihai Grecu and Anatol Țăranu, *Trupele ruse în Republica Moldova: culegeri de documente și materiale* (Chișinău: Ed. Litera, 2004), 7–8; Mihai Gribnicea, "Die russische Militärpräsenz – ein historischer Abriss," in *Die Republik Moldau – Republica Moldova: Ein Handbuch*, ed. Klaus Bochmann, Vasile Dumbrava, Dietmar Müller, and Victoria Reinhardt (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2012), 422–29.
44 Derluguian, "The Tale of Two Resorts," 261–92.
45 Derluguian, 266.
46 Baev, "Civil Wars in Georgia," 137–40; Derluguian, "Tale of Two Resorts," 267–75; Zürcher, *Post-Soviet Wars*, 118–32.

ment in the Treaty of Kars that it would grant its new Muslim citizens autonomy. An Ajarian nationality, however, was officially counted only in the 1925 census, but has never been since. Azeris, Meskhetian Turks, Georgian Muslims, and, by language, Gurian were different concepts for giving Muslims living in Ajaria a collective identity, but none of these were established as the autonomy's titular name, nor were they politicized in the autonomy movement after 1989/91. When Tbilisi threatened to curtail its autonomy, Ajaria fought back with demonstrations with red banners and a communist election victory in 1990, instead of recurring to ethnonationalist mobilization discourse. The local strongman Aslan Abashidze led the republic from 1991 to 2004 as a long-standing member of the regional nomenklatura. Ajaria's economic and political centre Batumi is not only a seaside resort but also has an important port, which in the early twentieth century had been of global importance as the endpoint of what was then the world's longest pipeline, bringing oil from Baku. For the economy of the "militarized autonomy" of the 1990s, the trade route to Turkey was more important, as Abashidze's militias controlled borders with Turkey and Georgia proper.[47]

3.4 Mariupol

The hybrid war in the Donbas between 2014 and 2022 directly reached the shores of the Black Sea too. In 2018, Russian navy ships blocked Ukrainian vessels in the Sea of Azov, after the bridge from Southern Russia to Crimea crossing the Kerch straits was inaugurated. To whom the sea belonged was clearly part of the conflict over eastern Ukraine. This is also reflected in the imaginaries of the protagonists fighting on land, as the name of the far-right ultra-nationalist Azov Battalion, later Regiment,[48] the most important officialized Ukrainian paramilitary unit, suggests. The struggle for the Black Sea port Mariupol in 2014 was emblematic. Controlled by militias belonging to the local oligarch, Rinat Akhmetov, the town remained neutral for several weeks, facing the bid of the DPR's leader at the time, Aleksandr Borodai, to incorporate it into the separatists' territory and the Ukrainian army's efforts to regain control. Eventually, the Ukrainian army took the city in the summer of 2014. Mariupol, known in Soviet times as Zhdanov, after the temporary second man in the CPSU under Stalin, was characterized not only by its multicultural sea port history and the strong Greek identification of many of its inhabitants but also by several immense steel and machine-building works. It is located at the peak of a triangle of almost direct vectors from the iron ore deposits of Kryvyi Rih and the coal deposits of the Donbas to the sea. These steelworks had been bought by the lord of many Donbas mines and factories, the richest Ukrainian oligarch, Rinat Akhmetov. Socialized in the Donbas and having been closely associ-

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47 Derluguian, "Tale of Two Resorts," 275 – 84; Zürcher, *Post-Soviet Wars*, 200 – 6.
48 Report Center for International Security and Cooperation: Mapping Militant Organizations, "Azov Movement," Stanford University, last modified August 2022, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/azov-battalion.

ated with the "Party of Regions" government, Akhmetov was certainly skeptical of the Maidan-driven overthrow of Ianukovych. At the same time, a takeover by separatists or even direct control by Moscow would have endangered Akhmetov's interests as well. For example, the separatists declared, in a cynical propaganda statement disguising their highly likely involvement in the re-allocation of the region's wealth, that the "ex-Donetsk oligarchs [were] clinging to their property. But they will not succeed. We are building a People's Republic. We will return everything that was stolen to the people."[49] In Donetsk, for instance, the insurgents burnt down Akhmetov's ice hockey stadium. In Mariupol, Akhmetov was able to mobilize his workers to patrol the streets and keep the separatists out, before coming to terms with the government in Kyiv.[50]

4 Conclusion

So how much Black Sea was there in post-Soviet secessionism and territorial conflict in the region? By no means can post-Soviet territorial conflict be ascribed to a meta-historical regional cultural proneness to violence. The regional developments during the break-up of the Soviet Union were in fact rather ambiguous and ranged from brutal war to non-violent conflict resolution. Regional connections become visible, however, when the focus is shifted away from the protagonists' own nationalist ethno-cultural reasoning and from a reduction to Russian interference. On a concrete level, the infrastructures and landscapes connected to the sea were significant for the formation of the collective actors. The protagonists did make allusions to the Black Sea. Even the pro-Russian movements were not only oriented towards Moscow but also devised a vision of the Black Sea region in which they acted. The sea, its shores and landscapes, and the infrastructures built around it became the site of conflict and could occasionally influence its course and its protagonists' imaginaries.

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49 Malyarenko and Wolff, *Dynamics*, 26.
50 Malyarenko and Wolff, 45–46; Zofka, "Politische Unternehmer," 331.

Alexandr Osipian

Straits, Bridges, and Canals: The Black Sea Region and Russo-Ukrainian Conflict 2014–22

Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 has stimulated new wave of interest in the peninsula. However, most of the publications on the annexation are focused on the military issues, identity, and domestic politics.[1] At the same time, the broader context of the annexation and its aftermath for the whole Black Sea region, including the issues of logistics, infrastructure, and global food security have been left unexplored. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 revealed how important these issues are not only for the Black Sea littoral states but for many faraway countries too.

After the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 Russia faced three main problems in sustaining the peninsula: transport connections, electricity, and water supply. Crimea was heavily dependent on mainland Ukraine for food, and totally dependent on gas, electricity, and water supplies.

In order to supply Crimea by land, Russia needed to establish its control over a large portion of eastern Ukraine with the Kharkiv–Lozova–Dzhankoi–Simferopol railway line and the M-18 Kharkiv–Zaporizhzhia–Melitopol–Simferopol highway. In early April 2014, Russia attempted to trigger the series of secessionist insurgencies in southeastern Ukraine. In this part of Ukraine, the Party of Regions—the party of the ousted

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1 Tor Bukkvoll, "Russian Special Operations Forces in the War in Ukraine – Crimea and Donbas," *Russia and Hybrid Warfare – Going Beyond the Label, Aleksanteri Papers* 1 (2016): 25–32; Tor Bukkvoll, "Why Putin Went to War: Ideology, Interests and Decision-making in the Russian Use of Force in Crimea and Donbas," *Contemporary Politics* 22, no. 3 (2016): 267–82; Kent DeBenedictis, *Russian 'Hybrid Warfare' and the Annexation of Crimea: The Modern Application of Soviet Political Warfare* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2022); Kerstin S. Jobst, *Geschichte der Krim: Iphigenie und Putin auf Tauris* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 313–24; Eleanor Knott, "Generating Data: Studying Identity Politics from a Bottom-Up Approach in Crimea and Moldova," *East European Politics and Societies* 29, no. 2 (2015): 467–86; Eleanor Knott, "Identity in Crimea before Annexation: A Bottom-up Perspective," in *Russia Before and After Crimea: Nationalism and Identity, 2010–2017*, ed. Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018), 282–305; Pål Kolstø, "Crimea vs. Donbass: How Putin won Russian Nationalist Support – and Lost it Again," *Slavic Review* 75, no. 3 (2016): 702–25; Adam Charles Lenton, "Why Didn't Ukraine Fight for Crimea? Evidence from Declassified National Security and Defense Council Proceedings," *Problems of Post-Communism* 69, no. 2 (2022): 145–54; Jeffrey Mankoff, "Russia's Latest Land Grab: How Putin Won Crimea and Lost Ukraine," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2014-04-17/russias-latest-land-grab; Kimitaka Matsuzato, "Domestic Politics in Crimea, 2009–2015," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 24, no. 2 (2016): 225–56; Andrew Wilson, "The Crimean Tatar Question after Annexation: A Prism for Changing Nationalisms and Rival Versions of Eurasianism," *Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society* 3, no. 2 (2017): 1–45.

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president Viktor Ianukovych (2010–14)—dominated the regional and municipal councils. On April 17, 2014, President Putin, in a question-and-answer session with Russians in a TV broadcast, referred to southeastern Ukraine as "Novorossiia" ("New Russia")— a term that had been out of use for almost a hundred years. Putin claimed that these territories had never belonged to Ukraine and had been incorporated into it by the Soviet authorities in the 1920s.[2]

Russian leadership and mass media demanded a federalization of Ukraine with more autonomy for southeastern Ukraine—Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv, regions constituting the industrial powerhouse of Ukraine. Of particular importance for Russia are the military and aerospace industries in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv. Connecting Crimea with mainland Russia via the areas of a "Novorossiia" protectorate would make it much easier for Russia to move goods and people to and from Crimea. Furthermore, turning these areas into Russia's protectorate would allow Russia to establish control over all coastal lines with sea ports and to reduce Ukraine to a landlocked agrarian country. The main aim of this plan was to turn Ukraine into a fragile confederation of Ukraine proper and "Novorossiia" without annexed Crimea. Russia's plan was modeled on Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was reshaped in accordance with the Dayton Agreement of 1995.[3]

The pro-Russian insurgency—the so-called "Russian spring," inspired and backed by Russia in southeastern Ukraine—had mainly failed by the late spring of 2014. Local political and business elites did not support the insurgency, while local pro-Russian groups were not numerous and entirely marginal. It was only in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that the insurgents succeeded in taking some administrative buildings and police stations, thereby obtaining arms and establishing their militia and quasi-mayors, who co-existed with local authorities responsible for municipal issues. However, in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the local political and business elites did not take part in the insurgency, and instead preferred to escape to Kyiv. Local pro-Russian secessionist groups were marginal and unpopular prior to the 2014 turmoil. The main reason for the initial success of the insurgency was the mass infiltration of Russian commandos, Cossacks, nationalists, and adventurers conducting Russia's proxy war in the Donbas and pretending to speak on behalf of local residents. Nevertheless,

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2 "Transcript: Vladimir Putin's April 17 Q&A," *Washington Post*, April 19, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-vladimir-putins-april-17-qanda/2014/04/17/ff77b4a2-c635-11e3-8b9a-8e0977a24aeb_story.html.

3 Richard Caplan, "Assessing the Dayton Accord: The Structural Weaknesses of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 11, no 2 (2000): 213–32; Derek Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Matthew Parish, "The Demise of the Dayton Protectorate: Inside the Bosnian Crisis. Documents and Analysis," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 1 (2007): 11–23; Susan L. Woodward, *Implementing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Post-Dayton Primer and Memorandum of Warning* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Foreign Policy Studies Program, 1996).

due to the advance by the Ukrainian armed forces in early July, the military defeat of the insurgents was unavoidable. In order to save the remnants of the defeated insurgents, the regular detachments of the Russian Army invaded Ukraine's east in mid-July and late August 2014.

Thus, Russia established two statelets there—the "Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics"—which occupied about 30 percent of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The statelets were totally dependent on Russia's military, financial, and economic support, and their purpose was to act as a smokescreen for Russia's covert military presence in the Donbas. Furthermore, Russia's plan was to use the statelets as a "Trojan horse" for causing permanent trouble in Ukraine in order to prevent its development as a pro-Western democracy. Finally, defense of the statelets from alleged Ukrainian aggression could be used as a pretext for Russia's further political and military interference in Ukraine's foreign and domestic politics. Russia had already employed the same model in Moldova and Georgia via military and political support for the respective breakaway regions of Transnistria and Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

1 The Power Bridge: Electricity Supply to Crimea after the Annexation

After the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Ukraine continued to supply the peninsula with food and electricity. Meanwhile, Russian authorities in Crimea persecuted numerous pro-Ukrainian activists and those who were found not to be loyal to the Russian occupational administration. Many were imprisoned while others were forced to leave the peninsula for mainland Ukraine. The well-organized community of the Crimean Tatars became the main target of the Russian security service (FSB). Some Crimean Tatar activists escaped from Crimea and demanded from the Ukrainian authorities more radical measures to raise the costs of annexation to Russia. However, the Ukrainian government was reluctant to undertake a more radical blockade of Crimea because in that case Russia would definitely have escalated the military conflict in the Donbas, partly frozen in March 2015 due to the Minsk 2 agreement (February 12, 2015).

On September 20, 2015 Crimean Tatar activists began blocking the roads and suspending reciprocal cargo transport between Crimea and mainland Ukraine. On November 20 and 21, 2015, four pylons were damaged and downed, grounding a transmission cable and completely cutting off the power lines sending electricity to Crimea. The Crimean Tatar activists denied responsibility, though they did not distance themselves from the act either.[4] In the following days they prevented Ukrainian workers and policemen from accessing and repairing the pylons. The Ukrainian authorities showed lit-

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4 Anna Shamanska, "Why Ukraine Supplies Electricity to Crimea, and Why it Stopped," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)*, November 24, 2015, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-crimea-power-supply-electricity-explainer/27384812.html.

tle urgency in restoring the power supplies. In early December, Ukraine restored the electricity flow to Crimea through only one of the four power lines. Russia-backed insurgents in the Donbas area stopped coal deliveries to Ukrainian power plants in response, but Ukraine had already managed to store enough coal for the winter. Vladimir Putin instructed the Russian government not to sign a new power contract in Crimea with Ukraine, while the previous one would expire on December 31, 2015.[5]

On December 2, 2015 Putin visited Crimea and launched the "power bridge" construction. Russia hired a Chinese firm, Hengtong, to supply the power cables to be laid across the Kerch Strait.[6] The power bridge was built from the Rostov nuclear power station (built in 1979–2018) in Volgodonsk, Russia to Simferopol, Crimea. An electricity cable was laid along the bottom of the Kerch Strait to connect Crimea with Russia's southern Krasnodar region. Construction works were finished on May 11, 2016.

The German company *Siemens* sold seven gas turbines to Russia in 2015 and 2016, but four of them were installed in new gas-fired power plants in Russian-annexed Crimea, violating the EU sanctions.[7] Two new power stations were built by October 2018: Balaklavskaia (Sevastopol) and Tavricheskaia (Simferopol). Along with the modernized Sakskaia power station (Saky), they contributed to the full supply of electricity to Crimea.

2 The Crimean Bridge

After the annexation of Crimea, Russia could not use Ukrainian railways and highways (Kharkiv–Simferopol) for transit of cargoes and passengers, not to mention troops and military equipment. Ukrainian trains have not gone to Crimea since December 27, 2014. On the other hand, using the Kerch Strait ferry line had its limitations: Ferry traffic was often halted due to bad weather. Following the failure of Putin's "Novorossiia" project in the summer of 2014, the construction of a bridge across the Kerch Strait became the top priority for Russia.

The idea of an international bridge had been considered by the governments of Russia and Ukraine long before the annexation. Presidents Ianukovych and Medvedev signed a memorandum of mutual understanding on the construction of the bridge on

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5 Oleg Varfolomeyev, "Ukraine Stops Power Supply to Russian-Annexed Crimea," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 13, no. 3, January 6, 2016, https://jamestown.org/program/ukraine-stops-power-supply-to-russian-annexed-crimea/#.VqeVF_krKUk.

6 Anastasia Lyrchikova and Alexander Winning, "Russia-annexed Crimea Faces Long Road to Power Security," *Reuters*, December 13, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-crimea-power-insight-idUSKBN0TW06G20151213.

7 Alexander Hübner, Gleb Stolyarov, and Arno Schuetze, "Three Siemens Employees Investigated over Turbines in Crimea," *Reuters*, November 29, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-siemens-ukraine-sanctions-idUSKCN1NY1JB.

November 26, 2010, and an agreement on its construction was signed as part of the Ukrainian-Russian action plan of December 17, 2013. In April 2014, the Ukrainian government gave Russia six months notice of its withdrawal from the now-defunct bilateral Kerch Bridge agreement. Since then, the Ukrainian government has actively condemned the Russian construction of the bridge as illegal because Ukraine, as a coastal state with regard to the Crimean Peninsula, did not give its consent to such an undertaking.[8] In January 2015, the multibillion-dollar contract for the construction of the bridge was awarded to the Russian company Stroigazmontazh, owned by Putin's close confidant Arkadii Rotenberg. The initial cost of construction was estimated at 228.3 billion Russian rubles.[9] However, the costs ultimately ran higher than anticipated, coming in at more than 4 billion US dollars.[10]

The construction of the bridge commenced in February 2016. The road bridge was inaugurated by Russian President Vladimir Putin on May 15, 2018 and opened for cars on May 16 and for trucks on October 1. The rail bridge was inaugurated on December 23, 2019 and the first scheduled passenger train crossed on December 25, 2019. The bridge was opened for freight trains on June 30, 2020.

The Crimean Bridge, also called the Kerch Bridge, is a pair of parallel bridges, one road, one rail, spanning the Kerch Strait between the Taman Peninsula of Krasnodar Krai in mainland Russia and the Kerch Peninsula of Crimea.

Just as the bridge connects the Russian mainland and Crimea, it also divides the Sea of Azov from the Black Sea, arching over the very narrow Strait of Kerch. The construction of the Crimean Bridge led to the partial blockade of the Sea of Azov and has given Russia means for a further strangulation of the Ukrainian economy.

Ukraine has two major ports on the Sea of Azov through which it exports steel and agricultural products—wheat and sunflower seeds. The Mariupol Sea Port is the main export hub for the industrial region of the Donbas. The sea port is also used for export from Mariupol's two huge iron and steel works—Azovstal and Illicha. The Mariupol Sea Port had a capacity of 18.8 million metric tons (20.7 million short tons) per year, and its cargo turnover in 2016 amounted to 7.6 million metric tons (8.4 million short tons). Berdiansk Sea Port is a hub for agriculture export from southern Ukraine.

The technical parameters of the Crimean Bridge prohibits Panamax class vessels from entering the Kerch Strait and shipping cargoes to and from Mariupol and Berdiansk—Ukraine's main ports on the Sea of Azov. The main span of the bridge is 33 to 35 meters (108 to 115 feet) above sea level, while an average Panamax class vessel has an overall height of up to 45.87 meters (150.5 feet). Panamax is the term for the size limit for ships travelling through the Panama Canal. These vessels have an average

8 "Kiev schitaet protivopravnym vvedenie RF zapreta na sudokhodstvo cherez Kerchenskii proliv," *Interfax-Ukraina*, August 11, 2017, https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/441850.html.

9 "Doroga k Krymu: Kak izmenilos transportnoe soobshchenie s poluostrovom," *Kommersant*, March 18, 2015, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2688702.

10 Richard Lourie, "Putin's Bridge over Troubled Waters," *The Globe and Mail*, October 26, 2018, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-putins-bridge-over-troubled-waters/.

capacity of 65,000 deadweight tonnage (DWT), and are primarily used in transporting coal, crude oil, and petroleum products. Subsequently, Ukrainian Azov ports have lost 30 percent of their maritime cargo due to lower bridge clearances.[11]

Control of the Kerch Strait has enabled Russia to slow maritime trade and impede international shipping. Since the end of May 2018, Russian naval patrols have been halting and harassing Ukrainian (as well as third-party) state cargo vessels. Shippers, delayed by inspection, are losing between 5,000–15,000 US dollars per hour as a result of the Russian checks. The Russian strategy is to make imports and exports from both ports economically unprofitable.[12] By October 2018, the bridge had reduced Ukrainian shipping from its Sea of Azov ports by about 25 percent.[13]

3 Incident in the Strait of Kerch

According to a 2003 agreement between Ukraine and Russia, Ukrainian- and Russian-flagged ships, both merchant ships and state non-commercial vessels, have a right to free navigation in the Strait of Kerch and Sea of Azov, which both sides consider their own internal waters. However, after the construction of the Crimean Bridge, Russia tried to establish unilateral control over passage through the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov.

On November 25, 2018, in the Kerch Strait the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) coast guard fired upon and captured three Ukrainian navy vessels—a tug and two small gunboats—after they attempted to transit from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov through the strait on their way to the port of Mariupol. The attack took place in the Black Sea more than 12 nautical miles off the coast of Russian-occupied Crimea—that is, in international waters. The Russian action was indefensible, particularly as the Ukrainian ships clearly were heading away from the Kerch Strait when attacked.[14]

Russia's November 25 attack on the Ukrainian ships was a test of how the West would respond. Foreign ministers of many NATO members had expressed their deep concern. According to Steven Pifer, the former US ambassador to Ukraine (1998–2000), "Washington had nothing to say on the 25th. The next day, Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made strong statements, but Pres-

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11 Roger Hilton, "Russia's Strategic Miscalculation in Blockading the Sea of Azov," *European Leadership Network*, November 27, 2018, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/russias-strategic-miscalculation-in-blockading-the-sea-of-azov/.

12 Yuri Zoria, "Is Russia Preparing to Attack Mariupol by Blockading Ukrainian Azov Sea Ports?," *Euromaidanpress*, July 18, 2018, https://euromaidanpress.com/2018/07/18/is-russian-blockade-of-ukrainian-azov-ports-preparation-for-attack-on-mariupol/.

13 Lourie, "Putin's Bridge over Troubled Waters."

14 Michael Cruickshank, "Investigating the Kerch Strait Incident," *Bellingcat*, November 30, 2018, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2018/11/30/investigating-the-kerch-strait-incident/.

ident Donald Trump almost immediately undercut them when he seemed to take a neutral position."[15]

Russian President Vladimir Putin accused Ukraine's president, Petro Poroshenko, of trying to boost his ratings ahead of presidential elections in March 2019 with a naval confrontation off Crimea.[16]

Ukrainian vessels, the *Yani Kapu*, *Berdiansk*, and *Nikipol*, were impounded at a Russian facility in Kerch and the ships' crews imprisoned in Lefortovo Prison in Moscow. On May 25, 2019, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea decided that Russia immediately release the three captured ships and twenty-four captured Ukrainian servicemen.[17] However, Russia defied that decision. It was not until September 7, 2019 that all twenty-four sailors were returned to Ukraine during a mutual exchange of prisoners with Russia. On November 18, 2019, the captured ships were returned to Ukraine.[18]

4 The North Crimean Canal and Water Supply

The North Crimean Canal was constructed in 1957– 71 to supply water from the Dnipro River to the Crimean Peninsula via the Kherson region in southern Ukraine. The canal provided Crimea with 85 percent of its water supply. Crimean agriculture was thus heavily dependent on irrigation. After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, a dam was built in Ukraine across the entire canal south of Kalanchak, about 16 kilometers (10 miles) north of the Crimean border. The dam caused a massive shrinkage in the area under cultivation in Crimea, from 130,000 hectares in 2013 to just 14,000 in 2017. An empty canal and an almost dry reservoir resulted in widespread water shortages, with water only being available for three to five hours a day in 2021.

Russia launched a 50-billion-ruble (680-million-dollar) program to bolster Crimea's supplies, repairing crumbling infrastructure, drilling wells, and adding storage and desalination capacity—with limited impact, however. The water shortages threaten to undermine President Vladimir Putin's promise of a better life for Crimeans under Russian rule. In the spring of 2021, Russia deployed tens of thousands of troops and advanced weapons to Crimea. It became evident to diligent observers that Russia is

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15 Steven Pifer, "The Battle for Azov: Round 1 Goes to Russia," *Brookings*, December 3, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/03/the-battle-for-azov-round-1-goes-to-russia/.

16 "Ukraine-Russia Sea Clash Staged, Says Putin," *BBC*, November 28, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46370619.

17 "Russia Ordered to Release Ukraine Sailors," *BBC*, May 29, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48409370.

18 "Russia Returns Navy Vessels Seized from Ukraine," *Deutsche Welle*, November 18, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/russia-returns-navy-vessels-seized-from-ukraine/a-51286196.

looking to seize the canal as well as adjacent territory to connect Crimea with the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.[19]

On February 24, 2022 Russian troops advancing from Crimea occupied the town of Tavriisk and established control over the North Crimean Canal.[20] Two days later, Russian forces used explosives to destroy the dam that had been blocking the flow since 2014. The flow of water to Crimea was restored by the end of March 2022.

5 Military Operations in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov in Spring–Summer 2022

In the first week of the full-scale invasion in 2022, the Russian army occupied the Ukrainian port cities of Kherson (March 2) and Skadovsk (March 9) on the Black Sea. It also occupied Berdiansk (February 27) and besieged Mariupol, both on the Sea of Azov.

The siege of Mariupol became the most devastating and fierce battle of the ongoing war. Russian forces constantly and deliberately shelled critical civilian infrastructure in the city, leaving it without water, heating, or power and preventing bringing supplies or evacuating people. This kind of warfare has its origins in the Warsaw Uprising and the Warsaw Ghetto fight, where the German army sought to literally crush the defenders under the collapsing city rather than wage a military battle.[21] On March 9, Russian planes dropped several bombs on Mariupol's maternity hospital number 3, destroying the building. On March 11, the Russian troops destroyed and captured the town of Volnovakha, cutting off Mariupol from any relief by the Ukrainian forces. On March 16, the Russian air forces bombed the Dramatic Theater in Mariupol, where a large number of civilians had taken their shelter. Estimates of civilian deaths vary. On 25 March, Mariupol City Council estimated that about three hundred people had been killed as a result of the airstrike. By March 18, Mariupol had been completely encircled and fighting reached the city center, hampering efforts to evacuate civilians. On March 20, an art school in the city, sheltering around four hundred people, was destroyed by Russian bombs. On March 24, Russian forces entered central Mariupol. On April 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin stated that the city of Mariupol was under Russian control. On May 16, 2022, the last remaining Ukrainian troops in the Azovstal steelworks

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19 Roman Olearchyk and Max Seddon, "Crimea 'Water War' Opens New Front in Russia-Ukraine Conflict," *Financial Times*, July 29, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/5eda71fc-d678-41cd-ac5a-d7f324e19441; Max Seddon, Henry Foy, and Roman Olearchyk, "Russian Brinkmanship Leaves Clear Message for Ukraine and Allies," *Financial Times*, April 23, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/65e2bdb6-6c1d-4033-b677-a07bb34716ae.
20 "Russian Forces Unblock Water Flow for Canal to Annexed Crimea, Moscow Says," *Reuters*, February 24, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-forces-unblock-water-flow-canal-annexed-crimea-moscow-says-2022-02-24/.
21 Tomasz Kamusella, "Mariupol and the Warsaw Ghetto," *New Eastern Europe*, August 9, 2022, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2022/08/09/mariupol-and-the-warsaw-ghetto/.

surrendered as Russia secured complete control over the city. Ukrainian authorities stated that about 90 percent of buildings in Mariupol had been damaged or destroyed. Azovstal, Ukraine's biggest steelworks, was totally destroyed by Russia's airstrikes. The number of civilian casualties is estimated at 22,000 residents.[22] Mariupol's population was estimated to be 431,859 in 2021. Following its capture, the population is now estimated to be less than 100,000. Malnourished and traumatized civilians keep dying due to a lack of even basic life-saving medicines.

On March 4, Russian troops entered the suburbs of Mykolaiv but were forced to withdraw shortly after. In early June, Russians established control over the Kinburn Peninsula and launched an unsuccessful offensive on a small port city of Ochakiv on the opposite shore of the Dnipro-Bug Estuary.

On February 24, 2022, the Russian navy had seized Zmiinyi (Snake) Island, defended by thirteen Ukrainian border guards. The island is situated 37 kilometers (23 miles) to the east of the Danube Delta and 120 kilometers (75 miles) to the south of Odesa. The rocky island has strategic significance for traffic in the northwestern part of the Black Sea, overlooking sea lanes to the main Ukrainian ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk (formerly Ilichevsk), and Pivdennyi (formerly Iuzhnyi) as well as the Danube Estuary.[23] Russian forces had installed multiple rocket launchers on the island. As an outcome of a series of devastating artillery and missile attacks between June 20–30, Russian troops were forced to abandon the island.[24]

On June 20 and 26, 2022, Ukraine fired on the gas drilling platforms in the Black Sea between Crimea and Snake Island.[25] Ukraine had built the platforms in 2012. However, in March 2014 Russia seized the platforms and established its soldiers and radar systems there. The strikes took out several modern air defense and radar systems, essentially ending Russia's dominance of the sea and air in the northwestern part of the Black Sea.

As of September 1, 2022 Russia controls the entire Ukrainian shore of the Sea of Azov, and most of the Ukrainian Black Sea littoral. However, Ukraine maintains its control over the main Black Sea ports in Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdennyi as well as a port in Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi in the Dniester Estuary, and the ports of Izmail and Reni

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22 "At Least 22,000 Civilians Killed in Mariupol – Mayor's Adviser," *Interfax-Ukraine*, May 25, 2022, https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/834794.html.

23 For more details on the territorial disputes over Snake Island between the USSR and Romania and between Ukraine and Romania, see Constantin Ardeleanu, "The Making of the Romanian-Ukrainian-Moldovan Border at the Maritime Danube in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," in *Making Ukraine: Negotiating, Contesting, and Drawing the Borders in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Olena Palko and Constantin Ardeleanu (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2022), 320–22.

24 Max Hunder and Tom Balmforth, "Russia Abandons Black Sea Outpost of Snake Island in Victory for Ukraine," *Reuters*, July 1, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-steps-up-attacks-ukraine-after-landmark-nato-summit-2022-06-30/.

25 David Axe, "Ukraine is Blasting Russia's Offshore Platforms on the Black Sea," *Forbes*, July 13, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/07/13/the-ukrainians-are-blasting-russias-offshore-platforms-in-the-black-sea/.

in the Danube Delta. The port of Mykolaiv is under Ukrainian control, though it can't be operated due to the Russian troops on the Kinburn Peninsula.

6 Ukrainian and Russian Navy Losses in Spring–Summer 2022

One of many reasons behind Russia's initial success in the southern theater and failure in the north of Ukraine could be considered to be the Russian Black Sea Fleet, enforced by many warships sent from the Baltic and North Fleets just before the invasion. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Crimea-based fleet was at the center of the action, launching Kalibr cruise missiles at military and civilian targets deep in the country, blocking access to the country's ports, and threatening an amphibious landing at Odesa.

In March 2014, all of the larger ships of the Ukrainian navy were captured by the Russian forces in Sevastopol harbor and Donuzlav Bay, Crimea. Thus, the Russian Black Sea Fleet has been strong enough to hold the outnumbered and outgunned Ukrainian navy at bay.

In the early weeks of the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022, the Ukrainian navy lost most of its high-profile warships. On March 7, 2022, the Ukrainian flagship the *Hetman Sahaidachny*, the only frigate possessed by the Ukraine navy, was scuttled by its crew in the port of Mykolaiv to prevent its capture by the advancing Russian troops.[26] On June 10, 2022, the Ukrainian anti-submarine corvette *Vinnytsia* was sunk in the port of Ochakiv.[27] Some cutters and patrol boats were destroyed by Russian airstrikes.[28]

However, the Russian navy has suffered much heavier losses. Despite the absence of its own navy, the Ukrainian forces were able to destroy Russian warships with missile strikes. On March 24, 2022 Russian large landing ships—the *Saratov*, the *Novocherkassk*, and the *Tsesar Kunikov*—were targeted by Ukrainian missiles in the port of Berdiansk. The ships delivered ammunition, armored vehicles, and military equipment from Crimea to the Russian forces besieging Mariupol. Due to the numerous explosions on board, the *Saratov* sunk in a few hours while two other ships suffered less severe damage.[29] Russian officials and media have hushed up these losses. Only on July 1, 2022

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26 Liam James, "Ukrainian Navy Scuttles Flagship as Russia Advances on Mykolaiv," *Independent*, March 7, 2022, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-navy-frigate-sunk-mykolaiv-b2029108.html.

27 "Ukrainian Forces Sink Their Own Anti-Submarine Corvette Vinnytsia," *World Defence News*, June 10, 2022, http://worlddefencenews.blogspot.com/2022/06/ukrainian-forces-sink-their-own-anti.html.

28 Patricia Kime, "Russia Reportedly Sinks Former US Coast Guard Patrol Boat Donated to Ukraine," *Military.com,* March 7, 2022, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/03/07/russia-reportedly-sinks-former-us-coast-guard-patrol-boat-donated-ukraine.html.

29 "Russian Warship Destroyed in Occupied Port of Berdyansk, Says Ukraine," *BBC*, March, 24, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60859337.

did Russian media report the salvage of the *Saratov* in Berdiansk.[30] Finally, on August 19, 2022 some secondary local media reported that in the sea port of Berdiansk a memorial plaque had been erected to commemorate four Russian sailors of the *Saratov* who had been killed.[31]

Russia's flagship Black Sea missile cruiser, the *Moskva*, was targeted by two Ukrainian *Neptune* anti-ship missiles on April 13, 2022. The next day the *Moskva* sank in the Black Sea. The Russian defense ministry said ammunition on board exploded in an unexplained fire. Russian officials and media suppressed the losses among the five-hundred-strong crew.[32] In the course of the war, the *Moskva* had provided anti-aircraft support to the Russian warships launching missiles to destroy numerous targets in Ukrainian cities. Thus, the sinking of the *Moskva* made the Russian navy more vulnerable and less effective. Two weeks later, on April 30, a Russian missile strike knocked out the newly-constructed runway at Odesa's airport,[33] making it impossible for Russian military aircraft to land at Odesa airport. One can therefore suppose that after the sinking of the *Moskva*, the Russian military leadership finally abandoned its initial plan to seize Odesa from the sea by naval and airborne assault.

These losses have forced the Black Sea fleet to stay well offshore, and out of the fight, for months and, in a way, helped to break the blockade of Ukrainian ports in late July and ease the global food crisis.

7 Ukrainian Missile and/or Drone Attacks on Crimea in July–August 2022

Since early July 2022, Ukrainian forces have pursued a new strategy for attacking key military targets deep inside Russian-occupied territory in southern Ukraine. This became possible due to the shipment of US drones and missiles.

On June 1, 2022 the administration of the US president declared its plans to offer to Ukraine the General Atomics MQ-1C Gray Eagle drones with Hellfire missiles.[34] The

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30 "Russia Salvages Landing Ship Hit by Ukraine Missile Fire," *BBC*, July 2, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62022476.

31 "Ekipazh BDK 'Saratov' pochtil pamiat pogibshikh," *Morpolit*, August 19, 2022, http://morpolit.mil portal.ru/ekipazh-bdk-saratov-pochtil-pamyat-pogibshix/.

32 Leo Sands, "Sunken Russian Warship Moskva: What Do We Know?," *BBC*, April 18, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61103927.

33 "Russia Knocks out Odesa Runway, Zelenskiy Says it Will be Rebuilt," *Reuters*, May 1, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-strike-odesa-airport-knocks-out-runway-ukraine-military-2022-04-30/.

34 Mike Stone, "Exclusive U.S. Plans to Sell Armed Drones to Ukraine in Coming Days – Sources," *Reuters*, June 1, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/exclusive-us-plans-sell-armed-drones-ukraine-coming-days-sources-2022-06-01/; David Axe, "Ukraine Isn't Just Getting American-Made Killer Drones. It's Getting a Whole System for Remote Warfare," *Forbes*, June 2, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/06/02/ukraine-isnt-just-getting-american-made-killer-drones-its-getting-a-whole-

drones and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS, are part of the sixteenth package of military equipment sent to Ukraine by the United States.[35]

In July and August 2022, the Ukrainian forces used US HIMARS multiple rocket launchers to hit as many as fifty arms stores in the east and south, as well as bridges across the Lower Dnipro, jeopardizing vital supply lines from Crimea to Kherson.

On July 31, the Russian Navy Day celebrations in Sevastopol were cancelled after a drone strike on the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet injured six people.

On August 9, at least six explosions hit the Saky military air base in Novofedorivka, Crimea, in nearly an hour. Satellite images revealed that from eight to ten Russian military jets were destroyed. The blasts had significantly degraded the aviation capability of the Russian navy's Black Sea Fleet.[36]

On August 16, the blasts in the Dzhankoi area, Crimea, destroyed an ammunition depot and damaged a power station and a railway.[37]

On August 18, four explosions were reported in the Belbek military airbase outside of Sevastopol. The same day, the drone attacks were prevented by Russian air defense in Kerch, Ievpatoriia, and Sevastopol harbor.[38] On August 20, a drone hit the roof of the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol.

Overall, since the start of the war the fleet's leaders have failed to adjust and have revealed its structural deficits in terms of training, professionalism, adherence to safety procedures, and adaptability.[39] On August 16, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet was replaced by a new one.

system-for-remote-warfare/; Jack Detsch, "'It's Not Afghanistan': Ukrainian Pilots Push Back on U.S.-Provided Drones," *Foreign Policy*, June 21, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/21/ukraine-us-drones-pushback/.

35 C. Todd Lopez, "More HIMARS, Phoenix Ghost Drones Bound for Ukraine," *Defence Department*, July 25, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3103655/more-himars-phoenix-ghost-drones-bound-for-ukraine/; Leo Shane, "500-plus Drones, Extra HIMARS Headed to Ukraine in Latest US Package," *Military Times*, July 22, 2022, https://www.militarytimes.com/pentagon/2022/07/22/500-plus-drones-extra-himars-headed-to-ukraine-in-latest-us-assistance-package/#:~:text=Pentagon%20%26%20Congress-,500%2Dplus%20drones%2C%20extra%20HIMARS%20headed%20to,Ukraine%20in%20latest%20US%20package&text=The%20White%20House%20will%20provide,against%20Russia%2C%20officials%20confirmed%20Friday.

36 Paul Kirby, "Ukraine War: Russia Blames Sabotage for New Crimea Blasts," *BBC News*, August 16, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62560041.

37 Liz Sly, John Hudson, David L. Stern, and Annabelle Timsit, "Explosions Rock Crimea Ammunition Depot as Ukraine Special Forces Strike Again in Crimea," *The Washington Post*, August 16, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/16/crimea-depot-explosion-ukraine-russia-dzhankoi/.

38 "Explosions Reported in Ukraine's Russian-Occupied Crimea Region," *RFE/RL*, August 19, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-crimea-explosions-russia-invasion-belbek/31995369.html.

39 Christopher Miller and Paul Mcleary, "Ukraine Has Hobbled Russia's Black Sea Fleet: Could it Turn the Tide of the War?," *Politico*, August 29, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/08/29/russias-black-sea-fleet-stuck-struck-and-sinking-00054114.

8 Global Food Security and Grain Export from the Black Sea

For centuries, the Black Sea has been an important region for geopolitics and global food security. Grain export from the lands of present-day Ukraine (ancient "Greater Scythia") was extremely important for ancient Athens,[40] late medieval Genoa and Venice,[41] and the modern Mediterranean.[42] In the last two decades, Ukraine has become one of the key exporters of grain-wheat, barley, corn, and sunflower seeds—to the Middle East (mainly Lebanon and Syria) and some parts of Africa (mainly Egypt and Ethiopia).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 stuck sixty-nine foreign vessels in Ukrainian ports.[43] Russia's blockade of Odesa and other ports has produced some of the gravest global consequences, undermining a global food distribution network. Prices for food staples on world markets have soared—wheat cost about 50 percent more in May than it did in February. Ukraine says the Russian navy is preventing it from shipping grain and other exports and accuses Russian occupation forces of stealing grain from Ukrainian farms in the occupied east and south of the country.

Then, in May–July 2022, Ukraine, Poland, and Romania cobbled together new transport networks using trains, trucks, and river barges on the Lower Danube, raising exports of Ukrainian food to nearly three million short tons (2.7 million metric tons) per month—still far below pre-war levels.

The blockade of Ukraine's grain has caused a global food crisis with wheat-based products like bread and pasta becoming more expensive, and cooking oils and fertilizer also increasing in price. It could lead to famine, political unrest, and a new wave of migration from the global south to Europe. Western officials have accused Putin of using hunger as leverage for sanctions relief.[44]

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40 Thomas S. Noonan, "The Grain Trade of the Northern Black Sea," *Antiquity: American Journal of Philology* 94, no. 3 (1973): 231–42; Peter Garnsey, "Grain for Athens," *History of Political Thought* 6, no. 1/2 (1985): 62–75.

41 Michel Balard, "The Black Sea: Trade and Navigation (13th–15th Centuries)," in *Maritimes Mittelalter: Meere als Kommunikationsräume*, ed. Michael Borgolte and Nikolas Jaspert (Ostfildern: Jan Thorbecke, 2016), 181–93; Hannah Barker, "Laying the Corpses to Rest: Grain, Embargoes, and *Yersinia pestis* in the Black Sea, 1346–48," *Speculum* 96, no. 1 (2021): 97–126.

42 John P. LeDonne, "Geopolitics, Logistics, and Grain: Russia's Ambitions in the Black Sea Basin, 1737–1834," *International History Review* 28, no. 1 (2006): 1–41.

43 Bahtiyar Abdulkerimov, "Almost 70 Vessels Stuck at Ukrainian Ports, Say Officials," *Anadolu Agency*, May 6, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/almost-70-vessels-stuck-at-ukrainian-ports-say-officials/2581286.

44 Matina Stevis-Gridneff, "Russia Agrees to Let Ukraine Ship Grain, Easing World Food Shortage," *The New York Times*, July 22, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/22/world/europe/ukraine-russia-grain-deal.html.

On July 22, 2022, in Istanbul, Ukraine and Russia signed "mirror" deals that will allow Ukraine to resume exports of grain through the Black Sea. The deal—which took two months to reach—is set to last for 120 days, with a co-ordination and monitoring center to be established in Istanbul, staffed by UN, Turkish, Russian, and Ukrainian officials. It can be renewed if both parties agree.[45]

Russia has also benefited from the deals—the Western sanctions imposed on Russian cargo vessels have been lifted. The European Union published legally binding clarifications that banks, insurers, and other firms were permitted to participate in the export of Russian grain and fertilizers, and that its sanctions did not affect the key Russian port of Novorossiisk on the Black Sea.[46]

According to diplomats, the deal comprises the following:

– Russia will not target ports while shipments are in transit.
– Ukrainian vessels will guide cargo ships through waters that have been mined.
– Turkey—supported by the United Nations—will inspect ships, to allay Russian fears of weapons smuggling.
– Russian exports of grain and fertilizer via the Black Sea will be facilitated.[47]

Global grain markets reacted immediately to news of the deal. The price of wheat futures fell by more than 5 percent on July 22 to around 7.60 US dollars per bushel.

The deals could help free more than twenty million metric tons (twenty-two million short tons) of grain stuck in Ukraine's blockaded Black Sea ports. According to UN officials, the deals could quickly bring five million metric tons (5.5 million short tons) of Ukrainian food to the world market each month, freeing up storage space for Ukraine's fresh harvests.

In one month since the first vessel sailed under the deal on August 1, 2022, more than eighty ships have carried over 1.6 million metric tons (1.8 million short tons) of agricultural products from Ukraine.[48]

Turkey became the main beneficiary of the grain deal. Of the sixty-nine ships at Ukrainian ports, twenty-six were either Turkish-flagged or owned. The other ships departed from Ukrainian ports for Germany, Djibouti, China, France, South Korea, India, the Netherlands, the UK, Iran, Ireland, Spain, Israel, Italy, Libya, Lebanon, Egypt, Romania, Somalia, Sudan, and Greece.

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45 Flora Drury, "Ukraine War: Deal Signed to Allow Grain Exports to Resume by Sea," *BBC News,* July 22, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62268070.
46 Stevis-Gridneff, "Russia Agrees to Let Ukraine Ship Grain."
47 Drury, "Ukraine War."
48 Zehra Nur Duz, "12 More Grain Ships Leave Ukraine Under Istanbul Deal, Türkiye Says," *Anadolu Agency*, September 4, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/12-more-grain-ships-leave-ukraine-under-istanbul-deal-turkiye-says/2676463.

Of the eighty-six ships which will go to the ports in Ukraine for the first time after the opening of the grain corridor, thirty-five are Turkish-flagged, Turkish-owned, or operated by Turkish businesses.[49]

9 The Bosporus and the Dardanelles Straits, the Montreux Convention, and Turkey's Role in the Russo-Ukrainian War

While Turkey supports Ukraine's territorial integrity, it continues to keep the Bosporus Strait open for Russian warships. On February 8 and 9, 2022 six Russian landing warships of the Baltic Fleet and the Northern Fleet passed the Bosporus to the Black Sea to take part in pre-announced military drills with more than 140 military vessels involving more than 10,000 military personnel.[50] In fact, they were deployed in the Russian attack on Ukraine two weeks later.

On the morning of February 24, 2022, Ukraine's ambassador to Ankara asked Turkey to close the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to Russian warships in accordance with the Montreux Convention of 1936, which guarantees freedom of passage for civilian vessels but limits the passage of military vessels in times of conflict.[51] Under normal, peacetime rules, the convention regime guarantees the general right of warships of all states to transit the straits, but with a bias toward the six Black Sea riparian states (Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and Russia). To transit, warships of all other states must not have a displacement greater than 15,000 metric tons (16,535 short tons) and may not stay in the Black Sea longer than twenty-one days. Black Sea states are exempt from these restrictions.

The same day, the Turkish foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said Turkey was studying Kyiv's request but stated Russia had the right under the Convention to return ships to their home base, in this case, the Black Sea.[52] "We came to the conclusion that the situation in Ukraine has transformed into a war," said Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, speaking on CNN Turk on February 27. "We will implement all articles of Montreux transparently."[53] On February 28, 2022—five days later—Turkey finally declared

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49 Burak Dag, "Over 1.6 Million Tons of Ukrainian Agricultural Products Shipped Under Istanbul Deal, Türkiye Says," *Anadolu Agency*, September 3, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/over-16-million-tons-of-ukrainian-agricultural-products-shipped-under-istanbul-deal-turkiye-says/2675854.
50 "Six Russian Warships Sailing from Mediterranean to Black Sea for Drills," *RFE/RL*, February 8, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-warships-black-sea-ukraine/31692995.html.
51 "Ukraine Asks Turkey to Close Straits for Russian Warships," *Daily Sabah*, February 24, 2022, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/ukraine-asks-turkey-to-close-straits-for-russian-warships.
52 "Turkey Says Cannot Stop Russian Warships Accessing Black Sea," *Al Jazeera*, February 25, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/25/cannot-stop-russian-warships-returning-in-black-sea-turkey.
53 Jared Malsin, "Turkey Says War Exists in Black Sea, Allowing It to Block Russian Navy," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 27, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-02-

its decision to close the Black Sea straits for Russian warships during the Russian-Ukrainian war. Why did it take five days to make the decision? One can suppose that the Turkish leadership waited for an outcome of the invasion—if Russia's *blitzkrieg* had been successful, then there would have been no need to close the straits and destroy good relations with a victorious Russia. However, on February 28, in Russia-Ukraine first negotiations in Homel (Belarus), the Ukrainian delegation declared Ukraine's intention to fight instead of surrender as Russia expected. It was only afterwards that Turkey demonstrated its observance of the Montreux Convention, albeit in a very special way.

Nevertheless, Turkey still allows Russia to covertly deliver heavy weapons through the Bosporus strait. On August 29, 2022, Ukraine's deputy minister of foreign affairs, Mykola Tochytskyi, expressed to the Turkish ambassador the Ukrainian side's concerns in connection with the available information regarding the transportation of S-300 missile systems from Syria to Russia via the Bosporus strait by the ship *Sparta II*, chartered by the Russian ministry of defense. Tochytskyi drew the ambassador's attention to the fact that "according to the provisions of the Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits of July 20, 1936, the specified vessel falls under the definition of a warship for the purposes of this Convention."[54]

Russia is the main beneficiary of the Montreux Convention. Ever since the Crimean War of 1853–55, when Russia's ports on the Black Sea were attacked by British and French warships, Russia/the USSR has been concerned to prevent it from happening in the future. During World War II, the Convention prevented the Axis powers from sending naval forces through the straits to attack the USSR.

It is worth mentioning that in August 2008, when Georgia was invaded by Russia, and the Russian navy maneuvered in vicinity of Georgia's shore, Turkey rejected an American request to move warships to the Black Sea, citing tonnage limits on naval vessels sent from outside the region.[55]

But perhaps even more remarkably, among the NATO countries Turkey is the only one not to have imposed the sanctions on Russia, either in 2014 or in 2022. Russia was Turkey's tenth largest export market in 2021 and supplies around 40 percent of its nat-

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26/card/turkey-says-war-exists-in-black-sea-allowing-it-to-block-russian-navy-uDQCa9dMZsNGZLQsfWYg; "Turkey to Implement Pact Limiting Russian Warships to Black Sea," *Reuters*, February 28, 2022, https:// www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-implement-international-pact-access-shipping-straits-due-ukraine-war-2022-02-27/.

54 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, "Comment Regarding the Passage of the Ship 'Sparta II' through the Bosphorus Strait," August 29, 2022, https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news/komentar-mzs-ukrayini-shchodo-prohodu-sudna-sparta-ii-cherez-protoku-bosfor.

55 Thomas Seibert, "US Request Puts Turkey in a Bind," *The National News*, August 21, 2008, https:// www.thenationalnews.com/world/the-americas/us-request-puts-turkey-in-a-bind-1.588848; "Russia Warns Turkey on U.S. Ships in Black Sea," *Hürriyet*, August 28, 2008, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/russia-warns-turkey-on-u-s-ships-in-black-sea-9766567; "Pact on Passage of Warships in Black Sea Makes Turkey Key Actor," *Daily Sabah*, February 23, 2022, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/pact-on-passage-of-warships-in-black-sea-makes-turkey-key-actor.

ural gas needs. For Turkey, Russia has been an important trading partner (32.5 billion US dollars as of 2021), a key source of foreign investment (more than 10 billion US dollars), and a colossal source of tourists (Russians account for almost five million visits, or 10 percent of all foreign tourist visits).[56]

Some NATO diplomats suggest that Turkey is serving as Moscow's stalking horse within the alliance's ranks.

10 Conclusion

As a consequence of the successful annexation of Crimea in 2014, Putin's ratings skyrocketed in Russia. However, it was not easy to incorporate the peninsula into Russia because Crimean critical infrastructure was well integrated into Ukraine's.

By the end of 2019, Russia had managed to integrate Crimea's power and transport infrastructure into its own. However, the issue of water supply has no other solution than getting water from the Dnipro River through the North Crimean Canal, blocked by Ukraine in 2014.

Every summer Crimea is visited by a huge number of Russian tourists exceeding the number of local residents. Following the annexation, many wealthy Russians bought real estate in the Crimean riviera and settled there. A huge number of Russian officials and military personnel have settled in Crimea along with their families since 2014. The growing population, the seasonal inflow of tourists, and mushrooming military bases have demanded more electricity, food, and water supply. As a strongman and authoritarian leader of a superpower, Putin refused to negotiate publicly the supply issues with Ukraine. The efforts to force Ukraine's concessions through a military escalation in the Donbas failed too. This made inevitable the Russian military invasion of southern Ukraine. By 2022, the peninsula had been turned into a base for the assault on southern Ukraine. On February 24, Russian troops moved into Ukraine from Crimea, spreading east towards Mariupol and west towards Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa, threatening to cut off Ukraine's maritime access, which would inflict huge economic damage on the country.

In the north of Ukraine, Russian troops failed to seize Kyiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv. It was a huge strategic blunder and in early April 2022 Russian forces were withdrawn back to Russia.

In contrast, the Russian invasion of southern Ukraine was rather successful. Here Russian armed forces pursued realistic objectives: 1) the Nova Kakhovka dam on the Dnipro River as starting point of the North Crimean Canal; 2) the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station in Enerhodar; 3) Melitopol as a main logistics hub connecting the south and east of Ukraine with Crimea. All these towns as well as the sea ports of Berdiansk

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56 Iliya Kusa, "Turkey's Goals in the Russia-Ukraine War," Wilson Center. Blog Focus Ukraine, June 13, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/turkeys-goals-russia-ukraine-war.

and Skadovsk were seized within a few days without resistance. Russian forces were well supplied from Crimea, the Russian navy supported the land forces from the Black Sea, and in southern Ukraine the Russian air force dominated in the sky while in the north the Ukrainian anti-aircraft defense was quite effective.

On the other hand, Russians lost almost three months for the siege of Mariupol instead of using these troops in more important directions. Russian forces suffered heavy losses in Mariupol in order to seize only the ruins of the city. As a consequence, following the quick seizure of Kherson in Dnipro Estuary, Russian forces failed to develop their assault on Mykolaiv and Kryvyi Rih.

Furthermore, Ukrainian forces were able to retake the initiative in the summer of 2022. With minimal resources, using their own military drones and missiles as well as the HIMARS multiple rocket launch systems supplied by the US, Ukrainians were able to attack Russian military ships, munitions stores, critical infrastructure, and military air bases in the southern region and Crimea. As a consequence, the activities of Russian fleet were mainly reduced to the harbor of Sevastopol.

The Russia-Ukraine war has reminded the world once again how important the Black Sea region is for global food security.

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